

The Communist

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NOVEMBER

1943

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY
OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

EARL BROWDER

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THE GLORIOUS VICTORIES OF THE RED ARMY

DMITRI MANUILSKY

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TWENTY-SIX YEARS OF STRUGGLE AND GLORY

ISRAEL AMTER

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THE COMMUNIST

A MAGAZINE OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

EDITOR: EARL BROWDER



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ON THE 26TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET POWER AND THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

BY EARL BROWDER

NOVEMBER, 1943, marks the twenty-sixth year since the Soviet Government arose under the leadership of Lenin out of the ruins of the old Czarist Empire, as the first socialist state in history. This is also the tenth year of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet and United States Governments.

Coincident with these anniversaries, and serving to point up their significance, the heads of the Foreign Affairs offices of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States are meeting in Moscow in a conference of fateful importance to the world.

This is a moment of the rapidly approaching climax of the war against Nazi Germany; the Soviet Red Armies have astonished the world with a three-month summer offensive which continues without a break into the autumn, breaching the Dnieper line, driving to the Latvian border in the center, and entering the final phase of clearing the Nazi invaders from Soviet soil. It is a moment lighted up by the announcement of a British author-

ity, Lord Selbourne, Minister of Economic Warfare, that nine-tenths of total Nazi casualties for the whole war period since September, 1939, have been inflicted by the Soviet forces alone since June 22, 1941. It is a moment when our own forces in Italy have demonstrated their brilliant capacity to meet the Nazis and defeat them.

This would seem to be a propitious time for careful review and re-evaluation of the whole field of Soviet-American relations. This is called for all the more since our country still suffers from remnants of the ideology of anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism which was Hitler's chief instrument for his rise to power and challenge for world conquest.

* * *

A fundamental obstacle to the development of normal Soviet-American relationships for almost twenty-five years, an obstacle still not entirely overcome, as we see in the inexcusable delay of the second front, was the prevailing opinion in American ruling circles that the

Soviet Power was a historical aberration, an accident of some sort outside the main path of historical development and unrelated to our own history, which must soon disappear. This attitude was expressed by the 16-year period in which the United States refused to recognize the existence of the Soviet Government and had no official relationships. More sharply it was expressed in the efforts from 1918 to 1920, to overthrow the Soviet Government by armed intervention and the subsidizing of various counter-revolutionary uprisings within Soviet territory.

When President Roosevelt took the initiative, ten years ago, to break the 16-year precedent of non-recognition of the Soviet Power set by Woodrow Wilson and continued through the administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, and when he negotiated with Maxim Litvinov the agreement which opened official diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the way was cleared for a more normal development. Unfortunately for our country and for the world, the first U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. William C. Bullitt, undertook his duties with the fixed idea that the Soviet Power was a transitory, accidental regime, and that his role was not the establishment of friendship and cooperation, but rather to "help" that country to rid itself of the Soviet Power, and "return" to the old and tried paths of the past. Mr. Bullitt failed miserably, of course, even as Hitler's more ambitious efforts along that

line have failed, but by his efforts he added much to the world's disorder and confusion which opened the way to Hitler's conquests. The Ambassadorship of Mr. Joseph E. Davies remedied much of the damage done by Bullitt, however, and prepared the great turn toward friendship and alliance that came in the end of 1941.

* * *

The United Nations Pact in January, 1942, crystallized the leading Anglo-Soviet-American coalition and established its character; this was more fully defined in May-June by the Anglo-Soviet Twenty-Year Treaty and the Soviet-American Lend-Lease Agreement. This marked the official end of the anti-Soviet theories and the acceptance of the Soviet Union, at long last, on the juridical plane of an equal among equals, as a great power.

Henry A. Wallace made a great contribution to the consolidation of this alliance when, in his speech of November 7, 1942, he gave recognition to the rise of the Soviet Power as one of the great landmarks of human progress, of the "peoples' revolution," along with the American Revolution of 1776, the Great French Revolution, the Bolivarian period of the liberation of Latin America, the European revolutions of 1848, and the American Civil War. Wallace's tracing of the common "family tree" of the Russian and American revolutions, now accepted by the great body of American opinion, was a smashing blow against the anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism which had so long be-

deviled American foreign relations and prevented our country from using its power to hold back the world from its disastrous plunge into war.

The main outlines of the position of the Soviet Power in world history were at last understood by the great majority of American people and their leaders. This great lesson may be summarized in a few simple propositions, as follows:

1. *The Soviet Union is here to stay; it is a great power.*

2. *The revolution which gave birth to the Soviet Power was one of the great liberating events of history, a landmark in the history of human progress and freedom.*

3. *The Soviet Power is a natural friend and ally of the United States, and perhaps the only one which gives to us much more than it expects from us.*

4. *The destruction of Nazism-Fascism and the establishment of a just and durable peace can be attained only in alliance with the U.S.S.R., by fully consolidating and maintaining the Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition.*

5. *The key to the next stage of world development is the collabora-*

tion of non-Communists with Communists, in the international field and within each nation.

When the foreign policy of the United States is fully adjusted to these simple but epochal conclusions, then for the first time in generations our country will have a foreign policy adequate to the full protection of American national interests.

This means today that our country must strengthen the American-Soviet-British coalition. This means that our nation, together with Great Britain, must open the second front in Western Europe in time to make a major contribution to shortening the war, to the military crushing of Hitlerism.

The manner in which we fight this war through to victory in concerted action with our Soviet and other allies will determine the shape of the post-war world and the position of our own country in it. It will determine the shape of the future. We have no future except as the result of victory, and our share in winning the victory will determine our role in helping mold the future of American and world democracy.

AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: HISTORIC DOCUMENTS

ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The White House
Washington, Oct. 10, 1933

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
Since the beginning of my administration, I have contemplated the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations between the hundred and twenty-five million people of the United States and the hundred and sixty million people of Russia.

It is most regrettable that these great peoples, between whom a happy tradition of friendship existed for more than a century to their mutual advantage, should now be without a practical method of communicating directly with each other.

The difficulties that have created this anomalous situation are serious but not, in my opinion, insoluble; and difficulties between great nations can be removed only by frank, friendly conversations. If you are of similar mind, I should be glad to receive any representatives you may designate to explore with me personally all questions outstanding between our countries.

Participation in such discussion would, of course, not commit either

nation to any future course of action, but would indicate a sincere desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the problems involved. It is my hope that such conversations might result in good to the people of both our countries.

I am, my dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Mr. Mikhail Kalinin,
President of the All-Union
Central Executive Committee,
Moscow.

* * *

Moscow, Oct. 17, 1933.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I have received your message of October tenth.

I have always considered most abnormal and regrettable a situation wherein, during the past sixteen years, two great republics—the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—have lacked the usual methods of communication and have been deprived of the benefits which such communication could give. I am glad to note that you also reached the same conclusions.

There is no doubt that difficulties, present or arising, between two countries, can be solved only when direct relations exist between them; and that, on the other hand, they have no chance for solution in the absence of such relations. I shall take the liberty further to express the opinion that the abnormal situation, to which you correctly refer in your message, has an unfavorable effect not only on the interests of the two states concerned, but also on the general international situation, increasing the element of disquiet, complicating the process of consolidating world peace and encouraging forces tending to disturb that peace.

In accordance with the above, I gladly accept your proposal to send to the United States a representative of the Soviet Government to discuss with you the questions of interest to our countries. The Soviet Government will be represented by Mr. M. M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who will come to Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MIKHAIL KALININ.

Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington.

EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND MR. LITVINOV, NOVEMBER 16, 1933

The White House
Washington, Nov. 16, 1933.

MY DEAR MR. LITVINOV: I am very happy to inform you that as a result of our conversations the Government of the United States has decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to exchange ambassadors.

I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual

benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world.

I am, my dear Mr. Litvinov,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Mr. Maxim M. Litvinov,
People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

* * *

Washington, Nov. 16, 1933.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am very happy to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is glad to establish normal diplomatic

relations with the Government of the United States and to exchange ambassadors.

I, too, share the hope that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the

preservation of the peace of the world.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOV,
People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

AMERICAN-SOVIET AGREEMENT

Official White House statement, issued June 11, 1942, on the Roosevelt-Molotov conversations

THE People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotov, following the invitation of the President of the United States of America, arrived in Washington May 29 and was for some time the President's guest.

This visit to Washington afforded an opportunity for a friendly exchange of views between the President and his advisers on the one hand and Mr. V. M. Molotov and his party on the other. Among those who participated in the conversations were the Soviet Ambassador in the United States, Mr. Maxim Litvinov, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Chief of Staff General Marshall and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Navy Admiral Ernest J. King. Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, joined in subsequent conversations on non-military matters.

In the course of the conversations, full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent

tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942. In addition, the measures for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks, and other kinds of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union were discussed.

Further were discussed the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war.

Both sides state with satisfaction the unity of their views on all these questions.

At the conclusion of the visit the President asked Mr. Molotov to inform Mr. Stalin on his behalf that he feels these conversations have been most useful in establishing a basis for fruitful and closer relationship between the two governments in the pursuit of the common objectives of the United Nations.

PRESIDENT KALININ'S GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT,
INDEPENDENCE DAY, JULY 4, 1942

ON THE occasion of your national holiday celebrating the independence of the United States of America I beg you, Mr. President, to accept the very best congratulations of the peoples of the Soviet Union and sincere wishes of happiness for you personally and for the great

American nation. I firmly believe that the cooperation of our countries in the war will hasten the day of the complete and final destruction of Hitler Germany, the enemy of all liberty-loving peoples, of all progressive humanity.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT KALININ

On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Republic, November 7, 1942

ON THE occasion of this twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet State I convey to Your Excellency the congratulations of the government and people of the United States.

For the second time in a generation our two countries are in the forefront of a gathering of nations aligned against a common enemy. Collaboration in the mighty military task before us must be the prelude to collaboration in the mightier task of creating a world at peace.

The resistance of free peoples has made possible the mounting powers of the United Nations. The Russian Army and the Russian people in their continuing struggle against Nazi conquest today bear the brunt of the massed weight of the Nazi might and their incomparable heroism stands as a symbol of determination and unrelenting effort.

Let Your Excellency rest assured that the steadily growing power of the United States has been, and will continue to be, dedicated to complete victory.

TEXT OF REMARKS EXCHANGED BETWEEN SOVIET
AMBASSADOR GROMYKO AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
IN WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 4TH, 1943

MR. PRESIDENT:

MI have the honor to present to you the letter of credence by which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredits me to you as Ambassador Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and also the letter of recall of my predecessor.

In presenting you with the letter of credence, I feel it my duty to state that the people of the Soviet Union entertain for the American

people feelings of friendship and deep respect, and that the maintenance and further development of friendly relations and closest collaboration with them constitute the unswerving desire and aspiration of my Government.

The friendship of the peoples of our countries is not accidental. It is the expression of the basic interests of our peoples and our nations. This friendship has grown stronger under the grim trial of this war, in which the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States fight against their common enemy—Hitlerite Germany and her allies in Europe. The bonds of friendship uniting our peoples are being still further strengthened by the blood which the best sons of our countries are shedding in the struggle against the German fascist gangsters.

During the entire two years of this stubborn struggle, in which the heaviest burden of effort and sacrifices have fallen upon the Soviet Union, the peoples of the Soviet Union received and are receiving from the friendly American people not only moral, but substantial material, support as well in the form of airplanes, tanks, guns and other military material, and also foodstuffs. The Soviet people highly value this support, for which I express to you, Mr. President, and through you to the whole American people, the warm gratitude of my Government and the peoples of my country. The armed forces of the Allies, including those of the United States of America, are taking an increasingly greater part in our

common struggle against Hitlerite Germany and have already inflicted a number of heavy defeats upon the cunning foe. The successes of the Red Army in its struggle against the Hitlerite hordes during more than two years, its present victorious advance on the Soviet-German front, the remarkable successes of Anglo-American arms in North Africa and Sicily, as well as the developing military operations of the Anglo-American forces on the territory of Italy, have created a favorable military-political situation for inflicting decisive blows upon the hated enemy.

It is now clear that the war is turning in favor of the United Nations. However, for delivery of the final blow upon the enemy, exertion of the total strength of our countries and also of all the United Nations will be required. I firmly believe, Mr. President, that the present joint struggle against our common foe, Hitlerite Germany and her allies in Europe, will bring about closer collaboration of our countries in the post-war period, in the interest of general peace and security.

I believe that the mutual understanding and mutual confidence between our countries, which are so necessary both during wartime and in the post-war period as well, will be forged to the maximum degree in the fire of our joint military effort. I am prepared to devote all my endeavors to further the consolidation of this mutual understanding and confidence between our countries, certain of the success and fruitfulness of our mutual

effort, directed to the achievement of this high purpose. I hope, Mr. President, that in executing my duties as the Ambassador accredited to you I may rely upon your support and likewise that of the Government which you head.

I beg you, Mr. President, to accept the assurance of the warm sympathy of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the American people, and the expression of full confidence in the further fruitful development and strengthening of the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, for the benefit and prosperity of our great peoples and of all friendly countries.

MR. AMBASSADOR:

MI am happy to receive from Your Excellency the letters by which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredits you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States, and I welcome you in that capacity.

I am deeply gratified at the expression of your determination to develop further the friendly relations of understanding and confidence which so happily exist between our two countries, and continue thereby the work of your distinguished predecessor whose letters of recall you have handed to me. I can assure you that, in the performance of this high task with which your Government has entrusted you, Your Excellency may

count upon receiving the full cooperation and support of the Government of the United States.

The fortitude, courage and self-sacrifice of the armed forces and people of the Soviet Union in their terrible hours of trial have aroused the undying admiration of the American people, and we rejoice with the people of the Soviet Union in the ever growing tide of success which is crowning Soviet arms.

Since the day of the treacherous assault upon your country by Nazi Germany it has been, and it is, the unswerving intention of this country to lend maximum assistance to your gallant armies. Our two countries are united against a common enemy. The Government and people of the United States have bent every effort to bring to bear as speedily and as effectively as possible the might of our armed forces against that enemy.

The enemy has felt, is feeling, and will to an ever increasing degree feel the weight of the combined forces of the United Nations, and when the final and complete victory is achieved, as it will be, I know that every one of the United Nations will have made its full contribution toward that victory.

Our countries are joined together in a high cause, and I fully share your confidence that the unity of purpose which binds our peoples and countries together in the prosecution of the war will be translated into a close and lasting collaboration, together with other like-minded countries, in the establishment of a just and enduring peace.

ON THE EVE OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE*

THE last few months have been full of events which have decisively changed the course of the world war. The Red Army victories on the Soviet-German Front, victories won in stiff and hard-fought battles against the German invaders, as well as the successful operations of the Allies in the Mediterranean theater, have contributed to the new and extremely favorable changes in the entire military and political situation for the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition.

These past few months have clearly revealed the growing crisis in the Hitler camp under the influence of its military reverses, and have brought the Hitler coalition to the point of collapse. At the same time these months have offered new examples of developing cooperation between the countries which have united in the struggle against Hitler Germany and her vassals.

It stands to reason that the countries heading the struggle for the rout of Hitler Germany feel the need of further promoting cooperation as the successes in the struggle bring closer the achievement of their common aim. There are a number of momentous facts at hand showing joint agreement between

Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. in solving the general and specific problems that have confronted them in the course of the war.

Of great importance, for instance, was the agreement between the Allies for action on the question of the armistice with Italy, which, as is known, ended in Italy's declaring war on Germany. The existence of such concord came as an unpleasant surprise to our enemies and their agents in the different countries who in every way spread rumors about the "discord" and "friction" in the anti-Hitler camp.

Another momentous fact in the development of the cooperation between the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States was the decision taken on the initiative of the Soviet Union to set up the military and political commission of the Allied countries which will soon be taking up its functions.

The growing cooperation also in the economic field is universally known. This cooperation is reflected particularly in the work of the International Conference on food problems held in Hot Springs, in which a Soviet delegation participated, and also in the joint elaboration of plans of the Administration of Relief and Rehabilitation of the

* An editorial in *Izvestia*, Moscow, October 18, 1943.

United Nations which is to develop its work after the war.

The press in Britain and the United States, as well as the papers in the neutral countries, attach particularly great importance to the forthcoming three-power conference in Moscow. The program and nature of the forthcoming talks have been expressed in a number of different conjectures, and though no official communiqués have been issued, the attention of the world press is already drawn to the Moscow meeting.

* * *

The development of cooperation between the U.S.S.R., the United States and Britain in a number of spheres—military, political and economic—has given rise to a number of questions which have to be jointly solved. Need has arisen to discuss the major problems ensuing from the common nature of the struggle to coordinate views and operations. They concern different aspects of the conduct of the war.

The foreign papers name a large number of questions which in their opinion are due for discussion at the forthcoming conference. Along with the essential question relating to the conduct of the war, the establishment of a permanent organ of contact between the Allies and the strengthening of their economic ties, a number of post-war problems are also advanced such as the attitude to conquered Germany, the situation in the Balkans, the role of the smaller nations, the future of Hitler's vassals Rumania, Hungary and Finland, etc.

It is the latter questions which actually hold the major attention of many organs of the press, which are ready to discuss them without end. Moreover, along with the voices of the sincere supporters of promoting friendly relations with the Soviet Union, unexpected defenders of the German satellites have come to the fore and are ready to crawl out of their skins in order to prove the need of making allowances for those who had dreamt of becoming rich at the expense of the territory of the U.S.S.R. with the help of Hitler Germany.

Naturally, the questions of post-war organization are of great importance to all the Allied countries, and it is necessary already now, in the war period, to prepare to solve many problems of the post-war period, especially in the political and economic spheres. However, events follow their logical sequence. The peace period must be preceded by a more or less agreed-upon conduct and victorious completion of the war. The post-war problems can be successfully solved on the condition that everything is done in the military, political and economic spheres to hasten this post-war period.

The outstanding feature of the present international situation brought about by the successful Red Army offensive and the growth of the military forces and successes of the Allies is that it brings to the fore the question of most vital importance to all peoples, namely, the duration of the war.

As is known, Hitler staked all on the "lightning" destruction of the

Soviet Union, just as he succeeded in doing in certain European countries. The Red' Army, however, frustrated the plans of the German General Staff for a "Blitzkrieg," and forced the Germans to fight a protracted war for which they were not prepared. This incidentally enabled the Allies to complete the necessary preparations of their military apparatus and to develop their military potential. The time factor became a weapon in the hands of the anti-Hitler camp.

The military situation has radically changed. The plans of the Hitler robbers have also changed. Forced to pass over from the offensive to the defensive, or more correctly speaking, from the offensive to a retreat, the Hitlerites are now building all of their plans on dragging out the war in order to postpone their final defeat and to cause the Allies difficulties connected with the prolongation of the war.

The paramount task of the Allies today is to knock the weapon of time out of Hitler's hands and utterly to defeat him. Swift and decisive action is becoming the sole powerful means of routing the Hitler armies.

* * *

It is now nearly two and a half years that the Red Army and our people are waging a mortal struggle against the enemy, shouldering practically the full weight of the Nazi war machine. The military and political situation is favorable for our Allies. Failure to take advantage of this, thus dragging out

the war, would mean taking political responsibility for the immeasurable sufferings of tens of millions of people and for a long-time disorganization of world political and economic life.

Undoubtedly, the question of decisively shortening the war and scoring victory in the shortest space of time is indissolubly connected with the task of opening the second front in western Europe.

The Hitler camp views the Moscow conference with fear. In order to calm their people they are hysterically crying about irreconcilable "contradictions" between the Allies. But the Hitlerites have already more than once deceived themselves with hopes of discord in the camp of the Allies. The old German policy of playing at contradictions has long ago spent itself, and during the war on more than one occasion has led to just the opposite results.

The Nazis themselves are gradually beginning to realize this when they dismally note, for instance, through the German Information Bureau that the "contradictions between the three Allies will never affect the very essence of the problem." The "essence of the problem" means to rout Hitler Germany. This task will be solved by the joint efforts of the Allies. The conference must hasten the solution of this task.

The forthcoming conference of representatives of the three Allied powers is called upon to play an important role in the solution of this task as well as in other problems that have arisen.

THE GLORIOUS VICTORIES OF THE RED ARMY

BY DMITRI MANUILSKY

THE Soviet country, the Soviet people and its Red Army are passing through stirring days. The significance of these historical days can be expressed in one word—victory. It is not yet final victory. Much effort will still be needed by the army and people to rout and destroy the enemy.

This victory is being born in great battles. The smashing of the enemy fortified belt, which the Germans considered impregnable, by the Red Army; the liquidation of strongpoints which they regarded as insuperable; the fording of rivers which they looked upon as impassable—all this is building up the victory.

It is emerging from the close pursuit of the enemy troops who are fleeing from the danger of encirclement looming over them, from the hundreds of thousands of German corpses, from the enormous cemeteries of German tanks, planes and guns. This victory is being forged by millions of people, by the whole Soviet people.

German fascist propaganda is now trying to have the world believe that the German army is allegedly "withdrawing according to plan" for the purpose of "shorten-

ing the front." Only a perfect idiot could believe that the surrender of the Orel base by the Germans, that base from which they intended to advance on Moscow; that the retreat of the Germans from their fortified line at Taganrog; that the opening of the "Smolensk gateway" by them is in any way in keeping with the plans of the German command.

Even to a baby it is obvious that once the front is shortened for the German army it is in like manner shortened for the Red Army too. However, it suffices to look at the map to see that the Germans have failed to effect any shortening of the front. Just the contrary. The winding line of the Dnieper where the Germans would have liked to retain a foothold, is if anything, lengthening the front.

However, the very fact that such fraudulent talk about "withdrawing according to plan" is indulged in speaks of the existence of panic in German fascist circles. On July 5 of this year the German command launched an offensive in the Orel and Belgorod directions which according to its words was to decide the outcome of the war.

Concentrating seventeen tank,

three motorized and eighteen infantry divisions on two small sectors, the German command hoped by concentric blows from north and south to pierce the Soviet defense and encircle and destroy the Soviet troops situated on the arc of the Kursk salient. The Kursk arc was defended among other Red Army units by those which had played a decisive role in the encirclement of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad.

All the German war prisoners stated in one voice that intensive propaganda had been carried out among the Hitler troops on the need to place the Russian armies of the former Don front in "Kessel" in revenge for the defeat suffered by the Germans at Stalingrad.

The mass annihilation of German manpower and equipment, unprecedented in any of the most violent battles of the present war, started in the very first days and hours of the German offensive. The greatest battle in history, as the German fascist command called its Orel and Belgorod operation, buried forever the illusions harbored by the Germans that after their winter defeats they would succeed in mending matters in the summer of 1943.

The German plan for a summer offensive utterly collapsed. On August 5, exactly one month after the German offensive was launched, the Red Army captured Orel and Belgorod, thus laying the basis for beginning the successful offensive operations which are still continuing.

After losing Orel the German fas-

cist command firmly held on to its highly important center of resistance at Kharkov. On August 23 the troops of the steppe front, actively supported on their flanks by the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, in violent battles crushed the enemy resistance and captured Kharkov by storm.

The salvoes of the Kremlin guns heralding the glad tidings of the capture of Kharkov were heard in Kiev and Odessa, in Minsk and Vilno, in Tallinn and Kovno, in Riga and Kishinev. They were heard by the men of the Southern Front who were preparing an assault on the German fortifications on the Mius River, at the Taganrog fortifications, which the German command considered a miracle of engineering technique and far superior to the famous Maginot or Siegfried Line.

