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From Labor Action, Vol. 14 No. 23, 5 June 1950, pp. 4–5.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Encyclopaedia of Trotskyism On-Line (ETOL).
The long weekend in Berlin is now over and the young Germans mobilized by the Stalinists have largely returned to their homes in the Eastern Zone. The American press has spent a considerable part of its collective space to dull moralizing on the demonstrations. Most of it has been to the effect that “Hitlerism marched again,” and the drawing of other superficial and empty parallels with allegedly similar demonstrations under the Nazi regime. All of this, of course, largely misses the point and tells us literally nothing.
Certain parallels between Stalinism and Nazism have long been obvious, and led Trotsky to describe the “symmetrical” aspects of the two regimes many years ago. But this scratches the surface and conveniently gets around the embarrassing need to analyze anything, including the way in which the West, the Allies, handled the entire event.
That the Whitsuntide weekend in Berlin was a totalitarian mobilization and demonstration, conceived in an utterly reactionary and chauvinistic spirit, goes without saying. Half a million German youth (and it is important to note that this is the most recent German generation, those who have grown up since the end of the war five years ago, and who had no direct participation in that war) were dragged into Berlin by one or another means, and whipped into line to parade under absurd slogans and banners of Stalinism, and to sing songs written for them by Stalinist party hacks. Gerhardt Eisler has at last found a natural outlet for his repressed talents! The entire affair was cooked up by a combination of the Russian masters and their East German Stalinist puppets, with the idea of impressing the world and the West as to the power of Stalinism.
Did the German youth participate freely, willingly and consciously? Thanks to Allied handling of the issue, no real answer can be given, but all indications are to the contrary. The intense discipline, the manner in which the Stalinist police, etc., watched these children, and other pointers indicate that the bulk of participation was through apathy, fear, threat and indifference. The comments of those, who fled to the West clearly indicate this. There is no reason to believe that the German masses in the East are pro-Stalinist or pro-Russian. Ex-Nazis, present-day Stalinists and Russian occupation forces make a convenient combination in mobilizing masses.
But how did the Allies handle the matter? In the typical bureaucratic and blind fashion of imperialists, they lumped together the whole “German youth” as pro-Stalinist, and created a largely artificial version of an attempted military coup. What was a POLITICAL demonstration by the Stalinists was countered, by the West, by a MILITARY demonstration. Berlin was to be “saved” from Stalinism by a display of tanks, GIs with tommy guns and barbed wire!
There was no understanding of what was at stake; aid notthe slightest inkling that a counter political .efforQ-.attempting to divide the ranks of the German youth, might even be attempted. The big. military bgains who run Berlin for the West knew only one possible response: If they move in on us; let ’em have it! In this sense, then, the East German Stalinists successfully pulled off a major political demonstration. That the Allied troops still remain in Berlin is cold turkey indeed; something like saying that the Giants are still in the race for the National League pennant! That was not the issue this past weekend.
As for the Western parties of Berlin, their behavior is no less stupid and reactionary. Did they make any effort, beyond the most cursory, to establish contact with this youth? Led by gray-haired politicians and bureaucrats of pre-Hitler vintage, these chiefs of the Christian Socialists, Social-Democrats, etc., really feel a distinct hostility, in principle, toward youthful elements in general, whom they neither understand nor sympathize with.
They were content to stay at home, warming themselves in the glow of American tanks, British barbed wire and French bayonets. There is little wonder that these parties have no youth sections of any account. The Social-Democratic youth appears to have been conspicuously absent.
The allies may rejoice in their hollow “victory.” It compares with. Chiang Kai-shek’s clever retreats. Stalinism, thanks to the failure of German socialism, retains the propaganda offensive together with the political offensive.
GM knew the conservative mood of the workers. It spoke about it during negotiations. But it also knew that the UAW-CIO. as the Chrysler strike showed, could and would shut down all plants, and that the economic cost of a struggle with the UAW would be terrific, as Chrysler Corporation found out. GM sought and found another way out!
The initiative was clearly in GM’s hands in this situation, and it decided to offer the UAW two propositions. The first GM proposal consisted of essentially the Chrysler package, including the $100 a month pension for employees with 25 years of seniority at the age of 65. With minor changes, the contract would be renewed for three years.
The second offer included a package equivalent to 19 cents per hour gains for this year, the escalator clause, the four-cent per year improvement wage boost, at the price of a renewal of the current contract, with a modified union shop and minor changes, for five years.
This second package was based on GM’s belief that economic conditions would remain relatively stable in the whole next period, and that the peace it hoped to win with the UAW-CIO would easily compensate for the cost of such a proposal.
The UAW leaders accepted the second package with alacrity. For them it was a heaven-sent way out of the crisis in which the union was involved. Suppose inflation continues, and the cost of living skyrockets? The escalator clause protects the GM workers. Emil Mazey, UAW secretarytreasurer, explained it thus to a large East Side caucus meeting of the Reuther forces. He added, Suppose a depression hits? Our union is safe from a head-on attack for five years. The workers get a 4-cent raise yearly. We are insured either way.
Nearly 200 delegates attended the national General Motors conference to ratify the agreement. What was their reaction? At first, suspicion at the manner in which the contract was signed and announced publicly before they had a chance to study it, and much concern over a five-year contract. But, after a two-day session, in which the high point was the usual militant speech of Walter Reuther the delegates voted overwhelmingly to accept the package. Less than 200 voted against it.
In the shops, a big sigh of relief went up. Especially when the GM workers figured out their economic gains compared to Chrysler and Ford workers. And the gains are unmistakable and represent a real victory for the UAW.
