

THE BRITISH DIEHARDS (See Page 563)

WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE



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# THE EIGHTH CONVENTION OF THE C.P.U.S.A. AND SOME CONCLUSIONS

By B. SHERMAN.

**T**HE Eighth Convention\* of the Communist Party of the United States took place nine months after the issuance of the Open Letter to the Party membership by the Extraordinary Party Conference of July, 1933. It met in the midst of the second powerful strike wave since the N.R.A. went into effect. This new strike wave reflects the tremendous sharpening of class antagonisms in the country, and the rapidly increasing resistance of the working class to the Roosevelt programme which sought to find a way out of the crisis for the capitalist class at the expense of the toiling masses. The Convention, therefore, had before it the concrete problem of first of all checking up on the Control Tasks adopted at the Extraordinary Party Conference, examining to what extent these were carried out and drawing the necessary conclusions; secondly, to review the experience of recent struggles and to formulate very concretely the immediate tasks of the Party for the coming period, in accordance with the line of the 13th Plenum of the E.C.C.I. We will confine ourselves to an examination to what extent the Eighth Convention fulfilled this rôle.

There is no doubt that the Convention reflected the considerable growth and improved composition of the Party, compared to the time of the Seventh Convention (1930), or even compared to last year. Of the 233 regular delegates, more than 50 per cent. were from basic industries such as steel, metal, marine, railroad, mining, auto, and textile. The majority of the delegates were native-born American, including 39 Negroes. A noteworthy fact is that more than 25 per cent. of the delegates were workers who had joined the Party within the last nine months, showing a significant growth of new Party cadres; the discussion was predominantly of rank-and-file members and comrades active in mass work, and dealt with practical and illuminating experiences of the Party and trade unions. The reports and discussion showed that the Party had

begun to penetrate the basic industries, and to strengthen its work in the shops and trade unions.

In discussing the trade union work of the Party, it is necessary to take note of some recent developments in the American labour movement. The carrying through of the Roosevelt programme is accompanied by the use of much social demagoguery, and the bourgeoisie is in need of utilising social reformism to a greater extent than ever; it is for this rôle that the American Federation of Labor has been utilised so considerably in the past year. At the same time, the bourgeoisie is also carrying on an intensified campaign to establish company unions. A classic example of these tactics can be seen in the Roosevelt auto agreement to avert the threatened general strike in the auto industry in March, 1934, where simultaneous "recognition" is given to both the A.F. of L. and the company unions, in effect, a victory for company unionism, which was carried further by the recognition of the company unions in the revised Wagner Labor Disputes Bill.

The past year has seen the increasingly prominent rôle played by the A.F. of L. in strikes. If we go back to 1931, we find that the revolutionary unions of the T.U.U.L. led about two-thirds of the organised strikes (as against those that broke out spontaneously). In 1932, the A.F. of L. was already leading about two-thirds of the strikes, and the T.U.U.L. one-third. In early 1933, before the N.R.A., we led the first big strikes (auto, etc.); but in the first big strike wave that followed the N.R.A., from July to November, 1933, when one million workers were involved, the T.U.U.L. led 16 per cent., the A.F. of L. led 49 per cent., and the independent unions led 16 per cent. of the workers on strike. For the first time in many years mass strikes took place in auto, steel and marine. In the later stages of the first strike wave, the sentiments of the workers assumed a more offensive character and the strikes contained more developed elements of political struggle (strikes against injunctions and arbitration, against N.R.A. codes, for release of strike prisoners, beginning of sympathy strikes). The second strike wave beginning in March, 1934, involved nearly half a million workers, with the A.F. of L. playing a constantly increasing rôle. In March, April and May, the A.F. of L. led 68 per cent. of the strikes, the independent unions 18 per cent., and the T.U.U.L. only 5 per cent. Of course it is not sufficient to take these figures alone to get an accurate picture of

\* Agenda of the Convention:

- (1) Report of C.C. on the situation in the U.S.A. and the tasks of the Party.
- (2) Lessons of the Economic struggles and the tasks of the Communists.
- (3) The winning of the working youth.

During the Convention the following Commissions were elected and met:—

Political, Organisation, Negro, Agrarian, Literature, School, Women, and Trade Union Conferences of various industries.

the work of the Party in the strikes, because in addition to the strikes directly led by the revolutionary unions, the Party also influenced considerably some strikes led by A.F. of L. and independent unions, through our united front activity and through our work inside of these unions. This is especially true in such strikes as the longshoremen's and seamen's strike on the Pacific Coast, in the aircraft workers' strikes in Buffalo and Hartford, and other strikes in various industries.

These strikes have taken on an increasingly sharp character, leading to violent collisions with the armed forces (Alabama, San Francisco, Toledo, Minneapolis) and influencing broad sympathy actions of the workers in other industries (sympathy strikes on Pacific Coast and Minneapolis, general strike votes taken in San Francisco, Minneapolis, Toledo and Butte).

During the past year the trade unions have grown very rapidly. According to official figures there was an increase of 450,000 by May, but what is also important is that several hundred thousand were recruited through hundreds of new Federal locals in such basic industries as auto, metal, rubber, etc. The independent unions have recruited about 150,000 workers, and the T.U.U.L. unions recruited about 100,000 new members. (During this same period, the membership of the company unions increased to 3 million.) But in order to understand better what has happened, it is necessary to examine the relationship of forces in some of the most important industries.

In the mining industry, where the T.U.U.L. union formerly led big strikes, the A.F. of L. is now the dominant factor, with about 350,000 organised into the U.M.W.A. (There are also independent unions in Southern Illinois and the anthracite.) The N.M.U. is a small organisation with only a few thousand members. Our policy till about a year ago was to lay main emphasis on the building of the National Miners' Union. Then the A.F. of L. unions began their big upward surge. As late as July, 1933, some comrades in the leadership of the N.M.U. took the position that the A.F. of L. union was in a state of collapse. Due to our sectarian isolation, we did not see or properly estimate what was going on among the mass of the miners. It was not until December, 1933, that on the basis of the new situation the Party shifted the main emphasis in its trade union work among the miners to oppositional activity inside the reformist trade unions. But due to the slowness with which the activity developed we could not crystallise the tremendous anti-Lewis sentiment among the miners around the opposition programme. The U.M.W.A. convention saw the opposition very

weakly represented, in spite of the dissatisfaction of the miners with the Lewis clique. The objective conditions are now extremely favourable for the development of mass opposition work inside the A.F. of L. and independent unions in the mining industry; this can be seen from the successes of the opposition in Southern Illinois, where the opposition slates won all or part of the official positions in 15 large locals of the Progressive Miners' Union, with a membership of 6 to 8,000.

In the auto industry, the T.U.U.L. union led the first big strikes in the beginning of 1933. To-day, tens of thousands are organised into the A.F. of L. Federal locals and the Mechanics' Educational Society, an independent union mainly of skilled tool-and-die makers; the Auto Workers' Union, on the other hand, has declined. Our sectarian approach to the skilled tool-and-die makers caused the influence of the Auto Workers' Union over them to be weakened. The M.E.S.A. rapidly grew to a mass organisation and led important strikes. When the Party began opposition work inside the M.E.S.A., we made serious errors which led to extreme weakening of the Auto Workers' Union and strengthened illusions in the minds of the workers about the militant and rank-and-file character of the M.E.S.A. We were slow in taking up a sharp fight against the Matthew Smith leadership, which has been moving closer to the A.F. of L. In our approach to the A.F. of L. workers, such formulations as "He who places the interests of any particular organisation first is a splitter," when incorrectly and insufficiently explained, only played into the hands of the reformist bureaucracy, in their fight against the Auto Workers' Union; further examples of the tendencies to forget the A.W.U. could be seen in March when leaflets were at first issued to the workers in Detroit plants without sufficiently explaining to the workers the need for following the leadership and policy of the A.W.U. It is no wonder that in spite of the tremendous amount of agitations activity of the Auto Workers' Union and a certain amount of influence it has, it was isolated from the struggle and was unable to exercise any decisive influence to prevent the betrayals, and could not become a mass organisation. The opposition work in the A.F.L. and M.E.S.A. has been strengthened and improved in the last period. In the recent M.E.S.A. election, the opposition was a strong minority, and the Smith leadership has begun an expulsion campaign against the Communists. At a recent United Front Conference called by the A.W.U., 26 delegates from the M.E.S.A. attended, and 14 A.F. of L. locals were represented. The activity of the Party and A.W.U. was influential in the calling of the Motor

Products strike in April, at the time the Party Convention was in session.

When we examine the recent developments in the steel industry, we see that the Party and the T.U.U.L. union was much more alert to the changing relationship of forces. The Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union has recruited thousands of workers and led a number of struggles, and is an important factor, but at the same time the A.F. of L. union in steel has grown to 30,000 members and is a major factor in spite of the fact that it still has no serious basis in the big plants and the big majority of the steel workers are unorganised.

By correctly placing the main emphasis on building the T.U.U.L. union, but not forgetting the importance of building the united front with the A.F. of L. locals, it was possible for the Party and the Industrial Union to influence the opposition programme adopted at the A.F. of L. convention in preparation for a general steel strike, which was a big defeat for the A.F.L. leadership. The united front activity developed by the Industrial Union both before and after the Convention of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Tin and Steel Workers, on a local and district scale, is one of the best examples the Party has of a concrete approach to the united front tactics. Even in steel, however, we have not stressed enough the development of opposition work inside the A.F.L. locals; this is especially important because of the vacillating character of some of the opposition leaders which plays into the hands of the Tighe machine. One of the weakest points in our preparations for the steel strike was that side by side with the independent activity of the Industrial Union and the approach to the A.F.L. locals and district organisations, we had little or no organised opposition groups inside the A.F.L. union, and our influence was exerted mainly from the outside.

In marine, while the Marine Workers' Industrial Union has led a number of successful strikes among the seamen, the opposition work among the longshoremen in the A.F. of L. is very weak, particularly in the Atlantic and Gulf ports. In the strike struggles on the Pacific Coast, it was possible by combining opposition work in the A.F. of L. together with the independent activity of the Marine Workers' Industrial Union and its correct approach to the united front, to exert some influence on the longshoremen's struggle in San Francisco, and to play an important rôle in spreading the strike to the seamen.

It is clear from all the developments both before and after the Eighth Convention, that it was absolutely correct and timely for the Convention resolution and discussion to focus the main atten-

tion of the Party on building a mass opposition in the reformist unions, side by side with the building of the revolutionary unions. And this will enable us to play a greater rôle in the leadership of strike struggles. The Party Convention found it necessary, therefore, to wage a sharp struggle against the ideology expressed in the position of Zack, a position which would have led to the complete isolation of the Party from the main masses of the workers. Zack's position is a negation of work inside the reformist unions, and would lead to taking the most militant workers out of the A.F. of L. and abandoning the struggle against the reformist bureaucracy.

The fact that Zack found no support for his position at the Convention should not lull the Party into thinking that such tendencies do not exist in the practice of the Party. A greater popularisation of the Convention decisions and a better ideological campaign against such "left" opportunist tendencies as expressed by Zack, will help to clarify the whole Party and mobilise it to carry through its tasks in the trade unions.

It is necessary in practice to concretise the line of the Party on this question after a serious examination of our position in specific industries. For instance, would it not strengthen the Party's position in the auto industry, if we did not build weak parallel organisations in localities and plants where the Federal locals of the A.F. of L. have mass organisation, but concentrated our forces on building a mass opposition inside the Federal locals, and giving leadership to the discontent and mass resentment of the auto workers in the A.F. of L. against the betrayals of the trade union bureaucracy which helped the Roosevelt Government to give recognition to the employers' company unions? Is it not necessary to struggle against tendencies to leave the A.F. of L. due to betrayals, which only isolate the militant elements from the masses, instead of remaining inside the A.F. of L. to carry on a struggle against the leadership, and influencing and stimulating a similar struggle of the rank and file in other reformist unions? These problems and many others require an immediate and urgent solution by the Party.