On August 30 the Supreme High Command of the Red Army announced the glorious victory of the troops on the Southern Front who had smashed the German Mius Front. Kharkov and Taganrog to a considerable extent determined the fate of the Donbas, which was liberated from German fascist occupation by September 8. Just a few days before this the front in the Smolensk direction was pierced and Yelnya was occupied by the Soviet troops.

While the Red Army was clearing the Donbas the troops of the Central Front began their heroic march into northern Ukraine, looming over the flanks of the German fascist troops who were trying to entrench in the central and southern parts of the

Ukraine. On September 6, the troops of the Central Front occupied Konotop; and on September 9 Bakhmach, an important railway junction, center of enemy communications and decisive strong-point of the German defense in the Kiev direction.

On September 15 followed the liberation of Nezhin. Every day brought new and outstanding Red Army victories. On September 16 the troops of the North Caucasian Front in interaction with the ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet, following five days of violent battles, gained possession of Novorossisk. That same day the Soviet troops fording the River Desna captured Novgorod-Seversky, and on September 17, Bryansk.

On September 19 Red Army units smashed the German fortified belt covering the so-called Smolensk gateway. Then followed Chernigov and Poltava. On September 25 the troops of the Western Front crossed the Dnieper and captured by assault Smolensk, which the Germans regarded as the key to their defense on the Soviet-German Front. The Red Army emerged on the bank of the Dnieper. As a result the Red Army smashed the enemy front in a number of important directions and forded the Rivers Mius, Seim, Desna, Vorskla, Sozh and others.

In a little under two months the Red Army advanced from its initial position 314 kilometers and more, liberating from the German invaders territory of more than 300,000 square kilometers.

The Red Army returned to the Black Sea Fleet the naval port of

Novorossisk, second in importance to Sevastopol, thus creating the conditions for successful naval operations in the Black Sea.

Economically the Red Army victories are of exceptional importance. The Red Army has given back to the country the Donbas, the most important coal and industrial district of the country; it wrested from the claws of the German plunderers the most fertile section of the Ukraine, rich in grain and technical crops. The Red Army liberated from the German fascist yoke tens of millions of Soviet people, tens of thousands of inhabited points and hundreds of Russian and Ukrainian towns and regional centers. The Red Army entered the territory of Byelorussia. In its sweeping offensive operations the Red Army saved hundreds of thousands of Soviet people whom the German fascist fiends were preparing to drive into slavery in Germany.

In the absence of a second front in the west the Red Army, by its successful operations, rendered inestimable service to the Soviet Union's Allies, hastening Italy's withdrawing from the war and facilitating the landing of Allied troops on Italian territory.

Finally, the Red Army victories are of immeasurable significance from the viewpoint of their moral and political effect on the enemy's army. In the enemy camp the successes of the Soviet troops are giving rise to feelings of despair and hopelessness and are affecting for the worse the already declining fighting capacity of the German fascist soldiers.

* * *

What are the reasons for the brilliant victories of the Red Army? They are, above all, the brilliant strategy of the Red Army Supreme High Command; the foresight of its military plans to rout the enemy; the ability, not only to see through the enemy's designs, but to upset them in good time; the ability to take advantage of the enemy's vulnerable spots, systematically to wear down the enemy and inflict a crushing blow on him at the most appropriate time, at the most suitable place and thus impose our will on the foe.

The reasons for the successes of the Red Army are to be found in the splendid qualities of the Red Army men; in their fearlessness, endurance power and fervent patriotism; in the qualities with which they have become imbued through the centuries of Russian history. The summer fighting against the Germans revealed the Red Army's ability to maneuver boldly and frustrate the stereotyped tactics of the Germans.

In the summer battles the Soviet troops displayed truly Suvorov swiftness, accomplishing long marches and suddenly appearing where the enemy least expected them. They revealed unexampled courage and great skill in fording river barriers. At Novorossisk they showed their ability to combine blows from the ground with naval landing operations, which decided the fate of the Germans, not only in Novorossisk, but also the fate of their bridgehead fortification in the Kuban.

The summer battles showed the world at large that the Red Army has highly talented generals who are fully capable of carrying out the brilliant plans of the Red Army Supreme High Command and of ruthlessly routing the vaunted German generals who in their self-confidence considered themselves experts in military matters. Finally, the summer battles showed that Soviet industry supplied the Red Army with up-to-date weapons and in such quantities as to ensure the success of the offensive and to cut down to a minimum Soviet losses.

However, although the Red Army's successes are great it should not for a minute be forgotten that the Soviet people are face to face with a foul and cunning enemy. The peoples of the Soviet Union and the Red Army are fully justified in holding the entire German fascist army responsible for all their despicable and foul crimes. The justifiable cry "Death to the German occupationists" is not only a call to retribution dictated by the feelings of justice inherent in every Soviet citizen. It is a wise measure of state and national defense against the imperialist adventurers, a measure which means the removal of the bandits and robbers who have violated the standards of the human community.

From this rise the tasks confronting all Red Army men and commanders—tirelessly to drive the enemy off Soviet soil, allowing him no chance to recover, to rest or to entrench on river positions or other natural barriers.

The Red Army troops must fore-

stall the enemy, must break into the inhabited points and towns occupied by him before he has a chance to carry out his foul destructive work.

Let the glorious victories of the Red Army still further extend the partisan struggle which is inflicting

blows on the enemy from the rear. Let the example of the heroic Minsk partisans, who removed the executioner of the Byelorussian people—Wilhelm Kube—serve as an example to all the districts of the Soviet country still occupied by the enemy.

TWENTY-SIX YEARS OF STRUGGLE AND GLORY

BY ISRAEL AMTER

"I readily admit that much of all this would have been impossible in this form, or at this time, but for the valiant and magnificent exertions and triumphs of the Russian Armies, who have defended their native soil against the vile and unprovoked attack with incomparable vigor, skill and devotion and at a terrible price in Russian blood. No government ever formed among men has been capable of surviving injuries so grave and cruel as those inflicted by Hitler upon Russia.

"Under the leadership of Marshal Stalin and thanks also to the stand made by the British people when they were all alone, and to abundant British and American supplies and munitions of all kinds, Russia has not only survived and recovered from these frightful injuries but has inflicted, as no other force in the world could have inflicted, mortal damage on the German Army machine." (Winston Churchill, Quebec, August 31, 1943.)

NOVEMBER 7, 1943, marks the twenty-sixth year of the rise of Soviet Power. A generation of terrific struggle against enemies from without and within, and of triumph in the establishment of Soviet Power on a granite basis over one-sixth of the globe, against the machinations and destructive activities of all the

enemies of socialism. A generation of struggle and of triumph.

The young Soviet Republic, on the very morrow after its birth, was compelled to wage a war for its national preservation. It truly became a war for survival. The Soviet Government and the people of the Soviet Union had to fight against the counter-revolution organized within the country, against the aggression of the imperialist powers, and against famine. They had to combat and defeat the anti-Leninist theories and policies of the Trotskyites, Bukharinites and others, who were later exposed as agents of foreign powers. The Soviet Union came out of this struggle entrenched among the people and a force within the community of nations.

Then, in 1928, there were launched the great Five-Year Plans. The Soviet Government, under the guidance of Stalin, was gearing the nation to the concentrated task of making the Soviet Union as quickly as possible economically independent and of placing her in a position where, in case of assault, she would be able to resist all aggression and continue the building of socialism.

With this in mind, and answering the sentiment expressed by some in the Soviet Union that the strain was

too great, Stalin, in a speech on February 4th, 1931, at a conference of managers of Soviet industry, said:

"It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo a bit, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. . . . To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten!" (Joseph Stalin, *Leninism—Selected Writings*, International Publishers, New York, 1942, p. 199.)

And the achievements were great. As a result of this struggle, the Soviet Union became the second nation in the world in production, second only to the United States! In about twenty years the Soviet Union, from a preponderantly backward agrarian country, became an industrial country. Despite hostile prophecies of complete collapse, the Soviet Union likewise militarily became that mighty state whose Red Army has evoked the wonder and gratitude of the democratic nations and their leaders throughout the world.

Churchill, therefore, was correct when he paid tribute to the strength and resistance power of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is not only withstanding but defeating the military and industrial power of Germany and all the satellite governments. Soviet industry, turning out military supplies, is competing with the industry, not only of Germany, but of the satellite states as well as the occupied countries. Millions of Soviet citizens and men and

women of the occupied countries have been transported to the industries of Germany and today are working as slaves, turning out war material for Hitler. In addition, these imported slaves have taken the place of Germans, who have been released for the Nazi army.

When we realize that to date there is still no second front and that the Soviet Union is bearing the brunt of the fight against the Nazi military machine, we appreciate the fact that Churchill did not overestimate the significance of the "valiant and magnificent exertions and triumphs of the Russian Armies."

The Allies have helped furnish the Soviet Union with war supplies, food, etc. Up to the month of August this amounted to \$2,440,000,000 worth from the United States in supplies that were shipped from American ports but partly lost in the Atlantic. This, however, is only a small fraction of the total war needs of the Soviet Union, which have been supplied directly by the factories and fields of the Soviet Union.

The Spirit of the Soviet Union

What is it that has made it possible for the Soviet Union to carry on the titanic struggle and achieve such triumphs? It is: (1) that the people of the workers' state, enjoying the highest democracy, socialist democracy, are united in an indestructible moral and political unity, and no fifth column has been permitted to exist to undermine this unity; (2) that there are the fullest confidence in and support of the

Soviet Government; (3) that there is the firmly welded confraternity, on the basis of full equality, of the many peoples embraced in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (4) that there is only one thought in the mind of the people, Army, and Government of the Soviet Union, namely, to win the war and to win it in the shortest time possible.

Do we need a definition of the spirit of the Soviet Union? If so, it was expressed aptly by Lieutenant-General Brehon Somervell of the United States Army. Somervell declared in his speech at St. Louis, in September, 1942:

"I can sum up Russia in one word. It stands for heroism, for supreme self-sacrifice, for devotion, for the most gallant qualities man can possess. The word is 'Stalingrad.'"

Yes, Stalingrad and the spirit of Stalingrad are the expression of what animates the whole Soviet people—heroism, supreme self-sacrifice, devotion. Stalingrad, which fought for 162 days, holding the enemy at bay, retreating, going into the counter-attack, fighting from street to street, from house to house, from door to door, fighting with their backs to the river! Spurred on by Stalin and the spirit for victory, they drove the Nazis back, destroyed their armies—and Stalingrad was freed of the Nazi scourge.

Writing of another city that faced the same danger, Henry C. Cassidy declared:

"A great people, or a strong system, is one that can undergo such a test, know the danger and rise above it. That, Moscow did. Its nerves were steadied by a supreme

display of calmness and confidence on the part of its leaders. On November 7 they went through the ritual observance of the 24th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, almost under the eyes of the Germans.

"On the eve of the anniversary, the Moscow Soviet called its traditional meeting. The Mayakovsky subway station instead of the Bolshoi Theatre, was the scene of the meeting. But the important thing was that it was held, and that Stalin spoke." (Henry C. Cassidy, *Moscow Dateline*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1943, p. 168.)

Cassidy tells about five seamen, naming them, in Sevastopol, who "emulated the deed of the twenty-eight on the Moscow front, by tying hand grenades to their belts, leaping under an advancing enemy tank column, and blowing the tanks—and themselves—to pieces. . . . There were nameless civilians who lived and worked in the underground vaults under the chalky cliffs, producing the munitions for those who fought above, and treating those who came down, wounded." (*Ibid.*, p. 236.)

In Stalingrad, where tanks and guns were made, the workers continued at the job, disregarding the battle that was going on. Tanks and guns were turned out and those brought back damaged from the field were repaired in the daytime and then taken to the front again by the workers in the shops.

This awe-inspiring courage, patriotic fervor, and self-sacrifice have inspired the masses all over the world. Only a bitter enemy of

humanity would dare to underrate the example that the people of the Soviet Union and their government have set for all mankind in the fearful battle against the barbarous Nazi machine.

Our age will be known, among other things, as one in which a monstrous fascist-imperialist clique was permitted to launch its offensive for world conquest. Egged on and supported by ultra-reactionary finance capitalist circles in Britain and the United States, the Hitlerites, ostensibly to build a wall against Communism, became the incendiaries of a world war. When Chamberlain and Daladier went on their villainous mission to Berchtesgaden and then to Munich to sign an agreement permitting Hitler to invade Czechoslovakia, Nazism raised its banner of annexation and pillage, reaching from Poland around the map of Europe to France and beginning the assault upon England, with the aim of subjugating the whole world.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler decided to make the supreme assault—the invasion of the Soviet Union—calculated to establish his mastery over the peoples of the world. This was to be a test between democracy, represented first of all by the great socialist state, and fascism, the negation of everything humanity has built through the ages.

The test came. In the first stages, the Soviet people and their Red Army were compelled to retreat. Fifty million people came under the bloody sway of Nazi power—580,000 square miles, including large industrial cities with key war

industries and a large part of the rich agricultural area of the Soviet Union, and especially the Ukraine, fell into the hands of the marauders. It was a path of murder, of destruction of homes, of desecration of cultural institutions and shrines, of driving into slavery of millions of Soviet citizens, of massacring women and children.

With Hitler's conquest of the Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union, the situation of the Soviet Union became very serious. In response to the call of Stalin, the people scorched the land that was being overrun by the invader. The government transferred factories and their workers eastward beyond the Urals, where they re-established the factories and immediately began to work again. They built new towns and cities at the new sites. New industries were established and production went on. *Went on—and increased manifoldly.* And in the regions where the Nazis were driven out, the people and the machinery returned to the old cities. They cleared away the debris, repaired the old houses and built new ones. They began to produce food, install the machinery, and the war went on.

The Soviet Government reports that in 1942 alone plane production increased by 75 percent, shell output by 400 percent. After the loss of her three aluminum factories, the output of aluminum in the Urals exceeded the entire prewar output of the country. The well-known aircraft plant producing Lavochkin-5 fighter planes doubled its output in the past year with a

working force of five per cent fewer hands in August, 1943, than in the same month in 1942. This represented a growth of labor productivity by 126 per cent. Despite the loss of such a large fertile area as the Ukraine, the cultivated areas in unoccupied regions have been increased by more than 5,000,000 acres for the 1942 summer crop and by 3,700,000 acres for the 1942-43 winter crop.

This is due to the unparalleled possibilities of expansion of production under socialism. It is due to the inexhaustible strength, determination and bravery of the people of the workers' state. It is due to the leadership of the Soviet government. It is due to that indestructible morale typified by that Moscow street-car conductor whose words Maurice Hindus reproduces in his *Mother Russia*:

"Plenty of bombs fell in Moscow at the time the Germans tried to take the city, and, would you believe it, people got so toughened to the raids that if they stood in a queue before a shop they refused to go into an air raid shelter and the militia had to threaten arrest to get them to obey orders. . . . Our nerve is the one thing Hitler will never break, never." (Maurice Hindus, *Mother Russia*, Doubleday, Doran, New York, 1943, p. 80.)

The question of national minorities and the right to self-determination has been fully solved in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has nearly 100 different nationalities and peoples, living in freedom and equality, united on the basis of the right to self-determination—a prin-

ciple reinforced in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. This is the living realization of the right of peoples to determine their national and political destiny.

The right to self-determination has been written into the Atlantic Charter. The experience of the Soviet Union can be a guiding light to all democrats who wish to see the right of nations and minorities to develop and contribute their national capacities, heritage, and culture, as a means of enriching the entire life of the world.

Within the Soviet Union there is not only a Supreme Soviet, corresponding to our United States Congress, but also a Supreme Soviet of Nationalities, with equal rights. Thus, politically, programmatically, and organizationally, the national question is concretely solved in the Soviet Union.

Artists, writers, scientists, outstanding workers and farmers, military men, arising out of the various nationalities, make their contribution, not only within their own national entity, but within the whole Soviet Union. Professor Solomon Michoels and Lieutenant-Colonel Itzik Feffer, two world-renowned Jewish artists of the Soviet Union who came to the United States as envoys of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow, did very much to explain, not only the position of the Jew in the Soviet Union, but also what the Soviet Union represents to the whole world. They are famous not only among the Jews of the Soviet Union but among all the nationalities within that great country.

The heroic story of the Soviet peoples would be incomplete were one to fail to estimate what the Soviet women have contributed to the war effort. Lieutenant Ludmilla Pavlichenko, who visited this country, is one of the hundreds of thousands of women who are in the Red Army and in guerrilla formations carrying on the fight. Her courage and heroism are an example of what the women of the Soviet Union are doing to win the war. There are thirty million Soviet women, old and young, working like true soldiers in the industries.

We rightly marvel in the United States at the contribution that women are making in our country and in Great Britain. Yet we have still to equal the record of Soviet women. The Soviet Naval Command recently took over a ship built almost entirely by girls between the ages of 18 and 26. The ship was designed and all specifications were drawn by Chief Designer Natalya Dimitrieva, who graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute in 1941, and her assistant, 26-year-old Engineer Zoya Petrova. The shipyard workers were former housewives and secondary school and college girls. The shipyards were frequently bombed by the Luftwaffe; but the young women remained on the job, even when bombs exploded in their immediate vicinity.

Yes, even the children are playing their part in the war, studying and working in the fields and in factories turning out munitions. The deeds of Soviet children in the

patriotic war of their land will forever remain in the treasury of humanity's sagas of heroism.

Nor is the education of the youth stopped by the war. On the contrary, larger numbers are enrolled in the colleges, universities and technical schools. Likewise, the general education of the people is being fostered by the government. Newspapers and other publications have increased manifoldly. Russian, American, English, French, and classic and anti-fascist German literature are highly prized. Artists are turning their skill into the production of war posters that inspire the people in their glorious struggle. Sports events, scientific and cultural congresses, exploration of new fields, go on apace. *The Soviet Union fights today for tomorrow.*

This expresses the firm unity of the Soviet people, their indomitable courage and devotion, and their confidence in their leaders.

It is no wonder, therefore, that with morale rising and victories increasing, Joseph Stalin could declare that the time is not distant when the Hitler armies will be turned off Soviet soil.

U. S. and U. S. S. R.

What does the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Soviet Union mean to us in the United States? 1776-1917-1943. In one of his brilliant speeches Vice-President Wallace, developing the struggle for progress in modern society, pointed out that the American Revolution of 1776 was followed by the French Revolution of 1789, the German and

Latin American Revolutions of 1848, the American Civil War of 1861, and the Russian Revolution of 1917, all of these steps leading up to a broader unfoldment of democracy. 1776 represented the freedom and independence of the American Colonies and the steps toward democracy that were taken by the Colonies in their united program, enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 1917 represented the ushering in of an enhanced democracy, socialism, guaranteeing the freedoms but also safeguarding the economic security of the people as the basis for all freedom. 1943 represents and must further emphasize the unity of the United Nations and the democracy they represent in the struggle on a world-wide scale against the throw-back to barbarism, fascism. Out of this struggle, through the strengthened Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition for speedy victory and post-war reconstruction, will come new freedoms and new guarantees for democracy and peace.

Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah has aptly characterized what the Soviet people are fighting for. In a speech inserted in the *Congressional Record* of February 25, 1943, the Senator said:

"Russia brought unity by making a union of republics. America brought unity by creating the United States where each state is guaranteed the republican form of government. Russia has united people successfully and so have we. World unity will follow either or both these methods.

"Soviet Russia's first twenty-five years of history resemble our own first twenty-five years. The ideals of the American Revolution struck so hard at age-old injustices that of course the Revolution was misunderstood from one end of the world to the other. The Russian Revolution also struck at age-old injustices, and it, too, was bound to be misunderstood. Both revolutions today, though, can be judged in their true light by their accomplishments."

Then, speaking of the "people's army of Russia," Senator Thomas said:

"This army, which has already done so much, is destined to be honored, as Washington has been, as an army which brought freedom to men, women and children in the new world now dawning.

"The tyrannies which Washington struck against were those which hindered the growth and development of individual man. The tyrannies of old Russia kept the people submerged. *Freed by the people's army, Russia today knows what she is fighting for. Men, women and even children have tasted freedom. They call it good. And for it today they willingly sacrifice.*" (emphasis mine.—I. A.)

What is the freedom that 1917 brought to Russia? That freedom is socialism, which animates the life of the individual and the whole nation. That is why the people, with such superb patriotism, undergo suffering, make heroic sacrifices, giving up everything to preserve the family, the home and their country from the hands of the barbarous invader.

What is the function of the peo-

ple's army? Stalin made it perfectly clear in his Order of the Day on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Red Army. On February 23, 1943, Stalin said:

"The Red Army is an army of defense, of peace and friendship among peoples of all countries. It was created not for the conquest of foreign countries, but for the defense of the frontiers of the Soviet country. The Red Army has always treated with respect the rights and independence of all nations. . . .

"The Red Army has become an army of life-and-death struggle with the Hitlerite troops, an army of avengers of the violence and humiliation inflicted by the German fascist scoundrels on our brothers and sisters in the occupied districts of our country."

This is a clear statement. Cooperation with the Soviet Union in real coalition planning and warfare is essential for winning the war. There dare be no ifs and buts in the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union. The "anti-Comintern," "anti-Bolshevik" bogey raised by Hitler must be erased from the minds of the American people. If this is not done, grave danger faces the United States and the United Nations.

This was well expressed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard, in addressing the convention of the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor in Boston, on September 28, 1943. Mr. Bard said:

"The course of the Russian Revolution during and after the last war generated a massive question

in our collective minds, and made fear of Communism not only respectable, but a ready stick with which to beat progressive ideas. This fear was the stuff of which appeasement was made, and it was that philosophy of appeasement that nourished Hitler."

Yet in face of these facts the enemies of the Soviet Union continue and extend their work. These enemies are not only the Nazis and their satellites. They are to be found in the United States and England, as well as among reactionary sections of the governments in exile. Powerful reactionary forces in the United States, like Hoover, Hearst, Taft, McCormick and Wheeler, are driving in the direction of a prolonged war and for a negotiated "peace." They would like to turn the war away from pivotal Europe and make the Pacific the center of gravity. Reactionary elements within the trade union movement, like Matthew Woll, Hutcheson, Dubinsky, Antonini, John L. Lewis, etc., and Norman Thomas and the Trotskyites, are doing their share in fomenting distrust of the Soviet Union. Together with some British labor leaders they are doing whatever they can to prevent unity of the trade union movement of the three leading nations of the United Nations, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. They dare to insult the people of the Soviet Union, who are making the greatest sacrifices of any nation of the world in the global war against Hitlerism and at the same time are destroying vastly more Axis sol-

diers than all the combined forces of the other United Nations have done. The defeatists hate the Soviet Union, and as in previous years, even today, they conspire against our mighty Soviet ally and thereby against their own country.

But, rejecting this anti-Sovietism, is the flood of admiration for, and solidarity with, our mighty Soviet ally.

Just as the Soviet people will see this war through to a finish, so, too, the American people will fight to the end to smash fascism. Differences in systems need not and must not be an obstacle to the closest unity in the prosecution of this national-liberation war. The common enemy, fascism, must be destroyed.

The twenty-sixth anniversary of Soviet Power coincides with the tenth anniversary of the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States, by the Roosevelt Administration. In reply to the new Soviet Ambassador, Andrei Gromyko, who presented his cre-

dentials on Oct. 6, 1943, the President declared:

"I fully share your confidence that the unity of purpose which binds our peoples and countries together in the prosecution of the war will be translated into a close and lasting collaboration, together with other like-minded countries, in the establishment of a just and lasting peace."

