

# LABOR ACTION

Independent Socialist Weekly

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SEPTEMBER 26, 1955

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## Peron Falls, New Conflict Lies Ahead

By HAL DRAPER

The circumstances surrounding the downfall of Peron, as the result of the new armed revolt, were such as to point up the vital role played in the events by his loss of working-class support.

As we explained in some detail right after the June revolt ["Why Peron's Power Cracked," June 27] Peron's power was founded, not decisively on a totalitarian party or governmental structure, but on the balancing against each other of two big social forces: the officer cadres of the army, and the sections of the working class organized and state-controlled in the Peronist "trade unions" of the CGT.

As the dictator's mass labor support—originally won by social demagoguery on the basis of a war-born prosperity which permitted real economic concessions to the workers—was eroded away by discontent and growing strike struggles which exposed the regime's basically reactionary character, it became harder and harder for Peron to keep his power bloc united. It became possible for the armed forces to become the instrument to overthrow the dictator when they no longer feared mass street struggles in defense of Peron by the *descamisados* ("shirtless ones").

This relationship was behind the June revolt when the naval forces spearheaded an attack on Peron, hoping that the army cadres would be drawn along with them. Already here it was clear that Peron's first appeal for an outpouring of mass worker-fighters, such as had rescued him before, had been a flop. Only some pretorian bands turned out.

The call was rescinded to save face, and Peron turned to cunning compromises to stall for time. He has been fencing ever since between the open opposition elements and the "loyal" army supporters.

This past week, faced with spreading defection from army ranks, Peron's last card also was a flamboyant appeal by his CGT "trade union" henchmen for a general strike and mass workers' demonstrations. This appeal got almost as big headlines in parts of our New York press as in Buenos Aires, no doubt because the former took pleasure in suggesting that the terroristic dictator was depending on labor to support his dictatorship.

But the unheeded though decisive part of the Argentine picture was that this last call to labor was an even more complete failure than in June. Thereupon Peron was through.

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## Balance Sheet of the Negotiations:

# What Moscow Gained And Adenauer Lost

By GORDON HASKELL

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer did not leave Moscow with empty hands. He returned to Bonn with a political time-bomb ticking away in his briefcase which may one day blow his government to bits. Its power is demonstrated by the fact that its mere existence was enough to explode before the whole world Adenauer's vaunted policy of unifying Germany from a "position of strength."

In London and Washington the government leaders are moaning about the effect Adenauer's Moscow decision will have on the forthcoming Big Four conference. It will strengthen, they say, the Russian negotiators' position that the German situation has been stabilized, and that the future of the unification of Germany must be settled between the two governments of Germany.

It is quite true that the position of the capitalist negotiators at the next Big Four conference, already difficult, has been made virtually impossible by the Moscow agreement. But that is not its chief, long-range significance.

What became clear when Adenauer's policy collapsed at Moscow was that either Germany will remain divided, or it will be united not by an agreement between the Stalinist and capitalist negotiators but by the action of the German people themselves.

The question of German unification has now become, more than ever before since the country was divided by its conquerors after the war, a problem of internal German politics. In the immediate future, its full force will be felt primarily in Western Germany, where the existence of political democracy permits the struggle to pro-

ceed in "normal" political terms. As the meaning of the Moscow agreement begins to sink in, it is bound to create major strains in the Adenauer coalition, as well as to give the Social-Democrats a weapon more powerful than they have ever had before.

What actually happened at Moscow was not some unforeseeable catastrophe for Adenauer's policy. Ever since his government adopted its orientation of tying West Germany to the capitalist military camp, his opponents have insisted that this would preclude the unification of Germany on a negotiated basis.

### CARDS ON THE TABLE

The initial successes of Adenauer's policy—the achievement of sovereignty for West Germany; its development as a major power in Europe; its rapid economic recovery—all this won popular support for the chancellor in West Germany and tended to relegate his opponents to the position of Cassandras, whose cries of doom fell on deaf ears. If *der alte Fuchs* had proved right on so many things, the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois beneficiaries of his policies reasoned, why should he not prove right on the question of unification also?

# Russian Amnesty Is Part of Campaign to Lure Emigres Home

By A. STEIN

By their political cynicism and audacity, the clique now ruling in the Kremlin are proving they are the true heirs of Stalin. Moscow's latest announcement of a sweeping amnesty for those who "collaborated" with the Germans during World War II is an integral part of a developing campaign aimed at the Russian emigration abroad. Above all, it is directed at the more than 100,000 Russian DPs living in Western Germany.

It is of these tragic pawns in the political-propaganda struggle between Washington and Moscow that Bulganin spoke in negotiations with Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany. When Adenauer raised the demand for the return of all German prisoners still held by Moscow, Bulganin in effect proposed the following exchange: Russia would hand the German "war criminals" over to the East German puppet regime; in return, Bonn ought to return the 100,000 Russians, most of whom (according to Bul-

ganin) are being kept in West German territory against their will.

This outright demand for the forced repatriation of these Russian DPs was made by Bulganin in the name of "humanity and of freedom of the individual."

Moscow's understandable concern with the existence of a large and visible body of émigrés who feared to return to Russia has always been considerable. Primarily, of course, it has been interested in preventing the emergence of any cohesive political groups, whether of the right or left.

Until recently Moscow's method of

And as long as the results of his policies, in this particular field, remained in the realm of prediction and argumentation, he was able to give as good as he took from the Social-Democrats and the growing number of grumblers and second-guessers in the ranks of his own coalition.

But when the call came from Moscow for negotiations, the cards had to be laid on the table. At first Adenauer's spokesmen said that the chancellor would not go to Moscow unless the Russians were prepared to state in advance that they would recognize his government as the spokesmen for all the German people. In a couple of days, this position had to be modified.

It was then announced that although Adenauer would be willing to open negotiations with the Russians without such recognition from them, the first thing which would have to be settled would be acceptable terms for German unification and the return of German prisoners from Russia. Unless these were agreed upon, there could be no question of establishing diplomatic relations with the Russians.

When the German delegation arrived in Moscow, with its ostentatious display of a horde of officials riding in state in a private train, Adenauer made a speech in which he announced himself as the representative of the whole German people. The Russians said nothing. In the first days he tried out his "tough" line on them. They did not even get angry. They simply told him, in an offhand way, that the time was "not opportune" to discuss German unity, and that there was "no

(Turn to last page)

dealing with these DP and émigré groups was to issue general appeals for a return to the homeland and simultaneously to engage in acts of terror against outstanding political personalities. In the last few months, however, the propaganda campaign has become more systematic and intensive.

A "Committee for the Return to the Motherland" was set up in East Berlin under the direction of a Major General Nikolai F. Mikhailov. This propaganda group has been issuing a bulletin, pamphlets and leaflets describing the wonderful life in the Soviet Union and contrasting it with the wretched life of the DPs in West Germany.

This propaganda has not neglected those Russians who have emigrated to the United States and other countries. They too have been receiving appeals couched in the same language. A recent issue of the committee's publication, "For Return to the Motherland," mailed

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This Wednesday:

**JAMES WECHSLER**

of ADA, Editor, N. Y. Post

vs.

**HAL DRAPER**

of ISL, Editor, Labor Action

on

**AMERICAN LIBERALISM vs.  
INDEPENDENT SOCIALISM**

See top of Page 5 for details

# LABOR SCOPE

## KOHLER: SHADOW OVER TALK OF LABOR PEACE

By BEN HALL

For 18 months pickets have paced in front of the Kohler Company's plumbing ware plant in Kohler, Wisconsin. On April 5, 1954, 2,500 members of the United Auto Workers Local 833 went on strike. Their demands were not unusual—higher wages, security—and even these demands were reduced as the strike dragged on. But they face a company that wants nothing less than smashing the union.

The factory is family-owned by Kohlers; Kohler village has been dominated by Kohlers; the governor of Wisconsin is a Kohler. The union is threatened with an anti-labor alliance of employers, courts and government, the kind of union-wrecking that is supposed to be outlived in America.

But Kohler has never accepted unionism. In 1934 an AFL strike was broken when company police shot and killed two and wounded 47 others. A company union was encouraged by the owners but conditions became so futile that it affiliated with the UAW-CIO in 1952.

The UAW won its first contract that year, far inferior to the rest of the industry; but the union hoped that it would be the beginning of an upward climb. It was a miscalculation. Herbert Kohler, company president, later told reporters: "You can sit and bargain with them but you don't have to give them anything." The union struck when the contract expired in April 1954 and the company refused flatly to negotiate.

Since the strike, the company has:

- (1) Rejected every proposal for mediation by local and national politicians.
- (2) Admitted publicly that it had stored away an arsenal of clubs, guns and tear gas.
- (3) Reopened the plant with scabs recruited anywhere in the country.
- (4) Fired 90 strikers, including all officers and secondary local leaders.
- (5) Insisted that it would rehire, without loss of seniority, only workers with 15 years seniority and none of those it discharged. It demanded too that scabs get preferential seniority.
- (6) Stubbornly restricted its offer to an increase of 3 cents per hour when the union cut its demand to 10 cents. But after negotiations were suspended, Kohler gave its scabs an increase of 10 cents.
- (7) Demanded in case of layoffs the right to select 10 per cent of the victims at its own arbitrary discretion, regardless of seniority. In other words, it sought the right to fire union activists at any time.
- (8) Demanded the elimination of contract clauses which provided for the submission of grievances to arbitration when company and union could not agree.

### IRON FIST TACTICS

The state's political climate is symbolized by the adoption of the notorious Catlin bill by the legislature, a law signed by Governor Kohler that places the most extreme restrictions on union political activity adopted anywhere in the country.

Local 833 kept the shop shut down for 54 days by mass picketing and finally abandoned it under pressure. On May 21, 1954, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, under terms of a state "Little Taft-Hartley" Law, ordered the end of mass action. By September 1, a circuit court judge issued an injunction restricting picketing in particular and strike activities in general. By May 25, 1955, 16 strikers were found guilty of contempt.

Meanwhile, the attorney general ruled conveniently that Kohler Village police were fully authorized to have machine-guns. On July 21, the governor warned the union that he would call out the state militia to keep "law and order" if the strikers continued what he called "illegal acts." And through all this, the CIO charged, federal contracts were being awarded to Kohler.

