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Central Bureau: Berlin SW 48, Friedrichstrasse 225, III. — Postal address Franz Dahlem, Berlin SW 48, Friedrichstrasse 225, III
for Inprekorr. — Telegraphic address: Inprekorr.

POLITICS

The Economic Boom and the International Labor Movement

by Leon Trotzky.

Throughout Europe the labor movement is showing signs of a new period of revolutionary development. Though it cannot definitely be stated whether or not we are approaching the decisive conflict, there can be no doubt that the revolutionary curve is steadily going upward.

Capitalism in Europe passed its most critical period in the year immediately following the war. The acme of the revolutionary struggle in Italy (September 1920) was reached at a time when Germany, Great Britain and France had already overcome the serious stages of the political crisis. What took place in Germany in March last was but the belated echo of a revolutionary epoch passed by, and not the prelude to new one. Having strengthened its first positions, Capitalism and its various governments adopted offensive measures in the beginning of 1920, thus forcing the labor movement into the defensive. The Communist Parties became convinced that they were but a small minority, and they appear at times as if isolated from the majority of the working-class. This state of affairs resulted in what is commonly called "the crisis" in the Third International. At present, however,—as has been maintained before—a change for the better is taking place. The revolutionary attack of Labor is developing; the perspectives of the struggle are widening.

The cause for this change are various and complicated. The basis for it, however, is to be found in the sharp ups and downs of world economics in which is reflected capitalist development during the post-war period.

The period most fraught with danger for the European bourgeoisie was that of demobilization, when the disillusioned soldiers returned and had to be fitted into the process of production. The first few months after the conclusion of the war created great difficulties which furthered revolutionary development. But the ruling classes regained their courage and inaugurated both a financial and political policy of considerable magnitude, intended to overcome the demobilization crisis. The peace budgets of the various states retained the magnitude of war figures. Many enterprises were kept going by artificial means. Many orders were effected merely with the view of preventing unemployment. Flats were rented for prices hardly sufficient to cover the outlays for repairs. Various governments included in their budgets subsidies with which the prices of imported meat and grain were held at a certain level. In other words: the state's indebtedness was increased, the currency inflated, the very basis of economy undermined—all for political ends: to prolong the deceptive war time boom in trade and industry. These measures provided the captains of industry with the possibility of perfecting the technical apparatus of their main enterprises and of adapting them to the purposes of peace industry.

But the artificial boom found its limits very quickly in the general impoverishment. Industries producing necessities of life, were confronted with an extraordinarily limited market, which created the first wall of overproduction and retarded the further

development of the large industries. The crisis assumed a tremendous extent and tremendous forms. Incepted in the United States in Spring 1919, the crisis crossed the ocean, reached Europe in the middle of 1920 and thoroughly enveloped it by May 1921.

Thus we see that when the open post-war trade and industrial crisis commenced to develop (after one year of artificial boom) the first attacks of Labor against bourgeois society were nearing their end. The bourgeois warded off these attacks. Partly by means of persuasion and compromise, partly by employing force. That first proletarian onslaught was rather chaotic, devoid of any definite political aims and ideas, without a well defined plan, without leadership. Its development and its outcome proved to Labor that a change of its position within bourgeois society is rather more difficult to achieve than it appeared to be during the first months of the post-war protests. Labor's uniformity in its chaotic state of revolutionary sentiment disappeared rather quickly. Internal differences were beginning to make themselves felt. The more active section of Labor, the part least bound up with earlier traditions, united in the Communist Parties, being through experience convinced of the necessity for clearly perceiving one's aims and also for organizational centralization. The more conservative and less class conscious elements declined, for the time being, to consider revolutionary aims and methods. The labor bureaucracy promptly utilized that state of affairs and regained its lost positions.

The trade and industrial crisis in Spring and Summer 1920 broke out, as mentioned before, at a time when both political and psychological reaction had gained a foothold among the workers. The crisis has undoubtedly increased the discontent of large sections of Labor, it has even at some places resulted in stormy manifestations of that discontent. But after the defeat in 1919 and the internal differences resulting from that defeat, the economic crisis in itself was no longer able to give the movement the necessary unity and make of it a decisive revolutionary onslaught.

From this we see that the crisis does not influence the labor movement in as regular a manner as it appears to some people. The political effects of a crisis (not its depth only, but its tendency as well) are determined by the entire political situation and the events preceding and accompanying the crisis, and above all by the previous successes and failures of Labor itself. In some cases a crisis can be instrumental in rousing the revolutionary activity of the workers, in others it is apt to deaden the militant spirits of the proletariat and, if it lasts very long and demands too many sacrifices of Labor, to weaken not only the offensive energies of the workers, but the defensive as well, and that in an extraordinary degree.

Now, if this line of thought be following and completed, the following opinion can be arrived at:

If the economic crisis with its wide-spread unemployment and general insecurity had set in immediately after the war, the revolutionary crisis within bourgeois society would have assumed a decidedly more powerful and fundamental character. In order to prevent this, the bourgeois governments endeavored, by means of an artificial boom, to weaken the revolutionary crisis. That means that the inevitable has been postponed for a year and a half at the expense of the still further destruction of both the financial and economic apparatus of capitalism. Though the crisis gained thus in depth and intensity, it did not coincide with the stormy wave caused by demobilization, but with a time of

defeat, of a settling of accounts, when in one camp the masses had to start anew at the very beginning, and in the other were disappointed—all of which was the cause of many splits. The revolutionary energies of Labor were directed inward and found expression in the formation of Communist parties which have become powerful factors in Germany and France. Capitalism, which in 1921 artificially prolonged the unreal boom, exploited, once the immediate danger was avoided, the resulting crisis in order to deprive Labor of its gains (the 8-hour day, increases in wages) which in self-defense it had granted during the preceding period. Labor, though it defended its positions, had to yield in the end. The ideas of conquest of power, of the Soviet system, of a Socialist revolution, naturally receded at a time when Labor was compelled to fight against a reduction of wages, and not always successfully at that.

In countries where the economic crisis did not assume the forms of overproduction and wide-spread unemployment, but another, even more serious form, that of selling out the assets of the country and lowering the standard of living of the workers (as for instance in Germany), the energy of Labor expended in increasing wages (while the buying power of the currency was steadily decreasing) can be likened to a man chasing his own shadow. The German capitalists, together with their brothers in other countries, went over to the offensive. The workers retreated in disorder.

In a situation such as that, the March occurrences took place in Germany. The explanation of those events is that the young Communist Party, alarmed at the apparent retreat of the labor movement, made a desperate attempt at utilizing the action of a group of militant proletarians to "electrify" Labor, and, if possible, to develop the action into a decisive battle.

The Third Congress of the Communist International met with the impressions of the March action still fresh in the minds of the delegates. After careful examination the Congress realized the danger resulting from a clash between the "Offensive Theory" and that of revolutionary "electrification" and those deeper processes going on within Labor in connection with both the economic and political changes.

