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ASSESSMENT OF THE RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ANTI-PARTY CAMPAIGN

By the Political Bureau of the Central Committee
Communist Party of the Philippines

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By Erwin Engst and Joan Hinton

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BY THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
DECEMBER 1993

A. Advancing the Rectification Movement

1. In almost a year and a half since the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee (henceforth, 10th Plenum), the rectification movement has ran and developed throughout the Party organization all over the archipelago. This enabled the Party and the revolution to decisively veer away from revisionism and opportunism and firmly advance on the revolutionary course.

The long-running grave deviations, errors and weaknesses were identified, criticized and repudiated. The Party has distinguished the correct line from the erroneous lines and overcome the deleterious effects of revisionism, "Left" and Right opportunism, bureaucratism and ultrademocracy. It has firmed up its stand on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, its line against modern revisionism, its analysis of Philippine society as semifeudal and semicolonial, its general line of people's democratic revolution, proletarian leadership through the Party, theory of protracted people's war and strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside, united front according to the revolutionary class line, democratic centralism, socialist perspective and proletarian internationalism. While undertaking rectification and consolidation, the entire Party is rigorously laying the solid basis for renewed advance. This is a victory of historic significance.

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The long-running grave deviations, errors and weaknesses were identified, criticized and repudiated. The Party has distinguished the correct line from the erroneous lines and overcome the deleterious effects of revisionism, "Left" and Right opportunism, bureaucratism and ultrademocracy. It has firmed up its stand on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, its line against modern revisionism, its analysis of Philippine society as semifeudal and semicolonial, its general line of people's democratic revolution, proletarian leadership through the Party, theory of protracted people's war and strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside, united front according to the revolutionary class line, democratic centralism, socialist perspective and proletarian internationalism. While undertaking rectification and consolidation, the entire Party is rigorously laying the solid basis for renewed advance. This is a victory of historic significance.

The rectification movement has frustrated the attempts of a few opportunist traitors to sink the Party into the mire of revisionism and opportunism as well as their all-out demolition campaign seeking to

stop the rectification movement. Some 90 percent of the Party membership initially stood by the rectification movement and the revolutionary line of the Party and an increasing number of those who had been deceived and misled by the traitors have now come to their senses and expressed their desire to return to the Party's fold. More importantly, the struggle against the all-out anti-Party campaign has sharpened our Party's understanding of the principal issues regarding our theory, history and line and has thus tempered our Party cadres and members in the crucible of the two-line struggle. The fullscale degeneration of the opportunist renegades from petty-bourgeois subjectivism, revisionism, opportunism and individualism towards outright anticommunism, liquidationism and counterrevolution provides the entire Party with negative examples from which to draw significant lessons. With their removal, the Party has been relieved of a potent poison undermining its body and spirit.

The past period since the 10th Plenum can be regarded as the first phase of the rectification movement. During this phase, the great majority of leading units and cadres at the regional and national levels achieved — through the propagation of the principal rectification documents, summing-up and assessment of past experience, deepgoing criticism and self-criticism and struggle against the all-out anti-Party campaign — unity in viewing our practice in the last decade and a half, in upholding basic principles and the principal stresses of our current efforts. We have accomplished the widescale redeployment of forces and set the tasks according to the line of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare with an ever expanding and deepening mass base.

We have not yet thoroughly carried out this first phase. Some regions and lines of work still have to undertake their comprehensive summings-up. Some parts of the Party organization are still recovering from the sabotage wrought by the traitors. And one or two areas are still reeling from the sabotage.* We must complete the defeat of the opportunist traitors, win over those who can still be won over,

* This state of affairs persisted only up to early part of December 1993. Editor

reconstitute the units damaged by the anti-Party campaign, and most importantly, accomplish the comprehensive summings-up of all the regions and principal lines of work.

In the meantime, we must attend to the tasks of further extending and deepening the rectification movement while carrying out all the other important tasks of the Party. This entails the following:

a. Continuing to extend collective study of the rectification documents down to the levels of the district, section and branch in the localities and the mass organizations;

b. Advancing the education campaign to promote the three-level Party course and to translate and publish Marxist-Leninist texts;

c. Systematizing the criticism of the wrong line and deleterious petty-bourgeois influences and reviewing results of the summings-up of the regions and main lines of work;

d. Strengthening the central organs on the basis of victories in the rectification movement;

e. Further strengthening the units deployed for mass work and providing them with training aimed at developing the work of *propaganda, education and solid mass organizing in the countryside and the cities*;

g. Strengthening the machinery for internal and mass propaganda;

h. Revitalizing the mass movement and the guerrilla warfare;

i. Encouraging the self-organization of, as well as alliance work among, the middle forces and other positive forces; and

j. Expanding propaganda and organization work among compatriots and mutual solidarity work with friends abroad.

The gains of the rectification movement must translate into a leap in the general quality of our regular ideological and educational work, into renewed expansion and strengthening of the mass base, into an expansion of the united front and into a revitalization of mass struggles and guerrilla warfare. These are the ultimate gage by which we measure the effectiveness of the rectification movement.

2. The conclusions of the 10th Plenum summing-up have been confirmed and further deepened by the summings-up, assessments

and collective studies undertaken by the Party organizations in the regions and main lines of work. The entire extent of the disorientation and the damage caused by it and thus the urgent necessity for a thoroughgoing rectification movement have not only been confirmed but have been further stressed by lower Party organs. From direct concrete experiences which subsequently revealed the bigger negative aspect, we find additional major evidence supporting the correctness of our basic principles and general line — matters that have been firmly established by revolutionary theory and the long history of the Philippine revolution.

Richer data coming from the deepening of the rectification movement confirm the urgent need to criticize, repudiate and rectify the following major errors, deviations and weaknesses:

a. The long neglect of Marxist-Leninist theoretical education, the disappearance and denigration of the writings of the great communist teachers as well as of the basic Party documents, the growth in influence of nonproletarian ideas, the proliferation of petty-bourgeois subjectivism and the ideological degeneration of some cadres;

b. The deviation from the antirevisionist line, the misrepresentation of revisionist and bureaucrat capitalist parties and regimes as communist and socialist, impelled by vain expectations of support then regarded as pivotal in the advance or stagnation of the armed struggle and thus led to confusion when these parties and regimes collapsed and the imperialists heightened their ideological offensive;

c. The questioning without factual basis and thus undermining of the Party's analysis of Philippine society as semifeudal and semicolonial, despite the obvious absence of development and continuing socioeconomic deterioration and despite the dubious basis comprising an extremely superficial study of urban and rural population distribution and a misrepresentation of comprador-type industry and the service sector as evidence of basic industrialization;

d. The emergence of opportunism, both "Left" and Right, with regard to the class line and the strategy and tactics of the national

democratic revolution and the people's principal weapons in waging revolution (the Party, the people's army and the united front);

e. The ultra-Left opportunist line of "regularization", meaning the premature and unsustainable military formations combined with bureaucratization in the urban areas, both impelled by the combination of purely military viewpoint and insurrectionism, which together inflicted the heaviest damage, especially on the mass base through the neglect and even opposition to painstaking mass work and solid mass organizing.

f. The recurrence of such fatal and self-damaging hysteria as the Apos campaign — the worst of such incidence — after an initial round of resounding though fleeting military victories and insurrectionist surprise attacks, subsequent loss of mass base, eventual grave damage and finally panic.

g. The abandonment of the strategic line of people's war, by the ultra-Left and Right opportunists, who both agreed on the view that political struggle and military struggle are diametrical opposites and who wished to liquidate the absolute leadership of the Party over the people's army, although the ultra-Leftists are notorious for their rush to achieve victory and for their neglect in combining the armed struggle with land reform and mass-base building; while the Right opportunists are notorious for pushing populism, reformism and capitulation;

h. The growing tendency towards Right opportunism due to exhaustion from military adventurism and insurrectionism, overblowing of the boycott error as the gravest error of the Party in 1985-86 in order to cover up the far graver error involved in the Apos campaign, urban bureaucratism, preoccupation of cadres with salaried posts in the city, and the stop in the flow of educated young cadres to the countryside for mass work and the armed struggle;

i. The erroneous concept of a united front for liquidating or bearing down on the proletarian class leadership and the two-stage Philippine revolution, capitulation to the anti-Marxist ideological offensive of the enemy, and the seepage into the Party of populist, liberal, social-democratic and other petty-bourgeois ideas, and of

erroneous views on peace negotiations and the struggle for a just and lasting peace; and

j. The attacks on the Party's principles, especially the principle of democratic centralism denigrated as authoritarianism, personal attacks on the principal leaders of the Party as a shortcut to destroying the Party, the complaints about "process" by elements pursuing antidemocratic and factional activities and sowing intrigues in order to discredit the basic principles and leadership of the Party at various levels, and the relentless ultrademocracy, sectarianism and blows against the Party's integrity.

3. Based on data from the regions, the true extent of the disorientation and deviations, as well as that of the resulting damage have become clearer. Some of the conclusions of the Central Committee in its 10th Plenum summing-up need to be adjusted in order to reflect more accurately our past experience and actual situation. The adjustments tell of heavier not lighter problems that need to be resolved by the rectification movement. Among the adjustments are the following:

a. The actual contraction of the mass base is bigger than what was noted at the 10th Plenum. The organized mass base contracted by more than 60 percent from the level reached during the middle of the '80s. In some regions, this fell by 80-85 percent and, in the worst case, by 97 percent.

Repeatedly in the regions, the big damage to the mass base due to neglect of mass work, premature "regularization" and bureaucratism were aggravated by more damage resulting from forced "pol-mil campaigns" in responding to the enemy's general offensive and the dislocations as a result of insurrectionism. The last two almost completely wiped out the mass base in many guerrilla fronts.

b. As a result of grave damage on the mass base and the damage on the Party brought about by the all-out factionalist and anti-Party campaign, the 10th Plenum assessment that the armed struggle generally was approximately at the level reached in 1983 can no longer stand. In many areas, the general extent of our forces

and mass base is nearer that reached at the onset of the '80s. At the same time, we must take into account the advantages and disadvantages that we have today compared to then.

c. Gangsterism as a serious disorientation was not sufficiently focused upon in the 10th Plenum.

Worst afflicted by the proliferation of gangsterism was the Visayas where it seeped through all the regions, destroyed our relations with the masses, became a principal factor in the diminution of our mass base in some places and corrupted the armed city partisans and a large number of urban-based cadres. The notion of all-out confiscation and expropriation in dealing with "class enemies", totally disregarding the level of the war and political considerations, was widely practiced supposedly to finance the war. The worst form of gangsterism was the so-called "covert operations" in Panay which were no different from house-breaking operations, targeting allies inside and around the guerrilla zones.

The extent of gangsterism as practiced by the defunct "general command" (GC) and in Manila-Rizal was also serious. The defunct GC was at the fore in the practice of giving out bonuses which even more rapidly hooked the operatives to gangsterism and corruption.

At certain times, some units in Bicol and CL and armed city partisans in Southern Tagalog also got involved in some gangster operations.

Aside from corruption, it was gangsterism which spread worsening defiance of the Party's leadership. This came to the point of repeated cases of armed units separating from the Party in order to form criminal syndicates, such as the Red Scorpion Gang.

d. Various concepts denigrating, weakening and subsequently liquidating the leadership of the proletariat and the Party emerged and developed in different lines of work on varying scales.

The first coherent form of such concepts was that of the New Katipunan as a united front organization superimposed on, if not liquidating, the leadership of the Party. This was pushed simultaneously with the removal in 1981 of the provision on proletarian leadership and the socialist perspective in the

constitution of the Christians for National Liberation (CNL).

Consequently, the concept of "separate dynamism" of the mass organizations and the united front focusing on depreciating the leading role of the Party was also pushed.

From 1987, the GC promoted the concept of "regularization of command" which stressed the enlargement of the power of the individual commander and the top-down vertical flow of command within the people's army. The role of the Party core within army units was diminished, the units came under the power of individual commanders, and within the GC itself, collective Party life was finally liquidated. The top-down vertical flow of command was strengthened with the intent of supplanting even the leadership of the Party committees over the people's army within their respective territorial scopes.

The attacks on the leadership of the Party in legal offices took particular forms. In these offices, collective life and Party work are neglected; ideological, political and organizational relations are totally dissolved into office work and technical arrangements. In the long run, cases multiplied of NGO bureaucrats usurping legal offices as their personal kingdoms and finally outrightly attacking the Party. Now, the opportunist traitors propagate the concept of legal organizations and institutions without a clandestine movement.

