

The New _____ **INTERNATIONAL**

FEBRUARY · 1942

NOTES OF THE MONTH

The Issue of Labor Unity

By Max Shachtman:

DAVIES' WAR MISSION

By Jack Wilson:

LABOR IN THE WAR

By Leon Trotsky:

THE RIGHT-CENTER BLOC

By Irving Howe:

The Dilemma of Partisan Review

By Gregory Zinoviev:

What Is Imperialism?

SINGLE COPY 20c

ONE YEAR \$1.50

Have You Seen the

NEW PENNY

LABOR ACTION

*-it's better
than ever-*

*featuring stories
about*

**WAR
LABOR
NEGROES
WORLD NEWS
Editorial Comment**

Subscribe NOW!

Name.....

Address.....

City..... State.....

**RATES: 60 Cents a Year. \$1.00 in Canada,
Foreign and New York City**

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

Vol. VIII

No. 1, Whole No. 60

Published monthly by NEW INTERNATIONAL Publishing Company,
114 West 14th Street, New York, N. Y. Telephone: CHelsea
2-9681. Subscription rates: \$1.50 per year; bundles, 14c for 5
copies and up. Canada and foreign: \$1.75 per year; bundles, 16c
for 5 and up. Entered as second-class matter July 10, 1940, at
the post office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879.

Editor: ALBERT GATES

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Notes of the Month:

The Issue of Labor Unity	3
The Truman and Vinson Reports	5
Our White "Democracy"	7
By A. G.	

DAVIES' WAR MISSION

By Max Shachtman	9
------------------------	---

LABOR IN THE WAR

By Jack Wilson.....	13
---------------------	----

WHAT IS IMPERIALISM-II

By Gregory Zinoviev	15
---------------------------	----

THE DILEMMA OF PARTISAN REVIEW

By Irving Howe	20
----------------------	----

Archives of the Revolution:

CRISIS IN THE RIGHT-CENTER BLOC-II

By Leon Trotsky	24
-----------------------	----

Books:

DURANTY CONFESSES

By M. Sh.	29
----------------	----

DOS PASSOS' CRUMBLING GROUND

By I. H.	31
---------------	----

A 32-Page New International

The Finest Marxist Theoretical Organ

SUBSCRIBE NOW!

\$1.50 PER YEAR

Name.....

Address.....

City..... State.....

I also wish to contribute.....

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

VOLUME VIII

FEBRUARY, 1942

NUMBER 1

NOTES OF THE MONTH

The Issue of Labor Unity

When the *New York Times*, on January 19th, published an alleged agreement between John L. Lewis and certain top leaders of the AFL whereby the unification of the two labor organizations might be accomplished, it willfully distorted the most important labor problem of the present period by directing attention to the issue of labor unity as merely something to be realized by a division of posts and salaries. This journalistic fraud intended to convey the thought that the split in the American union movement had nothing to do with any fundamental issue of unionism, but was rather the result of a simple fight for power.

The *Times'* story, moreover, intended to give the problem of labor unity an aura of mystery, pictured it as a mess of intrigue, politics, double-dealing, personal ambition. We are certain that all of these things are involved. However, important as they may be, the issue of labor unity is so powerful, so sweeping in fundamental importance for the American working class, that they decline in significance when compared to the main problem. The one merit the *Times* story had was that it pushed the whole matter into the open and revealed that the question of unity was discussed and considerably advanced. Everything else in the "scoop" was yellow journalism.

Almost immediately thereafter, Lewis' letter to Murray and Green on the subject of labor unity was made public. The letter stated: "Labor imperatively requires coherency in order to give maximum assistance to the nation in its war effort to defend American liberties and American institutions." Thus Lewis precluded, so he thought, any attack on his proposal for immediate unification of the AFL and the CIO, on the grounds of his isolationism and support of Willkie in the last presidential election.

The Opposition Lines Up

What followed the publication of the unity proposals took on the air of a Hollywood scenario. Roosevelt, who had heretofore insisted upon labor unity as essential to the war effort, suddenly reversed himself and came out flat-footedly against Lewis' proposal. An isolationist plot was charged against Lewis, Wheeler, Norman Thomas and Dorothy Detzer of the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom. This charge was thereafter denied. Roosevelt also denied a *Times* story that he declared his belief that an isolationist plot was involved in Lewis' proposal.

Lewis denounced the *Times'* story about the retirement of Green at a pension of \$20,000 a year for life, the division of posts with George Meany as president, Lewis as vice-president and Murray as secretary-treasurer of the united labor or-

ganization, the collusion with Dan Tobin and William Hutcheson, as a pure fabrication. There is no evidence to sustain the allegations of the *Times'* report.

Dan Tobin entered a demurrer! William Green sulked and pouted until Roosevelt openly stepped in to stop Lewis and then suddenly Green began to bark like a puppy dog enraged. Murray hastened back from a Florida vacation to halt what he regarded as his demotion. The "isolationist bloc" denounced the story contained in the *New York Post* that they had in any way fostered the Lewis proposal.

Amidst the great confusion which necessarily emanated from the fog created by the incessant flow of charges and counter-charges, most people lost sight of the singular fact that the most outspoken, militant and threatening opposition to labor unity came from big business, the industrialists and financiers organized in the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, and the venal toady of big business, the corrupt and reactionary "press of the nation." How they howled and screamed! They, above all, were not interested in the Washington side-show. They were concerned with the issue of labor unity itself.

And finally, we come to the Stalinists. They too, joined the wolf pack in denouncing their erstwhile friend (before Germany attacked the Soviet Union) for his proposal on labor unity. They had found a new man in the CIO, Philip Murray. The Stalinist policy was based on a fear that unification of the AFL and the CIO would result in their elimination as an organized destructive force in the labor movement.

CIO Misses the Point

Several charges were levelled against Lewis' proposal for labor unity. Roosevelt's opposition originated from his fear, despite his denial, that there might be an isolationist scheme involved in the proposal, that unity now would bring forth an intensive period of class struggle arising from the determined opposition of America's financial and industrial ruling class, or that a series of strike struggles would ensue from a unified labor movement's desire to organize the unorganized. His proposal, at once accepted by Green and Murray, to set up a joint AFL and CIO committee under his personal supervision, to handle all jurisdictional disputes, has as its one and only aim the maintenance of class peace and, therefore, postponement until after the war the question of labor unity. Meanwhile industry "earns" fabulous war profits. And the labor movement remains disunited.

It seems evident that Lewis had done considerable exploratory work in the AFL and the CIO before launching his proposal. But the extreme pressure of the capitalist press and the White House compelled retreat among all the proponents of "unity now" with the exception of Lewis. Green and Murray reacted, the one meekly, the other violently, to what they regarded as a maneuver to eliminate them from the scene. Murray went so far as to charge that Lewis intended to sell out to the AFL on the issue of industrial unionism, that he had become, once more, a confirmed craft unionist. Murray also

charged that Lewis had no right to make any proposals on labor unity except through the CIO executive board over which Murray presided. In its official statement, the executive board of the CIO declared:

Organic unity between the CIO and AFL is an additional problem which merits the attention of organized labor. The CIO desires a unified labor movement which will reflect the aspirations and needs of the American workers. *This would necessarily require a recognition of the industrial form of union organization in the mass production and basic industries and the absolute need of non-discrimination against any affiliated union or any member of the CIO.*

In this rather back-handed manner, the executive board of the CIO sought to create the impression that under Lewis' program, industrial unionism would be surrendered in favor of the old-line AFL craft unionism.

Since a large part of the attack on the Lewis proposal revolved around the question of the war effort, the CIO executive board created another smokescreen, namely, that the Lewis proposal would hinder this effort. This was done by indirection, as is indicated in the following section of its statement:

The issue of labor unity must be viewed today in the light of the all-embracing problem which now confronts the American people. Every American is interested in one objective—to win the war. Any contribution which organized labor can make toward this objective must be the desire of every affiliated member.

This quotation reads as though it were taken out of the editorial columns of the *Daily Worker*, for it reads like a typical Stalinist document of the "new turn" type. A more grievous implication of this statement is that it ties the CIO movement behind the war machine, placing the defense of the labor movement in a secondary and, therefore, weakened position.

Thus the CIO made use of the patriotic issue to nail Lewis to a cross. But in doing so, it has only prepared the ground for future attacks upon it as an "unpatriotic organization."

The Constitutional Issue

Finally the CIO executive board declared that Lewis had no constitutional right to initiate any moves for labor unity since this right was vested only in the board and Murray. For our part, we are not too greatly concerned with this legal conflict. It is beyond the issue of labor unity. In any case, Lewis has a constitutional case. Lewis is not a member of the executive board and did not attend its meeting. But in his letter to Murray, he points out several interesting things in connection with the constitutional issue:

1. The third constitutional convention of the CIO specifically conveyed this authority (to initiate unity moves) to three of its representatives, designating them by name.

2. The foregoing convention unanimously adopted the following motion: "Your committee recommends that this convention continue its negotiating committee, consisting of Mr. John L. Lewis, Mr. Philip Murray and Mr. Sidney Hillman, with the authority to participate in any future negotiations, looking forward to real labor unity, which must be in conformity with the foregoing principles."

3. This action was not nullified by the Detroit convention.

4. Under the CIO constitution, the executive board is an inferior agency without power to change "the enactment of a constitutional convention."

5. That unity negotiations were adjourned in 1939 with the proviso that it may be reconvened by Lewis, chairman of the negotiating committee of the CIO.

Lewis, in anticipation of a rejection of his letter to Murray, concluded with the following proposals to the executive board:

- A. Express their good will and their hopes for successful negotiations, fully protective of the interest of the CIO and its membership.

- B. Exercise the constitutional powers of the board by convening a special national convention of the CIO to take action on this question under the white spotlight of open public debate.

- C. Submit the question of participation in further negotiations to a referendum vote by secret ballot of the members of each of the thousands of local unions affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

These proposals were swiftly rejected. The unity proposals had already been torpedoed by the President and by the actions of Green and Murray.

Opposition from Other Quarters

From an examination of the cross section of "opinion" on the Lewis proposals, it is clear that the opposition to them stems from considerations having nothing vitally to do with the issue of unity itself. *The Nation* of January 31 put it plainly when it stated in its editorial, "Everybody Wins but Lewis," that "John L. Lewis' sudden espousal of unity in the labor movement is, if we may slide into Lewis English, the accouplement of an unimpeachable idea with the most impeachable auspices."

The Militant, weekly organ of the Socialist Workers Party, for example, attacked the Lewis proposal on the ground that it was favored by the bosses, President Roosevelt, the reactionary Congress and was, above all, a war measure. *The Militant*, as usual, was wrong on all counts, with the possible exception of the last. In its issue of January 31, however, it goes on to say that "President Roosevelt has countered John L. Lewis' unacceptable proposal for AFL-CIO unification with a plan that shelves the question of unity altogether." But *The Militant* fails to explain why Roosevelt shelved a plan which he is presumed to have fostered.

The Militant also fell in with the official line of the CIO executive board when it incorrectly attributed the defeat of Lewis' proposal to "disfavor among the militant workers not because it proposed unity, but because it threatened to sacrifice the interests of the industrial unions and lead to the kind of unification that would weaken the labor movement." (Emphasis mine—A. G.) Following this type of reasoning, we are to conclude then, that the bosses, Roosevelt, the reactionaries in Congress, Murray and Green, all united to oppose Lewis' proposals because it would weaken the labor movement!

In its over-all significance, the issue of labor unity is far superior to all the secondary considerations posed by everyone who joined the chorus of denunciation of the Lewis scheme. For our part, we are not greatly concerned, at this moment, with what Lewis may have had in mind by the proposal—that is, how his espousal of labor unity may or may not have pushed him, once more, to the top in the labor movement. We do not hold the slightest brief for Lewis. We regard him, as always, a reactionary labor bureaucrat. By the same token, however, all the other "outstanding" labor leaders fall in the same boat—many of them having been tutored by Lewis, and were, only until yesterday, his loyal subordinates. If Lewis had in mind by his proposals an improvement of his bureaucratic position in the labor movement, his opponents, too, were chiefly concerned with their own positions in fighting him.

Unity Is Still the Issue

We are against all the bureaucrats, we are against the high salaries which these bureaucrats vote to each other, we are opposed to any and all behind-the-scenes maneuvers and deals, no matter from what quarter they may arise. But one of the initial steps by which such things can be eliminated from the labor movement is by the unification of all labor organizations into one mighty federation. Of infinitely greater importance, is the cumulative effect of a single labor organization to the tune of 10,000,000 workers. Given such an organization, the unification of the entire American working class becomes a genuine reality. This is by far the paramount consideration in the whole situation. Given such an organization, the South could be more readily organized. Given such an organization, the great mass production industries could be completely organized. Given such an organization, labor in this country could not possibly be at the mercy of the best organized and strongest ruling class in the world.

We know that for some years the issue of labor unity was not real. But the fact that it was propelled forward in the dramatic manner in which Lewis announced his proposals made it the burning issue it is today. The labor movement would be remiss if it did not do all in its power to effect such genuine unity. The politically conscious working class organizations would be doubly remiss if they did not openly declare their unqualified support to labor unity—and cast aside all secondary considerations. Labor unity is the great hope of the working class for the immediate period ahead.

The Truman and Vinson Reports

Several weeks have passed since the Truman Senate Committee investigating the war effort made its report. Washington was shocked by its disclosures. The press was startled, but only for a moment. The labor movement chuckled with an "I told you so" attitude, while big business denounced the "one-sided" nature of the report, charging that the senators had only a political interest in making their report. But it was only a matter of days when the Vinson Naval Committee tendered a report in which it was shown that industry was making "unconscionable profits" at the expense of the government. In the hands of a labor-hating chairman, this committee then proceeded to make the pernicious charge that the trade union movement, too, was making "unconscionable profits" out of the war effort.

Since the reports were made public the atmosphere has been cleared. The President's action in appointing Donald M. Nelson completely in charge and personally responsible for the war effort was taken to ward off the growing criticism of the OPM, headed by the now deflated William Knudsen. Knudsen was promoted by being made a lieutenant general of the Army, in charge of war production.

The Truman committee investigation differs from past committees occupied with similar tasks in that its work and report came at an early stage of America's participation in the war—not years afterward. Thus, it has the appearance of an intervention while "something can be done about it." Its findings, in their general content, are not unlike those of similar congressional committees, after the last war. Wittingly or not, the Truman report substantiates everything we have said about the war effort since the conflict broke out in Europe in 1939.

Big business in America reaps enormous profits from the

war program. It controls every major field of war production. Unmonopolized business, the small producers, are completely discriminated against by the representatives of the huge monopolies in charge of the OPM. Big business had so contrived matters, through its monopolistic stranglehold on production, as to artificially increase prices, create false shortages, control markets and hold up the government on contracts until its profit demands were met.

The Big Business Mind

All of this was accomplished, says the Truman report, because the giant monopolies controlled the OPM, and were aided and abetted by the "big business minds" in the War and Navy Departments. In hurling the lie at the manufacturers, who said that there are "no real profits in big defense contracts because of the heavy tax program," the committee showed, as an example, that the three largest automobile manufacturers, Ford, Chrysler and General Motors, had aggregated profits for the first nine months of 1941, of \$430,604,778, as compared with \$408,212,589 in 1940 and \$296,075,775 in 1939.

The Truman committee likewise disclosed that the copper, lead and zinc monopolies had withheld increases in production so as to obtain increased prices and larger profits. Despite this fact, the government subsequently signed contracts with these monopolies allowing a 42 per cent increase in the price of copper, 33 per cent in the price of zinc and 62 per cent for the total production of these metals above the level of 1941! To complete this picture, the committee "observed" that these metal corporations enjoyed a 30 per cent increase in profits during the first nine months of 1941 as compared to the corresponding period of 1940.

In explaining the conduct of the dollar-a-year men who fill the offices of the OPM, the report says:

...the companies loaning the services of dollar-a-year and no-compensation men obtain other and less tangible, but perhaps even more important benefits. All important procurement contracts must be approved by these men, which means that contracts must conform to their theories of business. *Since they represent the largest companies, this means that the defense program in all its ramifications must obtain the approval of the large companies.*

It is only natural that such men should believe that only companies of the size and type with which they are associated (the big monopolies) have the ability to perform defense contracts; that small and intermediate companies ought not to be given prime contracts; that the urgencies of the defense program are such that they have no time to consider small companies for defense contracts; *that the large companies ought not to be required to sub-contract items which they could profitably manufacture and as to which they express lack of confidence in the productive facilities of smaller concerns; that the producers of strategic materials should not be expected or required to increase their capacities, even at government expense, where that might result in excess capacity after the war and adversely affect their post-war profits; and that large companies should not be expected or required to convert their existing facilities into defense plants, where they prefer to use their plants to make the profits from their civilian business and, at the same time, to have additional plants directly or indirectly paid for by the government; which they can operate profitably on terms dictated by themselves.* (Emphasis mine—A.G.)

But Nothing Can Be Done

This statement of the Truman committee explains pretty nearly everything one wants to know about the OPM. But what did this august body propose to overcome the situation? Only that the dollar-a-year and no-compensation men be paid by the government and sever their monetary relationship with their companies. A knobby proposal, indeed. The OPM men are not merely "representatives" of their companies; they are the companies themselves. On top of that, the committee

already precluded any change to be accomplished by such a step when it declared:

The dollar-a-year and no-compensation men subconsciously reflect the opinions and conclusions which they formerly reached as managers of large interests with respect to government competition, with respect to taxation and amortization, with respect to the financing of new plant expansion, and with respect to the margin of profit which should be allowed on war contracts. (Emphasis mine—A. G.)

Nothing else need be said on this point, since the new director of the war effort, Donald M. Nelson, already said it. He is going to retain all the dollar-a-year men, because one cannot expect to obtain the services of such qualified persons by asking them to sacrifice (!) their private incomes for government salaries of about \$10,000 a year! Nelson maintains that they are irreplaceable! Especially the private incomes!

The great objections of the capitalist press to the Truman report is that is generalized too much! It should have named names, said the press, for otherwise the report was in the nature of an indictment of capitalism! There's the rub. Big business is ready to indict individual members of its class when there is a requirement for it, but be careful, they say, that in doing so you don't indict the whole class and the profit system.

The Vinson Report

When this point was made, the Vinson Naval Affairs Committee came in with its own report on a specific aspect of the war program, naval construction. The section of the report dealing with profits was simple enough. It stated that big business had been earning "excessive and unconscionable profits" out of construction for an enlarged two-ocean Navy. Profits ran as high as 247 per cent on a small contract, 24.5 per cent on many large contracts running into millions of dollars, and that General Motors, Cleveland Diesel Engine Division, earned profits of from 12 to 27 per cent on fifteen separate contracts ranging from \$1,000,000 to \$18,000,000. Bethlehem Steel Co. earned profits of 20.7 per cent. In general, more than half of the contracts reported on showed profits in excess of 7 per cent, others 8.7 per cent, *with the tendency upwards.*

The real significance of this aspect of the report was revealed by Pearson and Allen, who disclosed that, in response to a House investigation committee questionnaire on profits accruing from naval contracts, and in anticipation of the Vinson report, companies voluntarily (!) made refunds to the government in the amount of \$27,000,000.

Having made its exposure of the greed for profits on the part of big business, the Vinson Naval Affairs Committee proceeded to couple the labor movement with big business, showing that it, too, had earned "fabulous profits" as a result of the war program. How? Well, the labor unions increased their membership, increased their dues payments and assessments and thus enriched themselves. This could not have happened without the war program. The reactionary, labor-hating members of the Vinson committee presented figures showing that the AFL, CIO and all independent unions had total assets of \$82,594,939, an increase of 14.85 per cent from October, 1939, and this increase occurred despite liabilities of \$12,103,878. These figures reveal that for every paid-up member of all the trade unions, the treasuries of these unions have \$14 to pay a variety of benefits, cover expenses and carry on union work. Thus the committee concludes:

The tremendous financial gains made by labor organizations during the period of the defense effort and the vast amount of funds and assets

in their treasuries, present an astounding picture of concentration of wealth, a situation heretofore usually associated only with industry and finance. (Emphasis mine—A. G.)

You may well ask yourselves: Are these people stupid, ignorant and vicious? Are they merely malicious? Or is there something more fundamental behind this insulting report? Consider the comparisons made by the intellectual giants comprising the House Naval Affairs Committee. The AFL, CIO, and independent unions with a membership of 10,000,000 workers who pay dues and assessments, have \$82,000,000 in their treasuries, or an average of \$8.00 for all members. The union movement has in its ranks one-fourth of the proletarian population of the United States, or 13 per cent of the entire population. On the other hand, big business represents an infinitesimal percentage of the population. The significance of the report becomes clear when one observes that in this monopoly dominated country, 200 out of 250,000 non-banking corporations possess 62 per cent of all corporate assets. Here are a few examples:

American Telephone & Telegraph Co., \$5,225,000,000; Pennsylvania Railroad Co., \$2,781,000,000; United States Steel Corp., \$2,279,000,000; Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, \$1,827,000,000; General Motors Corp., \$1,313,000,000; Electric Bond & Share Co., \$1,231,641,000; and Cities Service Co., \$1,194,450,000.

