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## XIV. National Conference of the C. P. of Russia.

We publish in this number of the Inprecorr, the most important speeches delivered and resolutions adopted at the recent Conference of the Communist Party of Russia, which will serve to inform our readers as to the main problems dealt with and the attitude taken up by the Russian Party at this Conference. Ed.

## Comrade Zinovievs Report on the Results of the Enlarged E. C. C. I.

### The Parallel Development of the Comintern and of our Revolution.

Comrades! If you look back upon the whole of the activity of the Communist International, you will see that turning points in the history of the Communist International have almost invariably coincided with turning points in the history of our Party. Certain it is that we can trace a definite parallel line in the development of the Communist International and in our own revolution. You will remember the article which Lenin wrote on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Communist International. At that time he wrote of the triumphant forward march of the Communist International, which conquered one position after another. And at that time this triumphant march coincided with the rapid successes of our revolution.

The II. Congress of the Comintern was held at the time of our Warsaw offensive.

The III. Congress gathered together after Cronstadt, and the tactics adopted by our Party were of great influence upon its decisions.

The IV. Congress took place at a time when we were just drawing the first balances of the NEP, and here again our international policy harmonised with the policy of the Russian CP. The V. Congress draws a certain balance of internal Party discussion. But our internal Party crises have in every case corresponded to certain crises or semi-crisis in the history of our revolution.

A similar parallelism may again be observed at the present time. The decisions of the recent session of the Enlarged ECCI, a session which rather bore the character of a congress, are closely associated with the total political situation in our own country. This is easily comprehensible when we recollect that the Communist International was born and reared in the atmosphere of the first victorious forward strides of

the proletarian revolution in Russia. Although the Soviet Union embraces only one sixth of the globe, the preponderant importance of the Russian revolution in the Communist International is undoubtedly very, much greater — for reasons which require no explanation. The decisions accepted by the session of the Enlarged ECCI are therefore of the utmost importance to us, not merely as a Section of the Communist International, but as the Party taking the lead in the first proletarian country.

### The II. International seeks a Basis.

A similar parallel may also be found in the activity of the II. International and the developments in a number of bourgeois countries. If the bourgeoisie is on the upward path, the II. International shares the upward tendency. If capitalism succeeds in accomplishing a certain degree of stabilisation, the II. International is stabilised with it. It is difficult to say which country is to-day most closely bound up with the II. International, and which country incorporates its policy the most. During the period of the MacDonald government we were all inclined to assume that London is the centre of the II. International, just as Moscow is the heart of the III. Events have proved that this is not the case.

The very decided swing to the Left in the deepest interior of the English labour movement, leading as it has done to the rapprochement between the Trade Unions of England and the Soviet Trade Unions, incontestably denotes a diminution of the role played by the II. International. Today it is no longer possible to maintain that London embodies the II. International, and that the English labour movement is its basis. If anyone wants proof of this, he will find more than sufficient in the events of the last few days. At the recent conference of the I. L. P., (the party of MacDonald, representing to a certain extent the Left wing of the Labour Party), MacDonald suffered an absolute defeat. The results of the

vote taken in connection with the notorious story of the forged "Zimoviev letter" are in themselves highly symptomatic and instructive. MacDonald, the leader of the party, found himself in a minority on this question. He received 261 out of 386 votes. The matter went so far that in the course of the following days the "Morning Post" prophesied the founding of a new and entirely communist-free labour party by MacDonald and Thomas. The newspaper writes ironically that the Labour Party is controlled by the I. L. P. This is however under the control of those of its members who are — openly or not openly — communists. Thus there remains nothing else for Messrs MacDonald and Thomas to do except to found a new Labour Party.

I do not know whether the formation of a new labour party will be resorted to, as prophesied by the "Morning Post", but the fact that such a contingency can be mooted shows the way the wind blows. A short time ago, at Easter, MacDonald announced his plan, intended as a counterweight to the Anglo-Russian trade unionist rapprochement. He expressed himself in favour of an Anglo-German rapprochement, and substantiated his proposal by the statement that after all German influence is preponderant in the labour movement of Europe.

At the recently held session of the Executive of the II. International, an interesting conflict arose on the question of where the Executive should have its headquarters in the future. This conflict was seasoned with various piquant incidents, and ended in a division yielding a majority of two votes in favour of Germany. The formulation of this result was however somewhat mitigated in the wording of the resolution as passed, which merely states that the activity of the Executive of the II. International is transferred to a "German speaking country". They could not quite bring themselves to say Germany outright. This fact alone shows that England no longer represents the leading country of the II. International to the degree in which the Soviet Union is the main country of the Third. It would rather appear as if we are entering an epoch in which Germany will again be the chief country for the II. International.

#### Our Decisions are distorted by our Enemies.

These were the conditions under which our new line had to be determined upon. You are aware, comrades, that the Enlarged Executive has pointed out the existence of these conditions with the utmost clearness, showing that they have been more or less observable since the III. Congress, since 1921. The Executive has laid down our line of action in face of the diminished speed of international revolution, and pointed out the degree to which capitalism had contrived to become restabilised. Our resolutions and decisions have been, if not unexpected at least somewhat disagreeable to many comrades. Such things are not pleasant to hear. But we have had to state the situation candidly, for the communist movement can never win anything by illusions and self-deception.

Communism was right in 1923, at the time of the acutely revolutionary situation in Germany, to stake the whole of its influence on this card; communism was right in subsequently waiting for a year and a half — as we did in Russia after 1905 — in the hope of a return of the revolutionary situation. And communism is equally right in 1925, at a time when quantity has already been converted into quality, to place the dot over the *i* and state plainly that at the present time — especially in Germany, where there was an acutely revolutionary situation in 1923 — no such situation exists. As was only to be expected, the statement made by the Enlarged Executive on the partial stabilisation of capitalism has been eagerly snapped up by the capitalist and social democratic press, and interpreted in such an "extended" sense that it is represented as meaning that the world revolution has been deleted from the programme altogether, and all prospect of its accomplishment annihilated. Here a "slight" falsification has been committed in the camp of the enemy. We spoke of a partial stabilisation, but the enemy totally omits the word "partial". We spoke of the non-existence of an immediately revolutionary situation, and again the word "immediately" is omitted. Thus interpreted, there is no revolutionary situation whatever, but a complete consolidation and stabilisation of capitalism. May this interpretation serve to console those who contrived it.

#### The Limits of the Economic Stabilisation. France as Example.

A very brief time has passed since the session of the ECCI, scarcely a month, but we can already observe various important facts rendering it possible for us to throw clear light upon the import of the decisions of the Enlarged Executive, and enabling us to see beyond the limits and extent of this partial stabilisation. Within these two to three weeks, events of the utmost importance have taken place in France, Bulgaria and Germany.

France has just passed through a severe governmental crisis, which has so far taken a course fairly favourable for the Left bloc. Herriot and Painlevé have merely changed places. As we know, France is a land of old parliamentary traditions, and such crises occur in innumerable repetitions. But this last crisis possesses the distinguishing feature of not having arisen out of any storm in a teacup, or out of any common parliamentary combination, but of being based on a profound economic foundation. What has been the immediate cause of this latest parliamentary governmental crisis in France today? Questions of financial policy have been the cause. France is a country which emerged victorious from the imperialist war, up to now it has known no unemployment, and its large industries have developed greatly during the last few years. And even this country has now run into a hopeless cul de sac. France is hovering on the verge of the so-called inflation, of the necessity of saving the situation by means of an excessive issue of banknotes. The situation hitherto so favourable for the bourgeoisie is in serious danger, and this danger has called forth an extensive regrouping of forces among fairly broad strata of the bourgeoisie.

Why? Because the mere mention of the word "inflation" calls before the French bourgeoisie the spectre of Germany in 1923, that frightful crisis with its many characteristically revolutionary features. And what was the course of events in Germany in 1923: financial disaster, economic depression, swollen issue of paper money, unemployment, inflation, etc. We see that here in the richest country of the continent, in a victorious country, a crisis has broken out before our eyes only very shortly after the Session of the Enlarged Executive, a crisis based on economic foundations, and bringing the country to the verge of the precipice of a financial crisis.

For the moment the situation has been saved in France. But you must not forget that France's deficit amounts to 24 milliards. For the moment it has wormed its way out of the difficulty by some means: four milliards are covered by an issue of paper money (leading in part to the outbreak of the governmental crisis), but 20 milliards of the deficit are still left uncovered. If four milliards suffice to bring about a governmental crisis, the total sum of the deficit is enough to cause five such crisis, and every successive crisis will be greater in extent and acuteness.

There is no immediately revolutionary situation in France; there is on the contrary a certain "stabilisation", but a stabilisation with clearly observable economic limitations. It need not be said that the situation will not clear up within a week or a month, but the limits of the stabilisation are graphically illustrated by the economic crises maturing before our eyes.

#### The Limits of the Political Stabilisation. Bulgaria and Germany as examples.

Let us now regard the stabilisation from the political point of view. I am of the opinion that the events in Bulgaria, and especially the events in Germany, can aid us to gain an equally clear idea of the limits set to the present political stabilisation.

We do not know what the immediate consequences of the events in Bulgaria will be, but we see that the point reached in this country was not confined to an attempt on the part of Bulgarian landowners and capitalists to fly at the throats of their "own" workers and peasants, but extended even to the possibility of an armed conflict between, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Roumania. This was the express question concerned. It is true that it did not come to an armed conflict, but it was very near it. Everyone who remembers the conditions ruling on the eve of the great war knows that the Balkans are rich in classic possibilities for armed conflicts capable of initiating a world war. And the present situation in the Balkans shows no signs whatever of a political tranquillity in the camp of capitalism.

The whole bourgeois world is now engaged in zealous attempts — though these have slackened somewhat during the

last few days — to throw the blame of the events in Sofia upon us, upon the Soviet government, and the Comintern. The complete absence of the slightest foundation for this incredible and frightful accusation has forced its originators to beat a retreat.

During the days immediately following the event, the "Rul", the cadets' newspaper, went farthest of all. It asserted that at the session of the Enlarged Executive of the Comintern the Bolsheviks had purposely invented the stabilisation idea for the purpose of strewing sand in the eyes of the international bourgeoisie, so that this might be lulled into a feeling of security, leaving more opportunity for the preparation of the assassinations in Sofia (Laughter). It is not to be supposed that such nonsense has been believed by any body. The explosion was prepared by the whole social situation in Bulgaria, or rather by the whole social situation in the Balkans. The fact is that it is not possible to govern such a preponderantly agricultural country as Bulgaria against the interests of the huge majority of workers and peasants.

Scarcely two weeks have passed since the Enlarged Executive completed its task. Seen from the political standpoint, the situation in the Balkans shows us that the struggle taking place there has again brought us face to face with the possibility of renewed war. We have witnessed events which might serve to rouse an echo all over the world. Events are taking place which may lead to the aggravation of class antagonisms, and to the furtherance of civil war in Bulgaria, and Bulgaria is not the least important of the Balkan countries.

