

young socialist
the organizer
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reports
on the
antiwar
upsurge

20 Cents

UC Berkeley

In order to better understand what happened at the University of California-Berkeley (Cal) it is important to understand the political climate that helped sharpen the conflicts over strategy that developed on the campus during the recent upsurge in antiwar activity.

Cal is an important political center for the Bay Area and for the student movement as a whole. Its 28,000 students and 10,000 employees make it the single largest concentration of students and workers in the entire East Bay. Most of those 40,000 people live near the campus. As a result, the reformists have oriented toward Cal. Cal is the real base of the Democratic Party in the East Bay: it is Congressman Dellums' base, and it is the organizing center for the McGovern campaign.

The Democratic Party-type student reformists have a very strong base at Cal, and because it is an election year and they are going all out for McGovern and have established a strong organization. Their "Coalition" has swept the student body offices for three years in a row. At the head of their Coalition are people who are important figures in the local Democratic Party machine and who are playing an important role in the McGovern campaign.

Another part of the political climate of Cal is the notoriously large ultraleft community. Not only is it probably the largest single concentration of ultraleftists in the country, but during the upsurge they were fairly well organized through the Campus Anti-Imperialist Coalition (CAIC). The CAIC formed in late winter and is composed of members of the Revolutionary Union and assorted ultraleftists. It was connected with the Bay Area April 22 Coalition, which called a demonstration in San Francisco April 22 that was counterposed to the Los Angeles antiwar demonstration that NPAC and the SMC were building.

The SMC entered the upsurge as the only mass action oriented antiwar organization at Cal and with a small active membership. The SMC faced open, hostile opposition from both the ultraleftists and the reformists.

THE FIRST UPSURGE

Three issues were involved in the first upsurge at Cal. Besides the bombings of Hanoi and Hai-phong, 1,000 campus workers stopped work on Friday, April 14. They were demanding that a decision to reclassify campus workers that would mean a 40 percent reduction in wages be rescinded. Also, the administration had decided to cut down the admission of students to the Boalt Hall Law School from 290 to 260. Since the cuts were clearly an attack on the numbers of students of oppressed nationalities that would be admitted, the Chicano law students initiated a strike.

How did our opponents relate to these issues?

Progressive Labor and International Socialists reacted by demanding that students not cross the picket lines, stating that anyone that did was a scab.

The CAIC largely ignored the strike until they were pressured into inviting Boalt Hall speakers to rallies and meetings.

The YSA, however, understood that students were in motion around the war. Both the work stoppage and the Boalt strike could be related to the war question, thus helping students to understand the issues involved and mobilizing them around all three issues, with the war as the central issue. We also knew that students were confused about the issues of the stoppage and that an educational drive was needed to clear up the issues.

On Monday night, the ASUC (Associated Students of the University of California—the Cal Student Government) held an emergency meeting. The student senators who had been elected on the YSJP slate introduced a motion that was passed, calling a meeting on Wednesday where the union leadership could explain the work stoppage to

students, and a rally Thursday to protest the war, link the issues, and decide further actions.

The ASUC set up a subcommittee to work on the two meetings. The committee was made up of a majority of CAIC forces that refused to allow any SMC speakers at the Thursday rally. Fifteen hundred people attended the Wednesday meeting to discuss the work stoppage and on Thursday, 4,000 people participated in the rally, which called a student strike.

Although excluded from the speakers list on Thursday, the SMC tried to work through the strike steering committee that was set up immediately following the Thursday rally. The SMC proposed in the steering committee meeting that a strike center be set up on campus, but the CAIC forces voted it down and refused to call any action for Friday.

The SMC wanted to build the broadest strike formation possible, based on the experience of May 1970, when an open, democratic strike committee projected many activities and helped involve many students in action. The SMC also wanted to involve the student government forces in mass actions. Broader forces would have helped to mobilize more students and to isolate the ultraleftists. As it was, the SMC found it impossible to work on the steering committee where the CAIC excluded it every step of the way. Not only did the CAIC exclude the SMC from every speakers list, they even resorted to secret meetings of the steering committees.

The SMC participated in the Ad Hoc Student Faculty Committee for a Convocation, with the perspective of having an antiwar convocation that would link student support to the union work stoppage and the Boalt Hall demands. (In May, 1970, a convocation voted for the conversion of the school into an antiwar university.) Through the work of the SMC, the campus newspaper and the ASUC endorsed the idea of a convocation. However, as soon as it became clear that the upsurge was ebbing, these forces backed down and began talking about the convocation being a mass McGovern rally rather than an antiwar rally. Then they dropped the whole idea.

During this time, the SMC called meetings in its own name to get out its perspectives. It also continued working in the high schools.

THE SECOND WAVE

The second wave of the upsurge hit deeper and faster, probably because Nixon's decision to mine the harbors of Vietnam presented the possibility of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and China.

Immediately after Nixon's speech on Monday, May 8, there was trashing in Berkeley. On Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday the CAIC called demonstrations that were very large (2-5,000). Each day though, the leadership of the rallies projected nothing but trashing.

During the second upsurge, the SMC tried to project alternatives to trashing. On May 9, sentiment grew for going to the evening's City Council meeting. The SMC put out a leaflet calling for a meeting that evening at Cal and a march to the City Council meeting to present a proposal. The proposal had been discussed with one of the councilmembers and called for a moratorium May 12 that would let all city employees off work at noon, with pay, and all students out of school at noon so they could participate in antiwar activity. The SMC proposal also called for the City Council to endorse the May 13 demonstration in San Francisco and to set up an antiwar office in City Hall. About 500 people marched to the City Council meeting where almost 2,000 people were already waiting. Although the first part of the proposal calling for a moratorium was passed, the meeting was adjourned when the ultraleftists took over the stage and the rest of the night was full of trashing.

A press conference of student government leaders, labor leaders, and SMCers was called

by the SMC to pose an alternative to the trashing. It was successful in getting out the SMC's perspective, to a degree, but it was clearly a one shot deal as far as the student government leaders were concerned.

Even more effort was concentrated on building the SMC, since it was clear that attempting to work with the CAIC was a dead end. The SMC was the only group that would maintain a mass action perspective and so it called actions in its own name to help build a periphery and propose an active alternative to the trashing. Monitor training sessions were also used to consolidate forces behind the SMC's perspective of peaceful mass action and reaching out to involve other people in antiwar activity.

The SMC came out of the upsurge unquestionably stronger. It built three forums and six demonstrations in its own name in four weeks. There is an enlarged mailing list of active people and a solid core of high school and college students that understand what the SMC is and that want to continue to build it.

