

SPECIAL NUMBER

English Edition.

Unpublished Manuscripts - Please reprint

- INTERNATIONAL -

Vol 9. No. 53

PRESS

25th September 1929

CORRESPONDENCE

Editorial Offices and Central Despatching Department: Berggasse 31, Vienna IX. — Postal Address, to which all remittances should be sent by registered mail: Postamt 66, Schliesstach 213, Vienna IX.
Telegraphic Address: Inprekorr, Vienna.

Tenth Plenum of the E. C. C. I.

Full Report.

Fifteenth Session.

Concluding Speech by Comrade Manuilsky.

I. Vacillations and Deviations in the C. P. S. U. and the Comintern.

1. CAPITALIST STABILISATION AND OUR FIVE-YEAR PLAN.

Comrades, in my concluding speech I shall deal chiefly with a series of tactical questions.

The Right deviation is no trifle in our country where the Party has been in power for more than ten years. Numerous hangers-on alien to proletarian ideology, cling to the Party that is in power. The pressure of the surrounding petty bourgeois milieu has a demoralising effect upon not very consistent Party members. The Right deviation in our country threatens the proletarian dictatorship. Our differences of opinion are class "differences of opinion". Our inner Party struggle brings into motion the million masses of our country. It may be said that the discussion about N. E. P., about the "kulak", about the "pace of industrialisation", etc. is really carried on, in our practical life, by the whole country. The Right deviation in our country is associated with the pressure brought to bear upon some elements of our Party by the dying classes that are offering furious resistance to the proletarian offensive against the capitalist elements of town and village. We have a young generation which has seen no capitalism, which has grown up in the atmosphere of N. E. P.

The Right deviation in the C. P. S. U. does not constitute something detached from analogous currents in the capitalist countries. It is organically bound up with the whole line of the Right elements of other Sections of the Communist Inter-

national. It is this internal connection that must be dealt with in the first place.

Let us take a question like that of **capitalist stabilisation**. The stabilisation of world capitalism cannot be examined apart from such a tremendously important factor of its destruction as the **socialist achievements in our country**. The socialist achievements undermine the stabilisation of capitalism to no smaller extent than the revolutionary movements of the proletariat in the capitalist countries and the revolutionary movements in the colonies. He who underestimates the successes of socialist construction is bound to overestimate the successes of capitalism upon an international scale. Those elements which exaggerate the significance of capitalist stabilisation are bound to disseminate in our country a pessimistic attitude towards the successes of socialism.

Trotskyism failed to understand this internal connection and became totally perplexed when it spoke about our degeneration, about Thermidor, about our supposed fusion with capitalism, while at the same time talking about the instability of the whole capitalist system and about short revolutionary perspectives.

If the proletariat in the capitalist countries undermines the capitalist stabilisation by taking advantage of all the inherent contradictions of capitalism to accelerate the pace of the revolutionary movement, the proletariat of the U. S. S. R. undermines it by strengthening and extending its socialist economy. The proletariat of the capitalist countries helps us by its revo-

lutionary movement, first of all, in the sense that it weakens the pressure of world capitalism upon the U. S. S. R. On our part, we help the former by the fact that we undermine the foundations of capitalist stabilisation, creating favourable both objective and subjective pre-requisites for the development of the revolutionary movement beyond our borders.

Our five-year plan is a plan for the destruction of capitalist stabilisation; the revolutionary movements in Germany or in India are a sort of guarantee for the carrying out of our Five-Year Plan.

In order to facilitate the task of revolution in the capitalist countries, we conduct an energetic offensive in the U. S. S. R. against the capitalist elements in town and village. On the other hand, in order to ensure the triumphant progress on the road to socialism for the proletariat of the U. S. S. R., and to frustrate the union of world capitalism with the capitalist elements in the U. S. S. R., the proletariat abroad takes the offensive against its respective bourgeoisie.

He who will hinder the proletariat abroad from carrying out the task of the offensive against capitalism, is an enemy of the U. S. S. R., an enemy of the socialist order which is being built in our country. On the other hand, he who hinders the struggle against the capitalist elements in the U. S. S. R., is an enemy to the proletarian revolution in other countries. International opportunism is a double-faced Janus with one face turned towards capitalism and saving it, and the other face turned towards socialism and revolution, hampering their progress in every way. One cannot conceive such a situation that the world proletariat should take up the offensive while the U. S. S. R. was upon its defence. Neither can one imagine the reverse, that the U. S. S. R. should be marching forward without causing at the same time an increase in the militant activity of the proletariat throughout the world.

That is the reason, comrades, why we present to you today our Five-Year Plan as the basis for the development and intensification of your revolutionary movement.

2. N. E. P. AND THE UNITED FRONT TACTICS.

This internal connection which testifies to the unity of the revolutionary class struggle, is reflected in the whole of the tactical line of the Communist International. Take the question of the united front tactics. We have never considered the united front tactics as a formula established once and for all, for all times and for all people. There was a time when we were prepared to negotiate with the II. and 2^{1/2} Internationals. There was a time when we did negotiate with the General Council and Purcell. Now we have grown stronger, we are taking up more aggressive methods in fighting for the majority of the working class.

The same we may see also in the strategical plan of N. E. P. N. E. P. was also a sort of tactics of the united front with the millions of individual peasant undertakings. Yet N. E. P. is not a form of alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry established once and for all, and based exclusively upon market relations. It is a class struggle, a struggle against the kulak and the N. E. P. man who are trying to detach from the proletariat the masses of the middle and poor peasants. The dynamics of the correlation of class forces within N. E. P. lead to changes in the character of N. E. P. The elimination of N. E. P. will take place not by means of Decrees, but in the process of the victorious march of the proletariat onward to socialism. And he who, like Comrade Serra, demands of us that we rely upon N. E. P. at all costs, is calling us back to the N. E. P. of 1922, to the original relations established then. The present N. E. P. is not the same as in 1922. Neither are the present united front tactics of the Comintern the same as in 1921. He who calls us back to the III. Congress of the Comintern as regards the application of the forms of the united front tactics of that period, is bound to call us back to the N. E. P. of 1922. He who is now trying to hold back the Party when it takes the offensive against the Social Democracy, is bound to clamour: "Proceed more gently, do not attack the kulak, avoid taking sharp turns"! He who urges the observance of all provisions of revolutionary law in regard to the kulak is bound to reach also loyalty in regard to the trade union bureaucracy. People who would like to contribute to

the restoration of capitalism in the U. S. S. R. are bound to lend their support to those elements which contribute to the preservation of the positions of capitalism in the capitalist countries. Such is the inner logic of the class struggle which can neither be escaped nor brushed aside by a few meaningless phrases.

Let us take the question of winning the majority of the working class, to which so much attention has been given by our Plenum. Does not this question confront also the U. S. S. R. in a different form? In the country of the victorious proletarian dictatorship we are not confronted with the problem of winning the majority of the working class, this problem we have already solved; we are confronted here with the question of winning the majority of the toilers by drawing the millions of the peasantry into the system of socialist construction. If we succeed in rousing millions of peasants not only for the armed insurrection against the bourgeoisie and the landlords as was the case in October 1917, but also for the consolidation and construction of socialism in our country, making them part of the whole system of socialist economy, and in this we shall succeed, comrades, then we shall not only create a mighty and invincible bulwark for the proletarian revolutions in the capitalist countries, but we shall also facilitate in every way the task of the Communist Parties of these countries in the matter of winning the majority of the working class even before the proletarian revolution.

At the same time the winning of the majority of the working class by the Communist Party of the capitalist countries facilitates for the C. P. S. U. the task of winning, upon the basis of the new forms of alliance, the majority of the basic masses of the peasantry for socialism. Therefore, he who hinders the realisation of the new forms of alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in the U. S. S. R., who hampers the collectivisation of agriculture and tries to pull the Party back from the Soviet farms and collective farms and to pursue the line of strengthening the individual peasant undertakings, hinders also at the same time the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries from carrying out their task of winning the majority of the working class. And vice versa, the Rights in the capitalist countries, by opposing the new forms of the united front tactics, are at the same time hindering the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry in the U. S. S. R. upon the basis of production.

3. AGAINST RIGHTS, CONCILIATORS AND RETICENT PEOPLE.

But, comrades, the question may arise in your minds why the Right elements abroad are now outside of the ranks of the Comintern while our Rights occupy even high positions within our Party? Comrades, you must understand the peculiarities of the situation in the C. P. S. U. The pressure of capitalism in your countries is far greater than here. We have the proletarian dictatorship, which helps us to paralyse the influence of the Right deviations. We have in our hands the power of the State, this invaluable weapon in the struggle against the hostile classes, against their ideology, against their influence upon the weaker links of our Party. When, for instance, Bordiga used to reproach the C. P. S. U. with employing the coercive methods of the State in the struggle against the Opposition, this only showed that people of the type of Bordiga have no understanding for the elementary principles of the proletarian dictatorship. Bordiga did not understand that in a country where every deviation has a tendency to grow inevitably into a collision of classes, it is the good fortune of the proletariat to have in its hands such a weapon as the proletarian dictatorship. I have had occasion to hear comrades say when speaking of the regime in the Comintern, that the methods of struggle admissible in the C. P. S. U. are not always suitable for the Communist Parties of Western Europe. I believe such a view to be profoundly erroneous. Precisely in the capitalist countries, where the Communist Parties are surrounded by a hostile atmosphere on all sides, where the corrupting influence of the whole apparatus of bourgeois domination presses upon the toiling masses, where the school, the press, and the church are at the service of the ruling classes, the struggle against deviations by the Communist Parties can in no way be less energetic and less active than in the C. P. S. U. Comrade Ercoli has said here that it is the greatest merit of the C. P. S. U. that it is able to discern already in little things the basic class lines of big controversies. This is

true, comrades, but this is not merely a peculiarity of our Party, but the ability of every good Bolshevik Party. Take the German Communist Party, how apprehensive it is in regard to the least deviation in its ranks. It seems to me that it is a defect of the Italian Communist Party that it has always been a little late — only by a few months — in taking up fundamental questions of principle. Such was the case in the Italian Party with Trotskyism, such was also the case on the question of our Right deviations. Nevertheless I welcome the declaration made by Comrade Ercoli. I believe this declaration shows the firm determination of the Italian C. C. to be more vigilant in future as regards the manifestation of deviations and digressions from the line of the Communist International.

We now have a number of comrades who maintain complete silence on a whole number of these fundamental questions. These silent ones are to a certain extent martyrs. But the Plenum would very much like these people to talk. The whole Plenum of the E. C. C. I. has awaited with the utmost impatience to hear what Comrade Humbert Droz has to say.

Comrade Humbert Droz has held for a number of years one of the most responsible posts in the Comintern. Comrade Humbert Droz has not come into the Communist movement by chance. He is one of the most prominent comrades, and the Plenum of the E. C. C. I. was entitled to expect from Comrade Humbert Droz an open expression of his views on all questions of the international as well as of the Russian Party discussion which has been going on in recent months.

II. On Social-Fascism.

1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL-FASCISM.

I now turn to the question of social-fascism.

Comrade Molotov is right in saying that we have dealt with this question somewhat in an abstract, theoretical way, that the question should be brought down to earth. This question is of tremendous practical importance to the Sections of the Comintern just now. It is by no means a question of theoretical importance only.

To begin with, a considerable part of our Sections have to live and work under the conditions of the fascist regime. The capitalist world is heading for revolution, but before succumbing it goes through the phase of fascism. Just now the question of social-fascism stands particularly acutely in the German Communist Party. All the inner Party controversies in the coming months will turn on the question of social fascism in Germany. Further, little Austria is faced with the danger of a Fascist coup d'Etat. Proceeding from surrender to surrender, the strongest Social Democracy has brought the Austrian working class to the Fascist counter-revolution. The Social Democracy has held back the Austrian proletarian masses from revolution, scaring them with the prospect of intervention by Hungary and Italy. In reality, it has prepared all the conditions for a fascist coup d'Etat in Austria, a country which is encircled by the fascism of Italy, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland. Little Austria raises before us a number of problems. What is the meaning of the outward fight which is staged between the Heimwehr and the Social Democracy? This sham fight of the Austrian Social Democracy against the Heimwehr is not a struggle of classes; it is a struggle between two shades of theory and practice within the Fascist camp, something like the struggle between the Liberals and Conservatives of Great Britain within the bounds of the bourgeois domination. Austria raises before us a most interesting problem: to what limits may the influence of a party like the Austrian Social Democracy grow, after which this influence becomes transformed into fascism, when quantity is turned into quality.

Since the VI. World Congress we have seen, how one more "democracy", which has carried out a coup d'Etat under the flag of fighting against reaction, has now rapidly turned into purest fascism. I refer to Roumania. Since the time of the VI. World Congress we have also seen the Fascist coup d'Etat in Yugoslavia, which with the support of world capitalism, has

Comrade Humbert Droz has chosen a different path. He has sent a letter to the C. C. of the Swiss Communist Party, and a copy thereof to the presidium of the E. C. C. I. What is the content of that document? Comrade Humbert Droz does not admit a single one of his mistakes on the question of capitalist stabilisation, on the question of the German Communist Party, on the question of the unorganised, etc.

Secondly, Comrade Humbert Droz, has not disclosed his attitude towards the line of the Comintern, nor towards the line of this Plenum, whereas the Plenum is entitled to learn his standpoint in this matter. This is no excessive curiosity on our part, it is our duty to know in what camp Comrade Humbert Droz is now.

Thirdly, Comrade Humbert Droz should have spoken about his attitude to the new documents which have been quoted here and which come from the pen of Comrade Serra who shares his views. Comrade Humbert Droz has not spoken even once against the Right renegades in recent months. Comrade Humbert Droz has combated exclusively those who defended the line of the VI. Congress in such a Party as the C. P. G.

I believe that the Plenum of the E. C. C. I. is no place for a game of silence; the Plenum of the E. C. C. I. should dot the i's and cross the t's. The same conditions that our resolution contains regarding the German conciliators must also be submitted to Comrade Humbert Droz. The Plenum will await an answer from Comrade Humbert Droz to these fundamental questions.

resulted in the restoration of an absolute monarchy. In the United States of America we have seen until quite lately the growing frequency of bloody encounters of strikers not only with the official police, but also with armed bands of strike breakers recruited by the Fascists from the dregs of the urban population. The different dictators in South America are rapidly learning the methods of the Fascist cut-throats of the old "civilised" capitalist world. All this shows that this question cannot be disposed of in a couple of sentences in the resolution; that the intensification of the class struggle will raise ever more sharply the question of fascism and social-fascism, as a variety of the former, for all the Sections of the Communist International

Yet what has been shown by our debates here, comrades? Our debates on the subject of social-fascism have rendered this question somewhat more complicated. We have listened here to a number of comrades. Some of the comrades have created a new brand of fascism, "agrarian fascism". Others have spoken about fascism in the colonies. Comrade Bela Kun, who has delivered one of the most interesting speeches at this Plenum, has attributed fascism exclusively to the third period of development of post-war capitalism. I believe it will be necessary to deal somewhat more minutely with this question, if not in order to give a full reply to the question, at least to try and draw to it the attention of all the Sections of the Comintern.

It has already been stated here that fascism, as a political system, is a product of the epoch of monopoly capitalism. In a number of highly developed capitalist countries, fascism is going to be the last stage of capitalism before the social revolution. I believe one cannot speak about fascism in those colonies which are on the eve of the phase of bourgeois-democratic revolution. In such countries, regardless of the existence of some capitalist enterprises of the latest type, the pre-capitalist relations are still prevalent, being far more typical of the colonies than the highly developed monopoly capitalism. In China, bourgeois-feudal counter revolution is raging, and not fascism. Here we find the centralisation of the machinery of violence by the State. The political system is based upon the regime of autocracy by the governors of the different provinces, which is characteristic of countries that have not shaken off the survivals of feudalism.

