

# - INTERNATIONAL -

# PRESS

# CORRESPONDENCE

Vol. 2 No. 44

2nd Juny 1922

Central Bureau: Berlin SW 48, Friedrichstrasse 225, III. — Postal address Franz Dahlem, Berlin SW 48, Friedrichstrasse 225, III  
for Inprekorr. — Telegraphic address: Inprekorr.

## The Results of the First International Campaign for the Proletarian United Front

by *Karl Radek.*

The break-up of the Commission of Nine marks the close of the first phase of our world-wide struggle for the proletarian united front. This campaign has taught us a number of lessons (both of a general political nature and an international organizational character) which it behooves us to go into carefully, because the campaign just ended was only the first one and the struggle is to continue.

How is the united to be established—from below or from above?

The first question we had to answer when the problem of an united front came into the foreground was, "In what way will we urge this united front, from below or from above?" This way of putting the question is even now repeatedly met with in discussions on the united front. In this connection, the opinion is advanced that the break-up of the Commission of Nine is due to the fact that we approached the matter too much from above instead of carrying our idea into the masses. This attitude bears the earmarks of immaturity and ignorance. If we had been faced with the alternative of either moving Wels, Renaudel and Henderson, or the hundreds of thousands of workers behind them, our choice would have been easy indeed. Or does anybody really doubt that every Communist would not prefer association with the Social Democratic proletarians to connection with the Social Democratic leaders?

When we decided to sit down at one table with Wels and MacDonald, we did so because the workers behind them were still under their spell and inaccessible to us unless we sat down at one table with their leaders. It goes without saying that if the development continues in the same direction and the economic situation of the proletarian masses goes from bad to worse, great sections of the workers will leave the camp of the Social Democratic leaders and join our ranks. But the tactical task we applied ourselves to when unrolling the problem of the united front was this, "How can we unite the proletarian masses in a struggle for their immediate interests before they have parted company with their leaders and come to us?" With this end in view we did what had to be done and sat down at one table with the Social Democratic leaders.

Hence the correct way of formulating the question is this, "What is the net result of our endeavor to approach the Social Democratic masses through a conference with their leaders upon our activities amongst the Social Democratic workers?" We believe that the result can only be called favorable. Did not the leaders of the Social Democracy, of the Second International, under the very eyes of the workers' masses wreck every attempt to unite these very same masses; did they not help the bourgeoisie to weather the breakers of the Genoa Conference; did they not prevent labor from closing its ranks within the coming months when the condition of the working class will undoubtedly grow still worse! All that remains to be done is to hammer these political results of the Berlin Conference and the first session of the Commission of Nine into the consciousness of the broad masses. It

must be stated, however, that so far only very little has been done in this respect both by the Communist International and its national sections. I will only mention the two most important parties. The Communist Party of Germany appealed to the masses merely through its Press and did not simultaneously issue popular handbills which would have spoken to millions of workers, not to speak of the French Party which did even publish the official documents on our struggle for the united front. All means at our disposal must now be concentrated in an attempt to approach the masses of non-Communist workers (and not merely) by means of handbills) to tell them what conclusions must be drawn from the three months of struggle.

And these conclusions are not only the fact that the leaders of the Second International sabotaged the united front but also that the masses permitted them to do so. Now it is rather easy to censure merely the former, but it would be committing a serious blunder if we were to persuade ourselves that it is merely the leaders who are sabotaging, while the workers behind them are fired with enthusiasm for the united front. If such were the case, we could afford to make light of the leaders and their sabotage. But unfortunately it is not; for though broad sections of labor feel the want of unity, they are not prepared to enter upon a struggle for it. This passive friendship for the united front is the outcome of the weariness of the masses resulting from their dissatisfaction with the party strife which appears to be quite futile to them. The united front means to them, "Quit warring against each other"; but not, "Come on with the struggle!" Hence our demand and appeal to the masses to ignore the leaders of the Second International does not signify that these masses are already with us; it imposes the task of going among them and rousing to struggle there masses only very small sections of whom are inspired by militant sentiments.

Is our appeal to the broad masses after the collapse of the Commission of Nine to be interpreted as meaning that we will not continue our attempts to build up the united front from above and in spite of all that has happened? For an answer (and to show the variety of the problem) it will be sufficient to point out that in Saxony despite the breakdown of the Commission of Nine we did not abandon our negotiations regarding our attitude towards the Government. We did not succeed internationally in compelling the leaders of the Social Democratic Parties to cease sabotaging the united front because the pressure from below was not everywhere the same. This fact, however, should not keep us from advancing in the same direction and trying to compel the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half to defend together with us the interests of the workers—wherever and whenever this is possible, whether in a state, a province or a municipality. And every time success crowns our endeavor it will be of the utmost importance for the future united front on an international scale. If, for instance, Saxony gets a labor government supported by the whole working class and the government is consequently compelled to struggle for the vital interest of labor, it will convince the workers throughout Germany that

a united front is possible and is the best manner of defending their interests. Every gap made in the wall behind which the Second International seeks to shelter its adherents from the Communist International tends to facilitate the final surrender of the stronghold.

Our work which will require a long time to accomplish (and then only provided our comrades do not take things too easily!) does not consist of *shouting*, "From below! From below!" What counts is whether one understands how to *work* from below. This demands careful study of the immediate interests of labor, to which interests our agitation must be adapted. But that is not all—the ability to turn agitational successes to account on the organizational field is just as essential. That however is an art which has been developed least of all in the ranks of the Communist Parties. Their one great failing is a certain schematism of thought; they fondly believe in the possibility of making an organized Communist of every worker who favors the attitude of the Communist International. Hence they are averse to loosely knit formations enabling us to get together greater masses even if they have not yet decided upon final rupture with their parties.

Finally, it must be understood that a real collaboration of all Communist Parties is the prerequisite for the struggle for the united front. One of the lessons to be gathered from the last months' campaign is that such collaboration is still wanting. It would be childish to deny that. The attitude of the French Party, aiming as it did at sabotaging the endeavors of the Executive Committee, will be made the subject of a searching inquiry and of serious measures by the Executive before the tribunal of our French comrades. The French comrades will have to state what they prefer—a centralized International or a pile of sand. The resistance offered by the French comrades to the decisions of the Enlarged Executive Committee gives rise to the question whether or not it was not necessary to wait with the struggle for the united front till we had first convinced the French comrades. Could we have afforded to tarry, it would most certainly have been better to discuss the matter at length and do away with all misunderstandings. But unfortunately it is not always possible to wait for the struggle till everything and everybody is ready for it. The struggle itself is the best teacher. We are convinced that every Communist who can survey and understand the first phase of the struggle for the united front is more than ever persuaded of the necessity for the decision advocating our entering upon that struggle.