The YSA participated in and helped give leadership to the SMC during the upsurge. We also got out the mass action perspective through the Young Socialist slate that we ran for ASUC offices. During the upsurge, we passed out 9,000 campaign newspapers that explained our conception of the antiwar university and how the socialist candidates would use the student senate to build the upsurge. We also built a successful campaign conference that was helpful in recruiting several of the activists that were attracted to the YSA during the upsurge.

The upsurge reaffirmed the centrality of Cal to political life in the East Bay. We learned a lot about the political dynamics of the campus.

COMPARISON WITH MAY 1970

The role of the reformists in the recent antiwar upsurge stands in marked contrast to their role in May 1970. In May 1970 they took the initiative toward mass action. They blocked with the SMC against the ultraleftists to avoid trashing. They took the first action by having the Faculty Senate meet and call the convocation that voted for the conversion of Cal into an antiwar university.

During this upsurge, it was literally impossible to involve them in any united front-type coalitions. Not only did the reformist forces refuse to become involved in formulating the forms that the upsurge should take in the action arena—they very consciously attempted to subvert it into McGovern precinct work, particularly during the second phase of the upsurge. They consciously counterposed the McGovern campaign to actions of any sort, refusing even to endorse the nationally called actions. The student senate president, a leading McGovern organizer, even called a press conference condemning the trashing and calling on everyone to get involved in doing precinct work to help McGovern win the California primary as the *only* alternative to the trashing.

Because the reformist forces could not be drawn in and used as a counter to the ultraleft approach, the SMC was isolated and no clear perspective for action was able to emerge. The SMC constantly strove to get broad based agreement on an action that would serve to qualitatively deepen the upsurge. However, it was not strong enough to be able to defeat the ultraleftists while having to battle the reformists as well.

Finally, when it was clear the neither the USSR or China was going to press the question of the blockade and that Nixon's trip to Moscow was definitely on, the upsurge subsided.

**TOM TOMASCO
BRIAN WILLIAMS
Oakland-Berkeley YSA**

Columbia

Editor's Note: For background information on what happened at Columbia University following the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong and a discussion of the debate on strike policies at Columbia, readers are referred to the article, "The Debate on Strike Policies at Columbia" in the May 19, 1972 Militant.

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One of the most important ways to look at the recent antiwar upsurge is to compare it to what happened in May 1970 and see the differences as well as the similarities to that upsurge on the campus.

First of all, the depth at which the recent upsurge affected the campuses and brought students into action was clearly not the same situation that the campuses faced in 1970, when almost the entire student body of many universities were involved in action. In May 1970 at Columbia, virtually the entire school was out of class and involved in some sort of activity. Whole Columbia colleges and departments began to organize their own students, faculty, and staff. In the recent upsurge, the departmental form of organizing began in a very embryonic stage about three or four days after the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong. But there are two main reasons why the departmental organizing did not continue from this embryonic stage and develop on the same scope as in May 1970.

The first reason was the depth to which students as a whole were brought into action, both at Columbia and on campuses nationally. Columbia students seemed a little afraid to move into the developed forms of organizing that existed in May 1970 unless they were sure that the depth of the upsurge was as deep as it had been in May 1970. This is better understood by examining the context in which May 1970 occurred as compared with the recent upsurge. May 1970 had been preceded by a year of continuous antiwar actions in the student movement: October 15, November 15, and the February 1970 SMC conference of 4,000. The recent upsurge was preceded by a lull of mass antiwar activity on the college campuses since April 24, 1971.

The second factor in not moving the departmental organizing past the embryonic stage was the problem of a clear political leadership that could pose what to do next for the upsurge as a whole. To examine this question, it is necessary to look at the different tendencies that existed on the Columbia campus at the time of the upsurge and the relationships they had to the developing struggle.

THE REFORMISTS

The entire reformist wing of the campus did not play the same role in this upsurge as it did in May 1970. On many campuses in 1970, broad strike committees that reflected the entire student body were formed, and they functioned as the leadership for the strike. These broad formations included student government officers, newspaper editors, liberal faculty members, representatives of the departmental committees, campus union representatives, campus organization representatives, and many independent students that were the key activists and organizers of the strikes. These forces agreed with and helped build the mass actions that took place during the initial upsurge in May 1970. It was a reflection of the desire of the entire campus to take direct action. Only later, after the upsurge had been going on for several weeks, did these forces begin to turn their energies into the Democratic and Republican Party congressional campaigns, the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, and other actions that were counterposed to a mass action strategy. During the recent upsurge, many of the same forces were already involved in the 1972 election campaigns before the upsurge began. This was particularly true for the faculty, although it was also true for many student government figures, depending on the individual.

As the upsurge began this spring, these people began to organize work, particularly for the presidential candidates, to draw people into electoral activity. These forces were willing to take part in the mass actions that took place on the Columbia campus but were unwilling to be part of the political leadership that would have continued the mass actions and could have helped spread the upsurge to other sectors of the population. At Columbia, we found a negative reaction from these forces toward building takeovers and ultraleft actions, but an unwillingness to propose an alternative of direct mass action for the student body and a complete unwillingness to participate in any type of organized leadership.

OTHER TENDENCIES

On the other side were the ultraleftists, of which there are a large variety on the Columbia campus. The largest group is organized as the Columbia Anti-Imperialist Movement (CAIM) that is basically two tendencies. One tendency is the Dien Bien Phu Family, an amalgam of ultraleft individuals of a semi-Maoist character. They had about 10-15 people on the Columbia campus. The second tendency within the CAIM is PL-SDS, which has about 5-10 students on the campus. There are also a number of individual ultraleftists and several that are affiliated with the Asian American Political Association or Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. Altogether, CAIM represents 35-100 people on the Columbia campus, depending on what is occurring at the time.

CAIM's main work on the campus before the upsurge was organizing against war-related research being done on campus around the JASON project (connected with research for the Defense Department) and at the School of International Affairs. CAIM had also participated in the Attica Brigade contingent in past mass antiwar demonstrations.

It was with the CAIM, who did not agree among themselves most of the time, that the SMC had the major fight for leadership and the broadening out of the strike during its initial stages. I will return to this fight later in the article.

The other tendencies at Columbia are the various sectarian groups and the Young Workers Liberation League (YWLL). The Labor Committee has about 15 students (mostly in graduate school) on the campus. The Workers League had two members on campus at the beginning of the strike but one dropped from membership after seeing the Workers League position on the strike. The Spartacists-Revolutionary Communist Youth have one or two people on campus. All the sectarian groups brought a number of other members of their organizations onto the campus during the strike.

The YWLL did not operate openly at Columbia. They worked through a group called the Student Assembly. The YWLL never intervened in its own name at any of the strike meetings or activities. The only student that is known as a YWLLer played only a very minimal role by working with the ultraleftists on a couple of actions.

