


Independent Socialist





# independent socialist

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## contents

defend the ghetto uprisings	2
the war in the middle east	4
the conference for new politics	5
the UAW strike	6
student revolt & the anti-war movement	
1 berkeley-oakland michael friedman	8
2 wisconsin al greene	11
3 brooklyn college ian mcmahan	14
on regis debray don bacheller	18
two laws against labor kim moody	22

## editorial

# defend the ghetto uprisings

THE ghetto uprisings which have turned cities and towns throughout the country into blazing battlefields are a natural, long-expected, and justified counterattack against the oppressors of the ghetto—the police, politicians, and economic powers that control America. In spite of slander and condemnation by the whole spectrum of politicians and the shameful capitulation of most middle-class Black leaders, it is clear that the revolts do not represent a “minority hoodlum element” of the ghettoes. There is much more involved than “lawbreaking,” and no mere handful of criminals could maintain resistance against thousands of police, National Guardsmen, and Vietnam-trained Army paratroops with tanks and machine guns. It is true that only a sizable minority is actually involved in the sniping and looting. However, this minority has the passive support of the bulk of ghetto residents, who shield its more active members from the police.

### the roots of revolt


There have been few attacks on ordinary whites. The press has reported white as well as Black snipers, and there have even been cases of integrated looting. The main targets of the revolts have been the white institutions which exploit and control the ghetto—the white-owned stores that depend on a poverty-based credit system to gouge their victims for shoddy goods, and the police. It is not just that the police are physically brutal or that they commit indignities against the Black community daily. The police are the first-line enforcers of the status quo in a community which finds the status quo oppressive. Maintaining “Law and Order” in the ghetto means upholding the exploitative relationships that exist. In the uprisings, the violence directed against people has been caused by the police. The police enter the ghetto to pro-

tect private property; human life runs a poor second. That is why most of those who have died in the revolts have been Blacks, innocent bystanders and suspected looters. It is the police, not the revolt, that lacks a proper respect for human life.

The pattern is quite clear. We are witnessing, not some irrational striking out by a “handful” of “mad dogs,” not the ghetto equivalent of a college football riot, not a looting spree by a mob crazed by the idea of free goods, but a spontaneous uprising by a people who are demanding a change in society and who are consciously attacking their immediate oppressors. The uprisings pass over Black-owned stores, but systematically loot and burn those owned by whites.

### war against the ghetto

The politicians and liberal leaders piously declare that only small numbers of Negroes are involved. But in practice these same politicians recognize that this is a revolt against the institutions of white society. They have virtually declared war on the Blacks in the ghetto. If they really believed that only a criminal element was involved and that 98% of the ghetto opposed the revolts and were “good upstanding American citizens,” they would not hesitate to give economic aid to rebuild the ghetto so that these “good Negroes” would not suffer. But instead the liberal officials such as Humphery and Shriver (and their sociologist hangers-on) tell us that such aid is impossible because it would seem like a reward for rioting. In other words, the entire ghetto is in fact being held responsible for the uprisings. In place of a phony war on poverty there is now a very real war on the ghetto. Every black man is a presumed enemy. If the police thought a building housed a sniper, they would riddle the whole building with



announcing the formation of the

# Independent Socialist Clubs of America

THE ISCA has been formed as a federation of independent socialist clubs and organizing committees around the country. This formation reflects the dramatic growth of the ISC's over the past two years. This September, in New York City, the first national conference of the ISCA was held. Members and friends of the ISCA, activists in the growing radical movement, students, Negro, anti-War and labor insurgents, participated in fruitful and stimulating discussions of the problems facing these movements.

The ISCA has an essential role to play, participating loyally in these movements from our own independent revolutionary socialist vantage point. If you would like information on the ISCA, its federated clubs, ideas, publications and activities, write to:

**ISCA, ROOM 504, 874 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10003 or phone: (212) 674-9590**

bullets. In Detroit, federalized Guardsmen were ordered to shoot fleeing suspects. And in fact, "Guardsmen and police said that they were 'shooting at anything that moves.'" (San Francisco Chronicle, July 9, 1967) In New Jersey, Guardsmen shot up and wrecked the Black-owned stores left untouched by the revolt.

All this is done in the name of "Law and Order." It is not even for the purpose of restoring peace and quiet or protecting human lives. In Detroit, after police and guardsmen were driven out of a large area, the Chronicle reports, "The neighborhood quieted. Then authorities ordered a counterattack, led by a column of tanks and armored personnel carriers." As in other wars, the aim of the military was not to protect citizens but to occupy the area and to reestablish white political authority at whatever cost to its inhabitants.

## liberalism on the rocks

The revolts, the armed defense of the people in the ghetto, and the new "Black Power consciousness" have grown directly from the experiences of the old civil rights movement. In the course of civil rights battles, Black militants confronted new problems. It became apparent that the achievement of full equality and human dignity for Negroes would not come with the attainment of legal equality. Major changes in the dominant economic and political institutions of American society would be needed to provide decent jobs, housing, schooling, and the other basic necessities for living as a human being.

As the struggle against the dominant institutions developed, the Black militants discovered the nature of white liberalism. While most of white America was willing to give lipservice to the notion of equality, it could also vote by over 2/3 against a fair-housing law in California and defeat a civilian review board in New York. The "War on Poverty" turned out to be puny. And of what there was to fight the "war," most of the budget in local communities went for administrators' salaries or to the dominant local political machines. Here and there "poverty money" was given to groups genuinely trying to overcome the causes of poverty by organizing labor unions, political parties, rent strikes, and so forth. But complaints from local political and economic powers that thrive on the existence

of low wages and poverty conditions soon got these funds withdrawn. As a result, in this period of prosperity, in spite of all the politicians' promises, the Black man in America is suffering rising unemployment and worsening living conditions.

## the liberal—establishment alliance

But if the white liberal "allies" of the Black struggle were unwilling or unable to challenge the dominant social institutions responsible for poverty, unemployment, and discrimination, these liberals were willing to make demands on the civil rights movement. Time and again they demanded that the movement subordinate its own struggle to the needs of the liberal Establishment. Leading liberals demanded that the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party give up its challenge of the racist Mississippi state delegation at the 1964 Democratic National Convention, so that party unity (with blatant racists) could be maintained. During the Presidential campaign, liberals put pressure on the civil rights movement to declare a moratorium on demonstrations so as not to antagonize racist support for the Johnson consensus. Election after election Negroes gave their support to liberal candidates who paid lipservice to the needs and demands of Black people. But because Black support and votes were in the liberals' hip pockets, and because these candidates (including the Black politicians) were responsible not to the Negro community but to the dominant social interests that controlled the Democratic Party, the needs of the movement were sacrificed or subordinated to the needs of maintaining social peace, that is, the status quo.

As a result of these experiences, Black militants have understandably and justifiably moved to control their own organizations, to develop their own power and base in the Black community so that they no longer need to subordinate its needs to the needs of liberalism. The failure of white society to deal with the needs of the Black community is not a "backlash" from Black Power. Just the reverse. Black Power resulted from the abysmal failure of the liberals to hold up their end of the "alliance" that promised so much and produced so little.

Although a new militancy has spread throughout the ghetto, it has not yet produced an organized Black move-

CONTINUED ON PAGE 15

# the war in the middle east

THE "glorious" war in the Middle East is over. A "notable victory" has been won. But who is the victor?

*Not the Jews.* They came to Palestine in the hundreds of thousands not because they were Zionists but simply because it was the only place they could go to escape the charnel house that Europe had become. Barred by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and other bastions of humane words and inhumane acts, they came to rebuild their lives and gain security from mass murder and war. The "victory" in the recent war has added further fuel to the fires of hostility that surround Israel. This war makes the next war inevitable—and, given the overwhelming Arab numerical supremacy, how long can defeat and destruction be staved off?

*Not the Arabs.* The Arab people, living under antediluvian despotisms or in statist military autocracies—sucked dry by foreign imperialism—what have they gained by the adventure with Israel? Nothing except humiliation, dismemberment, further indebtedness to foreign powers, and greater economic deprivation.

## a tragic history

The cause of the recent war lies in the sordid history of the Middle East. In 1948, while fighting for their legitimate right to exist as a nation, the Israeli Zionist ruling class adopted a reactionary means to accomplish its end. The new regime, under cover of the War for Independence, systematically drove out the indigenous Arab population (most of whom had attempted to remain neutral in the struggle) and robbed them of their homes and land. Arabs who had fled a few miles from their homes to escape the bullets and terrorism were permanently ejected from their land together with those Arabs who had fled over the border. Israel participated in its own encirclement by ringing itself with hungry, desperate refugees. By treating the remaining Israeli Arabs as second class citizens and a potential fifth column, it created a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Israel's stance since 1948 has been far from simply defensive. Her ambitions for the whole of Palestine as an ideological fulfillment of Zionism have never been rejected. Her participation with the Franco-British imperialist attempt at Suez in 1956 further identified Israel as an enclave of the imperialist West intruding upon the Arabs.

If the record of the Israelis has been sordid, the Arab side has been no less so. The Arab states have clearly used Israel as a scapegoat for internal dissensions.

Western imperialism carved the Arab nations out of the desert with little attention to economic viability, the desires of the people, and religious and ethnic differences. The Arab masses live at a bare subsistence level in one crop or one resource economies while the West and local lordlings grow fat on oil derived profits.

Some of the states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, are old reactionary monarchies resting on a narrow social base, propped up by the West. When such regimes prove too decadent to stand, even with the support of American capital, their collapse created a vacuum filled unasily

by the military and, secondarily, intellectual castes. These new regimes, replete with the social demagoguery of "national sacrifice," exploit their peoples just as rigorously as their predecessors. The popular yearnings for social change and Arab unity are distorted into adventures against Israel. The Arab states, unable to forge unity under present economic and political conditions, vie with each other for leadership of the Arab world through "can you top this?" adventures.

The tinderbox situation of the Middle East caused by both Israeli and Arab actions over a twenty-year span was the incubus of the recent conflict and determined its nature.

Syria, plagued by a long series of internal coups, openly supported Arab refugee incursions on the Israeli border in order to lock internal forces together behind the present Baathist regime. (It should be noted that these border incursions are often independent attempts by Arab refugees to regain their stolen land.) The Israelis replied and the dispute escalated to the Israeli full-scale reprisal against El Samu in Jordan. The Syrian sponsored attacks have little more than nuisance value against Israel but symbolized a Syrian victory over Nasser for Arab leadership. Nasser's side of the Israeli border had a UN force present since 1956 (the Israelis refused such a presence on their side). The UNEF acted as a cover on the frontier and at the Straits of Tiran for Nasser's unwillingness to risk conflict with Israel after the 1956 Sinai disaster.

Syrian prodding forced Nasser's hand and he resumed his leadership of the Arab bloc by massing his forces in the Sinai. As S. Peters, in an article in the pro-Zionist *New Leader*, indicated,

Clearly, Nasser decided he had to prove to the Arabs that he was no "paper tiger." Probably he also hoped his troop build-up—plus international pressure exerted by the major powers, already nervous over the heightened tension—would be sufficient to deter Israeli reprisals against Syria even if terrorist attacks continued unabated. Then he could boast that he had restrained Israel and saved Syria. . . .

Despite the hortatory cries of wiping out Israel, the Arab policies were directed at much narrower goals. However, a new factor entered the explosive situation when U Thant and the UN entered the scene and called Nasser's hand.

## the UN war effort

The original request for UNEF withdrawal was made by an Egyptian general, Fawsi, not Cairo, via an ambiguous letter to the local UN general. When questioned, the UAR delegate had no knowledge of the request. U Thant, in demanding that Cairo make clear its position, informed Nasser, gratuitously, that withdrawal was an all-or-nothing proposition; that it would also mean evacuation of the Straits of Tiran and that it would be immediate. Nasser's hand was forced for all the world to see but even so the response was delayed for a day and a half.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 17



# the conference for new politics

MASSIVE dissatisfaction with the American Establishment is growing daily. Millions are becoming increasingly aware that the two major parties offer no solution to the problems which plague the vast majority of Americans. In the light of this growing disaffection with Establishment politics, the left has a real opportunity to begin building a real independent political alternative based in the growing movements for social change now.

1968 looms as one of the most critical years in our history. Either the left offers a genuine political alternative or we suffer the consequences. Despite self-congratulatory proclamations by the liberal press, it is apparent that the local 1967 elections demonstrated a growing racist sentiment in America. The relative set-backs which the right received, such as the defeat of Louise Day Hicks in Boston, gave greater evidence of the complete bankruptcy of reactionary "solutions" than of a dwindling willingness of white Americans to listen to them.

The reactionary direction of American politics springs from the frustration caused by the policies of the liberal Establishment. Americans have good reason to question the fruits of the last great liberal ("All the Way with LBJ") victory: the war in Vietnam, inflation, higher taxes, dwindling "anti-poverty" programs and a growing assault on the labor movement and civil liberties. In the wake of the growing social crisis, the frustration and rage of millions who cannot see any hope for a solution is directed into racist sentiment on the one hand and desperate revolt on the other.

Now is the time for the left to begin the attempt to build a movement which can channel the growing discontent with the status quo into a movement which can pose real solutions to the problems causing that growing rage. The left must begin today to fashion an independent political movement which can truly represent the needs and interests of millions of workers, black people and the poor. Now is the time for independent political action.

## the cnp conference

In the light of this need, the Conference for New Politics met in Chicago in the beginning of September. The surprising amount of press coverage obtained by the conference is a real indication of the interest which the conference events held for millions. The NCNP could have offered a bold new course in politics. It could have offered a radical program for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, full employment, defense of the ghetto, a program in defense of the labor movement and in support of the growing rank and file revolts against the official labor bureaucracy. Above all, it could have begun to build an instrument of independent political power to make these programs effective, the beginnings of a party with a program designed to ally the various progressive movements. It could have begun all this, making a clear, open break with Establishment politics, by announcing its intention

of running a national presidential candidate in 1968.