If in 1918-19 there had been in Germany as strong a Communist Party as in March 1921, it is very possible that the proletariat would have already been victorious in January or March 1919. But a Party such as that did not exist—and the proletariat suffered defeat. Out of the experience gained in that defeat there grew the Communist Party. If in 1921 it had acted as a Communist Party would have been obliged to act in 1919, it would have perished. That was stated by the last Congress.

The discussions on the "Offensive Theory" are closely connected with the problem of how to appraise the economic boom and its development. The spokesmen of that theory developed the following theorem:

The whole world is dominated by a crisis—the crisis of the decay of bourgeois society—which is bound to grow in intensity and thus revolutionize the workers. Hence a Communist Party has no reason to look backwards upon its reserves; its task is to attack capitalist society. Under the pressure of the economic decay the proletariat must sooner or later fulfill that task.

That point of view could not maintain itself in so unimpaired a form till the time of the Congress. Its crudest points were eliminated by the Commission on the Economic Situation. The mere thought that the crisis could be succeeded by a relative economic boom, seemed to the conscious and half-conscious followers of the "Offensive Theory" as something akin to—Centrism. Regarding the opinion that a revival of trade and industry would not only not act as a brake upon the revolution, but could on the contrary imbue it with fresh power—that point of view was held to be purely Menshevik. The badly employed radicalism of the "Left" found an innocent reflection in a resolution adopted by the last convention of the German Party which levelled a personal attack against me. This in spite of the fact that I had been merely repeating the opinion held by the Executive of our Party. I can console myself for that petty revenge of the "Left" since the lessons of the Third Congress have gone home everywhere and most of all in the German Party.

II.

Clear signs of a change in the economic situation are noticeable everywhere. Platitudes about the present crisis being the crisis of decay and the basis of a pre-revolutionary epoch, which can only end with a victory of the proletariat, are not likely to replace a concrete analysis of the economic development and all tactical conclusions resulting therefrom. The world crisis really and truly came to a standstill in May last. The branches of industry manufacturing necessities of life first of all showed signs of a boom. Then came large industry. At

present there are undeniable facts which can be proved by figures.¹

Does that mean the decay of industry has been brought to a stop? That the balance has been regained? That the revolutionary epoch has come to an end? Not at all! The industrial boom simply means that the decay of the capitalist system and the development of the revolutionary movement are merely somewhat more complicated than they appear to some people who always like to simplify matters.

The trend of economic development is characterized by two curves:

One—the basic one—determinates the general growth of the forces of production, buying and selling, import and export, banking operations, etc., etc. The general direction of this curve throughout the entire period of capitalist development is upward. It expresses the fact that under Capitalism the forces of production and the general wealth of society have increased. But this basic curve does not rise steadily. There have been decades when it remained stationary, and others when it soared upward only in order to remain at the same level for a long time. In other words: in the history of Capitalism there have been epochs when the forces of production developed rapidly, and others when they grew very slowly. Thus for instance, considering the curve of Great Britain's export trade, we can see that from the beginning of the 18th century till the middle of the next it developed very slowly indeed. After that time, however, it grew very quickly within two decades (1851-73). In the following epoch (1873-1894) it remained nearly stationary, only in order to go steadily upward again until the outbreak of the war.

If we were to draw this curve, its unequal course upward would be a schematic representation of the development of Capitalism or of one of its parts.

We know, however, that capitalist development moves within the industrial limits given by a few successive phases of the economic boom: boom, standstill, crisis, standstill of the crisis, improvement, boom, standstill, and so on. History teaches us that the period of this cycle is eight or ten years. If we were to put this cycle on paper, we should have a basic curve representing the general direction of capitalist development, and its periodical ups and down, which are as inherent in Capitalism as the beat of the heart in a living animal.

A crisis is succeeded by a boom which is again followed by a crisis. Generally speaking, of course, the curve of capitalism has gone upward during the last few centuries. Hence it follows that the total of development exceeded the total of the crises. The curve has, however, a different aspect in the various epochs. There have been periods of standstill. The oscillations continued. But as the capitalist development was generally slowly upward, it follows that the crises have about balanced the booms. The oscillations continued even through epochs when the forces of production grew very quickly. It is not to be doubted, however, that in every boom industry has gone forward to an extent that could not altogether be destroyed by the succeeding crisis. The ups and downs of capitalist economy can be likened to the vibrations of a chord, if one thinks of the lines of economic development as tightly stretched, which is not the case, however, for they are complicated and bent.

These inner workings of capitalist development, this continuous alternation of booms and crises prove that to think of the present crisis as continuing and intensifying until it is ended by the dictatorship of the proletariat, no matter if that dictatorship will set in within one, two or even three years, is wrong, unscientific and one-sided. Oscillations—we said both in the report and in the resolution of the Third Congress—were and are accompanying capitalist development in its youth, maturity and decay, just as the heart beat is always present in a human being, even in a state of agony. No matter what the general conditions, no matter how far economic decay has progressed, a crisis does away with overproduction and the forces of production, it regulates supply and demand and thus tends to enliven industry.

The tempo, the extent, the firmness and the duration of the revival depend upon the conditions characterizing the vitality of capitalism.

It can now be declared definitely (it was already stated at the Third Congress) that as soon as the crisis has broken through the first wall, the tremendous increase in prices, the industrial revival will within the limits given by the present

¹ Those interested in those figures will find them in the article by Comrade Pawlowski in No. 19 of the Communist International and in an article by Comrade S. A. Falckner in *Economicheskaya Zhisn* (No. 281, 282, 285, 286).

system be confronted with other obstacles—the destruction of the economic balance between America and Europe, the impoverishment of Central and Eastern Europe, the lasting and thorough ruin of the financial apparatus. The next industrial boom, no matter how great, will not be able to put industry on its pre-war level; it is even possible that this boom once the first obstacles are overcome will come to grief in an economic blind alley.

Nevertheless, a boom remains a boom; it means an increase in the demand of goods and consequently an increase in production, the reduction of unemployment, an increase in prices and a consequent possibility of increasing wages. Under these given historic conditions a boom will not weaken Labor but strengthen it. That follows from past events. In all countries the labor movement reached its highest point after the war. At this point Labor, as we have seen, was more or less defeated and compelled to retreat, which resulted in many splits occurring within it. Though a lasting crisis would under conditions such as these increase the bitterness of the workers (especially the unemployed and part-time workers) it would at the same time seriously weaken the activity of Labor which is bound up with the knowledge that without it the wheels of production would not revolve. Lasting unemployment after a period of revolutionary political attacks and defeats is under no circumstances favorable for the Communist Parties. On the contrary! The longer a crisis lasts the more conducive it is both for anarchist and reformist tendencies. This fact finds expression in the splitting away of the syndicalist groups from the Third International, in Amsterdam joining hands with the 2½ International, in a temporary consolidation of the Serrati group, in the splitting off of the Levi group, etc. An industrial revival is apt to strengthen Labor's self-reliance, weakened by many defeats and dissolutions within its ranks; it is furthermore apt to weld the workers in mill and mine together and strengthen their attempts at united action.