In the Chrysler plants, the reaction was quite different. It was like salt on an old wound. Since most workers view settlements in bread and butter terms, the common feeling was, “Look what they got. We sure got hooked!” At Ford plants, many similar comments were heard.
In estimating the overall effect of the GM settlement these reactions at Ford and Chrysler are important factors. Before the 1951 convention in May, the UAW has a re-opening date for economic demands at Ford and Chrysler. The workers in these campaigns will be stimulated by the GM victory to make more aggressive demands than before. And they can win them too.
The GM pact, with all the dangers of a 5-year term, offers new possibilities to the UAW, perhaps with turbulent days ahead until after the 1951 convention, and the Ford and Chrysler negotiations next year, but also with prospects of cracking them both.
It is very unlikely that Chrysler will again decide to lose $50,000,000 minimum of profit, its competitive place in the auto industry, and 450,000 car production for a fight with the UAW, in which it does have to retreat from its die-hard attitude. The Ford Motor Company knows that lesson already, and if it doesn’t, it can be taught.
What is most likely is that these companies will give wage boosts to bring up their rate to a GM level, but in return may well ask for longer extensions of contracts.
A few weeks ago Walter Reuther criticized a delegate at the Chrysler conference who said he was disturbed by the trend reflected in a three-year contract. And at the General Motors conference Reuther did not refer to the five-year pact as an “exception,” the line he used at the Chrysler conference. It would have been difficult to do so.
Rather, to anticipate his critics, Reuther came up with an explanation which touches on the core of the problem raised by such a long-term contract. How does the UAW involve its ranks in the union now that its primary method, the national wage conferences, the posing of a major struggle every two years, etc., is gone? How can the UAW keep from taking on the character of an AFL business union, in which all union business rests in the hands of a relatively small but all powerful bureaucracy?
The answer, said Reuther, could be found in drawing the ranks into effective political action. He outlined the many wage negotiations and crises in which he and others found themselves, and said that now for the first time he could devote himself to political problems.
As usual, Reuther was aware of the problem, and evasive in his solution. Certainly, the broadening of the struggle of the UAW from primarily the economic front to the political front could involve the ranks more. Certainly, building independent political machines would provide a new arena in which militants could function. Leaving aside the question of what kind of political action, the danger in the Reuther approach is that his proposal, or rather long range idea, is a substitute for rank and file involvement in the union’s daily economic problems, rather than a required supplement.
Furthermore, involvement in politics will probably be building a machine within the Democratic Party (as is still being done in Michigan right now) or just supporting the Democratic Party (as the CIO policy is nationally.)
The conclusion is inescapable, however, that the UAW will devote more and more time in politics on a local, state and national scale, and that the Reuther leadership will have more time for working out some of the long range plans of the ambitious “Redhead.”
Concern over the democratic structure of the UAW becomes greater when one reviews the proposals of the Reuther leadership for the internal structure and functioning of the union. At the last convention the Reuther leadership proposed two-year conventions, two-year local union elections, higher dues, and regular assessments instead of the special strike assessment which was finally adopted. The chief argument of the leadership was that the recurring crises with the corporations made imperative fewer conventions and elections so that the leadership could concentrate mainly on fighting the companies.
What possible excuse could be found now for such a program, what with a five-year contract at GM, a three-year contract at Chrysler, and a two-year contract at Ford? As a matter of fact, there is now a greater need to maintain the yearly elections, the 18-month national conventions, and other traditional democratic features of the UAW. To tamper with them now is to clearly and coldly bureaucratize the UAW, and to accelerate the trend towards AFL business unionism.
Turning to another aspect of the GM contract, the five year clause signifies a freezing of the present working conditions, especially since no improvement was made in the functioning of the poor shop steward system and the red-tape in the bargaining procedure. The tendency again is dangerous. But it is a deliberate lie to state, as does the Daily Worker, that under the new contract, no fight against speed-up is possible. The Stalinists know, as well as the next man, that under paragraph 117 of the contract, the union has the right, as it did previously, to call a strike on the speed-up issue. The UAW does have a loop-hole if the GM Corporation takes too much for granted in the five-year pact. Some of the blind critics of the Reuther regime found themselves caught short when they screamed this is a five-year no-strike pledge, for Reuther quickly pointed out that paragraph 117 remains in the contract. (Not the least of Reuther assets are still most of his critics.)
The GM settlement emphasizes another major shift in the Reuther strategy on pensions. Although the UAW is signing up many small companies in “area” agreements, and expects to settle quickly at Briggs, the fact is that the fight for industry financed pension plans is over. The main pre-oecupation of the UAW will be to increase Social Security benefits, with the hope eventually of making them a substitute for the present make-shift arrangements. Very few UAW workers are satisfied with the present plans.
For every worker eligible to retire there is another of the same age not able to retire because he never had 25 years seniority in one plant. And, if prelimnary spot checks mean anything, there are two workers with 25 years seniority under 60 years of age (and thus not entitled to major benefits) for each one over 60 years of age. The pension problem, therefore, will remain a source of irritation and aggravation within the shops!
As for Reuther’s claim that the union won a billion dollar package for five years at General Motors, the only modifying factors – and they are hardly inconse-quentional – are the doubts that auto production and employment will remain at their present high level for five years. A more accurate appraisal would begin with the statement: If our workers continue to keep their jobs, if model changeovers don’t cause too much unemployment, if business keeps up, then our package will total perhaps a billion dollars in five years.
[Labor Action will deal further with the GM contract in coming issues. – Ed.]
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