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PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

The New Tactics of the
C.P.G.B.

Editorial

Tenth Anniversary of the
Red Army

K. Voroshilov

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C O N T E N T S

THE NEW TACTICS OF THE C.P.G.B. Editorial	162	THE FATE OF THE LAST CENTRIST LABOUR PARTY	K. Remmele	179
THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RED ARMY		THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN SWEDEN	Karl Kilbom	183
K. Voroshilov	167			
NORTH AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND THE COMING CRISIS	P. Schubin			
	176			

The New Tactics of the C.P.G.B.

THE Comintern Plenum's resolution on the British question, carried unanimously on the eighth of February last, sums up all the modifications and changes that have taken place both in regard to the correlation of forces in Britain and in the mutual relationships existing within the working class. On the basis of a clear Leninist analysis of those modifications and changes the resolution indicates a new tactical line of struggle for the Communist Party, which in effect lays down the principle that henceforth, while heading the struggle against the Conservative Government, the Communist Party must pass to an open attack on the leaders of the Labour Party, who are becoming more and more part of the apparatus of the bourgeois State.

The passing of this resolution was preceded by a discussion in the C.P.G.B., and a diligent examination of all the problems arising out of the new tactical line in the commission of the Plenum. The members of the Plenum commission came to the unanimous conclusion that the discussion on the question of the new tactic had first and foremost shown the political growth of the ranks of the Comintern in general and of the C.P.G.B. in particular. The discussion centred around the following fundamental problems: (1) the prospects of Britain's economic development; (2) the tendencies of the Labour Party's development; (3) the prospects of a further process of differentiation inside the working class, and (4) the slogan of a Labour Government.

During the analysis of these complex and difficult problems one could observe the extent to which the members composing the main framework of the Comintern had mastered the Leninist methods of class analysis, and the definition of a tactical line on the basis of a considered application of the fundamental principles of Communism to the given concrete circumstances, to the given correlation of class forces.

THE first problem—that of the prospects of Britain's economic development, did not lead to any special discussion in the British delegation itself. The British delegation unanimously held the view that the "prosperity" of 1927, of which British

bankers and British reformists are so loud in their praises, can in no case justify a reconsideration of the general position in regard to the decline of British imperialism. The partial "prosperity" which was expressed in a certain revival in the spheres of industry and trade was resultant on the ending of the seven months' miners' lockout, and also on the intensified pressure brought to bear on conditions of labour after the defeat of the general strike. And the British delegation was confident that even this "prosperity" was drawing to its end. Both in the sphere of economic struggle and in that of political struggle we note symptoms of the beginning of a fresh animation among the British proletariat, and they are beginning to close their ranks for a united resistance to the attack of capital, now being concealed behind the reformist slogans of "Peace in Industry."

THE British comrades provided the Plenum with a clear analysis of the celebrated theory dealing with the so-called "second industrial revolution," which is based on the comparatively favourable position of new spheres of industry. The bourgeois economists are endeavouring to draw attention from the chronic depression in the basic spheres of industry by pointing to the growth and development of the chemical, electrical, motor and a number of other new spheres of industry. There is not the least doubt that the development of these spheres of industry is to a certain extent alleviating the results of the general economic depression. None the less, one must not forget those basic facts of British economics owing to which the development of new spheres of industry can in no case compensate for the destructive results of the decline and decay of Britain's old spheres of industry, which in their time were the basis of her economic leadership and which right down to the present day, represent the indispensable conditions of a sound functioning of British capitalism.

For a start, the basic spheres of British industry—coal, metal-working, textiles, shipbuilding, etc.—provide occupation for the majority of the British working class, while all the new spheres of industry taken together employ only about seven hundred thousand hands. If it

New Tactics of C.P.G.B.—continued

be granted that all the seven hundred thousand hands employed in the new spheres of industry are enjoying all the benefits of the economic prosperity, even so one could speak of the satisfactory position of only an insignificant section of the British proletariat. But the correlation of these two groups of industry is by no means exhausted by a comparative relationship of the number of workers occupied in them. The chief and fundamental difference between these two spheres of industry consists in the fact that while the first works predominantly for export, without which the metropolis of the British empire is destined to destruction, the second sphere of industry is preponderantly occupied with luxury articles supplied mainly to the internal market of the metropolis itself. And just because of this the growth of new spheres of industry against the background of a continuing and at present intensifying depression in the more important spheres of industry is rather a symptom of the further decline of British economic life than of the beginning of a new era of flourishing economy.

THIS general estimate of the economic situation does not, of course, exclude the possibility of modifications in British economy. If course, it would be the greatest of mistakes not to take into account the fact that 1927 was a record year for "peace in industry," excelling in this regard not only the post-war years, but even the years immediately preceding the world war. The Baldwin Government in conjunction with the leaders of the Labour Party and the trade unions have taken and are taking the most heroic measures to continue this peace at all costs and to improve their position on the international market at the cost of lengthening the working day and cutting down the wages of the British workers. The British ruling classes are also making certain attempts to rationalise British industry, both with the aid of uniting scattered and unconnected enterprises and by improving and perfecting the technique of production. All these facts must be considered and weighed most diligently. But at the same time one must keep in mind the fact that the British bourgeoisie is subjected to conditions of a continually growing intensification and severity of international competition, and consequently it is necessary to study the successes of British capital and its victories in the realm of rationalisation from the point of view of the comparison of those successes with the successes of other capitalist countries, particularly of the United States and Germany.

The older British industry proved to be impotent in the presence of foreign competition even in the pre-war period. The backwardness of British technique, the corruption of the ruling classes by a previous prolonged period of monopolist predominance gave and still give an unquestionable predominance to the newer capitalist countries. The eyes of the British ruling classes are fixed mainly on the possibility of worsening the position of the workers. The hopes of the Monds and the Baldwins that with the aid of the Hickses and Thomases it will be possible to effect a sound stabilisation of British capitalism at the cost of the workers' interests are clearly unrealisable. If we approach the analysis of British economic life from this point of view we come naturally

and inevitably to the conclusion that the talk of a "second industrial revolution" is a manifestation of that official optimism with which the economists and politicians of bourgeois Britain endeavour to veil the real tendencies of development in British economic life.

An analysis of the present economic situation is not included in the resolution passed by the Plenum. The C.P.G.B. and the Communist International will continue to give the most thoughtful study to all the new factors of British economics. But the Plenum as a whole held the opinion that the movement in the sphere of British economics during the past year afford no basis and no reason whatever for a reconsideration of the basic line of the Comintern in regard to the question of the destinies of Britain's economic development.

MORE serious, and at the same time more lively discussions took place over the question of the tendencies of development of the Labour Party. The British Labour Government existed only nine months altogether. The life of this government, which faithfully and truly served the British bourgeoisie in their struggle against the British workers and against the peoples of the east, was put to an end by two questions which objectively had revolutionary significance; relationships with the U.S.S.R., and the question of freedom for Communist propaganda (the Campbell case). The 1924 election campaign was carried through under the sign of defence of the Labour Government against the pressure of the united bourgeois front, while it was not the Labour Party but the Conservatives who, with the celebrated Zinoviev letter, took care to give the election campaign the character of a severe class struggle. This peculiar feature of the election campaign towards the end of 1924 would seem to have pushed into the background and obscured the lessons to be drawn from the Labour Party's period of office, which revealed the true features of the so-called Labour Government. The first year following Baldwin's victory was also marked by extremely complex class mutual relationships, and this contributed to the encouraging of all kinds of illusions concerning the Labour Party, the trade unions and all the so-called organised Labour movement.

THE movements and modifications that occurred in the Labour Party after it had become a governmental party found clear expression on May 12th, 1926 (the day of the betrayal of the general strike) and became finally crystallised during the period that followed this ill-omened day. The fundamental mistake of the C.P.G.B. consisted in the fact that it failed to effect a timely re-estimation of all the values immediately after the betrayal of the general strike, and to adapt its tactical line to the modifications which had taken place inside the Labour movement itself.

The Labour Ministry governed for a very short period. But that period was quite sufficient to show that the Labour Party was harnessed to the chariot of British imperialism. The day after Baldwin's victory, the Parliamentary Labour Party continued essentially the same policy as it had carried on during the period when MacDonald was the Premier of His Majesty's Government. In its role of opposition, the Labour Party continued to fulfil the functions of a third bourgeois

New Tactics of C.P.G.B.—continued

party, standing guard over the basic interests of imperialism and capitalism.

THE Labour Party as a whole was not adapted to its leaders' new course. Right down to the 24th congress of the Labour Party in October, 1924, it continued to exist as a federative party, built up on a trade union basis not only from an organisational, but also partly from a political point of view. The various sections of the Labour Party enjoyed freedom of criticism, and the decisions of the Party Congresses were respected but little either by the Labour Party leaders or by its local organisations. The 1924 Labour Party Congress took the first serious step towards transforming the Labour Party into a social-reformist party. That congress not only passed a series of repressive measures against the Communists, but also worked out a definite political formula, directed against all forms of revolutionary struggle. The work begun at this Congress had its consummation a year later, at the celebrated Liverpool congress, when the Labour Party did in fact exclude all Communists from its composition, leaving to the latter only the possibility of remaining in the party in the capacity of trade union members.

But in 1925 also the leaders of the Labour Party displayed a certain caution. The Liverpool congress took place after the Labour movement by its united efforts had forced the Baldwin Government to make an important concession in regard to the miners (Red Friday). In its turn Red Friday had its reflection in a series of radical resolutions at the Trades Union Congress held at Scarborough, which congress immediately preceded the Liverpool congress. But the leaders of the Labour Party proceeded to ungird themselves immediately after the general strike had been completely betrayed, and threw away their disguise altogether after the defeat of the miners.

AFTER the miners' defeat there followed the union of the trade union bureaucracy with the leaders of the Labour Party, and with united efforts they began to work to transform all workers' organisations into the direct apparatus of the bourgeoisie. The co-operation of MacDonald and Baldwin in the political field corresponded to the joint conferences of the trade union bureaucracy with the employers, while this co-operation gradually evolved into the direct fusion of the machinery of the Labour movement with the machinery of the employers and the bourgeois State. For this very reason the Comintern Plenum considered it necessary to note that the Labour Party, from being a special organisation of a federative type, built up on the basis of the trade unions, is becoming more and more transformed into an ordinary social-democratic party. Out of this definition of the fundamental tendency of the Labour Party's development also arises the tactical attitude of the Communist International. In these conditions and in this situation the Communist Party cannot and must not limit itself to a struggle only against the Baldwin Government. By the very course of things, the British Communist Party is called on to intensify the struggle against the liberal-bourgeois policies of the Labour Party. It is not merely a ques-

tion of severe criticism of the Labour Party, but also of carrying on a struggle against the Labour Party as against a party which is becoming more and more transformed into a third party of the bourgeoisie.

The British comrades wholeheartedly and unanimously agreed with this analysis. Nor could it be otherwise. If a survey be taken of the documents of the C.P.G.B., in particular of the articles which have appeared in the "Communist" and the "Labour Monthly," and also the theses of the majority of the C.C., and the open letter of the C.C. of the Party, we see that the Party has been seeking an exact definition of the basic tendencies of the Labour Party's development, and endeavouring to define and elucidate these movements which have taken place in the Labour movement of recent years, and which became specially crystallised in the months that followed the defeat of the miners. None the less the Party was unsuccessful in making the necessary tactical deductions from an analysis of the movements which have been going on in the Labour Party.

THE tactical deductions indicated by the Plenum arise not only from an analysis of the essence and the nature of the Labour Party, but also from the experience gained in the struggle during the last fourteen months. The purport of this experience is formulated not only in the resolution of the Comintern Plenum, but in a number of documents issuing from the C.P.G.B. During the last fourteen months the Party has on the one hand continued on the whole to apply the old tactic which was adapted to the situation existing before the general strike, and on the other hand has from time to time applied new tactical methods in accordance with the new circumstances. And in practice it was demonstrated that in all those cases where the Party correctly estimated the changed circumstance and organised the struggle not only against the government of hard-faces, but also against the reformist leaders of the Labour Party and the trade unions, the Party slogans met with profound sympathy among the proletarian masses. The best examples of this are the First of May demonstration, the organisation of delegations to the U.S.S.R. and the miners' march on London. And in those cases where the Party had not taken into account the preceding movements, as a general rule its manoeuvres led to defeats: the signing of the document forced on the Trades Councils by the General Council for effecting a break with the Minority Movement, the municipal elections, and so on.

An analysis of the new tactical line and the results of its partial application inevitably lead to the conclusion that the process of differentiation inside the working class has gone so far, that the Communist Party is called upon to organise directly under its banner those active elements of the working class which are revealing more and more definite dissatisfaction with the new, nakedly bourgeois course of the bureaucracy of the Labour Party and the trade unions.

