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GENERAL WESTMORELAND GOES -- U.S. TROOPS STAY IN VIETNAM

By George Novack

By kicking General Westmoreland upstairs from head of the U.S. military command in Saigon to Army Chief of Staff, President Johnson has tacitly acknowledged the validity of what his critics have been saying since the success of the Tet offensive: American military strategy in Vietnam has run into a hopeless dead end.

It has been revealed that as recently as January 1 Westmoreland submitted a year-end report predicting that war gains in 1967 would be "increased manyfold in 1968." He assumed that the enemy forces had been compelled to withdraw to frontier sanctuaries and would be unable to mount major attacks from bases within South Vietnam. He did not anticipate or allow for the possibility of any invasion of the cities.

The U.S. military mastermind was outmaneuvered and caught with "his plans down" by General Giap and the NLF strategists. While American forces concentrated on "search-and-destroy" missions in sparsely populated border areas and clung tenaciously to death traps like Khesanh, the NLF and North Vietnamese with collaboration from the population of South Vietnam assembled supplies, infiltrated their troops into the major cities, and launched the stunning surprise of their Tet offensive. Even the CIA privately admits that this was "a massive failure of intelligence."

It was far more than that. It gave convincing proof that the Pentagon's war policy is bankrupt.

The extent of this failure was summarized in the March 18 issue of Newsweek. The bombing of North Vietnam, its editors wrote, "was launched to punish the enemy, slow down Hanoi's infiltration of the South, bend the will of the Communists, so they would come to the negotiating table and bolster the government of the south." What actually happened?

Three years after the bombing attacks began, there are 112,000 instead of 5,000 North Vietnamese in the south. The Tet offensive, "brilliantly planned and powerfully executed," shows the strength of "the enemy's will." After sending half a million American troops mandated to "crush the enemy's main forces, root out the guerrillas, seal the borders and secure the countryside," "four NVA divisions are ranged near the tortured Marine garrison at Khesanh, security has broken down across the country, the Viet Cong are again recruiting feverishly and American casualties are sharply on the increase."

The puppet regime of the two generals in civilian dress, President Thieu and Vice-President Ky, has "been unable to galvanize their troops or their people and few indeed would be so rash as to predict that anything lasting can be built on their government." And many allied nations "can barely conceal their moral revulsion at the sight of the world's most powerful nation locked in battle with a small and obscure state."

Newsweek concludes from this "dismal balance sheet" that "the war cannot be won by military means without tearing apart the whole fabric of national life and international relations." Its editors propose a revised strategy and reduced scale of military operations designed to secure a military stalemate. The achievement of such a limited goal would pave the way for a realistic negotiated compromise.

This analysis of the U.S. situation in Vietnam and its recommendations are shared by an ever-growing number of people and publications on the top levels of the ruling circles in this country. These include military men like generals Gavin and Ridgeway, newspapers like the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, the majority of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, candidates such as Kennedy and McCarthy, and even privately disaffected officials just below the highest echelon of government.

According to Neil Sheehan, Washington correspondent of the New York Times, support for the current war aims "had been severely constricted" even before Westmoreland's removal, and "was progressively narrowing down to the President and his closest advisers: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford and Mr. Rostow."

Sheehan reports two recent incidents illustrating the "malaise" over Vietnam among the members of the Washington establishment. At an exclusive dinner party one of the country's senior diplomats berated a hawkish newspaper columnist in an angry voice: "It's people like you who are always talking about winning the war in Vietnam who are losing us the world."

At a dinner party a few days before, another senior government official referred to Walt W. Rostow, the special presidential assistant most closely identified with the current war policy, as a "fanatic."

In addition to these critics who

are deeply troubled by the administration's course, the majority of the American people want to get out of the war—and get out as fast as possible. This was indicated by the response to the questionnaire on Vietnam distributed to registered Democrats in Nassau County on Long Island in New York for guidance in selecting delegates to the Democratic National Convention. Out of 219,634 enrolled Democrats, 73,454 answered in the largest direct response in the nation on the war issue. Sixty percent called for either an immediate halt to the bombing as an aid to negotiations or complete withdrawal from Vietnam.

This sentiment is the single most potent factor in American life and politics today. Testimony on this point has just been given by two of the most authoritative figures in American journalism.

In the March 23 New York Post
Walter Lippmann described the extraordinary revulsion against both the war and
the draft in these terms: "The President
is confronted with the resistance, open
or passive, of the whole military generation, their teachers, their friends,
their families. The attempt to fight a
distant war by conscription is producing
a demoralization which threatens the very
security of the nation. No one living
today has seen a time when it was fashionable not to go to a war and entirely acceptable to avoid it. In all the other
wars of this country it was the fashion
for young men to go."

On March 24 James Reston, associate editor of the New York Times, asserted that "no President can face 500 American deaths a week during the enemy's latest offensive in Vietnam, plus a run on the dollar, a budget crisis in Congress, the Kerner report on the plight of the cities, and a challenge to his office by McCarthy and Kennedy -- all within a few days and all connected with the war -- without wondering about where the national interest and his personal interests lie."

Despite the tremendous attrition in his support, to all appearances Johnson is adamantly sticking to his past strategy. He reminds visitors to the White House to "remember the Alamo," himself forgetting that the last-ditch defenders of that Texas redoubt were all killed. He plans to send more reinforcements to Vietnam, though not as many as the 206,000 requested by the deposed Westmoreland.

He replies to his critics by suggestions that any questioning of his conduct of the war plays into the hands of Ho Chi Minh, who expects to win by "cracking America's will." That will has already been cracked into a thousand pieces and the most fervid exhortations from the president will not repair it.

Johnson will have to do far more than sacrifice the discredited Westmoreland to satisfy the growing chorus of his critics which is loudly resounding from one end of the country to the other.

GOMULKA ANSWERS STUDENT STRUGGLES WITH REPRISALS AGAINST PROFESSORS

By George Saunders

With signs of growing support from the working class, Polish students have persisted in their campaign of demonstrations for socialist democracy. The Gomulka regime has responded to the sharpening tremors with more punitive measures, such as the dismissal of six leading Warsaw University professors March 25, and with the violence of police clubs and of anti-Semitic vituperation.

In Cracow and Warsaw, students took up the tactic of sit-in strikes after engaging in street demonstrations and boycotts of classes. The sit-in by 5,000 students at the Warsaw Polytechnic School March 24 had the greatest impact, coming as it did after a speech by Gomulka calling for an end to demonstrations.

At the March 20 meeting where the Polytechnic students voted to strike, a message from workers at a rolling-stock plant in Wroclaw was read expressing sol-

idarity with student demands. During the 48-hour strike hundreds of adults came up to the spiked fences of the school campus and passed money and food through to the students.

During the sit-in the facade of the administration building was draped with banners. Some of the slogans were "Warsaw With the Students," "Workers, Your Cause Is Ours," "Democracy and Socialism," "Truth From the Press," "Don't Lie to Our Fathers, Workers and Peasants," and "Higher Wages -- Not Security Police."

Students distributed copies of resolutions demanding "freedom of expression, assembly, mass meeting, and demonstration," and calling for reforms like those in Czechoslovakia. The leaflets referred to "the revolutionary seething in the nation" and said, "Don't lie to the people," alluding to the rallies sponsored by the regime where "Zionists"

have been blamed for the disorders. According to <u>Le Monde</u>, during the strike the students received "many messages of sympathy from various institutions, as well as from the working-class milieu."

Late on the second day of the strike, March 22, some 10,000 people gathered outside the campus. The regime obviously feared that the insurgency of the students might spread. At 7 p.m. a column of riot police took up positions on the street bordering the campus. The crowd dispersed. At 8 p.m. an official ultimatum, broadcast over television, warned that unless the students ended their strike within the hour, they faced expulsion from school.

Apparently stirred by the ultimatum, the crowd of 10,000 reappeared at Workers Unity Square across from the school. At 9 p.m., the crucial hour, a student representative appeared on the balcony of a school building overlooking the square. He announced that, while some were leaving, 4,000 students had voted to defy the ultimatum. Cheers went up from the crowd: "General Strike,"
"Workers With Us." The crowd outside and the students within joined in singing the Internationale. The students held out for several hours more and then disbanded. The demonstration displayed good discipline and thorough organization on the part of the rebels.

In retaliation for this bold resistance, the regime fired six professors noted for their connections with rebel students. These were the same liberal professors on whom Gomulka blamed the crisis in his speech March 19. (In that speech he also half-heartedly attempted to set a tone of greater subtlety for the anti-Semitic campaign, which was being waged quite crudely by certain elements of the hierarchy.)

The professors who were dismissed were Bronislaw Baczko, Leszek Kolakowski, Stefen Morawski, Zygmunt Bauman, Wlodzimierz Brus, and Maria Hirszowicz. In announcing their dismissal, the Polish press agency said they were "revisionists"

who sought to "implant in youth political views contrary to the regime."

Among the youth named by the press agency as having been influenced by these professors were Jacek Kuron, Karol Modzelewski, Adam Michnik, Henryk Szlaifer, and Jozef Dojcgewant.

Kuron and Modzelewski, instructors at Warsaw University, were the authors of a document called "Open Letter to the Party," which advocated establishment of workers democracy with workers councils, and a revolutionary foreign policy. They were jailed in 1965 for circulating the document. Released in 1967, they have been rearrested during the present upsurge as its alleged inspirers.

Michnik and Szlajfer were arrested for leading a student demonstration January 30 to protest the closing of the play "Dziady." (See World Outlook, March 29, p. 270.) Michnik had earlier been expelled from Warsaw University for his activities protesting the expulsion from the party of Prof. Leszek Kolakowski (now fired from his job as well). Kolakowski, at odds with the party leadership since 1956, was expelled in late 1966 because of a speech criticizing the regime.

The Polish press agency explained the official view of the link between the rebel students and the dissident professors: the student group, it said, "could not have been active long and exerted such influence" had it not been for their "professorial defenders and protectors." The professors, said the press agency, had acted "contrary to the duties that the law on higher education imposes on them," especially since they were teaching subjects of "great ideological significance in close connection with politics."

Far from being cowed by the regime's latest reprisals, the students have been spurred to further resistance. They were reported meeting in secret to plan more protests like last week's sit-ins despite the threat of arrest or of being drafted into military service.