## POLITICS

### Decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the Report of Comrade Joffe

After hearing the report of Comrade Joffe, member of the Soviet Delegation to the Genoa Conference the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the following resolution:—

In defending the autonomy and the independence of the R.S.F.S.R., in opposing the attempts at enslaving the Russian workers and peasants, and in blocking resolutely the plot of the foreign capitalists aiming at the reestablishment of private property in Russia, the Delegation of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Allied Soviet Republics executed the task imposed upon it. By concluding a treaty with Germany based on equal rights and reciprocity, the Delegation has furthermore guarded the interests of the toiling masses of the R.S.F.S.R. and its Allied Soviet Republics. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee especially underscores the correct and timely proposition of the Delegation for general disarmament which the delegates formulated at the opening sessions of the Conference. This motion of the delegation of the R.S.F.S.R. expressed the interests and the desires not only of the toiling masses of Russia but also the immediate interests of the toilers throughout the world and of all exploited and enslaved peoples and nations.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee regrets very much that this motion of the Delegation of the R.S.F.S.R. found no echo in the delegations of the Powers represented at the Genoa Conference and was excluded from the deliberations. This action on the part of the Powers exposes their peoples to the continuous threat of new wars and bloody conflicts. The toiling masses of the whole world cannot abandon their endeavors to

ensure peace under all circumstances and will be compelled to seek guarantees for such a peace.

The international political and economical situation is characterized by the extreme instability of the capitalist system as a whole. The political effect of this instability is the absence of real peace, the increase of armaments and the intensification of the conflicts between the great powers leading to the danger of new gigantic imperialist wars, to colonial rebellions, nationalist campaigns, etc.

The Genoa Conference not only disclosed the profound antagonism between Great Britain and France, Japan and the United States, France and Italy, the victors and the vanquished, it also exposed the utter incompetence not only of the League of Nations but also of the so-called Entente. On the other hand we see civil war in Ireland, civil war in China, India and Egypt, the nationalist war of Turkey against enslavement by foreign capital and the intensification of the social class conflicts in all countries (strikes in England, revolts of the workers in South Africa, lockout in Denmark, strikes in Germany, etc.). All this is merely the objective expression of the continuous decay of the social political system of capitalism.

Economically seen this decay is harshly expressed by the fact that three-and-a-half years after the end of the war the powerful and (owing to the war) rich states — whose attempts at gathering ever more riches finally adopted the forms of undisguised cynical robbery — cannot reestablish their former capitalist relations. The Treaty of Versailles has proven a failure even in the chaos in the exchange market, the impossibility of regulating mutual financial claims and debts on a capitalist basis the profoundly disturbed relations between Europe and America, the utter decay of a number of countries in Europe and the impossibility (which hard facts have brought home even to bourgeois economists and politicians) of economic reconstruction without including Russia in the world's economic relations, are all the symptoms of economic decay.

For these reasons Paragraph One of the Cannes Resolutions in recognizing the equality of two systems of property (the private capitalist system and the Communist system which so far had only been recognised by the R.S.F.S.R.) and thus, if only indirectly, the collapse of the first-named system and its penetration by a new form of property relation which, though it was compelled to live under extremely unfavorable conditions, has nevertheless demonstrated its staying power.

The remaining paragraphs of the Cannes resolution, however, and the Genoa memorandum contradict that principle and thus condemn themselves to a feeble existence.

The equality of both systems and the manner in which to combine them (if only temporarily — as long as the world has not finally abandoned the system of private property and the crises, the economic chaos, etc., resulting from it for a more advanced system of property relations) is only emphasized in the Treaty of Rapallo.

No matter what the immediate outcome of the conference of Genoa, the whole recent development of international relations is conclusive proof of the inevitable necessity for the side by side existence of the bourgeois and the Communist systems of property for at least some time; it furthermore compels even Soviet Russia's most stubborn enemies to look for ways and means of coming to an understanding with the Communist system of property, after four years of attempts at liquidating this system have shown the futility of the latter course.

Moved by all these considerations, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee

1—Welcomes the Russo-German treaty concluded at Rapallo as the only way out of the difficulties, the chaos and the danger of war;

2—Considers treaties of that kind as a standard for relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the capitalist countries;

3—Instructs the Council of People's Commissars and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to continue their foreign policy in this spirit,

4—Instructs the Council of People's Commissars and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to deviate from the Rapallo Treaty type only in such cases where exceptional advantages would accrue to the toiling masses of the R.S.F.S.R. and its Allied Soviet Republics from such a course.

(signed) M. Kalinin, President of the A.R.C.E.C.

(signed) A. Enukidze, Secretary of the A.R.C.E.C.

Moscow, May 16th, 1922.

## ECONOMICS

### The Crisis in Russia and the World Economic Crisis

by E. Varga.

For some years past, Russia has been in the throes of an unparalleled economic crisis. We will here attempt to disclose the connection between the Russian crisis and the general world crisis and to inquire into the reasons behind the unusual extent of the former.

Like the other warring countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia is suffering from an absolute underproduction resulting from the war. Russia's economic basis has always been very weak. The expenditure for the upkeep of the modern state apparatus and especially of the expensive army already in pre-war times exceeded by far what a primitive economic system could reasonably be expected to support. Agriculture, the basis of national economy, was backward; its yield was—in spite of the fertile soil—the smallest in Europe due to the poverty and ignorance of the Russian peasant. The existence of extensive large landholdings did not change matters, because the greatest part of the land was rented to the peasantry in small leaseholds. Only the chronic hunger of the Russian peasant (which we meet with in Tolstoi's and other authors' writings) made possible that export of foodstuffs whose proceeds went to pay the interest on the foreign debts and the war material purchased abroad. The young large industry which for the most part had been built up with foreign capital, had not grown out of the needs of the country; it was propped up by Government contracts for war material, high protective tariffs and low wages corresponding to the meagre standard of living of the Russian peasant. The productivity of labor was very low: 25% and even 10% of that of highly developed countries. The country was very poor in accumulated goods.

This primitive economy could not bear the pressure of the world war. Russia was the first of the great powers to collapse. How far the decay of economy had already advanced in the Kerensky period can be gathered from the small booklet of Lenin: "The impending catastrophe and how can we avoid it?"