We are already noticing the first signs of this process. Labor, beginning to feel solid ground under its feet, strives for unity; it feels that splits are obstacles on the way to action. The workers endeavor not only to present a united front to the capitalist attempting to take advantage of the crisis conditions, they even prepare for a counterattack and rely in this on the conditions created by the boom. The crisis represented for Labor a period of disappointments, bitterness and partly despair at its own weakness. The boom will give these feelings occasion to vent themselves in action. This is said in the resolution of the Third Congress:

"If the development should slow down, and if the present crisis is, in some countries succeeded by a period of boom, this would not mean the ushering in of the "organic" epoch. Oscillations are inevitable as long as Capitalism continues to exist; they will be with it in its time of agony just as they accompanied it during its youth and maturity.

If in the course of this crisis the proletariat is overrun by Capitalism, it will surely assume the offensive once a period of boom has set in. An economic attack such as that which must be carried out under the slogan of revenge for the deceptions of the war period and for all humiliations suffered during the crisis, would thus show just as much tendency to become a civil war as the present defensive...."

III.

The capitalist press shed tears of joy over the economic improvement and the possibility of a new epoch of capitalist stability. There is a little cause for that joy as for the supplementing fears of the "Left", who held the opinion that the Revolution would be the outcome of an uninterupted series of ever-intensifying crisis. Politically speaking, it would in practice be only favorable for us, if the next trade and industrial boom means increased riches for the big capitalists. The tendencies for unity within Labor are but an expression of the increased determination for action. If Labor, in the name of the struggle against the bourgeoisie, demands to-day that the Communists join hands with the Independents and the Social Democrats; it will in the course of development quickly convince itself that only the Communist Parties are able to lead the revolutionary struggle. The first wave of the attack will engulf all workers' organizations and compel them to unite. Both the Social Democrats and the Independents will meet with the same fate; one after the other they will be drowned in the revolutionary tide.

Does this mean, contrary to the opinion of the adherents of the "Offensive Theory", that not a crisis but the industrial revival will lead to the victory of the proletariat? Such a categorical statement has no foundation. We have shown that the connection between a boom and the character of the class-struggle is not mechanical, but complicated and dialectic. In order to understand the tasks of the immediate future, it is sufficient to

know that we are better prepared for a boom period than we were for the crisis. There exist strong Communist Parties in the more important countries on the Continent. These parties are undoubtedly presented by the boom with the opportunity of both an economic and a political offensive.

It would be useless to try and guess to-day how far this offensive can go. It has only commenced, or rather, the very first signs of it have put in their appearance. Some dialectic theoreticians will maintain that if the next industrial revival does not immediately help us to attain victory, a new period of industrial stability will probably set in which will be another step on the road toward the reestablishment of capitalist equilibrium. Does that not involve the danger of a fresh epoch of capitalist reconstruction? To this we can reply as follows: If the Communist Parties would not continue to grow and if the proletariat would not gain more and more experience and join with the bourgeoisie in always more serious and bitter battles, if it would not endeavor to assume the offensive on the first occasion presenting itself—if all this would *not* be the case, capitalist development would, assisted by the manoeuvres of the bourgeois governments, surely attain its goal. Whole countries would then once more be forced back into a state of economic barbarism; millions would perish through hunger and despair, and upon their bones would be built some new equilibrium of the capitalist world. A perspective such as that is a mere abstraction, however. Many obstacles lie on that road: chaos in the world's market, collapse of currency, militarism, dangers of wars, insecurity of even the immediate future. The elementary forces of capitalism groping for a way out of these entanglements affect Labor and spur it to attack. Development of the labor movement goes on even if Labor be compelled to retreat. Because even defeats provide experience and strengthen its party. Labor moves on. The working-class itself is its most important moving factor, the incarnation of its future.

It is true that the movement is impeded by the oscillations of Capitalism, which in a period immediately following a war assume abrupt forms. But no matter in what stage of development the union of objective and subjective conditions will take place—resulting in Revolution—we are satisfied with the knowledge that the tempo of the development depends to great extent upon us, our parties, and our tactics. It is of utmost importance to gain a comprehensive view of the new economic boom which will, perhaps, prove to be a fresh stage in the consolidation of our ranks for a victorious attack. A clear and profound knowledge of the prevailing situation means for a revolutionary party a shortening of the long road of suffering, an approach toward its aim.

Roumanian Politics

by Al Badulescu (Bukarest).

At last! The government of the bloody general Averescu, the cynical Argentinian and of the comedian Take Jonescu has been given the sack. . . . The general did not want this to happen! He made every possible attempt to remain at the rudder. For this noble purpose he changed his opinion twice daily . . . out of love for his country and his party-followers, but all in vain.

The economic and financial crisis, for which no remedy was found, was supplemented by a moral crisis and gave birth to the political crisis. As to the economic and financial crisis, the minister of finance Tibulescu could be sent to Paris or London twice a month; or the import of luxuries and export of necessities could almost daily be permitted or prohibited; or the announced capital and property tax could be postponed indefinitely, and so on. But even at this rate, there was no end to trouble, because the "Banca Nationala", which is the only bank having the right to issue paper money, and which is totally dependent upon the Liberal Party, refused to advance the Government 800,000,000 lei, long ago necessary.

Besides this the government suffered a defeat on the moral field. There is one instance where a colonel made crooked deals in the name of a general; another, where revelations were made of a country villa built by a general with materials and men belonging to the community and government; the embezzlement of millions by higher officials; the appointment of generals and colonels as "Controllers of Speculation" (or as "Speculation of the Controllers", as the opposition called them), etc.

On the political field the "People's" Party was no more successful. Reports came from all sides that leaders as well as entire local organizations were leaving the party. The representatives of the bourgeois opposition in Parliament boycotted it. The terror practised against the great masses weakened the former popularity of the general, i. e., of the party. The leaders of the

People's Party felt that the ground was becoming unsteady; but who wanted to give up the budget?! Who wanted to get through with politics so quickly?

The general attempted to fortify himself politically. He had to resume the fight against the Liberal Party and at one time even succeeded in winning the neutrality of the Peasants' Party (the Tzaranists) which is now the bitterest enemy of the Bratianu Party. The Tzaranist representatives returned to Parliament. For their neutrality they were given the following pledges by the government: A democratic election reform in all provinces; a new election and the calling of the Constituent Assembly. These political concessions for the Peasants' Party were necessary for the future existence of the People's Party, but they also led to an immediate solution of the government crisis. For such election reforms and new elections would necessarily result in immense gains for the left parties, i. e. the Peasant's and Socialist parties, and for the National minorities. It would also have meant the defeat of the Liberal Party for many years. (The Liberal Party controls finances and large industries.) In other words it would have meant a blow to reaction.

The king over whose "constitutionality" much was written could look on calmly. The Liberals gave him the impetus to act. General Averescu had to get out, in spite of the fact that he had announced several times at mass-meetings and in Parliament that his rule was based upon definite principles (Censorship, martial law, long-term sentences for strikers, raising prices, etc.) and that as long as the people's representatives had faith in him, he had no desire to surrender power to the bloody rule of the Liberals!

