

# REBOLUSYON

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Theoretical and Political Journal  
of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Philippines

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**COMMUNIQUE OF THE INTERREGIONAL  
CADRES' CONFERENCE OF THE CPP  
IN NORTHERN LUZON**

**APROPOS CARLOS FORTE'S INTERVIEW,  
"NOW, THE 'REAL REVOLUTION' CAN BEGIN"**

**MANIFESTO OF PARTY CADRES  
AND MEMBERS WHO HAVE REPUDIATED  
POPOY AND HIS GANG**

**CPP TO CELEBRATE 25TH ANNIVERSARY**

**Number 4  
Series 1993  
October-December**

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Published by the Central Publishing House, Luzon, Philippines

## Editorial Note

In this last issue for 1993 we publish documents on the Rectification Movement from two very important regional organizations of the Party, those of Northern Luzon and Manila-Rizal.

The "Communique of the Interregional Cadres' Conference of the CPP in Northern Luzon" encapsulates the progress of the rectification movement in the entirety of Northern Luzon (NL). The Conference itself is a high point in the ongoing Rectification Movement. Among all the regions since the reestablishment of the Party, NL has the richest revolutionary experience. Twice, the region has been the focus of the enemy's most intense military campaigns in a strategic offensive aimed at weakening the entire Party to the core and finally wiping it out.

The first had been the series of enemy campaigns in the years 1971 to 1977. The second series of the enemy's focal campaigns is the current one, Oplan Lambat Bitag (OLB), which started in the last quarter of 1986. OLB-1 and OLB-2 are over. OLB-3 is still running, with the vain objective of wiping out the revolutionary movement in the entire region.

NL was the first region to which the Party had expanded in 1969 when the enemy concentrated its forces in the second district of Tarlac where Party and the New People's Army had first taken roots. The Party, the people's army and the mass base had grown rapidly in NL to more than compensate for the revolutionary forces, the mass base and the areas temporarily lost to the enemy in Tarlac in late 1969 and 1970.

From its successful beginnings, the revolutionary forces in NL have undergone two major surges (1969-1972 and 1977-1988) and two major declines (1972-1977 and 1988-1992). But with correct summings-up and correct lessons learned, the particular problems arising from the conduct of the revolution at each stage would be resolved and the movement would develop to a higher stage with its own particular problems to be resolved.

For a while, the pushers of "regularization" and military adventurism in line with the "strategic counteroffensive" (SCO) concept thought that they would have a success story in NL as reports from the regions there continued to register advances despite the enemy's offensive. Now it is clear that the gains made in the region as a result of the first great rectification movement there starting from the Northeastern Luzon Conference of 1977 under the guidance of the two basic summing-up documents of the Party, "Specific Characteristics of Our People's War" and "Our Urgent Tasks"; and the message to the conference of then Party chairman Amado Guerrero identifying the major errors, have been negated by the erroneous line and policies pushed under the SCO concept.

A third surge is in the offing with the second great rectification movement now being undertaken in the entire region. The Interregional Cadres' Conference is the watershed for the new and next higher stage in the development of the Party and the revolution in Northern Luzon. The communique gives us an idea of the sharp theoretical awareness of the cadres in the region and the correctness of the theoretical and political line that they have drawn up for advancing the revolution. This bodes well for the entire revolutionary movement in the Philippines.

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The second and third documents come from the Manila-Rizal regional Party organization: the manifesto of the cadres and members who have repudiated the former leadership of Manila-Rizal regional Party organization and an article from the former editor of *Taliba ng Bayan* criticizing the counterrevolutionary ideas of the former secretary of the regional committee. Both documents demonstrate the ideological and political deterioration of Filemon Lagman, who uses both the names "Popoy" and "Carlos Forte", in peddling his counterrevolutionary ideas.

Since the beginning of the latter half of this year, the ideological and political line between revolution and counterrevolution has been clearly drawn in Manila-Rizal. Forte and his fellow degenerates who up to now continue to misrepresent themselves as "insiders" in the

revolutionary movement have issued a stream of documents in a pathetic bid to prove their "revolutionary credentials". The more documents they issue the clearer they demonstrate their counterrevolutionary character. In these documents there are no ideas and analysis that are not better articulated by the outright imperialist propagandists. The two documents that we publish in this issue exposes the "revolutionary" pretensions of "Popoy" or "Carlos Forte".

The Manila-Rizal regional Party organization has suffered from a long line of unrectified errors dating back to the 1970s when Lagman was appointed secretary of the provisional regional executive committee (PREC). Even at that point, he already had the tendency to carve out the Manila-Rizal regional Party organization as an "independent kingdom" with its own strategy and tactics. In 1979 he was disciplined for factional activities in the period 1978-79 and the Manila-Rizal regional Party organization was put under the direct supervision of commissions under the Central Committee along certain lines of work until a comprehensive regional Party committee was appointed in 1987 to build the regional Party organization anew. No comprehensive summing-up was undertaken.

In 1989 Lagman was again appointed secretary of the reconstituted regional Party organization. His tendency to carve out Manila-Rizal as an "independent kingdom" for himself grew stronger with his reinstatement. Together with the militarists and the insurrectionists in the defunct "general command" with its headquarters in Manila-Rizal, he misdirected the Alex Boncayao Brigade towards an insurrectionist strategy far removed from the development of the level of the people's war in the countryside and, worse, towards gangsterism in collaboration with Romulo Kintanar and Arturo Tabara. Also in pursuit of this insurrectionist strategy, Lagman designed his own education courses for cadres and members in the Manila-Rizal Party organization drawing heavily from the experience of the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union.

Unlike in Northern Luzon, the revolutionary experience in Manila-Rizal has not been comprehensively and correctly summed up so that

errors and weaknesses have not been properly identified, criticized and rectified over long periods of time. That is why the Manila-Rizal Regional Party Committee has been a weak point of the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally. It has been afflicted by either a mix-up of adventurism and reformism or arbitrary swings from one to the other. The new Manila-Rizal Provisional Executive Committee is now in the process of summing up the revolutionary experience in the region. ●

# COMMUNIQUE OF THE INTERREGIONAL CADRES' CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES IN NORTHERN LUZON

JULY 20, 1993

## Introduction

The Interregional Cadres' Conference convened by the Communist Party of the Philippines in Northern Luzon is an historic event and is a great ideological victory.

Guided by the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and by the decisions of the Central Committee's 10th Plenum, especially its main document in the Rectification Movement, "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors," the Conference was able to carry out the tasks it had set for itself. These are the following:

- 1) assess revolutionary work in NL from 1991 to the present;
- 2) study the important developments in the objective conditions in NL during the previous decade up to 1992;
- 3) study the documents of the Central Committee's 10th Plenum, its statement on the 24th Anniversary of the Party and the latest EC-CC decisions regarding the intense two-line struggle inside the Party;
- 4) comprehensively sum up the 12-year revolutionary experience in NL, from 1980 to 1992; and
- 5) draw up firm resolutions upholding the general content and issues identified by the Rectification Movement, a resolution on mass work (base-building), on extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare, on Party courses and studies — a key to consolidating the revolutionary forces in NL.

We were able to hold the Conference undisturbed and securely despite the large and continuous operations of the enemy around the conference area. As a matter of fact, the big "counterinsurgency" campaigns and operations by the enemy against the guerrilla zones and bases in Northern Luzon have been going on from November 1991 to the present. Here, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have concentrated two full divisions (5th and 7th) of the Philippine Army and a division-size force of the Philippine National Police (PNP) under the Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM). Big and intense battles have been taking place. The casualties sustained by both sides have not been *inconsiderable*.

The enemy's campaign has entered the *third phase of Oplan Lambat Bitag (OLB-3)*. The bulk of the forces of two divisions are now concentrated in the Cordillera guerrilla fronts while complementary operations continue to be launched in other fronts. The enemy has also stepped up its psychological warfare aimed at deceiving and demoralizing the revolutionary forces and the masses. At the same time, it continues to peddle the "peace process" which has no other objective but to entice the *revolutionary forces to surrender*.

Like our experience with OLB-1 and OLB-2, the Conference is confident that we can frustrate the enemy's attempt to destroy the revolutionary forces despite the immense sacrifices we have to endure and the casualties we have incurred both in the cities and in the countryside. But unlike our experience in OLB-1 and OLB-2, the summing-up by the CC's 10th Plenum has provided our cadres with a *clear understanding of our fundamental errors* which the enemy could exploit. The Rectification Movement and the decisions of the 10th Plenum provided the Conference an excellent framework and a firm foundation for raising our capacity to overcome the enemy's campaign. The line has been set for our gradual but steady advance along the correct road of protracted people's war.

Amidst our big battles and sacrifices in repulsing the enemy's campaigns, some temporary confusions became added burdens to the will of the comrades in NL. Ultra-democratic mobsters, anti-Party elements, and opportunists disseminated statements, writings and



articles grossly attacking the Rectification Movement, the CC's 10th Plenum, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee (EC-CC) and the Party Chairman; peddling perverse lines and inciting factionalism against the Party center.

The first and second drafts of "Reaffirm our Basic Principles and Rectify our Errors" were rapidly and immediately propagated among the cadres in the different regions. The responsible comrades in the regions and other organs immediately grasped the central message and fundamental lessons that the document seeks to communicate. Although they could not immediately put in full context many pertinent issues identified outside their respective regions, they recognized that these basically reflected their own significant and living experiences. The document sifted, amended, integrated and sharpened our grasp of the issues which had been troubling the comrades or were being studied or rectified piecemeal. In the scheduled plenums of some regional committees, the document guided their study, summing-up of experience over a long period of time, criticism, self-criticism and rectification of what they recognized as their own errors within their scope of work. In short, the document was eagerly welcomed and valued.

The Interregional Cadres' Conference deeply and comprehensively studied the summing-up and resolutions of the CC's 10th Plenum. It further strengthened the cadres' stand on the correctness and the necessity of the Rectification Movement.

The Conference was attended by leading cadres of all the regions in NL and the NL operational command as well as by all the members of the Commission.

### **The Conference's Study of the CC's 10th Plenum Documents**

In studying the basic documents of the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee, we deepened our discussions and repeatedly went over the various wrong notions and interpretations that have proliferated, in order to sharply and correctly understand and grasp the following basic principles of the Party: adherence to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the repudiation of modern revisionism, the class analysis of

Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal, the general line of new-democratic revolution, the leading role of the proletariat through the Party, the theory of people's war and the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside, the united front according to the revolutionary class line, democratic centralism, the socialist perspective and proletarian internationalism.

Our firm understanding of and adherence to these basic principles served as a clear guide to our study and summing-up of more than two decades' experience in NL. In the past, all sorts of "theories" from various sources seeped into our arsenal of ideas and were used, got mixed up and appeared as "new" or as "refinements" on our basic principles. In the light of our current understanding of the basic principles, we clearly and systematically saw the essential character and entire picture of the significant issues in our experience. Thus our discussions were lively and vigorous, full of concrete examples drawn from the rich and extensive experience of the Party in general and the Commission and regions in particular. Although the books and documents available to the Conference were incomplete, the most important were consulted for theoretical and historical clarification and for the official formulations of concepts, policies and stand on issues. We can say that those in attendance achieved a fairly high level of ideological unity while still recognizing the great need to further raise or develop this unity.

In the light of our basic principles, the Conference sifted through the arguments of the "Contras" and the factionalists regarding the various theoretical and practical issues being debated. We saw that their arguments are very far off the truth, be it in the logic or in the reality that they present. These arguments do not differ much from what the outright enemy is propagating. The theme is very similar but the tone of those pretending to be communists or revolutionaries is even worse than that of the latter.

In the two-line struggle between the correct and the incorrect, between revolution and reaction, between Marxism-Leninism and its negation, we saw a world of difference between the basic principles and the Rectification Movement being upheld by the CC's 10th

Plenum and those being upheld by the factionalists (a collaboration of the addicts of military adventurism and insurrectionism), revisionists and ideological agents of the enemy. We also saw that these elements have no other intention but to inflict further damage until the Party and the revolution are destroyed.

It is indeed one big shortcoming that in previous years the Party's *education program was not systematic, regular and continuous*; and failed to develop theoretical study within the correct framework. We saw that this is one of the root causes of the serious errors that undermined the revolutionary movement in NL and in the whole country.

### **The Summing-Up**

After the study, the Conference made a comprehensive summing-up of 12-year revolutionary experience in Northern Luzon, from 1980 to 1992. As part of the summing-up, we traced the history of the revolutionary movement in NL from 1969 when the first cadres and units of the Party were sown in the various provinces of NL. The experiences of each region were also summed up, from the time that Cagayan Valley and Ilocos-Montanos-Pangasinan (IMP) stood as two separate regions up to the present setup of four regions.

The document "Reaffirm..." serves as the principal framework for the summing-up. Through it and through our own efforts under the guiding light of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought we painstakingly and carefully analyzed, as objectively as possible, the extensive revolutionary practice running through more than twenty years, identifying the correct from the wrong, the successes from the failures, and putting them within the correct theoretical and historical perspective according to the entire process and law of development of the revolution and the people's war in Northern Luzon and the entire country.

