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Problems of peace and socialism

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The October revolution and proletarian internationalism

TODAY, WHEN PROGRESSIVE people everywhere are celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, when the epoch-making significance of this revolution and the basic tendencies of social development ushered in by it are being examined in the light of a half-century's experience, and when the transition of the peoples of the world to the positions of socialism has been entered on the agenda of history, the international solidarity of the working people acquires exceptional importance.

The international solidarity of the working class of all countries, stemming from objective roots, was engendered by the socio-historical conditions of the struggle waged by the working class and all revolutionary forces against the capitalists, against the entire system of exploitation. This solidarity found scientific substantiation in Marxist-Leninist theory and tangible political embodiment in the dynamic organizational forms which evolved and continue to evolve in keeping with the concrete historical conditions.

The idea of this internationalism was first theoretically formulated by Marx and Engels in the dynamic call, "Workers of all lands, unite!" Under this watchword Communist organizations affiliated to the First International were founded in a number of countries.

As the working-class movement grew, the concept of international solidarity likewise developed on a higher plane. With each successive stage of the revolutionary struggle its significance and role in remaking the world have grown and its content and forms have been enriched. This was the case in the past and so will it be in the future. The growth of the role played in social development by the international solidarity of the working class and its unity with all other progressive forces has been particularly rapid since the Great October Socialist Revolution.

I.

Although the October Revolution carried out by the people of Russia had its specific national features its place in the overall march of history makes it an international event of the first magnitude marking a turning point in the destinies of the nations and of civilization. It ushered in the era of the world socialist revolution, opened the era of socialism, and thereby predetermined the overall trend of social progress. International experience shows—and Lenin underscored the fact in his time—that its fundamental features are of international, and not only of local, specifically national, significance.

All the basic aspects of the October Revolution are in their very nature profoundly international. It is international by virtue of its place in history, of its impact on relations between the nations, on the social processes in all countries, and on the future of civilization as such. It is international in the historical sense, for it continued and enriched not only the revolutionary traditions of the people of Russia but also the traditions of the world revolutionary movement. Lenin drew attention to the organic link between the Soviet Republic born of this revolution and the world ocean of revolution.

"Russia," he wrote, "achieved Marxism—the only correct revolutionary theory—through the agony she experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, practical trial, disappointment, verification, and comparison with European experience. Thanks to the political emigration caused by tsarism, revolutionary Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of international links and excellent information on the forms and theories of the

world revolutionary movement, such as no other country possessed."

Prior to the October Revolution international solidarity was just beginning to assert itself. Sympathy with the liberation struggles of the Irish, Polish, Indian and other peoples, the enthusiastic participation of revolutionaries from many countries in the battles fought by the Communards in Paris, and the moral support of European working people for the 1905 revolution in Russia—these were the early phases of the crystallization of revolutionary solidarity. The Stuttgart and Basel congresses of the Second International laid the ideological and organizational foundations for joint struggle by the peoples for peace, against the approaching menace of imperialist war.

The First World War, an imperialist war, was a serious political test of internationalism. The solidarity of the European working class was the only force that might have been able to avert the carnage. But betrayal by the Right-wing Social Democratic leaders opened the doors to bourgeois ideology into the working class, and chauvinism and jingoism swamped internationalist sentiment and fraternal solidarity.

The banner of international working class solidarity was picked up and held aloft by the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin. True internationalists in other countries sided with the Bolsheviks.

In the course of the October Revolution this solidarity acquired a new quality. In truth it became an instrument for the social emancipation of the people of Russia, and to this day serves the fight for freedom waged by the working people in all countries.

Establishment of people's rule in Russia and the class struggles fought in other countries posed before the working-class movement the pivotal question of *the international duty of each national contingent of the working class, its historical responsibility for the outcome of every national revolution, the future of the world revolution, and the destiny of socialism.*

No one in the anti-capitalist camp could evade this issue. And the stand taken by each group and each sector of the working-class movement—from the outright traitors to the extremists addicted to Leftist phrasemongering—was a sure indication of where it really stood.

On the other hand, it was essential to see the interconnection and interdependence of the international aims and national tasks of the class struggle of the working class in the correct light. The problem was basic to the political strategy of the revolutionary parties, and the correct approach to it predetermined the success of their efforts.

Lenin and the Soviet Communists showed in both theory and practice the dialectical link between the national and international aspects of the working-class movement, and this to a large extent predetermined the success of the class battles fought in Russia.

Lenin took full cognizance of the specific, national features of the Russian revolution, but he also saw its international significance. An unsurpassed dialectician, he regarded the Great October Socialist Revolution in the light of the dynamic unity of the specific national and general international aspects and uncompromisingly castigated any tendency to ignore one or the other.

Throughout the past fifty years this dialectical intertwining of the international and national aspects of the working-class and Communist movement, the problem of historical responsibility, has been the *central* issue of the struggle waged by the workers in all countries, by every revolutionary party and every people.

Many attempts have been made in these years to misconstrue the interconnection between internationalist duty and national tasks, to distort the dialectics of the national and the international. Though all these attempts failed, they caused much damage to the revolutionary movement.

One of the sharpest clashes over this issue took place at the time of the peace negotiations in Brest shortly after the establishment of Soviet power.

Some Communists, unwilling to sign the Brest peace treaty, advocated a revolutionary war against German imperialism in the belief that this would give an impetus to revolution first in Germany and then throughout Europe. These people, known in history as "Left Communists," claimed that it was the duty of the Russian workers to carry the torch of the revolution to the rest of Europe and thus spur on the world revolution.

To justify this attitude the concept of *revolutionary sacrifice* was advanced — the idea that the interests of a national revolution should be sacrificed to the interests of world revolution. This, the Left Communists held, was being truly revolutionary.

They denied the necessity of defending the socialist motherland in Russia. In their view, peace negotiations with the German imperialists, essential in order to win a respite, and Lenin's readiness to enter into unavoidable compromise in order to save the base of the revolution were a betrayal of the working class of Germany and the rest of Europe, betrayal of world revolution. One of their documents actually declared that "in the interests of the international revolution it is

expedient to risk the defeat of Soviet power."

Lenin took a firm stand against this interpretation of what was expected of revolutionaries, inasmuch as it would inevitably have led not only to the defeat of the revolution in Russia but to a serious weakening of the world revolutionary movement as a whole. *Revolutionary phrase-mongering about a revolutionary war, he pointed out, might have spelled the defeat of the Russian revolution.*

To save the Soviet Republic, the base of the worldwide movement for the emancipation of the working people, was, Lenin held, the prime national task of the working people of Russia, their supreme internationalist duty, the most effective way to help the working class of all countries to combat the capitalists.

Lenin exposed the fallacy of artificially stimulating revolutions, the pseudo-internationalism of all attempts to export revolution, since they could lead only to defeat in the revolutionary struggle both in the countries undertaking a hegemonic mission and in the countries subjected to such experiments.

"There is one, and only one, kind of real internationalism," he said, "and that is—working whole-heartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in *one's own country*, and supporting (by propaganda, sympathy, and material aid) *this struggle*, this, and only this, line, in every country without exception." The dialectical interconnection between the national and the international Lenin saw in the working class of each country helping the international working class, and thereby fulfilling its internationalist duty, by resolving its own national revolutionary tasks, and, on the other hand, creating a favorable external climate for revolutionary reconstruction in its own country, for the successful solution of its socialist national tasks, by supporting, as a matter of proletarian solidarity, the revolutionary struggle in other countries.

Lenin's concept of what should be expected of revolutionaries triumphed, and this was an earnest of the soundness of the policy of the Russian Communist Party and its achievements. The subsequent development of the class struggle in the Soviet Union and on the world arena has shown again and again, in different situations and circumstances, the utter fallacy of the idea of artificially engineering revolutions which is merely a camouflaged form of export of revolution.

The working class of Soviet Russia contributed to the world revolution primarily by upholding and strengthening its country as the bulwark of the world liberation movement.

At the same time Soviet Russia supported the revolutionary struggle in other countries, politically, through propaganda, by extending its sympathy and in many cases material aid, limited though the possibilities for such aid were in the early years of Soviet power.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Republic propounded among revolutionary internationalists and through them among the workers of all countries its concept of internationalist duty, which met with complete understanding. A powerful movement developed in the capitalist countries under the watchword "Hands Off Soviet Russia!" International working-class support played an extremely important part in the struggle against the foreign intervention and the internal counter-revolution. For one thing, internationalists from many countries fought in the ranks of the Red Army on the fronts of the Civil War.

While remaining patriots of their own countries, they performed their internationalist duty by defending the Soviet republic and at the same time worked to carry out their national tasks. The schooling in class struggle which these thousands of Communist internationalists received in defending the gains of the October Revolution was of inestimable value to the revolutionary movement in their own countries. Steeled in battle, ideologically and politically more mature for their experience in Russia, they returned home to exert an enormous, and at times decisive, influence on the development of the working-class and Communist movement on their native soil.

The Communist internationalists of Czechoslovakia, Bohumir Smeral wrote, "paved the way to the affiliation of the Left with the Third International and the foundation of the Communist Party." The same idea was underscored by Bela Kun. "Our revolutionary movement," he said, "came into being as a result of the fact that the prisoners of war who had been forcibly herded to the slaughter in the imperialist war but who survived it joined the proletarian movement in Russia. . . . The Russian Communist Party and the Soviet Government, guided by the principles of international working class solidarity and conscious of the worldwide significance of the Russian revolution, extended a helping hand to the revolutionary organizations of prisoners of war which sprang up everywhere, united them and exerted every effort to carry into the spontaneous movement revolutionary consciousness, the Communist ideas of Bolshevism, of Marxism."

The revolutionary upsurge in Europe, the revolution in Germany, and the establishment of Soviet republics in Hungary and Bavaria

gave substantial support to the working people of Soviet Russia in combating foreign and internal enemies.

The subsequent growth of international solidarity found vivid expression in the establishment of Communist parties and Left Socialist organizations in many capitalist countries. Later, these formed the Communist International, which delivered a shattering blow at reformism and revived the revolutionary spirit of the First International and the finest traditions of the Second International.

The international content of the October Revolution was manifest in the orientation on the establishment and consolidation of broad alliances and fraternal cooperation with the national-liberation movement. The Leninist solution of the nationalities question on the basis of consistent realization of the right to self-determination was reflected also in the sphere of foreign policy. Exposure of capitalist secret diplomacy, annulment of all treaties concluded by the tsarist government, and recognition of the right of the peoples to freedom and independence were all new revolutionary departures which exerted a profound influence on international relations. The shaping of new relationships between the Soviet government and Iran and Afghanistan, generous support of the revolutionary liberation movement in Turkey and the national anti-imperialist movement in China, and all-round aid to the revolution in Mongolia were concrete examples of the internationalist approach taken by the victorious socialist revolution to the national-liberation movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

This approach hit hard at the expansionist policy of imperialism. The Soviet Union was subjected to incessant attacks by the imperialists, but it beat back all these sallies, drawing on its growing military and economic strength and on the support of workers throughout the world. The Soviet people were the first to build socialism, and by so doing they simultaneously carried out their national tasks and performed their supreme internationalist duty, for the achievements of the USSR shook capitalism to its foundations, gave the working class and all other working people the world over renewed confidence in victory over the oppressors, and exercised a powerful influence on the revolutionary liberation movement, to which the Soviet Union has always rendered multiform aid.

With the establishment of the Soviet Republic and its consolidation international solidarity acquired a material basis, and the attitude towards the Soviet Union, class solidarity with working people, and its defense as

the initial stronghold of socialism became the basic manifestations of internationalism and the criterion of revolutionary dedication.

A major contribution to deepening the content of working class internationalism and raising it to a higher level was made by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern which helped shape new forms of international relationships between the national contingents of the revolutionary movement and new forms of contact between the Communist parties. Speaking at this Congress, Georgi Dimitrov stressed: "Proletarian internationalism not only does not contradict the struggle waged by the working people of the various countries for national, social and cultural freedom, but also ensures them, through international proletarian solidarity and militant unity, the support they need to win. Only in *close alliance* with the victorious proletariat of the great Soviet Union can the working class of the capitalist countries achieve victory." And further: "The *national forms* of the proletarian class struggle and of the working-class movement in the different countries do not run counter to proletarian internationalism; on the contrary, it is precisely in these forms that the *international interests* of the proletariat too can be successfully upheld."

The power of international solidarity was strikingly revealed during the Spanish Civil War. International Brigades were organized on the initiative of the Comintern. Thousands of men from many countries, responding to the call of internationalist duty, went to Spain, where they inscribed unforgettable pages in the annals of the anti-fascist struggle. As for the Soviet people, they rendered aid of inestimable value to the people of Spain from the beginning of the war to the end.

One of the finest manifestations of international solidarity was the joint struggle waged by the workers of different countries against fascism during the Second World War. In this war it fell to the lot of the Soviet people to bear the brunt of the struggle against the brown scourge, the main responsibility for the freedom of the peoples and the very fate of civilization. And they carried out this historical mission with honor, once again fulfilling a national task and performing their supreme internationalist duty. The peoples of other countries fought side by side with the USSR in this struggle, in which a most active part was played by the Communists.

The struggle waged against fascism by the Soviet Union earned it recognition not only as a bastion of strength for the working people of all countries in their fight for their class interests but also as a consistent cham-

pion of the national interests of all peoples. International solidarity with the Soviet Union thus has both a class and a national aspect.

The situation created by the defeat of the fascist aggressors was marked by a series of people's democratic revolutions in Europe and Asia, in the course of which problems of national liberation were resolved simultaneously with problems of social progress. People's democracy emerged, and in this the decisive role was played by international anti-fascist unity, itself a momentous achievement for which the credit belongs to the Communists. With the rise of the community of socialist countries the world picture changed further. Humanity entered upon a new stage in its progress. In this new situation the role of working class internationalism became greater than ever.

II.

Thanks to the influence exerted by the socialist world, the new balance of class forces in the world arena, the higher level of class struggle in the capitalist countries, the sweep of the national-liberation movement and the rapidly unfolding scientific and technological revolution, two distinct but interconnected trends stand out in the present-day situation. One is the rapid internationalization of all social, political, scientific and technological processes, extension of contacts between peoples, and growth of mutual aid and mutual influence among the progressive forces. The other is the upsurge of national consciousness and the vast scale on which peoples formerly oppressed by capitalism are rising in the fight for complete national freedom and sovereignty, economic and social progress. These objective but dialectically contradictory trends, this simultaneous rapid development of both the national and the international elements, manifest themselves in two fundamentally different ways in the capitalist world and the socialist world.

Under capitalism the contradiction between the two trends cannot find a progressive solution. The imperialists are setting up internal and international organizations to check the free national and social development of the peoples and to suppress real solidarity among them. The socialist world, the Communists, on the contrary, possess an effective means of resolving this contradiction—working class internationalism which provides an avenue for organically harmonizing national tasks and international duties.

Needless to say, situations may arise when either national interests or progressive international responsibilities may predominate for

a time, but in all circumstances working class internationalism calls for the dialectical unity of the national and international elements. Violation of this unity invariably has harmful social and historical consequences.

Separation of the international activities of the revolutionary forces from their national tasks, whether this takes the form of national nihilism or international hegemonism (i.e., extreme nationalism), is a gross violation of the principles of fraternal solidarity and is fraught with the danger of a nation or party coming to regard its own experience, policy and tactics as the only correct ones and seeking to impose them on other nations and parties.

This would encroach on the independence of the revolutionary forces, preventing them from taking the concrete conditions of struggle fully into account and working out a political line according with the specific national features and traditions. The result would be a lowering of the level on which the class struggle is fought.

On the other hand, forgetting one's internationalist duty—which in the present conditions implies awareness of one's responsibility for the success of the emancipatory class struggle in all countries, one's responsibility for safeguarding peace and the future of democracy and socialism—leads to national exclusiveness and self-isolation, and, in extreme cases, to nationalism opposed to revolutionary unity. Nationalism of this kind is always negative and, at times, reactionarily, providing as it does an ideological and political groundwork for deviations in the working-class and Communist movement which weaken the revolutionary liberation struggle waged by the peoples against the imperialists and all oppressors.

It is because political concepts have been conceived and actions taken which violate the dialectics of the national and the international that the principles of proletarian internationalism have been subjected to severe strain in recent years, and formidable difficulties are encountered in their implementation.

Nevertheless, these negative circumstances notwithstanding, *working class internationalism has entered into a new and higher phase: the social base of international solidarity has expanded, the content of the concept has been enriched and deepened, it is manifested in a greater variety of forms, and its role in the reconstruction of society has greatly grown.*

The fact that international solidarity has risen to a higher level and its content and the forms in which it is manifested have been enriched is due primarily to the rise of the socialist world system, which is now a decisive

factor of historical development. With the emergence of this system, international working class solidarity became one of the *fundamental principles of world politics*, a factor determining the content and form of the relations between the peoples of the socialist countries, the regulator of their political, economic, cultural and ideological relationships and mutual aid in all areas of social life, the basis of their joint actions vis-à-vis imperialism. The unity of the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of working class internationalism is a historical phenomenon of the first magnitude, a powerful accelerator of social processes on a worldwide scale. It multiplies the strength of all those opposed to reaction and heightens confidence in the triumph of world socialism.

Socialist internationalism provides unbounded opportunities for the full, comprehensive solution of its national tasks by each socialist country; it guarantees the sovereignty of these countries, their complete independence in resolving all internal and external problems.

At the same time, as history has shown, the life of each socialist country is linked by thousands of ties with the struggle waged by the progressive classes in other countries, with the development of humanity as a whole. Success and failure have truly become international. Every achievement of any socialist country, big or small, is regarded as their own by progressives everywhere, and indeed constitutes a contribution to the common cause of social progress. On the other hand, every setback is painfully received by the forces of social progress and holds them back in one way or another.

The point is that the world revolution can unfold only on the basis of continuous and steadily growing socialist achievements within national frameworks, achievements which offer tangible proof of the superiority of socialism over capitalism. Moreover, it is only thanks to these achievements that the socialist countries can render moral, political, material and other support to the revolutionary forces everywhere.

From all this it follows that the historical responsibility of each socialist country to the peoples of the world is growing, and that the revolutionary content of its internationalist duty too is undergoing change. So long as the exploiters rule the roost, the revolutionary content of national tasks and internationalist duty consists in the overthrow of one's own capitalists; *after this has been done the revolutionary duty of the victorious national contingent of the proletariat is, above all, to build*

socialism in its own country, to strengthen it economically and politically, and on this basis to increase its aid to the embattled peoples of other countries.

Experience shows that this dialectical correlation of the international and national elements is the true lodestar for all detachments of the revolutionary movement.

The achievement of socialism in one or another country is intrinsically the fruit of the efforts of the given people. But no country or people has ever developed—and never will develop—along socialist lines in isolation. Socialism in all cases is built in historical contexts *created by the international efforts of all peoples, all revolutionary parties, both those in power and those fighting to win power.* The building of socialism, regardless of the country in which it is taking place, is an organic component of the mainstream of social progress generally, and this accentuates the significance of the internationalist responsibilities of the socialist system.

However, the unity of the socialist countries which existed for so many years is now, regrettably, disrupted. And imperialism has seized upon this to launch counterattacks on diverse sectors of the struggle.

In these circumstances, *consistent active work on the part of all the revolutionary forces to overcome the differences in the socialist world and to restore its unity as a bulwark against imperialism and the base for the further development of the world revolutionary process, is one of the most important international tasks of the day.*

Overcoming all forms of anti-Sovietism—an insidious weapon of imperialist ideology and policy—is of vital significance, all the more so since this pernicious ideology has begun to infiltrate some segments of the Communist movement as well. Hence there is an urgent need to make it clear in all sectors of the revolutionary movement that anti-Sovietism is incompatible with internationalism and communism.

* * *

The postwar has witnessed far-reaching changes in the world Communist movement. Many more Marxist-Leninist parties have been founded and the ranks of the Communists have grown rapidly. In fourteen countries, where the people have taken over the reins of government, the Communist parties are the leading force in the life of society. In some capitalist countries the Communist parties have become mass parties, and in others they are playing an increasingly important part in political life. Even in the countries where the parties are still illegal they exert

an active influence on all aspects of the class struggle.

As we know, the parties were affiliated to the Communist International for a long time, until they unanimously decided, in view of the changed situation, to dissolve this organization. The fact that the Communist movement was no longer in need of a single guiding center was a reflection of the greater maturity of the parties, which had become fully able independently to elaborate their policies and tactics in accordance with the national conditions and traditions. The political forms of struggle and the tactical methods became more varied.

It should be mentioned in this connection that the Communist parties see their internationalist duty in promoting sound patriotism, in reinforcing the international struggle of the working class with revolutionary gains in the socio-economic, political and ideological arena at home.

Left without an organizational center, the Communist movement found it necessary to work out new forms and methods of international contact, a new approach to ensuring the unity of the movement in face of the class enemy. The forms developed range from bilateral and multilateral contacts to broader international meetings.

The Communist movement, the most powerful movement of our time, is a political force bearing the main responsibility for the future of the peoples, progress and civilization, especially in the light of the growing danger of nuclear war. And the growth of their responsibility on the historical plane enhances both the parties' national role and their international weight.

The strength of the Communist movement is greater than the simple sum of the strength of the fraternal parties. It derives from the unity and identity of action within the various countries and on the international plane. The independence and sovereignty of the parties in no way imply that they feel free to renounce the common aims of the movement at will; on the contrary, the implication is one of indivisible responsibility for the realization of revolutionary and socialist aims both in the separate countries and on the international arena of struggle against imperialism and for man's peaceful, socialist future.

The dialectical correlation of the national and international aspects of the Communist movement is manifest in the connection between the independence of the parties in resolving all questions of policy, on the one hand, and the need for redoubled effort to cement the unity of the movement, on the other.

It implies the equality of all parties, big and small, as regards rights and responsibilities, and in their relations with one another; the equality of the responsibility they bear for the future of socialism and the peoples; and their equality in the fight for peace, to prevent nuclear war which threatens to destroy civilization. This interconnection between the various aspects of their activities is recorded in the 1960 Statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties, which declares:

"All the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and have equal rights; they shape their policies according to the specific conditions in their respective countries and in keeping with Marxist-Leninist principles, and support each other. The success of the working-class cause in any country is unthinkable without the internationalist solidarity of all Marxist-Leninist parties. Every party is responsible to the working class, to the working people of its country, to the international working-class and Communist movement as a whole."

In the present conditions both national tasks and internationalist duty call for active struggle to compel the imperialist powers to accept the policy of peaceful coexistence, this specific form of class struggle which, if correctly implemented, will facilitate the worldwide triumph of socialism over capitalism.

The Communist movement is the first movement in history to combine harmoniously consistent defense of national interests and the closest internationalist contact between all the national revolutionary detachments. This reflects the objective fact that national interests correctly understood in the final analysis fully coincide with the interests of mankind as a whole. The differences in the Communist movement are a violation of this interconnection and can only weaken revolutionary solidarity. Hence, it follows logically from the very nature of the Marxist-Leninist parties that *all of them, big and small, and regardless of whether they are ruling parties or not, are duty bound to work for the unity of the Communist movement.*

* * *

The rapid growth of the national-liberation movement, which has not only shattered the foundations of the centuries-old colonial oppression but also made millions of the formerly disfranchised participants in the reconstruction of society, has laid an imprint on the sum total of international relationships, on the entire process of social development, and on the world Communist movement. A new era has opened in the life of the formerly oppressed peoples; some of them have em-

barked on building socialism, in other countries the way is being paved for hundreds of millions to take the socialist road, and in still others a grim struggle is under way against colonialism and neo-colonialism.

It is indicative that the emergence to nationhood and the growing consciousness of many nations are associated with socialist ideas. Needless to say, their socialist dreams do not always strictly conform to scientific theory. However, the important thing is that internationalism and the experience of the socialist countries, facilitate the spread of scientific socialism, thanks to which more and more countries and peoples are coming to see that it is the socialist way which offers them the tangible prospect of leaving behind the backwardness, oppression and primitive social forms and emerging to progress and prosperity. The important thing is the process—gigantic in scale and momentous for its social consequences—of national ideology combining with socialist ideals which is sweeping the world today.

The revolutionary reconstruction effected by the working people of the socialist countries and also the class struggle waged by the workers in the capitalist countries have helped to create a climate favoring the success of the national-liberation struggle. This, too, is an instance of working class internationalism in action.

In the joint struggle waged by the peoples of all continents against imperialism, in keeping with laws of social development, a militant alliance of the working people of the socialist countries, the international working class and the formerly oppressed peoples has taken shape. An active factor in this alliance is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the internationalist policy of the USSR.

The broadening of the front of liberation struggle has deepened the connotations of working class solidarity. In the present conditions it is becoming an expression of the interests of all working people, of all those who are fighting to put an end to imperialist and capitalist oppression. The idea Lenin invested in the slogan "Workers off all lands and peoples subjected to oppression, unite!" which he advanced after the October Revolution has found new meaning and material embodiment in the revolutionary liberation movement of our day. The three currents of this movement—the constructive labor of the peoples building socialism and communism, the class struggle of the international working class and the national-liberation movement of the formerly oppressed peoples—have joined in a single torrent of world revolution which

is bringing with it a new life for all mankind.

Working class internationalism, which unites these three currents and enables them to reinforce each other through mutual aid, is a reflection of the structure of this powerful revolutionary process and the interaction of its components.

The identity of the striving for liberation and the historical destinies of the working people of all countries, the progressive, socialist nature of their aims, and the fact that world imperialism is their common enemy constitute the objective basis of the unity and solidarity of the peoples. All this makes it of prime importance to build a *united international anti-imperialist front* cementing all the links of the revolutionary liberation movement to combat the enemies of the people, the enemies of peace, socialism and progress generally. International organizations of the working people—trade unions as well as women's, youth, students', journalists' and writers' organizations and others — have an important part to play in creating this front. A valuable contribution to the emancipation struggle has been made by the Afro-Asian solidarity conferences, the tricontinental conference held in Havana, and by other assemblies.

III.

The main content of working class internationalism today is the cementing of the unity of all the revolutionary liberation forces of the world, resolute work to consolidate the positions of world socialism and the unity of the socialist countries, further development of the world Communist movement and overcoming the differences in it, ensuring a durable alliance between the workers of the world and all the oppressed peoples, creation of a united anti-imperialist front, and unification of all progressive forces fighting for peace, democracy, national and social freedom and progress.

In the overall context of these general tasks there are a number of key links which determine the basic trend of international relationships.

One, the most important, is the strengthening of solidarity with the socialist world system and above all with the Soviet Union, and combating all manifestations of anti-communism, including anti-Sovietism.

The importance of this task stems primarily from the fact that the achievements of the socialist countries are shaking the foundations of imperialism, showing the peoples the way to freedom and progress. World socialism

in effect bears the brunt of the struggle against imperialist aggression and reaction. The socialist system is the chief guarantee of peace and security for the peoples, the main force checking imperialist global aggression.

Moreover, the socialist system is the main object of the attacks of world imperialism, which dreams of isolating the socialist countries from one another and thereby weakening the system as a whole, undermining this bastion of peace and progress.

The test of loyalty to working class internationalism—a test not in words but in deeds—is now Vietnam. This is the key front in the anti-imperialist struggle, for it is here that U.S. imperialism seeks to deal the main blow at socialism and the national-liberation movement.

Aid to embattled Vietnam is, then, the direct internationalist duty of every revolutionary detachment. Artificial obstruction of this aid can but cause grave harm to the revolutionary emancipation movement.

The task of the day is to rally world public opinion against the U.S. aggressors, to isolate them morally and politically. Cementing the unity of all revolutionary forces on the basis of solidarity with Vietnam would help overcome the present difficulties and differences and carry the world revolutionary movement forward to new frontiers.

No less important is the unity of all revolutionary forces in the struggle for security in

Europe. For any conflict sparked off on this continent would almost inevitably develop into a world war. Consequently, European security is the vital concern of the entire revolutionary movement and primarily of the Communist and Workers' parties of Europe.

Joint action by all the European Communist parties, their elaboration of a common program to ensure security on the continent, and coordination of their efforts would be a valuable contribution to the common cause of struggle against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism.

* * *

The fifty years since the October Revolution have been years of growth and success for working-class solidarity. During these years the principles of this internationalism, which has a scientific basis in Marxism-Leninism, have been attacked from the Right and from the Left by the reformists, revisionists and dogmatists, but these attempts have failed. Each successive stage of the revolutionary struggle has been marked by new triumphs for working class internationalism. Both past experience and scientific examination of the perspectives of revolutionary development prove that as humanity moves on towards socialism and communism, the international solidarity of all working people in all countries will continue to grow and play an increasing role in the reconstruction of society.

The USSR today

Facts and figures*

3. THE USSR—AN INDUSTRIAL POWER

IN VOLUME of industrial output tsarist Russia occupied fifth place in the world and fourth in Europe. Its output was one-eighth of that of the United States. By 1920, owing to the devastation caused by the First World War, the foreign intervention and the Civil War, output had shrunk to one-seventh of the 1913 level. It was from that level that the Soviet people embarked on the job of developing their country into a modern industrial power ranking second in the world and first in Europe.

Industrialization was first proclaimed by the Fourteenth Congress of the Party (1925). The prime source of the accumulation for the industrialization was the labor of the workers and peasants. The first step was to develop heavy industry, that is, branches producing the means of production (Group A). Here the development was particularly rapid; the rate of production of consumer goods, too, (Group B) was relatively high. The overall industrial output has increased in the 50 years under review by more than 60-fold, with means of production growing by more than 141 times and consumer-goods output more than 20-fold.

The rapid industrial growth can be seen from the following table:

OUTPUT OF BASIC INDUSTRIAL ITEMS

	Units	1913	1966	Growth Compared with 1913
Electric power	bill. kwh.	2	545	272.5 times
Coal	mill. tons	29.2	585	20 "
Oil	"	10.3	265	25.7 "
Pig iron	"	4.2	70.3	16.7 "
Steel	"	4.3	96.9	22.5 "
Rolled steel	"	3.6	76.6	21.3 "
Iron ore	"	9.2	160	17.4 "
Mineral fertilizers (in conventional units)	"	0.09	35.8	397.8 "
Metal-cutting lathes (thous.)	"	1.8	191	106.1 "
Cement	mill. tons	1.8	80	44.4 "
Cotton textiles	mill. sq. m.	1,817	5,701	3.13 "
Leather footwear	mill. pairs	60	522	8.7 "
Sugar	thous. tons	1,363	9,700	7.1 "

*1964

Highest growth rates were in the electric power, engineering, ferrous and non-ferrous metals and the fuel industries. Today they are in electric power, chemicals and engineering—the three basic branches determining technological progress. In 1965 the three branches accounted for 35 per cent of the total industrial product.

By 1965 the machine-building industry had increased output approximately 480 times compared with 1913. Electric power production has increased nearly 300-fold in the past fifty years. Among the hundreds of high capacity power stations are such unique hydro-power projects

as the Volga and the Bratsk, the biggest in the world. In 1964 output of the modern chemical industry was 261 times the 1913 figure.

In the five years 1966-70 Soviet industrial output is scheduled to grow another 50 per cent. In volume of output it will inch up to the present U.S. level. It has already outstripped the main capitalist countries of Europe, and the United States, for average annual rate growths and in output for a number of items. Thus, the USSR ranks first in the world for output of coal, iron ore, coke, diesel and electric locomotives, timber, sawn timber, cement, pre-fabricated ferro-concrete structures and details, woollens and animal fats.

PLACE OCCUPIED BY SOVIET INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT IN THE WORLD AND IN EUROPE

1913			1965	
In the world	In Europe		In the world:	In Europe
5th	4th	Total industrial output	2nd	1st
8th	6th	Electric power	2nd	1st
2nd	1st	Oil	2nd	1st
Output inconsiderable		Natural gas	2nd	1st
6th	5th	Coal	1st	1st
5th	4th	Pig iron	2nd	1st
5th	4th	Steel	2nd	1st
5th	4th	Iron ore	1st	1st
4th	3rd	Machine building	2nd	1st
—	—	Tractors (in terms of 15 hp.)	2nd*	1st*
2nd	1st	Timber exports	1st*	1st*
2nd	1st	Sawn timber	1st*	1st*
5th	4th	Cement	1st	1st
3rd	2nd	Cotton textiles	2nd	1st
4th	2nd	Sugar	1st	1st

*1964

The gap between the USSR and the developed capitalist countries in per capita production of basic products is rapidly narrowing. The USSR

has outpaced the United States in the per capita production of coal, iron ore, harvester combines, woolens, fish and animal fats.

PER CAPITA OUTPUT IN THE USSR AND SOME CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IN 1965

	Units	USSR	USA	England	France
Electric power (gross output)	kwh	2,198	6,270	3,572	2,165
oil	kg.	1,053	1,978	—	—
Natural gas	cub. m.	561	2,344	272	181
Coal	kg.	2,506	2,450	3,489	1,105
Pig iron	kg.	287	414	322	321
Steel	kg.	395	626	503	401
Iron ore	kg.	665	468	276	1,229
Mineral fertilizer	kg.	136	257	92.9*	301*
Timber	cub. m.	1.6	1.6*	0.06*	0.9*
Cement	kg.	314	334	311	462
Cotton textiles	sq. m.	25.9	46.4	17.3	23.6
Woolen fabrics	m.	1.6	1.3	3.8	2.3
Sugar	kg.	38.7	23.6	15.8	43.8
Animal fats (including farm production)	kg.	5.1	3.2	0.5*	9.4

*1964

FIFTY YEARS AGO

APRIL 18 (May 1), 1917, May Day was celebrated for the first time legally in Russia. The Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party published a manifesto which ended with the words: "Over the heads of the capitalist robbers, over the heads of their predatory governments, we salute the workers of all lands with the watchword: Long live May Day! Long live the fraternity of the peoples! Long live the socialist revolution!" Lenin addressed a number of meetings in Petrograd on the significance of May Day and the tasks of the Russian revolution, including a meeting of 40,000 workers at the Okhtinsk Powder Works.

April 20-21 (May 3-4) over a hundred thousand people demonstrated in the streets of Petrograd demanding: "All power to the Soviets!"

"Down with the war!" "Down with Milyukov!" The wrath of the workers and soldiers had been kindled by Foreign Minister Milyukov's Note to the Allied Powers in which he assured them that the Provisional Government would observe the treaties signed by the tsarist government, and that his government would continue the war to a victorious finish. There were demonstrations also in other cities. These events proved the correctness of the Party's tactics towards the Provisional Government. For the first time since the February Revolution a political crisis erupted. A coalition government was formed which included six members from the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties. This Government openly associated itself with the policy of the bourgeoisie.

From April 24 to 29 (May 7 to 12), 1917, the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the Bolshevik Party met in Petrograd. The Party,

with a membership of 80,000 at the time, had 223 district and sub-district organizations, 163 city, three area and six regional organizations, in addition to branches in the army and the navy, which were united by the Military Organization of the Central Committee.

The Conference discussed the following agenda: the current situation (the war and the Provisional Government); the peace conference; attitude to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; amendments to the Party program; situation in the International and the tasks of the Party; unification of the Social Democratic international organizations; the agrarian question; the nationalities question; the Constituent Assembly; organizational matters; reports from the districts; elections to the Central Committee.

Lenin spoke on the current situation, the agrarian question and amendments to the Party program. His reports were based on his April Theses.

The Conference unanimously adopted a resolution moved by Lenin calling for the transfer of all power to the proletariat and confirming the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country taken separately.

The Conference denounced the imperialist war and stressed that it could be ended only by a democratic peace, by the transfer of the state power to the people.

On the agrarian question the Conference called for confiscation of the big estates and nationalization of the land. Regarding the victorious outcome of the revolution, the Conference noted that this depended directly on

"whether the urban proletariat will succeed in securing the support of the rural proletariat and the mass following of semi-proletarians of the countryside."

In the debate on the nationalities question Lenin sharply criticized those who denied the right of nations to self-determination and to form independent states. The Conference adopted a resolution drawn up by Lenin, which recognized the right of all nations freely to secede and to form independent states.

The Conference defined the attitude of the Party in the matter of uniting with other parties. It declared against uniting with parties and groups pursuing a defensist and social-chauvinist policy, and for rapprochement with groups and trends supporting internationalism.

The Conference instructed the Central Committee to draft a new program to be submitted for approval to the next congress.

It also instructed the Central Committee to take the initiative in establishing a new international—the Third International.

May 8 (21) Lenin reported to a city-wide conference of the Petrograd organization of the Party on the results of the Conference.

The Conference resolutions were circulated to 130 Party organizations which discussed them at committee meetings and district Party conferences. Almost daily the Party press carried articles by Lenin explaining the tasks of the masses in the revolution.

Throughout May the Bolshevik Party worked to consolidate its positions and to extend the revolution.

For a peaceful Europe

ADAM KRUCZKOWSKI

I.

EUROPE PLAYS a special role on the international arena just as it did in the past, when German imperialism bent on aggression sparked off the military conflicts that developed into two devastating world wars.

But apart from these bitter, tragic lessons of recent history, it should be recalled above all that the Second World War clearly showed that the combined efforts of the nations of Europe were a force powerful enough to curb and defeat the fascist criminals. And it is equally patent from the lessons of history that peaceful cooperation of all the nations of our continent is an important condition of peace and progress.

