

# **TWENTY-EIGHT YEARS OF THE USSR**

**A special issue**

# **NEW MASSES**

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
**WHY THE CRISIS IN  
US-USSR RELATIONS**

**IS RUSSIA A DEMOCRACY**

**ARE EUROPE AND ASIA  
AGAINST RUSSIA**

**DOES OUR CULTURE  
CONFLICT WITH THEIRS**

**WHAT'S BEHIND THE  
RED ARMY**



**Answers by: JAMES S. ALLEN    HARRY F. WARD    ISIDOR SCHNEIDER**  
**SERGEI KOURNAKOFF    NORMAN EBERHARDT    ALFRED GOLDSMITH**  
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# *What Follows on this Page Is Strictly Not Scuttlebut . . . . .*

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## Where We Stand With Russia

*By James S. Allen*

**T**HERE is no use belaboring the point that American-Soviet relations, the core of the coalition peace, are at a critical stage. From the San Francisco Conference on the crisis grew from bad to worse. Since the death of President Roosevelt and the accession of Truman to the presidency, which coincided more or less with the end of the war, our foreign policy has struck a new note. It is precisely this new emphasis, associated with Truman and Byrnes, that lies at the root of the trouble. Arrogance at Washington is today the most disturbing factor in world affairs.

One of the main problems in fixing the nature of the present crisis is to determine the real root of that arrogance. Is it merely a passing phenomenon to be ascribed to the ineptitude and uncertainty of men suddenly raised to commanding positions? Does it represent a pose struck for the sake of a better bargain? Or does it arise from something more fundamental in the American position?

Undoubtedly the untimely death of President Roosevelt, occurring at the most delicate point of transition between the ending of the war and the beginning of the peace, served to hasten the shift in American policy. Roosevelt was a strong and commanding personality bound to progressive opinion at home and abroad by many commitments during his long term in office. Recognition of the Soviet Union during his first term, the anti-Munichite character of his policy, his role in welding the wartime coalition, his resistance to anti-Soviet tendencies within the country and among the Allies, and his cooperative approach towards world issues set a certain line and tone which were most helpful to the development of American-Soviet cooperation.

He was succeeded by a man apparently tied to the same commitments, having been associated intimately with the Roosevelt program in the Senate. Truman committed the country to the continuation of the policy laid down at Teheran and Yalta, and confirmed by

the popular mandate in 1944, when he signed the Potsdam Declaration. It is true that he was chosen as Roosevelt's running mate to appease the reactionary wing of the Democratic Party, turned fairly hysterical at the prospect of seeing Henry Wallace on the ticket. But let it be remembered that the labor and progressive movement accepted Truman only on the strength of his pro-Roosevelt policies.

Obviously the lesser stature of Truman as political leader and statesman has affected the caliber of administration performance. But the deterioration of our relations with the Soviet Union cannot be ascribed merely to ineptitude and to certain quirks in the President's personality. These are serious, but not decisive, factors. Over many years the American handling of foreign policy has been noted for provincialism, and the State Department, even under Roosevelt, was open to criticism for its proverbial lack of knowledge about foreign countries. Truman, it is true, lacks the vision and finesse of Roosevelt which made up for the frontier quality of American statesmanship.

It is also far off the mark to see anything unusual in the strong influence of Southern reactionaries upon the administration. Cordell Hull is also a Southerner of the conservative type, subscribing to the same basic views on democracy as James Byrnes. The composition of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee remains as it was under Roosevelt; in fact, some of the reactionary extremists were removed from Congress in 1944.

The domination of Congress by a coalition of reactionary Republicans and Democrats, with whom Truman is finding common ground, deserves more attention than can be given here. But one point needs to be stressed. During the election campaign of 1944, Hoover, Vandenberg, Taft and Dewey scored a victory when they succeeded in appropriating for their party the main planks of the administration foreign policy, while invariably adding their own sharp anti-Soviet innuendoes. The

goal of a bipartisan foreign policy was much publicized in those days, from both sides of the political fence. Roosevelt appointed Vandenberg as a member of the American delegation to San Francisco. Accordingly Truman could claim that he was merely following Roosevelt's precedent when he appointed Dulles, Dewey's campaign adviser, as adviser to Byrnes at the London Council of Foreign Ministers. Both Byrnes and Dulles could then appeal to the American people in the name of nonpartisanship to unite behind the intransigent American stand at London, while Truman on Navy Day could pay tribute to Roosevelt as he put on the most shameful Big Stick demonstration in American history.

**P**OLITICALLY what has occurred is that the weakest and most negative aspects of Roosevelt's wartime policies have been raised to the level of dominant policy. This ersatz is being offered the American people as the Roosevelt policy, in brazen violation of the 1944 mandate. Trickery, sham and deception are employed on every side to turn the Atlantic Charter, the lend-lease agreements, the concords of Yalta and Potsdam into their opposites. In the most heated anti-Soviet campaign since the Finnish War, the Soviet Union is pictured as the disrupter of United Nations unity and as the potential aggressor, while even the pretense of Big Three unity is dropped from American policy.

In the mixture of firmness and cooperation, as Truman describes his policy, the former is more like a mailed fist while the latter is tagged on like an afterthought, to prolong the illusion that Roosevelt's wartime policies are still dominant.

This evolution of policy away from Roosevelt and from Big Three unity is caused by more than a shift of personalities and partisan groupings. It reflects something new in the American world position.

The crisis in American-Soviet relations must be seen against the back-

ground of the emergence of the United States from the war as the prime imperialist power in the world. All other imperialist powers without exception have been seriously weakened by the conflict. In addition, all the elements that were lacking during the interwar years to permit the United States to play the dominant role in the capitalist world are now present.

**O**N TOP of the industrial supremacy already enjoyed before the war the United States experienced a wartime industrial expansion unprecedented in its history. The vast wartime accumulation of resources, together with the deflation of the wealth of other powers, enabled the United States to develop quickly from its pre-war status as a leading creditor nation to its present status as the only big creditor nation. Economic penetration of the capitalist and colonial world within the orbit of the United Nations proceeded during the war at an accelerated pace, leaving the American interests in dominant positions in many places. This is supplemented by air, naval and military bases. Unlike World War I, when the United States fought only in Europe, during this war the United States fought or placed armed forces on every continent. Military power has been built up on a tremendous scale. Even after demobilization, according to present plans, the United States will have for the first time in its history the most powerful navy in the world, a gigantic air force and probably a sizable standing army plus a reserve one. Politically as well as economically the United States is now involved in every corner of the capitalist and colonial world.

Internally, there took place a corresponding growth in the power of the monopoly and financial combines. By the end of the war the 200 leading industrial corporations alone commanded assets somewhere in the astronomical neighborhood of \$100,000,000,000. Well fortified by gigantic wartime takings, the dominant big business groups are bursting with confidence that they will be able to hold the line at home against the unions and the democratic forces, while realizing the unexcelled opportunities for expansion abroad. They hope to achieve quickly by display of force and "bold" diplomacy the world positions which in their estimate are commensurate with the industrial, financial and military power of the country. This is the real source of the arrogance of American foreign policy now play-

ing havoc with our relations with the Soviet Union.

Big Three unity becomes an obstacle to the realization of these aims and ambitions. The atomic bomb, a big navy, an imperialist loan policy become more important than cooperation with the Soviet Union, even on such key questions for the peace as the permanent demilitarization of Germany and Japan. Control of the German and Japanese industrial-monopoly structure, including support to the neo-fascist forces which alone can maintain it, becomes more important than eliminating their war potential. The objective of assuring the unhampered operation of the American trustified "free enterprise" everywhere supersedes the Yalta and Potsdam aims of rooting out fascism and assuring the growth of a democracy incompatible with domination by monopoly capital.

**I**N THIS perspective Big Two unity takes the place of Big Three unity. There may be some chance of bringing Britain in as a distinctly junior partner, even as a satellite, in view of the relative weakness of England and the disintegration of the Empire, but there can be little prospect for subordinating the Soviet Union. If the United States is to establish its prime position over the capitalist and colonial world, one of the first questions to be settled is the crisis of Britain, and our moguls hope to overcome the deeply-rooted rivalry between the two imperialist powers by subordinating their rival.

This policy is doomed to failure, and every effort to carry it out only deepens the crisis of the capitalist world. Whenever this policy operates it provokes even greater cleavages.

There is no contesting the fact that the forces making for American imperialist expansion are powerful and that they are the main danger to the security of the American people and the world. But the men flushed with wartime gains and dizzy with the prospects of future expansion also suffer from delusions of grandeur.

The mighty superstructure of power rests on rather uneasy foundations. Even the almighty atomic bomb cannot mend the basic weakness of our country: the marked instability of the economy, expressed by especially deep economic crises following every expansion. Lacking appropriate precautionary measures at home and abroad, or lacking war, such a crisis is bound to strike with ferocious intensity in the near future. The administration's domestic policies,

which fail to cope even with the present reconversion crisis, hasten the bigger one, while the developing American foreign policy sharpens the political crisis in the world and lessens the prospect for any kind of expanding peacetime market.