In his concept of the NDF, Ricardo Reyes comprehensively attacked the leadership of the Party. He attempted to supplant it with a pluralist center of leadership, a concept of a vanguard organization which is no more than a camouflage for a petty-bourgeois leadership paving the way for an open big bourgeois leadership. After the bogus NDF congress in 1990, the Reyes-Gonzales tandem sought to dissolve the National United Front Commission (NUFC) and replace it with their anti-Party version of the NDF.

e. The actual extent and seriousness of the insurrectionist conspiracy in 1990 and 1991 is so much worse than what came to the knowledge of the 10th Plenum. Leading cadres of almost all the Manila-Rizal-based organs (Reyes in NUFC, Kintanar in GC, Lagman in Manila-Rizal Regional Committee [MRRC], Peña in the

National Peasant Secretariat [NPS], Tabara in Standing Group - Visayas Commission [SGVC] and some members of the Executive Committee of the Central Luzon Regional Committee [EC-CLRC]) in various degrees consciously violated the Party's democratic centralism.

In striving for "insurrections surpassing the EDSA-type", large parts of the Party organization actually made and launched putschist plans. The redistribution of forces and misdirection of tasks took place in Manila-Rizal, Central Luzon and other affected areas. Strategically decisive assaults were set, which if undertaken would have led the revolutionary forces into certain and senseless disaster.

The insurrectionist conspiracy explains the many strange moves made by the organs cited above in 1990-1992, including the quantity and intensity of the intrigues circulated within these organs, and their animosity (with the exception of EC-CLRC) towards the document "Reaffirm..." and the rectification movement.

We need to further ferret out all the details of this conspiracy for the information and education of the entire Party.*

f. From testimonies and self-criticisms by the regional Party committees themselves, the particular forms of the major deviations and errors in various areas have become clearer.

Aside from those that have been identified in "Reaffirm..." and "General Review...", various forms, such as "kasa, hasa, bulwak" [prepare, train, propel] of VIQUI and those in the implementation of the Red Area-White Area (RA-WA) line in the Visayas, should be added. The RA-WA line was implemented in the Visayas even longer than it was in Mindanao in 1985. This was implemented in Panay in the form of the "strategic combination" of political struggle and military struggle; in Central Visayas, in the form of the "strategic combination" of guerrilla warfare, urban armed partisan warfare and uprisings; and in Negros, in "pol-mil" struggles aimed at triggering an insurrectionary situation in 1987 and an insurrectionist interpretation of the Politburo's "Some Clarifications on our Tasks" in 1990. The

* Refer to the appendices.

height of the "pol-mil" struggles in Davao City in 1984 was equaled if not surpassed in Cebu City by "stirrings" through urban partisan warfare in 1985 and the "creation of an insurrectionary situation" in Bacolod City in 1987.

g. In 1991, Reyes, Tabara and Kintanar peddled the concept of "open season" for various strategies in preparation for a Party congress. Their push for insurrectionism and attacks on the line of protracted people's war were systematized.

Reyes drafted and circulated his own comprehensive orientation on united front work which he concealed from the rest of the Party's central leadership. He commissioned researches aimed at demolishing the Party's analysis of Philippine society as semifeudal and semicolonial. Gonzales conducted formal study courses on strategy attacking the line of the Party.

In Negros, a new Party course promoting insurrectionism was propagated from 1991 onward.

In Manila-Rizal, a "Leninist course" was pushed in lieu of the basic Party course. The course involved the concepts of "pol-mil" struggles, immediate attention to preparing the insurrection, "insurrection surpassing the Edsa-type" and the view that the masses in the countryside were tired of war and thus Manila-Rizal must hasten its victory through upsurge (bugso) and insurrection.

h. Reyes' underhanded and anti-Party maneuvers to push his insurrectionism, revisionism and opportunism occurred earlier than the 10th Plenum could estimate. In a newspaper interview, he has announced that he had been plotting against the Party as early as 1988.*

Worse incidence of violations of democratic centralism — such as

* Earlier in 1983 shortly after his release from detention and while operating legally, Reyes was intercepted by then Major (now Colonel) Robert Delfin of the Constabulary Security Group and was asked to sign up as an agent. He did as asked and was allowed to go free. Immediately after, he sought out connections in the underground and asked to be deployed to Mindanao. In 1988, Reyes started to work closely with the intelligence agent Jose Eliseo Rocamora.

secret gangster operations, obstructions to the flow of important Party decisions to lower organs, and implementation of their own policies without knowledge of the central Party organ — have been uncovered, particularly involving Tabara and Kintanar.*

i. With the growth of the Party organization and the spread of its influence under conditions of grave weaknesses in ideological building, the emergence of corruption and aggravation of bureaucratism in certain parts of the organization became conspicuous. Tendencies of these were noted in a considerable number of units assigned to salaried legal posts, in leading organs based in urban centers, in armed partisan units which got enmeshed in gangster operations and in units deployed in the collection of taxes. Even in units of the Party in localities in the countryside, there was a noticeable increase in the incidence of cases of petty corruption and nepotism in the management of socioeconomic projects and of gains in the agrarian revolution.

l. Indeed there is a low level of theoretical understanding among cadres due to prolonged neglect of ideological work and the growth of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois influences. Among the most notable weaknesses among Party cadres and members are:

- Ignorance of the history of the Philippines, the revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people and the world communist movement;
- Large gaps in the grasp of the line, program and policies of the Party;
- Inadequate understanding of the proletarian stand, viewpoint and method as well as of using these in confronting the issues and tasks;
- Inadequate grasp of the mass line and of the principles and methods of propaganda, educational and organizational work among the masses; and
- Ignorance of scientific socialism and modern revisionism.

m. Liberalism and bureaucratism played a big role in aggravating

* *There is a separate internal Party document detailing the criminal and IPO responsibilities of the top renegades.*

the deviations and weaknesses within the central leading organs. Instead of being promptly ferreted out and acted upon, serious symptoms of corruption and indications of violations of Party rules were ignored or quickly allowed to pass. Sessions of criticism and self-criticism were rare and irregular. No direct investigation was undertaken of the situation in large parts of the Party organization over a long period of time and thus the problems had become serious by the time these were felt and seen.

These errors and weaknesses as enumerated further emphasize the extent and value of the tasks we have set to accomplish in the rectification movement.

On the other hand, we must also emphasize the solid support for the rectification movement demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of the Party membership as well as their sincerity in revealing these errors and weaknesses and their determination to rectify them. The intense struggle against the all-out anti-Party campaign has demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of the membership and units of the Party are basically honest and healthy. Despite past deviations and disorientation, our Party's revolutionary spirit could not be overwhelmed and this spirit has prevailed among the cadres and members who are striving to rectify, revitalize and restrengthen the Party and the revolution amidst intense struggle against both blatant and disguised enemies.

4. The intense struggles in the last year and a half have yielded us big lessons regarding the two-line struggle within the Party. The class struggle within the Party in the form of the two-line struggle has been clearly demonstrated. In order to build a strong and consolidated Marxist-Leninist party, we must consciously uphold the Party's revolutionary line and be vigilant against the manifestations and influence of the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois line within the Party. Otherwise, we cannot build a militant and strong revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat, nor can we build a party capable of correctly and solidly leading the life-and-death revolutionary struggle of the working class and the people, and whatever strength and leadership such a party enjoys among the masses will quickly

disintegrate.

The long period during which the line of blending what is correct and what is wrong and subjectivist methods of thinking ran engendered wrong ideas and carelessness in upholding the line. Aside from those who have degenerated and turned traitors, many comrades were not mentally prepared for the escalation and outbreak of the internal struggle; many were confused or vacillated, if they were not easily misled. Although eventually the revolutionary standpoint prevailed among the overwhelming majority, there can be no denying of the large weaknesses and shortcomings in ideological consolidation.

Misled by liberalism promoted by the revisionists and opportunists, not a few initially rejected the analysis of the Party's experience within the frame of the two-line struggle. The anti-Party elements took advantage of the internal lack of ideological consolidation in order to obscure, merge and jumble the fundamental and strategic issues on the one hand and the merely minor, tactical and transitory issues on the other. They rode on petty-bourgeois sentimentalism, the line of unprincipled unity and the desire for peace while they campaigned and schemed against the Party. The revisionists and opportunists abhor the two-line struggle because it draws a clear line of distinction between what is correct and what is wrong, proletarian and antiproletarian, and revolutionary and counterrevolutionary. It rallies the proletarian revolutionaries around the correct revolutionary line and arouses them to struggle militantly against the bourgeois and counterrevolutionary line and against the various forms of corrosive petty-bourgeois influences.

Consciously undertaking the two-line struggle in order to uphold the proletarian revolutionary line and defeat the bourgeois counterrevolutionary line is at the core of building a Marxist-Leninist party. In a militant and healthy party, this struggle is consciously handled and developed according to the initiative of the proletarian revolutionaries, and thus can be resolved through the struggle of ideas, education, and criticism and self-criticism; that is, through nonantagonistic methods. But when this has been neglected and especially when the proletarian revolutionaries has lost the initiative,

the struggle becomes difficult and complex and can become antagonistic; it can even result in the defeat of the proletarian revolutionary line. The intense struggle that developed within the Party in the past year and a half must be understood in this light.

5. We must focus the Party's attention and efforts on theoretical education and the dissemination of Party publications as well as works of the great communist teachers. Hereupon depends the complete victory of the rectification movement and the thorough removal of the roots of revisionism and opportunism. The central machinery for education work is being set up; this has been delayed because we had to immediately focus on the struggle against the anti-Party campaign and some difficulties arose in the redeployment of cadres assigned to this work. The PB has taken some decisive steps to resolve the difficulties and immediately attend to education work.

The basic Party course is under review and revision, the intermediate course is being restructured and the outline of the curriculum for mass education is being propagated.

After the 10th Plenum, the approved outline of the three-level Party course and the list of references was distributed. An outline discussion guide for the study of socialism and modern revisionism has also been issued. Copies in diskettes of the basic documents of the Party and readings on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, socialism and modern revisionism have also been disseminated. These are being reproduced in the regions but the facilities and the quantities reproduced are still sorely inadequate. The machinery for translation is also a problem; the central machinery for this is still being set up.

The translation into Pilipino of documents of the Party, the writings of Amado Guerrero, Armando Liwanag and Jose Maria Sison has started. These have been farmed out to the different Party organs to be reproduced and disseminated in their respective areas.

The regions undertook a review of the documents of the first great rectification movement simultaneous to the study of the documents of the current great rectification movement. The leading committees in the regions themselves are attending to immediate actual education work while setting up and strengthening their machinery for this.

All Party organizations are conscious of the importance of education work and we are confident that we shall make progress in this work.

6. We have made substantial progress in the redeployment of our forces in accordance with extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare. In the plan adopted by the 10th Plenum, what has not been significantly achieved is the redeployment of cadres from the cities to the countryside because of the disruptions caused by the anti-Party campaign. In addition, a majority of the forces in the cities, long steeped in insurrectionist thinking and suffering ideological and organizational neglect, are not mentally prepared for immediate redeployment to the countryside. We are optimistic that the situation will improve with the further progress of the rectification movement.

In some regions the current composition of the leading committees is relatively strong. But a majority of the regions need additional cadres especially those from among the workers and intellectuals after the long period that there was a stop to the flow of cadres from the cities. In some regions, the need is compelling and immediate. At the front, provincial and still lower levels, all the regions have registered their great need for additional cadres with the capacity to study theory and conduct study and training courses among other cadres. The lack of local cadres and activists is also widespread because of the destruction of basic Party organizations and mass organizations over wide areas.

We have dismantled and redeployed the GC, the Northern Luzon Operational Command (NLOC), the Visayas Military Area Command (VMAC) and unnecessary large formations — the battalion and many companies. The redeployment of our forces to dispersed units for mass work and extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare have immediately brought about concrete positive results over wide areas. For the first time after so many years, we have reestablished contact with numerous barrios and revived or built the mass organizations and Party branches.

However, the urgent need to retrain our forces for mass work and small unit operations has emerged. Various concrete problems need to be solved in the recovery of the mass base, revitalization of the mass

movement and rebuilding of the basic units of the Party. We must also guard against the danger of overextension in our desire to quickly and simultaneously cover extensive areas. The training courses for the people's army drawn up according to the program of the SCO and "regularization" need to be replaced by political and military courses suitable to extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare.

7. The rectification movement in the urban areas has been peculiarly difficult and intense due to prolonged urban-basing, particularly in Manila-Rizal, the presence of the principal promoters of insurrectionism, opportunism and revisionism and also due to military adventurism in the form of premature "regularization". Some parts of the Party organization in Manila-Rizal came under the control and influence of Lagman, Reyes, Gonzales, Quiambao and others and have for several years been accustomed to activities violative of the Party's proletarian revolutionary line and principle of democratic centralism. Egged on and financed by the reactionary state, the opportunist traitors can freely move around, assemble and use the bourgeois mass media in pursuit of their campaign against the Party. In addition there are the concentration of the imperialist ideological offensive and various types of reactionary, counterrevolutionary and reformist elements and forces.