The discussion that took place at the Party Convention on the Negro question is of great importance. The Convention revealed a great improvement in the political development of the Negro cadres of the Party, and the strengthening of the Party's organisation and influence not only among the share-croppers, but also among the miners and steel workers in Alabama. Shortly after the convention, successful May Day demonstrations and meetings of Negro and white workers took place in such southern centres as New Orleans, Birmingham, Atlanta and Norfolk, in many of them for

the first time. But the number of Negroes in the Party still constitutes only about 10 per cent. of the Party membership, and one of the weakest points of the work of the revolutionary unions is the insufficient work among Negroes, which in such industries as steel, etc., means the penetration of the biggest and most important plants. It should be noted that while the Negro reformist organisations have become more active, the Party is carrying on inadequate struggle against them. One of the most dangerous of these movements is the Pan-Pacific movement, which is fostered by the Japanese imperialists and advocates the unity of all coloured peoples against "white supremacy." The insufficient struggle of the Party against Negro reformism was shown in petty-bourgeois Negro nationalist tendencies penetrating in the ranks of the Party. The Convention carried on a sharp struggle against Noel, who expressed some of these tendencies and attempted to organise a group around himself. In this struggle Noel was completely isolated and there was no doubt that the Negro comrades were more solidly united than ever in support of the Central Committee Leadership. The Convention correctly placed the question of the struggle against white chauvinism as the main danger, but in the discussion this was not explained sufficiently. The Party has intensified the struggle against Negro bourgeois nationalism, and its penetration into the ranks of the toilers and the Party itself. At the same time it must ward off any possibility of its watchfulness being weakened in the struggle against white chauvinism, which is the main and growing danger. It is necessary also, here, to popularise the Convention decisions on the Negro question to clarify the whole Party on the necessity of the struggle on two fronts, and to place as the main question the struggle against white chauvinism. It is necessary for the Party to strengthen the fight against the Negro reformism and win over the masses under its influence.

The situation of the Party organisation as revealed at the Convention was considerably improved as compared to last year, and shows that a real beginning has been made in carrying through the Control Tasks set by the Extraordinary Party Conference. The Party membership is over 24,000, as compared to 7,500 at the Seventh Convention four years ago, and 19,000 last year. The percentage of dues-paying members has increased from 75 per cent. to 90 per cent. The fluctuation is still very high, but decreased from 77 per cent. two years ago to 53 per cent. The Party has organisation in about 500 cities, with 27 districts and 200 sections. In the last recruiting drive, of over 7,000 new members, 92 per cent. were proletarian, 52 per cent. native-born Americans, 13 per cent. Negroes,

17 per cent. women, 38 per cent. employed workers, 11 per cent. A.F. of L. members, 16 per cent. T.U.U.L. members, and the average age was 36 years. At the Seventh Convention, the Party had only 64 shop units with 571 members; at the time of the open letter, 140 shop units comprising 4 per cent. of the Party membership; at the Eighth Convention, 338 shop units with 2,355 members, comprising 9 per cent. of the membership. In basic industries, the Party had in 1933 only 68 shop units with 459 members; to-day it has 154 shop units in basic industry, with 1,323 members, working in factories where 350,000 workers are employed.

Although there has been some improvement in the shop work of the Party, and increased attention of the Central Committee and district and section leadership to giving concrete guidance to the concentration points, we cannot be satisfied at all with the present situation. In some districts (Buffalo, New York, etc.) some of the shop units have actively participated in the organisation and leadership of the workers in struggle. But on the whole and particularly in the concentration districts (Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago) there is as yet no decisive improvement in the Party's work in the factories. An example can be seen in the Detroit district, which reported at the Convention that the Party had a shop unit in every important auto plant; but these shop units, at least until recently, played an insignificant rôle in the strike situation. The majority of our shop units are in small shops and light industries, and 80 per cent. of our units are still street units. In the last recruiting drive less than 25 per cent. of the new members were from the basic industries. The shop units have a poor political life, often functioning only as a trade union fraction; they react very slowly to shop issues, and to political questions. Only 47 shop units, out of 338 issue shop papers. Not enough attention has been paid by the Party leadership to help the shop units solve the problem of overcoming the obstacles to illegal activity in the shops, and combining this with open activity.

We did not sufficiently explain the rôle of the A.F. of L. leaders, we underestimated their manoeuvring ability in placing themselves at the head of strike movements to more easily carry through their treacherous policy. One of the shortcomings of the Convention discussion is that there was not sufficient discussion of our experiences in the concentration industries. The convention did not give enough attention to the checking up of the Control Tasks in the concentration districts, and examining why they were not fulfilled.

It is necessary to say a few words about some other shortcomings, although it is not possible to go into detail within the scope of this article. The struggle against social-fascism was weakened in the

Party in the recent period as reflected in the lack of attention to this question in the Convention discussion. Although we have had some successes in developing the united front with the workers in the reformist organisations and in winning over Socialist workers, the concrete forms of struggle against social-fascism are still too narrow, and must receive more serious attention by the Party; this is brought more sharply to our attention by the "left" turn of the Socialist Party Convention, by the activity of the Musteites in strikes, in the trade unions and unemployed organisations, and by the third party movement. In the struggle against fascism not enough stress is laid on the struggle for the defence of the democratic rights of the workers. The Party must also pay closer attention to the growth of fascist organisations in the United States. The struggle for unemployment insurance must be made much broader; that this can be done is seen by the wide response in support of the Workers' Unemployment Insurance. Roosevelt's demagoguery about unemployment insurance urgently requires that the Party shall concretely and convincingly expose the Wagner Bill, and the various state unemployment insurance schemes enacted or pending in various legislatures, and enliven the campaign for the Workers' Unemployment Insur-

ance Bill. It is necessary that we bring forward the Party's programme for public works, as against Roosevelt's proposed housing programme. The Convention paid far too little attention to the agrarian work; some questions still require clarification, regarding our relief programme and our approach to the reformist farmers' organisations. That the Party does not give sufficient attention to the work among the farmers can be seen in its slow re-action to the drought situation and its weak struggle against the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

If we estimate the work of the Party as a whole, it can be said that the Eighth Convention showed that the Party is much better equipped to fulfil its tasks than previously. The election of a new Central Committee which drew in many new comrades active in mass work, American workers, Negroes, and leaders of trade unions, has considerably strengthened the leadership of the Party. What is required now is a greater popularisation and verification of the Convention decisions, greater alertness to the issues at hand, which will serve to mobilise the whole Party to increase its tempo of growth and bolshevisation and fulfil the tasks set by the Eighth Convention of the Party.

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## ANNOUNCEMENT.

**T**HE publishers have pleasure in announcing that they have completed arrangements whereby the *Communist International* will be considerably improved without any increase in price.

The improvements, which will be introduced with the next issue (No. 15) which is to be a special Anti-War issue, will take the form of the introduction of a new extremely readable and pleasing type-face, together with the use of antique paper, which, with its greater opacity, is a great advantage besides improving the appearance of the magazine.

In addition a special cartridge paper cover will be introduced to avoid the usual drawback to antique paper, namely, its tendency to "fluff" and attract dust.

The publishers hope that these improvements will meet with the approval of all old readers and help to secure many new ones.

They take this opportunity of ensuring all readers that no stone will be left unturned to make the *Communist International* not merely the very finest political journal on the market to-day from the standpoint of the quality of the material offered in its columns, but also in its technical production, at the price offered.

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The publishers have a quantity of back issues of the magazine available for free distribution, which will be forwarded to applicants on receipt of postage.

# IMPERIALIST CONTRADICTIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AND THE ARMAMENTS DRIVE

By IVANOV.

**T**HE Pacific Ocean problem is one of the main key questions of world politics. The interests and the strivings of the most powerful imperialist states interweave and come into conflict in the Pacific Ocean. In the Pacific Ocean and in the districts surrounding it, there are to be found the most important colonial possessions of the British Empire, as well as of France and the U.S.A. As regards Japanese Imperialism, all the lines of its policy of plunder lie in the Pacific Ocean, in different sectors of which its aggression is showing itself to an ever growing degree.

At this stage of history the most important sector of the Pacific is undoubtedly China. The struggle of the Imperialist Powers for the gigantic Chinese market, for "spheres of influence" in definite regions in the country, or for their open seizure, grows ever sharper. On the other hand a rise is taking place in the opposition of the national liberation movement of the Chinese toiling masses against the imperialist robbers. The existence of Soviet Regions in China, which are growing firm on their feet is a guarantee that in the future the Chinese proletariat and peasantry, who have set out on the path to liberation from the yoke of foreign imperialism and from the bondage of the "national" bourgeoisie and landowners, will withdraw China from the position of passive "object" of Pacific politics.

For the Soviet Union with its extensive sea and land borders in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, the Pacific Ocean problem is of tremendous political importance and is closely linked up with its vital interests and defence.

Imperialist Japan, which is carrying through its robber policy on Chinese territory, at the same time receiving the unequivocal support of British Imperialism, is carrying out intense preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. All this makes it essential and extremely important to carefully take note of all the alterations in the situation in the Pacific Ocean, of the development of the inter-imperialist contradictions, and especially of the strategic situation and the direct preparation of the imperialist states for war in the Pacific Ocean.

The events of the recent period are a warning of the existence of an unheard-of sharpening of contradictions and the growth of the war danger. The declaration of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs made in April of this year, in spite of his "Pacific" explanations made later, means nothing other than the official claim of Japanese Imperialism for a protectorate over the **WHOLE**

of China. In spite of the Washington Nine-Power Agreement concluded in 1921, the participants of which pledged themselves to maintain the principle of the "open door" in China, Japan now lays claim to control over both the political and economic relations of China with foreign states, under the pretext that Japan has a "mission" to "protect the sea" in the Far East. In his way Japanese Imperialism is striving to ensure itself a monopoly for further seizures of territory in China, and at the same time to sever all contacts between the latter and other states. What is especially undesirable in the eyes of Tokyo is the present, it is true for the time being only limited, supply of finance to China by America, and the proposed setting up of aviation and air routes in China with American aid. In the same way Japan is placing its "veto" in advance on the comparatively humble plans of financial aid to the Nanking Government proposed by the League of Nations. The recent incident in connection with the "Disappearance of Churamoto" shows that the robber plans of Japan are by no means limited to the northern regions of China but that they also cover other regions in the country as well.

While carrying through its policy of plunder in China and its preparations for war on the Soviet Union, Japan is intensifying its armaments on land, sea and in the air, at a frantic pace.

In reply to Japanese aggression in the Far East, the U.S.A. is just as hurriedly intensifying its armaments, and is adopting a new programme of military, naval and aviation construction.

Great Britain is also adopting "preventive" measures in connection with all possible opponents.

Thus the situation in the Pacific Ocean is becoming more complicated and is growing ever sharper. At the present time it is sharply different from that which was temporarily organised in the period of the relative stabilisation of capitalism, and which found its expression in the Washington Agreement which has now been, in fact, reduced to nothing.