So large is American industrial capacity—probably at least sixty percent of world capitalist capacity—that an economic crisis in the United States means an instantaneous crisis throughout the capitalist world. That is the first gift which countries entering the American orbit are likely to receive from their big protector, as long as such partnerships are based on reactionary political programs. Thus, whatever British Tories and Torified Laborites may hope to gain politically from an Anglo-American combination to sustain the remnants of reaction in Europe, the colonial empire and their own fortunes at home, is offset by the danger of being dragged into an economic catastrophe along with the United States.

Politically, such a combination cannot stabilize a reactionary Europe. Things are too far gone there. Do they hope to set up a rump German imperialist power, centered on the Ruhr and linked with a West European "socialist" bloc? After all, Germany east of the Elbe will remain a Potsdam Germany, and the anti-fascist parties encouraged in the Soviet zone will also influence the rest of Germany. Without a de Gaulle France, where the power of the 200 families would be shielded by a clerical-socialist front, the Western bloc has no chance. Witness the blow given this scheme by the Communist victories in the recent election.

Through direct intervention in Eastern and Central Europe, the Anglo-American front may hope to prevent the consolidation of the new democracy and of the new regimes friendly to the Soviet Union. But despite many demarches and lectures on democracy, the peoples of these countries proceed along their chosen path—breaking up the big landed estates, confiscating German and collaborationist property, nationalizing their basic industries, purging their land of fascists, and carrying out their democratic reforms. Even Truman is forced to admit that at worst all the United States can do is to refuse to recognize these regimes, thus threatening to withhold economic aid.

Does the present Labor government of Britain hope to stop the decline of the British Empire and save it from dismemberment by inviting American



Guards Red Armyman Ivan Numladze, of Soviet Georgia, and Albert Kotzebue of Texas.

economic and political participation? Look at the price the British are asked to pay for a loan: to transfer a large portion of the foreign trade of the Empire to the United States and to permit the free entry of the American interests into any regional blocs they may form, in Western Europe or elsewhere, and into Britain itself.

Do the American oil and other interests hope to entrench themselves in the Middle East in return for political collaboration with the British and the Arab feudal potentates against the Soviet "influence"? Look at the price the United States is called upon to pay: to uphold the notorious White Paper, to support the British policy of kindling Jewish-Arab conflict, to share with the British in robbing France of her colonies and turning their independence into a mockery.

Do the American expansionists hope to gain easy access into the colonies of Asia by collusion with the British to restore to power the hated Dutch and French rulers of Indonesia and Indo-China? Once the United States becomes involved in suppressing the independent republics of these countries, the American power will find itself committed to sustaining British rule in India and the colonial structure everywhere.

The American expansionists may think that now at long last they have taken over the key imperialist positions in the Far East, in Japan and in China. How long do they think they will be able to continue MacArthur's fantastic "revolution from above" in Japan with-

out arousing an authentic popular revolution? They may count upon sharing power with the *Zaibatsu*, buying into their family monopoly holdings, and taking over a good portion of their monopoly network in Asia. If so, they count without the tremendous liberation upsurge throughout Asia, accumulating since World War I and beginning to burst forth now after the defeat of Japanese imperialism with a power that cannot be stopped.

The gathering civil war in China should be sufficient warning, unless the coterie around Truman is so blinded by the ambition to become dominant in Asia that they cannot see what their intervention in China is producing. For the time being it is imbuing Chiang Kai-shek with the courage to undertake civil war; but at the same time it is so undermining his power that the whole Chinese people is being turned against him. The situation is fast being created where the long-sought American penetration of China at most reaches only a portion of the country and even here can persist, if at all, only at the price of maintaining in power a small reactionary-feudal clique backed by American arms.

If the rule is to be civil war, intervention, intrigue with the forces of reaction in the vast periphery of the Soviet Union on two continents, what then is to become of the whole perspective for expanding world markets, for spreading investment, for the brave development plans of the American capitalists? The continuation of this policy can only have the effect of dragging the

United States and the whole capitalist world deeper into crisis.

These are the main contradictions which face American imperialism abroad as it assumes the dominant position in a crisis-struck capitalist world. It is not the kind of a world that can be united under the hegemony of a single imperialist power, or even two. It is a world torn asunder by many conflicts and contradictions, a world completely unsettled, defying any attempt even by so powerful a country as the United States to put it together. A policy aiming to unite it against the Soviet Union can prove only bankrupt, damaging in the first place to the United States. The streamlined democratic demagoguery, machines, capital and guns of the United States, even when combined with the British know-how of suppression, can do little to bring stability.

THE Soviet Union enjoys something that no other big world power today possesses: inner stability and momentum of historical progress combined with unparalleled prestige and influence among the peoples of the world. The Soviet Union suffered terrifically from the war, and yet it is stronger than before the German aggression. The United States suffered little from the war, yet its wartime expansion and its great power rests on an economy and a form of society which generate instability.

If our gift to the world is to be chaos and if as a result the American people suffer an economic catastrophe, many more Americans will question the validity of our social system and come to the conclusion that it has outlived its usefulness. One of the first products of a turn towards imperialist expansion at this late date in world development will be a maturing political crisis at home.

The basic factors which permit cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union still exist. The authentic national interests of the American people clash nowhere in the world with the national interests of the Soviet Union. More than that, the well-being and security of our country demand that the suicidal retreat from the Roosevelt policies of cooperation be halted and that our government immediately take energetic steps to restore the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. A clash of national interests appears only when a gang of robber barons attempts to take over the direction of American foreign policy and impose its own concept of the national interest upon the people. These usurpers are the main enemies of peace.

# What is Soviet Democracy?

By Harry F. Ward

THE other evening an influential leader in the Protestant churches leaned across the dinner table and said: "Tell me how we can bridge the difference between the Soviet idea of democracy and ours." Deeply concerned about the failure of the London Conference, he had evidently been reading reports that stressed a different definition of democracy as one of the causes of disagreement. My necessarily brief answer suggested that the approach to the desired bridge is the understanding that democracy is a developing historical process in which we are at one stage, they at another. That understood, the desired bridge can be built by uniting, as in the war, in anti-fascist action which Soviet leaders correctly insist is now the working test of democracy.

These are the key points in the discussion of democracy in the Soviet press which began in April during the seventy-fifth anniversary of Lenin's birth and is still continuing. This discussion emphasizes that the root fact from which spring the differences in practice and policy in the occupied countries is that theirs is a socialist, ours a capitalist democracy. Repeated is the teaching of Lenin that socialist democracy is a higher form because it spreads democratic principles and practices over more sections of the people and wider areas of life. There is insistence over and over again that, despite the differences between them, the fact that capitalist and socialist democracy belong in the stream of world progress provides a base for united action to develop more democracy in the former Axis countries and their satellites, also in the organization of world affairs.

These points are generally understood and accepted by the Soviet younger generation which fought the war and increasingly runs the country. All its war-time actions and utterances showed the conviction that it was fighting with the other democracies not only for security against fascist aggression but also against the fascist threat to the future development of democracy. If this is not the Soviet purpose, if it is not our purpose, then there is no basis for collaboration in the postwar world. If their purpose is the extension of Soviet power, if ours is economic domination for more profits and dividends, then our hope for peace and security is in vain, and our faith is also in vain.

From the beginning the pillars of Soviet socialist society were laid on democratic foundations. When Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize the new Russian government on the ground that it was not democratic and demanded the reconvening of the Constituent Assembly, Lenin replied: "If by democracy you mean numbers, we have them. Our program has the support\* of the overwhelming majority expressed directly through soviets of soldiers, peasants and workers. The Constituent Assembly was elected by a very limited franchise."

THE Soviet people have been continuously taught by Lenin and his followers that their democracy is an extension of the forms and principles developed in the capitalist period of history from earlier beginnings. Lenin wrote that "bourgeois democracy is a tremendous historical progress as compared with Czarism, autocracy, monarchy, and all the remnants of feudalism." He held that a democratic republic is the best form of the state for the workers under capitalism because democratic forms of government are an indispensable condition for the defense of the rights of the people against the forces of reaction. This is the base of Soviet friendship for us and Soviet support of national front democratic capitalist governments in occupied countries.

At the moment the Soviet press is instructing the people about the elections to the Supreme Soviet next February and extolling the virtues of the Soviet electoral system. These are summarized as "general, equal, direct and secret suffrage" and this is said to be "still an unrealizable dream for most of the people of the world." Especially emphasized is the fact that all persons who have reached the age of eighteen, of all races, nationalities and religions, regardless of educational qualifications, social origins, property status or past activities, now have an equal opportunity to vote by secret ballot in a strictly isolated booth. This includes temporary residents in any locality and all persons in the armed forces anywhere.

