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NEW STAGE IN THE CRISIS OF STALINISM





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SCHEDULE

This will be the last issue of INPRECOR before our summer break. No issues will be published in August. We will resume our regular fortnightly publication schedule with the issue of September 9 (No. 57.)

COLOMBIAN EDITION OF INPRECOR

Three Colombian organizations — Liga Obrera Comunista (Communist Workers League), Comandos Camilistas (Camilista Commandos), and Espartaco (Spartacus) — have begun reproducing the Spanish edition of INPRECOR in that Latin American country. We hail this initiative of these three revolutionary Marxist organizations, which, as they explain in the editorial note published in the first Colombian edition (number 53), is aimed at expanding the circulation of INPRECOR and at taking an important step forward toward the fusion of the Colombian revolutionary Marxist groups. This fusion process in Colombia is part of a much more extensive one now under way on an international scale on the road to the construction of the world party of socialist revolution, the Fourth International, to which revolutionary Marxists throughout the world are committed.

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the otelo campaign, reformist workers parties & prospects for portugal

by A.UDRY & C. MICHALOUX

On the night of June 27 a journalist from the Lisbon daily *A Capital* asked president-elect Ramalho Eanes, "Are you happy with the result?" "No," Eanes replied, "frankly I am not satisfied." "Why?" the journalist asked. "You hoped for a higher percentage of the vote?" "No, it's not that," Eanes answered, "but I am not satisfied because of the vote that went to Major Otelo de Carvalho. He represents a factor of instability and agitation that could endanger the pressing work of national reconstruction and the establishment of a real democracy in Portugal."

Francisco Sá Carneiro, leader of the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD — Popular Democratic party, the largest bourgeois party), echoed Eanes and rounded the picture out: "I think that the situation, which is already quite complicated, has been aggravated recently with the economic and financial difficulties and also with the result of the presidential elections, given the progress of the left (Otelo) and the CP taken together and

given the division of the SP votes. An exclusively SP government will never be able to engage the Portuguese in a project of national reconstruction." (*Diário*, July 5, 1976.)

These two statements sum up a decisive aspect of social and political reality in Portugal after the presidential elections, even though their alarmist tone is itself part of the offensive of the employers and their state against the working class.

Granted, the election of Eanes(1) establishes a "presidential majority" that contradicts the "legislative majority" won by the SP, CP, UDP (União Democrática Popular — Popular Democratic Union) and far left in the April 25 elections this year. In this sense, the bourgeoisie has carried out a part of the political project it had initiated on November 25 last year (and which it had hoped to concretize in the short term after the April 1974 coup): the establishment of a semipresidential re-

gime lending full powers "in time of crisis" to a president of the republic who is himself commanding general of the army.

After November 25, 1975, the ruling class had given priority to a plan — a groping one — to restabilize the state apparatus. But President Costa Gomes, along with the sixth provisional government, ceaselessly proclaimed their "lack of authority." After June 27, 1976, the restoration of the bourgeois state apparatus will be able to attain an institutional expression in the concentrated power now commanded by the president of the republic; the state apparatus will thus recover an operational character it has lacked up to now. Eanes can centralize the political will of the bourgeoisie on a higher level. In this sense, the class confrontation acquires a new dimension: the enemy the workers have to face is more solid than it was in the past.

Nevertheless, the election campaign and its results, as well as the present mobilizations, reveal the precarious character of the social foundations of a bourgeois project that, while it surely has greater coherence, is still far from commanding adequate means for implementation.

First of all, in spite of support from Mario Soares's party, Eanes is not shaping up as a president elected by both the workers and the employers, a president standing above classes. That is a first failure, a first weakness. In addition, in the eyes of broad layers of workers influenced by the far left, the CP, and even the SP, Eanes now appears as the spokesman of "capitalist recuperation." He cannot claim to occupy a position as arbiter, a position a majority of the workers ceded to Costa Gomes. Instead, Eanes is their enemy. This provides an objective basis for politicization, which will inevitably be accentuated by Eanes's probable intervention in coming social conflicts.

Second, in organizing (with the aid of the SP) a broad front of support to the man of November 25, the bourgeoisie had counted on reducing the vote for the candidate of the CP and the far left to a total that would not exceed the CP vote in the legislative elections. Now, the sum of the vote for Otelo and Pato (24.1 percent) was considerably greater than the vote of the CP and the far left in the April legislative elections (17.75 percent). Moreover, in the district of Setúbal (where big industry predominates, with the most concentrated latifundia and proletariat in the country), as well as in the districts of Beja and Evora (non-urbanized zones, land of the old latifundia and centers of agrarian reform), Pato and Otelo got more votes than Eanes and Pinheiro combined. To this was added the shift of CP votes to Otelo(2), which expressed the combativity potential that has been maintained in these proletarian regions after November 25. This is what Eanes noted and was talking about in the interview quoted above. The shift of SP votes (toward Pinheiro and Otelo) was no less significant. The SP was unable to solidify its voters — or its members — behind the Eanes candidacy. This, in addition to the affirmation of trade-union opposition to the orientation of the Soares government, promises in-

stability for a project that aims at combining "social dialogue" and an "austerity plan." Whatever his intentions, Sá Carneiro has grasped this difficulty quite well.

Finally, both the austerity measures — energy cuts, tax increases on certain capital incomes — and the options relating to the nationalized sector and the agrarian reform are generating contradictions and tensions in the bourgeois camp. Although recognized by consensus as an arbiter during the election campaign, the new president will be hard put to maintain unity in the ranks of those who supported him on June 27.

April 25 and November 25

One of the most striking elements in the unfolding of these elections was the dynamic of the campaign of Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. The basic reason for this must be sought in the policy followed by the two big reformist workers parties. In the eyes of a broad mass of workers, the SP's alignment behind Eanes and the CP's refusal to wage a real battle against him (after having long hesitated before presenting its own candidate) appeared as an acceptance of the man of the "military November 25" and a sanctioning of the plan for a "social November 25." After the majority obtained during the elections to the Assembly of the Republic, this capitulation by the SP and CP created favorable terrain for a polarization that took the misleading form of a counterposition between "April 25" and "November 25."

This was an "April 25" whose content expressed both the development of the workers commissions, tenants commissions, and experiences in direct democracy and the ambiguous relations of a working class marked by forty-eight years of corporatist dictatorship and led astray by the reformists with an MFA (Armed Forces Movement) "protecting" the development of "popular power."

It was a "November 25" that not only dealt the final blow to the hopes of those who, after the last assembly of the MFA (in Tancos on July 5, 1975), believed that there would be a new rise of this movement within the bourgeois institution that is the army, but also and above all marked the beginning of the bourgeois counteroffensive, of the assault of which Eanes has made himself the strategist.

Hence, whatever the initial form taken by the confrontation, whatever its ambiguities, it embodied a class battle whose contours were to become clear in the course of the election campaign. If one views the election campaign through a deformed prism that reduces this objective reality to the individual trajectory of Carvalho, including his possible future twists and turns, one is unable to grasp the relations among classes, among parties, and between classes and masses that were expressed during this campaign and that will also leave their imprint on the dynamic of relations between the SP government and its austerity plan and the toiling masses. To the extent that one adopts this point of view, one is constrained



to convert a social confrontation into a struggle among "three officers (contending for the voters' allegiance in different ways) and one civilian, a member of a workers party who, claiming allegiance to the MFA even more than any of the "military candidates," similarly aimed at assembling votes around the slogan of a "left majority" protected by a "united army."

There is no question of denying the ambiguities and contradictions that the very form of the confrontation injected into this class conflict, nor of endorsing the choice of candidate made by the far-left organizations. In choosing Carvalho as a spokesman, essentially out of electoral opportunism, the MES, PRP, FSP, and UDP(3) contributed to endowing the social confrontation reflected in the elections with a form that was laden with confusion and illusions.

The workers majority manifested on April 25, 1976, made it imperative to present a united workers candidate of class independence. It was only the revolutionary Marxists of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI — Internationalist Communist League) and the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT — Revolutionary Workers party) who fought for this. The Trotskyist candidate, who was withdrawn for reasons that have been explained(4), aimed at asserting this necessity as broadly as possible and at propagating a program of class struggle and independence.(5) Once this alternative was eliminated, it remained to grasp the potentialities and contradictions of the expression of the class conflict in Portugal in the current phase. And there is no doubt that we underestimated various aspects of this complex process.

Self-organization and trade-union organization

If such opportunities were available to the Otelo campaign, it was the policy of the CP and SP that generated them. Nevertheless, the impact of this candidacy, as well as its differences from a "revolutionary candidacy" of the type presented in France during the presidential elections of 1974 or by the Democrazia Proletaria slate in Italy, are substantially accounted for by the specific process of emergence of organs of the working class itself and by the unevenness of the level of consciousness of the toiling masses.

The emergence of organs of "popular power" was the combined product of the pressure of the activity of the mass movement and the weakness of the permanent and traditional structures of the workers movement, essentially the trade-union organizations. In addition, the space available to these organs resulted from the deep crisis of the state apparatus — provoked largely by the shock of the unexpected coup of April 25—and from the intense crisis of political leadership of the bourgeoisie. The combined process of the emergence of instruments of self-organization and trade-union organizations including various sectors of workers affected a working class that was emerging from forty-eight years of a corporatist regime, with no marked experiences in independent activity and organization during the period preceding the establishment of the dictatorship, with essentially revolutionary syndicalist and anarchist traditions, without experiences similar to those undergone by the working class of the Spanish state in the workers commissions since 1962.

GENERAL EANES



Hence, self-organization developed within the limits imposed by the lack of prior existence of a permanent united framework recognized by the workers such as would have been constituted, for example, by a trade-union federation. This was reflected in the very strong heterogeneous aspect (even though a clearer dynamic emerged between August and September 1975) of the instruments of self-organization, which often substituted themselves for inadequate trade-union organizations or, on the contrary, functioned as vanguard regroupments not free of sectarianism and finding it difficult to overcome fragmentation, given the absence of a tradition of trade-union centralization and the equal absence of a tradition of united mobilizations of the working class on a national scale. Between these two poles there arose the organs of rank-and-file workers democracy, essentially in the workers commissions, closer to "classical norms."

Another product of the history and configuration of the Portuguese working class lay in its limited capacity of independent intervention on the political field. This, along with the aid of the reformists, offered the objective and subjective basis for the preponderant role played by the MFA for more than one year. The Carvalho campaign had its roots in this contradictory reality of the formation of the Portuguese workers movement and of the organizational forms with which it endowed itself after April 1974. On the one hand, the campaign attracted the votes and support of little politicized layers for whom the form taken by the social polarization — the "April 25 versus November 25" antagonism — more or less coincided with their level of consciousness. Against the Eanes austerity plan, Otelo represented an almost providential solution, falling within the compass of the paternalism of the MFA, in whose shadow "popular power" had been born. On the other hand, for significant sectors of the industrial and agricultural proletariat, support to Otelo crystallized a confused mistrust of the policy of class collaboration, especially after the experience of six provisional coalition governments. It likewise expressed a will, matured by struggle and

by reference to March 11 as well as November 25, to defend and extend workers control, the agrarian reform, and the workers commissions, village councils, and tenants commissions. For these layers, the response to the employers' attack acquires not only the dimension of rejection of the attack on their standard of living, but also the dimension of a new push toward self-organization, toward the struggle for socialism.

Thus, the limitations of the expression of the political independence of the working class, a certain disarray as well as radicalization, and the combativity and will for self-organization and independence of sectors of the workers vanguard came to the fore and combined through the Otelo campaign. The very theme of "non-partyism" — which must be uncompromisingly combatted, even if only because it represents an important obstacle to unity in the proletarian ranks — rests on the pressure toward unity within a workers movement possessing its own specific history and experiences. Nonetheless, the "non-partyism"-unity coupling that exists in Portugal today bears certain similarities to the tendency toward unity explained by Zinoviev in 1922: "It is precisely the new layers of workers whose reformist illusions have begun to be dissipated by the experiences of the past two years and the workers who are not in any party and are now participating in a serious political struggle, perhaps for the first time, who are insisting most heavily on the unity of the workers front."

"But all these workers are not clearly aware of what they are looking for. Some would like to melt down all the workers parties and even all the workers organizations into a single party, a single organization. Others, understanding the impossibility of uniting all the workers parties into one, would like to have created common action committees, etc. Finally, others are not aware of what a party is. But they sense instinctively that at all costs some way must be found to achieve the unity of all the workers parties, otherwise it will be impossible to triumph over the enemy, who is becoming ever more heinous and ever stronger." (Bulletin Communiste, No. 6, February 7, 1922.)

In the present Portuguese context, the decisive question for revolutionary Marxists consists of grasping the dialectic of these tendencies within the workers movement and taking advantage of the potential of this workers vanguard in order to strengthen the affirmation of the political independence of the working class as a whole and, at the same time, to broaden the break with reformism that has already been begun in practice by some sections of the tailing masses. Among other things, this means to point to the axes of and means for a response to the projects of Eanes-Soares (plan of struggle, workers control, trade-union congress, development and coordination of genuinely representative workers commissions) and to put forward, after the electoral victory of April 25, 1976, and against the offensive of capital, the perspective of an SP-CP government based on the workers majority in the Assembly of the Republic, as well as to uphold the necessity of the united front of the workers organizations and of workers democracy.

The political context in which the campaign of the former Capcon commander unfolded was determined by the contradiction between the workers success during the legislative elections — a success that rested in large part on the defensive capacity manifested by the workers since the end of February and the beginning of March — and the capitulation of the SP and CP to the presidentialist operation of the bourgeoisie. Hence, in the present phase of the Portuguese revolution, it is necessary to characterize the candidacy of Otelo on the basis of the class alignment and the relations between the political parties and these classes. This method of approach cannot be replaced by speculation about the future of the "movement of support" to Otelo(6), nor by a simple personal characterization of the candidate.

The social forces this candidacy represented, as well as those that supported it, were radically opposed to the classes that constitute the social base of the candidacies of Eanes and Azevedo (industrial and banking capitalists, landlords, the merchant and agrarian petty bourgeoisie). In the most politicized districts of Portugal, where the tradition of struggle is most advanced, the Otelo candidacy assembled the majority of the wage-earning toilers, as may be established by a comparison between the total population in wage-earning categories(7) (employees, industrial and agricultural workers) and the votes Otelo obtained. In Setúbal about 70 percent of the workers rallied to his campaign, in Beja

about 50 percent, in Evora nearly 65 percent. In these same districts the sum of the votes won by Otelo and Pato accounted for more than 90 percent of the votes cast by the proletariat. In its balance-sheet on the campaign the CP was unable to dodge the class significance of a candidacy that, by the end of the campaign, had become the CP's major target: "Independent of the negative significance of the candidacy of Major Otelo, it must be stressed that the electoral results, viewed as a whole and understood in the context of the clear intention of the voters, reflect a shift to the left of more than 200,000 votes, once one observes that the sum of votes for Octávio Pato and Otelo was 200,000 more than the sum of the votes received in the elections to the Assembly of the Republic by the parties and groups that support these candidates." (Statement of the Central Committee of the Portuguese CP, July 5, 1976, published in Avante, July 8, 1976.)

The "Programmatic Bases for a Candidacy" (platform of the Otelo campaign) in large part corresponded to the effective needs of the moment against the offensive of "capitalist recuperation." And that, moreover, is what made it a program totally unacceptable to the bourgeoisie as a class. During a press conference held by the CP candidate on the morning of June 28, Pato commented on Otelo's vote in these terms: "In our view it reflects, and this is true for varied reasons, the popular will against the right."

The elements of the program that were increasingly emphasized as the campaign went on were the following:

"I pledge myself to intransigently assure the defense and deepening of the fundamental gains made by the Portuguese people since April 25:

2. The agrarian reform, which must be carried through to the end, consolidated, and developed with the decisive intervention of the toilers and which must benefit the small and middle-sized peasants as well as the sharecroppers.
 - Workers control exercised by the toilers, which will have to be stimulated, developed, and broadened throughout the country.
 - Nationalizations of the basic sectors of the economy, which we cannot allow to be placed in the service of the capitalist groups again and which must be developed so as to serve the people and national independence.
 - The right to strike, a sacred right of the toilers which cannot be the object of any rules that attack or destroy it.
 - Freedom of expression, assembly, and association insofar as it does not stimulate fascist or fascistic ideas and practices.

"I pledge myself to:

3. Defend, strengthen, and develop all the forms of organization of the workers and particularly the rank-and-file popular organizations, the workers commissions, tenants commissions, and village councils. . . .



"I pledge myself to:

4. Guarantee the independent trade-union organization of the workers, independent of the state and the parties, contributing to the creation of conditions that make it possible for the unions to have a united and democratic form. . . .

"The resolution of the economic crisis will be able to occur only in the framework of a socialist society, through economic planning, based on national independence, the mobilization of the workers, and the creative dynamic of their struggles." (Programmatic Bases for a Candidacy, pages 3, 4, and 5.)

Otelo's "economic program" was published at the end of the campaign. It was entitled "Lines for a Solution to the Economic Crisis in Portugal." After insisting on the necessity of a break with capitalism, the role of the workers and tenants commissions in this process, and the principal objectives of a socialist reorganization of the economy (according to debatable options that bear some similarity to the "Cuban model"), the program affirms:

"For any of these objectives to be attained, it is necessary to invest. To invest implies a choice: What part of the wealth created is to be invested and what part is to be oriented to consumption? What projects will be able to be concretized by the invested wealth? To what sectors will the investments be applied? In all cases, the choices have immediate and long-term consequences which must be properly analyzed from the standpoint of the interests of the toiling classes, for these classes will have to participate effectively and actively.



Cunhal, Soares, Eanes, Carneiro

"One cannot opt for the alternative of accumulation without very clearly knowing the grand lines of the objectives listed in the earlier points: agriculture and basic industry as the motor force of development, acquisition of the independent means of production, and modification of the conditions of reproduction of the work force. The instrument for rendering all these objectives compatible and harmonious must necessarily reside in the plan, whose fundamental choices should be made in the final analysis by the democratic organization of the workers, after adequate technical preparation by the central planning organ. To arrive at a clear formulation of the essential choices, a broad participation of the representative organs of the working people, at the regional and sectoral level, is necessary. Although it is a decision-making body, the central planning organ will have an essential function in harmonizing and synthesizing the plans worked out by the regions and branches of activity. It will do this effectively and in the interests of the workers only if the workers, through their representative bodies, constitute the center of the decisions." (Gazeta da Semana, June 1-7, 1976.) Obviously, these programmatic elements constitute the characteristic expression neither of a program of the bourgeoisie of an imperialist country nor of an officer who desires to enlist the masses in a project of "national reconstruction" based on a nationalized sector that acts as the keystone of capitalist accumulation! It is difficult to deny this evidence, even if one tries to place Eanes and Otelo in the same class camp by means of a mythical MFA.

The confusions and errors

Nevertheless, there must be no confusion between these aspects of the content of the program — to which the toiling masses were sensitive because they responded to the pressing needs felt by the masses — and the weakness, inadequacy, and grave errors concerning the orientation suggested for attaining the proposed goals. In fact, these things eliminated the possibility of offering a real political alternative to the strategy of the reformist parties and of leading the working class to victory.

So it is with the theme of "national independence" (a leitmotiv taken up by all components of the Portuguese political spectrum except the revolutionary Marxists), the confusion on the relationship between political parties and workers democracy, the absence of a rigorous definition of the character of the SP (and, on that basis, the inability to forge a coherent united-front tactic), and the incomprehension of the exact character of the bourgeois state and its institutions, with all the implications that flow from this on the strategic level.

It is within this line that Otelo's programmatic declarations on the constitution must be situated: "I pledge myself to assure the defense of the constitution of the Portuguese republic, a conquest of the people, which must be placed in the service of the toilers . . . , not to allow the privileged classes, which continue to hold power,



to destroy what is progressive in our fundamental law." (Programmatic Bases, p.1.)

This "respect for the constitution" (for which the UDP delegate voted, incidentally), along with the theme of "national independence," constitutes a feature common to all the major organizations claiming allegiance to the working class, from the SP to the CP to the MES, UDP, and PRP! The declarations on the army fall within the same framework: "I pledge myself to place the armed forces and militarized forces (that is, the police — INPRECOR) in the service of the people and the national interest, never allowing repression against the people." (Programmatic Bases, p.8.) "We belong to the MFA, ally of the people, whom it liberated on April 25. We will fight for an armed forces governed by order and discipline placed at the service of the most humble, as in the Copcon, and not order and discipline that constitute pretexts to repress the workers." (Declaration of Candidacy, Lisbon, p.7.) These proclamations reflect more a misunderstanding of the functioning and substance of the bourgeois state than the individual destiny of a presidential candidate, an officer in the army out on bail.

These were the errors and confusions that were at the root of the Otelo campaign's missing the point on the essential elements of an overall political response centered on the axes of an alternative to the reformists in the post-electoral period: trade-union congress (right of tendency, plan of struggle), an SP-CP government reflecting the workers majority in the Assembly of the Republic and applying a plan of struggle against "capitalist recuperation," the united front of the workers organizations for the defense and extension of the gains of the revolution (workers commissions, workers control,

nationalizations, response to reactionary maneuvers, etc.).

The Otelo campaign was a sort of still shot of the weaknesses of development of the class consciousness of the Portuguese toiling masses (initial references to the MFA-people alliance, "non-partyism"). It leaned on these weaknesses, and did not permit the waging of a consistent battle to unify the proletarian ranks and qualitatively raise the consciousness of the most active sectors of the working class.