NATURALLY the electoral tactics of the C.P.G.B. must also be subjected to modification. Until now the Communist Party has as a general rule supported the candidates of the Labour Party. But even before the Plenum the C.P.G.B. came to the con-

New Tactics of C.P.G.B.—continued

clusion that in the industrial centres in particular, the Labour Party is losing the support of the more active section of the working class, and that this loss is conditioned by the fact that the best elements of the working class are beginning to turn away from the Labour Party. From this point of view the analysis of the recent electoral campaigns in Leith, Southwark and Brixton is extremely instructive. Analysing these figures the C.P.G.B. came quite correctly to the conclusion that only in the single case where a candidate with leftward tendencies, openly attacking MacDonald and not afraid of a united front with the Communists, was the standard-bearer of the Labour Party, did the number of votes cast for the Labour Party show an increase. On the contrary, in all the other industrial centres the number of votes cast for the Labour Party showed a decrease. The deduction from this analysis is clear. The mobilisation of the discontented elements will be possible only if the Communist Party not only comes out with its own platform, its own slogans and so on, but also "strives to put forward the maximum number of independent Communist candidates."

LIVELY debates also took place on the question of the Labour Government. At one time Lenin had to exert a good deal of effort to convince the British Communists of the necessity of pushing the Labour Party into power and to support the slogan of a Labour Government. And naturally the C.P.G.B. (and the theses of the majority of the C.C. published in our March 1st number witness to this) took a doubly cautious attitude to the question of reconsidering the Labour Government slogan. The discussion on this question was ended with the unanimous decision which is formulated in section II of the Comintern resolution. We quote this section in its entirety:

Under no circumstances can the present situation be compared with the situation as it existed in 1918-20, when Lenin insisted on supporting the Labour Party and pushing it into power. In 1918-20, a Labour Party Government could have played the part of the Kerensky Government with all its vacillations. Nor can the present situation be compared with that of 1922-23, when the Labour Party had in its programme demands which were sharply resisted by the capitalist class (the capital levy, unemployment, Russia). No comparison can be made with the situation in 1924 when the Government was forced to resign on two objectively revolutionary issues. A Labour Government at the present juncture will be from the very outset an obvious instrument for attacking the workers. The experience of the MacDonald Government, the betrayal of the General Strike and the miners' fight, the changed attitude of the Labour Party and trade union leaders towards the question of war and relations with the U.S.S.R., China, India, and Egypt, their changed attitude on the principal domestic questions (rationalisation, the anti-Trade Union Bill, industrial peace), all this renders it necessary for the British Communist Party to come out more boldly and more clearly as an independent political party, to change its atti-

tude towards the Labour Party and the Labour Government and consequently to replace the slogan of the Labour Government by the slogan of the Revolutionary Workers' Government.

Even before the Plenum met certain timid steps in this direction had been taken by the majority of the C.C. of the C.P.G.B. The Plenum's resolution puts an end to all confusion and any false interpretations in this sphere. In our attitude to the MacDonald Government we shall start from the fundamental position that this government will "from its very beginning be a naked weapon of attack on the workers." It goes without saying that the task of the Communist Party consists not in setting up this government, but in preparing the workers for the struggle against it.

WE have endeavoured briefly to justify the fundamental points of the Plenum resolution on the British question, which resolution will, in our estimation, hold its place among the most important documents of the Comintern. The force of this resolution consists in the fact that it contains the application of general Communist principles to the complex and varied circumstances of the class struggle in Britain. But the significance of the resolution reaches far beyond the confines of Great Britain. In essence the British resolution of the last plenum embodies the basic tactical viewpoint of the Communist International on the question of the tasks of the world proletariat in the new circumstances. Not only in Britain but in all the other capitalist countries we observe the same ideological and organisational viewpoint of social-reformism, which is no longer restricting itself to the role of lackey in regard to the bourgeoisie, but is striving to transform all the organs of the working class movement into instruments of capitalist stabilisation. The tactical task of the advance-guard of the working class now consists in intensifying the struggle against attacking capital by a developed attack against the social-democrats.

The application of the new tactic will be accompanied by great difficulties in Britain, where the leaders of the Labour Party and in particular their left-wing lackeys will endeavour to present our tactic as a disruptive tactic. The editor of the "Daily Herald," the renegade Mellor, has already made the first move in this direction by declaring the resolution of the Plenum a proof of the insincerity of our "noisy" talk of the united front. There are still many workers to be found in Britain who will be caught by this. It goes without saying that it would be a fatal mistake to under-rate the importance of these difficulties. But it would be a still greater error to under-estimate the political importance of the new tactic from the point of view of the mobilisation of the active nucleus of the working class, which in all countries, including Britain, is beginning to recognise the true significance of the reformists' policies both in regard to questions of so-called high politics, and in regard to the every-day needs of the proletariat: wages, hours and so on.

DURING the last few years the British proletariat has continued to regard the Labour Party as the all-embracing party of the entire working class. The persecution and expulsion of the Communists were by many workers regarded as a temporary evil. The

New Tactics of C.P.G.B.—continued

change by the Communist Party to an open attack on the Labour Party will be considered by these workers as a breaking up of the instrument created by the working class for the defence of proletarian interests. These feelings of the middle section of workers will be most ruthlessly exploited by the Liberal agents of the Labour Party, who received their education in the old British Liberal Party, which had a perfect mastery of the art of pulling the wool over the eyes of the working masses. It is, of course, not unlikely that these charlatans will have some temporary success. None the less it is unquestionable that the adoption by the Communist Party of a precise tactic in regard to the Labour Party will force the workers to take a more serious and more critical attitude to the deeds, or rather the misdeeds of the Thomases and Lansburys, the MacDonalds and the Hickses.

THERE is no necessity to point out that the new tactic does not in the least mean a rejection of the united front. All the examples cited above of the application of the new tactic by the C.P.G.B. show that the C.P.G.B. has not only preached the united front, but has skilfully realised it. Was the First of May demonstration not a triumph for the united front? For in that demonstration, side by side with the Communist Party, participated not only trade unions, but local organisations of the Labour Party itself. The same thing applies to the miners' march on London. In that march participated miner members of the Labour Party, and throughout the whole route of the march the marchers were welcomed by the most varied proletarian organisations. The new tactic consists only in propos-

ing the realisation of the united front from below despite the will of the leaders who are striving to subject the workers' organisations to the bourgeois State. In opposition to the leaders of the Labour Party and the trade unions, who are actually realising a united front with the employers and with the bourgeois State, the Communist Party will set up a widely developed mass united front of the proletariat against capital, and its social-reformist allies.

THE C.P.G.B.'s new tactic arises not only out of the intensification of the class struggle in Britain, but also out of the increase in severity of the process of differentiation within the working class itself. Right down to the present time the reformist-bureaucratic leaders of the Labour Party and the trade unions have the insolence and impertinence to put themselves forward as the representatives of the entire working class. The C.P.G.B.'s new tactic includes a challenge to those leaders. It reveals those leaders to be not the representatives of the working class but organised traitors to the interests of the proletariat. It goes without saying that this new tactic will demand not only audacity and boldness but a redoubled caution from the Communist Party of Great Britain. The task of the C.P.G.B. in the struggle against the policies of the Labour Party will consist in wresting away from it those healthy proletarian ranks which still continue to follow it.

That struggle will be stubborn and intense. The strength of the new tactic consists in the very fact that it counts on the mobilisation and the organisation of those proletarian masses whose interests are being betrayed in the most cruel fashion by the bureaucratic leaders at every stage and in all spheres of the class struggle being waged by the British proletariat.

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The Tenth Anniversary of the Red Army

K. Voroshilov

PREDECESSORS OF THE RED ARMY

THE history of the Red Army is part of the general history of the struggle carried on by the proletariat in alliance with the labouring peasants against their class enemies, the landowners, capitalists and the world imperialist bourgeoisie. So we shall touch briefly, and that only in order to elucidate the present position of the Red Army, on that part of its history which directly concerns its foundation, development and growth.

Officially the Red Army was created on 23rd February, 1918. But we can see the germ of the idea of armed forces for the proletarian revolution in the period of revolution from 1905 to 1907. Even then the Bolshevik Party had strong military organisations inside the Tsarist army and fleet. Through the efforts of the Bolsheviks a far-reaching network of workers' guards was established. The numerous risings in the army and fleet during 1905 to 1907 and the armed risings of the proletariat in Moscow, the Don Basin, North Caucasus, Siberia and other places, and also the peasant movement which swept over the country, breaking up the estates of the Russian aristocracy, were, taken together, the prelude to the civil war of 1917-1921. The beginnings of the Red Army have thus to be sought in the Red Guard and in the workers' guards of the 1905 revolution. The proletariat and the toiling masses of peasants under the direction of the Bolsheviks had even during the first revolution (1905-1907) fought with arms in hand not only against the autocracy but against all the aristo-capitalist system of the Russia of those days.

The February revolution of 1917 was the natural continuation of the 1905 revolution. After overthrowing the Tsar in March, 1917, the working class armed itself for the next struggle. Now it was no longer necessary (as it had been in 1905) to demonstrate the indispensability of the workers arming themselves. Every factory, workshop and printer's shop selected special guards, divisions which were armed with rifles, grenades and even machine guns. Directed by the Bolsheviks, the proletariat strove feverishly to set up and hammer out their armed divisions, to have their own fighting sections, capable not only of preventing a return of the despotic regime, but of sustaining a successful struggle with the bourgeoisie and its government. How intensively this work of establishing a Red Guard was carried on can be judged by the following fact: in Petersburg alone there were up to 20,000 armed Red Guards in the pre-October days (on October 22nd.). The number of workers grouped around the Red Guard but not armed was much greater.

Simultaneously, the Bolsheviks carried on intensive activity in the old army. Formerly inaccessible to outsiders, the army barracks was henceforth turned into an original kind of club. How great our influence on the soldiers was can be judged from the one fact alone that the Petersburg "Soldiers' Committee" succeeded in organising 7,000 soldiers from the Petersburg garrison to meet comrade Lenin at the Finland station in April,

1917. While at the June All-Russia conference of the Party's military organisations up to eighty organisations (of which forty-three were from the front) were represented, with a total number of 30,000 soldier Bolsheviks.

The old army disintegrated. The years of inglorious war, the arbitrariness of the officers, the hunger and cold of the trenches had had their effect on the psychology of the soldiers. All the attempts of the Provisional Government and its leader, Kerensky, to collect, unite and breathe a vital spirit into an army organism in which disintegration was at work not from day to day, but from hour to hour, were unable to achieve any positive results. The army, as one of the most important attributes of the Tsarist autocratic system, died together with the regime which had brought it to birth. The army desired peace at all costs and at once, and demanded the land. The Provisional Government decided to carry on the war to "complete victory," and retained the land in the hands of the landowners. The Bolshevik agitation against the imperialist war, and their slogan of the immediate seizure of landowners' estates had enormous success. These ideas were caught up by the soldiers. The slogan of "peace and land" became the soldiers' declaration of faith. The front began to grow thinner. Desertion took on unprecedented dimensions. The following figures give some idea of the break-up of the Tsarist army: by June, 1917, the number of deserters had reached two millions, and more than two millions had voluntarily surrendered to the opposing forces. The old army melted away. After the Kornilov episode, event rapidly followed event.

When it carried out the October revolution our Party had behind it not only the working class and the solid block of toiling peasantry, but also the majority of the soldiers in the old army. The nucleus of the armed forces was the armed Red Guard detachments. Many are now in the habit of under-rating the significance of the Red Guard and are disposed to take an ironical attitude to the fighting ability of the Red Guard formations. However, this kind of view of the Red Guard is unsound. For those tasks which directly arose before the victorious proletarian revolution (defence of the towns, factories and workshops, struggle with the bourgeoisie and with their endless conspiracies) the divisions of the Red Guard were entirely to be depended upon. From the ranks of the Red Guards emerged the military, political and commanding officers for our Red Army.

THE ORIGINAL STRUCTURE OF THE RED ARMY

By the beginning of 1918 the necessity of establishing an armed force capable of defending the revolution not only "within," but also on the external fronts, was clearly demonstrated. It was a work of extraordinary difficulty. The apparatus of the army administration (the basis of the military structure) had not yet been created by us. There were military stores and equipment, but they were scattered, kept without any attempt at keeping an inventory, and pillaged. A serious

The Red Army—continued

deficiency of specialists made itself felt. There was need for intense work, which was begun from the moment of the promulgation of the decree dated April 22nd, 1918, establishing military commissars, and continued till the end of 1918. Only after setting up organs for stocktaking, assembling and supplying equipment, etc., could we pass to the mobilisation and the large-scale formation of military divisions.