These figures are several years old. The war has had the effect of increasing the incomes, profits and assets of giant corporations. These seven companies, out of 250,000, own between them some \$15,000,000,000 in corporate assets! And the Vinson report has the colossal impudence to denounce the unions as "an astonishing picture of the concentration of wealth"!

The Aim of the Vinson Committee

The purpose of the Vinson committee is twofold: 1. Divide the attention of the masses; make it appear as if everyone is guilty of utilizing the war program to make large profits, that labor is as guilty as business. This would steal the thunder of the workers and forestall demands for sharing in the profits of the bosses by showing that labor has already an unwarranted share; it would temper the criticisms directed against big business. 2. Accomplish the passage of anti-labor legislation now pending in Congress, especially those which call for supervision of the books and finances of the unions.

Vinson, a poll-taxer from Georgia, is the sponsor of one of the most vicious anti-labor bills in the House. The committee's counsel, Edmund Toland, was counsel associated with the Smith committee whose bill passed the House, and it is he who led the fight for repeal of the Wagner Act. It becomes clear that the main aim of this committee was not to indict profiteering big business but to push through the reactionary anti-labor bills in the House.

Thus we have seen two investigating committees report to the House and the Senate on the war effort. Neither report produced anything fundamentally new or striking. They permitted a little steam to be blown off. The culprits who have "hindered" the war effort were promoted. A new person has been put in charge of the war program. Big business, having been chastised but feeling less chastened, continues to enrich itself from the war. The working class, and the people in general, face more difficult times ahead with the prospect of a higher cost of living, greater taxation, inflation and rationing. A few senators and congressmen received national publicity which they hope will be remembered by the "peepul" at home in the next elections. And the President—he is

blissfully confident of the future! Everything was taken care of in good stride.

Our White "Democracy"

In the December issue of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL we expressed the opinion that the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms were essentially the shibboleths constructed and designed to gather in mass support for this imperialist war, pointing out at the same time that the freedoms outlined by Churchill and Roosevelt obtained in general only for the white race and, at that, the small economically dominant section of the white race, the bourgeoisie. The Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter have no applicability to the oppressed colonial peoples who inhabit the possessions of the big powers nor to the Negro people of the United States.

If we, this time, omit reference to the racial policies of the Axis (Germany, Italy and Japan) it is only because no hypocrisy shrouds their program. They frankly state that their program is based upon the most reactionary racial doctrines (Herrenvolk, Aryanism, divine destiny, etc.). They do not engage in any double-talk. But a glance at the ideological propaganda of the United Nations leaves one aghast at their cynicism and the wide gulf which separates the word from the deed, the program from the practice. The "democratic" powers *speak* of the right of national self-determination, the freedom of speech, press and assembly, and the equality of races. But they do not have and never had any intention of concretizing their program. Moreover, they do not believe in it. The colonies of Africa, India, the Dutch East Indies, the American colonies (Hawaii, Haiti, Puerto Rico)—all of them are governed upon the principle of white prerogatives, the superiority of the white race over all others.

One need not go to the colonies to observe the living expression of the race doctrines of American democracy. With 12,000,000 Negroes living within the borders of the United States, the practice of race discrimination, Jim Crow and judicial persecution has many-faceted openings. Prejudice against the American Negro is not confined to the South; it is not limited to civilian life. Discrimination and persecution of the Negro pervades every sector of our national life, economic, political and social. Since America's entry into the war this situation has become aggravated.

Some Notable Examples

1. In Philadelphia, for example, the United Service Organization (USO) Center, erected for the sole purpose of providing some social enjoyments for the soldier, bars Negroes with the statement that another center was being prepared for them in the Negro section of the city. It wouldn't do, the authorities declare, to mix the black and white boys, because that would give rise to ideas of equality!

2. This action was followed by the posting of a regimental notice in Philadelphia, declaring that any sexual relations between a Negro soldier and a white girl, with or without the girl's consent, would be regarded as rape and would invite the penalty of death!

3. Only a few weeks ago, the harrowing news of a "race riot" among the soldiers on leave at Alexandria, La., was published announcing that 29 Negro soldiers were shot and beaten, three of them seriously. What caused this outburst against the Negro boys? First, their stationing in Southern

camps and in the heart of Negro-hating centers. Secondly, the assigning of white mounted police to supervise Negro soldiers on leave. Thirdly, the inexcusable failure of the authorities to accord proper protection to Negroes from the North and the damnable discrimination in the Army itself, especially where Southern officers are in charge.

In this event, it was obvious that it was simply a case of prejudice assuming a violent physical form. The protests that followed the shooting compelled the War Department to undertake an investigation. But there was still another reason for this investigation. Continued persecution of Negro boys in the armed forces would hinder morale and militate against the conversion of Negro youth into soldiers.

So rank and obvious was the affair in Louisiana, where civilian police joined in what they no doubt regarded as a little fun "shooting and clubbing n.....s," that the War Department could hardly avoid pinning the blame where it belonged: on the civilian police, the white authorities. The report states:

Preliminary reports indicate that although a show of force (!) may have been justified to disperse the excited crowd which gathered when a colored soldier resisted arrest by a military policeman, nevertheless civilian policemen and one military policeman indulged in indiscriminate and unnecessary shooting.

And what is the War Department going to do about it? It says that:

...the investigation is continuing and efficiencies in military police control are being studied carefully with a view to appropriate action in this case and elimination of basic and correctible causes which might otherwise result in future disorders.

We are certain that this ends the Alexandria affair! In the meantime, twenty-nine colored soldiers are recovering from their wounds.

Sikeston, Mo., Gains National Fame

4. No sooner had the Alexandria affair ended when Sikeston, Mo., received some national prominence in the press. Cleo Wright, a 30-year-old Negro cotton mill worker, charged with an attempted attack on a white woman, was seized by a white mob and lynched. Lynch law, of course, has nothing to do with investigation, the ascertainment of facts and truth. It is the legal code which operates in the Southern and border states. The assistant chief of police of Sikeston announced that Wright had admitted (confessed) that he stabbed the wife of an army sergeant. After his "capture" he stabbed an officer and was in turn shot three times. We can understand his resistance. He knew what was in store for him if taken alive by his "judges." He had not long to wait!

Certainly, Governor Donnell became indignant. Certainly, the action of the mob was "a disgraceful blot on the state of Missouri." Poor blot! Poor state! The governor now demands justice be brought to those who participated in the lynching. But the county prosecutor already observes that it will be impossible to apprehend the lynchers. Why? Because, undoubtedly, the lynchers include the "best citizens" of the town and the surrounding area! And isn't that always the case? And did ever a lynching take place where the lynchers were brought to justice? Stuff and nonsense. Lynching is a law of the South!

5. On January 20th, the *New York Post* published a story of the intrigues in Congress that serve as a glimmer of light to show what happens even when a housing project for Negro workers in war industries is completed.

Here is the story: Such a housing development was recently completed in Detroit. Congressional pressure compelled the Federal Works Agency to turn the project over to white defense workers. Congressional pressure compelled the discharge of Clark Foreman, director of the FWA and New Dealer, for his opposition to the transfer of the housing project to white families.

According to *The Post*, the day before Foreman was discharged, the Public Buildings and Grounds Committee of the House informed Baird Snyder, acting FWA director, that before they would authorize a new defense housing program, Foreman would have to go. This demand was made by Representative Frank W. Boykin of Alabama, a member of the committee!

Foreman, the report states, was in conflict with the Southern congressmen for a long time. It began by his hiring of a Negro woman as secretary! Although his rating was "excellent" and he received an increase in salary for his work, the Southerners finally got him because he was quite obviously undermining race relations in this country.

The Detroit project, named after the Negro heroine and abolitionist Sojourner Truth, is now turned over to a Polish settlement. The protest against the Negroes occupying the project was first made by Representative Tenerowicz of Michigan, a Republican (!), on the ground that the Polish residents objected to Negroes occupying the houses. The Michigan representative appealed to the House committee and the Negroes were deprived of their project, but were promised another one!

But this is not the first time a Negro housing project was taken from them. According to *The Post*, Negro spokesmen in New York point out that a development in Texarkana was "temporarily" diverted to white construction workers. A 210-unit development near Portsmouth was, at the request of the Navy Department, turned over to white workers. A Maritime Commission development at Pascaguola, Miss., which originally contained a Negro section, is fully occupied by whites.

[Since this writing, the decision on the Sojourner Truth project has been reversed. Many-sided protests brought about the change, but nothing has yet been done about it.]

The Power of the South

This is the "way of life" for the Negro people in the United States. It is not our purpose to trace the origin and persistency of race prejudice and antagonism in this brief note. But we do insist on one point: Such discrimination and persecution of the Negro people would be greatly reduced and traditional race antagonism would be largely overcome if it were not fostered and nurtured in congressional halls; if the "great and freedom-loving" press had the courage and foresight to treat the question honestly and in a forthright manner; if the radio and the schools and the churches were to inveigh constantly against our native reactionary racial doctrines. We agree, that is asking too much.

The Senate and the House cannot even pass a lynch bill which is aimed at a prosecution of lynchers. Why? Because the Southern bloc is powerful and if such a bill were passed it would be a blot upon the Southern states—and the Southern congressmen would then prevent legislation of interest to the Northern congressmen. An eye for any eye! What makes the Southern congressman so powerful? An archaic representation system in Congress which gives an enormous power to the South far in excess of its population. Five Southern states, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ar-

kansas and Georgia, with a voting population of 1,620,584 (see, poll tax) have 43 representatives in the House, while five Northern states, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington, Connecticut and Indiana, with a voting population of 4,973,203 votes, have only 40 members in the House!

But this is only a partial answer. Race discrimination, the persecution of the Negro, the lynch law and Jim Crow are simple and typical means of class rule. It divides the oppressed and exploited peoples; it keeps them in conflict; it makes easier their exploitation. It is a weapon that did not originate with capitalism, but it is a weapon used to its extreme by capitalism. It is not confined to the United States; it is an international phenomenon.

The recent events mentioned above are not new. They may not be even the most extreme examples of Negro discrimination and persecution. But they take on an added significance in the light of the war for the Four Freedoms. They tear the mask of hypocrisy from the Atlantic Charter and show it to be in truth, another imperialist doctrine, in its own way hardly different from barbaric fascism.

The One and Only Solution

But the issue of Negro discrimination and persecution has an even deeper significance. It is a tradition that goes beyond the Negro. It strikes at the Jew, the Catholic, the foreign born. It is a doctrine which gives heart to the most reactionary prejudices of our social order. It is one of the bases for fascism. And there are not a few sycophants ready to become "the leader" of such a movement.

But, above all, the existence of these conditions stresses more than ever that only one solution remains for the Negro people. It is, in fact, the one solution for the workers and poor farmers of this country, for the workers and peasants of the entire world, for the colonial peoples and all subject races and peoples. It is socialism! For the root evil which gives life and blood to the most reactionary of all prejudices is the ever-present hunt for profits, the capitalist social order. Only socialism can destroy this evil. Only a society in which the means of life belong to the people, in which class rule and class exploitation are forever barred, can bring genuine and lasting political, social and economic freedom to all of mankind, no matter their color, no matter where they may be.

A. G.



AMERICAN-JAPANESE TRADE

(1) America has supplied Japan with approximately 34 per cent of its total imports.

(2) America has purchased 16 per cent to 20 per cent of Japan's exports annually.

(3) Exports to Japan—(round figures):

	1939	1940
Cotton	\$42,000,000	\$30,000,000
Wood pulp	2,000,000	7,000,000
Oil products	45,000,000	55,000,000
Iron and steel	43,000,000	38,000,000
Scrap metal	33,000,000	17,000,000
Copper	28,000,000	25,000,000
Machinery	25,000,000	23,000,000
Automobiles, etc.	6,000,000	2,000,000
Totals	\$232,000,000	\$227,000,000

Ambassador Davies' War Mission

The New Revelations of Ex-Ambassador Davies

Mr. Roosevelt's problem is not altogether enviable or easy to resolve. He has to convince the far-from-convinced masses that he is leading a war for freedom and democracy. At the same time, he has to convince the doubtful and hostile elements among his conservative and reactionary supporters that the alliance with Stalin is nothing to be disturbed about. In a way, the President is more concerned with the latter aspect of the problem than with the former. There is an almost inexhaustible supply of labor lieutenants of imperialism pounding away faithfully at the job of whitewashing the alliance with Stalin in the eyes of the professional leaders of the middle classes and some of the spokesmen of reaction in this country. It is not an easy job; it requires a minimum of scruples and self-respect, which is not much of a problem nowadays—and a maximum of skill and authoritativeness, which is something of a problem.

Whom to assign the job? Surveying the possible candidates ourselves, we cannot say that Roosevelt made a bad choice in picking his former ambassador to Russia, Joseph E. Davies. After reading his *Mission to Moscow*,* it is clear that he met all the requirements listed above. He was given a task to perform, a political assignment not less important than his original appointment as ambassador to Moscow. He has acquitted himself of his assignment as well as any man could, given the handicaps. As his book goes from better-seller to best-seller, the author has a right to feel gratified by the "bit" he is doing to keep the war going.

The elements we have referred to have taught or have been taught the following notions about Russia—some true, some false, all held by some and some held by all:

1. Russia has a revolutionary Bolshevik government in which the workers rule and benefit;
2. Russia is a terrible totalitarian dictatorship in which nobody but a tiny group of oligarchs enjoys any rights;
3. Russia is trying to spread world revolution and communism by means of the Communist International;
4. The Moscow trials and the purges were a monstrous travesty on justice;
5. Stalin is a despot with not less arbitrary power than Hitler, and Russia is not different from Germany;
6. Russia is where atheists run riot and when religion is officially condemned and persecuted;
7. Stalin's alliance with Hitler was treacherous; so were the invasions of Russia's neighbors; and Stalin may turn from the "democracies" and rejoin Hitler.

"WITH HUMAN NATURE AS IT IS!"

With opinions such as these fairly widespread in the country, the alliance with Stalin does not set well on the stomach, at least on some stomachs; in any case, these opinions are exploited against Mr. Roosevelt. The aim of Mr. Davies' book is to change these opinions. No small task. No unimportant task, as is shown by the almost official Administration endorsement given the book in the advertised encomiums from

Sumner Welles, who officially authorized the use of State Department archives, which are often quoted in the book, and from the President himself.

The first thing Mr. Davies must present to the audience at which he is aiming is his credentials, his authority to speak on the subject in hand. To do this, he finds it necessary to emphasize that he never entertained any radical ideas and that he didn't become contaminated with any as a result of his residence in Moscow. He was once a follower of Woodrow Wilson, and in recent times of Roosevelt and the New Deal. But don't get the wrong idea about him: "As I stated to Mr. Stalin, President Kalinin and the others of the Soviet leaders, I am definitely not a communist. I am called a capitalist. I am proud of the designation . . ." And again, as if he had just been converted by Max Eastman, he is "equally firmly convinced that communism, as such, cannot work on this earth, with human nature as it is . . ." And again: "I explained that I had always made it clear to the members of the Soviet government that I was a capitalist . . ." And again and yet again, until even the dullest reader begins to get the point.

Having made this most important point clear, Mr. Davies is ready to go to work. He sets forth, first, that while he still remains a capitalist, the Stalin régime has pretty well wiped out all traces of communism in Russia. "At the present rate at which differentiation and increases in compensation are growing, it will be but a very short time before there will be very marked class distinctions based upon property. Human nature," concludes this dispatch to the State Department from the disciple of the noted thinker, Max Eastman, "is functioning here even as always."

On March 17, 1937, he happily sends Cordell Hull, "strictly confidentially," the following intelligence: "The idea of a 'classless' society has been and is being destroyed in practice. The government itself is a bureaucracy with all the indicia of class, to wit: special privileges, higher standards of living, and the like." To "Dear Steve" Early, who is evidently interested in the subject, he writes: "These commissars certainly treat themselves well." To "Dear Pat" Harrison, the famous social scientist from Mississippi, he passes on the information that "there is no question but what human nature is working here the same old way. There are many indications of it. The bureaucracy all live very well and many have their country houses, or *dachas* in the country." And his very last word is this: "The Russia of Lenin and Trotsky—the Russia of the Bolshevik Revolution—no longer exists. Through gradual, stern and often cruel evolution that government has developed into what is now a system of state socialism operating on capitalistic principles and steadily and irresistibly swinging to the right. Concessions had to be made to human nature"—this man seems to be positively obsessed with the point!—"in order to make the experiment work."

One can almost hear the first sigh of relief from the Union League Club reader: Maybe they don't have capitalism there yet, but at least the Russia of Lenin and Trotsky—the Russia of the Bolshevik Revolution—no longer exists; and that's what's important.

**Mission to Moscow*, by Joseph E. Davies. 646 pp. Simon & Schuster. \$8.00.

THE COMINTERN—LENIN AND TROTSKY'S RUSSIA

But what about this world revolution business, and the subversive Communist International? Mr. Davies has a most reassuring answer on this score, too, and it's as honest as a dollar. To the Secretary of State in Washington: "The idea of the world proletariat and revolution has been set aside and replaced with the idea of a nationalistic Russia." Citing, in his diary, the Belgian Minister, De Tellier: "Stalin, he thinks, is a practical realist who is a nationalist, not an internationalist like Trotsky. Stalin, in his opinion, would 'ditch' the Comintern in a minute if he were assured of peace. He holds on to it as a military defensive agency." To Stephen Early: "The French Ambassador has said to me that the Comintern (the agency for the international revolution idea) is resorted to by Stalin, not because of desire, but purely as a military and strategic necessity. Stalin, he maintains, wishes to prove socialism in Russia first, as a successful object lesson to the world. Trotsky advocates world revolution, without which, he maintains, there can be no successful communism." The Comintern, then, does indeed exist, but it is merely a technical adjunct of Stalin's foreign policy; a means of black-mailing an opponent; and, hints Davies, even we might utilize its services in those countries which are the enemies of Russia—and of ourselves. As for its being a world revolutionary movement, that's so much poppycock. "The Russia of Lenin and Trotsky—the Russia of the the Bolshevik Revolution—no longer exists."

Trotsky: that brings up the question of the trials and the purges. Here Davies digs his brush down into the thickest part of the whitewash pail and lays on a coat with one stroke that other men would hesitate to build up with ten. "All of these trials, purges and liquidations, which seemed so violent at the time and shocked the world, are now quite clearly [!] a part of a vigorous and determined effort of the Stalin government to protect itself from not only revolution from within but from attack from without. They went to work thoroughly to clean up and clean out all treasonable elements within the country. All doubts were resolved in favor of the government. There were no fifth columnists in Russia in 1941—they had shot them. The purges had cleansed the country and rid it of treason."

For these hundreds words alone, the Stalinists are ready to forgive or overlook or forget anything else that Davies may say in this book. Yet, in their way, these words are as monstrous, as conscienceless, as calculated as the Kremlin frame-ups themselves. In order to apologize for the war policy of his political boss, Roosevelt, he makes himself the attorney for a band of cold-blooded cut-throats who were responsible for the most gruesome political massacre in history. Just the kind of job a Wilsonian liberal would undertake to do!

A CORPORATION LAWYER ON THE MOSCOW TRIALS

What makes Mr. Davies an authoritative voice on the Moscow trials? We understand that he has a reputation as a corporation and banking lawyer; he was present at some of the trial sessions in Moscow, accompanied by an interpreter; he has evidently glanced through some of the published versions of the court records; he has talked to the heads of the Soviet government, i.e., to the executioners, and to other foreign diplomats in Moscow. However, we know—even a moderately intelligent child can see this from reading the book—that the author pursues a very deliberate political aim, and that aim most certainly does not include depicting Roosevelt's Kremlin allies as frame-up artists and judicial assassins. We

have no reason to believe, moreover, that Mr. Davies has much more than a newspaper knowledge of the nature, origin, problems and course of the Russian Revolution, of the men who guided it and the men who destroyed it, even though this superficial knowledge is buttressed at many points by the former ambassador's emphatically avowed capitalistic predilections and instincts. That he is aware of such commonplace truths as "the Russia of Lenin and Trotsky no longer exists," does not mark him out from a million others, and the archives and library of the State Department must be full of documents on the subject of Russia far more thoroughgoing and important, even if written by obscure—but at least studious—people.

What, then, gives him the right to speak so authoritatively, so categorically—"all doubts were resolved in favor of the government"—about the trials? Nothing, unless impudence, unless ignorance, unless the command to do a dirty job, give a man such a right.