THE ROLE OF THE SMC

At the beginning of the upsurge, the SMC had 3-10 members that functioned as a working committee and that could be counted upon to work in the name of the SMC.

The main problem in trying to work with the student government and other reformist forces was their unwillingness to agree to a mass action perspective and to become part of any organized leadership. The question of whether or not to have an organized leadership was constantly under discussion and was the main point of many articles in the campus paper. This reflected a general problem of political life at Columbia and has been a feature of the struggles there since 1968. Every time a struggle emerges, the various sectarian groups that are on the campus all try to gain control bureaucratically to try to use the struggle for their own aims. Because of this history at Columbia, there was a general distrust of the SMC trying to put together any leadership because students thought that the SMC would then "dominate" that leadership.

For the first week of the strike, the SMC attempted to pull together a broad strike leader-

ship of the various segments that had been involved in activity. Almost the entire time was spent talking to the various reformist forces and representatives of the embryonic department strike committees to try to get them together in a leadership body. None of the forces were willing to block with the SMC and take on the ultraleftists in doing so.

The whole drive against an organized leadership was helped along by the Dien Bien Phu Family and other independent ultraleftists, who understood that if no authoritative leadership existed, then the leadership was, in fact, in their hands. For this reason, the question of mass meetings that made decisions, were run democratically with procedural questions decided by the body and not by the chairperson, an authoritative strike leadership, and other democratic procedures were of primary importance to the development of the strike.

From the beginning, the SMC helped to organize the mass meetings and came to the meetings with plans of action that generally passed or were modified slightly and then passed, even though the chairperson of a number of these meetings was hostile to the SMC. Because of the SMC's constant demand that the meetings be run democratically, most of the meetings followed that form.

Finally, the ultraleftists had enough of the SMC's attempts to broaden the strike and to win support against their tactic of closed picket lines. They ran the next mass meeting totally bureaucratically. Whenever an SMCer would attempt to speak, the chairperson would change the procedure and move on to another matter. The chair also allowed people to shout down others that they didn't agree with and the meeting degenerated. With no authoritative leadership and the tactics of closed picket lines and building takeovers, the strike began to fade.

The following week the SMC got together people that agreed to work on antiwar activity that would be counterposed politically to the building takeovers; activities that students in general could work on. The SMC continued to work this way throughout the antiwar upsurge on campus.

THE YSA AND THE UPSURGE

The Upper West Side YSA had only been in the Columbia area since the beginning of this school year. Although we had begun to get some feel for the campus, we did not have a general knowledge of campus political life. This was especially crucial to our intervention considering the pace at which things occurred and the base and knowledge of previous struggles on campus that the organized ultraleftists had. As the upsurge developed, a number of YSAers worked with the small fraction we already had at Columbia. Our fraction had to familiarize itself with campus political life in a situation that moved very rapidly and in a period of a few days.

After we realized that it was impossible to construct a leadership body and the SMC began to hold SMC meetings to attempt to bring people that agreed with their perspective around them, we concentrated on getting out the politics and name of the YSA. *Militant* sales and campaign interventions were stepped up. We held a campus forum and showed the YSA film. We also tried to talk to activists individually about the YSA's politics.

The upsurge clearly showed the need to build a base at Columbia. The local is planning now to have a number of additional YSAers attend school at Columbia in the fall.

BYRON ACKERMAN
Upper West Side YSA

University of Minnesota

The Sunday before April 22, the United States led bombing raids on Hanoi and Haiphong in an effort to crush the Vietnamese revolution. During the four-week period that followed, antiwar activity reached this year's peak in the U. S.

The initial response to the bombings was smaller than what was to follow. The meetings that were held, which were often as large as 400, were generally lacking in direction and were controlled by the ultraleftists.

During this time, the SMC continued to build the April 22 march in New York. A large number of people signed up to go during the week and five buses were sent from Minneapolis to New York City. During the meetings that were taking place, the SMC also agitated for a student strike that would turn the University of Minnesota into an antiwar organizing center and proposed an April 29 demonstration in conjunction with the national "Out Now" day called by NPAC and the SMC.

Despite the feeling advanced by many of our ultraleft opponents such as New American Movement (NAM), SDS, and Honeywell Project that mass marches were largely ineffective, the Minnesota Peace Action Coalition (MPAC) and the SMC mobilized over 400 people for the April 29 march. MPAC, the SMC, NAM, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and several church peace groups jointly sponsored a march on May 4 commemorating the shootings at Kent, Jackson, and Augusta. About 500 people marched on May 4 and the downtown rally grew to 1000 as shoppers and workers stopped by.

It was Nixon's announcement May 8 that the U. S. would mine Haiphong Harbor as well as escalate the bombing that triggered the actions of outrage that followed. At noon on Wednesday, a rally was held. The SMCers who spoke talked primarily about a May 13 march to the State Capitol and using the campus facilities to build it. Out of the noon rally, several hundred students decided to march to a recruiting center. When the students found the recruiting station closed, they turned to the armory where a five-hour battle with the police began, involving up to 2,000 students. Attention was turned to a main road, which was barricaded. From Wednesday, May 10, through Friday, May 12, University of Minnesota students occupied and barricaded the main street through the campus. The police were called in to clear the street and provoked the violence that erupted. Students—both participants in the occupation and onlookers—newspeople, and photographers were gassed several times. Students continued to hold the street, however, and during the next few days, there was a constant battle with the police to hold the street.

Rallies were held on campus every day at noon, mainly on the initiative of the SMC. Although there was no leadership body for the activity that was taking place, the rallies were attended by 3-6,000 students that listened seriously to debates on strategy. A number of people not in the SMC spoke about the antiwar university, including some individuals from NAM. Ultraleftists counterposed their tactics of holding the street and going off campus to trash to using the university as an antiwar organizing center and building the May 13 march on the State Capitol that the SMC and MAPC were building.

Strong support for the May 13 demonstration came from forces off the campus. In a short period of time, the Governor, Lt. Governor, Senators Humphrey and Mondale, the mayor-elect of St. Paul, six college student body presidents, a couple of state representatives, and about 25 local peace or social concern groups indicated their support for the march. For the first time, MPAC was united in an effective coalition with the Democratic Farmer Labor Party (the Minnesota Democratic Party formation) to build the action. The DFL lent their support in organizing and building the action. For example, they had leaflets flown around the state to help build the action, participated in press conferences, and sent out radio announcements from their headquarters.