We reviewed the data lined up, the analyses and lessons from the document files (reports, summings-up, decisions, etc.) accumulated, secured and carefully tucked away in various storage and hiding places by comrades who are either still with us or no longer with us

as cadres in existing or defunct units of the Party. Although incomplete, the materials were sufficient for us to have a stable foundation for the general conclusions drawn in the summing-up.

It was not easy for those attending the Conference to arrive at a firm and principled unity. It was necessary to go through a process of relative "leveling off" of knowledge, particularly with regard to important events in the history of the revolution in NL. As already stated, we traced this to as far back as 1969. We had to go through a struggle of ideas for the correct analysis to emerge. Occasional heated and emotional debates could not be avoided. Albeit, we maintained in the main the correct attitude in our summing-up of experiences and from this process flowed our criticism and self-criticism.

The complete summing-up document will be released at the soonest possible time by the concerned organ in NL. Nevertheless, below is a presentation of the character of the periods summed up by the Conference.

### **The Decade of the '70s**

After the period of initiation and rapid expansion of the revolutionary armed struggle in NL in 1969-1972, the entire revolutionary forces and the first two regional Party organizations went through some serious errors. In the middle of the decade what was then the Northeast Luzon region suffered huge losses, while the Northwest Luzon region, then at the peak of expansion, was nearly paralyzed by organizational confusion.

The initiation, expansion and sustainment of revolutionary armed struggle and its resurgence was achieved despite the fierce attacks of the enemy. This flowed from the objective conditions of the people's extreme oppression and exploitation by US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism as well as from the correctness of launching a protracted people's war. This had been clearly demonstrated as early as the beginning of 1970 in the "Preliminary Report on Northern Luzon" written by Comrade Amado Guerrero.

In that initial period, the masses readily and eagerly welcomed the advance of the armed struggle. As beginners, the small and weak revolutionary forces experienced huge and intense attacks by the much bigger and stronger enemy. And as beginners, they had a lot of immaturity in facing the complex problems of advancing the people's war in the particularity of Northern Luzon.

In the Northeast Luzon region then, the enemy fiercely attacked the revolutionary forces from the start of 1972. From then on until 1977 the revolutionary forces suffered huge casualties. The total number of fulltime guerrilla forces shrank to only about 20 percent. Guided by the message of Comrade Amado Guerrero, the first regional conference of the Party in Northeast Luzon, in its summing-up of that experience, identified as the principal error the insistence of the regional leadership in confining itself within the narrow forest region of Isabela where it had no mass base. That was a "Left" opportunist error stemming from the view that the base could be built and expanded in that area. A leading cadre in the regional leadership pushed this idea against the opinion of almost all the leading and middle level cadres. The same leading cadre also prevented the immediate formation in 1972 of a committee to lead the Party in the region when the first one (with responsibility for the whole of NL) could no longer function.

Meanwhile, in the Northwest Luzon region, what started as a small revolutionary force well rooted in one province could gradually expand but would later encounter a succession of problems.

A Right deviation occurred with regard to the analysis and the line of the Party on the issue of national self-determination of the Cordilleras. A careerist cadre misused the study of the CC document identifying the problem in order to embroil the entire regional Party organization in a two-year controversy over organizational matters and at the same time to push a "Left" opportunist application of the antifeudal line. Again, the central organ assisted the region in resolving the problem. It was also the CC that drew the correct line in the conduct of revolutionary work in the white areas of the region during the period.

Through the guidance of the CC and its basic documents the Party organizations in both regions were able to identify and correct the errors.

After rectification, the revolutionary forces in Northeast Luzon began to increase their ranks with growing rapidity after some years of continuous decline. Meanwhile, the area of operation in Northwest Luzon expanded and the movement in the cities surged. The intense enemy attacks were gradually overcome. The two basic documents issued by the CC during this period — "Specific Characteristics of Our People's War" (SCPW) and "Our Urgent Tasks" (OUT) — clarified the basis and the framework for the steady advance and growth of the revolution in the last years of the decade.

### **The Period 1980-1983**

This was a period of rapid expansion of the armed struggle and rich harvest of victories in big tactical battles. Amidst the intensifying crisis of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship, we made a relatively steady advance.

The overall expansion of the armed struggle was the essential content of the advance made in this period. Guerrilla warfare, the building of the mass base which expanded in almost all provinces of NL and the implementation of the minimum program of the agrarian revolution advanced fairly rapidly.

Through the widespread study of the Basic Party Course (BKP) and the implementation of OUT, the training (although far from being systematic) of quite a number of basic level cadres who came mostly from the peasantry was achieved. Old cadres who had taken ever greater responsibilities gained experience. The entry into the countryside of cadres and activists from the cities was still relatively brisk at that time.

Among the resounding tactical battles won by the revolutionary forces against the US-Marcos dictatorship were the peasant struggles in the San Antonio and Santa Isabel estates in Isabela, the struggle of the Cordillera peoples against the Chico Dam and the Cellophil Resource Corporation (CRC), the big antifeudal and antifascist

campaigns of the masses in Cagayan, the workers' strike in the BCI mines, the transformation of the big union there into a genuine and radical one, the big strikes and boycotts of the youth and students in the cities and main towns and the struggles against fascist repression.

But from 1982 onward, after the policies in line with the strategic counteroffensive (henceforth, SCO) concept were laid down, local cadres and fulltime forces gradually became overextended in the rush to implement the policy of "separating the Party machinery in the army from that in the (civilian) locality" and to set up "fulltime guerrilla units" "freed from mass work". At the same time, we still tried to fill the growing need to form more squads for expanding the guerrilla zones.

It is important to point out that as early as 1981-83, some guerrilla fronts had begun to feel the damaging impact of the new type of enemy attacks which meticulously focused on destroying our mass base. This resulted in a drastic decline of the organized forces and the membership of the Party in the localities. The NEL regional committee summed up these experiences in 1983 and identified some initial lessons based on an understanding of the "fluidity" of guerrilla warfare and the steps necessary for overcoming and continually expanding and consolidating the mass base within the "fluidity" of the guerrilla zones.

*Errors in tactical leadership were also committed with regard to the process of advancing in a relatively stable manner. Among these were: the excessively prolonged stress on consolidation; the preoccupation with big mass campaigns and with launching larger guerrilla tactical offensives in some towns in Eastern Cagayan which made these areas stick out and unduly draw enormous enemy attention; the slackening of efforts to raise the technical and tactical capability of the units of the people's army while also attending to the growing needs of mass work; the commandist tendency in launching mass mobilizations, such as unduly setting the struggle of the youth and students at the political level and raising the slogan "own the land*

for free" as a strategic call not limited only to the peasant's mass struggles in the two haciendas in Isabela; and others.

One big shortcoming in ideological work in one region was its failure to comprehensively sum up its revolutionary experience over more than one decade. The need of the cadres to raise their rich and complex experiences to the level of theory could no longer be served by one or two-year summings-up. The problem of unsatisfactory relations between the leading and middle level cadres was also not promptly resolved. And the systematization of the efforts to study the Party's line on the national question for the purpose of concretely applying it in the Cordilleras took quite a long time.

### **The Period 1984-86**

This was a period of rapid and resounding advances but marked by growing deviations from the basic principles and an overextension of the capacity of the revolutionary forces.

In the effort to exploit the favorable objective conditions in the period of the intense terminal crisis of the fascist regime, in the desire to keep in step with a general advance set under the SCO concept and under the influence of resounding experiences in Mindanao, the victorious advance of the revolutionary forces in Northern Luzon was marred by growing deviations and overextension.

During this period, we continued to deepen our study of the character of Northern Luzon and its regions. One big achievement was the study of the nature of the national question in the Cordilleras and its implications on the Party's policy. It cleared away a sizeable chunk of confusion over the problem and advanced our revolutionary work. It also set off our analysis and line in confronting the national question in the Cordilleras from those of the reactionaries.

Most notable was our exclusion of the erroneous and counterrevolutionary line that derived from the concept of the "Cordillera Nation" as picked up and peddled by Conrado Balweg and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA). This line became the basis for their factional activities, splitting off and outright attacks against the revolutionary forces.



However, simultaneously, there was the growing lack of comprehensive theoretical studies. The SCO framework, the random adoption of disparate concepts and theories, not thoroughly examined and studied, and the accommodation of a proliferation of "principles" and "lessons", which seemed as if they could not be contradicted because they were supposedly backed up by "incontrovertibly successful experience" of rapid advance in other areas, impelled the intertwining of wrong and correct lines of advancing the people's war to the advanced substage.

The concept of the Party's comprehensive leadership was combined with the concept of "allowing (and not restraining) the development of the internal dynamism" of each area of work. The integral strategy and tactics of the entire revolution was invaded by such a concept as the need to formulate the "particular strategy and tactics" of an area. It actually resulted in the Cagayan-Apayao-Ilocos Norte (CAIN) region's strategy which it called "carving out the solid North". The absolute leadership of the Party over the people's army was undermined by the concept of "primacy of command". The difficulty of the leading cadres (who had come from the armed propaganda units) in adapting to their new assignments and their tendency to monopolize all the work at the higher level of the Party committee (with a similar tendency at the local Party branches) were misconstrued as "party centeredness" and gave the wrong signals, leading to a weakening of the Party leadership over various lines of work.

What should have been a line of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare at the advanced substage was quickly transformed into a line of intensifying the guerrilla warfare and "all-round preparation of the masses for the war". The comprehensive conduct of the armed struggle was undermined by the Northern Luzon Commission's (NLC) concept of "categorizing areas" largely on the basis of the terrain and favoring the development of regular mobile forces (RMF) in the mountains and the intensification of the mass movement and uprisings in the plains. Solid step-by-step advance was undermined in the rush to seize opportunities offered by the favorable objective

situation. The stress on solid mass work was opposed and replaced by the method of sweeping work.

In the main, the whole revolutionary work advanced rapidly. The favorable objective situation was rapidly exploited for intensifying guerrilla warfare, expanding the guerrilla zones, advancing the mass campaigns and increasing the revolutionary forces. In the entire Northern Luzon, the CAIN region registered the most rapid advance in armed struggle.

However, in the rush to advance we overextended ourselves to the detriment of such fundamental tasks as: the consolidation and solid organizing of the people in the rapidly expanding guerrilla zones; the consolidation and comprehensive equipping of the cadres with theoretical and practical knowledge amidst the growing and increasingly more difficult tasks and, in many instances, increasing specialization demanded by their assignment; the strengthening of the clandestine movement as the ideological, political and organizational backbone of the developing open mass movement; the steady political consolidation of the forces experiencing the intensifying struggles; the strong guidance and leadership of the Party over increasing military concerns; etc. Aside from these, the other regions could not keep pace with the onrush of the armed struggle in CAIN.

### **The Period 1986-1988**

In the entire NL region, this was the period of a forced advance of the revolutionary forces in straining to accomplish the important factors for the SCO. This overextension of our forces gave rise to serious vulnerabilities which the enemy could exploit in his general offensive against us.

The fall of the U.S.-Marcos autocratic and fascist regime and its replacement by the initially "popular" and liberal-posturing U.S.-Aquino regime prompted the Party organization in NL to stress the analysis that the fundamental social crisis remains and, thus, it is correct and necessary to continue the armed struggle.

In this period, the entire movement entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Manila government (GRP). Although we in the Northern Luzon Commission (NLC) and the regional Party committees were opposed to it, we abided by the policy and thus made our areas and our local NDF representatives vulnerable to enemy exposure. On the positive side though, the Party organizations in the regions could project the issues and basic demands of the peasants, thus achieving certain benefits for them.

But at the same time, the mainly "Left" opportunist error of further accelerating the development of the armed struggle and rapidly accomplishing the preparations for the SCO (according to the program of regularization) prevailed. This had been prompted by the advances achieved and the erroneous estimate that the decline of reactionary power would further accelerate because of the intensity of the crisis and would open the way for the rapid growth of the revolutionary forces.

Petty bourgeois impetuosity impelled the prior mixture of correct and wrong concepts towards a big deviation. The conference during that period had drawn up a program to accelerate the building of several company and battalion formations as preparation for regular mobile warfare, the verticalization and regularization of the NPA command, the setting up of provisional revolutionary governments at the municipal level, the rapid preparations in cities and town centers for launching partisan warfare, and the formation of an increasing number of staff units. The conference belittled what it had perceived as problems of increasing inadequacy in consolidation. Instead, the NLC further accelerated some aspects of the program after the coup attempt in 1987.

Because the acceleration was far off the existing balance of forces and well beyond the capacity of the people and the revolutionary forces to carry and sustain, it exhausted them to the extreme, and further increased the vulnerabilities of our still small and weak forces against the intense attacks of what was still a far bigger and far stronger enemy. And indeed the enemy undertook powerful military offensives starting from the latter part of 1987.

The widespread concern and questioning among many cadres and members about the excesses in the program had been correct. But the rapid advance had impelled the emergence of various concepts that departed and deviated from or otherwise blurred the basic principles of the Party regarding strategy and tactics, army building and united front, advancing the armed struggle and the revolutionary mass movement in the countryside and the cities. We have a wealth of negative lessons learned from all these.

