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New Disclosures About the Social Revolutionary Party

By Karl Radek.

I. The Secret Archives of the S.R.'s.

The Soviet Government has succeeded in confiscating the secret archives of the S.R. organization in Paris, the so-called *Administrative Center*, consisting of Kerensky, Avksentiev, Zenzinov, Brushvit, Tchernov, Machin and other well-known S.R.'s. These archives weigh five puds, and until now only a small part of it could be assorted. The material already assorted deals with the activity of the S.R. Party during the year 1921. The last of the assorted documents are dated December 21st, 1921. They have been published in Moscow in pamphlet form entitled *The Work of the Foreign S.R.'s*, with photographic reproductions of the records and minutes of the *Administrative Center*, letters of Zenzinov, Kerensky and others. For the time being we will communicate the chief discoveries in the sifting of that material. This material will be the last nail in the coffin of that infamous Party.

In 1921 the SR Party lived on the money furnished it by the Czecho-Slovakian and French Governments as well as by the Russian White Guards.

These facts are proven by the following documents. Zenzinov, a member of the Foreign Delegation of the SR. Party, reports to Rogovski, member of the *Administrative Center*, on the 3rd of December: *Yesterday I had a conversation with Benesch, which lasted 15 minutes. He was as usual very amiable and obliging. I think he is upright. In our conversation I described to him our possibilities and actual position. I showed him our situation as a whole. "We believe your work useful and necessary for Russia as well as for us. We will not allow that your work be stopped; from January on you will receive from us weekly 50,000 crowns; I (Benesch) will see to it personally that this amount is raised to 60 or 65,000 crowns". (Benesch is the Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia). On the 21st of December, Zenzinov reports to Rogovski: "Four days ago I received 80,000 crowns. This money was paid us without any demand on our part."*

In their meeting of April 27th, 1921, the *Administrative Center* decided to curtail its activities in case the French should stop their subsidies, which proves that up to that time, the *Administrative Center* had been supported by the French Government.

As a third source of support appears the former Russian Ambassador Bachmetiev, in whose hands even today considerable sums from the Russian Government Treasury may be found. On the 12th of April, 1921, Kerensky sent the following coded telegram to Bachmetiev through the Czecho-Slovakian Embassy in Paris: "I have received an urgent call for aid from Russia.

The money you sent has reached its destination and was a great help. It is necessary to continue this help without delay. Our penury requires my immediate departure for America." In his letter of March 13th, Zenzinov writes Kerensky: "Yesterday we received your 50,000 francs, and 25,000 dollars from Bachmetiev by telegraph.

The fourth source of help is the *White Guard General Bitcherachov*. The S.R.'s received from him (according to his letter to Minor) during the year 1918/19, 20,000 francs and in 1920 several hundred pounds. Where did that money come from? The S.R. *Terpogossian* writes to Minor on the 21st of March 1921: "The money in the possession of Bitcherachov comes from two sources. After the evacuation of the Persian front, Bitcherachov organized a corps of volunteers. The English paid him a definite sum each month for the support of these troops. The payments were based on a personal contract. The English subsidies were greater than the expenses, so that a large sum always remained in Bitcherachov's hands. He also had at his disposal the money which had been appropriated by the Baku White Guard dictatorship after the overthrow of the Communist Governments in Baku and Petrovsk. *These consisted mainly of the railway funds, i. e., State-funds.* In consideration of these facts we thought ourselves justified to consider these sums not as Bitcherachov's personal property, but as given him for social and political purposes."

The fifth source were the *Russian capitalists*. During the Kronstadt insurrection, Zenzinov wrote to the *Administrative Center*: "To realize all this (the purchase of food for the Kronstadt rebels) a guarantee of 6 million Czechish crowns is necessary. In Paris you will be better able to judge who can furnish this guarantee. Perhaps through the Russian banks and industrialists, through Denikov; *Poslednia Novosti* and *Obshtche Dyelo* write a great deal about their readiness to furnish help to Kronstadt."

This proves that the S.R.'s were supported by French, Czecho-Slovakian as well as Russian White Guard capitalists. Further documents prove that the apparatus of this counter-revolution was placed at the disposal of the S.R.'s.

II.