INDIANS IN BRAZIL VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE

The extermination of Indians in Brazil has reached such proportions in recent years that even the dictatorial Costa e Silva regime finally felt compelled to institute a face-saving investigation and abolish its Indian Protection Service, officials of which were charged with "all the crimes in the book."

According to Jader Figueiredo, head of an inquiry commission interviewed

by Associated Press in mid-March, "From theft to rape, from land stealing to assassination, from bribery to Middle Ages torture, every crime has been committed."

Whites exterminated entire tribes to get government title to their land. For example, the Patachos were wiped out with smallpox inoculations. Dynamite was dropped on the Cint-Largas and those who fled were machine-gunned from the planes.

DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS DENOUNCE ESCALANTE GROUP

By Antonio Valdés

The Dominican Communist party (PCD) has issued a statement distinguishing itself from the position and activities of the Anibal Escalante "microfactional" group in Cuba. The question of contacts by Dominican Communists with the Escalante group and of their possible sympathy with Escalante's views was raised in the report by Major Raúl Castro to the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist party. (See World Outlook, March 1, 1968, pp. 188-189, for the relevant passages of Raúl Castro's report.)

The report stated that during the Seminar of Latin-American Journalists held in Havana a Dominican journalist by the name of José Amado Camillo had contacted Escalante's former secretary, Yolanda Pulido, who made possible a two-hour interview between Escalante and Camillo. Escalante had reportedly suggested that Camillo send Dominican Communist party material to Pulido's house.

Raúl Castro's report also quoted the following remark by a supporter of Escalante, Orlando Olivera, at a luncheon with two Soviet citizens:

"The economic resources...that we have, that are obtained in dollars, are invested to subsidize, to give anti-Communist orientation throughout Latin America and on other continents, to attack the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of every country. It is not that we hold these ideas, but recently we spoke with two members of the Central Committee of the Dominican Communist Party — one of them is Justino del Orbe—and they told us that in their country there are two organizations that are anti-Communist but call themselves Marxist: the 14th of June Movement and the MPD."

Olivera implied, not necessarily correctly, that Cuba was giving its support only to the June 14th Movement and the MPD [Movimiento Popular Dominicano -- Dominican Popular Movement], both Maoist oriented, and not to the PCD. This is not likely, at least not any longer, since the MPD has recently expressed its Maoism in the form of attacks on the Cuban line, denouncing "Debrayism" as "petty bourgeois" in a manner that echoes the Escalante group itself.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Dominican Communist party issued its statement on the Escalante case in its paper <u>El Popular</u>. This statement was reprinted in the February 8 issue of <u>Bohemia</u>, published in Havana. The reprint was datelined "Santo Domingo,

January 30." The quotes in the present article are translated from Bohemia.

Noting that Raul Castro's report had mentioned meetings of PCD leaders with the "microfaction," the PCD statement declared:

"The secretariat of our party wants to make clear that it has no knowledge of such meetings and that if they took place, it was as a result of a unilateral decision by the alleged two members of our leadership, without consultation."

The PCD stated emphatically, "We do not support the position of Escalante and his factional group, nor do we support their activities. The positions presented by the PCD at the first conference of the Organization of Latin-American Solidarity [OLAS], held in Havana, and all our other positions in regard to fundamental problems of national and international policy clearly differentiate us from them."

The PCD, which participated in the Dominican delegation to the OLAS conference together with the MPD and June 14th groups, took a line divergent from most of the Latin-American CPs. It supported the line of armed struggle, called for socialist revolution, and opposed the alliance with the national bourgeoisie. (See World Outlook, October 20, 1967, p. 833.)

Differentiating itself from both "pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese groups," the PCD statement in <u>Bohemia</u> proclaimed: "Our international policy coincides most closely with the positions of the Communist parties of Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, Guatemala, and Haiti." This statement was written previous to the public break by the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces from the rightist elements controlling the Guatemalan CP leadership; therefore, it is not clear what attitude the PCD presently takes on the Guatemalan CP's positions.

"We feel no partisan identification," the PCD statement continued, "with the pseudorevolutionaries who have set themselves the task of discrediting the Cuban Revolution and tarnishing the memory of Che Guevara."

The statement clarified to some extent the background to the Dominican CP's evolution in recent years away from the class-collaborationist "peaceful co-existence" line of most Latin-American CPs:

"As far as we know, the Escalante

group has rightist positions similar to those of our former leadership, headed by Juan and Feliservio Daucoudray, which was expelled in December 1965 precisely because the party militants and the present leadership did not hold their conciliatory positions."

The statement indicated the possible source of the confusion over alleged PCD contacts with Escalante:

"We do not rule out the possibility that the factional group that left our ranks, which today constitutes the PSP [Partido Socialista Popular -- Popular Socialist party, ironically the same name as the old CP of Cuba], used our name to carry on these activities against the present leadership of the Cuban Communist party. This is quite possible because José Amado Camillo...was also expelled from our party for supporting the position of the previously expelled group."

The PCD statement did not identify

Justino del Orbe, the alleged PCD central committee member named by Olivera. However, the PCD document stated that it was replying to information given over Radio Havana. Thus; it is likely that the full text of Raúl Castro's report, with the exact names and circumstances that would have allowed a detailed answer, was not available when the PCD made its statement.

This is likely in the light of the concluding remarks of the PCD leaders:

"Our party requests a confidential, detailed report from the Cuban Communist party on the activities of the two unidentified persons mentioned as members of our Central Committee.

"This information would help us establish a definitive position on this case, which will in no way alter our position of solidarity with the Revolutionary Government of Socialist Cuba."

CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME UNDER PRESSURE FROM SOVIET BLOC

The apprehensions among the conservative bureaucrats in Moscow, Warsaw and East Germany caused by the political upheaval in Czechoslovakia which culminated in the removal of President Novotny and scores of his supporters led to the sudden summoning of an extraordinary Communist summit meeting in Dresden over the weekend of March 23. This meeting, requested by the East German and Polish governments, was attended by the Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian leaders.

As the March 25 New York Times commented: "There is no parallel in the history of the Communist movement for this confrontation, because at no time before were the parties in power in Europe able to act more or less as equals. Until recently they were subservient to Moscow."

The Kremlin fears that Prague may loosen its military and economic links with the Soviet bloc. Gomulka and Ulbricht are concerned lest Czechoslovakia's economic needs and reassertion of national independence lead the Dubcek regime, like Yugoslavia and Rumania before it, to turn toward West Germany. The price for trade and aid from that source would be diplomatic recognition of the Bonn government by Czechoslovakia.

The meeting sought to put pressure upon Prague to resist the lures of the Kiesinger-Brandt government and slow down any steps which would undermine the po-

litical monopoly of the Communist party and reorient foreign policy toward the West. The communiqué issued by the participants gave the impression that Dubcek had bent under the pressures, but his concessions may have been more verbal than real in an attempt to gain time.

The Communist governments of the Soviet bloc are responding in different ways to the Czechoslovakian developments. The East German and Polish regimes are dead set against the reforms and anxious to quarantine their countries against the contagion of democratization. The Hungarian, Rumanian and Yugoslav leaders look approvingly upon the new course while the Kremlin is watchfully waiting to see in what direction it will unfold and how far it will go.

As their conduct toward Yugoslavia in 1948, China in 1961 and Cuba since then demonstrates, the Moscow bureaucrats are capable of threatening and imposing severe economic reprisals upon workers states that refuse to kowtow to their dictates. Situated between the Soviet Union and Germany, Czechoslovakia is vulnerable to Soviet blackmail. However, the Prague leaders reportedly resisted a plan by the Warsaw Pact countries to hold military maneuvers in Czechoslovakia which would have put Soviet and East German troops on its soil at the most critical juncture of the new turn.

Czechoslovakia and Poland today represent the sharpest contrast in con-

ditions. In Czechoslovakia the liberalizers are on the march. With students and
intellectuals in the forefront of a vast
popular movement, the government is fostering economic, political and cultural
reforms. It is proceeding to rehabilitate
the 30,000 victims of the Stalinist
purges, beginning with Rudolf Slansky,
former general secretary of the Communist
party, who was executed after a frame-up
trial in 1952.

In Poland, on the other hand, the Gomulka regime is repressing students, persecuting intellectuals, holding fathers responsible for the actions of their sons, dismissing them from their posts and expelling them from the party.

Ulbricht's East German government is no less alarmed about the effects of the liberalization processes in Czechoslovakia. A visitor was told: "Even if the bug does not spread here, and I don't think it will, we will still have to contend with a braking act with extra caution to avoid being accused of imitating the Czechoslovaks."

The Czechoslovakian events are bound to have a fallout in the rest of East Europe and play an explosive role in the months ahead. This is presaged by the expressions of support exchanged between the Polish and Czechoslovakian students despite the efforts made to keep them apart.

To prevent the spread of the insurgent spirit, and deter Dubcek from any accommodation with West Germany, the Soviet and East German leaders are considering extending substantial aid to Prague.

Dubcek's team is in midstream trying to navigate a difficult crossing. It has to steer between the hostile suspicions of the Soviet, East German and Polish leaderships on one bank and its inclinations toward greater freedom of action in foreign policy on the other. At home it remains beset by the Stalinist diehards who are on the defensive but encouraged by the Dresden meeting, and by insistent demands from the people for a definitive break with all the old policies.

The predicament of the new leaders

was dramatized by two events in the past week. They are holding mass meetings throughout the country to enable the politically aroused sectors of the population to vent their grievances and articulate their demands.

At one such rally on March 20, attended by 16,000 young people, Joseph Smrkovsky, a member of the party presidium, was jeered when he criticized a proposed resolution because it omitted praise of Czechoslovakia's alliance with the Soviet Union. The resolution was finally amended by a compromise formulation saying that Czechoslovakia's geographical position in Central Europe made it essential that she maintain "equal and good relations with all neighbors, especially the Soviet Union."

At a similar meeting the previous week Smrkovsky did not oppose a resolution of support to the Polish demonstrators. (See "Novotny Forced Out as President of Czechoslovakia," World Outlook, March 29, p. 268.) This time, in deference to protests from Polish diplomatic sources, he opened the meeting by urging students to go straight home afterwards and refrain from marching from the hall to the Polish embassy, as some militants had planned.