One strongly infected by military adventurism and insurrectionism was our guerrilla front in Vizcaya-Quirino. Compounding the "Left" opportunist reading of the situation and the program at the NLC level, the front's leadership belittled the capacity of the enemy (military, local officials and ruling classes), aimed for a "tactical stalemate" and launched a series of daring military actions and mass struggles. It pursued a united front line that made no distinctions among sections of the ruling classes to the effect that they solidified as a block. Conversely, it also made no distinctions among the classes and strata of the people (especially the peasantry) and, in the rapid formation of the revolutionary organization of peasants, played loose by trusting unreliable elements. In its propaganda, it called for the quick elimination of the power and rule of the landlords in the province. It also quickly made propaganda about a strong people's revolutionary government at the municipal level upward having been set up and about the partially accomplished free distribution of land.

But in less than a year after the cadres' conference and in less than a year from the time that the enemy launched his general offensive against the revolutionary forces, it gradually dawned on us that the capacity of the revolutionary forces had been terribly strained. The guerrilla fronts that formerly had proclaimed big quantitative increases declined rapidly. Clearly, more and more parts of the program drawn up by the conference were unachievable, especially in the face of the growing enemy offensive. Thus the NLC and many of the regional committees made certain tactical adjustments.

## The Period 1989-1992

This was a period of both fierce struggles to foil the enemy offensive and decline in our revolutionary forces. In this period also the errors were gradually recognized and initial corrections were made. However, it would be the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee and the Rectification Movement that would enable us to do this comprehensively.

Although in fact, the objective conditions had grown more favorable during this period because of the further intensification of the crisis and isolation of the U.S.-Aquino regime, we could not effectively exploit the general improvement of the objective situation because we increasingly suffered a decline in our overall organized forces and continuously suffered losses from the enemy attacks.

In the face of these problems, it was the Party's statements on its 20th anniversary and the NPA's 20th anniversary that clarified the basic principles and the line of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare in moving towards the advanced substage. It was these, together with the Politburo resolutions regarding the problems that had emerged, that guided the NLC in 1989 to make important changes on the 1987 program.

Among the important adjustments that we undertook were the campaign for the political strengthening of the NPA; the conference on mass work; the implementation of a new program and the efforts at deploying our forces according to the level that we had reached in our understanding of the line of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare.

Although as early as 1989-90 the NLC and the regional committees in NL had upheld the line of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare, the lack of a comprehensive summing-up and rectification movement, the sharpening of the line struggle within the Party and the many unresolved questions with regard to conducting the struggle within the advanced substage continued to result in the combination and struggle of correct and wrong concepts.

Most prominent among these was the continuing adherence to the ideas and plans for regularization and verticalization based on

"certain elements of regular mobile warfare". However, the weight of persisting wrong concepts that had not yet been sharply identified and the orientation and tasks (still within the SCO and "regularization" frame) that had continued to come down from the NPA General Command (GC) blocked the proper deployment of the forces of the people's army and the implementation of suitable tactics in confronting the enemy offensive.

In spite of everything, the entire revolutionary forces heroically fought back the enemy offensive. The enemy faced a resolute struggle. The resolute struggle of the forces in NL, together with those of the other regions, prolonged the enemy's implementation of his "war of quick decision" strategy. And OLB I was followed by OLB II and, subsequently, OLB III.

The heroism and sacrifices of the revolutionary forces and the people in this struggle reveal one important lesson. When the revolutionary forces are able to accomplish properly the requisites for sustained advance within the framework of a protracted people's war, they can exhaust the dwindling resources (material and moral) of the reactionary forces mired in an intense crisis and the revolutionary forces can effect a strategic shift in the balance of forces.

We consider this self-critical study that we have started of the experiences in NL, which in the main confirm the broad and incontrovertible analyses and conclusions of "Reaffirm...", a great victory for the Party under the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee against the factionalists and anti-Party elements relentlessly striving to impugn the truth.

### **The Summing-Up by the Conference**

The summing-up made by the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee is correct, sharp and objective and the Rectification Movement is correct, necessary and vital. The entire experience of the revolutionary struggle in NL is witness to these.

The latter part of the 1970s up to 1983 was a long process of gradual but solid and comprehensive advance towards the advanced substage of the strategic defensive in the entire archipelago. Although

our tactical errors in this period were big, they were not of the nature of strategic deviations from the line of the people's democratic revolution and the strategic line of protracted people's war. Thus, study and correction had not been difficult then.

In the period 1984-88, the wrong concepts deviating from the line and basic principles of the Party — large "Left" opportunist errors (military adventurism and insurrectionism) inflicting long-lasting damage — intruded, solidified and grew strong. Our foremost error was our underestimation of the enemy and our premature pursuit of great victories.

The years 1989 to 1992 were a period of general adjustment amidst huge losses and reduction in revolutionary strength. Partial corrections were made but, in the main, the essential and major errors and deviations continued. In the last year, we were at the stage of focusing on the key problems of the revolutionary movement in NL when the Rectification Movement initiated by the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee came.

At the Conference we also identified the outstanding victories and the errors within more than one decade in the various fields of work — in ideology, politics and organization.

Our errors are principally of a "Left" opportunist character. Because we did not grasp the correct line in moving towards the advanced substage of the strategic defensive, the predominance of the SCO concept (including our own "enrichment" of it) and the impetus of our rapid advance in the years 1984-86 (including our wrong assessment of potentials of the situation and the balance of forces) prompted us to make an **attempt to rush the development of the people's war to the next strategic stage.**

The most conspicuous expressions of "Left" opportunism are:

1) Military adventurism: the general attempt at premature regularization, enlargement of the formations, intensification and heightening of the level of the war that opened the ground for the spread of militarist thinking and practices.

2) Commandism in our relations with the masses (in the form of premature calls for and setting of campaigns in succession) and some

forms of insurrectionism (like the insurrectionist actions in Nueva Vizcaya).

3) Premature verticalization of the structures of the army and even of the organizations of the masses (provisional revolutionary government - PRG and the national peasant organization - PKM).

4) Diminished understanding and application of the absolute leadership of the Party over the army.

There are other expressions of "Left" opportunism but these are the most prominent.

The most glaring among the organizational errors was the sectarian current of maintaining a small Party organization in the NL region. We were able to identify an acute malady of liberalism, as well as of bureaucratism and, in certain particular but glaring cases, of authoritarianism. There were big errors in the deployment of cadres and big shortcomings in comprehensive training of cadres. There were also instances of campaigns to "ferret out infiltrators" that widely violated the human rights of the comrades and the masses, who were unjustly accused.

The current of petty bourgeois impetuosity joined the main dogmatist current in the ideological sphere. An assortment of lessons picked out at random from the experiences of other revolutionary movements were vainly "used" in an attempt to accelerate our advance. Being mechanical — being misled by forms and failing to delve sufficiently into the essence of things; being misled by quantity and losing grasp of quality — was another glaring and widespread current.

The empiricist current is related to the principal current of dogmatism. Particular experiences of victories are considered of general significance, whether or not these have been properly summed up and whether or not these have been properly classified. There have been not only a few instances when impetuosity in running after big advances turned into the other extreme of overestimating the capacity of the enemy and of weakening the proletarian standpoint, leading to pessimism or cynicism.



Under the weight of the above errors, the Party, the entire revolutionary forces in NL, persisted in all-out armed struggle. Amidst the strong determination to go on with the people's war our cadres and members continued to have a basic grasp of our Party's basic principles that enabled them to offset the wrong concepts in the period that the errors ran rampant and, subsequently, to support and *reinforce the correct line when the Central Committee identified the errors and called for their rectification.*

Although the revolutionary forces in NL suffered losses, they advanced in some areas and fields and maintained their strength and base among the masses. Although it can be said that their capacity is more or less at the level of 1984, there are many positive factors which now we can hold on to. One is our grasp of the stage-by-stage *raising of the level of the war on the foundation that we have laid.* Another is our grasp of the necessity to raise the level of the people's war and of the intensity of the struggle that it entails.

The strong repression by the reactionaries and their strong anticommunist propaganda today is prompted by their undeniable difficulties in resolving the simultaneous crisis of world capitalism and the Philippine semifeudal and semicolonial society. They are mortally afraid of the resurgence of the revolutionary forces under the leadership of the Party.

Also the strong barrage of propaganda by the bunch of anti-Party elements *masquerading as Party "reformers"*, by the factionalists and by the elements whose will to make revolution has weakened but still wish to drag the Party down with them are but a sign of their frustration at their failure to loosen the Party's grasp of the basic principles.

### **The Resolutions**

The Conference approved the resolutions as part of adapting the rectification movement to NL and to the regions, and responding to the problems perceived in advancing the work.

Among the resolutions is one amending the result of the previous *conference on mass work to make its implementation comprehensive*

*and to adapt it to the process of expansion and intensification. Still as a part of the rectification movement, the resolution on the people's army outlines the process and content of army building according to the present level of guerrilla warfare and also according to the process of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare. The resolution on education work and the Party school addresses the problem of strengthening the leadership of the Party and raising the theoretical knowledge of cadres and members in NL.*

The Conference united on the resolution to uphold the correct and firm leadership of the Central Committee elected at the 10th Plenum, its policies and decisions and to actively participate in the struggle against the dirty attacks and the distorted ideas being propagated by the anti-Party elements, factionalists, insurrectionists, military adventurists, populists and rejectors of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the Philippine revolution. The Conference took the position that for the Party to be able to return to the correct path from the errors and deviations to which it had been mired, it is an urgent necessity for it to **reaffirm the basic principles and rectify errors!**

After the summing-up, the Conference conducted criticism and self-criticism. What became most apparent during the criticism session were the shallow theoretical knowledge, acute liberalism in maintaining unprincipled peace, impetuosity, bureaucratism, militarism and unreasonable basing in the cities by leading cadres. Erroneous styles and methods of leadership as well as incorrect attitudes and undesirable practices were also pointed out.

The Conference was filled with optimism that we would again firmly adhere to the correct theory and principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the principles of the Philippine revolution. We are confident that the Conference was able to identify sharply and decisively the ideological, political and organizational errors and that we would overcome all these. When the ongoing rectification movement shall have permeated the entire Party organization, the entire revolutionary movement will be able to regain its health and vitality, and again expand and grow strong. We shall certainly be

more capable of performing our current tasks of fighting the U.S.-Ramos regime, bringing the protracted people's war to victory against U.S. imperialism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism, accomplishing the national democratic revolution and paving the way for the next stage of socialist revolution. ●

*(Translation from the original in Pilipino)*

## APROPOS CARLOS FORTE'S INTERVIEW, "NOW THE 'REAL REVOLUTION' CAN BEGIN"

BY ISAGANI MAGTANGGOL  
FORMER EDITOR, *TALIBA NG BAYAN*

In the *Manila Collegian* interview with "Carlos Forte" and "Sergio Romero" published on July 26, 1993, "Carlos Forte" has so far excelled himself in attacking the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war. Attempting to disguise his warped understanding of the theory and line of people's war, "Forte" argues that "dogmatism" reigns in the Party, that it is "objectionable to become fixated" on theory and tactics and that the world has changed so much and, therefore, [they, Forte and company,] "are open to a multiplicity of options".

Forte's declarations against "dogmatism", against becoming "fixated" and for "openness" have all been said before by his ex-communist and ex-revolutionary predecessors such as the advocates of popdemism, insurrectionism *a la* El Salvador and Gorbachovite revisionism who have all become reformists, capitulationists and revisionists. These declarations are but reformulations of the "freedom of criticism" slogan of the original revisionist, Edward Bernstein, against the basic principles of Marxism.

Marxism teaches us that knowledge is a continuously spiraling process of reflecting reality and it is relatively stable at every given period. There are conclusions, which — because they have been drawn from the most complex and the most essential contradictions and have been proven correct not only for a particular space and time but also for a much wider scope in space and time — have become

laws and universal theories. And within the structure of such laws and universal theories, there are theories and lines applicable to more particular areas and periods. On the subject of waging revolution, there are questions concerning strategic leadership as well as tactical leadership.

In his interview, what Forte wishes to exhibit by his "antidogmatism", refusal to "become fixated" and "openness" is the muddling of the distinction between strategic and tactical issues, the universal and the particular, the principal and the secondary. This is the complete opposite of Lenin's teachings about flexibility on matters of tactics while at the same time standing firm on principles and strategic questions. What Forte wishes to have is "flexibility" even on questions of strategy, line and principles. He now wishes to consign our Party, which has gained recognition in the world communist movement for its uncompromising stand on principles, into the quagmire of eclecticism.

In practical politics, such an understanding of the issues as Forte's, invites repeated deviations from the revolutionary course; for it creates a propensity or awe for seemingly new phenomena encountered, which in fact are merely new manifestations of long existing essential questions, matters and events. Thus, Forte and his gang are easy prey to opportunism; sometimes, ultra-"Left" and, at other times, Right opportunism and soon they will never ever get out of the mire of revisionism.