### Germany and Hindenburg.

Of even greater significance are the latest events in Germany, the election of Hindenburg to the position of President of the German Reich. I must make you familiar with the internal party side of the question. In Germany the second ballot took place at a time when the delegation sent by the German CP was participating in the session of the Enlarged Executive. We were perfectly aware of the importance of the political events going on in Germany. We decided unanimously that it must be left to the Party to decide the question on the spot, but we categorically advised the German CP to openly offer its support to a social democratic candidate at the second ballot, provided the SD Party refrained from withdrawing their candidate. After the first ballot, the German SD Party immediately withdrew Braun's candidature, although Braun had eight million votes and Marx, the candidate of the priest-ridden Roman Catholic Centre Party, had only three million. The social democrats withdrew their candidate, and decided to mobilise the whole of Germany for Marx's candidature. In return they received the post of Prussian Prime Minister for Braun. In consequence of this, there were three candidates in the second election (Thälmann, Marx and Hindenburg). The Right wing manoeuvred with the utmost skill, setting up Hindenburg as a candidate for the second ballot and not for the first, thus thoroughly shuffling the cards.

The first ballot was carried through in such a manner that to all appearances there was no danger to be anticipated from the "Black Hundred" — as we used to say — since the Right Bloc was in a minority even if the communists insisted on their own candidate. But Hindenburg's candidature mobilised three million new voters — chiefly women — for the Right Bloc, and thus entirely altered the situation.

We feared that at the second ballot the communist votes would shrink considerably, and that our 1,800,000 votes would sink to 1,000,000. But the communist vote did not lessen; the election statistics show that in Saxony many social democratic workers voted for Thälmann as a protest against the candidature of Marx, supported by the social democrats. It must be added that the Left social democrats, including a part of the social democratic Youth Union, protested against the social democratic support of a bourgeois candidate. This shows us that a psychological preparation for voting for Marx was lacking among the workers, and not only among the communists, but among the social democrats. This is the actual fact.

I received yesterday a report on the factory council elections now being held in Germany. These elections are now in full swing. The report shows a certain increase of communist votes in the works and factories in a large number of places. Were we to judge by these first data, we should

prophesy that the number of votes given for the communists in the factory council election in Germany will be considerably greater than the number given at the election to the presidency.

The results of these elections are being made the starting point for an international Menshevist campaign against the communists. The social democrats are shrieking, in every language on earth; that the communists alone are to blame for Hindenburg's election.

I should like to adduce a historical example showing how the social democrats once acted in an analogous case. In 1913 an election to the presidency took place in France. Two candidates opposed one another, Poincaré, at that time president of the ministerial council, and Pams minister for agriculture in Poincaré's government. The political nuance dividing the two was approximately the same as that between Marx and Hindenburg. A desperate electoral fight commenced in France. The election differed from the German in that they did not take place by means of a direct secret vote of the people, but as stipulated by the French constitution, in the united session of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The voting brought the following result; Poincaré and Pams received an almost equal number of votes, Poincaré's whole majority was 13 votes. At that time the social democratic party possessed 70 votes. Vaillant was put up as candidate by the socialists. The socialists voted for Vaillant, although very well aware that they were aiding Poincaré's election by doing so. There was no doubt as to the manner in which the voting was carried out, for there was no secret ballot. And there was as little doubt as to the result of the voting, for a test division was first made in accordance with the custom.

And despite this the French socialist party, a section of the II. International, and by no means a Bolshevik party, but led by such men as Jaurés, Vaillant, and Guesde, decided unanimously: we give our votes neither to Poincaré nor to Pams, but to our own candidate. They acted precisely as the Menshevist deputies acted at the election to the presidency in the state Duma in Russia. Gompers' policy has now become the policy of the whole II. International. We must hold this in view especially at this time, when so many dogs are let loose against us.

### The Political Significance of the Hindenburg Election.

The significance of Hindenburg's election is none the less extremely great. It must not be over-estimated, but as little under-estimated. The fact remains that after several years of civil war in Germany almost fifteen million Germans have voted for Hindenburg. This is one half of the German electors. In this sense such a symptom must of course not be underestimated. A considerable number of voters voted not so much for Hindenburg as out of revenge against the Entente, against the Versailles Treaty, and against mockeries of a kind unknown to us (since our country has never undergone such a situation, except during the brief period of the Brest peace), but arousing the utmost indignation and discontent among the broad masses of the German people. It is thus very possible that a great many voters voted not so much for Hindenburg as against the Entente, against French and English capitalism. However this may be, the fact remains that they did vote for him.

Here another historical analogy thrusts itself upon our notice. After the fall of the Paris Commune — in the year 1875, if I am not mistaken — an election to the presidency took place in France. The ratification of the republic by the parliament (1875) was carried by a majority of one vote only. MacMahon was elected president, under the watchword of "republic without republicans". What is going on in Germany at the present time is somewhat similar. The man who has been chosen as president writes upon his standard: "republic without republicans", for in actual fact Hindenburg's "republic" is without republicans. There is of course a very great difference between the situation in France in 1875 and the situation in Germany in 1925. The difference consists of the fact that in France the working class was crushed, drowned in the blood shed in Paris (in Paris there was not one working class family which did not mourn the loss of at least one of its members), and the revolutionary movement died out completely. In Germany we have a mighty working class at the present time, wearied no doubt by the incessant struggle and the severe defeat which it has suffered, but by no means inclined to abandon the struggle. There are fifteen million

German workers who have not yet spoken their final word, and Germany is bordered by countries possessing powerful labour movements. It is not in Germany alone that we see the growth of class war. The Parties of the Comintern are winning over broader and broader strata of the working class.

This is where the difference lies. The analogy is however none the less justified. The present situation in Germany is the same as that in France after the defeat of the Commune — a republic without republicans.

What will be the immediate consequences of the Hindenburg election? It is difficult to foresee with certainty at this juncture. One thing is however certain: that this election is bound to increase and aggravate political antagonisms within Germany itself. The social democratic leaders, now carrying on a campaign of pogrom agitation against the communists, will speedily reconcile themselves with Hindenburg. During the war they were amongst his truest supporters. They were the last to proclaim the bourgeois republic. Wels and Scheidemann will be reconciled to Hindenburg soon enough. But this does not signify any reconciliation between the German working class and Hindenburg.

There will be no such reconciliation! The inconsistencies of the situation in Germany will become more and more apparent; the political position now developing in Germany possesses much less political stability than might have been anticipated.

And what will be the international consequences? These will certainly be serious. It is plain that Hindenburg does not signify any stabilisation of relations between Germany and France; on the contrary, relations become more strained. Neither does Hindenburg signify a stabilisation of relations between Germany and Poland, but again the contrary. The election of Hindenburg thus means the creation of an insecure and disturbed situation all along the line, Germany-France and Germany-Poland, a situation fraught with all sorts of dangers and uncertainties.

With respect to us, the Soviet Union, the matter is much more complicated. Here many forces will be brought into play for a lengthy period.

The leading idea of the Entente will be to manoeuvre for a time in such a manner that Hindenburg Germany can be utilised as weapon against the Soviet Union. This tendency existed before the Hindenburg election. And now this election affords the English the opportunity of carrying on this game still further, if more slowly, but with the greater certainty. And you do not need to be told, comrades, that in America, and in the whole of the bourgeois world, there are elements enough who are willing to stake a great deal on the "steady" political forces in Germany, which in their opinion are still able to save the country from Bolshevism.

And what is happening in Germany from the standpoint of world historical perspectives? In Germany we expected the proletarian revolution. At the beginning of our October revolution we hoped that a few months would witness its accomplishment. But in Germany the revolution came much later, and then it was not the proletarian revolution, but merely a revolution overthrowing Wilhelm. It may be said, with certain reservations, that a bourgeois democratic revolution took place in Germany. This must however not be confused with our bourgeois democratic revolution, the social structure of the two countries being different.

#### What is to be learnt from the Experience gained in the German Revolution?

Germany has supplied an interesting illustration to our old quarrel with the Mensheviks and with Trotzky, who maintained that the Bolsheviks were in favour of a "self limitation" of the proletariat, but that the proletariat, should it succeed in seizing power, would never "limit itself", but would realise the socialist revolution immediately. Germany gives us an example of a proletariat which had actually seized power: the whole country was thronged with workers' councils, and these were the real masters of the situation. The first German government consisted of six social democrats, three Right and three Independent. The workers had all power in their own hands, but thanks to the rôle played by the social democrats, sufficiently well known to all of us, the councils dissolved voluntarily at the Reich congress of workers and soldiers. They chose the "self limitation" of the bourgeois Weimar

constitution. The highly civilised working class of Germany "limited itself" to a bourgeois democratic revolution. What is now happening may be designated as a certain reversed development of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the direction of a semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois monarchy. Whilst in our own case we witness the rapid development of the bourgeois democratic revolution into a proletarian revolution during the nine months between February and October 1917, in Germany we are witnessing the reversed process.

#### Hindenburg and Kautsky.

Hindenburg's victory is a symbol of the extent of the political stabilisation in Europe. There is no need to wonder that the German communists cannot bring themselves to consider the possibility of even a temporary pact with the social democrats against the monarchists, for the leaders of the German SP incorporate the policy of the bourgeoisie, as does the whole II. International.

One example will serve to illustrate this: We hear that at the recent session of the Executive of the II. International, Kautsky submitted theses on the Russian question, and these were rejected as being too Right for even the Mensheviks.

You are aware that Kautsky is a fairly old and settled person (Laughter). Hindenburg is 78 years old, Kautsky about the same. In any case their combined ages make a good century and a half. (Laughter.) You know that this white haired old man is as gentle as a lamb and soft as wax as far as the bourgeoisie is concerned. He is against all insurrection, civil war, etc. But listen to this mild old man, passing the remainder of his days in peace, when he begins to speak about us; see how he shows his teeth when he speaks of the Soviet Union, and of our revolution.

The title of his theses is as follows: The duties of the International with reference to Russia. (The quotations from Kautsky's theses have been retranslated from Russian. Ed.)

Hitherto we have cherished the belief that the duties incumbent on the International with reference to Russia consisted of some form of support or other. But Kautsky's theses begin as follows:

"Just as it has been the duty of the socialists of all countries to fight against absolutism, it is now their most important duty to fight against the despotism oppressing the peoples of Russia and the territories conquered by Russia. Those who benefitted by the revolution have become its grave diggers, and now that they are fulfilling anti-revolutionary duties only, they represent a Russian variety of Bonapartism.

The means of defence against the most brutal use of force which lies nearest to hand is the use of counter force. A despotism based on military power has hitherto almost invariably been overthrown by a popular insurrection or by the falling off of adherents. This is followed by small reservations intended to throw a diplomatic veil over what he actually aims at. You will note that he condemns insurrections which do not attain their object. And in this sense he does not approve of partial action. He would prefer to manage without insurrections, etc.

Kautsky's standpoint was "a bit too much" for even the Russian Mensheviks, and they rejected it. But you may well imagine the feelings of the German communists with regard to the social democrats, when you remember that they are aware of the attitude of the learned Kautsky, and of all the social democratic leaders, towards Soviet Russia. It is an additional proof of the wide chasm lying between the paths of the adherents of the II. International and the adherents of the III. International.

I believe that these two personalities, Hindenburg and Kautsky, may be taken as symbolical figures embodying the past of Germany and of the whole of Europe. At the present moment we are experiencing a configuration and a convulsion which strengthen Hindenburg and Kautsky for the moment. To-morrow will find them the best of friends. But the future does not belong to these two old men.

#### The Stabilisation and — the Armament Fever in the Capitalist Countries.

The present situation bears witness to the existence of elements of instability. Compare the present picture with that of a year ago. A year ago, MacDonald, Herriot and Ebert

were still in power; Davidovitch governed in Yugoslavia. These are now replaced by Chamberlain, Hindenburg, in France by Briand — as in fact he is head of the government; in Yugoslavia we see Mr. Paschitsch, an old acquaintance from the days of the Czar. Europe is becoming decidedly blacker. It is the swing to the Right which will be as inevitably followed by a swing to the Left.

