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The Discussion in the Russian Party.

The third great discussion since the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia is taking place in the Russian C. P.

The first discussion dealt with the Brest-Litovsk peace, with the question whether we should take up arms against the German Imperialism. The Bolsheviki were victorious in the „armed discussion“ against the Mensheviki and Social revolutionaries, but they were too weak for an „armed discussion“ with „German Imperialism“ which, at that time, was still armed to the teeth. The second discussion in the party took place in the year 1920. After the victory of the Russian Workers and Peasants in the war with Entente Imperialism and the inner counter-revolution, the Russian peasantry numbering many millions, began a „discussion“ on the so called War-Communism. The debate arose on the question of the Trade Unions. The originators of the discussion could not understand that the question was identical with the problem of the relations to the peasantry, as was the case also with the discussion on the Brest-Litovsk peace. The discussion ended at the 10th congress in an extensive compromise with the peasants in the new economy policy, as well as with the consolidation of the party unity according to the line laid down by Lenin, i. e. the strict prohibition of any formation of fractions or groups within the Party. The roots of the third discussion can be traced back to the discussions over the Brest-Litovsk Peace and the Trade Unions; only the number of those comrades who fought on the side of the opposition against Lenin's line, has grown smaller (although the leading personalities of the opposition are practically the same now as they were during the former grouping against Lenin's tactics). The attack of the opposition is directed precisely against those principles of the Party, which in former discussions were accepted as the decisions won by Bolshevism in a twenty years struggle.

As at the time of the debate regarding the trade unions, so also now in the third discussion the main question remained in the background. The discussion did not rage round the new economic policy or the relations to the peasantry (these questions seemed to play only a subordinate role), but round the question of the limits of democracy inside the Party. The resolution of the C. C. unanimously carried at an opportune time, afforded not the least point of attack for the opposition. The opposition was therefore obliged to seize on the decisions of the 10th congress on Party Unity and on the old guard of Bolshevism, who constitute, so to speak, a personal guarantee of unity. A victory on this question, or at least, the winning of a concession from the C. C. would have given the opposition an opportunity to begin their attack on the economic front, in regard to the question of relations to the Peasantry. It has now become clear during the course of the debate, that the opposition was not able to develop

a positive economic program, which was considered by any great number of comrades as worth disputing. Thus nine tenths of the discussion turns upon the question of organization. Just this fact will render the discussion irrelevant for the masses of the membership. Workers Democracy within the Party was realised for the Masses of the Party Members through the thesis of the C. C. The discussion concerning this question was, in its form, its extent and its method a proof that all demands for guarantees for the realization of inner Party Democracy were groundless. There is not perhaps a single party nuclei in the C. P. R. where the widest and freest discussion was not held or will be held. There was not a single case where the apparatus, which formed the butt of the opposition, has limited the liberty of debate. The masses of the party members too have likewise not regarded inner Party Democracy as a gift coming from above, they sought and found the guarantees for the carrying out of the decision above all in themselves and in the old guard of Bolshevism which has been well-tried in the struggle against opportunism.

The demands of the opposition to have the liberty of forming fractions was energetically refused as threatening the Party Unity. The great mass of the party members were conscious of their responsibility not only to the Russian proletariat and the Russian peasantry, but also to the International Communist Movement and whole-heartedly supported the C. C. in this question. The discussion showed that the collective judgement of important questions of the Soviet Union and the Party do not in any way require the formation of fractions within the Party. The unity of a governing Party, which is responsible in the first place for the international revolution, cannot be hazarded even for the shortest time without the most serious consequences.

The Party was no less unanimously in agreement with the C. C. in the second question: the question of the relation of the old Bolshevist guard to the young party generation. In the C. P. R. every current which is directed against Lenin's tactics meets with the most violent opposition from the disciples of Lenin, of the old Bolshevist guard. This guard however was not at all isolated in the battle for the defense of those results which were immediately attained under the leadership of Lenin. Thus, as the demands for liberty for fraction building were rejected by the mass of the party members, the old Bolshevist guard discovered the young party members to be on their side against the attempt at splitting the Party according to generations. The declarations of the Leaders of the Youth League, of the Youth organizations of Petrograd

and other industrial centres, stand opposed to the decision of a few University Party nuclei, who demand liberty of forming fractions. The unity of the old and young Bolshevist guard was not only not shaken during the debate, but strengthened by the fact that the youth gained an insight into the roots of the discussion, which dated back as far as the old struggle of Bolshevism. It was only now that they began to understand the real import of the old struggles within the party.

The result of the Discussion will be decided at the All-Russian Party Conference. According to all indications, there is no longer any doubt as to what form the decision will take. Not even a very small minority have definitely adopted the standpoint of the opposition. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority (in some districts 90 and even 100% of the membership) declared themselves to be absolutely for the old Bolshevist guard.

Address and Concluding Speech delivered by Comrade Kamenev

At the Meeting of the Functionaries of the Moscow Organization. (on 11. December 1923.)

Comrades! I shall deal with the most important points only, and with the results of the discussion which is going on at the present time in all the districts. If we examine into all the objections, doubts, and indications, which we have all heard raised at the districts meetings, we must candidly admit that the cardinal question yielded as the result and summing up of all these discussions is as follows: yes, it is true that the Workers' Democracy has been proclaimed by the central; it is true that the fundamental guarantees for the carrying out of the workers' democracy are contained in the resolution passed by the Central; but is the present Central worthy of confidence? Can we really believe that the policy indicated by the resolution has actually been firmly determined upon by the Central, and that the present Central will carry out this policy? I have formulated, in these words, the whole of the doubts and objections which we have been hearing from those who appear as opponents against the Central. This is the form in which I put the question to myself, and I think that it will have to be put to the whole Moscow organization in this form. We are faced by one of two things: Either these resolutions may be safely entrusted to the Central for their execution; or: we are in possession of a piece of paper, representing a policy which it is for the Party to see carried out, for it is not issued by the Central on its own initiative, only but under pressure; we are in possession of a piece of paper, but not of a conviction that the Central will actually realize its contents. This is the cardinal question confronting your meeting, and demanding a clear and unequivocal answer. The change of policy which we intend carrying out with you cannot be performed unless there is mutual confidence between us. Therefore I regard it as incumbent on me to explain how the Central came to formulate in its resolution the idea and the principles which are contained in it. This came about under the following influence: opinions have frequently been expressed at meetings, to the effect that the Central acted under pressure of the opposition within the Party; that some definite document exists in which all this voluntary action is dictated; that the Central has however taken no notice of this, etc. Is there any foundation for all these assertions? In the first place I deem it necessary to draw a dividing line between this question and all the unfounded rumours and gossip which have gathered around them. At one district meeting, a written declaration actually obliged me to tell a comrade straight out that such declarations, coming from our own midst, are nothing more nor less than a reflection of that kind of idle chatter amongst us which has already become a political weapon against our Party in the hands of our enemies. For there is not one amongst us who can have the slightest doubt — and for us old Bolsheviks, who have already passed through a hard school, it is a perfectly illuminating fact — but that at the moment when the bourgeoisie is robbed of the press and of the possi-

The great majority of the Party took full account of the fact that the C. P. R. is not merely one of the Communist Parties, but is a governing party, whose crisis is at the same time a crisis of the proletarian state, that the C. P. R. is the leading party of International Communism and its crisis means a crisis for the Communist international. The overwhelming majority of the Party, soberly and without faction hatred, pointed out the political faults of the leaders of the opposition. At the same time not one of the comrades of the majority thought of taking advantage of these faults to render the position of the leaders of the opposition impossible, or to deprive them of their positions.

The C. P. R. will emerge from this discussion, not only richer in experience, but more firmly united and with more closely consolidated ranks.

lity of open attack upon us, at this moment such petty bourgeois tittle tattles as has contrived to percolate into our ranks will stop at nothing, will disintegrate us more and more, will undermine the authority of our central institutions, and form a political weapon against us. At present there is a danger that those members of our Party who are insufficiently schooled, insufficiently firm in principle, may be deceived by this gossip. Let us therefore set it aside along with all the idle rumors and assertions which cannot be proved by documents; it should form no part of our discussion on actualities. Let us occupy ourselves solely with that which any one of us can prove. What were the origins of this question in the Central? The first and fundamental event compelling the Central to accord attention to the unsound conditions obtaining within our Party was something outside of the Party itself, in the working class. In July and August, extremely alarming phenomena showed themselves among the working class, which could not be passed over by the central institutions. We underwent a period of strikes in Kharkov and Sormovo. The direct causes of the strikes, the actual reasons for their outbreak, varied in the different cases. We, as the Party apparatus, as the state apparatus, were partly to blame. But this only applies to the immediate cause. The general conditions causing the movement forced us to direct our attention to the situation within our Party itself. We had to ask ourselves if it were possible to imagine a situation in which the Party organization is unable to foresee an approaching wave of dissatisfaction among the masses; that such a case could be possible as that at Zindel's, where a movement arose in August, where the representative of the nucleus and the manager admitted that the movement was entirely unexpected for the nucleus, and this comrade declared that: „We had no idea of the movement. The Yatchayka (nucleus) lost its head when it began; it lost its direction. Was this the fault of this yatchayka itself, or must it not rather be laid to the account of the unsound symptoms observable within our organization? We should indeed be blind or short-sighted should we maintain that the happenings in Moscow, in Kharkov, in Sormovo, and other places, are but passing episodes not requiring our attention, and having no bearing on the inner development and inner life of our Party. At the same time, phenomena became noticeable within our Party itself, phenomena equally symptomatic, and speedily demanding our whole attention. This was the rise of the counter-revolutionary „workers' group“, which represented a real danger, and whose symptomatic and essential character did not consist in its existence as a counter-revolutionary organization, but in the circumstance that one of these organizations — the workers' group — possessed connections among the working class, and began to have effect, in combination with the various attendant rumors, upon a certain section of our Party, if only upon a weak and inferior section. These two fundamental

phenomena, which appeared quite independently of any events within the Central, of any differences of opinion and resultant discussion among those belonging to the Central, faced us with a question quite outside of all this: The Party is attacked by a disease which has to be cured. And further analysis and examination of this question showed us that there are many phenomena in the life of the working class to which the Party has adapted itself too slowly, and to which the Party has devoted too little attention. In the first place Comrade Lenin drew attention two years ago to the fact that our proletariat was becoming declassed and decomposed.