However, owing to the policies pursued by the imperialist powers, Europe's postwar evolution has not been towards peace and cooperation. Motivated by anti-communism, the imperialist powers, above all the USA, adopted an aggressive attitude towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries of Europe. They hoped by a positions-of-strength policy to restrict the influence of socialism and to divert the people of the socialist countries from their chosen path. In pursuance of their aggressive designs they set up in 1949 the military-political NATO alliance aimed against the socialist countries. The aggressive nature of this alliance was sharply accentuated with the admission of Federal Germany into the bloc in 1955. In these circumstances the European socialist

countries had no choice but to create, in 1955, a defensive alliance—the Warsaw Treaty organization. The policy of the imperialist powers thus led to the division of Europe into two opposed military-political alliances; it was this policy that gave rise to and sustains tension. In the conditions of today an armed conflict in Europe would involve immeasurably greater losses and sacrifice of human life than was the case in the recent past. It would touch off a new world war which, in the age of missiles and nuclear weapons, would be fraught with disastrous consequences for all. Hence the worldwide significance of the struggle to promote peace and security in Europe.

This struggle, begun and consistently carried on by the socialist countries and the Communist and Workers' parties, which today represent a powerful force on our continent, has been actively joined by the masses of the population of all European countries. The manpower, territorial, economic and military potential of the socialist countries is inseparably associated with the ideological influence exerted by the Communist movement on the masses in the interests of peace, progress and freedom.

The socialist countries of Europe account for nearly 65 per cent of the territory of the continent and roughly half of its population. Moreover, their share in the European economy is steadily growing, as can be seen from the following table (in percentages of world production):

	Electric power		Fuel		Steel		Sulphuric acid		Grain crops		Meat		Milk	
	1950	1964	1950	1964	1950	1964	1950	1964	1950	1964	1950	1964	1950	1964
European socialist countries	14.2	20.3	17.6	24.1	19.1	26.3	11.5	19.1	17.4	20.1	16.9	17.3	21.7	25.3
European capitalist countries	27.8	24.5	19.2	11.6	27.5	28.3	31.4	29.3	10.8	11.1	18.1	20.1	29.7	30.9

Source: Rocznik Statystyki Miedzynarodowej 1965, Warsaw, GUS, 1967.

The Soviet Union, which this year celebrates the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, is now a major world power with an enormous economic potential. It has broken the nuclear monopoly of the USA and possesses a formidable missile and nuclear capability. The other socialist countries of Europe are steadily catching up with the leading capitalist countries. Their economic potential provides a solid basis for their socialist foreign policy of peace.

The West European Communist and Workers' parties with an overall membership of more than 2.5 million as against 500,000 in 1939, have won the confidence and support of working people by their steadfast fight for peace and democratic rights and economic demands. The millions of new votes won by the French Communist Party in the recent general election are indicative in this respect.

The forces of socialism and democracy in Europe and throughout the world are a factor capable of playing a decisive part in promoting peace and strengthening security. The changes that have taken place in the European and world balance of forces have indeed created a qualitatively new situation in the sphere of international relations.

II.

The fight for peace and security in Europe is proceeding in a complex international situation. The aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism has dangerously accentuated world tensions in recent years. With the present alignment of forces, in the light of the realities of today, any attempt to resolve outstanding international issues by means of force, by armed intervention, is not only doomed to fail, but is fraught with the danger of a worldwide military conflict.

The ruthless war waged by the USA in Vietnam is indicative in this respect. It has underscored the inability of U.S. imperialism to achieve military victory over the people of Vietnam, who derive strength from the justice of their cause and enjoy the support and aid of the socialist countries and world public opinion generally.

The aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism, regardless of the fact that its military action is concentrated on Southeast Asia, is a grave threat also to Europe. As was pointed out in the Bucharest Declaration, "U.S. policy aims in Europe have nothing in common with the vital interests of the European peoples, with ensuring security in Europe. The U.S. ruling circles want to impose their will on their allies in Western Europe with a view to making the latter an instrument of U.S. global

policy the underlying object of which is to halt and reverse the historical processes of national and social emancipation. Hence the attempts made to involve some Western European states in military gambles in other parts of the world, particularly in Asia."

The substance of this policy is not altered by professions of a desire to "build bridges," of readiness to cooperate in peace with the USSR and the other European socialist countries. There is no doubt that underlying these avowals, which trace their genesis to the Kennedy era, is an assessment of the basic lines of U.S. policy in the light of the military-economic potential of the socialist countries. U.S. imperialism is aware that a global conflict would endanger the USA itself. But for all that the policy of "building bridges" by no means signifies a genuine desire on the part of the USA to order its relations with the socialist countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Washington to all intents and purposes has reserved to itself the "right" to engage in armed intervention against revolutionary and national-liberation movements. It is out to undermine the solidarity and then destroy the unity of the socialist countries and the international revolutionary movement. These policy concepts, which constitute the substance of "selective" coexistence, clearly show that the ideologists of U.S. imperialism, far from having relinquished their basic anti-communist aims, are simply searching for new ways and means of achieving them. The "bridge-building" policy rests on anti-communism.

Actually, the U.S. politicians are not building any real bridges of understanding and peaceful coexistence between the nations. As it becomes bogged down more and more in its war in Vietnam, the USA professes to be striving for a detente in Europe while actually opposing every constructive proposal offering a prospect of real relaxation of tension and strengthening of European security.

U.S. policy towards Europe is all the more dangerous to the people of the continent because it is increasingly hinged on alliance with the imperialist and militarist circles of Federal Germany. This "Washington-Bonn axis" is a direct threat to peace in Europe and the world. "The main factor hindering the building of security and peace in Europe," Wladislaw Gomulka said in a speech in Katowice on February 8, "is the obdurate striving of all Federal German governments to cancel out the military defeat of Hitler Germany and to violate the status quo in Europe."

The basic principles of West German policy have not undergone any essential change, despite changes of government. What they

are is common knowledge. The Bonn government is the only one in Europe which makes territorial claims and refuses to recognize the state frontiers established after the Second World War, including Poland's western frontier on the Oder and the Neisse. It does not wish to admit that the Munich agreement was illegal and null and void from the beginning. It lays claim without any legal justification to the right to speak for "the whole of Germany" and the "entire German nation" ignoring the existence of the other German state — the German Democratic Republic, which it is out to annex in the guise of "unification." The Bonn government is the only government in Europe and the world which insists on being given access to nuclear weapons. It needs these weapons not for defense — for the FRG is not threatened from any quarter — but to back up its aggressive policy. A die-hard opponent of any relaxation of tension, it has torpedoed all peace initiatives aimed at détente, regardless of whether they have come from the East or the West.

It is, then, an incontrovertible fact that the policy of West German imperialism is the main obstacle to a détente in Europe, and that the aims and practical activities of the Bonn governments run counter to the vital interests of the European peoples, the Germans included.

The present alignment of forces in Europe, the defense capability of the socialist countries and the active struggle waged by the people generally act, of course, as a curb on the West German militarists, impeding the realization of their aggressive schemes. But the fact remains that the policy pursued by Federal Germany—now second in the capitalist world for volume of industrial output and possessing the biggest army in Western Europe—cannot but influence, and in the most adverse way, the situation in Europe. This is why the German question, or, to be more precise, the problem of the militarist and revanchist policy of the West German government, looms so large in the context of the overall problem of European security.

III.

Both now and in the foreseeable future the German question must be examined in the light of the existence of two sovereign German states. For 18 years now this has been a fact of German and European life. The chief aim of one of these states—the Federal Republic—is annexation of the other—the German Democratic Republic. This striving underlies the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, according to which the Federal Republic alone repre-

sents the whole of Germany. The FRG resorts to every possible device to prevent other countries from recognizing and establishing diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic, fearing that recognition would be an obstacle to the realization of Bonn's annexationist policy.

As we know, the new government in Bonn, essentially following in the footsteps of the Erhard government, has announced a "new Eastern policy" which, for the European socialist countries alone, ever so slightly modifies the Hallstein Doctrine. The men now in the saddle in Bonn know full well that when it comes to the socialist countries, which from the very beginning have had diplomatic relations with the GDR, this notorious doctrine works against the Federal Republic rather than against the GDR. Moreover, the "new Eastern policy" was conceived as a maneuver to create the impression that the Federal Republic has given up its cold war stance and is eager to normalize relations with the socialist countries. Actually, however, as can be seen from the fact that it refuses to recognize the existence of the GDR and has not renounced its territorial claims on a number of countries or its striving to lay hands on nuclear weapons, Bonn wants no real normalization.

The socialist countries discerned this maneuver, and so once again Bonn policy finds itself in an impasse. No amount of wishful thinking can change the real situation.

Speaking during the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid between the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic on March 15, Gomulka said: "The cause of peace and security in Europe and the normalization of relations with the socialist countries presuppose above all that the Federal Government gives up once and for all its usurpatory claim to be the sole representative of the whole of Germany . . .

"Europe cannot do without the German Democratic Republic, which has grown into the fabric of the European state structure, has become a component of this structure. The existence, development and stabilization of the GDR as a German socialist state are a basic condition of peace and security in Europe. And peace is the dominant problem in Europe."

The emergence of the two sovereign German states was the result of the defeat of Hitler's Reich and of postwar development. As is known, immediately after the defeat of Hitler, the Great Powers, with the agreement of the other members of the anti-fascist coalition, concluded the historic Potsdam agree-

ments, laying down Germany's new, inviolable frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse frontier, which correspond to the historical rights of the peoples and to the requirements of European security. The four Great Powers charted the future of postwar Germany, setting up a temporary occupation regime and agreeing to implement throughout the country the three D's—denazification, demilitarization and democratization. A fourth D was likewise decided upon—decartelization of the big trusts which had financed Hitler and set his monstrous war machine in motion.

But these decisions were not carried out throughout Germany.

Events took a completely different course in West Germany than in the East. The Nuremberg trial notwithstanding, denazification was not carried out to the end; the steps taken in this direction were soon dropped. Nor were social and economic reforms implemented which might have created the conditions for democratizing a society that had been poisoned for years by the criminal doctrine of Nazism. On the contrary, many genuinely democratic organizations and movements were banned. The Communist Party was again outlawed. Decartelization was opposed by the Western monopolies, primarily the American, which had made huge investments in prewar Germany and were determined to continue reaping the profits. Demilitarization was effected only during the first few years. Soon, simultaneously with the cold war started by the West, revival of West Germany's military potential was begun with a view to using it against an imaginary danger of "Communist aggression." The West pinned its hopes on the resurgence of German militarism, in which it saw—just as it did on the eve of the Second World War—a "bastion against the East." In 1949 the Federal Republic was established, and a few years later it was included in the Atlantic Pact which had been conceived as a means of exerting military pressure on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as the main instrument of the aggression being planned against these countries.

Faced with the choice between a united, demilitarized and neutral Germany and a West Germany included in this anti-communist bloc, the Western powers, and above all the United States, opted for the latter alternative. They rejected every proposal to unite Germany on the basis of demilitarization, and they opted for a division of the country which left the bigger part—more than two-thirds of the population and over 80 per cent of the industrial potential—on their side. This concept was espoused also by the West German

politicians, primarily Adenauer, and by the big capitalists.

In the meantime developments took a diametrically opposite course in East Germany. Here genuine denazification and demilitarization were carried out, and democratization consisted not in imparting to diverse institutions a bourgeois-democratic form, but in deep-going social reforms. One of the most important of these was the agrarian reform, which abolished the socio-economic base of Prussian Junkerdom. Decartelization was not a fiction in this part of the country, but was carried out to the end. Moreover, the key industrial enterprises were taken away from the concerns and made public property.

Confronted with the formation of the Federal Republic, the democratic forces in East Germany established the second German state—the Democratic Republic. Deep-going socio-economic reforms, without which there can be no real democracy, laid the groundwork for building the new, socialist society. Whereas in West Germany power again went to the imperialist forces, in the GDR the reins of government were held by the democratic forces, the workers and peasants, who under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party set to work to build the first socialist state in Germany's history. Indicative of the radical difference between the way things have shaped in the two Germanys is the fact that while in West Germany the Nazis have revived their party—the National Democratic Party—in the GDR all fascist activity is totally banned and no statute of limitation protects war criminals.

The GDR began building up its people's army only after the remilitarization of West Germany within the framework of the Atlantic Pact had been started. And it was only natural that when the socialist countries set up the Warsaw Treaty organization as a reply to the inclusion of West Germany in the Atlantic pact, the GDR, too, joined this organization—natural inasmuch as imperialist West Germany, now an ally of the Western powers, began arming at top speed, spearheading its aggressive policy primarily against the GDR. In the circumstances the latter, as a socialist state, joined with the other socialist countries to safeguard its security.

Such are the facts. There exist two German states deriving from the two diametrically opposite trends of postwar development: what is more, they are two completely different types of states—one capitalist, the other socialist. Their socio-economic systems are antipodes.

Federal Germany is an imperialist state, i.e., a state with expansionist aims, whereas the GDR is a peace-loving state pursuing a

policy based on the Potsdam agreements, a policy of peaceful coexistence aimed at ensuring European security.

Federal Germany wants to lay its hands on nuclear weapons, whereas the GDR has for years consistently advocated renunciation of nuclear armaments by both German states.

Given this situation, and given these fundamental differences, is unification of the two German states possible? On what basis could they be united? The Bonn government offers only one platform—the swallowing up of the socialist state by the imperialist state, the withdrawal of the GDR from the Warsaw Treaty and the inclusion of the whole of Germany in the Atlantic pact, and removal of Soviet troops from the GDR while retaining the U.S., British and French troops in Germany. This is a program not of German reunification but of West German imperialist expansion, with the annexation of the GDR regarded merely as the first step towards revising and cancelling out the results of the Second World War. It is a program leading to war in Europe and a new world war.

The establishment of the GDR was—from the standpoint of the Germans themselves, of their present and their future, and of Europe as a whole—one of the most important results of the defeat of fascism and of postwar development. Without it durable security in Europe cannot be visualized.

As the statement issued by the Soviet Government on January 29 this year points out, “the separation of the above sovereign states which came about as a result of the defeat of the Hitler Reich and the long span of post-war development, took place on a social, class basis, and to none is it given to change the situation.” The treaties of friendship concluded by the GDR in March with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and its 1964 treaty with the USSR, are important steps towards strengthening European security and hence of the utmost importance not only for the Warsaw Treaty countries but also for Western Europe.

IV.

Peace and security in Europe presuppose unity among all peace-loving and democratic forces, presuppose a constructive dialogue with those West Europeans who take a realistic view of the situation and who, in their own interests, sincerely strive towards relaxation of tension. “An important factor which makes it increasingly difficult to embark on military adventures in Europe,” the Bucharest Declaration says, “is the growing influence in the Western European countries of forces conscious of the need to rise above differences

in political views and convictions and to work for a relaxation of the international tension, for mutually advantageous relationships free from any discrimination between the countries of Europe, for the complete independence of their countries and preservation of their national features.”

In the course of recent years a trend towards overcoming the old cold war attitudes and normalizing relations with the socialist countries has become evident in the ruling circles of some Western European countries. This is due to a number of factors. Above all the myth of “Communist aggression” has been blasted. Thanks to the consistent policy of the socialist countries, their constructive program of cooperation between countries with different socio-economic systems based on mutual benefit and non-interference in internal affairs, and the development of political, economic and cultural contacts, the main argument used by the United States to mesmerize the NATO countries — “defense of the free world from Communist danger”—has begun to backfire. On the other hand, many Western statesmen have good reason to fear that the one-sided orientation on the United States and its aggressive global policy is likely to involve their countries in military gambles running counter to their interests.

Similarly, the revenge-seeking policy of cold war pursued by the FRG is encountering a certain resistance on the part of its Western allies. The more sober-minded politicians are beginning to realize that the U.S. and West German policy of aggression contains a threat to the interests of other Western countries. They can see that this policy prevents détente and normalization of international relations.

There is no doubt that the evolution of the Western European situation is greatly influenced by the struggle waged by the masses with the Communist and Workers’ parties in the forefront.

All this underlies the crisis of the North Atlantic set-up in which trends have appeared towards ending the U.S. hegemony, rejecting cold war policies, and safeguarding national independence and sovereignty.

The growing influence in Western leading circles of those who realize the need to take steps to ease the tension and to normalize relations between the countries irrespective of their systems, is a positive development from the standpoint of European security.

The socialist countries welcome this trend and actively support every move towards normalizing relations, advancing concrete and realistic proposals aimed at creating a system of general European security. A comprehensive program of action towards this end was

set forth in the declaration issued by the Bucharest meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw treaty countries held in July 1966.

Consistent efforts to put an end to the cold war, to stamp out the seedbeds of dangerous conflicts, and to ensure a relaxation of tension, cooperation and normalization of relations between the European countries presupposes constant, profound examination and realistic assessment of the situation.

V.

As before, the situation in Europe is far from simple. The imperialists are counterposing to the striving towards détente their own aggressive policy, seeking to sustain and aggravate the tension. The American escalation of the war in Vietnam, their systematic rejection of all peace proposals, and their ignoring of the realistic voices calling for a peaceful settlement of this dangerous conflict continue to poison the international atmosphere and to retard progress in the matter of ensuring European security. The Kiesinger government, continuing the old aggressive policy, has not given up any of the objectives of Adenauer and Erhard.

The economic division of Europe is being deepened by stepping up integration within the existing groupings and by the discriminatory policies towards third countries. Nor have the imperialists relinquished their planned ideological and political subversion designed to undermine the forces of socialism.

The U.S. monopolies are continuing their policy of infiltrating Western Europe and of exerting pressure on their Western European partners. And there still are those striving to realize the old concepts of "European unification" in association with U.S. imperialism.

These attempts to carry on the old line, and even to prosecute it more vigorously, are directly connected with the drive to intensify the economic exploitation of the working people and to curtail democratic freedoms. Consequently, the fight against cold-war policies and aggression is inseparable from the popular struggle against monopoly and reaction.

Recognition of the GDR and the territorial status quo in Europe and preventing the FRG from gaining possession of nuclear weapons are basic to a genuine normalization in Europe, to improving relations between countries. To this end it is essential for all the countries of our continent to work together to build a system of collective security under which the guarantees of continental security would at once be guarantees also of the security of each signatory. Many difficulties

remain to be overcome before such a system can be achieved. The reactionary forces must be made to re-examine their policies. What is needed is patient and consistent work to strengthen European security and promote European cooperation in order to forge ahead step by step towards the ultimate goal.

The convocation of a general European conference on security and cooperation could be an important step forward in this direction. A proposal to this effect was made in the United Nations as far back as 1964 by the Polish government. The idea was fully endorsed by the Bucharest Declaration.

There are also other proposals, such as the calling of an assembly of representatives of the parliaments of all European countries, which could help to promote cooperation and to ensure security.

An important role in this respect is played by promoting good-neighborly relations between all European states based on the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality, non-interference in one another's internal affairs, and mutual benefit. Cooperation on this foundation should extend primarily to economic relations, which are essential for developing contacts in the spheres of science, technology, culture and art and all other areas.

VI.

As pointed out above, the socialist countries and the Communist and Workers' parties are playing a signal role in the work to strengthen peace and security in Europe. The guarantee of the effectiveness of their policy is unity of action. This has been the case in the past, it is the case today and will be so in the future. In the light of the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism and the stepping up of revanchist moves by West German imperialism, unity of action of the forces of socialism, freedom and peace is more necessary today than ever before. Each party should realize its internationalist responsibility for the success of the cause of socialism and perform its duty by making its full contribution to the preservation of peace, to the shaping of new international relationships which would accord with the interests of the working people.

Party and government leaders in the socialist countries engage in systematic consultations on foreign policy problems. In the past few months representatives of our Party have had meetings and talks with the leaders of the fraternal parties in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary and Bulgaria. In February the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries met in Warsaw. Bilateral

al and multilateral meetings and consultations of this kind help to cement the unity of the socialist countries and to make their efforts to promote security and peace more effective.

Important too is the all-round development of bilateral and multilateral contacts between all the parties of our movement in Europe. The Communist and Workers' parties head the popular struggle and give effect to the joint strategy of the Communist movement in

combating the common enemy—imperialism. Joint elaboration and coordinated implementation of the basic lines of action on the international arena are a reflection of the international nature of our movement, of its internationalism. Hence the importance our Party attached to the April conference of the European Communist and Workers' parties. It fully supported this initiative and did its best in helping to ensure its success.

Bonn foreign policy— legend and reality

JOSEF SCHLEIFSTEIN

BY THE TIME THE Erhard Government resigned, the policy of the Federal Republic had reached a dead end. Bonn was isolated even among its Nato allies. Official "German policy" had been hopelessly discredited, and the cost of the "from strength" policy had caused a crisis in state finances, a crisis which coincided with the gravest general economic deterioration since the founding of the Federal Republic.

The government of "national concentration," which the more influential sections of the monopoly bourgeoisie wanted in the circumstances, was conceived as a "grand coalition" thanks to the Rightist Social Democratic leadership having aligned themselves with the political line of the Christian Democrats and the Christian Socialists. Since the new government could offer the public nothing but higher taxes, emergency laws and curtailment of the social gains, and since in foreign policy it faced the thankless task of dissipating the widespread mistrust of Bonn, it needed nothing more urgently than the legend of a new foreign policy. Yet this legend is worlds removed from reality.

The progressive forces in the Federal Republic, including the unlawfully banned Communist Party, are devoting much of their attention to foreign policy problems, for this is

the area on which peace in Germany and throughout Europe depends in very great measure. For years past, the champions of peace in the Federal Republic have been working assiduously for the renunciation of nuclear arms in any shape or form, the renunciation of territorial demands, the establishment of normal relations with the German Democratic Republic and the other socialist countries, and for concrete steps towards disarmament as, say, entry into a nuclear-free European zone of detente.

The peace supporters would welcome any step made by Bonn towards a genuine policy of peace and detente. But the only valid criterion they can use in assessing the governments' actions is whether or not they accord with the principles of peace, and there is not the slightest reason for satisfaction or complacency in this respect. The anti-militarist forces in the Federal Republic are conscious of their responsibility. The lessons of the struggle against fascism and imperialism have not been lost on them. They know that they must assess the situation, and the degree of the danger, realistically, that they must avoid illusions and swiftly counter the legends and maneuvers designed to mislead the people.

Monopoly capital recovered its economic and political power in the western zone of

occupation after the Second World War thanks to U.S. aid and by acting, initially, as an instrument of Washington. The German big bourgeoisie and the Western Powers split Germany in contravention of the Potsdam Agreement, created the Federal Republic and inducted it into the Western military bloc. Subsequently, for example, in 1952 and again in 1954, they turned down all Soviet and GDR proposals envisaging a united, democratic Germany with restricted armaments. A Christian Democrat congress in 1965 extolled the "historic" decision of Adenauer who, faced with the choice between the West, the East and a neutral Germany, opted for Nato.

The West German capitalists opted so because they always considered their domination of the Federal Republic as a springboard for extending their rule to the rest of Germany—"within the 1937 borders" for a start.

It has always been the objective of Bonn's foreign policy to annul the results of the Second World War and to change the postwar territorial status quo in Europe. All its military, political, diplomatic, juridical and psychological means have been centered on this goal. A thoroughly geared system of war preparations has been worked out with the typically German imperialist flair for "totality."

At the time when the career of John Foster Dulles, whom the late Konrad Adenauer characterized as his "best friend," was at its zenith, the West German Chancellor believed that the goal was near. He was convinced that socialism would be "rolled back," the GDR "liberated" and the former eastern provinces seized from "liberated" Poland with Nato assistance by the West German divisions incorporated in the Nato armed forces. "Until now," Adenauer said, "people have been speaking of reunification. Now we must speak about liberation." And he added: "We shall recover the Soviet zone provided the Western world becomes strong enough."

When these short-lived hopes foundered, Bonn changed the time-table but not its aims. Its foreign policy and military program, and the means by which it expected to revise the outcome of the Second World War and the territorial status quo in Central Europe, became increasingly obvious in the mid-fifties. The key elements of Bonn's foreign policy may be described as follows:

1. *Advance step by step towards the main goal, breaking it down for this purpose into partial goals — "reunification" on Bonn's terms, i.e., annexation of the GDR; restoration of Germany's 1937 frontiers, and the return of those Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia. Formulate these aims (in the Hitler*

way) as inalienable "legal claims" grounded in international law (the right to speak in the name of the whole German nation, the right to self-determination, the right to the Fatherland).

Steady reinforcement of the *military* power of the Federal Republic as the *chief instrument* of her foreign policy; modernize her armaments and press for a say in the matter of nuclear weapons.

3. *Reinforce the military-political alliance with the United States* as the strongest Western Power and become its indispensable ally (for example by rendering direct support to the U.S. aggression in Vietnam); recognize for the U.S. its leading role in Nato, while working for maximum strengthening of West Germany's own weight and her own leading position.

4. *Extend Bonn's position in Western Europe* through the European Economic Community and other West European organizations. Move towards this goal at first cautiously, in order to maintain fairly good relations with France and to nip in the bud any premature growth of mistrust on her part and on the part of the smaller Nato countries, until West Germany is strong enough by virtue of her economic superiority to come out into the open with her claim to supremacy.

5. *Make the most of all alliances as means of achieving the fixed aims; make these aims "European" and "Atlantic" in order to commit the allies to them by all possible means (diplomatic agreements and statements, economic and financial levers, purchase of arms and by maintaining foreign troops in West German territory) and thus have the opportunity to involve them in a military venture at a propitious moment.*

6. *In order not to alert the nations of Europe and the rest of the world prematurely, keep proclaiming (again as Hitler did) that all the aims geared to altering the status quo are to be achieved by "peaceful means" only, by "renunciation of force," through a "peaceful accommodation."*

7. *Conscious that it cannot count on its West European allies to support (or at least suffer) this conception, unless the cold war and tensions in Europe are continued, Bonn's motto should be vigorous resistance to every practical measure designed to relieve tension and speed disarmament, oppose the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and a nuclear-free zone in Europe, and obstruct a European security conference. To "justify" their practice, Bonn's official diplomacy and propaganda are trying desperately to keep alive the spectre of a "Soviet danger."*

Successive governments in the Federal Re-

public have followed this program doggedly, changing nothing but accent and method. Understandably, they have not come any nearer to their main aims, for these are illusory, unattainable and at odds with the political and military balance of strength in Europe. The mounting danger to European peace is rooted in the "positions-of-strength" policy in which the rulers of the FRG persist, despite its futility, in the continuous build-up of military power and in pernicious efforts to press home their claims.

Bonn's chief aim has always been to annex the German Democratic Republic. For a number of years they believed they would achieve it through what Walter Ulbricht recently described as a "frontal attack." They anticipated staging X-Day for the "Anschluss" in the summer of 1961 through economic bleeding, a brain drain and by subverting socialist construction. The GDR cut the ground from under these plans by sealing its borders with the agreement of its Warsaw Treaty allies.

The collapse of the "frontal attack" compelled Bonn to set out on a search for more flexible methods and new tactics. Washington, too, kept advising them to the same effect. The initial steps in this direction were made by the Erhard Government and its Foreign Minister, Schroeder. They were meant to dissipate the unfavorable view taken of Bonn's foreign policy and the impression created in the world that Bonn was opposed to any easing of tension.

There was much talk at the time about a "new Eastern policy," and in its so-called Peace Note in March 1966 Erhard tried to parade as the man with a refurbished foreign policy, a policy of detente and disarmament. In effect, however, he held fast to all the old positions. His government did not abandon the claim to exclusive representation in respect to the GDR, nor its demand for a say in the allocation of nuclear weapons, in revising the Oder-Neisse frontier and changing the territorial status quo.

Have things changed since the setting up of the "grand coalition"? Is the Kiesinger government, in which the Social-Democrat Brandt is Foreign Minister, blazing any new trails? Are there any practical steps being taken or at least signs of a new policy, that is, of new means and of peaceful purposes?

The fact that there are Social Democratic ministers in the government for the first time in the Federal Republic has unquestionably given rise to certain expectations both at home and abroad. Certainly Social Democrat voters do not want their ministers to follow the inept and dangerous policy of Adenauer and Erhard. But so far there are little grounds

for their expectations and this could lead to bitter disappointment.

We should not forget that a "grand coalition" and "national concentration" existed in foreign affairs long before the formation of the Kiesinger Government with its Social Democratic ministers. A common foreign policy has been pursued by all the parties represented in the Parliament since June 30, 1960, when Herbert Wehner, who spoke in the Bundestag on behalf of the Social Democratic group, declared unqualified agreement with the foreign policy of the Government, then headed by Adenauer. It follows then that those who opposed the foreign policy of Adenauer, Erhard and Schroeder as being fruitless, illusory, aggressive and dangerous, cannot but oppose the foreign policy of Brandt and Wehner. The Social Democratic leadership, as Wehner declared before the Kiesinger government was formed, believed that in principle an opposition foreign policy is ruled out in the Federal Republic.

And the main aspects of Bonn's current foreign policy need to be studied very closely before it can be said whether or not it has changed, and what elements of it have been revised. Take its stand, for example, on the question of nuclear arms, the prime indication of its attitude towards a detente and disarmament.

When rebuked for their nuclear ambitions, the Bonn Government (and sometimes Bonn's Nato partners too) usually pointed out that the Federal Republic had committed itself under the West European Union treaty of 1954 (Protocol No. 3) not to make atomic, bacteriological or chemical weapons in her territory. In effect, however, Bonn has long been clamoring for access to nuclear weapons.

Bonn realized even before Erhard's resignation that its overly insistent pleas for atomic weapons were meeting with little or no sympathy among its allies. This was the situation the "grand coalition" had to face up to when Kiesinger announced his government program on December 13, 1966. The tone was softened and the real aims kept in the dark. Kiesinger said his government was not seeking "national" authority over atomic weapons, or "national" possession of them. This left Bonn freedom of action. "According to Kiesinger's statement," *Die Welt* commented, "the Federal Republic would like to leave open the question of co-possession and joint disposal of atomic weapons."

It is all too clear that the new Government is not giving up the effort to obtain access to nuclear weapons and that it is prepared to work for this goal in every possible way. There is no unanimity at present, however,

over the best means to this end. Schroeder and the Social Democratic ministers appear to favor an "atlantic" solution, while "strong man" Strauss inclines towards a "European atomic force." To be sure, these are by no means mutually exclusive "solutions." Strauss suggests in his "programmatic" book, which has appeared also in English, that the Federal Republic should participate in "all solutions" that could provide "more information, greater consultations and a greater say in planning and organizing atomic defenses. He also says the only solution that will give the "Federal Republic true equality with comparable partners" is a "European nuclear-weapons potential under the control of a European government and at its disposal."

Freiherr zu Guttenberg, like Strauss, considers the French "force de frappe" a suitable basis for such a nuclear force. Both have long been striving to convince the French Government of the advantages of Bonn's financial, technological and scientific participation in making atomic weapons and missiles. Brandt, too, has repeatedly voiced the idea of joint "technological and scientific" arms projects, which has even been inscribed in the official government program. It stands to reason that the proponents of an atomic pact with France make it quite clear that they will never consent to a secondary role. Strauss said in so many words that the Federal Republic wants atomic partnership, not atomic patronage, and that it has no intention of "trading U.S. atomic patronage for French."

The legend of a new foreign policy hit a snag over the Geneva talks concerning a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The new government had had to show its true colors at what must have been a most unfavorable moment for it. The unbridled chauvinism, and the atomic claims voiced in statements by Kiesinger, Adenauer, Strauss, Barzel and Brandt must have contributed to the disillusionment of those who had been misled about the intentions of the new Government.

The rulers of the Federal Republic evidently feel that a nuclear non-proliferation treaty would strike at the *nerve center of their aggressive plans*. In the summer of 1965, Adenauer declared that such a treaty would "deliver Europe to the Russians." Strauss rejected it on the plea that "it would cement and largely legalize the status quo in Europe," and said it would then be impossible for Bonn to participate in a "European atomic force." To camouflage its true motives, the government has protested officially against the restrictions envisaged for peaceful atomic research and its use in industry, against economic espionage, and the like. It gives itself away by its obvious

dread of effective international control, losing no time to suggest that control be limited to the present Euratom framework. The anti-fascist Frankfurt-on-Main weekly, *Die Tat*, however, dug into the Euratom treaty and found that it ruled out control of atomic energy used for military purposes. "Control," says Article 84 of the Euratom treaty, "does not apply to materials intended for purposes of defense."

Is there anything the government wishes to conceal? Its attitude creates the suspicion that nuclear military projects are already under way in the Federal Republic. All the more so since the "warnings" issued by official spokesmen (e.g., Chancellor Kiesinger's interview of February 17 over the West German TV) against the non-proliferation treaty now say openly that the Bonn government undertook (and this only within the framework of the Western European Union) not to manufacture atomic weapons on its own territory, but had never renounced the right to make such weapons outside its territory, nor the right to acquire or to have access to them. Stress is laid on the fact that in a talk with Dulles, Adenauer had referred to the legal principle that a treaty commitment is valid only if conditions stipulated in it remain unchanged. So now it is the prime duty of Europe's peace-loving forces to overcome Bonn's obdurate resistance to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Like its predecessors, the Kiesinger Government is rejecting all serious disarmament proposals. It has evaded answering the clear-cut disarmament proposals submitted by the GDR government. It has also kept silence over the proposal to set up a nuclear-free zone in Central and Northern Europe contained in the Swedish government's reply to Bonn's "Peace Note." Its professed readiness to disarm is not being backed up by deeds.

The refusal of successive Federal governments to recognize the GDR and to establish normal inter-state relations with it, is another persistent threat to European peace. This refusal is tied up with the claim to exclusive representation, which was specifically reiterated in Kiesinger's official statement. It would be foolish to regard it as mere juridical fiction of no practical import. It is a vain claim no doubt, but by no means a harmless one. On the contrary, it is most aggressive and bellicose.

In making it, the Federal Government arrogates the right to speak on behalf of the entire German nation. Bonn has mobilized an army of lawyers, who juggle with a variety of theories to "prove" that from the standpoint of international law the Federal Repub-

lic is the sole legal successor to the German Reich and that it is, therefore, as Wilhelm G. Grewe, a West German diplomat, put it, "the only legitimate form of organization of the all-German state, which has never ceased to exist." The GDR and the provinces east of the Oder and Neisse are said to be "legitimate" components of this state, though the "lawful German government" is deprived of the possibility to exercise its sovereignty there by reason of "foreign abuse."

This is no mere juridical theory. The Federal Government has acted on it wherever it could in its political and legal practice. It has arrogated to itself and its bodies the right to apply the laws and legal procedures of the Federal Republic to citizens of other states, those of the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union, which is without precedent. Laws, definitions and judgements place the "German Reich within the 1937 frontiers" as the "interior region" to this day, and sentences passed by the Federal Court say of Polish towns that "German jurisdiction in them is still being impeded, though it has not been finally ruled out."

The political concept behind the legal claim to exclusive representation is the most dangerous of all. Bonn proceeds from the proposition that the Federal Republic is the sole "legitimate" German state, while the GDR is not a subject of international law, and concludes therefrom that since the GDR is an "unlawfully withheld territory" and the GDR Government a "group of rebels," the "lawful" government in Bonn is entitled to act against the GDR at any time, employing every available means, such intervention being simply an "internal" matter. This outspokenly interventionist and aggressive substance of the claim to exclusive representation was bared a few years ago by Dr. Dehler, Free Democratic Party leader and Deputy Chairman of the Bundestag.

While it smacks of madness, there is method in it—the old German imperialist method of supplementing material war preparations with psychological "pretexts for war." Hitler "returned to the Reich" the Austrians and the Sudeten Germans in accordance with the "right of national self-determination." The "right" of exclusive representation is a political and legal pretext for "returning to the Reich" the GDR. The interventionist complexion of this is borne out by numerous official and unofficial statements, including some made quite recently. It is impossible, it is said, to recognize the GDR because from the standpoint of international law such recognition would commit Bonn to non-interference in GDR affairs.

Successive Federal governments have denied for years that they intend to press home their claim to exclusive representation by force of arms. They referred to the undertaking they gave to the Western Powers to refrain from "unifying Germany or altering the present German frontiers" forcibly (London, October 3, 1954). But promises renouncing the use of force are not worth the paper they are written on so long as the Federal Government does not give up trying to gain access to nuclear weapons and so long as it resists all serious disarmament measures. Besides, despite its promises, the Federal Government can take cover behind the signboard of the North Atlantic bloc, which so far has never once declared its renunciation of the use of force with regard to the existing European frontiers, although Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, a member of the policy planning body of the U.S. State Department, suggests that Nato should make such a public renunciation in order to "placate" Poland.

The claim to exclusive representation, and to foreign territory, could be treated as the harmless raving of a few incorrigible maniacs if it came from the government of a disarmed, peace-loving country. But when it is made by men who in the summer of 1965 bragged that within two years the Federal Republic would have the best-equipped army in the world "alongside the USA," and who are bent on getting a finger on the nuclear trigger, the nations of Europe would do well to display the maximum vigilance, for what we are faced with is the well-known, highly inflammable combination of revanchism, territorial demands and feverish arming, the very inflammable material with which German imperialists have already sparked off two world wars.