It did none of these things. Instead, it passed a waivering resolution which failed to offer any political perspective which could deal with the tremendous problems facing the movement. Instead of a clear call for a break with the Establishment parties, for a real national alternative now, a half hearted motion was passed magnanimously allowing any local CNP which wanted to, to run any presidential candidate it chose combined with a call for community organization.

## community action and political action

By counterposing community action to national politics, the local organizers forego any possibility of countering the real center of social power in America. Without national political challenge, local victories will be lost in the drift of the power centers of the nation towards the right. On the other hand, a real political alternative to the Establishment could revivify the presently lagging community projects. This is hardly to deny the valid criticisms made by community action people of the third ticket proposal at the NCNP. A one shot third ticket, as a radical snipe at the Establishment, might tend to syphon off activists from the long range grassroots work without leaving anything behind to replace that activity over the long period. Secondly, the American people could hardly become excited over the idea of a third ticket as a "moral" gesture while the real problems which demand solution necessitate the building of a serious, long-term alternative. A third ticket would only have meaning as part of the building of a real and lasting alternative party which would demand strengthening the grassroots movement which must be the real basis of such a party.

The CNP failed to solve the other most important problem which it faced. As racist hostility grows, the first real step in countering that development would have been a real alliance between a self-directing Black Power movement and the white progressive movement. The conference's failure in this respect was truly tragic. Very important gains were made by the black contingents at the conference in achieving a degree of unity, a partial program and a sense of power. The way in which these partial gains were made, however, resulted in a serious setback for both the black cause and the movement as a whole. Due to pressures within the Negro community and the inattention to black aspirations by the Conference organizers, the Black Caucus demanded that the conference adopt without change a thirteen point program they preferred and that they receive half the votes of the convention. This gave the Black Caucus control of the conference and of the white groups represented. This was a travesty of Black Power. Instead of strengthening the movement, it only served to setback the movement and reinforce the tradition of manipulation and hypocrisy be-

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7

# the UAW strike

ON September 7, the United Auto Workers struck the Ford Motor Company. Weeks later, as the INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST goes to press the strike appears, to be over, but the terms of the settlement are not known. In line with the UAW's "one at a time" strategy, Ford is only the immediate target. At stake are economic gains for a million and a half auto workers in all the auto and parts companies and millions of other workers for whom the UAW agreement will set the contract pattern. Ford, fronting for their fellow manufacturers, and the UAW bureaucracy under the leadership of Walter Reuther have been conducting these crucial negotiations without explaining the issues to the other sections of the working class or to the public. As it stands, most workers, outside of the auto industry, probably believe that the strike continued so long because Ford refused to offer the union a large enough wage and benefits package. It is easy to understand why Ford and the employers would like to perpetuate this belief, as it gives them a basis for blaming the present inflationary spiral on labor. Reuther's role in keeping the working class and the public uninformed has less logic, for it can only hurt the cause of the auto workers and the union. The only logic in Reuther's position lies in his inability or unwillingness to deal with the issues that most concern the auto workers.

## reuther's record

For over 12 years auto workers have been telling him that they want to bring an end to the contract clauses that facilitate the daily speedup on the assembly lines. When words have failed they have resorted to wildcat strikes that have stopped more than half of all auto production. At the special bargaining convention of the UAW that took place in Detroit last April, an overwhelming majority of the speakers from the floor of the convention told Reuther that the struggle to improve the nature of life on-the-job should take priority over wage demands including Reuther's push for a guaranteed annual wage. Their message was further emphasized by the massive floor demonstration conducted on the second day of the convention by rank and file delegates from Detroit, Chicago and the Ohio area. They wanted to fight to "Humanize Working Conditions" by establishing some kind of check over assembly line speeds and improving the union representation ratio within the plants. UAW contracts typically allow one bargaining representative for every 300-500 workers.

Reuther made some momentary verbal concessions to the delegates. He agreed that the struggle to improve working conditions was an important one, but he was unconvincing and so speakers reminded him that wildcat strikes would be resorted to once again if all other efforts to persuade him failed. Unfortunately, auto workers have no means by which to inform the public of the struggle that they are forced to conduct. There is as yet no counterpart to the Rank and File Caucus that developed in the UAW during World War II. As long as that caucus remained

independent it was possible for militants in the ranks in different plants to communicate with each other and to get some word to the public through press releases. (In 1945 they won the right to an all union referendum in which 40% of the UAW voted to rescind the no strike pledge.) In the absence of such an independent caucus the rank and file cannot prepare itself for the fight that is ahead.

The decisive struggle in the auto industry today results from Reuther's refusal to meet the automation crisis which increases the speedup for production workers and downgrades the skills and skilled wage rates of the craft workers within the industry. The wildcat strikes against the contracts which Reuther has generally negotiated containing relatively adequate wage increases continue to be phenomena which go unexplained in the daily press. The nature of work again and again fails to become a public issue. An excellent example is provided by the August 23 demonstration of UAW skilled workers in front of the Ford Central Office Building in Dearborn, Michigan, near the giant River Rouge plant. It was called by the \$1 an Hour Now Committee to pressure both industry and union bargainers. For supporting it the committee in charge of all UAW bargaining with GM was demoted by the Reuther leadership. Over 6,000 of what are supposed to be the most conservative UAW workers answered the call to demonstrate on a regular working day. In the afternoon a body of more than 1,500 demonstrators forced its leaders to march up the ramp to the main entrance to the cold new building. Unlike the 1930's, the Ford police fled before them. Twice these predominantly white workers from the Skilled Trades Division made a full pass up and down the ramp yelling: "Burn, Baby, Burn." The Detroit press did not report the incident. UAW officials make no mention of it in their public pronouncements. However, news of the march spread to the Ohio and Illinois regions overnight, but is still in the process of reaching plants in the southern and western sections of the country. Gradually, the failure of the UAW rank and file to effect a direct voice in the official policies of its union forces it to create an informal, underground and shadow union structure.

## humanize working conditions

During negotiations, in which the guaranteed annual wage appeared as the central issue, Ford workers showed little interest in strike activity. The failure of Ford to attempt to bring scabs into its plants is only partly responsible for the less than token picket lines in front of Ford's factories across the nation. In effect, the ranks have conceded the authority over bargaining at this stage of negotiations to Reuther. If they do not like what he signs for, there may be hold-out or wildcat strikes in many locals. Already, on October 25th, hundreds of skilled workers picketed Reuther, protesting the terms offered the union. Days after the UAW contract had been signed, the *New York Times*, safely hidden on page 86, reported:

Ford remained shut down today for the 52nd day. A contract was ratified earlier this week ending the official nation-wide strike, but a series of plant-level disputes have prevented Ford from returning to work. (NYT. 29 Oct 1967)

The *Times* reported that twenty-two locals were still out over local issues. These local and plant level "disputes" are, of course, the signal that Reuther has again done little or nothing about working conditions, and has left them as "supplemental" issues for post-contract bargaining.

### revolt in the ranks

Throughout the basic industries the effects of automation, working conditions and job content are the issues underlying rank and file insurgency and wildcat strikes. The labor bureaucracy recognizes that the solutions to these problems involve an attack on corporate power and, therefore, avoid making these issues public. If the effects of automation and the nature of work—and their social implications—are to become issues of class-wide industrial and political struggle, they must be militantly pushed by organized rank and file groups. We look with hope toward the Committee for Militant Unionism, the "Dollar an Hour Now Committee" and other rank and file groupings in the UAW to bring these issues to the attention of workers in other industries before the present strike is long forgotten. In the long run, we look to these rank and file groups and to the shadow unions throughout the industry as the base for a political movement with the power and the will to change the nature of work and the entire dehumanized structure of American society. The first steps towards this goal are to force union bargaining policy, and political action, beyond the bread and butter level and to give union struggles a program that other workers and poor people can identify with and view as their own.

STARTING with this issue, the **INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST** is no longer published solely by the New York ISC but by the newly formed Independent Socialist Clubs of America. This change reflects the growth of the revolutionary socialist movement in America. **IS** serves a vital function, dealing with the most important problems facing the growing movements for radical social change. It serves as a rallying point for the rebirth of "socialism-from-below" in America. However, the problems of publishing **IS** require all the financial assistance we can get. We have no angels, the need for money is always desperate. Please send us whatever help you can afford either as a contribution or by subscribing to or distributing **IS**. Please do it now!

Beginning with the next issue, **IS** will be published in Berkeley. This change will benefit the publication and will

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1967

## new politics

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

tween the races in that the bulk of whites who voted for the thirteen points no more believed in them or intended to carry them out than they believed in Lyndon Johnson. The "victory" of the Black Caucus offered no direction for the black movement in America; it offered the black militants no vehicle to organize the Negro community just as it offered no direction to the whites.

Instead of pyrrhic victories, real ones could have been won. Blacks should have the right to arrive at their own programs and make their own decisions. Likewise, the whites and those engaged in joint projects, should have made separate proposals. A bi-cameral conference in which both forces could project their own programs and aspirations could have resulted in a meaningful alliance instead of the paper one attained. We do not offer bi-cameralism as a suitable solution for all problems but the need for it was certainly indicated at the Chicago Conference and others like it.

The National CNP now stands in shambles and offers a dubious standard for New Politics. Its morale is low; its proposed political action campaign a failure; its finances now non-existent. However, on a local level there are still vital CNP's own Peace and Freedom Parties sufficiently recovered from the conference to wage real independent struggles to get radical candidates on the ballot. Despite the immediate loss in Chicago, these groups can still provide the embryo of a new Third Party organizing attempt whether within or without the CNP.

It can still be done, if the local grassroots organizations and the many radicals across the country press forward at independent political actions now!

## editor's notes


help to free the New York ISC for its rapidly expanding local activities and its new tasks as the center for organizing the ISCA nationally.

### AUTHORS IN THIS ISSUE:

**Don Bacheller** was a member of the steering committee of Baltimore SDS and active in the Baltimore Committee to End the War in Vietnam. **Michael Friedman** is a member of the Berkeley ISC. **Al Greene** was active in the CSR steering committee from the beginning of the recent student struggle in Wisconsin, and has been active in Madison SDS and the anti-War movement. **Ian McMahan** is an editor of **New Politics**. **Kim Moody** has been active in public employee organizing and rank and file trade union movements in New York and Baltimore.



# student revolt & the anti-war movement



## 1 berkeley-oakland

THE week of October 16th-21st was one of unprecedented anti-War militancy across the country. After two years of mass demonstrations against the War, the radical anti-War movement decided to focus its attention on the institution of the draft as a means of attacking the War in Vietnam. This concentration on a particular institution, although having its political limitations, proved to be the means by which the movement could achieve a new militancy almost overnight.

In Berkeley, at the beginning of last summer, a small group of militants began work on "Stop the Draft Week," a week of demonstrations aimed at closing down the Oakland Induction Center, the largest inductee-processing center in Northern California. For the past year or so, the anti-War movement in the Bay Area had been a state of disorganization, and so it appeared to many that not much support would be forthcoming for this militant action. Throughout the summer, on the Berkeley campus, there was minimal publicity for the "Stop the Draft" action, while the Resistance, a group planning a mass turning-in of draft cards in October, was holding rallies almost twice a week. "Stop the Draft Week" didn't make a major impression on the Berkeley radical community until, as with the Vietnam Day Committee two years before, the authorities decided to crack down on these "illegal" activities.

As late as a week before the planned actions, the Board of Supervisors of Alameda County (which includes both Berkeley and Oakland) passed a resolution demanding that the University Administration ban the Resistance from the campus or face a suit. It was an indication of the lack of publicity previously received by the "Stop the Draft Week" Committee, that the resolution mistakenly named the Resistance as the group organizing the shut-down of the Induction Center. But the publicity following this action by the Board of Supervisors brought the planned demonstrations to the attention of the radical community, as well as the community-at-large.

### the heyns game

The campus Administration, apparently having learned its lessons from previous years, acted in an unexpected manner. Chancellor Roger Heyns announced that any organization registered on the campus had the right of freedom of advocacy, including the advocacy of off-campus, "illegal" acts, and that the administration did not "think it wise" to attempt to throw such a group off campus. This action by Heyns surprised everybody, because the Chancellor, who had proved himself a tough opponent of the Berkeley student movement, seemed to be doing what the movement had always demanded that the Uni-

versity Administration do when threatened by outside authorities. It was apparent to some that Heyns' purpose was to place himself in an unassailable position, by allowing himself to be "forced" to crack down on student political activity, while appearing to be the students' defender. And his actions did, indeed, make him look good in the eyes of the students. However, some leaders pointed out that Heyns could not be counted on to defend his noble sentiments when the authorities decided to act against them, and that once again it would be the students who would have to defend the campus from attack. It was not long before this analysis was tested.

### **crackdown**

As part of the plans for "Stop the Draft Week," an all-night meeting was to take place in the Student Union Building, beginning at 11:30 Monday night, and continuing until the next morning when the action at the Induction Center would take place. The meeting was originally planned as a rally and organizational meeting for the next morning's demonstration. It was this meeting that became the target of the authorities.

Under the threat of a court injunction against the meeting, the Administration and the liberal student government joined in negotiations with the organizers of "Stop the Draft Week." As a result, the format of the meeting was set as a "teach-in," to meet criteria of "educational value," with organization for Tuesday's activities to take place in the early morning, outside the Student Union Building. This format was accepted by the organizers, since there was a feeling that a big fight on campus over rules would tie down the movement against the draft and the War. There were even some who didn't appreciate the need to tie in the defense of student political rights on campus with the anti-War movement, and thought the on-campus issue could simply be ignored, or treated merely with militant declarations. In fact, however, the issues were tied together by the authorities themselves.

On Monday, October 16, hours before the meeting was to begin, an injunction prohibiting the "teach-in" was obtained, and the Administration dutifully began to enforce its provisions. The Student Union Building was closed early in the evening, and for all practical purposes, the teach-in was cancelled. But the students went ahead with plans for a rally and organizational meeting on campus. By 11 PM, the crowd in the plaza was about 10,000 and it was still uncertain what the authorities would do about this "illegal" rally. The crowd remained large well beyond 11:30 and nothing was done to stop the meeting. The confrontation would occur at the Oakland Induction Center.