Last July 2, the Norwegian freighter S.S. Fassum docked in Sheboygan Harbor with clay for Kohler. Mayor Ploetz, elected by union backing, forbade the unloading of the ship. It sailed to Milwaukee where the state CIO threatened a city-wide work stoppage if any effort was made to unload the cargo. It sailed off to Montreal, Canada. In Montreal police smashed a picket line organized by the

### UAW and the Canadian Congress of Labor, and the clay was unloaded and sent by rail to Sheboygan.

To facilitate reopening of negotiations, the union allowed supervisory rail personnel to drive the clay train into Kohler's yard. But later railroad men refused to transport freight past union pickets and again supervisory personnel took over. On August 4, 12 unions were charged with violating the Taft-Hartley Law and the NLRB got ready to hear secondary boycott charges.

By now, 2,000 scabs maintain production. The UAW has spent \$4,000,000 on strike relief and bases its future resistance on continued weekly payments of \$25 to strikers and upon a nation-wide boycott of Kohler products. But the Taft-Hartley Law puts severe restrictions on the boycott. And as winter approaches and temporary farm jobs come to an end, the strikers face a critical situation.

In most manufacturing industries, the big monopolies have reconciled themselves to unionism. Labor is powerful. Any attempt to crush it on a vast scale would create a bitter social crisis. Employers are content to tolerate unions while they enjoy mounting profits and relative stability. For the moment, they prefer peace. In this respect, Kohler is unusual.

But the strike reminds labor that all the tools of anti-union struggle—state and national laws, repression of strikes under certain conditions, compliant courts, laws against labor political action—are right at hand ready to be taken up by any employer who decides to use them. This is the shadow that hangs over all labor peace.

# Moroccans Win on Trade-Union Rights

By A. GIACOMETTI

PARIS, Sept. 17—A week ago the Moroccan government approved a bill granting full trade-union rights to Moroccans. Agricultural workers are not yet included in the bill; their rights will be set down in a special bill, yet to be drawn up.

These bills will legalize trade-union activities for 350,000 industrial and eventually for 600,000 agricultural workers, representing about 85 per cent of the working class in Morocco.

A second bill provides for personnel delegates in the factories and for the election of a social committee in every enterprise employing over 50 workers. The function of the social committees will be to administer retirement plans, mutual-aid funds, etc. Moroccan and European workers will be jointly represented on these bodies without distinction of race or nationality. Also under the terms of the new decrees, Moroccan trade-unions can affiliate directly to the international federation of their choice: international affiliation will not have to go through the French trade-union movement.

**These bills are the outcome of almost 20 years of struggle.**

Trade-union rights had been granted to European workers already in December 1936, under the "Popular Front" government in France. Moroccans were forbidden to join European unions until 1944. Then, under the pressure of the Liberation in France, the Moroccan government was compelled to informally "tolerate" the affiliation of Moroccan workers to the existing unions, but they were still excluded by law from collective bargaining and from positions of leadership. Already in 1946, the liberal Resident-General Eirik Labonne pointed out the inadequacy of this arrangement, and proposed to extend full trade-union rights to Moroccan workers. His proposals were immediately rejected by the ruling clique in Morocco, and he was recalled soon afterwards. In 1949, the Sul-

tan Ben Youssef came out in favor of full trade-union rights for Moroccans, in an interview to a delegation of Moroccan trade-unionists.

Since 1944 the Moroccan trade-unionists of the Istiqlal tendency have conducted an all-out struggle for their rights against the administration and against the Stalinist leadership of the European UGSCM (Moroccan CGT), which had every reason to favor the compulsory affiliation of Moroccan workers to the unions it was leading.

Very soon the Istiqlal tendency became dominant among the organized Moroccan workers, but was unable to take the leadership because of the discriminatory legislation of the Protectorate. In the course of this struggle, the Moroccan trade-union leaders Mahjoub Ben Sedik, Taieb Bouazza and others suffered repeatedly torture and imprisonment.

In January 1955 they created the "Organizing Committee for Free Trade-Unionism," which was followed in March by the creation of the illegal Union Marocaine du Travail. From the start the UMT affiliated to the ICFTU, following the example of the Tunisian UGTT and of its founder Ferhat Hached.

Today the French administration has recognized the accomplished fact of the UMT. The importance of this great victory for the Moroccan working class and for the colonial peoples in general cannot be stressed enough. The legalization of the UMT shows once again that struggle pays, and that it pays best when it is conducted on a sound political basis: against colonialism on the outside and against Stalinism in its own ranks.

Pointing to the wider implications of the new situation, the UMT stated in a press release: "Trade-union rights cannot be fully exercised except in a climate of peace, and they assume the practice of other fundamental liberties"; it also "expresses the hope that the trade-union rights will be only one of a number of measures taken in order to resolve the crisis of Franco-Moroccan relations."

# Russian Amnesty Is a Lure — —

(Continued from page 1)

to Russian émigrés living in New York City contrasts the lot of children in Russia, where they have kindergarten, Pioneer Camps and rest homes by the sea, with the fate of children in capitalist countries, who are "pale, hungry, emaciated and waste away before their parents eyes."

The Russian campaign to win back the émigrés is being imitated detail for detail by the satellite regimes. Amnesties along the lines of that just issued by Moscow were announced several months ago by several of the puppet governments of Eastern Europe. Hungary issued such a decree in April, and Czechoslovakia in May.

Rumania published an amnesty decree on June 25, for all crimes except murder, which applied to all Rumanian citizens and former citizens now living abroad. Former citizens who have lost their citizenship will automatically have it restored if they return before August 23, 1956.

### BEHIND "LENIENCY"

Perhaps the most sensational result of this policy of "forgiveness" was the return to Poland of Hugo Hanke, former premier of the Polish government-in-exile. There can be no doubt about the consternation this defection created in the ranks of the Polish emigration.

Writing from Warsaw, the New York Times expert on Russian affairs, Harry Schwartz, reported on September 18 that "Dispatches from London describe the Polish government-in-exile as demoralized by the defection of its former premier. These dispatches give the impression that the émigré leaders fear M. Hanke's return to Poland will initiate a mass return by Polish émigrés all over the world. They hint that many émigrés are now on the verge of returning." Schwartz adds that "Interviews with several émigrés who returned several years ago indicate that they have been permitted to lead normal lives."

Since any political activity by émigrés in Western countries was construed by the puppet regimes as "criminal," some

of them have taken unusual measures to prove to the émigrés that such political activity will not be held against them. On June 11, Radio Bucharest and the Rumanian newspapers announced that Gheorghiu and Christescu, had voluntarily appeared before state security agencies and confessed to being American spies who had been parachuted into the country. It was announced that because of their sincere confession they had not been arrested but were granted the "right to choose freely their residence and the possibility of getting a job."

This new tactic of "leniency," which is given credibility by the policy of "relaxation" within Russia and the satellite countries, is motivated by several factors.

First of all, Moscow is intent on discrediting the American propaganda theme that the Eastern European regimes are its puppets and undemocratic. If thousands of former citizens of these countries return from Western Europe and the United States, it will be proof that life in the "Socialist bloc of countries" is wonderful while existence in the capitalist countries is wretched.

Secondly, as we have already mentioned, Moscow is fearful of all political groups in exile who may some day act as centers of opposition to its puppet regimes. Naturally, all such groups are depicted as hirelings of Washington, but this does not reduce their potential danger to the Eastern European governments.

### ECONOMIC AIM

Finally, there is the economic aspect. Currently, the East European regimes are conducting an educational campaign to restore the standing of the "intelligentsia," that is, the professional and technical middle class, who were persecuted, jailed and driven into exile in the past years. The economics of all these countries paid a heavy price as a result of the loss of competent personnel, and now, under Moscow's direction, the Stalinist leadership in Eastern Europe is trying to redress the situation.

In the case of Russia itself, it is not so much a question of skilled manpower as of just manpower. A Belgrade correspondent of the New York Russian-language newspaper, *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* reported in the August 8 issue that Russian émigrés living in Yugoslavia who had been turned over by Tito's government to the Russians via Bulgaria and Hungary were writing letters on their "happy existence in the homeland" to their friends in Yugoslavia. Without exception, these returnees had been sent to the countryside to work in the kolkhozes. And in many cases, they had been sent to the new areas in Kazakhstan.

What will be the fate of these émigrés? For the present, it is clear, they will be left to pursue the work to which they are assigned. But sooner or later, the turn will come in the line, and they will be the first to suffer. Despite all the liberalization in Russia and the satellite countries, Stalinism has not changed its stripes.

More concretely, in the satellite countries the dreary spectacle of political show-trials has not been curtailed. During June and July there were a whole series of such trials in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

Ironically, the United States has been helping Moscow and its puppet regimes in luring former citizens back. The hopeless situation of the Russian and East European DPs is due in large part to the McCarran-Walter immigration law. As the readers of LABOR ACTION know, it is practically impossible for these DPs to enter the United States.

And just one day before Moscow announced its amnesty, Senator Eastland, Democrat, chairman of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, declared that he opposed relaxing the prohibitive conditions of the McCarran-Walter Law. Such a step, he said, would open gates to saboteurs and secret agents. According to Eastland, 30 to 40 per cent of adults admitted to West Germany up to eight or nine months ago were Communist agents!

Is it any wonder that many of those who risked their lives to escape from the East European countries and Russia are now given impetus to return?

REPORT FROM ROME

# THE CRISIS IN THE ITALIAN CP

By LUCIO LIBERTINI

ROME, Sept. 10—Recent electoral defeats, especially in Sicily, defeats in trade-union elections, as at FIAT, along with numerous comments on the deviations of the powerful functionary Pietro Secchia, have drawn attention to the crisis in the Italian Communist Party. Not all that has been written about this is true.

During the twenty years of Mussolini's dictatorship, the Stalinists controlled three quarters of the anti-fascist underground. Their organizational network, although extremely modest, had the advantage of being the only one with a minimum of efficiency, especially in comparison with the non-existence of the SP.

It was not able to play an effective role in the overthrow of the fascist government. However, it was left in a privileged position when Mussolini was removed from power, as the parties resumed public activity and as partisan warfare was organized in the North. Along with the socialists and the Action Party, the Stalinists carried the main burden of the partisan struggle.

Thus they succeeded, between 1943 and 1945, in extending their organization to large parts of the population which under different circumstances would not have joined the CPI.

Togliatti maneuvered with great skill in this situation. Immediately after his arrival from Russia he eliminated certain old conceptions and methods. Those Communists who had remained attached to the theses of 1921 and to the sectarian rigidity of that period were removed from responsible positions. The CPI presented itself to the Italian masses as a "new party" (in the words of Togliatti) based on a policy of "national unity" and "progressive democracy."