Lenin outlined the political goal of Soviet democracy as the direction of the state by the whole people. His phrase that even the cook must share in the government has gone around the world. Step by step the Soviet people have

moved toward the goal that Lenin set. The commission appointed to draft the new constitution in 1936 was instructed, after studying all existing democratic constitutions, including those of non-governmental organizations, to frame the most democratic constitution in the world, the one that most fully expressed the will of the people.

Raising the question of how do representative bodies become a genuine expression of the people's will, Lenin answered it by saying: "when the people have the unrestricted right to recall those they elect." Consequently all Soviet representatives are subject to immediate recall at any time on the initiative of a specified number of voters. This also holds for unions, cooperatives and professional organizations whose officers and controlling committees are also elected by secret ballot.

Soviet discussion of democracy emphasizes the fact that from the local to the Supreme Soviets the people vote directly for their representatives without intervening "electors." The same is true for nominations: for the right to put up candidates is secured to all public associations—unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, cultural and educational societies—and is exercised in meetings of workers, farmers, office workers, Red Army men, etc. Additions may be made to the nomination lists by a specified number of citizens. Every organization which has made a nomination, and every citizen, has the right to campaign in meetings, the press, and by other means.

Consequently, a Soviet legislative body has a different composition from those in the capitalist democracies. Workers and farmers are not represented by politicians, lawyers, bankers and businessmen but by persons from their own ranks, including intellectuals who have worked with them at the common task.

They are all chosen on the record of their contribution to the creative effort of the people—a woman on the farm, a worker in the mill or mine, a professor from the university. The result is a functional democracy in which those who are working in the common undertaking also compose the bodies that make and direct the policies.

Functional democracy is being further developed by the increasing

participation of the people in the government through auxiliary agencies. Labor and farm organizations quite generally take "patronage" over some branch of the local or national government. This means examining, assisting and reporting on its operations, proposing improvements, securing needed dismissals and providing replacements. This is one of several procedures designed to prevent the disease of bureaucracy—which is the deadly danger of socialist democracy.

**A** KINDRED preventive measure is the continuous discussion by all workers of each of the Five Year Plans, which provide the economic bases for the social advance of each period. Section by section, in each factory, mine, farm and transportation unit, the workers propose their production goals, check, recheck and amend them from time to time. This unites experts and workers and fuses the lives of all the people in the common creative endeavor. Early in my study of Soviet incentives I found that really to understand how and why things were being done I had to go beyond executives and general meetings and sit down with the small groups which gathered to discuss production after the whistle blew or after they came in from the fields.

When it is understood that the objective of all this planning is not merely production but more physical well-being and more cultural development for more people, then it becomes clear that Soviet democracy is a way of life and not merely the form of government to which our accepted definitions limit it. It is the people learning to meet together all their common needs, to share together all the burdens and risks of life, to achieve together a higher form of human living.

From the beginning Soviet leaders and people have agreed with us that the basic principles of democracy are freedom and equality. In his report to the

First Congress of the Third International concerning the new Soviet state Lenin described its purpose as attaining "true democracy, that is freedom and equality." Ask Soviet youth what they mean when they say: "Now we have socialism. Some day we will get Communism," and they reply: "Some day production will be so increased that distribution can be according to need instead of according to effort. Then everyone will be free to develop all his capacities." That is, more equality of opportunity.

By historic circumstance, and on principle, the order of development of the basic democratic principles has been different in the Soviet Union from ours. They sought more equality before more freedom and economic before political democracy. Lenin said that all talk of universal suffrage, the will of the whole people, and the equality of all voters would be a mere formality as long as economic inequality remained. He contended that if the people, without any previous training in political democracy, could gain economic power, the people's political power must follow. So the first objective was to transfer economic power from the few to the many by nationalizing the economic process. The next was to organize it in such a way as to develop democratic procedure. The severest critics of the Soviet Union have to concede its progress in realizing equality of opportunity for women, for children and youth, and for the many national groups which compose the Union.


Nor can they successfully deny that under the new constitution more political democracy is being continuously achieved.

**T**HE main obstacle that hinders many Americans from understanding Soviet democracy as a developing process is the erroneous idea that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state ruled by the small minority who compose the Com-

munist Party. The Soviet view of the state is the opposite of the totalitarian concept which makes the state the be-all and end-all of human existence and so puts absolute power in the hands of its controllers. Communist philosophy holds that the state is by nature repressive, and therefore evil, and expects it to gradually disappear as the peoples of the world learn to control together all their affairs.

In fact the Soviet system is a non-party state because the Communist Party is not a political party in our sense of the term. It is a leadership organization designed to guide the people through the first stage of a new form of society, and expected by Lenin to disappear as the capacity for leadership spreads throughout the people. It endeavors to avoid the corruption that waits upon the exercise of power by public examination of candidates and periodical "cleansings" of careerists and petty dictators. From intimate observation of local institutions and acquaintance with non-party people in critical periods I can testify to a far greater transfer of leadership to the non-party masses than is recorded in the rising proportion of non-party representatives in the Soviets. How else can the achievements of the Five Year Plans, the war, and the present rebuilding be explained? That Party representation is as high as it is under the present secret voting indicates the degree to which the most capable and sincere people have been drawn into acceptance of the heavy duties that come with membership. The political forms that will in due time express an established socialist economy have not yet begun to appear.

"But there is no freedom of discussion or the press, certainly not in opposition to the system." I remember in 1924 expressing amazement to an intellectual at hearing a man criticizing the government on a street corner in Moscow. "Oh, but you don't understand. He's a worker," was the reply. In later years



A fashion note from the Soviet humor magazine "Crocodile."

I saw peasants and intellectuals enjoy the same freedom of criticism. In common with others who have mingled freely and at length with the Soviet people I can say that I know no land where there is more political discussion (over 36,000,000 people attended meetings discussing the new Constitution and sent in 154,000 amendments), and no land where so many of the people express themselves at such length in their press, from the wall newspapers in local institutions to the papers and magazines of their national organizations. The Orthodox Church, for example, now has its own printing plant.

It is a democratic principle that freedom of expression stops at the point

where the peace and security of the nation and the stability of the chosen form of government is endangered. People who have only recently been through a revolution against repression, especially in Eastern Europe where opposing opinions and direct action are usually united, draw the danger line finer than we do, with our long stability and security. In this matter of the press as well as the kind of governments of occupied Europe the core of the difference between us and the Soviet people is whether democratic freedom includes freedom for fascist groups, their financial backers and collaborators, to destroy democracy.

In the last analysis this boils down to the fifth freedom concealed under our

pious moral phrases, the freedom that unchecked destroys all the others, the freedom to make money regardless of the consequences to society and the world. Even those who view that freedom of expression as a basic right of the individual admit that no one has the right to yell "Fire!" in a crowded theater. We now have to make up our minds quickly whether anyone has the right to start a fire in the crowded theater of the world where the greatest drama of history is being played, by spreading lies about any nation, race or religion. When we settle that according to our own need we shall have less trouble with the Soviet Union and in trying to organize the United Nations.

# Common Sense Perverted

By Corliss Lamont

THE will to wage wars of aggression against peace-loving peoples did not die with the United Nations' victory over the Axis. Even during the world war against fascism there were irresponsible minorities among the United Nations, especially in the United States, who harped constantly on the necessity of fighting Soviet Russia after Hitler was beaten. As far back as the spring of 1943, for instance, Maurice Hindus, one of our most objective observers of Soviet affairs, published his book *Mother Russia* and felt called upon to devote an entire chapter to the theme "Will We Have to Fight Russia?" Rare was the American, Mr. Hindus said, who failed to ask him this question. Throughout the war I myself kept receiving letters from men in the service who were alarmed over the undercover talk of future armed conflict with our Soviet ally.

Now, with the coming of peace, this talk has turned into a torrent of open propaganda directed toward dragging the American people into a war with the Soviet Union, our loyal and heroic partner in the struggle against world fascism, a country that lost between 15,000,000 and 20,000,000 dead in our common cause and which needs a long and lasting peace more than any other member of the United Nations. This hideous, senseless idea of a military crusade against Soviet Russia has obviously gained considerable impetus from America's successful use and possession of the atomic bomb secret.

In the October 1945 issue of *Common Sense* Mr. Bertrand Russell, Earl Russell, to be exact, once a leading liberal philosopher, becomes spokesman for the anti-Soviet reactionaries of every land. "Sooner or later," he states, "almost inevitably, there will be war. . . . Owing to the monopoly of the atomic bomb, a war between Russia and the Western democracies at the present moment would probably result in a fairly quick victory for the latter. But if the war were postponed for a few years, there would be more equality. . . . So far, this might seem like an argument for immediate war against Russia."

Not only seems, but *is*. And Russell's disclaimer—"this conclusion could only be reached by omitting important factors"—is not borne out by the rest of the article. Mr. Russell emphasizes, but expresses no relief over, the undoubted fact that neither the British nor American people would want to plunge into another conflict right now. And he proposes as the one hope of civilization "a vigorous and more or less imperialistic policy in the United States during the few years' respite before other powers possess atomic bombs." Totally ignoring the United Nations Organization, Russell advocates that America build up a League of Powers consisting, at the outset, of every important country but the Soviet Union.