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The offensive of Japanese imperialism on the Continent of Asia, the seizure of Manchuria and parts of Mongolia, the invasion of the northern provinces of Inner China, the open pretensions to a protectorate over the whole of China and the feverish preparations for new wars of plunder have intensified imperialist contradictions on the Pacific to an unprecedented degree. The aggression of



Japanese imperialism hits at the interests of the United States, and for the latter signifies a threat to close the Chinese market. Simultaneously the strengthening of Japan's armaments also creates a direct danger for the colonial possessions of the United States in the Far East, namely, the Philippines and Guam. Though the United States cannot at present prevent the offensive of militant Japan by armed force, it nevertheless announces its non-recognition of the situation which has arisen in Manchuria and Mongolia as a result of Japanese seizures, and simultaneously takes the path of intensively strengthening its armaments. At the same time the interests of British capital are suffering from the increase of Japanese dumping on the world markets. However, to the extent that Great Britain on the one hand encourages the aggressive and militant plans of Japan in so far as they are directed against the Soviet Union, and as on the other hand important contradictions exist between Great Britain and U.S.A. in connection with the struggle of the two biggest imperialist powers for world hegemony, there is no possibility of a united anti-Japanese front being formed by Great Britain and U.S.A. While not hindering Japanese expansion to the North, but, on the contrary openly inciting Japan to war against the Soviet Union, and taking a lenient attitude to violations of the principle of the Open Door in China by Japanese imperialism, since this strikes above all at the interests of the U.S.A., Great Britain is at the same time taking energetic "precautionary" measures in case Japanese expansion on the Pacific touches British colonial possessions in the southern part of the Pacific basin. The hurried completion of the construction of the Singapore Naval Base and the measures which are planned for strengthening British naval combinations in the Pacific are connected with this.

The situation is bound to become still more tense and complex in the year 1935 in connection with the fact that, on the one hand, the resignation of Japan from the League of Nations comes into force in that year, and on the other hand a new

Naval Conference has to be called then. The former signifies that in respect to the group of islands in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean (the Marian, Caroline and Marshal Islands), which formerly belonged to Germany and were seized by Japan during the World War, the "mandate" given to Japan by the League of Nations ceases to hold force. In spite of the "delicate" situation which thus arises, Japanese imperialism states in advance that it has a fixed determination to keep its hold on these islands, which are important strategic positions in the Pacific, irrespective of any future decision of the League of Nations on this question.

At the Naval Conference, the Washington and London Treaties on the limitation of naval armaments will have to be reviewed. The fact that at the present time the political basis of these treaties has fallen through (they were based on the Treaty of Nine Powers in respect to China which was concluded at the time at the Washington Conference, and which has, in practice, been torn to shreds by Japanese bayonets), makes it extremely unlikely that the Naval Agreements can be renewed. In addition, such great changes have taken place in the relationship of the naval forces of the imperialist powers in connection with the intensification of their contradictions and the armament race, that the establishment of any proportion and limitation whatever is impossible at the present time. The relation between the naval forces of Great Britain, the U.S.A. and Japan were fixed on the one hand by the Washington Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, and on the other hand by the London Naval Treaty of April 22, 1930. The Washington Treaty fixed the proportion 5 : 5 : 3 for the navies of these three powers in respect to the number and tonnage of the battleships and also in respect to the tonnage of the aeroplane carriers. The London Treaty also fixed a definite tonnage quota for various categories of lighter vessels, such as cruisers, torpedo boats and submarines. The corresponding "treaty" quotas for all classes of ships of the three powers can be seen from the following table:

	British Empire		U.S.A.		Japan	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
Battleships ... ..	15	473,650	15	455,400	9	272,000
Aeroplane Carriers ...		135,000		135,000		81,000
Cruisers "A" (With 8-inch guns) ...	15	146,800	18	180,000	12	108,400
Cruisers "B" (With 6-inch guns) ...		192,200		143,500		100,450
Torpedo Boats ... ..		150,000		150,000		105,500
Submarines ... ..		52,700		52,700		52,700

The above-mentioned figures are the limits which must not be exceeded by the time the period of both naval treaties lapse, i.e., by December 31,

1936. However, in reality matters are somewhat different. On the one hand, all the three powers have a considerable tonnage of vessels in the

various categories of ships which exceed the "age limits" fixed by the treaties, at the expiration of which they may be replaced by new units. On the other hand, these three powers have by no means equally utilised the possibilities for new construction given to them under the treaties. Whereas Japan has completely utilised to the limit the new construction quotas provided under the treaties, and in practice has even exceeded them, Great Britain up to the present time has not fully utilised these limits in respect to torpedo boats and

submarines, and the U.S.A. also in respect to cruisers. The actual composition of the navies of the three powers at the present time can be seen from the following table. We do not include in it the battleships the construction of which was stopped as far as Great Britain, U.S.A. and Japan were concerned, in accordance with the London Treaty up to December 31, 1936, owing to which the number and tonnage of all three navies correspond exactly to the above figures which represent the quotas fixed.

COMPOSITION OF NAVIES ON DECEMBER 31, 1933.\*

	Great Britain		U.S.A.		Japan	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
Aeroplane Carriers ...	6	115,350	3 (1)	77,500 (11,500)	4	68,370
Cruisers "A" ...	19	183,686	11 (1)	100,000 (7,350)	14 (2)	123,520 (15,720)
Cruisers "B" ...	35 (15)	165,045 (62,265)	10	70,500	20 (3)	93,375 (21,920)
Torpedo Boats ...	160 (116)	181,864 (123,490)	251 (248)	267,470 (263,900)	104 (42)	128,802 (39,821)
Submarines ...	58 (25)	54,744 (13,895)	82 (37)	67,790 (21,260)	70 (7)	77,125 (5,344)

It can be seen from these figures that the actual relation of the number of ships in the three navies by no means corresponds to the official Washington proportions. In particular, the Japanese Navy is at least equal to the American Navy in respect to aeroplane carriers and is considerably STRONGER than it is in respect to both types of cruisers, and especially in respect to the light cruisers with 6-inch guns. As far as concerns torpedo boats and submarines, if we reckon the superannuated units, the Japanese Navy occupies respectively the third and second places. But in respect to the number and tonnage of the newest units of both categories (with the exception of the vessels which have passed the age limit), it occupies FIRST place at the present time. In particular, this serves as an excuse for the Japanese imperialists to demand equality for its navy with the British and American navies at the forthcoming naval conference in 1935. Japan has backed up this claim not by words but by deeds, and during the last few years has developed such a frantic speed in naval construction that it has completely finished the construction of the London quotas, while its rivals have still a considerable amount of unused tonnage which they can build to reach their quotas.

	Vessels in construction on Dec. 31st, 1933		Vessels which can be laid down to reach the London limits in 1934, 1935 and 1936.	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
<i>Aeroplane Carriers</i>				
Great Britain	—	—	2	34,100
U.S.A. ...	3	53,800	1	15,200
Japan ...	2	20,100	—	—
<i>Cruisers "A"</i>				
Great Britain	—	—	—	—
U.S.A. ...	7	70,000	1	10,000
Japan ...	—	—	—	—
<i>Cruisers "B"</i>				
Great Britain	11	75,400	12	87,530
U.S.A. ...	4	40,000	5	47,100
Japan ...	6	51,000	—	—
<i>Torpedo Boats</i>				
Great Britain	27	37,275	39	63,696
U.S.A. ...	32	50,800	65	99,200
Japan ...	24	33,072	—	—
<i>Submarines</i>				
Great Britain	9	11,140	8	9,362
U.S.A. ...	6	7,460	30	35,520
Japan ...	15	19,200†	—	—

† The right to "replace" the corresponding tonnage ahead of time was legalised by the London Treaty. In reality, Japan has far exceeded the London quota in this category.

\* The figures in brackets signify the ships which have passed the age limit and can be replaced by new units.

The United States, which had considerably "lagged behind" in the sphere of naval construction, is now, in connection with the intensification of Far Eastern contradictions, hastening to raise the strength of its navy to the limits fixed by the Washington and London treaties. The Winson Bill which was adopted by the American Congress and endorsed by President Roosevelt on March 27, 1934, gives the government corresponding powers. The American naval budget for 1934-35 provides for the laying down of one cruiser of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns (the last unit of this class which America has the right to build according to the London treaty), 3 cruisers of 10,000 tons with 6-inch guns (again completing the quota given to America in the London treaty); and in excess of this, from special appropriations (from the funds of the National Industrial Recovery Administration) a further 2 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats and 6 submarines are to be laid down in 1934/5. Although this construction does not go beyond the bounds of the London treaty, it serves as an excuse for Japanese imperialism to raise the question of increasing the tonnage limit permitted to her. The first and second programmes for "reinforcing the navy" adopted by Japan in 1930 and 1933 respectively mean, in reality, a considerable excess over the London limits. The Japanese press, however, points to American armament and is already carrying on a campaign obviously inspired by the naval general staff for the further strengthening of the navy. The adoption and fulfilment of a new naval construction programme in Japan is therefore a foregone conclusion in the very near future. In connection with this, according to reliable information, the Japanese government intends to annul the Washington and London treaties. Until such a decision is made, Japan is not only fulfilling the London limits but is also carrying on energetic construction work on the categories which were not limited under the London treaty. The construction programme in these categories which has been begun recently provides for the construction of three big aviation transports, two oil tankers, one floating workshop, one submarine base, four submarine destroyers, one minelayer and 16 torpedo boats. Under the pretext that it is a necessity to build a navy for the "independent" state of Manchukuo which it has set up, Japan is also carrying on construction in excess of the London limits.

Great Britain does not lag behind its rivals in the speed at which it is strengthening its navy. The British Admiralty points to their intensive arming, to the present "weakness" of the British navy, and to the necessity of "guarding" the sea communications of the British Empire, and is preparing a new ship-building programme. In the

1934-35 financial year three 9,000 ton cruisers, one 5,200 ton cruiser, 9 destroyers and torpedo boats and 3 submarines will be laid down. In the future, as the leading organs of the British press unequivocally make plain, naval construction will be considerably speeded up and financial allocations for naval construction will be increased. The increase in the naval budgets of the three Pacific powers in connection with the sharpening of their contradictions during the last few years present a very clear picture:

	<i>Great Britain</i> (million pounds)	<i>U.S.A.</i> (million dol.)	<i>Japan</i> (million yen)
1931-32	50,015,000	357,821,000	227,128,000
1932-33	50,164,000	349,562,000	306,766,000
1933-34	53,570,000	332,000,000	403,771,000
1934-35	56,650,000	457,000,000	487,871,000

The rivalry in the sphere of naval armaments is not limited to the ships that constitute the navies, but extends to naval aviation. Simultaneously with fulfilling its two programmes for "reinforcing the navy," Japan is trebling the strength of its naval aviation, increasing it from 14 squadrons in 1930 to 39. The U.S.A. has not restricted itself to the fulfilment of its 1926 programme which fixed the strength of naval aviation at 1,000 planes (a figure which is several times as large as the naval air forces of any other power), and is beginning to carry out a new programme of aeroplane construction at the present time which, by the time the navy is increased to treaty limits (according to the Winson Bill) is to increase the strength of its naval aviation forces to 2,184 planes. Finally, Great Britain is also taking energetic steps to strengthen its air forces.

But the preparations for war are by no means limited to these increases in the naval and air forces.

In order to get a clear idea of the relationship of the naval forces of the future opponents on the Pacific Ocean, we must not only take account of the number of vessels in their navies, but also their systems of naval bases and the possibility they have of operations in the probable theatre of war. The dangerous task facing the Japanese navy in time of war is to ensure communications between Japan and the Asiatic Continent. This will provide Japanese imperialism with sources of raw material and food, and also the possibility of maintaining and further extending its territorial conquests at the expense of China. The preparations for war against the Soviet Union and the very conduct of this war will also be impossible unless sea communications are ensured across the narrow seas dividing Japan from the Asiatic continent (Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, Chinese Sea, and Yellow Sea).