We must consecrate ourselves anew to the task of bringing about this unity of purpose by effectuating an immediate land invasion of Western Europe, in order to shorten the war and save millions of lives. The three-power conference of foreign ministers will, it is hoped, work out a policy of close coalitional warfare in this single global war, to the end that the war can quickly be ended victoriously and an enduring peace be assured. To this end, the closest collaboration, particularly of the U. S. and U.S.S.R., will be the greatest guarantee.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOVING TOWARD UNITY

BY ROSE WORTIS

INTERNATIONAL labor unity today is a condition for strengthening the unity of the United Nations. It is the labor core of the mass base for the anti-Hitler coalition of states and peoples.

International labor unity during this crucial period of the war would further release the energies and the enthusiasm of the masses, would be a great stimulant toward enhanced production; would strengthen the hand of the government leaders against the defeatists at home, would give greater impetus to the launching of the Second Front for hastening victory, and would guarantee labor's adequate participation in shaping the peace.

These are the problems of greatest concern not only to labor, but to the entire nation.

What Is the Status of International Labor Unity Today?

Some headway has been made in advancing international labor unity. The initial step was the formation of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee nearly two years ago, a most important step in the direction of healing the split in the international labor movement.

However, alongside this Committee, there is the makeshift Anglo-American Committee* established after the A. F. of L. rejected the proposal brought here in 1942 by Sir Walter Citrine for the affiliation of the American trade union movement to the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. Because the Anglo-American Committee excludes the C.I.O. with its millions of organized war workers, as well as the Railroad Brotherhoods; because it leaves out the labor movement of our most important ally, the Soviet Union, it has remained sterile. Little can be expected from this committee in its present form. It has become an obstacle to unity.

The action of the 1942 convention of the A. F. of L. engineered by Hutcheson, Woll and Dubinsky, in rejecting the proposal for Anglo-Soviet-American trade union unity, was a divisive act. It served as an encouragement to the anti-war elements in their anti-Soviet campaign.

A handful of defeatists, reactionaries and Social-Democrats, pre-

* Now the British Trades Union Congress and the American Federation of Labor Trade Union Committee.

suming to speak for the labor movement, spurned the hand of friendship extended to us by the great Soviet trade unions, representing 28,000,000 organized workers in that great country, who have made possible the miracles of production of the instruments with which their Red Army, on the decisive front, is dealing deadly blows to our common enemy, the fascists.

This action of the A. F. of L., reaffirmed at its recently held 63rd Convention, in Boston, has retarded international labor unity throughout the world. Conscious of the strong rank-and-file desire for international trade union unity, President William Green, in his opening speech, was compelled to make a gesture to this mass sentiment by speaking of close collaboration of the United Nations. Green expressed the hope that "procedures and consultations and cooperation" already developed by the United Nations would "be made permanent and broadened in practice to cover the needs of interdependent responsibilities of democratic peoples." If unity of the United Nations, as President Green stated, must be broadened and strengthened in the interests of the democratic peoples, he is indeed inconsistent when in the same breath, as labor leader, he turns down the proposal for unity with the 28,000,000 organized workers in the country of our most powerful ally.

But the labor movement of the United Nations will not allow itself to be blocked in its efforts toward unity by a small reactionary clique of the A. F. of L. Executive

Council. Decisive steps leading to international labor unity have been taken in recent months by the labor movement in many countries, including important sections of American labor.

In August of this year, the Havana Congress of the Confederation of Latin American Workers adopted the following resolution on international labor unity:

"The time has come to establish close ties with labor in the two great non-American countries that have contributed so much to the defeat of fascism—Britain and the Soviet Union. . . .

"Through such ties, we hope to make it possible for world labor to present its opinion on problems related to the fight against fascism and to the coming peace."

Similar action was taken at the July Congress of the Australian Council of Trade Unions. The resolution emphasized that international labor unity is as important today as domestic labor unity and called on the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee to convene a World Labor Congress, "so that international labor may play its maximum part in winning the war and the peace." In line with this decision, Secretary Monk sent cablegrams to Sir Walter Citrine, Secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, and to Nikolai Shvernik, Secretary of the All-Union Council of Soviet Trade Unions, asking for affiliation and urging the extension of the Anglo-Soviet Committee to include all the United Nations.

The C.I.O. and its affiliated unions, since the organization of the

Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, have declared their eagerness to affiliate with it. In the last few months the demand for such an extension of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee has come from every convention of the C.I.O. unions, such as the United Automobile Workers Union, representing 1,000,000 workers; the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers Union, representing 500,000 workers; the United Shipyard Workers Union; the United Maritime Workers Union; the United Rubber Workers Union; the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union—all engaged in basic war production; as well as the State, County and Municipal Workers Union; the United Office and Professional Workers Union; the United Transport Workers Union; the United Fur and Leather Workers Union; and other C.I.O. international unions. Every state convention of the C.I.O. has spoken out most emphatically in favor of international labor unity, as well as some of the most important state A.F. of L. conventions, in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, New Hampshire, and other states.

As is known, Philip Murray vigorously protested Citrine's action of ignoring the C.I.O. and refusing to entertain its proposal to join the Anglo-Soviet Committee because of the A. F. of L. leadership's opposition and acceding to the proposal to form an Anglo-A. F. of L. Committee as a "liaison" with the Soviet trade unions.

The Railroad Brotherhoods likewise protested the presumption of

the A. F. of L. to speak for the whole labor movement, and urged the extension of the Anglo-Soviet Committee to include all sections of the American trade unions.

Throughout this year, hundreds of A. F. of L. local unions, city central bodies, state federations, and a number of international unions, have urged the Executive Council to reconsider its action on affiliation to the Anglo-Soviet Committee. It is a reflection on the democratic processes in the A. F. of L. that these voices found no expression at its 63rd Convention.

The main obstacle to unity of labor on an international scale was and remains the A. F. of L., led by the defeatist Hutcheson, the reactionary Matthew Woll and the professional anti-Sovieteer David Dubinsky, who place their narrow group interests above the best interests of the nation.

In once again rejecting international labor unity at the last Convention, they launched an attack on their own unions that are pressing for this unity. They resorted anew to a tirade of red-baiting and, *à la* Dies, denounced the hundreds of thousands of their members favoring unity as "foreign agents."

The report of the arch-Red-baiter Woll on international labor relations had the familiar sound of the McCormick-Patterson-Hearst defeatist press. Said Matthew Woll:

"Minority groupings within the A. F. of L. hostile to the democratic ideals, philosophy and practices of the Federation, have conducted a deliberately malicious campaign of misinformation on this question to

confuse and bewilder the American people. . . .

"No aspect of the Federation's international relations has been so wilfully misinterpreted. (Poor, misunderstood Mr. Woll!). . . . Abnormal pressure has been brought to bear on the affiliates of the American Federation to join the Anglo-American group."

Woll spoke with great indignation against the "pressure" designed to submerge the interests of free democratic labor organizations to the foreign policies of Soviet Russia, which "through its controlled agencies sought to promote disruption and disunity in the ranks of the American Federation of Labor."

The hysterical denunciation, the attempt to fall back on the old discredited story of "foreign agent," was indirect admission of the rank-and-file pressure for international labor unity, which reached the Convention itself through hundreds of telegrams (left unread) urging favorable action on international trade union unity.

Who are these "subversive elements," these "foreign agents," spoken of with such venom by Mr. Woll? Are they perhaps the important State Federations of Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, which have gone on record for international labor unity? Are they the hundreds of city central bodies, throughout every state in the country? Are they the several international unions, such as the Culinary Workers International Alliance, the Building Service International

Union, the International Jewelry Workers Union and the hundreds of local unions throughout the country? Are these the foreign agents acting against the A. F. of L. in the interests of a foreign country? These are patriotic American workers, speaking as members of the A. F. of L., interested in the welfare of the labor movement and the nation. The very report submitted by Woll, with its denunciation of all those who favor unity, proves that the policy of slander against the Soviet Union, the refusal to collaborate with the unions of our Soviet ally, is in direct conflict with the sentiments of a large, if not the decisive, section of the A. F. of L. Were the real sentiments of these masses taken into account, the decision of the Convention would have been the reverse of the policies advanced by the Executive Council.

Nagler's "Contribution"

The pretext advanced by the Executive Council for blocking affiliation with the Anglo-Soviet Committee is the oft-exploded charge that the Soviet trade unions are "not free." Ironic, indeed, is this charge coming from such notorious trade union despots as Hutcheson and Co.

The most shameful exhibition of this divisive demagoguery was the speech made by the Dubinsky stooge Isidore Nagler, Vice-President of the I.L.G.W.U., and delegate of the A. F. of L. to the recent British Trades Union Congress. Nagler stated at the Congress that the A. F. of L. would not affiliate with the Anglo-Soviet Committee because the Soviet unions are not free trade

unions, and that any association with them would injure, rather than advance, unity with the Soviet Union.

This was the contribution to unity made by the Woll-Hutcheson-Dubinsky henchman in the name of the A. F. of L.! In the presence of authorized representatives and spokesmen of the 28,000,000 organized workers in the Soviet Union, this puny pseudo-Socialist had the impudence to repeat the propaganda of Hitler's agents in our country, attempting to place the Soviet trade union movement on a par with Hitler's "labor front."

Since the British unions are in the Anglo-Soviet Committee, this speech was a slap in the face, not only of the Soviet unions, but of the British unions as well. The fine distinction about the difference between the people and their organizations, about supporting the Red Army but not collaborating with the trade unions, is only a demagogic coating for anti-Sovietism.

Mr. Nagler, at the British Trades Union Congress, alleged that collaboration with the Soviet unions would injure the war effort, because of the differences in ideology between the Soviet and American trade unions. There are ideological differences; but if the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. can agree not to allow differences of ideology to stand in the way of collaboration for common victory, why should not the same policy be adopted by the trade union movements of the two allied countries? Surely, there is much more in common between the workers of both

countries than between a capitalist and a workers' government. Yet the American and Soviet nations are allied while the organizations of the workers remain divided.

Surely, no one will take seriously the argument that affiliation of the A. F. of L. to the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee would sharpen the division in the American labor movement. On the contrary, it would be one important step in the direction of unity. Working together with the labor movement of Britain and the Soviet Union would undoubtedly bring the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. closer together and help clear away the obstacles in the path of unity in the ranks of American labor.

Nagler's speech was worth millions to Hitler and his agents in our country in their efforts to keep labor divided and to weaken the support of the people for the policy of collaboration with the Soviet Union and to disrupt the unity of the United Nations. In making his slanderous anti-C.I.O., anti-Soviet, anti-United Nations speech, Nagler did not voice the sentiments of American labor but of the defeatist Hutcheson, of the Social-Democratic anti-Soviet conspirators of the *Jewish Daily Forward-New Leader* clique. This was the purpose for which he was chosen as delegate to the British Trades Union Congress by the reactionaries and defeatists of the A. F. of L. Executive Council. This anti-Soviet speech, coming from a delegate parading as a Socialist, they hoped, would carry more weight than that of a Hutcheson or a Matthew Woll.

*On the Status and Functions of
Soviet Trade Unions*

Since the very birth of the Soviet Union the camp of reactionary labor leaders has fought bitterly against the workers' state. The ranks of labor, however, evidenced an instinctively favorable reaction to the great, epoch-making changes in the Soviet Union. From the very first, labor opposed Allied intervention in the Soviet Union and fought for Soviet recognition. From 1921 on, repeated delegations representing American labor accepted invitations to visit the Soviet Union to investigate conditions and establish closer ties. One delegation of non-Communist American trade unionists consisted of: James H. Maurer, President of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor; John Brophy, former President of District 2, United Mine Workers of America; Frank L. Palmer, Editor of the *Colorado Labor Advocate* and a member of the International Typographical Union; Albert F. Coyle, editor of the *Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Journal*; James W. Fitzpatrick, President of the Actors and Artists of America; and several others. This delegation issued a report, "Russia After Ten Years," signed by four members of the delegation—Maurer, Brophy, Palmer and Coyle. A quotation from the findings of this delegation, as embodied in the report, follows:

"The unions have a very definite relationship to the state, but the government does not control the unions. It would be more accurate to say that the trade unions control

the government. Yet neither statement expresses the truth. . . .

"The workers look upon the unions as an independent aid to the government and upon the government as the instrument of the workers' power in the field of politics and international relations."

This report was written during the early period in the life of the Soviet Union, when the country and its trade unions were confronted with almost insurmountable difficulties, in an industrially backward country, devastated by years of civil war, with a new working class population just recruited from the countryside. Unfortunately, in later years, which recorded the greatest progress in building the country and its industries, in advancing the education of the working class, the close ties and the exchange of delegates were interrupted. The influence of Hitler's "anti-Comintern" propaganda was no small factor responsible for this.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war side by side with Britain and our country has exploded the mass of slanders against the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, not enough has yet been done to bring to the mass of the American trade unionists the truth about the character and the functions of the Soviet trade unions and their role in the life of the nation. It is this lack of concrete knowledge of the facts that makes it possible for reactionary leaders to continue to mislead sections of the A. F. of L. workers and to place obstacles in the way of allied labor unity.

Soviet unions are "government-

controlled," states Woll's report on international relations. "They are not free voluntary associations of the workers in the sense that characterize American and British unions," says Woll. "They constitute a department of the state, so to speak, and enjoy no more autonomy than do the various agencies of any totalitarian government."

On what authority does Woll make these statements? How do we establish the legal status of trade unions in a particular country? Certainly, there is no more authoritative source than the law of the land. What does Soviet law say on this matter?

"In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational and political activity of the mass of the people, citizens of the U.S.S.R. are insured the right to unite in public organizations, trade unions, cooperative organizations. . . ."

How do these unions function? What are the basic rules guiding them? Let me quote from a recent pamphlet written by Edwin Smith, former member of the National Labor Relations Board, who surely had occasion to acquaint himself with functions of free trade unions:

"That there is a different relationship between the Soviet unions and their government and that existing in our country, of this there can be no question. But whether it is less desirable, less to the interests of the workers, is open to differences of opinion which need not stand in the way of joint collaboration on issues of common in-

terest to both, such as to speed victory and a just people's peace."

In a speech at the 1942 A. F. of L. Convention, Jack Tanner, representing the British Trades Union Congress, who has an intimate knowledge of the character of the Soviet trade unions and their relation with the government on the basis of personal investigation, stated the following:

"To say that the trade unions of Russia are nothing but appendages to the State machinery is to leave out of account the nature of the State and whose interests its activities foster and serve. In our two countries (England and the United States), we cannot pretend that it is the workers' interests which will triumph in any issue, unless we put up a strong and organized fight. But there is no evidence to support the idea that, in the Soviet Union, such a fight is necessary if the matter is one which concerns the well-being of the workers; and, if it is not necessary, the organizations which, in other countries and conditions, would conduct such fights, naturally assume a different character and take on different activities."

Important trade unionists in our country have spoken up with equal clearness against the arguments advanced by the opponents of international labor unity. In speaking on this subject at the Congress of Soviet-American Friendship in November, 1942, Jacob Potofsky, Secretary of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, said:

"In our own country, the labor movement is rightfully demanding

a greater representation in government and a greater share of responsibility for its administration. In assuming office and shouldering responsibility, we surrender no freedom. Indeed, we gain greater freedom, through greater participation in self-government. So, too, the fact that trade unionists hold important posts in the Soviet Government and that trade unions themselves perform important governmental functions is no evidence that they are not free, but on the contrary is evidence of their strength and freedom."

Tanner shows the basis of this relationship between trade unions and the government in the Soviet Union, where the government is controlled by the workers, as compared with capitalist countries. He demonstrates that, far from weakening the working class character of the trade unions, it is strengthened, and that the Soviet trade unions play a much greater role in determining the vital problems of the masses, an objective toward which labor in the capitalist countries is only aspiring. Quoting his speech further:

"We are proud to be associated with that brave people through our trade union organization, and if we are told that the character and spirit of their trade unions are different from that of the British trade unions, I can only reply that the character and spirit of the Soviet trade unionists in the fight against Hitlerism are also somewhat different from what our own have been up to date. . . .

"In 1924, 1927 and again in 1933, delegations of trade unionists from Britain visited Soviet Russia; and

on returning, all reported that the workers were owners and controllers of their country.

"It is only by realizing the full weight of that fact—the ownership of the means of production by the workers—that we can understand the relations of the trade union movement to the Soviet State."

The meaning of Tanner's speech has become much more real to American workers in the past two and one-half years. As a result of the war economy, labor more and more has to solve its problems through government machinery. In our country, much of this machinery, with the exception of the War Labor Board, is in the control of businessmen, to the exclusion of labor, and the interests of labor and production are often subordinated to the interests of the profiteers. Have the labor unions in America today ceased to be free trade unions because the determination of the conditions of the workers in the final analysis must have approval of the government? The reactionary Republicans and the anti-Roosevelt Democrats hold that position today. The fact is that labor today occupies a more important position in the life of the nation and has become a more powerful instrument, not only in defense of the interests of the workers, but of our national interest as a whole.

If it is correct for labor in our country to fight for representation in the government and to develop campaigns for the election of labor men and women to the various legislative bodies so that the interests of labor will find expression in these

bodies, how can we slander the Soviet trade unions as "not free" because they have achieved these elementary demands and perhaps a little bit more, and are "owners and controllers of their country"? In the Soviet Union, the workers in the shops directly elect their legislators, beginning with the local Soviet up to the highest legislative bodies, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, which comprise the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. What true American trade unionist would object to having the basic laws of the country governing the conditions of the people made by a governmental body democratically elected and composed of a majority of labor representatives?

Another argument advanced by the A. F. of L. leadership against the Soviet trade unions is that they follow the policies of their government. This is quite correct, since the workers themselves control the government and make these policies.

That the Soviet trade unions are not functioning as instruments to defend the economic conditions of the workers is still another argument advanced. Only people ignorant of the facts or deliberately interested in misrepresenting the facts can make such statements.

What are the economic functions of trade unions? (1) To improve the economic conditions of the workers, through collective bargaining; (2) to improve working conditions; and (3) to provide for social needs, such as unemployment insurance, sickness benefits, education, recreation, etc.

How do the Soviet trade unions function in regard to these requirements?

Clifford McAvoy, Legislative Director of the C.I.O., who made a study of the Soviet trade unions, gives the following description of their functions, taken from the constitutions of the Soviet trade unions, the labor laws, and investigations of authorities on labor problems:

"The Soviet trade union has many and diverse functions. As in the United States, it negotiates and enforces collective bargaining agreements with management, establishing wages, hours and working conditions for the workers in each factory and enterprise under its jurisdiction. It represents its members, in taking up and adjusting grievances. . . .

"The Soviet trade unions have further important jobs which, in other countries, are the responsibility of government or of private industry. They enforce the labor laws and the safety and sanitary regulations. They administer the vast social insurance system of the Soviet state. They participate with management and government in drawing up, applying and seeing to the fulfillment of plans which lay out the basic production schedule for the nation as a whole.

"Soviet trade unions are democratically organized and controlled. All officials are elected by secret ballot for one year terms. An election is valid only if two-thirds of the entire membership votes. All officials and official bodies are subject to recall by majority vote at any time." (*The Trade Unions of Our Soviet Ally*, The American Council on Soviet Relations, New York, 1942, pp. 9-10.)

As to social and educational features, the Soviet trade unions have no comparison. In the past 25 years, they have developed a predominantly backward peasant people into a highly skilled, disciplined, and advanced working class. They have organized and are directing hundreds of technical, educational, and cultural organizations and institutions. They administer to the social needs of the workers and their families in every conceivable way, including insurance, medical aid, sickness pay, maternity care, nurseries, child care, vacations, amusements, youth activities, etc. The Soviet trade unions have grown from a skeleton organization in 1917 to 28,000,000, embracing all groups and nationalities on a complete basis of equality. Racial discrimination and anti-Semitism, still unfortunately existing in a number of A. F. of L. unions, as demonstrated at the 63rd Convention in the discussion on the Negro question, are inconceivable in Soviet trade unions.

The Struggle to Extend the Anglo-Soviet Committee

An outstanding feature of the Soviet trade unions is the active participation of women as members of the Executive Committee of the All-Union Council of Soviet Trade Unions and heads of unions, as representatives to the Soviets, and in every other capacity. Unfortunately, too few American women workers are familiar with these facts which, if widely known, would help break down the barriers to unity.

A most unsavory role is played by the Social-Democratic leaders both in the United States and in Britain in blocking international labor unity. Citrine came to the United States in 1942 as a representative of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, to urge the affiliation of the American trade union movement to that Committee. During his visit, Citrine, under pressure of the Social-Democratic anti-Soviet clique led by the *Jewish Daily Forward* and the Social-Democratic emigrés, allowed himself to become a partisan of the most reactionary elements in the A. F. of L., the chief opponents of labor unity in our own country and of international labor unity. Instead of serving as a force for unifying labor, he accepted Woll, Hutcheson and Dubinsky as the authoritative voice of all American labor. Citrine accepted their slanderous characterization of the great C.I.O., as a rebel group, and the powerful Railroad Brotherhoods as insignificant groups of no account.

Instead of advancing international labor unity through his visit in our country, Citrine, strengthened by his reactionary Social-Democratic colleagues, became increasingly arrogant in his relations with the Soviet trade unions. At the July meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Committee in Moscow, Citrine refused to commit himself on the second front issue, giving the flimsy excuse that this would violate the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union agreement which pledged each trade union to support its own government. He argued that it would

constitute a censure of their own government, ignoring the fact that the same agreement provides for "joint war for the defeat of Hitler Germany."

Citrine would not agree to the extension of the Anglo-Soviet Committee to include the unions of North and South America as well as the occupied countries, despite the most urgent pleas of Soviet labor delegations and the movements of all other countries, with the exception of the Executive Council.

The first reports received here that the British Trades Union Congress, which followed shortly after the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee meeting, had gone on record for convening a world congress of labor gave a more favorable version of the Congress action than was actually the fact. It had authorized the General Council to "give attention to the possibility of convening, as soon as *the war conditions permit*, a world conference of representatives of the workers of all countries" (emphasis mine—R.W.). However, this does not answer the immediate need of hastening the defeat of Hitler.*

The delegates who voted for the motion undoubtedly had in mind to bring together the representatives of labor from all countries in conference, and in this sense the action of the Congress was a repudiation of Citrine. However, the vague formulation "when the war permits" leaves the situation in the hands of the General Council,

leaves room for maneuvering and delay, at a time when action to unite labor brooks no delay.

It must be clear to all who see in international labor unity an imperative instrument toward advancing the war effort that, in this period when history is moving with such rapid strides, this decision of the British Congress is unfortunate, to say the least. The hopes that labor the world over placed on the British Trades Union Congress have not been realized. The situation can be changed only through the most energetic action of the unions in their respective countries. The progressive labor forces in Britain and America will not rest content with the action of the British Trades Union Congress or of the A. F. of L. They will not be discouraged by the failures of the Congress. The need for international labor unity is growing more urgent from day to day, as we are confronted with the concrete problems of the second front and the rising peoples' movements in the occupied countries as the labor movements of these countries, after years of fascist oppression, rise from the underground, looking for the hand of solidarity from labor of all the United Nations.

Woll, in his report to the A. F. of L. Convention, waxed indignant at the "impudence" of the Soviet trade unions in proposing the extension of the Anglo-Soviet Committee to include the labor movements of thirty-three nations. He questioned their motives and said:

"Walter Citrine, like ourselves,

* Since this article was written the General Council of the B.T.U. has issued a call for a world labor conference in May.

balked at this, undoubtedly out of knowledge of Communist skill in the manipulation of paper organizations."