"Stop the Draft Week" had originally been planned by many anti-War groups, including the Resistance and pacifist groups. The week of October 16-21 was to include many and varied activities in the Bay Area. Sometime during the organizing, the pacifist groups went off on their own, because they differed with the "non-non-violent" attitude of the militants. The pacifists planned their own action for Monday: a strictly non-violent sit-in at the doors of the Induction Center, in which those who were willing to be arrested, such as Joan Baez, wore armbands and went limp or walked when seized. It all went according to familiar routine; about 100 were arrested during the day, and there was no overt violence.

To many of the militants who were to take part in the demonstrations on Tuesday and again on Friday, the paci-

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fist sit-in of Monday symbolized the end of a stage of the movement. From Tuesday on, the theme would no longer be mere "non-cooperation," but active resistance. Self-defense was a stated principle, although the unarmed students were not capable of organizing a meaningful defense against armed police.

For the first time, serious attempts were made to implement a tactical flexibility with large numbers of people. At about 2 AM Tuesday morning, the assembly on campus broke into about nine "monitor groups," each of which would have its own tactical plans. The demonstrators then boarded chartered buses by group and headed down to their respective "staging areas," near the Induction Center. At 5 AM they moved out in groups. The main object was to prevent buses carrying inductees from reaching the Induction Center. Each monitor group entered the area by a different street; if kept away from the building by the police, they planned to block the street that they were on. This plan turned out not to be applicable, since the groups of demonstrators were allowed to get near the Induction Center, where about two thousand filled the streets and began to picket. During the next hour, police gathered in rows on the next street, blocking it off and preparing for a grand sweep that would clear the area of demonstrators. Monitors gave instructions to swing against the building when the police charged. There were groups of people sitting-in at the doorways. Finally, when the Oakland police and California Highway Patrol had filled up an entire block, they formed a wedge and charged. They swept across the intersection toward the demonstrators, clubbing people as they went. Those who had been sitting and standing in the doorways were clubbed and tear-gassed without having a chance to leave. After a great deal of pushing and shoving on both sides, the demonstrators were finally swept into several side streets, cordoned off by lines of police. Eventually, the buses came through, with some of the inductees indicating sympathy with the demonstrators. Since there were no specific contingency plans for what to do next, the crowd gradually dwindled away. However, the dominant feeling was anger and determination, rather than demoralization or defeat.

### **rebirth of revolt**

The long moribund Berkeley movement had begun to assert itself again. Mass rallies, now declared "illegal" by the Chancellor because of the injunction, were held on succeeding days to plan further anti-draft action. Despite the inevitable confusion and disputes over questions of future militancy, the thousands of students involved were to

demonstrate that they could sustain more than just one militant action. The students would show that they could adjust their tactics and still hold together as a militant movement.

Because of still-remaining moods of pacifism, and due to uncertainty about their strength, the students decided to hold a peaceful picket at the Induction Center the next day. About 2,000 people showed up, indicating that "Stop the Draft Week" was still alive. At a Wednesday rally, after some debate on the question of militancy and strength of the movement, it was decided, against the wishes of a group of "super-militants," to have no demonstration on Thursday and a possible action on Friday. The disgruntled "militants" said they would go down anyway, and did so. Even that demonstration had about 500 participants; their action consisted of a small sit-in with a few arrests. Contrary to many past experiences in the student movement, the constituency did not wither away in the confusion of factional tactical disputes. On Thursday, a large rally was held at which it was decided to go back and once again try to stop the buses from getting to the Induction Center.

"The demonstrators had boasted they would shut down the Induction Center. Instead, they had thrown downtown Oakland into a state of siege." (*Oakland Tribune*, Friday, Oct. 20, 1967)

Preparations for the Friday demonstration were not as well organized as they had been for Tuesday. The Tuesday demonstration had been planned in considerable detail for weeks. By Wednesday, the "Stop the Draft Week" leadership was exhausted and, it seemed, hardly prepared for the continued militancy of their constituents. At the Thursday rally, people were merely told to be on campus at 4:30 AM the next morning, and car pools would take them to Oakland. There was no all-night rally to keep people there and awake. There were no chartered buses to keep everyone together. By 5:15 AM there were not more than 500 people in Lafayette Park, a few blocks from the Induction Center, where all the tactical preparations were to be made. It should have been demoralizing, but somehow it wasn't. The monitor groups met, were briefed by their monitors, and set out by different routes toward the Induction Center.

### from protest to resistance

The scene was similar to Tuesday's, except that the demonstrators (many wearing helmets this time) were located on two adjacent streets in front of the Center, with the police in the intersection, dividing the two groups, which soon grew to about 3,000 people. After a long wait, the police began to move toward the group directly in front of the Induction Center. Because of the unfavorable publicity the police had received after Tuesday, mostly because of their rough treatment of newsmen, there was virtually no clubbing in this dispersal. After the first group had been pushed back to the side streets, the group on the next block was also swept back. The demonstrators had learned an important tactical lesson from Tuesday, when people blocking the entrance to the building were trapped there and clubbed by advancing police. This time the effort was consciously made to keep everyone on his feet and out in front, so that the demonstrators could retreat right before the wedge of police, and avoid injury. The plan was to retreat only as far as necessary, and to remain in the intersections just behind the cordons. This time, everyone was aware of the fact that the demonstra-

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tion would just be beginning after the police sweep took place. As a result, morale was high and virtually every intersection in the area was blocked off by demonstrators, who in turn were cordoned off from the Induction Center by police.

By this time, perhaps 10,000 demonstrators were occupying most of the intersections around the Induction Center and near the downtown part of Oakland. Although the main leadership seemed to be almost non-existent, the "local" leadership, at the tactical, group level, played a crucial role. By means of runners, communication was maintained between the groups, some of which were over half a mile apart. Groups of people were moved from one intersection to another to fill gaps. New intersections were constantly being filled by demonstrators when it was possible without a clash with police. Although the 10,000 demonstrators were spread out over a large area, there was no loss of solidarity. It seemed that every demonstrator knew just where all his fellow demonstrators were. There were several incidents where Oakland police would clear a street by charging, even breaking their own ranks; clubbing demonstrators back to the next intersection. But, even though there were many more people involved than on Tuesday, there were fewer injuries, in good part due to the flexible and well organized tactics.

The occupation of the intersections was an active operation. Barricades were set up to block the streets, so as to avoid as much as possible the necessity for human bodies to directly face the police. Automobiles, their tires deflated, were placed in the intersections. Garbage cans, park benches, and other forms of "public" property were used as barricades. At least one time, after having attempted to clear a street of demonstrators, a line of Highway Patrolmen had second thoughts and retreated.

It was the use of public property for barricades that constituted, in the minds of the press and authorities, the "violence" of the demonstrators. And it was probably this tactic, conjuring up images of past revolutionary movements, that caused Governor Reagan to consider calling out the National Guard. In the belief that Guardsmen were on their way, the demonstrators decided to terminate their show of strength. They felt that by causing the authorities to bring in the National Guard in order to restore the "normal functioning of the Induction Center and the City of Oakland, they had won a great victory. Although the National Guard was not used after all, the Bay Area anti-war movement has had a great boost in morale as a result of its successful confrontation with the police power of Oakland.

### polarization

The week of demonstrations in Oakland revealed something about the present mood of the population. Even though these demonstrations were the most militant to



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date against the war, and therefore most guaranteed to "alienate" people, the general reaction indicated that important changes are taking place in public sentiment. The discussion on phone-in radio programs was not nearly so hostile to the demonstrators as one would have expected from past experience. More importantly, these discussions verified what people in the movement have been saying for the past few months: there is no longer much appeal for a "middle-ground" position on the war. People who called-in would talk about the issues of the war and the draft, rather than about the tactics of the demonstrators. And the sentiment was very much anti-war. Those who weren't anti-war were generally the people who thought that dogs and guns should have been used against the demonstrators, and who are for an escalation of the war. The phony issues of Law and Order have been pushed to the background, and the issue of the war has become the basis for the polarization of the society. This is reflected in the fact that the "respectable" peace movement has lost whatever viability it had. Not only has non-violence as a strategy reached a dead end, but politically, the liberal hat-in-hand approach has been discredited and rendered impotent by events. Since the week of militant demonstrations, even Senators Symington and Gore have come out for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

As for the movement itself, there has clearly been a

## 2 wisconsin

ON October 17, the Dow Chemical Company, maker of napalm used in the Vietnam War, came to the campus of the University of Wisconsin to recruit potential employees. An Ad Hoc Anti-Dow Coordinating Committee had met a week before and planned an obstructive sit-in and supporting picket lines both in and outside the Commerce Building where Dow was recruiting. Members of various left-wing groups including SDS, the Committee to End the War, and the Wisconsin Draft Resistance Union participated in the activity.

The University Administration responded with threats of suspension and expulsion as well as normal civil action, but the plans for the protest went on.

On October 17, the first day of recruitment, there was a peaceful picket line which, at its peak, numbered around

qualitative change. For months, the movement floundered in a state of powerless anti-war sentiment, with no organization and no activity. Now, the frustration which led to inaction and "dropping out" has apparently been broken. On the Berkeley campus, the Board of Regents has outlawed on-campus organization of "illegal" off-campus acts. The students will oppose this as an attack on the anti-war movement, just as the Free Speech Movement arose in defense of civil rights activities on the campus. As in the past, "free speech" at Cal is not just an abstract civil liberty. It is the use of their hard-won political rights in the struggle for equality and against the war that has given the Berkeley students the strength to hold their own against the powerful forces that own and control their University.

### organize revolt

The movement has reached a new level of activity. But Berkeley students have a history of temporary organization based on short-term uprisings. What the student movement needs right now is an ongoing political organization reflecting the new militant consciousness of the students. And what the anti-war movement must do, in Berkeley and nationally, is develop a political program and build an alternative to the political parties and economic powers that run this society and conduct its wars.

MICHAEL FRIEDMAN

As we go to press, the Dean of Students at Berkeley has recommended that 11 students be suspended for an entire year. Included among the 11 were the bulk of the leadership of the anti-war movement on the Berkeley campus. Their crime, say the Deans, was the setting of a precedent: by speaking at rallies during the injunction period, they posed a challenge, not just to the injunction against Stop the Draft Week, but to the whole system of campus rules that emerged from the FSM. A challenge is being posed to the gains of the FSM. But it is the Administration that has posed the challenge. The Administration at Berkeley is now engaged in an open assault not only upon the political rights of the campus body but on the rising militancy of the student anti-war movement as a whole. Only a militant and forthright defense of the anti-war movement can ensure the rights of the campus community. And a defense of the anti-war movement in Berkeley is a defense of the anti-war movement across the country.

400 students and other sympathizers. No obstruction was planned for that day.

On October 18, about 200 protestors crowded into the Commerce Building. These were the obstructors. They were followed by a crowd of about 400 people who were to stand against the walls and who made what attempts they could to let people pass. The obstructors sat down in front of the office where Dow was recruiting. Many of the other protestors who had entered the building surrounded the sit-ins, while a picket line almost 200 strong marched around the building.

### the administration's riot cops

Around mid-morning, some cops appeared. Three managed to get through the stand-ins and arrested three people but could not get them through the crowd and left.

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The stand-ins had formed a protective shield around the sit-ins. At 1:00 P.M. a dean appeared to "inform" those in the building that they were in an illegal assemblage, and then left.

Subsequently, riot cops arrived and began assembling across the street from the Commerce Building in front of the University bell tower. Dressed in thick clothing, knee-length boots, heavy helmets and sporting big pistols and billy clubs, the cops presented an ominous appearance. By 1:30 there were about two thousand people standing around the Commerce Building watching the picketers and cops. The Chancellor had freely allowed riot cops to come into a potentially explosive situation.

After the anti-war protestors made it clear that they would not leave, the cops went into action. After trying unsuccessfully to enter through the front door, they smashed a plate-glass window next to the door that was sheltered from the people inside by a bulletin board. They jumped through the window, swinging clubs through the crowd like they were chopping up so many hunks of meat. Indiscriminately hitting women as well as men, they picked up the obstructors and literally heaved them through the opened door, often cracking a skull or two as they went with their clubs.

Almost spontaneously, the crowd of onlookers became participants. Enraged at the sheer animalistic brutality being perpetrated upon the students, some of whom weren't even involved in the protest, students almost en masse formed a circle with a very thick circumference around the cops, jumped on them, cursed and harrassed them with cries of "Sieg heil!" Once in a while a student would make a false move and a cop would crack down on his head with a club. (Women were not exempt.)

The cops made little attempt to arrest anti-war protestors, but evidently just wanted to beat them. Over 70 students were hospitalized. Nevertheless, out of the en-

suing melee, six students were arrested. Before the police wagon could leave, students surrounded it, pushed cars in front of it, smashed its windows and let the air out of its tires. The cops in Madison are known for their ill treatment of students and these people were venting their pent-up fury upon the cops. After getting the six students' names, the cops were forced to let them go.

Meanwhile, the cars in front of the police wagon were used as a podium. When the cops threw tear gas canisters, the crowd milled away, but then surged back; when it was suggested that the crowd get clubs, rocks and sticks to arm themselves for self-defense against police terrorism, it was well received.

Many of those attacked by the cops were badly hurt. One had six stitches in his head, another sixteen in his leg, and some were on the hospital's critical list for awhile.

Several times more the cops threw tear-gas canisters. At one point, the crowd of over three thousand surrounded the bell tower where several radicals had gathered with a bullhorn. A spontaneous political rally broke out. Speeches were made and the call for a general strike was loudly applauded. This meeting was broken up as more tear-gas canisters were thrown. Almost four hundred of us went into a big lecture hall in the Social Science Building, and decided to call for a mass meeting that same evening at 7:00 P.M. on the library mall around the following demands:

■ All armed cops off campus for good and never to be allowed on campus again to disperse peaceful political demonstrations.

■ All corporations off campus.

■ A general all-campus strike to force these demands.