When the May 13 march was projected at the mass campus rallies it got a fairly good response from the new activists that turned out, although the ultraleftists continued to oppose a mass, peaceful legal demonstration. The SMC continued urging the students that attended the noon rallies to take leaflets to distribute in the communities, to talk to people about the campus actions and the current war situation, and to urge people to march on Saturday. Over 300,000 leaflets were distributed for the action, a number of which were printed by individual groups such as the Downtown Workers for Peace. The demand for leaflets could hardly be met. At one point, a box of 10,000 was emptied in less than 45 seconds.

Finally, with an almost complete media blackout, 15,000 people turned out to make the May 13 action the largest demonstration in Minnesota since May 1970. The Minneapolis demonstration was also the largest in the nation. It was a clear indication of the outrage the American people felt at Nixon's latest move. The large turnout was probably also reflective of the DFL's response and help in building the action. May 13 showed that mass actions around a single issue demand are the most effective way to mobilize the American people against the war at this time.

After May 13, a strike committee and a strike assembly were set up on campus. Strike committees included speakers bureaus, media information centers, and community outreach groups. The YSA, SMC and MPAC had representatives on the strike committee. Assorted ultralefts, including NAM members, were a majority on the committee. The SMC urged all its members to become involved in the strike committees and activities. The SMC was also instrumental in getting the strike committee to call a two-day moratorium on Wednesday and Thursday and was the key organizer of the teach-in and antiwar workshops that took place on those two days.

Four strike demands were also formulated. They were: ROTC off campus, war research off campus, striking students should be allowed to take the grade they received in a course by the seventh week and devote their remaining time to antiwar efforts, and the university president's \$21,000 entertainment budget should be used for antiwar purposes. No action was taken on any of the demands by the administrators, who called them "non-negotiable," and put off any action on them. The demands were widely leafleted and were presented to the Twin Cities Senate (a joint body involving representatives from both the St. Paul and the Minneapolis campuses of the University of Minnesota). The strike committee plans to present the demands to them again in the fall.

MPAC and the SMC joined the DFLers again to try to get an antiwar referendum on the state ballot in the November elections. The idea had originated when a group of people including several NAM members marched on the governor's mansion at 1:00 a.m. following Nixon's announcement of the mining of the harbors of North Vietnam. The group had raised three demands and the governor had agreed to try to place the antiwar demand calling for a vote on the war on the ballot. The SMC and MPAC then took over the responsibility for organizing support for the referendum. The governor said he supported the idea and polled the legislators in order to call a special legislative session to place the referendum on the ballot. Labor and public official endorsers of the referendum were asked to send telegrams to the governor and their state representatives. The SMC also circulated petitions on campus in support of the referendum. The petitions were well received and widely circulated. However, the legislators reacted two to one against calling the special session.

For the first couple of days following the May 13 march, there was no real focus for action. Although there was good response to the strike committee as an organizing body, the lack of focus on the overall campus contributed to a dwindling of the size of actions. Many students were also turned off by the actions of the ultraleftists and felt that the daily occupation of buildings and streets had led nowhere. Finally, the immediacy of the situation began to lessen nearer the end of the week as it became clearer that the Soviet Union was not going to take any decisive

action. By that time, most of the students had returned to classes.

The University of Minnesota campus is quiet now. Most students are studying for finals. The strike committee is continuing to function, however. It is made up primarily of people from NAM and the SMC as well as a number of new activists who became involved in activity earlier and stayed around to continue organizing antiwar activity after things died down a little. The strike committee is concentrating now on organizing an antiwar summer school.

We should seriously evaluate the gains and lessons from the recent period. Nixon's latest escalation made clear not only how far the U. S. government is willing to go to crush the Vietnamese revolution, but also how effective and necessary mass antiwar protests are. Getting out the concept of the antiwar university was the SMC's main gain. It became generally accepted by students during the mass rallies and debates on strategy where the concept was widely discussed that it was the most effective way to use the university. Many NAM members addressed themselves to the concept of the antiwar university when speaking and one section of NAM supported the SMC's perspective. Even the assorted ultralefts that were hostile to the SMC spoke about the antiwar university and demands of "close it down" were replaced by "open it up." The student union was opened 24 hours a day with offices, phones, mimeograph machines, and meeting rooms, reserved for antiwar organizing.

JEANNIE STEVENS
Twin Cities YSA

University of Colorado

In the wake of the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong the student newspaper at the University of Colorado, the *Daily*, carried a small announcement stating that there would be a meeting of those concerned, and anyone that wanted more information should come to the newspaper office. The *Daily* is dominated by left-sounding liberal student journalists, who had been generally hostile to the SMC. The SMC at the time of Nixon's bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong had no money, no phone, and was under attack by the conservative, prowar student body president, who was threatening to take away SMC funds and facilities in "punishment" for defacing (postering) university buildings.

The meeting at the newspaper office was attended by two Boulder YSAers; a representative of the Colorado Peace Action Coalition; several members of the Boulder New American Movement (NAM); people from the newspaper staff; and a few independent activists.

That meeting and a subsequent one called two demonstrations attended by about 350 people. The marches ended at the Boulder army recruiting office. There was general hostility to the SMC and a real animosity to leafleting, serious organizing, and politics in general during the activity.

A month or so prior to the bombing of Hanoi, the University of Colorado SMC led a struggle against the reinstatement of ROTC credit (see *The Young Socialist Organizer*, April 14, 1972). The struggle had started off well, but a combination of an initial mood of demoralization caused by the students' lack of confidence in their ability to win and spring break managed to fizzle the struggle. At the same time the faculty, in a rarely seen display of anger, voted to override the Regents' reinstatement of ROTC credit, which had been taken away as a result of May 1970, signaling a real victory for the anti-ROTC campaign. The faculty's vote was larger percentage-wise than their May 1970 vote and went against the advice of the moderate faculty leadership.

However, there was no significant mass action in the anti-ROTC campaign and this, along with the feeling of frustration, had caused the SMC to be characterized as "outworn" by a number of students on campus.

YSAers continued to fight in the newspaper office meetings—dubbed the Stop the Bombing Committee—for an open mass meeting. In trying to create an independent pole, an SMC meeting was called but was literally taken over by NAM and some ultraleftists, who had been inactive since May 1970. The SMC was unable, except for two instances, to break through the NAM-student newspaper staff anti-mass action block.

The *Daily* had been patronizing in its attitude to the developing struggle and had given it minimal coverage. Because YSAers took the lead in trying to open up the newspaper as an antiwar newspaper (that was our formulation) we began to get some footholds, as well as isolating the liberal wing of the block that was trying to keep a lid on the struggle.

Without the help of the *Daily*, the SMC built the mass meeting with minimal resources and a core of perhaps 15 people. Because of the poor organization of the Stop the Bombing Committee, at the time of the Hanoi bombing the nucleus of activists was small.