Despite all these, the loyal and honest Party cadres and members in the urban areas generally and even in Manila-Rizal particularly succeeded in drawing and rallying the majority of the Party membership to the *rectification movement*. They have maintained the leadership and influence of the Party over a large majority of the mass base among the workers, student-youth and other sections of the urban petty-bourgeoisie. They have overcome the separate as well as the concerted offensives and maneuvers of the opportunist traitors as well as the various antiproletarian and counterrevolutionary forces. They have sustained the revolutionary and militant spirit of the overwhelming majority of the revolutionary mass movement in the urban areas. Some sectors, such as that of the student-youth, have been revitalized after so many years of relative slump.

In urban areas outside Metro Manila-Rizal, the Party organizations

are even more extensively united around the rectification movement. It is only in a few scattered spots that the anti-Party elements have inserted themselves and caused disruptions.

Generally, the loyal and honest Party cadres and members are the majority of militants at the core of the revolutionary mass movement in the urban areas. Through the repudiation of the opportunist traitors and thoroughgoing rectification, the internal conditions for the renewed advance of the urban mass movement have further improved.

The task of fighting the anti-Party elements in the movement in the urban areas continue to be complicated and large. And while attending to it, we must give greater attention to deepening the rectification movement there.

By propagating the documents of rectification and fighting the anti-Party campaign, the principal issues on the line and strategy of urban struggle have been presented, discussed and clarified in accordance with the basic principles of the Party. However, in order to deepen the rectification movement and thoroughly repudiate the ideological, political and organizational roots of the major errors and deviations in the movement in the cities, it is necessary to undertake a particular summing-up of the experience here and thoroughgoing criticism and self-criticism. This task has been delayed because of the struggle against the anti-Party campaign but will now be the focus of efforts.

While undertaking the thoroughgoing criticism and repudiation of insurrectionism and influences of the theory of spontaneous masses, putschism, populism and revisionism, we must further expand and strengthen solid mass organizing at the basic levels. Sweeping propaganda and agitation must be put in its proper place and made to serve the more important tasks of solid mass organizing and of building our strength at basic levels in more extensive areas in the cities; as well as of strengthening support for the movement and struggle in the countryside. We must also resolutely strengthen the underground movement in the cities and shift cadres and organs identified by the enemy from the cities to the countryside.

In the movement in the cities, Right opportunism and revisionism represented by Reyes have for the longest time inflicted damage to the

units for united front work. It is also here where neglect of basic Party work is at its worst and Party units are most loose. The advance of the rectification movement in certain staff organs and units was barred for almost a year by those who pretended to be centrists. Thus these organs and units have to take double time in studying the documents of rectification, in summing up experience and in rebuilding from the damage wrought by the anti-Party elements.

8. Abroad, the rectification movement is combating the disorientation resulting from the long dominance of certain elements who promoted revisionism and Right opportunism and the grave neglect of Party work.

Although they had misled a relatively big number of Party members and nonproletarian foreign supporters, the opportunist traitors have rapidly been exposed and are disintegrating. Loyal Party cadres and members persevere in consolidation, struggling against the anti-Party elements and expanding political work among compatriots. The Party is among those leading in upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and in striving to build the unity of proletarian revolutionary forces all over the world. We continue to expand and develop our relations with revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces.

9. Much has been achieved in the rectification movement, in summing up experiences, struggling against anti-Party elements and in setting the priorities, the disposition of work and style of work — based on the basic principles of the Party and the rectification movement.

But much still has to be done in order to thoroughly isolate and defeat the counterrevolutionary scheme of the opportunist traitors.

We must persevere and continue to attend to, deepen and strengthen the work of consolidating the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally. We need to further accelerate the struggle against the wrong line and against deleterious petty-bourgeois and bourgeois influences. We need to militantly combat the reformism, parliamentarism and anticommunism generated not only by the imperialists, the local reactionaries and the old rabid anticommunists such as the Christian democrats calling themselves "social democrats" but also by such petty-bourgeois and bourgeois formations as

Popdem, Bisig and others.

And while consolidating ourselves, we must resolutely expose and isolate the U.S.-Ramos regime and advance the mass struggles and guerrilla warfare according to the capability and the all-round strength of the Party and the revolutionary movement.

B. Combating the Anti-Party Campaign

1. Factionalism and the anti-Party campaign launched by the clique of Tabara, Lagman, Reyes and Kintanar which sought to split and destroy the Party have been defeated. The Party has vigorously defended its integrity, strengthened its ranks and thoroughly exposed and opposed the counterrevolutionary scheme of this handful of opportunist traitors.

The principal leaders of the clique together with other ringleaders and their principal tools have been expelled from the Party. The elements who continue to be misled and act within the frame of the anti-Party scheme of the opportunist traitors have also been de-listed from the Party rolls. Now the basis for vigorously building a truly consolidated party ideologically, politically and organizationally are better than ever.

Less than ten percent of the Party membership before were misled by the intrigues, distortions and anti-Party scheme. This is a very small part relative to the overwhelming majority of cadres and members who steadfastly defended the integrity of the Party, resolutely upheld the basic principles of a truly proletarian party and resolutely pursued the rectification movement.

And with the continued exposure of the counterrevolutionary line of the opportunist traitors, a large number of those misled have come to their senses and have resumed contact and come back to the fold of the Party. We are confident that those who have fallen away will be replaced by new members of a far bigger number and better quality as a result of new victories from the rectification movement.

It will not do to have degenerate elements and those who continue to be misled or act under the influence of degenerate elements clinging

on to the body of the Party. It is appropriate, necessary and correct to remove the degenerates and those who continue to be under their influence. Otherwise, the entire Party will be infected by their degeneracy and led into total destruction.

2. When the 10th Plenum decided to undertake the rectification movement, it was aware that the task was not going to be easy. The roots of past errors and deviations ran deep. The extent of the damage caused by these was grave. Serious disorientation prevailed. Certain parts of the Party organization where the opportunist traitors had nested lacked the ideological weapon to combat them. And the degeneration had infected some elements and parts.

The Central Committee was aware that there were difficulties and obstacles to be hurdled in pursuing the rectification movement. Among these was the anticipated resistance among some elements to the criticism, repudiation and rectification of their errors. However, the optimism prevailed that through intensive and thoroughgoing ideological and political clarification, criticism and education, initial reactions and resistance could be effectively handled. And if some would fall off, these would only be a few.

But because of past weaknesses, errors and deviations, a few opportunist traitors succeeded in concealing from the Party the graver kinds of errors and deviations for which they are responsible and their earlier underhanded maneuvers. And these maneuvers had developed into a scheme of betrayal and deception of a proportion hitherto unknown in the history of the Party. Tabara had pretended to go along with the 10th Plenum decisions right at the plenum only to betray it and the rectification movement afterwards and make these the focus of attacks made in public.

And from there, through an intensive series of factional caucuses and activities, the clique of Tabara, Lagman, Reyes and Kintanar launched an all-out anti-Party campaign in September 1992, full of venom and hostility against the central leadership and the rectification movement. The malicious objective was to stop the rectification movement, to flee from accountabilities to the Party and to split, undermine and destroy the Party.

3. The counterrevolutionary all-out anti-Party campaign had the following features:

a. It publicly attacked the 10th Plenum, the Party's central leadership and the rectification movement. It relentlessly sowed slander and personal attacks, intrigues shamelessly hewing to the counterrevolutionary line of the U.S.-Ramos regime aimed at *undermining and smashing the Party*. It even surpassed the psy-war machine of the U.S.-Ramos regime in the quantity of venom and intrigues spewed out, the rapidity of the attacks, and its viciousness in spreading the counterrevolutionary anti-Party propaganda among the ranks of the revolutionary forces and the public within a short period.

b. It waged a demolition campaign against the Party in the form of a "petition" campaign aimed at decapitating the Party, whipping up a mob and anarchy within the organization, and instigating splits aimed at the total destruction of the Party.

The ringleaders of the factionalist and anti-Party campaign set November 1992 as the target date for an anti-EC/CC and antirectification turmoil to rage within the Party, aimed at forcing the central leadership to resign.

c. It attempted to create splits within the National Democratic Front (NDF, the legal formations and the mass movement).

The scheme to split the NDF led by the Right opportunists became the next resort of the factionalists to split the mass movement after their moves to split the Party had been frustrated.

The scheme included support for a capitulationist line ala-FMLN (in El Salvador) in a bid to shift to parliamentarism. It attacked the struggle for a recognition of the status of belligerency, which was denied as being true and was therefore wrong, and it pushed for a framework of negotiations-for-surrender. It pushed the line of using the NDF to liquidate Party's leadership in the revolution and of putting together a pluralist "New Left Formation" to replace the NDF and serve as the lead of the movement. It peddled anew Reyes' "medium-term program" and the "anti-imperialist democratic front (AIDF)"

d. It pushed an "autonomy" campaign which resulted in the falling off of some parts of the movement weakened by the anti-Party venom relentlessly spewed out by a few opportunist traitors and which was capped by moves of inciting some NPA units to a mutiny against the Party.

e. It pushed for an anti-Party alliance to drum up the anticommunist line of anti-Stalinism, whip up a witchhunt in the legal formations, and peddle reformism, parliamentarism, liquidationism and capitulationism.

4. The all-out anti-Party campaign in September 1992 was a combination of the scheme to wreck the Party from within and the complete degeneration of a handful of opportunist traitors who refused to answer for their accountabilities and rectify their errors. The direct enemy agents and the "Left" and Right opportunists conjoined on the single objective of wrecking the Party. Contrary to the claims of the opportunist traitors, long before their all-out anti-Party campaign, there had been not only an ideological but also an organizational struggle as a result of their increasingly grave violations of the Party's processes and principle of democratic centralism.

a. As early as 1986 and 1987, there had been underhanded moves to create a climate of hostility against the central leadership and to set traps for factionalism and splits in the manner of "testing the waters".

These moves rode on floating sentiments among the urban-based forces against the central leadership as a result of the 1986 boycott error. The schemers magnified the boycott error well beyond its proportion and rode on an ultrademocratic wind to fan up various petty-bourgeois and bourgeois-liberal views all aimed at attacking the principles and line of the Party.

As early as 1986, someone made oblique suppositions of the need to reform the Party and change its line. In some assembly of cadres in 1987, a document for the building of a new party was surreptitiously circulated. And there were reports of actual appeals for support in terms of facilities and finance from some close allies of the movement for meetings and other activities to be held in order allegedly to form a new party.

b. In 1988 (by Reyes' own admission), a secret and factional "reform bloc" was formed by Reyes, Rocamora and other cohorts. They then started to plan a systematic campaign of intrigue against the central leadership aimed at isolating it from the Party membership, undermining the membership's confidence in the strategic line of protracted people's war and propagating concepts against the principle of democratic centralism.

c. In 1989, the slanders and intrigues against the Party chairman and against some members of the EC/CC were escalated, with the line between Reyes and Rocamora serving as the main channel.* The internal struggle within the EC/CC and within the PB/CC also

* *There is ample evidence to show that Rocamora and Reyes have been collaborating at least since 1988 in a scheme to deliver the CPP and the entire revolutionary movement into the psy-war trap of General Ramos and his State Department and CIA bosses, among them John Negroponte, the current U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines.*

John Negroponte is basically a Defense Intelligence Agency agent. As a young military officer, he was part of Oplan Phoenix which killed many communist cadres in Vietnam in the attempt to break up the political infrastructure of the SVNLF. But he was also part of the opposition to the policy of simply killing off cadres. He was exponent of the line of "killing is not enough but the more important is to know the enemy side and split and destroy it from within"

As ambassador in Central America in the early '80s, he outfitted and supervised the Contra operations against FSLN (Frente Sandinista de la Liberacion Nacional) in Nicaragua. One of his supposed achievements was bribing and winning Commander Zero, one of the outstanding FSLN commanders. Negroponte's appointment as ambassador to the Philippines is purposeful and well-timed.

When he became president, General Ramos specifically asked for Negroponte to become U.S. ambassador in the Philippines because Ramos wanted to have someone to help him give the highest priority to psywar operations against the CPP. Negroponte is the principal pusher of the line of legalizing the CPP and inducing a split within the CPP (which is the very same line pushed by Rocamora for several years).

To understand the role of Rocamora and Reyes and their other witting collaborators is to understand the scheme of Ramos and Negroponte

sharpened over the errors cited for correction in the 20th Anniversary Statement of the Party.

Outstanding was the issue over the gross imbalances between mass work and military work and between the company formations and the units in the localities. The trio of Kintanar, Reyes and Tabara pushed the erroneous line of making Party work and mass work in localities catch up with the level set by the people's army in its "regularization". After the Politburo meeting, Kintanar and Tabara led in inciting the regional and other Party organs to question the Politburo's assessment regarding the imbalances and campaigned for maintaining the level of army formations and warfare based on the companies and battalions.