A letter was sent to the presidium of the Communist party March 26, signed by 134 writers and artists, including the new president of the Writers Union, voicing their concern over the pressures exerted upon Czechoslovakia's delegation at the Dresden meeting. Party Secretary Dubcek had to take the unusual step of giving an interview to the official press agency to calm their fears.

On March 27 Czechoslovakia protested to East Germany over its interference in her affairs after the East German ideological spokesman, Kurt Hager, had criticized the reform movement at the congress of 1,200 Marxist philosophers in East Berlin. Hager later attacked Forestry Minister Smrkovsky by name for filling West German "militarist and revanchist" circles with hope.

This official objection is the most abrasive expression to date of the widening divergences between the East German and Czechoslovakian leaderships.

HELP FOR LONDON BANKERS

Worshipers of the golden calf in London, who may have been feeling unduly moody in recent days over the deteriorating relationship between the sacred metal and the money that bears as its emblem, "In God We Trust," can now find a convenient service for their spiritual needs.

On March 15, St. Edmunds Church, which is in the very heart of the financial district in London, put up the following notice:

"Prayers for bankers between 12 and 2 o'clock."

REPORT ON THE MARCH 17 LONDON VIETNAM PROTEST

By Ernest Tate

London

The March 17 rally and demonstration organized by the Vietnam Ad Hoc Committee was one of the largest and most militant demonstrations to hit London since the antifascist struggles of the 1930s.

More than 30,000 people surged through the streets to express their opposition to the Vietnam war and their "solidarity with the Vietnamese people against American aggression," as the campaign poster stated.

The March 17 action received even wider support than the successful October 22 rally of last year.

Prominent in the demonstration were a number of well-known personalities in the entertainment field. Actress Vanessa Redgrave addressed the rally, having flown from Rome to attend. She stated that she was in total sympathy with the aims of the action, and read messages of support from the Italian film director Michelangelo Antonioni, and Marcello Mastroianni, the movie actor.

The statement from Antonioni declared: "This is a shameful war. The Americans are not only fighting a war against Vietnam but one against themselves as well....I unite myself vigorously with your demonstration." Also present was Mick Jaeger of the pop group, the Rolling Stones.

A message of solidarity from Bertrand Russell was read.

The mass meeting in Trafalgar Square was addressed by ten speakers: Reg Taylor, Labour party and Amalgamated Engineering Union local leader; Tariq Ali of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC); John Palmer of International Socialism; Igor Webb, a young American from the Stop-It Committee; Subid Ali, representing Overseas Students; Obi B. Egbuna, of the Universal Coloured Peoples Association, the most well-known "black power" organization in Britain.

Alain Krivine of the National Vietnam Committee in France received a warm reception as did Christian Semler, a leader of the German SDS [Socialist Student Federation of Germany], who substituted for Rudi Dutschke, who was unable to attend as scheduled.

International representation in the rally was high. Over 100 German students from the SDS participated. Many students

dents had come from Italy, France and Sweden.

Pat Jordan, editor of <u>The Week</u>, the closing speaker in the rally, expressed the sentiments of many when he pointed out the success of "this united front which we have built." It was only possible, he said, because we took a principled line. He received loud applause when he stated that "some people don't like this united front, this line of solidarity They say it narrows the movement, but look around."

"Our aim," he said, "is an even bigger united front, that will include all the elements of the left. I think we can achieve this if all of you work for it. We need a mass campaign that will become bigger and bigger until this government is intimidated."

He announced that the next major project of the VSC would be the organizing of student actions to take place simultaneously with the mass student mobilizations in the United States, April 26-27.

Despite police attempts to prevent it, the demonstration ended with a mass mobilization in Grosvenor Square directly in front of the American embassy.

There were numerous, and often violent, clashes with the police as protesters sought to reach the huge American edifice that dominates the square. They occupied the large park in front of the embassy for almost two hours.

Several thousand police were mobilized to hold off the demonstrators from the main embassy building. They linked arms to form a human wall to protect it.

Pitched battles raged when police, mounted and on foot, furiously assaulted the crowds with truncheons in an attempt to regain control of the square.

Loud roars of laughter erupted when police helmets soared through the air and were used as missiles against their owners. As on October 22, windows went crashing.

After repeated cavalry charges by the police and the rallying of police reinforcements, the demonstrators retreated. Attempts to organize sit-downs failed when other demonstrators went around counseling against this tactic.

According to official police figures -- like the casualty figures in Viet-

nam, no doubt, grossly distorted -- over 117 police were injured. The police say forty-five demonstrators were detained in hospital. This does not take into account the many hundreds of people who returned home without having their wounds treated. Almost 300 people were arrested.

The two slogans around which the demonstration was organized were: "Soli-darity with the Vietnamese People Against American Aggression" and "End British Complicity in the Vietnam War."

The Vietnam Ad Hoc Committee is a loose alliance of left-wing organizations headed up by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. The Stop-It Committee, an organization of Americans in Britain opposed to the Vietnam war, plays an active part in the VSC.

The demonstration was preceded by a build-up of activity and publicity lasting several months. Over 250,000 pieces of literature had been distributed, taking the mobilization to a level comparable to the early campaigns of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament in its heyday.

The upsurge of militancy, especially among students, in opposition to U.S. aggression in Vietnam has left many of the traditional antiwar organizations in Britain in a crisis. Peace News in particular has been hostile.

Busloads of students came from all

over Britain -- students were the biggest single force in the demonstration. Banners of universities and colleges where there has been considerable student unrest in recent weeks were there from Exeter, Sussex and Leicester, Birmingham and Manchester. There were banners from as far away as Durham, from Liverpool, and from Oxford, Cambridge and Nottingham.

Labour party Young Socialists were well represented, as was the Young Communist League. There was a fair sprinkling of Communist party members. Several Labour party banners were on the march as were trade-union banners -- most noticeable being the AEU and SOGAT [Society of Graphical and Allied Trades]. There were banners from the Young Liberals, from church groups, and even from the Young Conservatives.

The Socialist Labour League lived up to its reputation for doing nothing on Vietnam by boycotting the demonstration. It called a counter rally instead for the following weekend.

The successful March 17 action takes the Vietnam protest movement in Britain to a new height. The problem for the organizers of the action is to learn how to build an even bigger campaign, as Pat Jordan stated, which will encompass segments of the mass working-class movement, especially the trade unions. When 30,000 people turn out on the streets, that day is not far off.

VIETNAM SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN ANSWERS RIGHT-WING TORY CHARGES

At a well-attended press conference in London March 19, three leaders of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, Mike Martin, secretary; Pat Jordan, chairman; and Tariq Ali, a leading member of the Ad Hoc Committee, repudiated allegations printed in the "yellow press" that they had set out to deliberately provoke violence on March 17.

"At no time," stated Pat Jordan,
"did we advocate a confrontation with the
police or violence against the police."
Tariq Ali stated that the police were as
"responsible as anyone for what happened."
Mike Martin informed the conference that
certain allegations made by several papers were being considered by the Campaign's lawyers to see if they were actionable.

Since the Sunday demonstration, the reactionary press has been carrying a campaign of intimidation against the organizers. Right-wing Tories were the first to raise the cry, to be quickly joined by some Labour MPs.

The three spokesmen for VSC issued the following statement:

"We wish to point out that we attempted to deliver letters of protest to the American Embassy -- as had been agreed to by the police -- but were prevented from doing so, in the first instance, by the crowd in front of the square. When we attempted to get through the police lines to tell the crowd to proceed with the march as planned, we were prevented from going forward by the police.

"But having said that, we think it is absolutely hypocritical for the press and the Government to moan and whine about the 'violence' of the demonstrators. What can be expected when we are constantly exposed — in the press and television— to the daily crimes of the Americans in Vietnam: napalm, torture, bombing, etc.? As far as we are concerned, the mood and temper of the demonstration on Sunday was determined by the nature of the American aggression. It is impossible to re-

main calm and peaceful before the barbarism of American aggression in Vietnam. As our president Bertrand Russell has said: to remain quiet, to acquiesce in face of such barbarism is to condone it. Many of those who have been 'shocked' by events on Sunday have not made one word of protest about events in Vietnam.

"Frustration has increased because all efforts to turn the Americans from their course seem to have failed, and especially because the Labour Government has reneged on every promise it ever made on Vietnam. Its leader, Harold Wilson, just ignores his own party's annual conference decision on Vietnam.

"We are convinced that all those who are concerned about the war will seek to use whatever means are necessary to

influence the Government to change its policy of slavishly following Johnson. We do not think that there is anything alien in this to British tradition. It was not until the suffragettes used the most militant means -- which resulted in much violence and the smashing of windows that their voices were listened to and women won the vote. Perhaps the Vietnam movement will have to do the same.

"For our part, we are not going to let ourselves be intimidated by the press or by Tory MPs. We plan to counterescalate and intensify our opposition to the Government's support for the Americans. Last Sunday's demonstration was only a beginning of our campaign against American aggression in Vietnam and in solidarity with the people of Vietnam against that aggression."

VALENTIN CAMPA DENIED PAROLE

[The following statement issued by the Mexican Political Prisoners Defense Committee describes a new incident in the witch-hunt which has gripped Mexico for many months. It gives further illustration of the movement to the right of what has been known as one of the most progressive countries in Latin America.

[The Mexican Political Prisoners Defense Committee was formed in August 1967 by representatives of all the schools of the University of Mexico. Its address is Perspectiva Mundial (Para el Comité), Apartado Postal 27-509, Mexico 7, D.F., Mexico.]

* * *

VALENTIN CAMPA, one of the hundreds of political prisoners who fill the jails of Mexico City, appealed for the parole to which he is entitled because he has completed two-thirds of his sentence. His case serves to show to what lengths the Mexican government has gone in its policy of repression. Despite the fact that the constitution grants him the right to it, the competent authorities have denied him his parole. For a better understanding of the outrageousness of this refusal, a little background is necessary.