The theory of protracted people's war, its strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside and its three strategic stages of defensive, stalemate and offensive have been drawn by Mao from the most fundamental and most complex contradictions at a certain historical epoch and in this context are therefore universally applicable.

This theory and line is based on the Leninist theory of imperialism and the law of the uneven development of countries and areas in the world, which in turn underlies the existence of the weakest link in the imperialist chain. This theory and line has been summed up from 22 continuous years of victorious people's war in a huge country such as

China. The length in years and the broadness in scope of the war, ranged against the most powerful imperialist and puppet armies, encompassed the most extensive yet the most particular circumstances. It is unprecedented in world history. The laws drawn from it cannot be depreciated.

Through the theory of people's war, the Marxist theory of the violent seizure of state power in semicolonial and semifeudal countries took concrete form. In such countries, the revolution is the war and the war is the revolution. Forte exposes his superficial understanding of the theory of people's war when he separates the revolution from the war.

Such a war is not merely a war by an army, not merely a "military line" as Forte would put it. Above all, it is a war of, for and by the people, who from the very beginning build their Red political power (army, organs of political power, mass organizations) through armed struggle and then, use this Red political power as launching base and rear until the people's democratic dictatorship is established nationwide.

As the insurrectional strategy drawn from the Russian revolution is applicable to all the imperialist countries, so is protracted people's war drawn from the Chinese revolution applicable to all semicolonial and semifeudal countries.

The war of the Vietnamese people against the Japanese, French and American imperialists and the local reactionary ruling classes was a protracted war which accumulated strength principally in the countryside for encircling the cities and which firmly followed three strategic stages (stage of contention, stage of equilibrium and stage of counteroffensive).

Before a revolutionary situation erupted in Nicaragua in 1977 or 1978, the revolutionary movement in Nicaragua had been accumulating strength through guerrilla warfare and building bases in the countryside. Even when the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) had split into three factions and the "terceristas" (insurrectionists) had become dominant, Humberto Ortega himself said that the "traditional guerrilla movement" in the countryside was a

close complement of the big military actions and uprisings. Although what took place in Nicaragua was a shift from a protracted people's war [*guerra prolongada popular*] to an insurrection during the last one or two years of the war, the Sandinistas admit that they succeeded because of special conditions. Thus, when the FMLN tried to repeat the Sandinista model, they achieved nothing but failure and they have regressed from insurrectionism to parliamentarism and capitulationism.

Parliamentarism and peace negotiations, which according to Forte are parts of the "arsenal of revolutionary tactics", are misrepresented by him as separate from the "military line" of people's war. It seems that he has forgotten that parliamentary struggle and negotiations — coordinated with the armed struggle as the principal form — cannot be separated but are part and parcel of the entire warfare. Initiatives in this regard must always conform to the demands at every stage and conduct of the war.

By separating the "revolution" into two stages and the "military line" from protracted war and "political tactics" such as parliamentarism and peace negotiations, Forte has prepared the "theoretical basis" for denigrating the people's war in the countryside (supposedly because it is a mere "military line") and correspondingly, for overinflating the importance of parliamentarism and negotiations ("political tactics"). Here is a case of tactics being separated from, and not subordinated, to strategy; and thus "political tactics" actually become more important than the strategy of protracted people's war (because it is denigrated as a mere "military line"). This is not merely a case of juggling theoretical categories, it is already a matter of falsifying the principles, strategy and line in order to minimize the importance of people's war and to push the line of class capitulation.

His warped understanding of strategy, line and principle can be perceived in his equally warped understanding of other questions. According to Forte, the "biggest weakness" of the Party for the past two decades is in the conduct of the united front. He asks, "it is called a people's revolution but where is its conduct of the united front?"

Forte has already forgotten that for the revolution to have a broad sweep, for it to involve the broadest and largest class in society, it must rely principally on the basic alliance of the workers and the peasants. For the urban petty bourgeoisie and also the national bourgeoisie to be drawn to the side of the revolution and for splits to exacerbate among the ruling classes, it is necessary for them to see and feel the unity and strength of the workers and the peasants.

Concretely, this strength is manifested by the deeply rooted and effective leadership of the Party of the proletariat among the peasant masses and other oppressed classes, the building of Red political power in the countryside which is the embryo of the democratic dictatorship of the workers, peasants and other oppressed classes, the growth in strength of the people's army and the revolution, which is mainly of peasants, and the momentum of working class struggles in the cities and the countryside.

Forte has already forgotten that for the Party to advance the revolution and mobilize the broadest range of the masses under its leadership, it must put forward analyses and calls that do not stoop to the bourgeoisie's level of analyses and slogans but are in fact superior and more advanced, thereby infusing every struggle with the proletarian revolutionary mark.

But instead of grasping these, Forte joins those who hinder mass deployment of workers and intellectuals to take root in the countryside and organize and mobilize the peasant masses. Instead of pursuing painstaking mass work to enhance and strengthen the bonds of the revolution among the masses, they conspire to undertake "politico-military struggles", that — because these do not correspond to the actual political consciousness of the masses — thus actually constitute terrorism and upset and scare the urban petty bourgeoisie away from the progressive movement. While "neglecting" the necessity of broadening the revolutionary mass base, which is still very narrow in relation to the entire population, Popoy and company stumble over each other in the vain pursuit of "broad alliances" primarily aimed at drawing the petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie on the basis of tactical issues and tactical actions "in



order to seize favorable opportunities", even if it means compromising the revolutionary outlook and stand. For example, their offer of an "ultimatum" to the Aquino regime during the period that its reactionary and counterrevolutionary character had already been exposed to the people. And now, their tailing behind the Ramos regime in fomenting the illusion that it is capable of putting the country on to the road of industrialization!

Furthermore, they themselves [Forte and his cohorts] boast that the politicians with whom they had "allied" in the past elections were "persuaded" not so much by the political clout of the revolution but by the threat of armed violence by the ABB (Alex Boncayao Brigade).

Forte's mechanical understanding of united front building can be rooted to his weak sense of the need to have a sharp and acute appreciation or recognition of the actual strength achieved by the revolution and the balance of forces between revolution and counterrevolution. And this is so because he narrows the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war and the line of encircling the cities from the countryside to being merely a "military line" and because he refuses to set the strategic demarcations on the road of advance: the three stages of defensive, stalemate and offensive. If one does not grasp that the revolution is still at the stage of the strategic defensive, one would suffer again and again from having a warped view of such major questions as the united front.

It is not only about the united front that Forte nurtures miscellaneous fantasies but also about "what would have been an early victory" of the revolution. According to him, a "revolutionary situation" existed during the EDSA uprising, but because of the errors of the Party, the "historic opportunity for a victory was lost". What exactly were these errors, Forte could not mention any except the shortcoming in conducting united front, in setting the mobilization calls and in failing to achieve results in parliamentary work. But he is silent on the more fundamental issues concerning the people's war, such as, for example, how extensive were the revolutionary bases, which are the main factors in the growth of the people's army, and how deeply rooted is the Party and its leadership in the revolution, which

principally dictates the "momentum, initiative and political influence" of the revolution among the people.

Forte's rash conclusion regarding the surge of unarmed people on EDSA in response to the call of Cardinal Sin to defend the coup plotters is: "the opportunity for a victory" existed. But he neglected or deliberately avoided saying that in the broad expanse of the country outside Metro Manila, the number and strength of our guerrilla bases and zones and the level reached by the war (basically, guerrilla warfare) were not yet sufficient to induce a general revolutionary crisis. Even in Greater Manila, the greater part of the people who joined the uprising were still fans and enthusiasts of the likes of Sin and Aquino, they had no means of getting arms, if they had not altogether been unprepared to take up arms and the issue to which they responded was electoral cheating and fascism, and not yet the need to wage revolution. He also failed to mention that the counterrevolutionary armed forces, although factionalized, held together in the main and, following the orders of the imperialists, were the ones clearly determining what was to be the outcome of EDSA.

Forte also evaded acknowledging that, with the given level of the people's war, there had been the attempt to force the tempo of the war through premature "regularization" and verticalization of the people's army, thus devouring cadres and resources that should otherwise have been devoted to mass work.

After juggling and muddling the distinctions between strategy and tactics, narrowing the meaning of the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war to being merely a "military line" and stressing the need to maximize "political tactics" such as negotiations, and dreaming of the victory of the revolution even at the stage of strategic defensive, Forte could not help saying, "our children have grown, we want peace." Furthermore, he says, "in that 'Year 2000' of Ramos, we need to resolve the roots of the war. ... The world has gone through many changes, we are open to a multiplicity of options."

Forte cannot hide that at the core and at the background of his "antidogmatism", his refusal to "become fixated" and his "openness to a multiplicity of options" is a paltry ruse for his gradual departure from

the road of protracted people's war and towards parliamentarism and capitulationism. ●

# MANIFESTO OF PARTY CADRES AND MEMBERS WHO HAVE REPUDIATED POPOY AND HIS GANG

AUGUST 1, 1993

On July 15 (1993), Popoy and his gang declared their separation from the Party. Through the bourgeois mass media, Popoy had his voice heard and with his back turned on the people but nevertheless showing himself to the enemy, he related his life's story, full of "greatness" in struggle and "oppression" in the hands of the Party", and boasted about the "loyalty" to his leadership of "almost 5,000" members and "almost 300" chapters of the Party in the National Capital Region (NCR).

Popoy and his gang again called for "all hands on deck" as in "Bugso" (upsurge) for a show of force in the mobilization last July 26. Leading members of the gang, including Popoy himself, with a prize of one million on his head, joined the mobilization!

The reactionary mass media, not to mention the U.S.-Ramos regime, had a field day with their new-found "celebrity". They had found another Conrado Balweg, this time "better off in quality and quantity". Again, amidst the onslaught of the enemy's "psy-war" campaign and call for peace, a new "messiah" has emerged with his "new path of advance". If "autonomy" for the Cordillera people from the [Party of the] "lowlanders" was Balweg's slogan, "autonomy" also for city insurrectionists from the Party, rooted principally in the countryside, was Popoy's own call.

## A. THE "AUTONOMY" DECLARATION OF POPOY AND HIS GANG

The Party has long anticipated the formal declaration of separation by Popoy and his gang. Before this, they had already excluded

themselves from the Party structure for almost 10 months; they have refused to acknowledge and have continued to attack the central leadership and its decisions and the basic principles of the Party. They have launched an all-out campaign to divide, weaken and destroy the Party.

However, instead of a split, they clamor merely for "autonomy". And instead of separation by "a majority" of the Party's cadres and members, or even only by those whom they claim to be their confederates in the Visayas and Mindanao and from among former political detainees, they could only mislead their own following in the NCR, which — as admitted by Popoy himself — has even been reduced by "68" members and "5" branches of the Party!

### **1. The "constitutional basis" for the "illegality of the center"**

Popoy's excuse for himself and his gang's refusal to stop factional and divisive activities leading to their total separation from the Party, is their false claim that the Party's Central Committee (CC) is "illegal" because: (1) the 10th Plenum of the Party was "bogus"; (2) the effectivity of the decisions — together with the elected CC members — of the Party's First Congress have lapsed since 1973, as stipulated by the Party Constitution, "a congress should be called every five years"; and (3) the series of Central Committees from 1973 until today have been elected by the CC itself and not by a Congress, which should "constitutionally" elect them.

Let us set aside the "bogus plenum" line because this has long been exposed and nobody with a critical mind believes it.

With regard to the claim that the CC has been functioning illegally since 1973, five years after the First Congress, and the decisions of the Congress of Reestablishment have expired, let us quote the entire provision (something Popoy could not do) of the Party Constitution:

"Section 1: The National Congress shall be called and convened by the Central Committee every five years, unless it is deemed necessary to hold it later or earlier." (Article V)

Where in this provision is the requirement that a congress must be convened every five years? One clause in the above constitutional

provision is very clear: it sets the standard requirement to hold the Congress every five years, but immediately states that such a Congress could be held even before or after the lapse of five years.

The Party Constitution, being falsified by Popoy, is consistent with dialectical materialism by its firm recognition of the need for the regular convening of the highest assembly of the Party; but with due consideration of the objective reality affecting such regularity because the Party is at war.

In the first years of the revolution, especially at the height of the fascist offensives during the time of Marcos, our guerrilla zones were still so few and narrow that it was dangerous for the Party to hold a congress.

But it was not merely the problem of venue for the congress that posed a big problem. According to comrades in the CC, another problem was the objective limitation of Party cadres to hold a congress.

The congress is not simply a gathering of delegates to engage in endless debates, as the Popoy gang would have it. The congress is essentially for summing-up the experiences of the Party in the preceding period or from the end of a previous congress and for analyzing the political situation, both of which become the basis for laying down the tasks of the Party. After the arrest of Amado Guerrero in 1977, the Party failed to sum up its experiences (since 1968, it had conducted two summing-ups: the period from 1968 to 1971 and the period 1968-1975 which is embodied in "Our Urgent Tasks"). There were limitations on the part of the Party cadres then to prepare the summing-up and other requirements for a congress. But it is malicious to make it appear that the leading cadres of the Party deliberately maneuvered not to hold the Congress and are therefore irresponsible and antidemocratic...and it is only Popoy and his fellow splittists who are concerned and who grasp the need for a congress. (In fact, the Party has just made a 10-year summing-up at the 10th CC Plenum, on the basis of the draft prepared by Armando Liwanag.)