Almost ten thousand people came to the meeting to hear speakers, some radical and others whose first political involvement was caused by the day's events. The demand that Dow and other corporations be removed from campus was booed down. At this mass meeting, the students constituted themselves as the Committee for Student Rights (CSR), called a general strike of University students and teachers, demanded removal of all cops from campus, amnesty for leaders of the Dow protest who were suspended, a campus referendum on any decisions to be reached through negotiations between any steering committee of the CSR and the UW administration, with approval by such a referendum necessary before any decisions would be binding.

## democracy vs. fiat

A serious shortcoming was the failure of the meeting to elect the steering committee. The meeting disbanded and allowed some "leaders" who stayed behind to constitute themselves a steering committee. This group of less than 150 people, rather than electing a steering committee, allowed the chairman of the proceedings to take volunteers as heads of the various subcommittees which were set up. These chairmen again by fiat came to compose the first steering committee. Instead of organizing a caucus to fight for democratic elections, radicals and socialists relied upon those who stayed behind, most of whom were liberals, to do the work. Most radicals felt that since this was developing into a "liberal" protest against only police brutality, they couldn't taint their purity by becoming extensively involved. This attitude of Wisconsin radicals reflects a lack of internal political education and knowledge of mass protest movements and the role of revolutionists in helping to raise the level of consciousness of those participating in these movements.

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The struggle was only half-heartedly joined by a left-wing caucus of people from various radical groups, who leafleted, though quite effectively, the daily mass meetings on more basic social issues, but failed to wage the fight for a democratically-representative steering committee. This fight would have helped to raise the issues in a clearer way and would have helped to prevent the subsequent bureaucratic maneuvering of the CSR steering committee.

Three hundred of the 1000 University faculty members were sufficiently shocked by the police brutality to meet the following morning, the 19th, to caucus before a faculty meeting that evening. Immediately after the mass meeting on the mall, an ad hoc group of eighty teaching assistants had declared a strike until the demands of the CSR were met.

Another mass meeting of three thousand, on the morning of the 19th met on Bascom Hill to crystallize demands. These people then split up into large picketing groups and went to most buildings of the big U.W. campus carrying signs saying, "No more cops on campus," "No police brutality here," "Student Strike," etc.

That evening, the faculty met from 5 P.M. till nearly 12 midnight and defeated the faculty members sympathetic to the strike on every substantive resolution brought up, including a resolution to condemn the Administration for calling in riot cops. At about the same time, the campus Teaching Assistants' Association voted to go on strike in sympathy with the CSR's resolutions. Although the TAA makes up less than twenty-five per cent of the UW's teaching assistants, a considerably larger number of new T.A.'s were there.

After the faculty meeting, hundreds of students crowded around the entrance of the building where the faculty had met, and stood silently as the faculty filed past them. A political rally was then held at which some sympathetic professors urged the students to continue their strike. At this time the already-fragmented steering committee re-composed itself with different people. While the chairman of the steering committee and a few new members had been elected at the morning meeting, the formation of the new steering committee that night was again left to the fiat of the few rather than the decision of the many. It was also at this meeting that the demand for protection of striking T.A.'s from firing was emphasized.

## flickering protest

By Friday, the 20th, the strike had mellowed somewhat as the enthusiasm and militancy of people died down. Reports that morning indicated that many classes in the letters and science (liberal arts) department had been called off. T.A.'s were, however, not strictly on strike, generally, since many attended their classes but used them to discuss the strike issues. At a rally of three thousand held at 12 noon, people decided to stage a mass march to the Capitol the next day to dramatize the protest and post their demands on the Capitol door.

That night, a meeting of the steering committee, now generally defined as anybody at the meeting who felt he had "done some work," "reconsidered" the mass meeting's mandate for a march. One professor actually urged the steering committee to tell the mass meeting Saturday that the steering committee wouldn't sanction the march and a significant minority of CSR leaders were prepared to abandon entirely the democratic mandate they had received.

Those who argued for the march, generally radicals,

decreased in number. This writer pushed for a march followed by further escalation of tactical militancy if all demands went unresponded to on the basis that only militancy in a mass struggle, and not submission, will be able to create the atmosphere in which protestors will gain any concessions at all. The arguments of the capitulators were familiar—"alienation" of wavering "friends" on the faculty who "might support" us although *what* explicitly in our program these "friends" would support wasn't mentioned. The tensions of the situation were increased by a simultaneous meeting of T.A.'s then going on, since many T.A.'s were not for the march.

The steering committee voted against "recommending" a march. But the mass meeting on Saturday morning overrode the steering committee and held the march. The march itself was not very militant but it occurred without incident with the support of around four thousand students.

On Sunday morning the steering committee met and three resolutions were presented. The first resolution deleted the demand for no armed cops on campus and "temporarily" suspended the strike without intentions of bringing the decision to the CSR at a mass meeting. These decisions were put as *faits accomplis* by the steering committee. The strike suspension was to show "good faith" to T.A.'s and to the faculty who were to meet again Monday night. The resolution also called for a six person committee of three CSR people and three faculty members to rewrite the University charter's provision for punishing striking employees. A substitute resolution presented by this writer urged escalation of demands, including a "no confidence" vote by the faculty in Sewell, who had threatened to resign if amnesty were granted to suspended students, alongside a threat to sit in and block up the main administration building the Tuesday following the Monday night faculty meeting. A third resolution dealt with the wording of the University's charter alone. Both of the last motions were declared out of order by the chairman (who was not the chairman elected by the mass meeting of the CSR), who was supported by the steering committee. No discussion was allowed on the political and tactical issues and only "points of order" and "points of information" were taken.

## bureaucratic faltering

Another meeting of the steering committee was called for later that afternoon to discuss the proceedings of the steering committee that morning, including the steering committee's suspension of the strike without prior consultation with the CSR membership. After this meeting, a



rally was called for that night at which only 600 people showed up. There the steering committee's "decision" was "approved" *ex post facto* by the relatively small group of people assembled.

Monday night the faculty met and passed the proposal for a student-faculty committee in a watered down version limiting its powers to only "recommend" certain measures. As about two thousand people listened to the piped-in proceedings of the faculty meeting an anti-war leader told the former meeting that he had been subpoenaed with four others, but was not going to appear. At an emergency CSR meeting after the faculty broke up, two thousand people met but again no concrete militant and effective proposals were made. On the steering committee's recommendation, people broke up into "discussion groups." While subsequent to Monday night the steering committee met, the strike had extensively collapsed. Attempts made at Monday afternoon's mass meeting to present alternative motions were rebuffed by the meeting chairman as "out of order," so the meeting of the faculty that evening had nothing to worry about at all. The "compromises" of the leadership had destroyed the strike. The failure of radicals to try to stage a rank-and-file floor fight for internal democracy contributed to the steering committee's ability to pose itself as the "official spokesman" for the mass CSR. But the drop in participation in the political activities was due to alienation of the membership by the manipulative tactics of the steering committee as well as the latter's failure to sustain the atmosphere of militant enthusiasm with which we started.

By now, having won none of our substantive demands; with thirteen students suspended and not reinstated; with Chancellor Sewell recommending *more* cops on campus; with a new anti-obstruction law before the legislature, which has already passed the lower house by a 90-6 margin, that would penalize offenders with a \$500 and/or three months in jail; and with the arrests of obstructors taking place, as well as with the witchhunt now going on in the legislature through its own miniature HUAC, it can be seen that by our submission, we lost the first major round.

### democracy a necessity

There are a number of important political and tactical lessons to be learned from the first set-backs of the CSR struggle.

Firstly, the crucially important relationship between the leadership and the mass base in a political struggle. Neither can function effectively without the other.

Secondly, the necessity of relating the long term goal

to the fight for short term demands. Just as the liberals, by subordinating the movement to the attempt to gain "practical" immediate aims lose even the possibility of attaining those short term aims; so the radicals, have failed to link the struggles of a broad mass movement for immediate aims to the long term struggle against the War in Vietnam and capitalism itself. Those sincere anti-war activists on campus who attacked this writer's call for armed self-defense as "not the issue" were themselves mistaken. The very social situation in which we were involved made the issue, for most people, the cops' terrorism. In the process of being beaten, most of the students weren't learning to oppose Dow or capitalism; rather, they were confronted with a totally new picture of cops. At the beginning of the protest the issue was cops, although if radicals had intelligently fought in a political manner against the sell-out leadership, they might by this fight have been able to help raise the consciousness of large numbers of students to other issues. While the issue was cops at first, it was up to radicals to act to make it something different.

Thirdly, crucial to the strike was the support of a sector of teaching assistants. While "student power" may sound feasible, ultimately teachers and University employees must be brought into the struggle against the Administration. It should also be noted that the growth of the student movement was dynamically related to the influx of new people into T.A.A. Organizing T.A.'s and University employees in unions can be an essential aid to the student movement.

Finally, the students must begin to realize the subordinate role of the University in capitalist society which destroys not only their aspirations for a more creative and humanizing education, but the aspirations of other sections of American society, workers, Negroes and the poor. Ultimately, the only real safeguard of the student movement is a broader movement for social change throughout American society composed of these other sections of society.

It is to be hoped that the experiences of the defeat of the CSR will not be lost on its participants and other members of the student movement. Unless we can build on the basis of our experiences, the movement can not go forward. Unless we learn from our defeats, we continue in a circle. The defeat of this particular struggle by the CSR should be looked upon as the first step in the building of a student movement at Madison, the basis upon which a stronger student movement can grow.

AL GREENE

## 3 brooklyn college

ON Thursday, October 19, the Naval Air Corps came to Brooklyn College. Two officers set up a recruiting table in the lobby of Boylan Hall in the center of campus. At noon, representatives of SDS, du Bois, and the Student-Faculty Committee against the War entered the lobby. They had asked earlier for permission to set up their own "recruiting" table. It had been refused on grounds of safety. Now

they brought their own table and a selection of anti-war literature.

When the students reached the lobby, a chemistry professor who doubles as Safety Officer stopped them. He and a minor dean instructed them to leave. When they did not, Jeff Gordon of SDS and PL was singled out and asked to hand over his on-campus card. He refused. Very well,

they said, you are suspended if you are a student. Whether you are or not, you are trespassing and must leave the campus. As Gordon refused, a police sergeant appeared from the wings. Gordon and thirty or forty others promptly sat down.

Within half an hour, there were ten or twelve cops on the scene. They started dragging students out but stopped after the first five or six. For every student they removed, three or four sat down. The impasse continued until after four o'clock, when a new shift came on duty. Then thirty cops charged into the seated audience, grabbed Gordon, and dragged him off. They also dragged off about twenty others, more or less at random. After pulling the students down a flight of stairs by the hair, they threw them in a wagon parked in back.

### student resistance

However, someone had slipped up. The paddy wagons were parked in a circular driveway. By this time over a thousand students had filled both ends of the drive. After trying to move them with a dose of carbon monoxide, the cops made a nightstick charge on the crowd from two sides at once. A few cracked heads later they were on their way to the station house. Among their captives was a professor who had dared upbraid an officer for manhandling one of his students.

That night the students voted overwhelmingly to strike. At eight Friday morning there were picket lines at every gate to campus and at every classroom building. Another 1500 students picketed in the quadrangle. As they marched the students told each other some of the incidents of "Black Thursday": the dean who was asked by a girl with a bleeding head for a band-aid, but turned away to offer a cop some coffee; the administration officials at a faculty tea who shrugged and said this was not their department; the acting president who, as usual, was not on campus when the trouble started.

The administration claimed twenty per cent attendance on Friday; the students claimed ninety-five per cent on strike. At noon they rallied, three or four thousand of them, to discuss demands. The first was no more cops on campus. Others included no summary suspensions, no preferential treatment for government recruiters, and a student-faculty discipline committee. The rally also declared the offices of the three administrative hacks who had called the cops to be vacant.

Over the weekend the administration got together with some student government types and made concessions. These were, of course, far short of the students' demands, but they sounded good. On Monday morning copies were passed out to everyone. The picket lines were smaller and

the classrooms a little more populated, but the strike was still sixty per cent solid. At the noon rally the students discussed, and rejected, the concessions. They wanted more. There was faculty support now, and even some organized support from parents who had watched the Thursday events on tv.

### momentary quiet

On Tuesday the administration conceded a few more crumbs and the strike caved in. Some of the gains were real, others illusory. But after the strike the right and "radical middle" came out of hiding. The college president raised the cry of outside agitators. The campus newspapers talked of sinister leftist plots. Brooklyn DA Aaron Koota announced that he was bringing the arrested students to trial, even though the college declined to press charges.

For the moment, the Brooklyn College campus seems almost back to normal. Its WPA-Georgian buildings echo the drowsy hum of lectures, not the roar of mass meetings.

But in a few weeks the CIA recruiters are coming.

IAN McMAHAN

## ghetto

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 3

ment and leadership to focus and expand this militancy. Many of the militant Black organizations that have sprung up are organized primarily around the use of weapons. To a large extent they orient toward the futile and disastrous notion of guerrilla warfare, in which small bands of Blacks would terrorize the whites from sanctuaries in the Black community, rather than toward the task of organizing a Black mass movement. As a result, the uprisings in the ghetto were only spontaneous and disorganized attempts to do what an organized mass movement would have, in part, been doing: interfering with the police and waging a battle against slumlords and slum merchants. The armed organizations, contrary to their plans for guerrilla warfare, found themselves forced to engage in armed defense of these spontaneous actions against the police and troop invasion. Many others, previously unorganized, also found themselves forced into armed defense of the ghetto. And the uprisings have given new impetus to organizations for armed defense.