The S.R.'s are in very close contact with the French Government. The correspondence between Kerensky and Berthelot, the director of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs proves this definitely. On the 19th of February, 1921, Berthelot writes to Kerensky: "In spite of all our efforts, I and the Premier (Briand) will not be able to find any time this week to confer with you. However, I have been able to speak with Benesch on the question which interests you, and we hope that our resolutions will satisfy you." We see thereby, how French

Imperialism uses its influence upon the bourgeois government of Czecho-Slovakia to help the S.R.'s.

The S.R.'s sent Colonel Machin to Reval to conduct their work in the North and Welt. A report of Machin to Kerensky dated June 25th shows what the work consisted in: "Our work for the coming months will consist in the sending of a reliable and capable person to Moscow to obtain information about the situation, to carry on military espionage and to sound the Staff personnel of the Red Army". On the 24th of September, he reports: "These two points (Narva and Petchery) should also conduct their spying to determine the forces of the Red Army." In August, the Administrative Center is notified that the S.R.'s are being supported by the French Military Authorities in all this work. "During my last visit to the French General Staff, I have settled all the questions relating to you in your favor. I was asked to link up connection for you in Reval and Riga so that you may be helped in the organization of our correspondence and that an automobile may be placed at your disposal. All necessary orders have been given, and in case of need you should apply to the head of the French Military Mission in Riga, General Archard, and in Reval to his subordinates. You may send all your reports through them." The French military representative, Archard, takes the S.R. Colonel Machin in his automobile to the Western front. When Kerensky sends Colonel Boronovitch to Constantinople for espionage purposes, he gives him a letter to General Pellet, the military representative of France in Constantinople, dated August 11th, 1921. "General, I have resumed in Paris the negotiations which I had begun before my departure to Constantinople, and whose result I hope you already know. I therefore take the liberty to reckon on your help for our cause and ask you at the same time to regard the bearer of this letter, colonel Nikolaus Boronovitch as my sole representative in Constantinople and to give him your full confidence." The Administrative Center in Paris corresponds in the code of the French Military Mission with Tchernov and Brushvit in Reval; with the member of the Foreign Delegation of the S.R.'s Zenzinov, through the Czecho-Slovakian Mission in Paris and through the Czecho-Slovakian Foreign Office in Prague and with the ex-Ambassador Bachmetiev in Washington in the code of the Czecho-Slovakian Mission in Paris. Among the documents we find the autographic letter of Wratislav Trcka, the first secretary of the Czecho-Slovakian Mission in Paris, in forming Avksentiev that Bachmetiev's answer has arrived.

Just as the great capitalistic powers, with France at the head, so the vassals of the Entente also helped the S.R.'s. The S.R. delegate in the Baltic States, Brunshvit negotiates with Meyerovitch, the Lettish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and with the Minister for Defense, Goldmann. He reports at the meeting of the council of March 13th, 1921, that both Ministers of Lettland acted towards him with exaggerated frankness, and that he had the impression after his conversation with them, that they did not believe in the independent existence of Lettland. He reported as follows: "I spoke with him (Meyerovitch) about our cause briefly and in general; we came to a full agreement in principle on all questions. The technical details will be arranged on my return. I spoke at length with Goldmann, the Minister for National Defense. He showed the fullest sympathy and agreement."

Brunshvit complains at first about his cool reception in Reval and surmises the cause to be the bribing of the Estonian Government by Litvinov. Brunshvit demands therefore: "an exhortation from the English side would be in place here, pointing out this superfluous sympathy for Litvinov and the much too apathetic attitude towards us." On March 17th, 1921 Kerensky answered Zenzinov by telegraph: "Confer with Benesch about removing the obstacles we meet in the border states. It is necessary that pressure be exercised from London." London must have obeyed; Colonel Machin writes to Kerensky on July 25th: "Diplomatic relations have been resumed. The War Ministry and the General Staff are on our side." In the report of the 24th of September on the activity of the S.R. Council in Reval, he says: "The resumption of our work requires certain diplomatic steps which will secure us considerable freedom of movement and the sympathy of responsible circles."

These sympathies existed in Finland from the very beginning. On the 12th of March, Brunshvit reports to the Administrative Center: "After the first cool impression, the attitude of the Finnish authorities towards us suddenly became very friendly. This will serve as an example: When my sudden departure for Reval became necessary, all facilities of transportation were put at my disposal, from the government ice-breakers to aeroplanes."