Tabara harshly opposed the 1989 PB decision to review the maintenance of the Samar battalion by making an investigation and *summing-up before firming up a decision to redeploy it in smaller units*. By distorting the PB decision, Tabara prodded the officers of the battalion in Samar and the Eastern Visayas Regional Committee (EVRC) to protest to the central leadership. Tabara relayed to them the lie that the Politburo had decided to dismantle the battalion without any consultation and consideration of the practice and situation of the battalion and the region.

Also in 1989, Reyes maneuvered for the immediate implementation of the Politburo decision (based on his own proposal) for a superbody to oversee urban work, to supplant the EC/CC's power over important questions of leadership in political matters and to dissolve the Manila-Rizal Regional Committee, despite some conditions set by the Politburo for ensuring the ideological prerequisites before the decision could be implemented.

The Party chairman asked for a reconsideration of the decision on reorganization and the rest of the EC/CC agreed to change some of its provisions until the decision was completely withdrawn upon the recognition that it was fundamentally defective and furthermore due to the maneuvers of the Lagman gang to position itself in the superbody or else bar the reorganization by all means. Reyes' proposal for a superbody for urban work has been exposed as a conscious effort

within a bigger anti-Party scheme to use such a superbody as a vehicle and transmitter in the campaign for an insurrectionist strategy, Gorbachovism and revisionism within the Party.

After the correction and withdrawal of the decision on reorganization, another surge of intrigues and accusations against the Party chairman and some other members of the EC/CC was unleashed along the anticommunist line of an attack on "Stalinism".

d. In 1990 and 1991 the struggle further sharpened over issues involving the basic principles and the line of the Party. The anti-Party maneuvers and plot led by Reyes and his cohorts Tabara and Kintanar became direct and overt. Reyes resigned from the EC/CC so that he would be free to attack it and be able to maneuver for the accomplishment of his anti-Party scheme. He took advantage of the centers' big security problem and dislocation in order to maneuver freely, act treacherously, stop the flow of information between the EC/CC and the NCR-based organs, and trap the EC/CC into a series of fait accompli according to his own wishes.

Through his factional caucuses with Tabara and Kintanar, Reyes implemented in rapid succession his insurrectionist plan for the entire country, patterned after the insurrectionist RA-WA schema for which he is also mainly responsible.

The plan had the following main ingredients:

- An uprising surpassing the Edsa-type. It sought the setting up of a coalition government where the NDF and the NPA would oblige themselves to follow a medium-term program to be decided upon by a legal assembly packed with reformist and parliamentarist personalities and organizations.

The plan was set in an unauthorized national conference on mass campaigns. Reyes drafted the document of the insurrectionist plan and distributed it to the regional organizations and organs of the Party without the knowledge of the EC/CC.

- Anti-Imperialist Democratic Front (AIDF). Setting up a political center for uprising by combining the NDF with legal political forces.
- Confrontational mass campaigns to force "crisis points". Outstanding among these were the peasant movement's

confrontational actions in urban centers in combination with NPA maneuvers and other mass actions in line with the "pol-mil" concept. Included among these was the sabotage of the workers and people's struggle during the October 1990 GS-WB [general strike-welgang bayan] in pursuit of the "pol-mil" concept, capped by bus burning undertaken by ABB and other urban armed partisan units.

- Bombings in NCR to trigger an insurrectionary situation.
- The rush to hold the NDF congress in order to accomplish his (Reyes') concept of a political center in contention with the Party.
- The attempt to dissolve the NUFC in order to supplant it with Reyes' version of the NDF. The series of NDF statements made without the knowledge of the Party and in violation of the principles and policies of the Party and the NDF.

The insurrectionist plan branched out into the insurrectionist September Thesis of the Manuel Peña/Gerry Acuña clique, "victory in one year" of some members of the CLRC, the "pol-mil" struggle and preparations for insurrection of the Lagman gang. Refer to the appendices.

The EC/CC moved to foil and combat Reyes' insurrectionist plan in 1990. The moves had been partial because the EC/CC intentionally was not given a copy of the entire plan. The lessons of the October 1990 GS-WB were summed up. Lagman's "pol-mil" concept was criticized. A series of clarifications were made regarding issued minutes of the Reyes-manuevered NDF congress, the concept of the NDF, the correct relationship between the NDF and the Party, and other related matters. The AIDF concept was criticized. The September Thesis was also criticized and withdrawn. The "play to win, victory in one year" insurrectionist plan of some CLRC functionaries was ordered withdrawn.

Reyes attempted again to discredit the clarifications and criticisms made by the EC/CC, alleging that these constituted slander against him and other concerned Party organs and abuse of authority on the part of the EC/CC. He attacked the EC/CC for calling a consultation and investigation meeting of the major organs involved in the insurrectionist plan, for issuing the 22nd Anniversary Statement of the

Party and for the clarification on the Party's anti-revisionist line.

After his underhanded moves on mass campaigns and his unauthorized relations with certain Party organs had been exposed and criticized, Reyes again schemed to transform the Party's central organ *Ang Bayan (AB)* into an opposition paper against the central leadership, line and principles of the Party.

At the 1991 Politburo meeting, Reyes put forward some artificial issues to muddle and delay the discussion of his grave violations of the line, principles and processes of the Party. He made slanderous outbursts against the Party chairman and direct attacks on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism. He accused the EC/CC of Stalinism in the same vein as the imperialist anticommunist attacks on Stalin. He was echoed and supported by Tabara and Kintanar. Their ideas conjoined in pushing for an insurrectionist strategy and in attacking the Party chairman.

However, the Politburo still succeeded in making a decision to stop the unauthorized change of the orientation of *Ang Bayan* and pass on to the scheduled CC plenum the disciplinary action on Reyes in this regard. Reyes outrightly violated the PB decision to reinstate the AB to its previous orientation and submit AB issues for EC/CC approval before publication. He continued to have unauthorized AB issues printed. And when the PB issued a clarification on the orientation of AB and on its unauthorized issues, Reyes openly campaigned among the Party membership against the EC/CC by issuing a series of open letters of attack.

The Reyes-Tabara-Kintanar trio used the short period set for a recess in the 1991 PB meeting in order to spread intrigues and slander against the Party chairman and other members of the EC/CC and to campaign for a change in the Party's strategy to an "insurrectionary strategy". The trio declared to Party cadres and units with whom they came into contact that it was "open season" for questioning the strategy and tactics of the Party and that its standing strategy and tactics had lost effectivity. They also treacherously spread the lie that the PB had scrapped the Party's 22nd Anniversary Statement even as

Tabara and Kintanar were among those who agreed with the major conclusions of the document.

This led to a campaign against the line of people's war through Reyes' promotion of his own "strategy of war and uprising" and Gorbachovite revisionism, the NUFC's sessions on the "study of strategy" conducted by Frank Gonzales, the change of the education curriculum for Negros containing the attack on people's war and also the anti-Stalin line, the Central Visayas Regional Committee (CVRC) decision proposing the Party's changeover to the insurrectionary strategy. Reyes and the agent Rocamora maliciously pushed the line that the central leadership needed a "fresh mandate" on the malicious contention that it failed to grasp the new situation and insisted on an outmoded line.

The EC/CC strove to save the situation in the late part of 1991 by counteracting the venom, restore the Party units and organs to the correct processes through direct explanations to the leading cadres of the NCR-based organs and issuing a memorandum to highlight the spirit and concept of the Party in the face of the growing trend to separate the central Party leadership from the membership and towards autonomism. The EC/CC persevered in convening the CC's 10th Plenum in order to decisively confront the issues, prevent the paralyzation of the Party center and entire Party itself and solve the problems.

At the same time, Tabara outrightly violated the decisions and instructions of the EC/CC regarding the prohibition of gangster operations and the shift of the N3 to the countryside for ideological consolidation. He continued to order and/or give permission to the gangster operations of the N3 to acquire huge amounts of money for their personal and family expenses.

e. During the early part of 1992, Joel Rocamora and Nathan Quimpo wrote and distributed their anti-Party articles, respectively "Reform the Party, Save the Revolution" and "Resist Authoritarian Tendencies", to various parts of the Party organization. These anti-Party writings sought to incite anarchism organizationally, foment doubts and questions regarding the basic principles of the Party, overrun the

Party's processes and arbitrarily liquidate the legitimate central organs of the Party. At the same time, Rocamora made an unauthorized distribution in Metro Manila of copies of the draft summing up document of the CC, while at the same time sowing intrigue and hysteria against the rectification movement.

Meanwhile, Lagman and his cohorts preoccupied themselves with their unauthorized insurrectionist project "Bugso '92" which exhausted a large part of the forces in the NCR. Lagman went all-out in disregarding the decisions of the central leadership, the views and authority of the National Organization Commission (NOC) and the NUFC, and the opinion and integrity of the legal organizations and alliances. Refer to the Appendix for an extended discussion of this.

When the Bugso plan ran aground and demoralization and dissatisfaction reigned among the ranks of the Party cadres and members in the city, the Lagman gang refused to accept responsibility for the failure of their unauthorized and woolly-headed but costly adventure.

The struggle over "Reaffirm" and subsequently the all-out factionalism from September 1992 provided the Lagman gang with a shield to divert from itself the dissatisfaction of the Party cadres and members in the region over the Bugso fiasco, and, furthermore, to shift to an all-out struggle against the central leadership over matters of principle and organization.

On the other hand, factional meetings, caucuses and groups were formed in the NCR and abroad, with Rocamora acting as the agent. By May 1992, Tabara and his gang were declaring that they would separate from the Party if the document of the rectification movement would be approved and that the whole of the Party organization in Mindanao as well as other national staff organs would go along with them.

Also during the early part of 1992, Tabara violated the instruction prohibiting the N3 from conducting operations for bourgeois electoral purposes. He deployed a team of the N3 to a bourgeois politician for bodyguard duty and for targeting the electoral funds of his rival politician. This was the period that Tabara delayed his trip to attend the

10th Plenum.

After the plenum, he used the name of the EC/CC and deceived members of the N3 in order to take away a large number of its personnel, arms and equipment from the existing national military staff. Tabara further pushed the group (that he drew to himself) into gangsterism and corruption until it broke up over disputes involving the division of their ill-gotten loot and as a result of enemy blows.

g. And in September 1992, with a stolen copy of the minutes and documents of the 10th Plenum, Tabara sowed all sorts of disinformation about the plenum in order to ignite the all-out factional and anti-Party campaign.

5. The central issue at the core of the factionalism and all-out anti-Party campaign is the struggle on the line and the basic principles of the Party. The ringleaders of this campaign have thoroughly degenerated ideologically and politically and have refused to admit and rectify their errors. They have turned completely towards parliamentarism, reformism, revisionism and liquidationism. They merely wrap their counterrevolutionary line with Marxist and revolutionary phrases and pretenses, which with the passage of time get thinner and thinner.

Thus, the most decisive weapon that we as a Party have firmly wielded against factionalism and the anti-Party campaign has been the drawing of a clear line of distinction and division between what is correct and what is wrong, and between the proletarian and the bourgeois stand and ideology, between revolution and counterrevolution, as comprehensively laid out in the documents of the rectification movement. From this clear line of distinction, we have laid the principled basis for exposing and fighting the factionalists and the opportunist traitors. And thus, our determination as a Party to advance the rectification movement has further increased.

At the same time, we have issued the clarifications and answers to combat the opportunist traitors and to expose their bankrupt counterrevolutionary line. We have reissued and disseminated previous documents relevant to the struggle against the traitors. Among the documents issued by the central leadership relevant to the

exposure of and struggle against the factionalists and the counterrevolutionary line of the traitors are the following:

- Memorandum-circular of the PB/CC regarding the unauthorized change in the orientation of AB (December 1991)
- Comments of the EC/CC on the articles in *Ang Bayan* (December 5, 1991)
- Memorandum-circular of the EC/CC regarding the reaction of the AB editor to the memorandum-circular regarding the unauthorized change in the orientation of AB and AB's continuing violation of its original orientation (March 7, 1992)
- Memorandum-circular of the EC/CC on the initial clarification on the paper "Reform the Party, Save the Revolution"
- Notes regarding some internal issues presented by comrades in the NCR, December 1991
- Excerpts from the PB/CC clarifications on the "Letters of Concern" by Concerned Party Members Abroad (CPMA)
- Attacks and Misconceptions on the Rectification Movement
- Annotations on the Article of Takyo (Frank Gonzales) entitled "Comments on the Current Polemics within the Party"
- Annotations on Tosong's (Sixto Carlos, Jr.) Letter to the CC, 15 August 1992
- Annotations on Tos' "Discussion Paper" (presented at the "WE NDF Assembly" July 4-6, 1992) on Party-NDF Relations
- Memorandum of the EC/CC, November 20, 1992: Initial clarification and instructions regarding the "MRRRC" paper, "Stand for what is correct and true, invalidate the bogus plenum"
- Memorandum of the EC/CC, November 1992: On the "Letter of Concern" of Concerned Comrades in Mindanao
- Letter-Memorandum of the EC/CC to the members of the Viscom, the regional committees in the Visayas, staff organs in the territory, December 20, 1992
- Memorandum of the EC/CC, December 28, 1992: The "SGVC" conspirators' factionalism, splittism and distorted line and concepts.
- The "MRRRC's" anti-Leninist and anti-Party concept on organization, 29 December 1992

- Memorandum of the EC/CC, 15 December 1992: Clarification on the so-called petition against the 10th Plenum and the Rectification Movement

- "Notes on the Documents of the Popoy Gang, April-May 1993", April 1993

- Documents on the Peasant Secretariat: "EC/CC Clarification on the September Thesis of the Peasant Secretariat" and the accompanying memo and letter of the EC/CC for Party members under the PS, dated April 18, 1993

- Memorandum of the EC/CC, April 1993: Fight the new anti-Party and counterrevolutionary scheme in the legal mass movement

- Rejoinder to Michael (Edwin Lopez), April 1993

- Memorandum of the EC/CC, September 27, 1993: Illegal Consultation and Deceptive Position of the NUFC.