The accession to power of the Bolsheviks did not put a stop to the downward movement of national economy; on the contrary, the latter gathered headway. And this for two reasons. The peace of Brest-Litovsk though it marked the close of the foreign war was not a harbinger of peace. A number of counter-revolutionary attacks supported by the European bourgeoisie carried the war year after year into the interior of Russia. It was followed by the great campaign against Poland. The year 1921 was the first to see the return of what after a fashion can be considered peacetime. But the fact of her isolation as the only proletarian power in the capitalist world is compelling Russia even today to use her best energies for the maintenance of a big army—at the expense of economic reconstruction. The blockade intensified Russia's crisis, because it barred her way to the advantages derived from the economic achievements of the world. And because before the war Russia had chiefly imported means of production it was her production that was hit hardest by the blockade.

So far there is no fundamental difference between Russia's economic crisis and that of the capitalist countries in the region of underproduction. There are causes, however, which, immanent as they are in the dictatorship of the proletariat, tend to intensify the crisis of underproduction in Russia. It would be futile to deny this. The first stages of every revolution are always accompanied by a dwindling of labor discipline resulting in a decrease of production. Dealing with this problem elsewhere<sup>1</sup>, I wrote:—

"Because in every class society, the discipline of the workers during working-hours is enforced by the means of class rule, every revolution means a profound loosening of labor discipline. A bourgeois revolution is no exception to the rule; it shakes the masses' belief in authority and thus weakens labor discipline. The old methods of forcibly keeping the workers at their work, the methods of class discipline, lose their meaning once the workers themselves administer the shops and government and armed power is in their hands. The difficult task of evolving a new and free labor discipline corresponding to the changed social relations arises."

<sup>1</sup> E. Varga, "The Economic Problems of the Proletarian Dictatorship", Second Edition. Press of the Comintern, pp. 80-81.

But the evolution of this new and free labor discipline is not a matter of a day or two. The great mass of labor is slow to recognize the principal difference between working for the profit of capitalism and for the common good. Hence the wane of labor discipline and the consequent decay of productivity and production is unavoidable in the first stages of every revolution. And in order to safeguard the interests of labor itself the proletarian State is often compelled to resort to coercion against those sections of the workers which cannot be made to do an adequate amount of work with the usual methods of free labor discipline. The transition from the old to the new labor discipline in Russia was rendered especially difficult since the best elements of the Russian proletariat have been up to now required for the Red Army and the fight against the counter-revolution. Thus the shops lack the nuclei which would consciously undertake to carry through the new labor discipline and by their example fire the slow moving masses.

The second important factor responsible for the intensification of the crisis of underproduction (which is also due to the dictatorship) was the restriction of agricultural production by the peasants, the strong tendency to return to self-contained household economy, a tendency which was also present under capitalist conditions in the peasantry of Central and Eastern Europe during the war. The well-known necessities of "War Communism" tended to intensify these tendencies considerably in Russia.

Although Russia's soil is in principle the collective property of the workers, it is a fact that everyone of the 30 million Russian peasants is the independent master of his own farm.<sup>2</sup> He decides, subject to the terrible shortage of technical implements, what and how much is to be produced. But the interests of the defense of the country and of the dictatorship compelled the Soviet Government to requisition all agricultural products of the peasants which were not essential to the maintenance of his farm and the upkeep of his family. In principle the Government was to furnish in return all necessary commodities. During the first two years this was actually done. But with the progressive decay of industrial production it became impossible. The peasant was compelled to hand over his grain without receiving anything in exchange. He answered by returning to a self-contained household economy. That is to say he merely cultivated what was necessary for his own needs.<sup>3</sup> He cultivated all plants which the climate permitted: tobacco, hemp, vegetables, etc. He returned to the most primitive form of self-contained household economy. He made molasses out of sugar beets; he tanned the skins of slain animals; he spun and wove cloth out of his own hemp. The contradiction between private economic production and collective ownership was fatally balanced by a rapidly progressing decay of the whole national economy and in a nearly complete cessation of the exchange of commodities between town and country.

The war and the refusal of the Russian capitalists to produce under the dictatorship of labor (they still hoped at that time to be able to overthrow the workers' government by their economic sabotage) compelled the Soviet Government to extend state ownership further than was justified by the weak organizing forces of the Russian proletariat. (Under the capitalist system the proletarians are not in a position to develop their ability in the field of economic organization. The capitalists do not give them occasion to do so. The necessary knowledge must first be acquired under the dictatorship. This also is one of the reasons of the crisis of production in the first days of dictatorship.) There was called into being a gigantic bureaucratic apparatus which acted as a brake on the exchange of commodities and did not even allow of utilizing those possibilities of production which the impoverished and devastated country still possessed.

The new economic policy inaugurated one year ago is to remedy the evils. This purpose is served

1—By replacing the compulsion to surrender the whole surplus of foodstuffs by the tax-in-kind. (The necessity of this has in a highly admirable manner been shown by Lenin in his booklet on the tax-in-kind.) This measure does away with the previously outlined contradiction between private economic production and collective ownership; it restores to 30,000,000 Russian peasants the stimulus for increased production.

<sup>2</sup> We shall refrain here from dealing with the activities of the Seed Committees for regulating agriculture which commenced activities in 1921.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Popoff, "Grain Production in Soviet Russia", published in Russian.

2—By reducing collective ownership to the degree which can be taken care of. The restoration of free trade is the natural supplement of both measures. Without free trade the tax-in-kind would be of no use to the peasantry, and the factories excluded from state ownership and leased to private owners can also produce only if they are enabled to dispose of their products.

These two measures involve the principle of a change in the State's position. Under the former system of War Communism, state economy embraced in principle all inhabitants of the country. Every citizen was to work for the State and in return was entitled to maintenance by the State. The single economic entities were fused into the state economy. The new economic policy makes the State's attitude as an economic system towards the various individual economic entities resemble that under capitalism (with the difference that the part of industry remaining under the immediate control of the State is much greater.) Now the State claims part of the products of its citizens in the form of taxes. But apart from this its intercourse with the single economic entities is carried on on the basis of equality. It sells, buys, transports, makes banking transactions, etc.