In the colonies the process of the transformation of the bourgeois counter-revolution into fascism may take place at a more rapid pace owing to encirclement by world Fascism. This does not preclude the possibility that the Kuomintang might try to emulate the methods of Fascism, nor that some militarist

dictator in Chile might imitate Mussolini, like General Ibanez. Yet the fact that, for instance, the Kuomintang is organising yellow unions, does not signify that the leaders of the working class in China are becoming fused with the fascist State of the Kuomintang type, but it is rather the consequence of slight social differentiation in the ranks of the working class.

Recollect how the trade union movement developed in Germany before it had severed the threads connecting it with bourgeois liberalism. Recollect how in England for a number of years the trade unions dragged in the tail of Liberalism before becoming now, in the present stage, an appendage of the State machinery of the bourgeoisie. It seems to me, therefore, that the question of fascism in the colonies should not be raised in the manner in which this was done by some of our comrades.

Let us now turn to another category of countries. Some comrades here have spoken about agrarian fascism. Apparently, they meant to say that fascism springs up first in countries like Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia, etc. i. e. in countries with a strong agrarian hinterland. In a number of countries, e. g. Yugoslavia, this fascism bears a peculiar semi-feudal monarchist character.

How can we account for the fact that Fascism springs up first in such countries of the agrarian type? I believe we ought to consider three fundamental factors:

1. Fascism springs up, as a rule, in the weakest links of the capitalist countries, which have been particularly shaken economically, and are politically menaced with revolution. Fascism here springs up as a preventive counter-revolution.

2. The fact is not that the capitalist monopolies are feebly developed in Poland or Yugoslavia, but rather that these countries are tied to the monopoly trusts of international capital which dictates to them their home and foreign policy. There can be no bourgeois-democratic revolution in Poland.

3. In countries like Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia, fascism assumes sooner its political shape. Owing to the circumscribed economic basis there is no ground for social demagogy in such countries, or at any rate much less than in a country like Germany. Here it is not social fascism in power, but fascism of the purest water.

2. A FEW WORDS ON THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL FASCISM.

A few words on the question of Comrade Bela Kun's speech. In what is Comrade Bela Kun right? He is right in defining the organic process, almost imperceptible to an outside observer, of the conversion of so-called democracy into fascism. This process of the organic conversion of democracy into fascism is particularly revealed in the fact that the fascist coups d'Etat (which are so bombastically termed "fascist revolution") are effected without bloody fights with the "democracy". The "democracy", as a rule, voluntarily yields its place to fascism. Take, for instance, the march of the "black shirts" on Rome, the coup d'Etat of Pilsudski, or the coup d'Etat in Yugoslavia. Comrade Bela Kun is also right when he points out the fundamental difference between the old form of class collaboration, the social-democratic, and the present social-fascist form. Social-fascism is not the simple collaboration with capitalism of the old reformist type; the present social-fascism presents monopoly capitalism as its very own regime, as "democratic-socialism". Herein lies the fundamental difference between the two kinds of collaboration. Yet those comrades are wrong who attribute social-fascism to the third period in the post-war development of capitalism. The elements of social-fascism relate generally to the post-war period. At every one of our Plenums attempts are frequently made to give a new analysis of the questions already previously analysed. It is to be regretted that many have forgotten what is said in the resolutions of the Communist International. I am not alluding to the fact that in our programme there is a characterisation of social-fascism, albeit of a descriptive nature. Yet what is said about social-fascism in the resolutions of the Communist International? Is social-fascism related in them to the third period? I take the Theses of the V. World Congress on the question of social-fascism:

"As the bourgeois society continues its progressive disintegration, all the bourgeois parties, especially the social

democracy, are taking on more and more a fascist character, resorting to fascist methods of combating the proletariat and contributing in this manner to the destruction of the very social order which it is their purpose to preserve. Fascism and social democracy are the two edges of one and the same weapon of the dictatorship of big capital."

Furthermore, there is nothing new also in the debates going on within the Comintern around this question.

The polemics now going on in the German Party between the conciliators and the supporters of the line of the majority of the C. P. G. are to a considerable extent a revival of the polemics which we have had with Radek on the question of fascism after the defeat of 1923. He then put forward the formula: "Fascism has vanquished the social democracy."

What was the reply given to this by the V. World Congress?

"Social Democracy has for long been undergoing the process of transformation from the Right wing of the labour movement into the Left wing of the bourgeoisie, and here and there also into the Fascist wing. That is why it is historically erroneous to speak about a victory of fascism over social democracy."

It is for this very reason that the rise of fascism has been attributed by some comrades to the third period. One gets the impression that they consider Noske a representative of pure democracy, whereas in all the documents of the Comintern we find Noske treated as a clearly pronounced type of social-fascist.

What has confused these comrades? I believe it was over-cautiousness. They were afraid of finding themselves in one position with Brandler on this question. They are confused by the consideration that if Noske is a social-fascist, then it means that the social democracy has gone through no evolution since the time of the 4th of August.

It is necessary to bear in mind the evolution of the Social Democracy in the post-war period. Both Noske and Zörgiebel are social-fascists, yet they represent different degrees, different episodes in the development of social-fascism. The evolution of the social democracy from Noske to Zörgiebel, is the evolution from the social-fascism of civil war to the social-fascism of so-called "normal" capitalism.

What is the expression of this evolution which the German conciliators and Rights fail to understand? First of all, it consists in the fact that the fusion of the social democracy with the capitalist State is not merely a fusion at the top (August 4th). This fusion has taken place from the top to the bottom, all along the line. The thousands of social-democratic functionaries employed in the Ministry of Labour, in the police, in the insurance bureaux, in the municipalities, — this constitutes the apparatus of the fascist State. Secondly, the present social-fascist social democracy is distinguished from the social democracy of August 4th by the fact that the social democracy then accepted the war, voted for credits, but did not take part in the war preparations. The present social democracy, in the epoch of monopoly capitalism, constitutes a factor of preparation for war. Thirdly, in 1918—19 the social democracy with the hands of Noske was shooting down workers, while at the same time with the hands of Hilferding and Otto Bauer it was introducing bills for "socialisation". During that period the social democracy did not venture as yet to abolish the 8-hour working day or to introduce a compulsory arbitration act; it did not yet venture to struggle against the economic demands of the proletariat. The present social democracy has risked it, and this may be objectively seen in the Ruhr. The present social democracy is trying to put back the international labour movement for decades, and to abolish all the gains achieved by the working class as a result of years of stubborn fighting. The system of throttling the working class in the name of the authority of the capitalist State has now been carried to its supreme limit. This is what constitutes the fundamental difference. That is why by recognising that Noske is a social-fascist we would not run the risk of following into the arms of Brandler. Both Noske and Zörgiebel are fascists, but of a different shading and of different periods in the evolution of the social democracy.

III. The British and Swedish Communist Parties.

1. THE C. P. G. B. AND THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULT.

I am now going to deal with one of the most important questions now confronting the Comintern, with the question of our Communist Party of Great Britain. The British comrades should not think that if to-day the Comintern devotes so much attention to the line of the British Communist Party, it is because it is classed by the Comintern among the weakest Sections of the Communist International. No, comrades, we do not consider the British Communist Party as a stepchild, but rather as a Party which is confronted under the present circumstances with highly responsible and complex problems.

There were two categories of speakers who addressed us here on the British question.

The first category consisted of severe critics, an example of whose utterances was furnished by the speech of Comrade **Khitarov**. Comrade **Khitarov** has shown in his speech the way how not to criticise the British Communist Party. On the other hand, the speeches made by the British Comrades **Campbell**, **Hornor**, and especially by Comrade **Bell**, showed an example of how not to defend the British Communist Party.

Let us begin with the speech of Comrade **Khitarov**. Comrade **Khitarov** said, in criticising the British comrades: "But when the Communist Party of Great Britain, after the World War, after the great political lessons in the course of this period, after the lesson of the general strike, and after the Party's leadership of the Minority Movement in Great Britain, which has embraced nearly a million workers, has polled only 50,000 votes in the General Election, it is a result which should cause us seriously to ponder."

I should like here to correct some of the comrades who have said that Comrade **Khitarov** spoke of defeat. Comrade **Khitarov** did not go so far, he only expressed his inclination seriously to ponder over the result of the British election.

I am not going to compare the British Communist Party with the C. P. S. U. of the present period. Yet there was a time when our Party was also small and was at times in a position analogous to what is now experienced by the British Communist Party. We had the best Bolshevik Party in the world in May-June, 1917. This was after four years of imperialist war, when the masses of the people were under arms, exhausted and weary. Our situation in those days of May-June was not one after a general strike, but after the revolt of the workers and soldiers who had overthrown the monarchy. At that time we had already Soviets, we had an immediate revolutionary situation; nevertheless in April and in May we were still a small group in the Soviets in which the Mensheviks and the S. R.'s predominated. No one thought then of reproaching the Bolshevik Party with its being a little group, because the masses were passing through the great political school of experience. The same school, without an immediate revolutionary situation, is now being passed through by the masses in Great Britain at a still slower pace.

We should not attack the British Communist Party for having polled only 50,000 votes, but support it and prevent the spread of defeatist sentiments in it. We should stand around the British Party like a solid iron wall to beat back the international social democracy and all the renegades who are now calumniating the C. P. G. B.

This is what has been written about our Communist Party of Great Britain by Roy the renegade:

"If the Party will act in accordance with the decisions of the VI. Congress of the Comintern and of the IV. Congress of the Profintern, it will isolate itself even further from the masses. The tactic which leads to the creation of new trade unions is catastrophic for any old capitalist country. Yet nowhere does it lead to such immediate catastrophic consequences as in Great Britain."

How is the outcome of the general election estimated by Brandler's organ "Against the Current"?

"The estimate of the situation given by the E. C. C. I. was entirely wrong. The Labour Party has not been "ex-

posed" in the eyes of the majority of the British workers either by its term of office in 1924 or by its treachery during the miners' strike. On the contrary, the workers have given it an even more considerable majority so that it might be able to continue the work begun in 1924 which was soon interrupted."

The "Vorwärts" says that after the General Election the British Communist Party has ceased to exist as a factor of the class struggle.

The whole of the bourgeois press is now greatly elated, dancing the dance of death over our British Communist Party. Under such circumstances every word that is spoken should be carefully weighed.

2. ELEMENTS OF DEPRESSION AND THE PROCESS OF RADICALISATION IN THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT.

Yet, it is not so dangerous that Comrade **Khitarov** has unduly criticised the British Communist Party. Far more dangerous are the speeches of some British comrades who have incorrectly defended the British Communist Party. We have put to the British comrades a simple question: how did it happen that the people who had first advocated the tactics of "class against class" were removed from the leading institutions of the British Communist Party? What was the answer of the British comrades to this question? First to reply was Comrade **Campbell**. He said that it is not the tradition of the British Communist Party to divide the Party into goats and sheep, into those who defend the Party line and those who do not defend it, that they are all united in the fervent desire to carry out the general line in a united front. He believes that such a division extols some comrades on the one hand, and insults other comrades on the other hand. I am not acquainted with the British customs; possibly it is so. But I am going to ask our British friends: when you will have the revolution in your country, it will be perhaps necessary to chop some heads off, why do you think that we should to-day refrain from disturbing your self-complacency? It seems to me in the meantime that this argument about alleged causing of offence indicates only that the British comrades are still too polite and that they would have to get rid of this virtue (perhaps, a good one in social life) even before the advent of an immediate revolutionary situation.

We are not people of etiquette. We express our doubts in Bolshevik language.

Wherein lies the weakness of the British Communist Party? I believe that Comrade **Rust's** speech, on the whole, contained a correct criticism of the British Communist Party. Your first mistake, British comrades, consisted in that you have succumbed to the mood of depression which came after the general strike of 1926. You were not sufficiently strong to swim against the current. The British Labour Party and the General Council betrayed the general strike, and then they circulated the idea of depression, throwing out the slogan of "never again". This was definite class strategy: first to split the ranks of the proletariat and allow them to be defeated singly in a general strike, and subsequently in the miners' struggle, and then to spread the mood of depression, placing the responsibility for the defeat upon the workers themselves. It was the strategy of the class enemy. And it seems to me that the British comrades did not sufficiently struggle against these elements of depression.

Most characteristic in this respect was the speech of Comrade **Campbell**, which revealed the vestiges of this mood of depression. What did Comrade **Campbell** say? He said that it was very good that the Comintern had recognised for the first time that in Great Britain they had been swimming and were swimming against the current.

Excuse me, comrades, the Comintern not only recognises this, but it recognises it not for the first time. We are aware of the difficulties of your struggle, but at the same time we do not think that with you there is nothing but depression, that you are only swimming against the current. To be sure,

there were also moods of depression in your labour movement in the past, but you also had the radicalisation of the masses. The situation in your country is far more complex than either mere depression or radicalisation. You have the vestiges of the depression which came after the strike of 1926, plus the commencing radicalisation of the masses resulting from the capitalist rationalisation. It is an analysis of this combination of the elements of depression and radicalisation which you have failed to give us. And yet, this combination of the elements of depression and radicalisation lends a peculiar trend to the Leftward turning of the masses that we are witnessing in Great Britain. This trend does not follow the direct course of the immediate transfer of support from the Conservatives and Liberals to the Communists; the British labour movement follows its peculiar course through the intermediate stage of the Labour Party.

We do not reproach you for this, comrades. We remember and we know that also our masses, under an immediately revolutionary situation, did not go directly into the Communist Party in 1917, but through the S.R. stage. They had to go through this severe disease. We also know that in your country, in the absence of an immediate revolutionary situation, the period in which this intermediate stage is passed through will be different from what it was in your country in 1917.

It seems to me that the cause of the slow radicalisation of the masses of the working class in Great Britain is to be attributed to a certain extent also to the slow pace of rationalisation in Great Britain, which has already been referred to by some of the comrades here. Yet, if it be true that the MacDonald Government is a government of capitalist rationalisation, then it is right now that we expect you to meet your bills. Precisely now we shall urge you, British comrades, to become the mass Party of the British working class upon the grounds of the disappointment of the masses in the Labour Party. We wish to take measures in advance, so that your Party should not have to be blamed again. We wish right now to prepare our Communist Party of Great Britain for the great role which it will have to play; and this accounts for the tremendous interest shown by this Plenum in the Communist Party of Great Britain.

Wherein did your second mistake consist? It consisted in that a still considerable number of your Party comrades went into battle under the slogan of "Class against Class" not from inner conviction, but "by way of discipline". We welcome the fact that you are a disciplined Party, but discipline cannot take the place of conviction. Conviction begets enthusiasm, while its absence has a cooling effect on the masses. You have lost a good deal of valuable time on a kind of passive Ghandism in applying the new line, instead of mobilising the masses. You have pondered too long. For instance, in 1927 the British comrades still supported the slogan of a Labour Government. By this you have placed a most powerful weapon against you in the hands of the Labour Party during the election. Your speeches and articles in defence of your position in 1927 were cited by the British Labour Party.