Valentín Campa is a veteran member of the Mexican Communist party, long affiliated with the railroad workers union. After the railway strike of 1959, he fell victim to the wave of repression sweeping the country. He was jailed in May 1960 and sentenced to eleven years and two months in prison, which means that he has already served almost eight. The responsible bureaucrats' answer to Campa's request for parole was dated February 9 and entitled Prior Agreement with the Secre-

tary of the Ministry of the Interior. It was signed by the Department of Public Security chief in charge of the Federal District penitentiary. Among the reasons given for denying parole to Valentin Campa were the following:

"The district judge who sentenced him to the above-mentioned term and the Department of Justice attorney assigned for penal affairs to the Second Judicial District of the Federal District have expressed no definitive opinion as to whether or not benefit of parole should be granted or denied; they have left it to the judgment of the Department of Public Security to decide on the propriety or impropriety of the parole appealed for by the prisoner. The director of the Federal District penitentiary has attested to the prisoner's good behavior. Results from the criminological-medical study of the prisoner show that his thinking is rigidly cast according to an intransigent ideology insusceptible to change...that because he is sixty-three years old, although strong and in good health and sound from a physical standpoint, he exhibits a certain rigidity and difficulty in remolding his aforesaid way of thinking...we conclude that he has not repented, nor has repentance been proved, that imprisonment has not changed his personality as far as the political ideology he holds, which was the cause of his criminally antisocial behavior." Therefore, "Valentin Campa's request for benefit of parole must be denied and is denied herewith."

Never has the Mexican bourgeoisie's repressive apparatus shown such cynicism. There is no cover-up: It is ideas which are being punished, the ideology of its revolutionary opponents is punishable!

The repression is trying to force the political prisoners to become renegades, to betray their ideas, they are not only going to punish them for daring to oppose the "revolutionary government,"* but are going to strip them of their dignity, to make them renegades without self-respect.

There has been a furious scandal in the country over the possibility that the Summer Olympics [slated for Mexico] will be wrecked through the participation in these games of racist, fascist South Africa with its monstrous apartheid. This has led the Mexican bourgeoisie to unleash a campaign against Capetown-Pretoria. The Mexican bourgeoisie is afraid of losing the millions of pesos it invested in what seemed a perfectly safe and profitable proposition. The Mexican press is full of descriptions of the inhuman conditions of black people, etc. In addition, a campaign is underway against the "fascist" Avery Brundage, the president of the International Olympics Committee, who was responsible for South Africa's readmission to the Olympic games.

But what can be said of the method used by the Mexican government for justifying its denial of parole to Valentin Campa? That it is the favored method of open fascists like the "gorilla" butchers of Indonesia, Greece, Brazil, Argentina, and others of the same ilk around this beleaguered earth which is becoming a worldwide prison. Under the protection of the U.S. government's genocidal aggression in Vietnam, most of the world's governments think that they are justified in savagely repressing the people. Can it be that what Hitler failed to achieve can be carried through under the atomic shadow of the Pentagon?

In Mexico, the case of Valentin Campa is an ominous portent of what awaits the hundreds of political prisoners in the Federal District and the other hundreds throughout the republic. It is also a dangerous precedent which may be used against those potential political prisoners in this country, the men and

women who protest against this trampling under foot of the most basic human rights. No one can be sure that when Valentín Campa serves his [full] sentence some bureaucrat will not order his term extended because after eleven years of imprisonment he did not change his mind, falter, or renounce his ideas. Thought control is the lowest depth to which a dictatorial government can sink.

It is especially important at this time to make these facts known to world public opinion (fortunately Campa's case has been roundly discussed in the press by his political friends and by ordinary people disturbed by the spreading repression in this country). For, as a result of the international scandal touched off by South Africa's readmission to the Olympic games which are to be held in Mexico this year the Mexican government finds itself in the center of a controversy on the world stage over the right of peoples not to suffer discrimination.

The Mexican Political Prisoners

Defense Committee addresses itself to all groups, to democratic, progressive, and revolutionary people and asks that they redouble their efforts to inform and educate about the state of "veiled repression" which is arousing alarm in this country (still considered "revolutionary" by all those who accept their government's deceptive statements as true).

We demand of the Mexican government what it requires of South Africa!

Respect for the human rights of the Mexican revolutionary minority in the same way that it must demand respect for the rights of the black majority of South Africa!

That the country in which the Olympics are to be held respect the constitution that governs it and grant Valentin Campa parole!

Immediate release for the hundreds of political prisoners (workers, peasants, and students) that fill this country's jails!

Long live international solidarity with the victims of repression!

Mexico City March 1968

REPORT OF SUMULONG'S DEATH UNCONFIRMED

A Philippine Constabulary "source" claimed at the beginning of March that Commander Sumulong had been stabbed to death in Pampanga by a trusted aide. The report, however, has not been confirmed.

It may have been "leaked" by the government in hope of eliciting a response that would help locate the guerrilla leader, for whom a reward has been issued of 100,000 pesos [about \$25,000].

^{*} The Mexican government represents itself as the heir of the great Mexican revolution of 1911-17. The ruling party is called the Revolutionary Institutional party. -- W.O.

IS REHABILITATION OF STALIN A POSSIBILITY?

[The following article by Lev Kopelev, entitled "Ist Eine Rehabilitierung Stalins Möglich?," has been translated by World Outlook from the January-February issue of Tagebuch, an Austrian magazine that is generally considered to be close to the Communist party of that country. The editor of Tagebuch identifies Lev Kopelev as a Soviet writer, a specialist in German literature, who is already well known to Tagebuch's readers. He was asked to comment on a subject of considerable concern to observers of the new developments in Soviet literature, according to the editor, and responded at some length.

[Kopelev's opinions are of special interest as a reflection of informed opinion among Soviet intellectuals.]

* * *

You write, dear friend, with great apprehension about some recent Soviet publications, which, as you put it, made an "extremely disagreeable impression" on you. Specifically the publications are these: the article which you cited by Deborin and Telpukhovsky in the journal Voprosy Istorii KPSS [Problems of the History of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)], No. 9, Voroshilov's memoirs appearing in Oktyabr, No. 10, the novels by V. Zakrutkin and V. Kochetov (serialized in Oktyabr, Nos. 6-10), V. Kochetov's journalistic sketch Gorod v Shineli [City in Uniform], which was published in book form, and a poem by S. Smirnov, which appeared in the journal Moskva, No. 10.

In all these publications, so diverse both in theme and type, you feel that you recognize one and the same hardline tendency, namely a desire to rehabil-itate Stalin. It is quite natural that you were not only disappointed but also seriously apprehensive about the fact that after all that has become known in the last fourteen years, in contradiction to numerous documents and the experiences of millions of people, there are today journalists and writers who on their own would like to circumvent the resolutions of the twentieth, twenty-second and twenty-third party congresses and who consider themselves justified in maintaining that, although Stalin committed "a few errors," his role was on the whole progressive and beneficial for our country and for the international workers move-

You want to know what I think about this. I will try to answer your question as clearly and simply as possible.

I think that you are right in condemning with the greatest sharpness these expressions of incorrigible "lackeys of the Stalin cult." However, I trust that your concern will be in vain and your fears prove exaggerated. Why do I believe this? On the basis of these considerations:

Stalin's defenders appeal to objective historical truth: Wasn't it Stalin who led the party and the state in the years of industrialization and the Fatherland war, in those years of unquestionable successes and victories? They appeal to historical objectivity and cite as well the very important subjective factor of the education of new generations in the spirit of socialist patriotism and respect for revolutionary tradition; they consider themselves obliged to maintain that Stalin was an outstanding statesman and that his work benefited socialism and our homeland.

If these restorationist attempts are viewed in the light of the facts which have become known and in accordance with the basic principles of Marxist historiography and if the real -- and not the imaginary effect on the intellectual and moral consciousness of the youth is considered, then it must be clearly realized that such efforts can only have results diametrically opposite to the intentions of even the most well-meaning of the restorationists.

The emergence and development of the notorious cult in the thirties and forties had many objective and subjective preconditions.

- (a) Millions of people were convinced that our country was an isolated fortress besieged by deadly enemies; hence they considered maximum centralization coupled with iron discipline necessary and justified.
- (b) The successes in industrial and cultural development stood out with special prominence against the background of the world economic crisis and the growing strength of fascism. This served as an argument for those who maintained that all the wants and privations were only accidental insufficiencies or else the result of sabotage but that all the achievements were the product of the brilliant leadership of the "universal genius."
- (c) The public confidence in the press, in the state apparatus -- and most importantly in the state security administration, in the judicial system and in the courts -- was so great that most people suppressed their own experience and doubts as, overnight, heroes and leaders were declared traitors, spies, enemies of

the people, as history was turned upside down, as heroic deeds were attributed to Stalin which he never performed and his adversaries were charged with crimes of which they were innocent.

- (d) Blind faith was buttressed by mass trials. These aroused apprehension and fear in some. In others they strengthened the conviction that cunning foes were omnipresent and that, therefore, any wavering, any doubting of the rightness of Stalin's words and deeds, even an excess of moderation in settling accounts with waverers and doubters, meant direct aid to the enemy.
- (e) During the war and after, all these objective and subjective preconditions received a -- let us say -- natural as well as an artificial reinforcement. Take me, for instance. I am one of those who learned to love Stalin during the war and, indeed, with a sincere love.

He was the head of our state and our army. All our hope for victory, our love for all that we were fighting for and for which we were ready to die was incorporated in him. We ascribed to him all the virtues that we saw in the best of us. We believed the myth of the great, the all-knowing leader because we wished for such a leader. We ourselves -- many consciously and many unconsciously -- created this myth and we were convinced of its reality or virtual reality and still more of its absolute historical necessity, for we believed that victory was impossible without absolute authority and absolute faith.

It required many years and two party congresses, it required the perspective which our historical experience alone made possible, the new facts which came to light after 1953 and serious consideration of these new insights into the past and present before we finally understood what a repulsive "naked emperor" we had clothed with our blind faith and our fanaticism and how dearly this had cost our country and the international workers movement.

Twenty years ago, indeed, even ten years ago, out of an ignorance of the facts or by taking refuge in dialectical sophisms, one could quite sincerely declare himself both for Stalin and socialism -- cherish the welfare of the Soviet land and believe in the wisdom of Stalin's policy. Today, this is no longer possible.

After all that has become known in these past years, after the twentieth and twenty-second party congresses, after the publication of previously concealed documents of Lenin, after the publication of eyewitness accounts of hundreds of old Communists, the mythology of the Stalin cult is destroyed once and for all.