The "grand coalition" is using subtle methods to keep alive its claim to exclusive representation. Faced by scepticism even in the Nato countries, Brandt has set out to attach a new label, "the obligation of representation," to that shop-worn commodity. To make its claim weightier, Bonn is working might and main to isolate, weaken and "soften up" the GDR, using three inter-locking methods:

First, the Hallstein Doctrine, which, coupled with economic and financial pressures, is designed to hinder recognition of the GDR by capitalist countries and the new national states;

Second, partial modification of the Hallstein Doctrine, whereby the GDR is to be isolated from the Eastern European socialist countries or "elbowed out" from them;

Third, maximum interference in the internal affairs of the GDR, which is to be thus "softened up" and, as it were, "hugged to death."

It is to this somewhat unholy triad that Kiesinger's much advertised "new Eastern" and "new German" policy boils down. The new approach to the German Democratic Republic is every bit as unrealistic as the old. The bilateral treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual aid which the GDR concluded recently with Poland and Czechoslovakia bear this out conclusively.

The proposals for establishing contact with the GDR ("short of the threshold of recognition"), advertised by the Federal Government and particularly by Minister Wehner as a step towards mutual understanding and a detente are another piece of demagoguery. Mutual understanding is incompatible with the claim to exclusive representation. The new tactics with regard to the German Democratic Republic are, to a great extent, a result of the growing power and prestige enjoyed by that German socialist state. The monopoly groups that rule the Federal Republic have for some years watched with dismay how the GDR is depriving West Germany of the opportunities to engage in economic blackmail and sabotage. They would like to see this process develop in the reverse direction. They would like to see the economic relations of the GDR with the Soviet Union and the other CMEA countries weaken, to restore the former "dependence" and gain more direct opportunities for subverting the socialist construction in the GDR. That these designs have nothing in common with a detente is clear from the fact that the Kiesinger Government rejects not only negotiations, but even a discussion of the GDR proposals concerning mutual understanding and disarmament.

The "new Eastern policy" plays a prominent part in Bonn's efforts to make its foreign policy more attractive by means of a face-lifting. This 'new Eastern policy' accords largely with the recommendations made by U.S. State Department experts, especially those made by Dean Rusk's European affairs adviser, Professor Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. The latter's book *Alternative to Partition*, which appeared in the United States in 1965 and in the Federal Republic in 1966, outlines each of the measures now being taken by Bonn. As far back as 1965, Brzezinski advised Bonn to relinquish formal legal application of the Hallstein Doctrine in regard to the Eastern European states and to establish diplomatic relations with them. Furthermore, he recommended that the Federal Republic should persist in proposing "bilateral non-aggression pacts" to the Eastern European socialist countries and that it should express its readiness to "renounce the use of force."

This is just what the "grand coalition" is

doing today. It is acting on the motives that Brzezinski formulated as follows: "It would be sensible politics to improve relations with Eastern Europe and, at the same time, to isolate East Germany." He recommended a "strictly differentiated approach." But it could not be "too strictly" differentiated, because, in the final analysis, Brzezinski wants to "undermine Soviet positions" in Eastern Europe and press for "such changes" in the socialist countries as "arise only under constant pressure." What he meant, of course, was the abolition of socialism. There, in a nutshell, you have the whole "new Eastern policy." The "differentiation" between the GDR and the other socialist countries obviously concerns the methods, not the goal (with the one reservation that Brzezinski is not sure the East European nations can be convinced of Bonn's peaceful intentions so long as the latter refuses to recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier).

Indeed, Kiesinger's new policy gives no indication of a change in attitude towards the socialist countries. Even the modification of the Hallstein Doctrine which allows Bonn to establish diplomatic relations with the European socialist countries is based on the outrageous argument that their relations with the GDR may be discounted by reason of the "unvirtuous birth" of these states. For this reason, Bonn argues, diplomatic relations with them will not prejudice the right of exclusive representation. Kiesinger and Brandt have not expressed their readiness to declare the Munich agreement null and void from the very beginning. All they have said is that it is "no longer valid" (thus recognizing as "legitimate" Hitler's acts of aggression, because what was right in Munich must also be right in, say, the "Anschluss" of Austria).

The new government's stand on the Oder-Neisse frontier is no different from that of its predecessors. It insists, as they did, on the "legality" of its claim to the 1937 frontiers and says that the border issue will have to be settled in the peace treaty with an all-German government. Like their predecessors, Kiesinger and Strauss and Brandt and Wehner know perfectly well that neither the GDR nor the Oder-Neisse frontier can be abolished by "peaceful means."

Since Bonn's revenge-seeking and aggressive claims are met with mistrust in the Western European countries, its policy-makers have to refer to the Oder-Neisse frontier as a "trump" they cannot give up "prematurely," because it could be useful in any future peace negotiations. It is here that Strauss and Wehner, Guttenberg and Grewe see eye to eye.

It might be worthwhile to take a look at the

"logic" of their arguments. The final demarcation of frontiers will not come about, they aver, until a peace treaty, negotiable with none but an all-German government, is concluded. Since the chances of such negotiations in the foreseeable future are remote, the demand for the 1937 frontiers is retained as a psychological "pretext for war" in order to fan chauvinism and keep the public in a state of constant tension. Nothing could reveal the hypocritical nature of the "new Eastern policy" more clearly than Kiesinger's and Brandt's failure to question any of the existing organizational instruments and vehicles of mass propaganda — those generating the spirit of revenge. The neo-Nazi National Democratic Party for one thing, is allowed to function, though, to be sure, it is only the most venomous fruit of the nationalism that has been nurtured for years by the official Bonn policy.

The claims to Germany's "lawful" 1937 frontiers are just as impracticable as the "right" of exclusive representation. The German Democratic Republic and Poland have reaffirmed the Oder-Neisse frontier in their new treaty, and it is protected by the entire might of the Warsaw Treaty. Even in Western Europe, the Federal Government has failed to marshal much sympathy for its claims. These claims are dangerous, because they sow the seeds of war in the Federal Republic and are part of Bonn's designs upon the status quo. They are a danger to Europe in the larger sense because they are motivated by the same inflammable mixture of a sophisticated war machine, territorial claims and chauvinist madness.

According to influential men in the Government, and particularly Strauss, the "strong man," annexation of the GDR and "solving" the Oder-Neisse problem are matters of an "all-Europe" order. Strauss has told the allies of the Federal Republic in so many words to climb onto the Bonn bandwagon and make its claims "all-European," for then West Germany would no longer imperil the West. He wants France and, later, Britain to support these claims. He urges Bonn's allies to make the most of the "well-known energy and diligence of the Germans"; "in the long run," he adds, "a Germany that is a giant economically and a pygmy politically is unthinkable. That is why German policy needs a European framework."

This lifts the veil on the ultimate purpose of the "new Eastern policy." What Strauss suggests is a "purposeful play with all the actors cast in specific roles, in order to dampen the 'influence of Soviet policy' and to achieve a 'weakening of relations in the East.'" He

would like to see the Eastern neighbors brought "closer to Europe" and insists on the Western allies fulfilling their "liberation" mission ("the moral task") "also in relation to communism." In his book Strauss couches in more cautious terms the things he proclaimed so candidly at the CDU congress in the spring of 1965. We are not impelled by motives of a cheap popularity, he writes, when we say that our policy appeals also the enslaved peoples—not only the 17 million Germans but also the Poles, the Czechs, Hungarians, Serbs, Slovaks, Croats, Rumanians and Bulgarians. His colleague Guttenberg is no less outspoken. "I do not hesitate to say," he declares, "that Germany shares responsibility for Eastern Europe . . . Nobody should think that freedom can be restored for the Germans without a fundamental change in Eastern Europe." What a delightful prospect for the peoples of the socialist countries — Kiesinger, propaganda expert in Ribbentrop's Foreign Ministry, Strauss, ex-officer in Hitler's Wehrmacht, and Freiherr zu Guttenberg, Bavarian Junker, all bidding for the role of "liberators from communism" in the name of "Europe" and the "new Eastern policy."

To sum up. Neither the substance of Bonn's past policy nor its aims have changed in the least. Kiesinger and Brandt, trying simply to deck them in a somewhat less obnoxious garb, are using somewhat different methods in the struggle against the GDR. The Communist Party and other peace forces in the Federal Republic are faced with the difficult task of combating the illusions and of exposing the dangers of the present foreign policy. And this adds to their responsibility for the further development of the movement for an effective peace policy.

Opposition to the official foreign policy is growing in the trade unions, especially among the younger functionaries. The demand to forego atomic weapons and cut arms expenditure is voiced with growing insistence. The leadership of the Metalworkers' Union, for example, has called for a steep reduction in the military budget. Student organizations want the Government to relinquish its claims to exclusive representation, to establish normal relations with the GDR and to recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier. Liberal writers and politicians have urged the Government to recognize the facts and negotiate with the GDR Government. The Movement for Nuclear Disarmament and other peace organizations, and the cream of the working youth and students, are campaigning vigorously for Bonn to withdraw its support for the U.S. war in Vietnam and to agree to a nuclear non-proliferation pact.

Our Party is contributing actively and constructively to these movements. We are, moreover, striving to make the peoples more conscious of the perils of Bonn's foreign policy. A recent meeting of our Party's Central Committee advanced alternative proposals for a foreign policy of peace, which could be the basis for the integration of the nation's democratic forces. These proposals envisage renunciation of atomic weapons in any shape or form; renunciation of claims to exclusive re-

presentation, coupled with establishing normal interstate relations with the GDR; recognition of the existing frontiers; alignment with the projected treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; withdrawal of support for the American war in Vietnam and, last but not least, a substantial reduction in military expenditure. A new FRG foreign policy that would contribute to a European détente and security could be achieved by working for and realizing these demands.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF BUILDING SOCIALISM

Growing well-being in the Soviet Union

NIKOLAI LAGUTIN, VLADIMIR MAYER

LONG BEFORE THE OCTOBER Revolution, when the Communist Party in Russia had just been formed and its program was still being thrashed out, Lenin emphasized that socialism would ensure "well-being and the free, all-round development of all members of society."

Lenin's point was worked into the first Party Program adopted in 1903 and reproduced in the second Program adopted by the Eighth Congress eighteen months after the October Revolution. The Party directed the people's efforts towards developing the socialist economy with a view to ensuring a rapid rise in the standard of living and in the cultural level of the population. This point has been reaffirmed in the latest Program of the CPSU and in the resolutions of its Twenty-Third Congress.

A powerful modern industry and agriculture were built up in the Soviet Union. Today, the USSR produces nearly one-fifth of the world's industrial product whereas in 1913 Russia accounted for only a little more than four per cent.

The rapid growth of social production has been accompanied by a steady rise in the standard of living, although, naturally, there is no direct relation between the two because the rapid industrialization in the extremely complicated international environment necessitated a tightening of belts. Lacking foreign sources of accumulation and finance, the Soviet Union had had to muster its internal resources. A portion of the national income that normally could have been used to improve conditions had to be channelled into industry and building. Besides, for nearly twenty of the fifty years of Soviet power the country had had to fight wars forced on it by world imperialism and then to heal the war-inflicted wounds. The economic and cultural accomplishments were, therefore, achieved in a mere thirty years.

Despite all the difficulties that the Soviet state had to contend with in the process of its consolidation and development, the achievements in all spheres, including the standard of living and culture, have been im-

mense. Let us look more closely at a few facts and figures illustrating the Soviet accomplishments.

WAGE LEVELS

All too often, wage increases are accompanied by rising profits; hence real wages, that is average cash incomes pegged to changes in the cost-of-living index, are to be preferred as the basic indicator of the standard of living.

Although no regular statistics were kept in pre-Revolution Russia, there is evidence that the industrial workers' average monthly wage in 1913 was approximately 25 roubles.

Real wages dropped considerably during the First World War, the Civil War and the consequent economic breakdown, amounting to less than seven rubles (in 1913 rubles) in 1919 through 1921. A gradual rise began in 1922, the 1913 mark being reached by early 1926 and then surpassed.

The all-out industrialization necessitated by the growing fascist menace and the danger of a new world war called for a sustained effort, rigid economy and austerity. During the first five-year plan (1929-32) wages rose swiftly, but retail prices rose even more swiftly. Real wages declined in this period, followed by a further decline during the Great Patriotic War. The prewar (1940) level was attained in 1948, and since then real wages have been rising steadily. The factory and office worker's average monthly wage in 1965 was 95.60 rubles against 33 rubles in 1940, with retail prices up by 40 per cent. This makes the 1965 real wage (related solely to retail prices) some 110 per cent above that of 1940. Since service charges, including house rent, climbed less than commodity prices, *the worker's real wage rose more than 110 per cent in the period between 1940 and 1965.*

Absence of pre-Revolution statistics precludes any deep-going study of the growth of real wages for all gainfully employed. But a study of *industrial workers' wages* is quite possible.

In 1928, the average monthly wage of an industrial worker was 69 rubles, which was about 25 per cent more than *real wages* in 1913, whereas in 1965 the average monthly wage in industry was 1,013 old rubles (in circulation until 1961). Wages had thus risen approximately 14.7 times, while retail prices rose by about 8.7 times. In terms of commodity prices only, the rise in *real wages* in industry between 1929 and 1965 was approximately 70 per cent, and as much as 120 per cent if services, the cost of which increased only about twofold, are taken in account.

In 1928, as we have said, real wages in in-

dustry surpassed those of 1913 by about 25 per cent. Consequently, *in 1965 the real wage of industrial workers was about 180 per cent higher than in 1913.*

Wages, it will be recalled, form only part of the income of Soviet workers. The family budget is substantially augmented by pensions, grants and students' allowances. Moreover, many benefits are available gratis or at highly reduced rates, such as public education, medical services, kindergartens and nurseries, holiday homes, sanatoria, and state-owned housing. Soviet statistics and planning take these factors into account in the *real incomes* index. Since incomes over and above wages are rising steadily (as we shall show), real incomes grow more rapidly, as a rule, than real wages. *From 1940 to 1965, for example, real incomes of the gainfully employed increased 130 per cent, while real incomes per head of population tripled.*

FULL EMPLOYMENT AND REDUCED WORKING TIME

The Soviet Union was the first country to abolish unemployment. For more than 35 years no people have been without jobs, or lacking an income.

It has always been one of the main purposes of the Communist Party to achieve shorter working hours. The first Party Program called for an eight-hour day, and three days after the proletariat won power the first Soviet government issued a decree on this. The decree was enforced throughout the country by the beginning of 1918.

In 1927, on the 10th anniversary of the Revolution, the goal of a seven-hour day with no reduction in wages was proclaimed. The seven-hour (or still shorter) day was introduced for the first time in the world for the majority of workers in the subsequent five or six years.

The deterioration of the international situation and the threat of a Hitler attack compelled the Soviet Union to go back to the eight-hour day, and it was not until the post-war rehabilitation and economic development program was completed that the matter of reducing hours was again taken up. Early in 1956, the working day was cut by two hours on Saturdays and on the eve of holidays, and between 1956 and 1960 the seven-hour day was restored, with a six-hour day for underground jobs.

The reductions in working time did not involve *reductions in wages*. What is more, in industry steps were taken to raise the average wage.

Considering that a section of workers em-

employed in unhealthy jobs have a four-to six-hour day, the average working day for adult industrial workers in 1965 amounted to 6.93 hours, nearly three hours less than in 1913.

The average working week for industrial workers is 40 hours, but the shorter hours worked by some categories pressed the overall figure down to 39.4 in 1965, making it one of the shortest in the world. The working week in West German industry, for example, is 44.1 hours, in Japan's manufacturing industry 45 hours, in France 45.6 hours and in the United States 40.7 hours.

In pre-Revolution Russia workers had no paid holidays, and many never had any holidays at all. In the Soviet Union, all workers are entitled to an annual vacation of at least 12 days, paid for in terms of their mean wage of the preceding twelve months. The average holiday period which in 1958 was 18.5 working days was extended to 19.3 working days in 1964.

COLLECTIVE FARMERS' INCOMES RISE

In tsarist Russia, the working peasant's income is estimated to have been a little more than one-third that of a factory worker. Despite the prevailing difficulties and the war devastation, the peasant was the first to benefit from the October Revolution. "In this peasant country," Lenin wrote on this score in 1919, "it was the peasantry as a whole who were the first to gain, who gained most and gained immediately from the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Under the dictatorship of the proletariat the peasant *for the first time* has been working for himself and eating *better than the city dwellers.*"

In 1928, the real income of the peasant amounted to about 73 per cent of the income of industrial workers. The difficulties of industrialization affected the peasant's income as drastically as they did that of the working class. By 1940 the disparity between the incomes of workers, on the one hand, and those of the collective farmers, on the other, was somewhat greater than in 1928. It should be borne in mind, however, that the very large section of the rural population who became workers or office employees during the industrialization, had greatly improved their standard of living.

After the war, and especially in the early fifties, collective farmers' incomes climbed more rapidly than those of industrial workers. In the USSR, peasant families have three sources of income—income received for their work on the collective farm, income derived from their personal plot, and income from state payments in pensions, grants and

allowances, plus wages of family members employed in state-owned enterprises. In the past fifteen years or so, earnings on the collective farm, which depend on quantity and quality of work, have been growing much more rapidly than wages of industrial workers. In 1965, they were about half the wage of an industrial worker and about two-thirds of the earnings of workers employed on the state-owned farm. The following figures show how collective farmers' incomes for work done on the collective farm (per working family member) have increased over the years (in percentages):

1953	1955	1960	1965
100	150	168	320

By and large, peasants' real incomes rose by 240 per cent between 1940 and 1965.

AVAILABILITY OF GOODS AND CONSUMPTION

The greater abundance and consumption of foodstuffs and other goods, including durables, is another indication of the rise in Soviet living standards. Growth of staple foods consumption is shown below (annual consumption per head of population in kg.):

	1913	1965	growth against 1913 (%%)
Meat and lard	27	41	50
Milk and other dairy products	154	252	60
Eggs (pcs)	48	124	160
Fish	6.7	12.6	90
Sugar	8	34.2	330
Potatoes	69	141	100
Vegetables	43	73	70
Bread and pastry about	200	156	—22

The table shows that the nation's diet has changed substantially in the years of Soviet power, with the accent on high-calorie foods such as meat and lard, milk and dairy products, eggs and sugar, and a resultant drop in bread consumption. In terms of calories, the average Soviet diet today is on a par with that in most of the developed countries. Consumption of meat, milk, vegetables and fruit, it is true, is still lower than in some capitalist countries, but the gap is closing fast.

Per capita consumption of other basic consumer items, such as textiles, footwear, etc., has likewise risen considerably since the Re-

volution, to say nothing of durables, the sales dynamic for which over the past fifteen years is shown in the following table (thous. pcs.):

	1950	1965
Watches and clocks	8,226	21,926
Radio sets and radiolas	992	4,980
TV receivers	12	3,338
Domestic refrigerators	1.2	1,458
Washing machines	0.3	3,141
Vacuum cleaners	6	643

During the twenties, retail prices rose continuously, though insignificantly, but in the thirties during the industrialization and during the war years the upward trend was more rapid and at times (during the early years of industrialization and throughout the war) growth of cash incomes lagged behind rising prices.

Arresting the general trend towards higher retail prices was one of the big postwar achievements of the Soviet economy.

Prices were reduced at regular intervals in the early post-war years. Seven reductions took place between 1947 and 1954, the average price cut amounting to nearly 60 per cent.

Later, the price reductions were discontinued. The resources were used to increase cash incomes in order to narrow the unjustified means gaps of different categories of the public. The minimum wage has been raised twice in the past ten years, and new wage scales, which, as a rule, exceed the previous ones, have been introduced for the bulk of the workers. Pensions, too, were raised, with the minimum pension being raised most. Taxes are being reduced or abolished, first and foremost in respect to the low-income groups. Old age pensions have been extended to collective farmers, and high rates of growth have been secured for collective farmers' cash earnings.

While incomes were raised, retail prices were stabilized. Taking 1940 as 100, the price index for 1956 was 138, 1958—141 and 1965—140. The food price index for 1965 was 133, the index for other consumer goods 126 and that for alcoholic beverages 258. The 1965 price index for retail marketing by collective farms, now free and unrestricted and amounting to 4-5 per cent of the turnover of state-operated and cooperative trade, stood at 111 against 1940.

The policy of stable retail prices rules out inflationary effects and ensures a steady purchasing capacity for the ruble, so that real incomes and consumption strike a stable balance.

PUBLIC CONSUMPTION FUND

Most of the Soviet family income derives from wages or collective-farm cash emoluments. Another source of income, especially for the rural population, is personal supplementary farming.

But it is not always desirable and it is sometimes difficult, to satisfy all of the public demand out of cash earnings. For this reason, as we have said earlier, some needs are paid for out of what we call the public consumption fund. This fund is that part of the national income allocated for pensions, grants and allowances and on financing free and partly free services (partial payment of their cost). The benefits derived from the public fund are not, therefore, related to the work done by the individual worker.

Despite the desperate lack of resources which prevailed in the early years after the Revolution, a public consumption fund was inaugurated to finance the fight against illiteracy, to pay for compulsory education, to build the public health system and the mother-and-child protection system, and to sponsor vacations and recreation schemes. As its resources grew, the State tackled broader programs in cultural development, public education, public health, social security and insurance.

GROWTH OF PUBLIC CONSUMPTION FUND

	1927-1928	1940	1965
Total, in 000 million rubles	0.2	4.6	41.5
Per head of population, rubles	1.3	21.0	180

A few figures will show what benefits derive from the public consumption fund. In 1965, for example, the average Soviet monthly wage of 95.6 rubles was augmented by allowances and free services to the extent of 33.4 rubles, or what amounts to a 35-per cent addition, bringing up the average monthly income to the 129-ruble mark.

About 26 per cent of the public consumption fund (10,900 million rubles) was spent on maintenance of the aged and disabled. At the beginning of 1966, there were 32,000,000 pensioners. The pension age of 55 for women and 60 for men is among the lowest in the world. Besides, a sizable section of employees in arduous jobs are pensioned off at 50 to 55 and some even at 45 to 50. In capitalist countries the qualifying age as a rule ranges from 65 to 70. The average old age pension in the Soviet Union usually amounts to more than 70 per cent of the wage, and as much as 100 per cent for low-income groups.

Members of agricultural cooperatives (collective farmers) qualify for pensions on reaching the age of 60 for women and 65 for men. But in accordance with a decision of the Twenty-Third Party Congress, by 1970 the pension scheme for collective farmers will be similar to that now operating for industrial workers.

Besides old-age, the pension scheme covers disability, loss of breadwinner, etc. All workers receive social insurance payments amounting from 50 to 100 per cent of their average earnings when temporarily disabled (sickness, etc.). For mothers there are pre- and post-natal leaves adding up to 112 days, during which they are paid a special allowance equal to their average wage. Large families qualify for special allowances.

Free medical treatment is available to all, regardless of income. In 1965, thirty-one per cent of the public consumption fund (12,800 million rubles) was spent on public health and health-building.

KEY FIGURES ILLUSTRATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET HEALTH SERVICE

	1913	1940	1965	Growth against 1913
Number of doctors (excl. army doctors)				
thous.	28.1	115.3	554.2	20-fold
Number of hospital beds (excl. army hospitals)				
thous.	208	791	2,226	11-fold

More than four million people are employed in the health service, which has the biggest number of doctors in the world. Every fourth doctor in the world is a Soviet doctor.

The health of the nation is one of the prime concerns of the Soviet state. More than 8,000,000 people benefited from rest cures in sanatoria and holiday homes in 1965. A considerable number of these (20 per cent) were accommodated free of charge, the remainder paying 30 per cent of the cost of accommodation. More than 4,000,000 children annually spend summer vacations in holiday camps largely financed by the public consumption fund.

By 1965 the mortality rate had been cut to one-quarter of what it was in 1913, while child mortality was down to one-tenth. Average life expectancy rose from 32 years in 1896-1897 to 44 in 1926-1927 and to 70 in 1964-1965.

Housing is also maintained largely out of

the public consumption fund. Rent, which covers not more than one-quarter of the maintenance cost, takes only an insignificant portion of the family income.

Housing in urban areas expanded almost sevenfold in 1965 against 1913 and threefold against 1940. Since 1957, the Soviet Union has been leading the world in housebuilding. In 1965, for example, 9.5 new flats were built per 1,000 of the population, which compares favorably with the 7.9, 7.3 and 8.1 flats built per 1,000 of the population that year in the United States, Britain and Italy, respectively. As many as 112,000,000 people or almost half the population moved into new homes between 1957 and 1966, inclusive.

Yet housing is still a big problem for the urban population, which has risen 340 per cent during the years of Soviet rule, has been growing even more rapidly than the very high rate of housebuilding. The Communist Party has set its sights on providing every family with a comfortable flat within the foreseeable future.

Nearly one-third of the sums allocated to the public consumption fund are spent on education.

A GENUINE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Only one in five children in tsarist Russia attended school. According to the 1897 census, 76 per cent of the population from nine years of age upward could neither read nor write. For women the figure was 88 per cent.

The Soviet Union has built facilities affording every citizen extensive educational opportunities. Elementary education was made general and compulsory some time before the war. It is planned to move on to universal ten-year secondary schooling by 1970. Today, there are no illiterates in the Soviet Union.

More than 72,000,000 of the total population of 234,000,000 attend *tuition-free* general and vocational schools, specialized secondary schools, higher educational establishments and courses. This means that almost every third citizen is enrolled in some kind of educational establishment.

In 1965, the USSR had 756 university-level institutions with a total enrollment of 4,100,000. Some three-quarters of the day students qualify for government allowances. Over 400,000 students, including 170,000 engineers, were graduated in 1965. This compares favorably with the 41,000 engineers graduated that year in the United States.

The complex of Soviet research institutions employs nearly 700,000 researchers and scientists, one quarter of the world's total. The

number of brain workers has grown from 2,000,000 in 1926 to 25,300,000 in 1965.

It is, therefore, safe to say that the October Revolution has changed the cultural image of the people beyond recognition. A *genuine cultural revolution* has been carried out, making the people the true heirs to man's cultural heritage.

THE TASKS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

The Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU defined the main trends in the nation's economic policy for the coming five years. The program envisages an expansion of production, greater efficiency and bigger returns, coupled with a further rise in well-being.

The Congress decisions provide for extensive measures in 1966-1970, designed to raise the standard of living. In the five years preceding the Congress, real income per head of population increased by 20 per cent, and is expected to rise by another 30 per cent in the current five years.

Further headway in eliminating the distinctions between city and countryside, and between mental and manual labor, is among the most important social tasks of the new five-year plan. Measures are being taken further to enhance the educational, cultural and technological levels. In March this year the Supreme Soviet decreed a five-day week. Accompanying measures will improve community services, retail trade and public catering.

Higher remuneration for labor is uppermost in the welfare program mapped out by the Twenty-Third Congress. The average wage is to be raised by at least 20 per cent from the monthly 95.6 rubles in 1965 to approximately 115 rubles by 1970.

Collective farmers' incomes from socialized

farming are scheduled to rise 35 to 40 per cent between 1966 and 1970. The more rapid growth of collective farmers' earnings is designed to narrow still more the gap between the income of the collective farmer and that of the factory worker. The policy of closing this gap is no novelty. What is novel is the introduction in 1966 of a guaranteed monthly payment for collective farm labor similar to the wage for state-farm workers.

The public consumption fund is to be boosted by at least 40 per cent in the new five-year plan period. This will enable us to raise the minimum old-age pension for factory and white-collar workers and collective farmers by more than 30 per cent, and to reduce the pension age for collective farmers and for some categories of female labor.

Housebuilding, too, is to be expanded in the current five years. Some 65,000,000 people will have moved into new homes by 1970.

* * *

The results for 1966, the first year of the new five-year plan, show that headway has been made in fulfilling the decisions of the Twenty-Third Congress.

National income rose 7.5 per cent, industrial output 8.6 per cent and agricultural output about 10 per cent. Real income per head of population rose more than six per cent, wages 3.6 per cent, reaching the monthly average of 99 rubles, and collective-farm incomes by as much as 16 per cent. Nearly 11,000,000 people have moved into new homes.

The results of this first year inspire us with confidence in the successful accomplishment of the program mapped out by the Twenty-Third Congress for enhancing well-being in pursuance of the ideals of the October Revolution.

The economy of the CMEA countries in 1966

SURVEY

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES affiliated to the Council for Mutual Economic Aid rounded out 1966, the first year of their new five-year plans, with notable achievements. Nearly all registered substantial growth rates in national income, industrial expansion, in agriculture and a further rise in living standards.

The elaboration of the new five-year plans for 1966-70 was preceded by extensive work in most of the countries to improve the forms and methods of running the economy and to place planning and management on a more scientific footing. The first year of the plans showed that the transition to new methods of management has had a beneficial effect on the economy as a whole, making it possible substantially to increase returns from social production.

The scale of economic cooperation between the CMEA countries also expanded, and for the third time readjustments were made in the plans for the current five years with a view to better coordination.


Following is a summary of the year's achievements in industry and agriculture, the basic spheres of material production, in raising living standards and in expanding economic relations with other countries.

INDUSTRY

In the course of 1966 the industrial base of the socialist countries was enlarged, with the share of industry increasing in overall production. In most the bulk of the national income derives from this branch of the economy, which accounts for roughly three-quarters of the total output of industry and agriculture.

All CMEA countries exceeded their industrial output plans, the overall volume of in-

SHARE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN WORLD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION



dustrial production increasing eight per cent over 1965. According to preliminary estimates, the corresponding increase in the capitalist world was seven per cent.


Industrial development in the CMEA countries was marked by a number of common features, the chief of which was a *striving to increase the economic effectiveness of industrial production, to produce more and better goods with the minimum expenditure of social labor, more extensively to introduce the achievements of science and technology in production and to improve the production structure.* Notable headway was made in solving these tasks.

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (in per cent)

	1961-65	1966
Albania	6.8	12
Bulgaria	11.7	12.2
Hungary	7.5	7
GDR	6	6.5
Mongolia	10.5	6.6
Poland	8.5	7.4
Rumania	13.8	11.7
USSR	8.6	8.6
Czechoslovakia	5.2	7.4

An important factor making for increasing returns from industry is the introduction of new methods of management. Work in this direction was continued through the year in most of the countries. In Bulgaria, enterprises

DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION CMEA AND CAPITALIST COUNTRIES (1960=100)



operating according to the new system introduced in that country turned out 65% of the total industrial output. In the USSR, last year witnessed the introduction of new management methods in 704 enterprises employing more than two million workers. As a rule, the new methods have improved performance considerably. For instance, in the USSR as a whole productivity of labor in industry increased 5% and profits by 10% in the course of the year, but for enterprises operating under the new system the respective percentages were eight and 25. The results for the year thus underscore the soundness of the policy aimed at reorganizing the entire system of industrial management.

The industrial production structure was further improved in all the CMEA countries. This was primarily a matter of accelerating rates of growth in the production of articles of consumption (group B) with a view to bringing them closer to the growth rates in the output of the means of production (group A). In Poland, for instance, output of group A increased in the course of the year by 7.5%, and output in group B by 6.8 per cent. In Rumania the corresponding percentages were 12 and 11.2, in the USSR 9 and 7, and in Czechoslovakia 7.5 and 7.1. In all the countries the best growth rates were in branches decisive from the standpoint of ensuring technological progress throughout the national economy and heightening the effectiveness of social production generally, namely, in the engineering, chemical and electric power industries.

In recent years the *machine-building and metal-working* industries have been developing exceptionally rapidly in the CMEA countries. In several this branch is now the leading industry, accounting for a growing share in the gross industrial output.

SHARE OF MACHINE-BUILDING AND METAL-WORKING IN THE GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (in per cent)

	1960	1965
Bulgaria	12.4	16.5
Hungary	25.1	27.3
Poland	19.7	25.6
Rumania	24	28.3
Czechoslovakia	33.4	32.2

The machine-building industry continued to develop at a rapid pace. In Bulgaria output in this branch increased by 19.6%, in Hungary 9%, Mongolia 10%, Poland 9.6%, Rumania 13.7%, the Soviet Union 12% and Czecho-

slovakia 10.6%. In the aggregate, machine-building and metal-working output increased roughly by 11 per cent as compared with 1965.

Progressive structural changes are continuing in the engineering industry of these countries in line with the specific features of the economy of each and the deepening of the international socialist division of labor, particularly specialization and coordination. Bulgaria substantially increased the output of radio and electronic as well as hoisting and transport equipment, turning out some 24,000 electric telfers, over 17,000 electric trolleys, 586,000 electric motors, 1,153,000 storage batteries, and 5,028 transformers. In Hungary the most rapid growth was registered in electrical machinery, telecommunications equipment and precision instruments; last year nearly 114,000 sets of telecommunication equipment, 373,000 amperemeters and some 106 million incandescent lamps were turned out; headway was also made in machine tools, of which 14,300 were put out in the course of the year. The Hungarian transport machine-building industry turned out 563 freight and 589 passenger cars, 107 diesel locomotives and 50 diesel trains.

In the GDR manufacture of electrical (including electronic) equipment, optical devices, precision instruments, machine tools and equipment for the chemical and textile industries is growing rapidly. Last year output of electric motors of up to 0.25 kw capacity grew 33%, of transistors 37%, reflex cameras 29%, and chemical equipment 23%.

Poland registered a substantial increase in output of steam turbines (37.3%) and double drive axle tractors (24,600, a growth of 14.3%). The machine-building industry turned out 32,600 metal-working machine tools.

In Rumania output of metal-working machine tools grew by 19% (8,522 units), electric motors of more than 0.6 kw. capacity 19%, diesel-electric locomotives 14% (125 units), and tractors 17% (18,500). Last year the Soviet Union's engineering industry turned out

101,000 metal-working machine tools, 38,200 die presses, 600 trunkline electric locomotives, 675,000 automobiles, 382,000 tractors, and 23,400 excavators. Machine-building in Czechoslovakia likewise made good headway.

In the past ten years the CMEA countries have greatly increased output of consumer goods, especially durables, such as TV sets, refrigerators and washing machines.

PRODUCTION OF DURABLES (in thousands)

	TV sets		Refrigerators		Washing machines	
	1955	1966	1955	1966	1965	1966
Bulgaria	—	90	0	47	—	125
Hungary	—	298	—	113	12	179
GDR	39	562	17	360	18	314
Poland	—	413	3	335	28	404
Rumania	—	105	0	140	—	101
USSR	495	4,400	151	2,204	87	3,900
Czechoslovakia	17	228	31	279	206	230

The chemical industry is making rapid progress in most CMEA countries. In 1966 its output grew in Bulgaria by 20.7%, Hungary 12%, Poland 13.3%, Rumania 21.6%, the USSR 13%, and Czechoslovakia 9.2%. On the whole the CMEA countries increased the output of chemical products, rubber and asbestos by about 12%.

The rapid growth in the chemical industry is due primarily to the greater demand for fertilizers and agricultural chemicals, to the striving to reduce imports of many types of natural raw materials, and the growing demand for the consumer goods turned out by the chemical industry. In view of this, most of the countries accord priority to the branches making mineral fertilizers, plastics and synthetic resins, and synthetic fibres. In the GDR the chemical industry is one of the most important branches of the economy, employing more than 10% of all the industrial and office workers in the country. The GDR is a leading

PRODUCTION OF BASIC CHEMICAL OUTPUT (in thousands of tons)

	Mineral fertilizers		Plastics and synthetic resins		fibre	
	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966
Bulgaria	125	340*	7.3	39	—	—
Hungary	102	299	9.9	31.5	4.2	7.6
GDR	2,098	2,603	115	246	155.8	180.2
Poland	477	826	55.4	135	77.8	109.5
Rumania	71	419	12.4	94.7	4.1	34.2
USSR	3,281	8,400	293	971	211.2	458
Czechoslovakia	287	517	63.6	145	62.3	82.3

*1965

world producer of potash fertilizers, calcined soda and synthetic rubber.

Electric power production in the CMEA countries totalled 731,000 million kwh. in 1966, 8% more than in the previous year. The Soviet Union registered an increase of 38,000 million kwh., Poland 4,600 million, GDR 3,200 million, Rumania 3,600 million, Czechoslovakia 2,300 million and Bulgaria 1,500 million.

PRODUCTION OF ELECTRIC POWER (in thousands of millions kwh.)

	1966	Increase over 1965 (in %)
Bulgaria	11.7	15
Hungary	11.9	6.2
GDR	56.8	6
Poland	47.4	8.1
Rumania	20.8	21
USSR	545	8
Czechoslovakia	36.5	7

Other industries, in particular *iron and steel*, are making good progress. Rate of growth in iron and steel has exceeded the average world rate in recent years. Output of steel, one of the main indicators in this industry, grew in the CMEA countries in 1961-6 by 38% as against the world increase of 32% and 18% growth in the Common Market countries. Growth of iron and steel and rolled metal output continued in 1966. The Council countries produced 127 million tons of steel, 6.4% more than in 1965. As a result their share in the world steel output has risen, according to preliminary estimates, from 25.9% in 1965 to 26.9 in 1966.

PRODUCTION OF STEEL AND ROLLED METAL IN 1966 (thousands of tons)

	Steel	Rolled Metal
Bulgaria	699	484
Hungary	2,648	1,744
GDR	4,537	3,048
Poland	9,850	6,578
Rumania	3,670	2,585
USSR (mln. tons)	96.9	76.6
Czechoslovakia	9,126	6,518

Growth of output was accompanied by a substantial improvement of quality. As a result of the introduction of new methods in management and the reorganization of the branch structure of industry, growth of labor productivity was accelerated, cost of production reduced, quality improved and returns

from production increased in all the Council countries.