Moreover, owing to this lack of conviction in the correctness of your own line, you have mechanically conceived the line of the Communist International. I recollect the first draft theses submitted by the C. C. to the last Congress of your Party. Those theses contained everything: the third period as well as the fight against the Rights and the conciliators. There was a little about everything. At the same time we could not see how this third period is reflected in the British conditions. What is the concrete expression of this third period in the British situation? It was an outward citation of the third period in a resolution, a sort of formal statement, but not an analysis of the concrete conditions of the third period in Great Britain. The correct articles by **Palme Dutt** and by **Page Arnot** pointing out that the new line of "Class against Class" should not merely be represented as a line for the duration of the election campaign, but that it should be reflected in all the branches of the Party's activity, did not meet with great sympathy in your ranks.

The third mistake of the British Communist Party was your attitude to **Maxton** and **Cook**. Here, in your attitude to **Maxton** and **Cook**, could be felt the tape which tied you to the old position. You could swear in words as much as you

liked that you were in favour of the new line, but your attitude to **Maxton** and **Cook**, your attitude to the Left Social Democracy, showed that you were still doubting, that you had not overcome this corroding demon of doubts. The attitude to **Maxton** and **Cook** was something like the last barrier which you had to negotiate to demonstrate not in words, but in deeds, your conviction in the correctness of the new tactics.

I now ask the British Communist Party whether it did negotiate this barrier? No, comrades, it has not yet jumped over this barrier. We were greatly amazed to learn that even now, when **Cook** has agitated for the Labour Party at the General Election, when **Cook** is furiously attacking the Communist Party, our British Party is still so polite to him that it has invited him to the Relief Committee for the victims of the Indian Revolution.

To expose **Cook**, is to expose the Labour Party, to expose the **MacDonald** Government. He who does not expose **Cook** is weak in criticising the **MacDonald** Government.

Your fourth mistake is your excessive "insularity".

How does it happen that all the fundamental problems of the Communist International fail to stir our fraternal British Party? It is not that the British Communist Party does not pass resolutions or take a stand upon all important questions. No, this cannot be said. Nevertheless, one does not feel any profound organic connection with all the problems of the world labour movement. All these problems have the appearance of being forcibly injected into the activities of the British Communist Party. In late years we have seen everywhere extensive political discussions. How many questions were passionately discussed, let us say, in the Communist Party of Germany? The German comrades carefully weigh every word spoken by anybody. They allow no deviation from the line, they attack the least deviation, respecting no persons. A series of such great discussions we have also seen in the Communist Party of Poland. Yet, in the British Communist Party there is a sort of special system which may be characterised thus: the Party is a society of great friends.

For instance, at the last Congress of the British Communist Party such a valuable comrade as Comrade **Campbell** delivered a report, and in that report, after all the discussion about control over production in the German Communist Party, Comrade **Campbell** for some reason brought out again the slogan of workers' control.

(**Campbell**: This is not true.)

Comrade **Campbell**, if this is not true, all the better, and I am prepared to turn out a liar in order that the Bolshevisation of the British Communist Party might triumph.

Not once have the fundamental problems of Right and Left deviations been thrashed out in the British Party. Comrade **Bell** has told us here that in the Comintern there were malicious deviation-hunters. I do not know whom Comrade **Bell** meant. I should rather like to have the names and addresses of such evil genii of the Comintern who disturb Comrade **Bell's** rest. Take, for instance, our youth, the Y. C. I. We have a body of young workers lately brought to the fore in the Communist International who keep a vigilant eye on all points of difference in the Comintern. Is this good or bad? This is good. This vigilance is an element of the Party's Bolshevisation. Whereas what Comrade **Bell** has said is an element of conservatism to which we must object and which we must combat in order to prevent the Communist Parties from becoming stuck in the rut of once recognised truths.

3. TASKS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY.

Where is the way out, comrades? Our Party should be now prepared for the great role in store for it. The way out is, first of all, in courageous, frank, Bolshevik self-criticism by the Party in regard to all branches of its activity without fearing to offend anybody, to tread on anybody's corns, to hurt anybody's amour propre. All the friendship in the world should not be a hindrance to telling the revolutionary truth.

We welcome the solidarity existing in the British C. C., but it seems to me that a little breach ought occasionally to

be made in this solidarity; not that we wish to split the Central Committee, oh no! but because it is necessary to enliven the activity of the C. C., to raise its ideological level and to increase its attention to all-important problems.

A second task. The British Communist Party should revise in most radical fashion all the methods of its activity. On this subject a very useful and good speech was made here by Comrade Piätniisky.

What did Piätniisky tell us in his speech? We were dealing with the political position of our Parties. Comrade Piätniisky drew the attention of the Plenum to the organisational realisation of all our decisions. Let us take our British Party. What do we see here? A drop in the number of factory nuclei, or rather, their non-existence. The cause of this phenomenon lies in the fact that the British Communist Party thinks it possible to do the Party work only through the apparatus of the trade unions. This has its positive side. The British Communist Party has done better work in the trade unions than all the other Parties. Nevertheless, just now there are tremendous negative aspects in this position. Properly speaking, this is a legacy of the trade union traditions that weigh down upon our Party. To penetrate into the factories as Communists, to entrench themselves through the nuclei in the factories, is just now the fundamental task of the British Communist Party.

Furthermore, (I am going to deal with this briefly, because it has already been spoken about), it is necessary right now to stir up at all costs the economic struggle in order to expose upon this basis the MacDonald Government as a government of war, of capitalist rationalisation, and of a policy of throttling the colonies.

The next fundamental task, which you have started to carry out and should continue to do so, is to render active aid to the Indian Revolution. If the British Communist Party will not help now the Indian Communists who are scattered and unorganised, who is going to help them? The Communist International has no other levers to influence the Indian revolutionary movement than the British Communist Party. The Plenum should now urge the British Communist Party to render the most active aid to the Indian Revolution and to the incipient Indian Communist Party by supplying organisers, by developing an agitation, and by all other means. You are still weak as a Bolshevik Party, but on the basis of your experience you can already give something to the Indian Communist Party. You have been subjected to the test and you have not passed it badly. You have passed the test during the General Strike in Great Britain. We observed then that before the instructions of the Comintern were received, the British Communist Party adopted and carried out analogous decisions on its own accord, upon its own initiative. This shows that the British Communist Party has already passed a certain test of maturity.

Furthermore, it is necessary to carry out some changes in the leadership of the British Communist Party. We believe those who have a "bad character" should be put into the leadership, and those of a good character should be entrusted with work among the lower organisations.

Next, one of your central tasks just now is the establishment of a daily newspaper. If the Party should fail under the present conditions to establish a daily newspaper as the organ for the concentration and mobilisation of the proletarian masses, the Party will indeed fail to carry out its fundamental task. Remember what role was played by our "Pravda" in its time, during the years of reaction. Yet the situation in your country is more favourable. The Party should unite around this organ the largest masses of the workers, forming a body of worker-correspondents, penetrating into the factories and establishing a special press fund to maintain a paper. The establishment of a daily newspaper is the most elementary condition for transforming your Party into a mass Party. It strikes us as something absolutely abnormal when the little Belgian Party has a daily newspaper, whereas the British Communist Party, occupying a most responsible post, a Party destined to play the greatest role in the fortunes of the world revolution, has as yet no daily newspaper, no mouthpiece through which to address the masses of workers.

Finally, I turn to the fundamental question that is of exceptional importance to the British Communist Party just now,

after its certain setback in the last election — to the question of the 1st of August. Precisely in connection with the outcome of the General Election you should have realised how important to you was the first of August demonstration under these circumstances. The British comrades should have demonstrated to the masses that the Party which polled 50,000 votes, on this day, when the Red anti-war flags would be unfurled throughout the world, was intrinsically of far greater significance than the millions who had voted for the Labour Party. The worker who had voted for the Labour Party, on witnessing this demonstration, would have been forced to say to himself: "Well, I have given my vote to the party which has polled eight million votes. By strange coincidence this party got also the votes of Baldwin's son, of various aristocrats and distinguished people, who divide their leisure between psalm-singing, church-going, and charity work among the workers. But I who have voted for this Labour Party do not feel any tangible results from the fact that the Labour Party has polled eight million votes. Yet, those 50,000 cranks who voted for the Communist Party have now developed such aggressive action against war, and are now coming out in such a solid front against his Majesty's Government of MacDonald, that they seem indeed stronger than we, the eight million voters. "This party", the British working-man would have said, "does not seem to be a party of idle talkers. They are people of action. It is a party which merits some confidence". Such would have been the thoughts and words of the British worker who is on the way towards shedding the parliamentary illusions. And with your demonstration on August 1st you would have helped him to cast off these illusions. This demonstration would have been your first indictment of the MacDonald Government upon the basis of its first steps, because this government has already furnished a good deal of material for its own exposure.

The British Labour Government has already managed to display its true character. Suffice it to refer to its dilatoriness in the matter of recognising the Soviet Union, to the rejection of the 7-hour day in the mines, or to the capitalist offensive against the working class which just begun. Under these conditions the British Communist Party might have turned the First of August demonstration into a most important action connected with all the questions of your internal politics. This demonstration should have constituted an act of protest against the war that is screened by pacifist phrases; it should have constituted the most determined support to the revolutionary workers and peasants in India. In reality, however, the British Communist Party, and a number of other Sections of the Communist International, were inclined to consider the First of August as a campaign wedged in among the normal activity of the Party, as a campaign which somewhat upset the plan of systematic activity, which diverted the Party's forces to the propaganda against the war danger which was not yet felt by the working class.

4. MISTAKES OF OUR SWEDISH COMRADES.

I now turn to our weak spot, to the Swedish Communist Party. I should not like to speak here in a tone of derision about the Swedish Party. No we do not wish only to upbraid the Swedish Party, but also to help it extricate itself from the opportunistic mire. A long speech has been delivered here by Comrade Flyg, and it is on this speech that one should chiefly dwell. It was a characteristic speech. Comrade Flyg began by describing the splendid growth of the Swedish Party from 7,000 members who remained after the Höglund crisis to the present membership of 18,000. But, Comrade Flyg, is it for this that we criticise you? The Swedish Communist Party has some very good points. In this respect a good deal may be learned from it by other Sections of the Communist International.

Comrades, we have in our Communist movement the type of man who will find it easier to fight upon the barricade than to draw up a report on his activity. This type is a sort of revolutionary "superman". But the Swedish Party has a splendid trait, it has developed the reporting activity. It is here that all the Sections of the Communist International have something to learn. Yes, Comrade Flyg, we wish to learn from you the good things while discarding the bad ones, and above all, we want to put an end to the opportunistic line of your Central Committee. You have committed mistakes and we have cri-

ticised them. The mistakes may be put right; the mistakes of the Swedish Communist Party are not dangerous, although they are grievous mistakes, e. g., the disarmament draft, or the refusal to demonstrate on the First of May. Not these mistakes in themselves are dangerous, but rather the attempt to defend them, which we have seen here in the speech made by Comrade Flyg. Comrade Flyg's speech has struck a discordant note in the spirit of this Plenum. Comrade Flyg, in defending the measures of the Central Committee, actually repeated the whole of the opportunistic arguments against which we are fighting; and this misunderstanding of the opportunistic character of the mistakes, revealed by Comrade Flyg, is the tragedy of the leadership of the Swedish Communist Party, as well as its weakest spot. The leadership of the Swedish Communist Party does not like to own to its mistakes. I shall cite to our Swedish comrades another instance. A speech at this Plenum was made by Comrade Minor, a comrade who has committed a number of mistakes jointly with the majority of the C. C. of the Communist Party of the United States of America. Yet, comrades, the whole Plenum breathed more freely when Comrade Minor honestly, frankly, in Bolshevik fashion, told us about these mistakes and admitted them.

Now, had Comrade Flyg frankly admitted his mistakes instead of defending them, he would have considerably facilitated the work of the Swedish Commission of the Comintern.

A good deal has already been said here about Comrade Varga, and for this reason I do not wish to deal especially with him; but Comrade Varga has told us here that one should have the courage of speaking one's mind, even if there was a risk of being accused of opportunism. To have the courage of speaking one's mind is a laudable trait, but I believe, Comrade Varga, the fact that our Sections are now afraid of being charged with opportunism is an achievement of the Comintern.

It is to be regretted that this saving fear of opportunism does not yet exist in the ranks of the Swedish Communist Party.

How did Comrade Flyg defend the postponement of the May Day demonstration? He did so in opportunistic fashion.

Just imagine the situation. There are 800 workers waiting in the street at Stockholm. This crowd, after the official postponement of the demonstration, is waiting outside in the rain to hear the speaker of its Party. Although the demonstration scheduled for 2 p. m. was called off at 10.30 a. m., the workers did come, while in the meantime the secretary of the Stockholm Committee of our Party was negotiating with the Social Democrats over the telephone for the postponement of this demonstration. I am informed that the Comintern representative vainly tried to prevail upon the Secretary of the Stockholm organisation to address those 800 workers, and that the latter gave the classic reply that this was inconvenient, because the question had already been settled with the Social Democrats. There are extremely polite and loyal comrades in our Swedish Communist Party towards the Social Democracy. Let us hope that they will prove also loyal to the Comintern when the latter exposes their mistakes. All this, mind you, occurred after the VI. World Congress, after the declaration of the tactics of "Class against Class". Why did we write resolutions about the tactics of class against class? Was it in order that the secretary of one of the largest organisations might defy them? Where is the loyalty here to the Comintern? Well, there was further pressure brought to bear upon the secretary of the Stockholm organisation. He then brought out a fresh argument, there were no speakers. The Central Committee which refused to address the workers on May Day would have been thrown out in any other Party. Then the Secretary of the Stockholm organisation pleaded that the 800 people gathered in the street consisted exclusively of Party members. Since when has it become the habit of members of the C. C. to refuse to address the rank and file of the Party on May Day? Comrade Flyg has also tried here to soften the significance of the mistake committed on the question of the disarmament draft. It is not worth while to spend time here — this we shall do in the Commission — to explain to the Swedish comrades the opportunistic and pacifist character of this mistake. Comrade Flyg said that this was a mistake, but it was neither opportunistic nor pacifist.

Why? Because, he said, in the parliamentary faction there were neither opportunists nor pacifists. What a strange, in-

comprehensible argument! It means the assertion of a new dogma about the infallibility of the parliamentary faction. The Pope may commit a score of mistakes, yet he is infallible; the parliamentary fraction of the Communist Party of Sweden may introduce the most vulgar pacifist motions, yet it remains pure from the revolutionary standpoint, because in this faction there are Comrades Flyg and others. This new dogma of infallibility, like the dogma of immaculate conception, belongs to the realm of myths.

Let us take, further, the question as to the character of Swedish imperialism. If I am not mistaken, Comrade Flyg has told Comrade Khitarov that if the latter had any material to demonstrate the completely imperialist character of Swedish capitalism, he, Comrade Flyg, would be exceedingly grateful to Khitarov if such material were presented to the Swedish C. C., because the C. C. was just now engaged in studying the question of Swedish imperialism. Strange, very strange, if eleven years after the establishment of the Communist International the C. C. of the Swedish Communist Party is in doubt whether Sweden is an imperialist State. Yet, the question about the character of Swedish imperialism is of decisive moment in all the inner-Party debates in Sweden. This question is connected with the tactical policy of the Party upon a number of fundamental questions, such as the question of Sweden's role in the future war, the theory of so-called neutrality, the under-estimation of the aggressive nature of Swedish imperialism, the question who is the chief enemy — foreign or Swedish capital, the question of the attitude towards the pacifism of the "Left" social democracy, and so forth. All these questions are clear to revolutionary Bolsheviks; they have long since been settled in all the Sections of the Communist International. Nevertheless, Comrade Flyg comes forward and argues somewhat after the manner of Comrade Serra. Comrade Serra said that nobody had given the correct theoretical criterion to define who was a kulak. Comrade Flyg, in the eleventh year of the Comintern, is still studying the theoretical criteria of Swedish imperialism. Of course, we do not object to theoretical study of questions, especially in the Swedish Communist Party where the revolutionary theory is generally in bad shape; nevertheless we are afraid that by the time Comrade Flyg will finally learn this question it may be too late, as the masses will already have learned from the experience of the war a good deal that is not yet clear to Comrade Flyg. We in the Comintern are prepared to help the Swedish C. C. study the question, but we demand from the Swedish Communist Party a little additional material: let it show us on the 1st of August how the majority of the C. C. contemplates the struggle against Swedish imperialism. This will be the decisive criterion.