The mass meeting was held right after the April 22 marches. The Denver YSA mobilized for it. Over 800 people came to the meeting. It started off with an air war slide show. At this time plans for April 29 in Denver were in full swing. A YSAer from Denver spoke first. He had attended the NPAC coordinating committee meeting in New York and was known to the students as a leader of the May 1970 strike and as a Socialist Workers Party candidate for Board of Regents. His opening speech set a militant tone, stressed the April 29 actions, pushed the SMC national student strike, and called for mass meetings and for open steering committee meetings.

The mass action perspective carried at the meet-

ing. The student newspaper people were silent and NAM freaked out (they proposed a myriad of strikes, marches, the napalming of a miniature White House, "anti-imperialist" actions, etc.) All the ultraleftists' proposals were defeated. April 29 in Denver was set unanimously as a central focus, and at least 500 students from Boulder participated in it.

Throughout all these meetings, large and small, YSAers consistently stressed the lessons of May 1970, and the necessity of building an antiwar university. The Denver local freed up leading YSAers to work with the YSAers in Boulder. It was important to do this to help consolidate recruitment, provide experienced leadership during the upsurge, and carry out the high level of activity that was necessary.

In addition, the Boulder campus, which has a history of activism, is politically the most important campus in Colorado. Activists from other parts of the state look to the University of Colorado campus for leadership. It has been both the barometer and the spark of the student movement in Colorado.

The April 29 action in Denver was a spirited demonstration of 5,000 at which Boulder SMC leaders spoke. This gave the SMC greater authority in Boulder.

After April 29, another mass meeting was held, a student assembly, the highest decision-making student organization on campus. While the first mass meeting had voted to strike, it had called, correctly, for another meeting after April 29 to affirm the strike. This meeting drew 2,500 students. It was run by the conservative student body president, and through bureaucratic maneuvering, he prolonged the debate to reduce the size of the crowd, which eventually voted 1,200 to 200 for a prolonged strike. At this time NAM was not visible, except for a couple of its leading figures.

During this time, before the mass meeting and into the middle of that week, many activists were drawn into a campaign to recall the student body president. The organizing that went into this campaign—collecting signatures to call the election and distributing leaflets—cut into the antiwar activity. The YSA supported his recall, but we did not have the cadre to organize the campaign, nor were there any meetings called to organize it. The vote in the recall election was 3,800 to 3,100 not to recall the student body president. This was the largest turnout for a student election in recent memory. About one-third of the student body voted. The president's right-wing apparatus was very well-organized for the election. The outcome was demoralizing for hundreds of students that were new to politics and gave the ultraleftists a handle. They said, essentially, why bother to organize the majority, you can't win.

The most prominent slogan of the student strike was the call for an antiwar university. The YSA arranged to debate a NAM member on strategy for the student antiwar movement and it was attended by 20 independent activists.

Funds allocated out of the pressure of the upsurge were used to bring Fred Lovgren, SMC National Coordinator to speak to a rally of 1,000 on May 4, where he was very well-received.

The last mass meeting before Nixon's second speech faced an organized challenge by the ultraleftists to change the orientation of the movement. Their proposal was unserious and rife with red-baiting. Because of the red-baiting many students became demoralized and left. The meeting began with around 400 students and ended with half that number. Those that were left voted overwhelmingly for the SMC's proposal for a day-to-day series of antiwar activities ending with a Jackson State memorial. The meeting also called for an emergency mass meeting to map out action in the event of a re-escalation.

The ultraleftists specifically red-baited the SMC and the steering committee of the Stop the Bombing Committee. It was refuted by both YSAers

and other activists in the antiwar movement.

When Nixon announced the blockade, the lid on the frustration and the rage and underlying tension of sporadic up-and-down antiwar activity all spring simply burst. A handful of students grouped and marched through dormitories chanting, "Join us; join us. Can't you see? We're on the verge of World War Three." The all night chanting and marching built to a crowd of over 2,000, which occupied a bridge. From Monday to Wednesday the bridge and intersection blockings took pre-eminence in the discussion of strategy and tactics for the antiwar movement.

The scenario was typical: arrests, gassing, and some well-executed police brutality.

About 1,500 students attended a rally on Thursday. The ultraleftists tried to lead a split-off from the rally, but only a handful followed them out. A mass meeting of 2,000 the night before voted for a strike and to support the May 13 action in Denver. But students were looking for immediate action, and when someone said, "Let's go take the streets!" nearly every seat emptied in seconds.

The second strike was dominated by the furor created in the city by the violence, arrests, street blocking, etc. For the most part, the students that blocked streets were not conscious ultraleftists. (There were about 50 to 100 conscious ultraleftists.) YSAers, throughout the upsurge, projected a mass action orientation with reach-out activities, using the campus as a base from which to work. They tended to be shouted down in the first part of the upsurge. The small size of the Boulder local, the strain of past activity, and the rapid tempo of events, added to the momentum and the lack of discussion at mass decision-making meetings and the newness of the mass of participants to politics and demonstrations made it nearly impossible to overcome the spontaneism simply through oratory and persuasion.

However, throughout all the actions one could see the impact of our slogans, even though many students did not understand them. When over 1,000 students peacefully took an intersection, their mood was one of refusal to organize the campus because of a spoken desire not to make the mistake of keeping students "isolated from the community." The ultraleftists talked of "mass action" civil disobedience to build the "antiwar university." Everybody talked about the antiwar university, although not everyone understood or agreed with the SMC's concept of it.

When the focus started moving away from street blocking and toward the strike on campus, 300 students took over part of a classroom building and five rooms and a watts line were given to them by a dean. They had no idea how to use them.

As the activity was organized the nucleus around the YSA grew to 20 or 25. But because of finals (the faculty refused to do anything to change finals policy), Nixon's trip to Moscow, a sense of general exhaustion and confusion, and the final push for May 13, this nucleus could not be fully consolidated.

There was tremendous and sharp red-baiting which added to the tension. After May 13, the momentum completely disintegrated.

On the night before the May 13 action there was a Boulder town meeting called by the City Council. Of the 2,000 people who showed up, about half were students and the rest townspeople and faculty. The meeting called for a "day of concern" May 19 around the slogan "end the war." The reformists controlled the meeting and our intervention was to push May 13 from the floor.

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While the SMC itself was not the central leadership of the upsurge, it was clearly seen as a serious, *political* force with consistent ideas, and SMC slogans were evident and generally used.

The YSA drew about 10 people around itself who, while they were not actually members of the YSA, worked closely with our fraction. The school year's end hindered their immediate recruitment but about half of these people will probably join either here or in other areas.

The ultraleftists were politically isolated and defeated at the end. They had been given an artificial life of two weeks due to their ability to tailend the crest of spontaneous anger.