On the other hand, in case of war with America, the Japanese naval forces would also have the duty of conducting active operations against the American island possessions in the Pacific, namely, the Philippines and Guam, and also, possibly, cruiser operations along the shores of Alaska and the U.S.A. itself. The position of Japan in the western part of the Pacific basin is secured by a rectangle of powerful naval bases on the chief Japanese islands (Yokosuka, Sasebojur and Midsuru) and also auxiliary bases (Tokuyama, Bako) in the Pisco Islands, Ominato, Rio-Yun (Port Arthur). All these bases are intended to guarantee the communications of Japan with its colonial possessions and with the districts which it has seized on Chinese territory. Simultaneously they provide the Japanese navy with the possibility of operating in any direction in the western part of the Pacific basin.

As advanced bases for light forces and aviation, use will be made of the group of islands seized by Japan in the Pacific as a result of the World War (the Marian, Caroline and Marshal Islands which formerly belonged to Germany). The Marian Islands and the Bonin Islands which formerly belonged to Japan, and the Belew Islands which stretch out in a meridional direction, cut across the communications of the U.S.A. with the ports of China. Other groups of islands, particularly the Caroline and Marshal Islands, which stretch parallel to the equator, hang over the flank of these communications. In case of war, the cutting of America's communications both with the Asiatic continent and with its own island possessions in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, namely, the Philippine Islands and Guam, and the capture of the latter, form one of the chief tasks for the Japanese navy.

Active operations by its main forces in the eastern part of the Pacific Ocean are made difficult by the absence of naval bases there. However, this by no means excludes the operation of Japanese light cruisers and submarines (which, it may be remarked, have an enormous radius of action) against American ocean trade between the Pacific ports and against the Panama Canal. Although the Washington Treaty prohibits the construction of fortifications or the formation of naval bases on the above-mentioned islands belonging to Japan, the latter nevertheless is actively constructing bases for its navy and aviation forces both on the Bonin Islands and on the Pelew Islands and on various islands of the Marian and Caroline groups. Sufficient information is available regarding the establishment of coastal batteries and the setting up of aerodromes on the islands of Hosol, Malakai and Saipan (in the Marian Island group). Thus Japan

is actively making preparations for the future naval theatre of war for the operations of its navy.

As for the U.S.A., its position in the Pacific Ocean is still weak in respect to naval bases up to the present time. This weakness comprises one of the "weak" spots in the policy and strategy of American imperialism. It prevents the latter from putting pressure on its rivals and establishing such an influence on the course of Pacific and Far Eastern politics as corresponds to its enormous economic resources, and consequently to its potential military power. At the present the American navy possesses only one operative base in the Pacific Ocean, namely, Pearl Harbour in the Hawaii Islands. This base is situated at a distance of 2,089 sea miles from San Francisco (the rear base of the American naval forces in the Pacific Ocean in case of war) and a distance of 4,770 sea miles from Cavite Bay in the Philippine Islands. Moreover, the radius of action of the main forces of the navy (particularly the battleships) is reckoned at approximately 500 miles only. Thus there can be no talk of the American navy defending the Philippines and Guam, and also of its active operations against the Japanese navy and the Japanese island possessions in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, in the event of war between U.S.A. and Japan, singly and without allies.

The United States is trying to compensate for its "weak spots" which make active operations difficult for its navy, by intensifying the development of naval aviation. The American air forces and also the submarines might carry on active operations against Japan, by basing them on Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to the west of it. Until recently, the U.S.A. had no naval base in this part of the Pacific Ocean and no points of reserve. At the present time bases are being equipped for air operations and for the light forces of the navy in Deutsch Harbour in Alaska. Simultaneously, preliminary investigations are being made in the Aleutian Islands with a view to forming advanced bases in these islands—for air forces and submarine flotillas. The fortification of the islands is formally prohibited by the Washington treaty; but in connection with its probable annulment and the intensification of naval rivalry (particularly American-Japanese contradictions) the corresponding measures will be one of the most urgent and practical tasks of American naval policy in the near future.

The rapid progress of aviation, especially the increase in the radius of action of bombing planes, considerably reduces the advantage Japan had in the fact of the vast spaces of the Pacific Ocean. The possibility of the use of aviation by America in case of a Japanese-American war is thus increasing. But at the present day, the possibility of

active operations against Japan, by the sea and air forces of the U.S.A. is still very limited and difficult. Owing to this, the most insistent task facing the U.S.A., in proportion as Japanese aggression sharpens and deepens, is to find allies. The repeated attempts made by the U.S.A. to come to terms with Great Britain during the present Far Eastern events, with a view to ensuring the possibility of the U.S.A. using the British naval bases in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, have always resulted in failure. The causes of this are the growing and deepening contradictions of both of these big capitalist powers in the struggle for world hegemony. Another possible way to overcome the basic difficulties which face American strategy in the Pacific Ocean is to establish contacts with the countries of the Asiatic continent which suffer from Japanese aggression.

Great Britain, with its powerful system of naval bases in the Pacific Ocean, could play a decisive rôle on one side or the other if it should intervene in the course of a Japanese-American conflict. In reality, the Singapore naval base, the equipment of which is being completed at the present time and will be finished in 1935, renders it possible to transfer the main forces of the British Navy from the Mediterranean, and if necessary from British home waters, to the Far East. At the present time the Singapore base has powerful harbour equipment and repair yards. In particular, the biggest floating dock in the world, capable of accommodating vessels of up to 50,000 tons, has already been built there, and construction is being completed on a double dry dock which is also able to accommodate the biggest ships. There are five double docks for cruisers. In addition large fuel reservoirs have been established in the Singapore naval base. In connection with the increase of the strength of the British air forces at Singapore, a big air base is now being constructed there in addition to the naval base. At the same time the system of fortifications is being strengthened, particularly the coastal batteries which protect the entrance to Singapore, on which long range artillery of the largest calibre—up to 18 inches—has been mounted. Singapore closes the passage from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and provides the British naval forces with facilities for the defence of Ceylon, India and also, though not in full, owing to the great distance, of Australia and New Zealand. At the same time, it will be difficult to use it as a base for active operations by the main forces of the British navy against the American island possessions in the Pacific Ocean, on the one hand, and against Japan on the other hand. It is situated at a distance of 1,260 sea miles from Manilla, in the Philippines, and 1,640 miles from Formosa. However, the advanced base for the British Navy in the Far East can be

Hong Kong (which has 8 dry docks and is protected by strong coast batteries). Hong Kong is only 360 miles from Formosa and 600 miles from Manilla. At the present time it serves as a base for big concentrations of British light forces (cruisers and submarines). In connection with the equipment and forthcoming opening of the Singapore base, which is intended to be the basic operative base of the British naval forces in the Pacific Ocean, the significance of Hong Kong will rapidly increase.

In this connection, new importance is assumed by the base which is now being equipped for the light forces and aviation in Port Darwin, on the north-west coast of Australia, the old base in Sydney (Australia), and the base in Auckland (New Zealand), as links in the single system of British naval bases on the Pacific Ocean.

Thus, in making practical preparations for war on the Pacific, Great Britain, like the other two Pacific imperialist powers, is not, however, showing at the same time any intention to put its naval forces at the disposal of any of these powers. There is reason to think that in the forthcoming bloody drama in the Pacific British imperialism intends to play the rôle of the "happy third," and will refrain from interference in the initial phase of the future conflict so as to act at the moment when the forces of the opponents are weakened by the struggle.

Great importance attaches to the struggle which is taking place at the present time in Central and Southern China between the imperialist powers, in respect to the setting up of air lines and air bases on its territory. Having seized Manchuria and preparing to seize the northern provinces of China, which it already controls in a military sense, Japan is fiercely opposing the attempts of the U.S.A. to form air bases in those districts of China on which it has not yet been able to lay its hands. It well realises that if the U.S.A. sets up bases for its aviation on Chinese territory, this would wipe out the distance factor which is so favourable for Japan, and there would arise a direct menace of air raids on its centres and naval bases from the side of the Asiatic continent.

The race for naval armaments on the part of the Pacific powers determines in advance their irreconcilable contradictions at the forthcoming new naval conference and the inevitable collapse of the latter.

The London conversations which took place in May and June between representatives of Great Britain, U.S.A. and Japan have not led to any preliminary agreement whatsoever, not only with regard to the fundamental questions facing the Conference, but also regarding procedure, the exact date for calling the Conference and as to who should participate in it. Particularly as regards the latter point the question has arisen of inviting

to the Conference not only the five States which participated in the Washington and London Naval Agreements, but also the U.S.S.R. and Germany. The political problems linked up with the Far East have, mainly on the insistence of Japan, been removed from the programme of the preliminary conversations. Japanese imperialism wishes at all costs to prevent a repetition of the Washington Conference, when alongside the Naval Agreement it was compelled under the united pressure of the U.S.A. and Great Britain to make concessions on questions of Far Eastern policy. It wishes to preserve intact the plunder which it has seized at the expense of China, and to preserve for itself unlimited possibilities for further imperialist expansion. The Japanese proposal to the U.S.A. made at the time of the London conversations regarding a pact of non-aggression, is an open manoeuvre, which by no means implies a lessening of Anglo-American contradictions, but is only calculated to free for the present period of time the hands of Japan in relation to the U.S.S.R. and China. As was to be expected, the proposal was turned down by the U.S.A. In so far as political questions have been removed from the programme of the conversations, the latter for the time being are limited to purely technical, military and naval problems. In view of the absence of any kind of political basis, any kind of serious agreement on these questions is completely ruled out.

In reality, the continuation of the Washington and London restrictions for a new period, with the maintenance of the proportions established by these treaties, as is proposed by the U.S.A., will inevitably conflict with the claims of Great Britain, which demands an increase of the quotas as given to it at London, especially in the cruiser category, and the claims of Japan which unequivocally demands "parity" with the other two naval powers. The proposal of Great Britain to reduce the maximum tonnage and calibre of the guns of the various categories of the navy, compared with the limits established at Washington (battleships from 35,000 tons and 16-inch guns to 22,000 tons or 25,000 tons and 11 or 12-inch guns, cruisers, from 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns to 7,000 tons and 6-inch guns) will inevitably be resisted by the U.S.A. As already mentioned, the latter is poorly supplied with naval bases and consequently is interested in

building ships of the greatest possible size and, therefore, with the greatest radius of action.

On the other hand, the proposal of Great Britain to abolish submarines, which are so dangerous for British sea commerce, a proposal which is insistently advanced by the British Admiralty at all "disarmament" conferences, will inevitably be rejected by Japan and also by France. Both of these powers attach tremendous importance to the maintenance of submarines, since they possess the most numerous and most powerful submarine fleets.

The proposal advanced by Japan to abolish aeroplane carriers and limit naval aviation (because as far as this new weapon is concerned, Japan is much weaker than the U.S.A., and has reason to fear the further strengthening of America's naval aviation)—will inevitably be rejected by its rivals.

In addition to these disputed questions which affect various types of armament and the relation of naval forces, THE PROBLEM OF NAVAL BASES will inevitably come up at the forthcoming conference in an acute form. The Washington treaty prohibited the construction of new bases, and support points for the navy and aviation and the establishment of new fortifications within the limits of an extensive zone in the Pacific Ocean including, in respect to Japan, the Kuril, Bonin, Marian, Caroline and Marshall Islands, in respect to the U.S.A. — the Philippines, Guam and the Aleutian Islands, and in respect to Great Britain—Hong Kong and the groups of islands in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. But in view of the fact that this decision has in reality already been violated by the parties to the Washington treaty, especially by Japanese imperialism, and in view of the fact that it was connected with the maintenance of definite proportions in respect to the number and tonnage of the naval forces of the Pacific powers, there can be no question of keeping it in force at the forthcoming naval conference. This in turn signifies that there are prospects of fierce rivalry not only in the sphere of naval and aeroplane construction but also in the sphere of the construction of new bases and support points on the Pacific Ocean for naval and air forces, and feverish preparations of this theatre for the coming decisive conflicts.

## THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH DIEHARDS IN THE ANTI-SOVIET BLOC

**W**AR" is a most ill-omened word which does not forsake the pages of the bourgeois press, and is ever being mouthed by the statesmen throughout the bourgeois world. The approaching danger of a new world imperialist war becomes more and more tangible and clear from day to day. German fascism is feverishly preparing for "a grand decision by blood and iron." Japanese militarism has been carrying on war against China for the past two and a half years, and does not make a secret of its intentions to turn this into a war against the U.S.S.R. The question of the repartition of the world is again on the order of the day. If German imperialism were to succeed in realising its plans, it would mean the end of France as a great power, the independence of nearly every State in Eastern and Central Europe would vanish. The realisation of the designs of the Japanese militarists would amount to this, that the great powers, first of all the United States and Britain, would be squeezed out of China and later out of the other countries in the Pacific. It is not hard to understand how great are the contradictions in the capitalist world, and how immense the proportions of approaching events. Nevertheless one must take into account that the interests of the chief imperialist powers in one or other part of the world—concretely in Europe and in Asia—are not identical. The whole power of modern France lies in its position in Europe. In German fascism's aspirations she sees the greatest danger confronting her. The prime interests of British imperialism are outside of Europe: in Asia, Africa, Australia, etc. In these spheres Great Britain is menaced by her "friend" Japan, which is encroaching to an ever greater degree on the spheres of influence of the United States.

Japanese imperialism has long been a "friend" of British imperialism which is doing all possible to preserve Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the struggle against the U.S.A., the Chinese revolution, and the revolutionary movement of the toilers living in the oppressed countries of Asia. The imperialist interests of Japan, however, are spurring it on to new plunder in Asia, where it comes up against the interests of British imperialism (primarily in China, but also in other Eastern markets). Japan is openly laying claim to domination in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean, declaring as the sphere for its unlimited influence those countries in Eastern Asia, which are most important from the point of view of the imperialist States. Therefore, while British imperialism is aiming at "friendship" with Japan, and does not want to be drawn

into a premature war between the U.S.A. and Japan, nor desire to yield its own interests, it is actively working to direct the expansion of Japan northwards against the U.S.S.R. It hopes to achieve this by the promise of financial and political support in which, as is well known in London, Japanese imperialism is very much interested.

Such in brief are the basis starting-points of the foreign policies of the different capitalist powers at the present concrete period. And it is here that we have to seek the explanation for the improvement in Franco-Soviet relations, and for the increased activities of the anti-Soviet elements in Britain.

France is doing all possible to hinder the realisation of the war designs of German fascism; she is taking great pains to prevent the outbreak of a war in Europe at the present moment. There is therefore nothing accidental in the fact that France found it necessary to withdraw from the anti-Soviet camp. The French bourgeoisie does not want war now. It understands on the basis of its capitalist interests that a successful struggle for peace in Europe, especially in the Eastern and Southern parts of Europe, cannot be waged without taking into account such a powerful and great factor for peace as the Soviet Union. The change which has taken place in the attitude of leading circles in France towards the Soviet Union has, of course, been pre-determined by the great depth of the imperialist contradictions, but this circumstance makes it possible for the Soviet Union to make use of the actual conditions to strengthen peace and to ensure the opportunity of peaceful labour for the builders of socialism. The turn which has taken place in Franco-Soviet relations is an event which at the present time defines the entire world situation, inasmuch as Franco-Soviet collaboration in regard to the struggle for the preservation of peace impedes the realisation of the plans and intentions of the war-mongers to a great degree, who are feverishly straining themselves in Berlin and Tokio, encouraged in every way by London.

British imperialism, the most consistent and irreconcilable enemy of the toilers of the Soviet Union, places itself at the head of all the anti-Soviet forces. It is precisely Britain which is now the organiser of the anti-Soviet war, irrespective of the fact that both the Japanese and the German imperialists, in preparing to attack the U.S.S.R., are pursuing their own INDEPENDENT predatory aims.

The British imperialists would like to bring about a new re-division of the world at the expense

of the partition of China, the U.S.S.R. and the States which were formed after the war.

This in actual fact is the content of the predatory plan of the diehards, which they modestly call "the creation of a new equilibrium" in Europe and Asia. THIS IS HOW THEY ARE TRYING IN LONDON TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF THE JAPANESE AND GERMAN IMPERIALISTS AWAY FROM THE INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN. The centre of gravity of these interests is outside of Europe. If the British diehards none the less support the solicitations of German fascism, it is simply because GERMAN FASCISM IS THE "NATURAL" ALLY OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM. The plan of British imperialism is therefore to reinforce the anti-Soviet war in the Far East with a war on the western frontiers of the U.S.S.R.

It stands to reason that none of the British diplomats speak about this aloud! But the intentions of British imperialism are too clear by now, and the people who shape its foreign policy are too well known to leave room for doubt. Exceptionally symptomatic in this respect was the debate on foreign policy which took place in the House of Commons, March 18th, and which is worth while dwelling on.

The British Labourites are now, as is well known, on the opposition bench and are compelled to look for popular slogans which are in some respects contrary to the policy of "their" imperialists. The question which now disturbs and worries the British masses most is the question of the danger of a new war. The Labourites are now to a certain degree making capital out of this, and, thanks to this, as has been shown in the by-elections, they are receiving new votes at the expense of the Conservatives and Liberals. Under pressure from the masses, and for purposes of competition, the British Labour leaders are now compelled to put forward such "damned" questions as that of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Labour leaders would have liked to serve the masses with fables about "disarmament," etc., but this does not work. The Geneva "disarmament" comedy is ending. In this tense atmosphere even a simple parliamentary question in the House illuminated the situation very clearly.

The debate was opened by the representative of the opposition, the Labour Member, Sir Stafford Cripps. We quote from his speech as reported in *The Times* of May 19th:—

"Sir S. Cripps said he wished to raise the question of the attitude of his Majesty's Government towards Japan in view of the very serious threat to the peace of the East and indeed the peace of the whole world which had resulted from the actions of Japan during the last year. He also desired to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a question in regard to the Disarmament Conference.

"The action of Japan in invading Manchuria and the incidents which took place at the same time in Shanghai were the first steps of a design by which Japan should gain preponderating power throughout the whole of the East. That design in its initial stages succeeded because of the weakness and vacillation of the governments who were represented on the League of Nations—in which weakness and vacillation our Government took a leading part. Since that time Japan had extended her conquests in the North of China. She had withdrawn from the League . . .

"Following the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan was now engaged in converting Manchuria and Jehol into a great military base, with strategic roads and railways, ready for some further adventure. Japan constituted herself, on her own statement, as the judge of what benefited China and whether she would permit other countries to engage in technical or financial assistance to that country. They were left with the perfectly plain claim and assertion by the Japanese Government that she proposed to continue in her breach of the Nine-Power Treaty and to extend that breach throughout Northern China. APPARENTLY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS ALLOWING JAPAN TO CONTINUE IN BREACH OF THE OBLIGATIONS BOTH UNDER THE COVENANT AND THE NINE-POWER TREATY.

"As the *Times* put it, in a rather remarkable article in September, 1933, 'The goal of the Japanese is lordship of the Far East.' IF THEY WERE TO JUDGE FROM THE OUTWARD APPEARANCE OF THE POLICY OF THIS GOVERNMENT THEY WOULD BE LED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS COUNTRY WAS EITHER IN LEAGUE WITH JAPAN IN HER AGGRESSION OR WAS TURNING A BENEVOLENTLY BLIND EYE ON HER OBLIGATIONS AND ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF THIS COUNTRY BOTH UNDER THE TREATY AND UNDER THE COVENANT. No nation would accept disarmament, because no nation could find security in the existing state of affairs, and it now seemed a possibility that the British Government was going to throw in its hand on the disarmament situation.

"THE GOVERNMENT TALKED ABOUT SECURITY AND SAID HOW NECESSARY IT WAS, BUT IN FACT THEY MADE SECURITY IMPOSSIBLE BY THEIR ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO JAPAN. AS REGARDED EUROPE, THE GOVERNMENT HAD REFUSED ALL THOSE MEASURES WHICH MOST PEOPLE BELIEVED TO BE NECESSARY TO GIVE REALITY TO SECURITY AS OPPOSED TO MERE PAPER SECURITY, WHICH NO ONE NOW BELIEVED WAS LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE."

The Conservative Member, Admiral Roger Keyes, replied to Cripps (we quote from *The Times*):

"Sir R. Keyes said that one thing was quite certain, THAT IF THE POLICY WHICH SIR S. CRIPPS AND HIS FRIENDS SO OFTEN URGED WAS CARRIED INTO EFFECT THIS COUNTRY WAS EVENTUALLY BOUND TO BE INVOLVED IN A WAR WITH JAPAN.

"JAPAN WAS DESTINED TO PLAY A VERY BIG PART IN THE FUTURE OF THE EAST, AND HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SHE WOULD GO FORWARD TO HER DESTINY WITH UNSWERVING DETERMINATION. HE HAD ALWAYS THOUGHT THAT IT WAS A DEPLORABLE MISTAKE ON OUR PART TO TERMINATE OUR ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN, WHICH WAS OF IMMENSE VALUE TO US IN THE EAST WITH A GUARANTEE OF PEACE IN EASTERN WATERS. . . He recommended to the government to do all that was in their power to return to the excellent understanding with Japan that existed in those



days. We should have come to an understanding over commercial interests, and it would be of very great benefit to this Empire and to our interests in the East if we could come to a thorough and good understanding with Japan."

Sir John Simon spoke after Keyes. This expert barrister knows how to raise a smoke-screen, and now he made every effort to dwell at length on his "deep concern in the presence of an international situation which was felt to be full of difficulty and, it might be, very threatening for the future." In Simon's speech one can find an answer to two questions, namely, the question of the policy of British imperialism in the Far East and of its policy in Europe. From Simon's speech one can very definitely gather, in the first place, that leading circles in Britain HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE PARTITION OF CHINA. Here is what Simon said:

"He (Sir John Simon) regretted as much as anybody that there had not been a greater measure of agreement between China and Japan in the Far East, but it was a complete confusion of ideas to suppose that in abstaining from seeking to apply sanctions anyone was departing from the Lytton Report or from the recommendations of the League of Nations itself. As regarded Sir S. Cripps' question, anyone who heard that question would have supposed THAT THE NINE-POWER TREATY CONTAINED SOME CLAUSE BY WHICH THIS COUNTRY UNDERTOOK TO RESPECT AND PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF CHINESE TERRITORY. IT CONTAINED NO SUCH CLAUSE. IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT WE HAD EVER SIGNED, OR THAT ANYONE ELSE HAD EVER SIGNED A TREATY WITH CHINA IN WHICH WE HAD PLEDGED OURSELVES TO USE ALL OUR FORCES TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF CHINA."

It is not our responsibility to remind His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Articles I. and II. of the Washington Nine-Power Treaty. What is important is that we are dealing with an indirect admission of an understanding regarding the partition of China and the violation of the Nine-Power Treaty by Japan. This is the real basis for Anglo-Japanese relations.