The main obstacle to the establishment of an army was the war-weariness of the people as a whole, and of the soldiers in particular, as the result of the imperialist war. As is well-known the Red Army was at first formed on a voluntary basis. It goes without saying that this method of assembling an army could not yield the desired results. The weariness, the apathy, the desire to rest after the three years of war were so strong among the population that very few wished to enter the army. By this time the old army had almost entirely dispersed to their homes. Here and there great flights from the hated front were still continuing.

An Example of War Weariness

I remember the following incident. It was in March, 1918. The German army of occupation had taken Kiev and was moving on Kharkov, indeed they had already occupied Konotop. With a proletarian division of Lugansk workers and two naval armoured trains, I was carrying on a continuous interchange of fire with a German armoured train and their infantry. The columns of German soldiers were moving along the line of railway across country, raising clouds of dust. The fire of our machine guns and rifles forced the German columns to leave the railway, but the movement continued. The intensified fire of our cannon and machine-guns finally forced the columns to break up into small groups, but the men moved in our direction as before. In our division there was a splendid cavalry reconnaissance detachment consisting of nineteen men. I gave the order to the commander of the detachment to investigate the situation. Within a short while, I received the communication that these columns were our soldiers coming from the Roumanian front. And after about an hour I had the opportunity of talking to these soldiers.

They were not men, but ghosts, so debilitated were they, worn-out and absolutely indifferent to everything. Despite all my inquiries about the Germans and as to how they had let them through the German front, I could discover nothing. We made an attempt to arrange an impromptu meeting, but absolutely nothing came of it. On the proposal that at least two or three dozen should join our division, not one showed the least desire (out of four to five hundred men, lying stretched out side by side, indifferent to everything, and miserable to look at). Not only that, but not one man entered into an argument, or even a conversation with me.

"We've had as many years at war as we want," said one or two of them.

Not one of these men showed any interest in who we were, at whom we were firing, who were our opponents. They accepted the fire as something quite

ordinary, something that had become inevitable, and consequently of little interest. They were moved by the elemental urge homeward to rest.

Not only were the self-demobilised soldiers of the old army completely subject to this mood, but the peasant masses had more or less the same feeling. And only the occupation of the Ukraine by the Germans, the Kaledin episode, the Kornilov movement on the Don and in the Kuban, and the Czecho-Slovak rising effected a change in the mood of the masses.

Like mushrooms after rain grew the counter-revolutionary bands throughout the whole of the country and especially on the borders. The landowner and the police commissioner, the manufacturer and the gendarme, the Kadet (Constitutional Democrat) and the "socialist-revolutionary," the priest and the village constable—all these strove to overthrow the power of the workers' and peasants' government and to liquidate the conquests of October. And now it became clear to everybody that only a ruthless struggle could guarantee the land to the peasantry. Gradually the necessity of establishing a regular army came to be admitted.

In January, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars decided to create the Red Army. By that date a cruel struggle was being carried on in many of the outlying regions of Russia between Red guerilla detachments and the generals' divisions. The Communist Party sent its best sons to the ranks of the Red Army already fighting and still in process of construction. The factories and workshops kept up an unbroken supply of reserves to fill out the thinning ranks at the front. Unfortunately the voluntary method of assembling the Red Army deprived it of the possibility of regular replacements. The commanders were partly appointed and partly elected by the divisions themselves, and this also interfered with a successful organisational consolidation of the Red Army.

Only the change to universal liability to service after the decision of the Fifth Congress of Soviets, and a widespread and sometimes compulsory drawing in of the former military specialists and also the introduction of the system of political commissars laid firm foundations for a sound building up of the army. It would, of course, be erroneous to think that we had completely organised military divisions with fixed complements and sections even at the end of the civil wars. There were certain regiments so organised, certain of them quite well, but one may say confidently that there was not one military division in the republic which was entirely built on these bases, which was replenished from reserve regiments, regularly supplied and equipped, and so on. The poverty of our material and technical equipment, the separation of the active divisions from their supply bases, the weakness of the rear apparatus, all these and many other causes hindered the creation of perfectly formulated military units. The chief cause hindering the creation of well-ordered and definite Red Army divisions was the incessant and cruel military effort which had to be made.

WHY WERE WE VICTORIOUS?

Towards the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, we had a numerically quite large and from the qualitative aspect, not bad, yet badly organised and badly trained Red Army. The army already had to its credit

The Red Army—continued

dozens of victories in many sections of the civil war, and not a few Tsarist generals had learnt its powers of resistance and fighting capacity from bitter experience. It may seem strange that an army hastily created, tempered only in struggle, and in large part absolutely untrained, should have been victorious over the soldiers of the Tsarist and the European bourgeoisie. Whence did the Red Army derive the strength and the intelligence to struggle and to obtain the victory over stronger and more experienced enemies?

Certain investigators into the civil wars are not slow to explain it by saying that neither a Red Army nor a White Army really existed, but that on each side there were unstable divisions which were incapable of serious struggle. Without entering into disputes with such experts, we will cite evidence coming from a camp hostile to us, from the book written by Pilsudsky.

In his study "1920" Pilsudsky quite without justification extols his own talent and even ascribes to himself the role of victor. But he is sound in his criticism of that group of "theoreticians" who are disposed not to regard the 1920 war as a real war. He writes:

"In their opinion (i.e., in the opinion of the Conservative theoreticians; K.V.) it was a kind of semi-war or even quarter-war, a kind of child-romp and tussle, in face of which the great theory of war proudly closes its pages. . . .

"I will not argue on the point. I want only to add that this tussle directly shook the destinies of two States, two countries with a population jointly taken of 150 millions."

Unquestionably the opinions of those armchair critics who did not regard the struggle of 1918-21 as a "war" are nonsensical.

The Class Armies in the Civil War

When we are discussing the causes of our victories during the civil war, we should always bear in mind the fact that behind the Red Army and behind the White Army were ranged definite classes with all their vital interests. The victory of the Reds at the fronts connoted not only the shattering of the generals with their armies and bands, but the defeat of the class of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. None the less it would be inadequate to ascribe the victory of the Red Army only to the fact that it was a workers' and peasants' army and fought for its vital interests. It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the enemy forces were highly organised and qualified. And none the less the Red Army grew in all senses and, suffering many privations, in the last resort always emerged the victor. That happened chiefly because the workers and peasants recognised the necessity for creating a strong Red Army.

On this point Lenin at the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the sixth of November, 1918, said:

"Those victories which we achieved in the summer against the Czecho-Slovaks, and those reports of victories which are now being received and which are reaching very great dimensions, prove that the period of regeneration has arrived and that the most difficult of tasks—the task of creating a consciously socialist-organised mass

after four years of war torture—that task is achieved. That consciousness has penetrated deeply into the masses."

Lenin characterised the coming change in the psychology of the toiling masses very exactly. None the less, to achieve victory it was necessary that in the ranks of the army itself there should be a strong movement in the direction of discipline and moral stability. Many war specialists consider that in war time success is seventy-five per cent. dependent on moral stability and only twenty-five per cent. on material factors.

Clausevitch, the greatest theoretician on war matters, whose works Lenin seriously studied, wrote in his book "On War" that "moral heights occupy one of the most important positions in a war." Clausevitch introduced a special conception of "the military valour of the army," in the composition of which discipline holds chief place. He declared that an army inspired with this valour, "even in the horrors of defeat would not lose its faith in its commanders and would remain obedient to them." In a special description of the soldier Clausevitch said that the bravery of the soldier should be distinguished from the bravery of an ordinary man: "The soldier should subjugate his bravery to demands of a higher order: obedience (discipline) to order, regulation and method."

Contemporary military authorities also hold this point of view, and these conceptions had their clearest confirmation in the trial of the civil war and the military activities of the Red Army.

And so the great masses of workers and peasants in 1918 recognised the necessity of defending themselves and of building up an organised, disciplined and well-prepared army.

This change showed its effect towards the autumn of 1918. It afforded us the possibility of assembling our forces and successfully carrying through the campaign of 1919 and 1920. But why did the imperialists not shatter us at the time when we were still quite weak?

The Imperialist Split

The explanation has to be sought in the external situation. In 1917 and 1918, the imperialists' camp was split. The Entente and U.S.A. were carrying on a life-and-death struggle against the blockade of the Central European Powers (Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey). During our most difficult period the imperialists could not set aside sufficient forces to annihilate us.

In his speech on concessions at a meeting of the nuclei of the Moscow organisation on November 27th, 1921, Lenin said:

"During the Brest period there were two gigantically strong groups of imperialist robbers; the German-Austrian and the Anglo-French-American. They were locked in a frenzied struggle, which was shortly to settle the destinies of the world. If we—a mere cipher in the military sense, without anything and going straight down the incline into the depths of ruin in economic life—if we came through, this miracle happened only because we correctly exploited the disunion of German and the American imperialism."

In these words of Lenin is also emphasised a second point: the soundness of our Party's tactics. A firm Party direction in the hands of a strategist and tactician

The Red Army—continued

of such genius as Lenin was one of the most important reasons for our victory.

One other point has to be noted: our national bourgeoisie, and foreign bourgeoisie so much the more, were extremely sceptical in their estimation of the stability of the Soviet Government in 1917 and 1918. The world bourgeoisie (and German imperialism in particular) did not believe that the Bolsheviks would be able to come through any long period at all. The imperialists considered that the Soviet Government would not be able to hold out in the condition of ruin, demobilisation and starvation which prevailed, and consequently did not take any serious steps at the beginning. But fortunately those hopes proved to be unjustified.

Towards the end of 1918, we began to stand on our feet. But about this same period the Entente also obtained the victory. The hands of France and Britain were unbound. None the less, the further struggle showed that the countries of the Entente were not in a position to throw sufficient forces against us to shatter us. Why was this? Lenin gave the answer in his speech at the non-party conference of the Krasno-Presnia district on January 20th, 1920.

“But why did the Entente forces withdraw from the north and from Odessa? It was because of their soldiers—workers themselves—the more they penetrated into the heart of Soviet Russia, the more resolutely did they refuse to fight against us. In other words, one of the reasons for our victory was the fact that war can only be waged against us with large forces, and a large army can be gathered only from workers and peasants; but these workers do not want to fight against us.”

These words of Lenin have significance for the present time also. Let the imperialists arm to the teeth; let them create and train their staff commands, let them organise their fascist divisions. In the struggle against us the masses will be with us, on our side. And this is one of the surest pledges of our victory in the coming struggle. Not in any circumstances should this be taken to mean that we can slacken the tempo of our work for consolidating our ability to defend our country. We must assure ourselves victory at the cost of the minimum of sacrifice, as comrade Frunze wrote at the fifth anniversary of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. And that demands the maximum consolidation of our army and in particular of its technique.

THE MILITIA BASIS OF THE RED ARMY

If it is correct that “war is the continuation of politics with other resources,” the war waged by the proletariat and peasantry against their class enemies was the sole method of politics at the dawn of the historical existence of the Soviet State. Consequently the Party and the State strove to find the most expedient forms of organisation for the army. The formula in the old social-democratic programme of “replacing the permanent army by the universal arming of the people” was applied by us in the struggle with Tsarism for a bourgeois-democratic republic. But after October, when the working class in alliance with the peasantry came to power, it was necessary to create such an army as could

defeat the innumerable enemies in the shortest space of time and with the fewest losses. By the force of circumstances we were compelled to create a permanent army. That army fulfilled its function with distinction.

Our Red Army, established on the basis of universal liability to service for all workers, has existed down to 1928 as a permanent army. Our Party has more than once considered the fundamental questions of military structure and has given the requisite attention to this problem.

In the resolution on the war question the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party in March, 1919 noted the necessity of establishing an “army of workers and poor peasantry on the basis of compulsory instruction in military matters by methods outside barrack conditions as far as possible, i.e., in conditions close to the labour circumstances of the working class.” As is obvious, the question at issue was that of a militia. By the Ninth Party Congress the question of a militia army arose still more definitely. The resolution on this question passed by the Ninth Congress (March-April, 1920) says: “The essence of the Soviet militia army should consist in the bringing of the army closer to the process of production in every way possible.” Further, it says that “the transfer to the militia system should bear the character of indispensable gradualness.”

A Series of Struggles

The Ninth Congress took place at a time when it seemed that the war was drawing to a close. But in actuality Poland began an attack on our republic. The war with Poland was carried on very intensively; then followed the campaign against Wrangel, the struggle with banditism and finally the Kronstadt rising. All these events hindered our setting to work to realise the decisions of the eighth and ninth congresses. The Red Army remained a permanent, levied army.