In the course of the struggle against the erroneous, petty-bourgeois and outright counterrevolutionary ideas of the opportunist traitors, and by the very statements of these traitors, the counterrevolutionary line of the clique of Tabara, Lagman, Reyes and Kintanar has become thoroughly exposed. The line has the following features:

- a. Revisionism. Rejection of socialism and the socialist revolution by rejecting the dictatorship of the proletariat, pushing the Bukharin line of prolonging the NEP and therefore continuing the enslavement of the proletariat and other working people by the bourgeoisie under the camouflage of socialist phraseology.

- b. Anticommunism. Echoing of the imperialist propaganda attacking Stalin in order to attack and undermine socialism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) and the October Revolution of 1917.

- c. Bourgeois-liberalism. Rejection of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as theoretical guide and weapon of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle and seizure of political power from the bourgeoisie. What is pushed is an "open ideological framework" or "blending of all the proletarian class tendencies". Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is attacked as the root of "revolutionary fanaticism" and as being devoid of a humanist perspective and blind

to so-called issues outside or above the class struggle such as "environmentalism", "gender", "ethnicity" etc.

d. Rejection of the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war based on the unfounded or illusory analysis that Philippine society is industrial capitalist or semicapitalist; that the struggle for national independence is outdated; that the issue of land or the agrarian problem is no longer the main problem of the majority of the people; that bourgeois democracy and its normal processes are operative; that the masses are tired of armed struggle; that armed struggle is no longer the principal form of struggle and that a combination of various forms of struggle must replace it.

e. Peddling of capitulationism by attacking and denying the "status of belligerency", pushing the line of the U.S.-Ramos regime on holding peace talks in the country, localized peace talks and limited agenda.

f. Parliamentarism and reformism. Supporting and drumming up programs of the U.S.-Ramos regime such as Philippines 2000, CARP and Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). Promoting popdemism or bourgeois populism and NGOism.*

g. Liquidationism. Peddling the concept of a broad vanguard front to supplant the Party. Pushing the bourgeois-liberal organizational frame of "freedom of criticism", "freedom of factions", "freedom of blocs", "freedom of all political tendencies", "consensus in lieu of democratic centralism", sectarianism and localism.

* *At the time of the summing up, the collaboration between the factionalists and the U.S.-Ramos regime was not yet quite obvious. The collaboration became very glaring in the early part of this year in the struggle against the oil price hike when the factionalist misleaders formed a so-called Kilusang Roll Back (KRB) which put a damper on the people's struggle by calling off demonstrations and settling for an alternative to the price hike in the form of a value-added tax (VAT). The VAT would eventually have the same effect as the price hike in jacking up consumer prices. Now the people are reeling from higher prices as the oil companies and the bourgeoisie have in effect passed on the VAT burden to them even before the effectivity of the legislation.*

h. Gangsterism. Continuation of gangster operations.

6. While decisively holding on to the question of line, it was necessary to stop the organizational wrecking operations of the factionalists.

The bitter lessons from the evil of factionalism are clear in our experience. Our experience shows why a truly proletarian party must condemn factionalism and prevent its emergence. The damage inflicted in the areas influenced or directly affected by the maneuvers of the factionalists are the following:

- disorientation, confusion, demoralization, loosening grasp or abandonment of the fundamental principles among the ranks of the Party membership;
- sowing trouble, division and disorientation down to the mass base;
- giving space for the growth of reformist, careerist and all sorts of bourgeois, antiproletarian and counterrevolutionary ideas and habits; and
- hodgepodge of all reactionary disinformation, intrigues, slander and sabotage against the revolutionary forces.

The organizational measures taken by the center against the clique of traitors are defensive measures against factionalism and the demolition scheme against the Party. These moves have been focused on elements and groups engaged in wrecking operations against the Party organization and undermining its structure and flow of democratic centralism.

Had the center not promptly and decisively acted against the all-out campaign of factionalism, the Party would have been paralyzed; its central leadership and authority liquidated; the integrity of its policies, structures and processes shattered; the troublemaking and disruptive activities of the factionalists and anti-Party elements given full rein; the Party units and members left to their own devices without Party guidance; and the Party itself left to disintegrate.

It is the democratic right and duty of the Party and its membership to defend the integrity of the Party and resolutely confront the wrecking operations of the factionalists and anti-Party elements.

Important to the Party are the tens of thousands of its membership and the hundreds of thousands of the people whom the factionalists want to split away from the Party and the revolutionary movement, whom they want to claim and fence off for their narrow factional interests and for pushing their deviant line, against the revolutionary interest and unity of the Party, the entire movement, the entire class and the entire people. Thus, the Party resolutely fought the factionalists and asserted its right to stop the factionalists from putting up barriers and to ensure the direct flow of the Party's line and democratic centralism down to the Party members and units below.

The measures — suspension from Party positions/functions and membership up to the final expulsion of the ringleaders of factionalism taken by the Party to shield and defend itself are justified, necessary and correct. It was necessary to reorganize affected parts of the Party organization in order to restore the flow of democratic centralism, consolidate the forces and advance the work; and also to effectively combat and prevent the continued wrecking operations of the opportunist traitors.

As a matter of fact, the ringleaders of factionalism should have been removed from the Party as soon as the EC/CC learned of the entire scope and intensity of the anti-Party campaign. But conditions within the Party would not permit this to be done immediately. We had to insure beforehand the forging of an ideological and political unity on the rectification movement in a remaining large part of the Party organization (parts of Mindanao and some regions in the Visayas) in order to grasp the entire frame or scope of factionalism and the Party's fighting chance against it and to be able finally to expose the real line and character of the opportunist traitors. Some parts of the Party which earlier came under bombardment of intrigues and slander were vulnerable under conditions that the disorientation, errors and strong petty-bourgeois ideological influences were still unrectified.

The factionalists could misrepresent themselves and confuse others as they played on the disorientation and on the weakened concept and spirit of the Party among the ranks of some cadres and some parts of the Party organization based in the NCR as well as in other urban

centers in the Visayas and Mindanao. Violations of the principle of democratic centralism were camouflaged by pretensions of defending the democratic rights of individuals; the encouragement of rebellion, anarchism and splits was depicted as mere internal ideological struggle; the continued insistence on the wrong line criticized by the 10th Plenum summing-up, as refinements and elaboration on the line; the factional caucuses, as merely the exercise of democracy. The factionalists claimed that factionalism had not yet existed because supposedly no formal factional center with a systematic counterprogram had been set up and no two-line struggle existed.

But by July 1993, after the plenum of the Mindanao Commission and that of the Panay Regional Committee and the EC/CC rejoinders and clarifications to counter the attacks and counterrevolutionary line of the opportunist traitors had reached various parts of the Party organization, it was time to formally expel the traitors from the Party. The EC/CC could already effectively take action but had delayed it in striving to let the bigger assembly of the PB take the decision. However, the scheduled meeting could not push through due to the dislocations and difficulties brought about by enemy operations. And when it was estimated that the PB meeting would take longer to convene, the EC/CC took the decision on October 5, 1993 to formally expel the ringleaders and principal collaborators of the anti-Party campaign with retroactive effect to September 1992 in most cases.

7. Unfortunately, some responsible cadres with centrist views and some sections of the Party organization influenced by them attempted to blunt our sharp exposure of the factionalists. This extended the life of the anti-Party campaign of the traitors and complicated the Party's handling of and struggle against them. Centrism muddled the real character of the factionalists and the counterrevolutionary content of the line they carried from the very beginning of the rectification movement. Centrism impeded some parts of the Party from recognizing factionalism and the counterrevolutionary line. It sought to draw the Party organization into a compromise and stop the rectification movement.

The centrism which emerged in the course of the struggle against

factionalism and the anti-Party campaign is rooted on extreme sentimentalism, on a bourgeois liberal concept of unity, on a desire to keep even the few traitorous elements and their camp followers at the expense of the entire Party organization, the majority of the Party membership and the entire struggle of the revolutionary people, and finally on a weak grasp of the life-and-death significance of the rectification movement for the Party and the decisive importance of the correct line in advancing the Party on a consolidated ideological, political and organizational base.

8. The Tabara, Lagman, Reyes and Kintanar gangs have been defeated organizationally. But the ideological conditions within the Party which engendered the Tabaras, Lagmans, Reyeses and Kintanars still need to be rooted out and removed. Only the resolute and thoroughgoing rectification movement that we have launched throughout the Party is capable of doing this. The Tabara, Lagman, Reyes and Kintanar phenomenon is the product of grave errors and deviations, of the "Left" and Right opportunism identified in the 10th Plenum summing-up. In the course of fighting the traitors, we have further discovered the ideological vulnerability and weaknesses of our Party due to the long neglect of education work and the resultant deviations.

The conditions that need to be combated, overcome and rooted out thoroughly are the following:

- a. The low theoretical level of the Party membership due to past neglect of education work.
- b. The petty-bourgeois, bourgeois and revisionist ideological influences which systematically seeped into the Party. Among these are bourgeois populism or popdemism, NGO-ism, "conjuncturalism" and Gorbachovism.
- c. Conditions and practices that promote bourgeois mode of thinking and lifestyle instead of the proletarian mode of thinking and lifestyle.

In the legal mass movement:

- the concept and practice of "salaried mass leaders and activists";

- the concept and practice of training mass and organization leaders initially in legal institutions and, in some cases, even Party units, in technical management drawn from bourgeois texts and from institutions specializing in the production of technocrats for imperialism, such as the AIM (Asian Institute of Management) at IIRM (International Institute of Research and Management) instead of practicing the mass line and the revolutionary method and style of leadership based on it;

- the concept and practice of foreign-funded NGOs for an "alternative socioeconomic program", charity-oriented, liquidating Party leadership in legal organizations and waylaying certain elements and revolutionary mass organizations in the countryside into economism and corruption;

In the underground movement:

- existence in some parts of the practice of "brokering" in negotiations for CBA (collective bargaining agreement) of workers, which has already deteriorated to the level of betrayal of the workers, and has resulted in corruption of individuals who directly benefit or are bribed (some parts and individuals);

- existence in some parts or among some individuals of the system of "brokering" in taxation or concealment of funds collected from taxation;

- some cases of compromises with landlords in the agrarian struggle or abuse of authority or position in order to engage in exploitative relations with the peasant masses for personal gain;

d. Bureaucratism, commandism, liberalism and ultrademocracy in organization.

e. The danger of gangsterism.

9. The anti-Party clique will certainly be defeated, dismantled and die as a political force. It will be difficult for its subgroups and chieftains to stay together for a long time and form a solid organization. This bunch of new NGO bureaucrats, syndicate bosses, advocates of parliamentarism, etc. have no other way to go but be swallowed by the reactionary system.

Whatever legal party or organization the opportunist traitors may be

able to build will surely disintegrate because it will be a bunch of small sects and individuals who are subjectivist, opportunist, egotistic, without revolutionary principles and with no patience for mass work.

At the moment, these elements are isolated and are undermining themselves because their main preoccupation is attacking the Party and its principal leaders while their criticism of the U.S.-Ramos regime is weak or half-hearted. In fact some of them are conspicuously financed by and collaborating with the U.S.-Ramos regime.

Now there are animated anti-Marxist-Leninists, anti-protracted people's war and parliamentarists among the factionalists. As time passes, the factionalists' insistence on premature regularization and insurrection for a shortcut to victory or a leap to a higher strategic stage grows fainter. The Right opportunists and revisionists are now the main setters of the ideological and political agenda of the factionalists. The "Left" opportunists have been led to echoing the populist, capitulationist and revisionist ideas of the Right opportunists.