AN UNFORTUNATE PREFACE

"There were no fifth columnists in Russia in 1941—they had shot them." Davies has the effrontery to vouch for the guilt of the murdered Soviet leaders even in the case of the Red Army officers, about whose "trial" there is not even a document faintly resembling the heavily-edited and patched-up stenogram that was given out of the "public" trials—no document except the statement issued by the combined accuser-judge-executioner. "The Bukharin trial six months later," he adds in a footnote to a report he wrote at the time Tukhachevsky and associates were shot, "developed evidence which, if true, more than justified this action," that is, the shooting of the "generals." What evidence? In not one of the trials was there a single piece of material evidence introduced that could in any way be interpreted as proof of the conspiracy charged by Stalin-Vyshinsky—not a single piece! Doesn't Davies know this fact? He can't help knowing it.

Or perhaps the "confessions" are what Davies means by "evidence." But the "confessions" are a monumental mockery of the prosecution; they are shot full of the most preposterous contradictions. Yet, even if the reasonableness of the "confessions" was to be granted, how does *Davies* explain them? Surely, they are not the most ordinary sort of thing in the legal career of the ex-ambassador. Were the accused brought to confess by confrontation with overwhelming evidence of their guilt, as almost invariably happens in a genuine case of this kind? Then why wasn't *any* of this evidence produced? Or perhaps the GPU inquisitors appealed to the conscience of the accused and thus broke down their resistance to confession? If this is so, how explain that the inquisitors in charge of revealing the "Fascist-Trotskyist plot" were themselves later revealed as two of the most important cogs in the same plot, namely, Yagoda and Yezhov, successive heads of the GPU?

But what's the point of going into all this! If Davies doesn't know all the details of the truth about the Moscow trials and purges, he knows them well enough. Does he really believe, for example, that Trotsky and Rakovsky and Zinoviev and Bukharin and Rykov and Pyatakov and Tukhachevsky and Gamarnik and thousands upon thousands of others were in league with Hitler and Hirohito to assassinate Stalin and his associates, to overthrow the government, to restore capitalism, and grant whole chunks of the USSR to Berlin and Tokyo? Of course not. To him, Trotsky and the people in the trials whom he would probably call Trotskyists

were not the real *counter-revolutionists in Russia*—and that, after all, is the very nub of the charges in the trials and in the purges—but rather the *revolutionists who remained faithful to what Davies and Co. really abhor, the Bolshevik Revolution*. The counter-revolutionists, those who put an end to “the Russia of Lenin and Trotsky,” are in the Stalin camp; and Davies knows it and says it, not once but a dozen times. When he writes of the liquidation of the opposition to Stalin he says that “human nature asserted itself here again as in the French Revolution, only the tempo here was slower.” Again: “. . . The prosecution has made a strong case establishing the existence of widespread Trotsky conspiracy to destroy the present government. It is the French Revolution over again.”

What is this talk about the “French Revolution over again” and, elsewhere about “the revolution devours its children”? Davies simply assumes that everyone knows what he means, and in a way he is right. The French Revolution over again means that the revolutionists—the men of “the Russia of Lenin and Trotsky, of the Bolshevik Revolution”—fell at the hands of the counter-revolutionists as incorruptible Robespierre and the Jacobins fell at the hands of the Thermidorians! And that is a process that emphatically does not meet with aversion in Mr. Davies. “Trotsky was then and is now the ardent proponent of the idea that the world revolution was foremost,” he reported to Cordell Hull almost immediately upon his arrival in Moscow. And when it comes to world revolution and its proponents, Mr. Davies is all for human nature taking its course. And where human nature doesn't work fast enough, it's handy to have A. Mitchell Palmer around, or Francis Biddle and Edgar Hoover; or, in Russia, Stalin and the GPU.

WHAT THE TREASON ACTUALLY CONSISTED OF

But the treason—what about that? Mr. Davies explains, and his comments (he is writing about the purge of the Red Army) are remarkably lucid, even penetrating! “It would have been quite natural,” he says of Tukhachevsky and the others, to resent the imposition of an espionage system over them; to have “criticized political bureaucratic control of industry when it handicapped the Army”; and “it is possible that they continued to voice such opposition” even after the party (i.e., Stalin) decrees on the subject. Correct; and all objective, intelligent analysis indicates that this grumbling and criticism and lack of complete servility to Stalin and his whims constituted the beginning and end of the “crimes” of the Red Army men.

However [continues Davies], if after the 17th of May, when political control over the army was established as a result of a party decision, the opposition on the part of these officers continued, even though it were simply through discussions among themselves, their action would be treasonable and a felony under Bolshevik rules of behavior. It is a fundamental of party government that once a party action is established by the vote of the majority, any further opposition thereto constitutes treason.

There is the sum and substance of the treason of Stalin's victims—they continued to criticize or oppose Stalin after he had ordered them to shut up. And since, according to the ukazes of Czar Joseph, which Davies jokingly calls the “Bolshevik rules of behavior,” it is treason even to whisper against His Majesty, many of the accused in the trials were undoubtedly guilty of treason “against the state.” After this piece of apologetics for jurisprudence under a despotism, it can be said: What Mr. Davies ever earned as a corporation lawyer, he undoubtedly deserved; but as a democrat, yes, even a bourgeois democrat, he is a downright impostor.

They were shot down, as Vyshinsky put it, like dogs, these last thousands of representatives of a noble generation of revolutionists, shot down because they weren't considered *intellectually convinced* serfs of Stalin; because in their secret hearts they knew that Stalin's rule meant all kinds of disaster; because, perhaps, they sometimes whispered to each other that Stalin was ruining the country with his course. Because of this extremely restrained form of opposition—if it can be called opposition of any kind—they were framed up, publicly humiliated and dishonored, and then shot down. Then the arch-assassin turns around and makes a reactionary imperialist alliance with the very Hitler whose agents he claimed to have tried and shot. And Mr. Davies, a democrat and the ambassador of a democrat, turns incoherent with praise of it all. To whitewash the slaughter of the peoples it is necessary to whitewash an ally whose blood-crimes stink in the nostrils not only of honest socialists, but of honest men everywhere.

“REVOLUTIONARY” SILHOUETTES BY A BOURGEOIS

What Mr. Davies does to perform the task assigned him once he gets through with the trials is in the nature of anticlimax. But it is part of the task and it should be noted.

Stalin a brutal despot? Not at all. The fact is he is a much misunderstood man; and so are most of the other Soviet leaders. All you have to do is get to know these people and you find that they're just simple home folks like us, main difference being they speak Russian.

Take Vyshinsky. You might think from the way he conducted the trials that he was just the kind of man to lead a drunken lynch mob, especially if it outnumbered possible resistance by fifty to one. But no; he “is a man of about 60 and is much like Homer Cummings: calm, dispassionate, intellectual, and able and wise. He conducted the treason trial in a manner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer.” (We're willing to bet Davies thought Prosecutor Katzman did a superb job against Sacco and Vanzetti.)

Or Molotov. “An exceptional man with great mental capacity and wisdom.” Molotov must have been extremely fond of Davies and decided to reveal his great mental capacity and wisdom at a private showing, for nobody else in the world ever noticed it. Walter Duranty, for example, in his latest book on Russia, admits that Lenin was flabbergasted at Stalin's proposal to add Molotov to the Central Committee and said: “If you want my opinion, the best filing-clerk in Moscow.” Duranty, more delicate than Lenin, says Molotov “never was a genius, but can always be relied on”—which is, God knows, not less than true. Anyone familiar with the personnel of the Bolshevik Party knows that Molotov was known for years to every one of his associates by no other name than “Lead-Bottom,” only it sounded and was a lot more salty in the original Russian and was meant to describe his intellectual, not his physical, characteristics. But Davies, with uncanny insight, finds him exceptional, and of great mental capacity and wisdom!

Or Voroshilov. He impressed me immensely . . . has great dignity and a military personality that is most effective. Moreover, I think he is a man of intellectual power that grasps the elementals of a situation that sweeps the non-essentials aside.” Tukhachevsky, on the other hand, “did not impress me very much”! Tukhachevsky, to whose brilliant abilities at the age of 26 in the Russo-Polish war even Pilsudski paid tribute, who rose steadily in rank out of sheer ability, who was the father of the motorization and mechanization of the Red Army, who was universally regarded as a strategist of high caliber, who had the respect of virtually the entire officers corps—didn't

impress Davies much; after all, Tukhachevsky turned out to be a traitor, or so Voroshilov said. But Voroshilov, notoriously mediocre, enjoying no prestige whatsoever among the qualified officers of the Army, pretty much a time-serving hack of Stalin's who had to be junked in the Finnish war and had to be junked as soon as the Hitler drive got under way, who never uttered an idea of his own and couldn't repeat someone else's coherently—*he* impresses Davies a lot—no, immensely!—and, one-two-three, reveals the most impressive and sweeping virtues. After all, he too is a war ally, and who among our allies has yet failed to show "intellectual power that grasps the elementals of a situation that sweeps the non-essentials aside"?

THE NEW STALIN

As for Stalin, the biggest misconceptions of all exist about him. "If you can picture a personality that is exactly opposite to what the most rabid anti-Stalinist anywhere could conceive," Davies writes his daughter after his first meeting with The Presence, "then you might picture this man." The slush gets so thick you can make balls out of it. "His brown eye is exceedingly kindly and gentle. A child would like to sit in his lap and a dog would sidle up to him. . . . He has a sly humor. He has a very great mentality." And again: "I was honored by meeting the man who had been built for the practical benefit of common men. . . . He gave me the impression of being sincerely modest." What a stomach Mr. Davies' pen must have! What a stomach Davies must expect his reader to have!

Then comes religion. Considering what Davies has to work with, he makes the bravest possible case. Yaroslavsky's indecent buffoonery, which passes under Stalinism for the socialistic or scientific struggle against superstition, goes unmentioned, of course. All Davies can squeeze out of Yaroslavsky's obscene posturings is that his "Militant Atheists" have lost half their members in four years. Then there's the fact that Stalin's wife is buried in hallowed ground, in the Monastery of the New Virgins; whatever can be made out of that is made. Then Davies intervened for a Catholic priest in Moscow and he reports that he got a break from the Kremlin authorities. Then there's the story of the question put to Kalinin about the numerous icons on the wall of his mother's house: "Kalinin replied that he didn't think they did him any harm . . . and he didn't 'mind' them. This indicates that Soviet official anti-religious sentiment may be only 'skin-deep.' I saw several indications of this character. It is pretty hard to kill the faith which came at the mother's knee." It isn't much. He might have made out a far better case for religion in Russia if he had gone into the details of the compulsory worship of Stalin as the official state creed and church of the bureaucracy.

MUCH ADO ON RELIGION

On Russia and Germany, Davies is not so much learned as enthusiastic. To impose the Christian religion upon Nazism would be impossible. They are utterly antithetical. That is the difference—"the communistic Soviet state could function with the Christian religion in its basic purpose to serve the brotherhood of man. It would be impossible for the Nazi state to do so." If Davies means by "communistic Soviet state" the reactionary society of Stalinism, he's talking so much flub-dub. As ultra-totalitarian régimes, neither Hitler's state nor Stalin's can tolerate the potential rivalry or claims for temporal recognition of any organized religious

institution, or risk for long their existence as possible hearths of social opposition. At the same time, both régimes, by fostering poverty and misery for the masses, feed the streams that make for the resurgence of priestcraft, superstition, ultra-mundane consolations. A society of true socialist abundance and freedom will not think of suppressing the right to religious liberty; and at the same time it will remove the whole social basis and intellectual atmosphere which make possible—inevitable—the flowering of organized superstition and institutional mumbo-jumbo. But Mr. Davies made a brave effort, and perhaps he should not be begrudged the very, very few fish he will hook with his apologetics on this point.

Finally, there is the war itself, and the rôle of Stalin in it. Mr. Davies skips over the fragile subject of the Hitler-Stalin pact with a gracefulness and lightness of touch that belie his age, humming something in an undertone so that you have to strain yourself to hear what he is saying. It seems that the Stalinist final explanation of the Pact was substantially right, after all. It was just Stalin's astute way of working to crush Hitler. Fact is, he was preparing against him all the while; his whole policy was the "collective security" bloc with England and France against Germany. But Chamberlain and Bonnet sabotaged the bloc; tried to play Hitler off against Russia (this part is true enough, of course); and finally drove Stalin into the alliance with Hitler.

However that may be, it is all water over the dam now and the important point is that we're allies in the common struggle for democracy. Russia under Stalin is an invaluable partner in the fight: tremendous industrial reserves and capacity; tremendous physical reserves for an army; and no threat of communism emanating from Moscow. It is we who must be careful, emphasizes Mr. Davies, and conduct ourselves in such a way that we don't force Stalin back into Hitler's arms.

Preposterous as Mr. Davies' warning may have sounded five years ago, it is serious today. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that right now at least the life of Anglo-American imperialism, in any case the extent of its lease on life, depends to a tremendous extent on the war of its Kremlin ally. Of all times, this is not the time to offend the Stalinist bureaucracy; on the contrary, it is its favor that must be courted. Lest this be considered overdrawn, it is only necessary to picture the consternation in the camp of Roosevelt and Churchill—and for good cause—if Stalin should suddenly announce a new change of front.

TWO CONTRADICTIONS AND TWO QUESTIONS

Mr. Davies' book thus performs a double task: the gratification of the insatiable vanity of the Kremlin autocracy, on the one hand, and more importantly, the justification, in the eyes of the Doubting Thomases, of Roosevelt's alliance with that autocracy in the war. As we said at the outset, it is no small task, and the 646 pages occupied by the writings of Mr. Davies are not too many when the difficulty of the job is understood. Yet, in all these pages, we miss one point: there isn't even a hint that such a point might legitimately exist and require treatment. Yet, while it remains untreated by Davies, it nevertheless does exist. Namely:

If, through these confidential reports and letters to the State Department from the special ambassador to Moscow, people like Hull and Welles and Roosevelt (and surely also their more intimate colleagues) were informed of all the illuminating truths now publicly divulged by Davies, why didn't they act throughout the first period of the war in accordance

with this information? Were they too stupid to understand, or was it a case of their attaching no weight to the views of the President's ambassador?

For example: if they were so reliably informed (we are assuming that all of Mr. Davies' dispatches did arrive . . .) about the truth concerning the Moscow trials, is it conceivable that they would allow the vast majority of America's newspapers to persist in their error of condemning the Stalin régime? More important because more recent: if they were so reliably informed of the truth concerning the Hitler-Stalin past, and of the invasions of the Baltic and Balkan countries and of Finland, and of the invincibility of the Red Army and the inexhaustibility of Russian production, why, during that whole period, did Roosevelt and Hull, and those who speak like them and for them, denounce the Stalin régime, denounce its actions, its strategy, its tactics, its plans, its explanations, its apologies and everything connected with it? How explain

their hostile, contemptuous attitude, in such sharp contrast to the attitude expressed in the reports and communications of the man Roosevelt described as exercising "a happy faculty in evaluating events at hand and determining with singular accuracy their probable effect on future developments"?

In view of the position taken by the "Statesmen of the Republic," of what they said and did, is it permissible to conclude that Mr. Davies' reports and opinions, so sensationally presented to the public today, so ardently praised on all hands, were not taken seriously by the very persons for whom they were written? And further, that when the unexpected did happen, when Hitler broke the alliance and Stalin and Roosevelt and Churchill somewhat bewilderedly found themselves in partnership, that Mr. Davies was commissioned to mix together everything he could lay hands on in order to make the unlooked-for union with Stalin appear more palatable in the eyes of Roosevelt's not entirely reliable supporters?

MAX SHACHTMAN.

The Role of Labor in the War

In the epoch of the ascendancy of American capitalism and the concomitant growth of large-scale industry, the development of the labor movement was marked by a stormy and turbulent character. The Pullman strike, Homestead and Haymarket are but a few of the names that hold a special place of honor in the great tradition of the American labor movement. The First World Imperialist War did not retard this development. From the timberlands of the Northwest to the clothing factories of the East, labor continued its battle during the war. And the post-war period was even more openly a period of great clashes between capital and labor. The Seattle general strike, the 1919 steel strike, and the miners' walkout are three of the highpoints of this stage.

Only for the brief years from 1925 to 1929 did there emerge a relatively "stable" labor movement, the American Federation of Labor, whose varying fortunes from 1881 never before took such a turn for the worse that its very existence was jeopardized. For the Federation, "the aristocracy of labor," had always managed to keep its place with the bosses as a bulwark against industrial unionism. It was precisely in the 1925-29 period, too, that tons of literature was published proving that the American way of life was permanent and that such ideas as industrial unionism to protect the interests of the millions of mass production workers was a radical utopian dream.

The crash of 1929 destroyed in one fell swoop the vast array of imposing notions about the American way of life. It created the objective basis for a mass movement of the industrial workers, those teeming millions who suffered most keenly from the economic collapse. In the breadlines, unemployed demonstrations, eviction battles and sporadic strike struggles, the subjective basis for the CIO found its roots. The San Francisco general strike in 1934, the Toledo Auto-Lite struggle, the Minneapolis teamsters' fight, were preludes, dress rehearsals in a sense, for the coming struggles of the CIO. These battles revealed that the stormy and turbulent characteristics of the early American labor movement were not something due only to historical conditions of another day. The militancy of the American worker was an integral part of his life, his way, irrespective of the epoch of his existence.

The struggle to establish permanently an industrial union movement in America was the crowning achievement of labor. The story of the CIO is the most brilliant chapter in the history of the labor movement. The sit-down strike wave of 1936-37 assumed nation-wide proportions and built the CIO. Even the ghastly Little Steel strike defeat could not shake its foundations. And in the face of the coming war, and the growth of reaction, the CIO marched forward to greater struggles and victories. Little Steel was fought over again. This time the CIO triumphed. Henry Ford, symbol of open shopism, tumbled from his throne and the CIO obtained a closed shop agreement. And just before the declaration of war, the powerful United Mine Workers of America, long the backbone of the CIO, stood off a combined challenge of the Roosevelt Administration and the steel trust over the issue of the union shop in the captive mines.

THE VICTIM OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM

At long last industrial unionism, an indispensable need for the mass production workers, was established permanently in the nation which prided itself on its observance of the "principle of the open shop." The Knights of Labor had come and gone in the latter part of the 19th century. The Industrial Workers of the World flashed across labor's horizon like a brilliant meteor, but it too failed in the attempt to organize the industrial workers. The CIO, however, accomplished the main objective.

For many capitalists, and not a few of their journalistic hacks, the CIO was destined historically to play the rôle of an IWW in the Second World Imperialist War. By favoring the AFL against the industrial workers, as was done in 1917-1918, it was hoped to weaken and divide the labor movement and tear asunder the CIO. However, the period of major concessions to organized labor is past. Favors on the grand scale to the AFL are not possible today, as they were in 1918. Besides, the CIO dominates the key war industries. Its power is too great for a head-on collision, as was possible with the IWW, which was isolated from the rest of labor by a virulent propaganda campaign and physical terror.

The CIO withstood even the calamity of bitter internal

dissension fomented primarily by the Stalinists in their pursuit of a "rule or ruin" policy. Its militancy and achievements have kept on the statute books the Wagner Act and other social legislation which compels the courts to treat labor with some degree of "respectability." And the AFL with its antiquated ideas of craft unionism which it tried to impose on the industrial workers in 1934-35 and 36, has lost face with the industrial toilers. The test of events, the verdict of history, stands behind the CIO.

POTENTIAL STRENGTH OF AMERICAN UNIONISM

Today the CIO, representing 5,000,000 organized industrial workers, is strongly entrenched. The transformation of American economy into a war economy creates the objective possibility of increasing the ranks of the CIO by millions more as government officials estimate that war production industry will employ between 15,000,000 and 20,000,000 workers. Combine this economic development with the fact that the CIO is already established in this field, and one can easily foresee an industrial union movement in America of truly staggering proportions! Naturally, the unfolding of this vista will not take a cut-and-dried character. There will be advances and retreats, marked as always by the violent characteristics previously described.

Since the AFL boasts of another 5,000,000 organized workers, and the railroad brotherhoods are measured by more than another million members, the combined strength of the American labor movement already surpasses any in the history of the labor movement. It is the specter of this combined strength which so badly frightened the Roosevelt régime and the Wall Street bosses when John L. Lewis recently proposed labor unity. This was openly admitted by all leading capitalist magazines and newspapers, as shown in the survey of the Twohey Associates, a sort of Gallup Poll in the publishing field.

Roosevelt's ability to block labor unity through his influence over the present CIO top leadership, and his supporters in the AFL executive council, is not of a lasting character. The six-man board he proposed and set up as a spurious substitute for a genuine unity of the two organizations is another of his notorious patchwork proposals which new events will split asunder. The advantages of labor unity are too great for any capitalist politician to block them permanently. When the Gallup Poll indicated recently that 71 per cent of the ranks of the AFL and the CIO were for labor unity, it was testimony that the workers realized the period of rivalry between the organizations was coming to an end. Industrial unionism was established, and this had been the basis for the split in the AFL. The attractive powers of one unified organization, its strength in the economic and political fields, were also foreseen by both the bosses and the workers. No doubt, the close call labor had on the Smith "slave labor" act, which passed the lower house of Congress, had its effect on the bureaucrats as well as the ranks.