Otelo and the bourgeoisie

Nevertheless, the Portuguese bourgeoisie in its totality (and the international bourgeoisie as well), including all its parties, all its associations (from the SEDES, the association of "modernist" employers and technocrats, to the CIP, the Confederation of Portuguese Industrialists), correctly paid less attention to all the weaknesses, ambiguities, and confusions of the candidacy of Major Otelo than to the anticapitalist social content and objective function played by the emergence of such a current. Nobody, no capitalist, no bourgeois journalist made any mistake on this. No one saw the Otelo campaign as a means of channeling or diverting the workers combativity that is escaping from the iron vise of the reformist workers parties. This sets the Otelo campaign off from the MFA, which was seen that way, by the SEDES, among others, during 1974. *Jornal Novo*, owned by the CIP, synthesized the uneasiness of its directors, writing: "If Major Otelo gets 10 percent of the vote we can be sure that Portugal is a state heading for disintegration and perhaps in the process of collapse. . . . If Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho gets 3 percent of the vote, we can assert that the civic pathology that has reigned among us is not overly worrisome, for this percentage corresponds to what is current in our democratic societies." (June 24, 1976.) The columns of the Portuguese press teemed with statements of this type. Class hatred impelled *Diário de Notícias* to write an editorial promising a glorious future to the supporters of Otelo, qualifying them as follows: "If public enterprise comes out of the present whirlpool, if the employers have a government behind them, if private enterprise survives and prospers, if the agrarian reform is reexamined and comes to the North in a cooperative form, if the streets of this country are cleared of their garbage, if the workers lose their fear and gain security, if the ministries regroup in a rational manner, if Portugal becomes European, then the wild fanatics, incompetents, and mental deficient (70 percent of the workers of Setúbal! — INPRECOR), along with those who have aristocratically (sic!) taken refuge in ideological sterility, will be reduced to their proper marginal proportions." (June 23, 1976.)

Thus, the Portuguese bourgeoisie had no doubt about the character of the class confrontation going on. The bourgeoisie did not allow itself to be led astray by the chimera of a so-called counterposition between three generals and a civilian. As for the officer corps, the

military hierarchy, at no time did anyone manifest the slightest support to or encouragement of the former general. On this subject, the Communist party declared, with regret and mockery: "What we have here is the candidacy of an officer who lacks the slightest real military power. . . . It stimulates conflicts and divisions in the armed forces." (*Avante*, July 8, 1976.)

All the elements we have examined (social, political, etc.) enable us to assert that only an extreme schematism bordering on blindness can lead to the claim that the Otelo candidacy was a bourgeois candidacy, a third bourgeois candidate standing alongside Pinheiro and Eanes. Such schematism amounts to forgetting this principle, invoked by Lenin: ". . . it is obvious that here, as always, the task is to be able to apply the general and fundamental principles of communism to the particularities of the relations between classes and parties, to the particularities of objective development toward communism, which are proper to each country and which one must be able to study, discover, and lay bare." (*Left-Wing Communism*, emphasis in original.) Thus, a call for a vote to Otelo cannot be excluded as a matter of principle. After a coherent battle for a united candidate of the workers movement, a call for a vote to Otelo and Pato, who amassed the workers' protest votes against the austerity plan and for defense and extension of their gains, was a tactical choice that in no way contradicts the general and fundamental principles of revolutionary Marxism. Such a call would have to be accompanied by an independent campaign around the central programmatic elements mentioned at various points in this article.

Evolution of the campaign

A real analysis of the Otelo candidacy must take account of the evolution and reorganization of the central themes of the campaign. This evolution cannot be reduced to the evolution of the candidate or to changes in his political entourage. It has its source in the sharper emergence of the social content in the course of the campaign, the sharper emergence of the class confrontation embodied in and deformed by the "April 25 vs. November 25" polarization and hence of the needs of the masses that this evolution had itself contributed to expressing.

At the most immediate level, Otelo's gestures of respect for Eanes as "an honest man who cannot be used by the forces of the right" (*O Jornal*, June 9, 1976) gave way to statements like this: "Behind his dark glasses, Eanes hides a well-known monacle: Spínola's." (*Diário Popular*, June 22, 1976.)

Opposition to Eanes led Otelo to take his distance from the initial theme of "national unity" (taken up during his speech in Porto on May 29, 1976), to the point of saying: "I consider it a mistake . . . to talk of national unity. Class conciliation is impossible. It is not possible to conciliate the workers, who have only the strength of their hands, and those who exploit the work-



MARIO SOARES

ers." (*Diário Popular*, June 22, 1976.) This undeniable evolution, the product of the objective dynamic of the campaign (which dynamic it in turn fueled), was most clearly expressed in Otelo's Lisbon speech of June 25, 1976. The ambiguities are far from eliminated, but it is no longer simply a translation of the slogan "April 25 for president."

Moreover, the Central Committee of the CP itself had to recognize this in drawing a balance-sheet of its "relative electoral setback": "The Central Committee notes that the lack of precision of the results achieved by the Communist candidate reflects a deficient appreciation of the state of spirit of the masses. . . ."

Workers parties draw the balance-sheet

Neither of the two big Portuguese workers parties can draw a positive balance-sheet on the presidential elections. The SP saw about 20 percent of its voters (400,000 of them) reject the party's recommendation of support to Eanes and vote for Pinheiro in the North (Porto, Viana de Castelo) and to a lesser extent for Otelo in the South (Lisbon, Setúbal, Beja, Evora, Faro). In the case of the CP, about the same number of voters shifted to Otelo and cut Octávio Pato's score in half. Each in their own way, the leaderships of the SP and CP have now had to draw the lessons of their relative failures, for this modifies the line of conduct they envisage for the post-electoral period, at least in the short run.

Although this was never alluded to in any public statement, the leadership of the SP nonetheless knows full

well that the partial indiscipline of its voters was caused fundamentally by the public image of the candidate the party supported, further accentuated by the haste with which the PPD and the CDS (Centro Democrático Social — Social Democratic Center) rushed to support him. It was also the result of the trade-union base the SP has developed during the past year and its recruitment of worker militants. The party leaders had to pay the price for the hostility of these workers to the candidate of the employers of the CIP and the landlords of the CAP (Confederation of Portuguese Farmers). The prime concern of the Soares leadership is thus to associate Eanes's electoral victory to his acceptance of the SP program and government: "Contrary to what is claimed by certain rightist sectors and some left pseudoradicals, who are united by the same spirit of analysis, the victory of General Ramalho Eanes does not represent a triumph for the right and still less for a pseudocoalition of parties that would make anticommunism their banner. . . . The repeated statements of Ramalho Eanes — and especially his electoral manifesto and his press conference in Gulbenkian (after the results were announced) — absolutely set him off from the right and define him as the legitimate representative of the spirit of April 25, a man determined to struggle for a democratic and socialist project openly opposed to all forms of totalitarianism and dictatorship. . . . The victory of General Ramalho Eanes constitutes a singular reinforcement of the democratic authority of the Portuguese state. Moreover, this will be completed on the institutional level by the coming formation of a homogeneous Socialist government with a consistent left program which will lend it a broad base of support capable of matching and surpassing the influence of the SP itself." (Statement of the National Secretariat of the SP, June 29, 1976, *Diário de Notícias*, June 30, 1976.)

This timorous attempt at differentiation from the right on the part of the SP leadership in order to regain some of the credibility eroded by the Eanes operation is not easily reconciled with the exercise of government responsibilities, for which Mario Soares is preparing. Neither the measures his government will decree nor the workers struggles that are already taking shape in response to them will leave the SP leaders much room to maneuver in their attempt to recover their lost audience. Although proportionally smaller than those of the CP, the SP's electoral losses are not any easier to recover. Once it occupies the position of government party, responsible for and author of an antiworker policy, the SP leadership will have great difficulty trying to base itself on a "social pact" negotiated with the majority of the trade-union leaders, many members of the SP itself, and will have equally onerous problems with the national leadership of the united central trade-union federation that will emerge from the congress to be held in November. (It may be predicted that the majority of this leadership will be Socialist-oriented.)

To this must be added the bourgeoisie's notable lack of eagerness in supporting the experiment of a Soares government, whose term it will do everything to shorten. This is illustrated by the position taken by the PPD lead-

ership: "The consequences of the vote, reinforced by the sensible diminution of SP votes in Madeira and the Azores, also remove much credibility from the thesis of a minority government. Not only can the SP not claim the weight of a candidate that was not its own, but also the lack of verified support reveals a sensible diminution of its social base." (*Primeiro de Janeiro*, July 4, 1976.)

It is in this context, caught between the sabotage of reaction and the resistance of the working class, that the Soares leadership will have to deal with the most important tensions the SP has faced in two years. These tensions may well be manifested during the coming SP congress in December, through the crystallization of a current or tendency opposed to the government policy of the party's National Secretariat. This opposition, which seems already heralded by the formation on July 5 of a Group for the Defense of the Socialist Program (GDPS), would then reflect the contradiction — up to now masked because of the ultrasectarian attitude of the CP leadership, which enables the SP leadership to pursue a two-sided policy — between the aspirations of a working-class rank and file animated by the Socialist trade-union cadres and the government policy of the National Secretariat. The coming struggles and the trade-union congress this autumn will constitute important tests of the maturity of this conflict between antagonistic class interests within the Portuguese Social Democracy.

"This apparent loss will be won back with interest," said Alvaro Cunhal on June 28 while flying to the East Berlin conference of European Communist parties. (*Diário*, June 29, 1976.)



Cunhal

True, the low vote won by Octávio Pato runs strongly counter to the project of the CP leadership. The leadership saw this campaign as an instrument in future negotiations with Mario Soares on the composition of a government, or at least on a tacit alliance between the two parties in the Assembly of the Republic on the basis of a government platform that would satisfy some of the demands of the Cunhal leadership. In order to recover

the part of its electoral base that voted for Otelo and left the party members and close sympathizers alone behind Pato, the CP leadership is counting on the difficulties the SP will run into in the government and on the CP's ability to maintain control of the unions and workers commissions in the big factories. To the immediate detriment of its strategy of "left majority," the CP leadership, at least during the initial months of the Soares government, wants to demonstrate, through struggles that it can stimulate and direct, that "you cannot govern without the CP, and still less against it." The Central Committee statement of July 5 clearly lays out this perspective: "The CP reserves the right, which is conferred on it by the constitution and is an integral part of democracy, to oppose a government whose policy it condemns and to develop the struggle against such a policy and such a government." (Avante, July 8, 1976.)

And for the CP leadership, the "recovery with interest" mentioned in this same document means that the organizational strength of the party, which will be demonstrated in coming struggles, combined with an offensive of political explanation, will once again rally the sympathy of many worker militants who temporarily defected to join the current of support to Otelo. The central Committee even felt the need to explain in regard to these workers: "The CC calls the attention of the regional, local, and rank-and-file organizations to the necessity of not taking any precipitous administrative measures against the comrades and friends (who voted for Otelo — INPRECOR). The task is to discuss in the organizations, to discuss the situation fraternally with all these comrades and to draw the indispensable lessons." (Avante, idem.)

The CP's line of action will thus probably bend to the left during coming months in order to capitalize on the fruits of an increased intervention in the struggles waged against the policy of the bourgeoisie and the Soares government. But the aim remains unchanged: For the CP the point is to recover a position of strength in order to negotiate with a Soares who finds himself in trouble over the composition of the government that will succeed the SP government: "The analysis of the economic, social, and political situation leads to the conclusion that even if a government without Communists is formed in the immediate future, the continuation of the democratic process will put the participation of the CP in the government on the agenda relatively soon in order to be able to resolve the national problems." (Avante, idem.) Nevertheless, this policy of channeling struggles, while it intensifies the problems of the SP leadership, also entails dangers for the CP leadership. The people who voted for Otelo in the presidential elections but had voted for the CP in April 1975 and 1976 do not automatically escape the political and organizational grip of the CP. But in the coming conflicts they will constitute a current of militant workers who, in the very course of these struggles, may be led to translate the electoral motivations that impelled them to vote for Otelo into a radical practice in terms of demands and modes of organization and leadership of the struggles. Not only because of its bureaucratic and sectarian atti-

tude in the workers movement (as was once again manifested in the CP's frenetic attacks on the Otelo campaign), but also because of the needs of its strategy of class collaboration, the CP is led to try to curb this dynamic at a certain point in order not to endanger its chances of negotiation within the bourgeois state apparatus. Moreover, this is what is already announced in the statement of the Central Committee: "At the same time that it warns against raising unrealistic and demagogic demands by pseudorevolutionary groups and against inadequate forms of struggle, the CP opposes a policy of aggravation of the living conditions of the working classes and stands and will stand at the head of the struggle of the working class and the popular masses for their just demands. At the same time that it upholds the necessity of a policy of financial austerity, the CP insists that this austerity must begin among the parasitic classes and with superfluous and luxury goods." (Avante, idem.)

If the transfer of half of its votes to Otelo is not to be "recovered with interest" by the CP during the coming central political conflicts, it is above all necessary that the far-left groups be politically and organizationally capable of presenting an alternative to the most active of the workers, most of whom are influenced by the CP. But these groups are on the contrary embarked on a decidedly triumphalist course, especially the UDP, the largest of them, which is led by the Maoists of the Portuguese Communist party (Reconstructed).

In fact, the UDP-PCP(R) believes that the electoral shift from which Otelo's candidacy benefited constitutes a consolidated victory that now need only be enlarged in order to construct the "antifascist popular front." According to an editorial published in the organ of the PCP(R): "To construct a vast popular front that regroups and organizes all the people of Portugal is an arduous task that cannot be achieved overnight. Carrying it out requires breaking the masses under bourgeois influence away from that influence. And since 'free-floating' masses free of all ideological and political influence do not exist in any class society, a hard struggle must be waged against bourgeois ideas and parties, to break up their ranks, deprive them of their popular base so that the popular front can be established. In this first test we have attracted a mass of workers, corresponding to 800,000 voters, to the revolutionary popular camp. What can one call this if not a victory?" (Bandeira Vermelha, July 1, 1976.)

The MES advances a similar evaluation in the June 28 statement of its National Political Commission: "The high score for Otelo has transformed the political panorama of our country overnight, for it represents obvious proof that the current that rejects Social Democracy and reformism exists, is powerful, will get stronger, and that no one will henceforth be able to ignore it." (Diário Popular, June 29, 1976.)

The Maoists of the PCP(R) believe that the first stone of the "front" has been set in place by the 800,000 popular voter-militants for Otelo. It remains only to complete the job by using the major as a figurehead.



The opportunism that had marked the choice of candidate and the elaboration of the electoral propaganda (Otelo in his general's uniform with the slogans "April 25 for president" and "a friend in the presidency" on the green and red background of the Portuguese flag) are now being extended in the definition of the components of this "front": "If one is to be carefully correct, the votes of Pinheiro must be added to those of Otelo, in spite of the differences between them, as votes for the officers of April 25 against Eanes," declared Acacio Barreiros, UDP deputy in the Assembly. (Voz do Povo, organ of the UDP, July 6, 1976.) There is not a word in this interview about any other addition, such as the votes of Otelo and the votes of Pato, which should be done by revolutionaries to show the militants of the CP and SP that anticapitalist unity in action can actually be sealed between workers organizations against the Eanes regime. It is true that for the Mao-Stalinists of the PCP(R) Pato is a "diversionist social fascist," while the prime minister of the sixth provisional government is "an antifascist admiral of April 25." The objective the UDP assigns to the GDUP (the groups founded to support the Otelo campaign) strikingly clarifies this orientation: "A party is necessarily a restricted organization representing certain specific class interests, with its own ideology. Consequently, it cannot unite broad sectors of the people in its ranks. A popular front, on the other hand, has more open objectives and does not represent a particular class but instead materializes the immediate common struggle objectives of several allied classes. It is an organization of this type that will be

created on the basis of the GDUP." (Voz do Povo, July 6, 1976.)

The possible dynamic of the GDUP cannot be considered apart from the role that will be played in this process by the various organizations of the far left, especially the UDP-PCP(R) and the MES. The projects they uphold are in large part contradictory. While the UDP aims at the formation of an "antifascist popular front" with immediate and minimum objectives, the MES calls for the formation of an "antifascist and anticapitalist front, a mass organization struggling for socialism." (Poder Popular, organ of the MES, June 30, 1976.) Nevertheless, the two conceptions — one Mao-Stalinist, the other ultraleft — converge on one essential point: Both see the GDUP as organs whose task will be to contribute to the development of the workers commissions, deliberately excluding any recourse to a policy of united front directed toward the reformist parties, which means also toward the leadership of these parties, through proposals for united and nonexclusive action in defense of the toiling masses. In the absence of any tactic of united front toward the SP and CP, for these organizations the extension of the electoral success of the candidate they supported consists of working around the bulk of the working class and the organizations that influence or structure it in order to construct a sort of alternative workers movement of which the GDUP would represent the embryo and of which the "popular unity movement" would be the expression, after the congress of the GDUP. Hence, the tendency toward a substitutionist policy of working around the traditional workers movement, of which the FUR (Front of Revolutionary Unity) had been a first experience and a first failure, has come to the surface again, accentuated by the impact of the Otelo campaign.

In the neighborhoods, where the base of the tenants commissions has significantly contracted since November 25, the GDUP, which are actually regroupments of militants and sympathizers of the far left, can find a terrain for propaganda, agitation, and organization of initiatives around the rising cost of living. But this activity is already being carried out to the detriment of a possible reactivation of the tenants commissions, for which the GDUP are substituting themselves wherever militants of the MES and UDP have a certain base. In the factories, the same phenomenon may occur in another form. In the great factories of the Lisbon industrial belt and in Setúbal, the far-left militants regrouped in the GDUP may be led to set themselves up as competing organizations to the workers commissions and trade-union sections led by the CP, to appear as a minority introducing additional division in the working class and contributing to isolating the vanguard militants from the majority of the workers in the factories. In the coming period these workers will have a natural tendency to turn toward their own permanent organizations, especially their unions, in order to provide themselves with an effective and united instrument of struggle against the bourgeois offensive. It is in this area that the sectarian attitude of the MES and UDP can cause the greatest damage, especially since this policy is re-

flected in conceptions that run counter to the unitary and democratic aspirations of the workers. An example of this is the position of the PCP(R) on the coming trade-union congress: "To have the GDUP participate in the struggle . . . for the right of trade-union association and independence against the maneuvers of the parties, for trade-union unity against the right of tendency, which the bourgeoisie wants to introduce into the union movement." (Statement of the Political Commission of the Central Committee of the PCP(R), A Capital, July 6, 1976.)

Thus, the far-left groups, while they may see their audience broaden because of the electoral success of the Otelo campaign after the period of isolation following November 25, are still proceeding in the same logic of sectarian ignorance of the need for a united-front policy toward the reformist workers parties; this reflects the pressure of the rise of a layer of militant but little politicized workers. That is why neither their program nor their initiatives can effectively contribute to strengthening the independence and unity of the workers or to establishing workers democracy in the workers movement. The proliferation of struggles now shaping up can offer these far-left organizations a field of intervention propitious for some extension of their influence and, on this basis, for an extension of the influence of the GDUP. But given the present state of their political development, the central political questions posed by the convening of the trade-union congress and the response to the Soares government limit their ability to intervene in the direction of the majority of workers organized or influenced by the SP and CP. Neither the MES nor the UDP nor the front that may be born of their common efforts will be able to appear to these workers as a real alternative to the collaborationist and bureaucratic policy of the traditional leaderships.

For the rest, this contradiction, which arises out of the objective impact of the far left and the limits of its subjective ability to capitalize on that impact, will contribute to stimulating a political discussion of a strategic order among the various components of the far left. Revolutionary Marxist militants can play an important role in this process through a unitary policy and a clarification of the central themes under discussion in the vanguard.

Toward a new crisis?

If American imperialism and the European bourgeoisies do not come to its rescue, the Mario Soares government will soon find itself in a more or less protracted situation of suspension, depending on the intensity of the workers resistance to the brutal austerity measures and the depth of the consequent capitalist sabotage. Only massive aid in credits would be able to alleviate the lack of investment and give the SP government a certain margin for maneuver in order to attempt, with the aid of some concessions, to divide the workers response, reduce some of the points of resistance, and gain at least the neutrality of the unions led by members of the So-

cialist party. But this hypothesis remains unlikely. The European and North American bourgeoisies must lend priority to their efforts to defuse the explosive potential of the Italian and Spanish situations; Portugal comes only third. Under these conditions, the workers response, which began during the days following the election of Eanes with the strike of the hotel workers and the movement at the petrochemical complex of Sines, will rather tend to amplify in face of the austerity measures, a foretaste of which was offered by the last decrees of the sixth provisional government on price increases. These struggles, which the CP will sharpen for its own reasons, will nevertheless have to overcome the obstacle of the fragmentation inherited from the very organizational and political division of the Portuguese workers movement. In this context the trade-union congress in autumn takes on decisive importance for the organization of a counteroffensive of the working class against the crisis of a Portuguese capitalism managed by the SP government. The Soares leadership will do all it can to blackmail the trade-union militants of the SP with the (real) threat of reaction in order to dissuade them from engaging in the battle against the policy of the SP government and thus to allow that government to gain time so as to better divide the potential resistance of the workers.