GROWTH OF PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOR IN INDUSTRY IN 1966 (increase over 1965 in %)

Bulgaria	4.5
Hungary	6
GDR	6
Poland	3.6
Rumania	8.1
USSR	6
Czechoslovakia	4.7

On the average productivity of labor in industry increased in the CMEA countries, according to preliminary estimates, by more than 4 percent. Growth of labor productivity accounted for 37% of the increase in industrial output in Bulgaria, over 80% in Hungary, nearly 100% in the GDR, over 72% in Rumania and 64% in Czechoslovakia. At the same time cost of production in industry declined in the GDR by 2.4% (exclusive of light industry) and in Rumania by 1.5%. In the USSR, economy effected through lowering production costs as compared with 1965 amounted to roughly 1,500 million rubles.

All the Council countries launched new lines of output and improved quality. In Bulgaria, for instance, nearly 90% of the output measured up to the world average and top standards or was given top rating according to Bulgarian standards. In the GDR 12.2% of all industrial output subject to such classification was rated in the top category, and 74.4% in the first category. In 1965 the corresponding percentages were 11.6 and 73.6. Last year Poland's heavy industry put out 660 new items of improved types, and Soviet industry, nearly 800.

As before, many inventions, improvements, and rationalization proposals were submitted by working people generally. In Bulgaria the total in 1966 amounted to nearly 53,000 and the economic effect of their introduction ran to 27,800,000 leva. In the USSR about 2,800,000 inventions and rationalization suggestions were introduced yielding an annual economy of some 2,000 million rubles.

* * *

Capital construction is a basic factor of the high rate of extended reproduction registered by the Council countries in all branches. Investment is growing from year to year. In 1966 alone the Council countries commissioned hundreds of new enterprises and other installations.

GROWTH OF INVESTMENT IN THE ECONOMY IN 1966 (in per cent)

Bulgaria	24
Hungary	7
GDR	7
Mongolia	3.8
Poland	7.6
Rumania	10.1
USSR	6
Czechoslovakia	8.9

AGRICULTURE

The basic trend in the agriculture of the socialist countries in recent years has been toward intensive farming, with emphasis on yields, mechanization, and use of chemicals. Large investments are being made in this branch.

SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN TOTAL INVESTMENTS IN THE ECONOMY IN 1961-65 (in per cent)

Bulgaria*	23.5
Hungary	16.4
Mongolia**	22.7
Poland	13.3
Rumania	19.5
USSR (1959-65)**	16.5
Czechoslovakia	14.3

*Exclusive of individual investments by the population.

**Including forestry.

Notable progress has been made in mechanization of agriculture.

TRACTORS IN AGRICULTURE (thousands)

	1960	1965	Increase
Bulgaria	25.8	42	1.6 times
Hungary	41	64.2	1.6 times
GDR ¹	70.6	124.3	1.8 times
Mongolia	1.8	4.2	2.3 times
Poland ²	62.8	124.1	2 times
Rumania	44.2	81.4	1.8 times
USSR	1,122.3	1,613.2	1.4 times

1. Socialist agricultural enterprises only.

2. Exclusive of garden tractors.

In 1966 farms in the Council countries received 345,700 tractors, 98,700 grain harvesting combines and thousands of other machines.

An important factor in putting farm production on a more intensive footing is the use of chemicals. In the past ten years use of

mineral fertilizers in the CMEA countries nearly trebled. Last year the farms were supplied with nearly 11,800,000 tons, or 11.3% more than in 1965.

Thanks to progress in building the material and technical base of agriculture in previous years as well as to favorable weather conditions, most Council countries obtained in 1966 record yields of basic crops and substantially increased their agricultural output as a whole. Taken together these countries increased their gross agricultural production by 9.1% as compared with the previous years.

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF GROSS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (in per cent)

	1961-65	1966
Bulgaria	3.1	15
Hungary	1.7	6.1
GDR	1.3	2.9
Poland	3.2	5.5
Rumania	2.4	11.2
USSR	2.1	10
Czechoslovakia	-0.5	10

In most of the countries the growth was the result mainly of increased crop yield, especially grains. The gross grain harvest for all the countries amounted to 229 million tons, an increase of 26.6% over the annual average for 1961-65, and of 13.1% over the peak harvest year of 1964. Grain yields increased substantially, wheat, for all the CMEA countries taken together, exceeding the 1961-65 average by 42.5%, barley by 24%, oats by 31.2% and corn by 23.1%.

In Bulgaria yields of some crops, including corn, wheat, sunflower, barley and sugar beet, set new records for the country. Average wheat yield per hectare was 2.78 tons, corn 3.68 tons, and sugar beet 39.2 tons. The total grain harvest was 6,900,000 tons, nearly 30% more than in 1965. Intensive development of crop cultivation is a major achievement of socialist Mongolia; in 1966 it obtained 297,200 tons of grain. Rumania obtained a record yield of grain, sunflower, sugar beet, potatoes and other vegetables, the grain harvest amounting to 13,800,000 tons, 10% more than in 1965; average yields per hectare of corn were 3.17 tons on the state farms and 2.46 tons in the producers' cooperatives, and of wheat and rye 2.04 and 1.59 respectively. In Poland the harvest of the four main grain crops ran to 15,500,000 tons and average yield to 1.9 tons per hectare (wheat—2.15 tons per hectare). The sugar beet yield averaged 31.2 tons and potatoes 16.9 tons per hectare. The Soviet Union brought in an overall grain

harvest of 170,800,000 tons, or 12% more than the previous peak of 1964. The increase was achieved through raising the yield from 1.14 tons per hectare in 1964 to 1.37 tons. The Soviet cotton harvest—6 million tons—was the highest ever. In Czechoslovakia the average wheat yield in 1966 was 2.55 tons, corn 3.2 tons and sugar beet 32.9 tons per hectare.

Most CMEA countries increased their herds of cattle as well as productivity of livestock farming. In all the countries taken together the head of beef and dairy cattle increased by 3.7% and that of sheep by 6.3% in the course of the year, while the number of hogs declined by 1.6%. In Bulgaria beef and dairy cattle increased by 4.5%, hogs 5.5% and sheep 3.1%. Milk yield per cow increased on the average by 9% over 1965. In Hungary the herds of beef and dairy cattle increased, while the number of hogs declined slightly. The number of beef and dairy cattle increased by 4.4% in Poland, 5.3% in Rumania and 3% in the USSR. In the USSR production of meat increased 8%, milk 5% and eggs 8%. Czechoslovakia produced more milk and eggs than in any previous year since 1945.

Farm production was stimulated to a great extent by the measures taken to improve planning and management, to provide more

incentives, and to improve cost accounting. Encouragement of local initiative, discontinuation of rigid centralized regulation, and the higher prices paid for farm produce created favorable conditions for the steady growth of agricultural output.

IMPROVEMENT IN LIVING STANDARDS


The basic factor making for rising living standards in the socialist countries is the use of nearly three-quarters of the national income for personal and public consumption.

Rate of growth of the national income increased in nearly all CMEA countries.

AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF NATIONAL INCOME (in per cent)

	1961-65	1966
Bulgaria	6.7	11
Hungary	4.6	6
GDR	3.4	4.5
Poland	5.9	6
Rumania	9	7.9
USSR	6.4	7.5
Czechoslovakia	2	7

DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL INCOME IN CMEA AND COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES (1960=100)



The high rate of growth made it possible substantially to raise living standards. In Hungary average real income of the workers and office employees increased by 5% against the 3.5% called for by plan, and peasants' real income went up still more. In the GDR growth of real income amounted to 3.7%. In Mongolia the average wages of workers and office employees increased 2% and the money income of members of agricultural associations 11%. In Poland real wages went up 3% and in Rumania 5.9%. In the Soviet Union per capita real income rose by more than 6% in the course of the year. In Czechoslovakia real wages increased 2.1%.

Growth of well-being in the CMEA countries is reflected in the steady growth of retail trade, i.e., the rapid increase in the quantity of consumer goods sold to the public. In Bulgaria the people were able in 1966 to buy more with their income than they could in 1957 and 1958 taken together. A 7% increase in sales was registered in Hungary. In the GDR retail trade increased by 4.1% in the course of the year, the biggest advance being made in the sale of furniture, motor cars and other durables. Retail trade turnover in Mongolia increased 5%, in Poland 6.7%, in Rumania 9.9%, and in the USSR by 8.7%.

As is known, a substantial part of the needs of the people in the socialist countries is covered, apart from wages, by public consump-

tion funds. Year by year the Council countries are spending more on the social services and pensions, education, health service, on art and culture generally, and on housing. Last year some 55,000 flats were built in Hungary, over 65,000 in the GDR, 139,000 in Poland, over 50,000 in Rumania, and 1,850,000 in the USSR. In the USSR some 11 million people moved into new homes or otherwise improved their living conditions in the course of the year. In Czechoslovakia 75,000 new flats were built.

FOREIGN TRADE RELATIONS

The foreign trade relations of the CMEA countries continued to expand in 1966—a fact directly connected with their economic growth and the further improvement of their economic cooperation with one another. Their foreign trade grew by 5.4%. The GDR increased turnover 9%, Poland 4.3%, Rumania 10.2%, and Czechoslovakia 2.2%. The share of the Council countries in world foreign trade as a whole was 10.1%.

The bulk of their trade is with one another. Last year 72.7% of Bulgaria's foreign trade was with the other socialist countries. Corresponding percentages were nearly 75 in the case of the GDR and 68.9 in the case of Czechoslovakia. Mutual deliveries by Council members cover 95% of the machinery and other industrial equipment, nearly 100% of the coal, roughly 80% of the metallurgical coke, 94% of the oil and oil products, and over 80% of the iron ore, pig iron and rolled metal they import.

An important result of the industrial development of these countries is the annual growth of the share of manufactured goods in their exports. In 1966 this share was 86.2% in Bulgaria, and in the case of Rumania it amounted to four-fifths of the country's exports. In particular, the share of machines and industrial equipment is growing, amounting in Bulgaria to 25.2% last year as compared with 24.6% in 1965. The corresponding percentages for Poland are 35.5 and 34.7.

The foreign trade of the Council countries is stimulated by inter-country specialization of production. Although the extent of specialization can hardly be considered satisfactory, it nevertheless extends to the most important items of engineering, chemicals, electronics

and other output. In 1966 inter-state specialization was practised in the case of some 1,800 types of engineering output and over 2,200 lines of chemical output.

Notable progress was made also in other spheres of economic and scientific and technological cooperation. The oil pipeline built by the joint efforts of five countries (USSR, Poland, GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) carried more than 16 million tons of oil as against 8,400,000 in 1964. The unified power-grid system distributed nearly 6,500 million kwh. of electric power (in 1960 the figure was 1,600 million). The CMEA railway car pool now exceeds 103,000; this rolling stock carried more than 60% of the member countries' exports. The Intermetal organization increased mutual exchange of rolled metal among its members by more than 1,300,000 tons.

The foregoing shows that 1966 marked a significant step forward in expanding and deepening economic cooperation between the CMEA countries. And in keeping with the guidelines laid down at the Bucharest meeting of the leaders of the Communist and Workers' parties and the heads of government of the CMEA countries, cooperation between the fraternal states is to expand still more in the years ahead.

Economic relations between the Council members and other countries are being extended, as is evident if only from the fact that the number of third countries trading with CMEA members is steadily growing. Bulgaria, for instance, traded with 102 countries in 1966, Rumania with 100 and Poland with 152. Development of economic contacts between the socialist countries and all the other countries of the world strengthen the groundwork for peaceful coexistence of the two socio-economic systems.

* * *

The economic progress made by the CMEA countries in 1966 is the precondition for the further growth of all branches of their economies and of a further rise in their living standards during the current year. The results of the first three months of 1967 show that the economy of most of these countries is continuing to develop at a rate in excess of plan. In other words, the new five-year plans in the socialist countries have got off to a good start.

The outlook for Austrian labor

FRANZ MUHRI

THE ELECTIONS TO THE National Council (parliament), held on March 6, 1966, opened a new stage in the political evolution of Austria. The Socialist Party (SPA), having no satisfactory alternative to offer to the masses, suffered defeat. On the other hand, the reactionary bourgeois People's Party (APP), which made demagogic use of the discontent among the electorate and profited by an undemocratic electoral law, won an absolute majority, polling 48 per cent of the votes. This enabled it to form a government of its own after twenty-one years in coalition with the Socialists. Developments in Austria over the past year have borne out the estimate of our Party to the effect that the policy of the present APP leadership and government expresses chiefly the class interests of big capital and the big landowners. By means of a policy designed to consolidate the power of big capital, it is jeopardizing democratic rights and gains, sapping them step by step.

One of the first bills passed by the new Government was the radio reform. In Austria, radio and television are government institutions and the new laws means that the APP is now in a position of direct control over these important moulders of public opinion. The Communists have long been debarred from both, and now the discrimination is spreading to the Socialist Party.

The new government also authorized the entry into the country of Otto Hapsburg, a scion of the one-time imperial house of Austria. When, in 1918, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was supplanted by the Republic of Austria, the Hapsburgs were deported under a constitutional law and their property confiscated. The entry granted to Otto Hapsburg is an anti-democratic provocation, since he is a bitter opponent of democratic and republican government and of Austria's neutrality.

A further move was the law establishing the Austrian Industrial Society, a law which

recasts the management of the nationalized industries. Significantly, the APP commands a majority in the new managerial agencies, which for all practical purposes signifies that their decisions dovetail with the interests of the APP and its government. An effort is now being made from this position of strength to "reorganize" the nationalized industries with a view to restricting the public sector and extending the sphere of direct influence of big capital, both Austrian and foreign.

The latest government measure is a "far-reaching housing reform." In substance, this reform provides scant protection against arbitrary eviction and introduces freedom of contract between tenant and landlords. This is an encroachment on an important democratic gain dating from the period of the First Republic, and is intended to give more power to landlords.

A feature of the foreign policy of the new government is its pressing for talks on the matter of an arrangement with the European Common Market. The object is to bind Austria to the EEC by a treaty that would greatly enlarge the influence of West German monopoly capital in Austria and undermine the country's neutrality and independence.

How has the Socialist Party—the second strongest party in the country with 74 of the 165 seats in parliament — reacted to this situation?

Ever since 1945 the Socialist Party leadership has been committed to a policy of class peace, of the smoothest possible cooperation and "partnership" with big capital and the reactionary forces. The "social partnership" policy led to a gradual strengthening and consolidation of capitalism, of the bourgeoisie, to renunciation of the socialist perspective. Motivated by anti-communism, the Socialist leaders in effect abandoned the democratic and socialist alternative. Moreover, this policy was hardly suitable for combating bourgeois in-

fluence among the working class and it accounted, along with other factors, for the electoral success of the bourgeoisie on March 6.

The Socialist Party seems to have learned little from its election reverse. It is true that immediately after the elections a discussion began in its ranks during which many officials pointed to the unsound policy of the Party and insisted on it being revised. But the Party congress, held in January—February this year, drew no relevant conclusions.

Gabriele Proft, a veteran Socialist who attended the congress as a guest of honor, commented on the congress as follows: "I have been a member of the party for 70 years and have attended practically all its congresses. But we have never had such a congress as this one."

And true enough this year's congress differed from all previous congresses of the Socialist Party chiefly for two reasons.

For the first time, the reactionary People's Party was in a position directly to influence the election of the new chairman of the Socialist Party. Accordingly, it waged a vendetta against the incumbent, Dr. Bruno Pittermann, who is also President of the Socialist International. In this it had the support of a Right-wing group in the Socialist Party. On the other hand, it made clear that it would welcome the election of Dr. Bruno Kreisky as Party chairman. As the date of the congress drew near the bourgeois press began openly to campaign for Kreisky. And while there were other important reasons for electing Kreisky to the post of chairman, the pressure exerted by the bourgeoisie played quite a part.

The other feature of the congress was that it was practically preoccupied with the single question of who was to be the new chairman.

Rosa Jochmann, a veteran Party leader, said not without emotion: "This is the first time a congress has been concerned solely with the issue of replacing the party chairman and not with business items . . . Pittermann is not the only one defamed by the People's Party; it has defamed every Federal President. But never has it been so successful in its defamation as it has in the case of Pittermann (the Federal President is a Socialist. — *Ed.*). It has . . . deliberately brought this slander into our ranks. Small wonder, therefore, that we are now in this tragic and sad situation . . . Brother acts against brother."

Needless to say the debate on this personal issue was an expression of the political crisis in the party leadership, and of the political differences that came to the fore during the pre-congress discussion, the biggest political discussion in the Socialist Party since 1945. The most diverse views were expressed on

party policy. The party, finding itself in opposition for the first time in 21 years, faced an entirely new situation. There were sufficient reasons for a reappraisal of policy. In the light of the new situation the congress could have summed up the results of the discussion on party policy. But political and ideological problems hardly played any role at all.

Summing up, it can be said that the congress failed to solve the party's political crisis. In fact, Dr. Kreisky's election to the party chairmanship did not end even the crisis of leadership. Some 30 per cent of the delegates voted against him. A diluted resolution was adopted on the pressing economic and political problems of the day, but nothing was said of a democratic and socialist alternative. The internal differences remain, and sooner or later they will make themselves felt.

In personal and political terms alike, Bruno Kreisky's election to the chairmanship marked a turn to the Right. The entire bourgeois press was jubilant at his election. The People's Party organ found that Dr. Kreisky had "always advocated a policy of moderation" and that he would also "try to draw a line between the Left and open the party on the other side." Those who before the congress has insisted on "modernizing" and "renovating" the SPA, holding up the German Social Democratic Party and its Godesberg program as a model, were of course heartened by the outcome of the congress. Kreisky himself talks about the need to renovate the party.

His public statements as Party chairman are characterized by two things. First, he uses every opportunity to dissociate himself from the Communists and the socialist countries. He talks about the insoluble contradiction between the Communists and "democratic socialism." Second, he keeps on saying that the Socialist Party's aim is to resume governmental functions. He wants the coalition with the People's Party to be restored as early as possible.

Now that big capital and the reactionaries have strengthened their positions, they are exerting greater pressure on the working class and especially on the Socialist Party. The trend to the Right in the Socialist Party is a clear manifestation of this development.

Another development is that Austro-Marxist trends, which have a long tradition in the SPA, are stirring back to life. Spokesmen of these trends, taking issue with those who want the party to swing farther to the Right, speak of the need for socialism and use sharper and more radical language. But their everyday policy is opportunistic, it is characterized by renunciation of concrete action for democratic

structural reforms and for socialism. Karl Czernetz, the Party secretary for international affairs, writing in the journal *Zukunft* shortly before the congress stressed the need "to include the everyday effort for reforms in the grand long-range socialist concept." Reporting to the congress, Dr. Bruno Pittermann, said: "The nations cannot expect peace, freedom and prosperity from capitalist society, which clings to inherited positions of power in economy and politics."

These Austro-Marxists say that more thought should be given to a party program really envisaging socialist objectives, among others the demand for a classless society.

Theirs is a contradictory role. On the one hand, they argue, and rightly so, against attempts to secure a greater integration of the Socialist Party into the capitalist system. Accordingly, they help to popularize socialist ideas and socialist trends and to deepen socialist consciousness in the working-class movement. But this "neo-Austro-Marxism" suffers from the fundamental shortcoming typical of the Social Democratic Austro-Marxism of the time of the First Republic, namely, the contradiction between words and deeds.

The genuine Left, which in addition to its advocacy of socialism partakes in action for socialism, has little more than a toehold in the Socialist Party and for this reason was powerless to swing the congress against the organized campaign of the Right.

What in this situation is the policy of the Communist Party?

Our Party believes that despite the relative stabilization of capitalist power in Austria the working class in alliance with the other democratic forces is, objectively speaking, strong enough to uphold the democratic and social gains of the people and achieve a renovation of democracy. We still maintain that there is in Austria a real prospect of the peaceful road to socialism, and we are firmly guided by this prospect.

The evolution of our country bears out what the 19th Congress of our Party recorded two years ago. The Congress resolution said: "The policy of social partnership is the basic obstacle to using the favorable strategic prerequisite of depriving big capital in Austria of power. With regard to capital the policy of social partnership amounts to virtual renunciation of a dynamic and independent labor policy and to renunciation of the socialist perspective. It immobilizes the workers, confuses the democratic forces and by neglecting the opportunities at the disposal of the working people in Austria it buttresses the positions of big capital; it stifles working-class initiative and helps to 'de-ideologize' the work-

ers. The blame for the swing to the Right manifested in Austrian policy last year rests with it."

The fight against the ideology and policy of social partnership is a vital task of the Austrian Communists. We refer to the facts to show the Socialist workers and their officials that today "partnership" between the working class and big capital is more harmful than ever. During the past months even the Socialist Party leadership has had to admit that the People's Party is pursuing an anti-labor class policy. Hence the working class in its fights against big capital and reaction should act from the standpoint of its class interests and bring into play the strength of its unions and its political organizations. The fight against the "partnership" policy calls for painstaking political and ideological discussion with the Socialists and with Catholic working people. More important, however, are the joint mass struggles and mass movements to win the economic and political demands of the working people. For it is in these struggles that the masses begin to realize all the harmfulness of the policy of social partnership. The Communists see their most important task in acting as the organizing and motive force of the working class especially in the enterprises and in the unions.

At present priority should be given to the fight to safeguard and reinforce the nationalized sector, to the fight for more rapid economic progress and against the high cost of living, for higher wages and greater social rights. Solution of these problems is closely linked with the factory and office workers winning the right to economic co-management.

Our 19th Congress stated that liability to crisis is still characteristic of capitalism. But it also stressed that the Communists see their task in preventing a new economic crisis, not in waiting for it to come. I would like to list four reasons for this:

1. An economic recession inevitably entails social and economic setbacks for the working people, whereas the Communists want to see better conditions for them.

2. An economic crisis does not automatically make the working people more keen to fight for a new social system. Experience has shown that an economic crisis can also give rise to anti-democratic trends and seriously endanger the democratic development of our country.

3. An economic crisis like the crises experienced in the past is, as we see it, by no means a requisite for the transition to socialism. On the contrary, our Party is striving for democratic alternatives and structural reforms

as a means of staving off major economic upheavals.

4. Due to the changed balance of forces at home and to the economic challenge of the socialist world, the bourgeoisie in Austria as in a number of other capitalist countries is compelled to revise many of the traditional forms of exploitation and economic management. This provides the working class with real opportunities for insisting on an economic policy not in the interests of big capital alone but one that will take into account those of society as a whole.

The Communists have a clear idea of the kind of policy needed—one of rapid economic expansion, assuring full employment and giving the working people a bigger slice of the national cake. They have, therefore, put forward specific demands in keeping with an overall economic concept envisaging the early establishment of a processing industry fit to meet future requirements, appropriate alterations, particularly in the output program of the nationalized industries and, last but not least, a multiple increase in appropriations for research and development. A key point of this concept is to strengthen the public sector through adequate funds and coordination and long-range planning.

To ensure and accelerate economic growth, it is also important to extend foreign trade to the utmost. Hence, apart altogether from considerations suggested by the policy of neutrality, Austria must not unilaterally bind herself to the EEC. To have a prosperous economy it must use every opportunity of extending its economic relations with all countries. But the EEC insists, among other things, that Austria withdraw from EFTA and furnish guarantees that it will not expand its trade with the socialist countries. Yet it is precisely trade with the socialist countries, whose economy is free from crises, that makes long-range and guaranteed sales possible and should therefore be regarded as a most valuable economic factor. Trade with the EEC could be assured by a trade agreement.

That is the alternative we Communists have submitted to the public as a means of solving the more urgent economic problems of the nation. Much of our program is recognized as being sound even by non-Communists. But so far nothing has been done about it, and the danger is that nothing will be done.

And the explanation is that the government is implementing mainly the class policy of big capital which is interested in unlimited profit and not in raising the purchasing capacity of the masses. The fact that allocations for research are so scant is due to the particularly conservative attitude of the bourgeoisie

and to its narrow profit-seeking thinking. There is also the fear, widespread among the bourgeoisie, of all programming or planning. Lastly, hostility to nationalization goes so far that efforts by the nationalized enterprises to set up new production capacities are blocked and hardly anything is done to solve their financial problems. There are forces which for political reasons regard economic difficulties as a pretext to strike at the public sector. The strong dependence of the Austrian bourgeoisie on foreign capital, particularly West German capital, which it sees as a bulwark against the working class, is another reason for raising hurdles to the nationalized economy. It also accounts for the government's increasingly frequent recourse to foreign capital and for its determination to bind the country to the EEC. West German capital, which in recent years has flowed into Austria through various channels, exerts a growing influence on the economic, political and cultural affairs of the country, thus imperilling not only its economic expansion but also its political independence and neutrality.

These facts show the failure of capitalism and also that the working class must take the anti-capitalist course, particularly from the point of view of finding constructive solutions to our economic problems. This means that it is more necessary than ever to curb big capital and to push it back through democratic structural reforms. What we have in mind is the need to safeguard and build up the public sector, particularly through control over the economy and economic co-management by factory and office workers. This control and co-management at enterprise level and at higher levels should first be introduced in the nationalized enterprises, which presupposes the removal of opponents of nationalization from the managements of these enterprises.

The objective need for overall economic planning and programming is now more obvious than ever. Even People's Party politicians and some of the bourgeoisie are beginning to recognize this. We believe, however, that the need is for those forms of democratic planning that will assure working-class control and co-management. This is still far from socialist planning but at least it would somewhat restrict big capital's freedom to lord it over the economy.

Unless the working class is on the lookout and unless it secures democratic planning and control over and participation in economic management through resolute united action, the government and the bourgeoisie will try to overcome the economic difficulties solely in their own interest. And the workers will have to foot the bill.

Hence the fight for rapid economic growth, for a prosperous economy, full employment and a further rise in the standard of living boils down to a political campaign which the working class must carry on against big capital and government policy. Regrettably, it so happens that the Socialist Party leadership and the Socialist group in the Trade Union Federation are still trying to evade these *political* problems. Due to the policy of social partnership, they refuse to take concrete action for structural reforms and co-management. The working class is strong enough to win co-management through its factory councils, trade unions and political organizations. Austrian Communists see their task not only in putting forward constructive proposals but in contributing as much as they can to rallying the working class to preserve and extend the public sector and to secure a policy of real economic progress, that is, actually to exercise the right of co-management.

Joint Socialist-Communist action prevented the proposed closing of a number of coal mines. The government was forced to give way. At present Communists, Socialists and Christian factory councillors and trade unionists in the nationalized oil industry are taking joint action against the attempts of the foreign oil monopolies to gain ground in Austria at the expense of the nationalized sector and to bring the power supply of our country largely under their control. Furthermore, a campaign is underway to safeguard the nationalized power industry against the Siemens concern, which is anxious to build plants in Austria and make the country's power industry increasingly dependent on the big West German concerns.

A feature of nationalization in Austria is that it helped to put the key economic positions beyond the direct reach of big capital, both home and foreign. Nationalization is, therefore, an important factor for national independence in view of the aspirations of the West German monopolies, which are intensifying their efforts to control the Austrian economy. Besides, we see in the struggle to uphold and extend the public sector and to win economic control and co-management for the working people important democratic objectives within the range of our orientation on the peaceful way to socialism.

Prominent in the activity of our Party is the effort for an active contribution by neutral Austria towards solving the problems of European security and to the movement against the American aggression in Vietnam. For years

our Party stood alone in pointing to the danger emanating from a resurgent West German imperialism and militarism. Recent months have seen some changes in this respect. The obvious fact that recent terrorist acts in South Tyrol were engineered by neo-Nazi and revanchist centers; the rise of the fascist National Democratic Party in West Germany and its electoral gains had the effect of alarm signals in Austria. The resistance which the West German reactionaries are putting up to an atomic non-proliferation treaty has, for its part, drawn numerous criticisms from Austrian public opinion.

In respect to Vietnam, too, there are signs of a growing political differentiation. Our demand that the government and the parliament of Austria should, in the spirit of an active policy of peace and neutrality, insist on the United States immediately and unconditionally stopping the bombing of North Vietnam is evoking louder echoes in Austria. For this reason and because of other developments—the effort to cover up the Kennedy assassins, racial discrimination, CIA intrigues—more and more Austrians evince a distrust of Washington, dissociate themselves from Washington politically and morally, reject its policies and condemn its aggression.

All these issues are involved in the fight against the reactionary government of our country. The struggle against the anti-democratic and anti-social policies of the People's Party and the government is the principal task of the Austrian Communists. Resistance to these policies is mounting. But this struggle also requires earnest and principled criticism of the Socialist Party's attitude. The government is not a stable regime, and if the working class parties pursue a sound policy it will encounter growing difficulties. But we already sound the warning that the Socialist leadership, desperately anxious to rejoin the government, may again help the People's Party through a "grand coalition" in the event of a new political crisis blowing up instead of using the crisis to translate the democratic and socialist alternative into reality.

Hence a highly important task of the Austrian Communists is to work for a genuinely Left orientation of the working class. With this aim in view, we must pay special attention to strengthening our Party organizationally and to extend its ideological and political influence, since the Communists are the decisive motive force and the solid political base of the Leftward evolution of the Austrian working-class movement.

Guinea today

CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT IS BASED ON HUMANISM

WHEN WE TURNED to the job of building the national economy, said Ismael Toure, Minister of Economic Development, we decided not to follow earlier practices, let alone preconceived concepts. We proceeded from the political, social and economic situation in the country, realizing that if we were to advance we had to enlist the support of all the people.

The task at the first stage was to ensure the conscious participation of the people in carrying out the development program. This meant charting goals that would rally the people. Hence the Three-Year Plan (1960-1963) which traced the two main directions of the national effort. These were:

1. Development of an infra-structure and internal communications, a unified national economy and home trade;
2. Realization of social measures, construction of schools, hospitals, etc.

Had we been concerned with profitability only when drawing up the first plan, we would not have been able to carry out the social measures aimed at overcoming passivity, at enlisting the cooperation of the people. Unlike the concepts of the colonial regime which regarded our country merely as a source of cheap raw materials and mineral wealth, our concept of development is based on humanism, on perfecting our aims and people as technology advances.

We were greatly helped in carrying out our three-year plan by outside aid, particularly Soviet aid. Thus several enterprises, a modern airport, radio station and other units were built with the help of the Soviet Union, not to mention the polytechnical institute at Conakry which has become the educational hub for training technicians.

Although we consider foreign aid is essential to economic advance, even more important is a national sense of responsibility for the country's development.

The Democratic Party directed its activity towards this end. Important laws were passed on nationalization of the land and prohibiting financial transactions in land; also the idea of voluntary labor contributions was advanced.

The new seven-year plan (1964-1970) is of a more pronounced economic orientation. It has been drawn up with a view to making the most

of the country's mineral resources and its considerable crop and stock-raising possibilities. The main achievement of the previous plan was that it geared our people to tackle the new economic program. The present plan will make it possible to use the means accumulated for industrialization, for promoting agriculture, the power industry and transport. It lays the groundwork for bolder future plans. Its objective is to modernize agriculture through amelioration and the use of fertilizers, to secure the harmonious development of all regions and industries, to build up modern industrial centers.

The people judge of the government's policy not by speeches and ambitiousness of plans but by concrete results in the sphere of supplies, in education and public health. Our immediate task, therefore, is to attain a level of production that will meet the requirements of the population.

Speaking of the sources of accumulation, Ismael Toure declared that the country's main source was the people, the accumulation of its creative energy.

He discussed the importance of the new national monetary unit which has eliminated the danger of sabotage on the part of foreign capital and laid the basis for capital accumulation; billions of francs that formerly poured into foreign banks now remain in the country.

Other important sources of accumulation are the state-owned enterprises. Thus, for example, the new cigarette and match factory will save the country 600 million Guinean francs (hard currency) annually. Also the national enterprises regulating the import of foodstuffs will help greatly to cut down hard currency expenditure.

The Democratic Party considers curtailment of consumer imports to be one of its most important economic tasks. At its last meeting in January the National Council of the Revolution adopted a resolution urging people "to make every effort to increase production with the objective of becoming 'self-sufficient', and thus doing away with the need to import foodstuffs and to concentrate all our resources on economic, social and cultural development."

All the means received from accumulation, Ismael Toure noted, are immediately invested in production. Thus, for example, the incomes received by insurance companies are used to finance the construction of new enterprises. In the countries where neo-colonialism holds sway,

he went on, there can be no real national accumulation since all means are concentrated in foreign banks. In Guinea, however, all foreign capital is controlled by the Central State Bank.

MODERNIZATION LEADS TO COOPERATION

Agriculture, with which 90 per cent of the population is associated in one way or another, is the leading branch of Guinea's economy. Fodeba Keita, Minister of Agriculture, formulated the basic tasks confronting agriculture, as follows:

1. To provide the population with adequate food, especially rice, the staple food. A national campaign to promote rice production will be launched this year. To this end a study has been made of existing possibilities, and due account taken of the difficulties likely to arise. In January the National Council of the Revolution vetoed all rice imports (it had originally been planned to import 40,000 tons in 1967). Taking into account Guinea's demographic growth, rice production will now have to be increased by 50,000 tons annually. Important, too, are the measures to introduce other crops, particularly root crops.

2. To provide the national industry with industrial crops. The Party requires that when planning the construction of new enterprises due account should be taken of the possibilities of meeting the requirements in raw materials. To date this has not been the case. The new textile mill, for example, will have to wait another two years before it can hope to procure the necessary cotton supplies. The cigarette and match factory still depends on imported tobacco. However, new areas are being sown to cotton and tobacco to meet the requirements of the said enterprises. Also raw material supplies to the cannery and palm-oil refinery are being improved.

3. To increase the production of export crops. The coffee crop is growing steadily. Thus, in 1966, 2,000 tons more were grown than in 1964. The Government has earmarked 310 million Guinean francs to expand the coffee plantations and improve the crop. We hope that we shall be able, as a result, substantially to increase the production of this valuable export crop within the next ten years.

The banana crop too is scheduled to grow considerably. Because of the low agrotechnical level the average banana yield at present is 10 tons per hectare. It is planned to double this figure. Attention is being paid also to other export crops such as pineapples and oil palms.

The main problem in agriculture, however, is its modernization. The country has 1,200 tractors. But these can be effective only if agriculture is provided with other machines such as stubbing and harvesting machines. The peasant, naturally, prefers the tractor to the plough, but under certain circumstances, the Minister noted, 50 ploughs can accomplish more

than one tractor. Certain output standards have therefore been introduced for mechanized and non-mechanized farming, so that the tractor should not replace the plough but should complement it and thus help to increase production.

Turning to the matter of cooperation, Fodeba Keita noted that purely political measures in this sphere did not always yield the desired results. At present cooperation is developing in step with the development of the productive forces and the modernization of agriculture. The peasant is beginning to see that mechanized cultivation is more profitable. But he also realizes that it is beyond the means of one family to afford a tractor, that by itself this family cannot hope to cultivate any area of considerable size. Thus, the very process of modernization is impelling the peasant to join the co-operative movement.

THE ARMY IN THE MAIN LINE OF THE LABOR FRONT

"On September 28, 1958, Guinea became an independent and sovereign state. The French troops were withdrawn from the country. Simultaneously with this, France removed all material values, leaving the Treasury empty. The budget deficit totalled 250 million francs. The country was left with a primitive level of production. It had no specialists, no army." With these introductory remarks General Lansana Diane, Minister of the People's Army and the Home Guard, began his interview.

"During the colonial era," he said, "Guineans served as infantry in the French army. Most of them returned to the country when independence was achieved. Some 3,000 of their number were selected for the national army. This army differs radically from those of the capitalist countries. Its purpose is not to wage unjust wars of conquest. The Guinean soldier is, first and foremost, a citizen of his country, a member of the party. The army is built not on mechanical but on conscious discipline, and it serves the people.

"When a poor, illiterate people creates an army it should before all else serve national development which calls for physical and moral effort. The Guinean soldier defends the revolutionary regime and his main task, therefore, is to safeguard the existence of the people.

"The Guinean soldier must be a worker, builder, peasant. He is called upon to defend his country in work, in diffusing the new conscience. We already have farms where soldiers cultivate crops, factories where soldiers produce footwear and clothing.

"As a foremost citizen of his country the soldier participates in national upbuilding, is in the front line of the labor effort. He helps to take in the rice harvest while undergoing military training, helps to popularize modern production methods.

"In conditions of imperialist pressure an army of 3,000-5,000 can hardly be expected to ensure a country's safety. Hence the need to

train all the people, to prepare them to defend their gains. Home Defence youth brigades and a people's militia have been formed for the purpose and also to help with the job of economic construction."

"The army," Lansana Diane noted in conclusion, "should not be better organized than society, for this might create a feeling of superiority among the military. The Guinean Government thinks that systematic military training of the population will eventually put an end to the traditionally privileged position occupied by the army. The Democratic Party educates the country's soldiers in the spirit of socialism. Under its leadership the army is becoming a force for social and economic progress, a bulwark of independent development."

* * *

Considerable attention is paid to vigilance, to defense of the gains of the revolution. At the last session of the National Council of the Revolution (enlarged meeting of the executive of the Party), it was decided to form "revolutionary defense committees," under the leadership of the Party, in every district and factory. Extensive measures have been taken to safeguard security, to prevent any attempt that may be made to divert Guinea from its path.