In the recent conferences held in Washington, the day-to-day events have demonstrated likewise the advantages to labor of working as one unit. When the National Defense Mediation Board, now a defunct body, ruled against the United Mine Workers of America on the captive coal mine union shop issue, the real damage was caused by the fact that the AFL representatives had joined with industry and the government against the CIO. But when the two labor organizations made a bloc at the industry-labor conference held subsequently in Washington, the closed shop principle was not

sacrificed at the altar of the employers. At the present writing the labor movement has 26 cases before the War Labor Board, which is of course the old National Defense Mediation Board dressed up in a new title. Most of them involve the union or the closed shop. The decisions of the War Labor Board depend largely on how effectively the CIO and AFL work together and against industrial and government representatives on this board. Significantly, the CIO and the AFL representatives have agreed to hold a joint caucus and act as a fraction. This is another demonstration of how the vital needs of the labor movement are forcing a trend toward organizational unity, despite past and present differences. Incidentally, the AFL, which has the closed shop as a principle, can give the CIO the benefit of this one good tradition in the older organization. It should be remembered that the combination of industrial unionism and the closed shop afford the best basis for labor's struggle in the gigantic industries.

ROOSEVELT AND THE VOICE OF "MA" PERKINS

The unprincipled character of the American labor bureaucracy is demonstrated by its actions of joining without any serious questions or doubts, boards like the War Labor Board, or the new Roosevelt labor board. The bitter experience of the CIO on the National Defense Mediation Board apparently is a closed chapter to Phillip Murray, CIO president, who placed himself along with Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, under the thumb of Roosevelt, alongside of the contemptible William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor. Labor unions are going to learn through their own experiences the need for demanding the resignation of their leaders from these kinds of set-ups, which are openly admitted to exist primarily for the purpose of tying the union movement to the imperialist war machine.

The Roosevelt Administration is placed in a great and insoluble dilemma by the development of the labor movement up to this war. Its first major task must be to get labor to pay the major burden of the war. In a country unorganized, or disorganized, labor cannot struggle effectively against paying the war cost. But in America, the price of smashing labor openly is the same which France paid. Not the least impressive lessons from recent European affairs was the vast difference between the conduct of the French working class, crushed and demoralized when its general strike was broken by Daladier. Through the use of the army just before the war began, and the conduct of the English workers in supporting largely the Churchill government through the deception of "having a say in the government" in the personages of Ernest Bevin and Major Clement Attlee. Roosevelt knows this, and that is why he doesn't permit the Southern poll-tax congressmen to run wild too often.

How to get the labor movement to give up its union standards—the very reason for its existence—is the question which Roosevelt must try to answer. For that is the only possible, although not very probable, solution to the dilemma. Secretary of Labor Perkins stated the problem succinctly enough in a speech on January 27th which appeared in the *New York Times*: "Men and women now on the job must keep every machine running, regardless of the sacrifice entailed." And after outlining a six-day week and other modifications of present union contracts, she added: "These standards must be relaxed if and when necessary for total war production." Her policy statement which was also approved by the War and Navy Departments, was amplified by Verne A. Zimmer, director of the Labor Department's Division of Labor Stand-

ards: "Existing state laws place a limitation upon hours of work, particularly for women and minors. State regulations also, in some jurisdictions, ban Sunday work, prohibit night work for women and minors, and require one day's rest in seven. When these or similar laws stand in the way of top production demanded by the war program, relaxation or easement should be effected promptly, as pointed out in the policy statement." There is Roosevelt's labor program in a nutshell.

DANGERS IN WAR LABOR BOARD

The War Labor Board and any other agencies set up by Roosevelt are the façades under which the union movement will be slowly squeezed out of its gains and standards. The rôle of the labor leaders on these boards will be to cover up their real meaning. However, the pressure of the men in the plants will not be lacking, and will manifest itself through the regular union channels. Of course, in the first period of the war, the natural tendency to resist the breakdown of union conditions will be partly sublimated in the spirit of self-sacrifice, another quality distinctly working class in character. But a few more reports like the Truman revelations, which show what fabulous profits the munitions makers and other Wall Streeters are gorging from the war effort, will arouse a different spirit among the workers.*

The battle of production will not merely take the form of fighting to increase the war materials necessary for the grandiose strategy of American imperialism. Nor will it reflect itself only in the lowering of present union standards. It will intensify the antagonisms within the factories because it means the introduction of new technological devices, which brings technological unemployment, and, above all, the speed-up of the men at the machines. It should not be forgotten that the burning issue of the General Motors sit-down strike was the speed-up which reached a tempo a human could no longer stand.

All these conditions will react strongly on the leadership of the unions within the plants, the shop stewards. It is true that the labor bureaucrats have pledged their unions to a no-strike policy. However, if the labor leaders spend their energy in resisting the just demands of the ranks, it is probable—the Washington politicians expect it—the actions will take place anyhow. And the shop stewards, as in England, will become the more direct leaders of the unionists. This development has also the effect of making the union movement more democratic since the ranks participate as a whole in the shop in the determination of their immediate destinies.

To counteract this significant development, one can expect the "outside" union leadership, the international officers who find themselves further and further removed from the immediate vicinity of the ranks, to seek to retain their influence and control by obtaining increased participation of the organized labor movement in the war machine. Perhaps along the lines of the English experience. (How nice of the Labor Party representatives in Parliament, for example, to take the main responsibility and blame for the conscription of man power,

*The CIO *Economic Outlook*, in its yearly forecast, just published its conclusions for 1942. Besides an increase in unemployment by 2,500,000 due to war economy dislocations, thereby bringing the total unemployment figure to 7,500,000, the CIO report contrasts the trend for a reduction in the real wages of employed labor, to the soaring profits of industry. The CIO report emphasizes that all efforts to increase war production will intensify these glaring contradictions. Here, as in the CIO upsurges in 1936-37 and 1939-40, are the objective economic conditions which are the basic cause of turbulent "labor relations." And while "priorities unemployment is fundamentally a temporary phenomenon," as explained in the last issue of *The New Internationalist* by James M. Fenwick, the scars of this experience will remain. The present crisis in the auto industry is a case in point.

through Ernest Bevin, the minister of supply. How nice of it to save Churchill the political embarrassment, and a major political crisis, over the issue of conscription of wealth, by taking the matter up first in the Labor Party caucus, and then rejecting it, after the Tory pleas of Bevin and Attlee. So the issue failed to arise in Parliament.) *Et tu, Murray!*

LABOR'S FUTURE DEPENDS UPON ITS STRUGGLE

The grand sweep of world and national events which are hitting labor with such a powerful impact, the perspectives outlined herein, indicate that the course of labor will continue along its classic lines: storm and strife. But the inability of capitalism to offer major concessions will tend to give purely economic struggle of the working class less results. Economic struggles, that is, strikes, will continue and sometimes reach unabated fury. But the problems of today demand further and more general solutions. The problem of cost of living, for example, of the coming rations, is one which strikes alone cannot settle. Action on the legislative front becomes more imperative. The CIO has already gone in for more "legislative and balloting" action, as an organized body, than any other labor movement of the past. The political education, therefore, will continue. And in the objective situation arising, there will also arise even more sharply the need for independent political action.

Labor's perspective for this war is only "blood, sweat, tears and toil" insofar as the Roosevelt Administration has plans for it. But the economic conditions, the class interests, the rich traditions, the glorious opportunities for expansion, and the growing political consciousness of the American workers, indicate that labor has for itself, in a groping, unclear fashion at present, to be sure, a different perspective. For the American labor movement is now the mightiest in the world. It hasn't gone through the terrible defeats and demoralization of the European class. It is fresh, growing, militant and unafraid, as its history shows.

Labor has come of age in America.

JACK WILSON.

HOW THE ALLIES ARMED JAPAN

RAW MATERIALS — METALS AND ORES — MANUFACTURED GOODS.

- (1) From the Allies (United States, British Empire, Dutch East Indies, Philippine Island, Latin America) there came: 75.5 per cent in 1939, 76.2 per cent in 1940.
- (2) From the United States *alone* there came 34.3 per cent in 1939; the percentage for 1940 is not available.
 - (a) Britain and America supplied 70 per cent of raw cotton.
 - (b) British Empire supplied 80 per cent of wool imports.
 - (c) Britain and America supplied 98 per cent of Japan's scrap iron, copper, lead, aluminum.
 - (d) America and the Dutch East Indies supplied *all* of Japan's petroleum and oil imports.
 - (e) Britain and America supplied 75 per cent of machine tools.
 - (f) Britain and America supplied 80 per cent of automotive and aircraft products.
 - (g) Britain and America supplied over 50 per cent of iron and steel semi-manufactures.
 - (h) British colonies supplied 75 per cent of ores, tin and pig iron.

What Is Imperialism? — II

[Continued from Last Issue]

Modern capitalist expansion policy [arises] as the heir of old-time liberalism [says Otto Bauer very correctly.] Wherever British capital seeks export outlets or investment spheres, it clashes with the competition of the other capitalist states. Thus England must look for other paths today, just as every other state must in order to attain the old aim... Old-line British free trade was *cosmopolitan*: it wanted to tear down tariff barriers, weld the entire world into a single economic entity. Modern imperialism is different. The aim here is not to create a unified economic entity out of all the countries, but to build a tariff barrier around one's own economic domain; to close up the less developed countries and to secure them as export markets and investment spheres for the capitalists of other countries. This does not make for dreams of peace, but for war preparations. (Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, Vienna, 1907, pp. 472 ff.)

The great British colonies with white populations like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, are independent states. They wall themselves in against the mother country with protective tariffs to foster their own young industries. Politically and economically they become constantly more divorced from the mother country. Is the day still distant when they will break away entirely from it and bring about the decomposition of the British Empire? The feeling of national solidarity is too weak to hold them tied down to the United Kingdom; the mother country and the colonies must be knit together more closely with bonds of mutual interest, if the British Empire is not to fall apart. The most favorable opportunity for such a course is England's surrender of the superannuated free trade policy. The mother country could then gird itself with a tariff barrier, place a lower tariff on the agricultural products of the colonies than on the competing goods of other countries and in turn be compensated with a preferential tariff by the colonies. (*L. C.*, p. 492.)

Thus capitalism regards free trade as superfluous and even harmful, even in the classic country of free trade. Protective tariffs impede the productive forces? What is it? "It [capitalism] seeks to supersede the stifling of the productive forces which follows from the contraction of the economic terrain, not by a transition to free trade but by an expansion of its own economic domains and by an artificially stimulated exportation of capital." (Hilferding, *Finanzkapital*, p. 394.)

The exportation of capital plays a tremendous rôle in all of modern socio-economic life. The latest form of imperialism is characterized, not by the export of commodities, but of capital.

Hilferding defines "capital export" as follows:

By capital export, we understand the exportation of value which is designed to produce surplus value abroad. In this process it is essential that the surplus value remain at the disposal of domestic capitalism. For instance, when a German capitalist emigrates to Canada with his capital, produces there and fails to return to his native country, that signifies a loss for German capitalism. That is not exportation of capital but transportation of capital, denationalization of capital. (*Ibid.*, p. 395.)

THE PHENOMENON OF CAPITAL EXPORT

Capital exports are taking on ever greater proportions. Countries rich in capital export it not only to colonies, in the narrow sense of the word, but also to politically independent and autonomous countries. Thus, Russia exports its capital not only to its colonies, but also, for example, to the United States of America. "It is estimated," says Sartorius in his book, *Das Volkswirtschaftliche System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande*,* "that England derives a billion marks [annually] from its investments in the United States in capital profits and in-

*By A. Sartorius Freiherr von Walterhausen, Berlin, 1907, Georg Reimer, publisher. The author of this work is conservative, imperialist and hates socialism. But his work is of great scientific value. Hilferding's *Finanzkapital* also owes a great deal to him.

terest." France exports its capital not only to its colonies but also to Russia, Spain, etc.

The struggle for capital investment spheres, i.e., for territory designed for the exportation of capital, plays a tremendous rôle in modern economic and political life. Which country will build the railroads, obtain the concessions in the colonies and in the independent countries that require imported capital?—that is the most important question in determining the foreign policy of the capitalist governments, in provoking wars, etc.

The country richest in capital, England, dominates the whole world today, although it has already lost its *industrial* hegemony. "England is the land of the coupon-clippers," says Sartorius. Schulze-Gaevernitz, in his book, *Der Britische Imperialismus*, comes to the conclusion that at the beginning of the twentieth century there were exactly one million coupon-clippers in England (p. 323). If their families are to be included in this calculation, they would constitute 10 to 11 per cent of the population. This tremendous wealth of capital in England leaves its mark upon the entire life of the country, determines its fate and the policy of all parties and classes in the country. There is a grain of truth in what Sartorius says: "The United Kingdom never had any sort of social democracy of any significance. The tremendous wealth accumulated in England throughout the last hundred years or so has served, even though industry itself has retrogressed, as a protector of the class of skilled workers." And he quotes Schulze-Gaevernitz approvingly: "The skilled and highly paid working class of the great British industries has realized today that the high standard of living it has achieved with so much hardship stands and falls with England's political power." (Sartorius, *l.c.*, pp. 387-389.)

Herein, it may be said, lies the entire philosophy of present-day social chauvinism: the workers of each "fatherland" are personally interested in the power of their native imperialism. . . .

Sartorius is wrong in his assumption that the social democracy is the party of the skilled, highly paid workers. We are *not* the party of the labor aristocracy, we are the party of the *working class*, Mr. Sartorius! But Sartorius has correctly observed the fact that, aside from all the other powers within its province, the imperialist bourgeoisie, with its wealth of capital, also has at its disposal the means of bribing considerable strata of the labor aristocracy and of demoralizing them and thus of undermining the work of the social democracy.

However, this is only incidental. At present it is important merely to point out the tremendous rôle that capital exports play in modern imperialism. Competition for the newly opened investment spheres brings with it new contradictions and conflicts between the capitalist states themselves. On the other hand, the points of friction between the countries acting as *objects* for the exportation of capital, and the ruling classes of the countries *importing* this capital, are constantly growing. The ruling classes strive to subject to themselves as completely as possible the national territories into which they import their capital. The latter, on the other hand, try as much as possible to secure for themselves independence of the countries which bring their capital to them. "This movement for independence threatens European capitalism precisely in its most valuable and most promising fields of exploitation. It [European capitalism] becomes constantly more

constrained to maintain its domination only by means of a persistent increase in its instruments of power."

That accounts for the insanely rapid growth of militarism, the persistent demand of all capitalists interested in foreign countries for a strong state power which will be able to defend their interests with the mailed fist at all times and everywhere, even in the most remote corners of the globe. Export capital naturally feels most secure when the state power of its "fatherland" subjugates some new territory to itself ("annexes" it, "leases" it or a hundred years, etc.) Then its interests are best assured; it is protected against the invasion of rivaling export capital; it enjoys a privileged situation; the state with its armies provides it with a guarantee for its invested moneys, profits, etc.

Thus export capital contributed to the strengthening of imperialist policy, thus it nurtures and develops modern imperialism. (See Hilferding, *Finanzkapital*, p. 433.)

THE STRUGGLE FOR INVESTMENTS

At the moment, the industrially most progressive countries—Germany and the United States—are characterized by a strong tendency toward the exportation of *industrial capital*. Here industrial development—in its technical as well as its organizational phases—has taken on new forms. In this connection, England and Belgium stand in second place. The rest of the countries, developing along old capitalist lines, participate in the exportation of capital more in the form of loan capital than by the construction of factories, etc. In the field of loan capital exports France occupies one of the front ranks. French loans to Russia alone—according to figures given by Sartorius—amount to nine billion marks in 1906. In 1914 they jumped from 14 to 18 billion. The very same countries may at the same time import as well as export capital. The United States, for instance, exports *industrial capital* on a large scale to South America and at the same time imports loan capital necessary for their own industries from England, Holland, etc., in the form of bonds and other obligations. (*Finanzkapital*, p. 439.) And even a country like Russia, which is in constant need of capital flowing in from other countries, itself exports—even though comparatively little—capital to the Balkans, etc.

Competition for investment spheres among the various cliques controlling finance capital has often faced Europe with the possibility of a world war. It is sufficient to recall Morocco. How many high-sounding "patriotic" words were uttered in Germany regarding France's and England's unwillingness to take into account the interests of the German "fatherland"! In reality, however, it was only a question—aside from the downright robbery perpetrated on one or another piece of African territory—of German capital desiring its share of concessions for the construction of railroads, harbors, telegraph lines, public works, etc. In the Turkish as well as in the Moroccan conflicts between Germany and France the main issue was the competition between the Banque Française and the Deutsche Bank, between Rouvier and Helfferich, between Schneider-Creuzot and Krupp. In a word, between the sharks of finance capital or, as the bourgeoisie likes to call them, between the "money marshals" of French and German capitalism. At the Algeiras peace conference these two sides haggled like petty shopkeepers until they had divided among themselves the various concessions and other advantages. The German "patriots" could not be quieted down before a certain share in the loans had been assured the German capital-

ists.* Otherwise, the German government—the loyal servant of the German imperialists—threatened France with war.

Thus finance capital becomes the agent of the idea of consolidating the power of the state by all possible means. Thus finance capital becomes the chief motive force of militarism. The antagonism between the great imperialist powers—in the first place, between England and Germany—has for some time been assuming the sharpest forms. That this antagonism had to lead to a violent solution, that is, that it had to result in a war—that was predicted by the Marxists many years before the outbreak of the war in 1914.

This violent solution would have intervened a long time ago [writes Hilferding in his *Finanzkapital*, pp. 450 f.] if contrary causes had not counteracted it. For capital exportation in itself creates tendencies which resist such a violent solution. Uneven industrial development creates a certain differentiation in the forms of capital exports.... This brings about circumstances in which, for example, French, Dutch, but in a great measure also, British capital becomes loan capital allocated to industries under German or American management. Thus tendencies arise toward a solidarity of international capitalist interests. French capital, as loan capital, becomes interested in the advances of German industries in South America, etc.

For the progress of the industries, for the security of the moneys invested in other countries, peace is more desirable to finance capital than war.

INCOMPATIBILITY OF PEACE AND IMPERIALISM

Such a tendency—Hilferding calls it the tendency toward a solidarity of international capitalist interests—is theoretically possible, and up to a certain degree it does not exist. Many writers tend to overestimate it, however, and thus are led to a denial of the imperialist character of the last war. Finance capital has nothing to do with this war, contended the well known Russian historian, M. N. Pokrovsky, for instance. For—finance capital is interested in peace: in war time, foreign capital is simply confiscated, etc.**

This point of view is completely wrong. A weak tendency toward "solidarity" exists, to be sure. But, on the other hand, there is also, as we have seen, a strongly developed tendency the contrary direction. The decision as to which of these tendencies is to predominate—as Hilferding correctly says—differs in concrete instances and depends, above all, upon the prospects for profit opened up by a recourse to arms in this struggle.

In the first place, the capital investments confiscated by the belligerent governments in the course of the last war tend, in part, to strike a balance. Secondly, these capital investments are also balanced by the profits which the kings of heavy industry have pocketed already during the war, and only thanks to the war. Thirdly, these capital investments do not count much in comparison to the advantages to be derived by the imperialists of England, let us say, or of Germany, or of France, in case of a victory won by their "fatherland" over their powerful competitors.

Aside from that, we must also keep in mind the following: The victors will undoubtedly demand the *release* of all confiscated capital as one of the conditions for peace, as well as the *recognition* of the claims which guarantees the capitalists of the victorious coalition the security of the capital they have exported to the vanquished countries. At the outbreak of the

*See the brief but very lively account of these events in the work of the Frenchman, Delaisi, *La Guerre Qui Vient*.

**Bebel, by the way, once expressed the same view when he made the following remark at the Jena Congress (1911): "I say openly: the greatest guarantee for world peace may lie in this international export of capital." (*Minutes of the Jena Congress*, p. 845.)

war both parties hope to emerge as victors from the struggle. Naturally, that implies a certain amount of risk to which the imperialist cliques have to reconcile themselves.

As a general rule, we can maintain that finance capital impels the governments of the various countries to constantly increased armaments, both on land and on sea; that imperialism breeds an entire era of wars, that imperialism makes the morrow appear uncertain, destroys every equilibrium and revolutionizes conditions in Europe, Asia and America with tremendous force.

Kautsky correctly described the facts when he said that industrial capital, the class of industrial entrepreneurs, displays at first entirely different tendencies from those of commercial and finance capital. Industrial capital tends toward peace, toward the limitation of absolute state powers by means of parliamentary and democratic institutions; it tends toward thrift in the state budget and therefore turns against tariffs imposed upon necessary supplies and raw materials. It often looks upon even industrial tariffs as an outgrowth of industrial backwardness which must of necessity disappear with the growth of economic progress.