A few days ago, **Mussolini** held a speech in the Senate, demanding fresh armament credits. He addressed himself to the senators, asking: "Do you really believe that the war between 1914 and 1918 was the last war, as many people maintain?" The senators shouted in reply: "Of course, we don't".

Today's newspapers report the manner in which the armament question is dealt with in **Sweden**. Deputations arrive from various places, bringing petitions to the parliament and to the ministry of war, against the limitation of armaments. The same question was the subject of a meeting held in **Stockholm** yesterday. One of the speakers was Sven Hedin, the old acquaintance of comrade Chicherin. He maintained that war complications might arise at any moment in Eastern Europe. As proofs he adduced the assassinations in Reval and Sofia. General Lidar raised the alarm of the "Russian danger", and declared that the "first attack made by the Soviet Union would be on the neutralised Aland Islands, which could not be defended either by Finland or by Sweden". The resolution passed emphasised the necessity of increased defence for Stockholm, though the armament limitation plan had provided for a considerable limitation of armaments.

Just imagine this! An increased defence for **Stockholm!** In the year 1925 and on account of the stabilisation!

Lloyd George, too, lately observed that though he is no pessimist, still when he sees what is going on in English economics, he is convinced that a catastrophe is inevitable unless something radical happens.

You have heard the opinions of **Mussolini**, of **Sweden**, and of **Lloyd George**. Combine these with the last General Staff conference held in Riga, and with the fact that the Sofia explosion took place under circumstances tending towards war, and in a part of the Balkans which witnessed the initiation of the great war in 1914. If you consider all this, it will be clear to you that whilst we fully recognise the stabilisation and base our actions upon it, we must none the less take into account the circumstances, extent, and character of this stabilisation.

We must grasp the fact that capitalism, even during this period of comparative stabilisation, is not likely to lie still. The present stabilisation is of a nature which does not exclude either a turn to the Right or to the Left. As late as 1915 Lenin wrote that: "the revolution can, and probably will, consist of years of battles, of some periods of advance with intervals of counter-revolutionary convulsions of the bourgeois social order"

The situation today furnishes a graphic world historical illustration of this. Truly the revolution is composed of: 1. a number of battles, 2. of years of struggle, 3. of intermediate periods of the counter-revolutionary convulsions of the bourgeois social order.

### The three different Species of Revolutionary Situation.

In our theses, which were entirely approved by the Political Bureau, we attempted to go somewhat further than the **ECCI** has done, and have endeavoured to give a more accurate and complete formulation of the international situation. I am of the opinion that we must differentiate: 1. a revolutionary situation in general; 2. an immediately revolutionary situation; and 3. an immediate revolution. This distinction was not sufficiently emphasised at the session of the Enlarged **ECCI**, and I must endeavour to make it somewhat clearer here. Recently the article written by Lenin in 1915 and dealing with Axelrod's German pamphlet was published. This article did not see the light of day until now, for at that time no-one abroad was prepared to publish it. I believe that it gives us the key to the question of this differentiation between the general revolutionary situation, the immediately revolutionary situation, and the immediate revolution.

In his pamphlet Axelrod expressed himself approximately as follows: Lenin might be more or less in the right with his wild slogan of the transformation of imperialist war into civil war, and of the defeat of all bourgeois governments, if it could be proved that we are in the midst of a revolutionary situation in Europe, such as was the case in Russia in 1901. Lenin seized upon this declaration, and wrote:

"The example adduced by Axelrod is an incomparable revelation of our opportunists as they are. Could anybody in his right senses have positively maintained, in 1901, that we were on the immediate verge of the decisive struggle with absolutism in Russia? Nobody could do this, and nobody maintained it. At that time nobody could know that four years later one of the decisive battles (December 1905) would be fought, and that the next "decisive battle with absolutism would perhaps follow in 1915/16, or perhaps later".

Though in 1901 nobody maintained, that the decisive battle would be fought in the "immediate future, and though we maintained at that time that the "hysterical" shrieks of Kritschewski & Co. on the "immediate battle" were not to be taken seriously, we revolutionary social democrats maintained something else very positively at that time: We maintained that in the year 1901 only hopeless opportunists were incapable of grasping the task of immediately supporting, promoting, and developing the revolutionary demonstrations of 1901, and of spreading the most decisive revolutionary slogans for these demonstrations. History has shown that we, and we only, were right, and has condemned the opportunists, actually throwing them out of the labour movement, although the first "immediate battle" did not take place at once, but four-years elapsed before the first decisive battle was fought, and this proved not to be the last battle, and was thus not the actually decisive one.

Europe is going through the same experience today, literally the same. There is no shadow of doubt that in Europe in 1915 there is a revolutionary situation, just as there was a revolutionary situation in Russia in 1901. We cannot know whether the first "decisive" battle between the proletariat and the bourgeois will take place in four years, or in two, or perhaps not for ten years or even longer, or whether the second "decisive" battle will not follow for another decade. But we know exactly, and maintain "positively", that it is our immediate and urgent duty to aid the beginning fermentation (in process of origination), and the demonstrations which are already taking place. In Germany, Scheidemann has been hissed by the crowd, and in many countries there are demonstrations against the high prices."

For Lenin these were at that time proofs of the existence of a revolutionary situation, equal to the proofs furnished by the students demonstrations in 1901 in Russia. Things are different now, but in 1916 these were some of the proofs of the existence of a revolutionary situation. All the same, Lenin observes that it is uncertain when this situation will become a revolution.

These simple things: the difference between a general revolutionary situation and an immediately revolutionary situation, must be now properly grasped by us, and explained to the workers of all countries. If we take the example of our own country in 1902, it is evident that at that time there was a revolutionary situation. But in 1905 there was an **immediately** revolutionary situation. And then it was that Lenin called upon us to rally together for the attack. We see how the immediately revolutionary situation merged into the revolution of 1905. But the revolution was not victorious.

In 1906 Lenin and the Bolshevik Party continued to insist that the situation was still immediately revolutionary. You may recollect that many Mensheviks laughed at Lenin for saying that when the harvest work was ended, the time would come when the peasants would rise. Until 1907 the Bolsheviks assumed that the second revolution would break out within a short time, and maintained that the situation was acutely and immediately revolutionary. The second revolution will come. And we based our tactics entirely on the assumption of this approaching revolution.

We now observe a similar state of affairs in Germany, and to a certain extent in the Balkans. Matters are entirely different in England for instance, where the beginnings of a general revolutionary situation are just being felt for the first time. The political swindlers of the II. International are endeavouring to place the matter in such a light as if the Enlarged Executive had acknowledged the complete absence of any revolutionary situation, and as if we had entirely discarded the question of the world revolution from our agenda.

They are trying to convince the working class that we have not merely ascertained the slower pace of the revolution, but that we have acknowledged its complete collapse. This is the swindle being perpetrated by the II. International, in this question again the faithful servant of the bourgeoisie.

We must arouse no illusions. We must acknowledge that in a country like Germany, around which events centred in 1923, there is now no immediately revolutionary situation. But the general revolutionary situation continues to exist, and exists incontestably all over Europe. It is becoming more and more acute all over the world, slowly but surely, aggravated more and more by the developments in the East, by the colonial question, by the South East. This must be taken into account, and the revolutionary perspective must not be lost sight of.

I remember how Lenin took the renegade Kautsky at his word in 1918 and said: "At one time you were a Marxist; you acknowledged in 1909 ('The Road to Power') that there is a revolutionary situation in Europe. In 1902 you again acknowledged, in your pamphlet: 'The social Revolution', that the situation in Europe is revolutionary. And we can certainly maintain this today with an even greater right, for the situation in Europe is now much more acute than it was in 1909. The epochs of wars and revolution do not cease, we have not reached the "end", we are only at the "beginning of the beginning" of these epochs. In Europe the situation is not merely revolutionary in the sense that capitalism in itself is bound to call forth a revolutionary situation, but in the sense that 1. capitalism is torn by much greater contradictions since the imperialist war than it was before the war, 2. that the Soviet power reigns over one sixth of the globe, and 3. that the Eastern question, the question of the oppressed peoples, is very much more acute than formerly.

### Two Stabilisations.

In order to give a precise expression to the purport of the decisions of the Enlarged ECCI, we must not speak of a stabilisation only, **but of two stabilisations: of the stabilisation of the capitalist order, and of our stabilisation (Soviet Union).**

The fact that we form a link in the chain of international relations is a proof of our power. And the fact that we are building up our own socialist economics according to our own plans — we have been engaged on this up building for some time now — and have a perfectly correct idea as to the manner in which our socialist economics are to be further developed, this fact alone renders us a factor undermining the bourgeois state of society.

The question of the world revolution must never for a moment be severed from its connection with the revolution of the country in which the revolution has already been victorious. This problem has existed since the earliest days of the revolution, and becomes more and more complicated and acute. And since the Enlarged Executive has recognised that capitalist economics have succeeded in a partial stabilisation, it is of special importance to ascertain how this partial stabilisation is effecting the upbuilding of socialism in our country.

The answer is perfectly clear. Were our economics not securely established, then we would be involved in the difficulties of a peculiar "scissors"; then we should have been obliged to look on whilst our economics decline, we ourselves become weaker and weaker, and the world bourgeoisie stronger and stronger. In this case we should be on the downward and our enemies on the upward track. This is what Lenin most feared. You will remember how triumphantly he spoke, at the IV. World Congress, about the first rays of light cast by our financial successes, and how confidently he based his expectations of the favourable progress of our economics upon this. He attached much importance to this question, for he recognised an immediate association between the development of the world revolution and the advance of the economics of our country.

Although we observe a partial stabilisation in the camp of the enemy, we have none the less the right to assert that we are decidedly on the upward track, and that our cause is advancing rapidly, not only in the sense that production itself is increasing, but in the sense that there is a growth in the socialist elements of our economics.

### The Connection between our Revolution and the World Revolution according to the Leninist Conception.

We see that we must thus not merely speak of a stabilisation, but of two stabilisations. The question of the connections between the victory of proletarian revolution in one country and the duties imposed on this country with regard to the other countries of the world — this extremely important problem has become especially urgent at the present time. This problem was theoretically solved by Lenin. And as it has been the object of our theses to obviate every possible objection, to avoid any misunderstanding, and to throw every possible light on this question from every standpoint, we have replied to this question mainly from the viewpoint taken by comrade Lenin.

In 1915 comrade Lenin stated the question for the first time in its most general form, saying that the revolution would consist of long years of battle, and of periods of advances intermingled with counter-revolutionary struggles.

In the course of his article published in the collection "Against the Stream", and directed against Kautsky and in part against comrade Trotzky's theory, comrade Lenin formulated his law of capitalism, showing the irregularity of the development of capitalism. Comrade Lenin's book on imperialism is based on this law. And in 1917, after the February revolution, comrade Lenin stated the programme of the Russian revolution in his well known letter to the Swiss workers, and declared that "the Russian proletariat cannot carry the socialist revolution through to a victorious conclusion alone, it can only begin it". The problem is defined with great determination in a number of the speeches held by comrade Lenin at the VII. Party Congress of the RCP (at the beginning of 1918), at the time of the Brest peace treaty. In his admirable article on "Left childishness and the petty bourgeois tendency", comrade Lenin makes mention of the famous "chicken". He writes:

"Socialism is . . . unthinkable without the rule of the proletariat in the state. This is another platitude. History . . . develops in such an extraordinary manner that in the year 1918 two separate halves of socialism were born, lying side by side like two future chickens in the one eggshell of world imperialism. In 1918 Germany and Russia embodied the most graphic object lessons of the material realisation of the economic, productive, and social economic prerequisites of socialism on the one hand, and of its political prerequisites on the other."