This situation highlights the imperative necessity for revolutionary Marxists to stimulate the battle, offering the workers an alternative on the key questions that will be posed: elaboration of an action program, of a plan of struggle unifying the workers battles around defense of the major gains of the toilers (nationalizations, agrarian reform, workers control) and for the immediate satisfaction of the demands of the masses of toilers against the attack on their living standards; strengthening, extension, and unification of the trade unions into a single central independent and democratic union federation and coordination of the independent bodies of the workers through the relaunching of workers control by means of the centralization of the workers commissions. Next, and this is an essential point in winning the confidence of militants critical of the big workers parties, against the sectarianism that fosters the isolation of the vanguard and the division of the ranks of the workers, intransigent defense of the broadest workers democracy in the workers organizations, particularly the right of tendency in the unions. Finally, the indispensable proposal of the unity in struggle of all the workers organizations — political, trade-union, and mass — especially against the rise in activity of the armed gangs of reaction which the accentuated social polarization will stimulate toward antiworker terrorism.

Such are the grand lines of a policy that can effectively contribute to solidifying a nascent workers response that otherwise could be channeled by the CP or derailed into vanguardist isolation. In spite of their present organizational weakness, the Trotskyist militants are the only ones capable of carrying forward such a project corresponding to the immediate objective interests of the Portuguese workers. Defended with consistency and perseverance, this line of action could rapidly get a response from a growing number of worker militants in

the context of the great political debate that is opening among them as they come out of the presidential elections.

As soon as the new rise of partial struggles really takes hold and as soon as the objective possibility arises, they will thus be in position to move to agitation and even to impelling a generalization of these struggles for a national centralization of the workers response. This could then take the form of a general strike against the sabotage of the bourgeoisie, the actions of reaction, and the antiworker measures of the government. Such a perspective would permit workers solutions to the economic crisis to be concretely placed on the agenda. While Eanes and the bourgeoisie are already concocting their plans to replace the discredited SP government with an SP-PPD-CDS government of national unity, if necessary by provoking new legislative elections to put an end to the majority of workers parties in the Assembly, such a workers and people's mobilization would also place a real alternative solution on the agenda: that of an SP-CP government supported by the mobilization of the workers and satisfying the demands the workers will put forward throughout these months of struggle. It is through pursuing such a policy that the Liga Comunista Internacionalista, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Portugal, will intervene in the period now opening in Portugal. It is around such

axes that common activity between the Trotskyists of the LCI and PRT will be able to lead to the unification of the two organizations into a Portuguese section of the Fourth International in a favorable position to constitute an alternative pole to the capitulations of the reformists and the ultraleftism and centrism of the majority of the presently existing revolutionary organizations.

July 13, 1976

FOOTNOTES:

1. On the economic situation, the projects of the government, and a detailed analysis of the election results, see INPRECOR, No.55, July 8, 1976.
2. See the comparative table of results in the presidential and legislative elections, in INPRECOR, No.55.
3. MES: Movimento de Esquerda Socialista — Left Socialist Movement; PRP: Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado — Revolutionary party of the Proletariat; FSP: Frente Socialista Popular — Popular Socialist Front.
4. See INPRECOR, No.53, June 10, 1976.
5. See INPRECOR, No.52, May 27, 1976.
6. GDUP: Grupos Dinamizadores de Unidade Popular — Popular Unity Dynamizing Groups.
7. Anuário Estatístico, 1973, Vol.1, p.16ff. Published by INE.

GREECE: A WAVE OF REPRESSION

Προλεταριοι όλων των χωρών, ενωθείτε!

ΕΡΓΑΤΙΚΗ ΠΑΛΗ



ΕΛΘΕΡΟΤΗΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΤΗΤΑ

Since the general strike and mobilization of the Greek working class on May 24 and 25 (see INPRECOR, No. 53, June 10, 1976), the Caramanlis government has escalated its repression against the left and the labor movement. The strike and mobilization had been called to fight against passage of government anti-labor legislation that virtually bans strikes and institutionalizes state control of the trade unions. The purpose of the current intensification of repression is to drive the labor

movement into an increasingly defensive position so that the government will have a free hand to pass the rest of its package of reactionary legislation without facing the sort of mass resistance it had to contend with in May.

Essentially, the proposed new legislation aims at restricting the right of assembly and demonstration. It includes

a law authorizing the police to open fire on any rally or demonstration whose participants refuse to disperse at police command. Another law limits freedom of the press and its circulation. In fact, both these laws are far more reactionary than the corresponding ones that were in force during the period of the military dictatorship.

The repressive apparatus has begun enforcing these laws even before their passage by parliament. Dozens of young militants have been arrested for selling left papers on the streets, which is prohibited by the law the government is now preparing, and for distributing leaflets. Under the application of the anti-labor law passed in May, some 500 trade unionists have been fired, most of them because of the strikes of May 24-25 against this very law. After sentencing thirteen militants to prison terms ranging from five months to two years on charges growing out of the brutal police assault on demonstrators May 24-25, the government has now launched a new round of persecution of the alleged "instigators" of the May 24-25 actions.

This new round is directed first of all against the far-left organizations, but in reality it is aimed at the labor movement as a whole, for the formulation of the charges is such that the same accusations may be filed against anyone who writes or speaks against government policies. During the past week dozens of militants have been interrogated by the secret police under the pretext that the articles in the newspapers of their organizations and the leaflets they have distributed indicate that they, "together with the other members of their organization, incited the crowd to throw stones at policemen and to engage in violence against the police and the state." To give an idea of what these "extremists" actually wrote in their papers and leaflets, here is a quotation from a leaflet of the Organization of Internationalist Communists of Greece (OICG, Greek section of the Fourth International), on which the accusation is based:

"We shall demand of the reformist leaderships that they broaden, coordinate, and escalate the struggle against the anti-labor draft law on a national scale, through union assemblies and the election of struggle committees to coordinate the struggle on a trade-union, city, regional, and national scale."

On the basis of this paragraph, two members of the OICG, Giannis Felekis and Aleka Felekis-Ambaris, have been accused of being leaders of the OICG responsible for "instigating" the May 24-25 events. The accusation is formulated in such a way that it can be applied to anyone the secret police suspects of being a member of the OICG. According to existing legislation, the possible prison sentences in this case are the same as those in the cases of those charged with having "conducted" the May 24-25 events: between five months and two years.

The current attack on the labor movement and its political organizations was prepared by a weeks-long campaign by the bourgeois press, the government, and the

state-controlled mass media. Long front-page articles with huge titles have been published demanding the smashing of extremist organizations, particularly the Trotskyist ones, because of the consistent role they have played in the struggle against the anti-labor legislation. This campaign has gone hand in hand with a coordinated campaign by the League of Greek Industrialists, which has included layoffs and lockouts aimed at smashing the wave of strikes.

The two Communist parties have remained silent about this persecution and the imprisonment of those arrested on May 24-25. The Maoist groups, which have a rather broad influence, have also remained inactive, for their political analysis claims that "any attack on the Caramanlis government would harm the anti-superpower bloc and would not be correct, since the main enemy at this stage is social imperialism."

The centrist groups, the OICG, and two other Trotskyist groups, the Revolutionary Communist Front and the Internationalist Communist League (the latter was formed after a split in the Healyite organization in Greece) have initiated a defense campaign against the repression, in defense of democratic rights, and for the continuation of the struggle to repeal the anti-labor legislation. This campaign has included leaflets, posters, petitions, rallies in the streets, city centers, factories, and working-class neighborhoods, as well as press conferences and demonstrations.

The government repression marks an important turn in Greek politics. It is the end of the period during which the bourgeois government followed a policy of selective repression aimed at maintaining the illusions of the masses so as to gain the time needed to stabilize the state and repressive apparatus and institutionalize repression of the labor movement. It also marks the beginning of an open and generalized repression, the initiation of an effort by the government to revive the anti-communist hysteria of the period that followed the civil war.

It is, however, impossible to reestablish such an anti-communist hysteria today. But what the government can succeed in is to give fascist and reactionary elements a green light to step up their terrorist attacks on bookstores, headquarters, and individual militants of the left, attacks that are always conducted with the collaboration of the state apparatus and its repressive branches. It is this context that accounts for the recent assaults with arms and grenades on two headquarters of the Communist party (exterior) and the firebombing of left bookstores just after Caramanlis's statement that "the left and the labor movement are responsible for all the problems."

The vigilance and mobilization of the world working class and its organizations, especially in Europe, is needed for the maintenance and broadening of the fragile democratic rights the Greek workers and students have won at the cost of all the blood shed in the struggle against the military dictatorship. □



THE RISE OF THE SPANISH WOMENS MOVEMENT

●by JACQUELINE HEINEN●

In Madrid, the saleswomen of one of the Simago chain stores have been in struggle for more than a month. They went on strike after one of their union delegates was fired because she had eaten a sandwich on the job (the rule says that you have to do this in the toilets!). The police arrested some of the striking women, claiming that they had obstructed the entrance to the store. About thirty women then occupied a church for three days, with the support of the neighborhood association and the women's group of the Aluche neighborhood. They were forcibly ejected, after which a solidarity demonstration of 1,000 was organized. The saleswomen are now back at work, but they are holding general assemblies to discuss how to struggle for an increase in their scandalously low wages and against the harassment they suffer. They have established ongoing links with the Women's Social Center recently set up in the neighborhood.

Three weeks after these events, since the management had still not rehired the fired saleswoman, her comrades organized a boycott of the Simago chain for June 22-24, with the aid of various Madrid women's groups. (The Association of Housewives' Groups, dominated by the Communist party, refused to participate because the action was not legal.) This was a very militant action, widely reported in the press. It raised slogans for the immediate rehiring of their fired comrade and on

the struggle against the specific oppression in the department stores.

In the Basque country, domestic workers have gotten together and are fighting for a forty-hour workweek, social security coverage, a minimum wage, and the right to unionize.

In Barcelona the wives of the workers of Motor Iberica barricaded themselves into a church on June 1 in support of the wage demands of the workers and to break the wall of silence surrounding this strike. The occupation has enabled them to discuss their own problems (as housewives, part-time workers, or poorly paid domestic workers) and to see how much easier it is to care for children collectively and how much the population manifests its solidarity. They had left their ghetto. The police who came to throw them out by force — with jeeps, trucks, and anti-riot equipment — compelled them to return to their homes, but things will never be the same again.

Throughout the Spanish state, neighborhood women's groups organized a boycott of the markets on June 26, following a demonstration of more than 50,000 in Madrid four days earlier against the rising cost of living and for the legalization of the neighborhood associations.

The militancy exhibited by these women is commensurate with the mobilizations of the entire Spanish proletariat: work stoppages in solidarity with Motor Iberica in Barcelona and with Feramica in Martorell; demonstration of 15,000 in Barcelona for amnesty and for the rehiring of all workers fired during struggles, inspired by what happened in Bilbao, where all the workers at Babcock Wilcox fired since 1939 had been rehired, and by the rehiring of all the workers fired during the 1962 strike at Siemens-Barcelona; the very militant demonstration of 15,000 in Santa Coloma, a suburb of Barcelona, which stopped in front of the headquarters of the Guardia Civil, chanting "dissolve the repressive bodies"; 10,000 youth in Cornelia, in the Barcelona area, demanding jobs for all and concluding their demonstration with a big festival; the metalworkers and chemical workers of Madrid taking to the streets to back up their demands.



The social and ideological crisis

But the context in which the radicalization of ever broader layers of women is occurring is also determined by the social and ideological crisis in which the Spanish bourgeoisie has been mired since the death of Franco. The fierce repression against many militants, among them many women, has not managed to quell the need for self-expression, for liberation, for throwing off the stifling straitjacket of Francoism. The innumerable articles now appearing in many bourgeois newspapers and magazines on sexuality and contraception — from advertisements for this or that pill to what position to assume to avoid pregnancy — simply reflects the pressure being expressed by ordinary women in neighborhood meetings where sexuality is discussed, one's own sexuality, where a series of taboo questions are finally opened up (like the meeting in Barcelona that brought together 900 women and men).

In this country in which the traditional role of women has been so extolled by the reactionary bourgeoisie, in particular by the Falangist party whose women's sections are assigned the task of teaching young girls how to become good mothers; in this country where the obligatory "social" service still exists — for young girls it consists of doing six months' apprentice housekeeping; in this country where up to a year ago wives were considered abnormal beings needing permission from their husbands in order to go to work; in this country where marriage in the Catholic church is practically mandatory, the spirits are in revolt — and the bodies too. This is evidenced by the first issue of the women's journal in the Santa Coloma neighborhood: the illiterate women are demanding to be taught to read, adolescents want to discuss their rights with their parents, and some fathers are engaging in discussion in the nurseries on the discrimination against their daughters ("why these pink and blue baby clothes?").

The emergence of the women's movement in Spain has been shaped by contradictory factors. One is that only 15 percent of all women are wage workers, while more than 50 percent of all women remain in the home. But another is the strong tradition of solidarity with workers struggles, in demonstrations and on strike picket lines. Only 0.24 percent of all university students are women and a very low proportion of women are skilled workers. But at the same time in the public debates in past months women have often expressed their desire to have access to culture. There is a poverty of social resources available to women to ease their domestic tasks, but at the same time women have been active participants in neighborhood struggles for several years. Today, they are beginning to become conscious of their specific oppression as women, particularly around the struggle for free child-care centers. (One of the most advanced examples of this was the simultaneous occupation of fourteen Barcelona child-care centers by the parents, children, and teachers at the end of May.) Finally, the European women's movement has had an impact; through the "Year of the Woman" declared by the bourgeoisie it found channels through which to make its demands known and inspire Spanish women to begin struggling for themselves.

Women's groups are springing up wherever they had not existed before: in the neighborhoods, the universities, and some factories. In several cities these groups have begun to coordinate, giving rise to conferences such as the one in Madrid last year, where 500 women were able to meet for the first time. The "Women's Days" held in Barcelona at the end of May is another example. It was attended by 1,500 women on the first day and 4,000 on the last day. Participants came to discuss point by point the eight themes that were on the agenda on the problems of women workers, women in the neighborhoods, questions of sexuality, the laws, the mass media, etc. It was during these first regional encounters (with many delegates coming from other cities in the case of Barcelona) that it became clear that the movement was already structured around three major poles. In addition to the Movement of Democratic

Women (linked to the CP) and the pole of radical feminists, who uphold positions similar to those held by this current in the rest of Europe (a current that owes a lot of the press coverage it initially got to its extremist positions), there is a third pole represented by such groups as the Association of Women University Students, the Women's Liberation Front in Madrid, and ANCHE in Barcelona, which emphasize the necessity for an independent revolutionary women's movement.

Beyond these divisions, what was striking about the discussion during the Barcelona "Women's Days" were the links, very close from the outset, between the various groups and the workers movement (even certain groups upholding more or less sexist positions), either through their organic links with the tenant associations, parent associations, or local workers commissions in the case of the neighborhood women's groups, or through the program of demands put forward by the other groups and the understanding of the importance of a struggle around specific oppression, which tends to be the oppression not only of women, but also of all the workers. (Catholic women linked to the Christian Democracy, who were officially present at the beginning of the "Days," had to leave because of the uproar touched off by their reactionary positions on the family.)

The CP and the radicalization of women

In this situation, the work of gaining a base in the neighborhoods that has been carried out by the Communist party for about ten years now has had far from negligible effects. This is true even though the housewives groups (*Amas de Casa*) linked to the tenants associations did not have a feminist slant at first. Organized and led for the most part by the Movement of Democratic Women (MDM), they were content to mobilize women as one more force in the social struggle. Nevertheless, the deepening of the political and economic crisis linked to the daily confrontation with social problems that almost always relate to the role of women in capitalist society — housing, child care, neighborhood management, parks in which children can play — has led these groups to modify their positions and put forward specifically feminist objectives, even on questions that seem least related at first glance. "If we have to broach the problem of rats," which infest the filthy neighborhoods around the great cities and are a real danger to small children, "we will do so while also asking ourselves why it is always women who have to discuss this sort of problem," says a woman of the MDM. Which does not prevent her from locating this struggle in a totally reformist perspective: "The future democratic government will be able to respond in large part to the needs expressed by the demands for free child-care centers, building new schools, and the question of prices. Even if it does not permit a full liberation of women, it will create the material basis to enable us to work toward this."



Saleswomen of Simago chain on strike.

The explosive situation that will inevitably result from the fall of the dictatorship and the intensification of the contradictions of the system in the eyes of the workers (because of the future government's inability to deal with their demands) will enable revolutionaries to get a growing response to their strategic perspectives. The head-on battle against positions like those expressed above by a leader of the Communist party will then take on its full significance for broad layers of women and men who are now still victims of the worst reformist illusions.

For the immediate period, given the urgency of a united battle against repression and the breadth of the campaign for amnesty, this polemic appears relatively abstract to them. But be that as it may, militants, and above all women militants, of the CP have understood one thing: the importance of the neighborhood as the natural terrain for assembling all women who do not work and the necessity for engaging in a dialogue with other political currents. Along with all the ambiguities of the recent program of the CP, in which this party affirms "We must be a feminist party. We are the party of women's liberation," there is also the explicit recognition of the women's liberation movement as a "broad front in which organized movements coexist side by side with important currents in which basic orientations confront one another."

These are certainly the most open positions that have been taken on the question of women by any European CP up to now. So open, in fact, that the woman of MDM interviewed in an article published in the magazine *Triunfo* declared: "We believe that there are inter-class demands among broad popular and bourgeois layers that can structure a feminist movement." An alliance with the "democratic" wing of the bourgeoisie is thus called for. But the very dynamic of the movement in a region like Barcelona, in which the traditions of workers struggle are very strong, indicates that the CP will soon have some trouble with its ranks. "It smells a bit bourgeois here, doesn't it," said a woman of Santa Coloma, a member of the MDM, when the Catholic women were present at the Barcelona "Women's Days." And, casting a glance at the solemn pictures on the wall, where the diplomas of honored doctors are traditionally hung up, she said, "I'm illiterate; but I'm here anyway."

The radical feminists

Because of the present strength and base of the reformists and because of the revolutionary dynamic of the situation in Spain, the radical feminist current that publicly emerged during the December women's conference in Madrid scarcely has any room for development in the coming period. Its present audience partially derives from the fact that it represents a pole of attraction for many women, youth or intellectuals, who resist entering the neighborhood groups because of the social composition of these groups, the age of the women involved in them (often in their forties), and their primary concerns (cost of living, child care, the question of the family as seen by married women, etc.). This does not mean that the women who follow the radical feminists today necessarily adhere to the theories of Lidia Falcón on the struggle of the sexes or the building of a woman's party. It is thus the task of the third component that has recently emerged in the movement, within which revolutionaries generally predominate, to win to their positions the women who are attracted to the radical language of the radical feminists (which often corresponds to their own revolt against the family and society) rather than to their strategic perspectives.

To understand this necessity is also to understand its corollary: the need to win the women of the neighborhood or factory groups away from CP influence, women who have already exhibited an extraordinary militancy but who could remain completely disarmed in face of the betrayals of the reformists if no alternative is proposed to them.



What tasks for revolutionaries

In part, building this alternative consists of effecting the linkup of a part of the women's movement with the most advanced fringes of the working class around common objectives such as the struggle against repression and the active boycott of the government referendum. But it also consists of the fight of women to impose, es-

pecially within the workers commissions, the existence of structures that enable them to defend their own demands (equal job training and wages, struggle against sexist harassment in the factories, free abortion and contraception on demand, etc.). Another element in building this alternative is the capacity of vanguard women to stimulate the emergence of women's groups in the factories, groups that coordinate among themselves and would be an integral part of the independent movement around all factors underlying the specific oppression of women.

Part of building this alternative is also understanding the primordial role the neighborhood women's groups can play in the coming period in the emergence of a women's movement on clearly anticapitalist positions. This is because of the depth of the economic and social crisis, the dynamic of demands such as "free child-care centers and schools for all" (which has already been advanced today), and the focal point the neighborhood represents for the struggle of the most oppressed social layers. Hence the importance of revolutionary women militants' being present in the existing neighborhood groups and pushing for their creation where they do not yet exist.

Contrary to the Maoists, who have exhibited the most incredible sectarianism, trying to create their own women's groups and putting forward their own movement, the self-styled Democratic Association of Women, we believe that the women's movement must be independent, united, broad, and democratic and that its strength derives precisely from the ability of the various political currents, sectors, and groups to confront one another within the movement and forge unity around specific objectives. It is the achievement of this unity that will also determine the capacity of the women's movement to stimulate mixed struggles of a mass character that compel the leaderships of the traditional workers movement to take into consideration such objectives as free abortion on demand, the struggle against discrimination against women in job training and employment, the struggle for improved social services, and so on.

The very way in which the women's movement in Spain has tended to structure itself during the past several months should permit it to attain these goals. Sectoral coordinating bodies of neighborhood groups in Barcelona and Madrid, coordination among the various sectors at the local level (neighborhood, university, factory), the regional coordination recently decided on in Catalonia — these are the sort of links that are decisive in taking account both of the diversity of the movement and of the specific character of the many groups and sectors that are part of it, while still permitting a constant dialogue among all of them.

Whether this movement stands on class-struggle positions, whether it is organically linked to the overall struggle of the Spanish proletariat, and whether it will participate in the emergence of organs of dual power in the future will depend on the place revolutionaries are able to occupy within it.