YSAers were conscious of talking about the YSA and recruiting to the YSA. *Militant* sales went well; during a short breathing space four YSAers sold 100 *Militants* in one day. The SWP

campaign was visible through the presence of candidates who spoke in Boulder and through mass leafleting for the campaign and YSJP at the April 29 and May 13 demonstrations in Denver. Although there are many McGovern supporters in Boulder, the leaders were not visible at any time in the upsurge.

While the pace of activity at the University of Colorado matched that of May 1970, in fact excelled it at times, the breadth of involvement was smaller. The biggest actions of May 1970 were a meeting of 8,000 and a march of 5,000. This spring the biggest meetings and rallies were not over 2,500, although there were *more* actions this spring. However, in Boulder in 1970, both the YSA and SMC were larger and the student government and student newspaper threw themselves into motion.

A central drawback was the small size of the YSA. Considering that, an amazing amount of

work was done, which resulted in a growth in familiarity with YSA politics. The most valuable outcome was the real experience through action gained by the Boulder YSAers.

JON HILLSON
Denver YSA



Philadelphia

At the beginning of the spring antiwar offensive, the Philadelphia Peace Action Coalition (PAC) was working in isolation from other peace groups. PAC meetings were poorly attended and press statements were not picked up by the major media and only rarely printed in the campus press. Other groups such as Harrisburg Defense and Resistance were building the April 1 Harrisburg action, but showed no interest in April 22. PAC's decision to participate in the April 1 demonstration provided an opportunity to contact other groups and draw new people into the office.

On the campuses, SMC chapters existed at the Universities of Pennsylvania, Temple, and Rutgers but they did not hold regular meetings or organize activities other than occasional educational. PCPJ forces called antiwar meetings sporadically, but no actions resulted from them. There were a number of active high school

SMCers, however. Citywide High School SMC (HSSMC) meetings were regularly attended by 15-20 students, including representatives from several of the outlying schools. A high school antiwar conference was held early this spring and helped activists reach new high schools. Although the conference was not large, it was attended by students from 21 different schools. Six new HSSMC chapters were established before April 1, two of them predominantly Black. Through consistent outreach, the SMC had a reputation in the high schools as the antiwar group capable of mobilizing large numbers of people.

Building for April 22 was progressing slowly. Many campus SMCers indicated that they would help build April 22 as the action drew nearer, but they had little interest in organizing building activities. Many were cynical about the prospect of mobilizing antiwar sentiment in the university community, much less the population as a whole.

The Pennsylvania primary election was at the end of April, and electoral activity took priority over antiwar activity for many students. The "Youth for" groups of the various candidates were willing to place April 22 literature on their tables and to attend SMC press conferences, but their main objective was to mobilize students in support of their favorite candidates. Nixon's "winding down the war" propaganda also had an effect on campus activity.

PAC AND THE SMC

The Vietnamese offensive and the reprisal of the U.S. government triggered increased activities on the campuses, in the high schools, and on a citywide basis. PCPJ followed their April 15 action with belated involvement in building April 22, and PAC and PCPJ united to build a May 4 action. Actions on the campuses included rallies,

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speak-outs, marches on ROTC buildings, candle-light parades, and, at the University of Pennsylvania, students took over an administration building for two days.

Strikes were called at three area campuses on April 21. They were endorsed by the student newspapers and student governments, but they did not effectively involve a majority of students in strike activity. Some civil disobedience was organized, such as closing down the draft board offices and Nixon's campaign headquarters. A larger number of students were involved in antiwar actions than at anytime since May 1970. Demonstrations on the larger campuses involved 500 to 800 students and 200 to 300 participated at the smaller campuses. Most campuses closed for summer vacation at the end of April, which left little time to draw in fuller participation.

Activity in the high schools intensified also, and high school activists were the principle builders of the nationally called actions. Rallies were organized at individual high schools or at locations central to a number of schools. About 10 schools were involved, and the citywide antiwar office was asked to send SMC speakers to the rallies. High school activists were also more receptive than the university students to doing out-reach work, both at other schools and in the community. During the upsurge, citywide High School SMC meetings usually drew about 30 to 40 people.

The overall mood during this period did not completely reverse itself. The blatant escalation of the war angered students and created renewed interest in the war and in the antiwar movement. The myth of the war winding down was shattered. Large numbers of students felt obligated to demonstrate their disgust and abhorrence toward the continuing war. However, the overriding sense of powerlessness and frustration still played an important role.

Even though the majority of Americans have indicated an opposition to the war, the expression of this sentiment in the streets as yet has involved only a minority. Beginning to understand the power of the working class but failing to recognize its potential to radicalize demoralizes many students. This demoralization tended to lead students away from consistent education and out-reach work and into ultraleft or reformist tactics.

During the upsurge the PAC and SMC office was established as an information and organizing center for campuses, high schools, and the press. PAC and the SMC were able to work with other forces in coordinating efforts around specific actions, especially May 4. There was a steady stream of traffic in and out of the SMC office—not only SMCers but the periphery of groups like the YWLL and Resistance, that came into the office to work on publicity, press, etc. The news media started covering PAC press statements and called the office for information. The SMC also established good relations with a number of sympathetic reporters.

The citywide coalition included the Communist Party, Resistance, SANE, the Attica Brigade, VVAW, and community and religious peace groups. At general meetings the Peace Action Coalition commanded a certain respect because the other groups admitted that peaceful, legal demonstrations like April 22 were vital, which was what PAC had been building. Legislative, electoral, or civil disobedience activities were not counterposed to building broad antiwar actions as a response to the escalation. PAC's main political advantage in the coalition, however, was the size and strength of the HSSMC. Recognizing the SMC's ability to mobilize high school students,

PCPJ was anxious to include PAC in building May 4.

The Young Workers' Liberation League attempted to strengthen their influence among high school students by calling a meeting at their bookstore, which drew eight or nine independents. Through the Progressive Caucus of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, the Communist Party helped initiate a student-teacher feeder march for the May 4 rally, in which the HSSMC participated.

The SMC faced limitations on the campuses due to the small number of SMCers and the fact that the main campuses were closed for the summer. Where the SMC did intervene, its influence could have been greater had SMC meetings been called to draw people into the SMC. Instead, SMCers worked entirely through antiwar committees, strike bodies, etc. These formations did not always have the same perspectives as the SMC, especially as the frustration took hold and students moved toward ultraleft and reformist actions.

SMCers were able to raise the concept of the antiwar university in an educational way. However, the SMC's lack of a base on any campus limited its influence, and the concept of turning the campus into an antiwar organizing center did not carry on any campuses. At times, SMCers failed to offer immediate and specific projections other than building for the nationally called actions, which did not enthruse students, although they were willing to participate in the actions.