The moral position of the Liberal Party did not yet warrant the taking over of power. In spite of its conceit the Peasants' Party could not win the confidence of the king, the queen and their clique. The other bourgeois parties are too insignificant to be able to form a government by themselves. The hero of the situation was at this moment the energetic mercenary Take Joneescu.

He is known the world over. He is the great European who formed the Small Entente! He is the man who can not point out a single honest hour in his whole life! He will rule 2 or 3 months, in which he will steal more than was stolen in the 2 years' rule of Averescu. It is no secret that the present government of Take Joneescu (who in 8 days succeeded in finding 12 men for the cabinet) was formed at the recommendation of Bratianu; and that it serves as a curtain for the Liberal Party which is trying to gain time before it can form an independent government. Even the price is known. It the next Parliament, the "Takists" will get 10 seats! Because without the open support of the other parties the "great European" would never get a single seat. But 10 seats will suffice for him . . . to live as a European and to do business for his country . . . as a Roumanian!

The Liberals will therefore form the next Government. Perhaps even before the Spring. This project is supported by the numerous large dailies: "Adevarul", "Dimineta", "Dacia", "Izlanda" (the property of the Liberals), "Universul" (with the largest circulation) and "Lupta" (the new organ of the former democratic war-provocator—C. Mille—as the property of Take Joneescu), and the numerous official organs of the Liberal Party in all the provinces of greater Roumania. The "Banca Nationala", the "Banca Romaneasca" and hundreds of other banking houses are also still influential.

In the last analysis, a Take Joneescu government signifies the following:

- a) No democratic election reform.
- b) War against Soviet Russia.
- c) The indefinite delay of the trial of the hundred Communists who have been languishing in prison for years.

A Take Joneescu government means open, lawful reaction.

The brutal dissolution of the Averescu Government saved the Peoples' Party from a complete breakdown. The greatest disappointment is felt by the new revolutionaries . . . the Tzaranists. By threatening with a very radical program (the capitalist press calls it a copy of Zinoviev's phrases) and through a love-declaration to the dynasty the General's followers hoped to be the successors of the general; but the king and queen do not seem to be as childish as Dr. Lupu, Mihalake and Steve are.

The general situation is again favorable for a revival of the Socialist and Communist parties. But we lack forces of leadership for carrying out the organization of the masses (these are in prison) and *particularly* a daily newspaper.

"Bolshevik Atrocities" Against Polish Prisoners of War

by L. Domski (Warsaw).

Ever since reciprocal repatriation of refugees and former prisoners of war between Soviet Russia and Poland commenced, the press of the latter country is publishing reports alleging that the Bolsheviks are committing atrocities upon the miserable Polish deportees (which allegations are, by the way, usually complied with the statement that 70% of the transports arriving from Russia are Jews who import into Poland Bolshevik ideas). The Chairman of the Polish Committee for the Repatriation of Prisoners of war, Korsak, had even the effrontery to dispatch an official note to the Soviet Government in which he accused the latter of "inhumanity" and "barbarous treatment" of the returning Poles.

Since, however, Poland has already received 400,000 refugees and prisoners of war and the witnesses of "Bolshevik atrocities" have become too numerous, the truth of the matter is beginning to crop out in the debates of the Sejm and even in the columns of the yellow press. National Democratic papers are accusing the aforementioned Korsak of using his notes as a weapon against Bolshevism and as a means of covering up his own guilt. It appears that the alleged Bolshevik atrocities were committed on Polish territory and by Polish authorities at the receiving stations Kolossovo, Rovno and Baranovitchi.

I quote the National Democratic interpellation in the Polish Parliament:

"The situation of the refugees does in no respect improve on crossing the border. The receiving station Kolossovo, where from three to four thousand refugees arrive daily, has no accommodations whatsoever, not even the simplest of barracks. The arrivals are obliged to wait from 12 to 36 hours in the open, on snow-covered ground for the Red Cross train in which force must be used to get a seat. No provisions are made for the preparation of food; neither cooked food nor boiled water are available. As a result of these conditions many refugees who have come through the Bolshevik purgatory (?) unharmed, perish on our side of the border. Close to the railway track in Kolossovo a cemetery can be seen where those unfortunate victims have been buried. No wonder, further, that many of them perish even after they have managed to board a train; on November 14th fifteen corpses were in Stolbcy taken from a Red Cross Train crowded with refugees.

There must indeed be a wide gap between "Bolshevik atrocities" and the methods employed by Polish humanity, if as yellow and rabid a sheet as the "Gazeta Poranna" writes:

"Though the Bolsheviks furnish merely freight cars, our compatriots are able to procure stoves and fuel and reach the border anyhow. There, however, they are brought by our authorities into wooden barracks without any heating apparatus . . . Thus they are compelled to wait for 19 days . . . During the day one has to wait from 3 o'clock in the morning to deliver one's papers into the hands of an official. Anybody becoming impatient is beaten and knocked down by policemen . . . Dozens die in the barracks every day . . . Two children arriving from Rovno at the Repatriation Office in Kosakiewicz in the best of health, did not survive the tender care of the Polish authorities . . ." Here is more material to prove the difference obtaining between the methods of Soviet Russia and of Poland in this respect. The "Gazeta Warszawska" quotes the report of a returned refugee: "After a trip lasting about 10 days we arrived at Rovno without mishap. In that town, however our terrible sufferings commenced". A well-known physician, writing in the PPS. organ on the conditions prevailing in Baranovitchi, says: "The treatment meted out to the deportees by the authorities is intolerable. It is by far too brutal; there have been instances when soldiers, supposed to keep order, have made use of the knout. Such things do not occur in Bolshevik Russia, where a soldier with fixed bayonet or a member of the Extraordinary Commission keeps guard; the knout, however, is quite unknown there." The physician then goes on to heap abuse upon the Extraordinary Commission which, however, does not detract from his admission that his compatriots are a good deal worse than that hated institution.

Of interest in this connection are the newspaper reports on the debates in the Sejm on December 6th:

Rottermund (Nationalist): "Our trains for refugees are not heated for reasons of economy, while the Bolsheviks heat their trains (Voices: Shame!)"

Parson Maciejewicz accuses Secretary Darowski of putting the blame on the Bolsheviks.

Parson Sykulski: "I know of a case when a Bolshevik physician refused to trust our sick to our physicians, because we had no proper trains for them, expressing at the same time

his astonishment that Poland receives her returning compatriots in so sorry a fashion."

And so on and so forth. What hurts those patriots most is that the comparison is all in favor of Soviet Russia. All patriotic lies are of little avail if there are 400,000 witnesses to testify against them.