Then follows, the "Renegade Kautsky", in which a whole chapter is devoted to this subject. Then comes Lenin's declaration of 13. March 1919 that we are living in the midst of a system of States, and that two different systems cannot both continue to exist permanently. In the end one or the other will be victorious. In other places comrade Lenin laid special stress on the point that the term "in the end" does not mean: "at the beginning of the beginning". A number of other important statements follow: the highly important speech held in Moscow on 27. October 1920 on the concessions; the speech held at the III. World Congress of the CI; the remarks on the original plan of the taxes in kind, in 1921; and finally the last statements, to which we must accord special attention: his political legacy, the notes from the diary in 1922/23, in which the ideas referring to the cooperatives and to the East are of special importance. The extracts show us clearly that Lenin considered the complete realisation of socialism in a country like ours could only be accomplished by the aid of the cooperatives if we are safe from international intervention. But at the same time he does not omit, as international proletarian revolutionist, to emphasise the fact that final victory is possible on an international scale only, and that our victory is neither permanent nor final without the international revolution.

If we wish to be clear as to the Leninist view of today's most burning question of the connection between the victory of proletarian revolution in one country and the duty of this country towards all other countries, we must follow all the stages of Leninism from comrade Lenin's statements in 1915 up to his notes on cooperatives and on the East. The question is not merely of theoretical significance to us at the present time, it is of profoundly practical importance. I must remind you of what Lenin wrote in his pamphlet on the taxes in kind (1921):

"Let us look at the map of the **RSFSR**. We see vast areas, capable of accomodating a dozen civilised states, stretching away north of Wolojda, south east of Kostov on the Don and Saratov, south of Orenburg and Omsk, north of Tomsk. And in all this great territory there are prevailing patriarchal conditions, semi-savagery, and even complete savagery. And what about the remote agrarian districts of the rest of Russia? Everywhere where dozens of versts of road — or strictly speaking dozens of versts of no road — separate the village from the railway, that is, from material connection with civilisation, with capitalism, with big industry, with the city — are the conditions prevailing in these districts not equally patriarchal, Oblomovist, semi-savage?"

"Under these conditions now obtaining in Russia, asks Lenin, is a direct transition to socialism thinkable at all?" And he himself replies: "Yes, it is thinkable up to a certain degree, but only under one conditions regarding which we are fully informed, thanks to a great scientific achievement. This condition is electrification. If we erect dozens of electric power stations (and today we are thoroughly informed as to where and how these can and must be set up), if we conduct energy from these into every village, and if we have sufficient electro motors and other machines at our disposal, then we shall need scarcely any stages of transition whatever, connecting links between patriarchalism and socialism. But we know very well that this "one" conditions means at least ten years of preparatory work, and that this term can only be shortened should the proletarian revolution be victorious in such countries as England, Germany and America."

Lenin faced the problem in this practical manner without losing sight of its international relations for a moment. Lenin is an international revolutionist; he knows that the final victory is possible on an international scale only, that victory on an international scale is the sole certain guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois conditions. But at the same time his articles defend and propagate the idea that our country, with its patriarchal, semi-savage, and Oblomovist life and customs, may be converted into a socialist country. In his last speech in the Moscow Soviet he bequeathed us a magnificent legacy: The conversion of the Russia of the NEP into a socialist Russia.

This legacy has now become of the utmost importance to us all. The question of the partial stabilisation of capitalism in Europe is wrongly reflected in the minds of many of the members of our Party, especially among our young students, and these are thus led onto the wrong track. We as Party must propagate the Leninist principle that socialism can be established even in our poor country — even though we are surrounded by a ring of capitalist countries. We have all acknowledged the partial stabilisation of capitalism in Europe. We have all acknowledged that the cause of the world revolution is developing with less rapidity. Does this mean that a petty bourgeois degeneration is inevitable in Russia? Does it signify a stagnation, or even a retrogression, in our revolutionary development? It may safely be asserted that an out spoken current representing this standpoint does not exist. But there is a feeling of it in the air, and this feeling is perfectly comprehensible in the present stage of the revolutionary movement.

### **Two Dangers attendant upon the Estimation of the Present Situation.**

There are two dangers attendant on the present situation, and these are the following:

The following trend of thought is frequently expressed: If the final victory is really only possible in the case of the world revolution, and if we recognise that the world revolution is moving forward but slowly, will we be able to develop socialism in Russia without adequate aid from outside? Have we not arrived at such a pass that — to use the graphic definition coined by a comrade ridiculing the whole trend of feeling — we shall have to "cast our anchor"? Does the present situation perhaps signify that we, the Russian CP, are unable to fulfil our historical mission as Bolshevik Party, as the Party of the international proletarian revolutionists? This is one tone of mood of the scale which is filling the air at present, and finds expression now and again.

Another possible tone of mood is that which we have described in our theses as the "danger of national narrowness". This refers to the trend of thought which ends in: What does the international revolution matter to us? We can arrange our own affairs very comfortably, we possess an unlimited territory, we possess the power, we can establish our victory finally, and are actually in a position to concern ourselves but little with the events taking place in the international arena. This is again an idea unrepresented by any clearly expressed tendency, but it can be felt in the air. And although these trends of thought have not taken any definite form as yet, still we must face the possibility of their doing so. Were we to fail to do so, we should not be the Party created by Lenin, capable of looking forward, and of coping with possible dangers. We must prevent the genesis of such ideas. We must continually remind all our comrades that we are proletarian revolutionists, **international** proletarian revolutionists, that we can only imagine our victory on an international scale, that we do not and can not forget this for even a moment, and that after having won the victory in **one** country we shall do our utmost to promote the revolutionary movement in other countries.

We are now confronted by the necessity of safeguarding ourselves against these two possible dangers in our own ranks. Our first task is therefore to go to the Comintern, to afford it the maximum of support, to help it to draw upon the treasury of theoretical Leninism and of our practical political experiences, especially from the fund of experiences gained between 1907 and 1914, so that the Comintern may be enabled by our efforts to help the international proletariat over the difficulties of the present situation. It is true that it would be considerably easier for us to speak in high tones, to call the masses to battle, to lead them to a direct attack, etc. It is much more difficult to restrain an international organisation from too hasty steps, to bridle its revolutionary impetus, and to point out all the obstacles in the road. But it is necessary if we are to attain our aims. It is very needful at the present time, if the Comintern is to remain a Bolshevik organisation.

### **Our Agrarian Policy and the Development of the Proletarian Revolution.**

The whole of the resolutions passed by the plenary session on the agrarian and colonial questions, and especially on the question of Bolshevisation, are naturally thoroughly permeated with Leninism, and are in perfect harmony with the tasks confronting the Comintern.

It is very necessary that the most advanced elements of our Party should consciously realise the harmony existing between our agrarian policy and the policy of the Comintern, in order that they may carry on the work with full confidence. Here exaggerations arise now and again. After the publication of the theses I received a letter from a comrade, in which he asks: "What is your opinion? Is it true that the decided swing to the Right in the peasant policy of our Party is explained by the international situation?" In this question the elements of a correct view of the question are combined with extremely mistaken elements in the most striking possible manner. There is no doubt that our agrarian policy is dependent to a certain extent upon the international situation. But it is entirely wrong to suppose that it constitutes a swing to the Right on the part of our Party. No. This is no swing to the Right, it is the Leninist continuation of the policy pursued by our Party since 1917 and before this. There is no thought of a swing to the Right here.

However slow the development of the revolution, we should have had to pursue the policy of the alliance with the peasantry in any case. Even at the time of the II. World Congress, when comrade Lenin shared the belief that the revolution was making decided progress, he taught us that it is precisely after the victory of the proletarian revolution that new and magnificent possibilities arise for the firmer establishment of our alliance with the peasantry. It need not be said that much would be done differently among us if the course of revolutionary development were more rapid, but the principles underlying our policy would be the same. The necessity of establishing an alliance between the peasantry and the workers would remain the basis of this policy. The confusion filling many minds must be dispersed. There is no swing to the Right in the policy of the Party, there is only the pursuance of the one correct policy based on the recognition of the

mutual relations between the various classes in our villages. And of course class relations in our country can only be correctly estimated in the light of the corresponding international relations, since we are the Party of the international proletariat. But this does not in the least alter the essential character of the matter: the policy which we pursue is the correct one.

If we can safeguard ourselves against the two dangers which I have mentioned, I am confident that we have done all that is necessary to keep the Comintern on the right path at this difficult moment.

And I am confident, comrades, that if we accord due consideration to the work done by the Enlarged Executive, to the work accomplished of late by our Central Committee, and to the work of this Conference, we may observe a complete harmony. There is now a perfectly harmonious connection established between the task imposed upon us in our character of a proletarian Party which has up to now been victorious in one country only, and our other task, formulated by Lenin as follows: An internationalist, when he has seized power in one country, is in duty bound to do his utmost to secure the same victory in other countries. The harmonious connection now established will be intensified when our agrarian policy has been further widened and deepened. This connection must be developed along the lines of actual practice, of principle, and of theory.

In our theses we have quoted from the draft made by comrade Lenin in 1921 for his article on taxation in kind. Here he writes: "10 to 20 years of the right relations with the peasantry, and we have won on an international scale, even though international revolution should follow a slow pace." This sentence was not included in the articles, and I cannot think that this omission was accidental. At that time Lenin did not want to mention such a lengthy term in the press. But now we **must** speak of this term. We **must** remember these 10 or 20 years. This of course does not mean that we undertake to wait for 10 to 20 years. We shall be very pleased to shorten the term if the history of the world permits it. But we must calculate with the likelihood of such a term: 10 to 20 years of the right relations to the peasantry, under the conditions given by a slower development of the proletarian revolution. It need not be emphasised that we require not only the right relations to the peasantry, but the right line of international policy as well, especially for our People's Commissary for foreign affairs, and more than all we require a correct labour policy. When we have realised the first, the second, and the third of these, then we shall have really overcome all obstacles.

#### **The Rapprochement between the Trade Unions of England and the Soviet Union.**

It is not merely our individual opinion, it is the opinion of a large number of eminent scientists, a generally prevailing opinion, that in England, precisely at this moment under the rule of the Conservatives, a general revolutionary situation is beginning to evolve, slowly but surely. This lends tremendous importance at the attempt at a rapprochement between our and the English trade unions, for it is part of the historical line along which England is moving. We are advancing to meet this clearly expressed tendency in the historical development of England, the tendency towards the revolutionisation of England and its labour movement. Precisely in England the correct application of the united front tactics is of the utmost importance. The Red International of Labour Unions must be developed to such an extent that the realisation of international trade union unity becomes a possibility. At the same time we are doing our very utmost to promote the rapprochement commenced between the English and French trade unions and the trade unions of the Soviet Union.