"The Congress is the Party, and the Party is the Congress," Popoy and his cohorts claim. But despite the absence of a congress five

years after the First Congress, the revolution has forged ahead and the Party has grown and gained strength; and its leading cadres enjoy high respect and confidence among the broad membership of the Party and among the people. Thus, Popoy's slogan is illogical, it says in effect that since 1973, the revolution has been advancing with no Party in existence (since there has been no Congress).

The history of victorious people's war led by communist parties also refutes Popoy's spurious argument that without the congress, there is no Party to effectively lead the revolution to victory, because according to him, there can be no "real" Party in such a case. In China, from the time that the Chiang regime launched intense suppression against the Communist Party of China and the latter took the road of armed struggle in 1927, it would be only in 1945 that the Party could hold a congress inside China, after it had developed extensive base areas, like Yenan (the 1928 congress was held outside of China, in its neighbor, socialist Russia). From 1928 until 1945, inner-Party struggles, involving such fundamental matters as strategy and tactics, were conducted and resolved by CC plenums or Politburo meetings. For example, the ascendance of Mao Zedong Thought, the election of Maoists to the center of the CPC and the defeat of the line of insurrectionism and military adventurism took place at an expanded Politburo meeting in 1935 (the Tsunyi Conference). Nonetheless, the revolution triumphed principally because of the effective leadership of the Party.

We point this out not to disregard the weakness of the Party in failing to hold the Congress. In fact, we also criticize this weakness (in its statement of May 10, 1993, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee [EC-CC] also criticized itself on this score). But at the same time, we condemn and repudiate Popoy's hocus-pocus on the question of the Congress.

Popoy and his gang also claim that the series of Party Central Committees since 1973 are illegal supposedly because they have not been elected by a congress but by the CC itself in its plenums.

Indeed, the Party Constitution states that the Congress should elect CC members. But have not those whom Popoy misled into

believing such a line not asked why Popoy, who has not attended a single plenum or Congress of the Party and is not a CC member, is the first and only one to present such a basis for the CC's alleged illegality?

According to comrades in the CC, during the First Congress an internal rule was formulated regarding the election of CC members. It authorized the CC to elect its members as long as the number did not exceed half the number of the existing CC. Such an internal regulation conforms with dialectical materialism, confronted as we are by a difficult, complicated and long war where, aside from the difficulties of convening the Second Congress, there is always actual and potential danger to the cadres of the Party.

Furthermore, another constitutional provision stipulates that "If the Party or any Party organization cannot function in full accordance with this Constitution because of extraordinary circumstances, the forms of organization and methods of work shall be determined by the Central Committee or the Political Bureau". (Section 2, Article XII)

[In fact, the Party has long been preparing for its Second Congress, not as a venue for endless debates between those who adhere to the proletarian revolutionary line on the one hand and the factionalists and splittists pushing the line of opportunism and revisionism on the other, but for ideologically uniting the Party cadres and members beforehand by firmly adhering to the line differentiating Marxism-Leninism from opportunism and revisionism.]

## **2. The "theoretical basis" of the "autonomy" line**

As with their earlier factionalist and splittist maneuvers, Popoy and his gang have put a "Leninist" label on their declaration of "autonomy"

They claim: "autonomy" is in accordance with the experience of Lenin when the Bolsheviks declared their autonomy from the Mensheviks who then held the majority in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party [RSDLP] and were maneuvering against the Bolsheviks.



Even in grabbing a "theoretical argument" to embellish their separation, they cannot conceal their real intention: which is to pull the Party backward, not to propel it forward.

Popoy and his gang must understand, or must not conceal from those whom they have misled and deceived, the historical truth that the very first Bolshevik Party in history did not mature suddenly. It had to go through a long process of development before it could emerge as a proletarian party, tempered ideologically, politically and organizationally. This happened only in 1912 after the Mensheviks had been expelled from the RSDLP when they tried to liquidate the Party and supplant it with a legal "Labor Congress" whose substance was to "represent the various tendencies within the working class" — as the Popoy gang would like to do to our Party, according to their paper, "Leninismo o Stalinismo?" ["Leninism or Stalinism?"]. The Bolshevik Party reached maturity after undertaking theoretical ("What is to be Done?"), organizational ("One Step Forward"), political ("Two Tactics") and ideological ("...Empirio-Criticism") preparations.

The historical circumstances of the RSDLP, which Popoy and his gang filched for their "autonomy" line is completely different from the historical and national circumstances of our Party today. In Russia at that time, the RSDLP from the beginning had been divided into two factions, a situation that Lenin did not desire. The factions emerged within a Party that had just begun to lay down its organizational principle (democratic centralism), and had not reached unity among its ranks on important questions of politics and ideology.

In the Philippines, our Party has gone through reestablishment as a result of the struggle against the Lavaites who had trapped the Communist movement in a series of "Left" and Right opportunist errors until it deteriorated into revisionism. Our Party benefits from the treasury of the theory and practice of the revolutionary proletariat, particularly from the Marxist line of party building and from the rich practice of the Communist Parties of Russia and China.

Notwithstanding its limitations, our Party has come a long way in party building. But here comes Popoy and his gang wanting to drag the Party backward to an infantile and primitive state — of having

Menshevik special agents of the bourgeoisie within the proletarian party!

While Popoy and his gang are stroking, applauding and serenading that part of the experience of Lenin, they stuff and conceal in their closet of "theories" Lenin's teachings on the centralist aspects of party building, especially Lenin's works with regard to the factions and groups at the 10th and 11th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

According to Lenin's "On Party Unity" which was approved by the 10th Congress of the CPSU in 1921:

"The Congress orders the immediate dissolution, without exception, of all groups that have been formed on the basis of one platform or another and instructs all organizations strictly to see to it that there shall be no factional pronouncements of any kind. . ."

Historically, this resolution was made in the context of the New Economic Policy, which gave way to the revival of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influence after they had been crushed during the October Revolution and the ensuing few years. Lenin's objective was to stop the emergence of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois lines and ideas within the CPSU. The situation in the Philippines today — where counterrevolution is still dominant, and especially because the world communist movement is in crisis, and within our Party, there is some confusion with regard to its basic principles — obliges us even more to adhere to Lenin's basic teachings on party building. We must grasp this basic teaching of Lenin, because in Popoy's paper, "Leninismo o Stalinismo?", he falsifies history by making it appear that Lenin was only forced against his will ("agonized") to propose this resolution to the CPSU and that its value is only for that particular moment.

But "we are neither factionalist nor splittist", Popoy and his gang protest, even in their declaration of "autonomy" this July. They claim they are not, because they do not have their own "platform".

The claim that a line struggle and a faction exists within the Party only when there are those who openly carry a line or program diametrically opposed to the Party's line or program is not correct.

Such a view can only disarm the Party ideologically and allow into the Party the entry, proliferation and corrosive effect of a variety of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois lines and ideas, paying lip service to the basic principles of the Party.

In fact, Popoy and his gang already have their varying "lines and program" which is diametrically opposed to the line and program of the Party; such as their revision and distortion of the theory of people's war, their proposal to transform the Party into a party of bourgeois-liberal pluralism; and their anti-Stalinist revisionism.

Popoy and his gang are raging over their being called factionalist and splittist after only issuing the paper, "Tumindig sa Tama at Totoo..." (Stand for What is Correct and True...)

In that paper, they declare that they do not recognize the center that was elected by the 10th Plenum, and that what they recognize is a now nonexistent "center" of the 9th Plenum. What else is the meaning of such a position (not recognizing any center), if not factionalism and splittism? Actually, those whom they have misled and deceived now recognize Popoy and his gang as their party center, and what they now follow are the decisions, line and "program" originating from the gang.

When the Menshevik minority refused to follow the decisions of the central leadership of the RSDLP that was supported by the Bolshevik majority after the Party's Second Congress, this was what Lenin said:

"Refusal to accept the direction of the central bodies is tantamount to refusing to remain in the Party, it is tantamount to disrupting the Party; it is a method of destroying, not of convincing..." ("One Step Forward")

The "autonomy" declaration of Popoy and his gang cannot be tolerated by any communist who adheres to Lenin's teaching on the character of the Party, a fighting Party and not a "debating society". Where have you ever seen a Party of a socialized and disciplined class, currently waging revolution against a much stronger and much bigger enemy, allowing itself to be fragmented and paralyzed by organs that are... "autonomous"?

In summing-up the CPSU's experiences in leading the three Russian revolutions, Lenin emphatically stressed that the *"absolute centralization and rigorous discipline" of the party of the proletariat were "essential conditions for the victory over the bourgeoisie"* (*"Left-Wing Communism"*).

"Dogmatism" is one principal accusation against the Party in Popoy's factionalist court. This also is supposed to be one "evidence" why the the verdict was separation from the Party. But the judge-accuser is clearly the one guilty of the crime of dogmatism. Popoy and his gang delight themselves with simply picking up, here and there, assorted quotations from Lenin without understanding their historical context, without striving to discover their significance relative to the more fundamental teachings of this great Communist teacher; they do not examine, if these correspond to the viewpoint, standpoint and methods of Leninism.

Popoy and his gang's declaration of "autonomy" is the culmination of their efforts at distorting the Marxist-Leninist line of Party building. By it they have completely put themselves out of the structure and the organizational principles of a proletarian party and they have been posturing as a separate clique. They are now free to implement their "newly discovered" line of party building, spiced with "Leninism" and wrapped in anti-Stalinism presented as a struggle against "absolutism" and "ultra-centralism", the better to conceal and vanish the brand and substance of their bourgeois-liberal pluralism.

## **2. The essence of the "autonomy" line**

By announcing their separation, Popoy and his gang take an offensive posture against the Party. But behind such a posture is the truth that in their struggle against the Party, they have long been put *on a defensive position. This is the reason why they could call only for "autonomy" and not a split.*

But a split is the essence of what they did, although up to now they do not admit this truth. It is only "autonomy", so they say; they still claim to be members of the Party.

It is only autonomy and not a split, they say, because it is only the central leadership and not the Party that they are repudiating. What? They recognize the Party but not the Central Committee which represents the entire organ and mass membership under it, and which manages and directs its course? They recognize the mass membership but not the leaders whom the mass membership trust and support because of their superior capability, experience and discipline to lead the struggle? They recognized the body of the Party but not its head; in brief, they recognize the Party as a body without a head? Lenin has already denounced the concept of separating the "leader" from the "mass membership" of the Party.

They claim that they recognize the mass membership, but the principal excuse that they give those whom they have misled about why, so far, they have not sought a split is — and this is the biggest insult they have heaped upon the members of the Party — that the majority of the members are still blind...and they need to be "enlightened" by the factionalists!

They also claim that they recognize the Party Constitution and that is why they do not want to split, and that their demand is "the constitutional Second Congress"; but simultaneously they claim that the decisions of the First Congress — and they cannot conceal the fact that the Party Constitution was one of its enactments — are no longer in effect. Their claims are caught up in contradictions.

What Popoy and his gang wants is not a vigorous and fighting Party but a decapitated one capable only of scaring away those who believe in ghosts, a jet fighter without a pilot, that despite having to confront an enemy — whose target is to crush it in 1993 — should remain without a leadership... "until the Second Congress has been held"! Where in this argument is there the least bit of concern for the Party and the revolution?

A split has been the inevitable direction of Popoy and his gang, as they refuse to acknowledge their own errors and remould themselves; as they want to remain in the cities and as they are "allergic" to life in the guerrilla zones. They refuse to accept responsibility for their organizational violations against the Party. And split as an option has

been throbbing in their minds since the start of the intense struggle inside the Party. This is why, in their struggle against the center, Popoy and his gang through almost 10 months of incessant "indoctrination" drew and misled the Party cadres and members over whom they "preside". So that if they "lost" in the struggle — according to Popoy — "we will not allow a repeat of 1978" when he and his confederates were easily compelled to stand by the CC decision and to stop their factional activities. This is because Popoy now has his "forts" — the "thousands of Party cadres and members and the hundreds of thousands of people that they lead" whom he wishes to involve in his separation from the Party, in order to avoid the organizational sanctions that may be imposed on him and his gang.

But their subjective wish for a split runs counter to objective reality.

They declared "autonomy" and not a split because, in the first place, they realize that all they are capable of is to destroy but they cannot present anything "sensible" with which to replace that which they seek to destroy.

The refusal to rectify errors — not any valid criticism of and alternative to the existing line, program and policies of the Party — this is the principal reason for the course that Popoy and his gang have taken and which has reached its limit. In fact, they "discovered" their new "theories" and line, such as on party building, anti-Stalin revisionism, etc., in the course of "inner Party struggle" only to justify their factionalism and splittism. Even before they had started with their factional activities, Popoy and his gang were already expressing particular views contrary to the basic principles of the Party; but only up to being contrary. But in less than a year, this evolved into their separation from the Party, even as they themselves doubt their own capability to become leaders and ideologues of a new party.