THE DOMINATION OF FINANCE CAPITAL

Finance capital, on the other hand, and the class of the landed gentry, intercedes for absolute state power, for the execution of its demands in the field of internal as well as external policy by even the most violent means. Finance capital has a particular interest precisely in the increase of state expenditures and state debts. It courts the favor of the landed gentry and does not object to their being pampered with agrarian tariffs.

Economic development has brought *money capital* to power *much more rapidly* than industrial capital. In the foregoing century industrial capital had the power in its hand while the money capitalists were relegated to the background. But this was only a transitional stage. In the end, another form of capital gained the upper hand. The form of the *stock companies*—which had much earlier played a great rôle for commercial and money capital—entrenched itself in the field of industrial capital.

By this means, the greatest and strongest sections of industrial capital have been tied up with money capital. The trusts, as well as the centralization of the great banks, are bringing this process to its conclusion.

The political tendencies of finance capital have today become the general tendencies of the economically dominant classes in the advanced capitalist countries.

And since these political tendencies of finance capital constantly lead to wars, the imperialist war policy leaves its imprint upon the entire activity of the present "advanced" governments, which are merely the office boys of capitalism.

The appetite of the financial clique is insatiable. The more they own, the more they want to grab; the more daring their game. In its hunt for export and raw material markets, for investment spheres, for "spheres of influence," for colonies and concessions, for all the possible governmental and social privileges which the ruling classes associate with this sort of economic policy, capitalism has led to the division of almost the entire world among a few "world powers" and to a bloody struggle among the latter for the best part of the booty. Thus has arisen the struggle for world domination, the tendency of the great capitalist states toward the creation of *world empires*; thus the imperialist struggle, into which Japan

and the United States of America are being drawn ever more inextricably in Europe's wake.

That classic representative of classic British imperialism, Joseph Chamberlain, closed one of his famous speeches glorifying imperialism (in Johannesburg, January 17, 1903), with the following words:

"The time of small kingdoms and of petty competition is past. *The future belongs to the great states.*" Chamberlain did not wind up as he should have: to the *world empires*.

Socialists also do not advocate small states. All other conditions being equal, they stand for great centralized states, but states which are socialist republics, which recognize the right of political self-determination for all nations, which rest upon the principle of complete national equality. The imperialists of all countries, on the other hand, need "great powers" as instruments in the hands of the bourgeoisie of the ruling nation for the exploitation of many millions of people who do not belong to the ruling nation, who inhabit colonies or have the misfortune of living in countries grown dependent upon the power-thirsty cliques of European capitalism.

The international dictators of finance capital in Europe today constitute a handful of perhaps a few hundred persons. The heads of the great banks, the stock exchange kings, the directors of the most important trusts and cartels, the steel and iron kings, the chairmen of the most important railroad companies and the other billionaires who actually decide about war and peace in Europe today could almost all be mentioned by name, so small is this clique numerically.

FINANCE CAPITAL IN THE CONCRETE

In 1910, Francis Delaisi made such an attempt in so far as France is concerned, in his book *La Démocratie et les Financiers*. On fifteen pages of his book he presented a fairly comprehensive list of the names of the biggest representatives of French finance capital. He drew up a number of tables and presented them in such order that it is possible to glean from them at a moment's notice just how many banks, metallurgical enterprises, railroad companies, etc., these gentry control. Gathering up all his data we get the following picture: All in all, 53 names are mentioned, among them Rothschild, Schneider, Rostand, the Barons Rostand Duval, the Marquis de Froudeville, Prince de Comoudeau, Adam, Einard, René Brice, Chubonneau, etc. These gentlemen control 108 French, colonial and foreign (Turkish, Dutch, etc.) banking establishments. Among them are the following great banks: Crédit Lyonnais, Société Generale, Banque Ottomane, Union Parisienne, Banque de France, Comptoir d'Escompte, Banque Russo-Chinoise, Banque d'Indo-Chine, Crédit Industriel, Banque Transatlantique, Banque Tunisie, etc. Furthermore, these gentlemen dominate 105 metallurgical establishments and mining enterprises in France and her colonies, French enterprises in Russia, etc. Among them, Creuzot, the gold-mining companies in South Africa, Carmaux, the establishments in the Donetz Basin in Russia, etc. Furthermore, this handful of capitalist magnates exercises its dictatorship over 101 railroad and transportation companies and, finally, they have in their hands the destinies of 117 other enterprises and monopolies, among them the Suez Canal stock company, many important enterprises in the colonies, insurance companies, gas works, etc. (Francis Delaisi, *La Démocratie et les Financiers*, Paris, 1910, pp. 44, 59.)

It is thus evident that from 50 to 60 finance capitalists in France rule over some 108 banks, 195 big business concerns in heavy industry, 101 railroad companies and 117 other important industrial and financial enterprises—altogether 431 enter-

prises—each of which has assets amounting to hundreds of millions [of francs].

This is finance capital incarnate!

The same picture may be observed in England and in Germany and—*mutatis mutandis*—even in Russia. Five hundred big bankers hold the whole world in the palm of their hands.

Here are the figures showing the power of finance capital in North America..

On the basis of the data furnished by the Bureau of Corporations, at the end of 1912, the following big banks and banking institutes existed in the United States:*

	Number of Directors' Posts	Number Occupying Posts	Total Capital in Millions
J. P. Morgan & Co.....	63	38	\$10,036
First National Bank of New York 89		48	11,393
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York 160		76	17,342
Bankers Trust Co. of New York 113		55	11,184
National City Bank of New York 86		47	13,205
Kuhn, Loeb & Co.....	15	12	3,011
National Bank of Commerce.....	149	82	13,165
Hanover National Bank	37	29	7,495
Chase National Bank of New York 67		48	11,527
Astor Trust Co.....	74	47	12,408
Blair & Co. of New York.....	12	11	1,784
Speyer & Co.	10	10	2,443
Continental and Commercial National Bank of Chicago.....	49	27	6,969
First National Bank of Chicago ..	55	29	9,021
Illinois Trust & Savings Bank of Chicago	28	22	4,599
Kidder, Peabody & Co. of Boston ..	8	6	2,395
Lee, Higginson & Co. of Boston ...	11	3,199

Naturally, many figures appear twice in this table, for the entire capital of each firm is quoted. If we subtract the sums that are counted twice, we get (E. Philippovich) the following results: The owners of the firms named and their directors, altogether 180 persons, occupy the following jobs:

Three hundred and eighty-five directors' jobs in 41 banks and trusts with a total capital of 3,832 million dollars and 2,834 million dollars in deposits;

Fifty directors' jobs in 11 insurance companies which control over two to six billion dollars in assets;

One hundred and fifty-five directors' jobs in 31 railroad companies with a total capital of 12,193 million dollars and railroad yardage amounting to 271,120 kilometers;

Six directors' jobs in two special-train companies and four in a shipping company with a total capital of 245 million dollars and a yearly income of 87 million dollars;

Ninety-eight directors' jobs in 28 industrial and commercial concerns with a total capital of 3,583 million dollars and a gross income annually of 1,145 million dollars;

Forty-eight directors' jobs in 19 companies engaged in city services (water supply, electricity) with a total capital of 2,826 million dollars and a gross annual income of 428 million dollars.

Altogether, 180 bank owners and their directors occupy 746 posts in 134 different enterprises with a total capital of 25,325 million dollars. That amounts to half of the entire national wealth of America.

There they are, the dictators of finance capital in America! One to two hundred billionaires and their closest collaborators share control over 50 billion dollars and hold in their

hands the strings leading to the most important branches of industry!

This handful of finance-capitalist magnates dictates the fate of not only the wealthiest industrial country America, but through it, also the fate of the entire world. It suffices to mention the tremendous rôle American loans played in the ranks of the Triple Entente imperialists even before America's entry into the World War. It is sufficient to observe the rôle of the American billionaires since America's entry into the war.

They are the ones to whom all governments have subordinated themselves. They are the ones who decide today whether and when a world war is to begin which costs millions of human lives. The situation is the same in every imperialist country by and large. If, for instance, we wish to know why "noble" Italy entered the war on the side of the Triple Entente, it is only necessary to look into the list of the stockholders and directors of the Banca Commerciale to be convinced of the many names of French capitalists who figure in it; and it is merely necessary to get a closer view of the sums which bespeak the dependence of the Italian bourgeoisie upon British capital. Herein lies the real reason for Italy's joining England and France, not in the desire to liberate the "enslaved" brothers.

MODERN IMPERIALISM—A SUMMARY

We are now in a position to sum up what has already been said and to proceed to a definition of *what modern imperialism actually is*.

In doing this, we must not forget that there are various types of imperialism. British imperialism does not resemble German imperialism in every feature, Russian imperialism differs from German imperialism, etc. There is a European imperialism, an Asiatic imperialism and an American imperialism; there is a white imperialism and a yellow imperialism. Japanese imperialism doesn't resemble the French type; Russian imperialism is of quite a unique type, because it is a backward (it is not even possible any longer to say: an Asiatic) imperialism, developing on the basis of an extraordinary backwardness.

We must, however, emphasize what is most characteristic of modern imperialism. We must define more closely that imperialism which today lays down the law for our entire economic and political life, upon which rain and fair weather appear to depend, so to speak, and which determines the destinies of the world.

The most general formula on which Marxists have universally agreed to date, is the following: *Imperialism is the (economic, foreign and any other) policy of finance capital*. But this formula is inadequate, precisely because it is too general.

Kautsky has proposed the following definition: "Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists of the urge of every industrial capitalist nation to subjugate to itself and to annex a constantly greater slice of agrarian territory, regard of which nations inhabit that territory (*Neue Zeit, Vol. XXXII, Pt. 2, p. 909*; compare also *Nationalstaat, p. 15*, and earlier works of Kautsky.)

This definition is, however, altogether inadequate. Kautsky only sees *one part* of the phenomenon when he reduces the whole thing to "agrarian territory." Present-day expansion does not restrict itself to agrarian territory. Above all, however, Kautsky's definition is too academic, too anæmic. It does not contain the slightest indication that we have already reached the stage of the partition of the world among the

*Eugen von Philippovich, *Monopole und Monopolpolitik*, in Grunberg's *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, 1919, I, pp. 158 ff. Philippovich's work is based upon the following works: J. B. Clark, *The Problem of Monopoly*, New York, 1904; Rob. Liefman, *Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften*, 2nd ed., 1912, Jena; J. Slinger, *Das Land der Monopole, Amerika oder Deutschland?* 1913; Oswald Whitmann Knauth, *The Policy of the United States toward Industrial Monopoly*, New York, 1914.

capitalist brigands; one cannot detect in it any echo at all of those storms, those war-like convulsions and revolutions which the epoch of imperialism brings with it; it does not contain a word about the fact that imperialism is conducting its policy amidst circumstances in which the economic prerequisites for the realization of socialism have become matured in the greatest part of the advanced capitalist countries. His definition is innocuous and pallid, even though it does contain certain elements of the truth.*

Hilferding approaches the definition of imperialism more closely when he says:

Thus the policy of finance capital pursues three aims: first the creation of as great an economic territorial entity as possible; secondly, the exclusion of foreign competition from the territory by means of wall of protective tariffs and thirdly, its transformation into a field of exploitation for national monopolistic combines (Hilferding, *Finanzkapital*, p. 412.)

Hilferding is right when he speaks of "as large an economic entity as possible." This expression is a good one because it comprises direct political conquests (annexations, colonial brigandage) as well as economic subordination. Hilferding is also right when he brings to the foreground such characteristics as the tariff walls and the monopolistic combines (trusts and cartels). These are positively the characteristic features of imperialism.

But Hilferding's definition restricts itself to exclusively

*Cunow also criticizes this definition of Kautsky's. Not, however, from the standpoint of Marxism, but from the standpoint of social-chauvinism. Imperialism is an "historical" necessity. All that is real is rational. As imperialism is real, it is necessarily rational, progressive. Conclusion: the workers must support the imperialism of their fatherland.

economic concepts. It is lacking in very important—political and other—elements.

On the basis of the foregoing, we believe that a Marxist definition of modern imperialism may be expressed as follows (instead of the brief formula, we prefer to present a more thoroughgoing description of the concept.):

Modern imperialism is the social-economic policy of finance capital tending toward the creation of the most comprehensive economic territorial entities and world empires possible. It is characterized by the tendency to supplant free trade decisively with the system of protective tariffs and to subordinate economic life completely to the great monopolistic combines, such as the trusts, cartels, banking consortia, etc. Imperialism signifies the highest stage in the development of capitalism, in which not only commodity export but capital export as well occupies a place of quintessential importance. It stamps its imprint upon an epoch in which the world is partitioned among a few great capitalist powers and in which the struggle proceeds along the lines of a repartitioning of it and the partitioning of what still remains [to be partitioned], in which the economic prerequisites for the realization of socialism have matured in most of the advanced capitalist countries and in which the national state barriers impede the future development of the productive forces; in which the bourgeoisie seeks to obtain a postponement of the approaching collapse of capitalism by means of its colonial policy and by means of debilitating wars.

GREGORY ZINOVIEV.

Hartenstein, Switzerland, August 4, 1916.

The Dilemma of Partisan Review

One by one the war takes its political toll of the organizations and groups that were not prepared to meet it. First came the sensational case of the Lovestone group which voluntarily dissolved itself and went into the business of supporting imperialist war, man by man. It was followed by the "Stamm group," which managed to collect enough people to a meeting to vote its dissolution. This in turn was followed by the vote of the Industrial Union Party to give up organized existence. The *American Guardian*, which had followed a semi-Populist, semi-socialist-isolationist opposition to war, gave up the ghost. Then came the collapse of the opposition to the war, such as it was, of the Socialist Party. All these groups suffered to one extent or another from the lack of a firm base in Marxist principle, as elaborated by the Trotskyist movement. As the great war crisis grew in seriousness, they all melted away, without the government having to lift a finger to accomplish its end. Now comes the case of the *Partisan Review*, which is dealt with in the following article, and has its importance not by any means for itself but rather because it is a symptom of the times—of how some people react in these times.—Ed.

"All a poet can do today is warn. That is why the true poets must be faithful."

—Wilfred Owen.

In the four years of its existence, *Partisan Review* has served a unique function both in the revolutionary movement and the cultural world. Edited by a group of intellectuals who broke away from Stalinism because of their revulsion for its political and cultural prison life, *PR* was the only magazine in the country which attempted to relate Marxism to the cultural life of our time. In its introductory statement, *PR* declared its purpose to be that of an organ of ex-

pression for the revolutionary writers who grouped around it, announced its adherence to the basic political principles of revolutionary Marxism, while strictly affirming—the fingers of its editors were still burned from their Stalinist experiences—its intention to be "unequivocally independent" of any specific political organization. In conformity with its adoption of a general revolutionary Marxist position on political questions as well as its belief that "literature in our period should be free of all factional dependence," *PR* announced that it welcomed the work of any serious or accomplished writer, regardless of his political point of view, while retaining the right to hew to its own political and social course.

As such, *PR* performed a number of valuable services to both the revolutionary movement and American culture. It served as a center for those intellectuals who broke from Stalinism and were moving—temporarily, at least—toward a revolutionary point of view. It opened its pages to obscure young writers and its editors exhibited that catholicity of taste and sympathy for innovation and experimentation that is essential for a left wing literary journal. It succeeded in bringing to a considerable section of the American liberal and radical intelligentsia a portion of Marxist ideas (a rather small portion, it is true, and often not too accurate or accomplished—but a portion nonetheless). And not least important, it brought literature and aesthetics a bit closer to the politics of the revolutionary movement.

If *PR* was often hesitant in its approach, if much of its creative writing was unsatisfactory, if it raised more problems than it solved—this should by no means be held to its discredit.

In its initial period, at least, *PR* played a stimulating and unique rôle.

THE FOUNDING PROGRAM OF PARTISAN REVIEW

After its very first issue, it became clear that the kind of magazine *PR* was and desired to be could not possibly steer clear of political polemics and disputes. *PR* stepped on too many toes and touched too many sensitive issues. The Stalinists appointed their culture expert, V. R. Jerome, to smear *PR* with some of his most choice language. The bourgeois intellectuals looked at *PR* with some distrust and disdain, though many of the more able among them were convinced at least of its sincerity and therefore agreed to contribute creative or critical writing to it.

The reception given *PR* by the Trotskyist press was warm but critical. The *Socialist Appeal*, the then Trotskyist paper, welcomed *PR* as a sign of "a revolt against Stalinism among the intellectuals," but charged it with proposing "to remain independent, i.e., neutral and indifferent, not toward politics in general, but only toward revolutionary labor politics." Thereupon the *Appeal* stated that *PR* should decide which "among the tendencies struggling for supremacy within the ranks of the American working class most clearly and consistently fights for the ideas, interests and aims of socialism and most faithfully carries on the best traditions of Marxism? Which must be considered the vanguard of the revolutionary movement?"

Ironically enough, the one other journal which agreed with the *Appeal's* criticism was the genteel *Poetry Magazine*, which asked "whether a magazine professedly revolutionary in character can avoid having some definite political program . . ."

To these criticisms, *PR* editorially replied—and its words are of utmost importance for the theme we are to develop—"Our program is the program of Marxism, which in general terms means being for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalist society, for a workers' government, and for international socialism. In contemporary terms it implies the struggle against capitalism in all its modern guises and disguises, including bourgeois democracy, fascism, and reformism (social democracy, Stalinism.)" It can readily be seen, then, that despite its desire to be "free from all factional dependence," *PR* took a stand on a number of rather consequential political questions.

THE ROLE OF THE ARTIST

The issue in dispute between *PR* and the *Socialist Appeal* at that time is a very old one; it will crop up every time a similar situation arises. It would appear to this author that a sensible position would be somewhere in between the haughty "independence" which *PR* assumed and the ultimatic insistence of the *Appeal* writer. In a letter which the late John Wheelwright, a poet and himself a member of the Trotskyist organization, sent to the *Appeal*, he implied a position which appears to us the most valid under the circumstances. We would put it as follows: While art is clearly related to and, in some measure, dependent upon politics, it is necessary for the revolutionary artist to maintain complete artistic and intellectual freedom. Art, as Trotsky has stated, has laws of its own, and the discipline of a revolutionary party does not often function in harmony with those laws.

The writer or artist must necessarily take his stand with the revolutionary proletariat; both his social awareness and responsibilities as a human being and his special interest in

protecting the existence and promoting the growth of culture require him to do so. But it is only in an exceptional situation where this stand can best be expressed through adherence to the party. And in the case of a group of intellectuals who have taken a big step leftward, it is clearly wrong and tactless to demand of them that they immediately label "the vanguard of the revolutionary movement." It is far better to attempt to persuade the individual intellectuals concerned of the correctness of this "vanguard's" program, rather than insist on a statement of adherence. What ultimately determines the relations between a revolutionary movement and a journal such as *PR* is primarily the political development of the editors of this journal.

And such turned out to be the case. For a considerable period of time, *PR* moved leftward. It specialized in literary criticism which attempted to relate the political backslidings of formerly radical, Stalinist and bourgeois liberal writers with their æsthetic development, while at the same time refraining from automatic literary condemnations because of political disagreements.

As examples of this dominant preoccupation of the magazine in its initial period, we may give the analysis of Malraux's book on Spain, the various critiques of Thomas Mann from several conflicting points of view, etc. In addition, the main political editor of the magazine, Dwight MacDonald, published a series of essays of social criticism and politics in which he generally came back to the theme that true cultural growth required the victory of socialism. At that time, he had close organizational relations with the Trotskyist movement and guided *PR*, as best he could, in a general revolutionary direction.

THE WAR—AND A TURN

It is only after the outbreak of the war—approximately—that *PR* begins to stumble and equivocate. The literary section of the magazine plays an increasingly dominant rôle and the political section becomes subordinate. That difficult to define but very much present quality which can best be described as its "tone" becomes more timid. As MacDonald brings up the rear guard of the left intellectuals drawing away from revolutionary Marxism, some of whom retreat into the respectable folds of bourgeois liberalism, the magazine—to the degree that it notices politics at all—is concerned less and less with its former task of smiting those ex-radicals who jump onto the war bandwagon and more and more with MacDonald's personal "theoretical" predilections—his fatal desire to criticize what he has failed to study and understand sufficiently: Marxism, his view of the nature of German economy and his rather pretentious espousal of an ill-digested and poorly understood "Luxemburgism"—and this to the exclusion of the far more important social themes arising from the outbreak of the Second Imperialist World War!

What the editors of *PR* had lectured so many writers about had now become the case with themselves: the intellectual in modern society cannot stand still; either he moves forward to a consistent and clear socialist doctrine and stands on the side of the revolutionary proletariat, or he must necessarily regress, willingly or not, into one form or another of support of or, what amounts to the same, toleration of the status quo. Their failure, both as a group and as individuals, to move leftward resulted in an abrupt turn toward the right. This may be a somewhat crude statement of the situation, but it is completely accurate.