Let us take the article by Comrade Kilboom on the question of the Party's tasks in the event of a war against the Soviet Union. According to Comrade Kilboom it will be the task of the Swedish Communist Party to prevent Sweden from joining the war against the U. S. S. R. Only this and nothing more? It seems to us that the task of the Swedish Communists consists not only in preventing Swedish intervention in the war, but also in transforming any attempt of war against the U. S. S. R. into a revolutionary action by the proletariat against its own bourgeoisie. A position of this kind does not come by chance, it is closely connected with the appraisal of the character of Swedish imperialism.

Further, on the question of the Right danger. The whole of the Comintern is discussing the question of the Right danger. The Right danger is in evidence in the most seasoned Parties. Yet here we have the responsible leader of the Swedish Communist Party, the Chairman of its C. C., not saying a single word about the Right danger in the Party. It looks as though everywhere there are Right mistakes and deviations, but there is only one country, Sweden, that resembles a blissful Arcadia in this respect. Everything thrives there, even the theory of "exceptionalism" blossoms forth upon the meagre Swedish soil.

Flyg is in agreement with the E. C. C. I. upon a whole number of questions. He declared his wholehearted agreement with the statement that every factional struggle is harmful. Yes, we do declare that we shall fight in a whole number of our Parties against unprincipled factional strife, e. g. in the United States of America. We shall fight against such hideous forms of factional strife as have taken place in the Polish Commu-

nist Party in the past. But, Comrade Flyg, there are moments when factions are a wholesome factor for the health of the Party. Remember the fighting which has been done by the Comintern since 1922. How many factions of every kind have bubbled up upon the historic stage? Not all of these factions have been an exclusive source of evil; there were also factions, and a good many of them, who have enabled us to Bolshevise the Communist Parties. Where the Party line has become distorted, factions are unavoidable. Comrade Flyg pleaded the

unity of the Party in defending his position. Yes, comrades, the slogan of unity is our slogan, but it is not the slogan of unity at any price. In this respect Comrade Flyg's ideas run in the same direction as those of some conciliators in Germany who have said: let us have a consolidated Party, upon the basis of equality for all the tendencies, upon the basis of "neutrality" on the part of the Comintern towards them. The unity slogan, like the slogan of Party consolidation, is a screen to conceal opportunistic views.

IV. The International Day against Imperialist War.

1. UNDER THE SIGN OF SELF-CRITICISM.

I now turn to the last point of my concluding speech, to the question of August 1st.

I was reproached here by some comrades that in my report I did not deal with sufficient fulness in criticising our Communist Parties. I must say that this was not accidental, that this was in conformity with a premeditated plan, so to speak. How do our Plenums frequently pass? The reporters criticise the different Parties, and usually they are followed by representatives of these Parties who make something like the following declarations: "Our delegation agrees with the whole of the appraisal given in the report of X., Y., or Z. We believe that now it is necessary to fight in the most determined manner against the Rights and the conciliators upon an international scale, etc. etc. Yet, as regards our own Party, we must say that the reporter did not draw a quite correct picture. In the first place, he is not sufficiently informed; in the second place, he has not taken notice of the positive sides in the work of our Party", and so on. Speeches and declarations of this kind would have taken up the whole of our Plenums. These speeches would have diverted the attention of the Plenum from the problems which confront us, to the respective narrow national issues. We have chosen a different system.

We have preferred to let the Parties draw their own pictures. This we have partly achieved in the Commission on the International Red Day.

What has been revealed by that self-criticism which developed in our Commission? It ought to be said that it afforded a highly convincing illustration of what was said by Comrade Piatnitsky about the defects in the work of our Sections. First of all, we saw that the connection of our Parties with the industrial enterprises is altogether bad. The Young Communist International was unable to tell us in what forms its Sections are carrying on the campaign for the Red Day in the factories. There was further revealed, in equally convincing fashion, the process of the restoration of the street nuclei and the decrease in the number of factory nuclei. Our work in the trade unions is badly organised. In our Parties the politician predominates over the organiser; the traditions of legalism are still strong in organising street demonstrations; the weakness of our cadres is still evident, and what is most essential, in regard to the 1st of August the defensive sentiment still prevails in our Party ranks.

There have been revealed also other quite substantial shortcomings. Thus, we vote quite unanimously for Theses in which is urged the necessity of raising our present economic movement to a higher political level, and at the same time many of us have still failed to realise that the International Red Day is the first step in this direction. It is necessary right now to put the political struggle in the centre of attention of all the Parties, it is necessary to put practically the question of the political mass strike on the order of the day. The question of the political mass strike should figure not only in our discussions and in our resolutions. It is now a quite concrete problem of the proletarian struggle. When was the question of the political mass strike raised for the first time in pre-war days? It was raised after the proletariat had tried out in practice this weapon of the strike movement in Belgium in 1902, and especially after the working class in the Russian Revolution of 1905 had put the mass strike on the order of the day, placing this keen-edged weapon in the hands of the whole of the international proletariat. The social democracy tried forth-

with to efface the revolutionary significance of the political mass strike by associating it only with the struggle for universal suffrage. All the debates which took place at the Jena Party Congress, where the social democracy had already then surrendered to the reformist trade unions on this question, were in a certain sense the prelude to the surrender in 1914.

Comrades, the timidity with which the overwhelming majority of the Parties have approached the question of the political mass strike on August 1st indicates that there is still a good deal amiss with us in regard to grasping this aspect of the importance of August 1st. This aspect should be particularly emphasised in our agitation for the 1st of August at meetings and gatherings of our Party.

After the 1st of August we shall have to sum up our experience of the first international action, fearlessly to record all our defects and shortcomings which will have become revealed in the course of preparing and carrying out the 1st of August day. After having submitted ourselves to the test of the International Red Day, we shall have to call forth everywhere the action of criticism, with regard to the carrying out of the Red Day. The Communist International, and particularly the editors of our Review, will have to summarise our experience and render it available for each one of our Sections.

Great credit is due to our German comrades. They have put the question of the political mass strike on the order of the day in the Communist International. But our German Party, as well as the French and Polish Parties and other Sections of the Communist International, will render even greater service to the whole of the world-wide Communist movement if they will thoroughly thrash out the question of the political mass strike by street action on August 1st. Thereby they will raise the world Communist movement to a higher level, to such that cannot be reached by any paper resolutions.

Comrades, we are not afraid lest our shortcomings become revealed. The argument that the bourgeoisie might see our lack of maturity for the revolutionary struggle, and that therefore it might proceed even more firmly and deliberately with the war preparations, is opportunistic through and through. Classes cannot deceive each other by telling stories about their weakness or strength. The classes show their forces in the actual struggle. He who fails to grasp this, approaches the revolutionary problems with the yardstick of the small shopkeeper who hopes to cheat his customer. The force of the Bolsheviks consisted at all times in that they fearlessly exposed all their own shortcomings and defects. Proletarian revolutions — said Marx — are strong in that they criticise themselves, thus continually raising the movement to a higher stage.

Further, comrades, we must secure ourselves against the penetration of defeatist moods into some strata of our Parties in the event of local failures on the 1st of August. Already now we see such attempts at spreading pessimistic moods in our ranks. In Czechoslovakia the Jilek-Hais group is developing a furious campaign against the August 1st action which they characterise as a putsch. Fröhlich the renegade, in his pamphlet, openly calls the 1st of August a putsch. Such a campaign is also carried on by the German conciliators. The Rights and the conciliators are acting in this case in accord with "Vorwärts" and the whole of the bourgeois press. All the better, comrades! This will render the line of demarcation within the labour movement more distinct and clear.

I cannot agree also with Comrade Garlandi who has recommended the greatest moderation in our appeals for the 1st of August. I am not against modesty, but I am afraid that

excessive modesty on the part of the Comintern would be no guarantee that our Parties might not be even more modest. I believe Comrade Molotov in his speech has taken the proper position when he said that the action of August 1st contains in itself the elements of a counter-offensive by the working class throughout the world. And I ask Comrade Garlandi why should we not speak openly and loudly about this to the working class, but whisper in a subdued voice, following the rules of Italian conspiracy.

Comrades, we have many defects. We should resolutely and rapidly dispose of them. Our comrades should return from this Plenum with a firm conviction that the 1st of August will be

the general review of our forces, that the 1st of August will be the test of the fighting ability of the Sections of the Communist International.

Needless to say, this is a difficult task; but the Plenum has already politically equipped the Parties by raising before them a whole series of most essential problems connected with the present struggle. It has also politically equipped the Parties in regard to the preparations for the 1st of August.

In the solidarity action on the 1st of August, there should be no absentees and no latecomers. No political weather, no measures taken by the bourgeoisie, will prevent us from carrying out our fighting day on August 1st! (Applause.)

Sixteenth Session.

Concluding Speech by Comrade Kuusinen.

Comrades, there was a good deal of collective work done this time in dealing with the first item of the agenda. Already the report represented collective work, not only because there were two reporters, but also because many of the speeches delivered in the discussion, like those of the Comrades Molotov, Thälmann and Piatnitsky, had the character of supplementary reports. In the discussion numerous questions were fully thrashed out which had been only cursorily touched upon in my report. Thus, above all, the question of capitalist rationalisation and the question of the living standard of the working class. In my report I could only theoretically state the question, but many of the speakers have illustrated the question by facts and data from the life of the working masses. This indicates the existence of lively contact between the leading comrades of our Sections and the lives of the working masses. I refer in particular to the statements made by the speakers of the German and British delegations, as well as to the speeches of the Comrades Semard (France), Minor (United States), Seegers (Holland), and others. For this reason I draw the attention of the comrades who will read the Minutes to the fact that the questions touched upon in my report have been dealt with in the light of the concrete material furnished by these comrades. Some other questions, like the questions of social-fascism and reparations, have been so fully thrashed out in the discussion that I am not going to deal any more with them. At the same time, I am of the opinion that these questions, especially the question of social-fascism, have not yet been exhaustively dealt with. At the next Plenum we shall have to supplement a good deal in the light of the new experiences.

Perhaps I am mistaken, but I am under the impression that in the discussion at this Plenum the speakers from the different Sections, more than ever before, have taken a deliberately independent attitude on the general questions of Communist strategy and tactics. A considerable internationalisation of the discussion is to be recorded. A number of comrades have spoken not only about the situation in their own Party and in their own country, but also on questions affecting other countries and on general questions of the Comintern. This has not been done to a sufficient extent, to be sure, particularly in regard to the colonies. Here we have still observed weakness in regard to internationalism. Nevertheless certain progress may be recorded.

I should like to urge at this point the importance of the further development of our international connections. In this respect there was also some recent improvement, especially in regard to the exchange of information between the E. C. C. I. and the Sections. The contact affected through our W. E. B. signifies also a good deal. (Quite right!) This ought to be even further developed. Still weak, however, is the militant connection among the different Sections. I shall allude but to one instance. Such important mass fights as the textile workers' fights in Poland, Czechoslovakia and France have taken place simultaneously, or nearly so, while no attempt was made by the Communist Parties of these countries to organise a campaign of international support. As regards the real carrying out of the general international actions, it is known that we are only making a serious beginning just now. We are still far from being on the road towards becoming a real World Party, but we must and shall become such a Party.

I. For Marxian Accuracy in the Use of Economic Terms.

THE LIVING STANDARD OF THE WORKERS AND BOURGEOIS STATISTICS.

Unanimity has prevailed in the discussion as to the general character of capitalist rationalisation, as well as concerning the necessity for defining certain of our previous formulae. According to our unanimous conception, capitalist rationalisation is such only from the standpoint of the capitalist exploiters, but from the standpoint of the workers it is plunder and murder. On the other hand, we have differed from Comrade Varga whether absolute or only relative decline in the living standard of the working class is the outcome of capitalist rationalisation. On this question I have advanced two chief arguments in my report against Comrade Varga: firstly, that he has overlooked the unemployed, and secondly, that he did not consider how much increase would be required in the wages to compensate merely for the increased intensity of labour. Nevertheless I was reproached by Comrades Bela Kun and Khitarov with having made a concession to Comrade Varga on this question. This was not at all the case. My whole argument was directed against Comrade Varga's assertion that there was only a relative, but

no absolute decline in the living standard of the workers. Comrade Kun took the first argument which I adduced and used it to "correct" my statement of the question. Comrade Khitarov took my second argument for the purpose of "correction". Well, it is certainly difficult to follow a lengthy report with full attention.

Comrade Varga did not repeat his own proposal at this Plenum (to the effect that there is only a relative decline of the worker's share in the total product), although he has tried to maintain his assertion against the thesis of the decline of the living standard of the working class as the result of capitalist rationalisation. He failed, however, to refute our arguments in any way. He was forced to admit that he did not allude to the living standard of the working class as a whole, especially to that of the unemployed, who are also a section of the working class. Secondly, he admitted that there was no compensation by capitalist rationalisation for the increased intensity of labour in the sense of "real wages", which he had used in his argument. But he pleaded that the term of "real wages" in this restricted sense had been used by bourgeois statisticians "in tens of

thousands of published documents". Thus, instead of dealing with the quality aspect of the arguments in our theses, Comrade Varga has tried to impress us with the argument of quantity. Yet he should know that precisely in the domain of ideological production in the capitalist world there has been standardisation, typification and normalisation going on in a particular large measure, so that the great mass of books and newspapers containing a false assertion, or repeating a false notion, carries rather little weight as evidence. Even the data of bourgeois statistics on money wages are quite frequently inaccurate and exaggerated; Comrade Remmele has already pointed out that many German workers by no means receive the "tariff wages" referred to by bourgeois statisticians. Still worse is the case with the comparison of the money wages with the cost of living. Comrade Varga objected that even if the absolute figures in the bourgeois statistics are falsified (this he admits) nevertheless the dynamics of the real wages are correctly shown by these statistics, and in this he is wrong again. Precisely the most essential component parts of the conception of "real wages", the data of the index of the living costs of the workers, are so chosen by the bourgeois statisticians that they embrace an altogether narrow circle, so that their movement does not reflect correctly the real movement in the living costs of the workers. At the same time important aspects of the living standard of the working class are entirely ignored.

Finally, Comrade Varga believed it was possible to state the case in one way or another to suit the purposes of propaganda and agitation. No, it is here essentially a question of correctly stating the facts. Comrade Varga's assertion that our thesis "was introducing confusion in our agitation and propaganda by including an incorrect sentence" must be categorically repudiated. If we describe exactly the living standard of the workers on the basis of Marxian conceptions, it should not be said, as Comrade Varga does, that we want to engage in a "quarrel about words" with our opponents. This was a bold statement on the part of Comrade Varga. It is not a question here of quibbling about words, but it is an important issue, and I assure you that if in our fight against the social-democracy we should fail to defend the Marxian conceptions and popularise them among the workers — which is absolutely possible — we should by this very thing introduce confusion.