This league, with an imperialist America always as its guiding force, would, Russell subtly suggests, exercise some effective atomic blackmail. And

then after a few years "it is by no means impossible that the Soviet government may become willing to take its place as part of a genuine international authority." Note that here Russell pretends that Soviet Russia is not cooperating at present for world peace and does not even mention its participation in the United Nations Organization and various international agreements.

ONE would not have been astonished had this shameless article of war-inciting doubletalk appeared in the Hearst press. To find it in the pages of *Common Sense*, however, originally founded twelve years ago as a genuinely progressive organ of opinion, might offhand be considered something of a surprise. But only for those who have not been reading *Common Sense* during the past year or so. For this magazine, even before printing Russell's piece, had become one of the leading anti-Soviet journals in the United States, a sort of special monthly supplement to the *New Leader*, weekly mouthpiece of the bitter-end anti-Soviet group, the Social Democrats.

During 1945 not a single issue of *Common Sense* has appeared that does not contain a vehement attack on Soviet policies. The first issue of 1945, that of February, started the ball rolling with a lead editorial entitled "Russia's Dead Idealism." In March came "Crimea: A Cynic's Peace"; in May an article by Kenneth Crawford claiming that the *Nation* and *New Re-*






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G. P. O. S. R.



**American and other architectural magazines are studied by the young Tartar, I. Gajnutdinov. One of the most gifted postgraduate students of the All-Union Academy of Architecture, Gajnutdinov's youth was spent in helping his father gather scraps from the city's garbage dumps, and education seemed to be only something to be dreamed about. But after the revolution he began to study, finished grade school and an engineering institute in his own part of the country (The Tartar Autonomous Republic). And then he came to study in Moscow.**

public had surrendered to Stalin; in July a statistical study of "Soviet Power in 1970" by Donald W. Smithburg, arguing that the rising "population strength of Soviet Russia gives the other European countries the jitters," and asserting that "Russia is safe from invasion by the countries of Western Europe—unless, by any chance, they should be joined by the United States." There are some who might think that Mr. Smithburg was giving a delicate hint.

The Smithburg article leads me to say that in the anti-Soviet front it is one of the functions of a magazine like *Common Sense*, under the guise of legitimate criticism, to awaken such fears and spread such prejudices among the American public that this country will get into a mood favorable to war against the USSR. A recurrent theme here is that German Nazism and Soviet socialism are, after all, pretty much the same thing. Thus in the August number Maurice J. Goldbloom claims that Poland was betrayed to Stalin at Yalta just as Czechoslovakia was betrayed to Hitler at Munich. In the same issue *Common Sense* hits an all-time low in a piece called "Anti-Semitism in Russia" by Solomon M. Schwarz, Russian Socialist emigre. Mr. Schwarz libelously accuses the Soviets of "years of appeasement" in relation to the sporadic anti-Semitic outbreaks that Nazi propaganda and pressure aroused in the German-occupied regions. He neglects entirely to state, for example, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party itself undertook strong and successful counter-measures.

Numerous subscribers to *Common Sense* have been writing letters protesting against the magazine's policy of painting the Soviet Union all black. In the July number Professor Douglass of Colorado says in this regard: "It is quite clear that the point of view and twisting of facts, as well as misrepresentation in recent issues of *Common Sense*, grow out of some very vicious, twisted bias of somebody at the helm." The editors of the magazine made a bland and altogether disingenuous denial of this charge. So let us take a look at those who have been "at the helm."

**A**FTER the founders of *Common Sense*, Alfred M. Bingham and Selden Rodman, entered the armed services, the functioning editor became an extremely anti-Soviet Socialist by the name of Sidney Hertzberg. One of the assistant editors became Maurice J. Goldbloom, cited above, another Socialist with a long record of anti-Soviet prejudice. In March 1945, Daniel Bell took up the position of associate editor and was later promoted to managing editor. Mr. Bell had long been on the staff of the *New Leader*, the outstanding anti-Soviet weekly in America. Then in June 1945, Varian Fry, well known as a bitter Soviet-phobe, took Hertzberg's place as editor. Mr. Fry had earlier resigned as a contributing editor of the *New Republic* because he thought that distinctly moderate magazine was too friendly toward the Russians.

The contributing editors of *Common Sense* include Richard H. Rovere, renegade radical formerly on the *New*

*Masses*, James Wechsler, who loves to bait the Russian bear, Abba P. Lerner, teacher in the anti-Soviet clique at the New School for Social Research and an economist with strong Trotskyite leanings, and Milton Mayer, who runs a monthly column in the magazine. In the September issue of *Common Sense* Mr. Mayer repeated Schwarz's libel about anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia; in the October issue he expressed the attitude that we're all war criminals anyway and asked whether the Soviet government should not be indicted by the War Crimes Commission for joining the United Nations against Japan.

Recently Editor Fry and his associates picked a permanent staff of book reviewers, each of whom covers a special field. The "expert" on Soviet Russia is Bertram D. Wolfe, a prominent member of the Lovestone splinter group that broke away from the American Communists, and consistently anti-Soviet from way back. The "expert" on the Far East is William Henry Chamberlin, probably the most able anti-Soviet commentator in the United States today. Raymond Leslie Buell, firmly anti-Soviet, especially on the Polish issue, is handling international affairs. Maurice Goldbloom, Daniel Bell and Richard H. Rovere, all of whom I have already mentioned, are taking, respectively, Europe, political economy and Americana. The other five experts I do not know much about, but it is clear that the six key fields are in the hands of anti-Soviet specialists.

We can, then, sum up the situation on *Common Sense* by stating that the present staff and contributors embody and symbolize all the most unjust and intemperate anti-Soviet trends in America today. As Professor Douglass, whom I quoted earlier, says, the anti-Soviet material in this so-called liberal magazine is on a level with that in the Hearst and Gannett press and the *Chicago Tribune*.

**T**HE chief angel of *Common Sense*, which has an annual deficit of about \$25,000, is still, I believe, Mrs. Katrina McCormick Barnes, niece of the *Tribune's* publisher, Col. Robert R. McCormick. About two years ago she completed the process of selling all her *Tribune* stock to the Colonel, having acquired more than \$3,000,000 for her shares. At the same time she declared she hated "Uncle Bertie" and what the *Tribune* stood for. Most of the \$3,000,000 Mrs. Barnes gave away. *Common Sense* became one of her main beneficiaries and she became one of its owners.

I wonder how Mrs. Barnes likes *Common Sense's* resemblance to the *Chicago Tribune*, which she so correctly despised. In fact, I wonder if she has really read *Common Sense* during the past year.

Others bearing a major responsibility for *Common Sense* are Alfred M. Bingham and Selden Rodman, who founded the monthly, who are part owners and whose names appear on the masthead as editors. It is reliably reported that Bingham and Rodman, who are still in the armed forces, are distressed over the recent policy of their magazine. Certainly only quick and drastic action on their part can prevent the reputation of *Common Sense* from being permanently ruined.

Though the circulation of *Common Sense* is small, the magazine constitutes a genuine danger in the current critical status of world affairs. What the Hearst and McCormick-Patterson newspapers say in frank, brash tones offensive to intellectuals and college graduates *Common Sense* gets across in a purposely ambiguous, smoothly genteel

manner. Bertrand Russell's article typifies this strategy. For Russell is a distinguished member of the English nobility and a philosopher of international repute, a man who went to jail for pacifism during the first world war. Now this noble lord, this profound modern thinker, this great lover of peace serves as a respectable-looking decoy to entice us along the suicidal path of war against the Soviet Union. And the editors of *Common Sense* try to complete the deception by entitling Russell's remarks "How to Avoid the Atomic War"!

One further point needs to be mentioned. That is, what is the most likely reaction of Soviet officials and citizens to such articles as Russell's and such magazines as *Common Sense*? I imagine that even Russians quite sophisticated about the currents of opinion in capitalist countries must be taken aback by the hostility and threats of war on the part of a considerable segment of the American press. When they reflect on this evil phenomenon, I should think they

might well become alarmed and ask themselves some searching questions:

For instance, will these war-wishing groups in the United States perhaps be powerful enough to win a national election in the not distant future? Do the widespread exhortations of "We must fight the Russians," together with the seeming development of an anti-Soviet "Western bloc," indicate that the USSR, may eventually have to face an armed attack from most of the non-socialist world? In the light of these possibilities, what patterns of foreign policy can the Soviet Union rely on in order to safeguard itself from aggression?

Yes, what I am implying is that the Soviet government has a right to be fearful and suspicious, even though we know that fear and suspicion are not good foundations on which to build a peaceful world. And what I am suggesting to Americans is that right now the greatest contribution they can make to international peace is to *stop the war talk against the Soviet Union.*

# Their Culture and Ours

By Isidor Schneider

TO THE average American the word "culture" signifies the university, the research institute, the latest books, concert hall music, the art gallery, the opera, the ballet, the good manners of the social set and the odd manners of the Bohemian set. It signifies the intellectual interests and the recreations of a minority.