Second, how could they possibly take pride in declaring a split if, aside from the fact that they cannot present a comprehensive line and program, they are only a handful. They would have gotten an outpouring of rebuke and told to self-destruct, had they declared a split!

The clearest proof that the factionalists and splittists are only a handful and that they are limited to their "fort" in Manila is the fact that only Popoy and his gang declared "autonomy", even after almost 10 months of factional organizing and factionalism within the Party, and issuance of all sorts of papers exhorting Party members to "stand for what is correct and truthful". This is also the most concrete reply to their lies about having a growing following.

But even their very lies reflect their dwindling ranks. One lie belies another. Very early on, they spread the news that four regional committees in the Visayas were solid factionalists as were two regional committees in Mindanao and possibly another one could be persuaded; a "White Area" in Bicol and the regional trade union unit in Southern Tagalog, and whatever else. Subsequently, they claimed that from the start, the two regional committees in the Visayas were pro-Party and refused to engage in factional activities; those from Mindanao had not been followed up yet; and they fell silent about the other organs that they had previously cited as factionalist. And lately, they claim that only one regional committee in the Visayas remains factionalist, and that in Mindanao, the regional committees had opted to be within the Party structure but that they struck a deal with the center for an increase in the number of company formations in the people's army.

Popoy and his gang will inevitably declare their formal split from the Party. But they still need to position themselves halfway — through "autonomy" — between remaining within the Party and formally separating themselves from it. "Autonomy" is not a sign of their strength but is a desperate measure to cover up their weakness.

Foremost among their stated reasons for choosing "autonomy", is **preservation of forces**. It means: prohibiting those "under them" from talking to cadres and members of the Party "except in specific cases"; a system of "blacklisting" Party cadres and members who "enter and reach out to those in their territory"; etc. In their declaration of "autonomy", the gang emphasized: "From now on, they do not have any right whatsoever to intrude" into the units and forces that

they have misled and deceived. Reinforcing the fortification around those whom they have misled is one reason for "autonomy".

Popoy and his gang were obviously shaken when they saw that Party cadres and units previously under them — refusing to act as blind followers and uncritical believers insisted on knowing both sides (the Party's and the anti-Party's) and proceed objectively and critically to analyze the theory, principles, points, data and style of both sides, and giving primacy to principles and to the future of the Party and the revolution over that of personal relationship and "fellowship" with Popoy and his gang — finally left and repudiated them.

Only "68" are pro-Party and anti-factionalist, said Popoy and his gang. Grant that indeed only "68", not much more, were the first to leave and repudiate Popoy and his gang, the latter could not deny the fact that this is a force sizeable enough to rouse the consciousness of those whom they had misled. They cannot conceal the continuously increasing number of those who take the course shown by the "68". Those with whom the latter had talked but could not be convinced completely about the correctness of the Party's line and decisions have started to question the position that Popoy and his gang had imposed on them. Some of those to whom explanations were made may not have returned to the Party's fold but they have become inactive and have distanced themselves from Popoy and his gang. And the ranks continue to swell of those who have been roused and are ready to heed this message and advice: "there are still many things that you do not know, do not be content and do not rely on what Popoy and his gang say and write, verify the data, discuss with cadres and members of the Party". Arm in arm with the Party organs that are actively smashing the fortifications put up by the splittists, the "68" continue to struggle with Popoy and his gang.

This is the very reason why the "68" make Popoy's blood boil and, with all their might, he and his gang have been intimidating and harassing them so that they, the "68", may not get through and erode the fortifications set up through demagoguery, lies, intimidation, pressure, coercion, playing "martyr", eliciting guilt-feelings, etc. Last May 24, for example, when Popoy spotted two of the "68" at the



queue of jeepneys at the Farmers' Market in Cubao (Quezon City), he spent about 30 minutes subjecting them to abuse, needling and taunting them in the presence of bystanders turned curious.

In anticipation of their separation, this is what Popoy and his gang have been saying:

"This declaration of autonomy by the MRRC can only lead to two directions: Formal reintegration under a legitimate national center in accordance with the decisions of the Second Congress or the reestablishment of a Marxist-Leninist Party because of continued blocking and delay of the Second Congress despite a broad demand for it."

Popoy and his gang do not dare guess or accept their more likely direction in the face of the demoralization and loss of commitment to the revolution suffered by their forces. Note from their declaration quoted above the absence of an answer to the question: what would they do if they continue to be alone and the ranks, shouting "Second Congress", continue to thin out?

The declaration of "autonomy" signals the accelerated decline towards the collapse of Popoy and his gang. How ironic that Popoy should still call this the "start of the true revolution".

## **B. THE "REVOLUTION" OF POPOY AND HIS GANG**

In their declaration of "autonomy", Popoy and his gang became more direct in attacking the theory and line of people's war.

### **1. Universality of the theory of people's war**

They still insist that the theory and line of protracted people's war is not absolute; although they claim to abide by the Marxist theory of violent revolution as a means of seizing state power. At the same time they use the statement of Lenin in "Marxism and Guerrilla Warfare" as a "theoretical justification" for arguing against the necessity of protracted war. In that quotation, the gang drew the point that one may choose strategy ("form of struggle" is the formulation in the selection) depending on the "stages of economic evolution.

depending on differences in political, national, cultural, living and other conditions".

The theory of violent revolution and Lenin's teachings on strategy are indeed universal truths that, according to him, are "principal theoretical propositions that should guide us".

But the matter does not end there. Such universal and abstract theories acquire concrete form in the national and historical conditions of a given society.

The experience of victorious revolutions shows that strategy is drawn principally on the basis of the existing mode of production, which is determined by existing class relations. (We must be clear on this point because Popoy's paper, "Tumindig..." ["Stand ..."], tends to make Lenin's use of the abstract term "stage of economic evolution..." collide with his use of the more concrete term "mode of production", and misses the most fundamental basis for strategy, its class basis.)

Let us cite some quotations from Mao on "Problems of War and Strategy":

"On the issue of war, the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries oppose the imperialist wars waged by their own countries; if such war occurs, the policy of these Parties is to bring about the defeat of the reactionary governments of their own countries. The war they want us to fight is the civil war for which they are preparing. But this insurrection and war should not be launched until the bourgeoisie becomes really helpless, until the majority of the proletariat are determined to rise in arms and fight, and until the rural masses are giving willing help to the proletariat. And when the time comes to launch such insurrection and war, the first stage will be to seize the cities, and then advance into the countryside, and not the other way about. All this has been done by Communist Parties in capitalist countries, and it has been proved correct by the October Revolution in Russia.

"China is different however. The characteristics of China are that she is not independent and democratic but semicolonial and semifeudal, that initially, she has no democracy but is under feudal oppression and that in her external relations she has no national

independence but is oppressed by imperialism. It follows that we have no parliament to make use of and no legal right to organize the workers to strike. Basically, the task of the Communist Party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside but the reverse."

Here Mao shows that the principal basis for the difference between the insurrectionary strategy and protracted war is the difference between the capitalist mode of production and the semicolonial and semifeudal mode of production.

Here Mao also shows that in the era of imperialism, the oppressed and exploited people can be found in two main categories of countries constituting the world imperialist system: capitalist and semicolonial-semifeudal. Accordingly, peoples who are waging revolution under the leadership of Communist Parties have two basic strategies: insurrectional and protracted war. The classic type of revolution in imperialist countries is the October Revolution in Russia; the classic type of revolution in semicolonial and semifeudal countries is the Chinese revolution. Any strategy that appears to be different from the either the Russian or the Chinese models is only a variation, or, in very rare instances, was carried out and proven correct on the basis of certain specific conditions.

This is where the question of the universality and absoluteness of the theory and line of people's war comes in.

This question has long been a theoretical achievement of the Party under the leadership of Amado Guerrero in its struggle against Lavaite revisionism (see "Pomeroy's Portrait"). But since military adventurists have again emerged, are rapidly moving towards parliamentarism and revisionism, we need a review for the benefit of those who have been misled by Popoy and his gang.

Mao developed the theory and line of people's war based on the existence of the weakest link in the imperialist chain according to the Leninist theory of the uneven development of countries and places in the world imperialist system.

The world imperialist system is divided into the few developed capitalist countries serving as the world's metropolis and bulwark of imperialism; and the semicolonial and semifeudal countries serving as the world's vast countryside where the weakest links of imperialism can be found. Each of these semicolonial and semifeudal countries themselves are of two parts: the few cities or urban centers and the extensive countryside where the majority of the population and the weakest link of imperialism and the local ruling classes can be found. This is another universal and definite truth, which also gives universality to the strategy of protracted war and the line of encircling the cities from the countryside.

To be able to fully understand the absoluteness and universality of the theory of people's war, we must have a correct evaluation of Mao who developed it in the course of waging the Chinese revolution. This is all the more necessary in view of the fact that Popoy and his gang belittle the place of Mao Zedong Thought in the treasury of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the Chinese revolution in the history of the international communist movement.

Mao's theory of protracted people's war is drawn from 22 long years of victorious practice and experience in a vast country like China. It was a war that went through the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the War of Liberation. The length in time and the vastness in scope of the war, where the enemies were the most powerful imperialist and puppet armies, encompass the most extensive but most distinctive circumstances. This was unprecedented in the entire history of mankind and the international communist movement. The laws drawn from it cannot be belittled.

Mao, the greatest Communist leader coming after Lenin, has been the most masterful in laying down the most comprehensive military line by drawing from such a rich experience in waging revolution. But this military line is based on, and not separate from, the comprehensive line of people's war, which identifies the decisive role of the masses in advancing the war.

The Chinese revolution further deepened the proletarian character of world revolution. If Lenin had linked the socialist revolution in the West with the national democratic revolution in the East, Mao in turn linked the national democratic revolution in the East to the socialist revolution in the West.

In the process of seizing power in their respective countries, the methods used by Lenin and Mao were complementary. In crushing the enemy, one started from the cities and proceeded to the countryside; and the other started from the countryside and proceeded to the cities.

In the victories of their revolutions, the socialist revolution in Russia breached the imperialist frontier of the West, while the national democratic revolution in China breached the imperialist frontier in the East.

## **2. The strategic line and its three strategic stages**

Popoy and his gang still misinterpret protracted people's war as a military strategy. Thus, they misconstrue "the line of three strategic stages and encircling the cities from the countryside". And according to Popoy, revolution is different from war, and that we should maximize the "arsenal of tactics" which he differentiates from the war. Among the "arsenal's" content, he underscores peace negotiations and parliamentarism.

We must indeed review the principles embodied in the theory of people's war in the face of such a distortion of people's war by Popoy and his gang, and especially because many among those whom they have misled — particularly new Party members and mass activists — there are those who have no knowledge, have very superficial, or have forgotten the theory of people's war. This is because what they have been studying during the last two years are the "masterpieces" of Popoy and his gang like *Lunas sa Kahirapan* (LSK: Cure for Poverty) and MRP.

In a semicolonial and semifeudal country like the Philippines, the revolution is the war, and the war is the revolution! Here, the concrete form of seizing power through violent means is war, a people's war.

The theory of people's war recognizes armed struggle as the principal form of struggle, and the other forms of struggle like parliamentary struggle and peace negotiations are secondary but integral to the war, forms that serve each stage and the conduct of the entire war. It is the height of absurdity to narrow down people's war to the armed struggle and exclude from it all other forms of struggle.

It is also absurd to reduce our armed struggle to merely being a military struggle. Essentially, it is a revolutionary political struggle, a distinct political struggle that is armed. The majority of our Party cadres and members, who in the main are directly fighting the enemy in the raging people's war in the countryside, know this. The only ones who refuse to understand this are the ex-communists and ex-revolutionaries who have grown old ensconced in the cities and have no more inclination to go to the countryside, or those who — after having tried to serve in the countryside but refused to remold themselves — have sworn off returning to the countryside.

The line of surrounding the cities from the countryside is not also reducible to a military line. In the countryside, guerrilla warfare is not just enlarging and strengthening the people's army and step-by-step wiping out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police until the counterrevolutionary armed forces, entrenched in the cities, are pushed and surrounded there by the New People's Army for the final military blow. Those who think that way are no different from the emperors and militarist generals whose wars are merely of standing armies.

People's war is essentially the building of revolutionary bases. The line of encircling the cities from the countryside is the step-by-step building of revolutionary bases in the countryside in the form of guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases where eventually the organs of political power (the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the people in its embryonic form) are set up; until the cities are totally surrounded by an extensive and interconnected network of guerrilla bases and organs of political power and the reactionary state can be toppled and

the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the people can be built nationwide (in the form of the people's government).

The revolutionary bases are not merely the **end** of the war; these are the **means** and also the foundation for waging revolutionary warfare. The issue is that of building up the political power of the people through armed struggle and, subsequently, of using these as **launching bases**, and rear areas for waging the war.

The survival, growth and strengthening of the people's army cannot be separated — as the "regularists" and military adventurers wish — but always depend on the development of the whole work of base-building and other related political work (agrarian revolution, building of mass organizations, etc.).