Inroads were made on two new campuses where no antiwar group existed and help was requested from the citywide SMC. Individuals from the campuses were drawn into the SMC through the citywide office.

THE ROLE OF THE YSA

Jeness and Pulley campaign work prior to the upsurge provided the YSA with a list of campaign endorsers at several campuses and high schools. We phoned these people about the activities around the upsurge and encouraged them to participate as YSJPers. We also worked on a day-to-day basis with YSJPers at the University of Pennsylvania. We have no YSAers at that campus, but three YSAers worked closely with campaign supporters there.

Andrew Pulley was on tour in Philadelphia the week before April 22, and he spoke to very receptive audiences at rallies, mass meetings, and antiwar press conferences. Pulley's appearances helped distinguish the SWP candidates as activists and organizers of the antiwar movement. Through the distribution of campaign literature and *Militant* sales at all antiwar events, many new people were brought into contact with the Socialist Workers Campaign.

The YSA National Executive Committee's statement on the upsurge that appeared in *The Militant* was reproduced on a leaflet along with a date for a "Meet the YSA" meeting and a coupon. The leaflet was left on the public information table in the antiwar office and acquainted many SMCers with the YSA. As a result, some of them came to our headquarters where we discussed the importance of joining the YSA with them. Three people decided to join the YSA directly out of the antiwar upsurge. We plan to encourage other SMC activists to attend the socialist summer school and forums. A YSAer has been assigned to head up this work and the campaign committee has added new people to work on consolidating campaign endorsers.

Having a fraction on only one campus limited our ability to intervene in the upsurge and recruit to the YSA at the other schools where students were in motion and looking for answers.

This summer we plan to think out very carefully our orientation toward the main schools in the area, especially the University of Pennsylvania, since we have a number of campaign supporters there.

ROSE OGDEN
Philadelphia YSA

NYU-Queens College

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

At the beginning of the spring there were two YSAers on the New York University (NYU) campus—both staff employees—and the fraction head, who had a nine to five job. By the time the upsurge in antiwar activity hit, the fraction had been strengthened considerably with the addition of several YSAers. A number of activists who had worked closely with YSAers in the SMC, the feminist movement, and the YSJP were also close to joining.

The SMC began to step up its activity in prep-

aration for the April 22 demonstration before the upsurge began; it had built several large meetings and put someone on staff to build the action at NYU.

As Nixon escalated the bombing, the SMC called a rally on campus that drew about 200 people. The next week the SMC called a meeting of campus leaders that agreed to call a mass meeting, although the SMC was the only organization that projected a big response. This meeting on April 19 drew 300-400 excited people. SMCers went to the meeting open on the ques-

tion of a strike. After some discussion, SMCers decided to push for a one-day student strike. SMCers had initiated the meeting, given reports, and presented ideas for implementing a strike. This helped establish them as leaders from the beginning.

The initial strike meeting and the April 21 strike rally were by far the largest events at NYU. All succeeding campus meetings, mass meetings, and coordinating committee meetings

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were attended by about 30-60 people. Two evening marches to Times Square involved about 100 people each.

A strike center was set up in the student union after the first mass meeting. The flow of activists into the strike center varied from 30 the first day to a steady stream of six to eight people a day during the next two weeks. By early May it was a small trickle. At no time did activity reach the level it did in May 1970.

After the first mass meeting several YSAers were added to the NYU fraction. The campaign director worked directly with YSAers and YSJPer to make sure campaign activity was carried on in the midst of the upsurge. The sales director came to campus to organize *Militant* and *ISR* sales.

A special coordinating committee was set up to oversee our intervention in the upsurge both at Queens College and NYU.

Our opponents—a few Workers Leaguers and a Labor Committee member, one YPSL member, and a couple of Radical Zionists—generally intervened noisily at the beginning and were quickly isolated and discredited by their hostility to the student antiwar movement. Other opponents that had not been visible before the upsurge came forward at various times. Several members of the Communist Party came around the strike center but remained completely on the outside. A handful of ultraleftists tried various maneuvers during early strike meetings, but avoided direct conflict with the SMC. The Attica Brigade, an assortment of all kinds of ultraleftists that is based near the campus, held several meetings to prepare for their intervention in the April 22 march but did not participate in strike activities. Several student government leaders and antiwar activists became frustrated when the first wave of the upsurge died down, and began to resort to ultraleft activities. We discussed tactics with several of these people, trying to keep them involved, and projecting actions such as community leafleting. As a result, their effect was neutralized in the activity. The student government people concentrated on the student elections. In fact, they were quite helpful in securing money and facilities.

The administration either stayed out of the way or provided resources when asked. For example, they provided facilities for the National Emergency Student Antiwar Conference. Precedents seemed to have been established in May 1970.

QUEENS COLLEGE

The YSA fraction at Queens College had been temporarily disbanded last fall but was reestablished in the spring. The YSA was known and respected by a large number of *Militant* readers and campaign supporters, but most of these people did not play a role in the upsurge.

A number of SMC meetings had been built this year, but the turn-out was generally small. The first meeting in response to the escalation of the war was not called by the SMC. SMCers attended, however, and were able to work out a unified call for a mass meeting and then a strike rally. The mass meeting April 20 was attended by 1,000 students and Jerry Rubin. The meeting voted for "militant" (i.e., closed) picket lines for the April 21 student strike. The rally April 21 drew 1,500 to 2,000 students. As at NYU, periodic coordinating meetings were held and an informal, open strike committee functioned on a day-to-day basis.

Although the intensity of activity was greater than at NYU, after the first wave of the upsurge a strong pacifist-civil disobedience current developed and most students became involved in small sit-in demonstrations at various corporation offices in New York City. It was difficult for the SMC to project peaceful, legal actions without seeming sectarian. The SMC's main focus was to use campus resources and energy to build city-wide and national actions.

Queens College is one of the few campuses where the National Caucus of Labor Committees has a strong base. They quickly isolated themselves in the strike, but they maintained their rather substantial periphery.

The main opposition to the SMC came from a group of liberals, radical faculty members, and New University Conference members, who had been involved in social work-type projects. They had a caucus of 30-35 in strike committee meetings, and pushed for civil disobedience actions.

EVALUATION

Our different experiences at NYU and Queens College were due in large part to the strength of the SMC in relation to its opponents.

The existence of a viable SMC at NYU with only small clusters of sectarians as opponents, enabled the SMC to play a leading role in the upsurge. The SMC's opponents were weakened. Several SMC meetings were held during the upsurge and a number of antiwar activists were drawn around the SMC.