3—In order to carry this through successfully the state enterprises were reorganized and put on a commercial basis, that is, they must show a surplus which can be expressed in gold value. The measures to achieve this end were the following.

a) Restoration of the principle of defining wages according to labor performed. This resulted in extensive reductions in the number of workers and in the discharge of all superfluous labor. The State maintains only those laborers who are entitled to it by their work; the others must shift for themselves.

b) The price of goods and the output of the Government enterprises are compiled on the basis of the cost of production. On the market all government enterprises function as private economic formations. They buy and sell and strive to realize as great a profit as possible.

c) In order to make this possible the enterprises are being regrouped along economic lines. State trusts have been formed, freed from the shackles of the former bureaucratic administration and adapted to make the best of the boom on the free market. And because the new economic policy naturally abolishes the former restrictions on commerce, the State is enabled to found "mixed economic enterprises" (corporations whose shares are taken up by both the state and the capitalist). The road has been cleared for the advent of state capitalism.

## THE UNITED FRONT

### Communism and the Peasantry in France

By L. Trotsky.

Our differences with the French comrades on the question of the united front are by no means at an end. On the contrary, if one judges from some of the articles in the French party press, one gathers the impression that the cause of the differences and misunderstandings, at least in some party circles, lies deeper than appeared at the beginning. I recollect the article of Comrade Renaud Jean which appeared as the leading article in "l'Humanité" of April 6th, 1922.

Comrade Renaud Jean, one of the most distinguished leaders of the party, who spoke on the agrarian problem at the Congress of Marseille, opposes with an energy and with a sincerity which we can only admire those views which we defend, but which to him appear to be incorrect. In the headlines of his article, he characterizes the tactics of the united front as a danger and an inaptitude (*danger et maladresse*). In the text of the article he even speaks of a *catastrophe* as the unavoidable result of these tactics in France, "Our country has been corroded for three-quarters of a century by the universal right to vote. Class differentiation has only been recognized by a very limited minority . . . Republican bourgeois France is the Holy Land of confusion." From these entirely correct facts Comrade Jean comes to the conclusion, which we accept entirely, "The Commu-

nist Party must be more uncompromising here than anywhere else." From the standpoint of this uncompromising attitude, Comrade Jean attacks the united front which appears to him, as formerly, a combination Bloc of various parties. We could have said, and we do say, that such an estimation of the most important tactical problem shows that Comrade Jean himself is not free from the purely parliamentary traditions of French Socialism; there where it is a question of capturing the broad masses, of making a breach in the bourgeois social-reformist blockade by the vanguard of the working class, Comrade Jean only sees, obstinately sees, a "sly" combination which at best can only result in increasing the number of seats in Parliament (!) at the cost of increasing confusion and vagueness in the political consciousness of the proletariat. And it is just France (and in this he is perfectly right) that needs more than any other country clearness, distinctness and decision in the political thought and work of the party. If however, Comrade Jean is of the opinion that French Communism should be the most uncompromising, why does he not take the trouble to find out, before fighting against the united front, that French Communism is at present the most compromising, the most tolerant, the most indulgent towards all deviations from the path?

To the clear and distinctly formulated criticism of Comrade Jean, we reply just as clearly and distinctly. In no other Communist Party would such articles be possible, containing declarations and speeches against revolutionary force in the sense of petty bourgeois and sentimental humanism, which are often met with in the French party press. If Renaud Jean speaks justifiably of the sickness of bourgeois-democratic ideology, the most severe consequence of this sickness for the working class is the blunting of the instinct and desire to take the offensive, the dissolution of the active tendencies of the proletariat into a formless democratic perspective. "The humanitarian mixture of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*", which in a serious hour, as is well known, crawled before French militarism, the preaching of the moralizing, Tolstolian political vegetarians, etc., etc., these all in the last analysis render excellent services to the Third Republic, by supplementing, although externally they greatly differ from it. This shapeless pacifist agitation masked by Socialist phraseology, is of excellent service to the bourgeois government. This assertion will perhaps be considered as a paradox by sincere pacifists, but such is the fact.

The pacifist airs of George Pioch will confuse and seduce neither Poincaré nor Barthou. In the consciousness of a certain section of the workers however, such sermons find favorable acceptance. The hatred against the bourgeois regime and against military power finds in the humanitarian formula a sincere but futile expression and dies away without leading to action. Therein consists the social function of pacifism. This is particularly shown in America where Bryan gained an enormous influence over the farmers owing to his pacifist slogans. The Socialists of the type of Hillquit and other blockheads, who imagined that they were extraordinarily sly, are being completely enmeshed in the net of bourgeois pacifism and thus facilitated the entrance of America into the war. It is the task of the Communist Party to arouse in the working class the readiness to apply force. For this it is necessary to teach them to discriminate between reactionary force having for its purpose the hindrance of historical development going beyond the stage already reached, and revolutionary force which has the creative function of freeing the historical path of development from the hindrances accumulated by the past. He who does not desire to discriminate between these two kinds of forces will not discriminate between the classes, i. e., he ignores living history. He who declaims against any militarism without exception, against any kind of force, inevitably supports the power of the ruling class, as the latter is an existing fact, sanctioned by statelaws and accepted by custom.

In order to overthrow it another force is necessary which primarily needs to be recognised in principle by the working class.

The last conference of the Enlarged Executive of the Communist International pointed to a series of occurrences in the internal life of the French party which all go to prove that it is in no way the most uncompromising. But it must be the most uncompromising; this is necessary in view of the whole political situation. In one thing we are in agreement with Comrade Renaud Jean; the application of the methods of the united front requires perfect clearness and distinctness of the political consciousness of the party, good organization and perfect discipline.

Further on Comrade Jean refers to the fact that in the list of demands set up as the program of the united front (fight against the taxation of wages, defense of the eight-hour day, etc.) there is not a single demand which immediately interests "the

peasants who comprise at least half the working population of France". What does the eight-hour day mean to them? What does the taxation of wages mean to them?

This argument of Comrade Jean seems to us to be very dangerous.