#### **The Conflict with Comrade Trotzky in the Comintern Questions.**

Our theses finally deal with the question of Trotzkyism. Considering the recent polemical discussions amongst us, many comrades may think this superfluous. We came however to the conclusion that it was not superfluous to deal with the matter here. We have here discussed it in two connections: in connection with the **theory of permanent revolution**, and in connection with the **question of our present tactics**. Some

comrades have formed the following view of the matter: In acknowledging the partial stabilisation of capitalism, we have admitted at the same time that comrade Trotzky has been right in the Comintern questions. This is not the case however. We did not quarrel as to whether the speed of revolution would be diminished or not. This has been clear to us since the III. Congress. The point contested has been as to the correct tactics to be adopted by the Comintern during the present period of the slower development of the international revolution. Whilst comrade Radek and various other comrades have been in favour of a coalition with the social democrats, and have consistently defended this policy, we are energetically opposed to this, and stand for the united front tactics in the sense of the decisions made by the V. World Congress. Between 1907 and 1914 our disagreements with the Mensheviks were not only, and not so much, with regard to the possibility of a retarded pace of revolutionary development. It was an incontestable fact that this retardation was coming, and that we had to face a temporary "stabilisation" of Czarism. Our disagreements were rather on the subject of the tactics to be adopted by a labour party during a period of Stolypin "stabilisation" of Czarism, and on the subject of whether we were inevitably advancing towards a second revolution, or whether we must admit that our whole tactics, adapted as they were to an impending second revolution, were entirely wrong. The analogy between the then and the present international situation is clearly observable. And this has made our present polemics necessary, for though these have the appearance of being merely a rearguard skirmish, in reality they deal with the question of the moment, the tactics to be adopted by us in the present period of the revolution.

#### **The Difficulties in the Different Parties.**

You are aware that the present period of transition is bound to bring with it certain unhealthy processes in the various Sections of the Comintern. It may be openly stated that the situation in the **Czechoslovakian Party** has been especially difficult. Here three different currents have been combatting one another, and their representatives may be designated in part as liquidators, in part as comrades true to the Party but not yet really Bolsheviks, and in part as Bolsheviks — though with certain faults in some cases. Our tactics have consisted of forming a bloc between the two latter currents, against the liquidators. I believe that the line thus taken has proved to be the right one. At least we are now in receipt of news that this bloc is being formed, and that the leaders of the liquidators (Rouček and others) have left the Party. This is not bad. The bloc thus formed by our aid is cooperating in a comradelike manner. We trust that it will lead the Party onto the right path.

We should like to devote a few words to the differences and difficulties in the **German Party**. Here every lesson in tactics has to be paid for at a high price, for the Party, after having been obliged to alter its tactics so abruptly after the Brandler experience, is now inclined to blow cold for fear of being burned, and often requires serious lessons. Left infantile diseases are still observable.

#### **We remain International Proletarian Revolutionists.**

The most important of all is that we give something complete to the vanguard of the international working class. The most important of all is that we not only bring the work among the Russian workers into harmony with our international policy, but that we combine our current tasks with the general tasks incumbent on the international proletariat. The foreign communist workers are eagerly interested in learning how the slower speed of the world revolution is reflected in Russia, whether a slowing down is observable in Russia too, whether the Party is degenerating, whether its proletarian spirit is not relaxing, and whether it is not deviating from Leninism. We must here formulate a combination of our tasks, not only for our own Party, but for the whole international proletariat.

I am fully confident, comrades, that we shall solve this question. It is extremely difficult, we shall have to work at it with the utmost care, and in our own country we shall have to continue the policy begun in the Comintern. When we work out the question further, we shall find the footholds which we require, both with reference to our work within our own



country, and with reference to the work of the organisations of the Comintern. With respect to our work within the Soviet Union, we have stated clearly that we must utilise every minute, every second, for the further upbuilding of socialism. In spite of the technical backwardness of our country, we must and can establish socialism, in face of the slower speed of the world revolution. We have stated clearly that the final victory is to be won in the international arena, and that the slower speed of the revolution does not hinder the victory itself, but merely postpones it. We have always been, and shall always remain, international proletarian revolutionists. This is what we want to say about our work.

### We shall overcome the Obstacles and the Difficulties.

We know that there are still great difficulties before us. The German communist workers too have many difficulties to face, and are now passing through a period similar in many ways to our July. They will be overwhelmed with accusations from all sides, and will have to stand against many severe attacks. And Hindenburg will seize upon every opportunity of crushing the communists. And the German social democrats will raise a cry amongst the German workers: Do you not see that there is no world revolution, you are going to prison and into penal servitude for nothing, for there is no world revolution whatever!

In Russia the Bolsheviks were given the gospel to read in prison. But in Germany today the communists are given the "Vorwärts" or a social democratic pamphlet, in which they may read that Moscow itself has "acknowledged" the stabilisation, that the revolution is at an end, that the revolution is a chimera, that the workers are rotting in vain in their dungeons, etc.

The German communists will have to bear even severer tests and greater moral torture. Consider the present conditions of the struggle carried on by the Comintern. Here in Russia the struggle was hard, especially between 1909 and 1911. How hard it was during the period of illegality! But to tell the truth, the communists have by no means an easy time in many countries today. Often enough their position is even more difficult than ours was. We have even had to become

accustomed to seeing communists shot almost every day, sometimes in one country, sometimes in another. The White Terror rages to an extent formerly undreamt of. After 1905 to 1906 we were forced into complete illegality. And yet international communism, taking the whole of Europe, is today in a much more difficult position. The European communists suffer the greater disadvantage because their traditions are not so established as ours were. They do not find that sympathy among certain circles of the bourgeois intelligentsia which we Russian Bolsheviks found. To be sure, their fight is facilitated by the fact that our victorious revolution backs them up; they have the Comintern behind them, and here and there they enjoy a greater freedom than we did. But taking all in all, they are in a much more difficult position than we were in the years between 1908 and 1912.

This is the sum total of the questions before us. The leaders of our Party here assembled must form a clear idea for themselves of these so necessary political connections. If this is done, then every comrade will be able to perform efficiently his own small task in his own place — and this task is at the same time a great one — whilst the comrades occupying other posts will be enabled to perform the same work on an international scale. Unless we are perfectly clear as to the connection between our own tasks and the tasks of the whole Comintern, we grope about like the blind.

We want to look upon the world with open eyes, we want to comprehend what is going on around us. In 1921 Lenin wrote: 10 to 20 years of right relations with the peasantry, and the victory is guaranteed on an international scale, even though the pace of international revolution slows down. This term is of course not obligatory. We hope that victory will be secured earlier, that the revolution will be victorious much sooner than this in other countries. But if this does not take place so quickly as we hope, then we shall work on systematically under the conditions of the slower development of the revolution, for 10 or 20 years, or longer if necessary. Our Party has always been, and remains, in the front rank of the Comintern, it is the Party of the working masses, the Party of the international proletariat, the Party of the international proletarian revolution. (Enthusiastic applause.)

## Theses of Comrade Zinoviev adopted by the National Conference of the R. C. P.

### The Tasks of the Comintern and the RCP in Connection with the Meeting of the Enlarged ECCI.

1. Owing to its composition and the importance of the questions discussed at it, the meeting of the Enlarged ECCI had all the importance of a Congress.

The principal documents discussed and adopted at this meeting were: a) **The theses on Bolshevisation** which, from the viewpoint of Leninism put into a concrete form suitable in the present situation for a number of countries, the general slogan of Bolshevisation, as proposed at the Fifth Congress; b) **Theses on the Peasantry** which expound the theoretical and political views of the Comintern concerning the role of the peasantry in the present epoch, without the practical application of which there can be no real Bolshevisation; c) Resolutions on the state of affairs in the various most important sections of the Comintern (America, Italy, Czechoslovakia, etc.), especially on the liquidatory tendency in the Czechoslovakian Party, etc.; d) The resolution condemning the Brandler, Radek, Thalheimer group as a right wing group within the Comintern.

2. Among the most important subjects brought forward in connection with the work of the Enlarged ECCI were the questions a) on the "stabilisation" of capitalism, which within certain limits was admitted by the Enlarged ECCI and b) **on the future development of the USSR in connection with the retarded development of the international revolution.**

This is how the question is presented by the entire international capitalist and social-democratic press, and this is

how it will be dealt with in our own Party and in our country.

3. "Revolution may and probably will take the form of battles lasting for years, of several periods of attack with intervals of counter revolutionary convulsions of the bourgeois system". (Extract from a recently published article by Comrade Lenin On P. B. Axelrod's Pamphlet, "The Proletarian Revolution" periodical, No. 26.)

This thesis, presented by Comrade Lenin as far back as 1915 has been now confirmed by the trend of development of the world revolution.

4. A distinction should be made between a) the revolutionary situation in general, b) the **immediate** revolutionary situation, and c) the revolution itself. "A Marxist knows perfectly well, that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation, and also that **not every revolutionary situation leads to revolution**", wrote Comrade Lenin as far back as 1915 (articles "Collapse of the 2nd International", "Against the Stream", p. 139).

The following examples are a good illustration of this.

In Germany there were beginnings of a revolutionary situation approximately since 1914—15. In 1917—18 **the situation there was pregnant with revolution.** Towards the end of 1918 this revolutionary situation became a real revolution which, it is true, did not resolve itself into a victorious proletarian revolution, but into a bourgeois revolution. Since 1920 and up to 1923, the immediate revolutionary situation made room for a revolutionary situation in general. In 1923, there were

in Germany all the symptoms of an immediate revolutionary situation, which however, did not resolve itself into a proper revolution. In 1925 there is no immediate revolutionary situation in Germany, but the situation is generally speaking, revolutionary.

In **Russia** by 1901—02 the revolutionary situation had taken a very definite form. In 1904—05 we had already a situation pregnant with revolution which, towards the end of 1905, resolves itself into a proper revolution (which, however, was not victorious). In 1906—07 Bolshevism continued to regard the situation as being pregnant with revolution. From 1908 and approximately up to 1915, Bolsheviks came to the conclusion that the situation in Russia was not pregnant with revolution, **but that the situation was generally speaking revolutionary, bearing in it the seeds of the second revolution.** From 1908 up to 1911 there was a seeming stabilisation of autocracy, Stolypin's agrarian policy was interpreted by the Bolsheviks as "yet another step on the road of the transformation of Czarism into a bourgeois monarchy". Nevertheless, the general revolutionary situation remained, and the Bolsheviks built up their tactics on the prospect of the second revolution. From 1916 onwards, the situation was again pregnant with revolution. It resolved itself into the revolution of 1917.

In **Great Britain** evidently the situation is in fact becoming generally revolutionary, (in this connection the state of affairs in the colonies is playing a very important part). But it is perfectly clear that the situation in that country will not be pregnant for revolution for a long time to come, etc. etc.

In his pamphlet "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" written in 1918, Comrade Lenin "hoisted Kautsky with his own petard". The latter in 1909 ("The Way to Power") and even as far back as 1902 ("The Social Revolution") admitted the existence of an objectively revolutionary situation in Europe.

Comrade Lenin wrote, "A long time before the war all Marxists and all socialists were agreed that a European war would create a revolutionary situation. Kautsky in 1902 ("The Social Revolution") and in 1909 ("The Way to Power")... when he was not yet a renegade, admitted this. Consequently to expect a revolutionary situation in Europe was by no means a Bolshevik fancy, but the general opinion of all Marxists".

In this sense a general revolutionary situation on a world scale, and a much more definite revolutionary situation as at that time, certainly exists even now: a) The economic antagonism which in 1914 led to the first imperialist world war have not been solved, and they cannot be solved in any other way than by a world proletarian revolution; b) A bourgeois Europe is pregnant with new imperialist wars; c) At the same time the East has awakened and to a certain extent we are justified in speaking of an objectively revolutionary situation not only in Europe, but also in Asia; d) The first victorious proletarian revolution has consolidated itself on a territory occupying one-sixth of the globe. The very existence of the **USSR** continues to revolutionise the whole world.