One might ask Woll: How can the Soviet trade unions "pack" a committee in which Britain and the United States have equal representation? Further, is it not a fact that the British and Americans have better access to the labor movements of the conquered countries, since, in the first instance, the governments-in-exile are located in their countries; and certainly they have better access to Latin America? The very report of the A. F. of L. Executive Committee on international relations (pp. 124-25) submitted to the 63rd Convention states as much. Why this fear of the Soviet trade unions? Does it not rather show a lack of confidence in the A. F. of L.? Why should Woll and Co. fear that the Soviet representatives would exert greater influence on the trade unions of the conquered countries than the British and Americans? Surely, the Wolls cannot be serious in fearing "manipulations"; for they are no novices in this respect. When it comes to manipulations, surely, Woll and his colleagues have proved themselves past masters.

Does not this unfounded fear rather imply an admission on the part of the A. F. of L. top leaders that Soviet trade unions may have more to offer to the representatives of the conquered nations in the form of help and cooperation to free their countries from fascism and rebuilding their unions, than the Wolls are prepared to offer? The

mass of the workers in America and Britain do not fear and have no reason to doubt the motives of the Soviet trade unions. These unions have given ample proof in the factories and on the battle front that they have but one aim, common to all the United Nations—to defeat Hitlerism and liberate bleeding humanity from the clutches of fascism.

The struggle for affiliation of the entire American trade union movement to the Anglo-Soviet Committee, for a real congress of United Nations labor in the immediate future, must be taken up with renewed energy. A great responsibility rests on the progressive forces in the A. F. of L. to give expression to the true sentiments of the A. F. of L. membership. Too long have the win-the-war forces in the A. F. of L. allowed the Hutchesons, Wolls and Dubinskys to speak for labor on the basic issues affecting the destiny of our nation. Too long have the progressives underestimated their own strength and influence and overestimated the strength of the reactionaries, who are today losing ground among the advancing patriotic thousands of workers in the A. F. of L. It is necessary to expose the Wolls and Dubinskys before the masses and show how their opposition to international labor unity, their collaboration with the Soviet-baiters, endanger our country's relations with our strongest ally, endanger victory. The progressive forces must bring home to the masses the danger in the present situation of labor, which should be in advance of the other sections of the population in fighting for

unity of the United Nations, unity of the labor movement and the people, itself unwittingly becoming an instrument of disunity in the hands of reactionaries and defeatists.

The lessons of the past decade are too fresh to be forgotten. It was a split in the ranks of labor, for which these Social-Democrats are responsible, that opened the way for the rise of fascism in Germany, made possible the victory of fascism in Spain, the nullification of the Franco-Soviet Pact, the defeat of collective security, the perpetration of the Munich betrayal, and Hitler's onslaught against the civilized world.

International unions do not have to wait until the Executive Council has reversed its decision before they establish ties with the British and Soviet unions in their respective industries. Under the rules of the A. F. of L. where each union has autonomous rights, there are no obstacles toward international relations on the part of individual unions in the various industries. Surely, too, there are no obstacles to developing international relations between the Railroad Brotherhoods and the respective unions of the countries of our allies, since the Brotherhoods are in no way bound by the decisions of the A. F. of L. Developments in the direction of international relations on an industry basis are progressing. In the metal trades, already a number of unions in our country such as the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, the unions of shipyard workers, and the Mine, Mill and Smelter Work-

ers Union, have accepted the invitation of the British and Soviet metal workers' trade unions to meet in conference. It is to be hoped that some of the A. F. of L. metal trades unions will join. Last year a number of unions decided to exchange delegations with the British and Soviet trade unions for the purpose of establishing fraternal relations, exchange of experience, etc. Unfortunately, this decision has not yet been realized, through no fault of the Soviet or British unions. It is to be hoped that in the coming period such interchange of delegations will take place.

A new phase in the struggle for international labor unity has been opened with the historic speech of President Murray at the recent convention of the United Auto Workers Union, announcing the intention of the C.I.O. to issue a call for a world conference of labor. This call will resound through the world.

It will give added strength to our armed forces, especially the hundreds of thousands of union boys in uniform. It will stimulate the efforts of the soldiers on the home front to speed the production of armaments for the impending Western Front. It will be greeted with great enthusiasm by the valiant Red Army. It will give encouragement to the underground trade unions in the conquered countries which are fighting Hitler's murder gangs. It will influence our war leaders at the conference in Moscow and help to resolve the difficulties which stand in the way of the immediate opening of a second front. It will solidify the peoples' mass base of the United Nations.

THE TIME FACTOR IN COALITION WARFARE

BY COLONEL M. TOLCHENOV*

IN COALITION wars the struggle is conducted under very complex strategic conditions. Special conditions arise on the different fronts, and the timely utilization of these conditions has a great and sometimes decisive bearing on the course of the war. The role of the time factor is still further enhanced.

In 1914 Germany, deploying her main forces against France, reckoned on routing the French army in a short space of time and after that on turning her efforts against Russia. It was to the advantage of the Germans at that time to play for time on the Eastern Front. However, the Russian army disrupted the plans of the German General Staff.

Without completing their mobilization the Russians launched a vigorous offensive and thus forced the Germans to weaken their pressure on the western front and to dispatch part of their troops from this front to the east. The Russian army had not yet been fully concentrated, and in the interests of Russia it would have been better to postpone the development of active operations on her front; but the interests of the coalition as a whole demanded the speedy participation of the Russian army in the war. Russia fulfilled her obligation to her allies.

In a coalition war of states against one state or groups of states common efforts must be coordinated and strictly timed; otherwise the enemy is able to use the time factor to his advantage and rout the coalition members piecemeal.

* * *

During the first year and a half of the Second World War, unleashed by the Hitlerites in Europe, fascist Germany succeeded in taking advantage of the time factor. While her enemies were passively waiting for the outcome of events, Germany took the opportunity to strike out at them singly.

Concentrating the bulk of her forces and equipment against the victim on whom the blow was to fall, the Germans scored decisive success in the given theatre of war in the course of a few weeks, after which the German troops without hindrance prepared for their next blow. During these lulls in the fighting the German command eliminated the shortcomings of their former campaign.

In the war as a whole they strove to outstrip their enemy in tempo, deployment of armed forces and operations, while retaining the strategic initiative and superiority of forces in each separate campaign.

As distinct from its campaigns in

* Soviet military analyst writing in *The Bolshevik*.

the west the German command in the war against the Soviet Union could not at its discretion lessen or heighten the tensivity of the military operations in periods advantageous to it. In the winter of 1941-42, when the German command planned to give its exhausted hordes who had been bled white the chance to recuperate, the Red Army forced them into violent battles under difficult conditions of winter. We did not let the opportune moment slip through our fingers, and the Germans suffered their first big defeat in the Second World War.

The war acquired a protracted character. In the summer of 1942 the Soviet troops in stiff defensive battles again won time from the enemy when they forced the Germans futilely to attack the positions at Stalingrad until the advent of winter. Allowing the enemy a respite at the time would have meant enabling him to use the winter to accumulate forces and to reinforce his divisions battered in battles and the military equipment destroyed. The Germans were not given this respite. The Red Army struck hammer blows at the Hitlerites at a time most favorable for us, that is, when the enemy's strength was ebbing.

As a result of the Red Army victories in the winter of 1942-43 and the terrific losses inflicted on the Nazi war machine, fascist Germany found herself on the brink of catastrophe. Had a second front existed in the west at that dangerous period for the enemy, nothing could have saved the Nazis from rapid and final defeat. The weakening of the German fascist troops as a re-

sult of their losses on the Soviet-German Front turned the tide of the war.

In this past year the Germans have not only failed to score any military successes but on the contrary they suffered heavy defeats on the Soviet-German Front, in Africa and in Sicily. The liquidation of the Orel and Kharkov bases of the Germans, the liberation of the Donbas by the Soviet troops, the steadily expanding offensive operations of the Red Army in other directions of the Soviet-German Front still further aggravated the situation in the enemy camp.

The Germans are now obliged to conduct a stubborn struggle to gain a day or an hour, to gain the time which has now become their enemy. The weakening of her military power and the sharp worsening of her military and political perspective have placed Nazi Germany in a paradoxical position. She who built all her plans on the strategy of crushing her enemies in the shortest space of time now has to clutch at every possibility to postpone the approach of decisive events. The Nazi clique is appalled at the very thought of the developing Red Army offensive; for the Anglo-American armed forces in western Europe constitute a real danger of the possibility of a second front being opened there.

As distinct from wars of the past years, fascist Germany has lost her strategic initiative and primarily because the overwhelming part of her forces are tied down to the Soviet-German Front. According to the enemy the war has reached the

stage when fascist Germany is getting a respite solely in order to "pull through" this most trying period for her.

The time that is gained would enable the enemy to mobilize the remnants of Germany's male population, forcibly drive the men of the occupied countries into the German fascist army, and by intensifying pressure on his vassals receive several more divisions from them. A respite would enable the Germans to prepare their reserve units which at present are being formed of untrained youth.

The absence of big-scale military operations would give the Germans the chance of compensating their losses with the help of their still rather strong industry of arms and munitions. Finally, every hour of delay in opening the second front in Europe gives the enemy the chance to strengthen his still weak fortifications on the coast of western Europe.

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Certain military observers in Britain and the United States, analyzing the question of the time factor in the opening of the second front in Europe, are trying to depict matters in such a way that the postponement of active operations by Allied troops offers certain advantages to the anti-Hitler coalition, inasmuch as Hitler-Germany's military and political might is steadily weakening. The harm such "theories" cause the common struggle against Hitlerism is obvious.

It is true that the enemy has suffered terrific losses, that his

strength is undermined, that there is a profound crisis in the enemy camp which is becoming ever deeper. But all the more reason is there to strike hammer blows in order completely to crush the enemy's strength.

To think that victory will come of its own accord without decisive action by all the participants of the anti-Hitler coalition and without their displaying iron staunchness in the struggle against the enemy, who is not completely routed, is to take an impermissibly flippant attitude.

The advantages offered by the favorable situation should be utilized as quickly as possible. Time does not wait. The more persistently the enemy tries to delay the development of military operations in Europe the more grounds are there to start these operations immediately; everything that is to the disadvantage of the enemy is to the advantage of the anti-Hitler coalition. Any delay gives the enemy the chance to protract the world war unleashed by him and consequently leads to a colossal increase in the sacrifices of the anti-Hitler coalition and among the European peoples enslaved by the fascists.

Today as never before the military and political situation favors the establishment of a second front in Europe. To fail to strike out at the enemy when the situation favors this is tantamount to rejecting the major advantages at hand and neglecting a favorable opportunity. The great Russian General Suvorov said: "Fortune seized at the right moment gives victory." The right moment has come.

THE AUTO WORKERS' CONVENTION

BY ROY HUDSON

THE Convention of the United Automobile Workers Union, held at Buffalo on October 10, demonstrates again that the 1,100,000 members of America's mightiest union are willing to do their share to help win the war; that the C.I.O. program is their program; that the leader of the C.I.O., Philip Murray, has their support; and that the auto workers join with the rest of labor and the people in backing up the Commander-in-Chief of all patriotic citizens, President Roosevelt.

This great labor gathering was confronted with the life-and-death problems facing the entire trade union movement and all the people, namely, how to shorten the war and speed victory.

The urgent war tasks before America and the patriotic duties and responsibilities of organized labor were placed before the Convention in the opening remarks of President Thomas. They were further stressed by Under-Secretary of War Patterson, and pounded home by the great speech of C.I.O. President Philip Murray. The enthusiastic response of the delegates to these speeches, and especially to that of Murray in which all 2,000 delegates, including the supporters

of both caucuses, united in a tremendous ovation, demonstrated the high patriotism of the overwhelming majority of the delegates and their desire to do everything to help guarantee a United Nations' victory over fascism.

The patriotic character of the auto workers' Convention was its dominant note, notwithstanding a disruptive bitter factional struggle. The basic patriotism of the delegates was one of the important factors that enabled the Convention to deal with some of the important win-the-war tasks that were set before it in the speeches of Murray, Thomas and others, even though organized caucus activities artificially divided many delegates on some important issues. Nevertheless, at times, factionalism enabled a few anti-war elements to thwart the patriotism of the delegates and distort their real stand and prevent this win-the-war Convention from dealing with *all* the main problems confronting it and adopting a correct solution to those problems that were acted upon. In estimating the results of the Convention, one must bear in mind this background.

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The auto workers' Convention was called upon to help the nation solve those urgent problems arising out of the present moment in the war by the adoption of correct win-the-war policies and by mobilizing all of its forces behind them for the great efforts required to shorten the war and speed victory.

As a pre-condition for accomplishing this central task, the Convention was faced with the problem of defending its unity and the program of the C.I.O. which were gravely threatened by the plans of the Reuther caucus to establish their domination over the union. The successful imposition of their faction program on the Convention would have undermined the C.I.O. program. The capture of the leadership of this union by this caucus would have further divided, weakened and possibly split the union. Therefore, if the plans of the Reuther caucus had succeeded, a disastrous blow would have been struck against the war effort.

In connection with its main task, the Convention adopted a number of important win-the-war decisions, but did not answer all the fundamental questions facing it. In connection with the second problem, the Convention successfully beat back the attack on the unity of the union and its program. Thus, it can be said that the outcome of the Convention was a defensive victory for the C.I.O., national unity and the war effort, because the anti-war and anti-C.I.O. forces were prevented from achieving their main objective, which was the control

of America's largest trade union.

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While the Convention adopted a number of important resolutions, it is necessary to stress that it failed to concern itself with the all-decisive question of shortening the war and insuring victory by the speedy opening of a Second Front. This vital issue, as well as such crucial questions as international labor unity, the treasonable actions of John L. Lewis, or the endorsement of the C.I.O. political action program, and a number of other questions, did not come before the Convention for action.

Hoover, McCormick, Hearst, Lewis and other defeatist forces will undoubtedly try to use these weaknesses of the Convention to undermine the support of the Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt; prevent the nation from cementing its alliance with Great Britain and the Soviet Union; and block the invasion of Western Europe by the armies of Britain and America which can shorten the war and speedily defeat Hitler and Hirohito.

Serious as these weaknesses are, they do not mean that the Convention was anti-war or that the delegates could not have been won for a correct position on these issues. The Chicago Convention of the union held in August, 1942, came out for the invasion of Western Europe, and in recent months many of its local unions have spoken out on the urgent need for an end to all delays in the opening of a second front. The Convention failed to

act on the question of a political program of action; but in many localities, such as Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, and California, the union is actively engaged in political activities, and the Convention itself pledged support to a fourth term for Roosevelt. The auto workers have many times endorsed the C.I.O.'s repudiation and condemnation of the defeatist policies of John L. Lewis. The Convention failed to act upon those concrete steps that are necessary to achieve international labor cooperation; but the union is already committed to a program favoring cooperation of American labor with that of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the trade unions of the rest of the United Nations.

Why then did the Buffalo Convention fail to act on such important issues upon which the membership have already expressed a stand? The explanation is to be found mainly in the factional situation which was used by the Reuther-Maizey-Silver combination in the Reuther caucus to prevent any discussion and action on these questions. Likewise, the win-the-war Addees-Frankensteen forces failed, either because of confusion or out of factional considerations, to take the initiative in demanding that these issues be brought before the Convention for consideration and action. Many delegates, however, such as Nat Ganley, Fred Williams, as well as John Anderson and others, vigorously and consistently pressed for action on the second front and other key issues.

Notwithstanding these weak-

nesses, the Convention took a stand on a number of important war issues, and its decisions on these questions are of great importance and constitute a real contribution to the war effort.

For months the U.A.W. has been the concentration point of sinister forces who have sought to split the C.I.O., undermine national unity and weaken the war effort by provoking the auto workers into repudiating their no-strike pledge, by renouncing the leadership of Philip Murray and by withdrawing support from President Roosevelt. Therefore, the actions of the Convention in "re-affirming without any qualifications its no-strike pledge," the endorsement of the C.I.O. program and of Philip Murray as "the outstanding labor leader of his time," and the endorsement of a fourth term for President Roosevelt, all register the fact that the pro-Lewis defeatist forces have suffered a major defeat on these issues. The convention decisions on these questions helped strengthen the C.I.O. and national unity, and a stronger fight to expose and isolate the fifth column elements in the ranks of the union is now possible.

Coming at a time when the Hearst, McCormick and other defeatist forces have launched a major campaign to disrupt the United Nations, the action of the Convention in support of a three-power conference is of considerable importance. The full significance of the Convention resolution on the three-power conference can best be appreciated when one recalls the manner in

which this question was dealt with by the following speakers:

"My heart goes out to the Russian soldiers and the people of Russia. . . . My friends, a people must be very interested in democracy when they have sacrificed ten millions of their population and still go on fighting for the thing they hold dearest to their hearts."—President Thomas.

"Thus far in the war the United States has paid a low price in casualties as compared with our allies. The Russians have borne the brunt of German power for more than two years and they have done so at a cost of ten million soldiers killed, wounded or captured. This is a fearful price and the time is now at hand when we will be striking heavy blows and when we will carry an increasing part of the burden that that valiant army has taken."—Under-Secretary of War Patterson.

"General Marshall in the City of Washington told us, without any qualification, that there had been suspicion built up deliberately by some between us in America and the people of Great Britain. There are others who say they are suspicious of our Russian ally. . . . I say to you today that our policy of wanting to win the war against fascism and Nazism should be to do whatever we can to tear down suspicions that come up in the peoples' minds in all the United Nations. In my opinion that is the only way a peace can be made and it is the only way it can be maintained in this world of ours."—President Thomas.

"Your President [Thomas] spoke yesterday about the need of unity among the allied nations and I want to endorse with all my heart everything he said on that score."—Under-Secretary of War Patterson.

With the exception of the C.I.O. nationally and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers' Convention, this is one of the first times that a major union such as the U.A.W. has recognized that the question of actively defending and strengthening the alliance between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union is a major win-the-war task of organized labor. Undoubtedly this action of the Convention was due to the greater understanding labor is achieving and which was so ably expressed at the Convention by Philip Murray when he said:

"Foreign policy, both political and economic, is as much our concern and can affect us as directly as the wages we are paid and the hours we work."

* * *

The decisions of the Convention relating to the organization of the home front, such as the manpower question, the roll-back and the Little Steel formula, taxation, relations with the farmers, were all, in the main, constructive. They expressed both the dissatisfaction of labor with many aspects of the organization of the war effort and showed that labor is developing greater understanding and initiative in bringing forward a solution to these problems. On the question of wages, the Convention correctly demanded

either a roll-back in prices or lifting of the Little Steel formula to permit wage adjustments to correspond to the increased cost of living. These decisions show that the plot of the Trotskyites and Lewis supporters to exploit labor's dissatisfaction in order to incite the auto workers against Roosevelt, did not succeed.

The Convention not only adopted a strong resolution on the rights of the Negroes, but in the debate roundly denounced the silent opponents of such resolutions who seek to sabotage them, especially by inciting hate strikes. An entire session was devoted to discussing two proposals for the establishment of special machinery to deal with the problems of the Negroes and other minority groups and to insure their representation in leadership. Factionalism, a lack of unity behind a single proposal, and widespread confusion which existed during the vote on the two propositions, prevented the adoption of one or another of the proposals. These are the reasons that an important step forward in solving the Negro question, which was more than possible, was not achieved. Nevertheless, the manner and extent to which the Negro question was considered by the Convention can lead to important results and a step forward. Perhaps in no other union convention have the problem and role of the Negroes been brought forward in such a forcible manner. In few other cases has there been such wide insistence, from both white and Negro, that the unions conduct an uncompromising fight for the full utilization of

Negro manpower and for their right to participate fully in the life of the unions. This debate again dramatized that the Negroes are a great constructive force for unity and a stronger labor movement. The dignified speech of Shelton Tappes, Negro Vice-President of Local 600, was really a historic one that moved the Convention and demonstrated that the Negro workers are producing important trade union leaders as well as leaders of the Negro people.

The debate on the Negro question was also the occasion for turning the spotlight on the scandalous situation that prevails in the handling of the special problems of the women workers and their participation in the life of the union. The indignant protest registered on the floor of the Convention against the lip service given to the problems of the women should be a warning that if the problems of the women continue to be neglected through indifference or factionalism, then a festering sore will develop that will be utilized by disruptive anti-labor forces. A more effective fight for equal pay for equal work, for nurseries and other special demands of the women; a more concrete approach to the women in organizing the unorganized, and the drawing of women into the leadership of the union, will not only change this situation but will also strengthen the union.

There was a complete absence of Red-baiting at the Convention, even though Walter Reuther and other elements in the Reuther caucus, prior to and outside of the Conven-

tion, had sought to make Communism an issue by slandering the Communist Party and by trying to smear Addes and Frankenstein with the red herring. This disruptive Red-baiting campaign was a dud and the Red-baiters knew that they would be rebuffed by the Convention if they attempted to use the disruptive anti-Communist weapon of Homer Martin, Dies and Hitler. The reason why this Red-baiting campaign did not achieve its object is no doubt due to the fact that large numbers of workers have learned what is behind the so-called Red issue. Likewise, the fact that Addes and Frankenstein took a firm stand against Red-baiting, pointing out that the attacks on the Communists were attacks on labor and the war, undoubtedly helped arouse and mobilize the rank and file against Red-baiting. Thus, the Convention objectively rebuffed Red-baiting, though it did not take action to deprive the Red-baiters of one of their principal weapons by removing the so-called anti-Communist clause in the union's constitution.

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The Convention failed to resolve the incentive wage issue in a manner that would advance the war effort and defend the conditions of the workers. Thus, for this union, this question continues to be in the category of unsolved problems. The action of the Convention on incentive wages will undoubtedly be utilized by those forces who seek to prevent a maximum war production and thereby hurt the war ef-

fort. Nevertheless, regardless of one's opinion on the decisions of the Convention on this issue, it is necessary to recognize that the Convention voted on this issue as it saw it and understood it. The majority saw the question as for or against a return to the inhuman speed-up which the workers had organized unions to abolish. Because they thought that this was the issue, the delegates voted for a resolution that condemns any form of incentive wages. This contradictory resolution permits incentive plans to remain where they already are in effect, but would forbid the application of union incentive plans in plants where they do not now exist. In other words, many workers would thus be unable to secure those *increased earnings* which already have been won by the workers in a number of plants where a correct policy of increased earnings for increased production has been worked out and applied.

The majority of the delegates did not understand that the issue was not a question of accepting the speed-up program which the workers hate and which many employers seek to put across now under the guise of helping the war effort. The real issue was the working out of a union incentive wage program that could guarantee the defeat of the speed-up plans of anti-labor forces and insure that for increased production the workers would get increased earnings. The Convention did not see that the issue was not submission to a program that would weaken the union, but the adoption of a policy that would strengthen

the union, maintain collective bargaining procedure, increase production and facilitate the organization of the unorganized.

These issues were not made clear because the leaders of the Reuther caucus, in opposing any form of incentive wages, consciously sought to make it seem that there could be only one form of incentive program, the kind dictated by the employers. They attempted to hide the fact that when the workers are organized they have the power to secure and enforce an incentive program that is in the interests of the workers, the unions and the war effort. They made the false charge that anyone who advocated a union incentive program was urging a return to the old forms of speed-up.

While this was the line of the Reuther caucus, the minority resolution expressed confusion on the incentive wage issue. Most of the Addes-Frankensteen forces who opposed the Reuther-sponsored majority resolution accepted the false proposition that any kind of incentive program was harmful. Their argument in effect was, "Yes, we too are against any kind of incentive plans. All of them are bad. But if local unions want to have an incentive plan, then we think they should have the right to adopt one, even though we think it hurts the union and is against the interests of the workers."