### black power

Struggle against the police, the slumlords, and the slum merchants, and the armed defense of the ghetto are necessary. But they cannot, either in their present disorganized state or as a total program, ultimately bring success to the Black struggle. The urban ghettos are not quite the same as foreign colonies of white society (an analogy popular among Black militants), geographically, politically, or economically. It is not enough to drive the white exploiters out of the ghetto. Black militants must launch a political attack on the power structure of white society itself. Unless that structure is changed, the ghetto will be crushed by the overwhelming numerical and technological superiority available to the present Establishment. To rely on spontaneous and disorganized uprisings as a program will result only in the defeat of the ghetto. Such uprisings are not only less effective than an organized movement in waging day-to-day struggles, but more importantly, they are not capable of challenging the power structure of white society. The uprisings, we have witnessed are progressive in that they do help build the consciousness in the Black community of the nature of

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the white Establishment and its institutions. But the task now is to build from these spontaneous and disorganized actions a powerful and effective movement that could really represent Black Power. The failure of such leaders as H. Rap Brown who have solidarized themselves with the uprisings is that they are not acting as leaders. They are acting as spokesmen, articulating the sentiments and consciousness of the ghetto. But in so doing they are suggesting the blind-alley strategy of relying on spontaneous and disorganized activity rather than pointing the way toward the building of a political movement.

### **a political movement**

Such a political movement must develop a program that can focus the Black struggle against the white power structure as well as meeting the day-to-day needs of the Black community. Such a program must involve struggle on every level, both electoral and non-electoral. Given the conditions under which the old civil rights movement arose and its middle-class leadership, it was to be expected that it tried to create an entrance for Negroes into the social structure as it is. But the dream of the Negro becoming part of middle-class America was a will-of-the-wisp. The structure of the economy and the dominance of white racism were immovable obstacles. The movement raised the hopes of the Black masses, but it could not create a real movement in the ghetto because its program failed to connect with the concrete expectations of the people. "Black Power" is a tremendous step forward, but many of its proponents are still caught in the web of "solutions" that accept the present structural bases of American society. For example, the development of a Black Capitalism (which would in any case be no solution for the problems of the masses of American Negroes) is impossible. The giant corporations and financial institutions that dominate the American economy—and indeed all of American life—would soon turn these "Black" enterprises into the arms of the white power structure. A coherent, independent Black movement can only be built around a program that is based on demands that offer a way out for the ghetto masses: full employment, substantial rent subsidies, a massive rebuilding of slum areas under local democratic control, and so forth. The creation of such an organized, independent Black force is the most important task before the movement today.

Armed defense would be a crucial aspect of such a force, for it would make possible new and successful struggles within the ghetto. For example, rent strikes in



the past have been only occasionally and partly successful. Slum conditions generally atomize the slum dwellers rather than unite them. Some victories have been won, but no movement has developed capable of building steadily on the basis of these gains. Tenants in each building were stalled with minor concessions and were unwilling to continue the struggle in support of their neighbors. Black Power could provide a needed stimulus for creating a feeling of solidarity, of identification with fellow-Blacks in struggle. Armed defense of rent strikers could be a further stimulus, absent in the past, by revealing the ability of masses of Blacks to prevent police-enforced evictions of hitherto-helpless families. Armed defense as an end unto itself leads nowhere, but when it is part of and committed to the defense of a mass movement, it makes possible new victories for that movement and for the ghetto as a whole.

Black militants must also be aware of the level of consciousness of the Black community at large. Today, most of the ghetto at least passively supports the revolts, but tomorrow it may vote en masse for a "lesser of two evils" Democratic Party politician who is not responsible to the ghetto. It is easier to see the immediate enemies, the police and slum merchants, than to recognize and respond effectively to the greater enemy, an entire social system with its sophisticated institutions. Unless a movement provides leadership and a program of action, the uprisings may only lead to the demoralization of the same people who supported them out of an elemental sense of Black solidarity and outrage. After the uprisings are put down by the troops, ghetto residents who have to live in a devastated and burnt-out area are likely to experience a return to the apathy and sense of futility which has for so long shrouded their lives and prevented mass action. They may then come to agree with the liberal Black leaders that the way forward is not through militant struggle but by accommodation to white liberalism. This is a likely outcome if the small Black militant organizations try to substitute themselves for a mass movement, as suggested by their guerrilla warfare strategy. They must address themselves to the Black masses, destroy the traditional sense of futility by offering a positive program for building a mass-based movement through which the people can force a change in the condition of their lives.

### **black power and labor**

The Black community has a weapon of tremendous potential at its disposal that it has not even begun to use: the pivotal position of Blacks within the labor movement. In America's large cities Blacks make up significant sections of economically crucial unions. The potential for militant Black caucuses which could exercise decisive power within these unions is tremendous. In New York, a number of these caucuses already exist, and the group within the crucial Transport Workers Union has called for the formation of white rank-and-file opposition groups as well. With the growth of rank-and-file insurgencies throughout the trade union movement and the expected strike wave next year, the increased militancy of American workers may well give Blacks an opportunity to shake this society to its roots.

In addition to the waging of organized struggles in the ghetto and in the labor movement, one of the first steps in building the necessary political movement is recognizing that the Democratic Party is not the party of Black people and that independent political organization is needed. It would be a step forward for the ghetto to move



from supporting the Democratic Party to having its own political organization. Such an organization could tie together electoral action and direct action, disrupting the stability of American consensus politics. Electoral action would be part of the mobilization of the entire Black population. It would also make possible the beginnings of joint action with those elements of the white community, such as the anti-war movement, which are struggling against the Establishment. In 1968, a "Peace and Freedom" presidential campaign based on these elements would be the start of a fundamental political attack on the power structure itself. These activities are not going to be organized by the Black politicians. In fact, quite a number of Black politicians have been demagogically using the Black Power slogan to advance their own careers and to channel oppositional sentiment back into the Democratic Party.

Responsibility rests heavily on the Black militants, who must organize people less radical than themselves. If a movement is organized, the Black revolutionaries will function as its left wing, pressing for still greater awareness of what needs to be done and who the enemies are. The leadership and program of such a movement will be limited only by the political consciousness of the rank-and-file. The advancement of this consciousness will be the continuing task of the left wing.

Black Power is at war with Police Power, and the average white person finds himself merely a spectator, with no immediate stake in the outcome. If most whites are racists, only a handful are direct beneficiaries of the economic exploitation of the ghetto. The spokesmen of the power structure are waging vigorous political warfare against the revolts and the Black Power movement, trying to divide Black people and to gain the support of whites for whatever repressive measures might become necessary. The mass media are busy generating a panic atmosphere which will make possible the legal lynching of Black Power leaders such as H. Rap Brown of SNCC.

### **alliance from below**

The Black movement today can expect little help from any sector of white America, nor should it compromise its struggles in an effort to win white liberal "allies." The precondition for a meaningful Black-white alliance is the emergence of a strong white movement fighting for its own demands against the "white power structure." Such a movement would be impelled toward overcoming its racism out of sheer necessity, in order to forge an alliance with exploited Black people based on mutual strength and mutual need. This is what happened in the great CIO organizing drives of the '30's, when white unions had to admit tens of thousands of Blacks as members and co-fighters. The belief in White Supremacy was stronger then than it is today, but the fruits of that alliance-based-on-necessity far exceeded the miserable handouts now being offered by liberal politicians. If the current labor struggles increase in intensity, it will be possible for Black Power and a militant white movement to join forces against the Police Power of the corporate capitalist state. It is the task of white radicals to help build this developing white opposition to the Establishment.

There are today the beginnings of a white oppositional movement in America, against the war in Vietnam. At present this movement still retains illusions about ending the war by working within the Establishment and its institutions. Such a movement must be strengthened so that its opposition to the war translates into a complete break from and effective confrontation with the Establishment

that is conducting the war. Only then can the anti-war movement be a legitimate ally of the Black struggle.

### **defend the uprisings**

There are today significant numbers of white militants, especially among the students, who support the ghetto struggle even now that it has come to armed rebellion. We must make ourselves heard. We have a responsibility to publicly defend the Black Power movement and the revolts at a time when every liberal spokesman is attacking them. For the sake of the kind of future movement that we hope to build, for the sake of future alliances that can overturn the old society and create a new one, we must put ourselves in solidarity with the freedom fighters of the ghettos.

## **middle east**

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

The UN withdrew without any of the usual diplomatic procrastination and without any attempt to exercise either political power or reason to hinder Nasser. The Arabs were trapped by their own adventurism and by that of the UN. The Israelis, who had contributed their share to the threatening build up, did not attempt diplomacy but launched all out attack.

For socialists and radicals, the fact that the Arabs were not looking for full scale war is no excuse for their actions which led directly to this war. At the same time, the legitimate right of a state to survive cannot be used as a reason to support the Israelis since this was not the important question involved in this conflict. Even if this were the central question, defense of the nation does not give Israel a *carte blanche* to rationalize any aggressive policy it chooses.

The present war in the Middle East demonstrates the bankruptcy of *realpolitik* solutions to fundamental social problems. There is little doubt but that the victory will strengthen the rightward drift of Israeli politics. The left should present a sharp alternative to turn the tide away from the wars and poverty which dominate Middle-Eastern life. The basis of this program must be:

- No territorial annexations.
- Self-determination for Arabs who were expelled from Israel.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 27

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"The duty of the revolutionary is to make the revolution." **Fidel Castro**

"The emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself." **Friedrich Engels**

# on régis debray

IN recent months, the writings of Régis Debray, in particular *Revolution in the Revolution*, published as the July-August, 1967 issue of *Monthly Review*, have gained widespread attention in left-wing circles and have attained considerable influence in the thinking of many who style themselves as "revolutionaries." Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, the editors of *Monthly Review*, state in their foreword to *Revolution in the Revolution* that "this little work represents a very real challenge to all revolutionaries everywhere." They further assert that it is a "comprehensive and authoritative presentation of the revolutionary thought of Fidel Castro." It is important, therefore, to examine and analyze Debray's thesis.

Régis Debray considers himself to be a revolutionary and a Marxist. He is concerned primarily with the problem of defeating American imperialism, overthrowing capitalism, and establishing what he refers to as "socialism" in Latin America. That he is no Marxist and that the social order which he seeks to establish has nothing whatever to do with socialism is highly demonstrable. The revolution which he does represent is of a very different nature—a revolution of, by, and for an aspiring new bureaucratic élite.

The situation which Debray faces in Latin America is one of social unrest and upheaval, if not yet one of imminent general revolution. Mass discontent runs high, anti-imperialist feeling is strong; worker, peasant and youth unrest sporadically breaks out in armed insurrection, as in Santo Domingo and Bolivia in 1965. The forces of reaction are, however, powerful. American imperialism is well entrenched in Latin America, with CIA agents, military "advisory" groups, plenty of "foreign aid" money available to shore up the power of the ruling oligarchies, and thousands of Marines on call if things get out of hand. The insurrections of the past few years have been defeated without too much difficulty either by the indigenous ruling classes, as in Bolivia, or by direct American intervention, as in Santo Domingo. The old, traditional Stalinist "vanguard parties" are, for their part, thoroughly bureaucratic, corrupt and opportunistic—useless as a revolutionary leadership. How, then, does Debray propose to resolve this dilemma?

## the guerrilla revolution

Debray answers that armed struggle must be initiated by the revolutionary intellectuals in the form of guerrilla warfare in the mountain areas and the countryside. This step, he argues, will begin the process whereby the armed power of the state is worn out, popular support rallied to the guerrillas, and the old order overthrown.

Debray's model differs, in form at least, from the classic Maoist theory of guerrilla warfare in several respects. The guerrilla-intellectuals, according to Debray, should form themselves into an independent, compact, mobile striking force separate from and independent of the

civilian peasant population, rather than attempting to build a mass peasant army, as was done in China and Vietnam. Debray's book represents the first explicit rejection by a theorist of guerrilla warfare of the idea of the mass involvement of the peasantry in the active phases of the armed struggle. (With respect to the working class, however, the theories of Debray and Mao are essentially the same. Debray seems to consider struggle in the urban areas to be a waste of resources and a positive danger to the guerrilla movement. At most, an urban movement can be an auxiliary to be used when needed, but which is clearly expendable. Similarly, during the period of the Chinese Civil War the Chinese Communists avoided involving the urban working class actively in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. In fact, in 1949, when Mao's armies had defeated the forces of Chiang and were approaching the major cities of China, workers were urged to remain quiet and to wait until the army arrived to "liberate" them.)

## a strictly military affair

Debray also has an interesting conception of the political role of the guerrilla fighter. He repudiates the conception of the guerrilla as an "armed agitator" organized into propaganda patrols which travel the mountain areas bringing the program of the revolution to the peasants. Instead, he argues, the guerrillas should avoid wasting time on the "political education" of those that they are attempting to "liberate" and concentrate on the main (i.e., the military) task, the defeat of the regular army in the field. He notes, with apparent approval, that in Cuba "during two years of warfare, Fidel did not hold a single political rally in his zone of operations.\* Only after the Army has been defeated and the previous zone of operations has passed into the effective military control of the guerrillas and become a rear area, he argues, can effective political work be undertaken. "In other words, armed propaganda follows military action, but does not precede it."\*\*

Debray does differ from Maoist theory and practice in one further respect. This concerns the origin and role of the vanguard party. Traditionally, the guerrilla army is supposed to be the military arm of the Communist Party (or of the "National Liberation Front" which the party controls) and is directly subordinated to it. Debray inverts this relationship. He argues that, in order to assure unity of command in the revolutionary movement and to guarantee it against becoming overdependent on outside support, the political leadership of the struggle should be in the hands of the commanders of the guerrilla band rather than in those of a distinct political party. The guerrilla army in effect becomes the vanguard party and its commander becomes, ex-officio, the undisputed political lead-

\*Debray, *Revolution In The Revolution*, p. 54

\*\*Debray, p. 56

er of the struggle. In fact, says Debray, subordinate political leaders should be chosen from among those who have distinguished themselves as military commanders. Again, the military determines the political.

In short, then, Debray proposes that left-wing intellectuals, acting more or less independently of other forces in society, initiate and carry out an armed struggle against the established order with the bulk of the population playing a secondary role. The guerrilla becomes the political leadership of the movement; in fact, he more or less is the movement.

Formulations of revolutionary warfare such as Debray's arise out of particular historical circumstances, and reflect the ideology of specific groupings in society. As noted above, Debray's thesis reflects, in general, the aspirations of the alienated intellectual in both the developed and underdeveloped worlds.