For many years the Stalinists continued to follow a conciliatory and cooperative policy, offering their collaboration to all parties. Such a policy corresponded in part to the legitimate need of overcoming a primitive sectarianism and a sterile revolutionary mystique, of applying the class struggle to the new developments in Italian society. However, it also served perfectly the interests of Russian policy. In effect, Moscow had excluded Italy from its sphere of influence, and had charged its functionary Togliatti with implementing this decision.

## Underlying Contradiction

Nevertheless, the policy of "progressive democracy" was accompanied by the creation of an imposing and efficient organizational apparatus. About 35,000 paid functionaries were put under Togliatti's orders; in all, Togliatti disposed of an annual budget of several billion lire, a large part of which was sent from Russia. The base of the CP reached some two million members and in several regions (such as Emilia) the CPI controlled entire communities, with economic interests amounting to several tens of billions lire.

Thanks to its new policy, to its financial means and to its apparatus, the CPI was able to score important successes against the Socialist Party. Numerous Stalinist agents were sent into the SP, and many of its sections were reorganized under Stalinist control. Saragat's split in 1947 left the SP entirely to the Stalinists, who controlled it with their own functionaries and financed it out of their funds. In 1948 both parties participated in the elections on a joint ticket, and the CPI, thanks to its better organization, was able to use the socialist votes to get its own deputies elected.

Through this kind of success, and in spite of the defeat of the "People's Bloc" in the elections, the CPI became Moscow's favorite party and Togliatti's prestige rose to great heights in Russia. Around 1948 great optimism prevailed among Stalinist militants, who extolled Togliatti's great ability and political talent.

Yet, from the start, the CPI's policy was

based on a fundamental contradiction.

Many Communists viewed Togliatti's new policy as a mere trick, as a kind of Trojan horse out of which at the favorable moment the fully armed revolution would spring. Others took Togliatti's declarations at face value. All looked with great expectations to the evolution of Russian policy. For years the CPI's base waited for "liberation" of the Russian type, an idea which became an object of hope and fear for millions of Italians.

Finally, there were those who saw in Togliatti an early Tito. This opinion was sustained by Togliatti himself, who told his nearest friends that when the CPI would take power, relations with the USSR might be determined in an independent manner.

## Roots of Decay

The hard years of the cold war and the following decrease in international tension gradually undermined the confidence of the CPI base. The electoral defeat of the "People's Bloc" in 1948 had already somewhat shaken Togliatti's prestige as an infallible leader. The subsequent consolidation of governmental and bourgeois positions, along with the intensification of the reactionary counter-offensive, left the CPI rather isolated. Little by little everybody understood that Russian "liberation" was outside the realm of possibility.

Finally it became apparent to the Stalinist rank and file that Togliatti's policy was without perspective. The gradual realization of this took the form of a slow and steadily growing crisis in the party.

The first spectacular "case" was the resignation of the deputies Aldo Cucchi and Valdo Magnani, who left the CPI for political reasons, having declared themselves opposed to the Russian guidance and advocating a Third Camp policy. They later contributed to the creation of the Unione Socialista Indipendente which fights for the unity and independence of Italian socialism.

Their break was all the more important and significant as they were the first outstanding Communist leaders of the post-war period who left the Stalinist party without either putting themselves at the service of the bourgeoisie or taking refuge in sectarian abstractions. The Communists who had previously left the CPI, with few exceptions, joined the social-democratic right or the clericals. Typical in this respect is the case of the writer Ignazio Silone, who now directs in Italy the anti-Communist and anti-socialist propaganda of the U. S.—and bourgeois-inspired movements. Also the Calabrese deputy Silipo, who left the CPI after Cucchi and Magnani, joined the Christian Democracy and took part in the elections on the clerical ticket.

The departure of Cucchi and Magnani from the CPI had no important organizational or electoral consequences as only a strong and united socialist party would have been in a position to attract the Communist base. Nevertheless, the crisis of the party did not cease to spread. In many places the CPI voters switched their votes to Nenni's SP, which had begun half-heartedly to follow a more independent course. This phenomenon repeated itself in the 1953 elections and in the Sicilian regional elections.

But the decline of the Stalinist forces took on really important and growing proportions on the trade-union level. The sharp and unremitting offensive which the government and the employers are conducting in the factories today, with fascist methods and with the purpose of breaking the unions, finds the major trade union, the Stalinist-led CGIL, in the midst of a grave crisis. Many Communist workers no longer have the force and courage to face firing, reprisals and hunger for politics in which they no longer believe.

Many who were still voting without conviction for the CPI would align themselves in the

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factory with class-collaborationist unions. This was recently admitted in an article in *Rinascita* by the Stalinist leader Montagnana himself, and the results of the FIAT elections leave no doubt: in the Turin works of this company the Stalinist-led union lost 17,000 votes.

These are the circumstances under which the "Secchia crisis" broke out.

Pietro Secchia, who spent many years in prison for anti-fascist activities, is considered, along with Togliatti and Longo, as one of the most faithful agents of the Russians. Within the CPI he held highly responsible posts, such as the vice-secretariat of the party, until 1955.

In the course of the past year Secchia became convinced that the party's policy was leading to defeat, and began organizing a growing opposition against Togliatti. The disagreement between the two almost exploded at the recent National Conference of the CPI; however, at the last moment, Secchia preferred to remain passive and Togliatti prevailed, excluding Secchia from the Secretariat and sending him to Lombardy with a minor post. The fall of Malenkov and the uncertainties of Russian policy prompted Togliatti to intensify the purge of his opponents.

A group of them, all from Northern Italy and led by Secchia's secretary, Giulio Seniga, have still continued a sort of underground action against the leadership. They attempted to get in touch with the Cominform offices in Bucharest, and undertook an agitation campaign in the sections of the CPI. The positions of this group are extremist in a primitive way. They accuse Togliatti and his friends of corruption, of class-collaboration, of weakness, and demand a "return to the origins" and "frontal class action."

Their major illusion is to believe that Moscow could approve of their action and even help them to throw Togliatti overboard. In this respect they are, if possible, even more Stalinist than the present leadership.

## The Fear and the Hope

As we have already pointed out, the Stalinist crisis expresses above all the failure of ten years of false policy. Today the workers realize that their sacrifices have been in vain: at the end of the Stalinist road there is neither revolution, nor "progressive democracy," nor Russian-style "liberation," but only defeat and isolation.

The decrease in international tension and Stalin's death have added to the confusion and disorientation in the CPI. This party, which in the eyes of its followers stood as a firm rock in the middle of storms, revealed itself to be in fact more like a frail boat swayed by every wind. Bulganin and Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade has come as a last blow to the Stalinist

Today there is practically no possibility for the CPI to increase its electoral strength. On the contrary, it will probably lose more voters. Yet it is unlikely that a sudden crumbling of the Stalinist electoral positions will take place, such as occurred in the factories.

In Italy the vote is free and secret, and many workers who are dominated by fear in their factory, would express their discontent at the ballot boxes by voting for what remains the major opposition party, even though they no longer agree with its policy. This situation would change fundamentally if the Italian socialists achieved unity and independence. If this happens, the Stalinist forces would be reduced by a good half to the advantage of the socialists.

The attitude of the working class today is one of profound mistrust toward the CPI; but many are afraid of favoring the bourgeoisie by leaving this party as long as a real socialist alternative does not exist. Whoever realizes the sweep and the violence of the present reactionary offensive, which Saragat supports in his own small way, cannot but understand these fears and anxieties.

We have asked Comrade Libertini to explain and elaborate on his remark, above, about the present political role of Ignazio Silone, in view of widespread American interest in the famous novelist.—Ed.

## LONDON LETTER

# Rightists Boast of Reining Workers' Anger at Tories

By OWEN ROBERTS

LONDON, Sept. 16—When the 87th Trades Union Congress ended at Southport last week it marked five days of verbal feasting which brought nothing unexpected. Once again the leadership of the General Council had weathered the challenge to its authority to emerge virtually unscathed from the conflict—a fact which has been welcomed by the Tory press.

The ultra-respectable London *Times*, in a leading article, said: "The movement made a start, if a somewhat shaky one, on the tasks of reshaping its organization and attitudes to meet the needs of the times. They still have a long way to go. But this week's discussions could be the beginning of a steady move forwards."

This welcoming—but cautious—attitude of the *Times* is an accurate reflection of the fact that, although the General Council managed to carry its policy, strong opposition was present at the Congress. With the British economic situation delicately balanced in a position above the slippery slope of slump, the militants might well succeed in turning the tables on the Right Wing and the trade union movement would then drive into a clash with the Tory Government on a whole series of economic issues.

The *Times* is clearly aware of this—hence its cautious note.

Probably the most sickening press comment was that of Labor's own daily newspaper, the *Daily Herald*. Its industrial correspondent, Harold Hutchinson, spoke of the anger and resentment present among the workers against the Tory Government. Boasted Hutchinson: "It is the TUC, its General Secretary, Sir Vincent Tewson, and its General Council... who are controlling that anger today, and ensuring the future of the nation." (His italics.)

In an article which displayed reformism at its very worst Hutchinson spoke of the need for the workers to act responsibly—in spite of the "irresponsibility" of the government. A handful of quotes, from what Hutchinson called the "sober voices" of the TUC leadership, were used to give authority to this argument.

## "TUC BETRAYAL"

After this display Hutchinson proceeded to have a crack at nationalization. He noted—or welcomed—"the way that nationalization has moved into the background." What really matters, he said, "is the performance of industry in creating wealth without which political programs are sterile." This from a so-called industrial correspondent in a paper which allegedly backs the Labor Party!

But Hutchinson cannot be blamed. For, as this week's *Tribune* states, "Mr. Hutchinson is an accurate reporter. In fact, he is understating the new trend. The General Council has not merely pushed nationalization into the background, it has shoved it off the stage altogether."

In this hard-hitting article, headlined: "TUC Betrayal on Nationalization," *Tribune* lambasts the TUC right wing and states that it is the TUC's job to

make the case for nationalization, not to decry it.

It was perhaps the atmosphere of the Southport Congress which prompted the British Employers Confederation to show its claws early this week. In the first major policy statement it has made since 1931 the Employers' Confederation outlined some of the remedies for Britain's economic difficulties. They consisted of the usual capitalist remedies—in the main a demand for the relief of the condition of "brim full" employment and an ax on government expenditure. In plain words—more unemployment and a reduction in social services.