The first explicit indication of this rightward tendency

appeared in the November-December, 1941, issue, wherein one of its editors, Philip Rahv, violently attacked an article in the previous issue written by two other editors, Clement Greenberg and MacDonald. Rahv attacks, in a completely unbridled and cynical manner, their "Ten Propositions of the War" (which, by whatever circuitous routes, came to the conclusion that the present war is reactionary on both sides, deserves no political support from the workers and that the road for the liberation of humanity is socialism).

Were such a display of bad polemical taste to appear in a Marxist magazine, MacDonald would undoubtedly yell blue murder about the "bad tone" characteristic of the Marxists. But, as the old saying goes, in the house of the hangman . . .

Rahv attacks revolutionary policy in regard to the war; he also attacks the reformist policies of Laski and Williams and their American counterparts. He sees no solution at present (since there is no large revolutionary movement, therefore a revolutionary policy is at present illusory, he cogently argues) other than support (critical, to be sure) of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in the war.

PARTISAN REVIEW ADOPTS A NEW PROGRAM

It is in the next, and most recent, issue of *PR* that the trend toward surrender and compromise takes its full expression. We print below the entire statement of the *PR* editors on the entry of America into the war—rather brief for such a portentous occasion, even if the necessity for printing the insipid, gossipy purrings of Marianne Moore about the old *Dial* did crowd the editors . . .

The country is now actually at war. *Partisan Review*, while mainly a cultural magazine, has always been concerned with politics. A question, therefore, as to our future editorial policy naturally arises.

For some time, as recent issues of the magazine have made clear, the editors have disagreed on major political questions. The complexity of the world situation, indeed, is reflected in the fact that no two editors hold the same position on all major questions. The actual outbreak of hostilities has not altered this line-up. It is clear, therefore, that *Partisan Review* can have no editorial line on the war. Its editors will continue to express themselves on the issue as individuals.

We believe that a magazine like *Partisan Review* cannot undertake the kind of programmatic guidance one expects of a political party. Our main task now is to preserve cultural values against all types of pressure and coercion. Obviously we cannot even speak of the survival of democratic civilization apart from the survival of our entire cultural tradition. This includes the fullest freedom of expression on political matters. All of us can at least agree on this: that in times like these it is a necessity, not a luxury, for *Partisan Review* to continue to give space to radical—in the literal sense of "going to the roots"—analysis of social issues and the war. No intelligent decisions can be made without a full consideration of alternatives.

Even the casual reader, not acquainted with *PR* or its history, will see what a far cry this statement, in its flaccid and timid equivocations, is from the initial bold and challenging statement of position. We are convinced that this statement is not merely timid and equivocal, but also—and we choose our words advisedly—intellectually misleading and dishonest. It goes well beyond the bound of even a rotten compromise; it is the beginning of a surrender. Let us dissect it, almost sentence by sentence, to prove our charges.

1) "We believe that a magazine like *Partisan Review* cannot undertake to present the kind of programmatic guidance one expects of a political party."

This sentence we submit as Exhibit A to substantiate our charge of intellectual dishonesty. We are only too well aware of the attacks to which we lay ourselves open by such a charge: "You Trotskyists accuse everyone with whom you disagree of intellectual dishonesty." But Dwight MacDonald, we are certain, will understand fully why we say that such a sentence

is intellectually dishonest, why we say that it goes even beyond the needs of a rotten compromise with Rahv and the other pro-war editors.

Let me first illustrate from an article by MacDonald himself in the very same issue of *PR*. He reviews James Burnham's *Managerial Revolution* and comments on Burnham's complete abandonment of Marxism to the point where Burnham even "forgets" that Trotsky had a theory of the "permanent revolution." Burnham had written that the outbreak of the revolution in backward Russia was "contrary to the opinion of all socialist theoreticians prior to 1917" and that once the revolution had taken place in Russia "the leaders of the revolution itself" expected it to develop steadily toward socialism. MacDonald expresses amazement that a man as familiar with Leon Trotsky's works as Burnham is (or was) could possibly write such preposterous nonsense. And then he says: "*The most charitable explanation is that Burnham is suffering from . . . 'cultural amnesia' . . .*"

Exactly the phrase! And it is the most charitable explanation for MacDonald signing a statement which contains a sentence such as the one under examination—he, too, is suffering from "cultural amnesia." For MacDonald knows only too well that the need for a magazine such as *PR* to adopt a position on the war is not in any way connected with an expectation that it furnish "the kind of programmatic guidance one expects of a political party."

WHAT IS FUNDAMENTAL AND SUBORDINATE

If we were to insist that *PR* take a position, say, on the class character of the Russian state; if we were to insist that *PR* take a position on the Murray Industry Council Plan; if we were to insist that *PR* take a position on the rôle of Chinese colonial nationalism in the war; if we were to insist that *PR* take a position on any number of other strategical or tactical issues facing the revolutionary movement—then it would be true that we ask *PR* to give "the kind of programmatic guidance one expects of a political party." But nobody asks *PR* to do anything of the kind; we do not believe that anyone should.

But a position on the most fundamental and important fact of our times, a fact which is not without relation to the future of our cultural life and inheritance—that is a different matter. If not because of any political impulsions or responsibilities, then certainly from the point of view of an exclusively æsthetic and cultural preoccupation, *PR* is obligated to take an editorial position on the war.

In its very inception *PR* took a position on: 1) Marxism, 2) the revolutionary overthrow of capitalist society, 3) Stalinism, 4) social democracy and 5) capitalism in all its guises and disguises, including bourgeois "democracy" and fascism. Nor were these mere editorial generalizations which had no relation to the life of the magazine. On the contrary, they vitally affected and molded the character of the entire magazine; they gave the magazine its political and cultural "tone."

Now *PR* faces the greatest test of its existence; and not only does it fail to take a stand on the war—it even denies any obligation to do so! But it will not solve its problem so easily. *PR* will have to say something about the profound repercussions which the war will have—in fact, which it has so clearly had already—on precisely those cultural matters with which it mainly concerns itself. Will it merely be satisfied with campaigning for freedom of expression for everyone and then not attempt to probe deeper into the problems of the

war? Will it be satisfied to serve as a sort of cultural civil liberties magazine?

It is not, on this occasion at least, the ultimatic demands of some sectarian revolutionary group that insist on *PR*'s taking a stand on the war; it is the pressure of life itself. The war is one issue on which nobody can be neutral. Even, we venture to predict, the most esoteric and detached literary magazines—those that have never had the political pretensions of *PR*, nor plunged nearly so heavily into political issues as *PR* has done—will be forced to take some attitude toward the war.

2) "*The complexity of the world situation, indeed, is reflected in the fact that no two editors hold the same position on all major issues. The actual outbreak of hostilities has not altered this lineup.*"

Again, we reiterate: these sentences are deliberately misleading. MacDonald and Greenberg, at the very least, know better. And Rahv, from his point of view, knows it at least as well. For the statement here deliberately confuses, as in the previously quoted passage, the distinction on which the editors of *PR* so carefully insisted in their old polemic with the *Socialist Appeal*: the distinction between taking a position on the general class issues facing society and taking a position on the subordinate issues which are better left to a political party.

A CLEAR CLEAVAGE ON THE WAR

Of course the five editors of *PR* disagree on all major issues. But there is a clear cleavage on the one essential, most determining issue: Is the war imperialist or not? Should one give political support to Allied imperialism or not? In the answer to these two simple questions there is enough to draw the line. (We do not wish to suggest that merely shaking one's head one way or the other in response to these questions solves all the problems of our time—but it certainly helps!) MacDonald and Greenberg, despite their disagreements about the nature of German economy and the character of Russia's participation in the war, saw sufficiently eye to eye to jointly write "Ten Propositions on the War." And we are certain that the other editors who support the imperialist war can agree on enough fundamental issues to be able to draw up their basic statement.

That is how the lines are joined in reality; that is how they are joined in the editorial committee of *Partisan Review*. To speak of other subordinate disagreements is sheer sophistry. For or Against the Imperialist War—that is the issue. And MacDonald and Greenberg are not unaware of this fact.

3) "*Our main task now is to preserve cultural values against all types of pressure and coercion. Obviously we cannot even speak of a survival of democratic civilization apart from the survival of our entire cultural tradition.*"

Here again, we must insist, MacDonald surrenders his entire intellectual position when he signs his name to sentences like that with people who support the imperialist war, and one of whom at least, is openly cynical about the possibility of achieving socialism in the near future and believes the revolutionary perspective to be an illusion.

OUT OF MacDONALD'S PAST

Why, it is precisely such vague and weasel-worded pronouncements of good will that MacDonald has spent a major portion of his literary time in attacking. Only in the previous issue of *PR* he wrote in his splendid article on Van Wyck Brooks' call to burn the books:

Confronted by a frustrating historical situation—the breakdown of the political, social and cultural values of the bourgeois order, and the simultaneous impotence of any progressive revolutionary force to sweep clear the débris—our intellectuals have for the most part either tried to find their way back to the long discredited values of the bourgeoisie, or else have begun to move toward a totalitarian solution. *But for the values they instinctively want to preserve, both roads lead to historical dead ends.*" (Our emphasis—I. H.)

And again, in the statement of the short-lived League for Cultural Freedom and Socialism, which every editor of the *Partisan Review* signed, we read:

It goes without saying that we do not subscribe to that currently fashionable catchword: "Neither communism nor fascism." On the contrary, we recognize that culture is inseparable from the liberation of the working classes and of all humanity. Shall we abandon the ideals of revolutionary socialism because one political group, while clinging to its name, has so miserably betrayed its principles? Shall we revert to a program of middle-class democracy because the Kremlin government, in obedience to its own interests—which are no longer the interests of the Soviet people or of the masses anywhere—directs us to do so? On the contrary, we reject all such demands. *Democracy under industrial capitalism can offer no permanent haven to the intellectual worker and artist. In its instability it becomes the breeding ground of dictatorship and such liberties as it grants us today, it will violently revoke tomorrow. The idea of democracy must come to flower in a socialist democracy. In the revolutionary reconstruction of society lies the hope of the world, the promise of a free humanity, a new art, an unrestricted science.* (Our emphasis—I. H.)

This is a far cry, is it not, from the more recent editorial statement on the war. (Incidentally, it is interesting to compare the first sentence of this quotation: "We do not subscribe to the currently fashionable catchword 'neither communism nor fascism'"—with the statement about *PR* not undertaking "to present the kind of programmatic guidance one expects from a party.")

MacDonald has always emphasized: the prerequisite for a genuine defense of culture is opposition to imperialism and its war and support of the struggle for socialism. The attempt to divorce the struggle to preserve culture from the struggle to build a new society is an illusion. But how is MacDonald to fight in defense of culture with Rahv, who believes that socialism is an illusion for the near future? *True, he can make a "united front" with Rahv against a given act of literary suppression, but he surely cannot unite with him on any serious, long range programmatic scale, when they have two such diametrically opposed concepts of how to "preserve cultural values."*

Does not MacDonald remember what he signed not so long ago—"Democracy under industrial capitalism can offer no permanent haven to the intellectual worker and artist. . . . In the revolutionary reconstruction of society lies the hope of the world, the promise of a free humanity, a new art, an unrestricted science"?

Is not every word of this as true as when it was originally written? What, then, is the value of his promise to jointly "preserve cultural values" with Rahv and to fight with him for the "survival of democratic civilization"? Doesn't the war and one's attitude have anything to do with all this? Are they not, in fact, the basic determining factors which give specific content and direction to these generalizations?

WHAT FUTURE FOR PARTISAN REVIEW?

For there is a more general consideration involved here. While the major preoccupation of *PR* was with cultural affairs, the specific impulse toward its creation and its unique *raison d'être* were essentially political. Now that *PR* has no particular political position on the decisive issue of our time,

what special rôle can it play which any number of literary magazines do not already play? Are its literary contents so superior to those of, say, *Kenyon Review* or *Virginia Quarterly* or the *Antioch Review* that they give *PR* a special reason for existence? It will be free and tolerant of all points of view. *But what will it say?* It was created because it had a unique political attitude and because it desired to apply this attitude as sensibly and as sensitively as it could to cultural life. Now that this political attitude is gone, what is left?

As a matter of fact, the most recent issue of *PR* already shows that its contradiction is insoluble. To the degree that there is political content in the magazine it is all pro-war. There are several letters from England which are uniformly pro-imperialist. One of them, by George Orwell, even makes the assertion that "to be anti-war in England today is to be pro-Hitler." And this preposterous statement—fit for the garbage pails of the *New Republic* or *The Nation*—goes unchallenged by the editors!

Marianne Moore contributes a particularly vacuous piece

of obnoxious literary gossip—which really belongs in the *Saturday Review of Literature*—and has the gall to append a footnote declaring her disagreement . . . with MacDonald and Greenberg's "Ten Propositions on the War." Nor do the editors bother to reply to this insulting humiliation.

How unresponsive to the world about us is this issue of *PR*! A month after the entry of America into the war a magazine which raised the banner of "Marxism" and "international socialism" in its first issue appears with its lead article . . . a study of Stendhal. It is a very good study, it should be published, but tell us, MacDonald and Greenberg, did you honestly feel that when you published an issue with this article as your lead in *such a situation* that you were really fulfilling your social and intellectual obligations?

The magazine has no future, no perspective, no axis around which to revolve. For an esoteric literary magazine—say one such as *View* or *Kenyon Review* are, or such as *Transition* or *Dial* were—to ignore the war is perhaps possible, but for *Partisan Review* it is fatal.

IRVING HOWE.

ARCHIVES OF THE REVOLUTION Documents Relating to the History and
Doctrine of Revolutionary Marxism

Crisis in the Right-Center Bloc — II

[Continued from Last Issue]

V. WHAT IS THE RIGHT WING?

Matters stand more simply and clearly with regard to the Right Wing.

The Thermidorian tendency in the country, in the broadest sense of the term, is that of the property-holders as opposed to proletarian socialism. While covering the essence, it is the most general definition that can be given. The petty bourgeoisie its driving force, but which petty bourgeoisie? That which is most addicted to exploitation, that which strives for position, that which is being transformed, or tends to be transformed into the middle bourgeoisie, that which seeks its ally in the big bourgeoisie, in world capitalism? The central figure of this Thermidorian army is the kulak, the protagonist of the moods and aspirations of the Bonapartist counter-revolution.

Inside the ruling apparatus and party, as an ally or semi-ally of the proprietors of Bonapartist inclinations, is the "completely hardened" official who wants "to live in peace with all the classes." There exist social causes for this: materially or intellectually he is related to the new proprietor; he himself has grown fat, he wants no commotion, he regards with raging hatred the perspective of a "permanent" revolution; he has had more than enough of the Revolution, which God be praised, is happily in the past and now permits him to harvest its fruits of national socialism—there is his arena.

This firmly established official, as we said above, is the ally of the Bonapartist kulak. However, even between them there is a difference that is very important for the given stage. The kulak would like to discard the whole hated system by using the army or by an insurrection. The bureaucrat, however, whose growing welfare is linked with the Soviet apparatus, is opposed to the open Bonapartist road; he is for the path of "evolution," of a camouflaged Thermidor. We know from history that Thermidor was only a step leading to the Bonapartist *coup d'état*. But that was not understood at that

time. The active Thermidorians sincerely rejected as a base calumny every suggestion that they were merely preparing the road for military-bourgeois usurpation.

These transitional relationships of the two sections of Thermidorianism are the cause of the weakness of the right wing. To take up the gauge of battle, it must openly mobilize all the propertied elements and instincts in the country. This was readily done during the struggle against the Opposition, but the bloc with the Center and the banner of the party served to conceal it. The powerful rear guard of the proprietors, encouraged by the leadership during these past years, exercised a pressure on all sides upon the party, helping to terrorize the proletarian kernel and to demolish the Left Wing. But since the struggle began openly between the Centrists and the Right, even though conducted with half measures, the political situation is changing brusquely. It is the Centrist apparatus that now speaks in the name of the party. This mask can no longer be assumed by the Right in this struggle. They can no longer base themselves upon the proprietors anonymously. They must now publicly and openly straddle a new war horse.

In the lower ranks of the right faction, the difference between the party bureaucrat and the kulak presents hardly any difficulties in the way of common action. But the higher one goes, the nearer the industrial sections, the political centers, the more obstacles are encountered by the Right—vital ones, as for example the dissatisfaction of the workers; dying ones: the traditions. The present leaders of the Right are not yet "ripe enough" to straddle publicly the proprietors' war horse against the official party. Driven into a blind alley by the pressure of the apparatus, the bureaucrats of the Right either resign, or else, like Uglanov, they make moving pleas that they be not "crippled."

The "unripeness" of the Thermidorian wing of the party, the absence of political connection between this wing and the reserve formed by the proprietors, explains the easiness of the

present victory of the Centrists over the Right. Instead of military operations there is an apparatus parade and nothing more.

There is also another reason for this "easiness." But this reason has its roots in the mutual relations between the Centrist apparatus and the proletarian kernel of the party. Its head was stuffed for more than five years so as to incite it against the Left Wing; for this purpose it was terrorized by the pressure of the bourgeois classes. As a result, we find that at the end of the sixth year of struggle, they are obliged anew to call for an *intensified offensive* against the so-called "remnants." In return, the proletarian kernel is ready to struggle against the Right, not out of fear but out of conviction. Even if the present campaign is entirely impregnated with bureaucratism that completely suppresses the initiative of the masses; even though "sentinels" have been posted ahead to indicate with their red pennants the limits to which the Centrist parade shall proceed; even though the masses are disoriented, perplexed and unprepared, especially in the provinces, the proletarian kernel of the party nevertheless supports the Centrist apparatus incontestably *in this struggle*, if not actively, at least passively; in no case does it aid the Right.

These are the essential reasons why the Centrists have vanquished the Right so easily—inside the party. But these same reasons explain the whole meagerness and superficiality of this triumph. To understand this better, let us examine more closely what they are disputing about.

VI. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CENTER AND RIGHT

A proletarian revolutionist cannot be an empiricist, that is, he cannot let himself be guided only by what happens under his nose at the moment. That is why the struggle against the Right is of importance to us not only from the point of view of the immediate budget questions, credits allocated for collective farming in 1929, and so forth, around which the struggle seems to hinge (though even on these points they keep within the bounds of allusion and common-places), but above all from the point of view of the general ideas that it introduces into the mind of the party.

What then is the ideological baggage of the Centrist struggle against the Right?

A. THE DANGER OF THERMIDOR

Before all, let us examine wherein lies essentially the Right danger. As our guide on this point, as well as on the others, let us take the fundamental (and alas! the most insipid) document of the whole campaign: the speech of Stalin at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow Control Commission on October 19, 1928. After recounting the differences with the Right—of which more later—Stalin concludes by saying:

It is incontestable that the victory of the Right deviation would unleash the forces of capitalism, would undermine the revolutionary positions of the proletariat and increase the chances for the restoration of capitalism in our country.

In this case, as in all others where Stalin turns upon the Right, he does not devise his own powder, but uses the weapons forged in the arsenals of the Opposition, breaking off as much as he can of the Marxist point. And really, if one takes Stalin's characterization of the Right seriously, it appears as the nub of Thermidorian reaction inside the party. The danger of counter-revolution is simply that of the "restoration of capitalism in our country." The Thermidorian danger is a masked form of counter-revolution, accomplished in its first

stage through the right wing of the governing party: in the eighteenth century through the Jacobins, today through the Bolsheviks. In so far as Stalin, by repeating what was said by the Opposition, declares that "the victory of the Right deviation would . . . increase the chances for the restoration of capitalism," he is only saying that the Right Wing is the expression of the Thermidorian danger in our party.

But let us hear what he says a few lines further on about the Left Wing, about the Opposition. From this side, you see, the danger consists in that the Opposition "does not see the possibility of constructing socialism with the forces of our country alone; it despairs and is obliged to console itself by chattering about the Thermidorian danger in our party."

This example of Centrist confusion could be called classic if confusion could have its classics. Indeed, if to speak of the Thermidorian danger in our party is to chatter, then what is the declaration of Stalin that the victory of the Right Wing in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would open the road to the restoration of capitalism? In what else, if not in this, does the Thermidor lie in the socialist revolution? To what point must one be muddled to accuse the Right Wing of collaborating in the restoration of capitalism and in the same breath to characterize words pointing out the Thermidorian danger in the party as "chatter"? There is their real chatter, and specifically Centrist at that. For the principal trait of Centrism is that it mechanically stacks up the contradictions instead of overcoming them dialectically. Centrism has always united in its beggar's purse the "reasonable" and "admissible" elements of the Right and Left Wings, that is, of opportunism and Marxism, neutralizing the one with the other and reducing its own ideological content to zero. We know from Marx that petty-bourgeois thought, even the most radical, always consists of admitting "on the one side" so as to deny "on the other."