East Berlin Conference NEW STAGE IN THE CRISIS OF STALINISM



by ERNEST MANDEL

The conference of twenty-nine Communist parties of Europe was finally able to be held, in East Berlin. The Communist party press in some countries, beginning with *Pravda* itself, hailed its convocation as a great victory. It is known that Brezhnev had made the holding of the conference a question of personal prestige. In fact, the differences of a number of CP leaderships — notably in Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, France, and to some extent Romania — with the leadership of the Soviet CP over some key passages of the final declaration had been so deep that for a long time it seemed that the conference might not even be able to meet.

If it was eventually held, this was essentially because the Kremlin leaders gave in on practically all the points on which their adversaries had insisted. Probably the most costly concession for the Kremlin was the elimination of any condemnation of the Chinese CP or Maoism from the text of the common declaration. But even these concessions did not prevent the most determined advocates of polycentrism — beginning with Berlinguer of Italy and Santiago Carrillo of Spain, but also including Tito — from clearly asserting that such conferences were in fact useless, that common documents should no longer be drafted in the future, and that the question of strategy and tactics in achieving socialism, as well as that of political orientation, were the exclusive province of each national party.

Some false interpretations and a correct one

How should this conference be located in the history of the Stalinist movement? There are a number of interpretations that should be rejected straightaway. One, which is shared by the most conservative sectors of the

bourgeoisie (of the Kissinger-Fanfani variety) and certain dogmatists of the so-called far left, blithely asserts that this conference amounts to nothing but a charade aimed at deceiving the gullible and that in reality Brezhnev, Berlinguer, Tito, and Santiago Carrillo are in complete agreement on all points.

Were this the case, it would be difficult to understand the interminable discussions, the many conflicts, and the flare-ups that nearly prevented the conference from being held, not to mention such events as the acid diatribes of the Suslovs, Panamarevs, and Bilaks, the public attacks of *Rude Pravo*, organ of the Czechoslovak CP, against the French and Italian Communist parties, Moscow's attempts to create a Communist party of Spain (Lister) to counter the Communist party of Spain (Carrillo), the letter of the Soviet CP to all "fraternal" parties denouncing "the absence of a critical attitude on the part of our French Communist comrades in regard to the anticommunist interventions of the bourgeoisie."

The second thesis, diametrically opposed to the first but equally false, claims that "Eurocommunism" represents the end of special relations between the French, Italian, Spanish, British, Swedish, etc. CPs and Moscow and, according to some variants, even sees signs of the dawn of the "reunification of the Western workers movement." If the French Communist party abandons the dictatorship of the proletariat, some people in France have asserted, then the Tours split (the split in the Socialist party that gave rise to the CP) may be considered pointless. Moreover, it appears that Ceausescu, leader of the Romanian CP, posed the question in similar terms during the East Berlin conference itself.

As against these incorrect theses, any correct interpretation of the East Berlin conference must begin from a

phenomenon which has been developing since 1948 and which revolutionary Marxists call the crisis of Stalinism. This crisis has been advancing, now at an accelerated pace, now more slowly and hesitantly, under the impact of a series of contradictions, partially independent, partially interlinked by a genuine system of interconnected compartments. The crisis of Stalinism may be described as an ensemble of five crises:

*The crisis of Kremlin control over those Communist parties that themselves hold state power, beginning with those parties that seized power in a manner independent of the Soviet bureaucracy, at the head of a genuine mass socialist revolution, even if bureaucratically deformed from the outset (the Yugoslav, Chinese, Vietnamese CPs).

*The crisis of CP control over the toiling masses in the capitalist countries (especially the working class) who are marked by growing militancy, anticapitalist consciousness, and clear distrust of bureaucratic manipulations. Moreover, these masses are exposed to the still limited but nonetheless expanding influence of a vanguard which is more influential, more effective, and more strongly implanted in the class than at any time during the past thirty years.

*The crisis of control of the CPs in power in the "people's democracies" (and in China) over the masses, whose political combativity and activity are in the process of awakening. This crisis can advance to the brink of genuine political revolution (October–November 1956 in Hungary, the 1968 "Prague spring" in Czechoslovakia, and, partially, the workers uprisings in Poland in 1956, 1970, and 1976).

*The crisis of control of the Soviet bureaucracy over Soviet society. This society is not yet characterized by an awakening of activity and politicization among broad masses, but the dialectic of "de-Stalinization" and of the ripening of the objective conditions for the political revolution has triggered an initial confrontation between the bureaucracy and political oppositions, which adds a new dimension to the crisis of Stalinism.

*The crisis of relations between the CPs of capitalist Europe and the Kremlin, which results from the manner in which these parties have been compelled to assimilate de-Stalinization, the manner in which they are inserted into the political life of their countries, and the manner in which they are exposed to the parallel and contradictory pressure of the imperialist bourgeoisie (and the general policy of "peaceful coexistence") on the one hand and the rise of the proletarian revolution on the other hand.

Once one grasps this overall complexity of the crisis of Stalinism, one can immediately put one's finger on the fundamental cause of the error of interpretation of "Eurocommunism" and of the East Berlin conference committed by so many commentators of both the right and the left. The Soviet bureaucracy must judge everything that is happening in the Communist parties not

only on the basis of its "détente" projects and policies with respect to imperialism, but also on the basis of its relations with the toiling masses in the "people's democracies" and the USSR itself.

That's the rub: It is on this point that the dynamic triggered by those CP leaderships that are taking their distance from the Kremlin threatens to make the bureaucracy more vulnerable, to contribute to the ripening of the political revolution.

What the Kremlin can live with and what it fears

Of course, when Berlinguer, Marchais, and Santiago Carrillo renounce the dictatorship of the proletariat, declare themselves in favor of "parliamentary and electoral roads to socialism," preach for alliances with bourgeois parties, and assert that they will even respect the Atlantic alliance when they become ministers in coalition governments, the Kremlin's grimaces of consternation are only for show. For a long time now, more exactly since the French CP voted for the war credits and since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935, the practice of the CPs has gone in this direction. Theory has finally caught up with practice. In this regard, the reformist CPs have repeated the process of revision of Marxism initiated by the Social Democrats at the beginning of this century. The Kremlin is in fundamental agreement. Renounce the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to gain a few ministerial portfolios? An excellent deal! Many others of the same type were concluded under Stalin.

Does the Soviet bureaucracy fear that this time the integration of the CPs into the bourgeois state apparatus will go all the way and that in the event of conflict between the European bourgeoisie and the Kremlin, the mass CPs will stand squarely in the camp of their own bourgeoisies against the USSR? Most likely, the more the CPs recruit on a rightist basis, the more the ideological differences with the Social Democracy will decline, and the more numerous will be the functionaries and bureaucrats who would be prepared to make this leap (there were already quite a few in August–September 1939, and they will be even more numerous next time). But for the CPs as a whole, to break completely with the USSR would be to lose their own identity, which would be to plunge into an irreversible process of absorption by the Social Democracy. Because of the important material base guaranteed them by their independent existence, it is not likely that the leaderships of these parties will go all the way in the process of Social Democratization and break with Moscow completely. The present relations with Moscow thus suit them nicely at bottom.

But when Berlinguer, Santiago Carrillo, and Marchais speak of a plurality of political parties in the "building of socialism," when they call for trade-union independence of the state, when they say they are for the right to strike after the overthrow of capitalism, and when they denounce — still in an extremely hesitant and in-

sufficient manner — the violations of and crimes against proletarian democracy and elementary human rights in the USSR and the "people's democracies," then, yes, the Soviet bureaucracy becomes indignant and panics. To see only the aspect of "capitulation to the bourgeoisie" in "Eurocommunism" is to fail to understand that the Italian, French, Spanish, and Portuguese CPs are now evolving in a prerevolutionary situation, under the pressure of a working class that has understood some of the crimes of Stalinism and is firmly resolved to prevent their repetition by any means necessary. To see the pledges of the Berlinguers and Carrillos solely as concessions to the bourgeoisie is to fail to understand the powerful antibureaucratic component that accompanies the revolutionary upsurge in capitalist Europe. This was already visible in May 1968. It has powerfully come to the fore in the Portuguese revolutionary process and will be still more powerful in the rising Spanish, Italian, and French revolutions.



The Berlinguers, Marchais, Santiago Carrillos, and Cunhals do not like workers councils any more than the Brezhnevs, Husaks, or Kadar do. But they cannot frontally oppose the emergence of these councils so long as we are in a rising phase of the revolutionary process in southern Europe. They will be compelled to take evasive action rather than strike openly, to maneuver with the councils rather than liquidate them. Moreover, this is what makes their role especially dangerous from the standpoint of the fate of the socialist revolution, for these maneuvers are incontestably aimed at restabilizing the bourgeois order. But to be able to execute these maneuvers during a period of revolutionary upsurge, they must pay an ideological and political price. And this is what exploded like a bombshell in East Berlin. This is what is driving the bureaucracy to distraction. This is what has a boomerang effect for the Kremlin. The action of the Polish workers against the price increases, temporarily crowned with success, can only augment the dangers to its rule the Kremlin now sees taking shape on various sides.

The leaders of the CPs of Western Europe are defending some elementary principles of application of democratic

liberties and human rights during the phase of construction of socialism in their own countries, without the Kremlin excommunicating them the way Tito and Mao were excommunicated. Thus, one can be an advocate of a multiparty system, real freedom of the press, and the real right of the workers to strike after the overthrow of capitalism without automatically being dubbed a "frenzied anticommunist," an "agent of imperialism," or even a "Hitlerite Trotskyist." A question is thus immediately posed: Suppose a Czechoslovak, East German, Polish, Bulgarian, Soviet (or Yugoslav!) Communist demands the application of these same principles in his or her country as well? Would that make him or her an "anticommunist," a "partisan of the restoration of capitalism," a "slimy viper," or an "anti-Soviet agitator," simply for having repeated what "comrades" Santiago Carrillo, Berlinguer, and Marchais had proclaimed aloud in East Berlin?

According to information from generally well informed sources (although we have not yet been able to confirm the authenticity of the document), a letter drafted by a number of leaders of the Czechoslovak CP eliminated by the "normalization" (although Dubcek himself is said not to have signed) was distributed to the participants in the East Berlin conference. (Excerpts of it will be published in a future issue of INPRECOR.) This letter speaks of a "faction" of Czechoslovak Communists who agree with the "Eurocommunists" whose theses triumphed at the conference. Under these conditions, they call for an end to the repression to which they have been subjected and for the restoration of their rights, since their political line has already been rehabilitated in reality!

In order to escape from this embarrassment, Prava censored practically all the "controversial" passages in the speeches of the "Eurocommunists." But there was immediately a new accentuation of the crisis. Other bureaucrats of the "people's democracies" were unable to completely imitate Moscow's action. The bureaucrats of the German Democratic Republic, up to now the most rigid and servile in their subordination to the Kremlin, were compelled to publish the speeches of Berlinguer and company without a single cut, for the simple reason that the East German radio and television had already broadcast these speeches live and millions of people therefore already knew about them. Once again the revolutionary potential of instantaneous transmission of events at moments of great political and social crisis was verified, this time in East Europe.

Thus, the Kremlin's great fear is not so much that its influence over the CPs of West Europe will be further reduced. What it really fears are the effects "Eurocommunism" and the concessions to the antibureaucratic sentiments of the masses it entails can have on Moscow's control of the CPs and masses of East Europe and the USSR itself. In its own way, the accentuation of the crisis of Stalinism by the East Berlin conference heralds the tremendous storm that will break over East Europe and the USSR (and even China) after the first victories of the proletarian revolution in capitalist Europe.

It could then be asked why the Kremlin finally ceded before "Eurocommunism" and "polycentrism" if the repercussions in its own sphere of influence threaten to be so negative. The answer is that the cure would have been worse than the disease. A new, third "schism" in the Stalinist universe, with the open excommunication of the Spanish, Italian, French, and British CPs, would have unleashed even greater centrifugal forces in the "people's democracies" and the USSR. Especially in the light of the great events on the horizon in Spain and Italy, such an excommunication would have left the Kremlin with no capacity for intervening in the political life of capitalist Europe and would have been laden with consequences both in relation to imperialism and in relation to the least depoliticized sectors of the masses in the USSR and East Europe. Brezhnev thus opted for what was the lesser evil, from his own point of view.

One step forward, two steps back

Does this mean that we applaud the success incontestably won by "Eurocommunism" and "polycentrism" at the East Berlin conference? This would be to fall into a one-sided and opportunist evaluation of the balance-sheet of this conference.

First of all, the increased prestige won at low cost by the Berlinguers and companies in East Berlin increases their ability to manipulate and thereby betray the rising proletarian revolution in the West as well as the rising political revolution in the East. Significant evidence for this is provided by the euphoric commentaries of R. Havemann (who is nevertheless an honest, critical, and leftist communist and a fierce opponent of the bureaucracy) published in the July 5 issue of the West German weekly *Der Spiegel*. Enthusiastic about the "democratic" professions of faith of the "Eurocommunist" leaders and hoping for innumerable beneficial repercussions for opposition communists and toilers in the "people's democracies," Havemann fails to see the decisive concessions to the bourgeoisie. The abandoning of any struggle to destroy the bourgeois state apparatus and the strangling of the self-organization of the masses that is the inevitable consequence of attachment to bourgeois-parliamentary institutions imply the risk of defeat of the socialist revolution in southern Europe. The disastrous consequences this defeat would entail for the working class and for critical communists in East Europe are obvious.

Second, the ideological retreats of the leaders of the mass CPs in West Europe also unleash an objective dynamic. They have negative consequences both on Communist cadres and militants and on Communist workers. An entire generation of vanguard toilers who joined the CPs because they considered these parties the most combative and anticapitalist mass parties will be systematically misled into confusing the democratic rights of the masses with bourgeois-democratic institutions, opposition to the bureaucratic dictatorship and one-party regime with opposition to the power of workers councils, and, eventually, "austerity" imposed by a government of coalition with the bourgeoisie in order to restore the capitalist rate of profit with "a stage in the transition



The following is an excerpt from a dialogue between the Communist party of Spain, and Manuel Azcárate, a member of the Central Committee of this party. The dialogue appeared under the title "Azcárate and Claudín Discuss Euro

CLAUDIN. . . . In the USSR a bureaucratic system was created, whatever may be the historic and objective reasons. According to Trotsky, there were socialist structures on the one hand and a bureaucratic superstructure on the other (he called it a "deformed workers state"), with the superstructure in contradiction to this socialist structure. But at the end of his life Trotsky himself affirmed that if this was transformed into a stable regime, this bureaucratic class would be transformed into a ruling class, not in the sense of a body of private proprietors and a state subject to these proprietors, but rather because of the function its components would fulfill within the state and the party. For these reasons, it doesn't seem to me mechanical to characterize the USSR as a system that does not have socialist relations of production. But it does seem to me mechanical to assert that on the one hand there are socialist relations of production and on the other hand a political and ideological superstructure that is not socialist. This is one of the great problems that Marxists are now studying and discussing in order to arrive at the most scientific possible definition of the nature of the Soviet system, which cannot be assimilated to the western capitalist system, but in my opinion cannot be called a socialist system either. . . .

You said that one of the important problems is the question of the relations between the party and the state. Why do the Communist party of Spain and the other CPs maintain that there can and should be various parties, both in the phase of transition and under socialist society? Is it a matter of tactics or is it a profound question



Freedom is

en Fernando Claudín, ex-member and leader of the Spanish weekly *Triunfo* (July 3, 1976) on "Eurocommunism."

that corresponds to a requirement of social reality in these different phases of the march to socialism?

AZCARATE. It turns out that I am in greater agreement with Trotsky than you are. (Laughter.) This doesn't bother me. Trotsky was a great revolutionary, a great Marxist thinker. Regardless of the fact that some of his theories, especially during the last phase of his life, have proven erroneous, a good part of his critique of the Soviet system has been shown to be valid with the passage of time, especially as concerns the bureaucratic deformation of the Soviet system. I don't want to go into an exhaustive discussion about a theme around which investigation has to continue, but I would say that the Soviet system is a primitive socialist regime. This is a consequence of its extraordinarily low starting point, the international conditions under which it arose, and a series of enormous deformations, of which Stalinism is the expression, which froze it in this primitive state. I agree that there is an enormous distance between Soviet reality and our socialist ideal. . . .

As for our conception of the march to socialism, the basis must be a plurality of parties, both socialist parties and parties that are enemies of socialism, that represent sectors that do not agree with socialism but which, in our view, will be beaten politically because the parties that support socialism will be stronger. Neither in Marx nor in Lenin is there the idea that socialism means one party. . . .

to socialism." This threatens to have extremely serious consequences during a decisive test of strength between the bourgeois state apparatus and the nascent organs of workers power, as was the case in Germany in 1918-19 or in republican Spain in 1936-37.

All this indicates the responsibility of revolutionary Marxists, who must combine utilization of the new breach opened in the Stalinist fortress by "Eurocommunism" with an intransigent struggle for an anticapitalist revolutionary strategy in West Europe. Enlarging the breach also means going after the "Eurocommunist" leaders on their own abridgments of proletarian democracy.

It is one thing to strut about like great democrats in big auditoriums in Rome, Paris, Madrid, or even East Berlin. It is quite another thing to practice proletarian democracy where one holds real power. It is our duty to stress this contradiction and exploit it to the advantage of the working class.

What, then, are these great democrats waiting for before granting the right of tendency in the CGT (the French trade-union federation) or the CGIL (the Italian union federation) or the national and regional coordinating bodies of the Workers Commissions (in Spain), which they control? What are they waiting for before allowing the election at all trade-union congresses of delegates elected in general assemblies, delegates chosen on the basis of the presentation of reports and counterreports by each of the trade-union tendencies and ideological currents present in the trade unions? What are they waiting for to introduce freedom of the press in the trade unions, with open discussion tribunes for different tendencies? Are they prepared once and for all to halt the bureaucratic practice of expelling revolutionary minorities from the unions? What are they waiting for to reintroduce the right of tendency in their own parties?

As for denunciation of the crimes committed by the bureaucracy against workers democracy, the rights of the toilers, and human rights, their first timid protests cannot satisfy anyone. Some leaders of the Spanish CP have declared that Trotsky was a great revolutionary. (See extracts attached to this article.) We hail this confession as a step forward. It immediately follows that these same leaders must publicly denounce the crimes committed by the GPU against Andres Nin, the leaders of the POUM, the Trotskyists and left anarchists during the Spanish civil war.

But there is more. One ex-member of the Communist party of Spain (or is he still a member?), Ramon Mercader, murdered the great revolutionary Trotsky. He lives in Moscow today, decorated with a high Soviet medal, and whiles away his time writing a history of the Spanish civil war (who knows, maybe it will be "critical" too). The leaders of the Spanish, Italian, and French CPs should demand that this vile murderer be hauled before a tribunal formed by the international workers movement. They should demand the public rehabilitation of Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev,

Rakovsky, and all the old Bolsheviks. They should demand that the works of these great revolutionaries be freely published and distributed in the USSR and the "people's democracies." Otherwise their pledges in favor of socialist democracy remain little credible.

The same remark applies to the advocates of "liberal communism" in East Europe. It appears that Tito and Ceausescu applaud "Eurocommunism" with both hands. But violations of proletarian democracy are multiplying in Yugoslavia (and violations of self-management too, witness the affair of the Marxist professors of philosophy in Belgrade), while the internal Romanian regime is one of the most repressive and Stalinist of all the "people's democracies." Let these gentlemen begin to bring their actions into conformity with their words; otherwise the credibility of their "democratic" and "pluralistic" pledges will be undermined even further.

The East Berlin conference reflected a deepening not only of the crisis of Stalinism, but also of the ideological and theoretical bankruptcy of Stalinism. At a time when the international capitalist system is going through its most serious crisis since the second world war, the CPs of Europe are completely incapable of drawing any of the indicated conclusions for the workers of Europe and the world. They have nothing to offer but time-worn neo-Keynesian palliatives, which the bourgeoisie itself is now questioning as less and less effective. At a time when the internationalization of the productive forces and class conflict is attaining an unprecedented degree, the CPs proudly come up with an increasingly pronounced nationalist withdrawal.

In face of this bankruptcy, the Fourth International, legitimate heir of communism and the Communist International, today embodies living Marxist thought, proletarian internationalism, and the road to the proletarian revolution. With its still weak and very insufficient forces relative to the gigantic tasks of our epoch, but forces that are after all growing rapidly, that have increased tenfold during past years, the Fourth International says to the proletarians of Europe and the world: The combined crisis of capitalism and Stalinism facilitates the accomplishment of your historic task. Forward to the socialist revolution, to the overthrow of the reign of capital, to the democratic power of workers councils, to the Socialist United States of Europe and the World!

Forty years ago, Trotsky wrote: "Many things suggest that the disintegration of the Comintern, which has no direct support in the GPU, will precede the fall of the Bonapartist clique and the entire thermidorian bureaucracy in general." (Transitional Program.) When Tito, paraphrasing Berlinguer, said of the East Berlin conference that it "has no past and no future," in his own way he confirmed Trotsky's prediction. In Warsaw it is being murmured that Stalin died for the third time in East Berlin, but that he is not yet dead for good. The victory of the proletarian revolution in Europe will bury him definitively.

July 13, 1976

Poland



1970. Communist party headquarters in Szczecin was attacked when government attempts to raise food prices sparked protests by angry workers in many Polish cities.