Perhaps this Employers Confederation doesn't realize just what a valuable service it did the Labor Left by producing that statement when it did. Coming immediately after a week during which the right wing of the TUC had endeavored to convince the trade union rank and file how important it was to show "restraint," it served to show that the boss class still remains the same no matter how conciliatory the workers' leaders are. It also proved what a lot of bawdles had been talked by certain people at Southport the week before.

## Peron Falls — —

(Continued from page 1)

Fear of working-class intervention in the struggle, on either side, was also undoubtedly a strong factor in bringing about a quick arrangement on top as soon as Peron had stepped out. This is a fact about the downfall of Peron which bodes little good for the post-Peron regime, whose features are not yet visible as this is written.

The absence of mass participation in the overthrow of Peron is, of course, not simply due to the haste of the generals on both sides to compose their differences (over Peron's political corpse) before anybody else takes a hand in the game. It also no doubt reflects the relative political passivity of the working-class cadres—who are no longer willing to jump into the trucks and head for downtown yelling for Peron, but who also do not yet have any other banners and centers around which to rally their class forces.

## NEW CHAPTER

In the event of continued lack of motion on the part of the masses, and given the bourgeois, military and clerical background of the armed conspirators who led the rebellion, even the impetus of the dictator's overthrow may not be enough to ensure such a democratization of Argentine political life as to clear new ground for the political class struggle which is certain to rise now.

Under such circumstances it is even possible that a military dictatorship (without the demagogic-totalitarian trappings of Peronism) may succeed Peron sooner rather than later, though even this will not be able to prevent the building of a new and cleansed labor and socialist movement—for which the overthrow of Peronism was a precondition.

The overthrow of Peron ends one chapter in the development of Argentine labor, as of Argentine society as a whole. In the next chapter, which begins now no matter what type of regime is installed immediately, the construction of a new labor movement will have to go hand in hand with new and deep social struggles.

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## ISRAEL

# Mapai and Stalinoids Negotiating New Gov't

By AL FINDLEY

For the first time since the establishment of the state of Israel, there now seems to be a prospect of a predominantly labor government there.

Press reports have it that the three workers' parties—Mapai, Mapam and Achdut Avodah—have reached an agreement to form a government. In the 120-member Knesset, Mapai has 40 deputies plus 5 allied Arab deputies; Achdut Avodah has 10; Mapam has 8-9.

But these three parties may also try to get the bourgeois Progressive Party (liberal General Zionists) and the Hapoel Hamizrachi to join with them in a coalition.

The reports indicate that Mapam made most of its demands in the field of foreign policy. Further discussion on division of ministerial posts must now take place before agreement can be reached. The post of minister of Agriculture is the one that is most moot between the three parties.

The possibility of the formation of such a labor-composed government in Israel is the result of two important developments outside the borders of Israel.

The first was the Geneva conference of the big two of the world, Russia and the U. S. With the development of the "Geneva spirit," Achdut Avodah and especially Mapam (now separate wings of the former united Stalinoid party) became more inclined to take a tolerant view of the pro-Western orientation of Mapam.

Parenthetically, while on the subject of the Geneva spirit, it should also be mentioned that it spread to the Jewish question under Stalinism, although in a confused manner. For the first time in years, the Russian government has renewed its propaganda against anti-Semitism. In addition, Russia voted with the U. S. to call for a cease-fire in the Gaza fighting.

On the other hand Ilya Ehrenbourg, who seems to be the foremost spokesman in Russia on the Jewish question, declared that the Jews in Russia should become Russians. He took the trouble to deny that he knew Yiddish, despite the fact that he is known to have a good command of the Yiddish language and was once head of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Russia. There have also been reports that many Jews were arrested in Russia for the crime of beginning to display an interest in Jewish culture after Geneva.

## DULLES' IMPACT

Coming back to our main subject, the second reason for the Israeli development, besides the "Geneva spirit," was Secretary of State Dulles' peace proposal. Dulles offered an international loan to Israel for the settlement of the Arab refugee problem, and also proposed to join in guaranteeing the Israeli-Arab borders after the opposing sides had reached an agreement.

While official statements welcomed Dulles' speech, unofficially it has been conceded in Israel that Dulles dealt a final blow to Israeli hopes that the U. S. would sign a defense treaty with Israel now and guarantee Israel the present borders.

As we reported in *LA* (Aug. 18) the main point that was preventing a coalition of the three labor parties was the plan for a U. S. defense treaty. This stumbling-block has now been removed, and a U. S.-Israel treaty is some distance in the future.

Despite the fact that Dulles accepted much of the Israeli point of view on how to achieve peace in the Near East, the question of borders is decisive. Israel now occupies much more territory than was allocated to it by the UN partition resolution. For a long time now, it has been a cardinal principle of all groups, except the irredentist Cherut, to try to get the present armistice lines accepted as the permanent boundaries.

It is for that reason that Israel has not seized Arab territory even where and when it could do so from a military point of view. Cherut is probably correct in claiming that the Israeli army could have seized all of the Gaza territory when it carried out its raid on Khan Yunis.

However, Israel does not want the Gaza strip. For one thing, this territory contains thousands of Arab refugees from Palestine who would pose a serious problem. Any seizure of territory would

raise again the question of fixing new boundaries, whereas what Israel wants most of all is recognition of the existing boundaries.

## STORM BREWING

In this connection, a far greater threat to peace in the region than the border incidents ever were is the developing conflict over the Gulf of Akoba. This gulf lies between Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In all cases it is within the three-mile limit of territorial waters. The Egyptian government has announced its intention of controlling the gulf and preventing Israeli traffic. It has demanded 72-hour notice from any ship entering the gulf.

There can be little doubt that the Egyptian action is a violation of international law, and has brought protests from the major maritime powers beginning with Great Britain.

The danger lies in the fact that it represents a real threat to Israeli plans to develop the relatively large area of the Negev and part of Elath. Israel has poured vast sums of money into the development of areas for political reasons despite adverse economic considerations. This is also true of the corridor to Jerusalem and Jerusalem itself, but the Negev has been the chief point of interest to Israeli planners.

While at present it is politically expedient but economically wasteful to spend the money Israel is investing in the Negev, it is true that the Negev represents a vital area for future development. The government of Israel would therefore be impelled toward decisive action to safeguard its interests in the Gulf of Akoba. Given its military superiority it would find it difficult to resist popular pressure for such action.

As usual the actions of the great powers only muddle the issues. England and the U. S. try to appease both sides and find themselves pleasing no one. Russia, which for years had had a pro-Arab position, has further confused the situation by giving Israel some smiles while at the same time offering to supply arms to Egypt, Syria and other Arab states.

This development, too, may have affected the possibility of the formation of the three-party government in Israel. It is not excluded that Mapai hopes that the inclusion of the Stalinoid Mapam in a government will balance the visit made by Nasser of Egypt to the Eastern bloc and his flirtation with "neutrality" and may prevent Russian arms from going to the Arabs, or give Israel an equal chance to get arms itself.

## Labor Action FORUM New York

Thursday at 8:45 p.m.

Sept. 29—Michael Harrington

THE EDUCATION OF  
HENRY ADAMS

Oct. 6—Hal Draper

SCHUMPETER'S THEORY  
OF IMPERIALISM

Oct. 13—Sam Taylor

THE ECONOMIC BASIS  
OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY

Labor Action Hall

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## LABOR ACTION

September 26, 1955 Vol. 19, No. 39

Published weekly by Labor Action Publishing Company, 114 West 14 Street, New York 13, N. Y.—Telephone: WATKINS 4-4222—Re-entered as second-class matter May 24, 1940, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1874.—Subscriptions: \$2 a year; \$1 for 6 months (\$2.25 and \$1.15 for Canadian and Foreign).—Opinions and policies expressed in signed articles by contributors do not necessarily represent the views of Labor Action, which are given in editorial statements.

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WED. EVE.—American Liberalism vs. Independent Socialism

# James Wechsler vs. Hal Draper

of the ADA—Editor, N. Y. Post

of the ISL—Editor, Labor Action

IN A DISCUSSION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OBJECTIVES AND HOW THESE ARE TO BE ACHIEVED

WEDNESDAY at 8 p.m. — September 28 — COMMUNITY CHURCH, 40 East 35 Street, New York City

Sponsored by STUDENTS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION and YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE



September 26, 1955

Edited and Published by the YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE

FIVE CENTS

## At the YSL Camp and School in Wisconsin

By GEORGE RAWLINGS

Socialist education and socialist fraternity were the dual themes of the second annual Young Socialist League summer camp held at the Recreation Camp in Genoa City, Wisconsin, from September 6 to 11, following the YSL convention in Chicago.

Over sixty members and friends of the Young Socialist League were in attendance at the camp some time during the week, participating in a successful venture in the development of socialist consciousness.

The camp was structured around thirteen educational sessions led by leading socialists and trade-unionists. The faculty of the camp included Hal Draper, editor of LABOR ACTION; Gerald McDermott and Saul Berg, socialist historians; Sidney Lens, Chicago trade-unionist and author of *The Counterfeit Revolution* and *Left, Right, and Center*; and B. J. Widick, co-author of *The UAW and Walter Reuther*.

Under the general heading of "Three Critics of Marxism," Draper devoted a session each to three important figures who have contributed to that literary genre known as "anti-Marxism." He had selected three subjects whose intellectual stature is widely respected, rather than easier marks like the run-of-the-mill Marx-slayers who infest contemporary journalism.

### ANTI-MARXISM REVISITED

The three considered were John Dewey, America's leading instrumentalist philosopher; Joseph Schumpeter, the late Austrian economist and economic historian who gained considerable influence in this country; and Raymond Aron, current French political journalist whose articles seem to have impressed at least that part of the American intellectual world which travels with *Parti-*

*san Review* and the American Committee for Cultural Freedom.

Draper's major contribution in this program was his analysis of John Dewey as a Critic of Marxism. Without derogating Dewey's own contributions as a thinker, he showed how—in *Freedom and Culture* and *Liberalism and Social Action*—Dewey insisted on attacking Marx for a crime he never committed, that of being a single-factor crude economic determinist; and how this leading exponent of scientific method abandoned his method when faced with the challenge of Marxism. At the end Draper documented the fact that Dewey admittedly had never bothered to study Marx or Marxism even though he devoted most of two books to attacking a doctrine of which he chose to remain ignorant.

Schumpeter's theory of imperialism, as presented in his recently republished *Imperialism and Social Classes*, took up the first part of Draper's second lecture, followed by a consideration of the critique of Marxism in the same author's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. For the third session in this series, Aron's book *The Century of Total War* was used as the basis for a round-table type of discussion in which the students were invited to work out on the journalist's polemic against Marxist ideas.