In general, the whole manner of characterizing the Opposition adopted in the speech of Stalin is scandalously impotent. The danger of the Left deviation is supposed to be that "it overestimates the forces of our enemies, the forces of capitalism; it sees only the possibilities of the restoration of the latter, but it does not see the possibility of constructing socialism with the forces of our country; it despairs and is obliged to console itself by chattering about the Thermidorian danger in our country."

Understand it who can! The Opposition "despairs" because it sees only "the possibilities of the restoration of capitalism" (that is, the danger of Thermidor); but it "consoles itself [?] with Thermidorianism in our party," that is, still with the same danger of the restoration of capitalism. Understand it who can. What can really drive one to despair, is this idealess Centrist rigmarole. But the Opposition hopes to triumph over this pestilence long before the complete socialist society is built up in our country.

B. THE CONCILIATORY TENDENCY

The struggle against the Right is conducted under cover of anonymity, in the sense of personalities as well as actions. Apart from the Mandelstams, everyone votes unanimously against the Right; and even the Mandelstams are now probably voting with the others. It is natural that the workers in the ranks of the party ask: But where is this Right Wing? Stalin replies to them as follows:

The comrades who emphasize the question of the persons who symbolize the Right deviation, in the discussion on this question, are equally wrong. . . . It is a wrong way of posing the question. . . . It is not a question of persons here, but rather of conditions, of the circumstances which

give birth to the Right danger in the party. Certain persons can be eliminated, but that does not mean that by this we would uproot the Right danger in our party.

Such reasoning is the consummation of the philosophy of conciliation; it is the most striking and most solemn departure from the fundamental Leninist tradition on the field of the struggle of ideas and the education of the party. To pass over the persons representing the Right deviation for the conditions which give birth to it—there is the typical argument of the conciliators. That was essentially the real error committed by the old “Trotskyism” that opposed it to the methods of Lenin. Of course there are “objective conditions” that give birth to kulaks and sub-kulaks, to Mensheviks and opportunists. “It is not a question of persons here, but rather of conditions.” A remarkable revelation. The old “Trotskyism” never formulated the theory of conciliation with such triviality and vulgarity. The present Stalinist philosophy is a caricature of the old “Trotskyism,” and all the more mischievous because it is unconscious.

Lenin invariably taught the party to hate and scorn the methods of struggle against opportunism “in general,” to reduce oneself to declarations, without clearly and precisely naming its most responsible representatives and their deeds. For the struggle by declarations very often serves to taint the atmosphere, to divert the dissatisfaction of the masses accumulating against the slipping toward the Right; this struggle can also be utilized to frighten the Right slightly, so that they will not let themselves be carried away too far and reveal their rear guard. Such a struggle against the Right can in the end appear as a protection and concealment for them merely practiced by more complicated and diverse roads. Centrism needs the Right, not at Ichim, Barnaoul or Astrakhan, but in Moscow, as its main reserve, and it needs such Rights who submit to command, who are tamed and patient.

C. SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

The crowning of the Right policy is the theory of socialism in one country, that is, of national socialism. The Centrists maintain this theory completely, holding up the rotting parts of the structure with new props. Even the most docile delegates to the Sixth Congress complained in the corridors: “Why are we forced to swallow this fruit in the program?” It is not necessary to argue here about the basis of the national-socialist philosophy. Let us wait for what its creators will reply to the criticism of the program. In spite of everything, they will be forced to answer; they will not succeed in evading it by silence.

Let us limit ourselves to point out a new prop that Stalin tried to put up at the Moscow Plenum on October 19. In their turn, Stalin came forward against the opportunists “on the one hand” and the Marxists “on the other,” and proved that we can . . .

Achieve the final victory over capitalism, if we carry through an intensified activity for the electrification of the country. . . . From this follows [??] the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country.

The speech refers to Lenin, of course, and falsely as usual. Yes, Lenin placed great hopes in electrification, as a road leading to the technical socialization of industry in general and of agriculture in particular. “Without electrification,” he said, “there can be no talk of a real socialist foundation for our economic life.” (Vol. XVIII, pt. 1, p. 260). But Lenin did not separate the question of electrification from that of the world revolution, and he certainly did not oppose them to each other. This time also, it can be proved by documents as

can generally be done in all cases where the unfortunate creators of the national-socialist theory try to base themselves on Lenin. In his preface to the book of the defunct Skvortsov, *The Electrification of the RSFSR*, Lenin says:

Special attention should be paid to the *beginning of the sixth chapter* where the author . . . superbly refutes the common “light” skepticism toward electrification. . . .

Now what does Skvortsov-Stepanov say at the beginning of the sixth chapter that Lenin emphasizes it and recommends it so warmly to the reader? Skvortsov there combats precisely the conception according to which we are supposed to believe in the realization of electrification and the construction of the socialist society within national limits. Here is what he says:

In the common conception of the realization of electrification, one generally loses sight of still another aspect: the Russian proletariat has never thought of creating an ISOLATED socialist state. A self-sufficing “socialist” state is a petty bourgeois ideal. [Hear, hear! L.T.] One can conceive of a certain movement in the direction of this ideal while the petty bourgeoisie predominates economically and politically; by isolating itself from the world, it seeks the means for consolidating its economic forms which new technique and new economies transform into the most unstable forms.

It would seem that no one could express himself more clearly. It is true that after Lenin died, Skvortsov-Stepanov expressed himself differently; he began to qualify as petty bourgeois not the idea of the isolated socialist state but rather the negation of this idea. But Stalin himself has traversed the same path. Up to the end of 1924, he believed that at the basis of Leninism was the recognition of the impossibility of constructing socialism in a single country, above all in a backward country; after 1924, he proclaimed the construction of socialism in our country one of the foundations of Leninism.

A successfully conducted socialist construction [said Skvortsov-Stepanov in the same chapter] is only possible with the utilization of the immense industrial resources of Western Europe. . . . Should the proletariat take political power in its hands in one of the first-class industrial countries, in England or in Germany, the combination of the powerful industrial resources of that country with the immense, still intact, natural treasures of Russia, would give the possibility of driving rapidly toward the building of socialism in both countries.

It is just this elementary Marxist idea that has been denounced for the last three years in every meeting as the fundamental heresy of Trotskyism. Now how did Skvortsov-Stepanov estimate the construction of socialism in our country before the victory of the proletariat in the more advanced countries? Here is what he had to say:

Naturally, if the economic region embraced by the dictatorship of the proletariat is sufficiently vast and has a great variety and richness of natural stores, its isolation does not exclude the possibility of the development of the productive forces, which is one of the premises of proletarian socialism. But the advance toward this will be a despairingly slow one, and this socialism will for a long time remain extremely meager, if only its economic premises do not become undermined, a probable alternative under such circumstances. (Chap. 6, pp. 174-179.)

So Skvortsov believed that without the European revolution, the construction of socialism would inevitably have a “despairingly slow” and “meager” character; that is why he considered it “very probable” that under such circumstances the economic premises would be undermined, that is, that the dictatorship of the proletariat would collapse without foreign military intervention. That is how Skvortsov-Stepanov expressed himself in the sixth chapter of his book, as a man of little faith, they would say today. And it is just on the subject

of this so-called skeptical estimate of our construction that Lenin wrote:

Special attention should be paid to the sixth chapter, where the author gives a splendid account of the meaning of the New Economic Policy [that is, our "socialist construction." L. T.] and then superbly refutes the common "light" skepticism toward electrification. . . .

The unfortunate child of the aboriginal Centrist thought has no luck. Every attempt to present another argument in its favor invariably turns against it. Every new prop can only shape the building constructed with rotten material.

A characteristic trait of the Right Wing, as is shown by the articles and resolutions that are all patterned on the same model is its aspiration for a peaceful life and its fear of commotion. That has been correctly pointed out, or, more exactly, copied from the documents of the Opposition. But it is right there that lies the tested hatred (penetrating to the very innards) against the idea of the permanent revolution. Of course it is not a question here of the old differences which can only interest historians and specialists now, but rather of the perspectives of tomorrow. There are only two possible courses: one toward the international revolution, the other toward reconciliation with the native bourgeoisie. The Right Wing was consolidated in the work of defaming "the permanent revolution." Under cover of the theory of national socialism, it is marching toward reconciliation with the native bourgeoisie so as to guard itself against any convulsions.

So long as the campaign against the Right is conducted under the sign of the theory of socialism in one country, we have before us a struggle going on *within the limits of revisionism itself*. This must not be forgotten for a single moment.

D. VITAL PRACTICAL QUESTIONS

If we pass to the vital political questions, the balance of Centrism is almost equally unfavorable.

a) The Right is opposed to the "present" tempo of industrialization. But what is the "present" tempo? It is the arithmetical result of *Khvostism*, the pressure of the market, and the lashes of the Opposition. It accumulates contradictions instead of diminishing them. It does not contain a single idea thought out to the end. It furnishes no guarantee for the future. Tomorrow, the "present tempo" can be something else. The hysterical cries about "super-industrialization" signify that the doors are left open for a retreat.

b) The Right denies the "expediency" of allocating credits for the collectives and the Soviet farms. And the Centrists? What are their plans, the span of their activity? To proceed to the work in a revolutionary manner one must begin with the agricultural laborers and the poor peasants. Audacious and resolute measures are necessary (wages, spirit of organization, culture) *so that the agricultural workers feel that they are a part of the ruling class of the country. A league of poor peasants is necessary.* It is only by preparing these two levers, and *if industry really has a leading rôle*, that one can speak seriously of collective and Soviet farms.

c) The Right is for "relaxing the monopoly of foreign trade." There is for an accusation that is a little more concrete. (Yesterday it was still called calumny to point out the existence of such tendencies in the party.) But here also it is not specified *who* proposes the relaxation and *within what limits*: is it within those fixed by Sokolnikov and Stalin in 1922 in trying to effect this "relaxation" or have these limits been extended further?

d) Finally, the Right denies "the expediency of the struggle against bureaucratism on the basis of self-criticism." It is

futile to speak seriously of this difference of opinion. There exists a precise decision of the Stalin faction saying that for the purpose of maintaining "a firm leadership," *self-criticism must not touch the Central Committee, but must be limited to its subordinates.* Stalin and Molotov have explained this decision in a scarcely concealed form in speeches and articles. It is clear that this reduces self-criticism in the party to zero. At bottom we have a monarchist-Bonapartist principle which is a slap in the face to all the traditions of the party. It is natural that "the subordinates" should also want to avail themselves of a little bit of the supreme inviolability. There is only a hierarchical and not a principled difference.

The present extension of "self-criticism" pursues temporary factional aims, among others. We simply have here a repetition, only on a larger scale, of the "self-criticism" that the Stalinist faction organized after the Fourteenth Party Congress, when the Stalinists "implacably" accused the Zinovievists of practicing bureaucratic oppression. It is superfluous to explain what régime the Stalinists themselves established in Leningrad after their victory.

E. THE QUESTION OF WAGES

But the manner in which the Centrists characterize the Right Wing is especially remarkable for what it passes over in silence. We hear of the underestimation of capital investments for collectivization, and of "self-criticism." But not a word is said about the material and cultural situation of the proletariat in its daily and political life. It appears that on this field there are no differences between the Center and the Right. But a correct appreciation of the differences between the factions can only be obtained from the point of view of the interests and the needs of the proletariat as a class and of every individual worker (see Chapter Two of the Platform of the Bolshevik-Leninists, "The Situation of the Working Class and the Trade Unions").

The articles and resolutions against the Right clamor a good deal, but without precision, of capital investments in industry, but they do not contain a single word on wages. This question, however, must become the main criterion for measuring the success of socialist evolution; and consequently, also the criterion to apply to differences. A socialist rise ceases to be such if it does not uninterruptedly, openly and tangibly improve the material position of the working class in its daily life. The proletariat is the basic productive force in the construction of socialism. Of all the investments, that which is put into the proletariat is "the most profitable." To consider the increase of wages as a premium for the increase of the intensity of labor is to be guided by the methods and criteria of the period of the primitive accumulation of capitalism. Even the progressive capitalists in the epoch of capitalist prosperity and their theoreticians (the Brentano school, for example), put forward the amelioration of the material situation of the workers as a premise for the increase of labor productivity. The workers' state must generalize and socialize at least this viewpoint of progressive capitalism, in so far as the poverty of the country and the national limitation of our revolution does not permit us and will not permit us for a long time to be guided by a real socialist criterion. That is to say, production has the task of satisfying consumption. We will not come to such really socialist mutual relations between production and consumption for a series of years yet, under the condition that the revolution is victorious in the advanced capitalist countries and our country is included in a common economic system. But since we have socialized the capitalist

means of production, we must at least socialize also, so far as wages are concerned, the tendencies of progressive capitalism and not those of primitive or declining capitalism. And for this purpose we must crush and throw to the winds the tendencies that imbue the last joint resolution of the Russian trade unions and the Supreme Council of National Economy relating to wages for 1929. It is a decree of the Stalinist Political Bureau. It announces that with few exceptions, amounting to nearly 35 million rubles, there must be no mechanical (remarkable word!) increases in wages. Innumerable newspaper articles explain that the task for 1929 is *to fight for the maintenance of the present scale of real wages*. And at the same time they let loose the rattles that announce the mighty rise of socialist construction. At the same time gods are on sale in the village. Unemployment grows. Credits for the protection of labor are insignificant. Alcoholism is on the increase. And as a perspective we have for the coming year the struggle to *maintain* the present wage of the workers. This means that the economic rise of the country is being accomplished at the cost of decreasing the share of the proletariat in the national revenues as compared to that of the other classes. No statistics can refute this fact, which is in equal parts the result of the policy of the Right and the Center.

In the reconstruction period, work followed the old roads blazed by capitalism. This period hardly brought the main cadres of the proletariat the reestablishment of pre-war wages. In the work of reconstruction we utilized the experiences acquired by Russian capitalism which we had overthrown. Basically, it is only now that the epoch of independent socialist development is beginning. The first steps taken along this road already showed very clearly that in order to succeed we must have, on an absolutely new scale, initiative, ingenuity, perspicacity, creative will and all this not only from the upper leading circles but also from the main proletarian cadres and the working masses in general. The affairs in Donetz is eloquent not only of the incapacity and the bureaucratic spirit of the leadership, but also of the weak cultural and technical level of the workers of Schakhty, as well as their lack of socialist interest. Has anyone ever calculated what the "socialist construction" at Schakhty cost? Neither the Right nor the Center has done it, so as not to burn their fingers. Nevertheless, one can boldly assert that if half, or even a third of the criminally despoiled millions had been employed at the right time to raise the material and cultural level of the Schakhty workers, to interest them more and more in their work from the socialist viewpoint, production would be at a far higher stage today. But the Schakhty affair is no exceptional one. It is only the most flagrant expression of bureaucratic irresponsibility above, and the backwardness and material and cultural passivity below.

If we speak seriously of an independent socialist construction, proceeding from the miserable economic basis we have inherited, we must be fully and wholly imbued with the idea that of all the economic investments, the most undeniable, expedient and lucrative is that which is put into the proletariat by systematically and opportunely increasing real wages.

They do not even dream of understanding this. The myopic conceptions of the petty bourgeois manager is the most important criterion. Whipped by the lash of the Opposition, the "masters" of the Center have only dimly understood, ten years after the October, that without making investments in heavy industry at the proper time, we are preparing for the future a sharpening of the existing contradictions and undermining the basis of light industry; on the other hand, these

companions in misfortune, with all their underlings, have not understood to this day that without timely investments in work for a wholly qualified workmanship from a social, political, technical and material point of view, they are surely preparing the collapse of the whole social system.

The stereotyped reply: Where will we get the means? is only a bureaucratic subterfuge. It is enough to compare the state budget reaching almost eight billions in 1929, the gross production of state industry amounting to 13 billions, capital investments of more than one and a half billion, with the miserable 35 millions constituting the annual fund for wage increases. No one disputes that bricks and iron, as well as their transportation, must be paid for. The necessity of calculating the costs of production is admitted at least in principle. But the costs of extensive reformation of socialist workmanship, the expense necessary to render it more qualified, remains the last reserve in all calculations, to the detriment of which all the contradictions of our economy, which is conducted in a miserable manner, are liquidated. It is not the Centrists who will put an end to this state of affairs.

VII. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STRUGGLE

When we speak of the possible consequences of the present campaign, the question can and must be approached first of all from the aims and plans pursued by the Centrist leading group, and then from the viewpoint of the objective results that can and must develop in spite of all the schemes of the Centrist staff.

The refrain one hears in this whole campaign is the entirely absurd affirmation that "basically" the Right and Left Wings are one and the same thing. This is not simply nonsense that rests on nothing and which it is impossible to formulate in a clear manner; this nonsense has a definite purpose, it serves a well-determined task: at a certain stage of the struggle, at the moment when the Right has been sufficiently terrified, fire will be brusquely opened again against the Left Wing. It is true that even without this the fire does not cease for a single moment. Behind the scenes of the anonymous struggle against the Right, an unrestrained struggle is conducted against the Left. Here the "bosses" do not stick to the "objective conditions." Determined long ago to stop at nothing, they lead an enraged hunt for "the persons." Since the "remnants" are not content to live, but "raise their heads," the main task dominating the whole policy of the Centrist staff is to bring the struggle against the Left Wing around to a new stage, a "higher" one, that is, to renounce definitely all attempts to convince them (in which they are obviously powerless) and to make use of stronger methods. Article 58 must be replaced with one that is still more effective. It is not necessary to explain that it is precisely on this road that the leadership condemned by history will break its neck. But the Centrist bankrupts, armed with the power of the apparatus, have no other road before them. To apply these more decisive measures, the Centrist leadership must make an end of the remnants of the "conciliatory tendency" inside the apparatus itself and around it. It is not a question here of conciliation with the Right Wing: that conciliation is the very soul of Stalinist Centrism. No, we speak of the *tendency of conciliation toward the Bolshevik-Leninists*. The campaign against the Right serves only as a springboard for a new "monolithic" attack upon the Left. He who has not understood this has understood nothing.

But the plans of Centrism are only one of the factors, even though still a very important one in the process of the devel-

opment of the inner-party struggle. That is why it is necessary to examine what are the consequences, "unforeseen" by the strategists of the Center, that follow from the crisis of the ruling bloc.

It is evidently impossible to predict now at what point the present campaign of the Center will be brought to a halt, what regroupings will immediately take place, and so forth. But the general character of the results of the crisis of the Center-Right bloc can be clearly perceived. The abrupt zig-zags that Centrism is forced to describe give no guarantee for the coming day. On the other hand, Centrism never accomplishes them with impunity. Oftenest of all, these zig-zags form the point of departure for a differentiation within Centrism, for the separation of one of its layers, of a part of its adherents, for the appearance within the Centrist leadership of various groupings, which, in turn, facilitates the work of Bolshevik agitation and recruiting. Centrism is the strongest force in the party for the moment. Whoever sees Centrism as something completely finished, and neglects the real processes taking place within and behind it, will either remain forever the oracle of some radical literary club or else he will himself roll toward Centrism or even further to the Right. A Bolshevik-Leninist must clearly understand that even if the Right-Center crisis does not immediately set broader masses into motion (and that depends upon us to a certain degree), it leaves behind it seriously increasing cleavages that penetrate the masses, and around which will grow new, deeper and vaster groupings. It goes without saying that this manner of seeing the internal processes of the party has nothing in common with the impatient striving to grab at the tail of Centrism, no matter where or how, so as not to arrive too late with one's Opposition baggage for the departure of the next special train.

The reinforcement of Centrism from the Left, that is, by the proletarian kernel of the party, even if this happens as a result of the struggle against the Right, will doubtless be neither very serious nor lasting. In fighting the Opposition, the Centrists are forced to weed out with the right hand that which they sow with the left.

The victory of the Centrists will not bring any real and tangible change either in the material situation of the workers or in the party régime, unless the workers led by the Bolshevik-Leninists exercise a strong pressure. The alert mass will continue to think in its own way about the questions of the Right danger. In this the Leninists will help them. On the left flank of Centrism there is an open wound which does not heal, but, on the contrary, goes deeper, keeps Centrism in a feverish agitation and does not leave it in peace.

At the same time, Centrism will also weaken to the Right. The proprietor and the bureaucrat saw the Centre-Right bloc as a whole; they saw in it not only the "lesser evil" but also the embryo of an internal evolution; that is why they supported it. Now they are beginning to distinguish between the Centrists and the Right. They are evidently dissatisfied with the weakness of the Right and their lack of character. But they are their own people who have only lost their way. The Centrists, on the other hand, are now strangers, almost enemies. By its victory on both fronts, Centrism has betrayed itself. Its social basis contracts in the same proportion as its power in the apparatus increases. The equilibrium of Centrism more and more approaches that of a tight-rope walker; there can be no talk of its stability.