A certain Lipinski laments in the social-patriotic sheet "Robotnik":

"Our Polish Bolsheviks are shamelessly exploiting all such occurrences, in their anti-Polish agitation among our prisoners of war and refugees. 'There you see', they say, 'how your dearly beloved country greets and receives you'. Unfortunately, under these circumstances, this propaganda is falling upon very favorable ground"

The barrister Zielinski said at a refugee meeting in Warsaw on November 27th: "On yonder Eastern frontier, where Polish authority and Bolshevik conditions meet, lives a irresolute population which does not know whom it should decide for. And before the eyes of that population, where two worlds meet and our national prestige hangs in the balance, there can be observed cold, uncomfortable Polish trains, people passing the night upon the snow-covered ground perishing on Polish soil—victims of our shameful neglect."

Quite recently it was rumored that Mr. Korsak "would leave" his office. Even the "Gazeta Poranna" said that "Korsak is responsible for the dead who are daily being carried out of the barracks in Rovno and Baranovitchi and for those corpses which are brought on to Warsaw."

Meanwhile Mr. Korsak has been promoted—no doubt because of his gifted notes against the "Bolshevik atrocities".

ECONOMICS

The So-Called Denomination of the Currency

by E. Preobrashenski.

At first a few words on the idea of denomination. By denomination is meant a new issue of paper money whose nominal value is to approach the buying power of a metal ruble and which is to take the place of the old depreciated paper money. The difference between denomination and devolution is as follows: Under a devolution the government must issue new paper money which can at any time be exchanged for metal money; at the same time the whole of the depreciated paper currency can be bought in at the market price. After a fixed date all the old money which has not been exchanged is declared to be of no value and is no longer accepted. With us for instance, a devolution at the present time would have the following significance: Considering that our ruble has a value of 1/70,000 of the pre-war ruble, then the market value of our entire currency is equal to the total number of billions we have on hand, divided by 70,000. Supposing that the quotient is 150,000,000, then it would mean that our whole currency is worth 150,000,000 gold rubles. The government issues 150,000,000 new rubles which are backed by gold, and fixes a certain period of time, let us say one month, in which the exchange of the old for the new rubles is to take place. Thus 70,000 old rubles will be worth 1 gold ruble, for, anybody will at any time be able to present the new paper ruble at the treasury and get a gold ruble in return. After the end of the month all the old money is declared invalid and the only money in circulation is the new ruble of full face value.

A denomination also means an exchange, but not against rubles which have a gold backing and which must necessarily have the same buying power as the old currency. From this point of view the new issue of paper money which is about to be decreed is not exactly a denomination, for, this decree does not intend an exchange of the old currency for the new. The new currency will circulate together with the old and the new ruble will have the value of 10,000 rubles now in circulation, and 10 rubles will have the value of 100,000.

But what is the idea behind all this? First of all we must simplify our currency system and make it more convenient for our population. We are already counting in millions, billions and trillions. The greater part of our population is not well versed in these figures. Thus, instead of a million rubles, one hundred will take their place, instead of a billion, these will be simplified and will approach those of pre-war times. Already the market calls a 50,000 note fifty kopecks, a 100,000 note one ruble, etc. As we see, the market went much further with its original "Denomination" than the Soviet decree which sets the value of one new ruble as 10,000 old ones.

The second advantage is that a big transaction will not require so many paper certificates. The buying power of a million old rubles is very small, but the payment of a million rubles requires 1000 thousand-ruble notes. This leads to many technical difficulties.

Another important fact must be taken into consideration. The Council of People's Commissaries decreed that the 1922 issue of paper money is to be limited to a certain definite sum based upon gold. In other words the new issue is not to exceed this sum. This opens the possibility of a gradual limitation of the issue of paper money by means of taxes. The Council of People's Commissaries has already decided that in case the taxpayer should exceed expectations, the 1922 issue will be considerably reduced.

This means that our currency is already taking a turn for the better. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to retain our fictitious "millions" in circulation and it is necessary to take the first step in assigning to these "millions" values which correspond more to their real buying power in relation to their pre-war value.

Many citizens fear that the issue of new rubles may ruin the possessors of the old ones. This fear has no foundation whatever. The new money will circulate together with the old one, and it will make no difference whatever to the buyer as well as to the seller whether they give or take one new ruble or 10,000 old ones for 10 pounds of potatoes, particularly when the new certificates are technically of better quality than the old ones and permit of counterfeiting.

The old money will circulate as small change. An old 1000 ruble note will have the value of 10 kopecks, a 500 ruble note, 5 kopecks, and according to the market-price standard a new ruble will have only one half the value of pre-war gold ruble.

IN THE INTERNATIONAL

On the Eve of the Second Congress of the Italian Communist Party

by Umberto Terracini.

Sometime next month, that is, in February, the Italian Communist Party will hold its Second Congress since its charter convention. The First Congress met at Livorno immediately after the withdrawal of the Communists from the Socialist Party. The large and unpretentious auditorium of the S. Mark's Theatre was used for one day by the representatives of the fraction which after a painful but necessary split sought to express its allegiance to the Third International. This meeting was not only of demonstrative and preparatory importance, but it also laid down in a clear and unequivocal manner the fundamental principles of the young Communist Party's program and of its form of organization.

No one will fail to recognize the great difference between the two congresses and between the circumstances under which each took place. The first one took place at a moment when the labor movement was completely downtrodden. The period of inner dissolution and degeneration had set in for the Socialist Party, which had given ample proof of its emptiness of content, the disconnectedness of its work, its complete lack of a definite program and its utter failure to take advantage of the situation.

After having reached the height of their power, and a membership of 250,000, the main fighting ranks began to thin out and to break up. A good proof of this is the fact that at the Livorno Congress only 170,000 workers were represented. After the admirable but vain attempt to seize the factories the Italian proletariat had to look on at the speedy growth of the Fascist movement and stand the attack launched against them by the capitalists without the political and trade-union headquarters having as much as offered a slogan with which to lead the action or given advice or offered assistance. Moreover, the detestable opposition to the Third International and to the Russian revolution on the part of the leading bureaucratic lights brought confusion into the masses and worked havoc in the ranks of the workers who only a short while ago still saw the present critics and slanderers at the head of the worshippers and adorers of the Revolution. The First Congress of the Italian Communist Party must also have had a premonition of the consequences of the milieu in which it took place. Being more of a war council than a Congress it must have felt the violent shock received by the revolutionary masses, which thirsted for clearness, knowledge and responsibility. Once and for all the Congress did away with every ambiguity and laid down the foundation of a strict discipline. Then the Congress adjourned and the delegates were instructed to go back to their provinces

and to stir the general hopelessness and desolation into a belief in the certainty of the events which were to follow.

The Second Congress will start its sessions under quite different circumstances. There is as yet in Italy only a young and small party; but it is constantly growing and promises to develop into a well-organized power. It is a party forming a network of 1403 groups and embracing the entire country; it is a party whose strongly centralized organization enables it to give a unified direction to all its actions and whose press consists of three dailies, twenty provincial weeklies, a young people's weekly, a trade-union paper, a newspaper correspondence and a publishing-house. The instructions of the party are observed by about one-third of the members of the Confederation of Labor and by a smaller militant vanguard within the Italian Syndicalist Union. The Italian proletariat can no longer be in doubt or uncertainty as to the program and tactics of the Communist Party, because the latter clearly defined its position in all questions of a general nature which had arisen on the world-stage in 1921. Moreover, it may safely be said that all of those who submitted themselves to the discipline and program of the Party did so in full consciousness of what they were doing. The actions of the Party at the Congress of Livorno were in strict accord with the fundamentals laid down in the program so that the Congress which is soon to take place need not spend much time in approving or passing judgement upon past events. It will suffice to check up and see whether any errors have been committed. The unanimity with which the party received and followed out the instructions of the Executive Committee serves as a good proof of its faithfulness, and it is therefore very unlikely that it will be severely reproached or criticized.