By its decisions, the Enlarged Executive of the Communist International merely declared that at present the situation in Europe is not **pregnant with revolution** (Germany). **But generally speaking the situation remains revolutionary.**

5. To be exact we should speak **not of one stabilisation, but of two stabilisations.** Side by side with the partial stabilisation of capitalism in bourgeois Europe there is the undeniable development of State industries and a consolidation of the socialist elements of national economy in the **USSR**. If side by side with the stabilisation of capitalist economy we did not have the development of the economy of the **USSR**, or if this development were very slow, or finally, if the general economic development in the **USSR** were not accompanied in a sufficient degree by a corresponding socialist development, — we certainly would be running the risk of the present temporary equilibrium being disturbed in favour of the world bourgeoisie.

But we do not run this risk. There is every reason to believe that with the support of the international proletariat which the **USSR** has enjoyed during the last eight years, it will be able to work successfully with its own resources for the further development of its economy, and will at the same time continue to be the most important factor in the growth of world revolution, by helping the workers of other countries to prepare for their revolution.

Comrade Lenin taught us to do "the maximum of what can be done in one country for the development, support and initiation of revolution **in all countries**".

Under present circumstances therefore the tasks of the RCP range from giving direct support to the revolutionary movements in other countries down to supplying cheap cotton goods to the peasantry in our own country. This is tantamount to working for the establishment of a socialist system of economy in the **USSR** and at the same time supporting the forces of proletarian revolution in all other countries.

6. From "the unevenness in the process of economic and political development, which is an immutable law of capitalism", Comrade Lenin rightly deduced two things: a) the possibility "of the victory of socialism at first in a few or even in one separate capitalist country", and b) the possibility that these few or even one country will not necessarily be countries of highly developed capitalism (see especially notes on Sukhanov).

The experience of the Russian revolution has shown that such a first victory in one country is not only possible, but that, given a number of favourable circumstances, this first country of the victorious proletarian revolution can (with a certain amount of support on the part of the international proletariat) hold out and establish itself firmly for a long period even in the event of this support not taking the form of downright proletarian revolutions in other countries.

But at the same time however, Leninism teaches us that **the final victory** of socialism, in the sense of complete guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois conditions, is only possible on an international scale (or in several important countries).

"The Russian proletariat cannot by itself **achieve a victorious** socialist revolution. But it can give the Russian Revolution an impetus which will create favourable conditions for a socialist revolution; it can give it, so to speak, **a start.** It can considerable facilitate the entry of its main and most dependable ally — the European and American Socialist proletariat into the decisive struggle". (Lenin, 1917, "Letter to the Swiss Workers".)

"Looking at the situation from a world-historical viewpoint, one can have no doubt whatever that it would be hopeless to reckon on an ultimate victory of our revolution if it were to remain solitary, if there were no revolutionary movement in other countries". (Lenin, XV, 129, 1918.)

"When three years ago we considered the question of the tasks and prospects of victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia, we always said that this victory cannot be a permanent victory unless it obtained the support of the proletarian revolution in the West; that a correct appreciation of our revolution is only possible from the international viewpoint. In order to stabilise our victory, we must bring about the victory of the proletarian revolution in all, or at least in some of the most important capitalist countries". (Lenin, Vol. XVIII, part 2, p. 189 1920.)

This fundamental principle of Leninism stands good even now.

7. As to prophesying how long the development of the international socialist revolution can take, lacking concrete historical experience, the RCP could not help, especially in the beginning of our revolution, making certain miscalculations in this respect.

There was a time (1918) when all of us expected the victory of the proletarian revolution in Germany, and in several other countries in the course of several **months or even weeks.**

The **German revolution** came much later, and when it came it was not a proletarian revolution, but a revolution which destroyed the power of Wilhelm the Second, but not that of the bourgeoisie. However, even this revolution in Germany, accompanied as it was by revolutionary convulsions in a number of other countries, was sufficient to allow the proletarian revolution in Russia to gain time and to establish itself.

It became evident that: a) the trend of development of world revolution was slower than expected; b) but at the same time it also became evident that the first victorious proletarian revolution (**USSR**), can hold out alone (with a certain amount of support on the part of the workers of other countries) much longer than it seemed possible at the beginning of the revolution.

8. "A complete victory on a world scale cannot be achieved in Russia alone. It can only be achieved when the proletariat in the most important countries, or at least in some of them, will be victorious". (V. I. Lenin, March 13th, 1919, Vol. XVI, p. 61.)

"We live not only in a state, but in a system of states, and a prolonged existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist States is unthinkable. In the end, either the one or the other will be victorious". (V. I. Lenin, March 18th, 1919, Vol. XVI, p. 102.)

These fundamental principles of Leninism stand good even now. The question is however — how the words "prolonged existence" or "in the end" are to be interpreted. At first it seemed that "in the end" would be in the course of a year or two, or even in the course of a few months. However, the trend of events showed that we reasoned thus only "in the beginning of the beginning" (Comrade Lenin's expression). Already in 1921, Comrade Lenin wrote: "Ten to 20 years of correct relation with the peasantry — and victory is guaranteed on a world scale (even if the growing proletarian revolutions are retarded), otherwise, there will be 20 to 40 years of the horrors of white-guard terror". (See "Bolshevik", No. 7, 1925, page 76.)

These most important programme declarations of V. L. Lenin, as well as his subsequent declaration on the role of the East (1923) must not be left out of account for a single moment.

"Thus at the present time we are faced with the question: will we succeed with our backward peasant agriculture, and with the state of ruin in which we find ourselves, to hold out until the West-European capitalist countries will have completed their development towards socialism?.... Our civilisation is too low for a direct transference to socialism, although we have the necessary political premises for it."

The years which have passed since 1917, and all the phases of the world revolution from 1917 up to 1925 in a certain sense can be looked upon as "the beginning of the beginning". The situation which has arisen now on a world scale can be described with Comrade Lenin's words: "protracted with no definite decision either one way or the other", adding now: — with a definite tendency towards the victory of the socialist revolution.

9. Generally speaking, the victory of socialism (not in the sense of final victory) in one country is no doubt possible. In his controversy with Comrade Trotsky on the question of the United States of the World, Comrade Lenin in 1915 wrote as follows: "As an independent slogan, the slogan of the United States of the world would be hardly correct, firstly, because it merges into socialism; secondly, because it may give rise to an incorrect interpretation concerning the impossibility of the victory of socialism in one country and concerning the relation of such a country to other countries.

The unevenness of the process of economic and political development is an immutable law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism at first in several or even in one separate capitalist country is possible. The victorious proletariat of such a country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised socialist production, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, attracting to itself the oppressed classes of other countries, making them rise against the capitalists and, if necessary employing armed force against the exploiting classes and their States." ("Against the Stream".)

On the other hand, the existence of two antagonistic social systems side by side creates a constant menace of capitalist blockade and other forms of economic pressure — armed intervention, restoration, etc. Therefore, the only guarantee for a **final victory of socialism** namely, a guarantee against restoration, is — a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries.

This does not by any means imply that it is impossible to establish a complete socialist system in a backward country like Russia without the "State aid" (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and economically. A composite part of the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution, is the assertion that "the actual development of socialist economy in Russia, will become possible **only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe**" (Trotsky, 1922), an assertion which dooms the proletariat of the USSR to fatalist passivity in the present epoch. Against

such "theories" Comrade Lenin wrote about the: "Infinitely stereotyped deduction, learned by heart during the development of the West European social democracy, which assumes that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that we have not, to use the expression of some of these "learned" gentlemen, the necessary objective premises for socialism" (Notes on Sukhanov).

One should always bear in mind Comrade Lenin's programme declaration made in his last article on cooperation, which is of particular importance in the present conditions, and in which he says: "State control over all the means of production, State control in the hands of the proletariat, union between this proletariat and the millions of small and smallest peasants and the retention of the leadership of the peasantry, by this proletariat, etc., is not all this required for the construction of a complete socialist system out of cooperation alone, which formerly we regarded as a purely commercial movement and which, to a certain extent even now under NEP we have the right so to regard? This is not the establishment of a socialist system, but it is all that is essential for such construction.... I am prepared to say that for us, the centre of gravity could be now transferred to cultural work, if it were not for international relations and the need to fight for our position on an international scale."

This shows that the country of workers' dictatorship, being the main base of international revolution, must look upon itself as the most powerful lever and support of the revolution. On the other hand, the ruling proletarian party of this country must do its utmost to build up a socialist system, convinced that such a system can and will be victorious, provided the country can be protected from all attempts at restoration, in other words, by a correct policy towards the peasantry within the country as well as in connection with international relations, the RCP must overcome all difficulties arising out of the retarded pace of development of the world revolution.

10. Since the end of 1920, Comrade Lenin used to say that "now we must not only talk of a respite, but of serious opportunities for new construction of a longer duration". But later, in 1920 and 1923, Comrade Lenin regarded our position as a "respite".

This "respite" must on no account be looked upon as something transitory, something of the nature of a "bivouac". The proletariat of the USSR, under the guidance of the RCP, must boldly plunge into the work of establishing socialism now, bearing in mind that our revolution itself is part of the world revolution, and that our success in the construction of a socialist economy, is in itself an important factor in the growth of the world proletarian revolution.

11. The historical experience accumulated by the Comintern during the past 8 years (1917—25), shows that not only the question concerning the rate and time-table of the growth of the world revolution, but also the question of its route are solved not quite the same way as was thought in the beginning of the revolution. In view of the newly arisen world situation it is becoming more and more probable that in the near future the revolutionary development might proceed through Great Britain and the Far East, as well as through the Balkans and South-East Europe. The revolutionary wave is on the ebb just now in Germany (as compared with 1923), but a revolutionary situation is ripening in a country like Great Britain. National liberation movements are growing and extending. All this has an enormous world historical importance.

12. The important revolutionary processes noticeable in Great Britain bestow particular importance to the attempts at rapprochement between the trade unions of the USSR, and those of Great Britain. Our trade union delegation was quite right, when at the recent conference in London, it made considerable concessions to the British Trade Unions in the interests of reaching an agreement. At the same time it should be borne in mind that whatever be the agreement with elements adhering to Amsterdam, it can only be durable if the necessary pressure is brought to bear by the masses. The Comintern policy for international trade union unity is proved to be of complete justification. This policy must be extended and developed.

At the same time, the Russian trade unions fully realise that the Profintern must be preserved absolutely, and must

be strengthened as the organisation of the revolutionary elements of the world trade union movement until such time as it will be possible to achieve trade union unity on an international scale.

13. Our practical differences with **Trotskyism** on the question of Comintern policy were not in the least concerned with the question as to whether the tempo of the international revolution is slackening or not. Since the Third Congress of the Comintern, the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the Executive of the RCP, have fully realised that a slowing down was taking place. The dispute with Trotskyism was and is on the question as to **what should be the tactics of the Communist International during this period of retarded development of the World Revolution.**

Comrade Trotsky's exaggerated and incorrect appreciation of the Anglo-American rapprochement compelled him to thoroughly revise the Leninist theory of imperialism (the question of ultra-imperialism). At the same time Comrades Trotsky and Radek, and those who shared their views, gave whole-hearted support to the tactics of the Brandler group in 1923, — a group which endeavoured to interpret the tactics of the united front as tactics of coalition with the social democrats.

Such is the real difference between the Lenin policy of the Comintern Executive and Trotskyism.