Mao was the first to discover the essential role of revolutionary bases in the entire conduct of people's war. This he achieved as a result of victorious practice in building liberated base areas in the Chingkang Mountains, after the retreat following the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927. Mao said:

"The policy of establishing base areas; of systematically setting up political power; of deepening the agrarian revolution; of expanding the people's armed forces by a comprehensive process of building up first the township Red Guards, then the district Red Guards, then the local Red Army troops; of spreading political power by advancing in a series of waves, etc., etc. Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration. Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide." ("A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire")

It is also wrong to label as a "military line" and "not to define" the strategic stages of the war such as the defensive, the stalemate and the offensive. These are not simply stages of military warfare, nor are

these simple questions of what mode of warfare and what military formation to deploy; all these involve such questions as the conduct of the mass movement and mass struggles, including uprisings; these are questions involving the entire war.

It is necessary for us to lay down and define the three strategic stages as our guide for gauging the balance of forces between revolution and counterrevolution at every given time; as a guide for the step-by-step growth in strength of the revolutionary forces towards achieving superiority over, and eventually defeating, counterrevolution.

With no signals on the road of advance, confusion can reign, any adventurist or dogmatist can ape or revise, insert or make experiments with whatever "arms" there are in the "arsenal of tactics" and, by lip service, claim that this is also in accordance with "protracted war"; the people's army can be "blown up" even when the mass base is still narrow and shallow; never mind what is the actual strength of the revolution; never mind what is the balance of forces between revolution and counterrevolution!

Following the three strategic stages means stressing the principal role of the subjective forces of the revolution while grasping and adapting to the objective conditions. Experience shows that those who refuse to define and wish to skip the three strategic stages suffer from the disease of overestimating the objective conditions and being obsessed by spontaneous factors while underestimating the actual condition of the subjective forces.

Popoy and his gang are among those infected with such a disease. This explains why they are constantly afflicted by "miscalculations", the meaning of which is addiction to plans and concepts that are not based on concrete reality.

The former MRRC has admitted that their 1990-92 Program was a failure because it focused on planning for gigantic mass actions in accordance with the "favorable objective conditions", to attain a leap in the mass movement in the NCR; while "failing to consider" the still extremely narrow mass base (four percent of the entire population of Metro Manila).



Widespread demoralization, disappointment and discontent swept through the forces of the former MRRC after Bugso failed, as a result of the overexpectation and overextension, strain and exhaustion, when they were pushed to a battle beyond their actual capacity. The Bugso plan was principally based on the "need" to respond to the objective condition ("final showdown with the Aquino regime" and "counter-current to reformism brought about by the election") and on "a sufficient number" of our subjective forces, achieved through rapid recruitment of "open revolutionary activists" without being consolidated, and lowered standards for recruitment of partisans.

The insurrectionists say: To follow the three stages is to limit the potential of objective conditions and the growth of flexibility. First, has there ever been any successful insurrectionist project within the movement "seizing upon the favorable objective conditions"? Second, the Leninist concept of flexibility does not contradict or override, but is firmly based on, the basic principles of the Party, like the theory of people's war and its strategic line and its three stages.

In theory, narrowing protracted war to being merely a military strategy and refusing to define the three strategic stages in order to be able to seize favorable opportunities; in politics, excitement over and obsession with struggles of attrition and overambitious targets, and constant affliction with "miscalculations". How else can this be called, if not insurrectionism?

### **3. Peace negotiations, parliamentarism, Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)**

In their "autonomy" declaration, Popoy and his gang underscored the peace question and parliamentarism, as parts of the "arsenal of tactics". On the peace question, Popoy said they would grab the "tiniest opportunity if only to achieve a peaceful settlement of the insurgency (sic!) through negotiation". They also lashed out at the Party's position on the question of a "neutral venue"; claiming that talks could be held within the country, in the barrios controlled by the revolutionary movement; and that what is more important is to have

the negotiations proceed to the "substantive issues", and achieve "concrete victories".

So, Popoy and his gang do not only want to destroy the revolutionary bases of the Party by demanding the premature "regularization of the army" which would devour resources and cadres otherwise devoted to mass work, and the self-constriction of the people's army in the face of the enemy's tactics of gradual constriction, but they also want to endanger our mass base by exposing them to the enemy's surveillance and military operations the moment we implement the gang's "proposal" for negotiations in barrios controlled by our movement.

Let us proceed to the more fundamental matters on the question of war and peace.

The question of peace more than anything else is the question of war. We can attain peace only through revolutionary war. Revolutionary war is the only means by which we can put an end to the counterrevolutionary war against the people. Any advance and any victory in the peace question can only be the result of the advance of the war.

It is madness to wish that regardless of the level to which the war has advanced, we should still "seize the tiniest bit of opportunity" for "concrete gains" and "peaceful method of settlement". This is because there are talks about peace premised on the enemy's view that the movement is weak and can be split, and also on the view that the fierce blows of the war on the enemy has had their effect.

Laying aside the revolutionary line in exchange for tactical gains, especially if this is connected with the war, is rank opportunism. Such is the wish of Popoy when he denigrates the question of a "neutral venue" because this supposedly "blocks" the talks from proceeding to negotiation on "substantive issues" and the achievement of "concrete gains".

A "neutral venue", whose content is the insistence on the recognition of the status of belligerency, is a question of revolutionary line. This is because we want not only the enemy but more importantly the peoples of the world and the whole world to see and

recognize the Philippine revolutionary movement not as a mere insurgent force but as a movement which has its own government and army, leads a sizeable number of the people and controls a sizeable territory in the country. And because we wish to show the high level that the war has reached, and to prove the correctness and legitimacy of the war.

On the other hand, giving priority to "substantive issues" and "concrete victories" by setting aside the question of a "neutral venue" is only a matter of "achieving" some reforms (in the logic of Popoy's declaration, the core of what they call "substantive issues" are the "concrete victories") Let us not equate the tasks of peace negotiations to the tasks of mass struggles.

The peace question, including peace talks, are closely linked with the question of war; what is involved here is the very fate, the outcome itself, of war. Once we separate the peace question from the war, we can be led to neglect and depart from the strategic objective of overthrowing the state and we can be carried away or trapped by reformism and capitulationism. This is the reason why we must grasp the dialectical link between peace and war.

In their interviews and press statements, Popoy and his gang did not define what concretely were the "concrete victories" they cited. But since in the last few months the factionalists have all been saying the same things, we can presume these are the same things that the "verdaderos" have all along been saying — civil rights.

If this is what they refer to as "concrete victories", what is its significance to the peace question?

Granting that indeed civil rights are allowed, the direct result may be some widening of the space for "bourgeois democracy", it will not be the "resolution of the roots of the war". There is the expectation that Ramos would improve the situation for parliamentarism and legal struggles. Thus, their vain expectation of "concrete victories" would suit their wish for "maximizing bourgeois democracy and elections" as enunciated by Popoy.

When the logic of the "verdaderos" is seen within the context of their insistence on civil rights as a priority in the peace negotiations, it

can easily be exposed as parliamentarism and capitulationism, especially because the "verdaderos" idolize the leaders of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador which, after the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, are now the frontrunner among the insurrectionists and military adventurers in the world. In El Salvador, the insurrectionists and military adventurers under the leadership of the FMLN have already surrendered their arms, transformed the FMLN into a legal party, and are preparing for the next elections there as a result of their negotiations with the U.S. - Christiani regime which granted their demand for the release of political detainees, the punishment of some abusive military personnel, and the easing of electoral restrictions — even if the roots of the war have not been addressed.

But Popoy and his gang are not openly pro-FMLN, so to understand their line of "concrete victories", we must view it principally within the context of their entire line of argumentation. They separate the question of war from the question of peace and the other "arsenal of tactics", and they reduce protracted people's war to mere military strategy. They attack the Party's strategy of protracted people's war as a "doubtful" path towards victory without, however, presenting any new strategy or clear "refinement" on our warfare. Their declaration already emphasizes the "maximization of bourgeois democracy like elections and negotiations". They have laid aside the question of the revolutionary line to make room for "concrete gains" in the peace question. (And the "leaders" of the impostor "MRRC" have taken to attending legal activities!)

Along this line of argumentation, it is extremely difficult to believe that Popoy and his gang can differ from the "verdaderos" and FMLN, and that they have not departed from the line and strategy of people's war or that they have not used the issue of peace negotiations to prepare the factors for parliamentarism and capitulationism.

Popoy may say that they have their own armed force, the Alex Boncayao Brigade, which is "now preoccupied with fighting the drug lords". But such an announcement is nonsensical except when seen as a proof for the point that we emphasize above.

The people's army should principally serve the objectives of the war more than anything else. The ABB, being in the National Capital Region, which is the center of public opinion in the country, should be launching, in its own way as an armed force, actions that expose and attack imperialism and fascism in the country, without harming the legal and defensive character of the mass movement in the NCR. On the other hand, the launching of operations against drug lords does not expose or hit imperialism and fascism but could further blur what should be the direction of the ABB's line of attack; it is in line with "concrete victories" whose objective is to "attend" to some fleeting and tactical interest being played up by the bourgeois media ("fighting" the drug lords) and setting aside the revolutionary objectives.

What would be worse is if such ABB tactics have the yet unstated objective of using armed violence as a leverage in campaigning for their desired "peace negotiations" and for seizing the "tiniest bit of opportunity to achieve the peaceful resolution" of the war. We draw attention to this point because in other countries such as El Salvador, "politico-military struggles" were used as a leverage for a campaign among the people to demand negotiations at the expense of their long-term interests.

But Popoy has said that what they desire is "peace that would resolve the causes of the armed struggle". Even the social-democrats, the petty-bourgeois socialists and progressive politicians can say the same thing. The question is the substance of such a slogan.

"Our children have grown up. We want peace," says Popoy. Such words have the obvious pathetic tone of a fighter who has grown old not so much in years but in spirit and has lost the will to continue and advance the protracted, difficult, painstaking and complicated warfare. In their "Declaration of Autonomy", Popoy and his band make a count of those who have died and the years that have passed since the armed revolution was re-launched in 1968, and they despair that the revolution has not yet been won. They blame this on the supposed "failure" of the Party's "war strategy", (i.e. protracted people's war) but they have not come up with an alternative strategy or refinement

of it...except to say that it is necessary to "maximize the arsenal of tactics" like negotiations and "bourgeois democracy". Popoy and his gang have grown weary of the revolution; they do not differ from other militarists and insurrectionists who — having been carried away by their impulses and ever on the lookout for "intense" and "fierce" battles, aspiring for objectives reaching up to the sky and beyond attainment — have exhausted and weakened themselves quickly, and turned pessimistic after their adventures and ambitions had been frustrated and have retrogressed to parliamentarism and capitulation. Once again there is this spectacle of Party members and activists, drained and strained after the so-called period of "Bugso", have become demoralized and bereft of militancy.

In August 1990, in a discussion with the staff of *Taliba ng Bayan* (People's Vanguard), Popoy said in connection with the slogan, "victory in the 1990s", that if the revolution could not be won within this decade, it would never be won; and this, according to him, is a lesson in dialectics. That is the "dialectics" that motivates Popoy. The "dialectics" of swinging from one extreme to the other extreme. The "dialectics" of one whose feet are not firmly planted on the material world and whose head is high up, enveloped by the clouds!

The FMLN in El Salvador also has such "dialectics". At first, the insurrectionists aspired for and launched big military actions and uprisings in vain attempts to seize the city; but as time passed and they could not win, they concentrated their military adventures on the goal of pressuring the state to come and sit with them at the negotiations table; and at the negotiation, the fighters who had become exhausted and pessimistic agreed to burn their weapons in exchange for "concrete gains" which would give way to their transformation into fullfledged parliamentarists and capitulationists.

Popoy and his gang by refusing to rectify their insurrectionism are now turning to parliamentarism and capitulationism. Ultra-left opportunism is swinging to the other extreme — right opportunism.

### III. THE DIRECTION OF POPOY AND HIS GANG

Let us consider the following:

1) March 30, 1993 — in front of the *Taliba ng Bayan* staff, Popoy said a split within the Party was inevitable because it is "unimaginable [for him] to surrender" to the center. He added: But should this happen, it would be impossible for the splittist and the Party to remain "as friends"; that is why when the split occurs, they would make a public expose of an alleged "case" of Armando Liwanag. Should this happen, he said, "**The Party will be POLITICALLY DEAD!**"

The alleged case of AL, which is supposed to be an internal matter of the CC, was first "revealed" at the first factional "plenum" of the "MRRC" to its members, but this was not announced to the rank-and-file. Even on the branch level, the case was considered internal because this was a case of safeguarding the prestige of a comrade and a matter for compartmentalization. But the paper "Tumindig" went on to drum up that Armando Liwanag has a "case" "that has no equal in gravity" and "should be acted upon", without mentioning what it is all about. This is all the more serious since, by mentioning a "case" of the Party Chairman without mentioning what it was all about, the comrades, especially the ordinary Party members and cadres, had no chance to make an objective judgment. This tactic constitutes pure and simple intrigue.