A serious regroupment will be effected within the Right Wing as well. It is not absolutely impossible that a certain part of the Right elements—elements who seriously believed

in the existence of "Trotskyism"—and who were educated in the struggle against it, will begin to reexamine their ideological baggage seriously under the impact of the shock they have just received and then turn abruptly toward the Left, even as far as the Opposition. But it goes without saying that only a very small, sincere minority will take this path. The main movement of the Right Wing will be in the opposite direction. The lower sections will be dissatisfied with the capitulatory spirit of the upper circles. The proprietor will press hard. The Ustrialovists will whisper finished formulæ into the ear. Numerous bureaucratic elements of the Right will submit, of course, that is, they will mask themselves as Centrists, take their place at the order of their superiors and vote against the Right deviation. The number of careerists, people who live only to save their hides, will grow in the apparatus. But the more stable and vigorous Right elements will mature rapidly, will think out their tasks to the end, will formulate clear slogans, and will seek to establish more serious connections with the Thermidorian forces outside the party. So far as the group of "leaders" is concerned, predictions are especially difficult. In any case, for the work that the Right has before it, the Voroschilovs and the Uglanovs are much more important than the Bukharins and the Rykovs. In citing these names, we are not thinking so much of specific persons as of political types. As a result of the regroupings, the "annihilated" Right Wing will become stronger and more conscious.

It is true that the Right wants to be at peace. Nevertheless one must not think that the Right Wing is entirely and absolutely "pacifist." In fighting for order, the exasperated petty bourgeoisie is capable of causing the greatest disorder. Example: Italian fascism. In fighting against crises, against commotions and dangers, the Right Wing, at some subsequent stage, can help the new proprietors and all the discontented in general to shake the Soviet power so as to drive out the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must remember that the instincts of the petty bourgeoisie, when they are confined and repressed for a long time, contain in themselves an enormous explosive force. Nowhere and never in the course of history have the instincts and aspirations of preservation and property been so long and so pitilessly curbed as under the Soviet régime. There are many Thermidorian and fascist elements in the country. They have become very strong. The confidence they feel in themselves, from a political point of view, grew in the process of annihilating the Opposition. With good reason did they consider that the fight against the Opposition was *their* fight. The policy of zig-zag consolidates them, tortures them and spurs them on. In contrast to Centrism, the Right Wing has great reserves of growth which, from the political point of view, has as yet scarcely broken through.

The final result is therefore the following: Strengthening and formation of the wings at the expense of Centrism, despite the growing concentration of power in its hands. This means a growing differentiation within the party; the false monolithism thus has to pay very dearly. There is no doubt that for the dictatorship of the proletariat this involves not only heavy costs in general, but even presents direct dangers. There is the curse of Centrism. Consistent Marxist policy made the party more compact by giving it revolutionary homogeneity. Centrism, on the contrary, appears like an ideologically shapeless axis around which Right and Left elements turn for a certain period. In the last five years the party swelled beyond measure, losing in precision what it won in numbers. The Centrist policy is on the way to being repaid

now in full: first from the Left side, now from the Right. A Centrist leadership in the last analysis always involves the crumbling of the party. To attempt now to get out of the processes of differentiation in the party and the definite formation of factions by means of tearful supplication or else by conferences behind the scenes would simply be stupidity. Without a general delimitation according to lines of principle, we will only have the crumbling of the party into molecules, followed by the catastrophic crash of the usurpatory apparatus, pulling the conquests of October down with it.

Despite their great scope, the two campaigns of the Centrists against the wings (against the Bolshevik-Leninists and against the Thermidorians of the Right) have only a preliminary, preparatory, preventive character. The real struggles still lie in the future. The classes will decide. The question of the power of October with which the Centrist dancers are juggling on the rope, will be decided by millions and ten of millions of people. Whether sooner or later, in installments or at one blow, by the direct use of violence or within the limits of the restored constitution of the party and of the Soviets, will depend on the tempo of the internal processes and the changes in the international situation. Only one thing is clear: the Bolshevik-Leninists have no other path to follow than to mobilize the living elements and those capable of living for their party, to weld together the proletarian kernel of the party, to mobilize the working class as a whole, to keep itself tirelessly in contact with the struggle for a Leninist line in the Communist International. The present Centrist campaign against the Right must show every proletarian revolutionist the need and duty of multiplying tenfold his efforts to follow an independent political line, forged by the whole history of Bolshevism and proved correct throughout the greatest events of recent years.

LEON TROTSKY.

Alma-Ata, November, 1928.

BOOKS

Duranty Confesses

THE KREMLIN AND THE PEOPLE, by Walter Duranty.
216 pp. Reynal & Hitchcock. New York. \$2.00.

Mr. Duranty's reputation as an authority on Russian has been gained among a section of the reading public by a shrewd combination of factors. He is an Englishman, and there are always enough American snobs to drool with delight at anything scratched on paper by one of their superior cousins. Secondly, he carefully affects an amused and detached cynicism toward the dumb ants he writes about, the antheaps they erect, the sufferings they endure. This attitude is calculated to make the snob feel fine: he is given a funny inferior to smile at, a tragi-comic one to pity. This feeling is enhanced in turn by Duranty's literary posturings as an English *sahib* in Russia: However dreadful this or that may seem, remember, it is happening to the Russian; and for him, being what he is, it is good enough; we Englishmen, of course—really now, it would never do for us, old man! Thirdly, he is full of unauthenticated or unauthenticable anecdotes written with the sly air accompanying every "I-got-this-from-the-front-office"—or back bedroom—story, and very often conveying the hint he "got this straight from my old chum Stalin himself but of course you don't expect me to say so in quite so many words, do you?"

These devices, together with an infinite capacity for living up to the motto on the coat of arms of the Prince of Wales, have made him an invaluable front man for the Kremlin mob in those circles where he can do the most good. To do the most good, he must needs permit himself an occasional "criticism" or "revealing story" to show that he's not a simple phonograph record. It's another shrewd device aimed not at objectivity but merely at mellowing the blatancy of the apologies for Stalin's crimes which are Mr. Duranty's long suit and rôle in the scheme of things. Not an easy game to play, for sometime or other you are bound to slip. In this latest volume of apologetics for his Borgian patrons, dashed off in the hope that it will take the taste of the trials and purges off the palate of the American public, Duranty makes what we are happy to catch as a real slip. The book as a whole is so much unboiled tripe, but a few pages from it are priceless. They deal with an episode during the Bukharin trial hitherto totally unknown, at least to us. The few words let drop by Yagoda while he was being harried by Vishinsky are so telling in their support of the argument that the trials and the "confessions" were framed, that Duranty's whole description is worth reprinting. Here it is:

Kazakof was accused of murdering Yagoda's predecessor at the head of the OGPU, Minjinsky. To me this was somewhat surprising, because I happen to know that Minjinsky, who had been badly crippled by an automobile accident in Poland in 1920, and had grave maladies in addition, had always ascribed his continuance in life to Professor Kasakof and the "Lysati." Like most chronic invalids, Minjinsky had his pet doctor and pet remedy, namely Kazakof and the "Lysati," and told Stalin so and all his friends. You can see the way he said it, the way we now talk about vitamins. You can hear him talking to Stalin and saying: "Comrade Stalin, I hear you've been having some heart trouble. What you really need is these 'Lysati' that Kazakof's been giving me. I mean, my friend, that they're wonderful, and in fact I don't mind telling you they're keeping me alive." That was what Minjinsky said; but one day Minjinsky died and Yagoda, his right-hand man, ruled the OGPU in his stead. Time passed and Yagoda fell and himself was brought to trial. And with him, as a make-weight, was the unhappy Professor Kazakof.

The prosecutor, Vishinsky, brought Kazakof to admit that he had deliberately contrived the death of Minjinsky, at Yagoda's bidding, because Yagoda wanted the job, by giving him wrong doses, or hyper-doses, or anything you like of "Lysati." It sounded like bunkum to me, but anyway that's what Kazakof said and admitted.

Then Vishinsky turned to Yagoda and asked him: "Is it true that you gave Kazakof instructions to murder your chief, Minjinsky, in order that you might take his place and use it for conspiratorial purposes?"

Yagoda said quietly: "I never saw Professor Kazakof until this day."

Vishinsky went back to Kazakof and drew from him the statement that on the sixth of November, 1933, an OGPU car had called for him at his home by Yagoda's orders, and taken him to the first entrance of the OGPU headquarters in Moscow; and there he'd been led upstairs to Yagoda's office. Where Yagoda had told him, said Kazakof: "Minjinsky's a living corpse. Why don't you finish him off? I want his job for myself. So finish him off, or else..."

"You mean, then," said the prosecutor, "that Yagoda frightened you into committing the shocking crime of the murder of Minjinsky?"

"That is what I mean," said Kazakof, "because Yagoda was so powerful and..."

At this point the audience shuddered. I felt them shudder and shuddered myself, because I knew and they knew what power Yagoda had wielded as head of the OGPU, Lord of the High Justice and the Low, the most dreaded and terrible man since Torquemada of Spain. Except, of course, Yezhof, who slew Yagoda the Slayer and later himself was slain. Then Vishinsky turned to Yagoda and said:

"Accused Yagoda, do you deny or confirm the statement of Professor Kazakof?"

Yagoda said: "I deny."

Vishinsky persisted: "So Kazakof is lying?"

"Yes, lying," said Yagoda.

"And Levin," Vishinsky continued, "did he lie too when he said that you had ordered him to kill Maxim Gorky, Stalin's friend?"

"He is lying," said Yagoda.

Vishinsky pointed a finger at him. I still can see this scene, so vivid it lives in my mind. The audience hushed and tense, and Ulrich, the bloodhound with dewlaps, watching coldly, and the podgy Vishinsky pointing his finger at Yagoda, a pallid man with dark hair and harsh eyes.

Vishinsky said: "Did you not lie too, Yagoda?"

At this point Yagoda bit. You might say that he bit off the finger; you might say that he bit off the hand; that he bit off Vishinsky's arm. In a voice that was menace of death, he said:

"Don't dare to ask me that question! That question I shall not answer."

He spoke with such concentrated venom and fury and threat of hell and damnation, that Vishinsky jumped in the air. I don't mean he really jumped, but somehow we felt that he'd jumped. And didn't the audience jump! Good Lord, how all of us jumped!

My friends often ask me why I don't go to theaters and movies and so forth. And here is my answer now: that I have seen something bigger and better. I told Noel Coward that once, when he was grumbling at me because I didn't know enough to satisfy his interest about some show at the Russian Art Theater. I said: "Yes, of course, and I'm sorry: I ought to have seen it and didn't. But you know, I saw the Trials, and they were so much better theater and so much more exciting, that even Moskvín or Kachalof were dull to me by comparison."

Yagoda's tone of fury and venom—far, far more his tone than his words—knocked Vishinsky off his feet, and knocked the audience, too. Myself, I was sitting close to the "stage," in the second row of benches, and thus received the full impact. But I'm a reporter, and philosopher as well, and have seen and heard horror and flames. And known pain to its uttermost limit.

But the people behind me were hit, and there came through them the sort of thing you don't often hear, a gasp of dismay and terror. No, not just terror and dismay, perhaps it was simply distress, as when the bullet hits a strong young soldier charging with fixed bayonet.

The President, General Ulrich, hard old bloodhound, rang his bell and said to Yagoda: "You don't have to talk like that, I won't let you talk like that."

Up to now I have been quoting from the official stenographic record of this trial, but the lines which follow were not included therein. I heard them, though, and remember.

Yagoda looked at Ulrich, the rat that looked at the judge. And said:

"That goes for you, too—you can drive me, but not too far! I'll say what I want to say... but... do not drive me too far!

Talk about cold shivers!

I've seen the redoubtable Ulrich in more than one of these trials, but this time he met his match. He knew that Yagoda was done, like a rocket whose flare was out. Oh yes, General Ulrich knew that, and so did his audience, and so did I, and so did the prosecutor, Vishinsky. Oh yes, we all of us knew it, and some of us were soft and some of us were tough, and some like me were philosophers and reporters, and some were just folks. But I assure you that this sentence from Yagoda was the most thrilling thing I have ever met in a wide and exciting life. It hit Ulrich himself in his big high President's chair, socked him hard like a crack on the chin.

I tell you that it is not without reason that men like Yagoda or Hitler rise to great heights of power. They must have an inner strength. They must have something we haven't. So here was this cornered rat, who knew he was doomed and we knew it. The judge knew it, the prosecutor knew it, everyone knew it. And yet from the strength within him he could use a few simple words like a sword of lambent fire, and honestly, for a second, make all of them shake in their boots. Especially the plump Vishinsky, who took no more cracks at Yagoda. Even Ulrich was careful after that. When Yagoda flung his thunderbolt, Ulrich blinked a bit, as we all did, but he is tough Bolshevik timber, like the boys who are holding the Germans. He blinked and then rang his bell and said: "Silence! the prosecutor will continue the examination of Kazakof."

So quietly ended one of the highest moments of interest in my life, which has been diligently passed in search of moments of interest. Yagoda, I say and maintain, was in that moment terrific. Yet the next day he confessed to something which seemed to me purely ridiculous. This demon who had startled the court with his sudden blaze of wrath, now came before it to tell the most childish of stories. About "fitting" Yezhof to death.

Are we not right in thinking that the housemaid has blabbed once too often, and said too much?

M. SH.

Dos Passos' Crumbling Ground

THE GROUND WE STAND ON, by John Dos Passos.
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 420 pp., \$3.50.

If we did not believe that John Dos Passos is a serious and conscientious writer, it would be fairly easy to poke fun at his latest book. Were it not for his explicit statement that he does have an ideological purpose for writing the book, it could be dismissed as a very confused and discordant attempt of a novelist to enter the field of early American history, which would have been better left in more expert hands. But such an easy approach cannot honestly be used, if only because of what Dos Passos has not succeeded in doing.

He has written a series of biographical sketches of American colonial and revolutionary figures, together with an introduction which explains the purpose of these sketches. At the outset, it should be noted that the book is not a potboiler; it is not an attempt to capitalize on a reputation in order to make some extra change. Despite the evident sincerity and seriousness of purpose, it will, however, reveal very little about American history. All that it will reveal is that Dos Passos, an honest and conscientious student of contemporary life, has gone back to "the roots of the American tradition" in order to find some set of guiding principles with which to solve the problems of our day. "In times of change and danger," he writes, "when there is a quicksand of fear under men's reasoning, a sense of continuity with generations gone before can stretch like a lifeline across the sorry present. . . ." But nowhere does our author succeed in either locating or making visible this lifeline.

No one can dispute, of course, the indispensable relevance of the past, either in terms of historical experience or intellectual creed, for an understanding of the present. But what is first needed is an understanding of the events and creeds of the past *in the context of their intrinsic and internal development and in relation to their own times*; otherwise, it is foolish to expect to find any relationship to the present. And it is this failure to comprehend the events and creeds of colonial and revolutionary America in their historical context that explains Dos Passos' failure to contribute, to even convey a conviction that he believes he is contributing anything that will help humanity in its present dilemma. In turn—the paradox is only apparent—it is his failure to understand the present which blurs his picture of the past. If there were any annihilating proof necessary of the thesis which Dos Passos professes with an air of virtual supererogation—the intimate connection between past and present and the necessity of learning from one in order to solve the problems of the other—it is provided, with complete irony, in the difficulties in which Dos Passos finds himself because of his inability to comprehend either the present or the past in terms of themselves or their interrelations.

What does interest us here, however, is Dos Passos' claim to have found in the creed of his heroes (Roger Williams, Sam Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and Joel Barlow) a theory of political science which should be substituted for Marxism by liberals and radicals in solving the problems of present day society. *And what is even more interesting is Dos Passos' failure not merely to prove the validity and relevance of this creed, but his very failure to even state its principles and contents.*

For the nearest that Dos Passos comes to any statement of the creed of Williams, Adams and the rest, which he would

propose for present-day America, is the idea that there is a "struggle between privileged men who have managed to get hold of the levers of power and the people in general with their vague and changing aspirations for equality, for justice, for some kind of gentler brotherhood and peace . . ." and that it is necessary to side with the latter. But merely to restate so loosely ("the people in general") what we Marxists categorize as (in what Dos Passos politely calls the "double-talk of the Marxist ideology") the existence of class societies in all previous history is not very much of a contribution to an understanding of either the past or the present.

DOS PASSOS OWES A DEBT

It is not, of course, that Dos Passos is without a guiding creed completely. Insofar as it is possible to divine his intentions from his statement of introduction and his sketches, we would say that it is essentially a version of Parrington's concept of the "generic liberal." This concept, which, by the way, Parrington was continually forced to qualify and at times virtually abandon because of its inability to actually explain the changes and growing complexities of American life, holds that there is a certain attitude toward societarian problems which is essentially static despite the dynamic character of society. It has never been very specifically defined; and Dos Passos is far less successful in his attempts than was Parrington. Parrington had an acute sense of the developmental line of American society and hung onto the concept as a sort of safety anchor in a world whose problems he found increasingly complex and insoluble. But Dos Passos cannot even blow a breath of life into the concept; it is for him merely a dead abstraction. To merely state, as he does, that it is necessary to find a "gentler brotherhood" and to respect civil liberties is very noble, but who would maintain that it provides a straw, let alone a lifeline?

On one occasion, Dos Passos attempts to concretize his belief with the statement that "when property rights conflict with human rights, human rights must be regarded first." But Dos Passos never attempts to show, *not once*, how this doctrine was applied and interpreted by Williams, Adams, Jefferson et al.; how, if at all, they held contradictory views about it; how, if at all, the doctrine changed in significance and content for them as they matured in years and American society took the vast historical leap from colonial dependence to national independence; and, most important of all, how the belief in this doctrine can affect American life today or how it can be used as a tool for social action.

[Any amateur, incidentally, could tell Dos Passos that his manner of posing the question is sloppy, unhistorical and raises more questions than it answers. To what degree do property and human rights clash today? To what degree did they clash in 1776? To what degree is this clash incidental to our form of economic organization, or basic to it? What is a property right, and can it also be considered a "human right"? ETC.!]

NARRATIVES FOR HISTORY

We are therefore left with a residue that consists of unintegrated narratives of portions of the lives of Williams, Adams and the rest. There is no skeletal guiding line in the book. It may be in Dos Passos' head; but it most certainly is not in the book.

Dos Passos might object: "But my method was not to write an explicit history of the ideas of these men, but rather to show through portraits of the crucial and representative

moments of their lives how they reacted to their problems in order to provide a guiding lesson for ours." This method, a legitimate if inferior one, must also require considerable discussion of the intellectual antecedents from which these men derived and developed their ideas, not to mention some critical discussion of the ideas themselves and in relation to the social forces of the times.

But even here Dos Passos fails. One can learn more from Parrington's dozen or so pages on Roger Williams than in Dos Passos' 138. Imagine a discussion of Williams which scarcely mentions his mysticism, or attempts to explain its relation to his democratic creed; which does not once attempt to explain both in terms of theological doctrine itself as well as their social causes and reflections, the several religious shifts which Williams made during his lifetime. Williams, it is true, deserves the rôle of hero, but we are never told why, other than that he believed in religious toleration. But what is really important is *why* he came to believe in it, and on that there is silence. And it would seem that it is not too difficult to trace the connection between his Seekers' creed and his belief in religious toleration or to explain what the Seekers believed as well as their connection to the English social scene!

This disregard of, or lack of interest in, the ideological spurs to the actions of the men he partially describes, becomes quite ludicrous when Dos Passos spends pages detailing Jefferson's architectural tastes as a reflection of his democratic concepts, but does not once discuss that Jeffersonian creed itself, for which we are to abandon Marxism; nor its antecedents, nor its present-day ramifications. Now, whatever else one may think of Jeffersonianism, no one can deny that it possesses a considerable body of ideas nor their right to serious examination, especially when a writer is asking people to accept it in place of a creed which they are to reject!

REJECTION OF MARXISM BROUGHT FORTH THE BOOK

The rest of the book is open to essentially similar criticisms, so there is no need to repeat them. It is only necessary to add that whenever Dos Passos turns from character sketch to a portrait of society, he is in an even worse mess. Peculiarly enough, he does not write of American society but rather drags in lengthy and involved descriptions of the Cromwellian period in England and of the French Revolution. The former is characterized by a chaotic jumble of details; the latter by a Girondist bias and a vile portrait of Robespierre worthy of Hilaire Belloc. (Robespierre, we are informed, was just a bloody villain . . . like Lenin.)

Dos Passos has succeeded in none of his aims. He has not portrayed the lifeline from the past to the present. He has not given a relevant or useful picture of revolutionary America, or even adequate character sketches of its leaders.

Even his writing seldom comes to life. He lacks that quality best described as "historical feel"—the ability to portray the drama and the significance of an historical period in a related whole, which provides details without losing itself in them—mainly because he is not clear as to what was or is. (How different from the Dos Passos who wrote *Body of an American* or *Woodrow Wilson* or *Randolph Bourne*!) He has moved from a vague belief in a vague Marxism to an even vaguer confusion, and that confusion is only occasionally congruous with Jeffersonianism.

The book, then, is a complete failure. Its sole virtue is that it is the failure of the conscientious groping of a man whose mind at present can only be described as in a seriously preoccupied muddle.

I. H.