The National Council of the Revolution has called on all members of the Democratic Party to redouble their vigilance and their efforts so as to "actively participate, side by side with all other peoples, in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, for peace, democracy and social progress in Africa and the rest of the world."

VIEWPOINTS ON CURRENT PROBLEMS

LATIN AMERICA

Present phase of the revolutionary movement in Latin America

ROQUE DALTON, VICTOR MIRANDA

IN MARCH 1967 armed clashes in Bolivia between guerrilla detachments and government troops marked the beginning of a revolutionary armed struggle in the southern part of the continent. Simultaneously, guerrillas delivered a series of sudden blows against the Army in Colombia.

On April 2, the Left gained a significant victory in the municipal elections in Chile.

In mid-April, Presidents of the Western hemisphere met for the first time since 1956 to elaborate a bourgeois and imperialist alternative to the revolution in Latin America.

In July a Latin-American Solidarity Organization will meet in conference to discuss the problems and perspectives of the revolutionary struggle on the continent.

These events and the situation on the continent generally, particularly underscore the need to examine the objective results of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggle in Latin America in recent years. Have the ruling classes in the Western hemisphere succeeded in halting the trend towards revolution which manifested itself so strongly at the beginning of the decade? What are the features of the present phase of the revolutionary movement in Latin America and what are the perspectives of this movement?

We shall try in this article to answer these questions—on the basis of the experience of the liberation struggle on the continent and the lessons of the world revolutionary movement. Our main purpose is to pose some of

the controversial issues related to the objective (basically political) conditions in which the Latin-American revolution is developing.

The fact that we speak in terms of the *Latin-American revolution* presupposes that we view the situation on the continent as an integral whole. We proceed from the hypothesis that although Latin America is far from being a homogeneous entity, there are in the national life of the countries common features which enable us to see in their totality the vital problems of the revolutionary movement.

Naturally, this hypothesis (which was advanced ten years ago by Rodney Arismendi, a foremost representative of Marxist thought on the continent), is based on definite factors of which three, in our view, are fundamental:

1. The specific level (compared with other countries of the world) of *Latin-America's economic development*. National income per capita is roughly \$440, which is relatively close to the average world index, two or three times higher than in other parts of the "third world" (Tropical Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia), and four or five times below that in the developed capitalist countries;

2. *The coincidence in the political dynamics of the continent*. The cycle of ebb and flow of the revolutionary movement, the processes of "democratization" and "gorillization" supersede one another on a *continental scale*, passing in a kind of undulating movement from country to country. (There are, of course, unavoidable "delays" arising from the process of "transmission" and from differences in the intensity of the process.) Moreover, the situation and events in the more developed countries of the continent exert a tremendous influence on the less-developed countries; the "backward" links of the revolutionary movement begin gradually to draw closer to the general level;

3. *The unified system of exploitation and domination established by the United States in Latin America*: investments totalling more than \$15,000 million (nearly four-fifths of all foreign investments); control of practically half of the continent's exports; colonies, bases, military missions, embassies, the CIA and the OAS—all add up to a powerful machinery of domination determining, as a rule, the policy of the local ruling classes. U.S. imperialism is, therefore, the main, direct *external* enemy of the peoples of *all* the Latin-American countries. For many of them it is the main enemy in general at the present stage of the struggle.

The countries of Latin America understandably differ from each other in levels of economic development, social structures and political institutions, in levels of consciousness

and organization of the masses.* The differences are even more marked between individual groups of countries, between the "sub-regions" of the continent (the countries of the "southern tip," the Andes, Central America and others). This distinctive feature of national (and also regional) life largely determines *the concrete correlation of class and political forces* in each country, the *tactics of the revolutionary struggle*, and sometimes even the succession of the stages of the revolutionary process.

But this notwithstanding, it can be said that most of the countries of the continent, with the exception of such "difficult cases" as Mexico, on the one hand, Haiti and maybe one or two other countries, on the other, are at a *qualitatively similar stage of historical development*, although they are at different points of this stage. This applies alike to Argentina with its average per capita income of \$780 annually, and to Brazil and Bolivia where the corresponding figure is \$390 and \$140. The *minute* hands of the clocks of history show different times in the different countries of the continent, but the *hour* hands coincide approximately.

This community of the "historical stage" and of the fundamental tasks related to it, determine—together with community of the main enemy, community of language, territory, culture and historical destiny (over the centuries)—*the unity of the historical and revolutionary process in Latin America*. It is in this sense, and only in this sense, that we speak of Latin America as a socio-political and historical entity, of the Latin American revolution.

THE STORM PERIOD

Last year Latin America marked the tenth anniversary of the new upsurge of the revolutionary movement on the continent. The offensive of the reactionary oligarchy and U.S. imperialists against the forces of democracy and progress, which had steadily gained momentum in the late '40s reaching its climax in 1954-55, had petered out by 1956. In country after country the reactionaries fell back on the defensive. The curve of the revolutionary process rose again. For the third time in a quarter of a century revolution ran high.

The fall of the military dictatorships in a third of the countries; the rapid growth of the strike movement; the wave of anti-imperialist demonstrations; the first victorious

*The differences are sometimes even more striking between the regions of one and the same country. Brazil, Peru and Ecuador are cases in point.

anti-imperialist revolution in Latin America and its development into a socialist revolution; the successful struggle of the first proletarian democracy in America, supported by the forces of world socialism, against U.S. imperialism; the powerful solidarity movement with Cuba; the rapid maturing of a revolutionary situation in the greater part of the continent; the proclamation of a sweeping program of imperialist reformism and its failure; the new chain of "preventive" military coups; the development of the revolutionary armed struggle in many parts of the Andes and in the Caribbean; the head-on encounter between the forces of the revolution and the counter-revolution—in short, the entire history of the past decade indicates that Latin America has entered a period of powerful revolutionary upheavals. Marxists hold that the transformation of Latin America into one of the principal arenas of the world revolutionary process is a feature of the present phase of this process, of the present third stage of the general crisis of capitalism. The existence of a revolutionary process on the continent was admitted even by the President of the United States who declared in this connection in February 1963 that he considered Latin America "the most critical area in the world today."

POWERFUL ACCELERATOR

The revolutionary movement did not develop evenly in the period under review. The initial phase of the upsurge in 1956-57 was followed by its swift acceleration in 1958; this paved the way for a *qualitatively new stage in the continent's history*. This stage—the "second war of independence," the "Latin-American revolution of the 20th century"—began in 1959 with the victory of the revolutionary armed struggle in Cuba.

The Cuban revolution was not the *cause* of the present revolutionary upheavals in Latin America. It was itself engendered by the very same profound and objective causes which conditioned the spread of the revolutionary movement in other parts of the continent. But the revolution in Cuba undoubtedly served as a powerful complementary accelerator and catalyzer of the revolutionary process on the continent. Its victory gave impetus to this process; its existence betokened the irreversibility and inevitability of the situation created in Latin America.

The Cuban revolution showed the masses that the objective of the struggle could be realized, that a *real possibility* existed for resolving the fundamental problems of the continent. It challenged the attitude that suf-

fering, injustice and oppression were predetermined and eternal. It convinced the working masses and also part of the ruling classes, that a change was possible, necessary and inevitable.

As a result of the Cuban revolution the *anti-imperialist orientation* of the revolutionary movement on the continent became more pronounced.

Relying on the support of the socialist world system, and first and foremost on the Soviet Union, revolutionary Cuba demonstrated the feasibility and "proximity" of socialism on the continent, traditionally considered the "private preserve" of imperialism; it showed—confirming the lessons of the October Revolution in Russia—that consistent struggle for land and democracy, for national independence and social justice leads on to socialism.

The Cuban revolution also embodied the general laws of development of the revolutionary process and the distinctive features of time and place related to the national peculiarities of the respective countries, and to the situation that existed on the continent at the end of the '50s, which the Cuban victory fundamentally changed. At the same time this revolution also revealed—or accentuated, we think—certain important trends characteristic of the present stage of the revolutionary struggle in most of the Latin American countries.

The intensity of the present revolutionary upsurge on the continent and the circumstance that it was precisely here—9,000 kilometres away from the frontiers of the socialist world and 90 miles from the U.S. coast—that the first socialist revolution of the "third generation" triumphed, evidently came as a surprise not only to reactionaries but also to many revolutionaries. (This became both a source of the strength of the revolution which took its adversaries unawares, and of its weakness—too much had to be attended to "on the go.") All the more reason to note that these "tricks of history" had to defer to the profound—and generally known—objective laws of history.

Above all, the events in Cuba showed the revolutionaries of the continent that objectively the *fight for power* has been placed by history on the order of the day as the task of the given historical period. The Cuban revolution delivered a powerful blow to the wait-and-see attitude, to sectarianism and economism, to the invented or copied cut and dried patterns, formulas and concepts which for decades had been current in the revolutionary movement on the continent.

The successes and lessons of the Cuban revolution encouraged the peoples of Latin America to intensify the struggle against

their class and national enemies and gave impetus to the revolutionary energy and initiative of the working people. At the same time there is no doubt that this revolution, like other great revolutions of the century, has also taught the counter-revolutionary forces, particularly U.S. imperialism, a great deal.

HEAD-ON ENCOUNTER . . .

These developments affected the subsequent course of the struggle. The years 1959-1962 saw the rapid advance of the revolutionary movement in nearly all the Latin-American countries, the movement gaining particular momentum at the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962. The contours of a continental revolutionary situation became clearly defined. The sentiment and fervor of that period found eloquent expression in the Second Havana Declaration, the manifesto of the Latin American revolution.

However, beginning with the spring of 1962 approximately, things changed somewhat. The element of the *surprise blow*—in an unexpected place, under unexpected political leadership and in an unexpected way—which had played such an important role in the victory of the Cuban revolution, had disappeared. The imperialist and reactionary forces drew conclusions from their first defeats; this time, too, the development of the revolution started a process of consolidation of the counter-revolution and increased its resistance.

The U.S. imperialist interference in Latin American affairs became more widespread and blatant; Washington virtually "guaranteed" the bourgeois-landlord regimes on the continent. The formal expression of this was the Johnson Doctrine and the Selden Resolution, and its practical expression was the shooting down of Panamanian students by U.S. marines and later the intervention in Santo Domingo. This policy of the United States naturally buttressed the position and the resistance of the local reactionaries, and increased the vacillation of the intermediate forces who had been ready to support the revolution in 1960-61. Alarmed by the *reality* of the threat of revolution and its *perspectives*, most of the bourgeoisie veered to the Right, sought a closer alliance with the imperialists and, in a number of cases, with the oligarchy. The reactionary military stepped up their activities.

The events in Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela in the first half of 1962 started a new phase in the revolutionary process on the continent, that of a head-on encounter between the revolutionary forces on the offensive and the counter-attacking reactionary forces of the two Americas.

The slowing down to some extent of the revolutionary process in recent years has been due not only to the increased resistance of the reactionaries and imperialists, but also to the weaknesses of the *revolutionary movement itself*. It is generally recognized that the *peoples* of the continent are today pressing for *tangible changes*, that more and more people are actively participating, in the most diverse forms, in the struggle for these changes. At the same time a feature of the struggle of the past decade is the participation in it on a bigger scale of the *revolutionary vanguard*—the advanced workers and peasants, students and revolutionary intellectuals who have proved that they are equal to the higher forms of struggle and who are turning more and more to the ideas of scientific socialism.

The political awakening of the masses and the fervor of the vanguard are of course important elements of revolutionary development, *essential*, indispensable conditions of its victory. But they were *insufficient* in a situation when the revolution is opposed by a strong and vigilant enemy who has learned lessons from his defeats, when it became clear how much farther the revolution must go if it is to consolidate its victory over this enemy. Therefore, if the counter-offensive of the reaction was to be beaten back, if the enemy's lines of defense were to be broken, a number of other conditions were called for, in the first place readiness on the part of the working class and the peasantry to wage a long political struggle.

The relative slowness of the process to draw the bulk of the working class and the peasantry into conscious, active participation in the liberation struggle became the main internal difficulty hampering the advance of the revolution, the objective cause of other of its weaknesses—the differences in the revolutionary camp and the mistakes made by the revolutionary forces.

These circumstances slowed down the revolutionary offensive (the partial changes in the economic set-up in 1964-65 were also partly responsible). In some countries (Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia among them), the reactionaries, relying on the direct and extensive support of the imperialists, and using the military as a shock force, were able to strike frontal blows at the revolutionary and democratic movement. In others (Chile and Peru), the awakening to political life of new, formerly passive sections of the population, coupled with the difficulties besetting the revolutionary process, determined the spread of reformist or pseudo-reformist trends and the rise to power of the forces representing these trends. It was only in the Dominican

Republic that the revolutionary forces were able to break through the "line of defense" of the local reactionaries in depth. However, here too the direct armed intervention of the United States saved the bourgeois-landlord regime.

In these circumstances the ideological struggle over the basic issues of the social development of Latin America has grown sharper. The question is sometimes asked whether it would not be more realistic to seek a way out of the present crisis through the evolution of the present system, on the basis of capitalist relations and dependence on imperialism. Such questions should not be dismissed offhand. For it would be incorrect to assume that revolutionary solutions are always *feasible*, that revolution is *possible* at every stage of social development. Clearly, the solution should be based on an analysis of the deep-going trends and objective laws governing the present stage of the continent's history, on an analysis of the requirements and potentials of the economic and socio-political development.

MATERIAL BASE OF THE REVOLUTION

As Latin American Marxists have pointed out, the events of the past ten years were determined by the coincident action of two powerful historical processes.

One of these is the changed balance of forces in the world under the influence of the success of world socialism and the liberation movement.

THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS

The second, decisive factor determining the specific nature and dynamics of the revolutionary process on the continent is the internal development of Latin American society itself, the qualitatively new and very specific stage of this development, which began roughly in 1929-32 and into which most of the Latin American countries have now entered. Tentatively it can be called a stage in the crisis of the traditional socio-economic and political systems of Latin-America, systems based on latifundist landownership and on the export of raw materials, on subordination to foreign capital and on the domination of the reactionary landlord-bourgeois oligarchy. The roots of this structure which dates back to the colonial times, have been preserved to this day and intertwine with the developing capitalist relations. The slowness and deformation of the continent's social development were both the outcome and the condition of the tenacity of "traditional systems."

Unlike the United States and West European countries which passed through all the stages of the bourgeois revolution and capitalist transformation, Latin America "got snarled," so to speak, at that stage of capitalism when it coexisted with the survivals of feudalism thus deforming its development. This stage, stretching from the early to the late bourgeois revolutions, from the crisis of the foundations of feudal society to the crisis of the survivals of the pre-capitalist structures (and structures of early capitalism), also became the period of the second enslavement of the continent, this time by foreign capital.

The "structural crisis," which according to the definition of the Latin American Marxists is the "material base of the continental revolution," first became apparent in the thirties. By the fifties it had fully matured.

How this crisis has manifested itself in the present decade, and its consequences, are examined in another article. However, it will be in place here to discuss the substance, nature and character of the revolutionary "effervescence" engendered by this crisis.

THE CRITICAL STAGE, ITS CHARACTER AND SPECIFIC FEATURES

The anti-imperialist orientation of the revolutionary struggle in Latin America makes it kindred in many respects to the national-liberation movements in other continents.

However, from the viewpoint of internal conditions, the correlation of social forces, the forms and immediate perspectives of the revolutionary process south of the Rio Grande are of a qualitatively different character than in most countries of Asia and Africa. Figuratively speaking, the "Latin American hour" mentioned earlier, is different from that in most of the countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia and even more so from that in Tropical Africa; it is also different from the "hour" of Western and Northern Europe.

When the countries of Asia and Africa achieved independence, capitalism there was in the early stages of its development, or was just taking its first steps. Latin America in the mid-twentieth century is approaching the average level of capitalist development. The relatively big proportion of the working class (together with clerical workers it constitutes more than 50 per cent of the gainfully employed population), the relatively high level of its organization, the existence of Communist parties in all the countries of the continent—these factors objectively favor the hegemony of the proletariat *already at the present stage* of the revolutionary movement. What's more, the minimum material conditions exist

in most of the Latin American countries for socialist transformations.

According to its place in the spiral-like process of historical development, the present period of revolutionary upheavals in Latin America can be said to correspond in all essentials to *the period of the crisis of the survivals of pre-capitalist structures and the systems of early capitalism,* to the period of late bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic) revolutions*; it is the phase of social development characterized by particularly sharp and diverse internal socio-political contradictions, the phase which, as history has shown, is one of the most critical for the exploiter classes, the phase of the inevitable development of the revolution into a *democratic, anti-feudal* one (and in the conditions of Latin America an anti-imperialist one) in a situation marked by the *relative weakness of the foundations of the capitalist system and when certain objective conditions obtain for a socialist revolution*. It is only natural that in these circumstances the trend towards democratic revolution should be particularly strong. In the first half of the 20th century not a single country emerged from this historical stage without powerful upheavals which in most cases took the form of revolutionary armed struggle. Examples of this are the first victorious socialist revolution in Russia and the youngest of these revolutions—the Cuban; the 1918-19 revolution in Hungary and the events of 1918-22 in Italy, the people's democratic revolutions in Spain and in the Balkans.

Of course, in the Latin America of the mid-twentieth century these trends and processes acquire a very specific form, intertwining with other trends.

The point is that the *place occupied by the Latin American countries in the capitalist economy* differs fundamentally from that of the Western countries a century ago; it is also different from the place held by the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe fifty years ago (although the level of internal socio-economic development in all three cases is about the same). Even the most developed Latin American countries are still *relatively* underdeveloped and dependent on, and exploited by, foreign imperialists. Consequently, if they are to overcome the traditional structural crisis they will have to destroy the survivals of feudalism, and then create the conditions for overcoming the age-old backwardness, for the "leap into the twentieth century." The first condition is the liberation of the continent from imperialist domination. This is an objec-

*That is, of the capitalist structures immediately preceding industrialization.

tive demand of the present stage of Latin America's development, it is the objective basis of the *anti-imperialist character* of the revolution.

The anti-imperialist struggle is decisive for all aspects of social development and the revolutionary process. Hence, partly, the pressing need (and inevitability) for radical changes and the unsuitability of many of the solutions and procedures which in the nineteenth century enabled European and North American capital to overcome the "critical stage"; hence the growing objective need for socialist solutions. The fact that the anti-imperialist revolutionary process in Latin America is spearheaded against the USA—the bastion of world imperialism—reinforces the radical and anti-capitalist trends of the process.

On the other hand, compared with many countries that passed through this historical stage earlier, the development and the success of the revolution in Latin America are greatly facilitated by the present stage of the world revolutionary process—the balance of forces on the world arena, the rise of the socialist world system, and the heroic struggle of the people of Vietnam against U.S. imperialist aggression.

Such, in our view, are the objective trends of the historical process which determine the need for revolution in Latin America, the character of this revolution, and the possibility of its triumph, trends embodied in the development of the Cuban revolution.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE REVOLUTION

It is true that the path of revolutionary reconstruction which is supported by a large part of the working class in the Latin American South and the vanguard contingents of the working class and the peasantry in the other countries of the continent, by the bulk of the students, a sizeable section of the intelligentsia and by some groups of the urban petty bourgeoisie, has its difficulties.

The resistance of the reactionaries here is particularly tenacious: the local exploiters have at their disposal a long established and ramified apparatus of coercion. Conscious of the approaching danger they are redoubling their resistance and consolidating their forces.

In Latin America internal reaction enjoys the particularly active and operative "massive" support of the external counter-revolution, directly represented in this case by U.S. imperialism, the world gendarme. True, the growth of the forces of world socialism has neutralized to a certain degree the unfavorable external conditions in which the revolu-

tionary movement on the continent is developing (proximity of the United States, the great distance geographically from the main territorial and political base of the international revolutionary and socialist movement). Still, even today imperialism's military and political positions in the Western hemisphere are stronger than in other key areas of the world. This gives it a number of advantages, facilitating export of counter-revolution.

The continent's relatively differentiated social and political structures make national unity and sometimes also unity of the revolutionary forces a difficult task. On the other hand, the movement of the working class, the class which, in view of its objective position and proportion in the social structure in most Latin American countries, is called upon to play the leading role in the bloc of revolutionary forces is lagging behind the rhythm and requirements of the revolutionary process.

In these conditions, both the preparation of the socio-political army of the revolution, and the development of the revolution itself acquire, as we have seen, a relatively prolonged character, pass through periods of ebb and flow. It is to this kind of revolutionary processes taking place in Latin America today that Marx's words apply: "The revolutions of the nineteenth century," he wrote, "criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltrinesses of their first attempts, seem to throw down their adversary only in order that he may draw new strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic, before them, recoil ever and anon from the indefinite prodigiousness of their own aims, until a situation has been created which makes all turning back impossible, and the conditions themselves cry out: 'Hic Rhodus, hic salta'."

* * *

Until now we have been discussing what we consider to be the *essence* of the historical period experienced by Latin America in the past four decades. Can it be said that the *decisive* limits of this critical stage have been crossed? Can we say that the objective tasks facing the revolution have been realized in the past ten years through capitalist solutions, that a new equilibrium has taken shape within the structures of the traditional capitalism or of state monopoly capital?

If such were the case, then the material base of the revolution for which the revolutionaries of Latin America have fought and are still

fighting no longer exists, and the struggle itself—in its present forms and with its present perspectives—is like the rider racing to catch up with a receding train (for as a rule neither the misery of the masses, the burden of their oppression nor the dedicated selflessness of revolutionaries can by *themselves* create the conditions for victorious revolution).

However, there is no reason to think so. On the contrary, we believe that Latin America is just approaching the decisive limits of the crucial period. This is evident, in particular, from the article printed in this issue of the journal on the structural crisis on the continent. It is also evident from the Punte del Este conference of Presidents: Frei's statement that Latin America's destiny (i.e., whether the bourgeois-imperialist bloc will succeed or fail to prevent a people's revolution) will be decided in the next ten years; Johnson's call to declare the seventies the "decade of urgency," etc.

PRESSURE MOUNTS . . .

Clearly, the material preconditions for revolution on the continent have multiplied in recent years, for the "accursed problems" of Latin America—the problems of land, democracy, radical improvement in living standards, economic independence — still await their solution. The semi-feudal concentration of landed property continues to be the greatest in the world; the gap between the economic indicators for Latin America and those for the developed capitalist countries is as wide as ever; pressure in the Latin American crucible continues to mount.

But it is not only the deep-going trends of socio-economic development that indicate that matters are coming to a head. The socio-political situation likewise bears this out.

An atmosphere of *political crisis* continues to be the prevailing atmosphere on the greater part of the continent. Only seven countries have been able to preserve the facade of "representative democracy" in the past few years. The situation at the top levels of power is marked by instability and discrediting of governments, by plots and coups, crises in the traditional parties. The contradictions between important groups of the Latin American bourgeoisie and ruling U.S. quarters have flared up anew.

Even more important is that the working people, whether motivated by sentiment engendered by the "revolution of growing requirements," by the direct aggravation of destitution and misfortune, or for purely political reasons, refuse any longer to live in the

old way, to be content with what has been achieved to date. The mass movement in Latin America is developing at a much higher level than in the previous two decades. Never before has the continent witnessed so many reactionary coups, and such naked forms of U.S. intervention, never has it been fed with so many alluring U.S. promises as in the past decade; but so great is the pressure of the revolutionary wave this time that neither "big stick" nor "carrot" is proving effective.

The revolution is again, after the retreat, resuming the offensive, breaking through to the most unexpected places and expressing itself in the most unexpected ways. The South is rocked by powerful actions by the industrial working class. The traditional general strikes and anti-imperialist actions are combined with other actions: occupation of enterprises, presentation by working-class organizations of constructive socio-economic programs indicating the way out of the crisis, measures to realize these alternative programs. The fight against dictatorial regimes, which gained a sweeping victory in Ecuador last year continues. Revolutionary armed struggle is being waged in Colombia, Guatemala, Venezuela and now in Bolivia, against the regimes of pseudo-democracy.

The failure of all attempts to destroy socialist Cuba has been a powerful factor in the development of the political crisis on the continent, proof of the inability of the reactionaries to reverse the course of history. The indisputable success in socialist construction achieved by the Cuban people in recent years is at the same time new seed scattered on the revolutionary soil of the entire continent.

REVOLUTION ON THE ORDER OF THE DAY

And so, the liberation process on the continent continues. The Latin American revolution has taken deeper root; the ingredients making for a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary explosion are accumulating.

Our view, then, is that *qualitatively* the situation remains the same, despite the slowing down of the revolutionary advance in 1963-65, despite the reverses in a number of countries of the continent and the ebb of the mass movement in some regions. The events of recent years speak of a dynamic *equilibrium* of the opposing trends of objective development rather than of defeat of the revolution. On the *continental* scale this relative equilibrium is sometimes the outcome of very stormy processes at national levels: in Latin America the class (and also anti-imperialist)

struggle cannot be said to be stable*, it can best be described perhaps as being an unstable equilibrium. As Ronald M. Schneider, a State Department expert on Latin American, admits, "the socio-political situation in a number of Latin American countries is so precarious that any significant deterioration could tip the balance in favor of radical revolutionaries."

In other words, it is not a question of some kind of new "evolutionary" phase of development to be followed a decade (or decades) later by a new phase of revolutionary upsurge. *Both the laws of historical development and the present situation south of the Rio Grande show that revolution and revolutionary solutions remain on the order of the day in Latin America.*

Our opponents are no less aware of this. Recall, for example, the words of Robert Kennedy in this connection: "A revolution is coming, a revolution which will be peaceful if we are wise enough; compassionate if we care enough; successful if we are fortunate enough . . . We can affect its character, we cannot alter its inevitability."

THE GENERAL REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION

The unstable, transitional and "undulating" situation in Latin America today is in its objective essence very similar to the phase of the revolutionary process defined in Marxist literature as a *general revolutionary situation*. It does not necessarily follow from this that the conditions on the continent are ripe for a revolution. It is rather a question of a situation similar to that in the Europe of 1915-16.

The specific features of the European situation of those days were, as Lenin described them, the existence of an economic and political crisis, the shattering of political foundations; extreme aggravation of contradictions; the misery and "smouldering indignation of the masses," the "beginnings of discontent among the 'lower classes'." All this, combined with deep-going irreversible objective processes which in their turn inevitably further exacerbate the entire socio-political situation (in 1915-16 such a process was the war) make for a general revolutionary situation.

This is not as yet the classical, *immediate* revolutionary situation, when the objective conditions for revolution are ripe, and when the indignation of the masses boils over into a powerful upsurge of their movement, involving even the most backward sections and the

*Witness the upsurge of the revolutionary movement in mid-1965 and the reactionary offensive in 1964 and again at the end of 1965.

mass sentiment, when, in Lenin's words, they support "the most determined, bold and dedicated revolutionary action. . . ." It is, however, the phase of the maturing of an overall national crisis (characterized by a number of Communist parties in Latin America as a *pre-revolutionary situation*) which, according to the general rule, directly borders on a revolutionary situation and can spill over into it—and into revolution—in a very brief space of time (recall in this connection the events of April 1965 in Santo Domingo).

Sometimes the *general* revolutionary situation persists long after a *direct* revolutionary situation, owing to the partial subsiding of the revolutionary wave. History knows of cases when a similar situation covered a relatively long period,* engendering not one but two or more direct revolutionary situations (or revolutions). This period can be likened to a plateau over which loom mountain chains of revolutionary crises.

The presence of a general revolutionary situation on the *Latin American continent* does not necessarily mean that an identical situation exists in all the countries, and still less that the revolution will take the form of a simultaneous general explosion. The revolutionary movement in Latin America is developing unevenly. In some countries there are elements of *direct* revolutionary situation, others passed through this stage not so long ago, and there are countries where the situation resembles the "continental average." But there are also countries (very few, it is true), which have not experienced even a general revolutionary situation. The common feature of the *quantitatively different* national situations (and this includes Cuba) in a world changed by fifty years of the international socialist revolution is, in our opinion, the *qualitatively identical* stage of revolutionary development on the continent.

In the final analysis, however, the point is not one of terminology. The point is that the fight for radical revolutionary changes in Latin America is becoming the concern of the present generation. The point is that in its entire *policy* (from the Alliance for Progress to the Johnson Doctrine), in *all* its actions (whether armed intervention in Santo Domingo or "sociological studies" of the Camelot Plan kind), the enemy, imperialism, *proceeds from the existence of a revolutionary situation on the continent*. It is particularly pertinent to remind the *revolutionaries* of Latin America of Lenin's words about "the indisputable and fundamental duty of all socialists" in situa-

tions like this, that of "revealing to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, explaining its scope and depth, arousing the proletariat's revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary determination, helping it to go over to revolutionary action, and forming, for that purpose, organizations suited to the revolutionary situation." There is hardly any need to add that it was this approach of the Bolsheviks that paved the way to the victory of the October Revolution, the fiftieth anniversary of which we are celebrating this year and the lessons of which serve the revolutionaries and peoples of our continent as a guide to action.

A feature of the present general revolutionary situation in Latin America is, in our view, its relatively long duration. This is due to objective factors. It is obvious that the action of the structural crisis—a process determining the situation on the continent—is not as concentrated as the action of *war*—the principal "generator" of the revolutionary situation in Europe in 1915-17. Such a process contains within itself the possibility (as a rule used by the ruling classes) of partial solutions, which temporarily reduce pressure in the revolutionary crucible; the different aspects of the continental revolutionary situation engendered by this crisis develop unevenly; *national* revolutionary situations develop just as unevenly as a result of the crisis of structures. While the structural crisis is no less a driving force of a revolutionary situation than the world wars and economic crises of the first half of the present century, the impulse generated by it in each instance of the social process is less. Hence the protracted duration of the situation engendered by it.

This is accompanied not only by a quantitative increase in the initial contradictions which call for a revolutionary solution. Also qualitatively new elements, contradictions and trends appear in the national and continental framework; the proportion of components of the revolutionary situation changes (the town-countryside problem being a case in point).

These objective conditions of the development of the revolutionary situation in Latin America evidently determine the specific features of the revolutionary struggle, make certain specific demands on the policy and tactics of the revolutionaries. We mention this since failure to understand this aspect of the problem sometimes gives rise to pessimism and even to acts of desperation. At the same time another aspect of the problem should be noted.

The circumstance that the revolutionary situation in Latin America has not grown into a series of national revolutions is due not only to objective conditions—and in *this* sense its

*For example in Russia from 1901 to 1917, in Germany from 1915 to 1923.

duration is not something predetermined. Also factors of a subjective order play an important role. "It is not every revolutionary situation that gives rise to a revolution," Lenin wrote, "revolution arises out of a situation in which the above-mentioned objective changes are accompanied by . . . the ability of the revolutionary class to take revolutionary mass action strong enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, 'falls,' if it is not toppled over." "A revolution may be ripe," Lenin noted in the same connection, "and yet the forces of the revolutionaries may prove insufficient to carry it out, in which case society decays, and this process of decay sometimes drags on for decades."

So far in Latin America—beyond the confines of Cuba—the maturity of the subjective factors of the revolution has been everywhere inadequate. Largely because of this, the direct revolutionary situations that arose on the continent in 1961-64 did not grow into revolution; on the contrary, they were partly and temporarily slowed down by reaction. One gets the impression that in some parts of the continent there are the elements of the "decay," concerning which Lenin warned more than 50 years ago.

In these circumstances the responsibility of revolutionaries, their obligation effectively to influence the rhythm and march of social development, is all the greater. To forget that the objective laws of development can make headway only through the conscious actions of *people and classes*, the idea that the results of the revolutionary process are predetermined, disregard of its specific nature, sectarian, and adventurist trends, a wait-and-see attitude—all are fraught with mortal danger for the revolution. In the event of the anti-imperialist, democratic and socialist forces of

the continent proving unable to utilize the objective revolutionary potential of the present critical stage of social development, the powerful bloc of the reactionary and bourgeois-reformist forces of the two Americas will sooner or later impose on our peoples one of *their* own solutions. In this event the revolution would be delayed for a long time and its character would change.

The actions that began this spring show that the Communists and all genuine revolutionaries in Latin America are determined to fight for a different outcome.

* * *

In these decisive decades the peoples of Latin America have issued a challenge directly to the main imperialist power. The revolutionaries of the continent fully realize that the battle ahead, which has already begun, will be a difficult, long and bitter one. They know that not all who "rise at dawn" will live to see victory, the happiness of their peoples.

But the fighters for the social and national emancipation of Latin America know that on their side are the laws of history, that it is *they* who express the vital interests of their people, that it is *they* who are the "wave of the future" on the continent, that it is the onward march of social development on other continents that is *their* ally. Building socialism in Cuba and vigilantly safeguarding the first liberated territory in America; in the guerrilla detachments in the mountains and the underground movements in the towns, in factories on strike, at campus meetings and in street demonstrations, on the plantations and in the parliaments—everywhere the revolutionaries are bringing nearer the radiant future of their continent.

The crisis of structures and the way out

F. MIERES, C. MEDINA

THE CURRENT REVOLUTIONARY upheavals in Latin America have their source largely in the stagnation which afflicts the economy of almost the entire continent south of the Panama Canal.

In the postwar "golden decade" of 1946-1955 the annual 5.2 per cent accretion to the aggregate national product, equivalent to 2.7 per cent per head of population, was the highest in Latin America's history. In the next five years, 1956-1960, the figure shrank to 4.7 and 1.8 per cent, respectively, and to 4.3 and 1.3 per cent respectively in the five years 1961-1965.* As we see, the growth of the aggregate product per head of population—the basic economic index for developing countries—declined by half. There may be insufficient reason to speak of a devastating crisis, but, clearly, the continent's economy is in a sustained state of stagnation, which is the most tangible of indications of the general crisis gripping the traditional socio-economic structure of Latin America.

Although mention of the crisis of Latin America's socio-economic system occurs quite frequently in our literature, there are still very few really profound Marxist papers on this subject. Yet it is vital for us to comprehend the processes taking place in the depths of Latin American society if we are to obtain a clear view of the present critical juncture in the continent and determine the nature of the revolution that its people are called upon to carry out. It is this, rather than any academic desire to salvage a concept from oblivion that has prompted us to select our subject.

*Figures for Latin America here and elsewhere do not cover Cuba.

1. THE TRADITIONAL PILLARS

The Latin American economy in the 1930's had taken the shape of a raw-materials appendage to the developed capitalist countries. The continent's economic system displayed considerable survivals of pre-capitalist structures (primarily latifundia landownership), foreign exploitation of economies that depended on the production and export of one or two raw materials, and a developing capitalism warped by the first two factors.

The roots of this traditional society go back to the period of Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule. The wars of independence, which displayed some of the characteristic features of early bourgeois revolutions, did not greatly alter the socio-economic pattern because of the strongly entrenched latifundia and the fact that the Creole gentry acted as the leading force in the fight for national independence. This retarded the development of most of the Latin American countries throughout the 19th century, leaving an imprint on their political life and causing them to stagnate as "underdeveloped," dependent countries. The big capitalist powers replaced the former colonial powers, but the process of extracting the surplus product from the continent continued unchanged.

It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that signs of a crisis in the traditional structures appeared in Latin America. It took such powerful cataclysms as the First World War, the October Revolution in Russia and the 1929-32 economic crisis for this structural crisis to burst out into the open. And ever since the early 'thirties it has been the principal internal factor shaping the fate of the continent.

In the past ten years, the crisis of structures gained in intensity, and has now fully matured. The general socio-economic picture has changed in many respects during the past half-century and has become much more complicated due chiefly to the beginnings of industrialization in some of the countries. However, the new elements have not altered the economy *qualitatively* and are themselves exposed to the general crisis of structures. The crisis of the latifundia economy (which began in the early decades of this century) is deepening and the effects of the decline in trade with the capitalist countries, which afflicted the economy of the continent in the 'thirties, are still felt.* Nor is this compensated any longer by spells of favorable foreign trade and by the inflow of foreign monopoly investments, which for several decades acted as a kind of "drug" obscuring the deepseated ailments and protracting the death agony of the old structures.

What we have today is a *general crisis of all the links of the Latin American economic structure*, the deepest crisis it has ever experienced.

THE AGRARIAN CRISIS

The new feature of the continental agrarian crisis is that, having broken out as a crisis of over-production of goods for *export*, it has now spread to the home market, where it is acquiring features of a crisis of under-production. The most highly concentrated landownership in the world and the survival of semi-feudal elements in almost all Latin American countries prevents agriculture from supplying the rapidly rising demand engendered by the equally rapid urbanization. The cost of the technological and economic backwardness in the countryside is all too obvious in terms of the rising prices for staple foods and key raw materials (breeding inflationist tendencies); import of staples (creating additional difficulties in foreign trade and swallowing the funds that could otherwise be used to purchase industrial equipment); the soaring land rent and the corresponding growth of non-productive consumption (which also cuts into re-investment funds); stagnation, even curtailment of agriculture, and the inability of agriculture to absorb more labor power, causing the "surplus" rural population to migrate to the towns.

The following facts and figures convey an idea of the acuteness of the agrarian crisis. Per capita food production in Latin America

*The continent's exports fell by two-thirds between 1929 and 1932, and the 1929 figure (exports per head of population) has not been attained to this day.

is lower today than it was before the war (in 1946 it was four per cent lower). In 1964 its per capita output of agricultural products was the lowest in the world.