Gerald McDermott led three sessions in which he analyzed three different historical problems: the Nature of Class Rule

and Democracy in the United States; the Meiji Restoration in Japan; and a History of Jim Crow in the U. S.

### HISTORICAL CLASSES

In the first lecture McDermott analyzed the many barriers built into the legal and political system of the United States which are successfully designed to limit and frustrate democratic operations and to protect capitalist social and economic power. In the second lecture he analyzed the series of events, known as the Meiji Restoration, which constituted the bourgeois revolution in Japan and which is important for an adequate theoretical comprehension of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the Far East.

In the last of the series of lectures McDermott analyzed the roots of American Jim Crow as being found not in "human nature" or in "the spirit of man" or in the experience of slavery but in the political and social struggles which resulted from the conflict of classes after the "Second American Revolution," the Civil War. Many of those present were surprised to learn that the entire system of Jim Crow laws concerned with education, marriage, housing, travel, etc., was not solidified until around 1900, some thirty-five years after the Civil War.

Perhaps the liveliest discussions were those on various aspects of recent trade-union struggles and of socialist participation in these struggles led by Sid Lens, B. J. Widick, and Gerry McDermott. One session was devoted to a discussion between Widick and Lens, with excellent contributions from others present, on the question of the unity of the AFL and CIO.

Although Lens supported the unity, he had serious doubts on the extent to which it was a progressive step in the development of the American working class, feeling that the unity meant that the more conservative and bureaucratic AFL would dominate the new federation. Widick on the other hand felt that the progressive significance of the unity far outweighed any possible reactionary consequences.

### FOCUS ON TRADE-UNIONISM

In a session highlighted by the extent and depth of the personal involvement of those present, by the genuine development in many of a feeling of the solidarity between the socialist movement and the trade-union movement, and by an active concern by each one present as to how to best utilize his life and talents in the service of socialism, B. J. Widick discussed the problems and satisfactions of socialists who function as active rank-and-file militants in the trade-union movement. A lively discussion followed the formal adjournment of the session in which many of those present asked searching questions around the problem of how they best could function as socialists.

In the evening of this day devoted to trade-union problems, Widick and McDermott gave reports on recent develop-

ments within the steel, coal, electrical and automobile unions which helped provide those present with the kind of information and analysis which is not available in the non-socialist press. The discussion that followed was in many respects a continuation of the earlier discussion started by Widick's talk on the problems of socialists in the trade-unions.

On the last day of the camp, Saul Berg devoted the morning to a penetrating evaluation of the North African crisis and of the forces engaged in the struggles of the North Africans against French imperialist exploitation. Last session before the camp ended was a lively and interesting contribution by Hal Draper on the relations between Socialist politics and socialist organization.

### PLAYTIME

In addition to the fine series of educational which contributed to the socialist education of all those present, the Greek ideal of a sound mind in a sound body was furthered by the athletic and recreational activities engaged in by the YSL campers. In the afternoons, there was volleyball or groups would depart for nearby Lake Geneva to swim, fish or sail. Most evenings after the class session, there was folk-dancing for those who wanted to learn the dances, led by Hal Draper.

One evening a very successful late-evening campfire was held on a hill overlooking the camp and surroundings, featured by weenie-roasting and socialist songs. A hotly contested treasure hunt was held on another evening.

Those who attended the camp left with their interest in and commitment to independent socialism heightened and with a new awareness of their comradeship with young socialists from various parts of the country. All of the Young Socialist League members went back to their local units filled with a new enthusiasm for socialist activity, and those friends and sympathizers who attended left with an increased interest in and respect for the Young Socialist League.

## Berkeley Modifies ROTC Oath

By J. CHARLES WALKER

BERKELEY, Sept. 17—According to the San Francisco *Chronicle* today, the new "affirmative" ROTC oath is compulsory for all students taking ROTC. This oath reads: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, so help me God."

While recognizing this oath as far milder than the previous "guilt by association" oath based on the attorney-general's "List" in force the last academic year, nevertheless male students must take a loyalty oath as a prerequisite to attending the University of California, where the regents have made ROTC compulsory. "Students refusing to take this oath will not be permitted to enroll

'informally' in the ROTC and thus, presumably, will not be able to qualify for graduation."

The ROTC department at Cal had permitted at least one person not to sign the new oath during registration, but apparently this was because it was awaiting clarification on army policy. The issue of "informal" ROTC wasn't forced at that time because uniforms were not to be issued until at least a week after registration, at which time a decision would have had to be made.

Because of the rewording of the oath it appears locally that ACLU is not seeking a test case, according to one SCLU spokesman. In the opinion of this writer this is regrettable, because there is a civil liberties issue directly involved: Must a student take any "loyalty oath" as a pre-requisite to going to school? Even a "little" oath, that the army insists upon ramming down the throat of freshmen and sophomore male students?

### Young Socialist CHALLENGE

organ of the Young Socialist League, is published as a weekly section of *Labor Action* but is under the sole editorship of the YSL. Opinions expressed in signed articles by contributors do not necessarily represent the views of the *Challenge* or the YSL.

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## IN LONDON DELEGATES FROM MANY LANDS EXPLORE COMMON GROUND

# The International Third Camp Conference

By SHIRLEY NEWCOME

LONDON, Sept. 7.—An International "Third Way" Conference was held in London from September 3-6 to set up the machinery for an international Third Camp movement composed of those socialist, pacifist, libertarian and other organizations and individuals who oppose both the Moscow and Washington war blocs.

This conference was called by American, British and the Dutch Third Camp movements for the purpose of bringing together all those who reject the present-day policies of both the Russian and American blocs and who are seeking a political and philosophical appreciation of the causes which issue in such policies; who refuse to give support to the war preparations of either of the two blocs or to any alternative military alliance; who believe unequivocally in human rights, including the right of all peoples to independence from foreign control; who are dedicated to waging war on want; and who stand for a program of political and economic democracy at home and abroad.

Over 100 delegates, observers, and visitors attended the conference from all over the world: from the Arab Baath Socialist Party; the Socialist Progressive Party of Syria and Lebanon; Plaid Cymru (Welsh National Party); Independent Labor Party (Great Britain); Peace Pledge Union; War Resisters International; Pacifist Youth Action Group; Movement for Colonial Freedom; Dar-es-Salaam; Cercle Zimmerwald (France); World Socialist Movement; American Third Camp Contact Committee; Common Wealth Party (Great Britain); Arbeitsgemeinschaft Denbeher Freundesbunde; Independent Socialist League (U. S.); Fellowship Party; De Derde Weg (Netherlands); League for Freedom and World Friendship (Australia); British Third Camp Coordinating Committee; Socialist Review Group; Victory for Socialism Group; the Gesamt Deutsche Volkspartei; Fellowship of the Spirit; Gravesend Discussion Group; and visitors from the Ceylonese Socialist Party (LSSP), the Praja Socialist Party (India), from Denmark, France, Madagascar, and Italy.

Greetings of solidarity were sent by many organizations which could not send delegations but which supported the conference. Among these organizations were the newly formed Socialist Party of Egypt, the Libertarian Communist Movement of Italy, the Libertarian Communists of France, the Libertarian Communists of Switzerland, the Chu Lie Society in Hong Kong, the South African F.O.R., and the Independent Socialist Union (Cucchi-Magnani party) of Italy.

Among the individuals who sent greetings were Czekaw Milosz, author of *The Captive Mind*, Fenner Brockway, British M.P. now in Africa, Pastor Niemoller, well-known German anti-Nazi pacifist, and Capitanni of Italy.

## LOOK TO COLONIAL FIGHT

A distinct drawback of the conference was the absence of the large Asian socialist parties which took a Third Camp position of Rangoon in the Asian Socialist Conference and the large African nations of independence movements. While this represents a serious shortcoming, there is every hope that these mass Third Camp movements will become part of the newly formed International Third Way. Furthermore, the support of Fenner Brockway and of Joseph Murumbi (Kenya) to a certain extent means the support "by proxy" of the many national liberation movements which these two represent in Britain.

To bring these liberation movements and the Third Way closer, the conference adopted a resolution of support to the Movement for Colonial Freedom and urged cooperation and exchange of literature between the two organizations. Also, to facilitate the attendance of the Asian Third-Campers, the next international conference is planned for Cairo after the second Bandung Conference (the Asian Socialist Parties have proposed to hold a second Bandung Conference in Cairo next year).

The conference was opened by A. J. Muste, chairman of the U. S. Third Camp Contact Committee and well known radical pacifist. Muste outlined the Third Camp concept in a speech which set the tone for the entire conference. He said, for example:

"There is a general tendency to ascribe 'the new climate' in international affairs largely to two factors. One is the internal changes in the Soviet Union, and especially in the high command of the Communist Party of the USSR since the

*We are glad to note that Independent Socialist representatives attended the International Third Camp Conference (here reported) and most particularly happy over conference contacts, present and potential, with the colonial movements for freedom. We hope to see the expansion of such contacts between Third Camp socialists and the anti-imperialist struggle.—Ed.*

death of Stalin. The other is that the development of the H-bomb and other such weapons has radically changed the character of war, and that the possession of super-weapons by both the dominant powers has brought 'a balance of terror.' There is a third factor of at least equal importance, namely that the uncommitted nations become increasingly determined not to be drawn into the orbit of either of the dominant powers and the respective allies and satellites of the latter are making it clear that they could not be depended on for loyal support in case of a major war. This has appreciably slowed down the polarization of power and has forced both the United States and the Communist bloc, especially Russia, not indeed to abandon the power struggle but to explore other means than nuclear war and threat of war for pursuing it. . . .

"The Third Way Conference brings together various elements, especially those with a background of democratic socialism and those with a background

of Gandhism, to discuss the political, economic and spiritual aspects of the Third Way and to explore the possibilities of strengthening the Third Way movement in all parts of the world."

Following Muste's opening address, Sir Richard Acland addressed the conference. Acland was the Labor member of Parliament for Gravesend until shortly before the last general election when he resigned from the Labor Party and from Parliament on the issue of the H-bomb, the manufacture of which he refused to sanction under any circumstances. Acland has been doing considerable rethinking since he took this position and has subsequently traveled far in the direction of a socialist Third Camp position.

The following session was devoted to a presentation of the political and social viewpoints of the major groups represented at the conference, and it was found that on the essential problems of Third Camp policy, there was a surprising degree of common ground. Left-wing or Third Camp socialists found they had more in common on international questions with radical pacifists than they had with right-wing socialists who support the American war bloc.