- 1. Today it is known to all and clearly proved that Stalin's tyrannical and incompetent interference in the management of the economy in the years from 1929 to 1933 as well as in the postwar period led to widespread famine and to the destruction of the economic bases not only of the individual peasant enterprises but also of the collective farms.
- 2. Today it is known to all and proved that in the years from 1935 to 1940 with Stalin's knowledge and, indeed, at his instigation, hundreds of thousands of people, including the overwhelming majority of the top officers and generals of the Red Army and the majority of the experienced and trained industrial administrators, were arrested, sent into penal exile, murdered and tortured to death. In those years more Communists were imprisoned in Stalin's jails and concentration camps than in all the capitalist and fascist countries put together. Among those shot as enemies of the people were the overwhelming majority of the delegates to all previous party congresses, and even the majority of the immediately preceding party congress of 1934 and the Central Committee elected by it, as well as the overwhelming majority of the members and functionaries of all the governments of the union republics and all the regional and district party committees.
- 3. Today it is known to all and proved that Stalin sought to transform the nonaggression pact with Germany into a treaty of friendship, that in his official documents and speeches he designated Hitler's enemies as imperialist aggressors and imposed a de facto ban on antifascist propaganda.
- 4. Today it is known to all and proved that Stalin, a pathologically suspicious man who was suspicious even of his most faithful and oldest friends and his comrades in struggle (for example, Yenukidze, Ordzhonikidze, Postyshev, Tukhachevsky and others), for some unfathomable reason was filled with naive trust in the friendship of a Hitler; he trusted him to the extent that he disregarded numerous warnings reaching him via various channels and ignored all intelligence reports on this matter, thereby condemning our army to very severe defeats and the entire country to terrible losses and sacrifices.
- 5. Today it is known to all and proved that after the war, with the knowledge and at the instigation of Stalin, once again millions of persons were subjected to the harshest reprisals. Whole peoples, the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, the Chechens, the Balkars, the Ingush, the Karachai and the Crimean Tartars were robbed of their homelands and sent into exile as entire nations, as whole ethnic communities. The overwhelming majority of

former Soviet prisoners of war, even prisoners released from fascist concentration camps, were tried for "high treason."

Their tragic fate is personified in the figure of Ivan Denisovich in Solzhenitsyn's novel.

6. Today it is known to all that it was Stalin who inspired the campaign of slander against Yugoslavia and tried to transplant the methods of the Beria terror, the lies and provocations, to Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

Today therefore an apology for Stalin is synonymous with defamation of socialism. The only ones who can defend Stalin today are unbelievably stupid simpletons among the bureaucrats grown old in service or retired, who have thoughts like the character in Dostoev-sky's anecdote, "If there is no God, how can I be a captain?" or else completely conscienceless, cynical advocates of the Jesuitical principle that "The End Justifies Any Means," who are incapable of understanding that the Stalinist "means" already bear within them a negation of the end adduced to justify them.

Seeking to rehabilitate Stalin today as if there had been no twentieth, no
twenty-second party congress, as if the
incriminating documents were still unknown, to spread the fairy tales about
his virtues and the lies about his loyalty to Lenin -- as Zakrutkin and Kochetov
are doing -- means nothing else but furnishing the enemies of Communism with
ideological weapons, ideologically playing into their hands; it means nothing
else but cultivating cynicism, hypocrisy,
and civic apathy in the youth, a contemptuous disbelief in precisely those ideas
to which the restorers of the cult verbally swear allegiance.

It follows from this that such articles, memoirs, poems, all this liter-

ature, entirely independently of its authors' subjective intentions, objectively damages our country and our party and strengthens its enemies and disarms or repels its friends.

Nevertheless, the experience of history shows that an ideological censorship only impairs the healthy forces in cultural and literary development -- like any administrative persecution of literary or scholarly work. I am convinced therefore that it is impermissible to demand the banning or destruction of the above-named or similar works, to subject their authors to any punishment or restrictions. That would be using their own methods against the belated heirs of the Stalin cult -- the same Stalinism under a different name.

It is a different sort of thing that is needed. An objective critical study of such restorationist tendencies in literature, which must be undertaken here and in the press of our Communist brother parties, would substantially lessen the harm that these works do. In this way the spread of such intentions could be prevented. The defenders and restorers of the Stalin cult fear nothing more than free expression, a public airing of differences, concrete historical truth and competent Marxist criticism.

We must not hinder either Deborin or Kochetov from writing and publishing anything they choose. But obstacles must not be put in the way either of those who want to criticize them. This is the only way to set limits on the mounting activity of the restorationists. Limits must be set, however. This tendency must be checked for the sake of our country, for all its friends, and for the cause of socialism throughout the world.

Moscow November-December 1967

LEV KOPELEV EXPELLED FROM CP

Lev Kopelev, the author of the above letter, has reportedly just been expelled from the Soviet Communist party for signing protests against the trial in January of four young Soviet writers -- Aleksandr Ginzburg, Vera Lashkova, Yuri Galanskov, and Aleksei Dobrovolsky. [See World Outlook, January 26, p. 69, for documents and background on this trial.]

Expelled along with Kopelev, who was identified in the March 26 report in the New York Times as the author of a book on the German playwright Bertolt Brecht and a former inmate of a Stalin-

ist prison camp, was Boris A. Zolotukhin, the lawyer for Aleksandr Ginzburg.

The other four were given in the <u>Times</u> report as Boris G. Birger, a painter; Boris Shragin, a specialist in aesthetics; Yuri Koryakov, a literary figure; and Lyudmilla Alekseyevna, an editor in the Nauka publishing house.

Since Communist party membership is a prerequisite for most of the better professional positions in the Soviet Union, expulsion from the party means that the victims face harsh material reprisals for their critical attitude.

A CANADIAN STUDY OF EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE

By Ross Dowson

EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE, by John Kolasky. Peter Martin Associates, Toronto. 238 pp. \$3.50. 1968.

Leon Trotsky, coleader with Lenin of the Russian revolution and founder of the Fourth International, in an article dated April 22, 1939, entitled "The Problem of the Ukraine," wrote:

"In order to guarantee 'administrative needs, ' i.e., the interests of the bureaucracy, the most legitimate claims of the oppressed nationalities were declared a manifestation of pettybourgeois nationalism. All these symptoms could be observed as early as 1922-1923. Since that time they have developed monstrously and have led to outright strangulation of any kind of independent national development of the peoples of the USSR.... Nowhere did restrictions, purges, repressions and in general all forms of bureaucratic hooliganism assume such murderous sweep as they did in the Ukraine in the struggle against the powerful deeply rooted longings of the Ukrainian masses for greater freedom and independence."*

Aside from the intrinsic importance of this whole question, what impelled Trotsky to take it up when he did was a situation that was developing in Canada, and in a parallel way in Ukrainian emigré Communist circles around the world. Since 1933, Ukrainian workers and farmers had been moving away from the Communist movement and falling into either passivity or nationalism. This trend became very sharp in Canada. Trotsky's article was intended to explain the nature of Stalinism to these forces and try to save them for socialism.

Education in the Soviet Ukraine appears thirty years later at another critical turn -- a rebirth of the struggle against the bureaucracy by socialist opposition currents within both the Ukraine and Russia, with the consequent

impact this is having on Ukrainian-Canadians around the Communist party, who are faced once again with the necessity of evaluating the "problem of the Ukraine."

It was in response to the growing reports of the suppression of the rights of Ukrainians, and the dissension these reports were causing in Ukrainian—Canadian circles, that a delegation headed by Tim Buck went to the Ukraine last spring. Their report, released in February in the January-dated Viewpoint, while loaded with assurances that all will be well, nonetheless admitted that there have been gross violations of the national rights of the 40,000,000 Ukrainians. [See World Outlook, March 1, p. 174.]

John Kolasky's book is an integral part of the ferment in Ukrainian-Canadian left circles. It is the result of a two-year stay in the Ukraine from 1963 to 1965. The Canadian schoolteacher went to study at the Shevchenko University in Kiev. His personal experiences led him to make a detailed study of the educational system in the Ukraine. The evidence that he presents of the imposition of the Russian language and the suppression of the Ukrainian language and culture is overwhelming and unchallengeable.

Kolasky clearly shows that the policy of Russification, which really began under Stalin, violates every principle on the national question propounded by Lenin. In fact it was around this very question that Lenin intended to give battle to the bureaucracy at the time of his death. Kolasky also shows that contrary to the expectations of many people, Russification of the Ukraine took on an even wider and harsher character under Khrushchev.

Unfortunately, while he is strong on the results of Great Russian chauvinism, Kolasky fails to grasp the roots of this criminal policy. He calls the policy of the heads of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic toward the Ukraine, "imperialism." This is the scientific term for the most ruthless, exploitative, and last stage of monopoly capitalism. However, the information submitted by Kolasky on the suppression of the rights of other nationalities besides the Ukrainians, including those within the RSFSR itself, confirms Trotsky's contention that it is a matter here, as on other questions, of the bureaucracy's frightened, arrogant, administrative and regulative approach to the problems of planning and centralization.

^{*} Trotsky's article was published in an English translation in the <u>Socialist Appeal</u> of May 9, 1939. It aroused widespread discussion and some controversy. Trotsky answered the objections in an article "Independence of the Ukraine and Sectarian Muddleheads" which was published in an English translation in two issues of the <u>Socialist Appeal</u> --September 15 and 17, 1939. The two articles were reprinted in the November and December, 1949, issues of <u>Fourth</u> International. -- W.O.

"It is a question not of the oppression of one nationality over another in the proper sense of the word," wrote Trotsky in <u>The Revolution Betrayed</u>, "but of oppression by the centralized police apparatus over the cultural development of all nations, starting with the Great Russian."

Kolasky compounds his error by presenting the national problem in Belgium, which has been reaching fresh in-

tensity, as "solved." In addition, Canadian readers will be surprised to learn from him that no language problem exists for French-Canadians.

None of this invalidates Kolasky's detailed study of the suppression of the national rights of the Ukrainian people and his intense moral indignation. The problem has complex sides which it is to be hoped Kolasky will come to grips with in subsequent writings.

VIETNAM WAR PROTEST DEEPENS IN JAPAN

Opposition continues to deepen in Japan to any further escalation of involvement in Washington's aggression in Vietnam. The Christian Science Monitor reported March 28 that "an edgy mood of apprehension about the Vietnam war seems to be growing among the Japanese people at large....

"Ever since the Tet offensive, the unsettling feeling has prevailed that something is radically wrong, that the United States may resort to nuclear weapons..."