THE WORKERS RESPOND

by F. DUPAIN

On the night of June 26, the day after the increases in food prices were rescinded(1), there was dancing in the streets of Warsaw. The Polish working class made no mistake about the meaning of the bureaucracy's retreat. This retreat, won in an incredibly short time and at much less cost than in December 1970(2), showed that neither the bureaucracy nor the working class had forgotten the revolt of the workers in the Baltic ports.

Immediately after the official announcement by Premier Jaroszewicz that the prices of basic food products were to go up, the broadest strike since 1970 paralyzed dozens of factories in all regions of the country. In some instances (the Ursus tractor factory near Warsaw is the best known example), the workers did not merely stop work and fold their arms. Some workers participated in street demonstrations in their cities (in Radom they burned the building housing the Communist party headquarters); others, such as the workers of Ursus, blockaded nearby railroads in order to popularize their struggle.

The timing of the price increases had been "psychologically" well chosen this time, unlike in December 1970. The students had already left on vacation and many workers were preparing for their annual leaves. In addition, the population had been bombarded with an intense "explanatory" campaign.

For months the press and the party leaders had been insistently harping on the need to "rationalize" the domestic market, which they said inevitably required a return to "true prices." The growing shortage of certain food products, meat in particular, fueled this insidious campaign, which suggested that the Poles were overindulging in consumption, encouraged by prices that had remained too low. Viewed within a technocratic logic, the arguments of the bureaucracy could seem irrefutable. The relative discretion, and even comprehension, of the bourgeois press is characteristic in this regard. According to the June 26 issue of *Le Monde* (which came off the press on June 25), the Polish government had no other choice. In the view of the bourgeois press, the credibility (the exact term used by *Le Monde*) of the Polish bureaucracy in face of its many and uneasy western creditors was at stake. But since that day in June, the spell is broken. The spell of Gierek — "efficient," "a good manager," "popular." The model of consumption he tried to impose on a people frustrated by the "benefits" of the West could not be led to completion.

The anesthetic didn't work

In fact, the Polish bureaucracy believed it was sufficient to make a few economic concessions to a working class that was decidedly too militant. Lacking support from this working class (and very few bureaucrats really believe that there is such support), the bureaucracy turned toward the "new layers of technicians" and a part of the intelligentsia. The consumer model proposed — which included happiness as conceived by *Fiat Polski*, completely private apartments, a house in the countryside, and easier trips abroad — partially corresponded to the aspirations of a social layer that felt left out during the Gomulka era. Incapable of proposing genuinely socialist solutions to the problems of daily life and offering mass transit that was certainly cheap but often badly organized and crowded, apartments that were tiny and uncomfortable, and an anarchic domestic market with low-quality products, the bureaucracy was unable to prevent the development of a life style and mode of consumption similar to that vaunted by western magazines as an alternative to the bureaucracy's own flat grey. Moreover, one may ask whether this model has not become the ideal even of this bureaucracy, whose life style increasingly resembles that of petty-bourgeois nouveaux riches.

When the Gierek team was called to power, the bureaucracy assigned it two essential tasks: anesthetize a working class that had shaken the bureaucracy's power; reorganize an economy inadapted to the needs of the country. All the objectives of planning had to be re-examined. Not only did planning have to attend to the most burning needs of the population, it also had to promote a policy of full employment. The 1971-1975 plan, worked out under the reign of Gomulka, had called for a small rise in income and a soaring of unemployment from 600 workers to 700,000! Gierek was instructed to "build a new Poland."⁽³⁾ It is no accident that one-fourth of all existing enterprises have been constructed during the past five years. In fact,

the very significant industrial boom the country has experienced has been achieved at the cost of a growing foreign debt to the West and a greater and greater dependence on the world market.⁽⁴⁾ Constantly subjected to the pressure of a working class whose December 1970 victory had rendered it no longer passive, a working class that did not hesitate to stop work in order to make itself heard⁽⁵⁾, the bureaucracy thought it had found a miracle solution: western credits.

At top speed, the bureaucracy threw itself into feverish construction of housing, the plans for which may have seemed charming at first glance. In reality, the foundation rested on quicksand and the materials used were of doubtful quality. The working class had nothing at all to say about this system, this attempt at a "new look." None of the political or trade-union demands raised by the workers of the Baltic ports in 1970 were satisfied.⁽⁶⁾ The only thing that changed was the tone in which the bureaucracy addressed the workers. Where it had been authoritarian and dogmatic in the past, it became persuasive and intimate.

The economic imbalance

The structural imbalances the country suffers have not been eliminated. Purely Polish problems are tacked onto the general incapacities of the bureaucratic system. Agriculture, still under the grip of archaic structures, employs a plethora of laborers whose productivity is one of the lowest in Europe.⁽⁷⁾ The peasantry, suspicious because of the experience of forced collectivization during the Stalinist period, rejects any process of placing the land under common ownership. The regime's inability to deliver all the necessary fertilizer and machinery to the peasants made them a social class increasingly prepared to resort to the weapon of delivery strikes, in spite of the many advantages the peasants have accumulated during the past several years. Although Poland traditionally had a largely favorable trade balance in the sector of food and agricultural products, during the years 1971-75 it piled up a deficit of \$1,500 million, the essential part of which was repayable in 1974 and 1975.

The world crisis of capitalism accelerated the process of demystification of this experience. Credits have become more difficult to obtain during the past two years. Exports to the West, which were intended to provide the wherewithal to repay these loans, declined so much that Jaroszewicz estimated the net loss at \$1,500 million for 1974 and 1975, that is, 15 percent of total Polish exports to the western countries. The increases in the prices of raw materials also dealt a hard blow to the Polish economy. Like all the other countries of Comecon, Poland had to pay 130 percent more for the great quantities of gas and oil imported from the USSR, not to mention the consequences of capitalist inflation on the prices of the capital goods Poland bought on the western market.

In spite of a clear improvement in the living conditions of the workers (average wages increased about 40 per-

cent in five years), the Gierk team was unable to overcome the weight of the past left by the Gomulka era. The country is still suffering from inflation (the money supply has more than doubled in four years); in spite of a real effort, the problem of housing remains one of the most painful aspects of working-class life (despite the enormous destruction wreaked by the war, Poland has constructed much less than most European countries; the number of persons per housing unit in Poland is the highest in Europe, along with the USSR). Supply of the market remains precarious, especially since the demands of consumers have risen.

Attacking the workers' gains

In spite of the promises of December 1970 and January 1971, the bureaucracy has launched insidious attacks on the gains of the workers. Some social benefits, health insurance for example, have been seriously cut. Prices are not stable any more. Even according to official statistics, they have increased 13.2 percent in five years. The sectors most heavily affected have been services and transport. Some subsidies have been cut to the bone. The situation of women workers has not improved much: official propaganda exudes an ideology worthy of religious images — the mother taking care of her numerous progeny is glorified, while child-care centers are increasingly few and badly equipped.

Incapable of attending to the essential needs of the population, the bureaucracy resorted to expedients, not least private initiative. Henceforth, the state will no longer rent out low-cost housing. Only co-ownership will be possible. The private sector has been called upon to contribute. A law has just been passed permitting any foreigner to invest in the country with a guarantee of exporting an important part of the profits. When one takes account of the fact that this appeal concerns mainly the services sectors (hotels, restaurants, garages, small shops, etc.), one can imagine the eminently "socialist" result of such an experiment in a country in which about 200,000 citizens have official currency accounts in the state bank.

The economic reform, officially enacted in 1973, is marking time. Decentralization was effected to the advantage of the largest enterprises in each branch. The discussion within the bureaucracy on this point seems not to be over.

After a long period of convalescence, the intelligentsia seems to have recovered from the traumas of the 1968-69 period. Broken by the repression it suffered after the student demonstrations of March 1968 and mutilated by the emigration of some of its representatives, the intelligentsia remained passive during the December 1970 events. Its irruption last winter, during the affair of the new constitution, testifies to its new vitality but also reveals the crisis undermining Polish society. An initial appeal, signed by fifty-nine intellectuals, attacked the new provisions of the constitution, which were to establish "eternal friendship with the Soviet Union" and impose certain obligations on each citizen

toward the regime. The "59" also demanded that some fundamental liberties be guaranteed, among them the right to strike. This appeal was followed by several others signed by university teachers and students, among them the appeal of Lipinski, one of the veterans of the Polish workers movement. Nevertheless, the most promising was the appeal signed by workers and intellectuals in Lodz. The solidarity expressed by the workers with the intellectuals, some of whom had signed the "appeal of the 59," is characteristic of a new state of spirit, of the consciousness that, as in 1956, only unity with the workers can make the bureaucracy back down.

Weak link in the bureaucratic chain, Poland is on the eve of great changes, which are only the reflection of the deep crisis of the bureaucratic regimes. Its working class has never really been broken since 1956. Just the contrary, every time it has gone into motion, it has forced the bureaucracy to retreat. From now on, nothing will be as before.

FOOTNOTES:

1. The prices of practically all food products were to have gone up, from 30 to 100 percent (meat 60 percent, butter 100 percent). Only milk and bread were left untouched.
2. The increase was announced on the night of June 25 and rescinded twenty-four hours later. Officially, there were "only" two dead and several dozen wounded in Radom, the city where the incidents took a particularly violent turn. Several hundred "hooligans" were arrested. In the Baltic ports in 1970 the repression resulted in hundreds of dead.
3. This "exhilarating" slogan has been the leitmotiv during the past few years. It is characteristic of the demagoguery of a bureaucracy in search of a "new look."
4. Poland's foreign debt to the West is estimated at \$6,000 million. The Comecon share in total trade fell from 63 percent in 1970 to 49 percent in 1975.
5. During past years, not a month has passed without a strike breaking out in some enterprise. The best known, for it was the most spectacular, was the dockers strike in Gdansk, which paralyzed the port in August 1974 so thoroughly that troops had to be called in to unblock it.
6. Among these demands were: for a genuinely independent trade union; for real trade-union freedom. The workers also demanded that there be no prosecution of the members of the strike committee. In fact, the most active militants were prosecuted.
7. Some 34 percent of the active population is still employed in agriculture, about 80 percent of which is private, based on small plots of less than 10 hectares each. Productivity is not even half that of some other countries of East Europe (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary). In 1974 overall agricultural production increased only 1.6 percent (the plan had called for a 4.3 percent increase); in 1975 it fell 2.4 percent compared with 1974.



south africa

BEHIND THE BLACK REVOLT

●by LANGA●

The uprising in Soweto, South Africa, was brutally repressed on June 16 and 17, with more than 100 Africans murdered. But the toiling masses were neither intimidated nor demoralized by the attack on the vast ghetto of more than 1 million African workers and their families just outside Johannesburg. In fact, the protest, which began as a struggle against the Bantu education policy of the racist regime, quickly spread to nearby Alexandra Township, famed for a mass boycott of apartheid buses during the second world war, then to the Mamelodi location, a cheap labor camp near Pretoria, and then to two Transvaal Bantu "homelands," rural reservoirs of cheap labor, and one in Zululand, where students also revolted against Bantu education.

The rebellion was quelled by one of the world's most concentrated totalitarian states, but it had affected some 3 million semi-migrant, semi-settled proletarians around the gold mining Witwatersrand. These proletarians lack even the semblance of rights, denied the life of a settled urbanized working class or a stable rural peasantry. They stand at the hub of the gold mining industry of world imperialism. The June revolt was the most serious uprising in a long history of class struggle against the Anglo-Boer system of racial discrimination known as "apartheid." There has been no lack of mass revolt against this system: Natal in 1906, a general miners strike followed by massacres in Queenstown (the Cape) and Bondelzwart (Namibia) soon after the first world war, the Marabastad (Transvaal) struggle and the miners strike in 1946, the battles in Witzieshoek (Natal) after the second world war and Sharpeville and Langa in 1960. But this was the first massacre of a mass rebellion against the Boer policy of "retribalization," which is part of the entire West European policy sponsored by Catholic and Social Democratic "Africanists" since the war. In this sense, it was the first significant anti-Western rebellion, and Vorster duly crushed it in the name of the West.

While the massacres in the locations were going on, Vorster held meetings with Henry Kissinger in Bavaria

and Helmut Schmidt in Bonn. The site of these meetings was appropriate, for West Germany is South Africa's first trading partner (if gold is excluded; otherwise Britain is first) and has investments in the apartheid state to the tune of \$2,000 million, including a special deal on fissionable raw material. The West German regime acted as spokesman for the entire Common Market, on the basis of the EEC Council and "parliament" resolutions of April 1976. These resolutions effectively supported apartheid by deliberately omitting (as did Kissinger's statements in Nairobi) any reference to "majority rule" in South Africa. At the same time, in Bavaria and Bonn, as well as in the United Nations meeting on Soweto, the entire bloc of imperialist states made it clear that they would not stand for "sanctions" against South Africa. This is, of course, not surprising, for a genuine boycott of South Africa would represent the "foreign policy" of the anti-imperialist, anti-apartheid class struggle in South Africa itself, the external application of the practice of the internal mass movement: non-collaboration with Herrenvolkism. It would thus involve the extension of the internal class struggle against U.S. and EEC imperialism, guarantor of the apartheid bastion.

Origins of South African racism

The racial colony of South Africa was a special product of the development of European colonialism in its interaction with precolonial societies in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. Broadly speaking, this interaction took three different forms: a) The North American or Australian road, whereby the colons were settled on lands whose tribal, communal owners were dispossessed and often massacred. Here primary accumulation took a genocidal form and the cheap-labor basis of colonialism was eradicated. b) The "Indian" road, taken in countries in which the European invaders found strong indigenous classes and ruled through the native ruling classes, transforming them into tribute collectors, compradors, and finally, under "independence," junior dependent

partners and managers of the semicolonial state. c) The road pursued in Brazil, the southern part of what is now the United States, and South Africa, where the decimation of the indigenous population was combined with massive importation and exploitation of slaves, while the pastoral or agricultural societies (for example, the Khoi-Khoi and Bantu in southern Africa) were broken down and inserted into a system of racist "indirect rule" through chiefs. With the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century, ex-slaves and serfs evolved into a racially regimented layer of cheap wage-laborers. Thus emerged the color-bar society. In the total absence of real or potential pre-existing local exploiting classes, the white population became the social base and agency of colonialism.

Cheap labor, superprofits

The roots of apartheid have never resided in the psychosis of racial mystique. Their origins lie plainly and simply in the need to extract immense profits from the superexploitation of cheap labor. In South Africa, however, labor has been kept cheap not simply by the self-regulating processes of capitalism, such as the reserve army of unemployed. On the contrary, ever since the mining revolution began a century ago, there has been a chronic shortage of labor, combined with an excess of capital. H.F. Oppenheimer points to a labor shortage and capital excess in nearly all yearly reports, including 1976. The South African labor reserves were never sufficient for the labor needs of monopoly capital, which had to



This third road took its sharpest form in South Africa. After a period of capitalist plantation slavery under Holland (1652-1795 and 1802-06) and Britain (1795-1802 and from 1806 on), British monopoly capital, backed by massive British, Dutch, French, German, and later Jewish immigration, created a racist state. Throughout the period of the rise of imperialism from 1860 to 1900, the economic base was provided by Natal sugar, Kimberly diamonds, and Johannesburg gold. The mining revolution occurred amidst rapid territorial conquests, an extension of the reserves (retribalized rural Bantustans as reservoirs of cheap labor), and the establishment of compound locations ringed urban areas (concentration of migrant laborers and semi-migrant, partially settled families); in addition, there was imported white labor.

The rapid expansion of capital from Europe on the basis of the exploitation of dispossessed cheap African labor with no rights, backed up by an iron alliance of white labor and capital against non-European labor, led to the first significant fusion of monopoly capital with the capitalist state. South Africa's white "democracy" was rooted in totalitarian rule over an internal "black colony" that included the majority of the population. The cheap labor centers, nuclei of colonial superprofits, were the real sources of the racist state, racism, and racial prejudice.

scour beyond the Limpopo River (north of South Africa), and even beyond the Zambezi (north of Rhodesia), deep into Africa as far as the equator, in its search for cheap labor. North of the Bantustans and protectorates, Britain established a vast network of reserves from which to recruit cheap labor for the mining-finance hub of the South African economy. At present, according to London Stock Exchange quotations, the market capital of South African mines (excluding banking, insurance, construction, and industrial and commercial investment) amounts to approximately \$14,000 million. All this was built up by cheap African labor, the profits from which were directly and indirectly ploughed back to create the world's most massive and concentrated single monopoly structure, or multinational mono-industry. The total EEC stake in the South African economy is on the order of \$30,000 million (the U.S. share is only about 12 percent).

This capital has an insatiable appetite for cheap labor, which means African labor. Through Cecil Rhodes's Recruiting Corporation and its partner, the Native Affairs Department (now renamed the Bantu Affairs Department), European capital turned most of Africa south of the Sahara into a cheap-labor hinterland. This forms the labor base for the as yet unofficial but nonetheless very real South African Common Market. At first, the labor reservoirs for this market consisted of the Bantustans and protectorates, the Portuguese colonies, the

former German colonies, Rhodesia, British West and East Africa, and even the former Belgian Congo. Despite the fact that most of these states have since become independent, they have continued to supply cheap labor to South Africa. The economic domination of these states by Anglo-South African capital has likewise continued, especially in mining, plantations, and cash-crop production. (In July 1965, when a motion to nationalize South Africa's vast holdings in Kenya was made by Kenyan parliament members and senators, Jomo Kenyatta rejected the motion, saying, "We are not thieves." Thus, the robbed are called robbers when they try to recover their own property.)

Every South African regime, from General Smuts (the major architect of apartheid) to Herzog to Malan to Strydom to Verwoerd and now to Vorster, has supervised this process of dragging the cheap labor net across most of southern and central Africa. The "détente" policies of the Vorster regime today have an economic history behind them. Part of this history lies in the character of African "independence" as a cheap-labor reserve.

The South African Common Market

The major stakes of imperialism in South Africa are as follows:

1) More than \$30,000 million of Western capital, the bulk of it from Common Market countries. There are financial and mining links between South Africa and Britain (the City would collapse without South African gold, diamond, and other mines), France (including an arms trade), Germany (which would like to see Namibia accede to "independence" in order to be able to dominate the territory through Germany's old mineral, industrial, commercial, and farming interests there), Holland, and the United States. EEC and OECD statistics indicate that in the early 1970s annual rates of increase in trade with South Africa were as follows: USA 15%, Holland 42%, France 48%, Germany 24%, Belgium 40%, Italy 16%, Switzerland 22%.

2) South Africa accounts for almost half of all industry in Africa. The industrial starvation of Africa is a characteristic of colonialism.

3) South Africa supplies about one-fourth of Africa's free on board export values and absorbs about one-fourth of Africa's c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight) import values.

4) South Africa supplies three-fourths of the Western world's gold requirements (bullion and industrial). Without this supply, there would be a total collapse of the monetary system of the OECD countries.

5) South Africa is a major source of uranium for the West's atomic industries, including the arms industry.

6) South Africa is the West's white base against Africa's struggle for real independence and democracy. The Western strategists do not see the "independence" trick as a workable alternative to apartheid. Since the only real alternative is another Vietnam or Cuba, they have long since resolved to retain the essential substance of apartheid, changing only its "structural relations" with the internal and external hinterland.

Such are the basic features of the South African Common Market, upon which Western strategy has been based. After the second world war, in the context of the shifts in the world relationship of forces and the rise of independent states, first in Asia and then in Africa, there was a reappraisal of imperialist strategy. The latest instrument of this strategy is "dialogue" and "coexistence."

Imperialism's new 'grand strategy'

The imperialist powers survived the postwar crisis by granting "independence" to the African colonies. Black managers were installed to look after white estates, and unprecedented superprofits flowed into Western European and North American banks; unprecedented wealth was congealed in the form of spirally expanding fixed capital. This neocolonialism steadily widened the gap between the rich and poor capitalist countries and placed new military and economic demands on the workers states. Thus, when the international recession and the Portuguese crisis created a new situation, the economic framework and political machinery existed for applying the new imperialist strategy, the major elements of which may be summarized as follows:

1. To lower the "color line" from the Zambezi to the Limpopo, that is, from Rhodesia to South Africa.

2. To protect the West's white bastion through a cordon sanitaire of "independent Bantustans." Some of these lie outside South Africa politically, others inside.

3. To consolidate the South African Common Market in Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rhodesia (through attempting to install "majority rule" puppets who would guarantee the property of the white settlers), Angola and Mozambique (South African interests in railroads, cheap labor to be exported to South African mines, the Cabora Bassa dam), and to some extent also in Nigeria and Ghana (banking, mining, and plantation interests). The potential labor reserve of this Common Market approaches 200 million, about half of all Africa.

4. To achieve this consolidation and expand it as one of the means by which to overcome the recession and problems of raw materials, through "coexistence." There was to be a veritable galaxy of black stars in the white Common Market.