The question of the small peasantry is undoubtedly of enormous importance for the French revolution. Our French Party has taken a great step forward in adopting an agrarian program in which the capturing of the masses of the peasants is placed among its daily tasks. It would however be dangerous and directly suicidal to dissolve the French proletariat into "working masses" or into "workers" as one dissolves the half in the whole. We have at present not only organically but also politically only the minority of the French working class. The revolution will only be possible after our having politically captured the majority. Only the majority of the French working class united under the banner of revolution can enthuse and carry with it the French small peasants. The question of the united front of the workers of France is a fundamental question: without the solution of this question, propaganda among the peasantry, however successful, will not accelerate the revolution. Propaganda among the peasants and a good agrarian program are very important factors for success. But the peasant is realistic and sceptical; he does not believe mere words. Especially in France, where he has been betrayed, he does not believe them. The French peasant in the villages as well as in the barracks will not enter a serious contest for the sake of problematical slogans. He will only take serious risks in the event of his seeing the conditions which guarantee success or make it at least very probable. He must see before him a power which inspires confidence by its mass character and by its discipline. The working class split up industrially and politically cannot be such a power for the peasantry. The capturing of a certain, if possible, important portion of the peasantry for the working class is a prerequisite for a victorious revolution in France. The unification of the overwhelming majority of the French working class under the banner of revolution is a prerequisite for such a capture. This unification of the overwhelming majority of the working class is the fundamental task. We must win the workers who today still follow Jouhaux and Longuet. Do not say they are only a few. Of course the number of the self-sacrificing active adherents of Longuet, Blums and Jouhaux, that is, those who would be prepared to sacrifice their lives for their program, is small. But there are still many passive, uneducated, inert, mentally and physically torpid workers. They are standing to one side. But should however events anake them they will in their present circumstance gather rather under the banner of Jouhaux and Longuet than under our own. Jouhaux and Longuet express and exploit the dullness, the ignorance and the backwardness of the working class.

If Comrade Jean, the director of the party's work among the peasants, is dividing his attention in incorrect proportions between the proletariat and the peasantry it is deplorable but understandable and not very dangerous, as the party as a whole will correct him. Should however the party adopt the point of view of Comrade Jean and consider the proletariat as merely the "half" of the workers, this would involve the danger of annihilation as this would dissolve the revolutionary class character of the party into an amorphous party of "workers". We can see the danger more distinctly if we follow the further mental processes of Comrade Jean. He directly rejects such tasks as do not comprise the totality of the working masses. As he expresses it, "the demands which are common to the two great halves of the proletariat (!) are not contained". Here by the word "proletariat" we are supposed to understand not only the proletariat, but also the peasantry. It is the most dangerous misuse of terminology, which has this political consequence: Comrade Jean demands that the demands of the proletariat (the maintenance of the eight-hour day, the fight against the taxation of wages, etc.) be put under the control of the peasants.

The peasant is a small bourgeois, who is more or less capable of approaching the proletariat, and who under certain conditions can be captured by the proletariat for the revolution. To identify the agrarian petty bourgeois, however, with the proletariat and to reduce the demands of the proletariat to the point of view of the peasantry means the renunciation of the actual class basis of the party and the sowing of this confusion for which there is such a favourable soil in peasant-parliamentary France.

If, as we have heard, the eight-hour day cannot be the slogan for the united front in France, as this demand does not interest the peasantry, then from Jean's point of view, the struggle against militarism is the real revolutionary program

for France. There is not the least doubt that the French small peasant, betrayed by the war, hates militarism and willingly listens to anti-militarist speeches. Of course we have to expose capitalist militarism pitilessly in the towns and in the country. The lessons of the war must be made full use of, but it would be very dangerous for the party to allow itself to be deceived as to how far, and to what a degree, the peasants' anti-militarism can become of independent revolutionary importance. The peasant will not give his son to the barracks; the peasant does not wish to pay taxes for the maintenance of the army. He sincerely applauds the speaker who opposes militarism (and even "militarism of all kinds"). The peasant's opposition to the army however has not a revolutionary, but a boycottist pacifist foundation. *Fichez moi la paix*, (leave me in peace), that his his programme! This mood can create a favorable atmosphere for the revolution, but it cannot create a revolution itself and secure its success.

Sentimental pacifism in the spirit of Pioch is the expression of the peasant and not of the proletariat attitude towards the state and militarism. The organized and conscious proletariat, face to face with the state armed to the teeth, asks itself the question, "How should it organize and arm itself for the overthrow and annihilation of bourgeois power by its proletarian dictatorship?" The isolated peasant does not go so far. He is simply against militarism, he hates it, he is ready to turn his back upon it; *fichez moi la paix*, leave me in peace with all your sorts of militarism! Such is the psychology of the dissatisfied oppositional peasants, the intellectuals, and the petty bourgeoisie of the towns. It would be absurd not to make use of these tendencies in our eventual petty bourgeois and semi-proletarian allies; but it would be criminal to transfer these tendencies to the proletariat and to our own party.

The social patriots have spoiled their chances of approaching the peasantry thanks to their patriotism. We must profit by this advantage in every way. But this does not confer on us the right to place the proletarian class demands into the background and if these would result in bringing about a temporary misunderstanding with our friends the peasants. The small peasantry have to follow the proletariat as it is. The proletariat cannot adapt itself to the peasantry. Should the Communist Party in avoiding the vital demands of the proletariat follow the line of least resistance and place in the foreground pacifist anti-militarism, it would be running the risk of betraying the peasants, the workers and itself.

In France as everywhere else we need before all a united front of the proletariat itself. The French peasantry will not become proletarianized by the misuse of sociological terminology by Comrade Jean; but the need for such a misuse is a dangerous symptom of such a policy which can only result in the greatest confusion. French Communism more than any other needs clearness, distinctness and an uncompromising attitude. In this we are quite in agreement with our French opponents.

## The United Front and the Government Crisis in Saxony

by Paul Boettcher (Leipzig).

The Communist Party of Germany has already gained definite experience in the realization of the tactics of the united front on the political and trade union field. Our practical tactics towards Social Democratic provincial governments are of considerable significance for the successes of our Party among the proletarian masses. In this respect the Party is confronted with two dangers. The first danger lies outside the Party within the proletarian masses. The second danger is within the Party itself and is an inherent menace. When the Communist Party supports the Social Democratic Government of Saxony it is conscious of these dangers and endeavors to overcome them by intensified educational work within the Party and systematic propaganda among the masses.

The last cabinet crisis in Saxony confronted the Party with the task of politically synthesizing the impatience of the Communist workers towards the Social Democratic Government and the indifference and the illusions of the non-Communist workers regarding this same Government. The correct application of these tactics does not only require a cool head but especially a dexterous concentration of the forces of the Party against the weakest spot of the Social Democratic government.

Our friends of the National Council of the Communist Party of France have adopted a resolution on the united front in which they "regret the experiments of parliamentary collabora-

tion with the Social Democrats made at present in various countries by Communist Parties". At the same time the National Council of the Communist Party of France rejects the idea of participation in the government which is being recommended as a means for the execution of the tactics of the united front. We, on our part are able to tell our French comrades that the tactics of the Party in Saxony are no doubt not as simple as their abstinence, but that these tactics have created an ever closer relationship of the Communist Party to the masses. While expressing their fears and regrets our French comrades unfortunately omit to criticize in detail the tactics employed in Saxony. They are especially afraid that the Communist Party may sacrifice its independence to the Social Democrats.