That is why the report of the Executive Committee does not stir any nervous expectations. Neither is there any personal quarrel or disagreement which can in any way disturb the coming Congress in its work, a thing not altogether unknown in many parties and at many congresses. However, the Congress will give its undivided attention to the principles which are proposed and discussed from various points of view.

It is the particular intention of the Executive Committee to bring up several questions of an immediate and practical nature. It is clear that the tactical questions as well as the questions of principle as they are laid down in the party program cannot and should not be altered.

And since the conquest of the trade-unions and the agrarian question, whose solutions form the prerequisite for all revolutionary action, are the two main objectives upon which the activities of the Italian party are concentrated, they are assigned two special sections of the agenda.

When examined, these questions exhibit deviations, not of a primary but of a secondary nature. Nevertheless, the party tactics must incorporate the results of the investigation, in order to avoid confusion and the division of the general action of the party into hundreds of confusing partial actions.

Since the fundamental principles on the trade-union and agrarian questions were already defined by the Third Congress of the Communist International, the corresponding tactics to be proposed by certain delegates of the Communist Party are not to contradict the basic principles laid down in Moscow, but they will rather seek to adapt them to the conditions and circumstances which are peculiar to the Italian milieu. Under these, the questions of "labor-organizations" and "land ownership and cultivation" assume an unusually characteristic form.

This part of the Congress' work will be preceded by a discussion of the "tactical principles", which starting with an enlargement upon the party program will determine the way of building up and developing the Communist Party, define the relations between the Communist Party and the proletariat as well as those between the Communist Party and the other proletarian political movements, lay down the tactical rules for direct and indirect action and finally define the position to be assumed by the Italian Communist Party in the present situation.

Through its serious attitude and the palpable results of its work, the Second Congress of the Italian Communist Party will introduce a new chapter into the history of the Italian proletarian movement.

The Italian Socialist Party has a not too-enviable congressional tradition. All its congresses, particularly those of recent years, were nothing more than pleasant trips or hikes for the comrades who came together from various parts of the country, not for the purpose of serious discussions or to help shape the destinies of the proletariat, but only for the sake of amusement and curiosity. Hence the three to four thousand delegates filling the theatre auditorium with noise, and the ever-growing unanimity in the acceptance of the majority reports by professional and intellectual men who could afford to travel and

to hold lengthy sessions. These congresses which were called to deal with yard-long resolutions, always confined their work to the struggle over their pet question, namely, over the political resolution which was discussed and passed from a onesided parliamentary viewpoint, and which conformed to the existing form of government and to existing laws. As exceptions to the rule come the congresses of Reggio Emilia in 1912 and that of Ancona in 1914, at which questions of inner organization were discussed and settled (the expulsion of the reformists and Bisolatti in 1912, and of the freemasons in 1914). In its instructions for the calling of the Second Congress the Communist Party of Italy fixes the number of delegates at 150, all of whom are to meet in advisory and executive meetings and hold district sessions. It is certain that all questions on the order of the day will be treated exhaustively, since the congress will do its work by means of committees.

Thus, the net result of the Congress' work will consist of a series of definite and palpable fundamentals. And through its activity the party will give shape to its program for the coming year. This program can be summarized as follows: Intensification of the armed resistance against the Fascisti attacks; the progressive conquest of the trade-unions; penetrating the masses of agricultural workers and forcing our way into the districts of Southern Italy which are exclusively agricultural.

RELIEF FOR RUSSIA

What the Bulgarian Workers did for the Famine Sufferers in Soviet Russia

by Kolarov (Sofia).

The news of the great misfortune that has befallen the millions of inhabitants of the Volga region, and the call for help which came from Soviet Russia and the Communist International, met with a great response among the inhabitants and the bourgeoisie of Bulgaria. At first the bourgeoisie also shed a few crocodile tears over the famished sufferers, but later bethought itself and started an outrageous campaign against the relief action of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

In response to the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in which the collection of contributions was suggested, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party issued a special appeal to the working masses of Bulgaria, in which they were summoned to do the following: first of all, to contribute a day's wages for the starving; secondly, to demand of the government the resumption of political and economic relations with Soviet Russia; and thirdly, to protect the proletarian revolution with all possible means against the newly organized advance of international capitalist reaction. This appeal sufficed to rouse the enthusiasm of the Bulgarian working masses for Soviet Russia and to bring about considerable sacrifices on their part.

Under the auspices of the Bulgarian Communist Party great mass-meetings were everywhere organized, the miserable condition of the Volga population was laid bare and the significance of the Russian Revolution and of Soviet Russia for the working masses was brought to light. At these meetings the first public collections were made. Later, the party organized workers' committees which went from house to house and from store to store and collected contributions either in money or in goods. The labor organizations pledged themselves to take off a day's wages from their members. Besides this, many other means were resorted to. In spite of their own poverty, the workers responded with great willingness and sacrifice to the appeal of the party. Thanks to the effectiveness of the Communist Party's activities, many members of the bourgeois class were also willing to help. The relief campaign thus assumed a national character. Only isolated villagers, mostly of the rich peasantry who are the sworn enemies of the Communists, refused to aid.

But the Communist Party was not satisfied with one appeal. It concentrated all its energy and the generosity of the masses and transformed the relief action into a permanent campaign. The 3rd and 4th of September were fixed as international relief-days. On these days, great mass-meetings were again arranged together with the Communist Youth. The Communist fraction in Parliament demanded of the government the reestablishment of political and economic relations with Soviet Russia. Outside of this, they made a motion to grant 500,000,000 leva for the purchase of food for the famine sufferers. Those Town Councils which are controlled by the Communists granted money, and in those controlled by the bourgeoisie the Communists made motions to that effect.

The time between the 20th and the 30th of October was set by the Executive Committee of the party as the Red Week for Russian Relief. During these 10 days all the energy of the party was concentrated upon the relief campaign.

On this occasion the "Workers' Journal" issued a special number dealing exclusively with the struggle against the famine. The net income, consisting of 50,000 copies at 5 leva, was turned over to the relief fund. The local committees intensified their activities and all the party organizations arranged an artistic evening for the benefit of the famine sufferers. On the 7th of November, the day of the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, the party renewed its appeal not to forget the famine sufferers.

The greatest support which the Communist Party received in its action came from the trade-unions, from all the other Communist organizations and its press. The trade-unions have contributed large sums out of their treasuries and are doing everything within their power to obtain a day's wages from the organized as well as from the unorganized workers.