We must however now grasp the fact (already partially demonstrable by statistical data) that this declassing process in the proletariat, the fundamental process of the inner life of our Party from 1919 till 1920 and 1921, has ceased, and that we are now experiencing the reversed process — the process of consolidation, of improvement, of return of the honest native proletariat to the city, of revival in the inner life of the working class, and of improvement in its material position. And upon this basis, the basis of the consolidation of the working class, of the comparative improvement of its material position, we find an awakening in the inner ideological, cultural, and political life of the working class, a growth of demands put upon life, a rise of cultural level, and an increase of the political demands put upon us, the communists. Thus the Party is faced by the task of not being behind-hand, of adapting its inner life with all speed, if it is to be equal to meeting these fresh tasks imposed by the higher standards and advanced consolidation of the working class. Should the Central and other Party organizations respond to these facts by closing their eyes, or by maintaining that everything is in perfect order, there is no doubt but that they would be the greatest criminals; their assumption of an official and authoritative satisfactory state of affairs might plunge the Party into the abyss. But in actual fact nothing of the kind has happened, and the structure and traditions of our Party render it impossible for it to happen. The above facts simply became the objective motives for the movement which became apparent in all our organizations, beginning with the Central, and based on the endeavour to enhance political activity within our Party itself, and to raise it to the required level. To this another circumstance must be added, one which becomes increasingly prominent, and to which we must devote much more attention in the future than in the past, for it concerns us more and more. We are living under the conditions of the NEP. I shall not deal with the new economic policy at this meeting, but I am aware that energetic attacks are being made upon it and upon the public economic policy pursued by the Central, and I am convinced that we shall presently have to thrash out this matter at a similar meeting to this, and come to a decision as to who is right — the Central which pursues a definite economic line, or the assailants attacking this policy from the districts. At the present moment I shall merely touch upon the question of the influence exercised by the NEP. at our own level, upon the question as to whether we are able to boast that the fighting unity, the psychological and political peculiarities possessed by our Party during the civil war a few years ago, still remain with us. If we do not deliberately close our eyes, and try to pretend that everything is in order; if we admit that we are bound to regard our own experience with a critical eye; then we must come to the following conclusion: Of course not. And for the very sufficient reason that our Party consists of three parts, of the proletariat, the peasants, and the employees — the intelligenzia, and that it is impossible to imagine that these three special groups are not subject to the corresponding influences brought to bear upon them from directions outside of our Party. Thus the proletarian wing of our Party, under constant pressure from the masses in the works and factories, possesses an entirely different psychological conception of things than, for instance, the intellectual wing, consisting of employees, which latter wing is again living in quite another atmosphere to that of the peasant wing of the Party, which has a mentality of its own. Without going further into details, we can see clearly that this NEP. is bound to have a different effect on the different wings of our Party, especially on the first wing, that wing which we have sent along with you far into the camp of enemy in the NEP. Those of our Party who have thus been sent into the camp of the enemy, must receive our full support in every respect, but we must not forget that we have placed them in a position in which they cannot shut themselves off from the atmosphere so different to that breathed by our Party. If

we take a workman, a communist from the ranks of the intelligenzia, and appoint him director of a bank, president of a trade exchange, or give him a leading and responsible position, or place him at the head of a syndicate, we must admit to ourselves that we are sending a comrade to a very dangerous position, for we are not sending him out to fight hand to hand with the bourgeoisie, but to make agreements with it, to sign contracts with it, to carry on commerce, etc. I repeat, that we should be blind were we to forget here Marxism, or to forget that the division which we have sent forward to occupy this post is much more liable than any other division — much more than the workman at his bench — to degeneration as Communists, and to succumb to the NEP. And we should be acting criminally with regard to these comrades if we did not adopt measures for neutralizing this influence.

Let us now consider another aspect of the question — let us remember what we demand from those comrades among the workers, or even among the unemployed, who are expected as Communists to understand our final aim, Communism, and our latest bloody struggle with the White Guards, and at the same time to find a clear mental path through those immediate external contradictions of the principles of Communism and Socialism which they — the unemployed or the city proletariat, are bound to come across at every step, when they go into the streets, look at the shop windows, or observe the doings of the NEP. We demand a very high degree of self-control, experience, and theoretical understanding from these comrades, if they are not to be carried away by anarcho-syndicalist currents. We must admit to ourselves that in proportion to the extent of the existence of the NEP, and in proportion to the increasing acuteness of the situation created in the relations between the separate workers, the unemployed, and these Nep. bourgeoisie, these anarcho-syndicalist currents are almost inevitably bound to reach nearly to the ranks of our Party. And when the workers' group, this Myasnikov set, has been able to gain a hearing among certain elements of our Party whose outlook is extremely limited, this influence exercised by Myasnikov's counter-revolutionary speeches is explicable as a result of those contradictions which we are unable to eliminate, which remain, and which are the constant cause of a certain amount of doubt and vacillation in this wing of our Party, a certain tendency to give a hearing to those ideas current in the Myasnikov atmosphere. What is the essential character of the Myasnikov tendency? The opposition of the working class to our state. What is Menshevism? The opposition of the working class to our state. It requires a high standard of political schooling to understand that our state, despite its many faults, and despite the insufficient wage payments to the workers, is still a workers' state. And this standard cannot be expected of every workman. The two dangers threatening us from various quarters are: first degeneration under the influence of the NEP., and secondly, the anarcho-syndicalist tendency. How are we effectually to combat these dangers, how are we to ensure that the increased demands put upon our Party are to be adequately met, how are we to make sure that a strike does not merely pass over without effecting us, but is made unnecessary by us beforehand; how are we to help the economists on the one hand and the provoked proletariat on the other, how are we to find an antidote against these decomposing influences within the Party, how are we to find a reply to the questions engaging the proletariat, questions which will become increasingly acute as the contradictory system of the NEP. develops further? The answer to this is to be found in the workers' democracy, in the raising of the general tone of the ideological life of our Party, in the conversion of every nucleus into a laboratory of Party thought, in which every member of our Party, and every non-partisan worker placing his confidence in our nucleus, can have the problems which disturb him answered in free discussion. The answer is to be found in not having the resolutions adopted by the nucleus dictated from above, but in their being the result of independent thought expended on these fundamental questions. This higher standard of political life, in the nuclei and in the higher organizations alike; the discussion of all questions coming before the Party in these organizations, so long as no insuperable obstacles stand in the way of such discussion: this is the guarantee, at the present juncture, against the schismatic elements entering our Party from various sides, just as other measures, measures of severest discipline, superlatively military in description, afforded guarantees to our Party against other dividing influences in other times of bitter struggle.

Another condition essential to the workers' democracy, dictated by the general situation, and a necessary guarantee for free discussion, is that the posts in our Party be filled by election.

You are well aware, comrades, that this question of the discussion of all questions, and of the participation of all members in the discussion, the question of the choosing by election of the whole Party apparatus from the top to the bottom, is in no way new to us either as a problem or as a task. The idea of this system has not occurred to the Party now for the first time. We have long been aware that democratic centralism does not consist in the Party being elected from below, but in the undeviating execution of the instructions of the Party on the part of the persons and institutions holding positions in the Party. This was a fact established for us some decades ago; but we have had to apply this democratic centralism in different ways under different conditions, and if we had delayed, at the present juncture, in our transition to a broader application of this principle, we should have committed a grave error. But can anyone maintain that on this occasion the Central did not observe the necessity in good time? How did this workers' democracy come about? As early as the Plenary Session of the Central in September (convened in connection with the prevailing excitement and with the formation of the worker' group above mentioned) comrade Dserszinsky submitted to this session a report pointing out that a dying out of our Party, the dying out of the inner life of the Party, the greater prevalence of nomination rather than election, might easily become a political danger, and might paralyse our Party in regard to the political leadership of the working class. An analysis of this movement, present both within and without the Party in July and August, caused comrade Dserszinsky to set up a broad commission to inquire into the internal situation in the Party. The task set this commission was to deal with the question as a whole. The Plenary Session following, in October passed a resolution citing the resolution of the Central, and stating that: „The Plenary Sessions of the Central, and of the C. C. C. (Central Control Commission) fully approve of the course adopted at the right moment, by the Political Bureau, with reference to internal Party democracy; they also approve of the stronger measures dictated by the Political Bureau to combat against the „wasteful expenditure“, and against the dividing influence of the NEP. upon the various elements of the Party.“

This resolution is the sole one passed by the October Plenary Session with reference to Democracy. The October Plenary Session dealt with various other questions as well, but these had no reference to Democracy. It dealt with some very delicate problems, but not with those pertaining to Democracy. With regard to Democracy, the Plenary Session of the Central and of the C. C. C. debated on the following lines. The resolution passed on this subject was as follows: „The Plenary Session instructs the Political Bureau to take every action required to accelerate the work of the commissions appointed by the Political Bureau at the September session: 1. The commission for examining into the disparity between the agricultural and industrial prices; 2. over the workers' wages, and 3. over the situation within the Party. The Political Bureau, after working out the measures necessary to be taken in these matters, is to begin with the immediate execution of these measures, and to report on its activity at the next plenary session of the Central.“ Thus the October plenary session commissioned the Political Bureau to work out the resolution. And we have worked it out, indeed, we have done more: we have succeeded in having this resolution (which contains every present element of workers' democracy within the Party, and which points out the actual character of this workers' democracy and how it is to be practically applied) unanimously adopted by the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the C. C. C.

By this action the Party has thus afforded the guarantee that the change of policy which we are accomplishing is really being carried out with mutual agreement, and can and must be executed with the slightest possible injury to the Party.

The carrying out of such a change of policy, comrades, is invariably difficult. We have gone with you through a large number of such alterations in tactics — sometimes the evolution has been difficult, and has cost the Party much, and sometimes it has been comparatively easy. We know then when we changed our course in the trade union question, we were obliged to do it in the midst of a reciprocal struggle, in the midst of a severe

combat which drew the whole Party into discussions outside the actual issue. And when we undertook the fundamental change of tactics implied by the NEP., we undertook this without internal discussion, without internal struggle, without the formation of fractions. Here, with regard to the NEP., we performed the evolution unanimously, and it was therefore performed smoothly and with the least possible detriment.

And what is the question before us now? We are, and always have been, in favor of the workers' democracy. I have not heard a single criticism of the formulation of the resolution passed by the Central. Nobody will assert that the workers' democracy is distorted in this resolution, or that this or that point should be added. We do not see any practical proposals for the carrying out of the real workers' democracy. But the danger exists that we shall find this evolution difficult of performance, and that some unsound conditions may be caused by it. In the Central we have done everything possible for facilitating the performance of the evolution: we have attained the unanimous acceptance of the resolution in the Central. But what danger is incurred by the actual performance? The danger exists that when we turn into this new path, our Party vehicle may take the curve so abruptly that its wheels may leave the earth altogether... You know the high appreciation of which our Central is worthy. You know that the unity of the Party is at stake. We are confronted by the danger which threatens us at this curve, the danger that when we do not possess firmly established groupings, we shall no longer know what we are to understand regarding the freedom of discussion which we proclaim. At every district meeting the same question arises: „How does the matter stand, does this workers' democracy include or exclude free discussion and the freedom to form groups? The workers' democracy, like every other democracy, includes the freedom of the ideological groups. If we think of democracy in its complete and unlimited form, the rights of groups cannot be excluded.