5. To internationalize this process by gradually partitioning South Africa. All concentrations of wealth — the great cities, mines, finance centers, harbors, means of communication and transport, industry, the vast array of means of production and sources of raw materials — would remain firmly part of white South Africa. The supply of cheap labor, that is, the Africans, would continue to be treated as foreigners, but in a new sense: The Xhosa workers and peasants would have a Xhosa "homeland," which would be recognized as their "nation"; the Zulus would have a Zululand, and so on. The aim is a "retribalization" of the tribal societies that had in fact been uprooted and overturned by Boer and British colonialism, an attempt to divide and rule



the "foreign immigrant" workers. "Africanists" and "traditionalists" would be employed at every level to further these ends "culturally." The whites would remain absolutely dominant politically and economically. The approximately 2 million "colored" people and the 750,000 Indians would be granted a special status based on the Coloured Affairs Department and Asian Affairs Department acting through "colored" and Asian Quislings functioning in the labor locations, schools, "bush colleges," and churches. A subsidiary aspect of this process is the elimination of "petty apartheid" — the separate parks, beaches, waiting rooms in bus terminals, and so on. But "big apartheid" — the locations, barracks, labor reserves, wage differentials, disenfranchisement — would remain, not only in practice, but also in law, under the formula "equal but different." These avenues of "new race relations" are already being explored by many liberal Boer and British circles, not to mention the EEC and the United States. The whites would continue to enjoy luxury and equality; locations, barracks, reserves, educational oppression, and deprivation of land would continue to be the lot of the blacks.

6. To further Bantustanize Namibia, granting it "independence" in the certain knowledge of West German collaboration, based on the racist German business colons established when Namibia was a German colony (before the first world war).

7. To fortify the frontier: politically through the "independent" states and militarily through U.S. and EEC land and air forces backed up by NATO naval forces capable of penetrating these frontiers virtually at will, as was done in Angola in 1975-76.

8. To make no concessions to the non-collaborationist political movements in South Africa or to the demand for full democratic rights, including the full franchise, that is, the right not only to vote but also to be elected and to make the laws of the country on a non-racist basis. The foundation stone of the domestic aspect of this "détente" policy remains the British-drafted White Dominion Act of White Union, passed in 1910.

This Act, along with the economic, social, and cultural racism on which it is based, constitutes the white pole of "détente." The flag that now flies from this pole — the flag of black collaboration with white bosses — is intended to be invulnerable to the "winds of change." It will, however, be hauled down by the united weapon of non-collaboration of the non-European toiling masses in a social struggle that must inevitably result in a massive combination of Cuba and Vietnam. For in South Africa, unlike most of the rest of Africa, imperialism cannot risk a solution that grants apparent racial equality but nonetheless maintains the white man as boss. South Africa combines the most explosive and concentrated contradictions of the entire Western system, and it is only the mighty and unbeaten proletariat, lacking in rights, landless, centered in the mines, and trained in the concentration camps, that will be able to achieve the complete abolition of racism, the agrarian revolution, full, non-racist democracy, and therefore the expropriation without compensation of white imperialist-settler capital and property in its entirety.

Completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution

The white socialists, trade unionists, and Stalinists who introduced or administered the industrial color bar always belittled the struggle for full democratic rights as a minor affair, not as important as socialism. Although they called for "socialism," in 1922 they shot down African miners and raised the slogan "For a white socialist South Africa." They helped to break one non-European organization after another: the All-African Convention, which the Stalinists betrayed by becoming representatives in the all-white parliament; the trade unions, which they segregated on the basis of the Industrial Conciliation Act and the policy of "white labor"; the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, with more than 100,000 members during the 1920s, which was battered to death by the Liberal-Labour agents of the British Trade Union (Motherwell) Congress; the National Liberation League and the Non-European United Front, which the Stalinists sacrificed to Smut's second-world-war effort in 1940. All these white "socialists" had one thing in common: They used socialism as the pretext by which to denigrate the struggle for democracy, thus protecting their own racist privileges.

For genuine socialists, however, the struggle not to be treated like a pariah, to be a woman or man with dignity, and to build a non-racist society, was part of the stuff socialism is made of. It was part of the "happiness of each . . . and the happiness of all" and not an abstraction fit only for Herrenvolk "socialists" for whom the struggle of the slaves is not important. The white "socialists" in fact betrayed both the struggle for socialism and the struggle for democratic rights. Thus, the Communist party was created by anti-African white British and emigré socialists. It maintained a color bar and its racial policy included the slogan "for a white socialist South Africa." It supported racist indirect rule even before the rise of Stalinism in the Soviet Union

and the bureaucratic degeneration of the Communist International.

The history of the "left" in South Africa has proven that substituting the "struggle for socialism" for the struggle for full democratic rights is nothing other than a racist oppression of the latter struggle. There is no road to socialism other than the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and, equally, there is no road to full democratic rights other than the social revolution. It is not an exaggeration to say that foreign and domestic white "socialism" was and remains an arm of imperialism and Herrenvolkism in South Africa. This is why united fronts in South Africa have excluded the white "socialist" parties as well as the white bourgeois parties (but not the CP, inasmuch as it was nominally part of the "liberation movement"). On the other hand, the united fronts have included the petty-bourgeois "coloured" African People's Organization, the African National Congress, which is mainly African, and later, during the brief Sharpeville period, the anti-Communist anti-Africanist Congress, as well as the Indian Congress, based mainly on the merchant class in the Natal, provided these organizations accepted the exclusion of the Liberals from such fronts. The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) itself held negotiations with the Indian Congress on this group's entry into the NEUM, provided it would accept these principles:

- a) nothing less than full democratic rights beginning with the full franchise, that is, no special deals for the merchant class at the expense of the Africans and other oppressed non-Europeans;
- b) non-collaboration, that is, no special Indian or other "representatives," boycott of the Bantu Affairs Department, Coloured Affairs Department, projected

Asian Advisory Board, local Advisory Councils, "multi-racial" Liberal bodies, "tribal" chiefs, and the rest of the gamut of racist institutions of indirect rule.

The dividing line is not between "socialist" and "non-socialist" but between collaboration and non-collaboration with imperialism and its agents, inside and outside South Africa.

The fruits of this struggle may not ripen soon. Imperialism will try to hold on in South Africa to the very end, for the reasons listed above. Events will be decided by the class struggle within South Africa, and not by developments in Rhodesia, Angola, or Mozambique, which are ambivalent in their effects on South Africa. There will be a mighty armed intervention by imperialism, a mighty resistance, and a victory for the non-European oppressed. But the domestic class struggle will decide things only in a tense international context, which is not a matter of indifference for the course of the permanent revolution in South Africa.

The workers of the imperialist countries are moving toward an upsurge of the proletarian revolution. They can finish what the colonial toilers have begun and can in turn open up new social revolutions in the semicolonial countries. The international solidarity of the proletariat in the imperialist countries will be decisive for the revolution in South Africa, where the imperialists will certainly intervene directly. Precisely because South Africa is, as Trotsky put it in 1935, both a "white dominion" (imperialist) and a "slave colony," it may well require an assault on both systems in order to create adequate conditions for the non-European oppressed toilers to explode the racial powderkeg in South Africa.

Boycott the Apartheid Regime!

DECLARATION OF THE UNITED SECRETARIAT OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The protests by South African students and parents against the use of Afrikaans as the language of instruction in the schools and the massive demonstrations in solidarity with them by black Africans have exposed the brutality of the apartheid regime and shown the world the desire of the African masses to end the racist oppression they suffer. The Fourth International denounces the barbaric murder of more than 150 unarmed demonstrators by the apartheid regime. This brutal crime once again reveals the true nature of this regime and the apartheid system it perpetuates, a systematic denial of all political rights to the black and "colored" people of South Africa, the overwhelming majority of the population, in order to maintain the superexploitation of black and "colored" workers in the interests of imperialist and white South African superprofits.

The struggle of South African youth for their elementary democratic rights — including the right to an education in the language of their choice — is an integral part of the struggle of all black and "colored" Africans for full democratic freedom, symbolized by the demand "one person one vote" without racial discrimination of any kind.

The Fourth International calls for a vigorous campaign of international solidarity with the struggle of black Africans against the Pretoria murderers and their imperialist backers. **BOYCOTT SOUTH AFRICAN GOODS, SHIPS, AND AIRPLANES! NOT ONE GUN, NOT ONE PENNY OF AID FOR PRETORIA! SUPPORT THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE AFRICAN MASSES!**

July 4, 1976

BEHIND CHINA'S POLITICAL CRISIS

by S. S. WU

Below is the second, concluding installment of Comrade Wu's analysis of the current political crisis in China. The first installment appeared in the preceding issue of INPRECOR (No. 55, July 8, 1976.)



III. CLIMAX & ANTICLIMAX

The Maoist faction has its trump card — Mao himself. But the "reversionist faction" also had a trump card — Chou En-lai. Before the cultural revolution, there could be no equation between the impact of the two. Shortly before the death of Chou, however, the situation had changed. The popularity of Mao the revolutionary was declining in favor of that of Chou, who was widely regarded by the masses as the "stabilizer" of society, the man under whom the masses would not be so frequently bothered and thrown into panic by constant political campaigns. A significant number of Communist party cadres felt the same way.

As the February mass movement receded, the new trump card was played. For thousands of years the Ching Ming festival in April had been an occasion for people to commemorate their late relatives and friends. The revolution did not alter this tradition. On April 3 people bearing wreaths appeared at the site in Peking where the public mourning for Chou had taken place not many weeks before. In effect, this was a political offensive against the Maoist faction. It was Chou, even more than Teng Hsiao-ping, who had insisted on the "four modernizations" of China and had called for unity and stability.

No one can be sure whether it was the reversionist faction that initiated this dramatic beginning. But in any event, the action drew genuine popular support and the Maoist faction was stymied, fearing discredit if it used force to break up this peaceful mass outpouring. The following day more people went to lay wreaths; some even made speeches, others distributed leaflets, and wall posters were put up. There was a high degree of spontaneity and tension was building. With Chou dead, people began to express indignation not only against the Maoist faction, but also against the social formation as a whole. This became clear on the following day.

In the early morning of April 5 Tien An Men Square, political heart of China, was engulfed in a riot involv-

ing 100,000 anonymous citizens of Peking. Most reports indicated that the strong mass reaction was triggered by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which is said to have removed the wreaths on the night of April 4 and the morning of April 5. The first target of the masses was a propaganda car belonging to the Public Security Department; it was overturned and smashed. By 9:00 a.m. 10,000 demonstrators were already massed before the Great Hall of the People. The number of protesters eventually grew to ten times that figure, even according to official estimates. Scuffles broke out between the demonstrators and the police and militiamen. Hundreds of militiamen were beaten by demonstrators and forced to kneel down and "confess."

After 11:00 a.m. tens of thousands of protesters stormed the Museum of History and a PLA camp. During the following two hours, police tried to break up the demonstration but were unsuccessful and even suffered injuries. The situation got completely out of control in the afternoon. Government cars were burned, buildings stormed and the equipment inside smashed. The violence continued late into the evening and resulted in hundreds of casualties among the police and militia.

The demands of the demonstration were expressed in a poem that was reprinted by the Peking People's Daily on April 7:

Devils howl as we pour out our grief,
we weep but the wolves laugh,
we spill our blood in memory of the hero,
raising our brows we unsheathe our swords.
China is no longer the China of the past,
and the people are no longer wrapped in
sheer ignorance,
gone for good is Chin Shih Huang's feudal
society.

We believe in Marxism-Leninism!
To hell with those scholars who emasculate it!
For the sake of genuine Marxism-Leninism
we do not fear to lay down our lives or shed
our blood,
and the day that China's modernization is
realized
we will return to offer libations and sacrifices.

People's Daily reported that a handful of class enemies had deliberately prepared and organized the mass outburst. But who were these class enemies? The report did not even dare ask. The role of Teng and the revisionists in this event remains obscure. No one has yet been able to prove or disprove their involvement in the organization of the riot. But this is not of great significance. What is more important is that 100,000 people took to the streets and directly confronted the party and the state. It is difficult to believe that the protest would have taken such a violent form if the revisionist faction had really planned it in advance. In fact, the size and violent nature of the action strongly suggest that what was involved was an outburst of mass discontent against bureaucratic control and party policies. Whether or not the revisionists tried to play a hand in it, the action was spontaneous.

Nevertheless, we should not be overjoyed by this mass explosion, for it was marked by severe weaknesses as well as strengths. In their desire and search for a better society, the masses seem to harbor illusions in the revisionists. These illusions could lead the masses into defeats, or at least serious setbacks, as the movement develops. Ironically, the hope for a better society which rested in the Maoist faction at the beginning of the cultural revolution has now dramatically shifted to the opposing side. But in any event, the night of April 5 was a long one for all the leading members of the CCP. All sides feared the spread of the mass movement and began calculating the best tactics to adopt.

The first decision was to place the PLA and the police on alert and to ban any further mass protests, to prevent them at any cost. This was probably the first political decision since the beginning of the "anti-rightist" campaign that was supported by nearly all high party officials. The supporters of the Maoist faction had every reason to agree, since the demonstration had been a direct attack on them. But so did the other officials, for it was clear that if the mass movement spread it would be difficult to control it and utilize it against the Maoist faction; the protest could well turn against the anti-Maoists as well. The second decision was to discharge Teng Hsiao-ping.

IV POLITICAL CLARIFICATION OF THE FACTIONAL STRUGGLE

It is important to define the political character of the contending factions, for at least since the late 1950s, the ups and downs of the faction struggles have affected nearly every aspect of society and have proven an important factor in shaping overall political development.

Both factions unreservedly support the theory of socialism in one country, but from different bases: the Maoist faction mainly from its ideological foundations, the revisionists mainly from the narrow interests of the bureaucracy. The ideological foundation of the Maoists does, of course, reflect the interests of the bureaucracy, but in a very different manner.

Ideology and orientation of the Maoist faction

The Maoist faction has a solid ideological basis, with Mao as the ideological mentor. Despite all the maneuvering and concessions, the faction's policies are a strikingly concrete and straightforward application of its ideology. Mao's conception of world revolution primarily reflects the detour of world revolution since the October revolution and the specific development of Chinese society in isolation. Secondly, it is a theoretical justification and rationalization of the particular features of this detour. (This is what allows Stalinism to find channels through which to assimilate Maoism.) Mao's basic positions in this regard may be summarized as follows:

1. It is true that the transformation of society from capitalism to socialism is a worldwide phenomenon determined by the objective laws of history. But the concept that this worldwide transformation is deeply rooted in the very nature of the political economy of capitalism, which integrates separate societies and countries, has never become a genuinely operative proposition in Maoist philosophy. On the contrary, Mao has moved to the opposite position, conceiving of the world revolution simply as the arithmetic sum of separate national revolutions.

2. The detour of the world revolution has been theorized by Mao into the proposition that not only will revolutions generally occur first in the economically backward countries, but also that the construction of socialism will be completed in these countries first. Hence the strategy according to which the cities (the advanced capitalist countries) will be surrounded by the countryside (the backward countries).

3. Mao does not examine the outbreak of revolution in backward countries in its international context, but instead explains it according to the following vulgar formula: The more backward, exploited, and oppressed the masses are, the more revolutionary they will be. On the basis of this voluntarist conception of revolution, Mao reaches the conclusion that with revolutionary consciousness not only can the old mode of production be overturned, but a completely new one can be consolidated. To some extent, of course, this is true. But Mao carries it to an extreme, maintaining that advanced modes of production (communism) can be established and completed solely on the basis of high revolutionary consciousness. Any other aspects of the relationship between the forces of production and the mode of production are thoroughly ignored.

Mao thus reaches the highly voluntarist conclusion that material conditions are at best a secondary factor in the building of socialism in China. The primary factor is the raising of the political consciousness of the masses through political education, campaigns, and even struggles (under the strict leadership and control of the Maoists) in order to liberate the productive forces and establish advanced social relations. This explains why every time the party leadership decides to implement a policy

that will affect broad masses, the masses are politically mobilized as the vehicle by which to realize the policy.

In order to be able to carry out certain types of economic and social policies through mass movements (albeit controlled), the Maoist faction favors maintaining a non-rigid relationship between the masses and the bureaucracy. The party cadres must therefore immerse themselves among the masses, for otherwise the bureaucracy would lose touch with the masses. In this respect, we may say that the Maoist faction wants to maintain the tradition of the party as a mass movement.

In order to maintain close relations between the party and the masses, the Maoist faction is inevitably led to maintain two additional basic positions. First, the bureaucracy must be as "purified" as possible in the sense that the social and economic privileges of the cadres should be as small as possible. Second, the party's leadership should be direct, with no middle caste between the party and the masses.

The Maoist faction views the consolidation of technocrats in the Soviet Union into a caste whose power increasingly threatens the party's leadership and widens the already vast separation between the masses and the party as a very dangerous development. This is regarded as the origin of the "revisionism" the Maoists adamantly oppose. It is in this light that Mao's position on the clash between "red and expert" as well as the educational policies pursued after the cultural revolution and the recent attack on scientists and technicians in China become comprehensible. The same conception may be seen in the Maoist faction's hard line on intellectuals as a caste and in the regime's tightened control over art and literature.

The Maoist faction should be credited for its effort to combat certain rightist social and political trends. But without understanding the material basis of such trends, the faction believes that they can be overcome with merely another mass political campaign. In this respect, we can say that the Maoist faction fetishizes mass movements, which it believes can transcend all objective difficulties and surmount the limits imposed by material forces in the shaping of socialist society. This is the origin of such ultraleft Maoist policies as the Great Leap Forward and the commune movement.

Search for a self-conscious bureaucracy

The other faction expresses the awareness of the bureaucracy as a bureaucracy. Its primary goal is to seek a more stable existence in society. It hopes to achieve this through its own bureaucratic resources and channels and through so-called moderate social and economic policies designed to compensate for the negative effects of the ultraleft policies of the Maoist faction. Rather than striving to maintain the tradition of the party as a revolutionary mass movement, this faction attempts exclusively to pacify and strangle the mass movement. Essentially, this faction is not based on any solid ideological foundation. On the surface, it espouses a sort

of "pragmatism," but in reality its goals amount to an "ideology" of a bureaucracy envisaged as a permanent social formation.

The "pragmatic" responses of this faction to the ultra-left policies of the Maoists offered this faction some solid ground for development both inside and outside the party. Its "pragmatism" grows out of the bureaucracy's conservatism and inertia. One might say that it is more "Stalinist" than the Maoist faction in the sense that it represents the most conscious and advanced features of the bureaucratization of the revolution.



Chou

Before the cultural revolution this faction had not presented its programs openly. But after the traumas of the cultural revolution, it found a common platform in Chou En-lai's report to the Fourth People's Congress, summed up in the three words "stability, unity, prosperity." Unity and stability mean nothing more or less than the strengthening of the party's leadership and the halt to political campaigns, movements, and struggles. But if a strong and unified party is not to be achieved through a mass movement or even through winning the confidence of the masses, then it can be achieved only through intensifying the political, economic, and social privileges of the bureaucracy. In fact, if party policy is not to rely on mass movements, even controlled ones, then the only possibility is to merely implement orders that come from the top. But this system can work only if the party maintains a more authoritarian position and if a huge and complex mechanism of bureaucratic social functioning is created as a stabilized social infrastructure.

The society envisaged by this faction is structurally similar to that of the Soviet Union. The faction's stance on technocrats provides a good example. In the clash between "red" and "expert," the adherents of this faction place the emphasis on "expert," as is expressed in Teng Hsiao-ping's well-known quote, "Black cat, white cat, what's the difference as long as it can catch mice?" The supporters of this faction will tolerate and even welcome the emergence of the technocrats as a privileged caste, for they believe that the economy cannot function efficiently otherwise. Accordingly, they are

more lenient in dealing with intellectuals and favor a more "traditional" and "regular" policy in education. Economically, this faction lacks a long-term perspective. But it does favor making concessions to spontaneous capitalist development and yielding to the rightist tendency of the peasantry.

Bureaucratic control and workers democracy

Which of the two factions is more "democratic"? This is a question that is often asked. Workers democracy in the full sense of the term does not exist and never has existed in China. Both factions clearly stand for the continuation of bureaucratic rule and the existence of the bureaucratic caste. The differences revolve around the infrastructures and mechanisms needed for ensuring this.

On the other hand, a special type of "horizontal democracy" does and did exist. In fact, this horizontal democracy is a special mechanism of the bureaucratic structure under which the policies of the party, vertically controlled from the top down, can effectively obtain the support and voluntary identification of the masses. An example: It was the party that decided to implement the commune movement. But before this was done, a "model" commune movement was established in one province and presented as a spontaneous mass movement that should be extended throughout the whole country. At the same time, political propaganda and activity by the party went into full swing. This decision, "vertical" in its origins, was thus "internalized" by the masses to some extent. With the building of a mass movement for the formation of communes, the party allowed the masses to discuss the details of implementation, within the already worked out regulations set down by the party leadership. Thus, a vertical and compulsory policy was recast so as to resemble a voluntary and democratic initiative of the masses. The Maoist faction regards this sort of horizontal democracy as the best means by which to resolve the contradictions generated by the existence of the bureaucracy, whereas the opposing faction, as we have already noted, regards this democracy as an obstacle.

It is reasonable to assume that the more the bureaucracy relies upon the masses, the greater will be the involvement of the masses in implementing the bureaucracy's policies, and vice versa. If the bureaucracy desires independence of the masses, then a system of control must be devised that is powerful enough to confidently and effectively suppress any mass dissent or opposition. Objectively then, the policies of the Maoist faction tend to weaken the bureaucracy, or at least prevent it from growing stronger (regardless of whether the Maoist faction is conscious of this or not), while the policies of the other faction definitely bolster the bureaucracy. Under certain conditions, the latter faction may "pragmatically" put forward some "democratic" policies, but these do not involve any lessening of bureaucratic control. Rather, they are tactical measures aimed at consolidating the bureaucracy. Although this faction

has recommended some "moderate" policies, it was also the faction responsible for dispatching 11,000 troops to ruthlessly put down the struggle of the workers in Hangchow, while the more "authoritarian" Maoist faction had sent Wang Hung-wen in a futile attempt to negotiate an end to the dispute in that city.