And finally,—Poland. Colonel Boronovitch, the leader of Kerensky's counter-espionage forces in Constantinople reports, September 16th, 1921, that the Polish Ambassador, Yadko has introduced him to Nelidov, the delegate of the White Guard insurgent organization in the North Caucasus. The report reads: "I have met His Excellence, Ambassador Yadko, who is the

prey of the blackest despair; Nelidov, he says, has ruined his whole career; Nelidov is a thief and an adventurer; I answered him that he himself had made the success of this adventurer possible and sent him to Paris."

These documents suffice to convince every reading man that it was no exaggeration on our part when we claimed that the S.R.'s were working not only with the financial support of the foreign powers but in closest contact with the latter's whole diplomatic and spying forces. We will show further what the S.R.'s had to pay for the support of capitalistic governments.

III.

In 1921, the S.R.'s stirred rebellions in the North-West and in the Caucasus. This does not relate to the support of Kronstadt alone nor to the attempt to bring grain to Kronstadt, as Zenzinov reports to Kerensky. At the session of August 13th, 1921 the Council of the Administrative Center, discussed the statutes of the Special Division whose task it was to prepare armed rebellions and the way in which experts could be secured for that work. Machin demands the financial and economic preparation for the overthrow of the Bolsheviki. Brunshvit speaks of the necessity to create a strong military organization. Kerensky declares: "Our experts and leaders are now in the various organizations in Russia, and we demand their signed pledge as guarantee for their political and military actions. They pledge themselves to an exemplary conduct in those matters." At the session of the Council of the Administrative Center, on March 31st Colonel Machin drew the attention of the Council to the existence in Finland of 15,000 Ingermanlanders, 3,000 of whom could be mobilized. Brunshvit reached an agreement with them on the matter of the material support of this White Guard organization through the S.R.'s; Tchernov gave them 14,000 Finnish marks.

The Committee of the S.R. group in the North-West provinces reports to the Administrative Center, November 6th, 1921: "To realize the plans of the Committee, the organization of armed attacks against the Bolsheviki, a special division of the truest and most devoted persons will be formed into a terroristic fighting group." This group shall be composed of a hundred men, disposing of the monthly sum of 559,000 Esthonian marks.

In the Caucasus, the S.R.'s ally themselves with the group called *The National Federation for the Liberation of the South East*, which was to prepare a general uprising in the Caucasus. In the archives of the Administrative Center we found a draft of a coded letter from one of the S.R. military experts, addressed to Machin, in which the following communication is made: "Two weeks ago a certain Colonel Nelidov addressed himself to us for help; he came to us from the North Caucasus as the delegate of the *Union of Insurgent Troops of North Caucasus* and of the Cossack, Peasant, and Urban Delegates' Council with the latest news about conditions in that region. The situation in the main, is as follows: The preparation of an uprising in the North Caucasus, including Dagestan, the Tver and Kuban Provinces, the Province of Stavropol and the Isal District of the Don provinces had been conducted along the same lines as in the Black Sea provinces, by Boronovitch; that is, central, provincial, district and company staffs were created. Of the 126 company staffs to be created 73 were already functioning. Local conditions make it necessary that the uprising take place no later than October, and Nelidov reports that the uprising would take place irrespective of foreign aid. It was decided to furnish that aid. For that purpose we again resumed negotiations with the French, and they have formally promised us all possible help, naturally on condition that the greatest secrecy be maintained. Boronovitch and Nelidov are leaving on the 20th of August for Constantinople, where they will enter into contact with the central organs, and should the foregoing be found true, they will fix the date of the uprising and with means of transportation previously prepared, they will bring the weapons and ammunition and the necessary personnel to points on the shore known to them."

The correspondence with Boronovitch in Constantinople was conducted through the Czecho-Slovakian Mission. In his letter of the 21st of September, Boronovitch gives a report of his negotiations with the representatives of the Central Committee of the Mensheviki in Georgia, referring to their common action. He organized in the Caucasus a military espionage system and sent through the Czecho-Slovakian Mission the most detailed information on the position of Soviet troops in the Caucasus. He writes, October 12th: "From Suchov and other places I have received through . . . a letter from one of my couriers, whom I had sent on the 12th of September to the Black Sea region. I have in that way entered into direct connection with the North Caucasus, and besides the importance of the news which the letter brought me, it has great significance from an other standpoint. After the French and English counter spies learned of that, they showed great interest in my actions and bade me to communicate my information to them." So we see that were

the uprisings, financed with French capital, to fail, the incurred debts would at least be repaid by a transmission of news to French counter-espionage, news which they would have received in any case, for it had been transmitted by the Czecho-Slovakian Mission in code to Paris.