Simon also replied to another question, namely, ABOUT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE EUROPEAN STATES. As is well known, British imperialism is doing its best to get the French Government to agree to the rearming of German fascism and at the same time it is persistently refusing to guarantee the security of the boundaries established at Versailles which French diplomacy has striven for. Britain has expressed its readiness to guarantee only the boundaries of France, thereby leaving the boundaries of the States in eastern and the south-west of Europe to the discretion of anyone who is striving for their revision, i.e., to the discretion of German fascism. As an experienced barrister, Simon did his best to formulate this part of his speech in terms as vague

as possible. He even excused himself by saying that "he had had doubts as to whether it would be wise to say anything publicly from that box about it." We are not aware how the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs resolved his "doubt," but what he did say leaves us in no doubts as to British policy in the question which he so carefully evaded, namely, the question of the revision of boundaries. "Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations," Simon explained to his audience, "in general terms provided that members of the League undertook to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of all members of the League." In order to alter the boundaries of the League members, the Covenant of the League of Nations must be amended. Simon declared that he does not object to such a revision, but he is not convinced that they, whose boundaries are to be the subject of discussion would agree. A shrewd fellow is this Sir John Simon! And if they object? What then? "Here was the problem, and he did not see the solution of it"—such was Simon's reply. This, however, is only a lawyer's cunning, because Simon considered it necessary to issue the warning that if war breaks out the British Government will not seek to resort to the application of the sanctions which the League Covenant provides against those violating the Covenant, because the sanctions mean war, and British imperialism is against war! Sir John appealed to the House not to be disheartened by the reports on the arming of Germany and on the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference. He ended his speech in these words:

"I trust the high hopes that have been expressed here that some way be found out of these terrible anxieties will be found. I OFFER ON BEHALF OF THE WHOLE GOVERNMENT THE ASSURANCE that nothing shall be found wanting in trying to continue to play our full part in saving the world from that what would undoubtedly be a most serious calamity—the breakdown of the Conference and the disappointment of hopes which we have all entertained for such a long time. DO NOT LET US TAKE THE FOOLISH VIEW OF SUPPOSING THAT IF THAT HAPPENS IT MEANS THE END OF THE WORLD."

And so the boundaries of China and of the States in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Europe are to be revised. If this results in war, the British bourgeoisie will not hinder the war instigators; and if the latter are now arming themselves and this threatens the breakdown of the Geneva Conference, then Simon, crushed though his soul may be, makes a note of the sorry state of things and consoles himself in the knowledge that this does not quite mean the end of the world.

The fragments have been joined together. Before us we have the elements which go to make up the foreign policy of British imperialism, a policy of the unrestrained race for armaments, and

of the incitement to war of those governments, fascist Germany and imperialist Japan, which are diligently seeking it. The tenor of Simon's speech made on May 30 at the session of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference, in which he expressed himself in opposition to Comrade Litvinov's proposals to guarantee peace and security, was in conformity with the spirit of that policy.

But we have at our disposal other facts which in no less degree testify to the present trend of British foreign policy. Just a few days before the parliamentary debate in the House of Commons, in the Viennese newspaper, *Neue Freie Presse*, issue of May 17, there appeared an article by the London Correspondent of this paper, H. P. Smolka, entitled: "England face to face with momentous decisions." Judging from the nature of the interview, it is not difficult to establish that through the person of H. P. Smolka, the opinions of the most influential circles of British imperialism are being expressed.

"England," says the correspondent, "is to-day confronted by two alternatives, for the solution of which great farsightedness and constructive abilities are necessary. This is especially so since once decisions have been reached, things cannot be left to develop spontaneously, but what is wanted is to hold fast to the line set, actively and diligently. The first group of decisions pertains to Europe, the second to Eastern Asia.

"In the first group England will have to choose between participation in the solution of the armaments question, or to completely turn its back on the conflicts taking place on the continent. If England chooses the road of active participation, then the harassed John Bull will immediately be confronted by another problem, namely, will he support Germany's demand for armaments and oppose France's theses about the sanctity of the treaties, which have become untenable, or will he conclude an alliance with France for the purpose of preventing Germany's rearming?

"If England decides to turn her back on the continent, then this will inevitably lead to an increase in naval and aerial armaments, because only if the British Isles are armed up to the stratosphere will they, under modern conditions of warfare, be able to feel themselves to some extent secure when they find themselves in the midst of a struggle which will shake Europe.

"And in Eastern Asia? Should the government give Japan a free hand against Russia and China and thereby free itself from competition on the textile market and simultaneously secure all British interests in Australia, India and New Zealand? Does MacDonald believe that Japan will be kept busy for a long time by her struggles in the Far East or at any rate, have her attention engaged in her aspiration for expansion, and let England alone?

"Or perhaps he fears that Japan, after conquering as wide a base as possible in Eastern Asia, will become a still greater menace to the interests of Great Britain in the Pacific and in Central Asia?

"If so, he could decide right now together with the U.S.A. and Russia to check-mate the 'yellow race.'

**"BUT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN AND THE EASTERN ASIATIC COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS LIE THE SHARPLY ANTAGONISTICALLY ORGANISED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF SOVIET**

**RUSSIA WHICH IS INSTINCTIVELY FELT BY BRITISH IMPERIALISM TO BE A FUNDAMENTALLY MORE DECISIVE OPPONENT AND A POTENTIALLY GREATER MENACE TO ITS WORLD EMPIRE THAN JAPAN, WHICH, THOUGH IT MAY PROVE TO BE A COMPETITOR, WILL NEVER, SO LONG AS IT CONTINUES IN ITS PRESENT FORM OF ORGANISATION, PROVE TO BE ABLE TO UPSET THE VERY FOUNDATIONS OF ITS WORLD SYSTEM OF DOMINATION BY SHATTERING THE BASES OF THE GREAT CAPITALIST POWER.** One can conclude an alliance and divide the markets with competitors after setting appropriate quotas, BUT ONE CANNOT DO ANYTHING OF THE SORT WITH THE RED HEREDITARY ENEMY, SOVIET RUSSIA. This is the way the English Conservatives argue.

"Recently, he adds, your correspondent had the opportunity of speaking with an outstanding English Conservative, a modern imperialist of the purest water, and former governor of one of England's greatest protectorates. This statesman offered the following solution:

**"WE SHALL GIVE JAPAN FREEDOM OF ACTION AGAINST RUSSIA. JAPAN MAY EXTEND HER KOREAN-MANCHURIAN BORDER TO THE ARCTIC OCEAN AND ANNEX THE FAR EASTERN PART OF SIBERIA. SHE WILL THEN HAVE AT HER DISPOSAL THE LENA GOLD-FIELDS WHICH WILL SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT HER PRESENT FORCED EXPORT POLICY. WE SHALL ALLOW GERMANY THE RIGHT TO ARM AND CONCLUDE AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE, THUS MAKING IMPOSSIBLE GERMAN EXPANSION IN THE WEST AS A RESULT OF FRANCO-BRITISH IMPERIALISM, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SHALL OPEN UP TO GERMANY THE PATH TO THE EAST, THUS MAKING ITS EXPANSION POSSIBLE. IN THIS WAY WE WILL SUCCEED IN KEEPING THE ATTENTION OF JAPAN AND GERMANY AWAY FROM ENGLAND AND ENDANGERING THE POSITION OF RUSSIA."**

"The English public (continues the correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse*), however, will not support such a policy because it is too rationalistic, too brutal, too open. BUT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE INTERESTS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, THIS POLICY IS LOGICALLY FAULTLESS. AND LET US BE FRANK, IS IT NOT TRUE THAT IN THE LAST MONTHS ENGLISH FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN DEVELOPING IN THIS DIRECTION IN RELATION TO GERMANY AND JAPAN?"

Precisely so, is it not true that in the last months British policy has been guided in this direction in relation to Germany and Japan? Is it not true that the declaration of the "outstanding English Conservative," who is no other than Lord Lloyd, one of the organisers of the fascistic groupings of the so-called "Young Tories"—is an excellent supplement to the debate in the House of Commons? And, finally, can there still be any doubt that British imperialism is the instigator of the war against the U.S.S.R.?

\* \* \* \* \*

We must take into consideration the concrete situation in which the so-called Anglo-German rapprochement is taking place. The British imperialists understand quite well how great is the strain on the relations between classes and states in contemporary capitalist Europe, and they take into account the fact that a new Franco-German

war would be dangerous and even fatal. But if the leading circles of the Conservative Party and the British General Staff understand that a second Sedan is a task which cannot be so easily solved in our times, they, on the other hand, allow themselves to believe in the possibility of a repetition of Jena. But what would the defeat of the Hitler dictatorship lead to? Would it not lead to bringing the proletarian masses into action and . . . at the mere thought of the proletarian revolution in the heart of Europe the British die-hards turn ghastly pale! No! Imperialist Britain has its own variant for the solution of European problems. Precisely because both Germany needs the assistance of England, and France cannot renounce this assistance, British imperialism is in position to bring her influence to bear, in one way or another, on the course of events in the European capitalist continent, and to direct these events for a time. And it is precisely for this reason that it is possible for British imperialism to play the rôle of the organiser of the war against the Soviet Union. It is not only a case of the anti-Soviet ideology of the ruling classes in Britain. The whole of the international bourgeoisie of course are sufficiently hostile to the Soviet Union. It is a question of the actual conditions in which the ruling classes in every country find themselves, of the political situation and, finally, of the degree to which this political situation favours the realisation of long cherished anti-Soviet plans. It is on this basis that the concrete line of Britain's foreign policy is being constructed. British imperialism is rendering not only moral support, but also according to all appearances, material support to the German fascists. It is supporting them in the sense that it is making it actually possible for German fascism to achieve complete freedom to arm itself, or more exactly to secure LAND armaments which in themselves represent no danger for the British Isles so long as the French army is in being in Europe.

A strong army is the key to the solution of the task which German fascism has set itself, namely, the task of an advance eastwards. German fascism is not only creating this army, but has already in practice done so, not without the help of her friends in London. **IN ADDITION, BRITAIN IS DOING ALL POSSIBLE TO HANDICAP THE ATTEMPTS OF FRENCH IMPERIALISM TO STOP THE ACTUAL ARMING OF GERMANY, TO HINDER THE ANNULMENT BY FASCIST GERMANY OF THE MILITARY CLAUSES IN THE VERSAILLES TREATY, AND THUS CREATE THE PREREQUISITES FOR THE REVISION BY FORCE OF THE TERRITORIAL STATUTES.** It is true that England is ready to

guarantee the integrity of the French boundaries, for London is by no means interested in seeing Germany replace France as the hegemon in Europe. Just exactly how the map of Europe will look after the fascist conquerors have finished with it is for the meantime a question which least of all occupies the British bourgeoisie. The main thing is to make good use of such a "god-given" event, as the establishment of the fascist dictatorship, to try again and, what is more, determinedly to organise an anti-Soviet war. And in the course of this war which will inevitably demand of Germany to strain its forces to the fullest extent, the possibility will undoubtedly present itself of limiting, in one form or another, the appetites for conquest of the re-born Vikings. A firm military alliance with France is necessary precisely in order to be able to call a "halt!" to German imperialism at the right moment. This alliance, however, has still other advantages, in that the British imperialists hope through the instrumentality of this alliance **TO CURTAIL FRANCE'S FREEDOM OF ACTION, TO ISOLATE HER FROM THE FORCES STRUGGLING FOR PEACE.** They hope thereby to prevent her from interfering prematurely, and from hindering the destruction of the French positions in Central and Eastern Europe **AND THEREBY TO ISOLATE THE COUNTRIES AGAINST WHICH FASCIST GERMANY'S EXPANSION IS DIRECTED.**

This is how the British imperialists would like to solve the European problem. They, it is true, understand that this whole scheme does not depend only on their own will. They also foresee most unfavourable turn of events, namely, the breakup of German fascism. The peoples of Eastern and Central Europe would hardly submissively accept the yoke of German imperialism which is pining for colonial oppression and plunder. Moreover, the fascist bands would have to deal with the Soviet Union and we know how these bands will end up if they attempt to lay hold of a single inch of Soviet territory. At any rate, it cannot be said that the British imperialists are deeply convinced of success in case of such operations. If things go as far as a revision of boundaries, it is by no means essential that the boundary lines be only moved eastward, without a doubt they can be moved far westward as well.