But we maintain definitely that the workers' democracy, as formulated by the present resolution of the Central, permits no freedom to groupings, let alone freedom for fractions. Here too we must come to an agreement with one another. There are comrades who believe that these limitations are impossible; comrade Preobrashensky (I am glad to see that he is present) maintains that: We cannot comprehend the workers' democracy without this freedom for groups. Why are we against groups? For the reason that we are obliged to leave the Party fundamentally where it is. We are against groupings because we do not merely represent a Communist Party, and because we find ourselves with you, in a special situation, as a Communist Party. And if even the Communist Parties of France and Germany possess group freedom, this is merely a circumstance which originates in the inheritance of the organizational methods of Social Democracy. Our Party is not in this position; our Party differs from all other Communist Parties in that it governs the country, whilst the others are still struggling for power. We need be a prey to no illusions here. Here we have 400,000 communists belonging to different spheres, different generations, and coming from different parties — and these 400,000 communists are governing the country. Is it possible to allow these 400,000 communists the liberty to form groups? We say — no. Such freedom to form groups leads to a splitting up of state power, and it is only irresponsible persons, only such who have no comprehension for the reciprocal relations between our Party and the state power, who can play with this idea and talk so much about it.

The 10th Congress of our Party dealt with this question at an exceedingly critical moment, and those comrades who maintain that the resolution passed by the Central is inadequate, or must be differently interpreted, must be asked the question: What do you propose to do with the resolution of the 10th Congress? The resolution was comrade Lenin's, written with his own hand, and passed without any amendment. Comrade Lenin understood very well the circumstances which induce the formation of groupings and fractions. There is a certain transition stage. When we stated at a meeting that this is the resolution passed by the 10th Congress two years ago, someone replied that the resolution was out of date, and should be altered, since it was written two years ago. But this resolution is so formulated that it cannot become obsolete. At the present time we are carrying on an existence three quarters of which is passed in a vice between the ruling regime and the elements hostile to

the Soviet government, an existence surrounded on all sides by the snares set by the NEP. So long as this objective situation remains, so long does every word of the resolution passed by the 10th Congress retain its full force.

I am of the opinion that when a member of the Party is in doubt about anything, he should apply to his organization, discuss the matter there, and try to gain a majority, but all within the confines of the Party. But if he goes to other people, or to comrades belonging to quite a different party, then he commits a crime. We know very well that there are many comrades engaged especially in the formation of groups.

We have nothing against differences of opinion. Let us assume that differences of opinion arise amongst us today with regard to this or that decree, or this or that enactment. The comrades meet and debate. Thus for instance the question of currency reform is on the agenda, a question of essential importance for the whole Soviet power and for the Party. Perhaps there is a group of comrades who are not in agreement with the manner in which this reform is to be carried out. But this is an accidental difference of opinion, subject to discussion in the Party. But when these same comrades, after being united for all these years on one and the same platform, now come to us and say that they are not in agreement with us at all, and that they can form a group complete in itself, then they must permit us, who are no infants in political experience, to say that we do not believe this. We say to them: You are treading on dangerous ground, on ground forbidden by the Congress. We tell you this because we are well aware how fractions come into being, and how they pursue their aims. We ourselves once formed a fraction; for 20 years we were a fraction in the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and we were deliberately a fraction, for we intended to conquer power by these means, and we have carried out our purpose. We split off from the Mensheviks, and made our Party into a complete whole in itself. If we are to solve the present question, we must state openly what a fraction leads to and what is the result of the formation of groups. We have a very different conception of the structure of the Party to that held by those comrades who stand for the liberty to form groups. There exist two forms of party groupings: let us take the Menshevik party, with which we long lived in close affinity, and which we got to know through and through — and our fraction, the Bolsheviks. What is the difference between these? The difference consisted of the fact that we were a centralized organization of the shock troops of the revolution, united down to the last man on our ideological basis. And what were the Mensheviks? They were a coalition of various shades, of various groupings. This was the Menshevik organization, and this is why they succumbed in internal party struggles. We stood as a united organization, and they as a coalition of differing shades and groupings. It was not for nothing that comrade Lenin named the Mensheviks the heroes of petty reservations. If we have an organization in which one section is opposed to another, it is only natural that each group will make reservations with respect to the other. I am afraid that comrade Preobrazhensky will make reservations with regard to comrade Sapronov, and that comrade Sapronov will do the same with regard to comrade Ossinsky. Comrades, I ask you what you really want. Do you want a firmly welded fighting organization, with all the inner democracy possessed by the Party, or are you trying to transform our Party into a coalition of groups, of small groupings and shades of opinion? This is a luxury which we cannot permit ourselves. And we are of the opinion that the Party would drive away, with a hangman's rope, and before the next congress, any Central bringing the Party into such a condition. Such a degeneration of the Party would signify its complete defeat on the field of real state power. It must be our endeavor to perform the necessary evolution in mutual agreement, and in such a manner as to lose as little as possible by it. But should anyone seek to utilize this evolution for the purpose of introducing into our conception of things, that which formed the essential character of the Menshevik party, then, comrades, you must permit us to call a halt. That is something which we shall not allow. Neither shall we allow that which we have heard and felt at the district meetings. The question of the Party apparatus was brought up at all these meetings. The favourable opportunity is to be seized upon, when the Party admits that errors have been committed, that there have been „appointment experts“, that stupidities have been committed. This is the moment for

those comrades who have been drumming at the door for three years to come and say: „Now then, down with the apparatus.“ If the necessary transition which we are endeavoring to carry out is to be utilized for the purpose of inciting one section of the Party against another — that means overstepping the limit and risking a broken neck.

What is our Party apparatus? According to information which I have received from the Central, 20,000 comrades are working in the Party apparatus. I do not know whether that is many or few. But I know that a much larger number of apparatus workers are employed in our people's commissariats. But if 20,000 out of 400,000 Party members are absorbed by what we call the Party apparatus, this has been brought about by necessity. The question is therefore: what are we to do with this apparatus; is it of any use for anything, or does it consist of a selection of members who should be hunted out of the Party? I maintain that this apparatus should be renewed, that the faults of the apparatus should be removed by our common efforts — but if the slogan is issued: „Down with the Party apparatus“, then we shall have to be careful indeed not to destroy the whole apparatus of government by such a slogan, and careful again not to injure the actual framework of the whole Party, by the aid of which the Party has been working up to now along the lines upon which it had to work. Is it possible to accomplish those state duties incumbent on the Party without the help of this apparatus? You forget that we, with you, are carrying on work which is three-fourths state work — or are you going to believe those who tell you that the Party should occupy itself with its own affairs, and the state with state affairs. There are people who will say this. It is a false political conclusion. In our agrarian country, with our number of proletarians, with our state apparatus, and under the NEP, it must not be forgotten that comrade Lenin placed this apparatus on a sound basis, and that we communists, as Party, are faced with this enormous task of purely state work.

The slogan: „dismissal of the apparatus men from their posts“ was employed by us Bolsheviks against the Mensheviks, because we wanted to destroy this party.

It must be remembered that we require a mighty centralized apparatus. The apparatus which we possess is bad. It commits errors, just as all our Party members do. And those Party members who have been placed in responsible positions by the Party, the economists, the co-operators — do they not make mistakes too? To be sure they do. But the errors which really concern the Party, our mistakes which effect the actual body of the Party, these cut much more deeply. As a general rule, however, the Party apparatus has carried out the policy dictated by the Central. The apparatus is a tool, an instrument, and if you are not going to admit that the apparatus has carried out its policy, if you are going to undermine the general policy by the slogan of: „dismissal of the old apparatus-men from their posts“, then the Party will not permit this. It will renew its apparatus systematically, and cure its diseases. Therefore the Party advises: „Renew the Party apparatus systematically at every new election, and choose comrades and workers capable of carrying out the workers' democracy.“

In conclusion, I should like to put one more question to myself and to you: Here we have a resolution and a historical turning point, which are in themselves naturally not of such essential importance as the change of tactics involved in the NEP. We have afforded the guarantee that the change implied in this resolution is going to be carried out with the smallest possible detriment to the Party, and the question as to what is going to be done towards the execution of the Central's decisions can be answered perfectly clearly: „Party life is to be renewed from top to bottom, all questions of a political and economic character are to be submitted to debate among the broad lower strata of the Party; our apparatus is to be systematically renewed at the new elections; comrades are to be elected and not appointed. Thus the resolution of the Central can be carried out.“ But what must not be allowed to happen is the following: at this critical turning point no groupings must be permitted, whether fractional or other groups; no one section of the Party must be incited against another; the evolution being performed by the Party must not be converted into a concealed struggle for power within the Party. Then we shall fulfil our task. If we prove too weak to offer resistance against those who are at present trying to play off the Party against itself; if we are not firm enough in this respect, then we shall

be criminals in the eyes of the whole Party and of the next Party conference. I am profoundly convinced that the Moscow organization will not commit this error, that it will dare everything, will discuss the whole criticism thoroughly in its nuclei, and will finally, with all determination and caution, and with due observation of the old Bolshevik discipline and the old Bolshevik ideology, perform the necessary evolution, and not permit anyone to hinder it in doing so.

Confuting Speech.

In my address I have dealt with the most essential and important questions of Party life at the present time. I believe that you must come to a decision today, and that this decision is not only determinative for the Moscow organization, but for the general opinion of the Party in the provinces as well. Therefore I beg you to set aside that feeling of nervousness now prevailing, and to draw the balance of the present discussion meeting.

Comrades, everything which has been said here is not quite in accordance with that demanded or desired by comrade Zinoviev. Mention has here been made of a monopoly, and this is not right. It is not right, because there has been no monopoly against the discussion. During the whole of the time that the discussion has been going on in Moscow, not a single circumstance has occurred enabling the much condemned apparatus to be reproached with having prevented any Party nucleus from carrying on the discussion, and there is no power which could act contrary to this, under the present resolution of the Central, or could prevent anyone from bringing up any desired question for discussion. We must come to some decision or other, or our discussion will appear to be nothing beyond a jest. It is not a question of whether this or that comrade is satisfied with the Central or not; it turns upon the Theses, upon the fact, that, if the leaders of this Central bring about a split in the course of the evolution which they are calling upon the Party to perform, this will be a disaster. And the second question: Does that democracy which we proclaim include the liberty to form groups — that is the essential question which must be answered.

Perhaps it is true that a certain monopoly exists, the monopoly which the Party has placed in the hands of a certain group of persons, and the duties attendant on it which we have to fulfil so long as the Party exists; upon this monopoly we have to keep a firm hand, or we should be criminals, and other workers and leaders would have to be chosen for the Central. It is our duty to defend this monopoly, and we shall defend it, or we should not be the leaders of the Central, but old women. And the question to which the Moscow organization must receive a reply is: Does the Central really represent that which it is whispered to be in the Moscow organization — a group fraction? The statement that the members of the apparatus are mobilized at this meeting, is nonsense. When comrade Zinoviev stated in his address that we members of the Central make it our endeavor not to bring up questions relating to differences of opinion — then this signifies that we have none. No one can say that the majority of the Central has become transformed into a group, into a fraction. Comrades, have you not at the head of your Party a Central elected by the Congress, and which is no accidental formation, for the elections at the Congress are not carried out by accidental majorities? The Central, as constituted at present, has been formed during the course of decades by gradual selection. How many have been members of the Central! Do not tell us that the Central is an accidental grouping of people who have come together from motives of personal friendship and have usurped power. The Central is something which has been formed by the Party by a slow and lengthy process of selection, it has been created from the elements which the Party has found it necessary to place in the foreground. Comrade Preobrashensky observed that he had heard something of a triple head. I should like to ask comrade Preobrashensky if he knows of one single political document, or of one single enactment or resolution which has emanated from this triple head? Does he know of any document in which the policy of the Central is not carried out in the name of the Central?