### debray and the intellectuals

Alienated intellectuals in the developed, Western world see in the writings of Debray, and in the actual guerrilla movements for which his writings form the ideological justification, an answer to the seemingly insoluble dilemma which confronts them. They are faced with a world in which international capitalism and, more particularly, imperialism are in the process of decay, but where there is no immediate prospect of revolution at home. Being intellectually committed to radical change, but lacking the social power to bring it about, they experience mounting frustration. Despairing of the possibility of revolution at home in the absence of a militant, radical working class movement, they look to the underdeveloped world for the answer. Guerrilla movements among the most exploited victims of imperialism seem to offer a way out. For Debray seems to offer a path by which the revolution (or a revolution, at any rate) can take place now, in spite of the objective conditions which had denied that possibility. For the less mass-oriented of these intellectuals, Debray performs an even greater ideological service. With his rather

lyrical descriptions of the purity of the guerrilla movement, he appeals to their (very strong) romantic and élitist instincts. They can now visualize a revolution unembarrassed by the untidy (and possibly uncontrollable) nature of a real mass movement from below. And, more importantly, he offers them a rationale for their inability to relate meaningfully to the present level of mass consciousness. While it is not possible at the present time for them to seize power on their own in the West, he does at least give them an abstract perspective, a *Deus ex Machina*.

Debray's relationship to the aspirations of non-Western leftist intellectuals (those who would actually have to put his thesis into action) is somewhat different, although related. He seemingly provides them with a concrete political and military strategy for the establishment of their power. They find themselves in societies which generally have little use for their talents, and where the modernization which could put these talents to use is blocked by the native oligarchies and by the economic relationships imposed on these societies by the Western powers. Motivated by self-interest, nationalism, and a sense of altruism (actually, "altruism" coupled with the belief that they are the only social stratum in their societies capable, by virtue of their education and intelligence, of acting "unselfishly" and "in the interests of all") they desire modernization desperately. At the same time, they also reject any orientation towards a mass revolutionary movement from below. Due to their isolation from the worker and peasant masses, and the alternating romanticization of and contempt for these masses which isolation breeds, they tend to fear real participation by the masses as much as they hate the ruling oligarchies. Debray neatly resolves their dilemma, assuring them that they can carry out their revolution on their own terms, regardless of the state of mass consciousness. In doing so, he leaves them with a facade of Marxist terminology, stripped of its democratic revolutionary content. This is not to say that Debray and his adherents consciously counterpose themselves to what they feel to be the interests of the masses. On the contrary, they assert that their revolution will bring progress and enlightenment to the oppressed. This, of course, is what any incipient new class aspiring to social power will maintain and believe. Since, however, the revolutionary-intellectuals retain the sole power to decide "what the masses really want," the reality (if the Cuban example, of which Debray is so fond, is any indication) should be quite different from the professed ideology.

### whose new society

Once Latin American intellectuals do follow the steps outlined by Debray the political and social outcome of the situation is more or less determined. Assuming that they are not defeated militarily by the oligarchies, which is by far the most likely possibility despite Debray's rather optimistic outlook, the victorious revolutionaries would proceed to establish a new social order. What sort of society would it be? The new regime would almost definitely nationalize the means of production and expropriate foreign investments, thereby providing itself with a "socialist" facade. Their "socialism," however, should bear very little resemblance to the socialism towards which Marx, Engels, Lenin and the working class movements of the last hundred years aspired. For Marx, socialism meant the social ownership of the means of production, under democratic control from below—workers' control. The

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working-class movements of the last hundred years have, at certain points in history, succeeded in establishing those institutions through which workers' control could be effectively exercised (the Commune of 1871, the soviets of 1917, the workers' councils of 1956), although these institutions did not survive the (either bourgeois or Stalinist) counter-revolution. The peasantry, due mainly to the conditions of rural life, does not tend to create such institutions on a sustained basis. Where such peasant councils have been formed they usually have been in a symbiotic relationship with such workers' institutions.

### the guerrillas and the masses

The conditions of guerrilla warfare eliminate the possibility of such institutions. In the first place, guerrilla campaigns are of necessity conducted in the more remote rural areas, far from the urban centers where working class power could be effectively maintained. As a result, even effective communication between the masses of workers and the guerrilla armies is impossible, let alone effective control by the workers of those armies. Secondly, since a guerrilla army is, throughout most of the war, insufficiently supplied and equipped to meet the regular army in a pitched battle with any hope of success, it is unable to protect any specific area from the forces of the old order, and therefore is unable to protect revolutionary institutions from suppression by the ruling class, even if such institutions did arise. Most importantly, followers of Debray would actively oppose the creation of any independent peasant institutions. Sustained revolutionary institutions among peasants are difficult at best. Peasants, unlike industrial workers, are not concentrated and organized by the very conditions of their life and work and do not tend to establish institutions (such as, at one level, trade unions) to protect their own interests. Industrial labor organizes people to work together in large numbers, enforces cooperation, identifies common enemies—all in the very seats of power in any society, the urban areas. Instead, the peasant by the very nature of his work process tends to remain isolated from his fellow peasant, in his life, outlook and aspirations. He retains a highly individualistic outlook towards life, one that is hardly conducive to self organization. Workers may aspire to own their own shop but under radicalizing circumstances this drops away rapidly and the idea of social or class control becomes the natural mode of response. Seizure of state power becomes a necessary mechanism for such control being maintained in their own hands, hence the proclivity to creating soviets or councils; i.e., the bourgeoning of mass democracy.

The peasant, on the other hand, at his most revolution-

ary, is for private ownership of the land. Since each peasant aspires to his own plot of land, the impulse toward social ownership, hence the workers' attitude toward the state, is missing.

No peasant class, in addition, has been able to take state power and hold it for any length of time. Historically, an outraged peasantry has provided a comparatively easily manipulable base for another group to utilize in its quest for power. In our present case, it is Debray's revolutionary-intellectuals who so use the peasants. This is true whether there is mass involvement of the peasantry (as in China and Vietnam) or not (as in Cuba).\*

Debray's model for revolution is a particularly informative example of what happens in such cases. The masses, both workers and peasants, remain uninvolved, in any significant way, in the struggle against the old order. They are unable to wield any effective control over either the revolutionary movement or the new social order. They remain the passive objects of history, rather than making their own history and their own new society. Instead, they rely on a tiny band of guerrillas to "make the revolution," to "liberate" them, and to wield power "in their name." (It is interesting to note in this connection that in Cuba, Debray's favorite historical example, out of a society of several million people, the guerrilla army which seized power on January 1, 1959 numbered no more than 800 men.)

A new society arising out of the sort of revolution which Debray proposes would certainly be characterized by new property forms and political relationships. In such a society economic power would, as noted above, be concentrated in the hands of the state. The state, however, would just as certainly be in the hands of the leadership of the guerrilla movement, which would possess a monopoly on effective political power. This group, then, could be characterized almost from the beginning of its rule as a new bureaucratic class, which in effect collectively controls the state, and through the state the means of production; the whole social order is thereby transformed into a bureaucratic collectivist society.

### accumulation vs. consumption

The new regime in such a society would undoubtedly undertake, as rapidly as possible, the primitive accumulation of capital (modernization). In order for this accumulation to proceed at the pace which such regimes generally hold to be necessary and desirable, capital for reinvestment would have to be sweated out of the backs of the workers and peasants by means of the most extractive exploitation possible, and their consumption limited to a bare subsistence level.\*\* This is the "progress" which the new regimes hold out to the masses. This is not to

\*It has been argued that increasingly the nature of the Latin American peasantry has been changing and that there are now large groups of peasants whose life styles and nature of work are more and more similar to the working class than to the traditional peasantry. This is true and very important. However, it should be noted that these peasants are not the guerrillas' chosen base. In Cuba, for example, the Castroites centered themselves in the Sierra Maestra among traditional peasants whose aspirations were for small land ownership as opposed to basing themselves on the sugar plantation peasant-workers. This was not by accident as Guevara pointed out a number of times.

\*\*The regimes based on the Cuban experience intermix harsh

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say that the new bureaucratic class would use its social power primarily for its own material enrichment. On the contrary, a new ruling class which has just assumed power and embarked on the road of primitive accumulation of capital would more than likely maintain a Spartan standard of living for itself—especially a class with the ideological pretensions of the bureaucrats of the underdeveloped world—and would impose an even more Spartan standard of living on the rest of the population. They would, however, maintain their self-interest through the continued aggrandizement of their own political power. This process would probably continue through the first, and possibly the second, generation of the bureaucratic class; subsequently material considerations would most likely reassert themselves.

Debray is himself the perfect ideological proponent for those intellectuals who aspire to social power. Romantic, indeed mystical, personally brave, he is by method an idealist rather than a materialist. Despite his use of this characterization in his fulminations against those whom he refers to as "Trotskyists" (in effect, any revolutionary socialist with an orientation towards the working class; his grossly distorted caricature of their position is hardly worthy of comment, except to say that his attacks on it seem to be more motivated by his need to put the ghost of mass participation and control to rest once and for all than by any desire to deal with it seriously) it is Debray who contends that nearly all objective conditions can be transcended by the will of the revolutionary, and that, by virtue of their "revolutionary" consciousness, his guerrillas have the right to determine the direction and program of the revolutionary movement independently of mass control.

As a mystic, Debray seems quite fond of religious imagery. He speaks of the role of the guerrilla army vis-a-vis the peasant masses as "this historic vicarship"\* (probably not an inaccurate description). Referring to the relationship between theory and practice, he describes how "the political word is abruptly made flesh," of how "This transubstantiation [of theory into practice] comes as a surprise, and when those who have experienced it want to describe it . . . they resort not to words but to exclamations"\*\*\* and so on, ad nauseum.

### revolutionary catholicism

Debray lays considerable emphasis in his book on the allegedly "proletarianizing" effect of the Sierra on the guerrillas. This is, quite frankly, utter nonsense. A protracted military struggle, waged in an isolated area where the combatants are cut off from any meaningful contact with the working class, does anything but proletarianize the guerrilla army. What it does do, in fact, is to reinforce the tendency for the guerrillas (both the original revolu-

enforcement and stringent regulation with ideological appeals of great persuasive power to get popular collaboration. The very real threat of US invasion and barbarism creates a willingness among the masses to give their all, with little recompense, to the anti-US regime. Secondly, the regime may as Cuba does, try to get capital from abroad to moderate the internal austerity before it hits revolutionary proportions. The only substantive source is the USSR and this brings the ostensibly independent nation into the web of the Kremlin's imperialist orbit. Cuba now plays a dangerous game of semi-bucking Russian policy while in this position. Like those semi-colonial countries tied to the American dole who have tried similar policies, time runs out and the whip finally cracks down.

\*\*Debray, p. 112

tionary intellectuals and those peasants whom they have managed to recruit to their ranks) to become declassed. It is an interesting example of Debray's idealism that he considers the mountain areas to have a proletarianizing effect, while he thinks that life in the urban centers (which are, one would presume, the home of the bulk of the working class and the birthplace of working class culture) has a "corrupting" and "bourgeoisifying" effect on the workers.

### the pack animals of the revolution

One further example is necessary regarding Debray's conception of the proper role of the peasantry. Referring to the Cuban experience, Debray quotes Fidel Castro regarding the relationship of the peasants to the guerrilla army: "Now I know who the people are: I see them in that invincible force that surrounds us everywhere, I see them in the bands of 30 or 40 men, lighting their way with lanterns, who descend the muddy slopes at two or three in the morning, with 30 kilos on their backs, in order to supply us with food."\* Valuable allies, to be sure, but allies in their role as the pack animals of the revolution, rather than as active participants in their own movement.

The writings of Régis Debray reflect the tragedy of the left-wing Latin American intellectual, who, driven by his own social impotence, frustration, isolation from the masses, and, above all, by his failure to transcend élitism, seeks to bring about a revolution which, due to its own conditions of struggle, will result in a society as oppressive and anti-democratic as the one which it replaces. The only concrete possibility for avoiding this tragedy lies in the revolutionary intellectuals orienting towards the working classes of the various Latin-American nations. Large and potentially organized working classes exist in most of these countries. The excuse that one cannot wait until objective conditions change so that the working class moves toward power, that substitutionalism is a necessity, is belied by the evidence. The guerrilla movement in Cuba did not win because it militarily defeated the Batista regime. Rather, objective conditions changed rapidly, virtually every class in Cuban society turned against Batista; in a classic revolutionary situation, the state power collapsed. A vacuum was left into which Castro marched, heir to a situation he did not create.

If radical intellectuals had maintained a socialist working class perspective and had participated in its movement, a different result would have followed. The reason for writing off the working class lies in the élitist outlook of the radical intellectuals and not in the reality of some permanent working class immobilism.

The hope is that revolutionary socialists in Latin America will base themselves in the working class. Such a perspective does not abandon the peasant. Rather, it sets up the basis for a real alliance based on the strengths and goals of each and not the dubious "altruism" of an élite.

### DON BACHELLER

AT this writing, Régis Debray is imprisoned by the murderous clique which now rules Bolivia. Whether or not Debray participated in guerrilla warfare or merely engaged in sympathetic journalistic support is of course not the real question. All sincere democrats throughout the world must demand the freedom of all political prisoners in Bolivia, Debray and those less celebrated as well. Any imprisonment or trial under the Bolivian military rule is a travesty of even elementary justice.

\*Debray, p. 113

# two laws against labor

FOR the past year, public employee unions around the country have been under severe attack. The most vicious and effective of these attacks has come in "pro-labor" New York, a state with over two million AFL-CIO members. The new anti-strike Taylor Law or, as it is called in labor circles, the RAT Law (Rockefeller And Travia), which replaces the old, ineffective Condon-Wadlin Law, is a monument to the criminal ineffectiveness of the AFL-CIO's idea of politics. The new New York City law establishing an Office of Collective Bargaining and effectively limiting the scope of issues that public employee unions may bargain on is a monument to the labor bureaucracy's cynicism and callous disregard of anything other than dues collection. The result of these two laws, which went into effect on September 1st, is to hamstring the ability of hundreds of thousands of New York State and City employees to fight for a better life.