Let us examine the justification for these fears on the basis of the recent events in Saxony. No doubt, in the beginning there existed certain liquidatory tendencies within the Party which denied the right of existence of the Communist Party as against the Social Democrats. After the exclusion of the KAG, (Communist Working Union) this danger is abolished. However, did the Communist Party in Saxony, though supporting the Social Democratic Government, deny the historic function, the special role of the Communist Party in the Revolution? This has not been proved as yet. It has been proved, however, that the Party by supporting the Government has forced the Social Democrats in Saxony to adopt another policy than in the other parts of Germany. Thereby the Party has successfully promoted the process of fermentation within the laboring masses and caused a shift in the relation of proletarian forces in favor of Communism.

In order to be able to fulfil its historic mission, the Party at first recognized the transformation of the role of the Social Democratic Government in the course of the post-war period. The Party emphasizes that the Social Democratic Government may be a weapon of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Only the Communist Party can compel it to fulfil this function, by mobilizing the proletarian masses for the determination of the character of the Government. Neither with its program nor by its character is the Social Democracy able to form a class government with class political objectives. In Saxony the Social Democrats attempted to carry on a policy which should satisfy the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as well. These attempts of the Government towards collaboration were doomed to failure. There can be no harmony between the classes and the interests of exploited and exploiters can never be combined. The bourgeois parties in Saxony became bolder every day and repeatedly provoked the Government in the most aggressive manner. To these attacks the Government could not oppose the working class as a sufficient counterpoise, the working class being as little satisfied with the policy of the Government as the possessing class. The bourgeoisie utilized this weakness and opened the battle on the whole front: it demanded that the Diet dissolve. Furthermore the bourgeoisie is attempting to bring about a referendum on the dissolution of the Diet.

On April 25th a joint session of the three labor parties took place at the initiative of the Communist Party. In this session the Communists proposed that the parties should take the initiative out of the hands of the bourgeoisie and by means of new elections mobilize the masses against the bourgeoisie. The Social Democratic Parties, especially the Independent Social Democratic Party, feared the dissolution of the Diet and rejected this proposal of the Communists. Thereupon the Communists declared that they would only be able to continue the support of the Government under certain conditions. The Communist Party demanded from the Government and its parties a public statement on their attitude towards the following four demands:—

1. Immediate amnesty for political offenses, for those committed on account of poverty and those against paragraphs 43, 218 and 222 of the Penal Code (abortion).

2. Prohibition of the *Technische Nothilfe* (official strikebreaker corps) in Saxony.

3. Immediate demilitarization of the police, to be provided for in the budget (abolition of the barrack system, of drilling in closed formations, and of heavy armament).

4. Presentations of the bills most important for the proletariat for endorsement to the General Assemblies of the Factory Councils to be convoked by the Trade Union Factory Council Central Committees.

The Government as well as the parties participating in it have not dared to answer in the affirmative. On the other hand, fear of the proletariat did not permit them to refuse our demands directly. Thus the government parties tried to put off the Communists by means of formal negotiations. In the session of the Diet on May 11th the Communists have put a definite end to all negotiations and presented their demands to the proletarian public.

The Government of Saxony intends to pass its budget within a short time. The Communist parliamentary group, however, makes its approval dependent upon the realization of the measures mentioned above. If the Government for fear of the bourgeoisie fails to fulfil our demands, it will have to bear the consequences.

These tactics of the Communist Party show quite lucidly that the Party does not feel itself bound to the Social Democratic Parties or even to the Government. On the contrary, the Party has secured fullest independence of action. It is merely bound to the interests of the proletarian class. Thus the fears of our French comrades that the Party may lose its independence are being refuted by the experience.

The governmental crisis in Saxony is not over. Either the Government will advance a considerable step on the way of class government or it will go into the camp of the bourgeoisie, as the Social Democratic President of the Diet has already done in the May 11th session. The Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party desires the latter. It wants to free itself from its dependence upon the Communists. The Right Wing of the Social Democrats would prefer to reestablish as quickly as possible the glory of the Socialist-bourgeois coalition in Saxony. The Communists will take care that this treacherous play be made difficult for them. The strength of the Party lies in the masses, which it is now mobilizing for a systematic campaign for these elementary demands.

## IN SOVIET RUSSIA

### Resolution of the XIth Congress of the Communist Party of Russia on Financial Policy

1—Under the conditions of the old economic policy the economic resources of the Soviet state were at the same time its immediate financial resources. The maintenance of the workers, the clerks and the army, the supply of the state industries with raw materials or semi-manufactured and other kinds of material was carried out by the direct shipment of goods. In consequence of this the financial policy was restricted to the question of distribution of paper money. The quite secondary importance of paper money was confined to the very limited field of market exchange.

2—Under the new conditions the Soviet State meets the expenditures in respect of the State administration and management only in part and that on a ever-decreasing scale, by the method of direct payment in kind (that is to say, the immediate despatching of goods). These expenditures are met on an ever-increasing scale by means of the market, i. e., by means of money.

3—The complete liquidation of the state economic system is only possible in the event of such a regulation of the relations of the state and of the market (small bourgeoisie and private capitalists) which guarantees the reliable and certain provision of the state industries (with raw materials and provisions), the army and the administration by the aid of the circulation of money. A preliminary condition to this is the stabilization of prices and a stopping of the depreciation of paper money.

The stabilization of prices and the ceasing of the depreciation of paper money are only possible provided that the whole financial system of the state is put into order, that a genuine budget showing no deficit is drawn up and that the exchange of commodities is increased. The extension of the exchange of commodities must be brought about on the one hand by means of increased production and the greater efficiency of transport, and on the other hand by extending the sphere of money circulation, by the reduction of the share of the state in the budget and by means of the development of the commodity character of agricultural production and exchange.

4—A certain widening of the sphere of the circulation of money took place and to some extent is at present taking place as a result of the adoption of the new economic policy. This widening resulted in Autumn 1921 (at the time of the realization of the harvest) in a temporary stabilization of the rouble. The deficit in the budget of the Soviet State has destroyed this stabilization. The present deficit in the budget renders impossible any immediate currency reform having as its object the stabilization of the rouble. Immediate reform of the currency is on other hand impossible owing to the famine, whose influence is to be seen primarily in increased prices and increasing depreciation of money.

—Without committing ourselves to the immediate return to gold currency, it is necessary to state that our economic and financial policy is set definitely towards the restoration of the gold money standard. This gold basis is necessary, inasmuch as gold remains the world currency and in so far as this importance of gold in the world market unavoidably influences the conditions of the home markets even in a country where a portion of the economic activity is carried out according to a regular plan.<sup>1</sup> One of the practical means of realizing this is the maintenance of the inviolable gold reserve and the increase of the production of precious metals.

