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From Labor Action, Vol. 14 No. 5, 30 January 1950, pp. 1 & 4.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.
The Truman administration brought a long period of diplomatic doubletalk, behind-the-scenes maneuvering and hypocritical denials to an end last Thursday on the question of recognizing Franco’s fascist regime in Spain.
In a letter to Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that the United States would officially support the scrapping of the United Nations resolution of December 1946. This resolution calls for the withdrawal of all ambassadors from Madrid, and the exclusion of Franco’s regime from the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
Acheson s letter made it clear that Washington is not only ready to resume full diplomatic relations with Spain, but is willing to grant Franco a loan via the Import-Export Bank, and to press for Franco’s admission to the UN’s special bodies. Acheson also indicated that the United States will favor bringing Spain into the UN, the European Recovery Program and the Atlantic Pact if and when Franco “liberalizes” his regime.
On his side, the Spanish Caudillo is trying to help Acheson save face, according to a news dispatch emanating from Madrid the day before. The New York Times correspondent, Sam Pope Brewer, reports that Franco has let it be known he is considering some important changes in Spain’s “fundamental laws.” The Caudillo is thinking of dropping his title of lifetime Chief of State (the product of a referendum) and having himself “democratically” elected Regent of Spain by way one another “free” referendum. Or else Spain would no longer be a monarchy and the Third Spanish Republic would be proclaimed under Franco’s Falange auspices and with Falange principles!
Washington’s decision to come openly to Franco’s aid has been primarily prompted by the urgency of the Spanish economic crisis. The situation has deteriorated from the impossible to the catastrophic. Agriculture, the mainstay of the Spanish economy, has declined at a feverish pace under Franco’s paralyzing rule. Once an important wheat-exporting country, Spain must now import grain to sustain its population.
For the past three years the Peron regime of Argentina has filled the gap with annual loans of 250,000 tons of wheat. Entangled in its own economic difficulties at the present time, however, the Argentine dictatorship has been forced to halt all wheat shipments. Peron is demanding payment in full for any further shipments plus partial payments on past loans. Franco has been forced to pledge a part of Spain’s gold reserves and to seek a new loan from the Chase National Bank of New York in order to acquire the dollars needed to buy American and Canadian wheat.
It is ironic to note that Acheson’s letter describes Franco’s position as strong. In reality, the Franco regime is politically, as well as economically, bankrupt. (One writer has said that Franco is living on his capital. More accurately, the Madrid regime is living on its future.)
As newspaper reports make quite plain, all sections of Spanish society are discontented and restless. It is awareness of the malaise which grips Spanish society that has caused the American government to discard the smokescreen of diplomatic caution.
The Truman administration is fearful of any change in the Spanish status quo. More explicitly, the American government fears the present crisis may lead to a serious rift in Spanish ruling circles, which will in turn open the way to a political upheaval from below.
In the view of the American general staff – and the Truman administration has adopted the Pentagon’s reasoning as its own – “political instability” would negate the present and future value of Spain as a strategic base for military operations. Interestingly enough, Acheson’s long-winded and cynical letter completely fails to mention Spain’s military importance as the chief and decisive reason for rescuing the Franco regime from the grave it has been digging for itself.
The American military, however, have made no secret of their views on the subject of Spain. For the past two years they have waged an energetic pro-Franco campaign with the aid of allies inside and outside of Congress. Army and air generals, admirals and congressmen by the dozen have made the grand tour to Spain and back.
Prominent among those congressmen visiting, Spain in 1948 and 1949 have been members of the Senate Military Appropriations Committee, who have close ties with the Pentagon. Among them have been Senators Thomas, Chavez, McLellan, Russell (Democrats) and Bridges, Ferguson and Maybank (Republicans). Almost without exception the statements issued by these politicos upon their return have followed the same monotonous pattern: Spain’s military importance calls for diplomatic recognition and immediate economic aid.
The role of the visiting military has been more practical. A typical instance was the visit of Admiral Conolly and his Atlantic fleet last fall to Spanish waters with the consent of the White House. As was to be expected, the admiral and his staff were cordially received by the Caudillo.
More to the point was the conversation between Conolly and Franco. According to the Paris newspaper Le Monde, Admiral Conolly told Franco that Spain’s absence from the Atlantic Pact constituted a serious gap in the Atlantic-Mediterranean defense line. He expressed the hope that Franco would take such measures as would make possible an American-Spanish alliance.
While Acheson talks vaguely and cynically about drawing Spain back into the European and international community, the American general staff has its eyes fixed on certain tangibles. They include the bases of Cartagena, Palma and Mahon, indispensable to the American navy in case of war; the Pyrenees, a natural barrier should an invading army overrun the rest of Europe in the opening phase of another world war; the Castillian plateau, a natural base for air operations; and last but not least the Spanish manpower Franco has been tirelessly offering for sale.
While the American general staff does not have to answer to anyone (except the president) politically, and has therefore freely propagated its views, the government has been forced to make haste slowly in the same direction for obvious political reasons. But as the record clearly shows, the Truman administration has given aid and comfort to the Franco regime where it could act without too much political embarrassment.
In May 1948 the American government negotiated a unique settlement of German assets in Spain, which gave three-quarters of these holdings to the Franco regime. In 1948 the United States government also cleared the way for a private loan of $250 million to Madrid by the Chase National Bank of New York. Although economically inadequate, these measures had first-rate political importance when coupled with Washington’s diplomatic maneuvers.
During the Paris meeting of the UN in the fall of 1948, General Marshall, then secretary of state, declared that the resolution adopted by the UN in 1946 condemning the Franco regime “no longer corresponds to the present situation.” Another step in the process of preparing public opinion was taken last spring when the American delegation to the UN, meeting at Lake Success, abstained from voting on the question of diplomatic relations with Spain.
The next step is indicated in Acheson’s letter. The United States government will support the introduction of a resolution in favor of full diplomatic relations with Franco Spain at the next session of the UN.
In the course of his letter to Senator Connally, Acheson regretfully indicates that the United States must deal with Franco because “there is no sign of an alternative to the present government.” But as the record shows, one reason for the ability of the Franco regime to survive has been the moral and political support given it by the United States. Only the existence of an aroused labor movement in the United States, and above all in Europe, prevented the American government from going much further and at a swifter pace in its desire to prop up the Franco regime. Acheson’s letter will go down in history as a model of political cynicism.
The fate of the Spanish labor movement, of Spanish democracy and of the Spanish people may well be decided in America. A transfusion of American dollars and goods may revive the putrescent Franco regime. Only the American labor movement can frustrate the plans of the Truman administration by determined action, hasten the demise of Spanish fascism and help restore to the Spanish people the democratic right to decide their own destinies.
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