In view of the fact that such bankrupt and false arguments were put forward by many to oppose the Reuther program, it is little wonder that the majority of the delegates voted as they did. However, their

vote certainly did express opposition to greater efforts to increase production—but reflected confusion and the effects of the factional situation.

The false proposition of the Reuther-sponsored resolution that all incentive plans are harmful did not go unchallenged and the debate showed that many important forces are no longer confused, but are beginning to fight for a union incentive wage policy. Outstanding in this respect was the speech of Frankensteen as well as the remarks of Kerrigan, Burke, Hall, Williams, Billby and a number of other delegates or officers. It is also important to note the two-to-one vote at this Convention in comparison with the handful of delegates that voted for an incentive wage program at the union's May Conference in Michigan. Therefore, in view of these facts, the Convention showed that the struggle for a union incentive wage policy is gaining ground and those who oppose such a policy are losing ground.

While the Convention voted against the minority resolution on incentive wages, it refused to vote to oust those officers that had supported this resolution. This is of great importance, because there can be no doubt that the Reuther campaign to upset the status quo had counted on utilizing the confusion and the differences on the incentive wage issue as a means of mobilizing the delegates to oust important leaders of the union, in the persons of Addes and Frankensteen. This plan failed because, whatever the confusion on incentive wages, the union

membership is firmly for unity and distrustful of any faction that seeks to strengthen its position at the expense of others.

The Convention did not see the real issues involved in the incentive wage question and therefore voted as it did. To the extent that the real issues become clear, the auto workers will work out policies that meet these questions. These issues can be made clear, but not on the basis of a factional struggle against the stand of the majority at the Convention. A serious effort to discuss in a non-factional manner the problems as they arise in the plants and affect the workers and show how a union incentive plan can solve these concrete problems, will undoubtedly quickly make the real issues clear. As this is accomplished there can be no doubt that the auto workers and their leaders will speedily work out and adopt policies that, on the one hand, will protect the unions and defeat the speed-up and anti-union plans of some employers, and, on the other, increase production and guarantee that with increased production the earnings of the workers will increase and war profiteering by the employers will be curbed.

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Time and again the Convention demonstrated that the existence of two organized caucuses artificially divided the majority of the win-the-war delegates and involved them in a factional struggle. This was proven especially on the decisive no-strike issue, in which the overwhelming number of delegates

rose above the factional struggle and caucus programs and achieved unity on one resolution.

A majority and minority no-strike resolution was submitted to the Convention. As a result of the initiative shown by some non-factional delegates, supported by President Thomas, the majority on the resolutions committee accepted certain amendments proposed by these delegates and George Addes. The majority on the committee also agreed to incorporate an important resolve contained in the minority resolution. Consequently, the majority resolution, which was ambiguous and played into the hands of anti-war forces, was transformed during the debate into a strong no-strike resolution. This made it possible to withdraw the minority resolution and submit to the Convention one resolution that had the support of all the win-the-war forces in both caucuses. As a result, the handful of Trotskyites and other disrupters, who had been aided by Victor Reuther, stood isolated in face of the unity the win-the-war forces achieved behind one resolution.

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This experience also shows that organized caucuses serve as an instrument through which agents of John L. Lewis and other defeatist forces work. Whenever the issues became clear the Convention overwhelmingly repudiated the handful of openly anti-C.I.O., anti-war forces, headed by Maizey, Silver and DeLorenzo, who were never repudiated and condemned by the Reuthers. On the no-strike issue

and the fourth-term question, these subversive elements were unable to muster a corporals guard to vote against the majority, who on these questions were not divided along factional lines.

The unity achieved on the no-strike issue shows that the overwhelming majority of the supporters of both the Reuther and Addes caucuses were win-the-war, pro-C.I.O. forces. It shows the division brought about in the union by the factional situation is artificial and that a basis for unity and cooperation exists between the majority of both groups. The achievement of unity on the no-strike issue shows that when the question of leadership was no longer an issue in the Convention, it was possible and easier to arrive at unity on program. This, therefore, shows that the struggle to oust Addes and Frankenstein was harmful and dangerous because it was incited and used by anti-C.I.O., anti-war elements to divide win-the-war forces who have every reason to be united on program.

The decision of the Convention on the no-strike pledge was a real blow for unity and the war effort and weakened factionalism and the position of those who were responsible for the organization of the factional struggle in the union. In view of this decision, there can be no doubt that many people will say, if both groups united on the no-strike issue, then it must be possible to unite on all other war issues and there is no need for a factional struggle in the union.

In re-electing all the national of-

ficers, the Convention further expressed itself for unity in the only form that was possible in view of the factional struggle. In maintaining the status quo, the Convention undoubtedly expressed the deep distrust of the rank and file toward all factional groups. This decisive defeat delivered by the Convention to those forces who sought to deepen the split by ousting Addes and Frankenstein will undoubtedly be endorsed by the rank and file, who know that if any factional group controls the union, the effect will be disastrous. Thus, the Convention struck a blow against those forces who, because of personal ambitions, factionalism and unprincipled alliances with anti-war, anti-C.I.O. forces, threatened the union's unity and its war program. Factionalism was not smashed, but the action of the Convention on the no-strike issue and the election of the leadership were powerful blows for unity that can mark the beginning of the end of disruptive factional activity. This conclusion is further confirmed when one considers that the former board members who failed to be re-elected were all die-hard supporters of the Reuther caucus. No faction won control of the board, and the possibility is opened up to unite the union and isolate those who may persist in their factionalism.

Further proof that this is so is to be seen in the fact that it was the votes of the non-factionalist delegates that insured the defeat of the efforts of the Reuther caucus to oust Addes and Frankenstein. The supporters of the Reuther or Addes

caucus tended to vote as a factional bloc on all questions of leadership. The Reuther factional strength was slightly more than the Addes caucus. Walter Reuther was re-elected as Vice-President; but the vote of the non-factional delegates, combined with the Addes-Frankensteen forces, secured the defeat of the Reuther-inspired campaign to defeat Addes as Secretary-Treasurer, and Frankensteen as Vice-President. Thus, neither caucus could win the *unqualified* support of non-factional delegates who rejected factionalism and caucus programs and fought for unity and the policies of the C.I.O.

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These experiences should teach all win-the-war forces that they can best rally the union membership against disrupters and pro-Hitler forces, not on the basis of a caucus struggle and program, but on the basis of a struggle for unity and the program of the C.I.O. Do not the experiences of the Convention express a growing distrust of all organized caucuses and a determination of the rank and file that no faction shall control the union? In the light of the Convention, can any one doubt that the best reply to the organization of the Reuther caucus was an appeal and campaign to mobilize the membership to repudiate factionalism and defeat those who sought to come into power by the organization of an unprincipled alliance and caucus struggle? After the Convention can any one fail to see that the way to establish unity and isolate factionalists and anti-war forces is

to break with all caucuses and to arouse the membership to demand an end to all factional activities? The Convention pledges of Addes, Frankensteen and others to help end factionalism and unite the union seem to indicate that these conclusions are already being drawn by many important and constructive forces. Such a course would increase the contributions of the Addes-Frankensteen forces to the union and the war effort. These forces, although hampered by their factionalism, nevertheless are staunch supporters of C.I.O. policies and at the Convention constituted the largest single force opposing the campaign of anti-war forces to take over the union and divert it from the C.I.O. program.

In the light of the Convention, the supporters of the Reuther caucus should face the fact that the struggle to oust Addes and Frankensteen was unprincipled and harmful to the union and the war effort. Did not Addes and Frankensteen and their supporters join with the win-the-war forces in the Reuther caucus in adopting important win-the-war resolutions? Are not these decisions life-and-death questions in winning the war? Is anything more important than winning the war? Have not the win-the-war forces, who up to now have been in the Reuther camp, everything in common with the supporters of Addes and Frankensteen, and nothing in common with the Maizeys, Silvers and DeLorenzo, who are anti-Roosevelt and anti-C.I.O., but who were part of the Reuther caucus? If Addes and Frankensteen

and their supporters agree with the constructive Reuther forces on vital win-the-war issues, then what reason was there for factionalism and organized caucuses? The only real answer to these questions is that factionalism divides the union, helps the anti-war forces and therefore must be abolished in order to unite the union to win the war.

The Convention also shows that a non-factional position does not mean "neutrality." President Thomas took a splendid stand on most questions of policy and remained independent of all caucuses. But President Thomas' contribution would have been greater and more effective if he had warned the membership against factionalism and condemned those who initiated and organized an unprincipled struggle for power. The effect of a "neutral" position made it easier for factionalism to take root and develop and gave a free hand to those who sought to upset the status quo, disrupt the unity of the union and sabotage the C.I.O. program.

One cannot be neutral towards factionalism which threatens to disrupt the union. One cannot be neutral towards factional programs that are contrary to C.I.O. policies and harmful to the war effort. One cannot be neutral towards an attempt to split the union by an unprincipled struggle for power. One cannot be "neutral" when factional slates are put forward. Responsible win-the-war forces who have the confidence of the workers should do everything necessary to combat and defeat those whose

factional activities would divide the win-the-war forces, promote policies harmful to the war and obstruct democratic non-factional elections and thereby help the enemies of the union and the war effort.

The stand of most non-factional delegates, among whom there were a number of Communists, was not a position of "neutrality." They vigorously and actively warned against all factional activities. They campaigned and voted against policies harmful to the union. They voted for a united union by insuring the re-election of the national leadership. The decisive role played by these delegates shows to the entire union that the first step in the fight against disrupters and for the unity of the union and a win-the-war program must be a break with factions and a struggle against factionalism. They were a minority, but they played a key role in delivering a smashing blow to factionalism. Factionalism cannot survive from this blow if the lessons of this Convention are grasped by all win-the-war forces.

The Buffalo Convention served notice that factionalism must end. Even Walter Reuther should be able to read the handwriting on the wall, because the Convention issued a warning that those who organized an unprincipled struggle for power, who put forward a factional program aimed at exploiting confusion, appealing to prejudices, and making concessions to anti-war forces, are not going to receive the support of the rank and file. Leaders whose

personal ambitions lead them to become indifferent to the prosecution of the war are in danger of losing their authority and posts as leaders of labor. Those who promote factionalism and seek to profit from it will become the victims of factionalism.

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As a result of the auto workers' Convention the anti-war forces have been weakened and the pro-C.I.O., pro-Murray, pro-Roosevelt win-the-war forces are in a much stronger position. The union is also in a position speedily to unite its ranks to solve all remaining problems. The path to such unity is the cooperation of all constructive forces on the basis of the C.I.O. program and unqualified support to the Commander-in-Chief. This unity of all win-the-war forces requires an end to factionalism and an uncompromising struggle against the defeatist agents of John L. Lewis, the Trotskyites, Norman Thomas Socialists, Coughlinites, and against all policies that weaken the union and the war effort.

Victory over fascism urgently requires that the great voice of the auto workers be raised throughout the land in opposition to those friends of Hitler who seek to prevent Hitler's defeat by delaying the invasion of Western Europe.

The blows struck by the auto workers' Convention on behalf of the United Nations can be reinforced if the auto workers now renew their efforts to help bring about the international cooperation of the organized workers of the world.

The hand of the Commander-in-Chief can be further strengthened, and the nation's unity consolidated if the auto workers back up their support for a fourth term for Roosevelt by joining with the rest of the C.I.O. in the application of the political program of the C.I.O., which will speedily mobilize and unite all the people to compel Congress to cooperate with President Roosevelt in prosecuting the war, and will insure the defeat of the enemies of the war effort, of labor, and of President Roosevelt in 1944.

The offensive actions planned to take the war to the heart of the Axis can be successful only if the armed forces are backed up by an all-out effort on the home front. This requires more tanks, airplanes, and weapons of war. Offensive action will demand a great increase in production. To help achieve this increased production, and defend their own economic interests, the auto workers need to speedily find the ways and means effectively to apply a policy of increased earnings for every increase in production that is required to help bring victory in the war.

To accomplish these tasks necessary to win the war, and more effectively to defend the interests of the workers in their relations with the employers, it is also necessary to increase the organized power of the auto workers and make this strength more effective. The organization of the unorganized is an important means of winning the war. Reaching and actively involving every one of the 1,100,000 members of the union in the activities of this

great organization will increase the effectiveness of the union's activities manifoldly. A more effective fight for the rights of the Negroes and the solution of the problems of the women and greater efforts to involve these sections of the union membership more fully into the leadership of the union will help cement the unity of the union and increase its strength.

Every Communist auto worker will, as in the past, loyally make every effort to cooperate with his union brothers and fellow Americans in helping unite the auto work-

ers' ranks behind the C.I.O. program and the elected win-the-war leaders.

By undertaking to solve these patriotic tasks and by ending factionalism, the auto workers will be able to unite their ranks so firmly that their mighty union will be an even greater source of strength to the C.I.O., enabling the C.I.O. more effectively to rally the entire labor movement and the people for the greatest tasks ever faced by the American people and our Allies—the historic task of destroying fascism.

REMARKS ON THE DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

BY HANS BERGER

THE Communist International has been dissolved by the decision of its parties. The Communist Parties approved the proposal for dissolution submitted by the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in individual declarations in which they discussed their specific national circumstances as well as the general situation. These important reasons were formulated in the resolution of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International as follows:

“The historical role of the Communist International, organized in 1919 as the result of the political collapse of the overwhelming majority of the old prewar workers’ parties, consisted in that it preserved the teachings of Marxism from vulgarization and distortion by opportunist elements of the labor movement. In a number of countries it helped to unite the vanguard of the advanced workers into genuine workers’ parties, and it helped them to mobilize the mass of toilers in defense of their economic and political interests for struggle against fascism and war, which fascism had

been preparing, and for the support of the Soviet Union as the main bulwark against fascism.

“The Communist International revealed in good time the true significance of the ‘Anti-Comintern Pact’ as a weapon in the war preparations of the Hitlerites. Long prior to the war the Communist International tirelessly exposed the base, undermining activities of the Hitlerites in foreign states, who masked these with outcries about alleged interference of the Communist International in the internal affairs of these states.

“But long before the war it had already become increasingly clear that to the extent that the internal as well as the international situation of individual countries became more complicated, the solution of the problems of the labor movement of each individual country through the medium of some international center would meet with insuperable obstacles.

“The deep difference in the historical roads of development of each country of the world; the diverse character and even the contradiction in their social orders; the difference in level and rate of their social and political development, and, finally, the difference in the degree of con-

sciousness and organization of the workers, conditioned also the various problems which face the working class of each individual country."

Despite the fact that only a few months have elapsed since the dissolution of the Communist International it is already possible to establish certain positive results. The decision was welcomed by the most responsible organs of public opinion. It was conceded that this decision is capable of strengthening the national and international front in struggle against fascism. In the working class camp and in the camp of the progressive forces this decision likewise has had favorable consequences. The possibility of strengthening the unity of the workers and of overcoming the old split in the labor movement has, in the opinion of many responsible labor leaders, been enhanced following the dissolution of the Communist International. Thus there are to be noted the steps toward the establishment of united Marxist working-class parties in Switzerland and Chile, and the broadening and reorganization of the Communist Parties together with important groups in the labor movement in Canada and Costa Rica. The British Trade Union Congress, while failing to act favorably on the Communist Party's application for affiliation, rescinded the "black circular" which banned Communists from holding posts in the trade union movement; and thus contributed toward strengthening the unity of the British working class. In this country also the decision has helped to blunt the red-

baiting campaign and to restrict its destructive effects.

If one considers the enormous mass of incorrect conclusions, lack of understanding, malice, slander and stupidity that has been piled up in the course of years with regard to the role of the Communist International, it is naturally not to be wondered at that, in connection with its dissolution, the most varied speculations were attempted and the most varied explanations offered, none of which had anything to do with the real reasons as they were presented in the resolution of the Presidium of the Executive Committee.

Stalin therefore rendered a great service to truth when, with characteristic directness, he gave Harold King, Reuter correspondent, his reasons for considering the dissolution of the Communist International as "timely and proper." The reasons given by Stalin are:

"The dissolution of the Communist International... facilitates the organization of the common onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy—Hitlerism....

"It exposes the lie of the Hitlerities to the effect that 'Moscow' allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to 'Bolshevise' them. An end is now being put to this lie.

"It exposes the calumny of the adversaries of Communism within the labor movement to the effect that the Communist Parties in the various countries are allegedly acting, not in the interest of their people, but on orders from the out-

side. An end is now being put to this calumny too.

"It facilitates the work of the patriots in the freedom-loving countries for uniting the progressive forces of their respective countries, regardless of party or religious faith, into a single camp of national liberation—for unfolding the struggle against fascism.

"It facilitates the work of the patriots of all countries for uniting all the freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against the menace of world domination by Hitlerism, thus clearing the way to the future organization of the companionship of nations based upon their equality.

"I think that all these circumstances taken together will result in the further strengthening of the united front of the Allies and other United Nations in their fight for victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

"I feel that the dissolution of the Communist International is perfectly timely because it is exactly now, when the fascist beast is exerting its last strength, that it is necessary to organize the common onslaught of the freedom-loving countries to finish off this beast and deliver the people from fascist oppression."

The dissolution of the Communist International took place, therefore, in order to facilitate the annihilation of the main enemy of the freedom of the peoples and the most dangerous enemy of the working class and of social progress.

Since correct strategy consists in uniting and concentrating all forces against the common enemy, necessitating the elimination of everything which makes such unification

and concentration difficult, therefore the dissolution of the Communist International, decided on unanimously by the Communist Parties, was doubtless an act in the interests of facilitating victory over the fascist enemy.

Consequently, there is nothing more false, more sophistic than to put the dissolution of the Communist International on a par with the collapse of the Second International in the year 1914, as has been done by certain commentators more or less influenced by the Trotskyites. The collapse of the Second International did not consist in the fact that it formally dissolved itself and decided to forego an international center in order to facilitate the victory of the peoples over their main enemy. As is well known, it never did that. Its collapse consisted in this: that the great majority of its leaders went over to the camp of imperialism, sacrificed the principles of Marxism and became defenders of the imperialist main enemies of humanity. Its collapse consisted in this: that the great majority of the leaders of the Second International helped their respective imperialist bourgeoisie to carry on the imperialist war, to disguise it as a war of defense, to incite the peoples against one another, and to split the working class. Its collapse consisted in this: that the majority of the leaders did what the leaders of the Finnish Socialist Party are doing today—acting as drivers for imperialism. In his article "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International," published in 1916, Lenin wrote:

"What is the economic nature of the theory of national defense in the war of 1914-15? The bourgeoisie of *all* the Great Powers are waging the war for the purpose of partitioning and exploiting the world, for the purpose of oppressing other nations. A few crumbs of the huge profits of the bourgeoisie may fall to the share of a small circle of the labor bureaucracy, the labor aristocracy and the petty-bourgeois fellow travelers. The class basis of social-chauvinism and of opportunism is the same, namely, the alliance between a thin stratum of privileged workers and 'their' national bourgeoisie *against* the masses of the working class; the alliance between the lackeys of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie *against* the class the latter is exploiting."

In contrast to the majority of the Social-Democratic Parties of the Second International during the imperialist World War of 1914-18, the Communist Parties stand in the forefront of the struggle against the main enemy of the national freedom of the peoples, the main enemy of the working class and of socialism—Nazism and every brand of fascism. In that country where the Communist Party is the ruling party, in the Soviet Union; in the countries where the Communist Parties are legal, as in the United States, England, etc., as well as in the countries where the Communist Parties must fight under the worst illegal conditions, they have centered their entire policy and concentrated all their energies on the annihilation of the main foe of all progress. The Communist Parties have thus never sacrificed their Marxist-Leninist principles, which know no boundaries, and which can never be given

up by them, but guided by their principles fight on with utmost consistency in the liberation-war of the peoples according to the varied, specific national circumstances.

Those commentators who take pains to compare the dissolution of the Communist International with the political collapse of the Second International put the present national-liberation war on a par with the imperialist World War of 1914-18, and the Soviet Union with tsarist imperialist Russia. Consequently, they talk of the duty of the "Russian revolutionaries" to oust Stalin; and the Nazi-linked Alters and Ehrlichs, not the heroes of Stalin-grad, become their revolutionary models. Consequently they denounce the American Communists as "strike-breakers," because the Communists favor the alliance of all classes and strata in the struggle against the main, Hitlerite, enemy of progress in the present phase of human history, an enemy that must be destroyed before the working class can take a single step along its historic path toward emancipation, an enemy whose victory would result, not only in the destruction of the national independence of the peoples, but also in the annihilation of the first socialist land and of all working class organizations throughout the world. These commentators, pouring out revolutionary-sounding phrases, are merely, under new conditions, playing the game of the Social-Democratic majority during the imperialist World War of 1914-18. Their policies aid and abet the most aggressive imperialism, fascism, the hangmen of the national freedom of the peoples;

their policies help this main enemy of progressive development.

If the policies of these commentators were successful, then we would have the following situation: revolt of the Red Army and of the Soviet workers and peasants against the Soviet Government (the fifth-column program of the Trotsky-Bukharin camp); mass strike movements, mass sabotage, in the United States and England; division of the patriotic forces, under the guise of "struggle against one's own bourgeoisie for Socialism," in France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Greece, and in all countries occupied by Hitler. These policies of splitting and undermining the anti-fascist national unity were tried once before, albeit on a small scale, by the ideological followers of these commentators, in Catalonia, during the war of the Spanish Republic against Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini. Hitler, his friends and agents, doubtless support such "revolutionary" policies and would not oppose their "justification" by distorted citations from Lenin. German fascism, indeed, always cooperated with Trotsky and Trotskyism. For in these policies there would be its greatest chance for victory on a world scale. It is known that the German imperialists also during the first World War offered no objections when the leaders of German Social-Democracy similarly "justified" their transfer into the camp of German imperialism and their hangmen's services by copious "citations" from Marx and Engels.

The "Socialist National Action Committee," the "Socialists" of the type of Norman Thomas, are ag-

grieved by the dissolution of the Communist International. And, indeed, for the very same reasons for which they grieve for Hitler, the founder of the "Anti-Comintern" pact, from whose hands a weapon has been torn by the dissolution of the Communist International. The Committee notes with sorrow the "danger" that the disguise will be torn off the supporters of the "Anti-Comintern" pact in the working class movement, just as the disguise was torn from the propaganda of the fascists through the dissolution of the Communist International. Sorrowfully, these "Socialists" declare:

"The chief significance of the move is the avidity with which the capitalist press and British and American government leaders like Churchill and Hull have hailed the dissolution and accepted it at face value.

"This reaction plays directly into Stalin's hands and results in strengthening rather than weakening his influence in the internal affairs of other countries. Now his Communist parties in the different countries will claim that they receive no instructions from Moscow. And gullible millions will swallow the bait."

And in order to prevent millions from freeing themselves from the poison of prejudices that were injected into them and especially from the reactionary Social-Democratic leaders all over the world which will be facilitated by the dissolution of the Communist International—the Committee declares that now, after the Communist International has been dissolved, "the Communist

parties of the world will be responsible directly to the Soviet Foreign Office."

But whatever kind of "ersatz" campaigns may be invented by these "Socialists," the dissolution of the Communist International has dealt them a heavy blow, as they are forced to admit despite themselves.

* * *

One cannot expect, naturally, that the dissolution of the Communist International will provide immediately, if at all, more basic understanding of the past, of the role of the Communist International and of the Communist Parties, to those liberals grouped around the *Nation* and the *New Republic*. Therefore, no one will be surprised, if these liberals, while greeting the dissolution of the Communist International, drag along their old mistakes and prejudices in the process.