In essence, the revisionist, or "moderate," faction represents the rightist tendency of the party and the bureaucracy. The Maoist faction is a unique creature of the Chinese revolution in its post-liberation period. It may be characterized as a left-centrist tendency in the party and the bureaucracy.

The Maoist faction would find it difficult to cease its hard attacks on the "revisionism" of the Soviet Union for two reasons. First, this faction opposes the total social and political separation of the party from the masses, the hardening of the privileges of the bureaucracy, the existence of a distinct layer of technocrats, and the nonexistence of any horizontal democracy. Second, to support or tolerate such "revisionism" would mean to politically strengthen the rightist tendency in China, for it is precisely this sort of "revisionism" that the rightist faction has been striving for.

During the early 1960s the Maoist faction advanced another argument against the Soviet leadership: the Soviet Union stood for collaboration with imperialism as opposed to world revolution. With the turn in Chinese foreign policy during the early 1970s, however, this argument evaporated. Is this another example of Maoist "flexibility" or does it represent an abandonment of the previous Maoist position? A definitive answer cannot yet be given. But in view of the weakening of the Maoist faction's mass base after the cultural revolution and in view of the fact that the Indochinese revolution had taken a comparatively independent path of development, it seems very likely that the Maoist faction is moving further away from its earlier positions. The foreign policy of the revisionist faction is more clear. This faction believes that while peaceful coexistence with the imperialist powers is helpful to China, peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union would also do no harm and would in fact create a more favorable situation for China.

Is the storm coming?

We cannot predict precisely when another revolutionary storm will break out, but we can outline certain conditions that would fuel such an explosion.

The first question is, To what extent has the April 5 demonstration broken the atmosphere of political apathy among the masses that had prevailed during the previous period? Similar events occurred in more than ten provinces, which indicates that it was a national and not regional phenomenon. How deeply the mood of the masses has changed, however, remains unclear and can be evaluated only in the future.

The second question is, How will the masses respond to the repression that followed the demonstration? In other

words, to what extent will the repression succeed in stifling further political opposition among the masses?

Third, does the demonstration mean that the nucleus of a revolutionary vanguard has emerged? To be sure, the demonstration and the official reactions to it will enlighten the more politically conscious elements in China. It is likely that they will group themselves together in some form, but at present it seems improbable that this process can occur in such a way as to unify all these elements on a national scale. It is difficult to predict the pace of the process.

These are the specific questions that arise from the Peking protest. But others arise from a more general examination of the political development of the masses, and they should be considered as well.

First, it is obvious that the most politically conscious elements in China today are divided. On the one hand there are those who are still attracted by the "leftism" of the Maoist faction. These people constitute the Maoist nucleus within the mass movement, despite the fact that some of them believe that the Maoist leaders compromised with the status quo at the conclusion of the cultural revolution. On the other hand, there are those who have embarked on a politically independent path but who are unable to clarify the character of either faction. They express varying degrees of belief in the illusions presented by the reversionist tendency without understanding the essential nature of the faction as such.

There are various signs of the real presence of such independent elements. As long ago as 1973 a wall poster written by three politically advanced youths appeared prominently in the city of Canton. Its contents were rapidly circulated in mimeographed form throughout the province of Kwangtung (population 45 million), creating a political sensation among Kwangtung's intellectuals and students.

This wall poster is of great interest, in part because it reflected the fact that the long period of political passivity among former rebellious youth embittered by the defeat of the red guard movement had come to an end. In addition, however, the poster questioned the very existence of the privileges enjoyed by the bureaucratic caste, arguing that such privileges could constitute the beginning of "social fascism" in China. The poster called for socialist democracy as a means of combatting such a dangerous possibility.

The three writers were subjected to enormous political pressure from the authorities after the appearance of this poster. Two of the authors capitulated and left the third to struggle alone. But it was clear that the poster had triggered a groundswell of popular support, for the authorities did not dare to send the third author to prison immediately. Instead, the provincial party committee of Kwangtung published its own wall poster attacking him. Later, the party organized many "struggle meetings" in which the targeted author was forced to participate. Unexpectedly, in many of these meetings he won the sympathy and support of the masses who were

supposed to be struggling against him. These episodes were extremely enlightening. If the demand for socialist democracy (regardless of exactly how the masses conceive it at any given moment) and the attack on the privileges of the bureaucrats did not correspond to the thinking of the people, how could the author have been treated so leniently and how could he have won such sympathy in meetings designed precisely to attack him?

But while the ideological basis of Maoism is disintegrating, the political maturity of the mass movement has not reached the point that a revolutionary alternative enabling the masses to go beyond both existing factions can yet be formed. The emergence or absence of such a revolutionary alternative is a decisive factor in the political development of the masses. If the masses continue to struggle against the party's policies and bureaucratic control and privileges, the resolution of the above-mentioned problems will be placed in much more favorable conditions. But will the mass struggle continue? We believe that it will, for the repression that followed the April 5 demonstration has not resulted in a decisive defeat for the masses. The likelihood of repression alone halting the political development of the masses is thus small.

Moreover, as long as the bureaucracy remains divided and unable to find satisfactory solutions to Chinese economic and social problems, the masses will be compelled to seek such solutions themselves. Further, the most advanced class in China, the working class, has never been defeated by the party and is therefore not devoid of political energy and vigor. This is one aspect of the situation, from the historical standpoint.

The other, more immediate aspect is that the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as premier in place of Chou does not represent the complete victory of the Maoist faction or the decisive defeat of the rightist faction. On the contrary, the factional differences persist, the party remains divided, and the state apparatus is still paralyzed by the confusion and demoralization of the lower-ranking cadres. These are the essential factors that will guarantee the emergence of yet another round of factional struggle in the not too distant future. Given the present situation and its likely evolution, it will be the masses who will benefit most from this new round. When will it come? Most likely after the death of Mao. The decisive battle that will then erupt may well mark the emergence of the masses themselves onto the stage of China's political revolution.

In any case, the April 5 events in Peking and other cities lend a powerful new impetus to the worldwide movement of the Fourth International and its active supporters in Hong Kong, the Revolutionary Marxist League (publishers of the Daily Combatting Bulletin). The scientific Marxist judgment that a political revolution is needed in China no longer appears abstract. History will prove that the masses in China will fight for genuine socialism, fettered neither by the Stalinist bureaucratism of the rightist reversionist faction nor by the subjective idealism of the Maoist faction. □

CONGRESS OF THE BOLIVIAN MINERS

by S. FERNANDEZ

The following text, which we received from Bolivia, deals with the congress of the Bolivian miners, which was held in May. The situation has undergone important developments since then, in the wake of the repression unleashed by the government against the massive strikes in the mining regions. (See INPRECOR, No.55, July 8, 1976.) In a Latin American context characterized by a series of reactionary counterattacks over the past few years, the mobilizations of the Bolivian masses (factory workers, students, and miners) reflect a certain recovery of the workers movement in at least one of the countries that had been hard hit. As of press time, information from Bolivia indicates that the struggle of the miners is not over and that the Banzer regime is far from having overcome its crisis.

As our party predicted and as we said in our message to the miners congress, the congress met in an atmosphere of general anticipation, the Bolivian masses full of hope, the bourgeoisie and fascist generals preoccupied by hate and fear.

For seven days Corocoro was the scene of a social and political event of the greatest importance. More than 700 delegates, observers, and journalists set this small village in the Altiplano rumbling. The attention of both friends and enemies was concentrated there, for the congress was to decide the immediate future of the proletarian struggles.

The expectations and hopes of the masses were justified. The very convocation, initiation, and realization of the congress represented a triumph for the workers. But its deliberations, conclusions, and resolutions also meant a significant step forward for the mining proletariat and consequently an advance of the masses toward the recovery of their organizations and the democratic formation of trade-union leaderships. Most of all, it was the point of departure for a national struggle that begins from the question of wages and moves toward the problem of power.

The miners congress of Corocoro and its conclusions constituted an open and vigorous denunciation and rejection of the national and international policy of the fascist generals. Above all, it was the expression of the will of the masses to get rid of the hated antinational and anti-worker dictatorship, valet of imperialism. In addition, the congress was a demonstration both of the tendency among the workers toward a united centralization that the sectarians wanted to prevent, and of their aspiration to change their old conservatized leaders. The congress delegates did not allow themselves to be intimidated by the difficulties of lack of preparation, an inadequate meeting hall, etc. They overcame the insufficiencies of a leadership that was in disarray because it anticipated defeat. Nevertheless, we believe that because of the defects in its preparation and the behavior of some sectors, the congress also had some limitations, especially organizational ones. These will

have to be overcome in practice, before the confrontations that are inevitable if the congress resolutions are applied.

Preparation of the congress

We say that there were defects in the activities preceding the congress and that the results would have been better, more organized, more homogeneous, had it not been for these defects.

The congress was called only thirty days in advance. Consequently, there was too little time for organizing and carrying out discussion among the rank and file. Moreover, the leadership of the FSTMB (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia — Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia) did not implement the recommendations of the previous congress, held in Potosi in 1973, that the activities report and the political, economic, social, and organizational discussion documents be circulated well in advance. The outgoing leadership did not issue official documents to orient the debate. The miners congress met on the basis of an agenda of the presidium, which released a general list of the themes that would be dealt with.

The result was that there was very little discussion among the rank and file, which could have served to centralize opinions, criteria, and proposals.

As far as the political aspect of the congress is concerned, nine documents were submitted to the congress, among which only that of the Catavi district had been approved by a democratic vote in a general assembly. The others were drafts of political tendencies or of individual trade-union leaders. The clearest case was that of Ninavia, a union leader in Huanuni, who, behind the back of the workers, the delegates, and even the leadership of which he is a part, tried to present a thesis drafted by his party, the pro-Chinese Communist party, as representing the mine workers of Huanuni. When this falsification and lack of political honesty was exposed, Ninavia had to admit that the document only had the support

of three of his party comrades who were in the union leadership of this district.

On the economic question, especially that of wages, twenty-six drafts were presented, expressing different positions on the percentage wage increase to demand, the effects of the currency devaluation, and the criteria by which to calculate the basic wage.

During this preparatory stage, a positive tendency emerged as regards the number of delegates, which reflected the desire of the rank and file to intervene more extensively. Up to the Potosi congress of 1973, there was one delegate per 300 workers. That congress decided that the representation would be changed to one delegate for every 200 workers at the next congress. The congress call incorporated this proportion, but the rank and file, beginning in the Catavi-Siglo XX district, decided on greater representation: one delegate per 100 workers. And it was on this basis that the delegates were elected to the Corocoro congress. The credentials committee recognized this modification, which was also approved by the plenary assembly.

The political discussion

Let us repeat that there was very little political discussion among the rank and file. Apart from Catavi-Siglo XX, there was an attempt at discussion in Huanuni, which was frustrated by the maneuvers and tricks of Nivania, who was trying to smuggle in the thesis of the pro-Chinese party.

In Catavi the discussion led to homogenizing ideas in line with the revolutionary traditions of the miners. The product of this was the political thesis proposed to the congress. In Siglo XX the discussion was unable to arrive at a unified position; this district sent four theses to the congress, corresponding to the political tendencies that exist in the district.

The political commission of the congress received nine political documents to analyze and discuss, each claiming to express the thinking and orientation of the miners. Undoubtedly, these documents corresponded to the positions of the various parties of the Bolivian left, but they were presented in the name of unions or leaders, following the old custom of the Bolivian workers movement.

Nonetheless, the discussion had the merit of lifting the veil that had shrouded the real attitudes of these parties. This was a positive step forward, which enables the masses to learn the real physiognomy of the political groups. At the same time, it confirmed the right of the tendencies that exist among the miners to speak in their own name. It also represented a setback for the dictatorship, which had tried to wipe the workers and revolutionary parties off the map with its decrees and measures of November 9, 1974. The result was that the parties Banzer tried to bury are nonetheless very much alive among the masses and are struggling against the regime.

The political polemic, which gave rise to violent and heated exchanges between the advocates of Soviet revisionism and Chinese revisionism, centered around the character of the revolution in Bolivia and the backward countries, the role of the various classes, and the type of government for which the workers are struggling. This debate took shape around two classical positions:

1. The position of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninists, embodied by the Trotskyists, which supported the thesis of the permanent revolution applied to the backward countries. This position denies that the bourgeoisie has any revolutionary qualities in the epoch of imperialism, defines Bolivia as a backward and dependent capitalist country, recognizes the working class as the revolutionary class in this epoch, sees the peasantry as an ally of the proletariat but under proletarian leadership, and thus defines the character of the Bolivian revolution as socialist. The working class in power, acting as the leader of the oppressed nation, will carry out the socialist tasks at the same time as it resolves the unresolved democratic tasks.

The documents that have been approved by the miners, from the Pulacayo thesis and program to the political thesis of the Siglo XX congress (1973), later adopted as the thesis of the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana — Bolivian Trade Union Federation), fall within this line, proclaiming the independence of the working class from the bourgeoisie, its allies, and its governments, and posing the struggle for socialism, for a government of the working class supported by and allied to the peasantry.

2. The other position was that of the neo-Mensheviks and neo-Stalinists of the two Communist parties. Although the pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese elements engaged in heated debates, each capitalizing on the evil deeds of the other — the pro-Moscow CP denouncing the Chinese pro-reactionary intervention in Angola and their close friendship with Pinochet, the pro-Chinese accusing the pro-Soviets of having restored capitalism and of being "social-imperialists" — these two groups are actually brothers, sons of the same mother, neo-Menshevik Stalinism.

The thesis of the pro-Moscow elements, drafted with "moderation," claimed that we are now in the epoch of "anti-imperialist revolutions and national liberation." They claim that the democratic anti-imperialist struggle takes priority, and for this all must be united; the struggle for socialism will come later. The thesis of the Siglo XX congress, adopted as the thesis of the COB, affirmed the contrary: The struggle for socialism is for now. There is no vigor in the document of the pro-Moscow CP; one has the impression that those who wrote it are ashamed of the assertions such as those we have cited, which represent an attempt to revise the revolutionary trajectory of the miners.

The document of the pro-Chinese, on the other hand, does not disguise their positions, and for this very rea-

son it appears grotesque, completely foreign to the maturity of mineworkers. They repeat old ideas formulated in the language of forty years ago. They are marked by the aberration of characterizing Bolivia as a "feudal country" with "feudal relations of production." From this apostasy naturally flows the additional absolute apostasy of the revolution by stages, the bloc of four classes, class collaboration, and so on. Since the country is feudal, according to them, it follows that the bourgeois revolution must be made. The socialist revolution is not on the agenda. The major revolutionary class is the peasantry and not the proletariat. This is the thinking of the Chinese. On this basis they ally themselves with the rightists in Angola, Pinochet, and some walking corpses of the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria — Revolutionary Nationalist Movement).

Thus, with this arrogance the pro-Chinese nucleus tried to counterpose its worn-out thesis to the whole revolutionary socialist tradition of the Bolivian miners.



The discussion in the political commission was violent. It ended in the defeat of the pro-Chinese. Once they had lost in the commission, they appealed to the plenary assembly, where they suffered an even greater defeat. Virtually unanimously, the delegates quickly ratified the theses of the previous congresses, including the struggle for socialism, and asked the political commission to draft a platform to unify the struggles of the Bolivian masses, which was later approved.

The plenary assembly thus corrected the error the political commission had made by spending all its time discussing this problem. The pro-Chinese, who had been trying to sterilize the discussion in the assembly, emerged disappointed. The functioning of the political commission was undoubtedly a negative element, for instead of discussing and resolving the present problems in order to strengthen the workers movement, preparing it for the coming struggles, it wasted time on a question that had already been settled years ago: whether Bolivia has a feudal or capitalist structure.

The Corocoro congress's ratification of the struggle for socialism must be assimilated, understood, and carried forward with full clarity and force. It should be noted that after the congress the pro-Chinese delegates who had participated in the political commission repeated their political dishonesty, introducing an "explanation" of the congress declaration containing phrases about a front of classes, which is contrary to the thinking of the miners. They have resorted to these methods in order to justify themselves before their own party and to try to cover up their political defeat.

The economic commission received twenty-six drafts. The discussion here was calmer, and agreement was quickly reached to support the steps that have already been taken. A demand has been presented to the government to raise the minimum wage to 80 pesos; the government was given thirty days to respond positively, otherwise there will be a general strike. It was also decided to form a rank-and-file commission to work with the federation in this conflict. The report of the economic commission was approved, along with nineteen complementary points on related subjects.

There was not much discussion in the commission on social affairs; documents were approved on questions of the living conditions of the miners, social benefits, and questions of education.

Election of a new leadership

Before and during the congress the leadership of the FSTMB acted in a disorganized manner, for it felt defeat coming. This became obvious during the discussion on the activities report of the general secretary and when the congress proceeded to the election of a new leadership.

The report of Victor Lopez was vigorously criticized. It was approved in a manner so confused that it appeared more like rejection. The resolution said: "1. To approve the activities report of the general secretary of the FSTMB, with the following observations: It is incomplete and ignores the political and social elements that confront the Bolivian people in their struggle for liberty and the democratic rights of the people."

In the discussion the FSTMB was accused of passivity and of lending only weak support to the struggles at the Manaco shoe factory and the universities (see INPRECOR, No.50, April 19, 1976); it was stressed that the rank-and-file miners had gone into struggle first, dragging the leadership along.

Along with criticizing this report, the congress resolution also condemned as traitors those who accept government posts in the "labor coordinating bodies," saying that this disqualified them from occupying posts in the trade-union leadership.

The tendency to repudiate the old leadership because of its capitulating conduct toward the dictatorship was expressed forcefully in the election. Nearly 75 percent of this leadership was turned out of office. They

were replaced by middle-layer cadres and some old militants of past periods whose conduct has been contradictory but who took advantage of the confusion of the moment. There was a lack of definition and clarity in the political discussion around the election of the new leadership. There were unprincipled compromises, maneuvers, and backroom arrangements.

The tendency that emerged among the rank and file to change the leadership and replace it with new, combative leaders was unable to be fully brought to bear. The new leadership, which maintains Victor Lopez as acting general secretary and also includes Lechón, Reyes, and Escobar (symbolically, for they are in exile), does not include the old bourgeoisified bureaucrats, but neither is it a leadership adequate to the coming struggles. There is a danger that those who remain and the old leaders who have returned may act as an obstacle to the development of the new, young elements. To eliminate this danger the rank and file will have to exercise constant vigilance while at the same time stimulating the desire to change the leadership, which is developing in the mines.

Conclusions and perspectives

The Sixteenth Miners Congress of Corocoro was a triumph for the workers and a political defeat for the military dictatorship. The workers ignored all the prohibitive measures and threats of the government. The dictatorship did not dare to attack the congress. In an attempt to confuse and divert public opinion the government assembled its own "coordinating bodies" at another congress, held in Santa Cruz, and also brought its groups of thug "nationalists" together in La Paz. The former decided only to ask for a wage increase of 60 percent and the latter, organized into shock-troop commandos, came to Corocoro but did not dare show their faces. All they did was pay some children to hand out leaflets. The defeat of Banzer and his thugs could not have been more clear.

The congress was positive. But its future impact will depend on whether its resolutions are actually applied in any organized way. The workers ratified their socialist line and resolved to struggle for a minimum wage of 80 pesos and for a revolutionary program. These questions involve not only the miners but all the Bolivian masses. The Corocoro congress itself included factory workers, peasants, and university students, who intervened in the discussion and approved the resolutions. Not only because of the needs felt by the broad masses, but also because the masses followed the congress and participated in it. The struggle must be organized nationally, beginning with the miners, to draw the rest of the workers into the same process. The miners must organize this struggle, acting as the vanguard and national leadership. At the same time, they must implement the resolution to make the COB start functioning again, doing this in a mining district by endowing the COB with the necessary infrastructure and guarantees. Finally, they

must also promote the united front of all the political tendencies in the workers movement. This was the mandate of the congress, and the new leadership is responsible for carrying it out in practice, in action. It is certain that this leadership is not homogeneous and that the old bureaucratic and conciliatory tricks will be transmitted through some of its members, but the vigilance of the rank and file can neutralize this, stimulating the developing combativity of the young new leaders.

The miners congress broke down the dictatorship's measures in practice, the November 1974 decrees for example. The workers of the entire country must consequently ignore these measures and begin to make their trade-union organizations function fully.

But we must also stress the limits and inadequacies of the congress, along with its positive features. Some very important resolutions, such as those dealing with the COB and the united front, were not sufficiently discussed; no practical measures were laid down to implement them. Nor was there any concretization of the forms the struggle will have to take to achieve the advancement of sectors that continue to be held back by the official "coordinating bodies." It is necessary to become conscious of these limitations in order to go beyond them.

Our party was present in the congress through rank-and-file delegates from various districts who presented a document of political analysis and tasks. Our delegation was larger and its political activity better than at any previous congress. Nevertheless, our progress remains modest. Our party must expand its base in the mines, improve the quality and increase the numbers of its cadres. The development of our party is a historic necessity for resolving the crisis of revolutionary leadership the miners and the masses suffer from. The atomization of the left, which is divided into small groups and parties, is an obstacle to the advance toward the socialist victory. Thus, to strengthen the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Combate) — Revolutionary Workers party (Combate) — Bolivian section of the Fourth International, is to resolve the crisis of the revolution.