These are problems which are being thought about in London painstakingly and daily. **THIS IS WHY BRITISH IMPERIALISM IS MUSTERING ALL ITS FORCES TO CREATE NOT ONLY THE CORRESPONDING FRONTS IN EUROPE, BUT ALSO TO UTILISE THE SITUATION CREATED IN THE FAR EAST.** In London they understand quite well how greatly interested Japanese imperialism is in having a

military ally in Europe. German fascism is logically such an ally. And it is in this direction, THE DIRECTION OF THE CLOSEST RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN GERMAN AND JAPANESE FASCISM THAT BRITISH DIPLOMACY IS STEERING. Germany, therefore, is a trump card in the hand of British imperialism, a trump card and at the same time a bait.

Thus we can come to the following conclusions: British imperialism is trying in every way to utilise the political situation in order to unleash anti-Soviet war in Europe and in the Far East. It supports the case of fascist Germany and it openly solidarises with the aspirations of Japanese imperialism. It renders these countries political and material support, it arms them. At the same

time British imperialism tries to shackle the freedom of action of those countries which are threatened by the aggression of the German and Japanese imperialists.

We have therefore in front of us A COMPLETED POLICY OF THE UNLEASHING OF WAR; BEFORE US ARE THE REAL INSTIGATORS OF A NEW WORLD BLOOD-BATH AGAINST THE TOILING MASSES. Now, more than ever before, it is clear that British imperialism is the main organiser of the war against the Soviet Union and the preparations for war have entered on such a phase when the organisers themselves do not any longer consider it necessary to hide the parts they are playing.

## SOME EXPERIENCES FROM THE ACTIVITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF JAPAN IN THE ARMY

TANAGI KATSUE.

(From data in the Party Press).

A TALL wooden fence stretches along the street over a whole block. Painted a dull blackish-grey colour it reminds one of a prison wall, which cuts off part of the street, festive with green vegetation, the sun, the shop-windows, where bright textures show off their colours, where fruit and vegetables form a palette of paints, and where bright parasols spread their fancy wings.

A massive gate is in the centre. Two striped sentry-boxes stand near the gate. Two khaki-clad sentries stand at attention under the scorching rays of the sun. From morning till night, broken shots are heard there, and a cacophony of signal horns.

Here are the barracks of the N. regiment stationed in Tokyo. Here, as in thousands of similar barracks scattered all over Japan, are locked in the best elements of the youth of the nation. Cannon fodder is being prepared out of them, for the war which is now going on, and for the war which is to come.

\* \* \* \*

From the very first days of the war in China the Communist Party of Japan placed its best members in the barracks, on the men-of-war, and at the front. In spite of all obstacles the Party press, and Party leaflets, penetrated into the ranks of the "Emperor's array," and bound the workers and peasants clad in khaki to their brothers in the factories and villages with thousands of strong threads. Since the Manchurian events, the central

organ of the Party, the *Sekki*, has become a genuine anti-war, Bolshevik newspaper. The paper set up a special section for propaganda in the army and navy, which contains letters from soldiers and sailors of the expeditionary units and from garrisons in the rear. In September, 1932, the *Soldiers' Friend* (Neisi no tomo) appeared in the Army. The Party began to issue a special monthly paper for the masses of soldiers. In October the mass arrests of Communists disrupted the publication of the paper for a time, but it began to appear once more in the beginning of March, 1933. A naval newspaper, *The Lofty Mast*, began to appear in the military port of Kurs. Local papers were published by Communists in the barracks, men-of-war and ports.

\* \* \* \*

A recruit ceases to be a human being as soon as the gates of the barracks are locked behind him. He becomes a soldier. Day in and day out, until his unit is sent to the front, he will march on the parade ground until he is dizzy, and to the accompaniment of the howling of non-commissioned officers, he will be taught to shoot, to stab, and to suffocate while wearing a mask during training. Military drill, cruelty and promotion will make an obedient killing automaton out of him.

*The Soldier's Friend* correctly approaches the soldier who is tormented by his drill, by dealing first and foremost with the things that agitate him. In publishing letters from soldiers and sailors in

different units, the newspaper shows how hard is the life of the soldier in the army and the sailor in the navy. By arousing a protest from the masses against the barbaric methods employed in military training, against the arbitrariness of the officers, the newspaper shows the way to struggle, namely, by creating soldiers' committees.

"... Lately, in connection with the preparations for the regimental shooting contest, we are having strenuous training shooting matches daily in our company. We are told that if the company shoots successfully, we will receive a present from the Emperor. This is the usual manoeuvre of the rascals, to evoke competition between us. This is how they force us to train ourselves in the art of the murdering of men."

"On June 20, while training, fifteen soldiers showed very bad marksmanship. As punishment they were ordered to run at full speed in full equipment from Toyamagahar to the barracks. Tired from the day's training, one of the recruits fainted during the race in the street of Sendshey. Half an hour later he was found lying there by the comrades who picked him up. Another of these soldiers lost consciousness and dropped near Seimon. He regained consciousness only in the morning. This refers not only to the soldiers who suffered in this particular case. Similarly cruel barbaric training is applied to all soldiers. Therefore this case is one that affects us all. Many of us are discontented, but we keep silent. After this case, we have begun to feel the necessity of uniting for the purpose of jointly presenting our demands to the officers and the non-commissioned officers. We shall immediately organise a soldiers' committee!

Soldiers of X Company, Y Regiment."

(*Soldiers' Friend*, No. 2, March 10, 1933.)

On board the men-of-war, the sailors are tormented, in addition to drilling, by the drudgery of "keeping the vessel in order." *The Soldier's Friend* raises this question before the masses of sailors in the following letter:

"... I believe that such conditions are to be found not only on board our ship, but on the other ships as well. We don't see the light of day because of the work we have to do. This work does not last a day or two; it lasts for months at a stretch, so that the weaker chaps break down. We clean the vessel from rust, and inhale the smell, and paint the vessel in such places where the air is so foul, that the candles go out. And after working in one spot for a few hours, we all express our discontent. The question is asked, 'And does the Emperor know how hard our work is? We are only the children of His Majesty when we are fed with bullets. But it is no concern of his when we starve.' We are against war, which destroys workers and peasants! We demand sanitary equipment on board! The money spent for the war should be given for unemployment dole! Such is our unanimous opinion. I believe that our brothers on board other ships are just as dissatisfied. If so, then it's no use being silent! We must unite our forces and act jointly. Only then will we succeed in getting our demands satisfied and improve the life of our brothers."

The Japanese militarists devote a great deal of attention to the ideological training of the soldier. The line followed by the barrack "political schooling" which takes up a considerable part of the soldier's time, is to make a devoted servant of the Emperor and fatherland from the worker or peasant lad, to set him against "domestic and

foreign enemies." The soldiers are told over and over again about the divine origin of the dynasty, and about the invincibility of their army and the Emperor. The ideal of loyal faithfulness and self-sacrifice is hammered into them, by quoting many examples from history and from the biographies of various generals. Particular attention is devoted to setting the soldiers against the U.S.S.R. and the Communists. In the very heat of the military activity in Manchuria, there were cases of military games being organised, staging the seizure of Soviet trenches.

The Party is developing a fierce struggle against the monarchist and chauvinist training of the masses of soldiers and sailors. The Party press is organically imbued with the struggle against the monarchy. Both the *Soldiers' Friend* and the *Sekki* show many excellent examples of Bolshevik agitation among the soldier masses against the monarchy. Thus we read in the *Soldiers' Friend*:

"... As we are aware, the essence of the military training in the Japanese army is the blind, forcible hammering in of monarchist ideas into the heads of the soldiers.

"We are forced to read and to copy *The August Decree to the Soldiers*, which reads: 'We, the Emperor, are your Marshal. You are our faithful servants. You must profoundly revere us, your head,' and so forth. But if all this is true, that the Emperor is our Marshal, and we are his faithful servants, then how is it that the following events can happen? How did the Monarchist government, the militarists, and the police behave, when the street car workers, who are our brothers, recently began a struggle against dismissals, against wage cuts and persecution? What did they do when our fathers and brothers in the villages in the prefectures of Niigata, Yamanashi, Mie, Seitams, Aomori, and Nekkaido rose against the hated landlords for rice, and for land? The Emperor's government is a government which ruthlessly suppresses the struggle of our fathers and brothers against unemployment, exploitation and want. And when we, workers and peasants, clad in military uniform, are told that we must be the first servants of the Emperor, they deceive us. . . ." (*The Soldier's Friend*.)

In exposing the extraordinary Parliamentary session of 1932, as a session for the speeding up of war, the *Soldier's Friend* skilfully makes use of the patriotic hullaballos raised by the bourgeois press in connection with the news, that the court intended to come to the aid of the people, by donating 4,800,000 yen in the course of five years. In this regard the *Soldier's Friend* stated:—

"... 4,800,000 Yen appears to be rather a big sum. But let us examine what part of the total funds at the disposal of the Emperor's court this sum represents. This sum is to be spread over 5 years, which makes it 960,000 Yen per annum, whereas the yearly income of the court is 34,500,000 Yen. Of this sum, 4,500,000 Yen comes out of our taxes. The income from bonds and lands owned by the Court, amounts to 30 million Yen. Thus, even if the Emperor gives 4,800,000 Yen, it will be merely one-thirty-sixth of his yearly income. If you divide these 960,000 Yen among the 90 million of Japan's population, only 1.1 Sen falls to the share of each person. Such a miserable pittance will hardly help anybody. The fraud

is quite obvious. The Emperor gives it because he is afraid of the sharpening of the struggle of the workers and peasants inside the country. In Osaka a movement is already developing for the distribution of this money not in five years, but at once and immediately." (Ibid.)

The soldier is locked up in the barracks, or hurried to the front, and has almost no contact with his family and his friends. The army is mostly composed of peasants. It is usual for recruits to be sent from one locality to another, further removed from their home. Control by post remains. But it is rather difficult for the soldiers to keep up a correspondence on the beggarly pay they receive. They frequently haven't enough money for a postage stamp. Furthermore, the officers who take care of the proper moral and political welfare of their units subject both the soldier's letter home, and the letters he receives from home to a rigid censorship, frequently confiscating them.

*The Soldier's Friend* tells the masses of soldiers the truth about the sufferings and starvation of the soldiers' families, who are without their bread-winners. It cites authentic facts of the want and ruination of the homesteads, and suicides of the soldiers' relatives, quoting their names and the names of the villages. It gives the soldiers an exposure of the true essence of the Extraordinary Parliamentary session of 1932, so much advertised by the bourgeois press as a "Session for the Salvation of the People," and claims that the building works undertaken to help the village will, in reality bring no actual help to the peasantry. This is what the paper says:

"At first the Government announced that 340 million Yen would be assigned under the estimate for the 'relief of the people.' However, 'owing to financial difficulties,' the estimate was cut down almost by half, namely, to 160 million Yen. The estimate of each ministry is the preparation for a big war under cover of relief. According to this 'relief' estimate, 43 million Yen are allotted for the improvement of arms, ammunition and equipment for the army. Forty-three million Yen are assigned for the building and repair of men-of-war. Ten million Yen are assigned to the Ministry of Communications for the opening of an air-line between Hokkaido and Formosa. Forty-four million Yen are allotted to the Ministry for Home Affairs for the laying of a special telephone system, etc., etc. All this is called 'relief,' but it is as clear as daylight, that it is an estimate for war preparations.