Considering that its *population growth* is the world's highest, the prospect for the 70s and 80s is one of widespread hunger. At the same time, the stagnation of its semi-feudal agriculture is holding up industrial development. It is not surprising, therefore, that agrarian reform is now one of the slogans of the Alliance for Progress and the "credo" of the new Catholic approach.

For all this, no *qualitative* changes have taken place in the system of landownership in Latin America in the past ten years, with the exception of Cuba (any *quantitative* changes have been confined to two or three countries). And the reason for this is that the class interest of the powerful landed oligarchy stands between an understanding of the problems and their practical solutions. But agrarian reform also encounters other obstacles. Even if the improbable happens and a bourgeois agrarian reform is carried through, the present stagnation in Latin American industry offers little opportunity of modernizing agriculture. Agrarian reform would, therefore, involve foreign financing, thereby accentuating the shortage of foreign exchange and adding to the continent's general dependence on imperialism.

In any case, it is more than doubtful that the "aid" will be forthcoming. According to ECLA*, Latin America will have to spend \$50,000 million between 1965 and 1980, or \$3,300 million annually to secure an annual 4.4 per cent growth of agricultural output. But foreign financing of Latin American agriculture between 1961 and 1965 (the heyday of the Alliance for Progress) averaged an annual \$125 million.

DECLINE OF FOREIGN TRADE

The worsening terms of trade and the Latin American export crisis are also chronic afflictions, so much so that our economic literature treats them as commonplace. Two points can be made on this score. First, the decline in the terms on which the underdeveloped countries trade with the imperialist countries is not a transient matter. It is viewed as the "normal" process, rooted in the tremendous disparity in efficiency, on the one hand, and in the vast difference in economic structures, on the other. It is a kind of law governing the relations between imperialist countries and the countries supplying raw materials. (The reverse case—a temporary improvement of business

*U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America.

activity, like that of the early postwar years—is the exception).

The full weight of this law of non-equivalent exchange has made itself felt in Latin American countries in the past few decades, although there has been no cyclical crisis and no general upheaval in international trade.

Second, among the backward regions Latin America is the one that suffers most from this "iron-clad law" of foreign trade. Its share in world exports has dropped from nine to less than six per cent in the past ten years. The West European economic groupings and their preferential ties with Afro-Asian countries are adding to Latin America's dependence on the North American market, which already accounts for two-fifths of the continent's export trade. Yet it is all too obvious that the more extensively foreign trade is tied to the United States, the greater the latter's chances will be to act as a near-monopoly buyer and absolute ruler of the market.

These factors indicate that the terms of Latin America's foreign trade are likely to worsen. This is the view also of UNECLA, which has estimated that Latin America's losses due to shrinking foreign markets and non-equivalent exchange amount to an annual \$2,500 million.

CRISIS OF OUTSIDE FINANCE

From the end of the last century and after the First World War, foreign investments stimulated economic activity and the beginnings of industrialization in some of the Latin American countries.

A renewed inflow of foreign investments came in 1945-1955, by which time a foreign monopoly sector had obtained a foothold in mining, agriculture and in strategic areas of the infra-structure (electric power, gas, communications). Though this inflow of foreign investment was on a much bigger scale, the *profits received and shipped out* by the imperialist monopolies were greater still.* Outflow of profits has swollen enormously in the last few years. Average annual withdrawal of profit in 1947 through 1949 surpassed direct U.S. investments by \$93 million. In 1950 through 1957 the figures climbed to \$345 million, rising to \$551 million in 1958-63 (this excludes private portfolio investments, profit from which has been running at \$150 million annually in the past few years). All in all, U.S. monopoly investment in Latin America between 1946 and 1963 added up to \$4,675 million, while profit pumped out in the same per-

iod amounted to \$11,234 million. In other words, our underdeveloped countries have "aided" the economic development of the imperialist North American giant to the tune of \$6,559 million.

According to ECLA, in 1950-55 the surplus product exported from Latin America amounted to 11 per cent of its foreign currency income, and in 1956-60 it exceeded 20 per cent. In recent years the percentage has approached 30.

After 1957, U.S. monopoly investment in Latin America began to decline. Whereas in 1952-57 it amounted to \$2,430 million, in 1958-63 the figure dropped to \$847 million. In 1962 the dynamics were negative, i.e., along with profit, part of the capital previously invested in Latin America was re-exported to the USA. In other words, there began an *accelerated decapitalization of the Latin American economies* with a resultant falling off in development rates.

Such *emergency measures* as government loans, loans from international finance organizations and short-term credit under the Alliance for Progress programs have but a fleeting effect.* As a result of these measures, the foreign debt has soared. Interest and depreciation payments rose more than fivefold in 1961-63 as compared with 1950-52, creating a balance of payments deficit. Average repayment term shrank to eight years at the beginning of the current decade compared with 28 years in 1945. Unable to meet their commitments, the governments have had to defer payments or beg for new loans.

If we take into account *all* the sources of external long-term financing, we shall see that over the 15 years 1950-1964 *only in five of them—1955-59—was the inflow of capital greater than the outflow.*

This suggests that in some countries of the Latin American continent foreign investment reaches "maturity" whenever interest and depreciation payments exceed the inflow of new investment or reinvestment (even Venezuela with its oil is no exception). The time comes when the foreign investor reaps the harvest, when the "lender" country "totes up the balance." Latin America is at the end of another twist in the vicious spiral of dependence.

True, recent decades have been marked by a rapid growth of U.S. investments in the Latin American manufacturing industry. By means of so-called mixed companies, the foreign monopolies have been able not only to

*The reference is to United States monopolies, whose investments surpass \$15,000 million and amount to nearly four-fifths of all foreign investments in Latin America.

*Taking into account all forms of external financing, the dynamics of the flow of capital to Latin America presents the following picture: nearly \$2,300 million in 1950-54, \$5,000 million in 1955-59 and \$4,000 million in 1960-64.

extend their control with less expenditure, but also to ensure extended reproduction of their capital at the expense of national private and state capital. It is the promise of lush profits that explains the interest displayed by U.S. financiers in industrializing Latin America, and the time comes when this "affection" begins to create new dangers to the continental economy. Profits are siphoned out of the continent on a growing scale, and the increasing dependence of this type of industrial development on imports of semi-manufactures, raw materials, industrial plant, spare parts, and technicians, tends to worsen the balance of payments. The vicious spiral of dependence is manifest here too.

Brazil is a case in point. The open door policy enables international groups to control broader areas of the burgeoning industrial economy through comparatively modest investments. Inasmuch as inflation enabled these groups to appropriate a substantial part of the national income at a *negative* interest rate and inasmuch as trade policy coincides with the interests of the foreign companies a sweeping de-nationalizing process has set in which will inevitably strangle the economy, regardless of whatever other factors may be at play.

This "strangulation" by foreign investors is the key to the tragedy of Latin America; it is a formula which not only pinpoints the problem, but also indicates the basic reason for its emergence. What remains is to name the strangler and to break his grip. This is something the Latin American peoples alone can do, and only by making the intensity of the fight match the aggression.

BARRIER TO INDUSTRIALIZATION

De-capitalization and the growing import and balance-of-payments difficulties are the chief factors in what might be termed the Latin American *crisis of industrialization*.

National industry began to develop on the continent in the 'thirties under the direct impact of the crisis in the more traditional elements of the economic structure. A further impulse to industrialization was given by the forced restriction of imports and accumulation of foreign exchange (the reserves of which rose fivefold) during the Second World War, and the temporary improvement in trade conditions after the war. Expansion began with branches producing the simpler types of consumer goods (food products, textiles and footwear) and afterwards was extended to production of durables and semi-manufactures, and even to certain kinds of equipment. Home-made goods began to replace imports, though

this did not necessarily reduce the overall volume of the latter. Development of industry necessitated increased imports of semi-manufactured goods, fuel, raw materials and industrial plant. But since the foreign currency income did not grow, imports had to be progressively reduced.

But this process can go only so far and no farther. There are goods which a country cannot produce for natural reasons or which it is uneconomical to produce owing to the limitations of the home market; then there are goods whose production requires greater investment than a country chronically short of foreign exchange can afford.

In these circumstances the obstacles in the way of industrialization are formidable. Accumulation does not find within the country the means of production it needs to acquire material form. The insufficient import possibilities, which at first had acted as a spur to industrial development, become a barrier to it, resulting in a tendency towards stagnation and decline. Industrialization is halted at the barrier between simple installation of plant and the construction of factories to produce more plant. This barrier, the barrier of underdevelopment, hampers growth of heavy industry.

Other factors, too, act as a brake on industrialization in Latin America, chief of these being the anachronistic latifundia structure in agriculture.

Tariff protection and the restricted national markets, plus the fact that technology has to be imported, result in production costs considerably higher than the international average. Hence manufactured goods produced on the continent cannot, as a rule, compete on foreign markets. This reduces still more the chances of at least partially coping with the problem of insufficient imports and putting production plant to more efficient use.

For the reasons enumerated even the biggest and most developed Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, are unable to reach the level at which their national economies could ensure their steady development. What is more, it is in the economically more developed countries that the process mentioned above has gone the farthest.* They were the first to arrive at the "barrier," which it is the objective task of revolution to re-

*In the ten years 1955-64, and the five years 1960-64 as well, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica, which rank 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th and 9th in Latin America for income per capita, had the lowest annual accretion of income, which never passed the two per cent mark. In fact, the accretion in income per capita in Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay and Costa Rica was less than one per cent. The rate of inflation, on the other hand, is highest in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina and Colombia (See *Economist*, September 25, 1965).

move. The stagnation (or decline) in *these* countries shows that the sole way out of the crisis is to abolish the existing socio-economic structure. Some of the countries of the continent are following in the footsteps of the more developed countries. Figuratively speaking, the tide of development (and also of depressions) began at the southern tip of the continent and is moving up towards Central America.* (Mexico, which had a bourgeois revolution more than half a century ago and is advantageously located in the geo-economic sense, is a "special case".)

To sum up, it can be said that Latin America sought to compensate for the decline (export crisis) that occurred in the 'thirties by an internal development designed to replace imports with home production and by encouraging foreign investment. It is obvious by now that both these expedients, worked into the framework of the old semi-feudal and semi-colonial structure, having failed, have but accelerated the crisis of the entire socio-economic system. The present "strangulation from without," essentially a reflection of the exploitation of Latin America by foreign monopoly capital, is the most acute aspect of this crisis.

There is no indication that the existing system will be able to produce a self-correcting mechanism in the foreseeable future. The chances are that the present standstill in the rate of growth of production per capita will prevail.

It follows that a break-up of the multiform system of imperialist exploitation is the prime condition for Latin America's emergence from its present crisis, for the independent and rapid progress of our economy. Another conclusion is that *capitalist* solutions and forms of development (capitalist industrialization, capitalist development in depth in agriculture, etc.) call for *imperialism's active participation in them*. This is one of the key aspects of the vicious circle in which we continually find ourselves. But it is also the tangible socio-economic foundation of the alliance between the Latin American bourgeoisie and U.S. imperialism. As is the case with all alliances of capitalists, this one too has its built-in contradictions and its conflicts. Therefore, one of the most important tasks of the revolutionary movement which, to use Lenin's words, has matured "into mass political action," is to take cognizance of the contradictions and

to use them flexibly to best advantage.

As we see it, those elements of the present economic, social and political situation which unite imperialism and the Latin American bourgeoisie are likely to become stronger than those tending to disunite them. The deep-going economic and political bonds between the bourgeoisie and the classes representing and upholding the traditional economic structure are, in our view, proof that *independent capitalist* development is impossible in Latin America.

One can hardly disagree with the conclusion drawn by Maurice Halperin, a North American economist, in his study *Growth and Crisis in the Latin American Economy*. He writes, in effect, that the factors deforming the Latin American economy and preventing its growth are so closely interwoven that they cannot be acted upon separately. The problems of ownership and utilization of the land, industrialization and external vulnerability are manifestations of a more important problem: the economic and political ramifications of the function controlling the area, i.e., of imperialist exploitation.

"The Latin American economy," Halperin continues, "has reached the stage where the question of its deliverance from neo-colonialist dependence and also the question of renouncing the old approach to development as a matter of drift should be entered on the order of the day. Consequently, the crisis of neo-colonialism is at the same time the crisis of national capitalism, and, hence, the destruction of the first is essential to hasten the abolition of the second (at least in the basic areas of production)."

In other words, the only real alternative to the bourgeois and *imperialist* way out of the structural crisis is the anti-imperialist and *socialist* (as regards both its nature and its perspectives).

II.

We have endeavored to show that the spontaneous development of the Latin American economy within its "normal" framework cannot overcome the present crisis.

True, some people hold that Latin America has passed the nadir of depression and is moving towards a "normalization" of economic development. Following the absolute decline in per capita output in 1963, the last three years have witnessed a moderate improvement. The fact is, however, that, firstly, annual fluctuations to one or another side of the general line of development are possible owing to chance circumstances (the harvest, better prices for exports, loans, etc.); second-

*The economically less developed countries in Central America are still in the initial "light" phase of industrialization, which is, moreover, stimulated by their recent economic integration. At the moment they are doing fairly well, but the economic difficulties likely to be encountered in the years ahead will in all probability be essentially the same as those of their southern neighbors today.

ly, economic indicators for the past three years have been below the minimum considered necessary by the United Nations and the Alliance for Progress; thirdly, per capita growth of production in 1966 was lower than in the two preceding years.* To conclude from the figures for recent years that there is a "trend towards normalization" would be tantamount to equating the *general structural* crisis of the Latin American economy—the vicious circle holding back its development—to a *cyclical* crisis typical of capitalism, whose compensating mechanism can, sooner or later, lead to a revival of business activity.

In this, as in many other matters, we could refer to the views of our opponents. They have expressed them again recently, when summing up the efforts of the reformist element (Bogota declaration, regional FAO conference, steering committee of the conference of Western Hemisphere presidents, etc.). These meetings and their results show quite clearly that the ruling classes in the two Americas have no faith in the mechanics of spontaneous development. They are looking for some *extraordinary means* that would enable them to refashion the socio-economic anatomy of Latin America, lead it out of the cul-de-sac and avert a revolutionary explosion of the basis and superstructure of Latin American society.

What are the basic trends espoused by the various alignments among the ruling classes for solving these problems?

STATUS QUO OR THE PRUSSIAN ROAD

One trend is followed by the bloc of reactionary conservative forces, consisting of the latifundists, the bulk of the bourgeoisie and the military, the U.S. monopoly investors and imperialist institutions like the Pentagon and the CIA. The tenor of their "solutions" is fairly obvious.

On the one hand, the fear engendered among the imperialists and reactionaries by the Cuban revolution impels the United States and its allies towards a policy of forcibly suppressing all popular movements, every real attempt from "below" to change the existing system, irrespective of whether the change is under socialist, nationalist or democratic auspices. This status quo policy, backed by a fairly powerful bloc and based on violence, may yield *temporary* advantages to the oli-

garchy and imperialism, and *retard* the development of the revolutionary process. But in the long run, the "gain" entails much too big a risk for the exploiting classes of the two Americas. The issue hinges not only in the growing politico-moral discrediting and isolation of U.S. imperialism (the natural consequence of every act of "pacification" and, equally, of every reactionary coup). The absence of mass support for the ruling classes, the crumbling of the old colonial foundations of Latin American society in the absence of a new, bourgeois foundation, and the fragile structure of civic society in the countries of the continent—all herald an explosion that is likely to blow up not only the survivals of feudalism, but also the U.S. domination and the capitalist structures so closely associated with it. The era of the "black decades," the stagnant years of reactionary dictatorships typical of Latin America in the past, is unlikely to recur, because it derived from a phase of economic and socio-political development now passed by most Latin American countries, and from a world situation that cannot possibly be duplicated.

The hopes entertained by the Latin American "gorillas" after every coup or electoral swindle are as groundless as the illusion that an explosion can be avoided by screwing down the lid. This is something the latter-day members of the reactionary camp seem to have grasped since Cuba. For this reason, the policy of socio-political conservation is shifting somewhat closer to the "center." No longer aiming at preserving the entire former socio-economic and political structure, it is working for a gradual reconstruction of some of the *pre-capitalist elements* (primarily in agriculture), while enlisting foreign capital in a big way "without qualifications" and pressing for all-out development of capitalist private enterprise. All this is being done through dictatorial, chiefly military, regimes representing the "consolidated interests" of all sections of the ruling class, in "close alliance" with Washington and without impinging on the privileges of the oligarchy.

This policy, the model of which is provided by the reactionaries in Brazil and which seems to accord most closely with the line of the Johnson administration, is what Europeans know as the Prussian Road,* the Stolypin reforms in Russia (after the 1905 revolution) and, to a lesser extent, the Franco way in Spain.

*It should be added that the deficit in Latin America's trade with the United States doubled in the twelve months and amounted to \$260,000,000. In the meantime, the payments made by the Latin American countries against their debts to the International Monetary Fund (\$215,000,000) exceeded the annual credits granted by that Fund to Latin American countries (\$174,000,000 in 1966).

*In Marxist literature the Prussian road of capitalist development and the conversion of feudal farming into capitalist agriculture is described as consolidation of the landowners' power in the state and gradual extension of the political positions of the bourgeoisie. It is described as a "military despotism clad in parliamentary forms."

While it may be feasible economically, its chances of success, in our view, are dim. To succeed, it would require several decades of "moderate progress within the bounds of law and order." Yet the present trends in the Latin American structural crisis indicate that history is unlikely to give the "gorillas" that much time. The burning problems of the continent's economic development are far too urgent, considering the rapid growth of population and the rising needs and demands. Pressure in the social kettle is nearing boiling point. The revolutionary ferment discourages the inflow of private U.S. investment needed for this way of coping with the crisis.

In the final count, it does not offer the desired tempo in the "race against time" which is now a problem of the first order in Latin America. (Recall the statements made by Johnson and Frei at the Punta del Este conference). In other words, in Latin America capitalist and neo-colonialist evolution leads rather to "putrefaction" of the present situation than to its "resolution." The likelihood of averting a revolutionary crisis in the context of this variant of social development is pretty remote.*

THE ROAD OF "REVOLUTION FROM THE TOP"

For this reason, U.S. imperialism or, more precisely, some of its groups are *basically* supporting this particular trend and banking on the Big Stick policy (direct intervention, military coups, an inter-American armed force, counter-revolutionary terror, freezing reforms, etc.), while keeping an alternative variant up their sleeve.

The allusion here is to a relatively rapid refashioning of the present system through consistently capitalist solutions, and to the elimination of the crisis of structures through intensified capitalist development within the framework of either classical or state-monopoly capitalism. Under this variant the traditional oligarchy is either wholly or partly removed from power, the political regime is fashioned along the notorious "representative democracy" lines, and imperialist domination remains, though its mechanics and outward appearance are partially altered (accent on state-monopoly methods, partial redeployment of investments into the manufacturing industry, etc.).

Some groups of the Latin American bourgeoisie, a considerable section of the petty

bourgeoisie, the labor aristocracy and, especially, bourgeois intellectuals advocate one variety or another of this particular solution, which should, by its *results*, correspond to a *bourgeois revolution*.

However, the virtual collapse of the Alliance for Progress in the form it was conceived and proclaimed by Kennedy shows how difficult it is to surmount the obstacles in the way of this kind of solution. To put it mildly, this difficulty springs above all from the substance of the current crisis of structures. The way out to the "highway" of evolutionary capitalist development in Latin America presupposes imperialist "aid," that is, a greater (or at least undiminished) economic and political subjugation of the Latin American countries. Yet, as we have seen, imperialist domination is the biggest obstacle to the continent's economic development and the key element of that very structure whose elimination is so necessary for progress in Latin America.

This basic, though not absolutely insuperable, contradiction in the program of "bourgeois-imperialist reform" breeds dozens of others and involves political and economic factors deriving from the resistance of the local oligarchy and the U.S. monopolies, the traditional masters of the continent, to any measure that might in the least affect their immediate interests, on the one hand, and from the strength of the revolutionary movement on the continent, on the other.

To be effective in Latin America, this program needs a whole complex of conditions. The most important of these are: 1) prevention or suppression of revolution in the countries of the continent, which, as history shows, is a task that will take decades; 2) simultaneous elimination without resort to revolutionary methods of the resistance of the landed oligarchy, the military, the top crust of the bourgeoisie and, to some extent, of private U.S. investors; 3) the possibility to dissociate the anti-oligarchic from the anti-imperialist changes and tendencies in the "renovation" movement; 4) rapid economic development in the presence of U.S. monopoly domination and the general economic dependence of the Latin American countries on imperialism within the capitalist economic system.

The difficulty of achieving any of these conditions makes any combination of them extremely improbable. (What is more, we have not touched on the most painful aspect of the problem: the irreconcilable contradiction between the interests of the oligarchy and imperialism, on the one hand, and the growth of political democracy, on the other). The experience of 1961-63, that is, the failure of the attempted broad program of bourgeois re-

*This is not to say that the given variant is completely ruled out; it may become practicable in the event of a sharp change in the general political climate on the continent or in a country where revolution has been suppressed.

forms and intensive economic development by reformist or counter-revolutionary methods within limits acceptable to the U.S. imperialists, is highly indicative in this context.

The same perils will haunt the project for the region's economic integration nurtured by the Latin American bourgeoisie. The results achieved by the Latin American Free Trade Association, the embryo of a continental common market, are illuminating. One of the participants in the latest foreign ministers' conference of member-countries described its achievements as "less than mediocre." Despite the efforts of the advocates of integration to accelerate the process, the difficulties have greatly extended the terms set for its materialization. There are no objective reasons for believing that integration will resolve the problems of the crisis of structures, although its goals are of a positive complexion* and may be attained over the years.

By and large, it would be safe to say that for the time being at least, a reformist solution of the revolutionary situation is also highly improbable for most of the Latin American countries.

As for the classical road of a radical bourgeois reconstruction, of a victorious bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic revolution, it appears to be impracticable in the Latin American countries ever since the Cuban experience.

The 1954 events in Guatemala, those of 1959-60 in Cuba, 1964 in Brazil and 1965 in Santo Domingo (a list that could well be extended) show that in contemporary Latin America any genuine revolution must be either an anti-imperialist revolution that quickly develops into a socialist one, or suffer defeat as a revolution.

NEW PROJECTS

Clearly, the line between the various tendencies in imperialist and bourgeois policy is fairly relative. Such issues as economic integration combine with the aim of suppressing the revolutionary struggle to form the common denominator of the reactionary conservative and reformist programs for "resolving" the crisis of structures. Rarely, however, is any of these tendencies carried into effect in its pure form. The policy of the ruling classes in most Latin American countries is really a

*Expansion of markets, regional specialization and greater exchange within the region will make for better use of available production capacity, enhance efficiency, reduce production costs, usher in the development of definite branches of industry and gain an export market for some manufactured goods. However, it will not be easy to effect genuinely Latin American economic integration in view of the "foreign stranglehold," of the over-riding influence of the direct or camouflaged branches of foreign monopolies and of latifundism.

compound of elements of different courses with a distinct pre-eminence of the conservative trend.

This applies to the continent as a whole.

Indeed, the politico-economic agreements between the ruling classes of Latin America and the U.S. imperialists, and the projects discussed by the two sides in connection with the recent Pan-American summit conference reveal something of a common plan that may possibly replace — or finalize — the previous formulas.

The main points of this plan appear to be the following:

- a) more U.S. loans, scheduled to reach \$2,500 million annually in the next five years;
- b) certain U.S. import preferences for Latin American goods;
- c) financial backing for some of the schemes to "modernize agriculture";
- d) enlistment of U.S. federal and private capital for regional economic integration as a result of which the formerly projected *Latin American* common market will materialize as a *Pan-American* market;
- e) development through association with U.S. monopolies of both state-operated and private companies;
- f) establishment, on this basis, of some branches of heavy industry, at least in the relatively more developed countries (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Chile);
- g) political coexistence of the bourgeoisie and the traditional oligarchy with imperialist control under regimes run by the military (whatever their "official" front may be);
- h) politico-military consolidation of the OAS;
- i) a policy of "firmness and moderation" vis-a-vis the people; curtailment of civil rights and freedoms, freezing wages, and systematic police repressions.

In the event of this plan being carried out, Latin America's inclusion in the United States orbit will be so complete and unconditional as to usher in a qualitatively new phase of pan-Americanism, with Latin America becoming part of the North American empire. At the same time, this program which was approved at the 1967 Punta del Este Conference, signified the scrapping of the much-touted plan of social reforms proclaimed in the same Punta del Este five years earlier. Yet the present program has been hailed by bourgeois reformist leaders as "acceptable" and as a "splendid compromise."

This "acceptable" deal is modelled chiefly along the lines of the "Prussian road" mentioned above (with certain innovations to make it fit the needs of the Latin American industrial bourgeoisie). Even if we were to

overlook the economic implications, it would be safe to say that its implementation will sharpen to the extreme the basic contradictions of Latin American society.

* * *

Developments on the continent demonstrate that it is impossible to perpetuate the traditional socio-economic system of the Latin American societies, and that it is difficult to remodel it along the traditional capitalist lines (bourgeois counter-revolutionary evolution, classical bourgeois revolutions, cycle of broad bourgeois reforms within the framework of bourgeois democracy, etc.). The unstable ship of bourgeois reform will have to sail—or drift—between the reefs and shallows of economic underdevelopment and imperialist domination, on the one hand, and the powerful vortex of the revolutionary movement, on the other.

This is not to say that it is *absolutely* impossible for the imperialists and the exploiting classes to surmount the present “stage of crisis.” Yet it is more than obvious that any variant of this process will be long, difficult and painful for the people. The rule of the oligarchy and imperialism continues to claim four human lives every minute of the day.

In these circumstances, the further growth of the national liberation and class struggle will force the *revolutionary* alternative to the forefront again and again, and impose an *anti-imperialist and socialist* way out of the crisis of structures. True, this way will have its own difficulties, by no means inconsiderable, but there is no other way to independence and social justice, rapid economic and cultural progress, to the attainment of human dignity. It is a way, too, that calls for broad unity and strenuous struggle by all the anti-imperialist, revolutionary-democratic and socialist forces of the continent.

AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY

Now to sum up. Towards the end of the 1950s, the crisis of the socio-economic and political structure of the Latin American societies became universal and irreversible. The more traditional, as well as the relatively re-

cent, elements of this structure are crumbling.

Theoretically, the process of surmounting the crisis of the old structures and the emergence of new ones may in most Latin American countries follow different ways of social development, each of which has certain social forces behind it. In the final analysis, however, the variants boil down to two mutually exclusive and antagonistic ways out of the crisis. The Latin American societies are nearing the crossroads, the point where they will have to choose the one or the other way.

One of the ways implies long-drawn-out painful reconstruction of society on the basis of *capitalist* solutions involving dependence on imperialism in one way or another. It is the road to a ripe and decaying capitalism with its new contradictions and—within decades—new structural crises and new possibilities for a revolutionary solution.

The only other realistic alternative is the road of *anti-imperialist, democratic and anti-capitalist* reconstruction, the road of people's revolution, the socialist road. The realism and the advantages of this way have been proved by the history of the past half-century that lies between the world's first socialist revolution and the first socialist revolution in Latin America.

Although the answer to which of these two perspective is *preferable* to the peoples of Latin America for the continent's swifter progress evokes no doubt whatsoever, the outcome of the struggle is by no means a foregone conclusion. “The objective forces on which the solution of the problems depends,” wrote Lenin, “are still extant.”

What is beyond any doubt is the inevitable and early demise of the old structures. What will replace them *will be settled by struggle alone*, a struggle that, objectively, has already begun.

Today, revolution in the Latin American countries is *possible, natural*, but not *inevitable*. This applies doubly to a *successful* revolution. The outcome depends above all on the united action of the revolutionary classes, on how correct they are and how massive, and on how well the Latin American revolutionaries employ Lenin's methods and principles in their struggle.

The Communist Party of Finland amends its program

THE PRESENT PROGRAM of the Communist Party of Finland was adopted in 1957, at a critical time for the international Communist movement. The denunciation of the personality cult led to a criticism of the past and to a reappraisal of many issues. The CPF Program did not reflect the new concepts which were emerging at that time, concepts enriching scientific Marxist socialism.

On the other hand, it should be pointed out that our Program clearly charts Finland's road to socialism. Moreover, it poses the immediate tasks, many of which have not been solved so far. The Program needs amending not because it contains serious ideological or other errors or inaccuracies, but mainly because more has to be said in it and with greater clarity about the conditions in our country, the changes that have taken place and the general trend.

When the Second World War ended, Finland was still an agrarian country, but shortly afterwards the situation began to change rapidly. At present the overwhelming majority of her people are wage and salary earners. Out of a population of 4,600,000 about 1,500,000 work for wages. The share of the rural population, including agricultural laborers, smallholders who work for wages part of the year, etc., comprises roughly 23-25 per cent.

Finland is a modern industrial country with many enterprises that are big even judging by present international standards. Industry is steadily expanding. This causes migration of the rural population to towns and industrial centers. Today the bulk of the population reside in towns or urban-type settlements. Changes are taking place in the structure of the working class: the number engaged in the services grows at a relatively more rapid pace than the number of industrial and other workers.

The advance of technology and of the economy generally has brought about essential changes in the way of life. People enjoy more leisure. Much of what used to be considered luxury goods has now become consumer staples. The standard of living has risen and social security has appreciably improved. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that with regard to many issues we are still at the level

of the 19th century. For instance, chronic and seasonal unemployment persists. In the winter of 1966-67 the number of jobless that is common for the winter period considerably increased, exceeding 50,000 in February 1967. In the north of the country unemployment assumed virtually catastrophic dimensions.

There is a deep gulf between unemployment and the relatively developed social security system, a glaring manifestation of the contradiction between the capitalist property relations and the social character of labor. Now the Finns are entitled to substantial aid at times of need. But when they are threatened with redundancy or lose their jobs, they become practically defenseless.

The concentration of capital taking place on the scale of the entire capitalist world is typical for Finland, too. We have every reason to say that twenty capitalist families dominate the economic life of the country.

The Fourteenth Congress of the Party held at the beginning of last year adopted a program of action for the immediate future, under the title "The CPF Is a Modern Marxist Mass Workers' Party." The program stresses that to ensure social progress in Finland there is need for a vigorous political force capable of advancing a progressive solution of both the tasks of the day and those of the more distant future.

The program emphasizes that in ideological work still greater cognizance should be taken of the changes which have occurred in the past few decades, the rapid advance in science and technology and the further mechanization and automation connected therewith—all of which are factors that have brought about changes in the structure of the population and the way of life. The role of the working class has grown and has gained wider recognition. The Communist Party should appraise these changes boldly and without prejudice, and build its ideological work in keeping with the new demands.

One of the key tasks of the Party is to amend its Program and Rules on the basis of the social changes that have occurred and to adapt its ideological and education work correspondingly. Fulfilment of this task calls for deeper

theoretical work, for examining and clarifying various social phenomena. Proceeding from this, the Central Committee has appointed a commission to draft the new Program. The first draft is expected in the first half of this year.

In the light of the changes which have taken place in the structure of the population, in the mode of life of the people, in the economy and in technology, we in our Program must approach the people in a different way than we did in the past. At present the overwhelming majority of the population consists of wage and salary earners. Hence today the question of allies is primarily the question of joint action by these sections. The question of alliance with the peasantry, naturally, continues to be on the agenda, but it is no longer as urgent as before.

All this is inseparably linked with the question of joint action by the two main trends in the working-class movement—the Social Democratic and the Communist. Finland is a country in which positive solutions of basic issues and progressive development are possible only when the Social Democrats and the Communists take a common stand on these issues. It should be pointed out that in the last general election the two Social Democratic parties polled approximately 710,000 votes, and the People's Democrats (including the Communists) received over 500,000 votes.

The majority which deputies representing the working people command in Parliament and the activity of the government based on this majority have demonstrated the possibilities the working-class parties have of influencing the affairs of the country. The Communist Party has stated on more than one occasion that it has no intention of assuming the attitude of a leading party that keeps all other parties out in the cold. The new Program should clearly point to the need for cooperation by the progressive Left and to the perspectives of this cooperation.

In 1965 the Central Committee of the Party issued a statement concerning the Marxist teaching on the state and Finland's road to socialism, which emphasizes the democratic traditions of our state system. To these traditions belong, in particular, the multi-party system, the Parliament functioning on the basis of this system and communal self-government. For these institutions to be genuinely democratic, there must be freedom of speech, assembly and organization, the right of striking and demonstrating, free elections, as well as a law providing for equal rights for those vested with power and those in opposition. Respecting the traditions of the working class of Finland, the Communist Party expresses its support for these rights and freedoms both now and during the transition to socialism and under socialism. This should also be made clear in the new Program.

Their attitude to the Communists having changed, other political groups regard the program and aims of the Communist Party

more seriously than in the past. Of late, general interest in socialist solutions of our problems has increased, and anti-communism is obviously losing ground. People want to know what are the views of the Communists and what are their aims. The question of cooperation with the Social Democrats is inseparably linked with this sentiment. True, old prejudices are still strong among the Social Democrats, and the bogey of communist dictatorship is invoked to influence other sections of the working people.

Our present Program stresses that the Communist Party wants socialist changes to be effected at all stages by peaceful and democratic means, in keeping with the will of the majority of the people. It sees the earnest of the victory of socialism in the establishment of genuine rule by the working people, in the conquest of power by the working class and all sections of the working people allied with it. The new Program should explain, more thoroughly and profoundly than the present one, what we mean by the power of the working people.

Finland is one of the countries in which there are real prospects of peaceful transition to socialism. The new Program should state with utmost clarity what are the prerequisites of the peaceful road and what methods we are going to use to ensure this road. Already in 1965 the above-mentioned statement of the Central Committee concerning the Marxist teaching on the state and Finland's road to socialism pointed out that there is every reason to speak about the possibility of establishing the power of the working people in our country, and hence it is legitimate to use this term in our Party Program. It is fully justified and withstands theoretical analysis if we speak about state power as a whole, including all its aspects—the power which is headed by the working class and its organizations.

In the new Program the words "dictatorship of the proletariat" will, evidently, be replaced by the words "power of the working people." In all probability, it is also possible to speak about power of the majority of the people. At present, as we have said, the majority of the people of Finland are wage and salary earners. Moreover, there are other categories of working people who earn their living by their labor. When we say that we want to put an end to the rule of the capitalists, we have in mind that power should really pass into the hands of the people, of the organs elected by them.

In this connection it should be said that neither in Finland nor in any other country can the Communist Party renounce the Marxist teaching on the state, while remaining a Communist party. In Finland as in other capitalist countries with the same level of industrial development the task is to further develop the Marxist teaching on the state, including the question of applying this teaching in the present-day conditions.

The advent of the working class to power in Finland cannot take place in the same way

as in Russia in 1917. Nor can it be effected by the same methods which were used after the Second World War in other countries of victorious socialism. The road to socialism followed by Cuba or by some developing countries cannot be used either in such a capitalist country as Finland.

Hence, the drafting of the Party Program and, all the more so, its realization will enrich Marxist theory. We should carefully study and analyze society in our country. In the past decades we have learned much from the experience of other countries and their Communist parties. It may well be that our experience has been useful for the Communists of other countries, too. Nevertheless, we cannot hope that we shall receive from without a ready-made scheme for applying Marxism-Leninism, which would make it possible to determine the Finnish road to socialism. This we must do ourselves.

Drafting a new Program is a creative endeavor. The discussion of the draft in the Party branches will also produce much that is new.

All Communist parties want to know whether a new, modern Program of the Communist Party for the 'sixties and 'seventies will appear in Finland. No one can predict what the future will bring with it and how socialism will be achieved in Finland. Nevertheless, the Party Program should lay a clear-cut, consistent line of action leading to a socialist Finland.

Today our task is to win over the majority of the people and build a more closely-knit bloc of the Left which will unite the political parties representing them, enjoy the support of other progressive forces and sections of the working people allied with these parties, and subsequently effect far-reaching changes in our society. The building of such an alliance will open and show the way to socialism. The Party Program must be rewritten, developed and extended from this point of view. The Program of such a Communist party as that of Finland must convincingly and consistently explain to the people the role of the Party and of Marxist socialism.

Erkki SALOMAA

The party and socialist democracy

"The more profound the changes we wish to bring about, the more must we awaken an interest and an intelligent attitude towards them, and convince more millions and tens of millions that the changes are necessary."

V. I. Lenin

THE DEEP-GOING changes taking place in our society were the focal point of the discussion that preceded the Seventh Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

The discussion was in a very real sense an examination of the progress made in fulfilling the socialist construction program adopted at the previous congress.

Those taking part in the debate spoke with pride of our achievements and looked back over the path traversed with a view to benefiting as much as possible from the experience. Criticism was levelled at the things holding back our more rapid advancement—passivity, red tape and laxity, and the insufficiently considerate attitude of some officials to the suggestions and criticisms made by the people.

We are now completing the building of socialism in our Republic. Many of the useful ideas and thoughts expressed during the discussion

were incorporated into the development plans.

Throughout the discussion matters related to the all-out building of socialism and the consolidation of the GDR were associated with the fight against the aggressive policy of the Kiesinger-Strauss government—against Bonn's claim to exclusive representation, its bid to gain access to nuclear weapons and its refusal to recognize the existing frontiers. There were indignant protests, too, against the U.S. war in Vietnam; our people reaffirmed their solidarity with the people of Vietnam; they stressed, too, that close friendship between our Republic and the Soviet Union was indispensable.