The civil and Polish wars came to an end. The largest bands of bandits were broken up; by an infantry attack made by Red fighters, the dreadnoughts with their mighty artillery armaments were captured in Kronstadt. The reduction of the Red Army, which had grown to enormous dimensions, was begun. Only in 1923 did the army take on its absolutely indispensable numerical dimensions. And in 1923, also was decided the question of a partial introduction of the territorial-militia system.

The territorial-militia divisions were organised side by side with the remaining skeleton divisions. In addition, in the formation of the territorial divisions themselves were established both the skeleton organisation and a changing formation around it.

Thus our territorial divisions were organised not on the basis of a pure militia, in which no skeleton organisation of regulars is retained in peace time, but on the basis of an original mixed system.

The experience of the last five years has convinced the workers in the Red Army that the territorial-militia system is fully capable of vital existence, and that it answers to our political and military requirements. At the same time we have all become convinced by experience that a skeleton regular army is an indispensable complement to the territorial-militia divisions of the Red Army.

In a number of his works, Friedrich Engels

The Red Army—continued

investigated the militia question. A study of the experience of the American civil war of 1861-65 forced him to think seriously on the fighting value of militia soldiers.

In a letter to Karl Marx written on March 16th, 1868, Engels, after remarking on the exceptional importance of good pivotal men for a militia, comes to an interesting conclusion. He writes:

"From the moment of the introduction of fire-arms to the centre of the struggle, the part playable by a pure militia has come definitely to an end. However, this does not imply that every national military organisation must occupy the middle position between the Prussian and the Swiss system. Then where? That depends every time on the corresponding circumstance. Only a communistically minded and educated society can closely approximate to the militia system. . . ."

This remark of Engels has significance for our own days also. In practice we could not realise the idea of a pure militia. Only gradually, in the measure of our growth, are we extending our territorial formations, which even at the present time are now the basis of our Red Army.

THE PROBLEM OF THE FORMATION OF THE COMMAND

The problem of the officer ranks arose before the Red Army from the very first days of its existence. Now that this problem is resolved in its fundamental and main aspects, it amounts to the purely technical task of further selection, qualification, and duplication. But in 1918-19, and even in 1920 this was a political task of the greatest magnitude. At that time the filling of the minimum commanding positions was an absolute condition of the construction of the first divisions of the revolutionary army and of their fighting ability.

The role and importance of the commander in an army is enormous. While in peace time the personnel in command needs to have technical training, political education and moral stability, in order to be able to train and educate the troops in their charge, in war-time every commander must be in addition the leader of his section. It was not for nothing that Engels, after the defeat of the French army at Sedan and Metz, wrote that everything can be restored except that "which is the most indispensable—a strong organisation which could create an army from armed men. That organisation depends on the officers and non-commissioned officers of the regular army." (Articles on war.)

This statement of the case is absolutely correct in regard to the Red Army also, with the one addition, however, that in no army was the problem of creating a class-dependable officer personnel so severe as during the organisation of the armed forces of the first workers' revolution. The reasons for this are obvious. For ages the armies created by the feudal and bourgeois classes over centuries of hegemony have had their officer personnel which has grown up together with the armies. But we had to build up the Red Army not only without any personnel on which to draw, but even despite the will of the powerful officers' corps of the old Tsarist

army. When it came to power after October, the working class numbered in its ranks not a few first-class politicians, economists, scientists and technical workers, but there was a complete absence of qualified military specialists. That is why during the first few months after October the commanders' positions were occupied almost exclusively by proletarians who frequently had never served in the army, while the non-commissioned officers and the educated revolutionary soldiers were almost the sole "authorities" on military matters and highly desirable candidates for front, administrative, and even staff positions. And only during 1918 did former officers begin to enter the army by way of mobilisation or personal volunteering. But the big military specialists came over to us in but small numbers and many of them preferred the large town centres to the varying destinies of changing fronts. During this period were also established the first Soviet officers' courses, which began systematically to replace the losses of the command personnel at the fronts.

Composition of Command

It is not to be wondered at that during the period of most intense struggles (1919) the officer personnel of the Red Army presented an extraordinarily varied picture. Towards the end of the civil war its number had grown to the enormous figure of 130,000 men. All this great mass was divided into three comparatively homogeneous groups: (1) revolutionary commanders, mainly industrial workers; (2) lieutenants, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Tsarist Army, almost entirely composed of revolutionary peasants; and (3) former front officers and officers of the old general staff. This variation in the officer personnel was not limited to differences in the extent of the special training received by each group, by their general culture and the social environment from which they had come. They were also divided by the variety of their political convictions and those impelling motives which had led them into service with the revolutionary army. While the first group was entirely and the second mainly the true representatives of their classes, for whose interests they were fighting, in the third group there were not a few men who had served in the Red Army through revolutionary compulsion, and in part (albeit a very small part) even maliciously and inimically disposed to the October revolution, betraying us at the first favourable opportunity. Unfortunately we have not kept statistical information on the numerical size of each group. But the figures for the Red commanders show how comparatively small was the percentage of those commanders. Thus in 1918, 1,700 men were passed out after training; in 1919 11,500 men; in 1920, 26,000 men; in 1921, 14,000 men.

With the beginning of the demobilisation of the Red Army (1921), the officer personnel also began to be seriously reduced in numbers. Of the 130,000 commanders only 48,000 men are left at the present time. As a matter of fact, only when we set about the reduction of the army did we obtain the possibility of making a selection of the officer personnel on a more stable basis than during the years of the civil war, when the devotion and ability of the commander were tested and tried in battle at often a very expensive cost. In addition, the coming peace period made quite different demands which to many were previously unknown and

The Red Army—continued

quite unexpected. The commander—the fighter and leader—of the Red fighters in the fields of battle had now to become an instructor, a teacher, and a political educator. Some may discern a contradiction in the fact that we who rated highly the fighting qualities of the Red Army during the years of civil war considered it impossible to leave it at the same level in peace time also. But we never preferred the poor military preparation of the Red Army to a high standard of training; or bad, often treacherously-disposed staff workers to specialists on military affairs well trained in the military academy. Nothing of the sort! History gave us the army as it was during the years of mortal struggle with our class enemies. We were not allowed any time for military preparation. We had no time in which to think over the questions of how to construct the army, how to organise its administration and so on. But as soon as the peace breathing-space arrived we had to raise and settle all these problems, including the problem of an educated and class-dependable commander. It was necessary to find such a solution to the problem as would combine the precious fighting qualities developed during the war by the workers' and peasants' officer personnel with the indispensable military knowledge, without which those commanders would lose their significance. It is obvious that this was no easy thing to do. Certain splendid commanders, whose services and exploits had been more than once recognised by the highest military distinctions, proved to be in a most difficult position. As I have already said, in the past the proletariat did not have its own military culture. On the contrary, the road to the military school was completely closed to him, and it is necessary to say that in pre-revolutionary times the worker himself showed no interest whatever in such schools. The proletarian guerrilla fights and propagandist-agitation activities in the revolutionary organisations of the old army—in other words, the activities with which the worker-revolutionary had to occupy himself, were, of course, "an inadequate school" in which to obtain the necessary military knowledge.

New Tasks

And so, in order to hammer out a homogeneous officers' corps from these commanders, in order to educate some politically, and to raise the technical level of others, we needed first of all time, and secondly an educational system. Within a short time we had covered our areas with a network of military schools, repetition courses, and improvement courses. These schools had to work up contingents to whom the language of machine-guns and the voices of cannon were much closer and comprehensible than were those general and special military scientific discipline and instructions with which their heads, often unaccustomed to learning, were overwhelmed. The difficulties both for the teachers and for those taught were enormous. But it has to be said to the honour of our Red commanders that they set about the storming of military science with the same energy and self-denial as they had previously shown when attacking the Denikins, Koltchaks and Yudenitches. Various repetition courses, both long and short period, reinstructed almost the entire actual officer personnel of the Red Army. The military and other special

academies, which had begun their educational and scientific work in the autumn of 1918, systematically supplied qualified specialists to the army.

But the Red Army had need not only of improving the actual personnel, but of a continual renewal of and addition to their numbers. And by the year 1924, we were beginning to receive a regular supply of Red-commanders who had passed through a normal school little inferior to the old junkers' training schools. In this matter, as also in the organisation of Red academies, the services rendered by former officers are enormous. They formed the special pedagogical nucleus without the aid of which it would have been difficult to have put the preparation and training of officer personnel on such a sound basis in the time.

The Red officers' personnel has greatly changed its features. The workers and peasants of yesterday, who had passed through a practical school in the struggle with their class enemies, have been transformed before our eyes into theoretically instructed military specialists. The officer personnel has not only assimilated the valuable qualities of contemporary military culture, but has acquired the ability to advance that culture beyond its present stage.

During all this period a natural winnowing of the officer personnel has been taking place. Unfortunately we have had to lose not a few of even those commanders whose fighting qualities were of a very high level. Many have voluntarily preferred the bench in the factory and the plough in the village to the work of a professional soldier. There were also those to whom education was more difficult than the taking of Perekop or Fort Tarakanov. All these comrades who have passed into the reserve will be no worse commanders if we have again to take to arms. Their military experience still remains of great value to-day.

Grouping of Officers

What picture does our officer personnel present from a social and Party aspect on the Tenth Anniversary of the Red Army?

Social Groupings				
		Workers	Peasants	Others
1921	...	12%	67%	21%
1927	...	22%	50%	28%

Party Grouping				
		Party members	Young Communists	Non-Party
1921	...	20%	0%	80%
1927	...	48.1%	4.8%	47.1%

These figures speak for themselves. 72 per cent. of workers and peasants and only 28 per cent. of others, among which the great majority are former low-placed employees. The growth of the Party group from 20 per cent. to 48 per cent. during six years represents a factor of enormous importance. These figures give us the right to say that the workers' and peasants' Red Army justifies its name from top to bottom, from the commander to the rankers, on the Tenth Anniversary of its existence.

No less interesting are the results of the military and educational selection. In regard to military education all the actual officer personnel at the present moment can be classified as follows:

The Red Army—continued

1. Passed through a normal school ...	23,889
2. " " short-period officers' courses	4,125
3. " " improvement courses	7,341
4. " " military academies	2,126
(Of these 465 had passed through an academy in the old army.)	
5. Received military education only in the old army	4,418
(Former officers.)	
6. Without adequate military training	3,968
(Former non-commissioned officers and privates and men who have not formally received any kind of training.)	

This table shows that it is still premature to affirm that we already have a perfect type of Red commander. A certain variety in training is still present, but as a whole the position is absolutely satisfactory. It was impossible to do more within the short space of time available (1921-27). The Red commander continues to grow, to develop and to improve, together with the whole army. And we are firmly convinced that the time is not far off when our officer personnel will present a monolithic, uniformly trained and highly qualified group.

Our Critics

One may mention in passing that of recent times our commander is receiving more and more attention from bourgeois politicians and their military specialists. Our critics are very severe in regard to the Red commander. They are still not disposed to recognise him as a real commander, genuinely able to fulfil his many and complex duties. The predominant note in the comments of foreigners is either scepticism or direct denial of the existence of an officer personnel in the Red Army. The military bourgeoisie, educated in a caste system, cannot admit the idea that workers and peasants have become genuine military specialists, "gluttons" for military science, art, and knowledge. But as it happens it is "gluttony" that we have driven out of the military profession. We have broken down the wall which separated the great masses from military knowledge, we have freed it of all caste husks and bourgeois prejudices, and in this form we have given and are giving this knowledge to the Red commanders. We are amused by the comments of foreign specialists on the following lines: "What kind of officer can he be if he only married a servant girl the other day?" or "What sort of officer is he when the soldiers do not salute him in the street?" In the given case one point only is of importance: has our officer become, or rather, is he becoming a qualified military specialist, or is he not? We declare that he is, that in certain cases we already possess a perfect, a splendid type of officer, and that we are swiftly moving towards a settlement of this task in its entirety. Further, the foreign bourgeoisie cannot understand that the absence of caste in the Red officer personnel, the absence of servility to rank, of obsequiousness and of a diving gulf between the officer and the Red Army ranker not only does not serve as an obstacle to his work, but on the contrary is an indispensable condition of that work's success.

In distinction from their bourgeois compatriots, the proletariat of other countries have a perfect comprehension of this characteristic feature which so profoundly differentiates the Red Army from the armies of the imperialists. Consequently, the questions which they put when making their acquaintance with the life of the Red Army also have a different sound. "How can you prove that the Red Army will defend the interests of the workers and peasants?" or "What is the social composition of the officers?" or "What ranks exist in the Red Army, and how are they called?" or "Is a Red Army ranker permitted to speak at a meeting when his general is present?" and so on in the same style. The proletariat quite justifiably fears lest in the process of its existence in peace conditions an antagonism may be developed in the Red Army between the rank and file and the officer personnel. The class-conscious workers of the whole world with entire justice, regard the Red Army as their own, as the fighting division of the world proletarian revolution. They are vitally interested in seeing it live and develop as the fighting force of the international proletariat. Consequently they seek first and foremost in the Red Army and in its internal relationships the thing which is absent from the armies of militarism: a unity in the class interests of the rank and file and the commander. Once more we can reassure our brothers across the frontiers. The Red Army is genuinely the army of the workers and peasants, and its power lies hidden where is to be found the vital energy of our State—in the close brotherly alliance of the working class and the toiling peasantry and in the indissoluble bonds between the U.S.S.R. and the whole world proletariat. The direction of the Red Army is in the firm, experienced hands of the Communist Party.