This concept of culture as a minority matter is the first basic difference between American and Soviet culture.

From the commercialized pap and entertainment served to the American majority, the word "culture," except in an anthropological sense, is generally withheld—and for a sound reason. The sense of the word includes a conscious choice of the best; and the conscious choice in a commercialized culture is profit—leading, if not to outright debauching of taste, to mere skimming of the mind and the emotions.

The "box office" determinant in the culture provided for the American majority is the second basic difference between American and Soviet culture. It involves something more than profits. A capitalist imperialism's first line of

colonials is its own masses. The culture it provides for them, more or less consciously, helps perpetuate class subjection. At its most naked and brutal this attitude was displayed in the Japanese establishment of brothels, and opium and gambling dens in conquered China, on the calculation that a debauched people would stay conquered. Attitudes akin to this are noticeable in our advertising agencies and in such publication chains as Hearst's or Luce's.

Moreover, the "box office" determinant is incompatible with our institutionalized ideals. Conscientious parents are in despair over the anti-education their children are exposed to after school. And the bolstering of a man's moral strength by Sunday observances is ineffectual against the undermining appeals to his fears, vanities, frustrations and envies in his weekday "culture." This contradiction between institutionalized ideals and the commercial debasements in America's majority culture, which also makes its way, in subtler forms, into its minority culture, is its third major difference from Soviet culture.

Finally our culture, particularly since its atom bomb inflation, exhibits a gross and dangerous chauvinism. In this historical moment we are the richest and most powerful people on earth. But this is a turn of history, not the reward of virtue or wisdom; and the historical situations that create such power shift with history. To conceive of ourselves as the world's cleanest, freest, brightest and nicest people is foolish; to conceive of the rest of mankind as requiring our strong hand in their problems and owing us unpayable debts which entitles us to a lien on their future, is dangerous.

This growing chauvinist attitude is the fourth major difference from Soviet culture.

## II

IT IS on the basis of these four differences, expressing in varied aspects the difference between capitalist and socialist society, that I will attempt to characterize Soviet culture.

First, then, Soviet culture differs from ours in rejecting the division of

the national culture into a hyper-individualized minority culture and a hyper-standardized majority culture. Its aim, which is still to be achieved, is to eliminate stratified levels of culture. It is true that not everybody in the USSR goes or wishes to go to symphony concerts and art exhibits, but millions already do; that the average trade union hall entertainment is at about the vaudeville level, but the level constantly rises; and all the social pressures, from fashion to government subsidies, push toward the acquirement of every form of culture.

It began with the wonderful, nationwide and mainly volunteer effort which transformed fifty million illiterates into lettered people in fifteen years. Its formal end is foreseen in the invasion-interrupted, long-range plan whose economic goal was a per capita production equal to that of the United States, and whose cultural goal was "the elimina-

tion of the distinction between mental and manual labor" (Stalin). Education, training and involvement in cultural activities is eventually to raise every Soviet citizen to the level of the intellectual.

In illustration of the process I could point to the trade union block purchases of tickets to concerts, opera, ballet, etc. I could list the first-rate repertory theaters playing even in the "provinces"; I could enumerate the musical ensembles, the schools (including art studios), the theater companies, the publications, etc., of the Red Army; the lectures, art shows, museum tours, press, shop wall papers, etc., of the trade unions; the hut laboratories, news correspondents and music ensembles of the collective farms; the children's culture with its richly developed theaters, puppet shows, club houses, parks, etc., assuring Soviet children a natural growth into adult culture and providing facilities

that not even American millionaires can afford for their children. The statistics, in their diversity as well as their totals, would be overwhelming. But I prefer to emphasize an aspect that, in the fascination of figures, is often overlooked.

In a profit culture participation is discouraged. Everything possible is absorbed into the producer-consumer relations—in culture, the starred performer and passive auditor relationship. In America the word "amateur" carries derogatory connotations.


In the Soviet Union the amateur is everywhere and is linked to the professional in a communal relationship. The novelist Sholokhov, for example, works with the literary circle of Veshenskaya, the Cossack village where he makes his home. The Moscow Art Theater director, Ivan Moskvina, is one of the coaches of the dramatic circle of a Moscow auto plant; and thirty members of that well coached troupe have moved into places in the Moscow Theater companies. The wallflowers in Soviet society are those who are not active in some cultural activity, if only a language study circle.

### III

A QUESTIONNAIRE answered by the several thousand workers of a Soviet factory on how they had spent a holiday showed them visiting, picnicking, taking in shows, etc.; but nearly all reading and many commenting on a long speech by Litvinov featured that day, according to the Soviet practice, in all the papers. This may answer the wondering questions of American visitors: do the Soviet people read their "dull" press, which not only prints such speeches but long informational and theoretical articles, long poems, statistical reports on industrial or agricultural output; which omits altogether or reduces crime stories to three-line items; and for its "pictures" prints the portraits of political figures and Stakhanovites and omits divorcees.

People wait in long queues in front of newsstands for these "dull" papers; and when they are sold out, stand before bulletin boards on which copies of the paper are posted. I have seen clusters around the boards in below zero weather.

Take away manipulations of human weakness for profit and you get the phenomenon of people avidly reading the papers for information. Take away the box office obsession and the star complex which festers with it, and great



Academician Leon Orbell autographing his pamphlet for Professor E. D. Adrian of England and Professor D. W. Bronk (right) of the United States, at the 220th anniversary meeting of The Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Leningrad.



A scene from the first act of Lillian Hellman's play "The Little Foxes," a hit show at the Moscow Theater of Drama last season.

repertory companies like our Washington Square Players and our Group Theater do not break up but flourish and produce classics to capacity audiences.

In my twenty months in the Soviet Union I once saw a book got up like the *Broadway Virgin* type of drug-store lending library fiction. That rare article proved to be a product of the NEP period when, for a few years, capitalism was allowed back in trade and in some of the consumption goods industries.

#### IV

**I**F WE remember our wartime national unity and the part played in it by our radio and press, which rose to levels considerably above their norms, we can get a clearer conception of Soviet life and the unifying role of its culture.

For the common social objective is characteristic of Soviet life. The day before yesterday it was the literacy campaign, industrialization, collectivization; yesterday it was the war effort; today it is reconstruction; tomorrow it will be the achievement of American plenty for all and the completing stages of the democratization of culture. The aims of the most sensitive artist and the most hard-boiled factory manager merge in the common social aim.

That is why on the Soviet radio everything is the sustaining program and in the press all news is of public interest. Nothing is slicked up to trap the listener or the reader into the advertiser's sales talk. The jungle ethics of buying and selling does not intrude into and corrupt the communal ethics.

#### V

**F**INALLY, there is the sense of the international in Soviet culture, which has remained unaffected by the wartime intensification of Russian patriotism. It is an internationalism of two concentric circles. One is the internationalism of the sixty-odd Soviet nationalities and the product of their equal and cooperative coexistence. The other is the fraternal Soviet sense of the world as opposed to the worldliness of the western cosmopolitan centers, which is closer to denationalization than internationalization.

The inner Soviet internationalization began with the 1917 Revolution which liberated the sixty nationalities. Among them were some quite advanced cultures like the Ukrainian and Armenian, which had suffered from forced Russification.

Then there were the stagnant Moslem cultures of the Caucasus and Central Asia, kept stagnant by their colonial status under Czarism. Finally, there were the nomad peoples of the

East and North that Czarism had been exploiting out of existence.

In the case of a people like the Ukrainians, liberation was enough. Our historians will dwell upon the Ukrainian renaissance as a feature of twentieth century Europe when they get over thinking of European history as something that ends at the Vistula.

In the case of the Moslem nations, special help was necessary. Native musicians, bards and craftsmen were enabled to live on their art and they were encouraged to teach others so that their arts and skills would not pass away as had happened in other countries where industrialization had killed off the folk arts. And their work was recorded, preserved and reproduced in the greatest folk culture preservation project in history. In addition, realizing that a cultural orientation toward the dominant West was inevitable, this was consciously fostered to prevent a loss of native elements. The Russian composer, Reinhold Gliere, for example, worked with young Azerbaijanian composers to initiate a music in which native Azerbaijanian instruments were introduced into the standard orchestra; and the native musical idiom provided the thematic base.

In the third case the aid was still more extensive. For some of the nomad peoples' alphabets and other primary instruments for cultural development were provided by Soviet scientists. Here, too, native crafts were preserved, though the native musicians, writers and painters were already resorting to Western forms.

The interrelation of these national cultures is manifold. It is carried on formally through remarkable intercultural festivals, and, informally, in ways too livingly intricate to follow. The result is a friendly fellow-feeling among the Soviet peoples corresponding to our attitude to our minorities as light to darkness.