6.—The principal measures of financial policy (including currency reform) at present are:—

a.—Increasing the circulation of commodities, principally through the development of state, cooperative and private domestic and foreign trade.

b.—The reduction and later the elimination of the budget deficit, the balancing of the budget by means of the reduction of state expenditures and the increasing of state income both in money and in kind. (For this one must steadily keep in view the bringing of the collection of all taxes into one channel and the gradual rendering of money forms of taxation the chief means of revenue). On the other hand it is necessary that the flow of currency shall be regulated and not proceed according to chance, and that a stable financial practice be elaborated.

7.—The development of the exchange of commodities can not be accomplished exclusively through the development of state trade. This last is by no means the chief method of developing the exchange of products. The state industry must chiefly develop itself with the help of those means which it obtains on the strength of its credit. The granting of this credit can and will be organized through the State Bank. The cooperative trade is to be receive considerable support but not so much as to be detrimental to the state. It is necessary that the exchange of checks for the conclusion of business and contracts be established between the state and private undertakings.

8.—The necessity of allowing private capital to carry on trade implies in regard to interior trade the granting of home monopolies only for fiscal purposes, and in regard to foreign trade the permission of mixed companies, the granting of trade concessions, etc., with the maintenance of the State monopolies.

The spending up of the transition of agriculture from the condition of natural to exchange economy is to be the chief task of Communist policy. Only such a transition will ensure increased productive power in agriculture. This increase is the sole guarantee of the most rapid recovery from the economic and financial crisis.

9.—The starting point in the fight against the budget deficit shall be the clear recognition that the Soviet State is not in possession of sufficient economic and in particular financial resources to enable it to maintain the whole of the vast administrative and economic apparatus that was set up in the period of "War Communism".

This apparatus was maintained at that time by means of methods which cannot be employed under the conditions of the new period which negates the expropriation of the small proprietor and in which the process of expropriation of the large property owners has been terminated. The Soviet State must thoroughly "disencumber" itself in the shortest possible time, and keep in the hands of the proletariat only the principal key-industries and branches of national economy (transportation, banks, coal, oil, metals and natural products) while it either retains the most important undertakings in these branches or secures its real and undisputed control by appropriate methods in the event of the participation of private capital in state undertakings and their combinations.

10.—In consideration of the tremendous importance of industry generally and of the state industries without whose development a serious clearing up of finance is impossible, in particular for the whole economic system of the R.S.F.S.R., it is necessary to take in hand a number of measures for the purpose of securing the existence of industry and its development.

11.—It is also necessary along with the reduction of the state financing of industry and commerce considerably to reduce the administrative apparatus, to lessen the number of governing bodies at the centre and in the provinces, to hand over a number of expenditures and tasks to the local budgets and to exclude from the state budget all expenditures which do not serve the immediate

maintenance of the existence of the proletarian state. Above all there must be a quantitative reduction and in its place there must be a qualitative increase. But there must be no question of separating the payment of wages from the management of production.

12.—With regard to the workers and clerks in the state undertakings (factories, transport, etc.) and institutions which remain under state management, the Soviet State must hinder by every means the sinking of real wages. It is the duty of the party and the trade unions to see to it that the economic and administrative bodies do not use the funds intended for the payment of the workers and clerks to meet other requirements. It is necessary at the same time to oppose most energetically the irrational apportionment of resources on the part of the state institutions, to fight against their expending too much on the central administrative apparatus at the cost of the business undertakings and the subordinate institutions.

13.—It is the special task of finance policy at first to reduce the output of paper money and later on to end it. This most important problem, to the solution of which a beginning must immediately be made, can be thoroughly solved only by means of raising the standard of production, the increasing of the state's income arising from the nationalized industries and in particular the successful execution of the taxation policy.

14.—The taxation policy must devote itself to the task of regulating the process of accumulation by direct taxes on fortunes and incomes, etc. *Taxation policy is in this connection the chief instrument of the revolutionary policy of the proletariat in the transition period.*

15.—The taxation policy must at the same time pursue the purely fiscal immediate purpose of securing the greatest possible yield from taxes. The execution of the system of taxation, however, shall involve no reduction of the real wages of the workers; that is to say, it shall confer corresponding compensation in respect of remuneration of labor. In consequence of the present condition of the machinery of taxation, which was liquidated during the past period, and is now by great effort being restored, it is extremely difficult to carry out the system of direct taxation. At the same time the party is taking up the task, concurrently with the setting up of the machinery of taxation, of developing the system of direct taxation and of gradually abandoning indirect taxes. At present, however, the chief basis of the system of monetary taxation can only be in indirect taxes as they are easier to realize (duties on articles of general necessity) and which are to be complemented by direct real taxes on trade and commerce and by a per capita tax for definite purposes (famine relief and combating the epidemic).

The production and use of articles of luxury will be subject to particularly heavy taxation. In order to secure the successful payment of the monetary taxes, it is necessary that the Party and Soviet organs devote their special attention to that task and that many members of the party be engaged in this work.

16.—The importance of the taxes on imports and exports will increase with the development of foreign trade. The customs duties on exports and imports will not be used merely as a means of revenue. They are also to be used for securing the greatest possible development of the state industries. Without losing sight of financial interests the tariff on imports will allow specially favorable conditions for the importation of provisions and foodstuffs until the new harvest. Imports of industrial and agricultural means of production will be granted a rebate.

17.—The increasing income from State industries, transport, trade, agricultural products, forests, mines, etc., the increasing number of concessionaires and lessees, all of these can and shall be employed towards clearing up the budget and wiping out the deficit. One must bear in mind in this respect that unrelenting struggle against waste, confusion and lack of all commercial knowledge is a prerequisite for the state undertakings, instead of as heretofore showing a deficit, showing a surplus. The members of the Party must learn to work and manage economically and profitably. We must gradually qualify a considerable number of workers for the management of industry and commerce.

18.—The growth of the exchange of commodities between city and country, the circulation of goods within the town and country markets, and in a still greater degree the exchange of goods with foreign countries can be rapidly and successfully developed only by the powerful help of credit. Its regulation must be in the hands of the State Bank. Branches of credit institutions can be established under the control of the State Bank which are to serve to concentrate idle funds for the purpose of using them in production. A network of small local credit institutions (Cooperative Credit) can be established. But this can only take place in so far as the dominance of the State Bank is not interfered with.