They seek to show off and freeload on other anti-Party and rabid reactionary forces in an attempt to prolong their existence. But this itself is writing a finis to their revolutionary phrasemongering and pretenses.

We need resolutely to struggle and fight against the opportunist traitors both in the underground and aboveground movement. They must be thoroughly exposed and isolated from the revolutionary masses and the general public. ■

APPENDIX I

EXCERPTS FROM THE POINTS ON EXPOSING THE LAGMAN GANG

AS EDITED BY THE EC-CC
SEPTEMBER 1993

The insurrectionist line in the national capital region (NCR), the NCR version — as systematized by the Lagman gang — of the insurrectionist Red Area-White Area (RAWA) line, is encapsulated as follows: "the direction of the NCR revolutionary struggle is insurrection", "preparation for the general offensive before the end of the decade", "pol-mil orientation of the NCR struggle" and "uprising surpassing the EDSA-type".

Most blatant among projects related to the above were the NCR bombing operation — a joint project (with the complicity of Ricardo Reyes) of the ABB* and RAM** — and the "pol-mil" operations during the GS-WB*** of October 1990 which was implemented through bus

* *Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB) was the name adopted by the armed city partisan units under the Manila-Rizal Party Committee to honor a worker-martyr hero of the revolution. However the ABB gained notoriety when some of its units under the influence of the wrong line deteriorated and committed acts of gangsterism. The ABB has been disbanded and the good elements have been redeployed to the countryside. However, the counterrevolutionary Lagman gang continues to misuse the name of the ABB for its handful of armed men and thus to bring dishonor to the memory of the revolutionary martyr-hero whose name they continue to misappropriate.*

** *Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) a faction in the the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It was created in 1985 and used by the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to destabilize the Marcos fascist dictatorship. The U.S. decided to drop Marcos after the Aquino assassination. He had become a liability to U.S. imperialist interests in the Philippines. He was toppled in a RAM coup cum popular uprising in 1986.*

*** *What was referred to as GS-WB or general strike-welgang bayan (or people's strike) by the Lagman insurrectionists was actually mere intention*

burning as a tactic to compensate for the lack of political support. Another plan which fizzled out and never took off was the unauthorized Bugso plan of 1992 with the objective of a "siege of Malacañang", the presidential palace.

This brought about serious disorientation, overreaching (repeated launching of actions beyond actual capability), exhaustion of the forces, demoralization among the ranks, damage to the political prestige of the revolutionary movement (because the errors identified and criticized by the EC-CC were not criticized and corrected), stagnation, weakening and eventually contraction of the NCR mass base.

The CC's 10th Plenum summing-up decisively criticized and repudiated the concept and practice of "the insurrectionary direction of the urban revolutionary struggle" as deviating from and going against the general orientation of the urban revolutionary struggle according to the strategy of protracted people's war.

It should be noted that the CC's 9th Plenum (1985) reaffirmed the correct orientation in urban revolutionary struggle but easily permitted its combination with the concept of "insurrectionary direction of the urban struggle" and even gave license to the SCO program. The aforesaid concept was proposed by Reyes to the 9th Plenum but was first formulated by the EC of the Mindanao Commission in 1984, together with the RAWA strategy.

The concept slurred over the main preparations and requirements for an armed insurrection for the seizure of political power to take place in the national capital: the successful building and strengthening of the revolutionary forces in the countryside. The correct orientation in the cities during the entire course of the people's war before the strategic offensive is to develop the urban mass movement in support of the revolutionary mass movement and the armed struggle in the countryside and to ensure the flow of personnel, materiel and other resources for the people's war in the countryside.

rather than fact. GS-WBs during the period were actually attempts at transport paralysis more than work stoppage and massing of the people in protest demonstrations on streets and public plazas.

The focus was wrongly shifted to "preparing the urban insurrection" according to the "dynamism" of the urban struggle which concentrated resources on so-called IFs (insurrectionary forces), increasing armed partisan units for all-out armed partisan operations, direct linking of military actions to the legal movement which sabotaged the latter, and attempts at launching unrealistic or artificial "explosions" of mass actions, all of which combined to deny the much-needed flow of support in personnel and resources to the countryside and at the same time exhausted and devastated the urban mass base.

The Lagman gang gave flesh and blood to its own NCR version of the insurrectionist RAWA line in the following manner:

[a]Preparing for insurrections according to the "autonomous dynamism" of the national capital:

>> "Here in the national capital, the masses in millions are dissatisfied and impatient about their miserable condition spawned by the corrupt system The only thing needed is to make them conscious of the revolution. Organize them and assign them tasks for the insurrection...." (From "Consolidate for revolution, for insurrection", 1990).

>> "The particularity of the region, which is the urban center of the country, dictates that the direction of our struggle is insurrection. In line with this and based on the most recent events that have led to the intensification of the social crisis, we must seriously attend to the issue of the direction of our struggle in order to ensure that all our efforts go into this." (February 1990.)

[b]Violation of the legal and defensive character of the political struggle in the urban areas by imposing on it the "pol-mil" concept as the general orientation, notwithstanding the lip service to the legal and defensive character of the urban mass movement.

>> "Pol-mil' is a basic feature of the urban political struggle. 'Pol-mil' struggle is a sharper, more conscious and more direct preparation for putting the urban revolutionary movement on an insurrectionary direction." ("The Pol-Mil Concept" in Taliba ng Bayan, 1990.)

>> "Pol-mil' is the concrete combination of political and military

struggles. It means that the previous entirely political struggle (open and unarmed) characteristically conducted by all NCR revolutionary forces must now be combined with military (or armed) battles." ("On the Pol-Mil Concept," December 1989.)

>> " Accordingly, our 'pol-mil' is the proper balance and combination of political and military struggles based on the particularity of the region. Thus, our pol-mil would strengthen and reinforce our efforts in the political struggle. 'Pol-mil' will compensate for the inadequacy of political struggle to achieve consistent and steady advance. Always, 'pol-mil' will ensure that political struggles exhaust the limits dictated by reaction and strive to surmount these until the rules of the political struggle are changed in favor of advancing it." (*Ibid.*)

>> And more important is the correct application of 'pol-mil' by comrades in their particular areas of work such as the bureau level (YS and TU) and the districts. Even at the stage of drawing up plans, they must already identify and remove possible impediments to the flow of military aspects of the work to be accomplished in order to facilitate our advance. This means that their plans should include the military aspect and should not be entirely political. And in order not to be caught by surprise, they must draw up their own **orders of battle** (emphasis ours) and continuously build up their dossier so that at the moment of need they can immediately respond to the military need." (*Ibid.*)*

[c]Exaggerating the role of the national capital in "preparations" for insurrection by claiming that 'pol-mil' in the national capital is the principal political component of the entire revolutionary movement. Note also the separation of the armed struggle in the countryside from the political struggle in the cities ala-RAWA insurrectionist line.

>> "... 'pol-mil' will ensure that we continuously contribute to national efforts in our people's war. Concretely, our struggle here will serve as the extension of our general guerrilla warfare and as the

* *The Lagman gang continues to defend and champion this orientation in their operations. Thus, their use of "ABB" terrorism in attempts to create trouble in legal assemblies is not surprising*

main political component of the entire revolutionary movement...
(Emphasis, ours.) (From the MRRC 2-Year Program drawn up in October 1989.)

>> "We hope that the two coming years will become a critical period of intense political struggles between revolution and counterrevolution, as well as among the ranks of the reactionaries. This comes simultaneously with the intensifying armed battles in the countryside as well as in the cities. The national capital region is the **principal field of these political battles.**" (Emphasis, ours.)

>> "We must set our political preparedness and capability for possible turns of the situation as a result of the intensification of the politico-military battles in the entire country and in the region. In politically preparing and actually mobilizing the broad masses for political struggles, most important are sustained propaganda and agitation and the dominance of the revolutionary movement in this field of battle."^{*}

[d] Revoking the orientation, deployment of forces, education and priorities of work in NCR.

>> Factors for implementation: theoretical study of insurrection by spreading materials on the experiences and practice of insurrection by movements in other countries, the "pol-mil" orientation, "insurrectionary forces (IFs)", "broad legal movement (BLM)", "four machineries", education courses.

IFs - "solid detachments consciously directing the advance of mass actions towards insurrection".

Tasks of IFs:

(1) Take the leading role in mass actions.

"a. IFs are expected to lead in active propaganda and agitation for massive participation of the people in mobilizations.

"b. IFs constantly and consciously exhaust the limits set by the state on mass actions in order to change the rules in favor of facilitating and raising the fighting will of the masses.

* Note the emphasis on propaganda and agitation which are clearly focused on running after the spontaneous masses.

"c. IFs are conscious advocates of armed struggle in the ranks of the legal forces and in mass actions."

(2) Stand as reserve forces of the armed city partisan units

(3) Stand as defense units

>> BLM: revolutionary organization of activists. The formation set for the flow of the mass movement and to lead its offensive in the national capital. The MREC call for 1991 was to "put into the BLM the bulk of the revolutionary masses at the basic level in open movement." This weakened the sectoral organizations, killed political life in the unions and workers' organizations; and created splits and trampled on processes of the mass organization concerned.

>> Education: LSK* is a populist approach to social issues, slurring over the fundamental issue of classes and class struggle;

MRP (*Marxismo at Rebolusyong Pilipino*/Marxism and the Philippine Revolution) is a return to some bourgeois concepts in the explication of wages, exploitation of workers, disregarding the analysis of its connection with imperialist exploitation in semifeudal and semicolonial countries such as the Philippines and totally ignoring the Philippine revolution and protracted people's war; LC is the so-called Leninist course which was imposed as a requirement for candidate-membership in the Party instead of the basic Party course and which intentionally set aside the theoretical study of the general line and policies of the Party. The dogmatic approach was obvious in the "Left" opportunist "socialist" orientation, the comparison of the EDSA uprising with the 1905 Revolution in Russia, the preparations for insurrection in the NCR according to the requirements of an insurrectionary strategy and not the strategy of protracted people's war; and so many others.

>> The "four machineries" brought about the weakening of the basic Party units and aggravated the bureaucratization of the NCR Party organization. At the same time, there was the formation of a highly centralized all-powerful machinery in the MREC which arrogantly imposed its will on lower organs and units whose powers were clipped or reduced.

* *"Lunas sa Kahirapan" or "Cure for Poverty"*

[e]The use of agent-provocateur tactics sabotaged the legal mass movement and prejudiced legal personalities and mass leaders. Lagman is addicted to such tactics. He calls these tactics "kiskis" (scrape), "bangga" (collide), "sunog" (burn), "confrontation", "paputok" (explosive), "exhausting the limits set by the reactionary state" and such other terms. His fondness for these "forms of struggle" shuts out all understanding of the entire level of the battle, the level of consciousness and organization of the masses and the entire character of the urban struggle. Since 1976, the EC-CC has been criticizing such ideas of Lagman (e.g., the plan to use explosives in a mass action in January 1976). But obviously Lagman refuses to accept and correct himself. (From an interview of Jose Maria Sison on the question of violence and the exchange of letters between Lagman and the EC-CC in 1978.)

[f] Setting grandiose targets for mass mobilization and campaigns, and high-pressure forms of actions while looking for Right opportunist compromises and methods to achieve them. Relatively all-out sweeping propaganda and agitation well beyond the consciousness of the masses and the capacity of the organized forces. One example was the February 1992 mobilization target of 200,000, half of which was expected to be delivered by reactionary politicians who were then at the height of their election campaign. ■

APPENDIX 2

EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORT OF THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL LUZON REGIONAL COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 1992

REVIEW OF INSURRECTIONISM IN CENTRAL LUZON

1. Insurrectionism in the region was the content and form of the "play to win, victory in one year" program and the movement for "salvation, rehabilitation and development".

This was a line of quick victory through "insurrection" or urban armed uprising at the very center and seat of reactionary political power.

It aimed to overthrow the U.S.-Aquino regime and achieve decisive victory. Decisive victory was defined as the revolutionary forces' occupation of the dominant position in a coalition government called a "government of national salvation, reconciliation and unity (GNSRU) to be set up by various anti-Aquino forces, such as the RAM-SFP-YOU, pro-Enrile forces, Marcos loyalists, pro-Eduardo Cojuangco forces and others, which were to combine in overthrowing the regime. The revolutionary forces were supposed to dominate the other forces. And the GNSRU was supposed to be a launching pad for completing the victory of the national-democratic revolution.

On the basis of the estimate that the conditions inside and outside the country were very favorable, the "play to win" program claimed it was possible and within our capability to seize political power through urban armed uprising.

The proponents stood waiting to pounce upon the supposed "explosion of the situation", the "leap in the crisis of the ruling system" to be brought about by the coup d'etat of a faction of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the anti-Aquino reactionaries or for the coup d'etat (a constitutional coup) by the Aquino-Ramos-de Villa camp itself. This was supposed to be the "opportune moment" for launching an

insurrection.