The reason why such laws should appear at this time is rooted in the present difficulties faced by American Capitalism. The enormous expense and inflationary pressures of the Viet Nam War has thrown a monkey-wrench into the old Keynesian machinery. If the billions of dollars going into the Viet Nam War have prevented a recession, as they certainly have, they have also helped to create an apparently uncontrollable inflation. In addition, urban riots and discontent at home have forced all levels of government to put at least some money into "anti-poverty" programs designed to mollify this discontent. The expense of the War and the persistence of inflation lead the Federal government to raise taxes. Higher taxes and higher prices lead workers to demand more money. What is more, the growing cost of the War forces cuts in Federal money for local anti-poverty, educational and other programs. The State or local government must then either raise its own taxes or cut its own programs—or not expand them, which amounts to the same thing.

## the budget squeeze

This chain of events can be seen in this year's attempt to juggle the New York City Budget. Toward the end of December, 1966, Mayor Lindsay asked Governor Rockefeller to grant the City an *additional* \$300 million to balance the Fiscal 1968 Budget. A few days later Rockefeller said that he would give the City a little more State aid but not \$300 million which would require a tax increase. At about the same time, Rockefeller scored the Federal government for not granting more aid to the State. It seemed as though there just wasn't enough to go around, so City Comptroller Procaccino predicted that the City's debt service would rise in 1968 by \$44,072,182 to a grand total of \$716,269,037. In the end, Rockefeller came through with \$126 million and Procaccino "discovered" an extra \$66.3 million so that absolute disaster was averted.

But money was harder to come by and something had to be cut. One area that was cut was the anti-poverty program. The Newsletter of the City's new Human Resources Administration (HRA) reported in April that HRA

would not get the \$45 million for community action programs it had expected for 1967-68. "It may turn out to be difficult to hold the line at this year's spending level of \$33.6 million." Of the \$25 million in State aid requested by HRA, they expected to get \$2 or \$3 million. This news followed a cut of Federal funds for certain programs from \$22 to \$17 million.

## wage restraints

But these sorts of cut backs are only piece-meal ways of dealing with the problem. Obviously, a more permanent, efficient way of holding down public expenditures is needed if those in power are to avoid taxing themselves out of office. By far the largest single "cost of production" in public service is labor. Obviously, the best long-range technique for holding down expenditures is to hold down the wages of public workers. Since the size and aggressiveness of public employee unions have been growing in New York, such an economic policy requires the hamstringing of these unions. In addition to the economic reasons for emasculating the unions there are, of course, political reasons—particularly since the Transit strike. Militant public employee unions are scarcely popular *within* the labor movement; outside of it they are an anathema. It is politically more feasible to tie up these unions than to cut back on regular government services or to raise taxes.

For a couple of years now, Rockefeller has requested the State legislature to "up-date" the Condon-Wadlin Act, which banned public employee strikes by enormous fines on individual unionists. The enormity of the fines made the old law unworkable. In fact, the law had been enforced only once in its 20 years of existence, against the Buffalo Teachers Union in 1948. The new law has none of the "flaws" of the old one. The Taylor Law, named after Professor George Taylor who designed it, allows the State to fine individuals, but it also allows for fines against the union itself; \$10,000 or one week's dues for each day the union is on strike. Furthermore, the State can withdraw the union's right to dues check-off for eighteen months for striking or even advocating the right to strike. Obviously, such penalties can break all but the largest and strongest unions. The anti-strike penalties, however, are only one aspect of the law. The Taylor Bill was sold as a law guaranteeing collective bargaining rights for public employees, and it does provide a mechanism for recognizing "employee organizations" for the purpose of negotiating with the State or local government agency. However, the law allows the agency to determine who shall be in the bargaining unit, which means that administrators can be thrown in. In fact, the Public Employment Relations Board set up under the law can appoint an organization which has a State-wide majority in an agency as the bargaining agent—without an election. What this would mean in New York State is that company union outfits such as the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) can be appointed sole bargaining agent with unions, such as Council 50, AFSCME, left out in the cold.



The Board, which is appointed by the Governor, also has the power of final arbitration, and the power to decide what is bargainable.

### the RAT act

The purpose of the Taylor Law was well described in an analysis by Steve Zeluck, the President of the New Rochelle American Federation of Teachers (AFT),

In view of the mounting demand by public employees for Collective Bargaining, [the Taylor Law recognizes] the inevitability of Collective Bargaining, but [creates] a situation in which really effective Collective Bargaining can not take place. This is achieved by rendering the union impotent, by observing the form of Collective Bargaining but not the substance. Thus we lose the right to decide for whom we bargain, the right to decide what is negotiable, the Board effectively has the final say on differences, and we even lose the de facto right to strike. (Analysis of Taylor Bill, by Steve Zeluck, mimeo.)

This vicious anti-labor law was proposed by Republicans, but it was passed by Democrats. The debate over a law to replace Condon-Wadlin has been going on in the State Legislature since December, 1966. For two months the Republicans and Democrats were unable to reach an agreement over the proposed Taylor Bill. This disagreement, however, was *not* over whether or not the law should forbid strikes, it was over the *degree* of penalties to be imposed on strikers. The Republicans, at that time, proposed unlimited fines on striking unions and/or individuals. The Democrats wanted some limits on the fines. Finally, at the end of February, Rockefeller introduced a "modified" Taylor Bill which provided for an initial fine of \$10,000 and one month of the union's total dues and then an additional fine of \$10,000 and one week's dues for each day on strike. Anthony Travia, Democratic speaker of the House, threatened to introduce a counter bill which would, he said, "reflect what I think is a fair penalty." On March 15, the modified Taylor Bill passed the Republican dominated State Senate while the Democrats continued arguing for smaller fines. The Bill now moved to the Democratic Assembly, where the debate over the *size* of the fines continued for a while. However, toward the end of March, the nature of the debate changed again. For three days the Democrats held up the

Bill, but not even on the question of fines. The New York City Democrats were fighting to have Lindsay's proposed Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB) supercede the State's Public Employment Relations Board for New York City unions. In short, even the fight over the size of the fines was dropped. At the same time, Travia entered into negotiations with Rockefeller. Apparently, these negotiations were primarily over the New York City question and had little to do with the fines and nothing to do with the right to strike. As a token concession—or rather, a face saver for the Democrats—the Republicans dropped the initial fine, but kept the \$10,000 and one week's dues fine. On April 1, this "compromise" passed the Senate. In a special session called by Rockefeller and Travia, on Sunday, April 2, Travia whipped enough Democrats into line to push through the final version of the Taylor Bill. The debate over this crucial anti-labor law lasted only two and a half hours, just enough time for most New York City Democrats to go on record against the Bill without really trying to stop its passage. The final vote was 93 to 51, with all those voting against the Bill being Democrats, mostly from the New York City area. All of this occurred in the final hours of this year's legislative session. In fact, a special session had to be called to pass the Bill. Under these circumstances, it would have been a simple matter for those Democrats who pretended opposition to have prevented the passage of the Bill by filibuster. The official AFL-CIO version of these events is that the 51 Democrats put up a courageous and principled fight, from beginning to end, and that only the perfidy of Travia was able to pass the Taylor Bill. This is clearly nonsense. The Democrats never opposed an anti-strike law. At best they only argued over the size of the fines. These Democrats obviously did not view Travia's "perfidy" as very serious, for two days later they *unanimously* elected Travia the President of the State Constitutional Convention. It might have been hoped that the labor bureaucracy would have learned a lesson from these events, but such is not the case.

### bankrupt resistance

The AFL-CIO has been campaigning and lobbying for years to eliminate or revise Condon-Wadlin. For nearly twenty years the strategy has been the AFL-CIO's tradi-

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**end the draft!**

**escalate the resistance!**

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tional policy of relying on their Democratic "friends." Until this year, they have not even been able to get a slight revision of the Act. This year, "pressure" yielded a law that is even worse than Condon-Wadlin. In the final days of the legislative session Ray Corbett, crusty old bureaucrat from the Iron Workers and head of the State AFL-CIO, ran around button-holing Assemblymen. Three days before the passage of the Bill, Corbett confidently told reporters, "We've got something coming up that might upset the whole applecart." What was this final thrust of labor's strength? A general strike? An announcement that labor would break with the Democrats if they would not help labor? No! Labor's thrust to "upset the whole applecart" was a telegram from George Meany. That is how labor's strength was brought to bear in the final desperate hours of the legislature. The only attempt to use the strength of labor's rank and file to defeat such a law was a demonstration by 2,500 public employees called by AFSCME, District Councils 37 and 50, on March 14.

### the ranks' response

The response of the labor bureaucracy to the passage of the Bill is even more pitiful considering the seriousness of the new law. As early as December, 1966 it was clear that some sort of anti-strike law would be passed, the question was only how severe the fines would be. But all of the months from December to April were not put to use designing a new political strategy. In fact, in the first days after the passage of the Taylor law, the leaders of the public employee unions had no idea of what to do. When Al Wurf, Director of State Employees Council 50, AFSCME, addressed the Executive Board of Local 1412 shortly after the passage of the Bill, he was not even willing to discuss a strategy for fighting the law. One of the first interesting ideas for fighting the Taylor Act and the politicians came from a meeting of the local leaders of Council 50's Mental Hygiene unions. They proposed a two point campaign: 1) the ouster of Travia from leadership of the Assembly; 2) the formation of a "public employees' party" to elect labor candidates to the Legislature. This healthy response from the secondary leadership, however, was not to become the official policy of the public employee unions. The idea of a break with the Democratic Party remains foreign to the thinking of the labor bureaucracy.

At about the same time, in early April, Jerry Wurf, President of AFSCME, called Al Wurf, Victor Gottbaum, Director of Council 37, and other AFSCME leaders to Washington. There he proposed a large public rally with big name speakers, etc., and the building of a "war chest" to be used politically to punish enemies and reward friends. Local leaders were urged to embarrass Travia but not to hit him "too hard." After all, Travia was a friend of Harry Van Arsdale, President of New York City's AFL-CIO, and you never know when you might want Van Arsdale in your corner. Besides, Travia's legislative assistant's salary had been paid by Councils 37 and 50 (another example of a bankrupt political strategy) and he might be persuaded to do some favors in the future. At any rate, these ideas, put forth by Jerry Wurf, became the guidelines for the present strategy of the public employee union leaders.

The goals of the union leadership are not the repeal of the law, or even a right to strike clause in the State Constitution; they are to elect more "friends of labor," i.e. Democrats, to the State Legislature. The kick-off for this

campaign was the huge May 23rd "Fight Back" Rally at Madison Square Garden. The sponsors of the rally were AFSCME, the UFT and the Transport Workers Union (TWU), the idea being that these three unions had forged an alliance and would help each other in future strikes. All of the speakers declared that their unions would strike, law or no law. However, the real atmosphere of the rally was well described by the TWU's Rank and File Committee's newsletter:

The May 23rd Garden Rally against the Rockefeller and Travia (RAT) Bill featured lots of actors, singers, door prizes, comedians, hats, raffles, marching bands, politicians, and many similarly dull "don't worry, we'll show them!" speeches, which at the end left the 25,000 rank and filers as bewildered about what they should do or what would be done as when they arrived. (*The Rank and File News*, June 1967)

As it turns out, the rank and filers who went to Madison Square Garden because they thought their leaders wanted to lead them into a fight against the "RAT Law," will be expected to do only one thing—pay more dues. The per capita dues of District Council 37, the leading union in the alliance, will be raised by \$1.00 a month. Half of this increase will go to build a \$1 million fund contributed to by the three unions to pay fines if there should be a strike; \$.25 will go to a political action fund for lobbying and campaigning; and \$.25 to expand the normal function of the Council. In short, the leadership will "take care of everything." But it is clear that they intend to "take care of everything" in the same old way. At the Rally, Jerry Wurf made it very clear that the political program of his union would be to work harder to get those good Democrats—who did nothing to stop the Bill—into office and keep them there.

### more of the same

We will go out and we will support our friends, and we will support them so hard that anybody who doesn't get our support doesn't need our punishment or enmity. (*Public Employee Press*, May 31, 1967)

Wurf didn't even bother with the idea of defeating those who voted for the Taylor Law. No public employee's party, or independent political action, for Wurf, just more of the same old thing—at a higher price to the union membership. Ten of Wurf's "friends," State legislators, were on the stage at this Rally. On the other hand, some of the other public employee unions were not asked or allowed to participate—the SSEU, Teamsters, Nurses, CWA, etc. Indeed, it was clear at the Rally, and doubly so since, that all the talk about striking "if we have to" and crushing labor's enemies was rhetoric. Gottbaum, Shanker (UFT), and Guinan (TWU) have no intention of using the enormous potential strength of their members in action. They are out for a lobbying and electoral campaign—in the Democratic Primaries.\* The fact that this sort of strategy hasn't worked for the past twenty years, and has only produced a worse law, has not impressed the labor bureaucracy at all. Even the brave talk about striking has faded away. In early June, about two weeks after the Rally, Al Shanker and the UFT recommended that the teachers abandon the strike and in its place use

\*Having been abandoned by Travia, the new political hero of District Council 37 is Frank O'Connor, Democratic City Council President (see *Public Employee Press*, June 21, 1967, cover showing Statue of Liberty and quoting Frank O'Connor, and article on p. 3).

the mass resignation. With the support of the more conservative elementary school teachers Shanker was able to push this proposal through a poorly attended membership meeting. AFSCME, Council 50, seems to have adopted the point of view that the Taylor Law really does grant collective bargaining and has dropped its active opposition to the law. This also seems to be the line of the Teamsters' public employee leaders, at least those of Local 237.

Only one attempt has been made by the AFL-CIO leadership in New York to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the Constitutional Convention. Far from being an all-out attempt to force the Convention to write the right to strike into the Constitution, this feeble action was simply to insert a vague "Labor Bill of Rights" into the Constitution. Staying well within the limits of their "pragmatic" approach to political matters, the State AFL-CIO in the person of Ray Corbett introduced a paragraph which says:

The State shall ensure and protect employees, in public and private employment, in the exercise of full freedom of association, self-organization, designation of representatives of their own choosing and preservation of their right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and protection. (*Public Employee Press*, June 21, 1967)

The *Public Employee Press*, organ of D.C. 37, AFSCME, hopes that "a court might conclude that the phrase 'concerted activities' includes a strike." Even if this clause were included in the new State Constitution, there is no reason to believe that any court would consider this vague wording as superceding the very clear wording of the Taylor Law. The real truth is that the leadership of the public employee unions are making only token gestures and are not seriously preparing a fight to break or eliminate this anti-labor law which could wreck public employee unionism.