The outer circle of Soviet internationalism is less picturesque but easily observable. It is to be noted in the widespread study of foreign languages, in the reading of foreign literatures, the performance of foreign masterpieces. The Soviet citizen is likely to see more of Shakespeare than the Englishman, more of Calderon than the Spaniard. General information is considerable and accurate. The average Soviet high school student is much better informed about America, and for that matter other foreign countries than our high school students are about the USSR and other foreign countries. A feature of Soviet parks is the historian lecturer standing

before a map, drawing large audiences from the holiday crowds for talks on current events.

This interest is charged with respect for the achievements of other peoples and the sense of human brotherhood that is the soul of socialism. It was so strong that it took a long time for the Soviet people in the war to get over it and realize how far from any reciprocal feeling his bestialized German enemy had been driven. But not even the Germans have destroyed it in the Soviet people; nor has our crass superiority complex affected it; for it is rooted in the new human attitudes of socialism. It is the quality that makes the Soviet people readier for their role, among the United Nations, than any other people.

## VI

SOME of our reader intellectuals may be so influenced by the standards and the pleasant sense of intellectual privilege they enjoy through sharing our minority culture that they may retort "better a minority culture that produces masters than a majority culture that merely rises to respectable mediocrity." No culture, however, escapes mediocrity; even the best has its average. But Soviet culture has produced its masters and in that respect can stand comparison with any contemporary culture.

These readers may also object that a culture that supports social objectives so closely is not free. In that they reason from the nature of our own profit system, which exploits differences, lives on conflicts and is itself so offensive that dissent becomes natural and is considered the mark of the free mind. But a free mind can give assent too, and Soviet culture is the evidence. It is an assent to the major Soviet objectives. There has been no lack of dissent with misapplications, a dissent vigorously expressed in satire and polemics.

Soviet culture has not been free from harmful tendencies. Some trends have proved too sweeping and have deformed some of the talents, driven along in the stream—casualties occurring in other cultures as well. Some of the trends, particularly the leftist ones, have proved sterile. Yet these trends, themselves, are an evidence of the vigor and variety of Soviet culture.

Basically the broad distinctions of Soviet culture remain the four qualities I have mentioned, its democratic character, its unity with the peoples' aims, its freedom from profit compulsions, and its strong sense of the internationale of culture.

# Changing Red Army

By Sergei Kournakoff

THE whole Soviet people and the Red Army are celebrating the twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the Soviet state in a radiant apotheosis of national, international and plain human victory. The Red Army carried eighty to ninety percent of the burden in the struggle against European fascism and a sizable percentage of the fight against fascism's Asiatic counterpart. The memories of the forty years between 1878 and 1918, one of the least glorious epochs in Russian military history, have been thoroughly obliterated and avenged. The eastern and western foes who defeated Russia in 1904-05 and then in 1914-18 lie militarily defeated beyond redemption by any means short of a new "Munich" of "atomic" proportions.

Soviet power has not enjoyed such a thoroughgoing triumph in its twenty-eight-year history. In the fire of an unprecedented war it has demonstrated the unity of the people behind it, the social and economic depth of its organization, the inextinguishable fire of its spirit, and, finally, the military qualities of its armed forces and entire apparatus of defense.

An army is the true reflection of the state it serves. This is especially true in the case of modern armies, which not only draw into their ranks a high percentage of the population, but which because of their technical and economic requirements are totally bound up with the whole body of the country they defend. Thus, the portrait of the Red Army as it emerges from its victory in World War II is at the same time a picture of the Soviet Union as a whole.

Ever since 1918 when it was formed by Lenin's decree, the Red Army has been the subject of foreign speculation, foreign suspicions and foreign slanders.

A paroxysm of speculation has usually followed on the heels of both exceptional Soviet successes and Soviet crises. The Red Army has been said to be going "internationalist" and "nationalist." It was prophesied that it would "stop at its borders" and "spill over them in a revolutionary march across Europe." It was said that it was "hardening into an oppressive military machine" under the influence of victory. At the same time it was intimated that its "discipline was breaking down" under the impact of the "Capuan de-

lights" of the "Western world" whose threshold it had crossed. In short, whichever way you look at it—"the old gray mare wasn't what she used to be."

Surprisingly enough, this proverbial dictum is perfectly true in the case of the Red Army, but not at all for the reasons cited above. The social outlook of the Soviet Union is based on dialectical materialism. Such an outlook recognizes that change is inseparable from life. Consequently, together with the whole Soviet way of life, the Red Army changes. As a matter of fact, it has never stopped changing.

To begin with, today the Red Army is an infinitely better and stronger army than it ever was before. Born in the Civil War of a quarter of a century ago, a war in which it triumphed over numerous enemies which surrounded it, it could have been expected to "freeze" in its military concepts, just as the French army, for instance, "froze" in its concepts of 1918 vintage. Instead, in the midst of the most difficult retreat, the Red Army leadership found the courage to shake off outlived theories and "states-of-mind." With this went far-reaching changes in tactics, armament, organization, etc.

The trim and dashing uniform of the modern Red Army is a far cry from the drab garb it was wearing only five years ago. Traditional Russian military attributes have been restored, together with traditional ranks. Certain disciplinary formalities have been tightened up. The military orders of today are named not only after revolutionary figures and symbols, but after military heroes of old and after such concepts as "Glory" and "Victory," not specifically related to revolutionary struggle.

Does this mean that the Red Army is "returning to nationalism"? Not at all. It is simply taking the best from the past and adapting it to modern times, but on a higher level. The difference in level is in the fact that while before the revolution these distinctions belonged largely to the ruling class and national pride took the form of oppression of scores of nationalities by a "ruling nation," now the most brilliant uniforms and decorations are worn by men and women who came from the people as a whole and national pride—Soviet pride—is the heritage of all the nationalities of the country. To put it simply—stars,

braid, honor and pride, while remaining a national heritage, are not a personal heritage any more. They must be earned by the individual.

The slogan of the "Patriotic War," which has disturbed so many "observers," is not a return to the "good old Russian times," but is a perfectly logical battle-cry for a people who now own their entire land and are therefore prone to be even more confirmed patriots than when they owned a minor share in it.

Some so-called observers have interpreted the return of gold and silver epaulettes, decorations and outward signs of military rank and pomp to a tendency toward a relapse into capitalism. Nothing could be more mechanical than this "explanation." Insignia and decorations are not *res per se* (things in themselves). They are outward signs of distinction. They may be worn by men who have distinguished themselves by being born in an "old" and noble family, and they may be worn by men who have done something with their own hands and brain to earn them. The difference is enormous, and basic.

History shows us that victorious armies sometimes become facile instruments of reaction. This happens because their leaders—let us call them "the generals" for the sake of simplicity—are linked either by birth or by social connections with groups which are inclined toward reaction. These generals do not have to be big bankers or industrialists themselves, but they may aspire to be rich, or may have married into finance, or, finally, they might simply be "power-worshippers"—a rather common species, especially in the middle class.

Now, a Soviet general cannot have any of these connections or aspirations—not because he is a sort of "Marxian saint," but because in the Soviet Union there are no groups which wield power through money. The Soviet general is a man of the people who has received everything he has from the Soviet system. Naturally, he will not only support this system at home, but will be inclined to be antagonistic to those groups within the orbit of his activities abroad which have in the past derived, and are striving to derive again, power and wealth from the exploitation of the common man.

To this must be added that the concept of soldierly honor as handed down by generations of the best Russian military heroes compels one ever to fight for the underdog, to be the protector of the weak against the strong. Thus the donning of traditional martial symbols



Meeting the demobilized veterans at the Rzhev station, Moscow.

inescapably pushes the Soviet officer further along the road of progressive social thinking. To him they are symbols of power to protect the weak against the strong.

The behavior of the Red Army once across its own borders has been marked by precisely this sort of thinking. Wherever the Soviet soldier's foot trod, he has not stood in the way of agrarian reform or the right of the people to express themselves when that right was denied them before.

As to the Red Army soldier, non-com and junior officer, he, as in every army, is the direct representative of the overwhelming majority which has received the greatest benefits from the revolution. To him the collective farm system has given modern machinery instead of the old medieval plow, to him socialized industry has given security instead of exploitation, hospitals, clubs, theaters, culture instead of hovels and police stations. Why should he want to go back to the "good old days"?

These things are simple, almost elementary; and still, so many supposedly

wise and worldly people do not seem to understand them.

Take for instance a rather well-intentioned man like Prof. Francis E. McMahon of the *New York Post*. On October 27, he wrote in his column "Plain Speaking": "These people (the Russians) are our brothers in the flesh and in spirit. . . . Only a fool would rejoice at their isolation from us. . . ." Good, plain speaking, isn't it? But notice the row of dots I put in the quotation. This row of dots conceals the following phrase: "Dostoyevsky demonstrates that." It is amazing that at this late date it is still possible to find a straight-faced reference to this old and discredited saw which for years has been a sort of standard joke. The "Dostoyevsky complex" explaining the "Russian soul"! But here we have it served to us cold, *au naturel*.