At Queens College the SMC was weak, and a strong Labor Committee had been a stumbling block to building it. It was much easier for the ultraleftists to take the initiative in the upsurge.

During the upsurge six people joined the YSA. Three were NYU students, two worked in the New York antiwar office, and one was a student at Queens College. Several people became interested in the YSA's politics as a result of our role in the upsurge.

JESSE SMITH
Lower Manhattan YSA

Cleveland

In early April at the beginning of the Vietnamese offensive it became clear that a U.S. escalation was imminent. The Cleveland Area Peace Action Coalition (CAPAC) and the SMC called an emergency picket line at the Federal Building. Among the 150 people who picketed were representatives from Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC), New American Movement (NAM), Women Speak Out, the Communist Party (CP), and the Young Workers Liberation League (YWLL).

The Peace Center (the CAPAC and SMC office) called an emergency citywide meeting for April 18 at Case Western Reserve University (CWRU). It was the largest antiwar meeting in Cleveland in two years; 75 people, most of them CWRU students, attended. However, there was little sentiment for action. The meeting called a campus rally, but the turn-out was small. Meetings were held April 19 at Cuyahoga Community College (CCC) and Cleveland State University (CSU), both of which, although the largest meetings yet held on these campuses, called for no significant actions.

At the YSA meeting before the citywide meeting at CWRU, discussion centered on the importance of flexibility with regard to previously scheduled YSA activities, such as the educational weekend planned for April 29. There was also discussion on the possibilities for recruitment to the YSA and the importance of selling *The Militant*, publicizing the upcoming campaign banquet for Andrew Pulley, and having speakers identified as spokespeople for the SWP campaign.

The first citywide meeting voted to call a second meeting on April 24 at CWRU. This meeting was attended by 150 people including representa-

tives from CALC, the CP, YAWF, and SDS. Everyone agreed to build demonstrations on April 29 and May 4. Although some independent radicals and YAWF and SDS called for other actions, including civil disobedience, these actions were not counterposed to mass, legal demonstrations on April 29 and May 4.

A coordinating committee for the YSA and SWP composed of both organizers, campus fraction heads, and directors of every area of work met after the April 24 meeting to evaluate the situation and to project a future division of labor. We planned to continue building the May 6 campaign banquet, although with slightly less elaborate plans.

The April 29 demonstration was attended by 300 people, and 200 demonstrated on May 4. Speakers at the May 4 rally included representatives from NAM and the CP, which had requested a speaker. An afternoon picket line called by CALC on May 4, drew about 100 people.

Nixon's May 8 speech announcing the mining of the harbors of Vietnam was immediately answered by a statement from CAPAC and SMC; the statement called for a picket line May 11. Meetings were called for the afternoon of May 9 at CCC and CSU, and CAPAC called a citywide meeting for the evening of May 9 at CWRU. The citywide meeting was attended by 300 people, including representatives from 15 campuses around the state where there were antiwar activities. NAM and CALC called a meeting for the same time as the CAPAC citywide meeting. The NAM-CALC meeting was attended by 100 people. Representatives from the NAM-CALC meeting later went to the meeting at CWRU.

We were surprised by the militant spirit of the meeting and the overwhelming desire for im-

mediate action. After an hour of discussion, which consisted largely of reports from other campuses, the meeting broke down by campuses. The meeting for CWRU students was attended by 150. They decided to march through campus to gather more people for midnight meeting. Well over 1,000 students attended the midnight meeting and voted unanimously to strike and for a march on May 10 from CWRU to downtown Cleveland. Another mass meeting was also called for the next evening.

On May 10 1,000 marched downtown from CWRU. The rally was attended by 2,000. More students were becoming active at CCC and CSU, but there were no signs of activity on the scale of CWRU.

There were 350 people at the meeting May 10 at CWRU. The discussion was dominated by ultraleftists that proposed civil disobedience and trashing. No activity actually resulted from their proposals.

Eventually, the meeting began to dissipate, and it finally broke down into activity groups. The May 13 organizing group was the largest. The ultraleftists' activity groups fell apart and essentially resolved to do nothing. Antiwar activists immediately moved to obtain facilities from CWRU for antiwar organizing and were granted an office, mimeograph machine, paper, and other supplies that evening. The next day the SMC was able to get offices at both CSU and CCC.

Activity decreased on all campuses after May 10. At CWRU exams, which had been rescheduled to allow for antiwar activity, became the main concern of students. The May 13 demonstration was attended by about 500 people, half

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of them ultraleftists, a sizeable contingent coming from Antioch College.

A regional meeting was held May 14 with representatives from 10 campuses in the Cleveland area to discuss building for May 21.

There were many other activities called during this period by the ultraleftists, PCPJ, and CAPAC and the SMC. CAPAC and the SMC continually called picket lines, vigils, and other activities to involve as many people as possible. NAM and CALC called for some traffic blocking actions, which drew 75-100 people, and YAWF built a picket line of 200. In general, however, no forces attempted to counterpose their activities to those called by the SMC and CAPAC, and most antiwar activists and the media saw the Peace Center as the citywide headquarters for the antiwar movement. Also, by calling all the schools in Ohio to gather information on antiwar activities, the Peace Center was established as the strike center for Ohio.

On the campuses, particularly at CWRU, YSAers played a leading role in the upsurge. Our opponents played no role in the mass meetings and went along with all of our proposals. It was clear that our consistent antiwar activity had helped establish us as leaders of the antiwar movement.

During the upsurge, CAPAC and the SMC were able to establish working relations with PCPJ and to involve many new people in antiwar activity.

Andrew Pulley's tour came just before the second upsurge. Pulley spoke at six different campuses and 12 people asked to join the YSA during his tour. Six of these people have joined so far.

However, more attention could have been paid to recruitment to the YSA. For example, campaign speeches at antiwar rallies at the height of the upsurge could have been geared specifically at convincing people to join the YSA. The campaign did not release a statement at any time during the upsurge, and the YSA did not set up literature tables, distribute the program for campus revolt or call "Meet the YSA" meetings.

Recruitment was discussed in the fraction and coordinating committee meetings. *Militants* were sold; the regional educational conference was publicized; campaign literature was distributed. But even that work could have been stepped up and improved.

Nevertheless, we were able to make significant gains for both the antiwar movement and the YSA through our work in the upsurge. The number of people who have joined the YSA this spring is twice the number that joined last fall. We were able to establish the YSA more firmly on the campuses in Cleveland, especially at CWRU. We now have a number of students around us that we hope will join when schools reopen in the fall. Most importantly, the local is now much more conscious of the importance of recruitment and of the necessity of thinking out how to build a campus base.

young socialist the organizer

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DAVID PAPARELLO
Cleveland YSA