A number of clashes have taken place in recent months between the antiwar movement and the growing U.S. military presence in Japan. The major incidents have been the visit to Japan of the Vietnam-bound nuclear carrier Enterprise in January, the moving of B-52 bombers to Okinawa, the plans for building an airport at Narita that will handle American military flights, and the recent opening of a U.S. army hospital in Kita Ward of Tokyo to treat Vietnam casualties.

The Socialist, Komeito, and Communist parties announced March 8 that they would submit a "B-52 withdrawal resolution" to the Diet in Tokyo.

The same night students clashed with police in front of the U.S. "field hospital." The <u>Japan Times</u> reported March 10:

"Riot police, 2,000 strong, battled with 1,200 rock-hurling Zengakuren demonstrators around a newly built U.S. Army field hospital at Oji, Tokyo, and arrested 157 of them...at least 72 police officers and 24 students were injured in the clashes which continued for more than five hours."

The <u>Japan Times</u> said that unionists and onlookers cheered the students. "Unionist demonstrators, about 1,000 in all, meanwhile, staged a street rally near the hospital's main gate, shouting protests that the hospital's treatment of American soldiers wounded in Vietnam would mean Japan's direct involvement

in the war."

The students, organized by the militant Sampa Rengo (Three Faction Alliance) of the Zengakuren, staged an even bigger demonstration March 10 at Narita, in Chiba Prefecture, the site of the proposed new Tokyo International Airport. A similar protest took place February 26 (see World Outlook, March 15, p. 240).

This time police carried out semimilitary preparations for the demonstration. Barbed-wire fences were strung
around the airport site, around Narita
City Hall, and at the office of the Tokyo
International Airport Corp. Bus companies
were "asked" by police to refuse to charter buses to student groups, checkpoints
were established throughout the city to
arrest students entering the city with
poles or sticks. More than 4,700 police
were mobilized.

The demonstration began with a rally of more than 3,000 students, unionists and farmers at the Narita Municipal Baseball Stadium.

About 1,300 of the students later tried to break through the barbed wire surrounding the airport site. The Asahi Evening News reported March 11 that the police attacked "with teargas bombs...and then used hoses to pour water containing teargas on the students." According to this account, "the farmers supplied the students with rocks" in their fight with the police. More than 477 were injured, including 277 police, and 198 students were arrested. Asahi said that "Police had explained their policy to Narita citizens last Thursday. During the clashes Sunday, they called for their cooperation but there was no response."

The <u>Japan Times</u> added March 12 that "Ichiro Tomura, chairman of the Sanrizuka-Shibayama Farmers' League opposing the construction of the airport, said... [from a hospital after the police attack] the league would continue its joint struggles with Zengakuren students. He said Sunday's rally with Zengakuren in Narita City was a 'big victory.'"

THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR: YOST'S ANALYSIS

By Peter Buch

"It remains...the thesis of this article," Charles W. Yost concludes in an essay entitled, "How the Arab-Israeli War Began," in the January 1968 issue of Foreign Affairs, a scholarly U.S. quarterly, "that no government plotted or intended to start a war in the Middle East in the spring of 1967...there is no evidence —quite the contrary — that either Nasser or the Israeli government or even the Syrian government wanted and sought a major war at this juncture."

Yost, a former U.S. representative to the United Nations (1961-1966), and at various times U.S. ambassador to Laos, Syria, and Morocco, begins with the existence of a Jewish state fearful for its survival and loath to grant concessions to its surrounding Arab neighbors. The Arabs, on the other hand, could not accept the permanent status of a country responsible for expelling one million Arab refugees from their native lands, refugees who were still suffering in miserable camps within sight of their former homeland. This situation gave rise to constant hostility and harassment, culminating periodically in war.

In 1966, the "El Fatah" commando raids from Syria grew in intensity. "It had long been Israel's policy," Yost remarks pointedly, "whenever it judged that Arab raids had reached an intolerable level, to retaliate massively." On November 13, 1966, Israel attacked Es Samu, a village in Jordan (not Syria, where the raids were said to come from), in which eighteen soldiers and civilians were killed and fifty-four wounded. Yost calls this a "disproportionate and misplaced retaliation" and it was condemned by the UN Security Council fourteen to one, as such raids by Israel had been condemned repeatedly in the past.

Both sides continued to insist on patrolling and farming disputed border areas, resulting in periodic clashes. One of these escalated on April 7, 1967, into an aerial dogfight in which Israeli pilots shot down six Syrian planes over Damascus.

Thus, the Arabs had sustained two bloody military blows within six months with no response from Nasser, the acknowledged central leader of Arab nationalism and head of the "unified Arab Command" in Cairo, established to contain Israel. The pressures within the Arab world for action mounted tremendously. The "El Fatah" raids increased. Israeli leaders in the meantime were issuing threats of further military actions, "no less drastic than those of April 7," as Premier Levi Eshkol

said May 11.

"These Israeli exercises in verbal escalation," says Yost, "provoked far more serious repercussions than they were no doubt intended to do and, far from sobering the exuberant Syrians and their allies, raised probably genuine fears in Damascus, Cairo and Moscow to a level which brought about the fatal decisions and events of the following week." [Emphasis added.] He quotes UN Secretary General U Thant in a May 19 report as saying: "Intemperate and bellicose utterances....are unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East. In recent weeks, however, reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that state statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines."

Yost adds: "Press accounts of these statements also seemed so inflammatory to U.S. State Department officials that they expressed concern to Israeli authorities."

Thus the Arab regimes as well as the Soviet Union became convinced that "a major retaliatory strike against Syria was fixed and imminent," which might result in the overthrow of the Syrian government and war on other Arab territory.

The Arab regimes reacted by denouncing the expected plans, readying themselves militarily, and verbally abusing the Jewish settlers.

Yost rounds out the story by detailing the steps through which Nasser's request for temporary and partial removal of UN troops from the Sinai desert was answered by the UN's "precipitous" and complete withdrawal of all its troops. (Israel never allowed any UN troops on her soil.) This left Egypt in full jurisdiction once again of the Straits of Tiran. Nasser felt obliged to make the obvious next move, namely, to assert "belligerent rights" by blockading the straits against hostile, i.e., Israeli, shipping.

These moves induced tremendous euphoria in the Arab world, expressed by the nationalist leaders in terms of new defense pacts, promises of troop shipments, and threats of vengeance against Israel.

"Yet even at this late date," Yost insists, "despite all these verbal pyrotechnics and concentrations of force, there does not seem to have been any intention in Cairo to initiate a war. In reply to a

question by British M.P. Christopher Mayhew interviewing Nasser on June 2, 'And if they do not attack, will you let them alone?,' the President said, 'Yes, we will leave them alone. We have no intention of attacking Israel.' Similar assurances were repeatedly given the United States by the highest Egyptian authorities. There seems little reason to doubt them."

In other words, the Arabs were made as apprehensive by the Israeli leaders as the Israelis were made fearful by the Arab leaders. But it is clear from Yost's account that the policy of massive retaliation and the unbending attitude towards the refugees, whose readmission was categorically rejected beforehand by Israel, led to an escalation in which the fate of the Jews in Israel hung once again in the balance. This time, a "first strike" made Israel victorious. But other countries can use that tactic also, a tactic which becomes increasingly attractive today when ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads can make a war a matter of days or even hours. What will be the outcome in the next round?

While introducing a measure of objectivity into the discussion on the Arab-Israeli war, this account remains skeletal. Even though the author recognizes the issues of the conflict arising from the vast refugee problem and the rising Arab tide of nationalist revolution, he does not analyze the basic nature of the social forces and contradictions at work here. He therefore lapses into psychological explanations and winds up with ex-hortations to all concerned to "face the facts of life." He lays the blame equally upon the Arabs, the Israelis, the UN, and the great powers for "overreacting outrageously" and condemns sins such as "arrogance" and "inflexibility" as impermissible modes of international conduct.

Of course, it is to his credit that he sees Israel, the U.S., and the UN as capable of sins usually attributed by bourgeois commentators to Arabs, Vietnamese, North Koreans, Cubans, and any others standing up to United States imperialism.

The most glaring deficiency in Yost's article is the complete failure to mention the central role of U.S., British, and French imperialist interests in the Middle East, revolving around the protection of their gigantic and highly profitable oil monopolies. He doesn't even refer to the fact that the nuclear-armed Sixth Fleet was poised to intervene immediately on Israel's side if she had begun to lose. It is not surprising, therefore, that Yost also does not deal with the Arab national revolution as a fundamental process threatening the interests of Western imperialism.

Nor does Yost view the Israeli regime as anything more than a Jewish government seeking, in however a blundering and headstrong way, to carve a Jewish homeland out of a territory that unfortunately happened to be occupied originally by another people, whose expulsion has led to some lamentable problems.

It is thus hard for Yost to explain the readiness of the Israeli government to act in accordance with the interests of U.S. imperialism against the Arab peoples, to resort first to massive and disproportionate retaliations and then to seize demagogically on the resulting Arab propaganda fusillade as a justification for preemptive attack and extensive occupation. This Arab propaganda, though filled with reprehensible and self-defeating threats of annihilation of the Jews, was backed up by essentially defensive measures of troop movements within the Arab territory, as Yost insists, and was not accompanied by any genuine mobilizations for an actual first-strike assault on Israel.

To Yost, it seems much more logical for Israel to seek some accommodation with the Arab peoples, instead of incurring their ever-deepening hatred. "There will be no security for Israel," he cautions, "until whatever the political and financial cost, the...refugees have been compensated, resettled and restored to dignity."

Why indeed doesn't the Israeli government declare its deep regret at the wholesale expulsion of a million Arabs from their farms and cities in Palestine? Why doesn't it offer to take them back and make up for past injuries as best it can, bringing the Palestinian Arabs into the national life of Israel as full citizens? Why doesn't it issue a worldwide appeal and demand that the rich nations, which claim such deep concern for the plight of the Jews and the welfare of the refugees and which have done so little for either, make available to the refugees the huge sums they now send there in the form of armaments?