14. With definite reservations and limitations, a parallel can be drawn to a certain extent between the present tasks of the Comintern, and the tasks confronting the Russian Bolsheviks in the epoch between the two revolutions, approximately between 1908 and 1914.

Hence, the policy of Bolshevism, which is accompanied by the struggle against liquidatory tendencies (the right in Czechoslovakia), as well as against ultra-left tendencies.

15. The Comintern has a period of particularly hard, complicated and responsible work before it. The task of the RCP will consist in giving adequate support to the Communist International during this period fighting now against all "funereal" tendencies with the same energy and manner which Bolshevism displayed in a previous period in its fight against the liquidators.

16. In connection with the situation which has now arisen on the international arena, two perils threaten our Party: 1, a tendency to **passivity** resulting from a too wide interpretation of capitalist stabilisation noticeable in some countries, as well as of the retarded tempo of the international revolution, the absence of a sufficient impulse to energetic and systematic work in the establishment of a socialist system in the USSR in spite of the slower tempo of the international revolution, and 2, a tendency to **national limitation**, a tendency to forget the obligations of international proletarian revolutionists, an unconscious ignoring of the close dependence of the fate of the USSR on the, if only slowly, developing international proletarian revolution, a failure to understand that not only does the international revolutionary movement stand in need of the existence, consolidation and increase of the power of the first proletarian State in the world, but that the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR also stands in need of help on the part of the international proletariat.

The RCP must be alive to these two perils and must offer energetic resistance to both these possible tendencies.

## Speech of Comrade Bucharin in the Discussion on the New Economic Policy in the Village.

I am of the opinion, comrades, that in the agrarian question the Party is at present being misled by two great aberrations; two false attitudes. I shall first deal with the first of these. Some comrades consider it to be perfectly right to promote the revival of our whole economics by means of affording possibilities of development to the upper strata of the peasantry and even by means of removing all restrictions on the economics of the kulak (that is, by giving these the possibility of development), to say nothing of the economics of the well-to-do peasant, the small holder, etc.

One step leads to another. If we release the uppermost stratum of the agricultural bourgeoisie from their restrictions, we give at the same time — so say these comrades — the possibility of development to the lower social and economic strata. The error contained in this aberration lies in the fact that these comrades disregard the other half of the task: the purpose for which all this is done.

The correct viewpoint — at least in my opinion — is that we must enable these economics to develop, to the end that the sum total of our national income, the collective proceeds of our agriculture, may be increased, and consequently our goods traffic, the income of our state industry, and the income of our state treasury, may be increased at the same time. In other words, the object in view is the increase of the sum total in the hands of the state power of the working class, enabling greater expenditure, in accordance with our agrarian policy, in the form of agricultural credits, etc. for the economic support of the main mass of the agricultural population, that is, preeminently for the economic support of the poor peasantry and the small holders, their co-operatives and collective organisations.

I believe that the matter is sufficiently correctly formulated when we state that we can now proceed to develop the NEP in the villages, where it hitherto scarcely came in question, for our leadership is now based on fulcrums which we hitherto did not possess.

There are some comrades in the Party whose opinion is approximately as follows: "What is the use of your chattering about socialism here in the villages; the conditions which will develop will be purely capitalist, however disagreeable that may be."

But is this true? I do not think so. Theoretically, this view is incorrect, and practically we may designate it as a "Kulak deviation". These comrades do not grasp the significance of the proletarian dictatorship, they observe the development of capitalist conditions in **themselves**, as if there had never been a proletarian dictatorship in Russia, as if there were not still a proletarian dictatorship. As if we had no Supreme Economic Council in the hands of the proletarian power, as if the banking system, the agricultural credit traffic, were not under our control.

In the bourgeois countries capitalist conditions developed with great rapidity after the agrarian revolution. But in Russia we have the proletarian dictatorship, and this is not only a state power, **but a very powerful economic one.** The proletarian dictatorship introduces "slight" corrections into economic development, and thus considerably alters the whole course of this development.

Of what do these alterations consist? Comrade Lenin has already dealt with the subject. When we finance co-operative organisation, we finance socialist construction at the same time. And when we now conclude that it is incumbent on us to aid the development of the economics of the Kulak and small holders, we have at the same time at our disposal a large number of measures enabling us to set limits to the attendant tendencies towards exploitation.

And yet we permit the Kulak to live and to accumulate. Why? For the purpose of obtaining a larger fund for financing the upbuilding of the co-operative organisations, above all the co-operatives of the middle class of peasantry, whom we can organise in co-operatives by means of suitable grants of state credits.

It is obvious that care must be taken not to confuse this piece of economic strategy with a "course directed towards the Kulak". Why? Because a "course directed towards the Kulak", or even a "course directed towards the well-to-do peasantry, would simply signify releasing the economics of the Kulak from all fetters, but nothing more. But what is now being proposed, and what I am endeavouring to substantiate, is the utilisation of this "unfettering process", for the support and financing of the (objectively) anti-capitalist elements among the peasantry. Our actual course is directed towards these anti-capitalist elements. Thus, if we are asked whither our agrarian course is directed at the present time, we must reply:

#### Towards the growth of the elements of socialist economics.

We have more distinctly and concretely defined our course as being towards the co-operatives. Not merely for the sake of shouting: "Co-operatives, co-operatives, and again co-operatives", but for the purpose of furthering this central form of our economic life. And to do this we must free our goods traffic from its fetters. Here we may observe a certain analogy. We have permitted the introduction of private capital. Thanks to our economic fulcrums, we recently found ourselves in a position to limit private capital to such an extent that in a certain sense we attained a greater effect than we desired. We can hold private capital fast in our hands, we can give it greater freedom of movement, and we can restrict it again. Can it be said of us that we are directing our "course" towards the bourgeoisie because we grant it a certain liberty of movement in a certain stage of our economic development? Not in my opinion. We grant this certain amount of freedom of action, and then observe whether it has the effect of increasing the national income and economic power of our state. This is not "directing our course towards the new bourgeoisie".

It is from this point of view that we must approach the new stage of developments in agrarian conditions. Our new course is not towards the Kulak, but towards the liquidation of that same system which we had in the cities at one time, the system obtaining at the stage when we had all the shops in our own hands, and every shop bore on its sign: "Workers of the world, unite!", but there was nothing for sale in the shops, and we had nothing to eat. We then "unfettered" the private merchant. We obtained something from him directly, but still more indirectly, by means of the strengthening of our goods traffic, and we utilised the increase of values for traffic, and we utilised the increase of values for securing our own position. Those comrades who only see one half of the problem, the unfettering of the capitalist forms of economics, the letting loose of the NEP in the villages, and who fail to see the other half, the aid lent to all strata of our supporters, these comrades are representatives of a "Kulak deviation".

Comrade Larin, who has also spoken here, represents another deviation, one taking a contrary direction. The representatives of the first deviation speak of the "unfettering" of the rich farmer, and of nothing more, and comrade Larin is guilty of the opposite exaggeration. How does the matter appear to him? For him the small holder simply does not exist. If it were a picture of "puzzle find the small holder" the small holder could not have vanished more completely. For comrade Lenin the small holder was the central figure. And is he not still the central figure? Indeed he is. But where is he in comrade Larin's estimation. He has disappeared altogether. Comrade Larin speaks of "capitalist conditions". On the one side we have the agricultural labourers, on the other the agricultural bourgeoisie. This is very good; it is an elementary fact. But is it the whole truth? No, for comrade Larin forgets the "central figure". He takes the two opposing poles, and says that they are all. But in reality they are not all, and it is entirely wrong to see the two poles only, and to ignore the main mass of the peasantry. How many kulaks and well-to-do peasants have we? Not more than about 3 to 4 per cent. And yet it is maintained that the farmers are gaining the upper hand. This is of course an exaggeration. It is true that in the immediate future the farmers will play a greater role in Russia, but when determining on our policy we must not lose sight of the actual proportions. We must regard the whole of the strata of the rural population in their real relations.

For comrade Larin the small-holder has disappeared. According to his conception, the small-holder has to be sought

for with a lantern, even in broad daylight. This is the origin of comrade Larin's strange deviation, which represents the continuation of a non-Bolshevist policy towards the peasantry. Comrade Larin's idea is that the small-holder remains in the background. There is only the kulak on the one side and the proletarian on the other, and we as "orthodox Marxists" have the task to aggravate the class struggle, and this aggravated class struggle will lead us to a "second revolution", that is, to a point where the one class overthrows and expropriates the other. The whole attitude of comrade Larin shows this to be his conclusion.

Yesterday he made an attempt to turn the matter off with a joke, and observed that the Soviet power will be strong enough by that time to accomplish this revolution by means of a "decree". But surely it is unallowable to speak in this manner. We shall not become "suddenly" so powerful that we can annihilate by a decree this "powerful stratum", which according to comrade Larin's idea is waiting for the opportunity to seize our power. His conception is as follows: The kulak is becoming frightfully powerful. He will become a tremendous power — here it must be remembered that the small-holder does not appear in the scene — and therefore we must expropriate him, that is the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from these premises. But in comrade Larin's speech this expropriation is carried out in a somewhat comic opera style. First we are frightened by the discovery of a mighty enemy, then we simply sweep him away by a decree. It is obvious that there is a flaw somewhere.

Were we in a position compelling us to carry out such an expropriation as comrade Larin imagines, this would mean the necessity of a "second revolution". But in this case we should not have to hide ourselves behind a decree, we should have to state openly: "We are obliged to submit to a fresh series of purely capitalist conditions in the villages. In the cities everything will be proletarian, or almost proletarian. But in the villages everything will be conducted as if under a capitalist regime. In the cities everything will go on as it does today, but in the villages there will be capitalist conditions, with exploiters and exploited, until we finally proceed to the "expropriation of the expropriators". Not until then will our two component parts, town and country, form a consistent whole."

Where is the main error here? Comrade Larin's main error lies in the fact that he does not see that we have not merely an "unfettering of capitalist conditions" in the villages, but that we have at the same time a dictatorship of the proletariat, and one which is not merely a political power, but simultaneously a powerful economic force. Tell me if you can, where there is room in comrade Larin's plan — in which we see solely the "kulak" and "collective economics", but no small holder — where there is room for the co-operative in the sphere of the process of circulation, that is, in the processes of selling of acquiring, of credit operations, etc.? Comrade Larin leaves scarcely any room for these at all in his "plan".

Such "Larinist" views exist among us in the Party. There are comrades who maintain the "collective economics" to be the real co-operative, and who consider sales, acquisition, and credit as of secondary importance. This viewpoint arises from the absence of the small-holder, and from the general theoretical conceptions of the comrades. The small holder having vanished, his cooperative has naturally vanished with him, and in consequence the whole Leninist plan of building up Socialism as cooperative Socialism vanishes too.

This is not our standpoint. We cannot share this conception, and thus we cannot agree with comrade Larin's views.

It seems to me that in his speech, yesterday, comrade Larin fell into a slight confusion of ideas. Instead of proclaiming the slogan of the "aggravation of class warfare in the villages" as such, he spoke of the aggravation of political class warfare in the villages, and imagined this aggravation in the innocent form of the struggle for influence in the "revival of the Soviets". It is perfectly true that if we are intent upon the revival of the Soviets, we much fight for our candidates, etc., with much greater determination. But this is very far from the necessity of an aggravated class struggle slogan in the light of a prospective second revolution, the inevitable conclusion of comrade Larin's attitude.