The officer is the commander of the soldier both in the army and outside it—such is the philosophy of the bourgeois officer. He himself is the personification of the class rule of the bourgeoisie over the workers. The officer personnel is gathered according to class indications, i.e., either entirely from the bourgeoisie, or from the scions of the ancient feudal aristocracy; while the rank and file are recruited from the workers, from the oppressed classes. The class State demands of the officer an unflinching attention to the soldiers, to ensure that they do not get out hand. Under such conditions the arrangements and mutual relations which rule between the officer and the soldier masses in the armies of bourgeois States, and without which not one of those armies could exist, are only natural. In those armies the soldier and the officer are first and foremost the representatives of two classes, of two socially hostile camps, and in so far as the officer incarnates the ideas of bourgeois class rule, he fastens them on his subordinates by force, while the State destroys the individuality of the latter by legislative acts and transforms them into mere mechanical force.

Nothing of that kind exists in the Red Army, nor can it exist. The commander and the ranker soldier of the Red Army belong to one and the same class. Their interests are not contradictory but one and the same. And consequently the mutual relations existing in our service are built on the basis of a strict, intelligent comradely discipline, which completely safeguards the commander in the carrying out of his responsible obligations.

The Red Army—continued**THE PARTY—POLITICAL APPARATUS**

The role and importance of the party-political apparatus in the Red Army are exceptionally great.

Political-educational work in the Red Army has always been regarded, and at the present time is all the more regarded as an extraordinary factor in its fighting capacity. In the building up of our armed forces our Party started from the immutable principle that the fighting capacity of our army is in direct proportion to the level of the political consciousness and the moral stability of its rank and file and officer formation. In this regard we have won great achievements, which are openly recognised even by our enemies. There is not another army in the world which can boast of such a brilliant position in regard to political and cultural and educational work as has been attained by the army of the triumphant proletariat. And this is not because the bourgeois armies are poorer than ours, and not because we are more experienced than they. The bourgeois armies can carry on political work only by deluding, obscuring, and drugging the class consciousness of the soldiers. Consequently the political work carried on in bourgeois armies bears the stamp of deception and falsehood and achieves comparatively unimportant results. In almost all bourgeois armies the function of carriers of political, cultural and moral education is fulfilled by the parsons, or in the best case by retired teachers and ultra-reactionary officers. The spirit of the troops is maintained mainly by a harsh discipline. Of course, we are not speaking of the fascist voluntary military organisations. In these the bourgeoisie carry on their "political" work far from stupidly and have as their chief purpose the development of the fighters' patriotic feelings with the aid of charlatan methods of moral influence.

Political Training

The Red Army is the only army in the world which from the very moment of its foundation right down to the present day has, in the work of consolidating its fighting capacity, put the main emphasis on the political consciousness of the soldiers. For this purpose it set up a well-organised political apparatus, which, being in essence the Party organisation inside the army, was the organiser of its victories. During all the ten years of the existence, development and consolidation of the Red Army, the political organs were the binding cement which protected the Red Army from a number of mortal dangers and made of it a mighty executor of the will of the insurgent proletariat.

"Our victories became possible thanks only to the intensified Party cultural and educational activity in the ranks of the Red Army," wrote Lenin at the time of our first military victories. And it is that Party political and cultural and educational work which has given us the predominance over our opponents. Consequently, we are completely justified in calling our political apparatus "a special kind of weapon," the power of which is well-known to our enemies.

In addition to the direct Party-political and cultural and educational work among Red Army men, our army political organs, being organs of the Party, during the difficult years of the civil war took on themselves yet another extraordinarily big and extremely responsible

task, that of political service in the rear and the districts immediately behind the front in the army's area of action. The political organs achieved truly astounding results in the execution of this task. Areas frequently inimically disposed to the Red troops were changed out of all recognition under the influence of the work carried on by the military political organisations. Cases were not infrequent where the well-organised activity of the political organs resulted in the possibility of replenishing the fighting divisions with local politically well-educated youngsters, and sometimes with men of mature age.

At the same time, notwithstanding all difficulties the political organs dealt brilliantly with the task of organisational work for the transformation of the areas won from the enemy. The setting up in these areas of apparatus for administration, the assembling of revolutionary committees, food campaign organs and other social-political organisations was a task entirely and always laid upon the political organs. Cultural and educational work in the divisions of the troops in action and in the nearest rear-line troops could naturally in its turn only have a favourable effect on the population with whom these army divisions came into contact.

Invaluable too are the services of the political organisations of the army in the matter of the political education of the youth who pass through the ranks of the Red Army. Many hundreds of thousands of workers and in particular of peasants are obliged to the political organs for the high level of political and class consciousness which they now display outside the army in their social-political activities.

The War Commissar

Of exceptional value were the services of the war commissar in the matter of building up the armed forces of the revolution. The war commissar, who in the Red Army was the Party-political core around which were concentrated all the most tried, politically stable and morally strong elements, was in actuality the soul of the army. During the whole period of the civil war the war commissar played a truly enormous and greatly varied role. Thanks to the institution of war commissars our Party was able to exploit the services of the old military specialists with great expediency during the first period of construction of the Red Army. The war commissar largely created the conditions under which many military specialists inimically disposed to the Soviet Power and its Red Army gradually passed through the stage of a loyal attitude to the Soviet Government and finally were transformed into friends, genuinely honest workers in the army of the proletariat. The war commissar, learning the military business directly from the military specialist, for his part by the power of conviction finally brought the specialist into the orbit of interests of the workers and peasants struggling for their ends. At the most difficult moments of the struggle the war commissar was obliged by his personal example, his unqualified bravery and courage to inspire the frequently worn-out, exhausted Red troops. It was he, the war commissar, who in addition to the tasks of the fight, directed and jointly with all the Party members of the division organised according to the plan previously outlined by the political organs the Party-political and cultural and educational work carried on not only in the divisions, but in the areas under their

The Red Army—continued

disposition. It was this war commissar, a semi-educated proletarian to his very marrow—a metal-worker or a weaver—who, in addition to everything else, had to possess a certain sum of knowledge which would afford him the possibility of answering all the questions of current political life, and of deciding on the spot the most complex problems connected with the further existence of the division. Because of his position the commissar had to keep his personality in the background at the moment of success, and to bring to the foreground the rank and file fighters, the division as a whole, and the officer personnel. When we achieved a victory we praised the commander and the commissar. But all failures, all mistakes were always ascribed first and foremost to the poor executive ability and the oversight of the commissar. He was answerable for everything—for such was the objective situation.

But this very circumstance of stubborn struggles and stern tests which set up the need for the commissar gave us on the other hand the possibility of obtaining an entire cohort of genuine fighter-communists who represented the finest executors of the will of the Party in the ranks of the Red Army. Out of the ranks of the war commissars have now emerged hundreds after hundreds of splendid commanders, staff workers and other specialists in military affairs.

Now that we have resolved the problem of the creation of a single Red officer personnel, completely ensuring the supply of officers to the Red Army, the role and importance of the war commissar has changed in many respects. The functions of controlling and supervising the officer personnel, the role of guardian and "nurse," which at one time formed one of the chief functions of the commissar position, have now been consigned to the past. As the result of a number of measures, the present officer personnel is now largely homogeneous, politically trustworthy and directly connected with the Party and with the organs of the Soviet Power. None the less, the role of the political organs, the importance of the commissars and of the so-called assistants in political activity, who have now come to occupy the former position of the commissars, still remain enormous, inasmuch as the Party-political and the cultural and educational work continues as before to be a factor of the greatest importance in the matter of preparing the army for struggle. The general situation demands an intensification of Party and political-educational work in the Red Army at the present time.

Continuous Improvement Necessary

The life of the Red Army has now been moulded into definitely stable forms, which sharply distinguish the Red Army from all bourgeois armies. The political organs, the Party organisations, the Young Communist League, the officers' institute—all these taken together present a most powerful level for the cultural and politico-moral education of the military divisions. And only the sound, clearly arranged, mutually complementary work of all these instruments will yield the necessary results. The slightest functional disturbance of the activities of these sections will react on the condition of the entire work. That is why in the interests of the consolidation of the fighting capacity of the Red Army it is necessary to continue to improve those forms of mutual activity of the political and officer elements which

have finally been set up in our army. That is why the special fighting training ought in no case to obscure the no less important work for the cultural and political education of the Red fighters.

THE RED ARMY WILL FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS

As we stand on the threshold of the second decade, casting a general glance over our armed forces, we can say that we have achieved by no means small successes.

The Red infantry, educated in the fighting traditions of the civil war, preserving its mobility and manoeuvring power, after the reforms of 1924 has been transformed into a strong modern weapon, having assimilated group tactics and new methods of rifle warfare.

Our cavalry, the exploits of which are in the memory of all, is becoming stronger and more perfect, improving its fighting preparation and material equipment, renewing its horse complement and retaining its previous generally recognised fighting qualities.

The Red artillery, which during the civil war demolished the fortifications of Perekop and the forts of Galicia, sweeping away all obstacles in the road of the Red Army, is now reorganised, and having adopted the new methods of fire, having improved its material equipment, is a trustworthy method of struggle in the army of workers and peasants.

The successes of our Red aviation and chemistry are known to everyone. Of recent years we are giving more and more attention to our armoured car divisions, which gave such unique service in the civil war.

Together with the general growth of industry in our country are growing the military-technical means of struggle and the special troops—the army of communications, railways, engineers, are being perfected.

We could not have achieved these successes in the building up of the armed forces of our State, if continual care for our Red Army had not been displayed by all the workers.

The mighty, two-million strong social organisation, the Society for Soviet Aviation and Chemistry, has given and is giving the army tremendous material aid and is rendering invaluable service to the aviation and chemical industry. The activities of this society are the best proof of the indissoluble bonds between the toilers of the Soviet Union and the Red Army.

As we enter on our second decade we shall continue our complex work for consolidating the defence of our State in all regards, giving especial attention to the further strengthening of our technical resources and the perfection of the fighting preparation of all the various categories of troops.

Continuing their stubborn pedagogical and scientific work, our Red assistants, who are gradually winning a position in the scientific world, must become generally recognised workers for military science.

Ten years of a difficult, but glorious path are behind us.

Before us are a new decade and the old task of the armed forces of the revolution: just as faithfully, just as steadfastly, just as self-sacrificingly and diligently to stand guard over the peaceful labour of the builders of socialism.

The Red Army will fulfil its obligations with honour to the end.

North American Imperialism and the Coming Crisis

P. Schubin

AMERICAN imperialists have displayed unusual activity during the past few months in the endeavour to cope with the approaching economic crisis, which they hope to ward off by securing new markets, expanding those already in existence, and gaining a further monopoly of the sources of raw materials. All military, diplomatic, financial and economic plans now being contemplated by North American imperialism are aimed at finding a solution of the approaching crisis at the expense of Europe. These plans include the increased trustification of industry and a ruthless policy towards European creditors. Needless to say, these activities of American capital are not without their effect on the European bourgeoisie, which is not sitting with folded arms waiting for fair weather and allowing matters to slide until the cessation of American credits brings about the bankruptcy of Europe in the autumn of 1929, as predicted by the British economist Sir George Paish.

European countries are preparing for economic warfare just as feverishly and as determinedly as America, though less ostentatiously.

A readjustment of the control of the seas, and consequently of the ocean lines of trade and chief markets where Great Britain is the main rival, constitute the most decisive issue in this conflict; hence the struggle now being prepared centres around Anglo-American rivalry. But this does not imply that all European and non-European imperialist countries will not be involved in this conflict, on the contrary, it presupposes that they will be dragged in to support one or other of these world opponents. There is every reason to assume that the open clash between American and British imperialism will be preceded by a number of local, economic and perhaps even military conflicts between less powerful marauders, which will be engineered by the two principal antagonists in their campaign to secure allies and more favourable conditions for the decisive blow. The chief struggle will arise out of an intensification of the antagonisms within each imperialist group, and amongst the "allies" where the clash of interests becomes more manifest as the economic struggle develops.