WHEN ONE CANNOT SEE THE FOREST FOR THE TREES.

Comrade Varga said that my report contained all kinds of interesting things, but not the most important questions which would interest "a gathering of militant Communists". This is, in my opinion, a serious accusation. There are, indeed, such politicians who are prone to overlook the most important things, who cannot see the forest for the trees. I should not like to be counted to such politicians. Comrade Varga had a certain justification for criticism on the grounds that in my report I have dealt only theoretically with these questions of capitalist rationalisation and the living standard of the workers. It cannot be said, however, that these questions are merely of an academic character; they are questions of supreme interest just now to every worker in the factory, to every unemployed worker, and above all, to every militant Communist. That such is the case, has been demonstrated at our Plenum. Comrade Varga's contribution to the discussion consisted only in that he finally mustered the courage to admit the possibility that he was too isolated from the real life of the working masses and was capable of overlooking hard facts that are visible to every worker.

Comrade Varga's strong point is in the study of economic conditions, in the description of various details of the economic situation. For instance, there can be made a little amendment in the resolution from what he has said on the agrarian crisis and on the actual crisis of credits. His weak point is expressed in his deductions and generalisations. Also on the question of reparations he has drawn wrong conclusions from a whole series of absolutely correct data, as has been pointed out by Comrades Molotov and Neumann. Further, he has quite mechanically linked up the question of the revival of the mass fights of the workers with the deterioration of capitalist business conditions. This matter is not quite so simple. We see, for instance, in the United States that in spite of prosperity there are big strike movements which cannot be explained solely by

partial crises in those particular industrial areas. Or how can a slump in business account for the big mass movements which have lately taken place in Germany? To state in a quite terse form the relationship between the forces of labour and the ups and downs of business, it would perhaps be more proper to say that a rapid change in business conditions affords a favourable basis for the revival of the mass fights of the workers.

Comrade Varga said that I had stated that "the over-estimation of technical progress was a Right deviation" and he observed: "This I fail to understand". Well, there are two different branches of science: technology and economics. In my report I have dealt with economics, not with technology. Many technical achievements may be of the highest interest as such, and we have no objection when individual comrades are privately doting on them. Yet in my report I said nothing about them, but about a wrong tendency which is revealed in the following two facts: Firstly, that any technical discovery is taken without further ado as an economic advance of capitalism, and secondly, that one overlooks the economic hindrances and restraining factors to the application of technical progress in capitalist production, the hindrances due to the property relations of capitalism, and above all, to the monopoly development of capitalist property. To my mind, this tendency is not merely a simple Right deviation, as some comrades think, but it leads directly, as I have said, to a revision of the fundamentals of Marxism. Why? Because, according to the Marxian doctrine, the economic substantiation for the collapse of capitalism consists precisely in the intensification of the contradiction between the development of the forces of production (through technical progress in production) and the parallel development of monopoly in the relations of capitalist property. He who says on this point, "I fail to understand", says no more nor less than that he fails to understand the economic inevitability of the collapse of capitalism. I do not mean to say that this is what Comrade Varga meant. At any rate, I wish to observe that while at first I felt somewhat uncertain whether it would not be superfluous to cite well-known Marxian principles in my report, I now find that this was not at all superfluous. Because anyone who does not understand this Marxian law, or forgets it, if he thinks at all economically and is moreover a revolutionary, must necessarily find out some substitute principles. To my mind, a substitute of this kind is the law advanced by Varga in his brochure to the VI World Congress. However, let me precede this by a couple of side remarks.

Comrade Theodorovitch gave in his speech a quite correct amendment to the theses on the agrarian crisis which is now maturing. It seems to me that these amendments can be accepted. But in stating his grounds for these amendments, he displayed a certain one-sidedness when he centred his whole attention on the "central fundamental contradiction" of capitalism by which he meant the contradiction between the continuous development of industry and the backwardness of agriculture. To be sure, this contradiction is also a highly important fact, but when it is put in the foreground as the "central fundamental contradiction" of capitalism, the idea might easily be suggested that one does not recognise the decisive importance of the other contradictions of capitalism nor the character of the fundamental contradictions (paying attention only to the secondary contradictions). It would certainly be wrong at this stage of development to reduce the decisive contradictions of the imperialist world to this one contradiction (between the development of industry and agriculture). He who would follow this line of thought to its logical conclusion, would get into the rut of the non-Marxian theories of the gradual dying of capitalism, as happened even to a great revolutionary like Rosa Luxemburg. This is also the direction towards which "grows" the tendency of the conception of Comrade Bukharin that the capitalist anarchy in the internal market is being replaced by capitalist organisation (while the anarchy remains only in the world market). Comrades Neumann and Manuilsky have already criticised here the last article by Comrade Bukharin. I have not yet had the opportunity to examine this article, but it seems to me that the criticisms were generally right. I should only advise Comrade Neumann to modify the passage in his speech where he gave it as my view that "technical progress was hampered by capitalist competition" (?), and also another passage in which he described the "conflict between increased productive capacity and the insufficient capacity of the markets"

as the "chief contradiction". Of course, the last mentioned contradiction is a fact. But when we deal with the fundamental chief contradiction, it would be better for us to keep as far as possible in orthodox fashion to the formulae laid down by Marx, proceeding from the sphere of distribution to the fundamental contradiction between the development of the forces of production and the development of the capitalist property relations, of "monopoly capital". (Neumann: "Which is also expressed through competition".) Monopoly capital is the fundamental fetter upon the capitalist mode of production. It is the outward form of capitalism with which the centralisation of the means of production and the socialisation of labour become incompatible. It is true monopoly capital does not do away with competition, but this monopoly is also a fetter to free competition. Naturally, the contradictions of capitalism find their expression in the market. But even the world market is no longer a perfectly free market. The world has been shared out, and in the struggle for economic expansion, the monopoly capital of one imperialist power encounters the monopoly of the other.

"THE TENDENCY TO DIMINUTION IN THE NUMBER OF WORKERS."

I have alluded to the law laid down by Varga. Comrade Varga himself denies that he ever laid down a law. He had only written about the "tendency to diminution in the number of workers". (Varga: "About the reduction in the number of workers in the service of industrial capital"). Comrade Varga said in his speech that he was a man of modesty, that 8 years were not enough to work out a real law, and that he merely wanted to state a statistical fact. Why so modest? In Comrade Varga's brochure we read something different. He wrote:

"A thorough investigation of recent development shows that cause of chronic mass unemployment does not lie primarily in these hindrances (i. e. in the industrialisation of the oversea countries, in the impoverishment of Europe, in the agrarian crisis. — K.), but is the inevitable result of the intensification of the inner contradictions of capitalism."

Already here we get something different from a mere statement of the fact of increased unemployment. Comrade Varga goes on, upon the basis of a theoretical survey of the mutual relations between profit and surplus value, to draw the following general conclusion:

The interest of individual capitalist enterprises to reduce their costs of production by cutting down the wages, so as to secure a greater share in the profits for themselves, is so contradictory to the interest of the capitalist class as a whole in increasing the total capital to the utmost value."

Comrade Varga goes on to describe "three main tendencies of capitalism" which include the two laws of Marx, the tendency for the higher organic composition of capital and the tendency for declining rates of profit, and as a third, "tendency for diminution in the number of workers". Then Comrade Varga refers to the general law of capitalist accumulation and he adds the thesis that "in the post-war period there was a positive decrease in the number of labour forces employed by industrial capital, not only by agriculture; the tendency for making workers superfluous had been fully realised". This is the law laid down by Varga.

Thus, the baby is here, although it is a very tiny one. The motto to this chapter was borrowed by Varga from the American writer R. G. Tugwell, who said as follows: "We have gained the quite definite conception that the task of an employer is to reduce the number of employees." That is the baby. A bourgeois baby which Comrade Varga has wrapped in the napkin of "Marxian" phraseology. This American theory, as far as I can see, is made up of two component parts. One of them is — to use Comrade Varga's words — "the interest of

individual capitalist employers to reduce their industrial cost of production by cutting down the wages so as to secure themselves a greater share in the total profits." The other part of this theory I can see in the utopian desire of the capitalist class, or of the big magnates of capital, to get free from any dependence upon the proletariat of their respective country while at the same time constantly increasing their profits. This appears to be quite an alluring perspective: constant decrease in the number of workers, no danger of revolution, and yet a constant increase in the accumulation of profits. This is an ideal state of affairs for capitalism, such as exists only on the Riviera and in Monaco where there are very few industrial workers (but a sufficient number of lackeys). This would be, so to speak, the butterfly stage of capitalism, as Kautsky might call it. (Yet even in Monaco there was recently an upheaval, so that even there they are not absolutely safe from revolts).

It is one thing to observe the fact of a diminution in the number of workers in certain industrial areas, or even in a whole country, and quite a different thing to speak about a general tendency for a reduction in the number of workers. It is not at all my intention here to polemicise against these arguments of Comrade Varga. Why then have I mentioned here this theory originated in America and attacked it? I have done so for two reasons. Firstly, because we have seen here and there how good comrades, who do not belong to the Rights, are beginning to debate among themselves the pros and cons of Comrade Varga's law. In order that such confusion might bring no harm, I believe it necessary to settle this theory.

Secondly, it is essential to draw from these rather academic arguments an important general lesson.

A SERIOUS LESSON.

Comrades, the serious lesson to be drawn from these theoretical arguments is the exhortation: caution in dealing with bourgeois economists! Can bourgeois economics be recognised as real science? No, for it is primarily the *apology* of capitalism. This we should never lose sight of. The bourgeois economists, without a single exception, are only scientists as a side-line, but primarily they are apologists of capitalism. The statisticians are by no means the worst among them. Among the leading statisticians one may still come across people who are trying to some extent, by elaborating more critically their statistical methods, to save their profession from the state of a prostitute serving everybody's whims. The theoreticians are among the worst of bourgeois economists. To judge from the standpoint of science, all of them are dogs.

Naturally, we have to make use of bourgeois statistics. Also Marx and Lenin made use of them in their works. We may do this, but with all the necessary caution. We must test every time the veracity of the statistical figures, what they prove and what they do not. Great care must be taken to avoid drawing conclusions on the basis of bourgeois economics and generalising them. Especially he who has to have intercourse with bourgeois economic circles as a professional matter, like Comrade Varga, should know that he always runs the risk of being contaminated with ideological filth and vermin. Only the supreme Marxian discrimination, such as Lenin possessed, can serve as an absolute guarantee against contamination with the filth of bourgeois economics. Comrade Minor has rightly emphasised what tremendous ideological pressure is brought to bear, for instance, upon the Communists in America, by the bourgeois press and literature; only this accounts for the crude opportunistic content of the theses of the majority leaders to the last Party Convention. None of us has an absolute guarantee of keeping pure from the vermin of bourgeois economics, if he does not take the most careful measures of Marxian hygiene. Comrade Varga is a conscientious investigator, he is conscientious with all his facts, but his method is not always unobjectionable, and his conclusions are not always pure. I therefore reiterate: when having intercourse with the filthy society of bourgeois economists the most rigid scientific, Marxian hygiene is indispensable. One should particularly take care to keep one's head clean.

II. On the Further Bolshevisation of Communist Parties.

There was perfect unanimity at the Plenum as to the character of the present period. The characterisation given in the draft resolution has not been contradicted. If I wished to state quite briefly this characterisation, I might say that the "third period" is not a period of stabilisation, but a period of the shattering of capitalist stabilisation, and furthermore, a period of the maturing of the new revolutionary tide. Particularly important to our revolutionary practice is the fact that this period represents a period of preparatory struggles. Comrade Molotov in his speech has already pointed out that the fights of the present time are preparatory fights for the final ones. The historic sense of the present period consists in the acceleration and preparation of the revolutionary upheaval, in the revolutionisation of the large masses, in strengthening the positions of the revolutionary labour movement to render possible the victory of the proletariat. The whole tendency of the movement has an upward trend, a tendency towards intensified forms of fighting, a tendency towards the political general strike, towards the tremendous growth of the class-consciousness and militancy of the proletariat.

At the same time we should keep a sharp outlook on the tactics of our enemies towards the revolutionary movement. These tactics are directed, on the one hand, towards sidetracking the process of revolutionisation going on among the proletarian masses, and on the other hand, towards splitting the proletarian fighting front, towards isolating and defeating the class-conscious revolutionary vanguard by means of baiting, calumny, provocation, persecution, terror, etc., in a word, towards destroying the mass character of the proletarian struggle. An important weapon of our enemies in the pursuit of these tactics are the "poison gas" methods of the social-fascists, as well as the method of provocation which will perhaps even more profusely be applied in the immediate future: the provocation of premature actions which are utilised in order utterly to defeat the Communist Party.

In order to frustrate such provocation, we should neither avoid the struggle nor allow our enemies to dictate to us its form and the time of action; under no circumstances should we allow ourselves to be detached and isolated from the masses, but we should so conduct our struggles as to mobilise the largest masses. Through these struggles of the present we must grow stronger, gaining more and more in revolutionary fighting power.

Have we not grown stronger in late years? To be sure, since the beginning of the second post-war period we have gained very much in revolutionary fighting power. You will recollect that at that time there was the danger of the Communist Parties becoming isolated from the large masses. We were then pictured by the social-democrats as splitters of the labour movement, as sectarians. The united front tactics that we are now carrying out from below, in those days we carried out not only from below, but also from the top. Was this a wrong policy then? No, comrades, it was not. By our united front tactics we have won the confidence of large masses of workers and have gained a good deal in prestige. A good deal was not realised then by the working masses, many of them wanted frequently the united front at any price. They were then on the defensive and were afraid of any split in the labour front. By our tactics then we gained a firm foothold in the mass movements of the proletariat. Our mass influence has grown stronger. It is true, this mass influence is not always expressed directly in the election results. In view of the acute actual situation, as for instance in England, not only a large section of the petty-bourgeois elements, but also a considerable section of the workers, of the semi-reformist workers, have begun to vacillate; they may, for some time, go over to the side of the bourgeoisie, and after some time, having become thoroughly disappointed, they may give us their confidence, provided that the Communist Party will pursue the proper tactics.

The disproportion between the growth of our mass influence and the relatively weak organisational development of our own Parties has also been thoroughly thrashed out at this Plenum. In this connection I must declare that the problem of combining the illegal and semi-legal existence of our Party with

the broad mass activity has almost failed to be dealt with at this Plenum. The Org. Department must take up the elaboration of this question, and the necessary advice must be given to the respective Parties. Needless to say, under the conditions of illegality there are certain natural limitations to the direct influence of the Communist Party, even if these limitations are not so narrow as the scope of our present influence in the different countries. But under legal and semi-legal conditions the discrepancy between our political and organisational influence is a defect which should not be underestimated and which should be unconditionally overcome.

LACK OF PROPER CONNECTION BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL WORK.

Comrade Piatnitsky in his speech has pointed out the political significance of our organisational tasks. You have heard the clear response with which this was met at this Plenum, a much clearer response than at our previous gatherings. This shows that our comrades are now grasping the increased political importance of the organisational tasks in the present period.

Lenin in his last speech before the IV. World Congress pointed out the importance of utilising the Russian experiences. I will also remind the comrades that at the commencement of the revolutionary upheaval in Russia, in March 1917, when Comrade Lenin learned in Switzerland about the February Revolution, he wrote forthwith: "Organisation, that is the slogan of the hour!" He wrote:

"Comrades, you will not succeed in securing a lasting victory in the next, in the real revolution, unless you accomplish miracles of proletarian organisation."