If we regard the prospective developments as they really are, what will be the course of events in the villages? Will the capitalist conditions increase? Yes, they will. Will there

be capitalist elements in the co-operatives, or will the Mensheviks and the SR, as comrade Lenin once put it, be "expelled by a chemical process"? To be sure there will be capitalist elements. Will the cooperative -- not the co-operative of the kulak, but the cooperative of the small holder type -- gain ground if we lend it the increased aid which our developed goods traffic will enable us to give? Yes. And will the co-operatives of the poorer peasantry grow also, in the form of collective organisations? Yes, these will grow also. What will then be the elements in the villages? The cooperative of the poor peasantry, that is, the collective organisation, and the cooperative of the small-holders in the sphere of sales, acquisition, credit, etc. Here and there will be kulak cooperatives, probably supported by the credit societies. This whole graduation of co-operatives will grow into the entire system of our economic institutions. And what will be the general result? The general result will be that when the kulak grows into the whole system, he will become an element of state capitalism; and when the poor peasantry and the small-holder have done the same, then we shall have that socialist co-operative of which Lenin spoke. We will present a variegated picture.

And what of the class struggle under these circumstances? Will it become more acute? In all probability it will at first become more acute. But can we maintain that our general line of action, our Bolshevik line, the line to be pursued by our policy, is bound to consist for a period in forcing the class struggle? It is just this which I do not believe.

Our class war will be carried on to a great extent in entirely different forms, and we must adopt the line of strengthening these forms at the expense of the earlier methods of class warfare. Why? For the simple reason that even the agricultural labourer, exploited as he is by the kulak, is, in his capacity as a **member of the ruling class**, to a certain extent above the kulak, and is enabled by our legislation to force his class will upon his "lord" in a large number of peculiar forms. We have at our disposal our **agreements**, our **trade unions**, **labour legislation**, **taxation**, and finally our **credit policy**. How shall we conduct and organise the class struggle? In the first place by fighting for our political candidates, at the election. This is beyond doubt.

There are however other forms of class warfare, which we must not forget, and which form the essential factors of the struggle during a whole historical period. If we tax the kulak more heavily than the other strata and finance the small-holder, what do we accomplish? In a certain sense we direct our course towards a **levelling of the peasantry**, for by raising the economics of the middle and poor peasantry we lift these out of their poverty. Are we to regard the poor peasant as condemned to everlasting poverty? To be sure not. We raise him a step upward, and on the other we place a heavier burden on the kulak. **This is one form of the class struggle**. Here the preponderant weight is removed from the earlier form of class war (the mechanical "using our teeth") to these new forms, possible **only under the conditions given by the dictatorship of the proletariat**. It is here that the characteristic peculiarity of our period and of our whole policy lies.

And if this is so, can we then maintain that we are moving consciously along the line of "aggravated class war"? Not in the least. We transfer preponderant importance to other forms of the struggle. Does this however signify that we are secure against attempts at mechanical collisions? No. It is possible enough that we shall encounter the misfortune of a war, and we shall be obliged to direct our course towards the committees of the poor peasantry; and if the kulak incites a rebellion against us, we shall be compelled to combat him

by terrorist measures. But our general line must consist of transference from these forms of class warfare to other forms; this is an essential element of a rational policy. We must pass to the heavier taxation of the richer strata, to the lending of aid to the other strata in the form of agricultural credits, and (in time) by the improvement of our technical basis, that is, by electrification, etc. Our conception of our prospective development is thus very different from comrade Larin's.

The whole fault lies in the fact that in comrade Larin's eyes the small-holder has disappeared. If the question of "un-fettering" is regarded as I regard it, the interests of the small-holder, the interests of this "central figure" still exist. Comrade Larin knows nothing of this.

With regard to the **co-operatives** I see the **selling, procuring, and credit co-operatives**, and besides these the **collective organisations**. Comrade Larin knows practically only the collective organisations. Collective economics are a mighty force, but they are **not** the main road to Socialism.

I attach much more importance to the new forms of class warfare, but comrade Larin holds substantially to the form of "using our teeth".

We look to a prospective inclusion of the farmer into our total system of socialist upbuilding, but he looks to a "second revolution".

You will see that these are two entirely different theoretical conceptions, two entirely different ideas as to the course to be taken by our revolution in the villages and by the development of our socialist upbuilding.

I maintain that everything which can be said at the present time shows us that we have no reason whatever to renounce the position now before us. This does not however mean that we are to fold our hands and sit still till things come of themselves. Let us remember comrade Lenin's attitude towards the cooperative question. He said: There are comrades who, for one reason or another, believe that the New Economic Policy renders the co-operative superfluous. But I say to you (these are comrade Lenin's words), "It is precisely our adoption of the New Economic Policy which renders the co-operative of the greatest importance".

We are now passing in general to the adoption of the New Economic Policy in the villages, and in a much more decisive form. We are adopting methods enabling the traffic in goods to be widely extended, and we are working at the revival of the Soviets, which is synonymous with the development of the political "self-activity of the peasantry". But it is precisely because we are doing this that a firmer closing of the ranks of our Party, and the strengthening of our core, become of even greater importance than before. We underwent a Party crisis at the time of our transition to the New Economic Policy, and our present transition means a Party crisis in the villages, caused by the lack of organisation hitherto shown in our village nuclei. The work of enlightenment with regard to our policy is therefore the more important.

We have not yet solved every problem. We are taking our first steps, and we must proceed cautiously. But I repeat once more: with such ideas as comrade Larin's we shall not go far, for we should then forget the small-holder, that "central figure" towards whom comrade Lenin "directed his course" in his pamphlet on taxation in kind, and in his subsequent tactical articles. At the present time we have no reason to renounce this policy, and I am confident that the resolution here moved by comrade Rykov represents this Leninist line, and not comrade Larin's line. Comrade Larin's conceptions are based upon entirely different premises, and are bound to lead to other political results, harmful to our Party. (Prolonged applause.)

# The Results of the National Conference of the C. P. of Russia.

## Comrade Stalin's Report at the Meeting of the Moscow Party Functionaries.

Moscow, May 13th, 1925.

At the meeting of the Moscow functionaries, Comrade Stalin gave a report on the results of the 14th National Conference of the CP. of Russia, in the course of which he said among other things:

The newest feature in the international situation is the **partial stabilisation of capitalism and the simultaneous growth of the economic and political power of the Soviet Union.** Lenin's saying with regard to the new epoch of the world revolution still holds good.

Many examples could be quoted from the development of the Russian revolution, which show that the Revolution does not develop in a directly ascending line, but by alternate phases of advance and retrogression. This is the historical meaning of the present period. The liquidators of our times are as much in the wrong as in the past when they regard stabilisation as the end of the world revolution.

The existing stabilisation is a **transitory stabilisation of capitalism, and a stabilisation of the Soviet system.** Stabilisation under capitalism leads to an intensification of contrasts and creates conditions for the collapse of capitalism. Stabilisation under the Soviet regime leads to an improvement of the conditions for the final victory of the proletariat. That is the difference between the two stabilisations.

The **stabilisation of capitalism** is expressed in concrete form:

Firstly in the agreement between America, England and France with regard to the **pillaging of Germany by the Dawes plan.** The agreement cannot last, for it implies a double subjugation of the German people by its own and by foreign bourgeoisie. Even the reactionary fact of Hindenburg's election shows that the agreement against Germany cannot last.

Secondly stabilisation is expressed in the fact that English, American and Japanese capital have succeeded in coming to a provisional understanding as regards **spheres of influence in China.** Even this is not permanent because of the imperialistic antagonisms and the growth of the revolutionary movement in China.

Thirdly the stabilisation of capital is expressed in the **agreement between the imperialistic countries not to interfere in the oppression of their colonies.** This will not last either, because of the imperialistic antagonisms and the revolutionising of the colonies.

Fourthly the stabilisation of capitalism may express itself in attempts to restore a **united front against the Soviet Union.** The united front could not be permanent because the mere threat of it would cause the whole country to gather more firmly than ever round the Soviet power and would turn it into an impregnable fortress, because a campaign against the Soviet country would rouse a revolutionary movement in the rear of the opponents, because the Soviet country is no longer isolated, but possesses allies: the workers of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East. A war against the Soviet Union will mean a war of imperialism against its own workers and colonies.

The duty of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries is to make the best use of the period of ebb for **consolidating the Communist Parties, for Bolshevising them and transforming them into real parties of the masses.** One of the chief duties of the Communist Parties in the West is to bring about an alliance between the Communist Parties

and the trade unions. The power of Social Democracy in the West is due to the fact that it rests on the trade unions; the weakness of the Communist Parties in the West is due to the fact that individual elements refuse to join with the trade unions. For this reason the campaign for trade union unity must be carried through consistently.

What is new in the colonial countries, is the destruction of the old social political relations, the growth of the proletariat and of the revolutionary Labour movement and the desire of the national bourgeoisie for compromise; this is why the liberation of these countries from imperialism can only be carried through in a struggle against the compromising national bourgeoisie. The question of the alliance of workers and peasants and of the hegemony of the proletariat is becoming just as acute in the countries with flourishing industries, as it was in Russia before 1905.

The question as to the fate of socialism in the Soviet Union and whether socialism can be established in a **single country,** is answered by Leninism in the affirmative. Although there are antagonisms between proletariat and peasantry, there are nevertheless common interests in important questions which form a common basis for an **alliance between workers and peasants.** The development of agriculture may take one of two paths: the capitalistic one which implies the pauperization of the majority of the peasantry for the benefit of a small handful of the bourgeoisie of the town and country, or the socialist one which would raise the standard of well-being of the majority of the peasantry. The peasantry is interested in the second path. A number of sayings of Lenin prove the incorrectness of Trozky's view as to the insurmountability of the antagonisms between workers and peasants. Socialism can be established in a single country, otherwise the October revolution would have been superfluous.

Other antagonisms are those between the **Soviet country and the capitalist countries.** As long as capitalism encircles it completely, there is danger of a restoration. A complete guarantee against restoration and of the final victory of socialism can only be given by the united efforts of the proletariat in different countries, or, better still, by the victory of the proletariat in some countries. Anyone who fails to distinguish between the internal antagonisms which can be completely overcome, and the second group of contrasts which demand the efforts of the proletariat in different countries, is an opportunist.

The bourgeois Press maintains that the criticism of shortcomings of the rural Soviet policy is a sign of disintegration. Self-criticism is a sign of the strength of our Party. New factors in the village are; the necessity of choosing the least painful way for building up socialism in cooperation with the peasantry, the economic growth of the village, the differentiation of the peasantry and the increasing political activity of the peasantry. Our chief duty now is to gather the middle peasantry round the proletariat, to raise the material and cultural level of the main body of the peasantry, and to build up socialism in cooperation with the peasantry. The **cooperative societies** are the way by which the agricultural element can be drawn into the general system of socialist construction. Further there is the task of carrying through Soviet democracy in the rural districts and of collecting round the Party a numerous body of active non-party peasants. The chief duty of the Communists in the country is that of joining hands with the agricultural elements.

In the Soviet Union, economic plans lag behind economic development. The budget had to be raised three times because the revenue was continually increasing. The growth of the metal industry is specially characteristic; production has been doubled in comparison to that in the Spring. This means that industry, the foundation of socialism is fully developed, and shows that the proletariat is capable not only of destroying the old, but of building up the new.

West European workers come into our country in order to convince themselves that the proletariat is capable of building up a new society and a new industry — and the world revolution has profited by it. At the present moment we have plenty to do to build up socialism and to defend our country. If we have 15–20 million industrial workers, electrification and agricultural cooperation, we have gained the victory throughout the world.