"The Government is advertising building works for the relief of the peasantry, as the basic work to help the population. It says, that if one half of the 75 million Yen allotted for this work, i.e., 37 million, be spent as wages to the peasants employed on it, then 43,700 peasants will thus be helped. This is an outright lie! Compare this figure with the 30 million population of starving peasants. Such, in reality, are these shameless, fraudulent figures of 'relief'!"

The *Sekki* writes systematically about the disastrous position of the peasants, about the way tenants are driven from the land, about the forcible extortion of taxes, about the confiscation of their crops and the sale of farms by auction in order

to extort debts and taxes. The paper explains that the 2.2 billion war budget, the war loans, the driving of the workers in the peasant families to the front doom the peasants to ever more weighty disasters. The paper demands that all tax indebtedness be annulled, that the poor and middle peasants be exempted from taxes, that all the taxes should be extracted from the landlords and the kulaks. The paper demands that the units be recalled from the front, and that the money spent for the war be devoted to assisting the peasants and the unemployed.

The Communists who work in the village in the peasant unions, use the opportunity provided by cases of oppression by the landlords of the families of peasants recruited into the army, and cases of land confiscation to link up the struggle of the tenants with the anti-war struggle. In a number of regions the revolutionary peasant union has succeeded in organising its anti-war activity so efficiently, that the authorities and the gendarmerie have been forced to restrain the attacks of the landlords on the soldiers' families.

The Communist Party of Japan exposes the class nature of the "Emperor's army" and is fighting for the establishment of an active link between the workers and the soldiers.

From the very first days of the war the Party put forward the following demands: to pay wages in full to workers taken into the army; to include the period of military service in the uninterrupted period of industrial service\*; to immediately supply demobilised soldiers with employment on the same terms as before the mobilisation; to provide for the families of the soldiers, etc.

These demands of the soldiers were immediately swallowed up by the masses in the factories, etc. The workers began to put them forward in strikes and conflicts. These demands were particularly widespread at the very height of the war operations in Manchuria and near Shanghai, when many workers were taken into the army from the works and factories. The struggle of the workers, striking for the soldiers' interests was one of the forms of rendering the economic STRUGGLE POLITICAL AND OF interlinking it with the anti-war struggle.

On the other hand, the wave of these strikes exerted a great influence upon the army. At the time when the workers of the Tokyo subway went on strike (March, 1932) and set forth the soldiers' demands, under the leadership of the Communists, the soldiers at the front followed this heroic strike and discussed it. It excited a live response

\* It is a practice in Japanese factories that a lengthy period of industrial employment entitles the workers to a pension "for having worked a certain period of years," and larger benefits in case of dismissal, etc.

among the masses of soldiers. In Tokyo itself, a soldier, who formerly worked in the subway, deserted from the barracks to help the strikers. He came to the strike committee and the workers had great difficulty in persuading him to return to his unit, and not to ruin himself in vain. This case of desertion was taken into consideration in military circles. Both the military and the gendarmerie authorities came out with assurances that they would themselves take care that the employers would not infringe on the interests of the "heroes, fighting at the front."

At the beginning of 1933, the fascist trade unions and the reactionary organisations in the factories started an intense campaign for levies and donations for the "defence of the country," for the construction of tanks and "Patriot" aeroplanes at the expense of the workers. The Party organised a counter-campaign against war and fascism. In the factories the Communists organised all kinds of workers' meetings, talks, "tea-parties, etc. They secured the adoption of proposals to disrupt and boycott the collections, about the raising of wages, about stopping the intensification of labour as a result of war orders. And along with this, they proposed that the funds already collected should be placed under the control of the workers and should be handed over for the relief of the soldiers' families, and to the peasants of the north-western provinces, who had suffered from the flood, and to the unemployed. Thus, the Party once more introduced the "demands of the soldiers" into the struggle of the workers.

Without confining itself to this, the Party put forward the demand for immediate state assistance at the expense of the war budget, to those in need from the flood. It demanded that the soldiers stationed in China, who were natives of the provinces affected by the catastrophe, should be sent back home; that the troops and men-of-war sent there to "maintain order" in connection with the unrest among the peasants should be withdrawn. This activity of the Party inside the army found its reflection in the ferment that developed among the soldiers who were natives of the provinces affected by the flood.

In the summer of 1933 the Party waged an anti-war campaign in connection with the air-defence manoeuvres in the Canto district.

Among the slogans launched during the campaign there were again included slogans concerning the soldiers, such as:—Medical treatment and rest for the soldiers wounded when in manoeuvres, payment of double wages after the manoeuvres, relief to soldiers' families at the expense of funds allotted for the manoeuvres, compensation for the losses due to the damage caused to peasant

fields, payment for military quarters in the villages, etc.

At the same time, the *Sekki* stressed that the struggle against the air manoeuvres presented excellent opportunities for the organisation of the united struggle of the workers, peasants and soldiers, and indicated to the Party organisations the forms for rapprochement between the masses and the soldiers, and the forms of joint struggle, such as for instance, the organisation of amusements for the soldiers at the bivouacs, the setting up of committees to estimate the losses caused by the manoeuvres to the peasant fields — committees made up of workers, peasants and soldiers.

While struggling for the establishment of a bond between the workers and the army, both the *Sekki* and the *Soldier's Friend* systematically gave publicity to the worsening of the conditions of the workers in the factories, etc., in connection with the war, and the struggle of the workers against this, stressing the necessity for joint struggle. This is how the *Sekki* described the conditions of the workers at the Nakedzime works, which was engaged on urgent war orders:—

"Aviomotors are manufactured here. Only 20 per cent. extra is allowed for work the whole night through. The workers are getting thinner, they have lost weight up to 1 kan.

Last year we were producing from 14 to 15 motors a month, now we are making 50. The officers commissioned to the works speak about the necessity of increasing the monthly output of motors up to 100, for otherwise, they say, we will be unable to win the war. If we continue this way in the future, we will drop off our feet altogether.

"The Departments are strictly separated from one another. Communication between the workers employed in the different departments is almost impossible. It is impossible to exchange a few words with your comrades. The ceilings in the department are made of glass, and a supervisor watches from above, who is doing the talking. Gendarmes are permanently present at the works. 'Pinkertons' are in abundance all over the place. We are watched as though we are in a prison.

"At night, the moment the supervisor goes out, the workers talk about their low wages, and their long working hours. In the machine section, the workers began to grasp that the more they worked, the more their piece-work rate was reduced, so they ceased to rush their work. General indignation prevails. The walls of the lavatories are covered with protests. As soon as they are white-washed, fresh inscriptions make their appearance." (20/10/33.)

An excellent way of linking the workers with the army was the organisation of meetings at the factories, etc., on the initiative of the demobilised soldiers who spoke at these meetings and spoke about the war or life at the front. In these cases the soldiers frequently proved to be the best agitators against the war. There were cases when the Communists transformed the parties, organised by the factory owners for the purpose of raising patriotic sentiments among the workers, parties in honour of the "heroes returned from the front" —into anti-war meetings.

" . . . At one Tokyo works," stated a report in the *Soldier's Friend*, "the management organised a gathering to hear stories about the war. Seventy workers were present. The tale was told by a soldier from the front. He spoke for about two hours about what the soldiers had to suffer at the front. Even there the officers wrapped themselves in several blankets, whereas the tired soldiers were unable to sleep at nights on account of the cold, for one blanket had to be shared by three men. The soldiers were not supplied with warm clothing, while they had to shoot from the knee, or lying in the snow in frosts of 40 degrees below Zero. (C.) The food was so bad that even pigs would not eat it. The chairman of this meeting finally got scared and closed the gathering. The audience was very much excited and carried a resolution against the war." (*Soldier's Friend*, March 13, 1933.)

The Party is popularising the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. among the masses of soldiers and tells them what the Red Army is, how it differs from the Japanese "Emperor's army." For instance, we find a large article in the *Soldier's Friend* of March 10, 1933, headed, "A Day In a Red Army Barracks of the U.S.S.R." The paper described this day, from reveille in the morning until "lights out" at night and related how the Red Army man masters military technique, how he improves his cultural standards, how he spends his leisure hours. The paper built its entire story on a contrast between the conditions prevailing in Soviet barracks and those in Japanese barracks. In a description of the political hour, devoted to the question of the possibility of the Japanese troops, who seized Manchuria, attacking the Soviet border the newspaper inserted the following words into the mouth of the Red Army man:—

" . . . We will have to fight firmly against those who attack our Soviet Union, our workers' and peasants' state, whoever they may be. However, not all are alike in the Japanese army. The majority in that army are Japanese soldiers who do not know for whose sake they came to Manchuria, and what they are fighting for. But there is a real enemy, who forces these soldiers to fight. This is the Japanese capitalists, the landlords and the monarchist government. The Japanese soldiers, like ourselves, are children of the workers and of the peasants. There is no law that the children of the workers and of the peasants should kill each other. And this should be told to our Japanese comrades in the first place."

"Fifteen years ago we annihilated the barbaric power of tsarism and of the landlords and capitalists, and established a workers' and peasants' power in Russia. For fifteen years we have defended this power and for the first time in history have built up a socialist state. The Japanese comrades must grasp this fact as soon as possible and establish in their country, in Japan, the power of the workers, peasants and soldiers."

The Party and its press are conducting great work in exposing the class nature of the imperial army, making use for this purpose of the facts of the shooting of revolutionary units at the front. For instance, the *Soldier's Friend* reported the following:—

"In the beginning of January the soldiers of the N. Company of the Mimedzi division, stationed in Dziaran-ton\* region, indignant at the delay in demobilisation, began to return home arbitrarily, ignoring the orders of their commanders, and infecting other units by their example. The scared commanders of the division immediately surrounded the soldiers in revolt with a detachment which excelled them in numbers and arrested soldiers who offered resistance. Two hundred men were arrested and shot.

"As one man, these Japanese soldiers showed firm resistance to the end, and fell under the bullets of the Japanese imperialists with the revolutionary call: 'Down with the Imperialist war!' 'Evacuate the army from China!'" (*Soldier's Friend*, 10/3/1933.)

The Party removed from the pedestal the legend about the invincibility of the Japanese army by describing the defeats it suffered from the Chinese troops:—

"Isimoto, a spy of the Quantung army, was captured by the Chinese Volunteer army in Jehol. Some time later, the Japanese commanders occupied this province under the pretext of releasing Isimoto. The volunteer army in Jehol valiantly resisted the Japanese invasion. On August 19, a detachment of 300 men destroyed the railway line in the vicinity of Nanrio, and attacked the headquarters of Yosioka, who was marching to the assistance of Isimoto. On August 20 a new battle took place which lasted several hours, the Japanese troops suffering a great loss, many being killed and wounded. Such is the stubborn resistance being offered to the invasion of Japanese imperialism into 'Inner Mongolia.'" (*Soldier's Friend*, 10/3/33.)

In explaining to the masses of soldiers that the "Manchurian bandits" whom the bourgeois press slanders and whom the Japanese commanders vainly endeavour to liquidate, are Chinese peasants, who defend their country from Japanese seizure with arms in their hands, the *Soldier's Friend* shows with facts and figures how the poorly armed Chinese partisans, sometimes only possessing shot-guns, defeat the Japanese troops, who excel them in numbers and arms, and compel them to retreat.

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\* All the Chinese geographical names are given in Japanese transcription.

(To be concluded.)