The "play to win" program called for the widespread formation of municipal-level "people's caucuses" on the basis of a "people's agenda". It also called for the NDF to be set up at this level. The NDF and the so-called caucuses were supposed to converge on an Anti-Imperialist Democratic Front or AIDF. All these forces supposedly were continuously being readied for the day of the uprising. At the same time or immediately after the coup d'etat by whichever camp, these forces were to converge with the people's army and the spontaneous masses in uprisings in every town. Then people's councils were to be set up. In the process of the insurrection itself the people's army was to grow and the reactionary army was to disintegrate. All the problems of recovery were to be simply swept away or overrun by the new strategy or framework.

The detailed military plan could not be drawn up because "play to win" was rejected by the military conference which was tasked to do it. The general plan was also rejected by the regional committee in March 1991, after it was adopted in January 1991.

The proponents of "play to win" seized upon various analyses and concepts in various statements and documents of the Party. Some examples were:

The possibility of an EDSA-type uprising (AB, Dec. 1989 and "Lead the Masses, Launch the Offensives" LMLO). It was stated that no limits should be put on the possibility of victory.

On the three tasks to be advanced at the stage of the strategic defensive ("Some Clarifications on Our Tasks"), uprisings were identified as key.*

On the existence of a revolutionary flow (LMLO), the immediate task was to be the seizure of political power.

On the campaign/movement for "salvation, rehabilitation and development, the analysis:

Natural calamities came on top of the intense crisis.

* *These tasks are extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare, some elements of regular mobile warfare, mass struggles and uprisings.*

The departure of the Americans from Clark was in the offing.

Class relations had been suspended because the exploiters and the exploited, the oppressors and the oppressed were both victims of the natural calamities.

The local government bureaucrats, as well as the local military forces were likewise victims. We should neither struggle nor contend with them. Our blows should be aimed solely at the USAR.

They pontificated that "the current situation opens many chances, opportunities and possibilities for the people and the revolutionary movement in the region to strengthen themselves and expand. This is to be achieved in the process of handling the situation. This means change in our tactics and methods as well as the formulation of new ones." In written documents, no direct call for uprisings could be made (precisely because the regional committee rejected the call) but in the actual attempts at implementation, the objective of overthrowing the USAR and putting up of an alternative government remained. And such was precisely the content of the plans for the campaign for "salvation" and the plan for mass campaigns during the first six months of 1992 (focus on bourgeois elections).

As enumerated in the "Flow/Chronology of Events" all sorts of "alternatives" were to be set up: alternative trading for the peasants; alternative cities/communities in resettlement and relocation areas of Mt. Pinatubo victims; alternative bases conversion plan.

The central task of the revolutionary forces were to be socioeconomic work (SEW). A policy of maximum restraint on or the prohibition of workers' strikes was implemented. The stress was sweeping legal organizing of "broad open legal formations" and "extensive organization of victims' cooperatives". Local mass struggles were prohibited, as in Pampanga, so as not to antagonize the local bureaucrats, supposedly because they must be drawn into the struggle against the USAR.

The result was: further decrease of the Party, people's army and the mass base. Party members, activists and allies in legal institutions and programs became tied up in the technical aspects of relief and rehabilitation work (packing, bagging and distribution). There was a

default of leadership in workers' strikes. Passing off or inability to take advantage of opportunities for a relatively quick recovery.

In sum, it is obvious that despite the desire to launch insurrection, no attention was given to organizing and tempering the masses in struggles. There was sheer wishful thinking that due to the "broad mass base" organized* into the cooperatives and other open formations, the masses would surge in hundreds of thousands or even millions due to the "favorable" political situation.

Thus, like the other versions of insurrectionism that contaminated the ranks of revolutionaries, insurrectionism in the region "spread the theory of spontaneous masses. In the desire to hasten revolutionary victory, wishing for spontaneous mass uprising was considered more important than consistent and solid mass organizing by a revolutionary party and other revolutionary forces. Sweeping propaganda, street activism, transport paralyzation achieved through actions of armed city partisan units and other dramatic acts of violence were considered more important than painstaking mass work.

The role of the organized revolutionary masses, together with that of the organized enemy forces, was not taken into account, as in the insurrectionist interpretation of the EDSA uprising in 1986. The actual state of the organized revolutionary forces was not fully taken into account. Spontaneous mass uprising was desired to become the decisive factor in changing the balance of forces between revolution and counterrevolution, as well as in the seizure of political power, without any consideration of the development of the people's war and the people's army in the countryside.

All types of insurrectionism go against the general line of the new-democratic revolution, which necessitates the leading role of the proletariat through the Party, and the strategic line of protracted people's war (which is an armed revolutionary mass movement), stage-by-stage building of the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and of the people's army as the force for smashing the bureaucratic and military machinery of the reactionary state.**

* *This was largely illusory.*

** *From "Five Types of Insurrectionism".*

The strategic line of protracted people's war has been set on the basis of our class analysis of a semifeudal and semicolonial Philippine society. Because the peasantry, the most numerous mobilizable force (politically and militarily) for the revolution, is in the countryside, it is here that we accumulate our forces for the revolution. In the struggle against feudal and semifeudal exploitation, we build the mass base which serves as our deep reservoir of fighters recruited into the people's army. While we have not yet acquired the strength to seize political power, the people's army launches tactical offensives against the AFP military troops, that are thinly deployed in the countryside relative to the cities. It is in the countryside where we find the weakest link of the unified and organized forces of reaction in the Philippines. It is here where we principally wage our struggles mainly to deal blows at them and weaken them.

Certainly, the revolutionary forces also accumulate strength in the cities through the revolutionary mass movement and other types of legal and parliamentary struggle; as well as in undertaking armed city partisan actions which do not prejudice the principally legal and defensive character of the movement here. However, such accumulation of strength by the revolutionary forces and weakening of the enemy in the cities are secondary. Thus, since the Party and the people's army were reestablished in 1968 and 1969, the principal stress of the Party's work has always been in the countryside.

The strategy of insurrection. An insurrection is an armed uprising by a majority of the people against the center of reactionary political power. This was the strategy used by Lenin in Russia in smashing the reactionary political power of the czar and the bourgeoisie, and in setting up revolutionary political power. In the strategy of insurrection, all the accumulated strength of the revolution is deployed and pitted in a decisive battle in the city against the very center of reaction. When launched, the result is either the victory or defeat of the revolution. The accumulation of strength through a long process is principally undertaken in the cities, where the insurrection also occurs.

Such a strategy was set by the nature of Russian society: modern capitalism was the mode of production which gave birth to a definite

structure of classes. Industries were highly concentrated in the cities. The proletariat was highly concentrated there. The proletariat was positioned at the very core, at the very pole of production or the economy of capitalist society. Thus, when they act, the entire capitalist system is hit at its very core. The entire system is shaken when they launch strikes or demonstrations.

The cycle or movement of capitalist production alternates between boom and recession or industrial crisis (fall in production, closure of many factories, widespread unemployment of hundreds of thousands of workers). During periods of boom, the principal tactics are legal and defensive. During periods of crisis accompanied by political crisis, tactics are offensive. During the years of the revolution, widespread economic strikes (which in 1905 and 1917 reached more than two million strikers) were transformed into political strikes, growing into gigantic street demonstrations and finally into uprisings.

In the particular case of Russia, the industrial crisis followed or occurred at the same time as the war. Before the revolution of 1905, there was an industrial crisis in 1900-1903 where hundreds of thousands of workers were thrown out of work. The czarist government had suffered a defeat in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. The February Revolution and October Revolution of 1917 occurred in the midst of the First Interimperialist World War or World War I (1914-1917). Famine and poverty brought about by the war stalked the people. The point here is to show not only the difference in basic character of the Philippine and Russian societies but also in their particular historical circumstances.

A major factor in the victory of the insurrection was the disintegration of the reactionary army. In Russia, not only was a major part of the reactionary army neutralized, but even became part of the organized armed force of the revolution, on the eve of the insurrection. This was not achieved simply in a short while. It took a lot of efforts through many years, together with the accumulation of strength and tempering of the masses for the revolution. Thousands of Party members were actually recruited and worked within the very ranks of the reactionary army. (For example, 5,000 Party members at the garrison and 13,000

at the North Front with the Baltic Fleet in 1917).

Whether the strategy is people's war or insurrection, the question is the seizure of political power through revolutionary violence. This is determined by the character of the reactionary state: the reactionary army being its main pillar. Thus the armed force of the revolution is built in order to smash reactionary power and build revolutionary power. Consequently, the question is the defense of revolutionary power. Thus, it is necessary to have a strong armed revolutionary force. In the Russian insurrection of October 1917, about 300,000 were accounted as the accumulated armed force of the revolution on the eve of the insurrection to be pitted against about 250,000 of the armed force on the side of reaction. Among the organized forces of the revolution were

- 23,000 Red Guards
- more than 80,000 sailors of the Baltic Fleet
- 200,000 soldiers of the Petrograd Garrison
- including 700 combat and auxiliary vessels, among them seven battleships, 9 cruisers and 68 destroyers.

The proletariat was intensively organized. They were in soviets, factory committees, trade unions and also armed detachments.*

Aside from the factors in the economic and political situation that must be taken into account, the process and requisites for a victorious insurrection are not to be taken lightly.

Thus, we can see the big error of "play to win,..." It was not only inappropriate to the conditions and character of Philippine society but it also deviated from the actual process and requisites of an insurrection. The accumulation of forces and the disintegration of the reactionary army have to go through a process, these do not happen at the time of the insurrection itself.

It will not also work, as conceived in the movement/campaign for "salvation, rehabilitation and development", to go on building only cooperatives and open formations on the basis of socioeconomic work, without launching militant struggles, and then simply hope that the

* *The data cited are from "The Great October Socialist Revolution"*

people in hundreds of thousands would rise up on the day of the insurrection. In real life, mass struggles grow in strength and militancy as the uprising nears. Tempering the masses is a protracted process.

However, the basic error of the proponents of insurrectionism is their disregard of concrete situation of the classes and the nature of reaction in the Philippines. In their rush, the insurrectionists dislike the painstaking process of arousing, mobilizing and organizing the masses. The insurrectionists wished to stake the entire strength in personnel and arms of the people's army, accumulated through many years of marching on the road of protracted people's war in one decisive battle in the city, at the very center of reactionary power. It was not only the armed force but also the unarmed which they wished to gamble away. Had "play to win" been pursued, the outcome would have been decisive destruction, not decisive victory, of the revolutionary movement.

2. "The revolutionary forces suffice for launching an insurrection." In fact, the proponents of insurrection did not know the situation of the revolutionary forces in the entire country.

3. The insurrectionists criticize the central leadership for "going against the possibility of victory," when it referred to the possibility of an EDSA-type uprising.

They did not know nor assess the situation of the revolutionary forces within the region. Thus, they went so far as to conclude that "the downward trend in the region had been arrested. The new strategy or framework would simply override the problems of recovery." On the contrary, looking at the whole, the downward trend still continued, and even worsened, when the leadership (the executive committee) in the region neglected the ideological, political and organizational tasks necessary for the recovery. It was only in some provinces that some significant recovery had been achieved, through efforts of their respective provincial party committees and other members of the regional committee.

It is obvious that there is no clarity of understanding about what just was the EDSA uprising and the balance of forces really in 1986 when it occurred and a similar one can occur.

The balance of forces between revolution and counterrevolution in 1986 and even now: the entire political, military, economic and cultural strength of the reactionaries is overwhelmingly superior to the entire political, military, economic and cultural strength of the revolution. Thus, we are on the strategic defensive.

It was under this situation in the balance of forces that the EDSA uprising took place in 1986. By then, the revolutionary movement in Mindanao was already devastated by the sequence of urban insurrectionism, militarist regularization and Kampanyang Ahas. And yet those responsible for the wrong line and bloody witchhunt would deck themselves out as champions of a victorious line.

The EDSA uprising was a popular unarmed uprising and mutiny by one section or part of the AFP. It was the convergence of contradictory forces and interests within the society: the forces and interests of the revolution and the people, and the forces and interests of reaction (the Aquino, Ramos, Enrile factions, the Church, big business and US) against one faction of reaction (the Marcos faction) in power. The outcome was the EDSA uprising: one faction took the place of another faction in the wielding of state power. The people could not seize political power. Even if another EDSA-type uprising were to take place, only some legal personalities from the ranks of the revolutionary forces would at the most gain positions in the new regime but the working people would not gain power.

The balance of forces did not permit the revolutionary forces to seize political power. The forces of reaction were still overwhelmingly superior, thus they could dictate the outcome of EDSA. The various reactionary forces united against Marcos. Thus, the AFP did not go firing away at a mutinous part of itself. No killings and no massacre occurred at EDSA.