This was in March 1917. If Lenin spoke in those days about a "splendid organisation of the whole of the Russian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia" which, he thought, should be opposed by "an equally splendid organisation of the proletariat"; we must observe that the bourgeoisie to-day in the capitalist countries of Europe and America is even much better organised. If Lenin in those days had in view the workers' councils for Russia, his exhortation may be applied to-day to all forms of proletarian fighting organisations in the capitalist countries. The bourgeois counter-revolution in all the capitalist countries is trying to improve its militant class organisations all along the line; it tries in the first place to achieve this through the fascisation of the whole of the bourgeois class rule, through enlisting the aid of the reformist labour organisations to the bourgeois machinery of oppression, and through social-fascism. Our only answer should be to stake everything upon strengthening the organisation of the revolutionary front to an equal extent. Comrade Thälmann has fully emphasised these tasks in his report to the XII. Congress of the C. P. G. I might do here the same.

Since the speech delivered by Lenin at the IV. World Congress the warning was given in all the instructions of the E. C. C. I. against a stereotyped manner of carrying out the organisational work. In late years attention was drawn more and more to the political content of this work. It is nevertheless a fact that in the practice of our Parties a certain detrimental separation of politics from organisational work was revealed. The proper connection, the proper synthesis between politics and organisation is frequently not discovered. Not in all the Sections does this defect exist to an equal extent: in some Sections and in some districts there may be observed only a certain one-sidedness due to a poor sub-division of labour. On the other hand, in the worst cases this phenomenon is associated with an under-estimation of either the proper political line or the organisational tasks. Nay, there are even such Sections, entire Parties, in which there is a certain one-sidedness in one direction or another.

As a case in point I might allude to our Chinese Party. In our letters we drew the attention of the Chinese Party to the necessity of raising the ideological level, as an essential task.

Yet I must say that in the ideological discussions the Chinese comrades are by no means the last. On the contrary, on reading the last letters and protocols of the Pol-Bureau it ought to be said that there is even a little too much of the good things to be found here. Too much discussion of principles, and too little practical work. One finds here almost unending quibbles about fine points in the formulae, quibbles which almost border on hair-splitting. One gains the impression as though there was an incessant hunt for deviations. This would not be so bad in itself, were it accompanied in practice by energetic organisational activity among the workers. Unfortunately this is not the case in China to-day. I might therefore with full emphasis and responsibility point out to the Chinese Party leadership that they should take up in all seriousness the work in the organisations, in the nuclei, and in trade unions. This practical work is just as important as the analysis of the situation and the definition of the political line.

Quite the opposite, and a good deal worse, is the situation in the Swedish Party; at any rate such was the case until last year. This Party may record organisational achievements and successes. Of course, not in the sense that the Party can be described as thoroughly Bolshevik, even if only in the organisational respect; nevertheless it has successes to its credit. Constant recruiting of members and subscribers for the newspapers is successfully carried on in Sweden. Some calendar campaigns, particularly press campaigns, are carried out very well. On some international questions the Party has carried out the campaign even better than on Swedish questions; for instance, the Finnish question was well thrashed out in the Swedish press. The business management and the editorial work of the newspapers are very carefully carried on. Also the distribution of Communist literature is very well organised in Sweden. If bad literature is well distributed, this is no credit; but if good literature is well distributed, as is mostly the case in Sweden, this is a double credit. Also the organisation of trade union work is now gradually improving. Particularly successful was the organisation of the election campaign, at least in regard to the collection of funds and the winning of votes. Yes, comrades, there was a time, the time of Höglund, when even this work was not done by the Party, when it practically did nothing at all. To-day we see an activation of the Party. Yet in regard to establishing the political line of the Party, to clarifying its fundamental questions of Communist strategy and tactics, there has prevailed in the Swedish Party until quite lately an incredible superficial impressionism — not the social-democratism of Höglund's time, but an opportunistic eclecticism of the worst kind, I should say a sort of unprincipled carelessness which almost borders on complete blindness. The last Plenum of the C.C. marked already a turning point, nevertheless the January Plenum presented something entirely incredible. There was absolutely no analysis whatever of the political and economic situation; why, the comrades even thought that this was not necessary. I believe, Comrade Flyg said that they could not do it, that it did not possess sufficient funds to establish an institute of scientific research. And the resolutions of the January Plenum, how weak they were, how low was their level! What does such political blindness lead to? Naturally, it leads to a subjection of the Party to the Right danger.

And the Right danger in the Swedish Party is grave. This was already said by the VI World Congress, but how did the January Plenum of the Swedish Party react upon this? It was said in a casual sort of way that in the opinion of the VI World Congress "there may be certain tendencies of this kind in our Party". It means that the Party leadership was not aware whether there was a Right danger or not. At the last Plenum of the C.C. certain mistakes of the Party leadership and of the parliamentary faction were criticised. But it was less a question here about individual mistakes as about a Right deviation of the majority of the Party leadership all along the line, in all the spheres of activity. The demonstration which did not take place in Sweden on May Day has acquired a symbolical meaning. Yes, had the Communist Party in Sweden already won the majority of the working class, do you believe that this would have meant the proletarian revolution in Sweden? I do not believe it. At any rate, it would not happen if the weather was not fine. (Laughter.) And I might say to Comrades Flyg and Samuelson that when the proletariat seizes power there is always bad weather. The workers will always stand outside and be disgusted if the leaders will not appear, as it happened

in May Day in Sweden. It is therefore to the interest of the proletarian revolution in Sweden that the Swedish Communist Party should now be politically activated, invigorated, and revolutionised. The Party must at last take up earnestly the fight against the Right danger. If this will not happen, the Swedish proletariat will be caught unawares by the maturing revolutionary fights; the workers will march into the street unprepared, and there will be a very heavy price to pay.

WHAT DOES THE TASK OF FURTHER BOLSEVISATION REQUIRE?

How is the synthesis, the connection between correct policy and correct organisation, to be established in practice? For this synthesis we need no new slogan, we have had a very good slogan for many years. It is the further bolshevisation of our Party. We still take the term of bolshevisation in its broadest sense, as the further political and organisational development of the whole activity of our Parties in the spirit of Leninism and with the consideration of the experiences of the Russian Bolsheviks, and I might now add, also of the experiences of the German Bolsheviks. Our Parties have already made considerable success in recent years on the road towards Bolshevisation, but a good deal more has yet to be achieved by all the Parties. "In this respect we should not be modest in our demands to the Parties," said Comrade Thälmann in his speech. That is quite right.

Bolshevisation means a correct revolutionary policy combined with a proper organisation. A good deal was said here on the political aspect of the question. This comprised everything spoken here about the character of the present period, about our immediate political tasks, about the united front tactics, about the tactics in the forthcoming mass fights, about gaining the leading role for the Communists in these fights, about the fight against fascism and social fascism, particularly against the Left wing of social-fascism, about the fight against the Right danger, and so on. Nevertheless, not one of these tasks should be considered only as a political task, but there should really be a Bolshevik organisation for carrying them out.

All these are important tasks, such as the conduct of the revolutionary mass fights, the fight against the Right danger, etc. Nevertheless, the pursuit of the proper political line is not only a political, but at the same time also an organisational task. The "line" is the deliberate definition of our strategical chief aims for a certain period or for certain actions or sections of our activity. The general aim of our strategy consists in strengthening our revolutionary positions, as well as in acquiring new positions. By establishing the concrete line we define the immediate aims which we pursue on the road towards strengthening our revolutionary positions. Yet the achievement of these aims pre-supposes not only the proper tactics and the proper slogans, the proper agitation and propaganda, but also the proper organisational measures. It is essential to define clearly these partial strategical aims from time to time for the various spheres of our activity, as well as for the important campaigns and actions, so that we might be able to verify later on whether the aims were properly chosen when the line was laid down, whether there were mistakes in the slogans or in the tactics, whether the organisation was efficient, and in what respect it was deficient, and so on. Care must be taken, however, to draw up the strategical aim with the utmost possible correctness. It means that in laying down the aim, say, for an election campaign, it should not merely be the polling of so many votes or the election of so many candidates; far more important is the revolutionisation of the masses of the workers.

This is the problem of real Bolshevik leadership, of further Bolshevisation of the Communist leadership in all the spheres of the proletarian class struggle. The Communist Party in the Soviet Union frequently defines beforehand in clear figures the objective of a given campaign, announcing afterwards the percentage at which the campaign was carried out. Thus we know that the campaign was carried out to the extent of 80%, which was bad, or 100%, which was good, or 120% which was superb, and so on. Of course, not everything can be expressed

in figures. But a Bolshevik leadership must always know, firstly, what it wants; secondly, what is strategically possible to achieve and by what means; thirdly, it ought to undertake everything to carry the decision really into effect. I must lay particular emphasis on the last point, when speaking about the further bolshevisation of our Parties. Sometimes we pass very good Bolshevik resolutions both on political and organisational questions, only that they are not carried out. And it is frequently very difficult to ascertain as to who was responsible for this. Circulars and instructions were issued, everything is in shape, only the resolutions have not been carried out. Who is responsible? Naturally, the leadership! Yet not only the central leadership, but also the district leadership and the local committees are responsible for carrying out the resolutions and for enforcing them. They should be called to account if they fail to lead in a proper Bolshevik way so that the resolutions might be carried out and enforced. It is better to pass less resolutions, but have the adopted resolutions better carried out!

How shall we march on to the decisive fights for power if we have no guarantee that our resolutions will be carried out? What is the worth of an army leadership whose orders are not carried out? There may be the best strategists in this army leadership, but the army will nevertheless be defeated. This is not only a question of discipline. Of course, there should prevail an iron discipline. In a period like the one through which we are now passing, the Communist Parties must be chemically pure from any petty-bourgeois Lovestonism. There is no room in our ranks for people who fail to understand what every striking worker understands, that the minority must submit to the majority, that the lower organs must be subordinated to the higher. Yet this is not everything. The leadership of each Section must understand the supreme political importance of the appropriate organisation for carrying out and enforcing the resolutions which have been passed. A change is necessary in this respect in all the Communist Parties. Each Section has its own defects in this respect, as well as in the application of the different fighting methods, and these defects call for a real turning.

I take as an instance a question which would seem to be purely organisational, the question of fluctuation. Is not the overcoming of fluctuation a necessary task? Wherein lies the defect? It lies in ourselves, not in the workers. With few exceptions, the workers who join our organisation are the very elements from which we must and can build up our Party, if we shall only properly understand our own tasks. Yet as a rule, we do not understand them. Our Party leaders should consult more the workers in the factories on these questions, not in order to act invariably upon their advice, but in order to hear their opinion about the cause of fluctuation, and how to organise in a better way the work of the Party so as to eliminate this evil.

Another question is that of the factory nuclei. Is this perhaps a small matter? A Bolshevik, properly functioning factory nucleus, above all in a large factory, a nucleus that is always active but can never be stamped out by the enemy in the factory, is not this a politically important thing? To fail to see this would be like failing to see the use of artillery in warfare. A nucleus in a large factory is an important fighting base against fascism, against social-fascism, against the war danger, i. e. on the all-important questions. If we have only five new nuclei in five of the largest factories in proper working order, this is certainly very little even in a little country, nevertheless this is a good deal more than 5cwts. of circulars that are not read and are not carried out. (Piatnitsky: "But the nuclei must also be active.") I have precisely spoken about well functioning nuclei, and the greatest emphasis ought to be made upon this point.

Furthermore, a general improvement in the division of labour is necessary. This does not mean any rigid specialisation, but a politically regulated distribution of the work among the members, the training of new cadres, the extension of the work in the army, and the creation of a better apparatus for this work. These are the most important and urgent tasks in the bolshevisation of our Party.

ON THE COMMUNIST YOUTH MOVEMENT.

To illustrate what I have said so far about the tasks of further Bolshevisation, I might illustrate the subject by referring to a sphere of activity in which the Communist leadership is a very grateful, yet exceedingly difficult task. I am referring to the Communist Youth movement. The political maturity of the Communist Youth movement is fairly great, but equally great is the organisational weakness of the movement. The relatively high maturity of this movement is primarily expressed in the participation of the Communist Youth organisations and Leagues in the general work of the Party, and especially also in the inner-Party fights and in supporting the correct line of the Executive. This means saying a good deal. This is to be accounted for partly by the fact that the Communist Youth in the capitalist countries is far more free from the social-democratic traditions than the older members of our Party. The most valuable services rendered by the Communist Youth movement in the last five years consist in that it has effectively helped our Parties and the Comintern in the struggle against Trotskyism, and now in the struggle against the Right deviations.

Is this function of the Communist youth movement already coming to an end? By no means. The fight against the Right danger is now the most important one. In supporting this struggle of the Communist Parties the youth movement to-day — if not to an equally high extent in all countries — is still playing an important role. A considerable section of the leading cadres of our Party, even some of the best members of the present C. C.'s, have come to us from the youth movement. Nevertheless, in a country like Germany, where the Party leadership has a proper Bolshevik line, the political strength of the Communist youth movement certainly does not find its expression, but there is rather a certain limping behind, a certain lack of understanding on the part of the youth what particular work it should do under the circumstances (seeing that the Party leadership is following the correct line). No doubt there was at times unjustified criticism against the leadership of the Y. C. I., which can mostly be explained by the simple fact that the very Party leaders who represented the Right deviation found it inconvenient that the Communist Youth movement "intervened" in inner-Party matters. This is one thing, but justified criticism is another thing. It is our duty to the Communist Youth movement to criticise its shortcomings quite frankly. Nevertheless, there should be a certain forbearing in this matter. I feel this particularly because I once said at the VII. Plenum that our activity among the youth was confined within narrow limits, and the comrades in the Executive of the Y. C. I. took exception to this. Since then, the limits of this activity have not been widened, but almost any word of criticism in this respect is invariably met by leading comrades of the youth with the haughty reply: "What are you talking about, you do not know our movement and our activity!" I am therefore going to quote this time from sources which cannot be accused of ignorance in regard to the Communist youth movement. I am going to cite the following passages:

"The Youth Leagues are really little parties for the youth which are almost exclusively carrying out the proper Party tasks and therefore, embrace only the politically advanced elements of the proletarian youth. Their shortcoming consists in that they do not understand how to carry out the proper political line in the youth question, to combine the general political work which is absolutely necessary with the everyday youth activity."

It is said further:

"Under the present state of affairs, in view of the importance of the youth for the political development, in view of the growing activity and militant determination of the masses, and particularly of the masses of young workers, the development of the Youth League is such that we must say, it lags behind the events. The Leagues do not fulfil their task as organisers of the struggle of the working youth for its interests, simply because they have not struck sufficiently deep roots in the factories and in the mass organisations, because the system of their activity and leadership is backward, and mostly of a social-democratic character."

This is very sharp criticism. Is it exaggerated? I believe it is somewhat exaggerated, but on the whole it is true. This criticism is taken from the last speech by Comrade Khitarov at this Plenum. It is precisely because of the great value attached to the Communist Youth movement that one must insist upon improving the activity in this respect. The facts and figures given by Comrade Piatnitsky showing the stagnation in the growth of this movement are undeniable. And Comrade Piatnitsky was also right when he said that the circle of those elements to be embraced by the youth movement should be far wider than the recruiting circle of our Parties. In the Communist youth organisations — at least in countries with a legal Communist movement — there should be no particular conditions of admission, and young proletarians should be admitted into the League without any stipulations. The leadership of the Communist youth movement, its leading cadres, must be Communists. But the large masses of the working youth must be attracted to the highest possible extent.