## SUPPORT MOROCCO

Separate sessions on the following days were devoted to a discussion of "War on Want" and "Colonialism and Human Rights." The first of these sessions was introduced by Tom Wardle of the British Third Way and the latter by Joseph Murumbi, former secretary of the Kenya African Union and at present secretary of the Movement for Colonial Freedom in London. Murumbi stressed the importance of the struggle for colonial freedom as part of the struggle for the Third Camp and the fact that the progressive nationalist movements instinctively adopted a Third Way position

in relation to the world power conflict.

Since the problem of Morocco had come to the forefront as a result of the recent atrocities there, the conference, which favored colonial independence everywhere, adopted a special resolution on Morocco. The following resolution was presented by a delegate of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and seconded by a French delegate from Cercle Zimmerwald:

"This conference of the Third Way declares itself in favor of immediate independence of all the countries of the Arab world still ruled by the Western powers, and of complete withdrawal of all foreign troops.

"At this moment we especially protest against French policy in North Africa.

"The responsibility for the recent uprising rests on the denial of the democratic rights of the national movement in North Africa by the French imperialists and on the violence of the French settlers. The military action taken in suppression of the uprising, in which some 30,000 people have been slaughtered is a crime against humanity."

The conference adopted a Declaration of the Third Way (published in this issue). This declaration is subject to amendment by those organizations which enter the International Third Way Movement.

The conference decided, further, that an International Interim Council be set up composed of one member from each organization which enters the Third Way movement. At the close of the conference an Executive Committee was elected whose officers include A. J. Muste as chairman, John Banks of the British Third Way as corresponding secretary, and Reimans of De Derde Weg as editorial secretary. The Executive Committee will have the task of issuing a bulletin regularly and of carrying out the executive functions of the international Third Way Movement.

## Draft Resolution Before the Conference

*Following is the text of the draft resolution which was presented to the International Third Camp Conference. Its general sense was adopted, we are informed, with the understanding that a number of formulations are likely to be modified by subsequent consultation of the groups represented; there was, for example, objection to the ambiguous references to "materialism," etc.—Ed.*

It would be presumptuous for this Conference of a limited number of groups and individuals to attempt to lay down a definitive ideology or a detailed program for Third Way forces which exist in many countries today or which must come into existence if the threat of nuclear war is to be permanently dispelled and the world saved from social disintegration. We believe, however, that it will be useful to outline some of the ideas we hold in common as a rallying ground for action in the months ahead and as a means of stimulating discussion among adherents of the Third Way throughout the world.

A "new climate" prevails in the world due to the fact that the threat of an immediate or early outbreak of nuclear war has, for the time being, been removed. To a considerable extent the change in the attitudes and policies of the dominant world powers has come about because nations have increasingly resisted the pressure to line up with one or other of them and even the respective allies and satellites of the United States and the Soviet Union have made it clear that they cannot be depended upon for loyal support in a nuclear war. For this and other reasons the big powers have been forced to a reconsideration of some of their policies and mankind has a breathing-spell which it has so desperately needed.

It does not follow that peace is now assured. The governments of leading nations have agreed to discuss certain burning political issues. Whether they will be resolved remains to be seen. It is a false notion, assiduously propagated by leading statesmen and publicists, that "the balance of terror" resulting from the piling up of nuclear weapons on both sides at last provides mankind with insurance against war.

War, moreover, is a symptom and an effect. Its causes lie in the outlook on life

prevailing on both sides of the Iron Curtain and on political and economic regimes, whether capitalist or Communist, marked by the concentration of power in the hands of a few, the exploitation of human labor and the degradation of the human person. Neither regime provides for genuine workers' control, a society of equals in which every human being has an opportunity for self-expression, the exercise of responsibility, and experience of vital and creative relationships with others.

"Peaceful coexistence" in the basis of such a status quo could provide only a brief and troubled respite from war. Even if war as we have known it were eliminated, it would only mean condemning mankind to some other nightmare of materialism, centralization and mechanization, perhaps based upon an open or tacit agreement by the two highly centralized and colossal powers, the United States and Russia, to divide the world into spheres of influence. The technology of the atomic age would place well-nigh absolute power at the disposal of the masters of such a totalitarian world, whoever they might be.

## AGAINST WAR BLOCS

Thence arises the urgent and imperative need for a Third Way (Third Camp) Movement.

The purpose of the Third Way Movement is to bring together all those who oppose and reject both the capitalist and totalitarian Communist social systems and who refuse to give support—"critical" or otherwise—to the war preparations and activities of either side in the contemporary power struggle, or to any alternative military alliance. A "Third Force" of ambitious power-states alongside of the two power-blocs which now dominate the world is no solution for mankind's ills. We must also be on guard against governments and movements which may attempt to pursue a so-called "neutral" or "independent" course, largely in order to preserve their own national systems of exploitation and inequality.

The power of peoples constituting a genuine "Third Way" must be essentially economic, political and moral, rather than military. On this basis they can serve as mediators and reconcilers. Not being atomically armed, they can call

upon those who are, to disarm. Not having yielded to the irrational temptation to join the arms race, they can call the great powers who have gone mad back to sanity. Being truly a force for peace, and not merely an organ for "peace" propaganda, they will have friends, actual and potential, in all parts of the world, including multitudes in both American and Communist lands. The latter will recognize the new, free, human and democratic order which the peoples of the Third Way undertake to build as the goal in which they also will find freedom and peace.

We recognize as central and basic in our philosophy the dignity and worth of every human being, his need and inalienable right to self-determination. Only on this basis are men able to achieve true self-expression and to make their full contribution to the development of community among all men in all relations and throughout the whole world.

## PROGRAM

From this central conviction it follows:

(1) The Third Way Movement believes unequivocally in the right of all peoples to independence from foreign control, whether military, political, economic or cultural. It will endeavor to bring to an end all forms of colonialism and will strive for the achievement of equal status as members of an interdependent world of free and equal peoples.

We believe in the abolition of exploitation, segregation and discrimination wherever these exist. We repudiate high living standards, special opportunities or favored status based on the tyranny of one group over another, whether that tyranny is expressed through force of arms or through the more subtle means of economic exploitation. The War on Want must be recognized as an immediate and urgent task for all peoples, especially those now privileged, and must be energetically pursued until all peoples have the basis for equal status, opportunity and personal dignity. This requirement bars aid bestowed as charity or in such a way as to maintain or create conditions of exploitation and inequality.

(3) We believe that the natural and productive resources and key instru-

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# PRO and CON: DISCUSSION

## Propose Defense Of Peron Regime

To the Editor:

Regarding Hal Draper's reply to my remarks on the crisis of the Peron regime (August 22), I recognize, even without his prefatory apology, that it was written in haste. I am satisfied to wait for a more considered reply; I also think a reply by Juan Rey would be of interest and educational value. I should like, in the meantime, to present some considerations which may help to clarify the discussion.

First of all, on the class character of the Peron regime. Draper misdirects at me a shaft tipped with irony: if the anti-Peron rebels represented, as I said, the land-owners, capitalists, and foreign imperialist interests, "it leaves very few classes for Peronism to represent, doesn't it?" And Draper wants to know whether I am "willing to face the conclusion that Peronism must be . . . a workers' and peasants' government."

Such a conclusion does not at all follow. Peronism does represent the ruling classes but it is losing their support, as it is also losing the support of the workers and peasants. It is not the first time that a Bonapartist regime finds itself suspended in mid-air, hanging on the thin thread of a temporary equilibrium of antagonistic class forces. As a matter of fact Draper vitiates the effect of his sarcasm. "Peronism . . . represented, at least in its heyday," he says, "the interests and perspectives of the relatively new industrial capitalist elements in the country." "Up to now at least (leaving aside naturally the anti-Peronist sectors of the labor and socialist movement) the main bastion of anti-Peronism has been in the landowning class; and there apparently have been important anti-Peronist sectors in the urban petty-bourgeoisie." "Even as far as industrial-bourgeois elements are concerned, one cannot assume that the regime still is the best instrument to express their present needs. . . . Would not a different type of authoritarian regime, cleansed of Peron's demagoguery and past, be better adapted to get the best results for the bourgeoisie? Some may indeed think so." And more, I may add, will think so as the economic situation worsens. Thus, Draper is face to face with the same question he posed to SR, namely: This leaves very few classes for Peronism to represent, doesn't it?

"I do not think," says Draper, "much work is needed to discard SR's proposals for class labels." I recommend that he take a little time to consider the significance of the above-quoted passages. Some of the industrial capitalists and many or most of the landowners favor the establishment of a different type of authoritarian regime, cleansed of Peron's demagoguery and past. They want an end to the promises and concessions with which Peron kept the support of the masses. How can the landlords and capitalists rule without the support of the masses? Only in one way: by destroying their power to resist, by atomizing them, by smashing their unions. The overthrow of Peron, for the ruling classes of Argentina, is part of a larger struggle—civil war against the workers and peasants.

### CITES ANALOGIES

This is not to say, I must reiterate, that Peronism is any kind of workers' and peasants' government. Matters may well take another course. Active working-class opposition may rise against Peron; the workers and peasants may, under the impulsion of the worsening economic situation, come into large-scale conflict with the Peron regime, before it is overthrown from the right. Under these conditions, a replacement of the Peron regime, even from above, could have quite a different character.

Such a situation prevailed in Bolivia in 1946. The government of Colonel Villaroel had precisely the same character as that of General Peron. Villaroel ruled with the same mixture of tyranny and concessions as Peron. There was, however, one important difference: Villaroel's control over the unions was not so firm as that of Peron; though the tin miners supported him the workers of La Paz, the capital, did not. Villaroel was overthrown by a combined military coup and mass uprising; the miners failed to come to his aid. Under the circumstances it was absolutely correct for socialists

to support the uprising against Villaroel. And this conclusion is in no way vitiated by the fact that the new government soon evolved into a military dictatorship.

But the circumstances of 1946 in Bolivia did not prevail at the time of the navy revolt against Peron. The Socialist and democratic parties were inactive; the anti-Peronist trade unions were passive. What should Marxists have done? Should they have shared this passivity? Should they have welcomed and supported the revolt, as Rey seems to advocate? Or should they have advocated the armed mobilization of the working class against the more immediate enemy?