The will and intentions of the workers have been expressed. The military dictatorship nonetheless refrains from responding, but it is preparing its response. Struggles and confrontations are now shaping up for which we must also prepare. And the way to do this is precisely to implement the decisions of the miners congress, to create bodies to centralize and direct the struggle on a national scale, to create self-defense detachments in order to halt the armed violence the gorillas will unleash.

Our consciousness must be armed with the resolutions of the congress and with the weapons with which to implement them in order to defeat the dictatorship of the capitalists and imperialists.

Huanuni, May 23, 1976

avanzada socialista



Organo del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores — Año V — N° 182 — 20 de marzo de 1976 — \$ 30.—

arturo gómez

In May 1976 Comrade Arturo Gómez, one of the major leaders of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina) and editor-in-chief of its weekly, *Avanzada Socialista*, died in Buenos Aires after a sudden heart attack.

Comrade Arturo came to Trotskyism toward the end of the 1950s as one of the major student leaders in the region of La Plata under the combined influence of the radicalization generated by the political struggles that followed the fall of Peronism in 1955 and the rise of the Cuban revolution. Modest, a man able to knit very fruitful human relationships, Arturo was one of the students of Angel Bengochea, one of the main leaders of *Palabra Obrera*, the precursor of the PRT (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores — Revolutionary Workers party) and the PST in Argentina. When Bengochea went over to Castroism, Arturo broke with him and became one of the regional leaders in La Plata during the subsequent tendency struggle.

Arturo won the confidence of the workers, who elected him as counsellor and adviser of the *Agrupación Metalúrgica Verde*. When the tendency struggle between the Santucho faction and the Moreno faction broke out in the PRT in 1968, Arturo Gómez opted for the Moreno faction and became a national leader of the organization that was to fuse with the Coral faction of the Socialist party to form the PST.

The PST was able to take advantage of the possibility for legal activity by presenting candidates for president and vice-president in the elections of 1973. The PST candidate for vice-president, Comrade José Paez, former leader of the militant and prestigious SITRAM-SITRAC autoworkers union in the city of Córdoba, transformed this campaign into political agitation for a workers candidate, which enabled the PST to recruit hundreds and hundreds of workers. Throughout this period, Comrade Arturo Gómez was the secretary general of the PST.

In 1974, when the PST decided to organizationally and politically consolidate the gains made during the preceding period by transforming *Avanzada Socialista* into a large-circulation weekly, Comrade Arturo was chosen as editor-in-chief. Although at the outset he lacked journalistic experience, he succeeded in establishing a remarkable team, which made *Avanzada Socialista* one of the most lively and popular Trotskyist newspapers in the world.

Comrade Arturo came to Trotskyism through internationalism, and he remained an internationalist throughout his life. He was strongly attached to the Fourth International, whose growth and internal debates he followed passionately. He was one of the leaders of the international minority faction and as such was a reporter at the Tenth World Congress, which elected him a consultative member of the International Executive Committee. With the death of Comrade Gómez the PST and the Fourth International lose one of their most experienced and valuable leaders. His memory will be kept alive by our entire movement.

The Kurdish Resistance Is Not Over



In March 1975 Iraqi Foreign Minister Saddam Hussein signed an agreement with the shah of Iran which entailed, among other things, the end of Iranian material support to the Kurdish fighters against the Iraqi regime. The leadership of the Kurdish Democratic party (KDP) under Mustafa Barzani, which held hegemony over the Kurdish struggle, gave up the battle and sought refuge in Iran. The result was the collapse of the Kurdish military resistance to the Iraqi regime and a vast increase in the oppression and repression of the Kurds in Iraq. This marked the end of the latest phase of the Kurdish rebellion, which had broken out in 1974.

It did not, however, mark the end of the Kurdish struggle. Kurdistan is a mountainous region in western Asia that has been the home of the Kurdish people for more than 5,000 years. After the end of the first world war Kurdistan, along with the rest of the Arab East, was divided by imperialism. The Kurdish population was parcelled out among four states: Turkey (2 million Kurds at the time), Iran (2 million), Iraq (1 million), and Syria (1.5 million). Since then, divided Kurdistan has been the scene of continual armed uprisings against national oppression. Historically, the Kurdish movement has been strongest in Iraq, one-fourth of whose population is Kurdish. The relatively large size of the Kurdish population, the high degree of their organization, the extremely mountainous terrain in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the extended periods of general political instability have prevented the various Iraqi regimes from succeeding in their repeated attempts to liquidate the Kurdish revolution.

On the other hand, the leadership of the Kurdish movement has likewise proven incapable of leading the revolution to victory. The 1975 defeat, brought on by the betrayal by the Barzani leadership, has given rise to an important process of political debate and recomposition within the Kurdish movement. The interview below, with Noshirwan Amin, a member of the National Union of Kurdistan (NUK), illustrates the lines along which this process is occurring. Future issues of INPRECOR will publish contributions from other tendencies that have emerged from this recomposition process, as well as the position of Arab revolutionary Marxists on the Kurdish revolution. We regard our participation in this discussion and our efforts to publicize it as part of our tasks of internationalist solidarity with both the Kurdish and Arab revolutions.

QUESTION. WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT IN THE LATEST WAR?

ANSWER. The Kurdish resistance in the latest war was broken neither politically nor militarily. The temporary collapse was brought on above all by the flight of Barzani, along with the KDP leadership, from the combat zones, the subsequent agreement between the Baathist regime and the shah of Iran, and the "shift" of a good part of the resistance fighters and their families to Iran. This leadership, a tribal leadership, was based on the most backward layer of Kurdish society, the landlords.

So if one can talk about a defeat today, it is only a political defeat of the KDP leadership which, because of its tribal structure, was incapable of leading the national struggle and linking the national question with the social questions.

In the Kurdish region, as in every underdeveloped country, the agrarian question is of life and death importance. The KDP leadership lacked any understanding of the peasant movement and had no faith in the power of the

resistance. It had no plans for a sweeping land reform that would have primarily benefited the poor peasants. This leadership thus concentrated on seeking the support of foreign regimes. But a prerequisite for this was to be prepared to make alliances with reactionary, imperialist, and chauvinist powers against the struggle of the oppressed masses in Iran, Turkey, and the Arab countries. This attitude was also reflected in the way the war was conducted: The partisan war was liquidated and in the final clashes, up until the surrender, regular positional warfare came to the fore. The concept that unity in struggle against oppression by the Iraqi regime meant that the KDP itself should be regarded as the only force understanding and embodying unity in action and should therefore not be criticized within the movement was mistaken. But the mistake was not merely in the lack of criticism, but also in the failure to build a vanguard party, that is, an independent organizer of the progressive forces of Kurdish society. Both the objective political bases for this and the subjective prerequisites among the masses existed.

I mean vanguard in the Leninist sense of revolutionary vanguard. Because of the backwardness of Kurdish so-

ciety, the proletariat is numerically weak; nevertheless, through their insertion into the struggle, the Kurdish workers will be able to assume the ideological leadership of the movement and will be among its activists. The peasant question is also central here, and the solution to it has to be radical, without making concessions to a middle layer of peasants. What we want is an agrarian revolution. The National Union of Kurdistan strives for the organization of the forces of the Kurdish national democratic revolution, whose task is to bring together the progressive tendencies and unite them in a militant way under the leadership of the Kurdish revolutionary vanguard.

Q. WHAT HAVE BEEN THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE DEFEAT ON THE KURDS IN IRAN AND THE OTHER STATES AND ON KURDS WHO HAVE EMIGRATED ABROAD?

A. The organized resistance of the Kurds in Iraq represented a strong pole of attraction for the resistance in the entire Kurdish region. Kurds came from other regions to participate in the struggles in Iraq. The influence and prestige of the KDP were high. With the flight of the Barzani leadership and its removal from the combat zone, the KDP gave up its role as the leading organizing force. Barzani tried to paralyze the movement and a good number of Pesh Merga fighters left with him to Iran. The majority of them have since returned, but there is no force having as great an influence as the KDP used to.

Of course, the outcome of the latest war has also had effects on the resistance movement in the other parts of Kurdistan: disorientation, demoralization, lack of a recognized leadership, fragmentation of forces. As far as Iran itself is concerned, it is clear that Barzani today cannot oppress the Kurds or hand fighters over to Savak (the Iranian secret police). In Iran, as in the other countries, the reorganization of the resistance remains the main task. We of the National Union of Kurdistan have a policy of return to the country.

Q. WHAT IS THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN ITSELF? WHAT IS THE STATE OF THE KURDISH MASS MOVEMENT?

A. The situation in Kurdistan provides striking proof of the incapacity of the bureaucratic bourgeois regime in Iraq to solve the national question. The promised appearance of autonomy is merely a means by which to intensify the repression and split up the Kurdish movement. The war and the repressive policy of Arabization have led to a flight from the land and a rise in unemployment. The chauvinist policy of Arabization, which leaves no social area unaffected, aims at driving the Kurdish population out of the mountains and deporting them. The map of Iraq is to be altered; new administrative regions are being established (for example, the partition of the rich mixed Arab-Kurdish province of Kirkuk into a number of Arab provinces). The aim is to

eliminate the basis for the establishment of indigenous industries and economic development in Kurdistan. The elimination of the Kurdish names of villages and cities in the new administrative areas goes hand in hand with the Arabization of hundreds of Kurdish schools. The resettlement policy, which was previously directed primarily against the Kurdish working class, is now being extended to the peasants. After a so-called land reform, 60 percent of the land in the Kurdish regions was taken over by the central state; 40 percent is left to the Kurdish peasants who have not been driven out of the mountains.

Some 400,000 deported Kurds are now living in camps in the southern and western parts of Iraq, without land or jobs. The organization of a resistance movement among these refugees is correspondingly difficult. The Iraqi regime is going to be responsible for creating a second Palestine.

The regime's forced resettlement policy is combined with a policy of replacing Kurdish peasants with Egyptian ones. About 50,000 Egyptian peasants are now living in Kurdistan. The plan is to transfer a total of 1 million Egyptians to Iraq, a means of pushing forward the decimation of the Kurdish minority. One of the arguments advanced in support of the chauvinist population policy is that it is necessary to increase the population of future generations of Arabs in Iraq.

These Arab peasants are either integrated as agricultural workers into the state-run cooperative agricultural enterprises or else granted land as private property, which will strengthen political backwardness and chauvinist tendencies in the newly Arabized, previously Kurdish regions. The greater part of the oil and raw material resources of Iraq are in Kurdistan. But only 7-12 percent of Iraq's industrial product between 1970 and 1975 went to the Kurdish region. The oil refineries have been shifted to the Arab region of Hammam Ali, even though this meant a 20 percent increase in the cost of construction of new oilfields. The metal industry was shifted to Basra in the south, even though the iron and copper has to be brought in from Kurdistan.

The official trade unions, linked to the Progressive National Front (the Baathist-controlled ruling group) includes representatives of the official Arab and Kurdish parties. Nevertheless, we do not boycott these trade unions, because there is some possibility of carrying out political discussion within them, in addition to fighting for some economic demands. There are seminars of union members, for example, so we send representatives into the unions to try to win the members to support of the Kurdish resistance.

As far as students, high-schoolers, teachers, and women are concerned, the resistance movement has independent underground organizations that function only illegally. Fewer and fewer Kurdish students are admitted to universities, the University of Sulaimaniya, for example, in the heart of the Kurdish region, in an attempt to make way for more Arab students.

Administrative functions in the Kurdish region have been taken over by Arabs; the Kurds are "permitted" to assume subordinate functions, which they fulfill under the threat of prison sentences of up to ten years. The organs of the structure of fake autonomy established by the regime have been occupied by the three legal Kurdish parties, which exist only on paper; their function is that of political police. The Kurdish resistance to Arabization thus remains directed against the state apparatus itself.

As for the peasants, it will be our task to organize illegal peasant leagues from which to break up the official leagues as soon as there is a basis for liberated areas. Today, however, there is no movement encompassing the Kurdish masses. The resistance is still limited to the underground organizations. Whether or not there will be some open manifestation of the resistance will depend on the relationship of forces. At present, even where it would be possible to hold a strike or demonstration, such attempts will not be made, because even if the masses followed the call to action, the movement is not yet strong enough to stand up against the inevitable repression without suffering excessive losses. The masses are not yet moving into action. But there have been some forms of open resistance in whole regions. These are carried out through things like poetry readings. This kind of expression of resistance, of the independence of the Kurdish people, does not leave any open traces — except on the Kurdish masses themselves.

Q. IN THIS SITUATION, WHAT PERSPECTIVES DO YOU SEE AHEAD?

A. The armed struggle should be launched in those regions that have not been reached by the Arabization policy. The resistance in Iraqi Kurdistan is sufficiently organized so that we can say that the phase of propaganda activity and the establishment of an organizational structure has been closed. The phase of the launching of armed struggle must now be begun; only in this way can the gains of a future mass movement be guaranteed and consolidated in any real way. Here I would like to note the preconditions for the victory of the Kurdish liberation struggle, for which the National Union of Kurdistan will strive:

- * national unification;
- * the building of a vanguard party;
- * common struggle of Arabs and Kurds in Iraq;
- * common struggle of all Kurds;
- * common work of the Kurdish resistance movement together with all progressive forces and all forces striving for the international socialist revolution.

Q. CAN YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE SITUATION OF THE LEFT IN IRAQ AND IN KURDISTAN? WHAT ORGANIZATIONS EXIST AND WHAT ARE THEIR POLITICS?

A. I'll speak of the opposition parties in general and the revolutionary organizations in particular. All those

parties that do not belong to the Progressive National Front (PNF) are classified as "opposition." This includes the illegal Baath party. The PNF is composed of the official Baath party, the Communist party, and the three paper Kurdish puppet parties (the Kurdish Democratic party, which uses the same name as the old KDP, the Kurdish Revolutionary party, and the Movement of Progressive Kurds).

The verbal recognition of Kurdish autonomy, which was granted in March 1970 under the pressure of events and the struggle of our people, was nothing but a smoke-screen for the rank anti-Kurdish chauvinism of the Iraqi regime. The fake autonomy law of August 1974, which only further intensified Arabization, was presented as a model solution to the national question, and the puppet parties today are trying to act within that framework. But they have no function, apart from spying. When the regime granted apparent autonomy, these parties approached the leadership of the KDP and sought to draw it into the PNF. At that time, Barzani refused.

The illegal Baath is not qualitatively different from the right wing of the Baath, which is in the regime. But it is an opposition party that tries to draw support from all layers of society. For example, it is possible today to publish articles that correspond to the interests of the Kurdish resistance in the organs of this party. Although we have no illusions in this party, the NUK participates in a union of parties that includes, in addition to the NUK and the illegal Baath, the Arab Socialist Movement, the leadership of the former Central Command faction of the Communist party, and some Nasserite groupings. The central slogan of this union of parties is "Democracy for Iraq, Autonomy for Kurdistan." Unlike in the past, the Kurds in the other parties today (with the exception of the NUK) no longer see themselves as part of the Arab world. This party union also has a project for a central regime in which the Kurds would have proportional representation.

Now, as to the groups I mentioned earlier:

* The Marxist-Leninist party was in the Central Command CP in 1969-70. It had strong points of support in southern Iraq and Baghdad and also held some positions in the trade unions. Like all the small revolutionary groups in Iraq, it commanded only minimal forces in Kurdistan and upheld the necessity of building an Iraq-wide CP. The group has no newspaper. In leaflets it calls for the overthrow of the Baath regime, which it characterizes as fascist, and for the seizure of power by the working class. It advocates the necessity of armed struggle in Iraq and believes the time is ripe for the destruction of the regime. It thus substitutes itself for the working class.

* As for the former Central Command CP, the leadership of the organization preaches defeatism and abstentionism. In recent times, a good part of the leadership has left the country, among them four members of the central committee in Kurdistan, who stayed with Barzani. The Baath party has initiated talks with the Central Command leadership and has offered either that they

work legally within the CP (with an official paper of their own) or that they adopt a policy of abstaining from any struggle against the regime. The leadership has agreed to discuss the second possibility. Nevertheless, the Central Command's underground urban cells have remained in existence and the Rank-and-File Union, which represents a part of the membership of the organization, has split and is putting out a paper, also called Rank-and-File Union.

*The Arab Socialist Movement, which was formerly Nasserist, now defines itself as Marxist and includes both genuine Marxists and nationalists. Its newspaper is entitled Workers Call. It has an agrarian program and stands for the right of the Kurds to self-determination in the form of autonomy.

None of these groups claims to be a sole representative, and unity efforts are now under way, the aim being to build a united revolutionary party in Iraq; they do not stand for an independent Kurdish communist party.

In Kurdistan itself there are the three paper parties I referred to earlier and the Arab and Kurdish sections of the CP, both of which have suffered heavy losses in the recent period. They participate in both the central regime and the fake autonomy structures. The aim of all the other groups is to organize a common armed struggle, for we see the armed struggle as a form of political struggle and we understand the impossibility of a peaceful solution. The old KDP, whose leadership is now sitting in Teheran, is trying to establish new points of support. But there are new groupings that used to belong to the KDP and are now discussing the betrayal of the KDP. They do not go as far in their political critique as the NUK, because they do not trace the defeat of the leadership back to this leadership's inherent inability to solve the national question. These groups lack a newspaper or a centralized leadership.

The NUK represents an initial attempt to reorganize and unify the divided forces of the Kurdish resistance. People of various political orientations belong to the NUK today: Marxist-Leninists (myself among them), socialists, democrats, and patriots. The NUK cannot take the place of a communist party, nor can it develop into a communist party. The point today is to assemble the revolutionary forces of Kurdistan along with all progressive forces and the nationalist left in Iraq in order to accomplish the tasks of the national-democratic revolution, tasks which lay before our Iraqi people including both its nationalities, Arabs and Kurds, as well as the minorities. These tasks are:

1. Final liberation of Iraq from the economic and political yoke of neocolonialism.
2. End to the bloody dictatorial regime.
3. Creation of a national-democratic coalition regime capable of guaranteeing democracy for the entire people.
4. Recognition of the right of the Kurdish people to genuine autonomy within an independent republic of Iraq.
5. Implementation of a fundamental agrarian reform

in the interests of the peasant masses. Industrialization of the country, utilization of oil and mineral resources for the development of Iraqi society in order to lay the basis for the transition to the building of socialism.

The NUK today has two press organs. One is in Arabic, called Spark, which answers all charges that the Kurdish resistance is chauvinist and which provides information primarily for Arab and world public opinion. Three issues have appeared so far. The Kurdish organ is called The New Way.



Q. WHAT CONTRIBUTION CAN THE REFUGEES IN EUROPE MAKE TO THE KURDISH LIBERATION STRUGGLE? WHAT ARE YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN LEFT?

A. The various Kurdish organizations abroad maintain their own independent character. The NUK, for example, is an organization only for Kurds from Iraq. But the student organizations in which all the groups participate contribute to the movement in Europe. There are now two Kurdish leagues in Europe. One includes those who still support Barzani; the other pursues common aims with us in terms of the reorganization of the resistance in Kurdistan. There is a preparations committee for return to Kurdistan. Our orientation for the Kurds in Europe is toward their return to the combat zone; this also applies in the case of students after they have completed their studies.

As far as links with the left in Europe are concerned, we have no concrete proposals in mind. The main thing is that the European left support the struggle of the Kurdish people, on the basis of their internationalist duty. Up to now we have made no analysis of the various left and far-left organizations in Europe. Our position may be summed up as follows: Our main alliances are with the Arab revolution, the national liberation movement of the third world, and the forces of socialism, workers power, and the revolution throughout the world. We strive for firm relations of solidarity, for common work to consolidate our links in struggle. We thus greet all forms of solidarity from the progressive forces, from simple aid in the fight to improve the living conditions of the refugees in Europe all the way up through participation in our armed struggle. □

SYRIAN TROOPS OUT OF LEBANON

DECLARATION OF THE UNITED SECRETARIAT OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

On May 31, 1976, the Syrian regime ordered its tanks, planes, and troops to invade Lebanon. The announced purpose of the invasion — in reality it was an open and dramatic escalation of an intervention that had been going on for some time — was to bring peace and order to that civil-war-racked land. The real purpose was quite different. The invasion was designed to bolster the faltering Christian right and to push back the anti-reactionary forces.

The Syrian regime, anxious for a settlement with Israel, moved into Lebanon to clamp down on the Palestinian resistance and to prevent the danger to bourgeois order that would have been posed had the rightists been defeated. That was the real meaning of the peace and order heralded by Damascus.

Thus it is that the Syrian invasion has enjoyed the blessings of all opponents of the Arab revolution, from avowed enemies like the Israeli settler-colonial state and U.S. and French imperialism to treacherous "friends" like the Arab bourgeois regimes.

For the masses in Lebanon, however, the Syrian invasion has brought only a dramatic rise in death, destruction, and human suffering. Thousands more have been killed and wounded. There are increasingly severe shortages of fuel, food, water, electricity, and medical care. Under the aegis of the Syrian invasion, the rightists have felt free to attempt to consolidate their territory, attacking Palestinian refugee camps and slaughtering those who fall into their hands.

But the rightist forces, even with Syrian support, can be beaten back. The Syrian invasion itself, despite its superiority in arms, has met stiff resistance. The Fourth International hails the struggle of the Lebanese masses and Palestinian resistance fighters against the Syrian-rightist combination. We call for a worldwide campaign of solidarity, centered on the demand for immediate Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.