Perhaps new experiences and new understanding will enable them to view the past and the significance of the Communist Parties in a clearer light than they are able to do today. Out of the vast number of comments on the dissolution of the Communist International, which issued from these circles, we shall here refer only to Freda Kirchwey's "End of the Comintern" (*Nation*, May 29, 1943) and to Max Lerner's "After the Comintern" (*New Republic*, June 7, 1943), which are typical of the views of these circles.

Freda Kirchwey recognizes that the dissolution of the Communist International was a heavy blow against the fascist propaganda. It robbed Hitler of "the old weapon [which] had served him well from

the day of his first street brawl to the present hour of decision."

"Stalin, with a single stroke, has taken it from his hand. Nothing is left to the German Propaganda Ministry but empty cries of 'fake' and 'trickery'—cries which sound peculiarly hollow emerging from the best-equipped fake factory in Europe."

To the question of whether the dissolution of the Communist International will facilitate the healing of the split in the working class and the unification of all progressive forces, Miss Kirchwey has no answer. She has nothing to say but that one must wait. For her this question is of subordinate significance:

"The world is at war. The primary consideration is not the future of the Communist Parties or their relations with other radical groups, or even the possible rise of new revolutionary alignments. The job in hand is to cement the allied powers in a tough, durable, aggressive union, to infuse it with all the progressive vision and energy available, and to drive through to victory and a decent peace. Viewed in this light Stalin's act is above criticism."

The emphasis on the strengthening of allied unity and on the drive to victory for the realization of a just peace is, of course, true. But the question of collaboration of all workers' organizations and parties, as well as the cooperation of all progressive forces in the conduct of the war and the achievement of the peace, is under no circumstances of subordinate importance. This becomes clear at once as we turn to

the conditions in the European countries. Even Miss Kirchwey cannot deny that the relation of the Communists to the other sections of the working class movement, to the progressive forces generally, to the other patriotic forces of the liberation-war in such countries as France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Greece, is of decisive importance for the strength and the development of the struggle against Hitler, and for the degree of support which the liberation armies will receive from people. Likewise in such countries as Germany, Hungary, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, the cooperation of all progressive forces in the struggle against Hitler is not only of the greatest political importance for the constitution of the post-war world, but is of most immediate military significance. The effectiveness of the struggle of these forces against Hitler and his vassals influences the duration and the magnitude of the war to a significant degree.

But if we turn to our own country, also the unification of the forces of the working class movement and of all progressive forces is not at all of secondary importance. The *Nation* and the *New Republic*, as well as the liberal *PM* and *New York Post*, have been carrying on, for a long time, a concentrated campaign "against the policy of the State Department," against the tendency to hobnob with reactionary forces in the European countries and to ignore and fear the European peoples' movements. But in all these European countries the Communists play a very significant role. The at-

tempt to ignore the influence of the Communists in the individual European peoples' movements, to want to isolate them, to shy away from every movement and organization in which they play a role, *leads of necessity to Darlanism, to the support of all reactionary movements, to the ignoring of the truly democratic peoples' movements, to AM-GOTism.* The liberals do not see the deep contradiction in which they are trapped when on the one hand they rage against these tendencies in our foreign policy, and on the other hand, in the United States, support a policy which attempts to isolate the Communists; when they support those forces who, like Antonini and Dubinsky, see their main task in combating and preventing the collaboration of all progressive forces. These liberals have not yet understood that support for the policies of Dubinsky, of Antonini, and not rooting them out completely, helps to re-create constantly such an atmosphere in the internal relations in the United States, which makes it easier for the reactionary forces in our foreign policy to shy away from peoples' movements wherever they find them and to view them through the eyes of the Dies Committee. Who will dare deny that the anti-Communist forces within our working class movement exert an evil influence on the establishment of national and international labor unity? Who can deny—and the liberal papers and magazines provide plenty of excellent and pertinent material, without, however, drawing the full conclusion—that the entire policy by

which we are conducting the war must be influenced much more strongly by the working class and by all progressive forces, especially so at a time, as Earl Browder has explained so brilliantly, when the policy of the coalition war is at a dangerous crisis which also threatens evil consequences for the whole post-war development?

Correct as Miss Kirchwey and the circles whom she represents are in the assertion that the dissolution of the Communist International means a heavy blow against Hitler, they are equally incorrect when they have nothing to say about the question: What is the effect of dissolution of the Communist International on collaboration of all working class and progressive forces?

* * *

In his main comment on the dissolution of the Communist International Max Lerner echoed the stereotyped allegations and slanders regarding the role of the Communists as "instruments of Russian foreign policy," as "instruments" of the "plans" of the Russians for so-called "world revolution," which for years have been spread by reaction and by the Red-baiters in the working class movement. With this false premise as his point of departure, Lerner proceeds with the contention that the "world revolution is dead," that Russia has become "nationalistic," and that, therefore, Stalin was ready to sell the Communist International for "a price." What Stalin demanded as a price is also quite clear to Lerner, who confuses the policy of the Marxist working class

movement with the sale of old clothes. Lerner writes:

"They [the Russians] need our aid and they are willing to pay a price for it. They need our good will in the post-war world and they pay a price."

The price, according to Lerner, consists in: (1) a second front in Europe, and (2) lend-lease arms and food.

It was on June 7, 1943, that Lerner wrote that the Russians "need our aid immediately." This was at the time when a good number still felt with anxiety, and many others hoped, that the Red Army could not stand up to a new summer offensive by the Germans, and that major Soviet setbacks on the Eastern Front were to be expected.

The months that have elapsed since then, however, should have convinced Lerner that the "sale of the Comintern" was not at all essential to the Red Army in order to defeat the Nazi invaders, and "to save themselves." If immediate help through a Second Front had been necessary to *rescue* the Russians, the "sale" of the Comintern would have been of no avail, and they would not have been rescued—for the Second Front did not come. Did Stalin, therefore, let himself be cheated, "sell" the Comintern in vain, and fail to get the most important part of the "price"? Were our government and the British government the ones who cheated in this "deal"?

Such a viewpoint is obviously absurd. But this absurdity results from Max Lerner's wretched under-

standing of such a great world historical movement as the Communist movement. This absurdity results from judging all things by the standards of Tammany Hall politics. The fault is not ours that it sufficed but a few weeks to expose so thoroughly, even for our liberals, the absurdities of which they were guilty and which they had overlooked in their haste.

It is not a question of demanding of Max Lerner that he approve the past of the Communist International. Nor is it a question of wanting to establish that the Communist Parties did not commit mistakes in one situation or another. The history of the Communist Parties involves their publicly avowed self-criticisms, which they have carried through in order to learn and become more mature. It is a question of the unbelievably superficial character of the method of viewing historic events on the part of certain liberal commentators.

Millions of workers in all countries of the world established Communist Parties after the bankruptcy and collapse of Social-Democracy in the imperialist World War of 1914-18. These Communists have taken part in countless battles against imperialist oppression, against reaction, against fascism; they have worked ceaselessly in the struggle against chauvinism, in the struggle against obscurantism; they have made untold sacrifices, have held firm in face of the most frightful terror and the most ravaging assaults and slander campaigns. And why they do so, what reasons motivated them; for no one could

force or pay them to do this—about this Max Lerner has nothing to say except that they were “instruments of Russian foreign policy.” The German Communists, who far-sightedly in 1918 wanted to uproot imperialism in Germany; the Chinese Communists, who already in 1927 consistently carried on the struggle for China’s liberation from the foreign yoke and for its unification; the French Communists, who endeavored to create the National Front, in order to prevent France’s present fate; the Spanish Communists, whose heroic role in the struggle for the Spanish republic surpasses praise; the British Communists, who warned against and combated the treacherous Chamberlain Government; the American Communists, who were the first to work consistently for the organization of the workers in the mass production industries, who were the first to fight consistently for unemployment insurance, who have fought most consistently against the oppression of the Negroes, who are the first and most consistent fighters for friendship with the Soviet Union, our mightiest and most dependable ally—did not all these Communists act in the true interests of their peoples, have not all these Communists performed the greatest services for their countries and for their working classes in the struggle for freedom and progress and against economic, social, and political reaction? Is it an accident that today also in all countries of the world these Communists are the boldest, most self-sacrificing, and most consistent fighters in the strug-

gle against fascism and its fifth column?

The Communist Parties were not created by Russian foreign policy. The development of the working class movement in the various countries after the imperialist World War, the new tasks facing the working class in the mighty national and social crises of post-war developments were the causes for the historic reorganization of the Marxist working class movements into Communist Parties and into the Communist International. But just as the Russian working class movement did not become an instrument of the German movement, because it had Marx and Engels as its great teachers* so the Communist Parties within the Communist International did not become Russian because they had as their great teachers the greatest students of Marxism, Lenin and Stalin. Just as Marxism made it possible for the Russian working class to carry on an historically correct policy in its country and corresponding to its national interests, so the Communist International made it possible for the various Communist Parties to develop a historically progressive policy corresponding basically to their national interests. The Communist International and the Communist Parties of the world could cooperate in the closest possible manner with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was the ruling party of the first socialist country, because the pol-

icies of the socialist country were never in opposition to the true interests of the national working class movements and the true national interests of the peoples. Indeed, precisely in connection with the dissolution of the Communist International one must propose in all earnestness to liberals like Marx Lerner that they reread Earl Browder's book *Victory—and After*, the while discarding their prejudiced spectacles.

The additional contentions of Lerner about the "death of the world revolution" and about the Soviet Union "becoming nationalistic" as reasons for the dissolution of the Communist International are upon no higher plane. Just what Lerner understands by world revolution is not clear. If he means that for the time being it is not a question of struggle for socialism he is right. But if Lerner would reread Dimitroff's Report to the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, in 1935, he would discover that the keynote of this congress was not the fight for socialism but the fight against fascism.

To accuse the Soviet Union in the present period of following a "narrow nationalistic policy" which is in opposition to the general interests of the peoples, as Max Lerner alleges, is the height of confusion and self-entrapment in revolutionary-sounding phrases. Each phase of history has a main task, on the solution of which the advance or retrogression of a considerable period of development depends. The destruction of the bulwark of reaction against mankind, the destruction of

* See the excellent article by V. J. Jerome on the attempt to represent Marxism as "Prussianism," *The Communist*, May, 1943.

the Hitler regime, is the decisive "world revolutionary" task for all progressive humanity, whose completion will influence the development of all mankind in the most positive fashion. Inasmuch as the Russian Marxist working class movement established in the Soviet Union a socialist state, a socialist system of society, powerful enough to play the decisive role in the destruction of the main enemy of mankind, the "national policy of the Soviet Union" makes the most decisive contribution to world progress in this period of history.

Max Lerner cannot, with his arsenal of prejudices, explain the dissolution of the Communist International, cannot seriously judge the reasons offered by the Communist International, nor can he make a serious effort at gaining a real insight into the motive forces that created the Communist Parties and the Communist International. That is regrettable. For Marx Lerner, despite his prejudices, strikes some stout blows against reaction on many issues and should not be found absent from the camp of "indivisible progressivism"—a phrase coined by him.

A group of commentators, among them the *New York Times*, have drawn the conclusion from the dissolution of the Communist International that the Communist Parties must now logically dissolve themselves. But that is not the logic of those who dissolved the Communist International. In the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the maturity of the Communist Parties was

named as one of the reasons why the Executive Committee felt the dissolution of the Communist International was possible. And Stalin, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in no wise views the dissolution of the Communist Parties as the consequence of the dissolution of the Communist International for otherwise he would not have declared in answer to Harold King, cited at the beginning of this article, that:

"It [the dissolution of the C.I.] exposes the calumny of the adversaries of Communism within the labor movement to the effect that the Communist Parties of the various countries are allegedly acting not in the interest of their people but on orders from the outside. An end is now being put to this calumny too."

Among the reasons which the leaders of the Communist Parties considered in supporting the dissolution of the Communist International was doubtless the question of strengthening the Communist Parties—and not dissolving them—the question of facilitating the unification of the forces of labor and the people as a whole in an anti-fascist national front.

The fighting French do not demand the dissolution of the French Communist Party. The Yugoslav patriots do not demand the dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist Party. And what consistent anti-fascist does not wish that the German Communists would win millions of active supporters as quickly as possible, who would make it easier to weaken and destroy Hitler? Or should the Communist Parties

in Bulgaria, in Rumania, in Hungary, in Finland, dissolve themselves—they who stand in the forefront of the struggle against Hitler and his Quislings? The dissolution of the Communist Parties in the European countries would be direct aid to Hitler. It would mean a tremendous weakening, disorganization, and demoralization of the liberation struggle of the peoples against Hitler.

And as far as our country is concerned, we believe, without being immodest, without exaggerating our capabilities, that increased strength of the Communist Party and its influence among the workers would strengthen the nation's war effort and help influence and implement correct war policy. If the influence of the Communists among the miners were greater than it unfortunately still is, Lewis would have found it much more difficult, if not impossible, to launch his strike-conspiracy against the war effort of the nation. Nevertheless, the influence of the Communists was strong enough to help repulse Lewis' assault against our war effort, which threatened to create a critical strike movement. If the *New York Times* were objective in relation to the Communist Party, it would have recognized the forthrightness and wisdom of Earl Browder, when he unhesitatingly opposed the mass strike sentiment in those critical days.

If the Communists had greater influence, the problem of centralized planning of our war economy would have been solved much more speedily and in a much more satisfac-

tory fashion than up to now. Earl Browder, in his *Victory—and After*, offered in good time a correct basis for the solution of this key question. If the Communists had greater influence, the decisiveness and boldness necessary in effecting our war measures would have been applied in meeting the question of fully integrating the Negro people into the war effort on the basis of equality.

If the Communists had greater influence, those reactionary tendencies which influence our strategy, our foreign policy, and our relation to the Soviet Union in such dangerous fashion would have been overcome more quickly. In fact, wherever we turn, we see how useful it would be from the point of view of carrying on the war, if the millions who read the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Daily News*, the Hearst press, would be educated by the *Daily Worker*, by *The Communist*, by the writings of Earl Browder, by Communist literature. In fact, there is not the slightest reason for "liquidating" the American Communist Party, but there are a thousand reasons for increasing its influence as quickly as possible in the interest of carrying on the war to a speedy victory and in the interest of post-war world reconstruction.

The dissolution of the Communist International, in facilitating the broad, unhampered collaboration of all strata of the National Front within each country, will thereby contribute to strengthening the unity of the nations in their drive to victory.

A TAX PROGRAM TO SPEED THE OFFENSIVE

BY JEAN FRANCIS

CONGRESS is now considering another tax bill. The wartime revenue acts are indeed a sorry spectacle for a nation engaged in a people's war for liberation. Instead of fashioning the tax program into an instrument for victory, reactionaries in Congress have been perverting the revenue acts into a weapon for disunity, saddling the heaviest burdens on the workers and consumers with low incomes.

*The 1940-41-42 Revenue Acts**

The 1940-41-42 revenue acts have witnessed the whittling away of income-tax exemptions to substandard levels—from \$2,500 to \$1,200 for family heads, from \$1,000 to \$500 for single persons, with the allowance for dependents cut from \$400 to \$350—while the cost of living climbed steadily. The 1942 act saw the passage of the demagogically-named "Victory" tax, conceived by the arch-architect of regressive taxation, Chairman George of the Senate Finance Committee. During this wartime period, the rate applicable to the bottom bracket has

jumped from 4 to 19 per cent.

The Tax Front

The defeats on the tax front can be traced to a combination of factors. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee are dominated by soak-the-poor, taxation-as-usual elements. In addition, in the House, the gag rule prevents effective debate and eliminates the possibility of progressive amendments. In the Senate Finance Committee, any progressive features of the tax bill are massacred in cold blood, under the crafty scalpel of its Chairman, Senator George, aided by the defeatists, Taft and Vandenberg, and additional reactionary proposals grafted on to the mangled structure. The House generally yields to these changes and the finished product is *taxation by misrepresentation*.

Another serious factor has been the tendency of the Administration to retreat in the face of the attacks of the reactionaries. While presenting, in the main, progressive features, the Treasury's programs have often made important concessions, thereby weakening popular support for the Administration's program.

A serious shortcoming has been

* For a more detailed analysis, see "The Battle for a Democratic Win-the-War Tax Program," in the March, 1943, issue of *The Communist*.

the failure of labor and the progressive forces to achieve unity on a common program. In the past each organization has advanced its own program, although the essence of the programs of various progressive organizations and of labor were basically in agreement. Another shortcoming has been the absence of unified action between the Administration and labor and progressive forces—in the formulation of the program and in the steps necessary for its realization.

Finally, the great masses of the country have not been mobilized in serious campaigns to force the adoption of progressive tax measures. The trade unions, with rare exceptions, have not stirred their members into vigorous activity; in many instances rarely going beyond the passage of a resolution. With the sectors of the tax front so disjointed, with the masses insufficiently active, the soak-the-poor forces, aided by the defeatist intrigues, have been able to score easy victories.

The Coalition Emerges

It is therefore historically significant that as the 1943 tax bill got under way, a coalition of seven national organizations announced united support for a common tax program. The coalition embraces advanced forces among labor, farmer, Negro, women, consumer, and civic organizations. It includes the Congress of Industrial Organizations, National Farmers Union, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, National Association for the Ad-

vancement of Colored People, the League of Women Shoppers, National Women's Trade Union League of America, and the National Lawyers Guild.

The coalition has urged the adoption of a 9-point program calling for:

1. Increased individual income tax rates on middle and higher incomes, along with a \$25,000 ceiling on net incomes, after taxes.

2. Restoration of income tax exemptions to \$750 for single persons, \$1,500 for married couples, and \$400 for each dependent.

3. Increased tax rates on corporations with incomes above \$25,000 beyond the existing 40 per cent rate.

4. All profits above 4 to 5 per cent of invested capital to be taxed as excess profits, with loopholes closed.

5. Repeal of the "Victory" tax.

6. Elimination of special privileges so as to provide for mandatory joint returns, the taxation of State and municipal securities, and the elimination of percentage depletion allowances for owners of mines and oil and gas wells.

7. Increased tax rates and lower exemptions for estates and gifts.

8. Heavy excise taxes on luxuries and non-essentials.

9. Vigorous opposition to a general Federal sales tax.

In support of its 9-point program, the coalition declared:

"While wages have been stabilized, prices have skyrocketed and business profits have soared. To saddle upon the worker and farmer

with small incomes, added tax burdens, is to threaten the entire home front. Workers cannot produce weapons of war without adequate food and shelter and clothing and other necessities for themselves and their families. To impose additional levies upon business and upon middle and high income groups is to recapture war profits and to put into practice the democratic principle of taxation according to ability to pay, while at the same time siphoning off the most dangerously inflationary incomes. . . . Such a program, through its fairness and its adherence to democratic tax principles, will contribute immeasurably to victory on the battlefields and on the home front."

This joint action marks an important advance in the determination of labor and progressive organizations to make their voice felt in Congress in the shaping of new tax legislation. It is to be noted that the A. F. of L. did not join in the coalition.*

The Treasury's Tax Program

On October 4, Secretary Morgenthau submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee the Treasury program calling for \$10,560,000,000 in *new* taxes, to be raised from the following tax sources:

Individual income	\$6,530,000,000
Corporation profits.....	1,140,000,000
Excise (taxes)	2,490,000,000
Estates and gifts	400,000,000

* At its recent convention in Boston, the A. F. of L. declared its "unremitting opposition" to a sales tax and to any increase in taxes upon wages of workers; any increases, it declared, should be in the form of savings represented by government bonds.

Individual Income Taxes—The Treasury recommended:

1. The repeal of the oppressive "Victory" tax, which hits all incomes above \$12 a week, regardless of family status.

2. Repeal of the 10 per cent earned income credit.

3. Reduction of the personal exemption for married couples and family heads from \$1,200 to \$1,100, and reduction of allowance for dependents from \$350 to \$300.

4. Increases in the surtax rates from 13 per cent to 21 per cent as a starter and steeply on up the scale until the rate reaches 90 per cent on brackets above \$100,000.

5. Post-war refunds of part of the tax. Under one plan, \$2,270,000,000 would be refunded to taxpayers, under a second plan \$3,510,000,000. The Treasury suggested that the taxpayer be permitted to purchase a fully-paid-up life insurance policy with his refund credit; also that there be a special provision permitting taxpayers whose incomes had not increased "substantially" since the war began to use their credit immediately to reduce their taxes.

The net effect of these proposed changes in the individual income tax can best be seen in the following table which shows the amount of income payable under present law and under the Treasury proposal for a married person with 2 dependents (the post-war credit is based on 50 per cent of the first \$50 of tax; 25 per cent of the next \$150, and 10 per cent of the balance, the maximum credit not to exceed \$400):

Net income before personal exemption	Present law including net Victory Tax	TREASURY PROPOSAL			Increase in Net Tax	Increase in Gross Tax
		Gross Tax	Post-war Credit	Net Tax		
\$1,800	\$39	\$27	\$14	\$14	\$-25	\$-12
2,000	58	81	33	48	10	23
2,300	116	165	54	111	-5	49
2,500	159	225	65	160	1	66
3,000	267	384	81	303	36	117
4,000	485	753	118	635	150	268
5,000	730	1,163	159	1,004	274	433
6,000	979	1,588	201	1,387	408	609
10,000	2,208	3,555	398	3,157	949	1,347
25,000	9,574	13,750	400	13,350	3,776	4,176
50,000	26,392	35,037	400	34,637	8,245	8,645
100,000	67,803	81,435	400	81,035	13,232	13,632
500,000	439,931	465,418	400	465,018	25,087	25,487
1,000,000	898,800	945,418	400	945,018	46,218	46,618

Corporation Taxes—The existing income and surtax rates on corporate incomes above \$25,000 would be increased from the present level of 40 per cent to 50 per cent. No changes were recommended in the excess profits tax.

Estate and Gift Taxes—The estate tax exemption would be reduced from \$60,000 to \$40,000, and estate and gift tax rates would be increased all along the line.

The following table shows the amount of estate tax payable under present law and under the Treasury proposal:

Net Estate Before Exemption	Amount of Tax		Increase in Tax
	Present law	Proposal	
\$50,000	0	\$650	\$650
60,000	0	2,050	2,050
80,000	1,600	6,450	4,850
100,000	4,800	12,350	7,550
200,000	32,700	51,150	18,450
400,000	94,500	145,750	51,250
600,000	159,700	263,650	103,950
1,000,000	303,500	540,850	237,350
4,000,000	1,802,800	2,931,350	1,128,550

Excise Taxes—The Treasury recommended raising 2.5 billion dollars by steep increases in present excise-tax rates on a long list of items and the adoption of two new excises on soft drinks and candy and chewing gum. The Treasury proposals and the estimated additional revenue to be produced are shown in the table on the next page.

Social Security—In a separate statement, Secretary Morgenthau strongly recommended that Social Security be widened to cover practically all persons in the nation, to increase unemployment insurance benefits and to provide benefits for temporary disability and hospitalization. He pointed out that to do this on the basis of bills pending in Congress, Social Security taxes paid by employees would increase approximately 3.7 billions, and by employers an additional 1.6 billions. The Treasury's spokesman concluded: "If payroll taxes are in-

Articles or Service	Present Tax	Proposed Tax	Estimated Addi- tional Revenue (in millions)
Liquor	\$6 per gal.	\$10 per gal.	\$487.2
Beer	\$7 per barrel	\$10 per barrel	210.5
Wine	various	various	61.1
Cigarettes	7c a pack	10c a pack	371.3
Cigars, Tobacco	various	various	113.9
Admissions	1c per 10c	3c per 10c	327.0
Cabarets	5% of charge	30% of charge	91.3
Club Dues	11% of charge	20% of charge	5.1
Bowling, Billiards	\$10 per table	\$20 per table	27.0
Transportation	10% of charge	25% of charge	212.7
Telephone, Telegraph	10%-20%	15%-25%	80.4
Jewelry	10%	30%	167.3
Fur, Luggage	10%	25%	108.2
Toilet preparations	10%	25%	51.4
Soft drinks	none	1c per each 5c	177.0
Candy, chewing gum	none	1c per each 5c	190.0

creased, the income taxes should at that time be made substantially lower than I have suggested to avoid an excessive tax burden on the lower income groups."