Where is the sore spot? Regardless of the insufficient attraction of the masses of the working youth to this movement, many young workers join the Y. C. League, but many of them quit. In the course of three years out of about 100,000 new members, only 20% have stayed in the organisation. Of course, a certain part of this fluctuation is natural: about 15% of the membership of the Y. C. L. are annually transferred to the Communist Parties. But the fluctuation is a good deal larger. Without this fluctuation the youth movement should annually increase on an average by 30% at least. It is therefore our primary task to investigate and eliminate the causes of this great fluctuation. The explanations which I heard and which I read about the causes of this fluctuation are not satisfactory. For instance, the fact that the Communist Youth movement is subjected to persecution cannot be denied, but equally so, and at any rate not less, are the Communist Parties subjected to persecution. The fault is in ourselves, in our Parties and in our Executive, but also in the Executive of the Y. C. I. and in the Committees of the Y. C. I. The system, to use the words of Comrade Khitarov, "the system of their activity and leadership is a backward one." The system must therefore be changed. But how!

I have only three little suggestions to make, but I hope that a little use will be derived from them. Firstly, to carry out the decisions. The Y. C. I. itself has decided to take a turn towards mass activity, to employ better working methods, to apply the "transmission belt" of auxiliary organisations, and so on. I have found that these decisions really contain a good many correct points. Yet these decisions were not carried out; there was no organisations to carry out the decisions and enforce them. This should be remedied as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the distribution of the work among the officials in the youth movement is extremely backward, sometimes even more backward than in the Parties. If many Party officials are overburdened with work on account of bad distribution of labour, this is even more the case in the distribution of work in the youth movement; the youth officials must frequently do full Party work in addition to their youth work, and so on.

Secondly, I have said in the beginning that the leadership of the youth movement is an exceedingly difficult task. Why? Because it presupposes both politically and organisationally everything that should be pre-supposed in regard to the leadership of the Party organisation, and something else besides, namely, a certain "pedagogical" understanding; of course, I am not saying this in the sense of school pedagogics, but in the sense of the revolutionary education of the unripe young elements, in the sense of Bolshevik educational activity. This side of the activity is easier, less complicated in the Soviet Union than it is in the capitalist countries. The whole environment in the Soviet Union is favourable to this work. (Neumann: "This is objective pedagogics!") Also subjective. Here in the Soviet Union the pedagogical question arises rather in connection with the Pioneer movement. The Russian Pioneers, at least the most advanced elements among them, when joining the Y. C. L. have already an amount of political schooling that should not be under-estimated. The working youth in the capitalist countries of 15—16 years of age is politically far less mature. If high political and organisational claims were to be made on them as soon as they join the organisation, in the majority of cases the result would be that they would soon withdraw in masses. Hence this does not lead to the desired result. Activisation, also

political activation is necessary, but how shall this be done? The task is to educate the young members to Communist activity in the full sense of the word. But if the full extent were to be demanded from the very outset, nothing would be achieved. The degree of the political maturity of the members ought to be considered in organising the work. This is what I mean by taking into consideration the "pedagogical", i. e. educational point of view. Should this mean a "depolitisation" of the youth movement? Not at all! I wish to say to the comrades of the Youth Executive that when the demand for depolitisation of the Youth Leagues is made in some of the Parties, I shall join them in the plucky fight against it. But it is essential to obviate the backwardness of the system of activity and service in the youth movement.

It is said by the comrades of the Youth Executive that they will have yet to consider the question, that they would have to start a discussion on it, and convene a conference for the autumn at which these questions would be thrashed out. Very well, I should only like to advise them to confer also with wise adult revolutionary workers on this question. I would also advise them not to copy in stereotyped fashion all the methods that are successfully applied by the youth movement in the Soviet Union in the Youth Leagues of other countries, but to work everywhere in the true Bolshevik spirit. I shall refer to a little instance. On the question of uniform clothing there was superfluous resistance offered by the leadership of the international youth movement for a number of years until it finally yielded when the uniform had already been adopted by the youth movement in the Soviet Union. Does this make the membership of our youth organisations any worse? Does this depolitisise them? (A voice: On the contrary!) Since the uniform proves so attractive, why should it not be utilised?

Comrade Khitarov has quoted in his speech a highly instructive letter by Comrade Lenin. Comrade Lenin's letters are always highly instructive, but it happens sometimes that they do not prove what one wants to prove. For instance, Comrade Khitarov wanted to prove by this letter the following: "This is a good reply to those comrades who still doubt the necessity for political activity of the Youth Leagues." There may be still some comrades in the different countries who have not yet realised this and to whom this understanding has to be brought home; but with this letter of Lenin there can hardly be anything started in this question, because Lenin does not speak here about the political activity of the Young Communist Leagues: he speaks on quite a different subject, on the necessity of attracting the young workers to the general militant organisations of the workers. Nevertheless there is something in this letter by Lenin which, I believe, not only the Parties, but also the youth organisations should bear in mind. Lenin writes as follows:

"There are a great many people who fail to understand that in recruiting members among the youth, one ought to be more broad-minded and courageous, and again more broad-minded and courageous, without being afraid of this."

It seems to me that this should be taken into consideration also by our Youth Leagues.

Thirdly, I should like to say the following. It is true that the Communist youth at its last Congress has taken a turning towards mass activity, although this decision was somewhat belated, being taken only after prolonged hesitation. But perhaps you have still insufficiently emphasised the slogan, having taken it too lightly, too calmly, without any particular enthusiasm? Is this remark perhaps a petty question? No, it is not. It is a question about the youth. Some comrades among the leadership of the youth movement are strong in criticising, but a good deal weaker in revolutionary enthusiasm. I should therefore like to give the following advice: in leading the movement of the young forces they should introduce more enthusiasm, more revolutionary temperament into this work, and especially, that they should look for new methods and for a new spirit. In this respect a complete turning has to be effected.

Why talk so much about the Young Communist movement? Because it is of the highest political importance during this very period, in the factories, in the trade unions, in the workers' sport organisations, in the army, in all the mass fights, in all the mass organisations. Without a strong and really Bolshevik youth movement we cannot win the victory. The duties of the Communist Parties and of the E. C. C. I. towards the youth mo-

vement have so far been quite deficiently carried out. In this the youth comrades are quite right. How rarely are youth questions at all discussed by the Party Committees! And if they are discussed, it is done so formally that in the majority of cases it can hardly be of any use to the youth movement. If the Communist youth movement is asked to take a more active part in the Party work, full support ought then to be extended to the youth movement. It is high time to put an end to the attempts of some Party Committees to place difficulties in the way of the Communist Youth movement (as is the case at the present time in Czechoslovakia). The Young Communist International should be continuously spurred to greater activity and efficiency.

REMARKS ON SOME SECTIONS.

Since Comrade **Manuilsky** in his concluding speech has dealt already with the questions of the individual Sections, including the questions relating to the C.P.G.B., I shall only add a few cursory remarks from the standpoint of Bolshevisation. First of all, about the C.P.G. The progress of Bolshevisation in the C.P.G. is a fact on which we have a fairly unanimous opinion. Yes, the Rights and the conciliators, intended to carry out last Autumn, on September 26th, a radical debolshevisation of the Party. The attempt had been quite shrewdly prepared for. Comrade **Thälmann** was to be removed from his position. Quite recently, at the April Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. it was asserted by Comrade **Bukharin** that Comrade **Thälmann** was a brother-in-law of **Wittorf**. I ask the German delegation whether this is true. (Answer by the delegation: No, it is a lie.) (**Remmele**: Bukharin knew this.) It is necessary to repudiate here this story publicly, so that no such twaddle might be brought up again to discredit the leadership of the German Party.

I cannot conceive how Comrade **Bukharin** could accept such lies without verifying. It is a petty-bourgeois way of thinking to assume that if Comrade **Thälmann** was the brother-in-law of a fellow who committed defalcations, it was natural for him to help him in this work. This petty-bourgeois calumny was to be utilised last Autumn to debolshevise the C.P.G. But the E.C. and the membership of the German Party were vigilant. Who was to take **Thälmann's** place on the Party Committee? **Ewert** and **Ernest Mayer**, and in the background there were **Brandler** and **Thalheimer**. Is it not better from the standpoint of Bolshevisation that Comrade **Thälmann** has remained at the head of the Party leadership? Or would the C.P.G. be more militant, better prepared for the coming class fights, had its head been cut off? Would the C.P.G. in that case have carried out its task on May Day, or would the result have been different? (**Neumann**: The same would have happened as in Sweden.) Not only the Swedish Party, but I am afraid — I am not saying this as a reproach, but as a serious warning — that many other Parties would have failed in a situation similar to that of May Day in Germany. The German Communist Party must keep on bolshevising, especially in the sphere of organisation. I feel convinced that the C.P.G. will do so with all the energy and resolve which it possesses. The C.P.G. will march at the head of the revolutionary mass actions of the German proletariat.

The example of the C.P.G. has demonstrated to us most clearly the necessity for the Communist Parties to get rid of the Right ballast and to purge the Party committees of the conciliators, if the Parties are to be equal to their militant tasks of the present period. This has also been emphasised in our draft resolution:

“Without cleansing the Communist Parties of the opportunist elements, without cleansing them of the conciliatory attitude towards the latter, the Communist Parties cannot make successful progress towards solving the problems which confront them during this new stage of the labour movement.”

In the C. P. of Czechoslovakia there was even a stronger cleansing of the Right elements than in the C.P.G., and it is clear that this cleansing proved also here an unquestionable prerequisite for the necessary change in the political course of the Party. However, this change was at first carried out with insufficient Bolshevist efficiency. Concretely I refer to the carrying out of this change in the Red trade unions. For it was known for a long time in advance what sort of people **Hais** and **Co.**,

were, this was many times repeated everyday, but no organisational steps were taken to prevent these rogues from getting into their hands the property of the proletarian organisations.

Judging from the standpoint of Bolshevist development, I believe next to the C.P.G. the Communist Party of Poland has made the farthest progress. The next chief task of the C.P. of Poland on the road to further Bolshevisation I consider to be the creation of a united Party leadership as far as possible. This is an indispensable postulate to the consolidation of the Party. Bearing in mind the high demands made by the present situation on the Polish proletariat and the Polish Party, we must resolutely insist upon this unification and consolidation of the Party leadership. How can this be achieved? To my mind, this can be achieved by bringing together the best Bolshevists of both factions. The waverers must be brushed aside. It is high time that all those Party leaders in Poland who are real Bolshevists should smash the factions and take a really courageous and full step for the unification of the Party leadership. I believe, everything said here by Comrade **Lenski** unquestionably corresponds to the political demands now made on the Party by the situation. What reasons can Comrade **Pruchniak** adduce against this course, reasons that might be in the interest of the Polish Party and of the proletarian revolution in Poland?

I take this opportunity to urge the British comrades **Pollitt**, **Campbell** and **Bell** to decide upon a courageous and resolute step on the road for the further bolshevisation of the British Party. A similar exhortation ought to be made also to the Italian comrades **Ercoli** and **Garlandi**. What does it mean to take a courageous and resolute step on the road to Bolshevisation? It means to take such step without reservation, without any hesitation, without any inner restriction, with revolutionary determination and enthusiasm. This is necessary both to the Italian and the British Party. It is time to put an end to the hesitation which has found its expression also at this Plenum; this course is dictated by the interest of the Communist movement. I should particularly like to say to Comrade **Ercoli**, do away with every sentimentality, with every non-political “sense of fact” in regard to a Right like **Serra**. The same sense of fact was shown by **Ercoli** towards **Trotsky** at the VIII. Plenum, which was also a mistake. (**Ulbricht**: Perhaps this is something more than a sense of fact.) Comrade **Serra** must declare clearly and unequivocally whether he submits unconditionally to all the decisions of the Comintern and withdraws his opportunist memorandum; if not, he shall be thrown out of the Communist Party. There is no third way.

Comrade **Manuilsky** has already addressed some earnest words to Comrade **Humbert-Droz**. To this I have very little to add. His silence at this Plenum is a very loud speech; it is as audible as through a loud-speaker. He says he does not speak because he wants to be disciplined and does not wish to speak against the line of his Party. Why not for the line of the Party? In my opinion, the stubbornness with which Comrade **Humbert-Droz** insists upon his wrong standpoint is the clearest indication which we stand in the E.C.C.I. He has declared that some of his utterances in the Polit-Secretariat may have been a little hard because he was not a good master of the language. Yes, Comrade **Humbert-Droz** indeed is no longer a master of the language that is spoken here. He does not wish to admit a single mistake. This clearly reveals his attitude, showing that the Executive must now talk to him in plain terms, namely about the conditions under which he may remain in the Communist International. In our draft theses there are three such conditions enumerated. In a letter to the Swiss Party it was declared by Comrade **Humbert-Droz** that he was prepared to submit to the decisions of his Party and of the Comintern. But the three conditions of our theses contain something more. It is demanded that “the conciliators should openly and energetically dissociate themselves from the advocates of the Right deviations”. Has Comrade **Humbert-Droz** done this? No. The second condition is that “they shall wage an active fight against the Right deviations not only in words, but also in deeds”. Thirdly, that “they shall unconditionally submit to all the decisions of the Comintern and their Sections and actively carry them into effect”. Comrade **Humbert-Droz** must answer these questions here plainly. Yes or no?

III. Questions of the C. P. of the Soviet Union.

Now, comrades, I wish to draw your attention to the Russian question. Naturally, I can touch here only upon a tithe of the important actual problems of Soviet politics. Comrade **Molotov** has referred in the discussion to a number of facts concerning the achievements of Socialist construction in the Soviet Union. He mentioned data about the introduction of the system of the agrarian minimum, the building of tractor stations, etc. The tremendous importance of such facts is quite clear to the comrades from other countries. For this reason I believe it necessary to attempt to shed some light upon the economic background of these facts.

SOCIALIST AGRARIAN POLICY UNDER CONDITIONS OF PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP.

Personally I have often thought that one may indulge in the luxury of dispensing with an independent opinion on questions of agrarian policies of the Soviet Union. The Russian comrades are such trained politicians, they understand the problem so profoundly, so that it would not be "national limitation" on our part as E. C. C. I. workers, who are occupied day by day with affairs of the rest of the world, if we refrained from forming our own opinion on the peasant question of the Soviet Union. But this idea was wrong, neither was it possible, seeing that fundamental differences have arisen in the C. P. S. U. on this question, first through Trotskyism, and next through the Right opposition. The Trotskyist policy would have led to a rupture of the alliance with the large masses of middle peasants. It would have been tantamount to the collapse of the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union. All of us realised that it was indispensable to take up a clear position against this. Yet, an agrarian policy which would further the development of peasant economy in the Soviet Union not on socialist, but on capitalist lines, would it have been less dangerous? Also this course would have led the proletarian dictatorship to a rupture with the decisive masses of the poor and middle peasants, or it would have reduced the Socialist economy into an appendage of individual economy. In either case the socialist development of the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union would have been liquidated. Is not this a question of paramount international importance? Of course, it is. We must therefore deal with this question, because no Communist can refrain from forming a firm opinion on this question.

It is quite obvious that the socialist construction of industry in the towns of the Soviet Union can neither politically nor economically ignore the tremendous environment of backward peasant economy. The building of socialism is possible only under the hegemony of the proletariat, but this hegemony does not imply the total independence of the Socialist economy of the proletariat from the requirements of the peasantry, so that there would be no need whatever to consider the latter or to influence it. Although peasant agriculture in the Soviet Union is broken up into a multitude of small undertakings, nevertheless in their entirety they represent a tremendous force. How many peasant farms are there altogether? There were about 16 million peasant farms before the revolution, and now there are about 25 millions. It means that there has been a further breaking up into small farms. The smaller the peasant farms are, the less able are they to make use of machinery and other technical means, as well as to produce commodities for the market. This leads to a growing deficiency in agricultural produce and in raw materials for the industries, which raises the danger of a rupture in the town and country, between industry and agriculture.