<sup>1</sup> On the basis of nationalizations of the principal industries and means of transport.

Branches of foreign banks can only be admitted provided they enter into treaty relations with the State Bank. Foreign banks may under no conditions acquire the right to issue bank notes.

19.—All measures of financial policy tending to bring order into the budget, to increase income, to regulate the circulation of money and to organize credit are nothing more than palliative measures, as they cannot remove the economic crisis which is the basis of the financial crisis. The only remedy lies in the extension of the market in consequence of the increase of output of the large industries and the peasant and home industries.

20.—The general economic policy and the financial policy must serve this purpose. After the conclusion of the period of "War Communism" the party of the working class is faced with the problem of consolidating captured political power in the shortest possible time, by giving the state apparatus created in the struggle a solid financial basis.

21.—The capitalist world is confronted with new crises, wars and revolutions. The transition period between Capitalism and Socialism is approaching its end. Nothing can stop it. Soviet Russia, the first proletarian state, will more completely fulfill its historical task, the more quickly it overcomes the poverty, famine and ruin which weaken it and carries out the economic and financial mobilization for further struggles on behalf of Socialism.

## IN THE INTERNATIONAL

### Telegram of the Communist International to Jim Larkin

To Jim Larkin: Moscow, May 27, 1922.

The Communist International sends its warmest greetings to the undaunted fighter released from the "democratic" prisons.  
*Zinoviev.*

### The Communist Party Convention in Poland

by L. Domski (Warsaw).

The Convention of the Communist Party of Poland took place a few weeks ago. Of course it met illegally, since all Communist activity in Poland can only be carried on underground.

In spite of this difficult situation, however, the very organization of the party convention showed clearly to what extent Communism in Poland has grown. This convention, the third one since the creation of the party, was attended as no other of the former conventions was. While the first party convention had only the delegates from the regions of former Congress Poland, and at the second one, the other Polish districts were little represented, at this third convention the delegates from Posen, Galicia, Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia and Polish Lithuania constituted one-fourth of the entire convention representation, namely, 11 out of 41. The members of the Central Committee, the central editors and the sections of the Central Committee were present with advisory votes, namely: 1.—the trade union section, 2.—the railwaymen, 3.—the Jewish section, 4.—the agrarians, 5.—the technical and 6.—the youth sections. A representative of the so-called Communist Bund, the Communist wing of the Jewish Labor Bund, was also present at the convention.

The agenda included the following: 1.—The political situation in Poland and internationally, with particular emphasis on the question of the united front, 2.—The political and organization reports by the Central Committee, 3.—The agrarian question, 4.—Trade union work, 5.—The national question.

Because of lack of time the national question and that of trade union work had to be left untouched, for it was considered unsafe unduly to prolong the convention. The united front question and the agrarian question gave rise, however, to lively discussions.

On the question of the united front, there were two diametrically opposed views represented at the convention, with a third conciliatory group between them. Those opposed to the united front tactics brought up the well-known arguments that had been voiced in other countries. This group feared that

the raising of the united front idea and the formulation of the so-called partial demands would blur the goal of the Communist movement and would lead to the actual abandonment of the more far-reaching issues of the social revolution and proletarian dictatorship. The proponents of the center position argued on the line of the united front opponents in France. They accepted the united front idea only as far as the International was concerned, but as to Poland, they argued these tactics were inapplicable because of the extraordinary intensification of inter-party relations and of the unprecedented infamy of the Polish social patriots.

Both of these groups were in the minority, and the majority of the convention accepted the tactics of the united front. The theses on the international situation already defined the attitude of the convention towards the united front. The special resolution on the united front question dwelt upon these tactics in detail.

Otherwise the theses on the international situation differed in no essentials from those of the Communist International and of the Communist Party of Germany. The theses on the political situation in Poland are however extremely interesting.

First of all, it is pointed out that at the time of the birth of the Polish Republic, the Polish bourgeoisie occupied a more favorable position than the possessing classes in other countries. The greater part of Poland was no real participant in the world war; for this reason it did not suffer much from demobilization. At that time Polish militarism began to develop, and it served as a safety-valve in that it absorbed the most active part of the unemployed masses. The revolutionary movement in Poland was then more of an echo of the revolutionary movements outside of Poland, but chiefly an echo of the victorious Russian and the German Revolutions. The defeat of the German Revolution led directly to the victory of Polish reaction.

It was only later that the development of the revolutionary elements in Poland took place. The enslavement of Poland in the interest of French imperialism did bring Poland territorial gains, but only at the expense of Polish economic life, all of whose natural treasures (Galician petroleum, Polish coal, Upper Silesian ore) are now the property of foreign capital. At the same time Poland must keep up a huge military machine that is bringing Poland to financial ruin. The burdens and the destructive forces of the long war rendered Polish industry incapable of competing not only in foreign markets but even within the country, in spite of the depreciation of the Polish mark. As a result we find Poland suffering from chronic unemployment, continual rise of the cost of living, wage struggles and the employers' offensive against the working class.

In the country, the peasant masses are disappointed with the agrarian reforms so pompously passed by the Sejm. Only the large landowners benefited by it, a fact that again intensifies the class conflict in the rural districts.

As far as the working class is concerned, Poland is dominated by a policy of the most ruthless and tyrannical oppression, that assumed the form of the White Terror at the time of the Ukrainian campaign. The growing militarism that is overrunning Poland serves as a weapon of oppression in the hands of the ruling classes, and the financial bankruptcy of the state brings about the most cruel exploitation and suppression of the working masses. The agrarian workers are particularly sharply suppressed.

If we add to this the nationalist policy of oppression applied by the Polish bourgeoisie against foreign nationalities in the border regions, the complicated colonization policy in the Eastern regions where it is being applied at the expense of the White Ruthenians and the Ukrainian peasantry, and which reaches its climax in shameless anti-semitism, we get an idea of the factors at work responsible for the continuous revolutionary ferment which are systematically undermining the present class-rule in Poland.

The demonstrative resolutions adopted at the beginning of the convention reveal the situation in the Polish party in its full light. In them we read the protest against the assassination of Comrade *Josef Krzos*, member of the Party Committee in Starachowice, and treasurer of the Metal Workers' Union. Without a trace of legality, the police authorities arrested this comrade, and when he refused to furnish the desired "information" at the "trial", he was tortured to death. The party convention also sent its greetings to those comrades languishing in prison for the cause of the proletariat. Finally we must mention the resolution rendering homage to the fighters of Soviet Russia.