Mr. McMahon says: ". . . There is infinitely more to Russia than Communism. Though Dostoyevsky wrote decades ago people do not change so quickly. It is the same Russia fundamentally today as it was then, the same



people. These people are likable even in their grave faults." Here you have the well-intentioned Bear dropping a rock on the Hermit's head to kill a fly which bothers the Hermit. . . . "These people are likable" but . . . "they are fundamentally the same" as in the days of Dostoyevsky.

The trouble with this is, of course, that the comparatively few Americans who have read Dostoyevsky have only a very faint idea of the social, economic and political background against which his heroes lived and acted. This writer happens to have been a "landed gentleman" in the district of which Dostoyevsky wrote in the *Brothers Karamazoff*. I knew the descendants of the original Karamazoff family (their real name did not begin with a "K" but with a "D"). The place where the Karamazoff's disported themselves—Selo Mokroye—is the little town which is only ten miles from my former estate and I know it much better than Greenwich Village where I now live.

To me—an admirer of Dostoyevsky—a statement such as Professor McMahon makes is, to put it mildly, amusing. Dmitri, Ivan and Alyosha all lived and acted in an atmosphere of utter frustration caused by social conditions. They were representatives of a decaying class—the leftover of feudalism. I knew scores of such men in the two decades preceding the first world war. Their recklessness, their skepticism, their mysticism were products not of the "Russian soul" but of Russian conditions in the vastness which the reactionary statesman Pobedonostsev described thus: "Russia is an icy desert in which wanders the Evil Man."

A good machine, good books in the library, a good show coming to the collective farm, the assurance that one's

children will be educated and will have all the opportunities they can desire—are not conducive to skepticism, mysticism and recklessness.

The Soviet soldier abroad, in an overwhelming majority, knows very well that his future is assured, *that he will not have to hunt a job, but that a job will hunt him*. He knows that every war-cripple will be taken care of, that ten percent of all new housing is being allotted for the exclusive use of veterans, that his family has had their taxes and indebtedness, if any, remitted, if he has been incapacitated on the battlefield. These things do not breed doubts, pent-up and incoherent strivings, outbursts of boisterousness followed by relapses into *melancholia*, and mystic "soul-fog."

The soldier of the Red Army knows from experience that there is no social group in his country which has profited from the war. He also knows that before the war his life was becoming better every day, every month, every year. He knows that after the war it will resume its triumphant forward march. He wants change: this is absolutely true. But he wants change along the line which has proved so beneficial to him and his family. He certainly does not want to reverse history.

He is a soldier in an army which is ruled by the strictest discipline in the world. But this discipline is being applied to soldier, officer and general alike. For this reason it is not burdensome. Every kind of restraint is hard to bear only when you feel that it is being applied unequally. The same can be said of privation and hardship. A socially equal distribution of both hardship and enjoyment, of obligation and right, is the foundation of true democracy. It would be better for world



peace if American public opinion sought an explanation of the nature of the Soviet Union and its reflection, the Red Army, less in Dostoyevsky and in the past than in Alexei Tolstoy, Sholokhov, Simonov and the present.

The Red Army has proved its worth by victoriously disposing of better than three-quarters of the greatest military might history has known. This victory was based on solid achievements, on knowledge, skill, heroism born of faith in the Soviet way of life, and finally, on hatred of fascism, as the personification of the oppression of the weak by the strong. Instability, skepticism and mysticism have no room here.

The slanderous stories of a handful of correspondents hobnobbing with the ex-elite of Poland and the Balkans, the vagaries of superficial readers of Dostoyevsky and the rantings of those who, despite the record of the Soviet Union in the war, still cling to the hope that it will "go bust"—cannot form a solid basis for cooperation between the two greatest powers in the world. Not even tons of Uranium-238 can swing the Soviet Union from its chosen path. Cooperation lies not in trying to put the USSR in reverse, but in the realization that the days of Dostoyevsky are gone and in a realistic approach to the entirely feasible cooperation between two societies, striving toward a betterment of the lot of the common man, albeit by different methods and roads.

The first thing to understand is that the Red Army is not "just another army": because it is the army of a state the like of which has never existed before.

*Captain Kournakoff's latest book is "What Russia Did for Victory," published by New Century.*



"I'll teach you to ride on the back of a streetcar!"—Crocodile's comment on the Soviet traffic situation.

# The One Party System

By David Zaslavsky

Moscow.

**A** RATHER strange discussion has arisen in the press abroad: the bone of contention is whether or not the Soviet state is really democratic. It seems there are people who have their doubts. There are even those who deny it.

Still others are ready to recognize the Soviet Union as a kind of second-rate democracy.

In my opinion the best answer was given in the war just fought and won.

Without a doubt, this was a war of the united forces of democracy against the joint forces of fascism, and democracy was the victor. German fascism found its most dangerous enemy in the Red Army, which scored such a tremendous victory over the fascists. Now that the war is over, the country which is most consistently fighting for the eradication of all the remnants of fascism should be considered the most democratic. Not all the democratic states by far have done everything possible in this respect.

Take American democracy, as an example, which even up to now tolerates fascist propaganda carried on by a definite section of its press. In America and Britain there are persons living in peace and comfort who throughout the war with fascism openly advocated a compromise peace with Hitler, and did their utmost to save fascist Germany and undermine the unity of world democracy.

With these black spots of all shapes and sizes on west-European and American democracy, it would be better for those who like to take such a critical view of the Soviet Union to follow the sound advice the bear gave to the monkey in the famous old fable: "Why, dear lady, look so hard for the faults of others? Would it not be far better to look at yourself?" Or we might quote the words of Robert Burns and ask for the "giftie" to see ourselves as others see us.

We are not the least surprised that certain persons place their own form of democracy above the Soviet form.

Here in Russia we have a saying that every snipe sings the praises of its own swamp. But we cannot let pass the pretensions of these people, who would like to force their concept of democracy on

the world at large as the one and only concept.

**W**HAT are their objections to Soviet democracy? First of all, that there is only one political party in the Soviet Union. They insist that where there is only one party there is no democracy. Well, this is utter rot. Were we to agree that the number of parties determines the degree of democracy in any given country, then we would have to recognize the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy as the model of a democratic state. In the Austrian Parliament of those days there were almost as many parties represented as there were deputies. But this parliament was the laughing-stock of the nations, and history has buried it in the graveyard as despotism.

In the United States Congress there are virtually two parties. In the British Parliament there are three. Does it not follow from the above arguments that the British constitutional monarchy stands head and shoulders above the American Republic as a democracy? But then, in England the Liberal Party was practically wiped out in the recent election. It retained scarcely any of the seats it had in the last parliament. But that does not mean that the degree of democracy in England has also been reduced.

Each party tries to win a majority of votes and, if possible, all the votes and thus down the opposition. Does this mean that every democracy strives towards its own negation?

Others say democracy demands that an oppositional minority be represented in parliament, and without this there can be no democracy. We certainly agree. If there is any opposition in any one country it should be represented. But supposing there is no opposition? What then? Must one be set up in the name of democracy?

An opposition is an integral part of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, for the simple reason that opposing interests are part of the very life of these countries. It cannot but exist in a country which has within it classes with conflicting social interests. Where you have large landed estates, there is bound to be a constant struggle between landlords and peasants—hence the opposition. Where capitalists and workers exist side by side, there is bound to be a struggle

between capital and labor: in other words—opposition.

Under Soviet democracy there is no opposition, because we have no landlords and no capitalists. Nor can there be any, for the socialist system destroyed the very basis upon which it could arise.

All power, both in the Soviet parliament and in Soviet economy, belongs to the people—to those who labor. Is this not then the highest form of democracy?

I might by way of a joke ask the critics of Soviet democracy—what have they done with the opposition of the monarchists, of those who championed Negro slavery? These critics would be quick to reply, and in all justice, that these opposition groups are not represented in Congress because they no longer exist in life. The American monarchists disappeared from the scene almost 200 years ago, the open champions of Negro slavery some eighty years ago—though in their time they were very strong oppositions indeed.

**B**UT what these critics do not wish to understand is that in Russia the landowners and capitalists disappeared from the scene just as these other groups from their own country; and with them the champions of capitalism here have made their exit for good.

A second—that is, oppositional—party in the Soviet Union could only exist as a party seeking to restore capitalism, the big landed estates and gambling on the stock market. All this has passed into oblivion along with feudalism, the nobility and the autocracy of the Russian Czars.

Soviet democracy has put an end to it all. The Soviet Union is the highest form of democracy. Not only has it fulfilled the age-long dreams of the people, but it dealt the most powerful, most destructive blow against all forms of reaction, against all the advocates of fascism.

The second world war showed this, through the universally recognized feats of the Soviet people—more clearly, more decisively and conclusively than any slander can hope to refute. The Soviet people can only look with disdain upon those persons who seek to criticize, from the swamp-lands which are their habitat, the height attained by Soviet democracy.