More than 600,000 members took part in the pre-Congress discussion. Many of the speakers were younger comrades. Harry Sterz, of the railway repair depot in Halberstadt and Comrade Krenz, a postal worker in the same town, strongly denounced the U.S. war in Vietnam

and spoke of the solidarity movement among their fellow-workers.

"Peace-loving people everywhere," said Sterz, "spurning the Johnson policy are extending tangible help to the Vietnam freedom fighters."

Comrade Sterz added that the workers in the railway repair plant had collected 14,000 marks for the Vietnam solidarity fund.

Referring to the West German support of the U.S. aggression, Sterz said that those who thrived on the annihilation of hundreds of thousands during Hitler's war are now supplying the poison gas and other chemicals used against the people of Vietnam. In return they hope that they will be given access to nuclear weapons.

"That our cooperative is stronger," said poultry-breeder Kaden, one of the many women who took part in the discussion, "means that our republic is stronger too; and the latter fact contributes to European peace and security."

Referring to defects in the cooperative, Comrade Kaden said it was necessary to improve collective management.

The accent in the discussion was on how to improve the political and ideological work of the Party, how to cement the bonds between Party members and the people as a basic condition for social progress.

The discussion demonstrated beyond any doubt that Party members and the people were working hand in hand, showing commendable initiative and striving to resolve all the workaday problems.

We could mention the initiative of the citizens of Torgau as an example of how democracy has developed in the GDR. It has stimulated the working people, who are volunteering work to advance our economy and culture.

The Presidium of the National Council (of the National Front) held a special meeting in Torgau on January 20, at which it urged all citizens to join in the popular movement.

The population was called on to tap potentials available over and above the plan in building, expanding or improving schools, kindergartens, nurseries and people's housing, to help improve towns and villages, and to take part in amelioration works and road-building.

The National Council appeal was warmly received. It is estimated from incoming district reports that about 1,000 million marks worth of volunteer work will be done in 1967 in support of the Torgau initiative.

Workers, peasants, artisans, intellectuals, schoolchildren and housewives have joined in the countrywide movement. Reports from all parts of the Republic indicate that work done by the day the Congress opened was worth 250,000 marks.

The preparations for the Congress revealed that the local Party leaders—those of primary, district and regional organizations—are eager to obtain a better groundwork and a deeper analysis of the conditions in which the Party organizations are doing their work.

Take the Party Committee of Stendal. As

part of its preparations for the District Party conference, it made a special study of the level of political awareness among various sections of the local population. This was the first attempt of its kind and naturally laid no claim to being either exhaustive or conclusive. It posed a number of important issues, which show that a regular study of the condition and sentiment of the various sections of the population is beneficial and should be made a regular function of the district organizations of the Party. We believe that it could be very helpful in planning future measures and pinpointing the hindrances to the growth of political consciousness and to our advance.

The experience of the Stendal Party Committee in preparing for the District conference shows how inner-Party democracy leads to a broader socialist democracy.

The Stendal Party Committee began its preparations for the conference well in advance, taking as its motto the Party slogan, "Socialism is for everybody, and needs everybody." It drafted a policy document six weeks previously and sent copies of it to all the local organizations and to District Committee members and functionaries.

In December, the draft was discussed at meetings of the local branches. Five thousand handbills were printed, elucidating the basic provisions of the draft on ideological work, cultural development, use of leisure time and work with the young people.

The press, too, took a hand in popularizing the main points, and special conferences were held for professional people.

The shortage of recreation and sports facilities in our district made us lay special stress on this matter. Citizens welcomed this Party initiative. The discussion prompted us to include in the conference decisions that all efforts should be concentrated on three particular projects. The decision specified the time needed to build the installations for the projected recreation, sports and cultural centers.

All in all, we had more than a hundred concrete proposals and suggestions, more than 300 statements on a wide range of subjects, and a large number of pledges and undertakings.

People who submitted proposals and criticisms were subsequently informed of what action had been taken on their ideas.

After studying all the points, the District Committee appointed a commission to re-draft the document for the conference. This draft was more concise and specific.

Copies of the new draft were sent to the local boards of the democratic bloc parties, asking for their views on it. At one of the consultations we had with them we were advised, among other things, to formulate the scheme for adult re-training in more specific terms. This proposal was tendered by the chairman of the local branch of the Liberal Democratic Party, who is also the director of the local high school. In following up his sug-

gestion we found that the original draft indeed presented the matter in rather general terms. Many more valuable suggestions of this kind could be listed.

The experience we have outlined above is only one aspect of the effects of the extension and deepening of socialist democracy. It is, however, of a fundamental nature. Encouragement of popular initiative by the Party organizations, and the willingness expressed by the people to work for decisions reveals the advantages of socialist democracy. The new approach also enhances the prestige and guiding role of the Party and accelerates the growth of socialist consciousness among the people.

We are, naturally, aware that broad discussion of a draft document and of all the related issues is but one aspect of the task of attracting people to our Party and fostering close contact.

The active participation of hundreds of thousands of people in the pre-Congress discussion and the new popular initiative are evidence of qualitatively new factors in the life of our people, an earnest of success in implementing the decisions of the Congress, of a fuller development of the socialist system and strengthening of the Democratic Republic as the socialist Fatherland of the German nation.

Rolf DOERING

Sudanese Communists prepare for congress

PREPARATIONS ARE UNDER way for the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Sudan.

The previous Third Congress was held in February 1956, a month after the declaration of independence and a few days before the historic Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. During these eleven years many important events have taken place on the internal and international arenas.

A major split in the National Unionist Party (NUP) led to the formation of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The pro-imperialist Umma Party, capitalizing on the split, allied itself with the PDP and formed a reactionary government. In order to forestall an alliance between the NUP and the PDP and the emergence of a patriotic government, the reactionaries staged a coup d'état in November 1958. A military dictatorship was established, which was overthrown only six years later by the popular revolution of October 1964. Reaction, with the direct and active aid of the imperialists, conspired to check this democratic revolution and succeeded in regaining power and in establishing a counter-revolutionary regime.

The years since independence have shown the impotence of the capitalist path of development. The bulk of the working people, influenced by the success of the socialist countries and by the achievements of the progressive Arab and African regimes, realize more and more that the stagnation and, in some cases, even the regress of the Sudan is due to the path followed by successive governments of

the propertied classes. It is not surprising, therefore, to witness in our country the emergence of steadily growing forces favoring the non-capitalist way of development, socialism. The growth of these forces stands out as the most important development since our last Congress and, especially, after October 1964. Therein lies the content of the sharp struggle in the Sudan. At bedrock of the changes taking place in the alignment of the political forces, at bedrock of the changing alliances, government crises and strikes lies the mistrust of ever-widening sections of our people in the "traditional" parties, in the capitalist path of development, and their growing conviction that only through socialism can progress be achieved.

At the heart of this trend is the Sudan Communist Party. Our Party has always championed the cause of the working people courageously and consistently. During the military dictatorship, when all the other parties failed to stand the test, the Communists fought heroically and suffered much more than all the other parties taken together. They played the leading role in the popular revolution that toppled the Abboud regime. The Communist Party gained the respect of the advanced sections of the people, and after the revolution tens of thousands of new members joined its ranks. From a small party which attracted less than 5,000 voters in the 1958 general election, it grew into a party which polled more than 73,000 votes in the 1965 election. Taking into consideration the existence of an alliance

of all the other parties against us, their slanderous campaign for which vast sums are spent by the imperialists and the reactionaries in the Arab world, this is a signal achievement and an indication of the Party's growing influence.

That is why the reactionaries are hatching plot after plot to secure a ban on our Party and to expel our deputies from the Constituent Assembly. That is why even after the Supreme Court ruled that the ban on the Party was unconstitutional, the reactionary government, in violation of all legal norms and the Constitution, is obstructing the legal functioning of the Party.

The Fourth Congress is called upon, drawing on the rich experience gained in the past eleven years, to chart a new line for the Party and to approve a new Program.

Our Party, the heart and soul of the revolutionary movement, heads the struggle against Sudanese reaction, against the encroachments of neo-colonialism, against the interference of the reactionaries in the Arab world who, headed by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, want to involve our country in the so-called Islamic Pact. Of late the "enlightened" Rightists, led by the young Prime Minister Sadiq El Mahdi, have been trying to enact some "reforms" — social, economic and administrative. Indeed, as our Central Committee has recently pointed out, it is not difficult to "reform" the present system and even less difficult to produce some positive results. This may confuse some sections of the people. Our Party will redouble its efforts to expose these "reforms" as an attempt to impose the capitalist path of development on the country, and as a means to check the struggle of the working people for radical social and political changes.

Our Party also has to continue the fight against the encroachments on democratic rights. In this respect the struggle for the full restoration to the CPS of its legal status, including the return of its deputies to their lawful seats in the Constituent Assembly, occupies a prominent place.

This struggle necessitates the unity of all the revolutionary forces in our country. In the past the Party was the foremost champion of this unity. The task today is to consolidate those forms of unity which already exist and to search for new forms that will embrace the revolutionary movement in all its aspects and at different levels. Relying on a solid and firm

internal unity, the revolutionary movement in the Sudan can play a truly positive role in achieving unity of the revolutionary forces in Africa and in the Arab world.

To be able to discharge its duties as the vanguard force in organizing and leading the revolutionary masses, our Party must become a genuinely mass Marxist-Leninist party. This is more easily said than done in the conditions of our country and of Africa in general. The Fourth Congress will have to analyze the experience of our efforts in this field since the Third Congress.

In the course of the discussions held in our Party, especially during the past two years, these problems were posed on more than one occasion and efforts were made to uncover the deficiencies and shortcomings in our work that hinder the transformation of our Party into a mass party. Thus, we endeavored in the course of these discussions to find the reasons why, after the influx into the Party of large numbers of people following the 1964 revolution, we failed to keep them as active members. Much was done to tear down the "wall" that had arisen between many advanced revolutionaries and the Party. This applies primarily to certain methods of work which took root during the early years of the Party's existence and during its long underground life. Much progress has been made in this field, but much still remains to be done. This will be one of the biggest tasks before the Congress.

Of special importance also will be the question of adopting a new Program. The present program was approved by the Third Congress. Though basically correct, it contains certain drawbacks and is out of date in some respects. The draft Program attempts to provide concrete solutions to the problems facing the country, solutions based on a deep understanding of these problems. What is envisaged is not merely the program of an opposition party, but one that would voice the interests of the working people and would indicate a realistic approach to the solution of their problems, and thereby mobilize them in the fight against reaction and its deceptive policies. What is envisaged, therefore, is a program of a party that presents itself to the people as the alternative to the "traditional" parties and which is earnestly preparing to shoulder the responsibility of government.

Tigani BABIKER

Party news in brief

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. February 8-9, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia discussed politico-educational work to consolidate the unity of socialist society, and work among the youth. The meeting adopted a resolution on celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution.

Another meeting of the Central Committee held over March 23-24, examined measures to improve managerial methods in agriculture and food supply. Also discussed were the status and functions of the national committees (local self-government bodies) and the drafting of an electoral law.

HUNGARY. The Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party met on February 15 to discuss international issues and the internal political tasks of the Party. It considered in particular the stand to be taken by Communists who will attend the congress of agricultural producer cooperatives. The meeting adopted a resolution on celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution.

On April 12 the Central Committee held a meeting to discuss international problems and also the question of elections to Parliament and to the local councils. The meeting adopted resolutions on organizational and personnel matters.

BULGARIA. On March 16-17 the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Council of Ministers held a joint meeting to discuss acceleration of technological progress in the country.

A meeting of the Central Committee of the Party on March 23 discussed some of the basic problems of the country's development and heard a number of reports.

RUMANIA. The Central Committee of the Communist Party met on March 27-28 to discuss measures for improving the organization and financial management of state farms. It also examined matters relating to the economic, scientific and technological cooperation of Rumania with other countries, and some aspects of the work of the Party and the government on the international arena. The meeting adopted a resolution on the celebrations in Rumania of the fiftieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. The Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party at a meeting on April 15 endorsed the Report of the Central Committee to the Seventh Con-

gress of the Party. The meeting examined international matters relating to the activity of the Party and the Government.

ITALY. A joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the Communist Party was held February 21-24. The agenda: the situation in the country and the policy of the Party; the fight for peace and freedom in Vietnam and the tasks of the Party in the struggle for the unity of the international Communist movement.

AUSTRIA. The Central Committee of the Communist Party met on February 13 to discuss internal policy and the tasks of the Austrian Communists.

Another meeting of the C.C. on March 30-31 examined the economic policy of the government.

FINLAND. March 4-5 the Central Committee of the Communist Party discussed the ideological work of the Party and the political situation in the country.

FRANCE. The Central Committee of the Communist Party met on March 29-30 to examine the lessons of the parliamentary election and the tasks of the Party.

SWITZERLAND. The Central Committee of the Party of Labor met on April 1-2 to examine the political situation in the country and problems relating to the fight for peace, European security and national independence. The meeting adopted a resolution on the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution.

GREECE. The recent 10th meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party discussed the political situation in the country and the activity of the Party. The meeting adopted a resolution on the unity and solidarity of the world Communist movement and a special resolution urging Party and people to observe, jointly with all progressive mankind, the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution.

JAPAN. A meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 16-18 discussed the election campaign of the Party.

SYRIA. An enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in February discussed the political situation in the country and in the world Communist movement. The meeting supported the opinion of many fraternal parties on the need for convening an international conference of Communist and Workers' parties. It urged all Communists, all

progressives and patriots in Syria to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution.

INDIA. At a meeting March 6-8 the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party discussed the results of the recent general election and decided to summon a session of the Party's National Council.

MEXICO. A meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 11-12 decided to convene the Fifteenth Congress of the Party on June 16-20, 1967.

COLOMBIA. February 23-25 the Central Committee of the Communist Party discussed the Party's attitude to various aspects of government policy and problems relating to the unity of the international Communist movement. Several documents were adopted. The document on

the unity of the international Communist movement points out that the Communist Party of Colombia supports the proposal of many fraternal parties to convene an international meeting of the Communist and Workers' parties at the earliest possible time.

USA. A meeting of the National Executive Committee of the Communist Party held in the first half of March discussed the trade union movement, work among the youth, and Party building. The international situation and home policy were also examined.

AUSTRALIA. The Central Committee of the Communist Party met on February 10-12 and discussed the internal and international situation, as well as the work of the Party among the youth. It was decided to hold the Twenty-First Congress of the Party in June 1967.

SOCIAL RESEARCH

Lenin's teaching on imperialism

(International conference of Marxist scholars)

In his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* Lenin examined the new phase in the development of capitalism, analyzing concrete reality without fear that the facts might not fit into the old frameworks. Lenin's ideas on imperialism continue to this day to inspire Marxists to further creative analysis of the highest stage of capitalism in all its modifications.

In the fifty years since the publication of Lenin's work the capitalist world system has undergone profound changes, due both to the development of the internal laws and contradictions of capitalism itself and to the growing impact of the new laws of world development. While retaining its reactionary nature, deriving from monopoly domination, imperialism has had to adapt itself to the changing internal and external conditions, to find other ways of coping with the development of the productive forces in order to hold out in the historical competition with socialism.

The numerical growth of the working class, and its organization, the consolidation of its political and social positions, have compelled the imperialist bourgeoisie to make quite considerable concessions and to resort, to a much greater extent than before, to the strategy of social maneuvering.

The evolution of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism has gone a long way.

The unprecedented revolution in science and

technology, demonstrating ever more clearly the social character of modern production, has impelled the ruling classes in the developed capitalist countries to use methods of economic organization of society, which, in the final analysis, are tantamount to a negation of the very principles on which it was built.

The task of Marxist thinking is to throw light on the modern trends in world development. This is an exceedingly complex task. The historical process has gained momentum. The scale on which the masses take part nowadays in the making of history has grown greatly. Over fifty new countries have appeared on the political map of the world. The class and social structure in the developed capitalist countries has grown in complexity. The main classes have become more experienced politically. The methods used by the capitalists in their struggle against the working class have become more refined and varied. At the same time the revolutionary movement is much more powerful, and world socialism is going from success to success.

The new phenomena in modern imperialism were the subject of a scientific conference held in Moscow in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Lenin's *Imperialism*; the conference was attended by Marxist scholars from 34 countries, who exchanged views on problems relating to the study of modern capitalism and the world revolutionary

process. The discussion was based on the theses prepared by the sponsor of the conference—the Institute of World Economy and International Relations under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences. N. Inozemtsev, Director of the Institute, in an opening speech, dwelt on the correlation of the internal and external factors in analyzing the processes under way in modern capitalism.

THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM OF CAPITALISM

In his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin analyzed the modification of the economic mechanism of capitalism arising from the latter's transformation into monopoly capitalism. The conference devoted particular attention to the mechanism of modern capitalism. Dr. Ludek Urban (Czechoslovakia) stressed that Lenin in his day defined the laws governing the development of monopoly capitalism and foresaw the possibility of its growing over into state-monopoly capitalism with an essentially different mechanism. At the same time the definition of state regulation, which first appeared during the First World War and which was conditioned not by purely economic needs, cannot be directly applied to the state-monopoly capitalism of today.

It was not during the war years that the break-down of the old mechanism of capitalism commenced; the turning point was the devastating crisis of the thirties and the subsequent period. It was then that life demonstrated that the spontaneous functioning of the old mechanism was threatening capitalism with stagnation, fraught with the danger of deep-going cyclical fluctuations and unemployment. By the early thirties the new monopoly structure of the economy had matured, while economic policy remained the same, corresponding to the pre-monopoly stage. It was at this point that state regulation—no longer of a war type but conditioned by factors of an economic order—set in. Objectively, the aim was to expand demand to a level capable of ensuring high and stable employment to mitigate the cyclical fluctuations. An important role here is played by state intervention in the sphere of capital accumulation. Under state-monopoly capitalism a major part of the solutions in this sphere is made not individually but in a centralized way. At bedrock of these solutions lie not only the interests of monopoly capitalism but also the most general interests of the bourgeoisie, and, in some cases, the demands of the working people also are taken into account.

Urban noted that in the theses and in the papers (in particular, the paper by V. Shamberg, USSR) special attention is devoted to the significance of the scientific and technological revolution. In this connection, Urban posed the question: how is it that capitalism has succeeded in adapting itself to the requirements of this revolution? How is it that it has been able to make such rapid scientific and technological

progress? Urban expressed disagreement with I. Sokolov (USSR) who, in his opinion, linked this ability of capitalism solely with the competition between the two systems. Without denying the impact of this factor, Urban inclined to the view that the new processes in modern capitalism stem primarily from the requirements and contradictions of the economic development itself, and are associated with the changes in the economic mechanism, changes that pass through two successive stages—from attempts to regulate short-term processes to efforts to secure favorable conditions for prolonged growth.

Another Czechoslovak economist, Assistant Professor G. Janis, discussed the meaning of the concepts "monopoly" and "monopoly capitalism," suggesting that the use of these terms in too general a form does not make it possible fully to grasp what is actually meant by monopolies and monopoly capitalism. Janis was of the opinion that Marxist science should pay more attention to concrete analysis of the monopolies—the big joint-stock companies and corporations. The task, it was pointed out, is to "get to know the enemy." What is needed is an examination of the conflict of interests within the big corporations—the contradictions between stockholders and managers, between the management and the trade unions. Since decisions are taken as a result of conflicting interests, it is essential to analyze concretely the aim of the different groups so as to arrive at a more realistic judgment both of the monopolies and of monopoly capitalism as a whole and of its mechanism.

The question arises: what determines ownership? Janis maintains that this can be revealed concretely by answering the question: who controls production, who makes the basic decisions, what are the criteria used in their making, and who decides how the results of production shall be distributed? But if control is one of the indications of ownership and if decision-making is one of its features, then the development of capitalism is simultaneously the development of the concept of ownership. Hence Janis concludes that with the development of the production relations of capitalism the very concept of private ownership also develops, being affected by the state regulation. In his opinion, the long-term trend asserting itself through class struggle is the transformation of private ownership into public ownership.

Y. Pevzner, D.Sc., (USSR), pointed out that in the imperialist phase the capitalist economy has lost its ability for self-regulation. The intrinsic content of state-monopoly capitalism lies in the active influence exerted by the capitalist state on the process of reproduction, in state regulation. However, as regards the limits in which the state regulation can take place, Janis and Urban, in the opinion of Pevzner, fail to take fully into account its deep-going internal contradictions. The growth of state-monopoly capitalism does not proceed along a straight line; it is a very uneven, zigzag process. The

objective necessity of economic control and regulation meets with the greatest resistance within the ruling class.

Antonio Pesenti, Member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, pointed out that the monopolies have ceased to be the mere superstructure of capitalism; they represent, he went on, the structure of a modern capitalism which can no longer function without the direct and indirect intervention by the state in the economy. By indirect intervention Pesenti understands measures taken by the state with a view to redistributing surplus value (regulated distribution of income and consumption), and by direct intervention he means direct participation by the state in the production of surplus value. Present-day conditions have opened a new sphere for the advance of the working-class struggle, i.e., programming. Italian Communists are working for democratic programs for the economy in contrast to the line laid down by the ruling class. While the bourgeoisie seeks to apply forms of state-monopoly regulation and programming which do not affect the capitalist nature of the regime, the task of the working class should be to impose measures and structural reforms that would impart new qualitative features to the society. This is one of the imperatives of our time.

IMPERIALISM AND STATE-MONOPOLY CAPITALISM

Lenin in his time stressed the growing role of the capitalist state in the economy, the new forms and the scale of this intervention, and pointed to the role of the state market. Drawing on Lenin's views, Marxist economists strive to analyze and assess phenomena inherent in modern state-monopoly capitalism. The latter, Professor A. Mileikovsky (USSR) said, is not only a product of the growth of the productive forces but also the result of the need for monopoly capitalism to adapt itself to the changes in the world, which compel the bourgeoisie to evolve—on a capitalist basis—a peculiar type of alternative to socialism in the shape of a broad system of reforms. One cannot say in our day that the state expresses the will of the monopoly bourgeoisie alone. More and more frequently it is obliged to act as the middleman in the class struggle. And yet, we know that the model of the future society, developing under the impact of the scientific and technological progress, can only be built on the basis of socialist revolution.

Pierre Joye, Member of the Central Committee of the Belgian Communist Party, took up the issue of whether state-monopoly capitalism is a simple development of monopoly capitalism or whether it is a new qualitative stage of capitalism. Marxists, he thought, tended to be somewhat timid in their approach to this question, although the answer is highly important for Marxist-Leninist theory and for the practice of the working-class movement. Without this,

Joye stressed, it would be difficult to understand, in particular, why the basic features of imperialism described by Lenin (with the exception of the first) have changed so much. If this question is left unanswered, it will be unclear why state-monopoly capitalism is, as Lenin put it, the ante-room of socialism.

In Lenin's time, Joye maintained, only the rudiments of state intervention had appeared. And yet Lenin was able to pinpoint the main features of state-monopoly capitalism, despite its then primitive forms. Joye expressed himself in agreement with Urban that the real turn to state-monopoly capitalism occurred in the thirties, that today it has become dominant, and without it capitalism would not even be in a position to approach the solution of the problems arising from the competition of the two systems, the scientific and technological revolution, etc. Laissez-faire capitalism and monopoly capitalism had at least one common basis—private management of the enterprise and private ownership of the means of production. State-monopoly capitalism has introduced certain modifications in this set-up and hence it should be regarded as a new phase in the development of capitalist production.

Professor E. Khmelnitskaya (USSR) observed that Lenin chose as the point of departure in his analysis of imperialism the transition from free competition to monopoly. Today the monopolies have not only made breaches into a number of new spheres, but they also increasingly draw into their orbit the survivals of pre-monopoly production existing side by side with them and have established control in various forms over its most extensive sphere—agriculture. The organizational forms of the monopolies have become more complex, they are fused in finance capital; the highest form of monopoly—state-monopoly capital—is also developing. Hence Lenin's basic thesis remains valid, although it would be true to say that much that is new, necessitating careful economic analysis, has taken place in modern capitalism.

Citing Lenin's concept that there is no such thing as pure capitalism, Khmelnitskaya argued that state-monopoly capitalism remains a superstructure of monopoly capitalism in the same way that monopoly capitalism acts as a superstructure of pre-monopoly capitalism. Needless to say, the new form of interpenetration of monopoly and competition and the new stage of monopoly have seriously affected the mechanism of the capitalist economy as a whole. Yet the monopolies remain disconnected cells of private ownership. Khmelnitskaya doubted the contention that state-monopoly capitalism signifies abolition of private ownership. After all, its purpose is to buttress this ownership.

Disagreeing with Joye as regards periodization of the development of state-monopoly capitalism, S. Menshikov, D.Sc., (USSR), recalled that Lenin had characterized monopoly capitalism as imperialism. In view of this, he went on, it will not be out of place to ask whether state-monopoly capitalism differs from imperial-

ism. In his opinion both phases could be included in the concept "imperialism." This being so, it would be more correct to say that state-monopoly capitalism is a more mature phase of imperialism.

Janis found no contradiction between the viewpoints of Khmelnitskaya and Joye in the matter of state-monopoly capitalism. The fact that state-monopoly capitalism as a long-term tendency is a negation of the principle of private ownership does not exclude a situation when it tries to preserve precisely this principle by perfecting the system on which private ownership is based.

Meltti Peltonen (Finland) expressed the view that the main features of imperialism as formulated by Lenin remain valid, and that state-monopoly capitalism by virtue of objective inevitability derives from the laws of the development of capitalism. This is not a time-limited phenomenon but the latest stage in capitalist development. One of the important points made in Lenin's book is that monopoly, replacing competition, not only does not reject it but, on the contrary, sharpens it, evolving new, monopoly forms of competition. Today, Peltonen said, we see how correct Lenin was. Even state-monopoly capitalism has not been able to abolish the competition between monopoly enterprises and associations.

L. Ambartsumov (USSR) pointed out that the changes in modern capitalism have acquired the nature of an uninterrupted process. If Marxists were simply to invoke the five features of imperialism without showing the line along which these features are developing and changing, if they were to ignore the political aspect of the matter and forget all about the capitalist state, then, the speaker held, it would be difficult to understand many of the processes in modern capitalism. After all, Lenin began his definition of the main features of imperialism with the call not to forget "the conditional and relative value of all definitions in general, which can never embrace all the concatenations of a phenomenon in its complete development." Lenin added that the features noted by him affect "only the basic, purely economic concepts" and that "imperialism can and must be defined differently if we bear in mind . . . the historical place of this stage of capitalism in relation to capitalism in general, or the relation between imperialism and the two main trends in the working-class movement."

THE DYING AWAY OF CAPITALISM

Several speakers dwelt on the question how to understand Lenin's thesis on "dying" capitalism.

Professor Stanislaw Zawadzki (Poland) suggested that objective factors (the scientific and technological revolution, militarization, etc.) plus the competition between the two systems and the pressure exerted by the working class have forced capitalism to adopt measures which, in effect, boil down to concessions to the working people—rising incomes of the popu-

lation and the development of social welfare, etc.

Urban supported this idea and said that as a result of these concessions the balance of the class forces and, in some cases, also the social pattern of modern capitalist society are changing. Capitalism is trying to adapt itself to the demands of the scientific and technological revolution, and one of these demands is mass production presupposing mass sales, which, in turn, is impossible without mass consumption. It would, therefore, be more correct, in his opinion, to speak not about concessions but about the accumulation in capitalist society of elements which no longer bear a purely capitalist character. The theses submitted by the institute contain an important idea expressed by Lenin that the development of monopoly capitalism "is dragging" the capitalist economy into a new order based on the transition from complete freedom of competition to complete socialization. It is a pity, Urban said, that the theses have not mentioned Lenin's views on the dying away of capitalism. Capitalism will disappear, Urban went on, not as a result of economic collapse or a revolutionary war (as visualized by the present Chinese leadership) but as the result of a gradual transition, which is already taking place. The disintegration and dying away of capitalism are possible only through the development of this capitalism, through rapid economic growth. In the course of this development the necessary structural changes will take place accompanied by the further growth of the working class and a change in the balance of forces. And this development will ultimately be consummated in the transition to complete socialist ownership.

Menshikov doubted the correctness of the formulation about capitalism dying through "prosperity" and called for more attention to the theory of reproduction, which explains not only the mechanism of economic growth under capitalism but also the reasons for economic stagnation and decline in production. Saying that the "convergence" theory was unacceptable and agreeing with Urban's criticism of it, Menshikov stressed that in private capitalist ownership—even in the event of it being monopolized and placed on a joint stock basis, and even bearing in mind its "statization"—in the entire system founded on this ownership there is nothing which would enable it to solve the basic political, social and economic problems of our time.

The dying away of capitalism, Janis emphasized, does not imply the destruction of a developed industrial economy but the dying away of definite social relationships based on private enterprise and subordinate wholly and entirely to profit-seeking. The working class and all working people, the democratic and socialist forces are a powerful factor of this process.

Professor V. Cheprakov (USSR) noted that the growth of elements of socialism within state-monopoly capitalism will not automatically lead to socialism. Needed for this is struggle

by the working people for a decisive say in all economic matters, for nationalization and other democratic demands. The speaker maintained that even the advent to power of an anti-monopoly front would not signify socialism. Rather it would be something in the nature of "anti-monopoly state capitalism," with elements of bourgeois production relations preserved but with monopoly ownership already abolished.

L. Meier, Director of the German Economic Institute (GDR), expressed the view that the monopoly process would ultimately lead to socialism, but pointed to the other aspect of this process: growth of the real power of the capitalist class. Superstructure, he observed, does not automatically follow from economic regularity. The existence of socialism is the latest and most powerful factor affecting capitalism, a factor which not infrequently proves even more important than the internal factors of development in particular countries.

The capitalist state cannot transcend the limits beyond which it becomes really possible to speak about the dying away of capitalism, stressed Pevzner. Society will be led beyond these limits only by the class struggle of the working people under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party against monopoly capital and against the capitalist state.

STRUGGLE AGAINST MODERN CAPITALISM

For Communists the thesis of the historical doom of capitalism and its dying away serves merely as a stimulus for stepping up the struggle against capitalism, for perfecting strategy and tactics. Many papers were devoted to these problems.

V. Zagladin (USSR) thought that a structure transcending the boundaries of capitalism and representing the pre-conditions of socialism is already taking shape within state-monopoly capitalism. He pointed to the possible course of the struggle and the consequences of the victory of the anti-monopoly coalition, noting the overall socialist character of the current stage of the revolutionary process.

Modern capitalism, in the view of Ambartsumov, leads to alienation of the individual, which finds expression in a kind of "acquisitiveness," a cult of things, arousing protest sooner or later. The range of problems embedded in the concept "alienation" can be resolved only by the mass movement.

Speaking about the gradualness of transition to socialism in present-day conditions, about the changes in capitalist society objectively bringing it closer to socialism, Ambartsumov was of the opinion that this gradualness does not at all mean that capitalist society no longer fears major upheavals. However, new features, corresponding to the new level of the development of capitalism, will characterize the revolutionary situation. As Lenin pointed out (in his remarks to Bukharin's *Economics of the Transitional Period*), the speed of the onset of the revolution "is not in direct proportion" to the maturity of capitalist relationships.

V. Lyubimova, D.Sc. (USSR), pointed to the need to study the new contradictions engendered by state-monopoly capitalism and the importance of a thorough analysis of the social maneuvering of the capitalist state, the dual character of state intervention. She drew a line between such governmental measures which run counter to the interests of the working people as anti-labor legislation, attempts to impose control on the trade unions, and tax policy, on the one hand, and social measures and programs that objectively benefit the working people, on the other. Not always can these measures be classified, in the strict sense, as gains for the working class. Not infrequently the state steps in, maneuvering between the workers and the monopolies, although in the final analysis it acts in the interest of the latter. Lyubimova stressed the growing role of the constant pressure brought to bear by the working class on the state administration and on its weakest links with a view to securing reforms on behalf of the working people.

Peltonen, speaking about the work of the Communists in the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism in Finland, examined the problems associated with the peaceful, democratic transition to socialism which, in his opinion, is possible only in those capitalist countries where state democracy is already established. The Finnish Communists have arrived at the conclusion that the sole road to this goal is united action by the workers' parties, that none of the workers' parties today is capable of achieving socialism independently.

Outlining the structural changes in the capitalist countries brought about by the disintegration of the colonial system, the scientific and technological revolution and the development of state-monopoly capitalism, which is already transcending the boundaries of individual countries, giving rise to an integrationist process, M. Maksimova (USSR) pointed to the exacerbation of the economic and political contradictions of capitalism. In these conditions, she thought, the democratic forces should strive to enter into the apparatus of state-monopoly associations in order to utilize the inter-state economic policy for curbing the international monopolies. Participation of the developing countries in inter-government agreements, their concerted action in the U.N. economic bodies, the setting up of "anti-cartels," as well as the inroads which the socialist exporter-states make on the monopoly of leading capitalist countries in the world market, could operate in the same direction.

The conference demonstrated the continuing significance of the ideas contained in Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, for the analysis of the processes taking place in modern capitalism, and the variety of shading in the approach of Marxists to the solution of concrete problems of theory and practice, the guarantee of the further creative development of Marxism-Leninism.

Andrei BORODAYEVSKY

A contribution to the fight against anti-communism

"Combating the ideology of anti-Communism and fighting for peace, democracy and socialism" was the subject of an international conference arranged by the Institute of Social Sciences in Berlin last March. The conference was attended by more than 500 people, among them research workers from Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Soviet Union, Rumania, Hungary, Great Britain and Austria.

ADDRESSING THE GATHERING, Kurt Hager, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, said that the fifty years of the Great October Socialist Revolution have witnessed convincing victories over anti-communism. The ideology and practice of anti-communism are being overcome in hard class struggle in the capitalist countries, in the development of the socialist countries and the successful pursuit of their policy of peace. Provided a correct line is followed by all the contingents of the world revolutionary movement, victory over anti-communism is guaranteed. This, an international task, calls for joint effort.

Propositions important for the fight against anti-communist propaganda were advanced at the conference.

Anti-communism, it was stressed, is the most reactionary trend of bourgeois ideology. Assuming different forms, it colors all aspects of this ideology, which is used as a weapon against scientific communism.

In the area of internal policy, anti-communism is used against all who stand for peace and democracy and who oppose the aggressive policies of imperialism. Thus anti-communism provides monopoly capital with an ideological pretext for the political oppression of the masses. Spearheaded first and foremost against the Communist parties, the anti-Communist offensive affects all progressives.

The foreign policy aims of anti-communism serve as an ideological camouflage in the political, economic, ideological and military struggle against the socialist states, in implementing imperialist plans for world supremacy, and in bolstering the positions of the ruling circles in the capitalist countries. It is used as a smoke-screen for the American war in Vietnam.

For the purpose of spreading anti-communism, the monopolies have a complex propaganda apparatus consisting of research institutes, publishing houses, radio and TV stations and other media of indoctrination. The principal objective of the bourgeoisie is not so much to preach anti-communism to their own class as to instil it in the other classes and strata with a view to retaining the allegiance of the intermediate class forces (the petty bourgeoisie and the middle strata) and to corrupt the working class.

The usual anti-communist propaganda includes the oft-repeated assertions that communism cannot provide a high standard of living; that it is incompatible with democracy; that communism is an accidental and temporary phenomenon; that communism is responsible for the tension in the world.

The pseudo-scientific theory of the "integral society" is one of the latest inventions of the anti-communists. According to this theory, socialism and capitalism have more common features than differences, and the two systems are moving along converging lines toward a "single industrial world." The "convergence" theory has been called into being by the success of communism, by the striving to show that this success does not prove the superiority of communism over capitalism.

The distorted interpretation of the economic reforms in the socialist countries has the same purpose. For instance, the emphasis on incentives and personal consumption is alleged to signify that the interests of society will be increasingly pushed into the background by personal interests and that socialism will evolve into something very close to capitalist society.

Much attention was paid at the conference to West German anti-communism, to its revan-

chist trend and its attempts to weaken the positions of the GDR, the first socialist state on German soil. Bonn's claim to the role of sole spokesman for Germany is one of the weapons of West German anti-communism aimed primarily against the GDR. This doctrine is expounded in the latest book by FRG Finance Minister Strauss.

Many speakers pointed to the emergence of the extreme, fascist brand of anti-communism, a trend closely connected with the new nationalist and extremist phenomena in West Germany.

It was stressed that of late anti-communism has suffered a series of defeats. Mention was

made of the serious setback it suffered in the recent general election in France.

Many ruling parties in the capitalist countries, anxious to divert the workers from socialism and communism, are forced to talk about profit-sharing. The same social demagoguery permeates the thesis on the fusion of highly-developed socialism and developed capitalism. The working people are told that there is no sense in being a Communist since all industrial societies are alike.

The conference in Berlin was an important contribution to the exposure of the ideology of anti-communism.

M. LALLEN

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Stop the aggression

"IT IS CLEAR," wrote the *New York Times*, "that the United States has again embarked on a substantial escalation of its war effort in Vietnam." After announcing the so-called "Free Kill Zone" in the Mekong delta the invaders turned to "scorched earth" tactics in South Vietnam, near the Cambodian frontier. The air-raids on North Vietnam have been stepped up. River mouths in the North are being mined. The Seventh Fleet and field guns shell DRV territory from the sea across the demilitarized zone. Another \$12,000m. has been appropriated to extend the aggression.