Does this imply that there exist no differences of opinion whatever in the Central? By no means. We were not chosen because we all agreed with one another. We disagree with one another in the Central, we have our majorities and minorities, as every nucleus has. It would only be possible to speak of a

fraction if some decision were arrived at and carried out behind the back of the Central, or when members of the Central who were not agreed with the line adopted by the Central were deprived of the possibility of mutually discussing the decisions arrived at. So long as this is not the case — and you have no right to maintain that it is the case — you have no right to maintain that the Central is a fraction centre. You have either to believe the Central or the others; the Central cannot work differently. And you must reply straightforwardly to this, even though comrades Preobrashensky and Sapronov allow that on the whole the Central acts correctly; for even if only one tenth of the Party were to believe that the Central is leading a muzzled Party, then this Central is worth nothing. And if you yourselves do not face this question clearly, we shall demand the convocation of an extraordinary Party conference.

And now with regard to the Party apparatus. This question must be viewed from the political aspect. Comrade Sapronov has asserted that the Party apparatus has become converted into a fractional apparatus. A narrow fractional spirit has been spoken of. This is what you have asserted, and not that the apparatus is decayed, and can be compared to a certain extent with the apparatus of German social democracy. This is utter nonsense, and it is difficult to see what is meant by it. In Germany the apparatus is preventing the development of the revolution. But what conclusion is there for us to draw from this? Decidedly none whatever. It is simply obvious that German social democracy possesses an apparatus worthy of it. But for us the question is whether we have an apparatus which efficiently serves our Party. In our opinion, our apparatus needs freshening up; it has made mistakes. The reasons for the attack on the apparatus must be examined into. Is it because it is bad? Is it not flexible enough? Does it gag the mouths of the workers? Then drag into the light of day, by the hair of their heads, all those who do not permit the workers to speak, who forbid discussion, and substitute the muzzle for leadership. But you have gone even further: you have asserted that the Party apparatus has become converted into a fractional apparatus, and this means that nine tenths of the policy pursued by the Central does not please you. But the policy of the Central will not please you any better when it consists of Sapronov and Preobrashensky, and the central apparatus puts into practice some resolutions not agreeable to you for some reason.

What is to be said about the fractional spirit? Have we not exterminated the Menshevik party? Have we not annihilated the "work" of social democracy in Germany? But we know the political background justifying our actions. We succeeded in our efforts to destroy an apparatus hostile to us, and belonging to a fraction pursuing a shameful policy. And when you speak here of a fractional apparatus, you are saying indirectly that the policy of this apparatus is disagreeable to you because it is not in your hands, and because it is pursuing a policy which you attack.

I repeat that the apparatus must be renewed, and to do this lies in our own hands. We can hold fresh elections.

Dare we dream for a moment of loosening the bands which bind us together, not only as Party, but as military formation? When you can prove to us that the formation of groups is no longer dangerous, that the influence of the NEP is not dangerous, that we have conquered an international position ensuring us power and strength; when you can tell us that our democracy occupies a different position, and that the position of our apparatus has become so secure that groupings within the Party can exercise no influence upon it, then we shall reply: „The time has now come for liberty of discussion.“ But until it can be proved that this point has been arrived at, we prefer to say: „Discuss and consult, go from one nucleus to another, but do not form fractions which will lead to the disruption of the unity of the Party and of the Soviet power. In conclusion, I should like to touch upon comrade Radek's address. He spoke of a split, and delivered here a passionate speech against this split. I cannot tell where he has found this talk of a split. If he had only desired to repeat the words of comrade Lenin: „Be on your guard against schism, fear it, and take measures to prevent it“, then he need only have taken Lenin's article and read it aloud. Why did Radek speak as he did? If facts actually exist which prove schism, then it was his duty to bring them forward, for such a speech as his can only sow doubt and alarm. We cannot preserve calm when a responsible member of the Central comes and speaks of a split. There is no split

in the Party, no sign of it, and there will not be any sign of it. Radek spoke of „both sides“. What both sides? The two sides in disagreement — but he forgot that we are not a side. We are not in such a position that the Central Committee forms one side and some fractional group another. The Party has a Central which does not feel itself to be a side; this Central leads and carries out the policy, and accords all attention to criticism of its action. Were we not in possession of such a courageous organ, capable of undertaking responsibility in such decisive moments as that of the German revolution, we should possess no Party. Two sides do not exist; there is only one whole — the Central, which estimates the criticism of its actions in accordance with essentials, and is willing to learn much from correct criticism. This does not mean that we are bound to reject every thing coming from any other source than our own camp, but it means that we have to subject everything we hear to a critical consideration, for on every occasion of historical turning points, these comrades have made us suggestions which would have driven our Party vehicle over the precipice. Radek observed: „I regret that Trotzky, in this article, has permitted himself a comparison between the „heads of our Party“ and the degeneration of Bernstein and other scholars of Marx.“ Radek is nine tenths on the same road as Saprionov, but not quite. At least that is my impression; yet he finds it necessary to express his regret that Trotzky has drawn this unnecessary comparison. In this case I share Radek's regret and am sorry that Trotzky has formulated his views in such a manner as to allow his words to be seized upon by Saprionov as a weapon against the Central. It proves that greater caution should be exercised when formulating opinions. Here I have a note written by a workman: „Trotzky demands

that the apparatus-men be removed, how are we to know what to do!“ It is obvious that the writer of this note has been induced to put this complicated question by Trotzky's formulation of his views. I do not speak of Trotzky's article, but of the manner in which his mode of expression is utilized.

Trotzky's article requires to be complemented and explained, or doubts may be aroused in the minds of the masses as to whether comrade Trotzky demands that the apparatus-men be removed. Salvation lies in the strict adherence and execution of the resolution of the 10th Congress. If our Party carries out the impending change under the slogan of: „Away with these!“, there is a danger that what is in reality a sound necessity may go too far, that it may overstep the line and destroy the essence of the apparatus. If you will make up your minds that the Moscow organization accepts the resolution worked out by the Central, and undertakes to carry it out under the leadership of the Central, declining at the same time to take part in any attempt at forming fractions, or in the incitement of any section of the Central against another, then we shall be able to perform the necessary evolution with ease. But if we let the reins go at this turning, then within a month we shall have fractions and sections being played off against one another. Above all, the Party must be preserved by the Central from internal schism. It has hitherto been customary to praise the Moscow organization. We read in the newspapers, and we hear from comrade Preobrazhensky, that the Moscow organization is a living organization, although it shows certain signs of bureaucracy. I fear that these comrades praise the Moscow organization because its first steps raised their hopes, and that they will cease to praise the Moscow organization when it lends determined support to the Central, and rejects this group.

Comrade Stalin on the Tasks of the Party.

Report on the Development of the Party.

Delivered at the Enlarged Session of the District Committee of the Krasnaya Presnaya attended by the group organizers, the members of the discussion club and the nuclei bureaus, held on 2. December 1923.

Comrades, I must above all emphasize that I speak here on my own behalf, and not in the name of the Central of the Party. If the meeting decides to hear my address, I am at its service (Please go on!). This does not mean that I differ in opinion in any way to the Central in this question — not at all. I speak here in my own name solely for the reason that within the next few days the commission appointed by the Central to work out measures for the improvement of the inner political situation will be submitting its results to the Central. These results have not yet been laid before us, and thus I have not yet a formal right to appear in the name of the Central, although I am fully convinced that that which I am about to say, will be at the same time essentially the expression of the attitude adopted by the Central in this question.

The Discussion — a Sign of the Power of the Party.

The first question which I should like to raise here is the question of the meaning of the discussion being carried on at present in the press and in the nuclei. What is this discussion about, and what does it signify? Is it not a tempest which has broken into the peaceful life of the Party; is this discussion not a sign, as some say, of the disintegration and decay of the Party, or, as others say, a sign of the degeneration of the Party? I believe, comrades, that neither the one nor the other is true; there is neither a degeneration nor a disintegration. The fact is that the Party has grown of late, that it has unburdened itself of a considerable amount of ballast, that it has become more proletarian. You are aware that two years ago we had no fewer than 700,000 Party members. You are aware that several hundreds of thousands of one-time Party members have left the Party or have been expelled. The Party has further improved in its component parts, and has attained a higher qualitative level during this period as a result of the improvement in the material situation of the workers, of the uplift of industry, of the return of the old qualified workers from the

country, and of the fresh wave of cultural uplift among the industrial workers. In one word: all these conditions have tended to the growth of the Party, to its qualitative progress. Its requirements have become greater, its demands are higher, it wants to know more than it used to, and it wants to decide more than it has hitherto decided.

The discussion which has arisen is no sign of weakness in the Party, and much less of degeneration; it is rather a sign of strength, a sign of power, a sign of the improvement of the elements composing the Party, a sign of its increased activity.

The Causes of the Discussion.

The second question with which we have to deal is the question of why precisely this moment, the autumn of this year, has happened to be the period in which the question of inner Party policy has assumed so acute a character? How is this to be explained? What are the causes? I assume, comrades, that there are two causes at the bottom of it. The first cause is the wave of ferment and strikes, in connection with working wages, which passed over some districts of our republic in August of this year. This strike wave showed that our organizations are faulty, that some of our organizations — Party and state organizations — possess inadequate contact with the events going on in the works and factories, and it also showed that some illegal organizations have been existing within the Party, anti-communist in their essential character, and striving to divide the Party. All these deficiencies thus brought to light by the strike wave have thrown such a bright light into the eyes of the Party, have flooded it with such a blaze of sobering illumination, that it recognized the necessity of inner changes in the Party. The second cause rendering the question of the inner Party policy so acute at precisely this moment, has been the extensive leave of absence permitted by our Party comrades. We can well comprehend their doing this, but the mass character of the leave taken had the effect that the pulse of Party life was considerably weakened just at the

moment when fermentation began to be apparent in the workshops and factories, so that the manifestation of the defects which had arisen was greatly facilitated at this period, the autumn of this year.

The Defects of our Inner Party Life.

What are the faults and failings of our inner Party life? Is it that the line taken by the Party has been wrong, as some comrades think, or is it that the line was right in itself, but has been departed from in actual practice, and has been adjusted in accordance with certain subjective conditions?

I believe that the essential defect of our inner Party life consists precisely of the fact that though the line of the Party has been right as expressed in the resolutions passed by its congresses, the actual practice in the provinces (not everywhere of course, but in some districts) has been wrong. Although the proletarian democratic line held to by our Party has been correct, its execution in the provinces has created facts and experiences which are a bureaucratic distortion of this line.

This is the essential defect. The existence of contradictions between the fundamental lines laid down by the Party, as established at the X., XI., and XII. Congresses, and the actual practice of our organizations when endeavoring to act on these lines in the provinces. This is the substance of all the inadequacies evinced by our inner Party life.