The tactics common to all the antagonists is an endeavour to protect their rear and increase their resources for the economic struggle by reducing the cost of production. For this purpose the workers' organisations are to be completely subjugated with the help of the reformist officials; the proletariat and its organisations are to be disarmed; the standard of living of the workers is to be lowered; and with the help of increased terror the colonies and semi-colonies will be exploited to a still greater extent. The policy of "industrial peace" in its various forms is an attempt of the bourgeoisie to mobilise reformism for active participation in the pending struggle. But already reformism has been played out to a considerable extent; with the intensifica-

tion of the struggle the Communist Party will find new and incomparably more extensive avenues of approach to the masses by utilising the experience gained in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. With the approach of the crisis the class struggle is becoming more acute in all capitalist countries and mass revolutionary tendencies gain ground in the colonial movement. In all probability the economic and financial crisis in Europe (1929) will create a revolutionary situation in a number of European centres, cause a new wave of revolutionary wars in the East, let loose the movement against Yankee imperialism in South and Central America and open up new possibilities for the workers' movement in the United States itself.

In surveying the facts which are characteristic of the growing activity of American imperialism, let us concentrate on those which bear on the recent activity of the Washington Government in the field of foreign politics.

The Admirals

Of late the admirals have been the most authoritative exponents of the present foreign policy of the Washington Government. They have even left the aviator Lindbergh and the firm of Morgan Morrow far behind, whose magnetic power is supposed to have brought about the victory of the New York oil kings. So far the American admirals have secured a partial victory. Congress has voted 725 million dollars for the construction of warships, but this is only a beginning. Now it is necessary to prepare "public opinion" and develop a big scheme involving the provision of 455 million pounds sterling for the navy. It is not so long ago since only the extreme imperialists favoured large-scale naval expenditure, now this has become the official programme of Coolidge and the entire American bourgeoisie. Why? This question is answered by the Admiralty with such clearness that it leaves nothing further to be desired. The head of the Admiralty, Wilburgh, stated, quite without reserve, that America must have that prestige, which the possession of up-to-date cruisers gives a government if enthusiasm for the struggle for new markets is to be aroused in big business circles. He goes on to show that the struggle for new markets for American products has become one of extreme urgency in view of the fact that normal conditions are being established in Europe. Admiral Charles Plunkett goes one better; he stated at a public meeting that economic competition makes war inevitable for the United States. Of course, it is nothing new for admirals to want to win laurels for their fleet; that is absolutely natural.

The new feature in the situation is the agitation for a monstrous expenditure on the fleet and the argument of the inevitability of war for reasons which appeal to the general public, such as "economic competition,"

North American Imperialism—continued

“the conquest of new markets” and the establishment of “normal conditions in Europe.” Such a concise and comprehensive statement of the economic programme of the United States is not to be found either in official statements or in the speeches of America’s most outspoken bankers and trust lords.

How does imperialist England answer this threat directed against her with such ostentation and frankness?

How does British imperialism answer this open challenge of its overseas rival?

In the very last stage of the conflict British imperialists want to appear as good Samaritans. If the last Admiralty report is to be credited, the growth of the American fleet has not made Great Britain desire to rival American shipbuilding, but, on the contrary, has resulted in an actual reduction in shipbuilding. According to Reuter the official report of the Admiralty shows that the shipbuilding programme approved in 1925 provides for the construction of six cruisers during 1927-29. Still in accordance with a government decision only three cruisers instead of six will be built during this period. Here we have an example of real Christian charity, an example of turning the other cheek!

British Hypocrisy

This Christian charity is useful both at home and abroad, and in the present instance it is especially important abroad! The Government runs no risk by pretending to be satisfied with three cruisers, since it has the right to build six; it can at any moment and for any reason decide to reconsider the whole programme without asking permission of anyone. The pretence of Christian charity is a convenient screen to speed up the frantic preparations for aerial, and especially chemical, warfare, etc.

The hypocrisy of the British bourgeoisie has been directed during the past few weeks to creating a complete theory which explains the pretended indifference of the insatiable Britishers to the growth of the American fleet. George Glasgow writes in the January issue of the “Contemporary Review”: “The United States, which, as many Americans simply confess, wants a big navy in the spirit in which some rich men want big motor cars.” Thus the big American shipbuilding programme may be explained in the final analysis by such an innocent weakness as the desire to boast.

Are British publicists, who write at the dictation of Chamberlain, so lacking in perspicacity as to take such a profound explanation seriously? No, of course not. But they are silly enough to think they can gull others and conceal their real plans. Wickham Steed, the great fighter for an Anglo-American understanding, went to America expressly for the purpose of dispelling American prejudice as regards Europe and Anglo-American misunderstandings, and to prevent disagreement in connection with naval rivalry. He delivered an endless number of speeches in all the most important centres in North America, and arrived at the following conclusion, which is not exactly optimistic: “British and American co-operation is possible. Conflict is also possible. . . . We [England and America] need no alli-

ance with each other. It will be enough if we are both ‘Allies of the Prince of Peace.’” It seems that this condition of formal peace might be possible for the British bourgeoisie if it could simulate death and in no way rouse its American rival. For Mr. Steed, writing in the Sunday “Observer,” remarked:

“If we are so foolish as to argue that for America a big fleet is a luxury and for us a necessity, she may set herself to build a supreme navy. . . . The people of the United States are certainly not now thinking of naval supremacy or of an aggressive naval policy against us or anybody else. But in any foreign attempt to determine what is a necessity and what is a luxury for them, they will see an impertinent denial of their sovereignty and will resent it. Then they may build a supreme fleet, and they will never forgive us for having goaded them into doing it.”—“The Observer,” 25th December, 1927.)

Thus the friend and defender of an Anglo-American *rapprochement* already visualises the moment when American imperialism will present England with a bill for the fleet built to be used against her. Whether this bill will be presented in the form of heavy reparations demands or, as Steed imagines, will be restricted to recriminations of a moral-political nature, it is quite clear that the position of British imperialism since the failure of the Geneva Naval Conference is one in which both tears and supplications are futile. Tears—that is the use of arguments to prove that the need of the scattered British Empire for the control of the seas to secure its imperialist aims is greater than that of the United States, which has all its forces closely concentrated, will merely irritate the Americans and urge them on to the realisation of a large-scale programme. This is the explanation of the new tactic of British diplomacy which is aimed at pretending that nothing unusual is taking place in the United States. The American fleet is nothing more than a magnificent, though harmless, toy. So let them play with it to their heart’s content!

The Chameleon Press

The British press of all shades and tendencies, except of course the Communist, is the most docile in the world; it is capable of changing its arguments completely at the wave of the magic wand. If for the purposes of the diplomatic game it is necessary to consign to the archives their fundamental arguments against American pretensions, then “public opinion” is capable of doing so overnight without any scruples. But the misfortune for British imperialism lies in the fact that a change of argument does not alter the nature of the situation, and the fact that the old opinion which has been thrown overboard, that the loss of naval supremacy for England is equivalent to a military defeat is more in accordance with reality than the theory put forward by Steed.

It is hardly necessary to cite official government speeches and the statements of the government press to recall what a mortal danger England considered the first reports about the open activities of American imperialism. It will suffice to quote the figures which were given in the “Economist” of December 10th, 1927. The “Economist” criticised the rash policy of the British

North American Imperialism—continued

Admiralty at Geneva, but at the same time got into a panic about Coolidge's Congress speech :

" 'We have,' Coolidge said to Congress, 'a foreign commerce and ocean lines of trade unsurpassed by any country.' Here he has frankly blundered. In exports America holds first place, but not in total foreign trade. In the last full calendar year, 1926, Great Britain's total foreign trade was £2,020,000,000, while that of the United States was \$9,239,000,000, or, say, £1,847,000,000. Moreover, while every pound's worth of British trade has to cross the seas, between 15 per cent. and 16 per cent. of America's trade is with her neighbours—Canada and Mexico—so that only 85 per cent. of the preceding total has to cross the seas. . . . Nor—to take the second part of the President's sentence—is it true that America's need for naval protection of 'ocean lines of trade' is unsurpassed. If a map could be designed showing British and American trade routes respectively, with the volume of commerce passing along each, it would be seen at a glance that in the matter of vulnerability from attack British ocean trade is incomparably less happily situated than America. Finally, the United States—as her tariff advocates never tire of repeating—is perhaps the most nearly self-sufficient country in the world. There are certain materials which she lacks, but they are a bagatelle compared with Britain's overseas requirements. Does Mr. Coolidge seriously compare America's need of rubber imports with the fact that we have to import 80 per cent. of our wheat, 50 per cent. of our meat, half our iron ore, all our cotton, copper, rubber, silk and tobacco, and nearly all our oil, timber, wood pulp, tin and sugar? Without seaborne imports we have the means neither of life nor livelihood for our population. To mention America's need of foreign trade in the same breath as ours is to an Englishman fantastic. Until this is understood in America we can make little headway."—"The Viewpoint of Mr. Coolidge," in the "Economist," 10-12-1927.)

Anglo-American Clash

Thus we see that only a few weeks ago the most loving of British bourgeois journals sent a warning to the Washington Government. Does America understand this? Of course, America understands only too well that the supremacy of the fleet is the main and perhaps the only means of holding together the disintegrating British Empire. But this is not all that America understands; every newspaper in America has been repeating during the past week that the fact that Great Britain possesses the most powerful navy is a source of danger for other countries, and the chief weapon she uses to keep the League of Nations in submission. Article 16 of the League obliges every member of the League to subject any attacking country to an economic boycott, but this is of no avail since the supremacy of the seas belongs to a country which openly flouts all the League statutes. But if this idea of the

League, and together with it the dictatorship of Great Britain in European affairs, were smashed then Great Britain would be obliged either to turn her swords into ploughshares—which for imperialism is equivalent to suicide—or to create other means of military aggression such as the attainment of the supremacy in the air and the formation of a powerful land army, which is even now possible. America knows very well that an attack based on Article 16 of the League of Nations must result in Great Britain's ceasing to act independently in world politics and becoming the vassal of her more wealthy Anglo-Saxon brother.

In the January issue of the American journal, "Current History," there are several articles by United States senators dealing with the question of "Peace in Europe." All these articles have one feature in common, that is the question of Article 16 and the definition of the term "attacking nation" against which this Article is directed; whilst at the same time pacifist phrases are used which are intended to secure complete independence for American schemes. Senator Thomas Walsh is the most outspoken in his exposition of this question. He points out that the United States declined to enter the international tribunal last year, and also proves that it does not regard the decisions of the League of Nations on the application of Article 16 as binding. But what we see when we examine the real state of affairs is the question which the American puts.

"If with intent to avert a bloody war, the League should direct or recommend an economic boycott against an offending nation, pursuant to Article 16 of the Covenant or some other provision thereof, the only result of which would be to transfer the trade with such nation, or a large part of it, from the countries joining in the boycott to the United States, declining to participate in it, the inutility of the plan of the League for enforcing peace by economic pressure would be painfully demonstrated."

Walsh arrives at the conclusion that the League must, nolens volens, wait to act until a preliminary agreement has been reached with the United States. Walsh excludes any kind of sentimentality or courtesy from the elements which constitute that agreement. He goes on to say :

"But it is no secret that no such unmeasured trust in the Council generally obtains in the United States. The idea has by no means been dissipated that the League is an agency set up by the victors to assure to them the spoils of the war, through which the Powers represented on the Council seek to impose their will upon the world."

And having given this well-deserved characteristic of the League of Nations, Walsh and his colleagues become suddenly apprehensive about the peace of Europe, and must naturally come to the conclusion that if agreement is to be reached with the United States it is necessary for her first of all to have a navy, capable of destroying and smashing everything and conquering everybody. The olive branch now being extended across the Atlantic from London does not arouse any enthusi-

(Continued on page 179.)

The Fate of the Last Centrist Labour Party

K. Remmele

THE Norwegian Labour Party enjoyed until recently the rare distinction of being the only centrist party which was not affiliated either to the Second or to the Third International. Until November, 1923, the Norwegian Labour Party was affiliated to the Communist International, but was then expelled because of its centrist tendencies. Now this party has gone the way of all the Two-and-a-Half International centrist parties which merged into the Second International. The lip service to the social revolution has been dropped by His Majesty's Ministers.

Norwegian centrism was a very special kind of centrism, far more cunning than Austro-Marxism. Other centrist parties, such as the German Independents, included the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviets in their programme, but the Norwegian Labour Party professed to approve in principle all the tenets of the Comintern policy in order to make the workers believe that it was the only real Communist Party, and that only ignorance and misunderstanding on the part of the Comintern had been the cause of its expulsion. This deception gained the N.L.P. the support of almost all the Norwegian workers. After the expulsion of the N.L.P. from the Comintern, those who faithfully supported Comintern policy formed the Communist Party of Norway. In 1921 a Norwegian Socialist Party had been formed so that now there were three workers' parties in Norway, but the N.L.P., to which were affiliated two-thirds of the trade unions, was by far the strongest party.