Draper rejects the second and third of these alternatives, the second by implication and the third outright, on the ground that it implies critical support to Peronism. This I deny. Socialists can support the class-struggle activities of the Peronist trade unions without thereby giving any political support to Peron, just as socialists can support the class-struggle activities of the CIO without thereby giving political support to the Democratic Party. I do not believe, as Draper charges, that the workers or the unions should remain in the Peronist coalition; rather they should break with Peron and fight for his overthrow. Naturally, it is quite difficult for socialists to remain in the Peronist unions, but there is some room for the activity of

militants and socialists, as I am sure Draper will agree.

The line that I presented for the concrete circumstances of the navy revolt is not critical support of Peron, but military defense with no political support. I hope no one regards this as hair-splitting; it is a vital distinction. Some historical examples may clarify it. In August 1917 the Bolsheviks fought together with Kerensky against the attempt of Kornilov to overthrow Kerensky and destroy the soviets. "We do not, even now," said Lenin, "support Kerensky." The Bolsheviks were simply turning their military weapons against the more immediate enemy. Neither did the Trotskyists extend critical support to the Spanish Loyalist government during the civil war, though they supported the war itself. Or is there no distinction between the line of the POUM, which entered the Catalan coalition government, and that of the Trotskyists, who bitterly criticized the POUM for this? Not to draw the distinction between military aid and critical support is to open the door to coalitionism and popular-frontism in a situation in which military aid is called for. It would indeed be disconcerting, as Draper says, to start thinking in terms of giving critical support to a "totalitarian" regime. Now a question to Draper: Would he give critical support to a non-totalitarian bourgeois regime, a regime headed, for example, by

the democratic cleric, Andrea?

For the clearest example of the distinction between military aid and critical support, and of the disastrous consequences of ignoring this distinction, we must take another look at Bolivia. In April 1952, the military dictatorship was overthrown in a revolt which was begun by the MNR and carried through by the trade unions. The MNR is the party of the "totalitarian" Villaroel; Paz Estenssoro, who assumed the presidency, was second only to Villaroel in Villaroel's government. Yet it was absolutely correct to participate in the revolt, that is, give military aid to the MNR. I doubt that anyone will dispute this statement. The correctness of participating in the revolt is borne out by this fact: when the action ended the army and police were disarmed, and the workers' militias possessed all the arms in the country.

The Trotskyist POR, which had important mass influence and could have played a significant revolutionary role in the subsequent period, frittered away its opportunity. It gave not only military aid to the revolt, but also gave critical support to the MNR government. It never criticized the entry of the labor leaders into the government, nor their class-collaborationism in remaining in the government. Comrade Draper is aware of my detailed criticism of the policy of the POR.

If Draper is going to maintain that critical support is necessarily implied in military aid, then he must face the problem of Bolivia: Did military aid to the MNR in 1952 necessarily imply critical support for the MNR government?

S. R.

## Socialist Policy in the Fight Against Peronism

I'm glad that Comrade S. R. seems to adopt the explanation on the nature of the class forces in the Argentine struggle which I suggested as against his own of Aug. 22, and which he now quotes in the first part of his present letter. It only puzzles me that he adds "Thus Draper is face to face with the same question" (class forces behind Peronism), right after quoting most if not all of my answer, apparently with approval.

However, as often, this fencing over "class character" can be grappled with more fruitfully through the underlying question of political policy. What is important about S. R.'s view is not his original mistake on the abstract class character of the anti-Peron rebels, but his present claim about the political and social program which they represent.

If, as I suggested, the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements are split over Peronism and anti-Peronism (as the workers are too), then the question that follows is: What are the differences within these class strata, on immediate political and social program, which correspond to the fact that two sides are shooting real bullets at each other?

Here the heart of S. R.'s position is his flat assertion in his present letter that the social program of the anti-Peron rebellion is adequately described by the statement that some capitalists and many landowners want to end Peron's concessions to the workers, smash "their unions" and atomize them; and that the rebellion against the Peron regime is "part of a larger struggle—civil war against the workers and peasants."

Where does S. R. get this simple interpretation? Is it his conclusion from some known facts about the rebellion, which he has not yet mentioned and which I have not seen? Or is it simply a "deduction" from the "class character" of the rebels as S. R. mechanically presented it in his original letter?

I think it is a fantastically mechanical deduction and so one-sided as to be perfectly useless in understanding events. Obviously, to be sure, the underlying social program of the anti-Peron rebel leaders has no progressive character, but then the Peronist social program is reactionary also, as S. R. seems to admit at times. But the conclusion is not the sectarian one that the workers have no stake in the present struggle, and still less, that the workers should support the Peronist reactionaries against the others.

The program on the basis of which the rebels appeal is overthrow of the Peron dictatorship and the restoration of democratic liberties.

Do they really "mean" it? Of course they do, in a real sense, with absolutely normal qualifications which any Marxist can make. Those sections of the dominant classes which have become restive with Peron's policies have found themselves unable to press their objectives for reform, because of the straitjacket of the dictatorship; they cry for elbow-room to change bourgeois policy. To gain

this they set out, first, to smash the dictatorship.

It cuts little ice, at this point, to argue irrefutably that once they smash the dictatorship, even if they begin with a more democratic regime, they will develop an anti-working-class social program of their own. Fortunately, I need not explain this point to S. R. since he himself cites and endorses socialist support to the overthrow of Villaroel in spite of "the fact that the new government soon evolved into a military dictatorship" itself.

### MARCH SEPARATELY . . .

The indicated socialist policy in this type of struggle is very clear, I think: to seek to organize the working class under its own banners to participate in the overthrow of the dictatorship and indeed take the leadership of the struggle if possible. The formula is: march separately and strike together. Strike together—against Peron.

The bourgeois allies, who now claim to fight for democratic liberties, will betray you as soon as a joint victory is won? Why of course, as soon as they are able. But all that this piece of elementary wisdom tells you is this: that, after the overthrow of the dictatorship, the social and political struggle continues, but on the new basis; the workers cannot rest with the overthrow of the dictatorship but must utilize their power in victory to press their revolution forward socially; their gains, and indeed the permanence of the democratic liberties won, depend on how strong they become and how effectively they fight; therefore no political support to the bourgeois allies or their government, now or later.

March separately—now and later; this is the watchword of independent working-class politics, though naturally it presupposes independent coordination with allies in struggle. Strike together now—together with the wider struggle to overthrow the dictatorship.

This describes a direction for socialist policy in the context of such a rebellion against Peronism as we are witnessing. How meaningful it can be depends, of course, on the strength of the socialist movement, whether it is strong enough really to exercise independent force.

This policy is the one which I set forth at the conclusion of my own article in LA analyzing the Argentine revolt (June 27) and it certainly has to be insisted on in view of S. R.'s proposals to defend the Peron regime. He now makes clear that he rejects any position of critical support to Peronism (the type of position held by some Argentine Trotskyists) but he insists on military defense of the Peron regime against the rebellion. He identifies his proposal with the Bolshevik strategy of defending the Kerensky regime against the Kornilov revolt.

Insofar as an analogy is implied, it is stood in its head. The Bolsheviks under-

took military defense of the government which was still formally based on the support of the soviets, and which lived only by virtue of this support, as against the Kornilovist force which openly set out to crush all the democratic institutions and impose a military dictatorship. In the name of this analogy, S. R. proposes to defend . . . the existing dictatorship in Argentina!

But if the analogy has little force one way or the other, why exactly does S. R. propose to apply this policy of military defense to the defense of the dictatorship—rather than adopting the indicated socialist policy of striking together with the rebels for the overthrow of the dictatorship? In his Aug. 22 letter, S. R. wrote that a line of supporting the rebellion "would mean isolation from the working class and aid to its enemies. The workers who came out to fight the navy revolt were impelled by class instinct." And in the same letter he refers to the "mobilization of the Peronist trade unions against the navy revolt."

### PERON AND LABOR

Now factually this is quite untrue. Further reports have quite confirmed, I believe, the analysis which I presented in our very first article on the rebellion (June 27), when I pointed to the decline in working-class support to Peron as the root of his crisis. In addition to further news reports on this point, and to Rey's reports, this has also been confirmed to the hilt by a friend who has just returned from Buenos Aires and Montevideo and who spoke to many socialists and labor men about the events.

The "class instinct" of the workers has been impelling them to break with the Peronist dictatorship. But even a few years ago, when the distorted "class instinct" of backward masses gave Peron his strong labor base, this argument about "isolation from the working class" would have been just as opportunistic as it is now.

This inclination to tail-end the given political state of the workers is evidenced also in S. R.'s present letter. He says that workers' opposition "may rise against Peron" and "under these conditions, a replacement of the Peron regime, even from above, could have quite a different character." But presumably, until such workers' opposition rises, he believes in defending the dictatorship. This is hardly an attitude possible for a socialist vanguard. The correctness of defending or overthrowing the Peron dictatorship cannot depend, for socialists, on whether the demagogue succeeds in deceiving a majority or a minority of the workers.

One word about our Latin American correspondent, Juan Rey: his articles on Argentina are interesting and informative as usual, but some of his formulations are very ambiguous at best and wrong at worst. Unfortunately, it has so far not been possible for us to contact him for discussion on this point.

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# Moscow & Adenauer —

(Continued from page 1)

point" in raising the prisoner question unless the East German government were there to negotiate the matter jointly.

That was the end of Adenauer's bluff of unifying Germany "through strength."

## ADENAUER'S POLICY

When he returned to Bonn, he explained to a packed press conference that Russia is an immense world power, covering one-sixth of the earth's surface, and that this is a reality which must be taken into account. To this startling revelation, he could only add that most Atlantic Pact powers have diplomatic relations with Moscow; that the reunification of Germany was the responsibility of the Big Four, and the Russian leaders had recognized their share of this responsibility.

What Adenauer claimed to have received, in exchange for his willingness to formally recognize the division of Germany, was the return of German war prisoners held by the Russians. This agreement did not appear in any of the official documents. And no sooner had the "old fox" left Moscow than the Russians announced that the return of some prisoners will be negotiated with their East German satellite. It appears that the prisoners will be turned over to the East German government, which will have the power to decide which of them, if any, are to be permitted to return to their homes in West Germany.

## PRO & CON

(Continued from page 7)

In his July 25 article, for example, I think he went away off the deep end in considering the pattern of the Argentine revolt, and specifically its military-clerical leadership, as the model for the overthrow of the *Stalinist* dictatorships. This was probably associated too with his quite misleading presentation of the naval rebellion as if it were merely the military arm of the "spontaneous" mass-opposition movement of the people, etc. It seemed to me that he implicitly gave the rebel leaders far too much political credit. In his Sept. 12 article, he already speaks of the "new period" of the rebellion as if it is now a united all-people's struggle of "all political currents" against Peronism, with a minimum of political distinction. He, exaggeratedly calls the Peron regime flatly "totalitarian." In all of these respects I would counterpose, as against both Rey's slant and S. R.'s Peron-defensism, the political policy which was adequately outlined in my original article on "Why Peron's Power Cracked," particularly its last column.