The Party has laid down the rule that the most important questions of our Party work, naturally with the exception of urgent matters, or of affairs involving military or diplomatic secrets, have to be brought up for debate at the Party meetings. This is absolutely demanded by the Party. But in the provinces it has been the practice, though of course not everywhere, to consider that there was no particular reason why a number of questions of inner Party practice should be dealt with at the Party meetings, as the Central and other leading organizations decided these questions themselves.

The Party has laid down the rule that the official persons of our Party have to be elected, and that this rule has to be unconditionally followed unless the nature of the Party membership, etc. offers some insuperable obstacle. You know that according to the statutes of the Party, a secretary of the government Party organization has to have been a member of the Party before the October Revolution, a secretary of the district organization has to have been a member for three years, a secretary of a nucleus one year. In actual practice the Party has not seldom decided that where a lengthy membership of the Party is necessary, it is not needful for an election actually to take place.

The Party has laid down the rule that the masses in the country must be kept informed of the work done by the economic organs, by the undertakings and trusts, for our Party nuclei are naturally morally responsible to the non-partisan masses for deficiencies in the works and factories. Nevertheless, the Party administrators have been of the opinion that since we have a Central, and this gives instructions to the economic organs, and these economic organs are further bound by these instructions, that the instructions thus passed on shall be also carried out without the control of the Party masses from below.

The Party has laid down the rule that the responsible functionaries of the various groups of work, whether Party workers, economists, trade unionists, military, are despite all specialization arising from their particular work, none the less closely bound together, and represent the inseparable components of a whole, for they are one and all working for the cause of the proletariat, and this cause is an inseparable whole. The actual practice of the Party has been such that where there has been a specialization in work, a division of work into that of the actual party workers, economists, military, etc., then the Party workers are not responsible for the economists nor the economists for the Party workers, so that an alienation and lack of contact is inevitable among the different categories.

This is, in general, the character of the contradictions existing between lines laid down by the Party and their actual execution.

It is far from my intention to accuse the local organizations of being to blame for this deviation from Party lines, for, when the matter is regarded in its true light, it is not a case of anyone being to blame. It is rather a natural evil arising from our organizations in the provinces. The root of this evil, and the remedy for it, I shall refer to later. I wish first to establish this fact, in

order that the contradictions may be explained, and shall then attempt to propose measures for removing the evil. And it is equally far from my intention to regard our Central as entirely blameless, for it has its small sins, like any other organization or institution, sins composed partly of faults and partly of natural evil. Some blame is deserved, if only for the fact that the Central, for some reason or another, did not observe the growing inadequacies and take timely measures for their removal.

But this is not the question at the moment; what is of importance at present is to get at the causes of the inadequacies of which I have just spoken.

The Causes of the Inadequacies.

The first cause lies in the circumstance that our Party organizations have not overcome, at least up to the present, some residue of the war period, a period which belongs to the past, but which has still left some traces of militarism in the Party in the heads of our functionaries. In my opinion one of these residual phenomena consists of those relations in the Party by virtue of which the Party does not represent an independent organism, nor an independent fighting institution, but a system of institutions, a description of organization composed of a whole number of institutions, in which the employees hold high or low positions. Comrades, this view is entirely wrong, and has nothing in common with Marxism; it is a view which has been handed down to us from that period in which we militarised the Party during the war, when the question of the self-activity of the Party masses for good or ill, and the military commands were of superlative importance. I cannot recollect that this view has ever been expressed in so many words. But none the less it is a view whose fundamental elements at least are a continual hindrance to our work. Comrades, we must fight against such views to the utmost of our power, for they represent the most actual danger, and they create conditions which favour the distortion in actual practice of the correct lines laid down by the Party.

The second cause consists of the existence of a certain pressure on the part of our state apparatus, which is bureaucratic in character, upon the Party and the Party functionaries. In 1917, when we were on the upward path towards October, we imagined that we should create a commune which would be an alliance of the workers, that we should do away with all bureaucracy in the administration, and that the state would be able to be converted, if not immediately, then in the course of two or three not too lengthy transitional periods, into an alliance of the workers. Actual practice has, however, shown us that this ideal is still far removed, and that the emancipation of the state from the elements of bureaucracy, the transformation of Soviet society into an alliance of workers, calls for a high level of culture among the population, and for a perfectly secure and peaceful environment, in which the necessity for the existence of great military bodies can be dispensed with. Our state apparatus is bureaucratic, and will remain bureaucratic for some time to come. Our Party comrades are working in this apparatus, and the environment and atmosphere of this bureaucratic apparatus is such that it facilitates the development of bureaucracy among our Party functionaries and Party organizations.

The third cause of the inadequacies lies in the insufficient activity of many of our nuclei, in the backwardness and even total illiteracy of the border districts in particular. The nuclei in these districts show little energy, they are behindhand politically and culturally. There is no doubt that this circumstance creates unfavorable conditions for a change of line in the Party.

The fourth cause is the lack of a sufficient number of Party politically schooled comrades in the provinces. Not long ago I heard an address given by the representative of the Ukrainian organizations in the Central. The speaker was an extremely capable and promising comrade. He said that out of 130 nuclei, 80 possess secretaries appointed by the leading Party organization of the governments. In reply to an interpellation to the effect that these organizations were not acting rightly in doing this, the comrade began to explain that there were no members of the nuclei who could read or write, or who had been members of the party for any length of time, and that the nuclei themselves beg that secretaries be sent them, etc. I am willing to admit this comrade had exaggerated by 50%; that the root of the evil does not lie in the lack of trained members in the nuclei, but in the fact that the leading organization of the gouverne-

ments had been following its old traditions and giving the nuclei too much of a good thing. But if the leading Party organization for the governments is right to the extent of 50%, does this not show that if there are such nuclei in the Ukraine, there are bound to be many more such in the border districts, where the organizations are young, where there are fewer persons able to read and write than in the Ukraine? This is one of the causes which has prepared favorable conditions for the distortion, in the provinces, of the essentially correct lines prescribed by the Party.

And finally, the fifth cause: This is insufficient information. We inform badly, — above all the central — perhaps because we are all over-burdened with work. And we are badly informed as to what is going on in the provinces. This must cease. It is one of the leading causes bringing about inadequacies in the Party.

How are the Inadequacies to be removed?

In the first place a fight must be taken up all along the line against the residue and rudiments left over from the war period in our Party; against the wrong idea that our Party is a system of institutions and not a new and creative fighting organization of the proletariat, thinking actively, acting on its own initiative, permeated with new life and destroying the old.

In the second place the activity of the masses of the Party must be increased by bringing up for discussion all questions of interest to the masses, in so far as these questions can be dealt with publicly, in order that all may be given the possibility of free criticism of the Party institutions and their actions. This is the only way to transform Party discipline into a really conscious and really iron discipline.

In the third place, it is necessary that all Party functionaries, unless insuperable obstacles lie in the way with regard to short a membership of the Party, etc., should be chosen by election. The practice of ignoring the will of the majority in the organizations when appointing comrades to responsible positions in the Party must be completely done away with in actual practice. The principle of the election must be realized in fact.

In the fourth place, it is necessary that the Central, as also the leading Party organizations for the governments and districts should hold active conferences of the responsible functionaries of every branch of workers, economists, Party workers, trade unions, and military. These conferences must take place regularly, the questions considered necessary by the conference are to be discussed, contact between the functionaries of all categories must be kept up uninterruptedly, all functionaries must be made to feel that they are members of the same Party family, that they are all working for one common cause, for the indivisible cause of the proletariat; around the Central and around the local organizations, there must be created an environment giving the Party the possibility of controlling the practical experience won by our responsible functionaries in every sphere of work, and of giving these the opportunity of experience.

In the fifth place, it is necessary that our production nuclei occupy themselves with the course of events in the works and trusts. This must be carried out in such a manner that the nuclei are kept a courant with respect to the work being done by the leading organs of our shops and associations, so that they may be able to exercise an influence on this work. You, as representatives of the nuclei, know very well how great is the moral responsibility borne by our production nuclei with regard to the non-partisan masses, in respect to the course of events in the shops and factories. In order that the nucleus shall be placed in a position enabling it to bear the responsibility for this course of events, it must be kept well informed, must have the possibility of influencing matters in this or that direction. It is therefore imperative that the nuclei be called upon to take part in the debates on economical questions connected with the works and factories, that from time to time economic conferences be convened by the representatives of the nuclei belonging to undertakings forming part of a trust, for the discussion of questions dealing with the affairs of the trust. This is one of the surest of the methods required for the enrichment of the economic experience of the masses, and for the organization of control from below.

In the sixth place it is necessary to improve the quality of the components constituting our Party nuclei. Comrade

Zinoviev's article already touched upon the assertion that our Party nuclei have remained behind the non-partisan masses surrounding them in point of quality. This assertion must of course not be generalized and applied to all nuclei. It would be more correct to say that our Party nuclei would for instance stand upon a higher cultural level than they do now, if we did not remove from these nuclei those persons whom we are forced to employ for other work. If all our comrades, the workers, if the unions, removed by us during the last six years from the nuclei, were to return to their nuclei, would any further proof be required that these nuclei stand at a much higher cultural level than even the most advanced non-partisan workers? It is just for this reason that the Party possesses no other elements for the improvement of the state apparatus and is obliged to return to this source again and again.

We must free ourselves from that superfluous formalism so often shown by our Party when admitting new members to the Party, when these belong the working class. We must not be so ruled by formalism. The Party can and must facilitate the conditions of admission to the Party for members of the working class.

In the seventh place, it is necessary to do more work among the non-partisan workers. This is one means by which the inner Party situation and the activity of the Party masses can be bettered. I must say that our organizations still pay too little attention to this. Too little attention especially to the presence of non-partisan workers in our Soviet organs. Comrades, I believe that if we do not put a certain minimum of faith in the non-partisans, we shall evoke a very great mistrust of our organizations on the part of the non-partisans. This faith on the part of the non-partisans is imperatively necessary. Comrades, it is imperatively necessary to force the communists to drop their candidatures. No speeches should be held maintaining that communists only should be elected. The non-partisans must be encouraged, induced to take up state work. We shall gain only advantage from this, and will receive as a reply the trust of the non-partisans in our organizations. The elections in Moscow are a typical example of the high degree in which our organizations are beginning to retire into a Party shell, instead of widening their sphere of activity, and gathering the non-partisans around them at every step.

In the eighth place, work among the peasantry must be intensified. I do not know why our village nuclei, for instance, cannot be set two practical tasks: First of being the interpreters and distributors of the Soviet laws bearing on the life of the peasantry, and secondly of being agitators and spreaders of elementary agronomical knowledge, if no more than to teach that the fields must be sown at the right time, the seed cleansed, etc.

I should now like to mention two extremes, two exaggerations which have appeared in some discussion articles in the „Pravda“ with respect to the questions of the workers' democracy.