But the Israeli regime's calculated risk in the June invasion, as well as its entire U.S.-oriented foreign policy, developed over the last twenty years, flows from its character as a government of a capitalist country, heavily dependent on foreign aid and private "charitable" contributions, largely from the U.S. This country is living beyond its means and is beset by overwhelming problems of unemployment, inflation, color discrimination, militarism, and government strikebreaking. Israel's ruling capitalist class, boasting already some 2,000 millionaires, survives by using the ideology of Zionist colonization to identify its interests, that is, of maintaining an exclusively

Jewish capitalist state, with the alleged interests of the Jewish workers and farmers of Israel and of world Jewry.

The deep grievances of the Israeli workers and farmers against their bosses, especially the grievances of the Oriental Jews, who are half the population and who are treated as second-class citizens, are

answered by patriotic Zionist appeals. All Jews are called upon to defend the regime of those bosses whose intransigence and aggressiveness are largely to blame for the danger of attack. This policy drives Israel deeper and deeper into dependence upon blitzkrieg-type "final solutions" against the Arab nations and into economic, financial and military dependence upon U.S. imperialism.

ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IN WEST GERMANY AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

By Gerhard Werner

[As foreseen in the analysis below of the West German political and economic situation, which was written in February, the Social Democratic party congress, which opened in Nuremberg March 17, was marked by the reappearance of a strong opposition from the left.

[This political development made a sensation in Germany. In its March 25 issue, Der Spiegel began its lead article: "A new wave is coming out of Nuremberg.... It is shaking the Social Democratic establishment and threatens the Red-Black power monopoly." (The reference is to the "Grand Coalition" of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.)

[The resolution of support for the coalition which the party leadership submitted to the congress (supplemented by a simple resolution of support for the Socialist ministers participating in the government) was passed by an embarrassingly narrow margin. Der Spiegel noted: "For the first time in the postwar period almost half the delegates refused to obey their leaders and heeded instead the blandishments of honest trade unionists and old-line socialists in the party."

[The right wing of the party also received a rebuff when Klaus Schutz, the mayor of West Berlin was defeated in his attempt to gain a position in the national party leadership. Schutz won notoriety for his unsuccessful attempts to ban the February 18 demonstration in Berlin against the Vietnam war and for his general red-baiting. After his failure to prevent the February 18 demonstration, he organized a prowar, anti-Communist counterdemonstration the following week.

[A large proportion of the counter-demonstrators were city employees mustered by the city government. They beat students and "suspicious loóking" onlookers. In fact, such a wave of violence accompanied this officially organized demonstration that many liberal commentators in Germany have compared it to the Nazi demonstrations.

[The Nuremberg Congress was also noteworthy for the militant student and youth demonstration held there against the opportunist and right-wing policies of the party leadership. Foreign Minister Willy Brandt was surrounded by demonstrators as he entered the congress and other party worthies had to be escorted everywhere by phalanxes of police.]

Frankfort

A depression, not a recession, is what the Trade Union Institute of Economics has termed the present economic decline in West Germany. In 1967, for the first time in West Germany since the second world war, an absolute, though slight, decline of 0.5 percent of the real national product was expected.

In 1966 existing economic capacity was already sufficient to produce ten billion DMs [4 Deutsche Marks = US\$1] more goods and services than were actually produced; and in 1967 unused productive capacity reached thirty billion DMs. The unemployment rate at the depth of the current depression was falsely given as 2.5 percent. In reality it came to 4.5 percent: 300,000 foreign workers were sent back to their countries; almost 300,000 blue-collar and white-collar workers were compelled to accept "early retirement" in order to relieve the labor market, thus shifting part of the cost of the depression from the capitalists to the social security system; and counter to international practice, construction workers receiving bad-weather pay were not listed as unemployed.

At the bottom of the depression, out of thirty-two branches of the economy, only six showed net growth. The national income, which had risen by an average of 8 percent between 1958 and 1966, stagnated for the first time in the life of the Federal Republic

This general depression was grafted onto partial structural crises which had

already gripped individual branches of the economy (coal, steel, textiles, leather, shipbuilding) and particular regions. In addition to the industrially underdeveloped areas which profited less from the so-called "economic miracle" -such as the regions bordering East Germany, the Bavarian Forest region, Schleswig-Holstein, and parts of Lower Saxony -- vast distressed areas emerged in Nordrhein-Westfalen and in the Saar. The decline in coal and steel production and the development of labor-saving techniques, which led to the firing of roughly 300,000 mine and steel workers in recent years, were not accompanied by a planned establishment of new industries for the future. That did not fit in with Erhard's economic theory.*

This theory was entirely suited to the postwar boom in West Germany. After the decartelization initially begun by the Allies, only relatively free competition could root out the unprofitable concerns and give new impetus to the process of centralization. Only thus could the necessary dynamism be produced to assure a leap forward for German capitalism to win itself a place in the sun in international competition.

When, however, the threat appeared of massive collapses of whole branches of industry and of large concerns (coal, steel, Krupp), free competition had to be replaced by state intervention in favor of the capitalists. Otherwise, a profound economic crisis would have become unavoidable. And no industrially developed country can risk the social consequences of such a crisis, as long as it is in a position to avert it.

State intervention at some point in favor of the private economy as well as the stimulation of private initiative through billions in public subsidies and credits became necessary when Erhard cut taxes and enacted costly social reforms in order to win the September 1965 elections. This method -- already successfully employed by Adenauer -- of putting off all needed social reforms until an election year -- at first proved successful for Erhard as well.

It was little noted, however, that as early as 1965 the first signs of the approaching recession were showing up, namely a decline in the production of producers goods. When in the fall of 1966 it became evident what a mass of potential bankruptcies threatened to occur in the event of an economic decline, considering the empty federal treasury,

the CDU/CSU [Christliche Demokratische Union/Christliche Soziale Union -- Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] had no alternative. It had to drop the "economic miracle man" [Der Wirtschaftswunderman] Erhard as well as its small coalition partner, the FDP [Freie Demokratische Partei -- Free Democratic party] and take the Social Democrats into the government. Only in that way did it dare shift the costs of economic recovery onto the backs of the workers without running the risk that its disillusioned working-class supporters would go over to the SPD [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands -- Social Democratic party of Germany].

This maneuver was successful to an extent undreamed of even by the CDU/CSU itself. Social-welfare laws passed with the votes of the SPD deputies in the Ehrhard era were repealed out of hand. In intermediate-term financial planning, the social security system was hit by a seven billion DM reduction in federal contributions. Two billion DMs were saved by cutting family allowances. Rents for two million public dwellings were raised by as much as 25 percent. Pensioners were forced to pay another 2 percent on their health insurance from their miserable incomes (which amount to less than 350 DMs for 50 percent of the disabled and aged male workers and 98 percent of the female workers in this category!). The sales tax resulted in an increased burden on the masses through a rise in the price of gas, water, electricity, and the cost of public transportation. Altogether, an increase of 2.5 percent in living costs is expected in 1968.

This robbing of the incomes of the masses goes hand in hand with princely gifts to the capitalists. Through the revaluation of old equipment accompanying the introduction of the sales tax, the CDU/CSU finance minister magnanimously presented them with 4.9 billion DMs. The Social Democratic economics minister Schiller (who had been, like Chancellor Kiesinger, a faithful member of the Nazi party from 1933 to 1945, and a Nazi economic theoretician in the bargain) has floated billion-mark loans for use as a contingency budget to stimulate the private economy. Although the capitalists hesitate to undertake new investments in view of their unused capacity, they of course gratefully accept orders financed with public funds.

In the first economic report of 1968, it was proudly stated that an increase of 8 percent in profits is estimated for this year. This was described as especially important for the creation of a climate favorable to investment and thereby for resumed economic growth.

However, another factor is deci-

^{*}Former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard has been known as the father of the West German "economic miracle" and as a classical "free enterprise" economist. -- W.O.

sive for this "creation of a favorable climate for investment," which is being achieved through an unprecedented indebtedness of the federal government, the states and the local governments.*

In 1967, productivity per man-hour had already risen by 10 percent. Although 600,000 men were expelled from the production process in industry, about the same amount of commodities can be produced as before. Only extraordinarily high growth rates would make it possible to restore full employment. However, one of the greatest concerns of Finance Minister Strauss and Federal Bank President Blessing, who are both direct representatives of big industry, is to prevent an "overheating" of the economic conjuncture.

Full employment gives the unions and the workers in the shops greater leverage and so must be prevented. Big capital needs a reserve army which can be used to bring pressure against wages and salaries. There were nonetheless 675,000 unemployed in January 1968, and a projected average unemployment rate of 311,000 is even included in Schiller's goal projection for 1968. But since in the meantime Strauss and Blessing, with the help of the CDU/CSU majority in the cabinet, have denied Schiller the use of stronger economic stimulants, it may be supposed that unemployment will exceed that of Schiller's goal projection.

An increase in hourly wages of 4 to 5 percent on an economy-wide average has already been included as a guideline figure in the yearly economic report by way of precaution. This goes hand in hand with an officially estimated increase in prices in private consumption of 2.5 percent. The full extent of the increase in the capitalists' wealth and their share of the national income, brought about by the coalition government in which the Social Democrats are participating, can only be appreciated once it is considered that a real growth in the national product of 4 percent (nominally this is more than 6 percent) is planned, that productivity per man-hour already rose in 1967 by 10 percent and will certainly rise still further in 1968.

There is no question that it is possible to bring about a new boom in the economy by transferring the cost of the depression onto the workers. The stock market has already anticipated the coming

boom with fantastic price increases, which for some stocks have reached 40 to 50 percent, and indeed, in the case of Daimler, a 100 percent rise in a single year.

The political consequences of this depression and the attempted method of overcoming it will be extraordinarily grave, however, not only for the SPD but for the Federal Republic. It can be counted on already that in the coming 1969 Bundestag elections some five million voters will change parties. To the right of the established Bundestag parties, which account for more than 95 percent of the votes — the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP— the neo-Nazi NPD [Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands — National Democratic party of Germany] will gain ground. To the left an electoral hodgepodge will operate, though with much less success than the NPD, and take votes from the SPD primarily.

Probably those petty-bourgeois elements who voted for the SPD because of its foreign policy or because they felt safe with it as an opposition peoples party will now turn their backs on it and return to the FDP -- although they may go to the CDU. Many old Social Democrats will probably incline to abstention out of protest against the party's betrayal of the illusions they harbored about it. For all these reasons, it is certain that the SPD will lose votes for the first time since 1949.