Analysis of Treasury Program

The Treasury's program must be tested by the planks in the 9-point program advocated by the coalition of labor and progressive organizations. Measured by this yardstick, the Treasury's proposals are, in the main, in accord with the 9-point program except for one basic provision: the Treasury proposes to *lower* income-tax exemptions whereas the coalition favors *increasing* such exemptions. Thus, the Treasury proposal would reduce the personal exemption for married couples and family heads from \$1,200 to \$1,100, and the al-

lowance for dependents from \$350 to \$300. The coalition proposal would restore exemptions to \$750 for single persons, \$1,500 for married couples, and \$400 for each dependent.

The Treasury's program would repeal the oppressive "Victory" tax, relieving nine million hard pressed families from a heavy burden. It rejects the vicious sales tax which would load the heaviest burdens on those with the smallest incomes. It would effectively tap the higher incomes, by its steep graduation of rates. By its 96% levy on every dollar above \$100,000, it compensates for the defeat of the \$25,000 salary ceiling established by the President's Executive Order. Thus, a net income of \$100,000 would be subject to a gross tax of \$81,435, with \$18,565 remaining after taxes,

while an income of \$500,000 would pay \$465,418, leaving \$34,582.

To reach estates and gifts, it recommends lowered exemptions and increased rates throughout the scale. It proposes to raise an additional \$1,100,000 from corporations by a 50 per cent rate. It would increase the excise-tax rates on many items of a luxury or semi-luxury character; however, the proposed increase of 3c on a pack of cigarettes should be dropped and the proposed 30 per cent tax rate on admissions should not be applicable to low-cost movies—these items provide necessary relief and relaxation to workers in war and essential industries, so many of whom are working long hours under severe strain. Likewise, the proposed penny tax on 5c soft drinks, candy and chewing gum should be eliminated—these new taxes would fall on the poor man already overburdened with indirect taxes.

Secretary Morgenthau emphasized the urgency of adopting a broad Social Security program. The financing of such a program must not impose crushing burdens on the beneficiary-workers but should be based on ability to pay. Although Secretary Morgenthau urged reductions in income taxes on the low-income groups if payroll taxes are increased, the present Congress cannot be relied upon to concern itself with the low-income groups. It is important therefore to press for the immediate adoption of a broad Social Security program, financed from ability-to-pay sources.

Most serious, however, of the shortcomings of the Treasury's program is its proposal to lower ex-

emptions rather than raise them as advocated by the coalition. *Because of the inadequate exemptions* recommended by the Treasury, the impact of the increased surtax rates is very heavy on the low-income workers. The Treasury was evidently quite conscious of this, for it made suggestions "for lessening the ultimate impact of the increased tax on the lower-income groups." It proposed that the refunds "should benefit principally the lower-income groups and might be in the range of between 2 and 3.5 billions of the 6.5 billion tax."

If the table (on p. 1033) showing the changes in the income tax load proposed by the Treasury, is reviewed, it will be noted that the *net* tax, after taking into account the post-war credit, starts to rise above the \$2,500 level (in the case of the married person with 2 dependents*). If the post-war credit is not considered, the *gross* tax load begins to rise at the \$1,900 level. If the coalition's proposal to raise exemptions to \$1,500 and \$400 were adopted (instead of the Treasury's proposals for \$1,100 and \$300), this taxpayer would have an exemption of \$2,300, or \$600 above the Treasury's corresponding figure of \$1,700. This additional \$600 exemption would start the rise of the increases at the \$3,100 level, on a *net* basis, or at \$2,500 on the *gross* basis. This would be in line essentially with the coalition's proposal that increased income taxes should be lim-

* In the case of the married person with no dependents, the *net* tax starts to rise above the \$2,000 level, and on the *gross* tax at about the \$1,100 level. In the case of the single person, the *net* tax would start to rise above the \$1,600 level and the *gross* tax at the \$500 level.

ited to the middle and higher incomes. The decisive element is therefore the adequacy of the personal exemptions.

The Cost of Living

Moreover, the provision for post-war refunds is no substitute for adequate exemptions; for it will not relieve the low income workers, who need every penny of their limited income *immediately* to take care of their basic necessities. Workers are now saving at least 10 per cent of their wages in war bonds. Secretary Morgenthau testified to the success of the voluntary payroll-deduction plan.

The plain fact is that a family of four whose earnings are less than \$3,000 cannot stand any further taxation if the wage-earner is to maintain his health for productive efficiency. The Heller Committee for Research in Social Economics at the University of California found that a budget providing the "standard health, decency and moral well being" of a wage-earner's family in San Francisco costs \$2,991.79, at March, 1943* price levels, calling for the following expenditures:

Taxes	\$334.23
War bonds (10% of income)	300.00
Food	916.85
Clothing	256.67
Housing (rent & water)	408.00
House operation	115.97
Furnishings	15.75
Medical care	179.00
Life insurance premiums.....	113.00
Recreation	48.00
Miscellaneous	304.32

Total Budget \$2,991.79

The coalition's tax program would leave the \$3,000 needed by a worker's family of four untouched by further taxation. And this figure corresponds to the fair share of the existing supply of goods and services each civilian is entitled to. It is estimated that the total outlay in 1943 for all goods and services will amount to \$90,600,000,000—or an average of \$700 per individual. The coalition's program is consistent with wartime needs and supplies.

To bring the Treasury program into line with the coalition's program, adequate exemptions of \$750, \$1,500 and \$400 must be provided; excise taxes on cigarettes, movies and other items used by the low-income workers must be eliminated; and corporation and excess-profits taxes must be increased.

Action of the Ways and Means Committee

The House Ways and Means Committee, by a 16 to 8 vote, has decided to scrap the individual income -tax proposals of the Treasury. Although the Committee technically repealed the "Victory" tax, the oppressive burden is continued by raising the normal tax rate from 6 to 10 per cent, which together with the initial surtax rate of 13 per cent, makes the total 23 per cent on the income above existing exemptions (\$500 for single persons, \$1,200 for married persons, and \$350 for each dependent). Family heads with incomes below these specified exemp-

* Since March, 1943, the cost of living the country over has gone up about 2 per cent and if we include the hidden costs, due to the deterioration of quality and the prevalence of black market prices, it has risen by possibly 5 per cent.

tions will have to pay a minimum tax of 3 per cent of their net income in excess of \$700 plus \$100 for each dependent. Thus a married man with no children, earning \$1,200 a year, will pay the minimum tax of 3 per cent on \$500 (\$1,200 minus \$700), i.e., a tax of \$15, which is the net amount he would pay under the "Victory" tax. A married man with 2 children earning \$1,900 would pay the minimum tax of \$30—3 per cent on \$1,000 (\$1,900 minus \$700, minus \$200 for 2 dependents).

The Committee voted to reject the Treasury's recommendation of a \$400,000,000 increase in estate and gift taxes. It also rejected the Treasury's proposal to raise \$1,100,000,000 by increasing the corporation income-tax rate from 40 to 50 per cent. It voted, however, to raise an additional \$616,000,000 from corporations by increasing the excess-profits tax rate from 90 to 95 per cent, and reducing the credit-exemption for invested capital. It retained, however, the formula of present law by which not more than 80 per cent of profits is taken all together in normal, surtax and excess-profits taxes. And it left unchanged the average-earnings method of computing excess profits so that corporations with large pre-war earnings continue to avoid their fair share of the excess-profits tax.

The Committee has tentatively approved an excise tax schedule to yield \$1,439,000,000 in new revenues by imposing higher taxes on liquor, wines, beer, jewelry, furs, luggage, admissions, toilet preparations, telephone, telegraph, transportation, electric light bulbs, and levying a

new tax on pari-mutuel race wagers, and increasing postal rates. It did not approve increases in tobacco taxes, nor did it adopt the Treasury's proposal to tax soft drinks, candy and chewing gum. In the face of vigorous opposition, the Committee turned down a general sales tax.

The strategy of the unholy alliance of poll-tax Democrats and die-hard Republicans is to choke off ability-to-pay sources (increased taxes on individual incomes, corporate profits, large inheritances) and thereby blackmail the Administration into accepting the vicious sales tax as the "only remaining source" for raising additional revenue.

Vital Statistics

Because of the widespread deception energetically propagated by spokesmen for business and representatives of high incomes that it is necessary to siphon off, by sales taxes and heavy income taxes, the incomes of the low-income groups, it is important to be armed with pertinent data, so as to expose the fallacious arguments advanced.

O.P.A. statistics* show that 62 per cent of the nation's families having incomes under \$2,500 received in 1942 only 30 per cent of the total family income (\$27.7 billion out of \$93.3 billion) and bought less than 40 per cent of the country's goods and services (\$25.5 billion out of \$65 billion). This shows that the great mass of the

* Source of the data relating to national income, spendings and savings: "Civilian Spending and Saving, 1941 and 1942, O.P.A., Division of Research, Consumer Income and Demand Branch.

people do *not* receive the mass incomes and do *not* have the mass purchasing power. Strikingly enough, 38 per cent of the nation's families with incomes above \$2,500 received 70 per cent of the total family income (\$65.6 billion out of \$93.3 billion) and made more than 60 per cent of the total purchases.

As a justification for heavier taxation of the masses, soak-the-poor exponents have seized upon Secretary Morgenthau's statement that: "Today, four-fifths of all the income of the nation is going to people earning less than five thousand dollars a year." The statement is but half-truth and, in its effect, misleading. The crucial question, however, is how is the income distributed and how many individuals

enjoy comfortable and large incomes.

Treasury statistics* for 1942 *net* incomes (*after* statutory deductions allowed from gross income) show that those with net incomes below \$5,000 constituted 95 per cent of the total taxpayers subject to the regular income tax; namely, 25,634 out of a total of 26,900. Thus 95 per cent of the income-taxpayers had 76 per cent of the aggregate net income (\$45.9 billion out of a total of \$60.4 billion), or, stated otherwise, 76 per cent of the net income of the nation was going to tax payers earning less than \$5,000 a year. This is in line essentially with Secretary Morgenthau's statement as to the distribution of 1943 incomes.

Now, the breakdown shown below

Net-income Classes	Number of taxpayers	% of Total	Net Income (in millions)	% of Total
Under \$1,000	4,257,000	15.8	\$2,697	4.5
\$1,000 to \$2,000	12,647,000	47.0	18,907	31.3
\$2,000 to \$3,000	6,031,000	22.4	14,327	23.7
\$3,000 to \$4,000	1,893,000	7.0	6,453	10.7
\$4,000 to \$5,000	806,000	3.0	3,517	5.8
<hr/>				
Total under \$5,000	25,634,000	95.2	45,902	76.0
\$5,000 to \$10,000	881,000	3.3	5,751	9.5
Over \$10,000	385,000	1.5	8,767	14.5
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Total	26,900,000	100.0	60,420	100.0

of the Treasury statistics on 1942 net incomes demonstrates that the great masses of the population do not enjoy the mass incomes which rest, in fact, in the upper brackets:

This shows the alarming fact that less than 5 per cent of the taxpayers (those above \$5,000) receive 24 per

cent of the total net income. The great mass of the taxpayers with net incomes below \$3,000, who comprise 85 per cent of the total taxpayers, receive only 59.5 per cent of the aggregate net income; while 15

* Hearings before Senate Finance Committee on Revenue Act of 1942, Vol. I, p. 57.

per cent of the taxpayers with incomes above \$3,000 receive 40 per cent of the total. It is the latter group which enjoys "excess" incomes and "excess" purchasing power—it is these incomes which possess ability to pay higher taxes, not the families with incomes below \$3,000. The proof is that 88 per cent of the aggregate savings made by individuals in 1942 was made by families and single consumers above the \$2,500 income level. These higher-income groups saved \$22.4 billion out of the total of \$25.4 billion. These are the funds which make up the so-called "inflationary gap." If the *inflationary gap* must

be closed, as is so often urged, then the "excess" incomes of these higher income groups must be taxed.

Profits, Taxes and Dividends of Corporations

The statistics on corporate profits and corporate taxes demonstrate that business has profited richly from the war effort, that existing income and excess-profits taxes have thus far been ineffective in preventing swollen corporate earnings. The table below shows official statistics* of profits, taxes and dividends of corporations for the years 1939-43 (amounts in millions of dollars).

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Net profits, before taxes	5,272	7,327	14,300	20,100	22,200
Income tax	1,216	2,144	3,750	4,300	4,500
Excess profits tax	16	405	3,450	7,450	8,950
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Total taxes	1,232	2,549	7,200	11,750	13,450
Profits, after taxes	4,040	4,778	7,100	8,350	8,750
Net dividends paid	3,841	4,068	4,500	4,100	4,000
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Net profits retained	199	710	2,600	4,250	4,750

Thus, net profits, *before* taxes, have skyrocketed in the war period; net profits, *after* taxes, have risen steady, despite the added taxes imposed. Finally, net profits retained, after the payment of dividends, have shot up in leaps and bounds. This overflowing pool of profits is the clearest evidence that more effective excess-profits taxation and higher income taxes are justified.

Inflationary Effects of a Sales Tax

In addition to the utter unfairness of the sales tax, the imposition of

such a tax would seriously disturb our entire stabilization program. A general sales tax, more than any other tax, produces an irresistible drive for higher wages and higher farm prices. It enters directly into the cost of living of all workers and into the index of prices paid by farmers which underlies farm parity prices.

* Testimony of Randolph E. Paul, General Counsel of the Treasury Department, at Hearings on Renegotiation of War Contracts, Ways and Means Committee, Part 2, pages 211-2 (Sept. 10, 1943).

Price ceilings would be seriously damaged since the sales tax would enter into industrial, agricultural and commercial costs. Directly or indirectly, the ceiling prices and support prices (prices guaranteed by the Government to farmers) of most farm products are linked to farm parity prices.

Statistics of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics show that, if a 10 per cent sales tax had become effective July 1, 1943, there would have been an average increase of 6 per cent in retail food prices during 1944. This increase, added to a 10 per cent tax on food sales, would raise food costs by approximately 16 per cent. A sales tax is *inflationary, not anti-inflationary*, for it increases living costs by direct price increases and by indirect tax-induced increases in food prices, as well as developing inflationary forces by the mutual interaction of price and wage increases. A sales tax would fan the fires of inflation and upset the stabilization program.

The Tasks Ahead

The central task is to see that the

new revenue act is fashioned so as to strengthen the unity of our people, to mobilize the maximum production of tanks, planes, ships and war material necessary to speed the launching of the Western offensive into the heart of Festung Europa.

The coalition's 9-point program points the way. The Treasury's program, modified in the direction of the proposals here presented, must be hammered into the statute books. If this kind of program is to be made into an actuality, the same kind of unified movement that drew up the coalition's program must be started in every community in the land. Labor political committees, legislative committees, consumer groups and all others must be alert and aggressive at every moment, demanding the defeat of the sales tax and the adoption of a democratic win-the-war tax program. Such a program can be enacted only by the most active mobilization of all sections of the population. The tax program must be welded into a weapon to speed the offensive—it must be forged into a powerful instrument for victory.

PROBLEMS OF WAR MANPOWER

BY GEORGE MORRIS

MANPOWER is now being whipped up into the most significant domestic issue, with a major fight looming around a National Service Act. The real question is whether reactionary interests can so persuade certain win-the-war interests that labor shortages are so acute as to require the drastic remedy of the so-called "labor draft." Unfortunately, planlessness and weaknesses on the part of the administration, coupled with groups within the administration that favor such legislation, make national service legislation more than a possibility. Only thorough understanding of the issues involved and a strong fight by labor can forestall such drastic and unwise legislation.

Unused Reserves of Labor

What is the problem? First, it is alleged that labor shortages are responsible for many war plants and whole war industries being behind schedule. Second, it is said that labor is refusing to make the necessary shifts into the required industries or plants. Third, there is much bewailing of so-called "absenteeism" and labor turnover. Shortages are said to be delaying shipbuilding, airplanes on the West Coast and

interfering with the output of metal mines and lumber. Bernard Baruch, in his recent report to War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes, quotes War Manpower Commission estimates that 500,000 additional workers are needed on the West Coast during the next six months, of whom only 240,000 can be recruited locally.

What are the facts? Some are simple, some complex, and involve a consideration of the whole war program. First, it is true that there are some plants with labor shortages, even some areas, possibly an industry as a whole. But the important thing is that alongside these labor shortage areas are labor surplus areas, where labor is being hoarded, or where labor is available but no adequate measures have been taken to recruit labor. And even in the labor shortage areas, labor is not fully utilized. And above all, no national service legislation can affect the problems of absenteeism and in many instances, turnover, unless measures which are already available are put into effect.

There is one fundamental fact which has so far been obscured in the discussion of national service legislation. That is that, overall, the

war production picture is good, that production rates are still moving up, even in the critical areas like planes and ships; moreover, that the war production schedules are being drastically overhauled, cut far below previous schedules in many items, and thus will release many workers in some industries, plants and areas, while other are clamoring for more workers.

This is fundamental to any approach to the manpower problem at present. Let us see what it means. In effect there is a good deal of complacency about war production schedules, despite published reports to the contrary. This complacency is evident in the lack of managerial "push" and drive, in the similar lack of drive in the ordnance district offices to get out even greater production. In part this proceeds from well-earned satisfaction that the production program is proceeding well. But for the major part it reflects inadequacies of strategy which have so far failed to make use of the terrific production of American war industry. To put it briefly, the lack of a large-scale offensive in Europe means that procurement officials feel no pressure to turn out more goods; that, in turn, manufacturers feel no drive to get the greatest output; and that, in general, there is a wide gap between the theoretical goals of war production set by the President in the light of fighting strategy and the actual goals felt to be practicable and workable by ordnance officers and plant managers.

These cuts in the program, this gap between theoretical and actual

production goals, must be kept in mind in all of the following analysis. What must also be borne in mind is that all estimates of labor needs and manpower shortages are fairly one-sided; they come from plant management, are not independently checked with the unions involved and by the War Manpower Commission, but are accepted as gospel thereafter.

New England, parts of the Middle West, the tool and die and naval and arms construction industries, are already beginning to feel the cuts in the program. What happens? Men are released from plants. Perhaps plants nearby, 50 to 100 miles away, are in need of men. Does any agency act to provide these men with transportation for themselves and their families to move to the new plants? Not at all. The closed-down plants remain closed down, the men are idle, while 100 miles away plant managers wire furiously to Washington about a labor shortage.

Thus, labor "shortages" will exist even when the program is very drastically cut down. If coordination and planning of manpower distribution were important in earlier stages of the war, they are doubly important today when layoffs due to tapering off of orders or changeovers to arms production confront us while in other fields of war production the demand is stepped up.

An estimate of manpower needs was recently published by the Department of Labor on the basis of a joint statement issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the War Manpower Commission. A min-

imum of 4,000,000 persons must be added to the armed services and arms industries between the period of last July, 1943, and July, 1944. Of this number, about 2,000,000 were scheduled for the armed services. One source of this supply was put first on an expected shift-over of 2,600,000 workers from civilian supply industries where a cutdown or complete elimination of raw materials is expected to force discontinuance of production or services.

The estimated need of additional labor supply is lower than the number of workers that transferred to essential war production during the previous year. But the difficulty, according to the survey, has increased because the labor shortages are concentrated in local areas where there is already a tight labor market and a shortage of housing and essential civilian services. Also, a large number of the persons available for war production have already been absorbed in munitions industries.

But the same survey which appeared in the August issue of the *Monthly Labor Review*, also observed that plant efficiency and manpower training have advanced to a point that labor utilization is at a much higher level and will continue to mount. The survey concludes that "a manpower program to meet next year's problem must emphasize intensive and selective measures." This involves a combination of fuller utilization of Negroes and women and such labor reserves in the shortage areas; greater emphasis on upgrading; greater

effort to improve civilian requirement in war production centers so as to make them attractive to incoming workers; more effort to spread war work to areas where labor supply is available.

Industry (and agriculture) is still using labor very wastefully. It is still trying to hang onto reserves of labor for individual plants and for individual areas and industries. Consider agriculture, the worst offender in labor hoarding. Roughly 1.5 million farm workers could be spared for jobs elsewhere. Nearly one-third of these—450,000, according to the U. S. Department of Agriculture—live in the five states of Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky. No real attempt has ever been made to mobilize these workers for war production. On the contrary, the Tydings amendment to the Selective Service Law, which requires local boards to defer farm workers, has tended to hold many more workers in rural areas than are actually needed and has pulled away from war jobs thousands more. Other recent legislation, including some which borders on legalized peonage, passed at the insistence of the large agriculturalists, further tends to freeze workers in rural areas.

A couple of illustrations will show another type of hoarding. In the Port of New York, and in all east coast ports, longshoremen are still hired by the old shape-up system. They shape at each pier every morning without knowing whether they will get jobs or not. If they are not hired on a particular day it is too late to go to another pier.

Meanwhile, there may not be enough men shaping at other piers. Thus, by insisting on preserving their own labor reserves, the stevedoring companies are preventing a general pooling of labor, such as exists in San Francisco and other West Coast ports. There the longshoremen are fully utilized. Here, of course, we must also observe the difference between a union led by Harry Bridges and a union by "King" Joseph P. Ryan.

Whenever battle experience requires a drastic change in airplane design, there may be a period as long as two or three months during which the changeover takes place. Meanwhile, many of the workers are idle. But the plant cannot afford to let these workers go; it will need them when it gets into production on the new model. Yet, no effort has been made by the companies or by the government to establish a pool of labor covering all the companies in a given area. Adoption of the pool idea in Los Angeles would go a long way toward solving the shortages reported in these plants.

These are simply illustrations. Everywhere the picture is the same. There are surpluses of labor scattered all over the country, and in practically all industries. Nobody can estimate how many workers are idle in these surpluses at any one time, but the number must run into several millions. This is the first thing to keep in mind about the manpower situation. *There are still large unused reserves of labor* which could be tapped if the government and industry were willing

to take the necessary steps. However, the official manpower agencies of the government, including the Byrnes office and the War Manpower Commission, give little emphasis to this.

Weakness in Developing a Manpower Policy

The second point to keep in mind is that right up to the present time *the War Manpower Commission has shown some serious weaknesses in developing a manpower policy and program.* In six important respects, manpower has been badly handled. The reason, of course, is not so much that the government is inefficient, as that it is subjected to pressures from industry, business and agriculture which serve to perpetuate, often because of post-war considerations, business-as-usual policies which hinder the war effort.

One early blunder was the failure to plan distribution of war contracts so as best to utilize available labor supplies. Plant facilities were crowded into certain areas far beyond the limitations of the resident labor supply and beyond the capacities of local housing, transportation or recreation facilities. The result has been an enormous migration of workers to the war centers, over-crowding, ill health and the consequent high turnover.

A second failure has grown out of unwillingness to step on certain industrial toes. Conversion of less essential industry to the production of war material has been secondary to the building of enormous new plants. The big companies have ac-

quired, or will acquire after the war, new up-to-date facilities. While these were building we might have been producing war goods in plants converted from peace-time uses. In Great Britain the production of civilian goods has been concentrated, in many industries, in a small number of plants, the remainder—and their personnel—have been shifted over to war production. In this country the output of civilian goods has been cut much less severely, with the result that there are many thousands of workers producing things which we do not really need in war-time.