The first extreme is in regard to nomination by election. This consists of the efforts made by some comrades to carry out nomination by "election" to the utmost possible point. Election having once been admitted to be the right method, then go on electing at any price! This view, comrades, is a mistaken one. The Party will not accept it. To be sure we are no longer living in times of war, we are passing through a period of peaceful development, — but we have the Nep. Do not forget this, comrades. It was not during the war that the Party undertook the task of purging itself, but after the war. Why? Because during the war the fear of defeat held the Party closely together, and various elements corroding the Party internally were obliged to fall into the line of the Party which was struggling to the death. These bonds are no longer there to hold us together, for there is no war. But we have the Nep, we have permitted capitalism to re-enter, and the bourgeoisie is striking fresh roots. It is true that all this furthers the work of purging the Party, of placing it upon a firmer foothold. But on the other hand it envelops us in the atmosphere of the rising and growing bourgeoisie. It was precisely after the Nep. that the Party undertook a sifting process, reducing its number by one half. It was precisely after the Nep. that the Party decided that the security of our organizations against the Nep. required, for instance, that it be made difficult for non-proletarian elements to gain admittance to the Party, that lengthy membership consist in consultation on all questions, and forget that other

of the Party be made a condition to appointment as a functionary of the Party, etc. Did the Party act rightly in taking these precautionary measures, which limited the "broad democracy?" In my opinion it acted rightly. It is just for this reason that I assume that the democracy is necessary, that nomination by election is necessary, but that the limiting measures prescribed by the XI. and XII. Congresses must still remain in force, at least the most fundamental of them.

The second extreme deals with the question of the limits of discussion. Some comrades demand that discussion be unlimited; they consider the Alpha and Omega of Party work to

side of Party work; that of real activity demanded by the execution of the Party decisions in real life. The Party is not merely a union of persons acting in like manner; it is a fighting union of participators in like action, fighting on the basis of the common ideology of their program and tactics.

I conclude my address, comrades, by warning you against these two extremes. I believe that if we reject both of these extremes, and proceed determinedly and straightforwardly on the course towards inner Party democracy which was laid down by the Central in September of this year, then we shall assuredly experience a great uplift in our Party work.

Speech

by Comrade Zinoviev

delivered at the Party Conference of the Petrograd District.

Comrades! At the present time the central of the Party is engaged with the discussion of those same questions which are now being dealt with publicly. The Central has formed a comprehensive commission, participated in by some members of the Political bureau, for dealing with this question. This commission will begin work within the next few days, and we are firmly convinced that within the next few days the Central will lay before the whole Party a definite and unanimously accepted resolution containing propositions towards the solution of the whole of the burning questions which have been recently debated in the press.

Perhaps, comrades, I really acted somewhat wrongly in giving the title of: "New tasks* of our Party" to the article which I wrote as subject for discussion. A number of opponents have pointed out that these are merely old questions which have never been answered, and that the title of my article does not therefore quite correspond to its contents. To be perfectly accurate, I should have indicated that I was writing on the topical tasks now set our Party — whether they be old or new tasks will be seen later.

At the present juncture, however, we are faced with a number of problems requiring solution, authoritative solution on the part of the Party.

For two years the Party has been working under the conditions induced by the Nep. At the 12. Party Congress I emphasized the fact that we must make a distinction between two things. In the first place the New Economic Policy is a historically necessary and very earnest chapter in the history of our struggle for the world revolution. But when we speak of the Nep. we have often in mind the capitalist commercial view of it, the speculative moment. I believe, comrades, that we must not forget this difference for a moment.

To what degree has this Nep. influenced our Party? Are those adversaries right who croaked their prophesies that the Nep. was bound to transform our Party into a petty bourgeois Party? Is it true that the fundamental nucleus of our Party organism has degenerated? Is it true that we have ceased to be the Party of the World Revolution, and have become transformed into a Party of democratic petty bourgeoisie?

It seems to me, comrades, that the best answer to these questions is as follows: The German revolution is developing, but the period of its development is proving longer than the estimate made by us, in the month of October, on the basis of our information. The German revolution is postponed for some months, but the fact that our Party took action, and the manner of this action is and remains, in view of the impending events, a point of the utmost importance.

The Party, from the top to the bottom, down to the last man, reacted upon the impending events in Germany just as the revolutionary Party of the proletariat should react, and not as would have been expected of a Nep. party.

This test is very important. It is the test in the light of history.

The Party reacted in such a manner that, had the expected events taken place in Germany, our Party would have regarded itself as the corner stone of the Communist International, and would have been prepared to fulfil to the utmost the duty of the revolutionary Party of the proletariat.

The test thus undergone by the Party must serve to prove to us that it is essentially sound, quite apart from the way in which events actually developed.

Had there been any real decay in the Party, had there been any degeneration of the fundamental nucleus of the Party organism, then our Party would have reacted very differently with regard to the maturing of events in Germany; it would have hidden its head in the sand. But it did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, if there is any reproach which can be made to us, it is that we over-estimated to a certain extent the speed at which events were developing, and that we expected, in October, in November, and in December 1923, that which will perhaps happen in Germany in May 1924 — but no one can reproach us that we have succumbed to the Nep, and that we made any attempt to avoid following up the world revolution.

Our Weak Points.

This does not by any means signify that we possess no weaknesses whatever within the Party. We have many weak points. In connection with the Nep, we can observe, in my opinion, two departures from the correct line, two false views, of the nature of the Party itself.

On the one hand, those comrades who are up to the eyes in administrative economic work look upon the Party as an institution provided for the purpose of aiding the successful execution of administrative or economic work. The others go to the opposite extreme and look upon the Party as a sort of free debating society, a kind of "Parliament of opinions".

Neither extreme is right. We must reject both, and must look upon our Party, as it is right for Bolsheviki to do, as a political organism, connected with the masses by thousands of threads, and setting itself the gigantic task of leading the whole state.

What is the present qualitative standard of our Party? We have statistical data up till 1. September 1923. Speaking generally, our statistics are somewhat lame in this direction. As you know, the latest statistics were compiled with special care and accuracy, with the aid of the Central. I believe that they correspond very fairly with the truth.

The figures are somewhat surprising. We had all assumed that we have about half a million, or even 600,000 Party members. It appears, however, that up to 1. September we had in the whole federation only 351,000 communists (including the communists in the Red Army), and 92,000 candidates for Party membership. To this the C. Y. must further be added. I am however dealing with the numbers of the Party in the strict sense of the word.

We have 54,000 Party members actually working in the shops and factories (not including candidates); this is but few.

It goes without saying that it is a perfectly unavoidable circumstance that we have been obliged to absorb the best and most mature communist forces for the purpose of state leadership, and have taken these from the workshops and factories. We could not have otherwise formed the Red Army, or the economic, administrative, and Soviet organs. It is perfectly comprehensible that the Party governing the state has to concentrate a considerable portion of its numbers in the state institutions. Despite this it appears to me, comrades, that if

we adopt a correct attitude we have well-founded prospects of increasing the number of our members in the shops and factories; in my opinion this is one of our most important tasks.

Another question is that of the intensification of Party work, of the intensification of the inner Party democracy. Those comrades who point out that this question was raised at the 10. Party congress, and that the resolutions passed by the 10. congress have not been fully carried out, in some cases not carried out at all, are perfectly right.

We put this question in the year 1921, and passed a fairly good resolution on the question of inner Party democracy. The reasons why this resolution has not been carried out are substantially objective in nature.

Let us cast our memory back to that time. What were the working people of Petrograd interested in at that time? The situation was extraordinarily difficult. The workers were chiefly and above all interested in their morsel of bread. You will doubtless be able to recollect the atmosphere obtaining at that time in a number of other proletarian centres.

When passing over to the Nep, we formulated our fresh tasks at the same time. But at that time we could not perform them, for the working class was divided and declassed, and the subject which occupied every workman all and every day, and which hung like a leaden weight about his neck, was the question of the potato ration. We are now putting the question under much more favorable circumstances. The fundamental difference in conditions lies in the fact that the declassing process in the working class has ceased.

The proletariat, which melted, split, and became declassed during the first years of the revolution, is now beginning to gather together again to a compact mass. This is the cardinal circumstance changing the situation.

The same workmen who have been pulling in different directions all these years, are now coming into our works and factories, and bringing with them the political experience garnered and increased during these years. They have shared with us the first successes won on the economic field. These successes, comrades, are still very small — we need not deceive ourselves — but they are dear to us for the very reason that they are the "very first" ones.

The feeling that we have gained our first economic successes is seizing the broad masses of the conscientious non-partisan workers. A wholesome atmosphere of production is to be felt, which was not the case before, but which was necessary if all our talk on the development of the Party was not based upon sand. Bad or good — wages have been raised, the productivity of work has increased, and discipline in production has improved.

I stated that the failure to put the resolutions of 1921 into actual practice had been mainly caused by objective obstacles. But there were subjective reasons too, dependent on us and our organization. These subjective reasons are to be classified in two groups: one of these is the mechanical nature of our organization. It was very difficult for us to get underway, to run on new lines from war Communism to the new epoch. The other group of causes is explained by our inadequate cultural level — this is one of the fundamental causes confronting us at every step of the way. There exists a certain minimum of political schooling, of political learning capacity, of political and general culture, without which many of the best resolutions are condemned to hang fire.

Bolshevism and the Workers' Democracy.

I have already stated, at the functionaries' meeting, that Bolshevism has not always held its present attitude in the question of the workers' democracy. There was a time when Bolshevism, in view of the objective conditions obtaining in our country, expressed itself in opposition to a broad degree of adherence to the principle of election within the Party. There was such a period up to the revolution of 1905.

It was in a great measure along these lines that our split with the Mensheviks ran. The Mensheviks followed the demagogic line of "democracy" and "election" even under circumstances rendering adherence to these principles impossible. I should like to remind you of an article written by Comrade Lenin, entitled: "We do not get fat on the song of the nightingale." The reason why I refer to this article is as follows: It dealt with an occurrence in January 1905, in the midst of the struggle between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. The Men-

sheviki accused the Bolsheviks, and especially comrade Lenin, of being opposed to democracy within the Party, of not wanting to allow the workers to hold leading positions in the Party, of being Jacobins, conspirators, exaggerated centralists etc. At that time a pamphlet appeared on "The tasks of the Party" written by a Menshevik, a workman, who also signed himself as a "workman". Paul Axelrod, one of the oldest leaders of Menshevism, wrote the preface to this pamphlet, thus imparting a tremendous significance to it. The Menshevik worker maintained in this brochure that the Menshevik promise much with regard to democracy, but do nothing to realize it — they also permit the intelligentsia to reign in the Party. Comrade Lenin replied with the article entitled: "We do not get fat on the song of the nightingale," in which he observed: "You see that even your workman Menshevik says that we will not be fobbed off with mere phrases, and that if you are in favor of democracy, you must really go over to an electoral system, to systematic regulation of accounts, etc. But it is impossible to carry out the principles of election at present." And comrade Lenin closed this article in the name of Bolshevism as follows:

"The „Iskra“ (the old one) is of the opinion that democratization, that is, the application of the principle of election, carry out the principles of election at present." And comrade the despotic police system."

At that time this was the fundamental idea of Bolshevism.

During that period, when Czarist absolutism still existed, we were unable to hold to the principle of election.