The Young People's Communist League has contributed all its energy to this action. Particular mention is deserved by the Workers' Cooperative, "Osvobodniye" which, with its branches in all the cities of the country, proved of great aid to the party, inasmuch as they pledged themselves to store the collected goods, hold them and to send them on. Besides all this, the Workers' Cooperative printed the special issue of the workers' paper for the Russian famine-sufferers free of charge, and placed its entire organization and its personnel at the service of the cause.

The results of all these exertions of the Bulgarian Communist Party are already to be seen. It made the first shipment to Soviet Russia, consisting of 30 carloads of grain, worth about 2,000,000 leva, and it will continue to make collections until Soviet Russia has overcome the famine.

What stand was taken by the government towards the famine-sufferers of Soviet Russia? What stand was taken by the Bulgarian bourgeoisie? The government expressed its sympathy for the famine-sufferers and declared that Bulgaria should aid them. The cabinet even decided to feed 20,000 children from the famine-region in Bulgaria at the Government's expense. The Red Cross was commissioned to institute relief-collections. The bourgeois press gave vent to the "humanitarian sentiments" of the Bulgarian capitalists, and announced its willingness to help the Russian people. But all this proved to be a shameless hypocrisy.

The resolution of the cabinet to feed 20,000 Russian children remained on paper only. All the other declarations of the willingness and readiness to aid the famine-sufferers in every possible way shared the same fate. When the delegation of the Ukrainian Red Cross arrived in Bulgaria on its mission for the starving children, the Government had them arrested and after 40 days' confinement they were sent back to Odessa. There were many cases where the local officials forbade the relief-activity of the Communists and it very often happened that the collected moneys were confiscated and the local committees were arrested and maltreated. It was only thanks to the great energy of the Communists and to the sympathy of the masses that the government opposition was overcome.

The bourgeoisie's mask soon dropped. It is true that it approved the government's suggestion in regard to the 20,000 children, but the organ of the former Czarist Party pictures to itself the carrying out of this plan in such a manner that not only are the children to be provided with bread, but they are also to be inculcated with Russian patriotism. This latter task is to be assumed by the numerous counter-revolutionaries in Bulgaria. The Privy Council in Sofia declared that the children could become servants in the houses of the bourgeoisie. For a long time nothing was heard from the Red Cross Committee and certainly nothing was seen. The whole affair was so outrageous that the Bulgarian authoress, Anna Karima, a member of the Committee, resigned her office and in an open letter unmasked the bourgeois hypocrisy. She did this in order to recommend to those who actually wished to aid the starving Russians, that they hand in their contributions to the Communist Committee. Put to shame by the relief activities of the Communist Party, the Red Cross Committee finally commenced its relief activities. The Russian relief action, set into motion by the Communist Party, jogged the bourgeoisie which then gave vent to its hatred against the Soviet government. The tears that it had shed evaporated, and in their stead the bitter counter-revolutionary hatred against the forerunners of the world revolution came to the fore. The first occasion for the outbreak of this limitless hatred took place when the League of Russian Cooperatives requested the Workers' Cooperative, "Osvobodniye", to purchase 1200 carloads of grain in Bulgaria, from the surplus

assigned for export trade. The circumstance that this grain was to be purchased by the Communist Cooperative and designated for Soviet Russia made this an important issue which led to a lively contest between the united Bulgarian bourgeoisie and the Communist Party. This fight is still on. It was started by the standard-bearers of the bourgeoisie, the Right Socialists (Bulgarian SP.). At first, this party also let a few words drop for the starving Russians; it even made a public collection which yielded from 1000 to 2000 leva. But when the relief action of the Communist Party proved to be successful, the SP. gentlemen at once sounded the alarm: "The Moscow hangmen, having driven their own people to starvation, now want to deprive the Bulgarian nation of its bread; the Bulgarian Communists are their well paid agents". They called upon the Bulgarian people to get even with the authors of the high prices, i. e. the Communists, and incited them to appropriate the vast stores of food, in the Workers' Cooperative, which were designated for Soviet Russia. In order to show their true color, these "Socialists" started a collection in their organ, for the "victims of—the Bolsheviki terror". The entire capitalist press joined in the howling.

By playing the role "protectors of the people's bread", these discredited "police-socialists" sought to regain their footing in the masses and at the same time to deliver a blow to the Communist Party. They submitted an interpellation to the government, requesting the latter to confiscate the food gathered by the Communists and to distribute the same among the poor, free of charge. At the same time they flooded the whole country with the most contemptible appeals, and even organized demonstrations for plundering expeditions.

But the Communist Party was at the rudder all the time. It took up the fight fully conscious of the just cause it fought for. In a short time it made clear to the masses everything concerning the purchase of food, as well as the real causes of the rise in the price of bread, and of the sudden howl raised against the Communists. The Communist Party gathered the workers and the small property owners throughout the country in great mass-meetings, at which it unmasked the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the "Socialists", carried on propaganda for the Russian Soviet Republic and for the Bulgarian Communist Party, and promised to use a strong arm against the provocators. The meetings of the "Socialists" ended in a fiasco. Their entire campaign came to naught.

Up to the present, the Workers' Cooperative has sent three ships of grain to the starving Russia.

Soviet Russia's Relief for its Starving

by Willy Munzenberg.

In the hunger campaign Soviet Russia, bleeding from the wounds of six years' war, with its industry and agriculture ruined by these wars, by an iron blockade and by innumerable acts of counter-revolutionary sabotage, has accomplished more than all the foreign relief committees and organizations together.

The Soviet government has provided 10,040,500 poods (approximately 150,000 tons) of seed grain for the winter sowing in addition to large quantities of grain to feed the starving workers and peasants and their children. Only 1,861,000 poods were obtained in foreign countries—mostly purchased by the Soviet government.

These figures are sufficient proof of the successful activity of our Russian comrades in the campaign against the famine. After the arrival of the seed all efforts were turned to the sowing. In many places they worked day and night—when daylight failed by the light of lanterns. The following table gives an indication of the degree to which they were able to attain the objective set beforehand.