Until now, only a small part of the material in the hands of the Soviet Government has been examined; but this material is sufficient to convict the S.R.'s of cooperation with foreign powers for the overthrow of the Soviet Government, helped in that work with the money and the military espionage systems of the Allies. The documents justify, nay, oblige the Soviet Government to treat the S.R.'s as an organization of military spies, of inciters to insurrection for the benefit of the Allies, of intervention instigators.

The Soviet Government will treat the S.R.'s as they deserve; and we do not doubt that all the honest elements still to be found in that Party, all those who have not dishonored themselves as spies of the Entente, will turn their backs upon this criminal band who have driven the S.R. Party into the hands of the Allied spy service.

IV.

A Few Questions to the Second and 2½ Internationals.

We bring this material before the large masses of the working class. We bring it also before the defenders of the S.R.'s. In the first period of the Revolution, in 1918, Russia had given up the war. The S.R.'s, however, felt themselves bound to the Allies. They attempted to overthrow the Bolsheviki by force of arms, and formed an Opposition Government. Since the defeat of their Government, since its overthrow by Koltchak, they organized no more uprisings, they gave up the fight with the weapons, they severed their connections with the Allies. This is the claim of the gentlemen of the Second and 2½ Internationals, who accuse us of conducting a policy of revenge, for actions long past. The documents now published show this to be nothing but a tissue of lies. During the whole of the year 1921, the S.R.'s were preparing themselves for armed uprisings. They conducted these uprisings with the money of the Allies, they worked in the closest connection with the Allied General Staffs, and the Allied spy-system.

And now, we have a few questions to address to the Second and 2½ Internationals and in particular to some of their parties.

First question: The Second and 2½ Internationals believe in national defense. As long as the bourgeoisie holds the reins of Government, national defense means the defense of

capital. We have rejected national defense; but the Second and 2½ Internationals still stand upon that ground. How is this standpoint consistent with the support of the party which conducts a system of military espionage in favor of foreign capitalistic governments, organizes insurrections to prepare for a new intervention by these governments, as the S.R.'s have clearly done during the Fall of 1921, when they demanded from the French, transport ships, weapons and military experts for the insurrection they had organized in the Caucasus.

Second question: If the Second and 2½ Internationals think it permissible to form a spy-system against the revolutionary government of Russia, to organize uprisings in Russia, and to accept for that purpose money from foreign governments, is this espionage work, this organization of insurrections admissible for all capitalistic governments or only for the Entente? If the Second and 2½ Internationals agree to the first, do they not believe that it will result in the split of the S.R. Party into two parts, one of which will conduct their spying for the benefit of the Allies and the other for the benefit of the German Government? But if this espionage work is permissible only for the Allies, how can the German and the Austrian Social Democracies support this espionage for the Allies and defend the spies of the Entente? We shall not object that this is against the Rapallo Treaty, but only insist upon the fact that spies have a tendency to enlarge their field of activity. Why should not the S.R. Colonels Machin and Boronovitch, who are conducting the espionage in Russia for the Entente, with the consent of Tchernov, member of the Central Committee of the S.R.P., also conduct this espionage in the service of Germany? We believe that this espionage International is a more influential factor than is the Second International, and we point out to the German Social Democrats the dangers which menace their fatherland.

We know that these questions will raise the loud cry: "We never knew anything about it!" Good, we will excuse your ignorance. If you have defended the S.R.'s only because you yourselves were betrayed by them, then now is the time to change your position on the basis of the facts which we have laid before you. You should now declare: Yes, we now break loose from the Social Revolutionaries. The Soviet Government has absolute right when it defends itself against these brigands with all the means at its disposal.

We now await this declaration, and should it not be forthcoming, we await what the honest workers of the Second and 2½ Internationals will say when they learn that their leaders have made them the allies of Entente espionage.

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