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From Labor Action, Vol. 14 No. 21, 22 May 1950, p. 7.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.
The Big Three conference of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France which ended on May 14 had for its primary consideration the bolstering of the economic and military establishments of Western Europe in preparation for a showdown at some future time with Russia and its satellites. This was the only point on the agenda, and there was not even the pretense of talking peace.
The meeting of the Big Three and the subsequent meetings of the North Atlantic Pact Council are a standing tribute to the bankruptcy of capitalism today. For all their talk of the championing of democracy and morality, the only answer that they have for Stalinism is the hurried preparations for the Third World War. While they recognize that to a decisive extent the fight against Stalinism is political, the only solution actually offered is the protection of the A- and (perhaps) H-bomb.
It was in this framework that on. May 9 the French cabinet offered a proposal for the linking and coordination, under a single authority, of the coal and steel production of France and Germany and any other European countries which wish to join. This French proposal represents the removal of the last official obstacle to the further- inclusion of Germany into the military plans of the Atlantic Pact nations.
It does not in any sense mean that France is going to give up the attempts of the last five years to control German heavy industry, but rather this is the best means under the present unfavorable circumstances to continue this attempt. It has been French policy to follow the most severe course of action toward Germany, varying with the particular stage in the resurgence of German industrial power and the developments of the cold war.
The French government has fought a losing rearguard action for reparations, dismantlement of industry, disarmament, and against the return of heavy industry to German hands. Failing in this be cause of the economic burden of having to support a destitute nation and contradicted by the encouragement given to the German industrialists by the United States, the French turned to attempts to have Germany participate in Western European organization, such as the Council of Europe, where it was hoped that political controls could be extended.
But this manifestation of French nationalism, like many other grandiose schemes, has fallen victim to the cold war. With the more or less sharp division of Europe into the two opposing war blocs, there arose the problem of how best to utilize German industrial power to bolster the Atlantic Pact military plans.
However, the problem was not merely the most efficient utilization of the German war potential as such; if this were the case, it could have been accomplished under the existing Occupation Statute of September, 1949. Rather the situation demanded that political concessions be made to the Adenauer, government in order to enlist its support and to bolster this right-wing regime. The danger (to the U.S.) is that the Germans might decide to sit out the cold war, or else support a government which might be more difficult to handle than Adenauer’s.
And it is to be expected that these concessions will be forthcoming in the near future. The Allied armies will not leave Germany, the Big Three communique of May 14 announcing that there would only be the elimination of the "major practical inconveniences arising in the countries concerned from the state of war.” But from the point of view of the Adenauer regime these are sufficient, for he stated on May 14 that he expected “rapid and great concessions” to be made in the next few months.
The Adenauer government evidently feels that the further developments of the cold war will necessitate even further concessions. It has even agreed to participate as an associate member in the Council of Europe after its earlier refusal because of the participation of the Saar with a similar status following the virtual annexation of this rich coal and iron area by France in March.
On the other hand, the Germans themselves have been applying pressure for greater autonomy within the limited framework of Allied policy. The Adenauer government, while not calling for the removal of the occupation forces, has been demanding a German foreign ministry. Thus Drew Middleton in the N.Y. Times, May 15, writes:
“Indeed, it is because the occupation powers would rather deal discreetly with a German foreign ministry than have German foreign policy explained to them by the chancellor in newspaper headlines that proposals for the creation of a German foreign ministry received such support in the offices of the three high commissioners.”
The actual details of the French scheme for the pooling of, coal and steel resources have not at this time been made public and remain to be worked out. The text of the Schuman plan (French foreign minister) talked in generalities of securing investment markets, modernizing equipment, insuring sources of supply, living conditions and investment in Africa. The statement went on to say that it “will change the destiny of these regions which have long been devoted to the production of arms to which they themselves were the first to fall constantly victims.” It also added that this organization would be “open to all countries that wished to participate in it” and that this steel would be offered to “all countries” on “equal terms.”
The reaction to this in Washington is reported by the N.Y. Times diplomatic correspondent James Reston on May 11: “Dean Acheson had gone to Europe convinced that the ‘cold war’ was here to stay and that the Western nations must organize together to fight that war. But did M. Schuman agree? Was he vying to organize the West to fight the ‘cold war,’ or was he making. some kind of a general offer designed to liquidate the ‘cold war’?” The French embassy hastily assured the frightened government officials that they need not have any fear.
But these apprehensions on the part of the State Department are real ones. They are manifesting themselves in the meetings of the North Atlantic Pact Council where there is growing resistance to the increase in military expenditures being demanded by the U.S. The Western European nations are maintaining that they cannot afford large war budgets and that these would adversely affect living standards at home, thus jeopardizing the present governments.
In addition the U.S. is pressing for the admission of Germany into the North Atlantic Pact. Germany is to rearm by entering the pact through the back door, that is, the proposal is that the pact be expanded to include a cultural and economic, role. Under these circumstances John McCloy, U.S. high commissioner, said that it was “possible” that Germany might get an opportunity to join.
Germany will be allowed to increase her industrial production, notably steel, and at the same time be allowed to take the first steps toward rearmament. Whether France can, in the face of this development, retain some controls On the German economy remains to be seen. The actual working out of the details of this pooling scheme, if it can be done; at all, will clearly show the relative weight that Germany is able to command.
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