Government	seed arrived poods	area planned for sowing dessiatines	area actually sowed dessiatines	percentage accom- plishment	area sowed as against 1920 dessatines	percentage as against 1920
Samara	1,909,743	8,000,000	426,831	53.0	529,600	80.5
Simbirsk	1,125,375	500,000	235,831	47.1	445,200	52.9
Saratov	2,008,820	1,000,000	900,080	90.0	167,600	117.2
Mari District . .	320,000	139,956	74,177	53.0	136,000	54.5
Tchuwash. . . .	557,598	174,859	14,587	83.4	138,400	104.0
Tartar Republic	2,210,141	962,000	359,161	37.3	846,100	42.3
Ufa	805,903	240,220	219,034	91.0	521,200	79.7
Votsk	49,956	286,780	146,352	51.0	229,400	63.3
Viatka	55,671	727,237	545,500	75.0	684,900	253.9
Astrakhan	76,500	47,830	48,500	101.4	19,100	253.9
Tsariysyn	406,348	399,210	321,917	80.6	287,700	111.9
German Colony	510,000	230,000	138,000	60.0	130,100	160.0
Bashkir Republic	185,642	125,000	34,720	19.4	151,400	16.3
Ural	233,481	46,000	40,000	87.0	24,000	166.6

Thus, thanks to the intensive labor of our Russian comrades the winter sowing was accomplished. The prospects for the spring sowing are, however, not very favorable since the governments which were still able to contribute rather large quantities of seed for the autumn sowing have today only little grain left. According to the figures of the Central Relief Commission the following quantities of grain are urgently needed for the spring sowing:

	Poods	Area to be sowed desiatines
Oats	13,440,500	577,700
Barley	1,985,600	340,200
Wheat	12,470,700	2,299,000
Buckwheat	1,512,300	205,500
Millet	1,749,700	1,167,400
Lentils	428,700	47,800
Peas	401,200	42,300
Flax	415,300	86,000
Hemp	479,000	47,700
Mustard	7,800	6,800
Sunflower	416,400	228,000
Spelt	440,000	44,000
Corn	364,800	90,000
Total	33,012,000	6,244,000

Russia itself can provide only a small portion of the necessary quantity, at most 15,000,000 poods. All the rest must be imported.

Workers and Comrades! Our relief campaign will be only patchwork if we only send food for the immediately necessary need, for the temporary alleviation of the famine. The furnishing of sufficient grain and of machines for an improved cultivation of the soil, which will enable a better crop in the future, is just as important, in fact even more important for the future and for the economic restoration of Soviet Russia. These are the present problems of the relief campaign which are of the greatest importance and which must be neither overlooked nor underestimated. We must do all in our power in order to help here as well and to ship the grain necessary for the spring sowing to Russia as soon as possible.

The White Terror

From Jugoslavian Jails.

Three of the former prisoners of war returning from Russia were recently arrested on their arrival in Subotica. Amongst these was Spasoje Stojanovic who, though his papers were in perfect order, was alleged to be a certain Nicola Spasojevic, the commander of a mysterious Jugoslavian Legion of the Russian Red Army. Stojanovic protested vehemently and repeatedly told his captors that he was nothing but a common laborer. "No," he was told, "you have commanded an army at Kharkoff, Kiev, Odessa and Archangelsk." Then Stojanovic was cruelly maltreated and compelled to sign whatever was dictated to him. This being done, he was asked to confess that Sima Makovic had sent him from Russia to assassinate the king (and his two fellow travelers to murder Premier Pashitch). On declaring this to be another untruth, Stojanovic was again manhandled and forced to sign a confession to the effect that these accusations were true.

The "Politiva" and the "Balkan" both of which papers are receiving large subsidies from the government contingent fund made these "attempts at assassination" the starting point of a new and even more rabid anti-Communist campaign. Meanwhile Stojanovic together with the documents signed by him had been transferred to the notorious headquarters of the Belgrade police where he was detained for seven days in a chimney flue without even being allowed bread and water. On the eighth day Stojanovic was brought before magistrate Vujitch and withdrew all his "confessions". He showed the magistrate his wounds and the black and blue marks on his body. The magistrate then led the prisoner through a number of offices where he showed the clerks the proofs of the brutality of the police, and then gave him 20 dinars. Stojanovic was discharged, and the judges had a good laugh at the "examination methods" of the police and at the "commander". And there the matter ended. Nobody has been held responsible for the bestiality and cruelty of the police.

The second repatriated prisoner of war was detained for three weeks and then released. The third, Djoka, was also

released after a few days detention. Neither of them was brought before a court.

In Negotin seven Communists were arrested during the night at their homes and brought to the police station. They were accused of maintaining unlawful connection with Communists for which terrible crime one may be sentenced either to death or to 20 years at hard labor in Jugoslavia. Though the magistrate declined to institute proceedings against them, the police did not release them immediately, but meted out corporal punishment (sixty blows with a club), and compelled them to cry: "Long live Premier Pashitch!" Some of the "suspects" died a few days afterwards from the effects of the treatment.

When comrade Josipovic Nikola on being arrested because he had been a delegate to the Third Congress of the Comintern, was asked his name he gave it and—was struck twice in the face by the gendarme because he had not arranged first and family name in the Serbian fashion. This occurrence is characteristic of the treatment generally meted out to prisoners in Jugoslavia. Comrade Josipovic has been in arrested now for four months without having been granted a trial.

Nikola Novakovic has suffered a similar fate. After having been under arrest for four months, the court declared its incompetency and referred the case to a higher court where the procedure will have to be gone over again from the very beginning.

The teacher Ratko Zunic, a Communist deputy, has been arrested several times, the magistrate having every time annulled the warrant issued by the Monastir police. Then the police accused Zunic of having sent a pamphlet and several Communist papers to an acquaintance of his in a neighboring village. Anybody accused of that "crime" is liable to very severe punishment according to the "law for the defense of the state". Nor was the fact that the "crime" was committed in July, four weeks before the anti-Communist law was passed, sufficient reason to desist from persecution.

The student Rakotovic was arrested in Milanovac and transported to Negotin on the 8th August because a pamphlet criticising Communism was found upon him. He was kept in a dark cell and repeatedly manhandled and suspended from the bars of his cell. He was cut down by two prison guards. After having been detained for 112 days he was released as innocent.

The Communist deputy Sima Miljus was arrested in connection with the attempt to assassinate Pashitch. As the case was founded on thin air, he had to be released and was banished from Belgrade to Zagreb. Here he was re-arrested a few months later for the same reason and again released and deported, this time to the village where he had been born.

Another Communist deputy, Doncevic from Strumica, was arrested there and in chains transported to the Belgrade jail where he was cruelly maltreated. When brought before the magistrate, that personage did not know what to do with the prisoner because no charges had been preferred. On being brought back to Strumica Doncevic was re-arrested by the police there and has been kept in jail now for five months. He was not allowed to communicate with the outside world; his relatives did not even know if he was still alive.

On his return from the Moscow Congress Milivoje Kaljevic was arrested, transported to Nish and cruelly treated by the police, the corporal punishment being meted out by the captain of the gendarmes himself. From Nish Kaljevic was transported to Belgrade and accused under a law which did not exist when he left for Moscow. Kaljevic has been in jail now for four months.

A few months ago the farmhand Stevan Obradovic was arrested in a mysterious manner and has not been heard of since. His family has been refused all information.

When the Communist deputy Nikola Kovacevic was arrested six months ago he was put into a cell the size of which does not allow the prisoner to lie down. When complaining, Kovacevic was mockingly told, "If you draw your legs together, Sir Deputy, you will have sufficient room". During the whole time Kovacevic was compelled to squat on the cold concrete floor.

Laza Petrovic and Nikola Rafailovic were in jail for five months in connection with the attempt on the Premier's life, before they were released by order of the court as innocent. After three days they were arrested by the Belgrade police as vagabonds, because they had not succeeded in finding work. Rafailovic was told, "You will stay in jail for the rest of your life". Petrovic is a Communist deputy from Belgrade.