Comrades, you will recollect the difficulties encountered by the Soviet Union in the State collection of grain in the Autumn of 1927 and in the Winter of 1928. Formerly even well-to-do peasants, kulaks, were forced to sell their grain. Now they have sufficient supplies and they were able to dictate the prices to the Soviets, trying to thwart the Soviet policy of prices. What was to be done under the situation? It was necessary to adopt emergency measures. There were no differences on this point, but on the question of the further line of permanent policy there came to light two different lines.

Comrade **Bukharin** demanded the "normalisation" of the market and a policy of "manoeuvring" with the grain prices,

i. e. raising the grain prices. As a matter of fact, the price of grain was as low then as it is to-day. The raising of prices would have been a concession to the sellers of grain. What would have been the consequences of raising the grain prices? Let us say, the Soviets would have increased their purchase price by 50%. The speculators could always raise the price to double or treble the amount, for the latter purchase only a few million poods, whereas the Soviets purchase hundreds of millions of poods. The peasant speculators would sell to the profiteers, while the Soviets would get nothing or little. The kulaks with their supplies could afford to wait for a further increase in the prices. It would also be necessary to raise the prices on other raw materials produced by the peasants. Furthermore, it would be necessary also to raise the wages of the workers, and consequently, the prices of industrial products, because otherwise there would soon be an end to industrialisation. This policy of prices would have soon compelled further increases of prices all along the line, yet affording no guarantee of securing grain, at least in sufficient quantities. This concession would have necessarily led to an endless number of concessions. The price policy of the Soviets would have been made directly dependent upon the price policy of the prosperous peasants and the speculators. This mad race of prices would have benefited only the Nepmen and the kulaks, the well-to-do elements of town and country. On the other hand, great hardships would have been imposed upon all low-paid workers, upon the semi-proletarians and small peasants in the country who have no grain to sell, and also upon those middle and small peasants who sell grain in the Autumn, but are compelled to buy back in the Spring at higher prices.

How does Comrade **Bukharin** picture to himself the possibility of regulating the prices, the checking of endless increases? He believes this should be effected through the co-operative organisations. Through the development of peasant co-operatives the peasant economy is to be led on towards socialism, emphasises Comrade **Bukharin** and he alludes to the great idea of Lenin. Comrade **Bukharin** has already urged for a number of years the fact that in some capitalist countries frequently a few big banks control and dominate the whole of the agricultural co-operative movement. From this he draws the conclusion that in the Soviet Union where the economic centralisation is much stronger, where not only the banks, but also all the other key positions of economy are in the hands of the proletarian State, it is only necessary to create a great network of agricultural co-operatives, something after the type of those already existing in the capitalist countries, and the Soviet State, through its centralised economic power, will get them completely under its control. This type of agricultural co-operatives in the capitalist countries comprises the consumers' societies and various forms of purchasing and selling co-operatives, but — and this is highly characteristic — the producers' co-operatives play a very negligible role.

At the same time an important fact is overlooked. Just because the peasant co-operatives in the capitalist countries develop on capitalist lines, is it possible to get them under capitalist control of the banks. Comrade **Bukharin** wrote:

"The principal network of our peasant co-operatives will be composed of co-operative nuclei that are not of the type of kulak organisations, but of 'producers' organisations; of societies growing into the system of our general State organs, thus becoming members of the uniform chain of socialist economy. On the other hand, the groups of kulak co-operatives will equally grow into the same system through the banks, etc. But the latter, will to some extent, constitute an alien body, something like the concession industries, for instance."

As you see, we have here a completely thought-out system. The salient feature of this system is the promotion of the all-round development of individual peasant farms and their introduction into Socialism on the basis of the free market. Objectively, this might lead to no other socialism than to the usual "free-trade socialism", i. e. to capitalism.

The other line, that of the C. C. was: no raising of prices; cheap commodities for the peasants; no discarding of price regulation by the proletarian State, but increased regulation. I am now going to quote from the speech delivered by Comrade Stalin at the April Plenum of the C. C. (from which I am citing only the most salient points) the following:

"The development of the individual undertaking of the middle and poor peasants must be complemented by the development of the collective and Soviet farms, by the system of mass contracts for grain, by more intense development of machinery and tractor stations, in order to facilitate the ousting of the capitalist elements from agriculture and the gradual transition of individual peasant farming to the road of big collective farms, to the road of collective labour."

Thus, it is a question here of a grand plan of technical and organisational reconstruction of agricultural production, and the collectivisation of agriculture, in order to form a **productive alliance** between socialist industry and agriculture, which naturally presupposes the utmost acceleration of the pace of industrialisation in the spheres of metallurgy, machine construction, tractors, chemical products, etc.

This means the building of Socialism, not only in the city, but — what is particularly difficult in the Soviet Union — in the gigantic number of backward Russian villages. The daring idea of Lenin to combine the State economy with co-operation in the direction of Socialism is now concretely carried out in the spirit of Lenin, and its practical realisation has been taken up with equal boldness and on an equally large scale as the idea itself was conceived. In the solid facts mentioned here by Comrade Molotov we find the expression of the first big successes of this work.

Naturally, this is carried on not merely by pursuing a policy of prices. Of course, it is not carried on without a **class struggle**. In fact, the class struggle is bound to grow more and more acute, not because the capitalist elements in the Soviet Union are growing stronger, but because the Socialist elements of the economy of the Soviet Union is becoming ever-stronger, crushingly stronger. The Russian bourgeoisie is not yet dead. It bases its hopes upon the capitalist world around the Soviet Union. The Shachty scandal was not the only instance of the deliberate injury done by the bourgeoisie. Other scandals of this kind have been revealed, and dangers of a similar character are still present. The kulaks in the rural districts are not only struggling for wealth, but also for complete political and economic freedom, for bourgeois democracy. They are fighting for influence over the large masses of middle peasants. Naturally, some provisional measures of coercion have to be taken against the kulaks.

Only through this class struggle, with the aid of the poor peasants and in alliance with the middle peasants, can the proletariat secure the victory. As a matter of fact, the Trotskyists could see in the Russian village only two strata: the poor, semi-proletarian peasants, and the kulaks; they overlooked entirely the large stratum of middle peasants. Comrade Bukharin actually loses sight of the social differentiation among the peasants in general, to him there is only almost the single mass of middle peasants. The Trotskyist policy would have led to a rupture with the large mass of middle peasants. The policy of Comrade Bukharin would have led to a rupture with the poor peasants and an alliance with the well-to-do-peasants.

Lenin taught that the alliance with the large masses of middle peasants in the Soviet Union is necessary. Comrade Bukharin believes any alliance with the peasantry is alright. This is what Lenin wrote:

"The idea of the understanding between the working class and the peasantry may be differently interpreted. If one does not bear in mind that such an understanding from the standpoint of the working class is admissible, correct, and possible in principle, only if it supports the dictatorship of the working class and is one of the measures for the abolition of classes, — then the formula of an understanding between the working class and the peasantry naturally becomes a formula which is taken up by all the enemies of Soviet rule and by all the enemies of the dictatorship." (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVIII, Part I, p. 257, Russian Edition.)

Only through the policy of the C. P. S. U., and upon the basis of a producing alliance, can a firm alliance be formed with the decisive masses of the peasantry.

Wherein lie the roots of Comrade Bukharin's fatal mistake? Comrade Bukharin is fond of describing himself as an economist. A pure economist may be able in his theories to detach himself even from the class relations. Comrade Bukharin possesses an extraordinary ability for such economic detachment. He has extensively studied bourgeois economics, and not with impunity. These economics are tied from A to Z to the ideas of commodity production, private property, competition, and the capitalist environment, and this environment has brought about such a theoretical jumble in the ideology of Comrade Bukharin. One should not imagine that Comrade Bukharin has any respect for capitalist property. Yet he wants no interference with the free circulation of commodities, with commodity markets and free exchange between agriculture and industry. It is true, he wants "price regulation", price "manoeuvring", yet without any interference in the formal freedom of trade. In the capitalist world the monopoly capitalists control the peasant farms, and small production in general while formally allowing the small producer the freedom of putting the price on his produce. Formally the competition is not abolished by the monopoly fixing of prices on the part of big capital. Now Comrade Bukharin as an economist arrives at the conclusion that in the same form — and only in this form — can the control of the working class, the Socialist regulation of the exchange of commodities, be accomplished. The capitalist form of control appears to him to be the only one, the universal form of economic regulation and control. Such is the "technique" of control, so to speak. To put it plainly, what does this mean? Respect for capitalist private property? No. But respect for the private property interests of simple producers of commodities, especially of peasants. Economically, it means: respect for the **law of value**. The law of value is the idol which he worships. Yet the realisation of Socialism is impossible without deliberate, systematic regulation of the social relations which in the capitalist world are regulated by the blind rule of the law of value. Comrade Bukharin has forgotten what Lenin wrote:

"The peasant as a toiler feels himself drawn to Socialism, because he prefers the proletarian dictatorship to the bourgeois dictatorship. The peasant as a seller of grain feels himself drawn to the bourgeoisie, to free trade, i. e. back to the "tried", to the "old system of capitalism." (Vol. XVI, p. 227.)

Comrade Bukharin wants to draw the peasants to Socialism through their interests as sellers and private proprietors. Yet this is a task that cannot be achieved. The result of such an attempt would only be that the peasants would be drawn "back to the old capitalism". Highly characteristic of Comrade Bukharin's standpoint is his indignation that by the present Soviet policy of contracts, the peasants are turned into purveyors to the proletarian State organs, and vice versa, the State organs become purveyors to the peasants. For this means interference with the free play of the law of value. How can a pure economist know the outcome of this policy! In reality, the opposite is the case. The outcome of regulation by the law of value cannot be calculated beforehand, whereas under the systematic regulation of Soviet economy the result can be told in advance.

The Trotskyists wanted to do away with N. E. P., to go back to War Communism. Comrade Bukharin, on the contrary, really wants to develop N. E. P. more and more in the direction of free trade. On the other hand, the Party does not consider N. E. P. as a dead scheme: it should be developed, the elemental force of the free market should be gradually chained, through deliberate, rational, and regulating control on the part of the proletarian dictatorship.

This is the road to Socialism. A great and daring step — the greatest since Lenin's death — is now taken along this road through the new course of the C. P. S. U., in the Socialist agrarian policy. It is now clear that this step has also tremendous international significance.

THE INNER-PARTY SITUATION IN THE C. P. S. U.

The pursuit of this policy of the Party is not possible without a constant fight against bureaucratism, without clean-

sing the apparatus of the State, as well as of the co-operatives and other economic organisations, without improving the work of the trade unions, and without cleansing the Party. This course is resolutely and consistently carried out by the Party.

There is absolutely no danger of a split in the Party. The Right opposition has been beaten chiefly by the arguments of the big achievements.

Through this internal fight the Party has become more firmly consolidated and more clearly conscious of its Leninist aims. Yet how this result has been achieved, is a highly in-

structive example of correct Party leadership, which I believe should be mentioned here.

The liquidation of the Right opposition in the C. P. S. U. was carried out with extraordinary ease, even considerably more easily than the overcoming of the Trotskyist opposition, although the potential danger is now a good deal greater. The greatest danger of Trotskyism consisted in its Left phraseology which had to be exposed. In the Right opposition the greatest danger was in the direct class content of the policy of the opposition. Its course appealed directly to the interest of the petty-bourgeoisie, especially of the well-to-do peasant elements.

IV. Some Conclusions.

Yes, the Socialist development of the Soviet Union is proceeding under tremendous difficulties which can be overcome only by concentrating the whole of the practical revolutionary fighting experience possessed by the C. P. S. U. The Russian comrades are helped by a very good saying which they have: "The devil is not so terrible as he is painted." This helped the Bolsheviks already during the last imperialist world war under tsarism, in their fight against the bourgeois State in October 1917, in the defence of the country against the intervention of 14 capitalist States, as well as in the struggle against the danger of splitting the Party. It has helped them in the struggle for industrialisation and for the Socialist reconstruction of economy, and it has also encouraged them to take up the big task of chaining the most terrific elemental force of petty-bourgeois commodity production and the free market. This undaunted courage in practical revolutionary activity will certainly help the Bolsheviks in the fight against the new imperialist war.

In this respect the C. P. G. has already learned some "Russian lessons". All the Sections of the Communist International should, in this sense, assimilate some of the Russian experiences. Because there are dangers and enemies, big like devils, to be fought in the capitalist world, even more than they existed in tsarist Russia. We have said that in the present period there is going on a shattering of the capitalist stabilisation; this is true, but this stabilisation has not yet been liquidated. Capitalist rationalisation is there, and we have to wage a fight against it. Monopoly capital is there, with all its forms of domination; the war danger is in existence; we are confronted by fascism and social-fascism which are co-operating and trying to gain adherents among the people. No wonder, that under these circumstances the poor conciliators are panic stricken. But the Comintern has only to pursue a firm Bolshevik course. If in one or another Section, under a complex situation, we might not always be sure as to which was the correct Bolshevik line, I would urge in such a case to exercise a double control: demarcation both from the Right as well as from the Left deviation. Characteristic of both of them is, firstly, confusion and tactical capitulation before the danger, and secondly, panic and despair. The ultra-Left creeps into a lion's skin in face of danger, and while the whole of his body is benumbed with fear, his mouth keeps on. He tries to roar, but this cannot scare any enemy. The Right opportunist screams and deserts the battle

ground, frequently running over to the front of the class enemy. Every real resistance, whether an offensive or a retreat, is considered by the Rights to be adventure and folly. Yet we know that it is one thing to make a necessary revolutionary retreat under circumstances, and quite a different thing to desert and surrender. We also know that not in every fight can direct gains be made, and that there can be no victory without losses and sacrifices. But to be constantly passive and waiting, to miss always the moment for the fight, this can never lead to success, but rather to the defeat of the revolutionary movement.

Comrades, in our draft theses the present period is described as the period of the maturity of the new revolutionary upheaval. This characteristic, perhaps may not appear to all the comrades to be strong enough. No, this characteristic is exact, and it needs but to be properly understood and its strength will be expressed in the revolutionary practice. It is essential, above all, to carry out the international duties during this period. For instance, if we think of the tremendous duties of the Comintern as regards the Indian Revolution, how much should the British Party do to bring home to the British proletariat the importance of the Indian Revolution and the conditions of the workers in India! The revolutionary situation is maturing very rapidly in India, but the majority of the proletarians in Great Britain do not yet understand this situation. Even in India there is as yet no solid Communist Party, and we should do our utmost to develop it. The Communists of other countries must help the Indian proletariat in carrying out this task.

There can be no doubt that in the struggles ahead of us there will be great heroism in the ranks of the fighting proletariat. Yet, heroism alone does not secure the victory. In the fight for power the weakling is defeated, and the weakness or strength of the proletariat in the revolution depends very much on the extent of the fighting ability of its vanguard, upon the fact whether the Communist Party is Bolshevik or not. We bear responsibility for this before the working class. The present course of the Communist International is a new course, yet it is old. Already three quarters of a century ago our present slogan was announced by Marx: "Class against Class!" when he raised the slogan of the revolutionary class struggle. This is our new course.