It would have been altogether a different matter had an **armed** uprising of the people ready to set up revolutionary political power taken place. Had the AFP been faced by NPA fighters and other armed masses, the full force of reaction would have been unleashed against them. If a peaceful demonstration of unarmed peasants could be attacked with brute force, would not the very center of reactionary

power not be militarily protected in the face of an armed uprising of the people?

And if the expectation had been the disintegration of the AFP or if the fact had been the neutralization of the majority of AFP forces because of the mutiny of RAM-SFP-YOU, two points need to be stressed. First, we had no basis for depending and relying on RAM-SFP-YOU. These forces would not even reveal to the movement who they were and how strong they were. The movement then did not have the capacity nor the means to verify what these groups claim. Second, we had no basis for believing that RAM or other AFP sections with them would help in putting the revolutionary forces into power. The actual solid data that we had about RAM had been the long record of their principal personalities and leaders in perpetrating torture and summary execution of comrades and the masses.

It is true that at certain times tactical alliance with some reactionary factions against the reactionary faction in power or principally favored by US imperialism can be developed. But to put our hopes or depend on them as a major support for achieving victory is a gross error.

4. The conclusion that "we must suspend the class struggle" due to the calamity of a volcanic eruption is erroneous. Exploitation of the masses by the big landlords and merchant-usurers has even intensified. These exploiters take advantage of the extremely difficult conditions of the masses in order to impose higher land rent and raise interest rates on loans. On top of this has been the setback or weakening of the revolutionary forces in some areas which the landlords have taken advantage of in order to take back the gains achieved by masses through the agrarian struggle.

5. Rank subjectivism, petty-bourgeois impetuosity and dogmatic style in the study of theory was the root cause of insurrectionism in the region.

Insurrectionism sprang from the failure to study and grasp the history and current conditions of Philippine society. It sprang from the failure to analyze the situation of the revolutionary forces as well as that of reaction, and the entire balance of forces between revolution and reaction.

Revolutionary theory is dogmatically studied. Principles and theory are studied apart from the entire history of the revolution from which these had sprung, without consideration of the particular history and circumstances of the society, the revolution and the principles. The basic differences, for example, of the Russian and Vietnamese societies and revolutions from our own society and revolution are not grasped.

In studying revolutionary theory, it is important:

>> First to comprehend our own society and revolution. Deeply grasp the history and character of Philippine society in order to draw the correct strategy and tactics of the revolution. Study the course of the history of the Philippine revolution and grasp the lessons that have come from history.

>> Comprehend also the particular history and character of other countries and societies whose revolution and revolutionary principles are being studied. Grasp the entire history and entire process of the revolution there. And understand the particular circumstances and issues being confronted at the time that the document or article was written or made. Then grasp the universal truth, principle or basic lesson.

>> Make the comparative study of the Philippine revolution and other revolutions. Grasp the similarities and differences. Study the concrete application in the Philippines of principles and lessons drawn from victorious revolutions elsewhere.

The responsibility of the national Party center in the spread of insurrectionism is definite. The center itself toyed with the ideas of uprising and insurrection. Its responsibility also for the low theoretical level of the Party is also definite. For a long period, there has been no centrally guided theoretical education. Thus, various organs and units of the Party were left to their own devices and various interpretations and application of theory ran rampant.

The insurrectionism of other national staff organs, such as the National Peasant Secretariat, also influenced the region. However, the responsibility of particular individuals and organs in the region for the current of insurrectionism is also definite.

6. In the implementation of and push for insurrectionism, many violations of the committee system and other principles of democratic centralism were committed. We can cite the following:

a. The refusal of the regional Party secretary to implement the instruction of the EC-CC for him to convene another CLRC plenum in order to recall "play to win..." which was decided upon by the CLRC plenum in January 1991. Instead, he misrepresented the position of the EC-CC on the CLRC's program of insurrection. Even as the EC-CC asserted that it was wrong and that "there cannot be two frameworks", he reported — after consultations with the EC-CC — that "there was no difference in the position of the higher organ and the region". Such outright misrepresentation is not mere organizational weakness but a sign of ideological weakness.

b. The formal and informal discussion and spreading of the "play to win..." program at lower levels by some CLRC and REC members in violation of the decision of the CLRC plenum not to do so without the approval of the higher organ.

c. The refusal of some CLRC and REC members to recall "play to win...", despite the decision of the CLRC plenum in April-March 1991 to recall it.

d. The failure to convene another CLRC plenum after the March-April 1991 plenum rejected "play to win". The CLRC was excluded from making major plans and policy. The CLRC decision to draw up a new plan was not implemented. There was no region-level program from March 1991 to October 1992.

Essentially, only a small circle within the REC, in the name of the REC, formulated the policies which still pushed insurrectionism. Without the knowledge of other REC members, without approval by the higher organ and by the CLRC, some leading cadres pushed their own policies and plan.

e. The formation in Bulacan of insurrectionary forces as early as mid-1990, even before the CLRC plenum decided on "play to win..."

f. The maneuver to add members to the REC at the January 1991 plenum. The selection of new REC members was made even when it was not on the agenda. It did not go through the correct

process of first discussing IPO record. There was also no secret balloting. In fact, the meeting was about to end when the new REC member was appointed. Granting that the comrade selected was qualified, he was not elected by the appropriate organ.

g. The campaign by an REC cadre to push the insurrectionist line even without the permission of the higher organ.

The CLRC could not meet after the March-April plenum. Eighteen months had passed before it met in October 1992. Even within the REC, discussions stalled in 1992. One cadre insisted on pushing insurrectionism. He said that there could be no discussions within the REC and CLRC unless the "debate" on the line was resolved, until the EC-CC sat down with the CLRC for mutual clarifications on the line. Paralyzed and unable to exercise leadership, the REC resigned on the ground of "failure of leadership" in July 1992. The resignation is contained in a letter of the regional Party secretary to the EC-CC and was made known to other members of the CLRC but was intercepted by one REC member.

The REC got bogged down by issues beyond its area of responsibility and competence (such as change in the entire strategy of the revolution) thus neglecting responsibility at its own level, scope and territory. Enmeshed in insurrectionism and continuing to be urban-based, the REC could not grasp the situation in the provinces, especially with regard to the people's army and the guerrilla zones. In 1992, despite the insistence of one EC member (Comrade Redar) that the situation of the forces in the region be discussed even while studying strategy, the EC failed to do this.

i. Not reporting to the EC-CC. During the entire period of 1990-1992, despite many events and big decisions made, the REC failed to submit reports to the CLRC. An attempt was made to report in January 1991, but when the file of the report could not be retrieved due to a diskette failure, the report was not resent. Worse, the regional secretary completely misrepresented the stand of the EC-CC on the "insurrection" program of the "CLRC". The plenum in March-April 1991 was convened only upon the insistence of others in the CLRC and in compliance by two REC members with the EC-

CC instruction to call another plenum in order to recall the "insurrection" program.

7. Effects of insurrectionism in the region:

a. Further deterioration of the work (very obvious, based even only on data available in October 1992).

b. Failure to take advantage of the situation and the opportunities for organizing and mobilizing the people towards recovery from the setbacks inflicted by the enemy offensives in 1988.

c. Confusion and disarray among a significant part of the forces regarding the line and policies.

d. Demoralization (in various degrees and forms) of a relatively large number of cadres and members, due to confusion and lack of guidance. This included some cadres of the CLRC and even the REC.

e. Paralyzation of the CLRC. Chaotic leadership by the REC until it was totally paralyzed.

Due to their dissatisfaction over noncompliance of the REC with the CLRC decision (such as the formulation of a new program, the decision to continue the summing-up, the calling of a new plenum, etc.) as well as over the REC's entire methods of leadership, the majority of the other members of the CLRC simply attended to their own tasks within their own assigned areas. As a result, significant gains have been made in recovery work in some areas.

f. Being hooked to insurrectionism, the REC continued to base itself in the city. Even cadres in the people's army and in the countryside were increasingly drawn to the urban areas. This mode of operation also infected some provincial Party committees. The entire executive committee of Aurora province was captured in the city. More than 30 cadres were arrested in the entire year of 1991 and until August 1992. The problem of security grew more and more complicated and it further compounded the confusion and disarray wrought by the wrong line, the lack of direction among many of the forces. ■

ON MAO'S GREATEST ACHIEVEMENT

COMMENTS ON THE GENERAL DECLARATION ON MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT*

BY ERWIN ENGST AND JOAN HINTON

JUNE 11, 1994

We are two Americans who came to China, one Erwin (Sid) Engst in 1946, the other Joan Hinton in 1948, attracted by the tremendous magnetic appeal of the Chinese revolution. To begin with we were going to stay just a few years to find out what was going on in the liberated areas of China. But it has been so fascinating we never left. Now, after nearly 50 years of participation in the Chinese revolution, we are still here working in agricultural mechanization.

We believe the Chinese revolution led by Mao was one of the great revolutions of all times, and believe that Mao was a proletarian revolutionary leader of the calibre of Marx and Lenin.

At this time with the demise of the USSR and the eastern European socialist countries and the failure of the Cultural Revolution in China, when many Marxists throughout the world have become discouraged and disoriented, we think this declaration is extremely important and timely.

While enthusiastically adding our signatures to the Declaration on Mao Zedong Thought, we submit the following suggestions:

We wholeheartedly agree, Mao's theory and practice of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat is his greatest achievement. It is a development of Marxism Leninism. In general we feel the discussion of this achievement is good, however it seems to us paragraph six in this section which reads, "He had the advantage of studying the bureaucratic bourgeois currents in the Chinese Communist Party..." is too weak. The wording "bureaucrat bourgeois currents" does not reveal the intensity of the protracted struggle Mao

* See *Rebolusyon*, Series 1994 Number 1, January-March

fought for every new stage in the building of socialism against *active opposition* coming from within the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. It was analysis of this opposition together with the "growth of modern revisionism abroad and capitalist restoration in Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe" from which he concluded the contradiction was an antagonistic contradiction. It was a contradiction between the interests of the masses of people and those of a small minority, a new bourgeoisie arising within the communist party itself — or as he called them, "those in the party in authority taking the capitalist road".

From our experience of participation in this struggle it seems to us Mao's contribution includes four aspects of this analysis, namely:

- 1) How is it possible there are capitalist roaders inside the very top organs of the party of the proletariat.

- 2) How can capitalist roaders be recognized in the process of the socialist revolution.

- 3) How to deal with the problem of capitalist roaders in the party.

- 4) The dialectical relation between the superstructure and the economic base.

In respect to these points we would like to make the following comments:

First, beginning with the Marxist philosophy that people's social existence determines their thinking, Mao showed that in our present era the main ideology in society is petty bourgeois. Party members carry this ideology with them into the party. As long as they are part of the oppressed people they fight hard against oppression. But once the party gains power the social existence of the party members changes to that of ruling groups at all levels of government. If this is not accompanied by a change in ideology, the untransformed petty bourgeois ideology of party members in positions of power will inevitably generate capitalist roaders within the party of the proletariat, i.e. people who use their power to gain advantage for a few, rather than serving the interests of the vast majority. Under these circumstances, this internal party contradiction becomes the main contradiction in society.

Second, Mao analyzed the struggle against the capitalist roaders as a class struggle taking the form of a two line struggle within the Chinese Communist Party. Capitalist roaders can be recognized by the line they are carrying out. Mao formulated the essence of the two lines as the proletarian revolutionary line — believe in the masses, rely on the masses and mobilize the masses, as opposed to the bourgeois reactionary line which shows fear of the masses, while believing in the few, relying on the few and mobilizing the few through backstage manipulations. Under the conditions of socialist revolution the old criteria of "Left" or right are no longer adequate for detection of capitalist roaders, since they attack from "left" or right depending on which is to their advantage. Summarizing the experience of the Cultural Revolution, Mao gave the masses of people a new tool for analyzing the two line struggle and detecting capitalist roaders, known as the "three wants and three don't wants" (i.e. we want Marxism-Leninism not revisionism, we want open and above board not scheming and intrigues, we want unity not splitting. We believe this is another important contribution to Marxism-Leninism made by Mao for analyzing the two line struggle and detection of capitalist roaders under the conditions of socialist revolution.

Third, Mao's whole theory and practice of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat is of course the main preventive measure he advocated. This includes mass movements (including periodic cultural revolutions), supervision of the party by the masses, cadres taking part in the three revolutionary movements, workers taking part in management, restriction of privileges for higher cadres etc. etc.

Fourth, after the socialist transformation of the economic base was completed, Mao emphasized the immediate next task of the socialist revolution was to bring untransformed parts of the superstructure (which includes ideology) into line with the socialist economic base. He warned, that though normally the superstructure is determined by the economic base, under certain historical circumstances the unreformed superstructure can react back on the new economic base undermining it and restoring the old. This is precisely what has happened in all the former socialist countries so far. ■

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