We were obliged to have a strictly conspiratory and centralized Party organization, as comrade Lenin demonstrated. He stated that adherence to the principle of election would only, have been to the advantage of the police. Those revolutionary workers who are capable of taking leading Party positions will be appointed by us, and will be appointed without any fuss. But to preach consistent democracy within the Party under an absolutist regime, at a moment when we require the concentration of conspiracy and centralism, would signify that we succumb to demagogy and place the revolution in danger.

It was no easy task to defend this official standpoint of Bolshevism. The Mensheviks earned cheap laurels, just as any "democrat" can earn them now, by singing the praises of democracy, without any regard for the situation as a whole.

In January 1905 Bolshevism declared that a broad adherence to the principle of election within the Party is impossible. But if the principle of election is not possible, where is democracy? Thus a broad democracy was equally impossible for the Party. For us the highest law is the furtherance of the revolution, but we do not follow the letter, the dogma. The furtherance of the revolution demands that our organization is strictly conspirative and concentrated. When the situation changes, then we shall raise the question of the workers' democracy within the Party.

And in actual fact, after Czarism was overthrown we raised for the first time the question of inner Party democracy, in another form.

The whole of the periods between 1905—1907 were a variegated intermingling of the legal with the illegal, and thus also a combination of the beginnings of inner Party democracy and the relentless inner Party centralization and conspiracy, in accordance with the exigencies of the changing situation.

The years of counter-revolution began. The Party was plunged into illegality. The legal element diminished until the year 1911, when the „Swesda“ and later on the „Pravda“ appeared. The element of legality vanished almost completely, and the elements of conspiracy and centralization took the upper hand. During the period 1907—1912 we lived in complete illegality. Nothing was heard of inner Party democracy. The leaders of the Party were appointed from above. Two to three comrades were chosen, and had the right of cooption.

Then came the war. The Party organizations dwindled away; a part was driven into illegality, and the conspirative element increased.

It need not be said that after the fall of Czarism, in the year 1917, we began to rebuild the Party. But then the civil war began, and this meant that every muscle had to be strained to its utmost tension, and it meant that the principle of democracy had to be confined to certain limits.

The Defects of our Organization.

Have we had, or have we still, faulty sides to our organization? Undoubtedly we have! Far too large a number of circulars are issued, and these substitute living energy. Even in such a splendid and universally beloved organization as the RCYU. Almost all the organizers of the collectives are appointed from above, by the government leaders. We know such governments. We have followed the rule of appointing the organizers for the collectives. But now this rule can and must be altered. We must give the nuclei the opportunity of even falling into error, of now and again electing an organizer who may prove useless for his position, and may have to be replaced by another. It goes without saying that where a nucleus is unsound, it must be cured.

In our Petrograd organization there is also room for improvement. We have 30,000 new metal workers in Petrograd. Has this fact been sufficiently apparent in the Party organization? No! But this great event — 30,000 new metal workers, among whom there is a considerable base of the old „hereditary“ proletariat — should be noticeable in our organization. There should be a supply of fresh blood. But this is not the case. It is imperative that this be changed.

The Limitations of the Workers' Democracy.

Reference must be made to those limitations which we have consciously placed upon the workers' democracy. A number of limitations have arisen spontaneously, and a number of others have been deliberately imposed by us. We undertook the purging of the Party, which means that the most proletarian section of the Party held it to be necessary, in the interests of the revolution, to review and expel from the Party the least reliable section of those members who had obtained entry into the Party without really understanding what the Communist Party is. The purging of the Party has nothing in common with the „pure“ principle of „comprehensive“ workers' democracy in the actual sense of the words. What kind of democracy is this, when we appoint some few persons from above, and say to them that they shall purge the Party to any extent necessary? And they have done the work thoroughly. More than 100,000 members were excluded from our ranks. There are many who say that this number of expulsions was not sufficient; others say it was too many. Comrades, in some governments one was true, and in other governments the other. In general the operation was well performed.

We once passed a resolution that at a Party Congress — I believe it was at the X. Congress — not every Party member had a right to vote, but only those who had been members of the Party for a certain time (two years).

It might be said that the Central of the Party selects the delegates, curtails the suffrage of the Party members just before the Congress at which it is to be criticised and re-elected. Viewed from the standpoint of an abstract workers' democracy, this is a travesty of all „democracy“. But we did this from the viewpoint of the furtherance of the revolution. We could only permit those to vote who really represented the Party guard.

We also make long membership of the Party a condition for the appointment of the secretaries of the leading Party organizations of the governments, and of the district organizations and of the chairmen of the government trade union Soviets. And this is not pure democracy either. In a democracy we elect whom we will. Is this limitation necessary or not? It is necessary! The furtherance of the revolution, that is the highest law.

The third limitation consists of the confirmation of the appointment of the secretaries by the superior organization. This too, is not pure democracy, and still we do it.

The fourth limitation is the Red Army. For a time there were more than 100,000 Party members in the Red Army. In the Red Army we need the spirit of comrade-like discipline, but we cannot accomplish pure democracy there, nor the principle of election. Here we carry on political work on the lines of the Political Divisions. It is impossible to do otherwise. And yet there was a time when the functionaries of the Red Army formed the fourth or third part of the whole Party. Can we give this up in the period of the dictatorship? No! This question must be put as follows: Either Red Army or broad workers' democracy. And every revolutionist will say: To the devil with the sacred principles of „pure democracy“ so long as we have a real Red Army, really able to defend the interests of the revolution.

There are thus quite a number of limitations necessarily imposed by the dictatorship of the proletariat. These we must consciously accept.

Workers' Democracy and Fraction Groupings.

There is still another limitation put on the workers' democracy, the fact that we inhibit the formation of groups and fractions within the Party. We often hear the words: We demand freedom of discussion! when what is meant in reality is: We demand freedom to form fractions!

The liberty to form groups — has this anything to do with the principles of the workers' democracy? Yes, certainly it has much to do with it. A pure workers' democracy demands the freedom to form groups within the Party, for if it is really the case that „we are all equal“, if we really possess „full“ democracy, then I naturally have the right to gather around me those who think as I do, and to weld them together, etc. This freedom of fraction existed at the time of the Second International. There were two or three groups fighting within almost every social democratic party. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg were only one fraction in the Second International, its left fraction. And it was the same, on an international scale, for 25 years. During the period of the organic development of the Second International such a state of affairs had become a regular rule. But when the Comintern began to organize itself, its first word was: What we now want is not a parliament of opinions, not an „answers to correspondence“, but a leading organ, a single leading communist world organ, for we cannot conquer the bourgeoisie in any other way. But the creation of a single workers' Party means that we have to renounce the liberty of fractional struggle. In the Second International we saw, at the Stuttgart Congress, Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin on the one side, Bernstein, Jaurès, and others, on the other. This is impossible for the Third International, for we are now in the midst of a different epoch. In exceptional cases there is now and again a group struggle in the Third International, but this is always an exception. We frequently prefer to cut away a considerable portion of the Party, as we did in Norway, in order to preserve a really united and homogeneous Communist Party, and not a „parliament of opinions“. And we do not act thus because we are in love with centralism, but because the present historical situation requires that the political Party be cast in one single piece, or it cannot conquer the bourgeoisie; without unity it is condemned to decay.

Our Party is the soul of the government. It is not necessary to go far to see this. Were we not in the same party as the Mensheviks for years, standing against them as a fraction? And now? Now we are two classes, two worlds. If we now approve of the formation of separate groups and fractions within the Party, and allow these to act as they please, this would mean nothing more nor less than developing the germ of a secondary government.

The Party cannot permit this. The very slightest division of power means the decay of the proletarian dictatorship. That we have been able to withstand the enormous difficulties pressing down upon us from all sides is solely due to the fact that the Party has been homogeneous.

It is frequently asserted that the X. Congress is to blame for all the misfortunes which have been encountered by the Party. Why this assertion? It was precisely the X. Congress which recognized the freedom of discussion and of consultations in the Party. It was this same X. Congress which, however, accepted the proposition made by Comrade Lenin on the prohibition of fractions and groups. And it is this which has been displeasing to many.

The policy of the X. Congress is the policy of comrade Lenin. It is therefore necessary to recognize clearly that an attack is being made against the foundations of Bolshevik policy, against the principles of Leninism, against its fundamental balance as drawn by the X. Congress. And thus the strictest dividing line must be drawn between a freedom of discussion and consultation permitted by the situation, and the liberty to form groups and fractions. It need not be said that this is not to be so interpreted as if we were going to designate every criticism as fraction-like. Not in the slightest. By doing this we should simply drive the comrades into fractions. Criticism is necessary, unavoidable, and necessary. Those who whine for „Party discipline“ at every breath of criticism, and want to train up a muzzled party, should be laughed at and set aside. But fractions are not permissible.

The cultural level of the Party and of the non-partisan workers.

The workers' democracy again.

I must now deal with a question which has given rise to some disagreement amongst us: the cultural education of the non-partisan and Party workers. Before entering into this in detail, I should like to first treat of two articles written by comrade Sarkis, in one of which he is in the right, and in the other equally wrong.

In the question of the workers' democracy, the second article is right and the first wrong. Comrade Sarkis, whom we know and appreciate as one of our best functionaries, working in one of the most important proletarian centres, has put the question wrongly.

The general trend of the article is to the effect that no improvements whatever are required in the Party organization.

It is scarcely necessary to say that this is not the case, for improvements are very necessary. We are behindhand in many respects with regard to the workers' democracy. Under the new conditions we must go over to the system of electing the organizations and nuclei from below. The elections to the government and district leading organizations must be carried out more publicly. In Petrograd, too, there is room for improvement in the Party organization.

With reference to the question of cultural education, I am in agreement with comrade Sarkis. I have stated that our collectives in the provinces are invariably ahead of the non-partisan masses, if only for the reason that they constitute a part of the whole Party, and this works on organized lines, possesses a program, tactics, a tradition, a history; but that we sometimes observe, in the sphere of culture, in intercourse with one another, and in economic matters, that a part of our Party functionaries are, in certain respects, behind many of the non-partisans.

Comrades, this has to be accorded sober consideration. Comrade Sarkis laid before you convincing figures from the Moscow Narva district. But I have other figures to lay before you; there are for instance 32,004 students in the educational establishments of Moscow, among whom 13% are members of the R. C. P., 15.7% of the R. C. Y. U., making to all 28.7% communists, whilst the non-partisans count over 71.43%. In Petrograd the higher educational institutions register 25% Party members and Russian Communist Youth, and 74% non-partisan. These are the comparative figures. It will be said that it is only the comparative figures. It is one of the questions in which quantity passes over into quality.

How can the cultural standard be raised? Solely by the perusal of books? No! We can only gain the culture which we require by means of personal and active participation of Party members in public life — in the state, the trade unions, and the Party.

If the cultural standard of the Party members is to be raised to the level which we require, we need books as well, and courses of instruction, and Soviet Party schools and workers' universities, besides newspapers and other aids. But this is only one half of what we require, the other 50% consists in the intense participation in the work of the trade unions and Soviets, that is, in the work of the State and the Party.