Reformist Manœuvres

The N.L.P. leaders were not content with the mere approval of Comintern policy, they actually put it into practice wherever it seemed to serve their interests in order to attract the workers to their ranks, and thus undermine the other parties. A case in point took place about a year ago when the N.L.P. carried out a unity campaign, which resulted in the Socialist Party leaving the Second International, with the approval of this body, and amalgamating with the N.L.P. Friedrich Adler, the secretary of the Second International, supervised this manœuvre personally. He foresaw only too well that this temporary loss of his supporters would in a short time result in the entry of the whole N.L.P. into the Second International. The fact that Tranmael, Bull and their associates took over the reins of government, if only for a few days, marked the adoption of the policy of the Second International, and removed the nominal reason for the breach between the N.L.P. and the Second International; it also brings the goal which Friedrich Adler aimed at with his "unity" policy in Norway appreciably nearer than was expected. The path of the N.L.P. is now clear; it is the section of the Second International in Norway, though as yet it has not actually affiliated for fear of losing the revolutionary workers. Everything the Comintern foretold during the struggle with Tranmael, Bull, Olsen, etc., is being realised to the letter.

The parliamentary elections last October resulted in the decisive defeat of the reactionary Conservative Party, which until then had been the ruling party, and a great victory for the N.L.P. The result of the elections was as follows:

	1927	1924
Conservatives	30	56
Peasant Party	26	22
Liberals	32	36
Social-Democrats	59	32
Communists	3	6

Parliament opened on January 11th, and on January 20th the Conservative government was obliged to resign as it no longer possessed a parliamentary majority. The government majority, which had consisted of 54 Conservatives and 22 Peasant Party deputies, became, as a result of the elections, a minority of 56 out of the 150 members. The King called on Melbye, the leader of the Peasant Party, to form a government. This was done in the hope of saving the former government policy, since the Peasant Party was only a branch of the Conservatives, and in the struggle against the workers went one better than the Conservatives did.

(Continued from page 178.)

asm or emotion in the United States. Washington does not believe in tears.

"It is quite likely," Walsh writes, "that what Mr. Steed would have said, had he spoken more plainly, is that Great Britain desires at all hazards to avoid a war with the United States or a controversy that might lead to war; that in the event of coercive measures being ordered by the League the English Navy would be expected to get into action, and that its operations, in the absence of any understanding or agreement such as that above canvassed, would precipitate in all probability such a conflict as it wishes to avoid. He accordingly desires such an agreement or understanding, or the announcement of a policy such as Ambassador Page stood for prior to our entrance into the World War. For reasons above set forth he is on a hopeless quest."

Hence the United States requires its big naval programme not for the satisfaction of the low instincts of ambition and display, as the writer in the "Contemporary Review" wishes to make the misguided public believe, but honestly for open warfare or threat of war, or, at least, in case of the economic boycott of any country, to be able to seize for itself the whole or part of the trade with that country. American imperialism, whose money power had its origin in its unprecedented seizure of world trade in the beginning of the 1914-18 war, has no objection to repeating this experience. All its efforts to maintain peace in Europe, as we shall see later, are only directed towards this aim.

(To be concluded.)

The Last Centrist Labour Party—contd.

But a Peasant Party government would also have required Liberal support just as was the case with the Conservatives, which would have given a majority of 88 as against 62.

The Liberals, however, did not venture to support such a government. The leader of the Liberal Party, Mowinckel, refused to support a "Right" government on the ground that the two-party system of government had become bankrupt, and that now there could be no question of any government except one composed of all sections of the people's representatives. The Liberals, who had been the opposition, also suffered severe losses during the elections, and, now, in their hour of need, they hit on the idea of the policy of class collaboration. The King in his turn, who realised that his reactionary method of government was at stake, discovered his "democratic conscience" and commissioned the N.L.P. to form a government. Was there any reason why he should not do so? King George of England, the saviour of the world, had had the best experience with the MacDonald Government without having to sacrifice an iota of his system. And the "democratic king" was not disappointed in the Tranmaelites in spite of their "revolutionary" talk.

The Labour Party's "Demands"

On January 14th and 15th the N.L.P. considered the question of government at an enlarged meeting of the national executive, and arrived at the following decision:

"The enlarged national executive commissions the Party executive and the parliamentary fraction to lose no time in making definite proposals to the Storting [Parliament] in respect of the following most pressing matters:

- (1) Abolition of the penal laws (i.e., laws on compulsory arbitration and labour disputes, and against interference with strike-breakers.
- (2) Disarmament.
- (3) Reduction of debts for small people and municipalities.
- (4) Relief for the unemployed.
- (5) Proposal of a new land law in respect of Crown lands.
- (6) Re-introduction of the corn monopoly and abolition of the corn guarantee.
- (7) Control of the prices of fishermen's working equipment and of the export of the produce of the fisheries—all this to be carried out in accordance with the Party programme and the directions formerly issued."

In respect of the question of a Labour Government the Enlarged National Executive declared that the Party would not take over the Government without having the majority in the Storting and that it can only take over the responsibility of government at the present moment if thereby the attainment of the most immediate important demands can be ensured.

This decision was the first document of importance which showed that the N.L.P. sacrificed its former principles in respect of the organisation and preparation of the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviets, and openly went over into the

camp of the Second International. Both the statement about taking over the government, provided there be a parliamentary majority, and that about accepting the reins of government at the present moment prove that the N.L.P. has become the lackey of the bourgeoisie. This constituted the most important and most decisive point in the ludicrous episode of the twelve-day ministerial glory of the N.L.P. heroes.

A "Courageous" Statement

Tranmael, Bull, Madsen, Olsen and the others were fully aware of the immensity of the betrayal and the consequences that this desertion to the bourgeois front must have for the Norwegian workers. Oskar Torp, the Party chairman, stated at the afore-mentioned session of the enlarged national executive:

"The bourgeois parties which constitute the majority in the Storting will in all probability want to retain power; our Party will hardly be asked to take over the reins of government.

"But the situation might change within a certain period and things might develop in a different manner. Therefore, it is our duty to make our attitude as clear as possible.

"In my opinion we ought not to try to take over the government until we possess a parliamentary majority. With the present distribution of strength in the Storting, if we were in power, we could only carry out what a wing of the bourgeois parties would allow; we would be forced to carry out a left bourgeois policy which would be of no advantage to our Party.

"Circumstances might, however, arise in which we should have to consider whether we should form a government. But the condition for that would be, that in the given situation, we ourselves would form the government and ensure by non-parliamentary pressure and other means the possibility of introducing our most pressing demands. It is of no interest whatever to us to retain power as a favour from the hands of the bourgeois parties."

A few days after this "courageous" announcement, on January 24th, the N.L.P. got the opportunity of realising its great promises. But what happened? The N.L.P. did not form the government itself as it had announced, but it took orders from "its King," clicked its heels, and formed His Majesty's most humble and obedient government. But when the equally loyal Liberals said "No," the N.L.P. thought no more about non-parliamentary pressure and other means to secure the introduction of their most pressing demands, but again saluted, this time, however, the Liberals, and resigned their ministerial posts at the command of the Liberals. And in this manner the N.L.P. ministry has won for itself the "fame" of being the most absurd episode in the whole history of the government comedy of a "Labour Party." The most radical Menshevism has attained the summit of banality and absurdity, only renegade fools of the type of Balabanoff and Paul Levi (see No. 5 of "Sozialistische Politik und Wirtschaft"), can attempt to represent the Norwegian banality as differing in any way from the customary treachery of the parties belonging to the Second International.

The royal "Labour Party" was in no happy frame

The Last Centrist Labour Party—contd.

of mind even during its foolish political escapade. On January 24th when it took office the central organ, "Arbeiderbladet" announced:

"As matters have developed, the Labour Party thinks it advisable to accept the responsibility. The urgent demands put forward by the enlarged Party Executive are of such great importance that everything must be done to carry them out.

"Naturally the bourgeois parties are not glad to see a Labour Government; but that is only another reason for making the attempt. The Party fully understands the limitations of this experiment: the bourgeois parties have a majority in parliament; but the seriousness of the political and economic situation makes it necessary that the policy and demands of the Labour Party become the centre of public life. This is the reason why the Labour Party has taken office.

"It is quite clear that there can be no question of a class-collaboration government, but of a militant government."

In spite of the announcement that the N.L.P. government was to be a "militant government"—and every "Labour Government" which is at the mercy of the bourgeoisie can only be a militant government against the proletariat—this statement gives proof of the uneasiness and pessimism that prevailed amongst the "victors."

The Workers' Attitude

What was the attitude of the Norwegian workers and especially of the workers in the N.L.P. to this great event? There are numerous clear statements on this point, and even N.L.P. statements, some of which we will reproduce here. The "Arbeiderbladet" of Jan. 25th wrote:

"The workers' power receives a new orientation through the formation of the government. The question of the seizure of power has been brought much nearer than ever before. A new situation has been created amongst the masses. Minds become ripe for the social revolution which the working class must accomplish in order to lay the foundations for their own society, the socialist society."

The central organ of the N.L.P. feels obliged to cover up its betrayal of the workers by radical phrases about the new orientation of power. The Tranmaelites have been apt pupils of Kautsky. According to Kautsky the coalition government, and not the dictatorship of the proletariat, constitutes the political transition form from capitalism to socialism: according to Tranmael the "militant government" of the N.L.P. serves to make minds "ripe for the social revolution." A more insolent betrayal of the working class cannot be well imagined!

A cry of distress in the "Arbeiderbladet" of January 28th showed how hard pressed Tranmael and his colleagues were by their working class followers and how little inclined the Norwegian workers were to suffer such insolent betrayal. This appeal was as follows:

"Therefore, rally to the Labour Government, create for it the best possible conditions for its work and struggle; in this hour direct your

weapons against the external enemy and not against your own camp."

The rejection of this ministerial policy of the Tranmaelites was much more pronounced in the provinces than in the capital. "Fremtiden," the organ of the N.L.P. in Drammen wrote:

"Are we glad? Not at all. The news that our Party is to form a government is the most depressing news we have heard for a long time. We are asked: is there no reason to rejoice? . . . People can go on asking. And we reply that we have longed for the day when our Party leaders would take the reins of government. . . . But this wish assumed that our Party government would have the majority in the Storting and that the necessary support would be forthcoming."

The N.L.P. organ "Rjukan Arbeiderbladet" wrote:

"We are all in agreement that the demands are important and that everything must be done to carry them out; but it is a fact that we are far removed from accomplishing them even if the Party should form a government. Such a government under the present conditions in the Storting cannot be a militant government. The struggle which it will carry on will first and foremost be one for its own existence."

These expressions of opinion in the N.L.P. press show how strong the opposition to this policy is within the ranks of the N.L.P.

The twelve-day government comedy of the N.L.P. marked a decisive turning point in the development of this Party; it was the beginning of its desertion from the radical, swaggering, centrist camp to that of the downright reformists and consequently to the left-wing of the bourgeoisie.

Radical Mask of Leaders

The N.L.P. tried to fool the workers and especially its own followers by a "radical" government programme. The afore-mentioned demands, decided upon by the enlarged national executive, were made the basis of the government programme. But the realisation of any one of these demands could not be even attempted, since the N.L.P. Government was at the mercy of the support of the Liberals. It was utopian even to imagine that it was possible to carry through even such minimum demands. The cunning N.L.P. leaders were very well aware of this, and the Party chairman, Oskar Torp, declared quite openly at the session of the national executive that nobody in the N.L.P. even thought of realising these demands. This programme was nothing but a masquerade intended to hide their truck with the bourgeoisie.

This episode does not mean either the defeat or the retreat of the revolutionary Norwegian workers; on the contrary it is a great gain for the proletarian-revolutionary movement. There is no doubt that the large majority of the workers who support Tranmael and Co., are for the class struggle against the bourgeoisie and these workers have more than once defeated the N.L.P. leader's clique. Last year when the trade union leaders, Halvard Olsen and Madsen—the present ministerial comedians, who are the most prominent leaders in the N.L.P.—expressed a desire to approach Amsterdam,

The Last Centrist Labour Party—contd.

they got such a lesson from the workers that they lost no time in burning their visas. And taking this attitude of the workers into consideration, the degeneration of the centrist N.L.P. to a social-democratic party provides the possibility for the C.P.N. to develop very quickly into a mass party. The sound and strong tradition of the most determined class struggle, existing in the ranks of the Norwegian workers, forced the N.L.P. leaders to affiliate to the Comintern and then, when the Party was expelled, this same tradition forced the Party to keep aloof from the Second International. This tradition, together with the failure of the government comedy of the reformist leaders, creates a favourable situation to start a movement for the real unity of the workers, for the class struggle.