And these, according to the U.S. Command in Saigon, are only the first steps in escalation.

The Americans are aggravating the situation in Vietnam and throughout Indochina at a time when conditions have been created for peace talks and for ending the war. Washington turns a deaf ear to the appeals of world opinion to stop the war and meet Hanoi's peace initiative halfway.

In the effort to mislead world opinion, Washington has for long wrapped its policy of aggression in hypocritical declarations about searching for ways to peace. The claim is made that the war in Vietnam is a "tragic necessity" and that Washington's "peace initiative" is invariably rejected by the enemy. U.S. propaganda is full of talk about "constructive" steps on the part of America that are allegedly ignored.

This deliberate lie was exposed by President Ho Chi Minh in his reply to a message from Johnson. The "peace initiative" of the United

States amounts to a proposal for "talks" on the understanding that the aggression will go on and the DRV will submit to force. "Only after unconditional cessation of the United States bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," wrote President Ho Chi Minh, "can the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States begin talks and discuss the issues concerning the two sides."

The real object of the U.S. in Vietnam was revealed, in particular, by Johnson's conference with military leaders and State Department officials on Guam in March. The meeting was yet another indication of Washington's persistent rejection of a peace settlement in Vietnam and of its reckless attempt, foredoomed to failure, at solving the Vietnam problem through escalation.

ISOLATION

The cynicism and dishonesty which the Paris newspaper *Monde* describes as a method of the present American leaders have shocked the world. They have outraged millions in all continents and increased the isolation of the United States both abroad and at home. On returning from his tour of foreign countries Gus Hall, General Secretary of the U.S. Communist Party, said: "In travelling around the world . . . one gets a feeling that Uncle Sam is developing a case of bad breath. Governments which have even ordinary dealings with the United States find it necessary to apologize to their own people."

The movement in support of the embattled peoples of Vietnam is growing. The week of solidarity with Vietnam, held in dozens of countries between March 13 and 19, was a worldwide demonstration against the American crimes in Indochina. People are collecting signatures to petitions condemning the U.S. aggression, setting up relief funds, sending deputations to the U.S. embassies and organizing peace marches.

Men and women of varying political views and from all walks of life—Communists and Catholics, Socialists and Conservatives—and national and international organizations insist on the war being stopped. Protests have been made by Argentine and Australian seamen who have refused to take military cargoes to Saigon, by the UN General Secretary and the World Federation of Trade Unions, by Quakers in Canada and the United States, by the International Union of Students, by Buddhists in South Vietnam and Japan and by public men throughout the world—scientists, scholars, writers, journalists—and by women's and youth organizations.

The socialist countries and the Communist and Workers' parties everywhere are in the van of the worldwide movement of solidarity with the people of Vietnam. The peoples and governments of the socialist countries have reaffirmed their support of the courageous people of Vietnam and suit the action to the word. Communists everywhere are active in the mass solidarity movements.

The new stage in the escalation has been condemned by leading people in France, Belgium, Britain, the Scandinavian countries, India, Burma, Pakistan, Cambodia, the UAR, Algeria, Tanzania, the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea and many other countries. In particular, the French boycott of the meeting of the SEATO Council is seen as an indication of President de Gaulle's disagreement with the United States on Vietnam. Appeals to halt the escalation, and to stop the bombing of North Vietnam and begin talks have been made by the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament, by Prime Minister Paasio of Finland, Chairman Paul Struye of the Belgian Senate and in Britain by a large group of Labor MPs.

According to the Stockholm *Dagens Nyheter*, a recent poll in Sweden showed that 57 per cent condemned the U.S. policy in Vietnam against 48 per cent last year. The proportion of those favoring U.S. policy dropped from 13 to 8 per cent. The newspaper believed these data to be valid for Western Europe generally.

Another sign of the isolation of the American aggressors is the sharply negative position of the "third world." For all the pressure it has brought to bear, Washington has been unable to drag a single Asian or African country into its war in Vietnam, except Thailand and South Korea whose rulers are dependent on Washington and can in no way be classed as neutrals.

CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE

The escalation has caused noteworthy shifts in public sentiment in the United States itself. The shouts of approbation with which the ultra-reactionaries greeted Johnson's decision to resume and extend the bombing of North Vietnam could not drown the voice of the indignant. Millions of Americans who voted in the presidential elections against Goldwater bitterly resent Johnson's policy of aggression. This is admitted by Johnson himself. At a recent press conference he said that if he were to read all the attacks against him, let alone parry them, he would have no time left for anything else. The discontent in the United States is aggravated by the growing realization among the public that the government is deliberately misinforming the people about the peace initiatives of the DRV.

Washington is experiencing a crisis of confidence. *Le Monde's* Washington correspondent reported in mid-January "an entirely new phenomenon in the U.S.—the people's systematic doubt of their leaders, who on more than one occasion have been caught lying." A university professor interviewed by the correspondent said if Johnson were to declare that they were in the twentieth century many Americans would disbelieve it, which was perhaps the worst consequence of the war in Vietnam for American society. The crisis of confidence, he added, was not confined only to the president, it involved every member of the government.

Speaking of the conflicting opinion in the United States over foreign policy issues, mention should be made of the shift in sentiment in the upper levels of society. Many of the top people are conscious of the grave dangers flowing from the official policy of world dominion. They realize that the Vietnam gamble is blocking the solution of numerous world issues.

Senator Vance Hartke, addressing the annual dinner of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, urged an end to the bombing in Vietnam and to explore the way for talks. The war in Vietnam, the senator said, was a monstrosity that must be ended.

Significantly, the war and its escalation have severely hurt Johnson's prestige in the Democratic Party. According to the *Washington Post* many Democratic senators who seek re-election in 1968 are at pains not to be associated too closely with Johnson's highly unpopular foreign policy, fearing that this might prevent their re-election. Senator Robert Kennedy's attitude on this issue is indicative.

"The fact," wrote the *New York Times*, "that Mr. Kennedy suggests a bombing pause and an offer to go to the peace table within a week is, in itself, a straightforward challenge to the Johnson policies." Robert Kennedy's attitude shows that opposition to official policy centers in the party of which the president himself is a member. A speaker at the annual congress of the California Democratic Council, which

represents roughly 37,000 rank-and-file Democrats, called for an immediate end to the bombing of North Vietnam.

The change of mood is even more revealing among Republican leaders. Senator Javits, who until recently supported the government on Vietnam, now urges it to stop the bombing in the North and to seek a peaceful settlement.

However, the influence of those who want a still bigger war in Vietnam should not be minimized. They are the "wild men" associated with big business. They want "military success" in Vietnam at all costs so as to use it in the coming election campaign.

Millions of Americans, however, are increasingly becoming aware that the government is waging an unjust war in Southeast Asia, goading the nation into steering a course the implications of which are hard to foresee.

Washington is trying to create the impression that the war is condemned by only a negligible minority. But recent polls have shown that over 65 per cent of the polled disapproved of official policy. The Vietnam war is now opposed by spokesmen in every segment of the population. Along with the working class, in which "the greatest opposition to the war is to be found" as Gus Hall points out, cessation of the war is advocated by public leaders, scientists, students, teachers, clergymen, office employees, and many businessmen. The countrywide Vietnam Week which took place from April 8 to 15 culminated in big public demonstrations in New York, San Francisco, Chicago and elsewhere.

Recent months have seen important changes in this respect also among organized labor which is casting off the shackles imposed on it by reactionary leaders, particularly George Meany. Late last year trade union leaders held two meetings in New York and Chicago on the theme of peace initiatives. The first meeting drew 1,000 trade unionists and the second 400 from 32 federations in Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Milwaukee and other cities. Both meetings called for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam and for peace talks.

The war was condemned by the delegates from 35 West Coast unions who met in Los Angeles in April. Similar resolutions were

adopted by congresses of the automobile, garment and meat-packing workers and wholesale and retail trade employees. The trade union section of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has stepped up its activity. Recently its spokesmen said millions of organized workers and officials elected by them disagreed with the AFL-CIO leadership's support for the war. The section proposed to take prompt and resolute action aimed at bringing about de-escalation, ending the bombing, at beginning peace talks, and securing the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. Workers' condemnation of the war was evidenced by the strikes of aircraft mechanics and electrical and engineering workers employed on war production.

The civil rights fight is an important factor in the movement against the war. There is a direct link between the two, for the fundamental right of the people to shape their own destiny is at stake in both Vietnam and the United States, and secondly, the war in Vietnam is supported by those reactionary forces holding back progress in the U.S. This explains why Martin Luther King, Negro civil rights leader, was so emphatic in his condemnation of the war. The Vietnam war, he said at a press conference in New York, has estranged most countries of the world from the United States. It has isolated America socially, politically and morally from even its own allies.

A grave charge against the U.S. government came from Arthur Schlesinger, historian and one-time adviser to President Kennedy. At a press conference of The Americans for Democratic Action Schlesinger pointed out that the bombing had failed to break the will of the North Vietnamese, and added that the U.S. was headed for an even more dangerous impasse.

The Vietnam war has always been unpopular in the United States and there can be no question that opposition to it will mount in step with escalation. So will the worldwide movement of solidarity with the people of Vietnam. The escalation of barbarity on which Washington pins its hopes is but hardening the Vietnamese people's resolve to uphold the freedom and independence of their country.

Jan PRAZSKY

Untruth on TV

TOWARDS THE END of the last year I learned that a TV documentary about the Leipzig trial of 1933 based on the trial records was being made in West Germany.

As a defendant in the Nazi frame-up, the sole surviving defendant, I was very much interested in this picture.

But to my disappointment I was to discover that the makers of the film had not drawn an objective documentation.

The Reichstag fire and the subsequent trial were, as most people know, a provocation engineered by the Nazis and for this reason alone the trial records were bound to have a strong Nazi bias. A film based on such documentation could hardly be true to life.

Nevertheless, my doubts notwithstanding, I allowed that the film makers might make an honest attempt to throw light on at least part of the truth. I was ready to give them the benefit of the doubt knowing that the court records could hardly bypass Dimitrov's personal testimony, his questions and speech from the dock which exposed the real purpose of the Nazi provocation, as did the testimony of some German Communists who later paid with their lives for having had the courage to tell the truth at the trial. Vasil Tanev and myself likewise declared on several occasions in the course of the hearings that the staging of the trial was a deliberate provocation.

I regret to say that my doubts and suspicions proved to be well grounded and my feeble hopes to see an honest attempt to give a truthful depiction of the trial unjustified. Now that the film has been shown nobody can say that the producers sought to establish the truth. In the conditions prevailing in West Germany where neo-Nazis are again raising their heads failure to do so opens an avenue for renewing the criminal Nazi ideology banned by the Yalta, Potsdam and other international agreements, for defending and, if possible, rehabilitating Hitler, Goering and Goebbels for whom the Leipzig trial, contrary to their expectations, was a crushing moral defeat.

The testimony, or, to be more exact, the Nazi harangues, the slanderous frenzied outpourings of Goering, Goebbels and other prosecution witnesses are so presented as to make them look like the truth. But Dimitrov's interventions and questions have been mutilated and distorted in order to expunge everything that unmasked the criminal face of Hitler fascism. Dimitrov's bril-

liant defense of communism as the custodian of progress and humanism and his annihilating criticism of fascism, which millions throughout the world remember, are missing. This adds up to a belittling of Dimitrov as leader of the international working-class movement, to emasculating the very essence of his defense of this movement. At the same time there is an obvious attempt to present fascism in a more favorable light.

Take, for instance, Dimitrov's references in his final speech to the unlawful exclusion from the trial of the defense counsel chosen by the accused. "Not being in need of either the honeyed or the cutting eloquence of the lawyer forced on me," he said, "I have defended myself without the help of counsel. Clearly, now too I feel bound in no way by Dr. Teichert's speech for the defense." This passage is omitted in the film.

Dimitrov's passionate denunciation of the slander that his people, the people of Bulgaria, were savages and barbarians is likewise deleted. This passage, with its annihilating definition of fascism, won him the admiration of the world. "The only savages and barbarians in Bulgaria," he said, "are the fascists. But allow me to ask you, Herr Praesident, in which country are the fascists not barbarians and savages?" This passage alone shows that Dimitrov was defending not only himself, that he confronted the fascist judges as a revolutionary internationalist and leader of the world working-class movement. From the dock he fought fascist obscurantism and upheld everything progressive in the world. Yet the makers of the film tend to depict him as a man concerned primarily with his own fate, his own defense.

Dimitrov's final speech is purged of his assessment of the three-month trial as a whole. For instance, the following passage is cut:

"What is the net result of this trial? The myth that the Communists burned down the Reichstag has been completely dispelled. . . . The Reichstag fire has nothing to do with the activities of the Communist Party. . . . But it has been proved that the fire was both pretext for and prelude to a drive to decimate the working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party of Germany."

Dimitrov made it clear that it was the fascists who had a stake in the fire and in the trial. The trial record of the famous encounter between Dimitrov and Goering is also distorted

by deleting the exposure of the latter as the real organizer of the fire.

It might be said that the makers of the film were at a disadvantage because of the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the stenographic records. But this hardly justifies them, for besides the written record there are the sound recordings with their full and accurate account of the court proceedings which they could have used had they so wished.

The fact is that the film covers up the truth, especially the circumstance that Dimitrov was not just another accused but an intellectual giant who turned the tables on his accusers, exposed the frame-up and brilliantly defended the Communist cause, the Communist International and the Communists individually, a man who ripped the mask off the fascists.

It is not by chance that the film ignores the struggle waged by the international working class and progressives generally in defense of the accused in Leipzig, and in particular the counter-trial in London and the countless strikes and protest demonstrations by millions which were the high points of this struggle. Thanks to this movement to curb the brown

plague, Dimitrov, Popov, Tanev and Torgler had to be acquitted. The first three were released and deported from Germany to the Soviet Union, which gave them Soviet citizenship.

Why have the producers of the film laid themselves open to criticism? This question is easy to answer if one bears in mind the way things are today in Federal Germany. The Potsdam agreement on demilitarization and denazification signed by the USA, USSR, Britain and France has not been carried out in that part of Germany. Many ex-Hitlermen occupy top posts in the government, in the courts, the prosecutor's office, the army, the press, radio and television. Revanchism is becoming more and more widespread, and the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party has vociferously entered the political arena with the support of the big monopolies, the very people who helped Hitler seize power in his time. At the same time the Communists and other champions of peace are persecuted. The Communist Party has been driven underground. The film about the Leipzig trial is, clearly, a reflection of this state of affairs.

Blagoi POPOV

The truth distorted

MORE THAN thirty years have passed since the Reichstag fire and the frame-up trial that followed it. But the magnificent stand taken by Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Communist and great internationalist, against the fascist leaders, demonstrating the invincibility of socialism and its superiority over the fascist and all other varieties of imperialist reaction, is still fresh in the memory of millions, as is the fact that the trial ended in a resounding political and moral defeat for the Nazis. Now that neo-Nazism is raising its head in West Germany it is particularly timely to recall this.

The fascists used the Reichstag fire—Dimitrov called it the "dual alliance of provocation and madness"—to whip up anti-Communist hysteria and to break the resistance of the working class, of all anti-fascists. Terror was unleashed throughout Germany. More than 200,000 Communists, Social Democrats and other progressives were arrested and herded into prisons and concentration camps where many were tortured and murdered. The terror was legalized by an extraordinary decree which, in effect, annulled the Weimar Constitution. By staging the Reichstag fire trial, which lasted from September 21 to December 23, 1933, the fascists sought

to give a semblance of legality to their ruthless drive against the working people, against humanist science and art, and against free thinking generally. The Hitler government was out to offer its services to international reaction as a shock force against the world Communist movement. The method the fascists chose was the old reactionary device of branding the Communists as conspirators.

That the Hitler government was unable to achieve any of these aims was due primarily to the courageous stand of Georgi Dimitrov. As one of the leaders of the Communist International, Dimitrov upheld his Communist convictions, defended the Communist International and the Communist Party of Germany, propounded the fundamental ideas of the world Communist movement. He showed that the Communist parties, the most consistent champions of the interests of the working class and all working people, were in the forefront of the struggle against fascism and war, for democracy and peace. The Communists pursue no narrow class or partisan aims. They are an inseparable part of the working class and the entire people. Through the example of the building of socialism in the Soviet Union, whose

ardent supporter he was, Dimitrov showed the role the working class was destined to play in world history as the custodian of progress.

In his skilful cross-examination of the Nazi witnesses and especially in his final speech, Dimitrov showed what really lay behind the Reichstag fire. Speaking in the very heart of fascist Germany, he exposed the class nature of the Hitler regime, which had the backing of the ultra-reactionary forces of the German monopoly bourgeoisie. In the course of the trial Dimitrov showed to the German and international working class the only way in which fascism could be checked and defeated — through working-class unity and a broad front of all anti-fascists.

And people everywhere responded to Dimitrov's call. The trial and its outcome, the acquittal of Dimitrov and the other Communists—an outcome due largely to the international solidarity campaign in their support—gave a powerful impetus to the anti-fascist movement throughout the world. The German Communists, who were waging a costly struggle against the Hitler regime, will never forget how much political and moral strength they derived from Dimitrov's magnificent fight in Leipzig. Many German Social Democrats and other anti-fascists too, gained heart and new confidence.

The twelve years of the fascist dictatorship and its demise bore out Dimitrov's analysis of fascism and showed that he was right when he said that fascist rule would not endure, that imperialism had no future. Nothing can erase these lessons of history from the memory of the peoples. But it is precisely these lessons which are feared today by the West German imperialists, who are anxious to annul the outcome of the Second World War. This explains why the film about the Reichstag fire trial recently shown on the West German TV failed to give a true depiction of this momentous event. Ostensibly objective but actually a biased selection of the trial records resulted in a production which has little in common with what really happened.

In this film the role of Dimitrov, the man who triumphed over the barbaric Nazi system, is distorted. And the role of German finance and monopoly capital which engendered the fascist regime is muted. The fact that Dimitrov dwarfed the "witnesses" Goering and Goebbels was, in effect, not brought out. Viewers did not hear Dimitrov's indictment of the fascist

regime or his brilliant defense of Communist ideas and human values. What he said about the democratic and anti-fascist struggle waged by the German Communist Party or about the united front policy and unity of the democratic forces was distorted. But the tirades of Goering and Goebbels, their anti-communist invective, the provocative purport of which was clearly brought out years later at the Nuremberg trial, were generously served up to the public.

Who gains by the spirit of this kind of "documentation"? It is an intrinsic component of the concept adhered to by the monopoly capitalists who rule West Germany and who are steering a course towards a new war. The policy of laying claim to the right to represent all Germany, of reaching out for nuclear weapons, of revanchist territorial claims and reliance on extraordinary dictatorial laws which the Kiesinger-Strauss government is pursuing is increasingly associated (as the present "documentary" also shows) with anti-communist, neo-Nazi indoctrination of the West German public.

Precisely because this is the fiftieth year of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which, thanks to the working class conquest of political power over one-sixth of the world, performed the greatest emancipatory mission in history and marked the beginning of man's turn to socialism, the West German rulers want to discredit and denigrate socialism and its advocates—the working class and its revolutionary party. Particularly vicious is their hatred for the sovereign socialist German Democratic Republic where the question of political power has been resolved once and for all in favor of the people.

We categorically take exception to this West German TV production.

Experience has shown a thousand times over that, as Dimitrov said before the fascist court in 1938, there is no force in the world that can turn back the wheels of history. The progressive and democratic forces are sufficiently powerful to prevent a third attempt by German imperialism and militarism to conquer the world. The socialist countries and all other peace-loving forces are an insurmountable obstacle to the aggressive, revanchist aspirations of the West German rulers. Never will these gentlemen be able to roll back socialism.

Lothar BERTHOLD
Ernst DIEHL

Who burned the Reichstag?

I VIEW THE recent showing in the West Berlin television of a film about the burning of the Reichstag in February 1933, which was designed to exculpate the Nazis from the crime of the burning, as an extremely serious and reactionary step.

It should, in my view, be studied from two main angles; the first, that the guilt of the Nazis—an important historical fact—has been established beyond reasonable doubt, and cannot now be questioned; the second, that the many attempts made from 1960 onwards to exculpate the Nazis are part of a series of attempts, made mainly but not solely in West Germany, to “whitewash” the Nazis in order to make the neo-Nazis of West Germany more acceptable to public opinion in Western Europe and the capitalist world generally, including of course West Germany itself.

Let me first remind readers—who include many who are too young to have lived through the events of 1933, and many more who have forgotten much of what they then learned—of the essence of the story of the burning, and of the evidence which established the guilt of the Nazis.*

The Reichstag building was largely destroyed by fire on the night of the 27th February, 1933; the fire started from between thirty and forty seats of fire, and was all over in an hour or two. It must have taken at least seven persons, and perhaps many more, to prepare for and to start such a fire so quickly, and the only access possible for so many persons and the necessary incendiary material to the well-guarded Reichstag building was by way of an underground passage which led from the official “presidential palace,” the residence of Goering, to the building itself.**

The only unauthorized person actually found in the building after the fire was a pathetic young Dutch tramp called Van der Lubbe, who was half-blind and little better than half-witted, and in any case did not know his way about the building. The recent attempts to exculpate the Nazis have in the main rested on the assertion that Van der Lubbe acted alone, succeeding somehow in getting himself and large quantities of incendiary material into the building

without being detected, and in then setting at least thirty separate fires in not more than 25 minutes. All attempts to establish any communist connection with the fire, or even to show that Van der Lubbe was a Communist, have long broken down, and all that is now attempted by “whitewashers” is to attribute the fire to Van der Lubbe alone, and thus exculpate the Nazis—which by itself is of course as serious as it is, in reality, hopeless.

The evidence which established the guilt of the Nazis falls into two sections. The first consists of the totality of the evidence given at the trial of Dimitrov, Popov, Tanev, Torgler and Van der Lubbe before the Supreme Court of the German Reich at Leipzig, which lasted from the 21st September to the 23rd December, 1933, and of that given at the counter-trial held unofficially in London just before the official trial at Leipzig began. This evidence showed both a complete absence of any connection between any of the accused, save Van der Lubbe and the fire, and also proved that the fire could not have been started by Van der Lubbe alone,

THIS REALLY WAS THE CASE . . .



**DIMITROV BECAME THE ACCUSER,
GOERING WAS IN THE DOCK**

Photomontage circulated at the time of the Leipzig trial.

*The story has been told in many publications, including the first volume of my autobiography, *From Right to Left*, published by Lawrence & Wishart in 1965.

**The Nazis themselves asserted at the trial of Dimitrov and others at Leipzig that this passage was used but sought, in vain, to attribute it to Communists.

and could only have been started by some persons having full access to the Reichstag building by way of Goering's residence—in other words by the Nazis.

The second section consists of positive statements of various leading Nazis and other persons made after the fire. One important item in this section is a letter written as early as 1934 by one Karl Ernst, a Gruppenfuehrer who was chief of the Berlin SA at the time of the fire. Ernst wrote the letter to work off a grudge against Goering, and it was published in the press of some Western countries; he was murdered shortly afterwards on the "night of the long knives," when many Nazis opposed to Hitler were disposed of. According to Ernst he was called shortly before the fire by Count Helldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, to a conference with Goering and Goebbels; Helldorf told him that something had to be arranged to give Hitler a pretext to clamp down on the Communists. At the conference, after the idea of staging an attempt on Hitler's life had been discussed, and abandoned at the insistence of Goering and Goebbels, it was decided to set fire to the Reichstag, using the underground passage. Shortly afterwards, Ernst was told that a suitable "front" had been found in Van der Lubbe, and Ernst himself was put in charge of the operation of preparing and starting the fire; he did not need to contact Van der Lubbe, and did not in fact do so.

The next item in order of importance is to be found in the deposition of Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, which was read at the Nuremberg trial on the 18th March, 1946. Halder stated that, at a dinner on Hitler's birthday in 1942, when the conversation happened to turn on the Reichstag building, he heard Goering, who was sitting close to him, say: "I am the only man who really knows the Reichstag. After all, it was I who set it on fire."

Then there is evidence from Hermann Rauschning, former President of the Danzig Senate, in his book *Conversations with Hitler*. Soon after the fire, he was called to the Chancellery to report to Hitler, and while he was waiting to be called in, he heard talk between Goering, Himmler, Frick, and others. Rauschning wrote after this talk as follows:

"... Goering told them details of the Reichstag fire ... At that time the secret of the fire was still closely guarded in party circles ... It was only from this conversation that I learned that the Reichstag had been set alight by the Nazi leadership itself ... Goering described how 'his boys' had got into the Reichstag by

an underground passage from the presidential palace, and how they had only a few minutes' time and had nearly been caught. He was sorry 'the whole place' had not been burned down. In their hurry they had not been able to do 'the whole job'."

Lastly, there is an item of evidence from John H. Kahan, an eyewitness, who was in Germany at the time of the fire and subsequently escaped to England. His account is given in a letter to the *Daily Telegraph*, published on the 20th March, 1961; a few days before the fire a party was given at the apartment of a well-known soothsayer Eric Jan Hanussen, at which Count Helldorf, mentioned above, asked Hanussen to arrange a special seance, at which Helldorf would put a question to him. Hanussen agreed; he had in fact learned from Ernst, mentioned above, what the question was. It was handed to Hanussen in a sealed envelope. It ran: "Will the party with the carefully laid plan succeed in the next few days?" Hanussen answered in writing, the answer being signed by persons present at the seance, including Hanussen himself and Count Helldorf. The answer was: "The plan of the party will fully succeed, and I can see the famous Wallott building going up in flames." (The Reichstag was known to Berliners as "the Wallott building"). Hanussen was arrested within a few weeks and his murdered body was found shortly after. Helldorf was hanged after the attempt on Hitler's life in 1944.

I come now to consider the attempts made during the present decade to "whitewash" the Nazis by asserting that Van der Lubbe acted alone. Some of these attempts may have been made by persons acting in ignorance but in good faith; most have clearly been made dishonestly by propagandists seeking to "put a good face" on to the Nazis of Hitler's days in order to try to portray the present rulers of West Germany in a good light, and thus to reconcile public opinion in Western countries to the existence of the West German revanchist and militaristic ruling class and government, which is not only permeated by important ex-Nazis in all its field of activity, but is also encouraging the specific neo-Nazi development of the new openly fascist party, the NDP.

Most of these attempts have originated in West Germany, but press organs in other countries have to share the guilt. The West Berlin television episode with which we are concerned should thus be seen in that context, and should be exposed and condemned as all the more serious for that reason.

D. N. PRITT

U.S. aggression in Laos

THE WAR OF AGGRESSION waged by U.S. imperialism in Vietnam and its predatory policy in Southeast Asia are accompanied by acts of aggression in countries of the Indochinese peninsula. One crime follows another. This is borne out by the policy pursued by the U.S. rulers in Laos, a country with a population of three million bordering on Vietnam.

Twelve Years of U.S. Imperialist Intervention and Aggression in Laos is a well-documented pamphlet issued by the Neo Lao Haksat Publications.*

In the eyes of the American military, Laos occupies an important strategic position. "The U.S. policy in relation to Laos, as in the case of South Vietnam and Cambodia," we read in the pamphlet, "consists in turning this part of Indochina into a U.S. new-pattern colony and military base aimed at encircling and eventually attacking the socialist countries, at suppressing the liberation movement in Indochina and in Southeast Asia" (p. 16).

This policy, leading to an extreme exacerbation of the situation in this part of the globe, is a grave and immediate threat to world peace. "Laos and Vietnam are becoming most dangerous theatres of 'hot' war in the world at present" (p. 121). U.S. intervention in Laos is part of its overall aggression in Southeast Asia. It was not yesterday that this policy began to be pursued. U.S. imperialism took over the colonial baton immediately after the signing of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and sharply stepped up its interference in this area.

The U.S. imperialists aim at facilitating their task by dividing the national forces, backing the puppets and traitors of the ultra-Right and making use of the material and manpower resources of their satellites—SEATO allies. Theirs is the old imperialist "divide and rule" motto of getting Asians to fight against Asians. In Laos, where they are waging "special warfare" their aim is to crush the just struggle of the people mainly by the hands of home reactionaries. This, of course, does not preclude direct U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Laos, or direct participation by the U.S. armed forces in the war against the patriots of Laos.

It will be recalled that the 1954 Geneva

Agreements stipulated respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos, guaranteed non-interference in its internal affairs, prohibited the reinforcement of troops or military personnel from the outside, banned military bases throughout its territory, and the shipment of armaments, munitions and military equipment of any kind. The National Union Government, set up in June 1962 on the basis of the tripartite Agreements reached in 1961 in Zurich and in 1962 in the Plain of Jars by the three political forces in Laos, the Right, the neutralists and the Neo Lao Haksat, put forward a program aimed at building a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos. Home policy would be to ensure democratic liberties, equal rights for all nationalities, to develop the national economy and culture, and to improve the condition of the people. In foreign policy the government undertook to implement the five principles of peaceful coexistence, to forbid any form of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Laos, and to refrain from joining any military alliance or bloc. This program fully corresponds to the interests of the people of Laos, the interests of world peace, and to the hopes for a peaceful and just solution of the problems of Indochina cherished by world public opinion.

Under the 1962 Agreement on Laos, the signatories undertook not to commit or participate in any way in any act which might impair the independence, unity and neutrality of Laos, not to resort to the use or threat of force in respect to this country. The 1962 Agreement confirmed the 1954 Agreement on Indochina and contained a special provision to the effect that Laos would not allow the protection of any military bloc, including SEATO.

However, the U.S. policy of intervention in Laos is based on systematic and bold contempt for all international and internal tripartite agreements designed to secure peace in this part of Southeast Asia.

One of the instruments of U.S. interference is "aid" to Laos which over eleven years, according to the official, obviously minimized, figures, amounted to \$830 million. Over 70 per cent of this sum, about \$600 million, goes for arms and other military expenditures.

The Americans have succeeded in putting

*Twelve years of U.S. Imperialist Intervention and Aggression in Laos. New Lao Haksat Publications, 1966, 130 pp.

that part of Laos governed by the puppet regime under their complete control economically and militarily. Laos' annual imports from the United States amount to \$20 million, while its exports total less than \$1 million. An agrarian country and formerly a rice exporter, it now imports up to 60,000 tons of rice annually and a whole range of other consumer goods and agricultural products, including vegetables. During the years of their rule in Laos the Americans have nurtured a social stratum of compradore bourgeoisie, reactionary high-ranking officials and military officers whose interests are closely associated with United States imperialism and who are used as political stooges.

Relying on its stooges, Washington seeks to control all aspects of political, social and cultural life in the country. The book shows convincingly how the Americans, aided by their henchmen, undermine and overthrow the regimes not to their liking and instal puppet administrations. Moreover, they exploit the divisions among some of the nationalities inhabiting the country and by buying the services of local chiefs, particularly among the Miao nationality, recruit bandit-commando units for terrorist activity in the liberated areas.

The interventionists rely, too, on the direct military and administrative control over the armed forces of the Rightist reactionaries exercised through a whole army of advisers and experts. Of late the number of Thai and South Vietnam troops introduced into the territory of Laos by the Americans with the knowledge and consent of the Vientiane rulers has sharply increased. Several strategic highways and airstrips have been built along the Thai border, and a network of strongholds has been erected in close proximity to the liberated areas. The pamphlet notes that in furtherance of their schemes for turning Laos into their war base, the Americans resort to all means. "A feature of their neo-colonialist policy in Laos is the close combination of military, political and diplomatic methods, the simultaneous application of the policy of force and the method of 'peaceful evolution' and peace negotiations. *But force remains their fundamental policy*" (p. 40).

The pamphlet shows how the logic of imperialist intervention has led the U.S. rulers to employ in Laos essentially the same barbarous and inhuman methods of warfare, to adopt the same cynical attitude to the universally accepted norms of international law, as in neighboring Vietnam. It describes the systematic and ever-increasing bombing of the liberated zone from bases both in Laos and in Thailand and South Vietnam with utilization of B-52 strategic bombers, the destruction of crops and forests with poisonous substances that have pernicious and, as often as not, lethal effects on people, the napalm-burning of houses, schools, pagodas, cultural centers and whole towns and villages; the so-called "pacification" of whole areas through forced eviction of the people to concentration camps camouflaged as "refugee centers" and "rural development

zones" (similar to the "strategic villages" and "new life villages" in Vietnam); the ceaseless punitive and offensive operations against the liberated areas accompanied with brutalities against the civilian population.

Escalation of the American "special warfare" in Laos has not, however, brought the desired results. They have not been able to crush the patriotic forces resisting the aggression and to break the broad united front of the people fighting for national salvation.

"Despite countless difficulties due to the American war of aggression, the liberated zone is being strengthened in all respects. Democratic freedoms and equality in rights between all fraternal nationalities are guaranteed. At all levels, elected local administrations are maintaining order and security and building up step by step a national and democratic economy and culture. Semi-mechanized production bases and state-run stores have been established, forms of collective labor organized; the people help one another to boost production. The various forms of exploitation in the rural areas are being curbed. The fight against illiteracy has developed, hygiene has been widely popularized. Hospitals and schools have been built in many places, even in the mountains. These efforts have helped to improve the life of the people in the liberated zone" (p. 99).

In sharp contrast to the success of the popular forces is the political instability and squabbling in the camp of the Vientiane puppets. In the 12 years of American intervention in Laos some ten governments have changed, i.e., the same ministerial "leap-frogging" as in South Vietnam takes place here. The conflicts between the pro-American political groups impel them towards mutual accusations of corruption, bribery, profiteering and abuse of power, and thus demonstrate once again the anti-national character and rottenness of the puppet clique. Neither the hypocritical references to "aggression from North Vietnam" nor the claims to the role of a "neutralist national government" can conceal the subservience of this clique to U.S. imperialism or lessen its isolation from the masses, internally and internationally.

The policy of the patriotic forces with regard to solving the Laos problem is reflected in the four-point decision adopted by the National Political Union Conference of the Neo Lao Haksat and the Neutralist Forces and the five-point solution set out in a manifesto issued in October 1965.

The four points read:

1. Resolutely to defend the peace, neutrality, sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos on the basis of strict respect for, and correct implementation of, the 1962 Geneva Agreement, the Tripartite Agreements of Zurich (1961) and the Plain of Jars (1962);

2. Persistently to fight all forms of United States' imperialist intervention and aggression against Laos;

3. To ensure the right of the people of Laos

to settle their own internal affairs through peaceful negotiations by the parties concerned, without U.S. interference;

4. Persistently to work for the implementation of the political program of the Tripartite National Union Government in order to build up a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos.

The five-point solution reads:

1. To withdraw from Laos all the armed forces, military personnel, covert military organizations and all weapons and war material which the U.S. imperialists and their satellites have illegally introduced into Laos; dismantling of all U.S. military bases in Laos;

2. Completely to stop all acts of aggression against Laos by the United States and, first and foremost, immediately to stop U.S. air raids and attacks by pro-American troops against the zone controlled by the Laos patriotic forces;

3. To put an end to all collaboration between the United States' lackeys in Vientiane, Bangkok and Saigon, and to the use of the territory of Thailand and South Vietnam as springboards for intervention in Laos;

4. To conduct tripartite negotiations in earnest and in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession with a view to solving all outstanding problems between the parties concerned, and stabilizing step by step the situation in the country;

5. To restore the organizational structure and the principle of tripartite unanimity of the Lao National Union Government based on the 1961 Zurich Agreement and the 1962 Plain of Jars Agreement.

Events, we read in the pamphlet, have shown that the four-point decision and the five-point solution are the only acceptable program for a basic and just settlement of the Laos problem, for helping to end the war of aggression in Vietnam, for the triumph of peace and the lofty ideas of national independence in Southeast Asia.

The statement adopted at a meeting of the Neo Lao Haksat Central Committee in Decem-

ber 1966 strongly denounced the attempts made by the U.S. imperialists to escalate their "special warfare" in Laos, their intention to introduce their troops to Middle and Lower Laos with a view to occupying these areas, and noted the success registered by the patriotic forces "in the military, political, economic, cultural, educational, diplomatic and other fields." The Neo Lao Haksat expresses satisfaction also at the growing cooperation between the Pathet Lao forces and the genuine neutralist forces in the country which, in particular, was reflected in the success of the Political Consultative Conference held in November 1966. Along with strengthening and developing the liberated zones, reinforcing the Pathet Lao armed forces, the Party sets the embattled people the task to unite all the nationalities inhabiting the country, all political parties, representatives of all religions, all fighters for peace and justice in a powerful political front capable of resisting U.S. imperialism and its henchmen. The Party also calls for greater publicity on the international scale with a view to ensuring the people of Laos "the sympathies and support of the socialist countries, the new national states and world public opinion generally." The meeting of the Neo Lao Haksat Central Committee reaffirmed that the four-point decision and the five-point solution adopted by the National Political Union Conference are the only just basis for the settlement of the problem of Laos.

The documents of the patriotic forces reflect the unbending will of the people to safeguard, while relying on the growing support of the socialist countries and on all revolutionary and peace-loving forces of the world, the independence and integrity of their country against the encroachments of the new-pattern American colonialists and their henchmen and, jointly with their brothers in the neighboring countries, to secure peace and conditions for the free development of the peoples of the Indochinese peninsula.

Y. ARKADAKSKY

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