Why are we so backward? For very simple reasons. The party has absorbed 10,000 of the best forces from the Party nuclei in the shops and factories. I have seen the brief statistical survey of the election to the Petrograd Soviet, in which we see that out of somewhat more than 800 persons, 711 were workmen who had been workmen until the year 1914, and are now engaged in organizational and administrative work. What kind of people are these? They are the same people who were formerly in the nuclei, and now form part of the state apparatus, since the dictatorship of the proletariat requires it. It naturally follows that if we withdraw tens of thousands of the best workers from the nuclei, the latter are politically at a lower level. This is our misfortune, but not our fault.

Another circumstance must be added: the lack of time. It has been rightly pointed out here that the non-partisan workman has more time at his disposal than our Party comrade, who is frequently burdened far beyond his powers, and whose material position is often not so good — he has more financial obligations, more material sacrifices for the Party, for the trade unions, etc. Very often he cannot afford that which the non-partisan worker can afford, and he has besides less time. Thus it happens that we have remained behind here and there, but not by any means everywhere. We must recognise this, or we shall earn that re-

proach of despicable communist boasting against which comrade Lenin so rightly warned us.

We must draw two conclusions.

Firstly, those non-partisan workers who have gone through every imaginable course of instruction and who have now, in the seventh year of the revolution, approached very nearly to us, must be admitted into the Party...

This is one solution. The other consists of the following: to exert every effort in aid of the Party organizations, to make up for lost time, so that the Party rank and file may be raised to a higher level of culture and knowledge.

We can already record definite successes. A considerable stratum of Party members is receiving instruction in the workers' universities, in the communist universities, and in the state Party schools; but this is not enough, it is only a drop in the ocean. The better we get things in order, the more importance we shall attach to this.

The Economists.

There are two further questions to which I must still refer: that of the economists, and that of the difference of age among the members of the Party.

With reference to the economists, I must state that we of the Lenin trend of thought make every endeavor to agree with the economists of our Party. The matter is frequently represented in such a manner that one might think we regarded the economists as Party members of a second class.

What is our actual attitude towards the economists? I know, as all of us know, that we in the Party do not choose the work accorded to us, but are given it by the Party. It is therefore ridiculous to find fault with the economists. The Party has placed them in the position they occupy; they did not go there of themselves. Would any self-respecting communist take up economic work if he were not convinced that he had the Party behind him, that the Party does not consider him to be a communist of inferior quality? There are a large number of old revolutionists, excellent functionaries, who have on many occasions proved their devotion to the Party, now engaged in economic work. We have not yet gathered together the whole stratum of the economists, but we are doing so, we are feeling our way and doing our best. This is a most important and responsible matter. This alliance of economists can only fulfil its tasks properly if it feels that it is backed up by the support of the whole Party.

It is unallowable to regard the economists as second class party members. They form a group of decisive importance, everything depends on their success, and their attitude is the criterion upon which our non-partisan comrades form their judgments.

But it is possible, comrades, to go to the other extreme. Among one small section of the economists we sometimes come across the following feeling: Why does the Party control me to such an extent? There is the government Party headquarters, and their organizations, and the district headquarters and its organization department, and the collective — it is more than the strongest man can bear.

We need not seek to cover up the sin: We worry the economists frequently with regard to trifles. This cannot be allowed.

What we have to say to the economists, and what every honest economist knows by himself, is that the conditions induced by the Nep expose the economists to the danger of division. Comrade Preobrashensky is right here. In the course of the speech which he recently made in Moscow, he pointed out that the economists are forced, under the conditions brought about by the Nep, to leave the trenches and fraternize with the enemy. This is very true. Anyone who is obliged to cooperate with the bourgeoisie is actually forced to hold intercourse with the bourgeoisie, even if it is not an actual fraternization. This involves danger.

Every profession has its attendant dangers. The Party has to admit this openly and definitely, and no self-respecting economist will deny it — it is an incontestable fact. And there is only one remedy against it: Party control, comrade-like alliance, and discipline. And there is no need to fear this.

Comrades, quite at the beginning I told you that we must differentiate between the New Economic Policy and the „Nep“. When comrade Lenin said: „Learn to trade“, some comrades interested in the practical execution of the idea took it to mean that the Nep implies dirty work, that it smells somewhat of the devil. It is an unavoidable zone through which we have to pass. Under

the „Nep“ — so they think — it is impossible to be an out and out communist, the tasks of the revolution have to be more superficially viewed, and so forth. But when this zone has been overcome, and we arrive at a fresh one, then we can put on clean clothes again, so to speak, and become real communists. This interpretation is not correct, and does not accord with the idea expressed by comrade Lenin. The meaning which comrade Lenin intended to put into his slogan was: Do not let yourselves be deceived, you must co-operate with the bourgeoisie in such manner that the advantage is to the workers' state. The Nep — the Nep is a whole chapter in the history of the workers' revolution, it is not merely a zone through which we can hasten with closed eyes, with the intention of becoming communists after we have got through. No; make it your endeavor to be communists during the Nep itself.

We must make it clear to ourselves that in the Party there can be no division into economists, trade unionists, purely Party workers, etc. Such a division would destroy us if not unified.

We must be a Party in which the various departments perform their duties on the basis of a definite division of work. No shadow of difference in our relations to the economists, as if they were second-grade Party members, is to be allowed. At the same time, we must not ignore the special dangers to which those engaged in work connected with the Nep are exposed.

The Difference of Age among the Members of the Party.

And now to the difference of age among the members of the Party. This is again one of the most important and interesting problems. What is the present state of affairs? The Party can look back upon a history extending over at least 25 years, and even if we only calculate from the 2. Party Congress, that is, from the time of the decisive split of the Party into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, still we have 20 years to look back upon. But nine tenths of the persons composing the Party have not 25 years of Party membership behind them, but only two to three years since the year 1920. This is the main mass of our Party. This is a really remarkable phenomenon. Other parties, formed under conditions of a peaceful parliamentary atmosphere, have developed in a more staid manner. In these parties the development was as follows: The party was formed, worked for one, two, three, or five years, and gradually gathered around it a personal party staff. In our case the process has been reversed. The main mass of our Party did not stream in until after we had overthrown Czarism and Kerensky, and it therefore happens that a Party whose history extends back over 25 years has nevertheless an extremely young personal staff. It has one group which has taken over the work of the last twenty years, and which incorporates the traditions of twenty to twenty five years; it has another group incorporating the five or six year old traditions of the civil war; and finally it has the main mass, incorporating still younger traditions. This has created an exceedingly characteristic and peculiar situation, which cannot be ignored.

Our fundamental group, representing twenty to twenty five years of development in our Party, and forming the cement holding the Party together, is worthy of the highest place in our esteem, but it is small, it is dying out, and it has not kept up with life in every respect, is not entirely competent for present tasks. A new stratum is arising from the other side, ready to attack broad questions and responsible work with greater rapidity than the old; often it has a perfect right to do this, but often it is insufficiently prepared. It is one of the most intimate problems of the Party to find out the required golden mean for accomplishing the needful amalgamation of our fundamental stratum, incorporating the history of twenty five years, with the new-stratum, brought into being by the Party during the civil war. It is imperative that the right basis of mutual relations be found, for these twenty five years of experience must not be lost to the Party, the gigantic political capital accumulated by the Party during this period must not be squandered in vain, and on the other hand it is equally important that this group of old members throws no obstacles in the way of those young members who are striving for more active participation. It is the task of the old group to transmit its political experience to the young, to further participation in the work under their leadership.

The General Situation and Tasks of the Party.

Let us now strike a balance. In regard to the working class our cause is in no bad position; the situation has improved. Confidence in our Party is growing among the working class; if we do not commit any very glaring economic mistakes, we

shall gain the confidence of the working class. In any case, there is an increase of confidence in the Party on the whole. The dissatisfaction brought about in Summer by the economic situation has proved to be merely an episode. Those organizations which were not able to deal competently with the discontent and strikes in the Summer are now being reorganized and strengthened by us.

Our relations with the peasantry have also improved. The peasant nuclei have themselves eliminated many unsuitable elements, and are in a better position than before. With respect to the rest of the population, there is something new to record. There is a great stream of sympathy for the ideas of the Soviet power from among the intelligentsia, lower and higher alike, and from every class of the student youth, not only among our own ranks, but from the ranks of other classes. This is the new element characterizing the present moment, for this was not the case two or three years ago. It is thus beyond question that there is a certain mass movement in our direction. We must utilize this turn of events, and must differentiate two sides of it. It possesses one extremely positive side. These are people who can set our schools upon their feet; the scholars can lend positive aid to our higher educational establishments, and can do much towards the solution of that problem raised by comrade Trotsky in his letter to the savants: It is war which rules chemistry and aviation.

Our positive gain lies in the fact that we obtain the support of cultured and semi-cultured strata which can bring us that which we are lacking. And the attendant minus is that we shall be enveloped in the predominantly petty bourgeois influences of these strata, which will take effect upon our party through a thousand channels unseen except to the most watchful observer. But we are Marxists, and we must be able to observe phenomena at the very moment when their germ is beginning to break the outer husk. We point out these new phenomena to you, and say to you: here is a fresh stream of mass sympathy from the intelligentsia, from the student youth, from the teachers; this sympathy bears witness of our strength; accept it and utilize it for our purposes and tasks. But do not forget that it possesses its negative aspects. Be on your guard.

I am of the opinion that we must not permit the discussion now started to assume the forms of that discussion before the X. Party Congress, when comrade Lenin was obliged to write that the Party had been attacked by a fever, and that the temperature must be lowered. We can no longer allow ourselves this „luxury“. In the first place it is entirely unnecessary; we shall pass matured resolutions on the question of the intensification of Party work and the inner Party democracy — unanimous resolutions. We shall put the workers' democracy courageously into actual practice. Everything which can and must be done will be resolved upon and put into execution without delay. And we cannot allow ourselves this luxury, in the second place, because the international situation is full of tension and responsibility. Each week may bring fresh surprises. The White Guard press is naturally seizing eagerly upon our discussion.

Surprises may await us in the international situation. This must not be forgotten. And then we have the inner Party question. At the time before the X. Congress we seriously pushed the matter to an extreme. But at that time we had some one whose opinion was absolutely decisive for the whole of the Party. This was comrade Lenin. At the present time comrade Lenin is still so ill that he cannot take any part in our discussion. This throws an even heavier responsibility upon the rest of us. The Central of our Party, which is composed of a group of comrade Lenin's scholars, has to make the most responsible decisions. At present it is only possible for the Central to work, to carry out responsible functions, to alter the course when circumstances require it, to remove evils in the Party, and to manoeuvre on the international front, when it is conscious of possessing the fullest confidence of the decisive fundamental strata of our Party. We can and will accomplish the realization of the principle of election. We must effect a number of improvements in the spheres of trade union and economic work, and correct a number of mistakes. Our Party Central must remain the army staff of the Party. It is only such a staff which is capable of leading the Party during the period of proletarian dictatorship. Here we must consider everything twenty times before acting; every decision must be accorded the most careful thought, and then finally made with that maximum of determination and that maximum of unanimity which is characteristic of our organization.