Tasks of the Communists

The first task of our Norwegian brother-party should now be a widespread campaign within the trade unions, aimed at the overthrow of the treacherous and office-hunting trade union leaders, such as Olsen, Madsen, and Co. Our Norwegian Party possesses sufficient good qualities to rally the revolutionary proletariat to its banner. It has formed a splendid body of leaders who have shown by their recent articles in the "Inprecorr" and in the Party press that they correctly interpret the effect of the present happenings on the Norwegian Labour movement, and that they understand how to apply the correct political measures in such a situation. But on the other hand the parliamentary fraction failed completely; this especially applies to the chairman Scheffo. This failure of the parliamentary fraction constitutes the greatest obstacle to the free development and the liberation of the healthy elements in our Party. At the present moment, when there is a fundamental change and new orientation taking place in the ranks of the workers, this failure of the parliamentary fraction is the greatest obstacle to the revolutionary workers joining our Party. Such elements, at an important turning-point such as there is now in Norway, render the Party incapable of either action or manœuvring.

The Comintern did everything possible and in good time to help the Norwegian Party at this decisive moment. It proposed that a manifesto be issued and presented by the parliamentary fraction on the occasion of the formation of the N.L.P. government, giving a clear exposition of the attitude of the Party to this political event. The leader of the parliamentary fraction refused to present any manifesto dealing with the situation. And, what is more, a bourgeois paper published an interview with this leader showing that the leader of the Communist parliamentary fraction had entered into an unconditional agreement with the N.L.P. Thus it happened that the three Communists who constitute the Communist parliamentary fraction, sided unconditionally with the N.L.P. on the occasion of the Liberal vote of no confidence. Such a policy, which has nothing to do with Communism or the fundamentals of the Comintern, is naturally likely to compromise the C.P.N. seriously in the eyes of the Norwegian workers. The Norwegian Party must not fail to condemn these leaders for their undisciplined and anti-Party behaviour. It must be made clear to the working class that the Communist Party will not suffer for one moment that Communist

leaders should be guilty of any criminal frivolity in respect of the most elementary interests of the workers. On the degree of thoroughness, energy and ruthlessness brought to bear on this inner Party task depends the success which the Party will have in winning over the revolutionary workers. The Norwegian Party must establish a clear and determined policy within the Party, for only then will it be in a position to fulfil its most important tasks in the interests of the Norwegian workers. The Party will be incapable of accomplishing its revolutionary tasks unless absolute clearness of purpose exists within the Party.

An Easier Task

It is a more simple and an easier matter to win over the revolutionary workers, who supported the N.L.P., than the workers who support other centrist parties, because the N.L.P. membership is mainly based on the affiliated trade unions. This is the path which our Party must take. Our Party has already considerable influence in the trade unions and the greatest attention should be paid to increasing this influence still more. Every step taken by the N.L.P. towards the reformist camp must be answered by a Party campaign in the trade unions. The slogans for this should be: "Leave the N.L.P.!" "Stop trade union subscriptions to this party!" "The local trade union councils and the minorities in the unions still belonging to the N.L.P. should be organised into a council of revolutionary workers under the leadership of the C.P.N." "All subscribe to the Communist paper!" "Individual membership of the C.P.N.!"

The government comedy of the royal N.L.P. marked the first secession of the centrist and would-be revolutionary Labour Party to the ranks of the reformists and portfolio hunters, which was apparent to every worker. There are sure to be further developments of this nature. This situation will open up for the Norwegian Communists the greatest prospect of a more speedy and comprehensive fulfilment of its historic mission: to rally, prepare and organise the Norwegian proletariat for the overthrow of the capitalist exploiters and oppressors. May our Norwegian brother-party recognise this great task, which has now become more actual, and act accordingly. In this work it will receive the entire support of the international revolutionary proletariat.

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The Position and Prospects of the Communist Party in Sweden

Karl Kilbom

WHEN the split between Hoeglund's supporters and the Comintern took place in 1924, the bourgeoisie and social-democrats declared that that was the end of Communism in Sweden, and that the Swedish workers were far too healthy-minded and sensible to be caught by the Asiatic teachings of Moscow. The rejoicings of the bourgeoisie and of their social-democratic satellites knew no bounds. There was nothing but contempt and ridicule for the "Moscow slaves," because they believed in the possibility of reorganising the C.P. of Sweden. But in spite of all this the work was begun.

When the last split took place the Party membership was over 9,000. There had been a split previously when the Vennerstroem centrists rejected the 21 conditions of the Comintern. The Hoeglund split cost the Party about 2,000 of his supporters, though, according to his own statement to the social-democrats, his following was 4,000 strong. During the period immediately after the split, the Comintern Section had a membership of about 7,061, though all of these were not members who had paid up their subscriptions. Since that time the membership has increased uninterruptedly, and at the end of 1925 there was a membership of 9,763, and 270 local organisations existed. Reorganisation on the basis of factory nuclei had not then begun. At the close of 1926 the Party membership had increased to 11,578 and 683 nuclei had been formed, whilst for the third quarter of 1927 the paid-up membership was 13,955 and the number of nuclei 815. At present the membership is probably about 16,000. There is no disputing the fact that the Party membership is growing daily, and everywhere the workers are beginning to recognise that the Communist Party is the only Party that works in their interest.

The Party Press

Our Party has five newspapers, two dailies, two that are published twice weekly, and one that appears three times weekly. In addition, there is one monthly for work amongst the poor rural population, another devoted to trade union work and a third to work amongst women. Besides these Party papers the Young Communist League publishes both a weekly and a monthly paper. Both the Party and the Y.C.L.—which according to recent figures has a membership of 13,000—publish special papers for their leaders and delegates, which usually appear once a month or as often as they are required. So far there is no Party theoretical journal, but the question has been under consideration for the past year, and a decision should be reached shortly. The growing interest of the workers in the Communist Party is also shown by the steady rise in the sale of the papers. "Folkets Dagblad," the Party central organ, increased its circulation last year by three or four thou-

sand. The position of the papers is also on a sound financial basis, and there is no doubt that their circulation will increase even still more.

The social composition of the Party presents an interesting picture. The Communist Party of Sweden is perhaps one of the most purely working-class Parties in the whole Comintern. The statistics of 1926, which are the most recent available figures, show the composition to be: 3.1 per cent. distributive workers, 11 per cent. dock and transport workers, 25.5 per cent. metal workers, 10.1 per cent. timber and sawmills workers, 7.4 per cent. workers in the paper industry, 9.9 per cent. labourers and building workers, 5.5 per cent. miners, 1.3 per cent. printers, 1.3 per cent. shoemakers and leather workers, 0.8 per cent. textile workers, 1.5 per cent. agricultural workers, 9.4 per cent. workers of various categories and 13.2 per cent. women. Intellectuals are practically non-existent in the Swedish Party, though recently a certain section has begun to show an interest in the Communist movement. Thus, the "Clarté" intellectual organisation is growing in popularity, especially in university and high school centres, such as Upsala, Lund, Stockholm and Gothenburg, and interest in Communism is being manifested also among other intellectuals. The social-democrats have recently been trying to transform "Clarté" into a purely social-democratic organisation, but without success. The majority of the "Clarté" members seem to be of opinion that their organisation is neutral and constitutes a kind of bridge which facilitates the transfer of intellectuals to the socialist movement.

Two Weak Spots

The statistics here given on the composition of the Party show two weak spots: the relatively small number of women, who are mainly the wives of the members; women in industry have scarcely been touched as yet, although since 1926 a slight improvement in this respect is noticeable. Secondly, we have far too little influence on the worst-placed workers, especially the textile and agricultural workers. Attempts are being made to overcome these shortcomings, but it will be no easy task, and will require time.

Petty bourgeois circles in Sweden naturally have their effect on the members of the Communist Party, and therefore the Party must pay special attention to giving a clear Communist interpretation to all activities, whether they be trade union, propaganda or organisational. Certain progress has been made in the task of making the Swedish workers see that Sweden is not an independent country, but that, on the contrary, it is being drawn into the Great Power policy of Great Britain and France. British imperialists especially have been trying for a long time to get Sweden into the much-desired Baltic bloc, which is to play a definite role in their anti-Soviet campaign. It is equally clear

The C.P. in Sweden—continued

that Swedish capital of late years is being drawn more into the meshes of international finance.

The best demonstration of the work done by the Party in making these matters clear to the workers was during the trade union conflicts, and especially during the "Navy campaign," which was directed against the social-democratic and bourgeois proposals for new naval equipment. Party and League schools have been started for theoretical training, but these are so far restricted to Stockholm and the immediate surroundings. Plans are being made to start similar educational centres as soon as possible all over the country.

In the struggle against capitalist militarism and the danger of war, the plan of attack on the Soviet Union is, of course, given greatest prominence. In this matter the delegates to the Soviet Union were especially useful. The big delegation of 1925, which had spent two weeks there, met with great success; about 600 meetings were held, and addressed by the delegates. The Party, together with its subsidiary and sympathisers' organisations, either organised these meetings or played an important part in them. Subsequent delegations, trade union and otherwise, were also used to make it clear to the Swedish workers that the Soviet Union is the helper and defender of the world proletariat, and that, therefore, it is the duty of the workers of all countries to help to defend it. All these campaigns were successful in spite of the social-democratic opposition, which of late has adopted the most objectionable forms and gains support from the social-democratic arguments of the Trotskyites. The social-democratic central organ has declared repeatedly that the workers in the Soviet Union live under conditions of "real slavery." Yet in the face of this our comrades were often able to have resolutions of sympathy passed both for the Soviet Union and the C.P.S.U. at the big mass meetings, where debates lasting for hours were carried on with the social-democrats. We get another side of the picture in the feverish campaign of the Social-Democratic Party, which is organisationally built up on the trade unions to attach the trade union organisations still more closely to the party. During the past year this campaign has been successful in different parts of the country.

Influence in the Trade Union.

The fact that the Communist Party is gaining ground amongst the trade unions is a proof of its growing influence, and this is further confirmed by the fact that the Party established a special trade union secretariat a few months ago. Already the trade union conference in Gothenburg in 1925 showed that about 80,000 trade unionists supported the Communist slogans, and the last election of officials in the trade unions resulted in an increase of our influence. Communist influence is making itself felt in the present workers' struggles in the mines, paper and sawmills industries, and this is proved by the unanimous statements in the bourgeois press that these conflicts are under Communist leader-

ship. The result is that the Communist movement is being subjected to a fierce attack. Needless to say, the bourgeois press exaggerates.

It is true that only the Communists came into the open and declared for the struggle, and that the workers followed their appeal; it is also true that we are taking the lead in order to lead the struggle on to victory, and that the attitude of the workers is continuously becoming more favourable; it is true that we are carrying on propaganda to spread the conflict to those branches of industry which are of vital importance for the capitalists; it is also true that we are formulating our demands in such a way as to extend these struggles on an international scale so as to include the Norwegian and Finnish paper industries in the conflict. In short, it is a fact that Communists are to be found everywhere at the head so as to give the struggling workers all the help possible; for example, proposals are being made in all municipalities that those workers who are in want should receive free food and that concessions should be made in respect of payment of rent. The reformists, however, are in the majority in those unions involved in the struggle, and they are doing their best, in conjunction with the arbitration commission of the capitalist government and the employers, to put a stop to the struggle as soon as possible. Their treacherous activities are no secret to the workers, sooner or later they will get what they deserve; the attitude of the workers is a good omen for this.

Unemployed Support

The social-democratic betrayal of the workers has already got the answer it deserves. In spite of repeated attempts on the part of the social-democrats to separate the unemployed from the Communists, the unemployed are following our slogans consciously and to a man. This is a very important matter since there are 70,000 unemployed, and in Stockholm alone there are 15,000, the majority of whom receive absolutely no assistance either from the State or the municipality.

This situation shows clearly that the position of the Communist Party of Sweden is fairly good. A powerful Communist push is being prepared for the autumn, as in September elections for the Second Chamber are to take place. These elections will show whether the Communists and the social-democrats together will be able to win the majority in the Second Chamber.

It is typical of the social-democratic leaders that they themselves doubt this possibility. They admit openly that there is no social-democratic spirit in the country. There is a large amount of truth in this statement if they wish to convey the fact that the attitude towards the social-democrats is unfavourable. On the other hand, the social-democratic leaders already admit that the Communists will be successful, a statement which gives a comprehensive and apt description of the position in the Swedish Labour world. It is quite clear that the development of the Swedish workers is towards the left, and the repeated demands of the bourgeoisie for "a struggle to exterminate the Communists" is the best confirmation of this fact.