Nevertheless, Popoy and his gang did not make a public expose of the alleged "case" of the Chairman when they separated from the Party for the obvious reason that if they did, they, and not the Party, would be "politically dead".

2) Exposing to the public of matters and facts that compromise the security of the Party, including identities of those supposedly involved in the struggle.

3) Harassment of the revolutionary forces, like the arrogant, gangster-like and lumpen-style abuse of Party members (as part of their "autonomy" plan).

4) Deliberate efforts to destroy the mass base of the Party. Intrusion into localities where there are existing structures of the Party organization and of progressive mass organizations and attempting to

establish counter-centers to rival, weaken and destroy the leadership and influence of the Party over the people. (This is totally different from the operations being undertaken by Party cadres and members to recover the units and forces that have come under the control of the impostor "MRRC".)

5) Deliberate efforts to split the open mass movement. Last July 26, Popoy and his gang launched their splitting activities within the open mass movement in the NCR by undertaking a mobilization independent from the mobilization by the national leadership of the open mass movement and there declared the "split" in the Party and the open mass movement. They recklessly showed the people and the enemy which legal organizations and personalities are with them and those who allegedly are with the Party (according to their announcement to mass media, this was a "show of force" to demonstrate which side had the "mass following").

6) Connivance with anti-Party and counterrevolutionary elements:

(a) The Phil gang (which usurped the name of "Standing Group Visayas Commission," or SGVC) — according to the Executive Committee of the Central Committee (EC-CC) regarding Phil, former head of the SGVC:

\*1991: Openly violated the prohibition against using the N3 [special operations unit of the General Command] in gangster operations, and openly violated orders to transfer this unit to the countryside for ideological consolidation. He continued to direct and/or allow the N3 to engage in gangster operations to secure large sums of money for their personal or family expenses.

\*1992. He violated the order not to let the N3 undertake military operations during the last elections. He assigned a team of NPA fighters to become bodyguards of a politician and to target the funds of the latter's political rival.

Added the EC-CC:

\*After the plenum, (Phil and his gang) used the name of the EC-CC and deceived the N3 personnel in order to take away the bulk of its personnel, arms and equipment from the current leadership of the military staff. They involved the members of the group whom



they deceived in gangsterism and corruption until it fell apart due to problems arising from sharing of their loot and from police operations against them." ("Some Notes on the Role of Popoy and his Gang," April-May 1993)

(b) Relating with agents of the U.S.-Ramos regime. According to the EC-CC, Popoy and his gang attended a meeting of the anti-Stalinist and Gorbachov revisionist "verdaderos", which was also attended by one of the three promoters of popdemism who is now working with Gen. Jose Almonte, National Security Adviser of the Ramos regime.

A summation of all these things: Popoy and his gang are deliberately trying to split, weaken and wreck the Party and the revolutionary movement. This is tantamount to supplying the enemy with the artillery with which to pound the strongholds and fighting forces of the revolution.

If as they claim Popoy and his gang had any concern left for the Party and the revolution, if they at all sincerely recognized the welfare of the majority of Party cadres and members, and still cared for the security and victory of the Party and the revolution, they would put the interest of the Party and the revolution ahead of everything else, they would stop their activities aimed at weakening and wrecking the Party and the entire revolutionary movement. It is around this issue that those who have been misled by Popoy and his gang must challenge the sincerity of their "leaders" in their "revolutionary pronouncements"

But it seems that it is their excessive hatred for the Party that principally determines their activities.

**"Whoever brings about even the slightest weakening of the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie," according to Lenin, "is actually aiding the bourgeoisie against the proletariat."** ("Left-Wing Communism")

And whoever weakens, let alone wreck, not only the iron discipline of the Party but the Party itself, actually helps the counterrevolution of the bourgeoisie against the revolution of the proletariat. And whoever strives to create the slightest weakening of revolution is already actually in the counterrevolutionary camp, a counterrevolutionary.

There are two categories of counterrevolutionaries. First is the nonconscious counterrevolutionary, whose intention may not be to undermine the revolution but whose deeds objectively undermine the revolution and thus serve counterrevolution. The second is the conscious counterrevolutionary whose intentions and deeds serve to undermine the revolution and serve counterrevolution.

Popoy and his gang may still be among the first category of counterrevolutionaries. But if they carry their hatred for the Party to the end, their inevitable direction would be full-blown counterrevolution. However, the issue really is not under which category are Popoy and his gang but that they are already in the camp of counterrevolution.

The test of a true revolutionary is the ability to criticize oneself and rectify. Popoy and his gang, by refusing to criticize themselves and rectify their militarism and insurrectionism, have changed course and gone a long way and arrived at counterrevolution.

In the Party's 24 years of experience, Popoy and his gang have been the most destructive internal disaster to hit the Party. Bereft of all decency, they use the name of the Party to attack and wreck it. They wave the name and words of Lenin to make a mockery of Leninism. They brandish the signboard of protracted people's war in order to attack it and to launch their insurrectionism, parliamentarism and capitulationism. In the name of revolution, they push their counterrevolution.

We, the former cadres and members of the Party under the former "MRRC", are proud to say that we have not erred in our decision to rid ourselves of and repudiate Popoy and his gang, and that we are again with the main current of the revolutionary movement to which we have offered the best years of our lives and will continue in service in the midst of problems and difficulties, until we achieve victory. ●

# COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES TO CELEBRATE ITS 25TH ANNIVERSARY

The Communist Party of the Philippines will celebrate on December 26, 1993 the 25th anniversary of its reestablishment under the theoretical guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and on the basis of the long revolutionary experience and concrete circumstances of the Filipino proletariat and people.

The Communist Party of the Philippines is currently making preparations for the celebration of the anniversary in the midst of an armed revolution for national liberation and democracy against the counterrevolutionary forces of foreign monopoly capitalism and the local exploiting classes of big compradors and landlords, now chiefly represented by the US-Ramos ruling clique.

The Central Committee of the CPP has declared that the best way to prepare for the anniversary celebration is for Party cadres and members to unite and reaffirm the basic Marxist-Leninist principles of the Party, rectify errors and shortcomings, raise higher the fighting will and capabilities of the Party and the people, wage a more militant and more effective revolutionary struggle against the enemy and win ever greater victories.

In 1968 a few scores of proletarian revolutionary cadres reestablished the CPP as the advanced detachment of the working class and as the leading force of the Philippine revolution. They inherited the great revolutionary tradition of the Filipino proletariat and people, relied on their own mass work in the preceding years among the workers, peasants, youth and women, rallied the support of hundreds of revolutionary mass activists and thousands of organized masses and marched forward in the new democratic revolution.

Since then, the CPP has accumulated a great amount of ideological, political and organizational achievements. It has built a

nationwide membership of several tens of thousands and is deeply rooted among the toiling masses of workers and peasants. The Party cadres and members are in the vanguard and at the core of a far greater number of mass activists and millions of organized masses.

A few months after its reestablishment, the CPP established the New People's Army on March 29, 1969 to start in earnest the people's war against the semicolonial and semifeudal ruling system and to further develop the basic alliance of the working and peasantry. At the beginning, the sixty Red fighters had only 36 firearms and a rural mass base of 80,000 people.

Now, the New People's Army which is under the absolute leadership of the Party is operating in several scores of guerrilla fronts. These cover considerable portions of more than sixty provinces of the total 73 provinces of the Philippines. There are several thousands of fulltime Red fighters armed with automatic weapons and they are supported by a far greater number of local guerrilla fighters and militia forces.

Most important of all, the people's army is cherished and nurtured by the millions of people who have built the democratic organs of political power and are in the various types of mass organizations. The Party has grown within the people's army and in the localities.

The Party has pursued the revolutionary class line in united front work, in both urban and rural areas. The united front involves the leadership of the working class, the basic worker-peasant alliance, winning over the middle social strata, taking advantage of the splits among the reactionaries and isolating and destroying the power of the enemy.

The united front has a national democratic character; i.e. it is anti-imperialist and antifeudal. It is principally for the revolutionary armed struggle. At the same time, the Party has consistently led the legal democratic movement based in the urban areas.

The Party carries out united front work through the underground National Democratic Front and the organs of political power. It has also encouraged and promoted the patriotic and progressive organizations and alliances based in the urban areas. Thus, it enjoys

the active support of millions of people outside of the guerrilla fronts and leads them in various forms of legal struggle.

The Party and the revolutionary mass movement steadily grew in strength in an all-round way from year to year, from 1968 to 1980. From 1980 to 1985, there was a rapid growth of strength because of the previous accumulated strength of the revolutionary forces and the rapid deterioration of the ruling system under the US-Marcos ruling clique. But overlapping with the brilliant victories were serious errors of line, at first becoming conspicuous through serious damage inflicted on the Party and the revolutionary movement in the major island of Mindanao from 1984 to 1986 and then nationwide from 1985 to 1989.

At various levels of the Party, criticisms of militarism and insurrectionism started in 1988. By 1989, adjustments were initiated in order to correct imbalances in the deployment of personnel and resources in various fields of work. Towards the end of 1991, the entire Party and its Central Committee were ready to launch a comprehensive and fullscale rectification movement, especially because the full information on the disastrous results of "Left" opportunism had been gathered and the "Left" opportunists bitterly resisted the correction of their errors.

The "Left" opportunists subsequently exposed their Rightist essence and combined themselves with the undisguised Right opportunists who rode on and assisted the ideological offensive of the imperialists and modern revisionists against Marxism-Leninism. After trying in vain to wreck the Party from within, the ringleaders of both types of opportunism have blatantly come out as a motley group of counterrevolutionary Rightists, using the anticommunist and anti-Stalin slogans of the cold war and receiving money from imperialist and Philippine reactionary sources to carry out their anti-CPP campaigns of slander.

The rectification movement was launched in early 1992 with the enthusiastic support of the Party cadres and members, with the exception of a handful of unremoulded petty bourgeois elements who had long practiced bureaucratism, commandism and, subsequently,

factionalism and ultrademocracy. Since then, the rectification movement has won resounding victory in raising higher the level of revolutionary strength, consciousness and militancy of the entire Party.

To further strengthen itself ideologically, politically and organizationally, the CPP carries out the following:

1. It promotes the study of the works of the great communists Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao and other Marxist-Leninist thinkers and leaders and the rich collection of Marxist-Leninist works by Filipino communist cadres in order to better integrate theory and practice and to combat petty bourgeois subjectivism and opportunism.

2. It stresses the proletarian revolutionary line against modern revisionism, and explains in Marxist-Leninist terms the degeneration and disintegration of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes in order to counter the imperialist ideological offensive and various trends of petty bourgeois anticommunism.

3. It asserts the vanguard role of the working class through the CPP in the Philippine revolution in order to make a new democratic revolution and it debunks bourgeois pluralism, populism and liquidationism.

4. It further exposes and takes advantage of the ever worsening crisis of the semicolonial and semifeudal ruling system since the time of the US-Marcos ruling clique and thereby refutes those who hold on to the notion that the reactionary puppet regimes, from that of Marcos through that of Aquino to that of Ramos, have changed the character of Philippine society for the better.

5. It carries forward the general line of national democratic revolution of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the working class against foreign and feudal domination.

6. It perseveres in the strategy of protracted people's war, criticizes and repudiates militarism and insurrectionism as well as parliamentarism, reformism, pacifism and capitulationism and is redeploing the New People's Army in order to expand and deepen the mass base and intensify the guerrilla warfare on a wide scale.

7. It clarifies the revolutionary class line of the united front, which requires working class leadership, the basic alliance of the workers and peasants, winning over the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, taking advantage of the splits among the reactionaries and isolating and destroying the enemy.

8. It upholds democratic centralism as the main organizational principle of the Party and is combating both bureaucratism and ultrademocracy.

9. It makes clear that the perspective of the ongoing new democratic revolution is socialist and that upon the basic completion of the new democratic revolution through the seizure of political power the socialist revolution begins in opposition to the counterrevolutionary prescription that it should not begin.

10. It adheres to the line of proletarian internationalism, regards the Philippine revolution as part of the world revolution and points to the current grave crisis of imperialism and to the bright socialist and communist future of the proletariat and people of the world.

In leading the revolutionary armed struggle of the Filipino people, the Communist Party of the Philippines is holding aloft the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and is proving to the people of the world that revolutionary resistance is impelled by the ceaseless crisis of monopoly capitalism and the unprecedented aggravation of oppression and exploitation.

In the wake of the end of the cold war of the two superpowers, we have entered a new period of revolutionary struggle. It is a period characterized by the total discredit of modern revisionism, the most intolerable conditions in the third world countries and in countries where capitalism has been restored, the basic exhaustion of neocolonialism and retrogression to the worst forms of oppression and exploitation, the jobkilling consequence of high technology, the far worsened crisis of monopoly capitalism and the widespread social turmoil in the world. All of these are favorable conditions for the resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement.

The Central Committee and the regional Party committees are in charge of the preparations for the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the reestablishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Communist and working class parties, national liberation movements, progressive people's organizations and institutions as well as revolutionary personages all over the world are now being requested to send in advance their messages of greetings to the CPP through its Central Committee. ●