Not that I think Comrade Rey really holds any position of political support to the rebel leaders. But the slant which appears in his articles permits a degree of ambiguity to appear. His emphasis often makes me uneasy even when what he writes is not actually wrong. On the other hand, S. R.'s proposed policy of defending the dictatorship would be an entirely unambiguous disaster for socialism.

HAL DRAPER

## Shoot If Necessary

French confidence in the enthusiasm with which their proposed "solution" of the Moroccan problem will be greeted in Morocco is obviously limited.

According to dispatches from North Africa, the French have been arming "selected French civilians" in Morocco, and organizing them into an auxiliary force. Road-blocks have been set up on all roads entering Rabat and Casablanca, and heavily armed soldiers search all Arab vehicles trying to enter these cities.

They have dropped thousands of leaflets from the air over the Arab quarters of Casablanca, Mazagan and Quezzane. The leaflets read in part:

"Warning! Pay no attention to agitators. Agitators are inciting you to strike and to foment trouble. You must know that the security forces are under orders to quell any attempted riot, and to shoot if necessary."

It may very well be that from Adenauer's point of view what happened at Moscow was not at all a serious defeat for his real policy. For him, the unification of Germany has been a "secondary" problem, if that, for a long time.

He has been forced to give lip-service to German unity as an objective. He, and his closest collaborators, may feel that the time has now come to make it clear to the West Germans that unity is not in the cards at the present time, and to remove it, if possible, from the German political stage for an indefinite period. With such a perspective, the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Russia is desirable, and since there is no early prospect that this could be done in a context of a big victory for West Germany, it might be best to get it over with as quickly as possible. (For a fuller discussion of Adenauer's real position on German unity see Max Shachtman's article in the September 12 issue of LABOR ACTION.)

## MOSCOW'S POSITION

Adenauer's reference to the responsibility of the Big Four for the unification of Germany was a clever parry against the Social-Democrats. This has been their tune for many a year now. They have demanded negotiations from the Big Four, and when these came and went without results, "sincere" negotiations, as the road to German unity.

Adenauer's reply to their expected attack will now be: "Well, you have always said that it is a responsibility of the Big Four to negotiate German unity. I agree with you. There is nothing we Germans can do about it. Let's all urge them to fulfill their responsibility and unify the country. In the meantime, we have our economy, world trade and rearmament to take care of. Perhaps as we get stronger and stronger, we can apply more pressure on the others to do what we want."

The Russians are playing their advantage to the hilt. What they gained at Moscow was formal West German recognition of the division of the country. They then proceeded immediately to emphasize this by calling in their East German satellites for negotiations, and announcing to the world that full sovereignty was now to be conferred on the East German regime, thus giving it full juridical equality with that in West Germany. From now on, they are saying in effect, all outstanding problems between East and West Germany will have to be negotiated between these two sovereign governments; we

have nothing more to do with those affairs.

Since the Stalinists have been insisting for years that Germany can only be unified as a result of a government-to-government deal between the East and West regimes, this maneuver simply adds weight to their contention. When the Big Four foreign ministers' meeting takes place this fall, they will be able to insist that the unification of Germany is now the affair of the two sovereign governments which exist on German territory, and that, "as is known," Russia does not meddle in the affairs of sovereign governments.

They can be expected to urge the capitalist allies to establish formal relations with East Germany, so that they can direct their suggestions on unification to the proper address. "We," they may well say, "intend to present our views on the matter, to the extent that it affects Russian interests, through our regular diplomatic channels at Bonn and Pankow. We suggest that you do the same. Now let us get down to business and discuss matters on which we can make agreements, such as disarmament, the withdrawal of American bases and the like, rather than making speeches about the affairs of sovereign governments which are not parties to our discussions."

Adenauer may be satisfied that he has done his best to exorcise the specter of German unity, at least for the time being. But this is one ghost which will not be laid to rest, because its existence is firmly based in the material needs of the German people.

In their objective of neutralizing Western Germany, while holding on to East Germany, the Stalinist rulers still have powerful cards to play. Their most immediate one will be offers of trade which will attract strong support in sections of West Germany's powerful and greedy capitalist class. They will play this card for all it is worth, first to strengthen bourgeois support for a delay in West German rearmament, with the hope that eventually this "movement" may be parlayed into an actual withdrawal of West Germany from its NATO commitments.

## SDs GET A CHANCE

The German Social-Democracy is now faced with a critical decision. Their thesis, that Adenauer's pro-American policy stands in the way of German unification, has been demonstrated in real life at Moscow. At the same time, the complementary

thesis, that German unification can be brought about by a deal among the conquerors of their country, remains as empty as it always was. The Stalinists have now driven the lesson home that, with or without smiles, they are not giving up East Germany except on their own terms, which remain: Either we get all, or you get nothing.

Unless the Social-Democrats are able to recognize the emptiness of their own policy, they will be able to derive little advantage from the collapse of Adenauer's sham policy of "unification." In the present posture of events it is clear that even a withdrawal from NATO would not win Russian agreement to a democratic unification of the country.

Now, as before, the only thing which can really defeat Stalinism in East Germany and force the Russians to withdraw is a determined struggle of the German people, on both sides of the dividing line, for a free, democratic and independent Germany.

West German prosperity alone is not enough to rally the people of East Germany to such a struggle. They recognize that this prosperity bespeaks not a change in West German social and economic relations, but a hardening and strengthening of the capitalist class over the workers. The prospect of joining the West German workers in whatever prosperity they have achieved in the present conjunctural situation is not enough to arouse the East Germans to revolt. And the prospect of joining the West German regime so as to become soldiers in a capitalist war against Stalinism via NATO does not arouse them at all.

The German Social-Democracy can only gain the initiative in German politics if it abandons its "let the Big Four negotiate" policy, and raises the banner of German unification as part of a Europe which rejects both American capitalism and Stalinism as models of its socio-economic future. Such a policy implies a determined struggle against the Adenauer regime along radical socialist lines on all major issues of foreign and domestic policy.

For the German Social-Democracy to ally itself with the bourgeois critics of the Adenauer regime and policy who are bound to be strengthened by the Moscow decision would be fatal, as it would simply play into the hands of the Stalinists in the long run. Their only course to victory is an independent one of intransigent opposition to Stalinism and all its works, coupled with an equally firm opposition to the Adenauer regime and its capitalist backers.

Only such a policy can hope to prepare the soil for the revolutionary unification of Germany. And unless there is such a unification, there will be none at all.

# Draft Resolution on Third Camp — —

(Continued from page 6)

ments of distribution and communication belong to all and should be socially owned and democratically administered through the people's own cooperative, community and other instrumentalities.

We believe that technology must be the servant and not the master of the human race. Irrational support of technological efficiency for its own sake and of so-called "ever-expanding economy," and the centralization of power entailing the growth of bureaucracy and statism, which go with such a policy, violate our democratic faith and threaten to destroy any possibility of a self-governing society.

The sound goal is the development of a reasonably balanced agro-industrial economy in all communities in which all members share responsibility for and power over the conditions of their life and work.

(4) We believe in the defense of the civil liberties of all persons and groups, in freedom of religion and conscience, in the need for constant struggle against the pressure for conformity and regimentation, and the vigorous defense of all victims of tyranny and discrimination.

## TOWARD A THIRD WAY

The Third Way cannot at present be conceived as a united world-wide organization or movement with a single ideology, strategy and goal. Rather, the Third Way is and must be made up of a wide variety of movements and organizations throughout the world, each of which has developed out of its own specific historical and social conditions, but which are drawn together by concrete opposition to the present war camps, and by a broad common aspiration for a democratic society.

The Third Way potentially consists of all those movements and organizations

in the colonial world which are struggling for their emancipation from foreign domination and social and economic exploitation, but which have not fallen into the trap of totalitarian Communism.

It consists of those groups and individuals in the great social-democratic and labor movements of Europe who genuinely resist Communism, and at the same time oppose the increasing subordination of their movements to the capitalist camp and its war aims; who fight for a domestic and foreign policy free from capitalist exploitation, military and political regimentation, and national privilege at the expense of their brothers in the underdeveloped part of the world.

It includes elements which are waging the struggle against rearmament in various countries and those Gandhians in India and other countries who are committed to rejection of the present power camps and the non-violent struggle for a free world.

It consists of those masses who, even in Communist lands, fight as best they can against their totalitarian masters, without becoming tools in the hands of capitalist imperialism.

## APPEAL TO MASSES

Although the broad Third Way forces already exert a considerable retarding influence on both war camps, they are neither sufficiently powerful and well organized nor have they clarified their ideology to a point at which they can present a mass positive appeal to the peoples of the world. But the hope of humanity for peace and for a better society can rest only on their growth, cohesion, and ideological clarification.

In this respect, we appeal specially to the labor and socialist movements, and to individuals, in Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Germany and the U. S.

We cannot move forward to a world of freedom and plenty unless the socialist

and labor movements of America and Europe individually, and all of them collectively, are willing to stand unreservedly as the foremost champions of the complete freedom and self-determination economically, politically and culturally of the underdeveloped countries of the world. Only when that freedom has been achieved will it be possible for the peoples of the world to unite in a new way, as brothers and comrades, and to achieve that fruitful economic collaboration which will be to the true benefit of all.

To the Third Way movements and groups in Asia, the Near East, Africa and Latin America we say this:

Our forces are small, and our influence in our own countries is far weaker than is the case with many of the movements in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, to the utmost of our ability, we will do what we can to support your struggles for complete national emancipation and revolutionary social and economic change. Your struggles help us to arouse the conscience and consciousness of the American and European peoples to the role their governments and ruling classes compel them to play in the world.

In the representative attendance at our Conference, the messages which we have received from groups and individuals in many parts of the world, we have found highly encouraging evidence that Third Way concepts are gaining acceptance and Third Way movements are growing in many lands. In spite of the grim aspects of today's crisis and the suffering to which multitudes of our fellow men and our fellow workers for a new society are subjected, we are convinced that the future belongs not to war but to peace, not to any of the tyrannies which men seek to impose upon their fellows but to free men and the freedom they shall achieve by their united efforts. To this goal, the members of this Conference express renewed devotion.