### the bureaucratic mentality

The reasons for this failure to fight are many, but primarily they are to be found in the labor bureaucracy's political conceptions and in their notion of how a trade union should function. The political conception is obvious, remain in the Democratic Party — the party of your enemies, no matter what the cost. The trade union ideas of the public employee leaders are more complex. It is not possible in this article to go into a thorough analysis of today's labor bureaucracy. Most of the readers of *IS* are already familiar with the class collaborationist practice of today's labor leadership. It is hardly necessary to point out that these labor leaders accept the system and its institutions and that as often as not, they are the guardians and enforcers of these institutions and their discipline. An instructive insight into what these facts mean concretely to public employee union bureaucrats, however, is to be found in the attitudes of most of them toward New York City's new law establishing an Office of Collective Bargaining and the Tri-Partite agreement that preceded it.

The new City law establishing an Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB) grew out of the Tri-Partite agreement signed by the City and District Council 37 in the Spring of 1966. The new law is essentially the same as Tri-Partite and was passed this June. Like the Taylor Law, Tri-Partite or OCB, as it is now called, provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. In fact, City employees have had this legal right for some time. What is really significant about OCB is its provision for "the use of impartial and independent tribunals to assist in resolving impasses in contract negotiations," on the one hand, and its severe limitations of the "scope of collective bargaining," on the other. It should be kept in mind that the architects of this law included Victor Gottbaum of D.C. 37, as well as City officials and professional labor arbitrators such as Peter Seitz.

### labor statesmanship

The City law provides for a "Board of Collective Bargaining" to oversee labor negotiations. This Board is given an impartial coloring by the fact that the unions will have two out of the seven members of the Board. The labor members will be chosen by the Municipal Labor Committee, set up by Tri-Partite which, in effect, belongs to D.C. 37. The impartial members must be agreed to by both the labor and City members. Theoretically, the Board will be impartial in its decisions on cases. This Board has the right to interfere in negotiations, determine what is negotiable or even what can be sent to arbitration, and to force the parties into mediation. Strikes are forbidden during negotiations and for thirty days after a mediation panel's report is presented to the Board. In fact, there is a long, involved procedure for mediation and impasse panels which are intended to tie a union up in prolonged legal machinations. On that score there is nothing impartial about the Board. All Board members are committed by law to work for a "peaceful solution" of labor disputes. The leadership of District Council 37, at least, apparently believes that this is possible and more, that it is desirable. An analysis of this procedure written by D.C. 37's Research Director Danie\* Nelson, and distributed to its locals, states, "Equally important is that the new procedures rely on genuine bargaining and impartial fact-finding to remove the need for strikes." There it is, strikes are no longer necessary. Labor leaders now become real statesmen operating out of official government positions (Board). The gentlemen from the City, the experts, and the labor statesmen will sit down, like rational men, and decide what the local unions can and cannot bargain for or win. And that is what the leadership of D.C. 37, AFSCME, thinks collective bargaining is. In fact, what this scheme really represents is the further absorption of the trade unions into the state apparatus.

The other aspect of OCB, the limitations of scope of bargaining, is a more direct thrust at militant unions. Section II-B of the Tri-Partite agreement, which is to be enacted by Executive Order under the provisions of OCB, specifically excludes certain crucial matters from bargaining. It states:

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determine the standard of services to be offered by its agencies; determine the standards of selection for employment; direct its employees; take disciplinary action; relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; maintain the efficiency of government operations; determine the methods, means and personnel by which government operations are to be conducted; determine the content of job classifications; take all necessary actions to carry out its mission in emergencies; and exercise complete control and discretion over its organization and the technology of performing its work. **The City's decisions on these matters are not within the scope of collective bargaining, but notwithstanding the above, questions concerning the practical impact that decisions on the above matters have on employees, such as questions of workload and manning, are within the scope of collective bargaining.** (emphasis added—KM)

6 District Council 37 has put much emphasis on the last part of this statement, which seems to open "practical impact" for bargaining. Their hopes have not been born out. In the Fall of 1966, the Police and the Firemen agreed to submit the question of whether or not workload was bargainable under Tri-Partite to arbitration. The arbitrator was Peter Seitz, who had participated in the framing of Tri-Partite and was familiar with its intent. Seitz ruled that a union could negotiate, or even submit to fact-finding, only the question of the "existence of undesirable or unsatisfactory working conditions." As far as the solution to these conditions go, Seitz stated,

The City is not obligated to bargain, however, on the specific method, means or manner in which such change or alleviation shall be effected. This is a matter confined exclusively to the decision making of the City by the management rights provisions of II-B and is outside the area of bargaining. (SSEU News, November 7, 1966.)

This means that unions will not have the right to bargain on workload or conditions — caseworkers on caseload, teachers on class room size, sanitation men on the number of workers on a truck, etc. Seitz also concluded that the unions cannot bargain on job descriptions, which the City can change at will. Thus, large areas of bargaining essential to most workers have been given up. District Council doesn't like to admit that it gave these things up, but that's what it did.

### dues vs. rights

Since Gottbaum, and most of his colleagues, accept the "labor peace" ideas of OCB it is easy to see why they would accept that part. It is more difficult to understand why they would accept such limitations on bargaining. The answer, in an immediate sense, seems to lie in the provision of OCB that grants city-wide bargaining rights on fringe benefits, hours, overtime, etc. to that union which represents 51 per cent of the City's employees. That union just happens to be District Council 37. D.C. 37 represents 104,000 City employees, and even though it only has 49,000 members (less than half of the employees it legally represents), this entitles it to exclusive bargaining rights on the issues mentioned. Obviously, the union with such rights has the edge on its competitors — SSEU, Teamsters, etc. To put it crassly, Gottbaum and the D.C. 37 bureaucracy have traded a number of the workers' rights for the possibility of a monopoly in City employment. Dues versus rights.

The City's two other large unions of public employees, the TWU and the UFT, have been relatively silent on

OCB—doubtless out of courtesy to Gottbaum. Only a handful of the smaller unions have fought Tri-Partite and OCB, most notably the SSEU. In Spring, 1966, the SSEU initiated a coalition with about 10 other unions, called the United Committee for Collective Bargaining, to oppose Tri-Partite. The United Committee had one demonstration of 8,000 people and indulged in enough lobbying to prevent the passage of OCB last year. The partners in this committee were unequal in terms of militancy and commitment, and unfortunately, the United Committee never really functioned after the Summer of 1966. This year, the SSEU and the Teamsters, feeling they could not stop the Bill, lobbied for slight adjustments in the law —one of which, the Weiss amendment, would allow other unions on the Municipal Labor Committee besides D.C. 37. In short, for the last year there has been no serious, thorough-going opposition to OCB.

### the SSEU resistance

This leaves New York City employees with a pair of laws, State and City, that seriously threaten the ability of their unions—even given the will—to win important gains for them. The fight against the Taylor-RAT Law has been channelled into Democratic politics, where it is "safely" out of the hands of the workers themselves, and the bulk of the union leadership has accepted, or even worked for, OCB. All of this is a great victory for State and City bosses. It is a victory not only because the present upsurge in public employee unionism has been driven into orderly, and highly official, channels, but because this attack on labor has found the unions divided. The City was able to use Gottbaum against the Teamsters, the SSEU, and unwittingly against the UFT as well.

The recent Welfare caseworkers strike—really a lock-out—was primarily over the issues covered in OCB—would caseworkers have the right to bargain on caseload and service and could they bargain on hours and benefits now relegated to D.C. 37 on a City-wide basis. The City insisted that the SSEU replace its old bargaining clause which guarantees the right to bargain on "salaries and salary grades, fringe benefits and other perquisites, promotions, Time and Leave rules and Pay Plans and Regulations, workload, working conditions, changes of title and personnel practices pertaining to the titles in this Contract" with Section II-B (quoted earlier). Against overwhelming odds, the SSEU held out for six weeks to maintain a contract clause that would allow them to bargain on workload and conditions. D.C. 37 not only refused to support this crucial fight in any way, but went so far as to print a vicious attack on the SSEU during the middle of the strike. Worse still, D.C. 37 actually went around the struck welfare centers and signed up scabs into their welfare local, 371. As a result of pressure from Gottbaum and others of his ilk, the teachers also refused to support the SSEU. This is most tragic since the issues in the SSEU strike were the same as the ones the UFT was forced to fight in the Fall in the form of classroom size, etc. Only the Teamsters and the National Maritime Union gave the SSEU any concrete support—and they for reasons other than labor solidarity. This is clearly a situation from which only the City bosses can profit, with bureaucrats of Gottbaum's stature gaining crumbs of political prestige. All of this is obvious in the case of the SSEU, for the caseworkers did not win many of the things they had fought for—particularly the contract clause that would protect them from OCB in the future.

## rank and file revolt

Where does this leave New York's public employees? In a way, it leaves them where they were before the laws, with a fight on their hands. But now, they will be forced to add to the list of their enemies the top level leaders of their unions. This means that there must be rank and file organization within the unions. If public employees are to win the rights their leaders have lost or given away, they will have to fight these leaders where it hurts—inside their trade union. This in no way implies de-emphasizing the fight against the City, for the fight for labor's rights is the thing the City fears most, particularly when that fight is made by the rank and file. There are already some rank and file groups concerned with this struggle. The SSEU has two rank and file groups committed to fighting the Taylor Law and OCB. These groups may soon be merged with a larger group that has grown out of those who voted to continue the recent strike for a sixth and seventh week. Local 1412 of AFSCME, Council 50, also has a rank and file group concerned with these laws. In the TWU there is a rank and file committee, which has called for an attack on the Taylor Law (we quoted their Newsletter earlier). In general, however, membership activity is still at a low level among New York City employees. There are, of course, many revolts among the ranks, but they usually take the form of competing electorally for local leadership, such as happened in a couple of D.C. 37 locals, 371 and 1509, a couple of years ago. In these cases, the new militant leadership eventually makes its peace with Gottbaum. Nonetheless, there is a potential. The May 23rd Rally showed that 25,000 City workers were worried enough about the Taylor Bill to attend a mass labor rally. That, certainly, is not apathy. The first step toward a concerted fight against these new laws and the attack they represent, is to unite the existing groups on a common program for action, and then to move to rebuild the spirit of rebellion that still exists in the UFT. The 100 teachers in the Bronx who called for the rejection of mass resignations and a commitment to strike, law or no law, was only one such group. The program for such a rank and file movement should be one of opposition and not an

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The recent UFT strike was an inconclusive test of the Taylor Law. The structure that is supposed to enforce the provisions of this anti-strike law and to force the parties to mediation were not set up. Yet, the State and the Courts did decide to fine the union \$10,000 a day, amounting to \$150,000, and to put the UFT's President, Albert Shanker, in jail for a little while. The UFT will, of course, appeal this decision and it will probably be months before we see if the law holds up. One thing, however, was conclusively shown, and that is that New York State will not allow unions to use dodges like mass resignations. From the State's point of view, any attempt by workers to exercise their historic right to withhold their labor power will be viewed as illegal.

AS WE GO TO PRESS, Rockefeller has used the Taylor Law to rule the Civil Service Employees Association as the bargaining agent for all state employees. This clear case of union busting has been met with a pitiful response by AFSCME Council 50's leadership. Rather than initiating a program of mass involvement and action, the only hope for the survival of the union, it has launched a membership drive to file a 10% appeal for an election to Rockefeller's hand picked Public Employee Relations Board.

attempt to patch up an intolerable law through lobbying efforts. Rank and file committees should call for a Council of all public employee unions, AFL-CIO, Teamster, and independent, to oppose the Law and give mutual assistance to any union striking in violation of the Taylor law. The political source of this law, the Republican and Democratic Parties, must be fought head on through independent political action, based on a social program that can rally all the disaffected elements of society. Union members, particularly in the UFT and D.C. 37, need to oppose their leaders' favorable attitude toward OCB and to fight any limits on the scope of bargaining. The first steps toward such a strategy were suggested in the TWU *Rank and File News*,

Once we have organized strong representative rank and file committees of civil service workers in many departments of many unions we can begin to unite in larger groups and return to the path of direct action that won for labor and the civil rights movement every benefit that it has today.

A serious struggle against these ensnaring and crushing laws will certainly be a long one, but the alternative is a deterioration of working conditions and living standards.

**KIM MOODY**

## middle east

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 17

- Land or compensation to these Arabs and the choice of settling in Israel or Arab lands.
- A Bi-national state in Palestine, with equal rights and self-government.
- A call for a Middle-Eastern confederation of states and ejection of the rival imperialist blocs.
- In return, demand recognition of Israel as a state and its right of access to Suez and Aquaba.

These are the beginning steps for a revitalized Israeli left. There are and have been Israeli radicals who have advanced similar programs. Our hopes rest with them for the sake of the Middle East and the world.

Arab socialists have likewise to initiate a campaign to demand social advance at home instead of military adventure abroad. They too have a vested interest in steps toward a bi-national state in Palestine whereby Arabs and Jews can rule themselves in fraternal cooperation. They too have a deep interest in a confederation of Middle Eastern states which would be able to steer an independent course for the united area and eject the rival imperialisms. The first steps have to include not only demands upon the Israelis—that they join the Middle East, sacrificing their Europe ethos, through bi-nationalism—but agreement to recognize Israel and assure its navigational rights. These are not only the first steps toward peace but towards facing the issues of social revolution for the area and towards a break with foreign imperialist sway.

Socialists throughout the world must continue their struggles against the Imperialisms of West and East which, by their economic, political, and military penetration of the area, provide the matrix and the stimulus to a conflict which could erupt into World War III.