Thirdly, the government's wage policy has been misdirected. It has been aimed at holding down wage rates, instead of at directing labor to the areas of greatest need. Wages have been relatively high in ship-building and aircraft manufacture, chiefly because those industries were in stride earlier, before restrictions upon wage increases took effect. These industries, consequently, have been able to build up their labor forces at a rapid rate. But other industries, hardly less important, have been losing workers simply because wages were so seriously out of line. The situation in non-ferrous metal mining is typical. Everything has been done in this industry to build up the labor force, including the release of men from the army—everything except the one obvious step of substantially increasing wages to make the job attractive. That this is the key was apparent nearly a year ago when increases beyond the "Little Steel" formula were granted to non-fer-

rous metal workers. But the increase was upon such extremely low wages that it was still far from adequate. Freezing workers in such low-wage industries is now being thought "necessary." Adequate wage adjustments would too seriously "upset the existing wage structure." This means that Anaconda and other big employers do not want to be stuck with high wage scales after the war.

A fourth respect in which government policy has been deficient has been the failure to develop a sound procedure for occupational deferment. The present hullabaloo about drafting fathers, the issue out of which Senator Wheeler and other anti-Administration Congressmen are making so much capital, could never have arisen if the Selective Service System had from the first adopted a draft program which recognized on the one hand the basic necessity of maintaining war production and on the other the equal necessity of replacing as rapidly as possible draft-age men with women and older men. In this respect, too, Great Britain has done a far better job than we have.

Fifth, the government has failed to create a single agency charged with responsibility for the whole manpower problem and possessed of the authority to take the necessary steps. Mr. Baruch, in his recent report, was forced to admit that "proper handling of manpower has been made impossible by the failure of government agencies to work as a team with a clearly defined program." Labor hailed the establishment of the Office of War Mo-

bilization, and Mr. Byrnes' appointment to head it, as a step toward the coordination of manpower agencies which such progressive committees as the Tolan and Kilgore committees have been urging. But Mr. Baruch's report, addressed to Mr. Byrnes, shows how badly the new Office has failed to fulfill expectations.

Finally, very little emphasis has been put upon the necessity for taking all possible measures to force industry and agriculture to make the most efficient utilization of existing labor resources. The influence of the agricultural lobby in holding an enormous excess of workers in agriculture has already been pointed out. But in industry, too, every worker knows that there is a tremendous amount of water that could be squeezed out. Plants are hanging onto workers because they expect they will need them sometime in the future.

Reaction Wants a National Service Act

These facts are being used by the reactionaries to argue that it is time to adopt National Service legislation. The argument runs: war production is falling behind schedule because of manpower shortages; industry has done everything in its power to recruit the needed workers; existing government agencies are powerless to do anything effective to correct the situation; therefore, we must have National Service to compel every adult man and woman to take and keep the job where he is most needed.

Two analogies are used to

strengthen the argument: workers are being drafted into the armed services, why not into industry? And, Great Britain has adopted National Service, why shouldn't we? In answer to the first, it is not enough to point out that working for a private corporation is quite different from working for the United States Army or Navy. There is a major difference, of course, but labor's no-strike pledge demonstrates that in wartime the difference must be minimized. The real point is that National Service is not necessary and that its adoption now would represent a victory for anti-labor forces. The same interests, in Congress and outside, which have obstructed the positive measures necessary to a thoroughgoing mobilization of labor, are lined up in favor of the Austin-Wadsworth Bill, the current proposal for National Service.

The very language of that bill indicates the chief reason why anti-labor forces are so enthusiastic for it. They are more attracted by its anti-union possibilities and the great power an employer could wield through it against union security, seniority, and like provisions, and, above all, by the possibility it offers to replace higher paid workers with cheaply-paid labor.

Labor is unanimous in resisting the bill because it senses it as a doorway to reaction. It recognizes that its duty to the millions of workers in the armed services is to maintain free labor, for only free labor can play the important democratic role that is expected from it in the war effort. More-

over, as is becoming increasingly apparent, reaction wants a National Service act as a measure that will weaken labor and its influence for the post-war period.

In Great Britain, National Service legislation was adopted as a necessary win-the-war measure, not a reactionary measure. It was therefore supported by labor. It was adopted as the capstone to a manpower program, not as a substitute for a program, as in the case here. Great Britain had a competent and efficient national employment service, a flexible wage policy, coordination of government agencies in the handling of manpower problems, a sound draft policy, and a settled policy of adequate labor representation. None of these prerequisites is present here.

The third point to keep in mind about the manpower situation is that *the failure thus far to mobilize the country's manpower effectively leaves the door open to those who are on the lookout for any opportunity to attack labor*. National Service is upon us unless labor organizes to stop it.

Estimates of "Labor Shortages"

There is an important point to be borne in mind about labor shortages. All of the estimates of so-called "labor shortages" are made by employers and are not critically examined by any of the governmental agencies which have supervision of the manpower problem. This uncritical acceptance of one-sided figures is one of the basic defects of all of the immediate proposals now being worked out by the

War Manpower Commission to solve the manpower problem, such as the Buffalo Plan and the present West Coast Plan. In effect these plans set up a priority of jobs in an area. The West Coast Plan also sets up a priority of factories, based on a priority of end-products. That is, it makes a list of the most important products being made in the area in the order of their importance. The West Coast Plan then translates this list of manufactured products into a list of the most important jobs being performed on these products in which there are labor shortages. Workers are not permitted to transfer from more important jobs or more important products to less important jobs and less important products even if wage rates on the less important jobs are higher. All transfers are made through the Employment Service which refers workers to the factory seeking them.

In essence this is really a job freeze. No transfers are permitted unless they are controlled by this complicated system of priorities. Such a plan would work if two things were true: (1) if the system of priorities actually meant something, and (2) if a real attempt were made to check on how accurate the estimates of labor requirements were. In none of the plans now in existence is either of these two principles true. In order to have an effective system of priorities, one agency must decide and must have the power to enforce its decisions as to which products are most important, which factories are most important, and which products

even within factories are most important. As a matter of fact, consider what is happening on the Pacific Coast at the moment. Is it conceivable that the Maritime Commission, which is building ships, will be willing to admit that its merchant shipping construction program in the shipyards in California, Oregon and Washington, is less important than the building of airplanes in the West Coast airframe plants? To go further, is it conceivable that the aircraft manufacturers will admit that the continued building of a relatively obsolete plane is less important than the building of transport vessels or cargo ships? Further, is it conceivable that a small parts maker will be considered more important than a large aircraft manufacturer or builder who is wastefully using large parts of his labor supply? The truth is that no single agency exists which is willing to exercise the power to enforce priorities in a strict and methodical way.

The second "bug," which is closely related to the first, is perhaps even more important. That is, even assuming that there is complete agreement on priorities of end-products, of plants and of occupations, why should there be an uncritical acceptance of the manpower requirements of any plant? A typical instance of such uncritical acceptance is the following: An aircraft employer needs five workers. He may request the Employment Service Office for ten, twenty, or even fifty workers, principally because he wants to exercise some selectivity. To compound this wastefulness, the Employment

Service may have to refer to the employer in question a hundred workers before he will hire the five he actually needs.

It is important to stress that the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board both have the right and the power to send so-called labor utilization inspectors into the plant to determine whether labor is actually being used to the full and, second, to determine exactly what the labor requirements of any particular employer are. However, neither agency is willing to exercise this power. The War Production Board in effect, and particularly its Labor Production Division and Manpower Division, both of which are under labor control, have played an exceedingly small part in the whole manpower picture. And the War Production Board in effect is afraid to enter plants and make definitive studies of actual manpower requirements. The War Manpower Commission, which has the power to set up labor utilization inspectors, is similarly fearful of sending these inspectors into plants to check on the validity of claims of labor shortages. The idea of labor utilization inspectors comes from the Tolan Committee; but, essentially, it still is little more than an idea.

There is one other important aspect to the problem that must be taken into account. Our war strategy and the general war picture as the average worker sees it have much to do with his output (which can be translated in terms of manpower) or his willingness to transfer to essential production.

We are already aware of the effect that the defeatist-inspired "the-war's-in-the-bag" propaganda, has had upon production and the light-mindedness it induces to the no-strike pledge. It is this very atmosphere that causes people to hang on as long as possible to their present non-essential jobs on the assumption that perhaps they will not have to dislocate their economic life after all.

The marking time as regards an all-out offensive in Western Europe and the absence of the effects of the full weight of the war are another reason for the lack of that emergency feeling that is needed to bring production up to higher levels. And when we speak of manpower we mean production, because a 10% rise in production with the same manpower actually cuts down manpower needs by that percentage.

As recently as September 15, War Manpower Commission Chairman Paul V. McNutt told the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate that there is really no labor shortage. At the same time, his committee's experts revealed that better utilization of labor could speed production by better than 25 per cent. It is this aspect of the problem that has not been really tackled. What is more, the progress in utilization that has been made is often offset by the loss of efficiency, because employers persist in anti-labor practices and provocations that cause much resentment among workers. Labor-management cooperation gives way to labor-management friction.

The mechanical application of

wage restrictions is another factor. We have already pointed out that wages have much to do with the direction in which labor power will move. Incentive wages can go far in advancing the utilization of labor and controlling its turnover. It is true that fear among workers that incentives mean a return to the much-hated days of uncontrolled piece work and speedup for profits is one big reason for slowness in introduction of incentives. But it is the profits-as-usual attitude of the employers, and their persistence in taking those speed-up schemes of the past as a pattern, that encourages this fear among the workers. The "5 per cent wage raise for 10 per cent output increase" plan recently adopted by Grumann Aircraft Corporation, where there is no union, is one example. A willingness by employers to give a union an equal share in control of an incentive plan, and a wage reward proportionate with the production increase, would go a long way in allaying the fear of incentives. It would go a long way in dispensing with additional manpower needs.

Toward a Positive Manpower Program

In our summary of programs and views on the manpower situation, we have them roughly divided into those aiming to meet constructively the real difficulties facing the country and those that would exploit the difficulties for anti-labor purposes, partisan politics, or as reason to bring military policies into civilian life and economy.

For labor it is not sufficient merely to criticize the wrong way of meeting the manpower problem. The trade unions must recognize the real danger that exists in the efforts of labor draft advocates. To defeat this danger and advance a constructive manpower policy, labor is duty-bound to press actively for the practical measures that will answer the need. Above all, labor should stress its manpower program as the most effective from the viewpoint of the entire country and its interest in an early victory.

A positive manpower program should hold in view:

1. Greater labor participation. This should be concrete and specific in every phase of the manpower program from the top to the very plants. The Plant Labor management committees should be converted into labor utilization committees, with power to study and enforce measures of greater and more efficient labor utilization. Machinery for labor utilization by itself solves no problems. Thus, the United Automobile Workers request for a labor man to head the War Manpower Commission is of no avail without a positive program of action for the immediate situation.

2. The key to immediate labor shortages is more efficient labor utilization. This means breaking down the reservoir of labor in agriculture, doing away with the Tydings and Pace amendments tying labor to counties. It means intensifying labor utilization in the plants; productivity varies widely between efficient and less efficient shipyards

and airplane factories. Pools of unconverted labor must be drawn on from such spheres as insurance, finance and service. Provisions must be made, however, for their transfer. Excess labor exists because of inefficient hiring practices, such as the outmoded shape-up in East Coast longshore. Hours of work could be increased, accompanied by a guaranteed work week. More skillful recruitment, particularly of women, is needed. Barriers to employment of Negroes and other minority groups must be broken down and these regulations enforced.

3. The wage policy must be overhauled. The disparity between wages in the same locality must be leveled off. Labor-management plans of incentives should be introduced where possible. There still exist low wage industries and employments in war industry which discourage new employment. Particularly, a priorities program, either with or without formal National Service legislation, without an adequate wage program, would force workers from higher paying into lower paying jobs and must be avoided.

4. Labor turnover and absenteeism can be cut down if the stated measures are taken and if much attention is given to improvements in especially the labor shortage areas, such as establishment of child-care centers, better marketing, school, health, housing, transportation, feeding facilities, and by strict enforcement of price ceilings which are scandalously disregarded in the tight labor districts.

PROBLEMS OF LABOR IN MASSACHUSETTS

BY FANNY HARTMAN

AFTER getting off to a slow start as compared with other states, conservative Massachusetts has at last become a war industry state. The influence of certain reactionary Big Business Republicans and Farley Democrats, opposed to the country's war effort, and the traditional prejudice against change by old entrenched financial and industrial interests, tended to retard expansion and conversion of industry to war production. Only in the past twelve-month, with the economic and political pressure caused by the progress of the war, has there been real expansion. For the first time since Pearl Harbor, Massachusetts, last October and November, received the highest war orders in the country, both in volume and dollar value.

The textile and shoe industries, long dominant in the economic life of the state, still play an important role. The woolen and cotton mills of Lawrence, New Bedford, Fall River and the Blackstone Valley are working full capacity filling army orders. But the greatest expansion has taken place in the shipyard, metal-electrical, precision instrument, rubber, and ordinance industries. New England is building

15 per cent of the total number of ships built in the entire country. In Greater Boston alone there are some 95,000 shipyard workers, and along the coast from Maine to Connecticut close to 200,000. Similar expansion has taken place in the other war industries.

This change to a war economy has had its impact on every industrial city, small-town and farming community—breaking through time-worn customs and prejudices, uprooting whole areas, bringing changes in political thinking.

The sudden demands for manpower caused by the new and expanded war industries and the need to replace men taken by the draft found the state completely unprepared. There was no organized planning to meet the emergency. Serious dislocations occurred. Industrial areas like Springfield and New Bedford were declared critical. Farms were left abandoned for better paying jobs in the shipyards and electrical plants. The low-paying garment trades were so seriously drained that a freezing of workers to the jobs was declared. Workers from non-essential occupations, department store clerks, tradesmen, laundry workers, build-

ing trades workers, etc., flocked into the war industries.

The increase in the number of women employed in these war industries has been significant. Although prior to the war the employment of women had been prevalent in the textile industry, the hiring of women in direct war production is increasing steadily. According to a recent report by the regional director of the United States Employment Service, a number of communities in Massachusetts now employ more women than men, and the trend will continue upwards as draftees are replaced. In all textile mills women now constitute over 50 per cent of the total number of employees, and in the electrical, precision instrument, and ordinance plants from 25 to 40 per cent.

The youth, also, are rapidly being absorbed into these war industries. Barriers have been let down on the 18-year minimum age requirement, and now 16 to 18-year-olds are hired directly from the public schools. In the new Bethlehem-Mingham shipyard, for example, six thousand such young people are employed. There is a greater degree of hiring of Negroes, although discrimination is still rampant as regards advancement to skilled jobs, with special discrimination against Negro women, who are shunted to unskilled and domestic work.

* * *

The pressing complex social problems arising out of the shift to a war economy cry for solution in

order fully to involve the people in the war effort. Lack of centralized planning manifests itself in the shipyards, for instance, in a wastage of manpower, and on the farms, in a drainage of farm labor into industry and the armed forces, with the resultant threat of a shortage of milk. Layoffs and a return to the 40-hour week are rife in the machine tool industry where war orders are near completion, while textile mills clamor for help. Wide disparity in wage standards exists. Economic grievances pile up, with profits-as-usual employers taking advantage of the war needs. The result is frequent shifting of jobs, retarded production rates, lowering of morale.

The weakening of price control and rationing through Congressional sabotage and the black market, food shortages (such as meat for workers in heavy industry) plague the people. Inadequate health safeguards and child-care facilities increase the rate of absenteeism among women. In the absence of organized sport, recreational and cultural activities as outlets for tension and over-crowdedness, there is a rise in alcoholism, juvenile delinquency, and venereal disease.

All these factors tend to dissipate the energies of the people and hamper their full involvement in the war effort.

And fifth columnists, Christian Fronters, defeatist Republicans and anti-Roosevelt Democrats are quick to make capital of these home front problems. "Blame the Communists; blame the Russians and the English; blame the Jews and

the Negroes; blame the unions; blame the Administration's war program"—these are the treasonable slogans used by these defeatists to undermine the war effort and create chaos and disruption.

John L. Lewis is praised by reactionary politicians and company union stooges alike as the "militant labor leader," while stoppages, as in the Fall River Shipyard, are deliberately provoked in order to hamper the war effort and crush the labor movement. Reactionary Congressmen like Joe Martin, Republican minority leader in the House of Representatives, piously sympathize with the grievances of their constituents at home, and blame Roosevelt. In Washington these same gentlemen proceed to vote against every Administration measure offered to solve these home front problems—the O.P.A., the subsidy program, etc.

The defeatists concentrate especially on the thousands of workers new to industry, playing upon their lack of experience in, or even contact with, the labor movement. Only a small percentage of the workers have been previously in labor unions; of the rest many come into industry with prejudices, anti-trade union bias, and political backwardness.

The problems of these new working class sections represents a real challenge to the organized labor movement. This challenge can be met by advancing a correct program that relates the economic needs of these workers to the drive for the successful prosecution of the war; tying wage increases to in-

creased production; supporting the economic stabilization program of the President; exposing the fifth columnists, etc. Organized on the basis of such a program, these thousands of new workers would add new vitality and strength to the labor movement and would strengthen the whole win-the-war camp in our state and country.

* * *

New forms and new organizational methods are necessary to overcome such obstacles as inability to attend meetings due to transportation problems; shyness and absorption in home duties which deter women from participating in union affairs; isolation of the night shift workers from the other workers due to hours of employment. Concern should be had for the needs of the young workers for sport, recreational, and cultural expression.

Concrete experiences point to the success of new organizational forms. The C.I.O. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, for example, is developing neighborhood and community as well as department organizing committees, to reach the widely dispersed shipyard workers of Hingham and Fall River. They have also initiated a system of junior shop stewards as a means of organizing the youngsters for solving specific grievances. Dances for service men under auspices of the United Electrical and Radio Workers Union have successfully appealed to the young girls in the electrical plants. Special dances, bowling and baseball teams

bring closer the second shift workers. Shop and neighborhood campaigns around price control and rationing, child care centers, attract the women.

Where unions have followed such correct programs, real results can be seen. Education of the union membership, new and old, has brought greater and more conscious participation in the war effort. The unions have become recognized political factors and begin to influence the political direction of whole communities.

These new war workers, when organized around a win-the-war program, learn and react quickly to political events. In Salem a plant of 1,400 young girls was recently organized, not so much on the issue of wages, since the company had for many years practiced a benevolent paternalism, but around increased production, dances for servicemen, etc. Only a few months ago these young girls showed little interest in political affairs; today, they enthusiastically sent greetings to the Soviet Union on the second anniversary of its liberation war. The recently organized shipyard workers of East Boston, which for years has been dominated by corrupt Democratic politicians, condemned the Boston City Council's vote to ban the film *Mission to Moscow* as an act of disloyalty to our government and the Allied Nations.* The membership saw clearly the connection between

the vote of the local defeatist councilor on this issue and his lack of concern over the problems of the shipyard workers and the war. They proceeded to organize a community movement of the labor and civic organizations to elect a win-the-war candidate in this year's municipal elections.

These examples of new vitality of the labor unions and the consequently growing unity of whole communities around a win-the-war program contrast vividly with areas where there is no union organization or where trade unionism-as-usual prevails. A case in point is the town of Attleboro, home stamping ground of the infamous Joe Martin. There the open shop and company unionism prevail. Production standards are at a low ebb. Community participation in the war services is feeble. There is no organized force to counteract the vicious anti-Administration, anti-war activity of Martin's reactionary Republican machine.

The textile workers of Lawrence played an active role in the election campaign of pro-Administration Congressman Lane. Recently outstanding was the emergency conference on the Detroit anti-Negro riots, which was initiated by the state C.I.O. and embraced every important Negro organization in the state, the Salvation Army, the Office of Civilian Defense, women's organizations, as well as representatives of the Mayor of Boston and of the Governor. The adopted program of Racial Equality for Victory included the demand upon the Federal Gov-

* Responsive to the protests of labor and the patriotic forces generally, Mayor Tobin of Boston overruled the vote of the City Council and the film was shown.

ernment for routing the fifth columnists, Ku Kluxers, and for measures by city and state administrations to prevent any such occurrences in Massachusetts.

* * *

Yet, in view of the seriousness of the tasks for winning the war, the labor movement is still not fully conscious of its own potential strength, and its political work is still comparatively ineffective. In the A. F. of L. hardly any organizational drives are being conducted. Open defeatist forces agitate for a John L. Lewis position, while bureaucratic and narrow trade union practices of even pro-war officials hold back the union membership from participating fully in the war effort. Partisan jurisdictional disputes between the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. make possible such situations as in New Bedford, where the A. F. of L. threatens to foment strikes unless it receives recognition, after an election by textile workers gave the C.I.O. the majority. The Railroad Brotherhoods are almost completely isolated from the other sections of the labor movement and from the rest of the population.

The C.I.O., on the other hand, has been outstanding in its contribution to the war effort. The state C.I.O., under the leadership of Joseph Salerno, is firmly united around the program of the national C.I.O. and its president, Philip Murray. Excellent resolutions have been passed on the opening of the Second Front in Europe, on national and international labor unity,

in condemnation of John L. Lewis, for the defeat of the defeatists, in support of the Administration's stabilization program, etc.

But the main weakness is the inadequate extent of reaching the membership with these resolutions; of involving the membership in carrying them out; of popularizing them among the population as a whole. This weakness, for example, is partially responsible for Emil Rieve's maintaining his stranglehold over the textile workers, undermining the outstanding role of Sidney Hillman with Red-baiting, anti-Administration policies.

Thus, although a resolution in support of the C.I.O. program and in condemnation of John L. Lewis was passed by the state C.I.O., the steps taken to popularize the decisions were slow and inadequate. Few discussions, special leaflets to the shops, radio broadcasts fully explaining the traitorous role of John L. Lewis were organized. Newspapers were praising Lewis for his "militant" fight for the miners' strike. So-called and unnamed "public spirited citizens" were publishing full-page advertisements urging the support of the Smith-Connally Bill. But no real intensive campaign was organized to reach the public with the program of the C.I.O. to counteract this vicious anti-union propaganda and to bring pressure on Senators and Congressmen. The consequences are known.

The labor movement of Massachusetts as well as of the whole country has the imperative need of

quickly drawing the proper lessons of this setback and using those lessons to muster a new united determination and strength for victory. The State C.I.O. Council of Massachusetts unanimously endorsed the patriotic, responsible position taken by Phil Murray and William Green. This endorsement must become the enthusiastic expression of the entire labor movement. These lessons can serve to strengthen and consolidate the win-the-war forces in the A. F. of L.

The battle for the crucial 1944 elections is being fought now. The degree to which the labor movement works now in uniting the win-the-war camp in both the Democratic and Republican Parties will influence the results. The defeatist and reactionary forces are well organized in both parties. In the Democratic Party, the defeatist ex-Governor Ely is making his bid for control. In the Republican Par-

ty even Governor Saltonstall, who supports the foreign policy of the Administration, is limited by the partisan, narrow "states' rights" concept of conservative Republicanism.

The immediate responsibilities of the labor movement are well defined:

A bold, aggressive organization of the win-the-war forces around the program of holding the home front lines for the winning of the war. Organization of the unorganized around this program. Extension of A. F. of L.-C.I.O. unity from isolated communities to a state scale. Political organization of labor in communities; participation in the municipal election. Isolation of John L. Lewis and his stooges in the labor movement. Fullest participation of the membership in every phase of the war effort.

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