The first test is already before it in the state legislative elections in Baden-Wurttemburg on April 28, and not even the SPD state chairman Krause has any illusions about their outcome. These elections will also provide the proof that in 1963 the SPD owed its 3.5 percent vote increase to the metal strike and lockout which stirred even this backward provincial area, which was then quite stable economically. At that time, however, the SPD had counted on a greater increase and put the blame for its failed hopes on IG Metall [Industrie-Gewerkschaft Metall -- the Metal Workers Union].

How will the SPD leadership react to an electoral defeat after having depicted its steady vote increase as primarily a result of the farsightedness it showed in developing the grand ideas of the Bad Godesberg program and the "peoples party"?* Can the probably unavoidable change in leadership after an electoral defeat in

^{*} The federal government's debt on the securities market reached 26.3 billion DMs (440 DMs per inhabitant) in 1967; the debt carried by the states reached 14.6 billion and that of the local governments, 30.7 billion at the end of June! (Cf. "Bericht über die 318. Sitzung des Bundesrats vom 15.12.1967," pp. 288 and 291.)

^{*} The Bad Godesberg Party Congress marked the culmination of the long rightward movement of the SPD. It disavowed nearly all the socialist principles still formally part of the party program. The concept of the "peoples party," or a nonclass democratic party of all the people, symbolized the SPD orientation that came out of this congress. -- W.O.

1969 again be carried out through a behind-the-scenes battle, as was the ouster of Ollenhauer at an earlier time? In view of the altered circumstances — for which the student and youth revolt and the conflict between the SPD and a section of the unions have been in no small measure responsible — this seems completely excluded. The SPD congress in Nuremberg should show that the party has recovered its voice, that an internal opposition will not meekly defer to the overbearing dictates of the top leadership issued from the speakers' rostrum.

The political polarization to the left and right is not only taking place outside the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP but is passing through these parties. The unrest on the left in the SPD is evident. In the CDU/CSU the Strauss wing* is rebelling both against the new foreign policy [accommodation to the U.S.-Soviet détente and seeking contacts with the East European countries] and against the draft program of the CDU which by their lights contains too much social romanticism. The FDP as always is split between its national conservatives and "left" liberals—but it now gives the latter significantly more leeway.

Although they are only "relatively unbinding commitments...served up conveniently in a preelection year" (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, January 9, 1968), the new CDU draft action program and the "Social Democratic Perspectives at the Turn to the Seventies" do reveal a "spiral to the left." This is all the more remarkable because it was to be feared that the big parties would engage in a contest of nationalist rhetoric with the NPD in order to try to win back the voters going over to that party. However, with its avowal of a policy of détente the CDU has now — even if very cautiously — made the turn imposed on it by the peaceful coexistence endeavors of the Soviet Union and the USA.

Moreover, both the SPD and the CDU want to take the wind out of the sails of the left with progressive education and social plans for the future. Apparently this seems advisable from the standpoint of their electoral tactics, which are based on public opinion polls. In any case, denunciations of the Great Coalition [as the Christian Democrat-Socialist coalition is called] as the final step in the formation of a regimented society have proved incorrect. This danger has in fact moved nearer as a result of the Great Coalition, but it is not yet an accomplished fact and can still be averted.

The "Social Democratic Perspectives at the Turn to the Seventies" resembles that celebrated barbershop sign which appealed to customers with the promise "Free Shaves Tomorrow." However, it has a seriour motivation behind it — the aim of capturing a left opposition which for the first time in years is clearly winning ground in the party:

- -- Under pressure from the unions the SPD leadership has had to retreat on the issue of the Emergency Powers Law.*
- -- Contrary to the desires of the party chiefs, attempts to form a trade-union or working-class wing in the SPD have been carried further in the most diverse forms.
- -- An opposition is showing up in delegated conferences on all levels, which is made up partly of young men who have not stepped forward before.
- -- Part of the social unrest has been focused directly against the party (the miners' demonstrations in Dortmund-Huckarde with the slogan "Kühn and Schiller -- Mine Killers" ["Kühn und Schiller -- Zechenkiller" -- referring to recent mine closings]).
- -- The Jungsozialisten [Young Socialists] have become as restless an element as the students were before the expulsion of the SDS [Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund -- German Socialist Students League]. In their federal congress in Mainz [December 10, 1967] the Young Socialists not only came out in favor of recognition of the Oder-Neisse line,* against the Emergency Powers Law, and against the Vietnam war; but they even declared that an "understanding with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) should not run aground on the question of de jure recognition of the East German regime."
- -- The tension between the party and the unions cannot but be heightened by the attempt of the SPD Bundestag fraction chairman Helmut Schmidt to put the blame on the unions for the balkiness of the SPD voters. ("No one of us can doubt that the unions create discontent among the SPD voters," he wrote in <u>Sozialdemokratie und Gewerkschaften</u>.)

The union leaders themselves are threatened by a conflict with their mem-

^{*} Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the CSU, the reactionary Bavarian wing of the CDU/CSU. -- W.O.

^{*} The SPD leadership had been supporting a Christian-Democrat-sponsored bill which would give the government dictatorial powers in the event of an emergency, including in matters of "labor discipline." -- W.O.

^{*} The postwar border with Poland. -- W.O.

bers. They have failed to carry out the trade unions' function of "safeguarding" the interests of the workers in time of depression. There is little doubt that the unions' prestige has suffered because of this in the most recent period.

Only where determined defensive struggles have been waged, as in the Hessian rubber industry, has trade-union consciousness been strengthened. Only there did the workers decide by a 91.3 percent vote to accept a contract resulting from a strike. On the other hand, in the IG Metall votes in Baden Wurttemberg and Hesse -- where in both cases mobilization maneuvers were resorted to without letting matters come to a strike -- the compromise which emerged from the bargaining was accepted by only a 65 percent vote.

The workers' reaction was weak in the first phase of the depression because only marginal layers and not the hard core were hit by layoffs, unemployment, short shifts, or reduced social benefits. However, their determination to defend their positions increased after the strike at Hanomag in early 1967. For various reasons, the workers stopped work at Continental-Werke in Hannover, at Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz in the Heidelberg Schnellpresse, at AEG in Mulheim/Saarn, at John Deere and Daimler-Benz in Mannheim, at the Fulda rubberworks (where the Hessian rubberworkers' strike was inaugurated on November 11, 1967), as well as in dozens of small plants. And in January 1968, despite the legendary paternalism in Krupp, the workers stopped work at the Essen automobile works of the Krupp concern -- which has been converted into a trust.

At the same time an unbroken chain of protest demonstrations -- not only against the war in Vietnam or the Springer combine* but also against the transportation fare increases -- brought together tens of thousands of university and high school students and, finally, even young workers or apprentices.

The students today unquestionably

constitute the vanguard of the political protest movement. But there is a danger that they will so far outdistance the development in the working class -- which they have as yet made little attempt to influence -- that they will suffer a tragic failure. In The Unfinished Revolution (pp. 20 ff. in the German edition), Isaac Deutscher points out that the 1825 Decembrist uprising against the Czar failed because the aristocratic elite did not have the majority of the nobility on its side. The Narodniks were likewise isolated from the peasantry by the 1861 emancipation law which brought reforms. On this, Deutscher wrote, "An oppressed class with great revolutionary potential betrayed its own revolutionary elite."
Even the martyrdom of the Narodnaya Volya [a revolutionary-democratic terrorist organization made up of intellectuals] only demonstrated the powerlessness of a vanguard acting without the support of a decisive class. Lenin was the first to achieve a revolutionary breakthrough. He combined Marxist theory with the specifically Russian tradition. And he maintained that the workers were the leading revolutionary force but that the peasants must be sought as allies; and he accorded an important educational and organizational role to the intellectuals and to the revolutionary elite of the mass workers' movement.

The German working class could certainly learn from the youth and student movement on how to mount an extraparliamentary struggle. However, if the two movements cannot be united, if the vanguard does not assume an educational and organizational role and does not take up themes which are as vital to the working class as university and educational reform are to the students, workers can be used by reaction against the students—as has already partially occurred in Berlin.

Right now is the time to act when the depression has shaken the faith of a broad layer of the working class in the welfare society. All the theories that the working class is already integrated into the capitalist system and thus no longer capable of struggle must be tested in the decisive test of action -- and the organization of these actions must not be left to the union leaderships. This is the task of the hour.

February 1968

OGINGA ODINGA BARRED FROM LEAVING KENYA

The Jomo Kenyatta regime barred the opposition leader, Oginga Odinga, from flying to Jondon March 20, withholding his passpor; for undisclosed reasons. He was on his way to lecture at Boston

University on revolution as it affects newly independent African states. Kenyatta was probably fearful of what Oginga Odinga might tell the American students about the lack of democracy in Kenya.

^{*} The reactionary press combine controlling more than 40 percent of German newspapers, which has been waging a hysterical proprganda campaign against the German student movement. -- W.O.

WORLDWIDE SUPPORT MOUNTS FOR APRIL ACTIONS AGAINST VIETNAM WAR

Support is growing around the world for the April 26 and 27 protest actions against U.S. aggression in Vietnam that were called by the American antiwar movement.

The Zengakuren, Japan's large and militant student organization has pledged its participation in the International Student Strike April 26, initiated by the U.S. Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

Fernando Alegría, a well-known Chilean poet and professor, has sent a letter to the chancellors of all major Latin-American universities, asking them to support the student strike.

In Great Britain, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, which played an important part in building the March 17 London demonstration of 30,000 against the war, has reprinted in full the Student Mobilization Committee's appeal for the actions.

Mass demonstrations will be held in cities throughout the world April 27. Antiwar marches have been announced for that date for the seven largest cities in the United States. Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Luther King, and comedian Dick Gregory have already agreed to speak in New York at a rally following the march.

In Argentina, the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores [Revolutionary Workers party] is campaigning for an active response to the appeal of the Student Mobilization Committee.

The March 25 issue of the party's weekly, <u>La Verdad</u> [The Truth], scored the apathetic attitude of the principal student organizations in Argentina.

Stressing the need for supporting the Vietnamese people in the most energetic way, La Verdad praised the example set by the students in the industrially advanced countries. "They have become one of the most powerful international allies of the Vietnamese revolution."

La Verdad expressed the hope that the Argentine student organizations will move into action in the remaining weeks, make up for lost time, and do their part to make the international April 27 action a resounding success.

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