# What They Think of the USSR

## In Europe

By Alfred Goldsmith

*Mr. Goldsmith was in the American Army in Europe for four years. The following represents what he heard and saw in the western and central part of the continent.*

NO AMERICAN could want a repetition for America of the war experience of France and England. The irony, however, is that the war experience in the sharply exact sense of bombings and shellings crystallized the ideologies of Europeans far more than those of Americans. No American landing in England in 1943 could miss it. The mind of England was moving left in 1943; and it was doing this underneath the enormous unity of the nation for victory. The ideas embodied in the westward movement of the Red Army were manifest throughout Britain. I remember the words "Uncle Joe" for Joseph Stalin written on a hundred walls from London to Bangor, Wales.

Bangor is some 200 miles from London, but its remoteness makes it seem much farther. The Welsh were in the war but their nationalism was steadfast. Yet here too the repercussions of the Russian drive were being felt; here too the strength of Russian arms was driving the mind down toward the source of that strength and to its history, which is the Russian Revolution. In a pub in Carnavon there were Australian, English and Irish members of the RAF on leave. Russia was the subject. The name of Stalin was spoken with a kind of wry affection. The pub legally closed its doors at ten o'clock, but the talk went on.

The English felt their innermost security tied up with the Soviet Union. The chambermaid in a London boarding house whose son was with the Eighth Army gauged his coming home as against the big facts of the war. One of them was, of course, the coming invasion of the Continent; and the other was the Russian army. In Leeds I talked to a girl who dreamed only of the end of the war and of changes in England. The change she talked about was a leftward trend in Britain. She was not

a Communist, but she could talk as she did only as a reflection of the enormous fact of the Soviet Union. This fact, grown out of 1918, was responsible for the energy and power of Soviet arms; this fact glittered in her eyes in the gloomy, blacked-out industrial city of Leeds in the fourth year of the war.

A REAL spring came to Britain in 1944. In May there was day after day without fog. D-Day was now close and those of us who were going to have some part in it, felt it coming. I went out to the East End of London with a friend; we walked past crater after crater, and abandoned houses whose bedrooms and kitchens were exposed like stage sets. We found a pub; we found a merchant seaman leaning against the bar who had made the Murmansk run many times. And this May he had decided, in lieu of the May Day celebration, to wear a Red Star for the whole month. He'd got it in Murmansk in exchange for a pack of English cigarettes. His Red Star was accepted by the crowd the way you accept any simple fact.

He talked about Russia with affection and respect. People listened to him and there was discussion, but not argument.

Now all this does not mean that there was no opposition to the Soviet Union in England in 1944. There was. But even in the opposition, which could be deadly and sinister enough, there was the recognition of the Soviet Union as a great political and cultural fact. Even in the opposition there was a more realistic sizing-up of Russia than there is by the American State Department. The whole level on which England—and Europe—understood the Soviet Union was several miles above the level on which these facts are understood in the United States, including, I regret to say, by the plain people of the United States.

This war gave to the peoples of Europe a single trend, and that trend was leftward. And while it is true that the dwindling illusions about Social Democracy could still be utilized as a po-

litical force, it is equally true that the real current was left.

It was that idea you felt in England before D-Day. And France showed something else again; something even deeper than the English trend. For the heart of the French Resistance was Communist, and no Frenchman worth a nickel has ever forgotten that. In Vichy, in January of this year, I met the Communist Party. The signs in the rented store which was the headquarters of the CP were the same ones you get in Communist Party headquarters elsewhere—"Be brief, state your business and don't loiter," "Please remember this telephone is not for private calls," etc.

Here were men who had first-hand knowledge of French fascism; and by first-hand I mean that they had seen the Petains and Lavals every day. The head of the Communist Party in Vichy was a cook, a wonderful, merry man who took me around the town, which is a Saratoga Springs bursting with hotels and mineral baths. He described without open bitterness the caravan of ministers arriving in Vichy in June 1940; Vichy, he said, "Was a red, white and blue Mecca. The head of this holy city was Petain and even the gift ashtrays had his emblem, the two crossed batons.

"I predict a Left trend in the municipal elections this spring. It should surprise no one who knows France. No one except those who wish to remain blind."

Paris in the early spring of 1945 voted in its municipal elections and it voted Left. Out of the mixture of pride and bitterness and neuroticism which the French were nursing; with homesick Americans, tired of the war, angry at the French for not giving them a paradise of lovely women strolling the boulevards—out of this and the Resistance came the municipal elections. The great fact of the Russian Revolution overlay this election as it did the more important national elections. How otherwise were the French to interpret their history of the last five years? Paris was hungry, Paris was cynical, but it had one ideal and one hope way down deep beneath the cynicism and that was the lesson of the Soviet Union.

THE last chapter of this journey is, of course, Germany. Germany in April 1945, with spring budding on the hills of Saxony but the air still chill

enough to seal off the stench of the corpses in Buchenwald. There are just one or two things I want to say something about. First, there is the old man in German uniform whom I met not far from Dresden. He had been a guard in a prison camp for American prisoners. And the American prisoners had great affection for this old man. He had done what he could for them as a guard; he had been given the choice of being put in a concentration camp or doing guard duty and had taken this job and put on that miserable uniform. He had helped these prisoners; got them extra food when he could; kept a personal record for the American Army of those men who had been beaten and starved to death. All this at the greatest danger to his life.

He was, of course, a Communist. I talked to him in the compound surrounded by the prison barracks. We went through a preliminary sparring, feeling each other out. He didn't say much. "I am," he said, "too old to change. I was a Communist in 1918 in the other war. I am very tired now and don't know what will happen to Germany. But Russia is younger than I am and I depend on her for Germany."

The experience of the German Left is unfathomable during this war. It remains to be depicted and documented during the next hundred years. How are you to figure out men dragged into the darkness and death of Buchenwald for seven and eight years—who persist in living and who still have a way of life in their bones when they are dragged out blinking into the sunlight in April 1945? Consider this: that there were Communist cells in Buchenwald; that Communists found a means of organization within this compound of corpses, starvation, incinerators and torture; that those who survived with sanity and without self pity were Communists.

It was a sailor from Eckenrode whom I spent an afternoon with in Buchenwald, a week later. He had been in concentration camps since the very beginning of the Hitler regime. He described all of this only on request. When I once held his arm it was like grasping a pencil. He was sunburnt and wiry, but I did not realize how thin until I held his arm. Then I realized that this man was alive and even healthy, in a minimal way. He was like a shrub you find growing at high altitudes; it survives but without luxury. This was how he was alive. He knew the Russian arms were beating westward and

the American arms eastward. He was a Communist grown out of the time of the other war; out of the Russian Revolution and the name of Rosa Luxembourg.

He was a tired man and at that moment he was not sure of what awaited Germany. But he looked toward Russia like that other tired man in uniform I had met a week before.

I WENT west toward home. In Paris on May First there was the May Day celebration winding past the Bastille. The French train of culture and freedom was back on rails again, as the

Russians walked the streets of Berlin. In England a week later they had their May Day; not quite as glittering as the French, but the English were marching around Trafalgar Square. When Bob Minor, speaking at NEW MASSES' John Reed celebration at Manhattan Center, said, "we in this country have burst the atom but the Russians burst the political atom twenty-seven years ago," it fit with what happened in Europe during the war. The English, the French, the handful of Germans who had hung on, were part of the energy of that burst political atom. And that energy will not rest.

## In India

By Norman Eberhardt


*Mr. Eberhardt has lived in China and India for several years.*

THE main factor in the attitude of the semi-colonial and colonial peoples of Asia toward the Soviet Union is the change that has taken place in that country since the end of World War I. In 1917 Russia was an absolutist semi-feudal monarchy, many of its main industries were owned by foreign interests, and its whole political and economic structure was reeling from the effects of a war it was not strong enough to bear. In 1922, the Soviet power had been firmly established, but the ravages of intervention and civil war had reduced her material condition to that of China today, and to something much less than that of India today. Between then and now the USSR completely emancipated all its peoples from imperialist influence, put an end to feudalism and illiteracy, and built its industry and agriculture to a point where it could become a victor in the greatest war of history, avoid the pestilence and famine that have been the concomitants of all its other wars and, despite its sacrifices, improve both its international standing and its prospects of internal progress.

There is no nation among the billion people of the Asiatic continent that does not feel within itself the same potentialities as those which lay in the peoples of the Russian Empire at the time of the October Revolution. There is no

nation on which the lesson of Soviet progress and power has been lost. On this plane, there is no distinction between classes in the desire of Asiatic peoples to learn from the Soviet Union, no difference in the self-confidence and feeling of power that Soviet progress has given them.

The second determinant is the fact that from its very inception the Soviet Union has stood forward as the enemy of imperialism—the chief burden of the Asiatic nations. The October Revolution was accompanied by the voluntary renunciation of the privileges Czarist Russia enjoyed alongside of the other imperialist powers—such as extraterritoriality and the concessions in China. The consolidation of the Soviet Union was accompanied by aid to the struggles for national freedom waged by such countries as China and Turkey, which was given without any conditions as to the political leadership of these struggles. Kemal Ataturk was anti-Communist, but so far as he was also anti-imperialist, Soviet Russia gave him aid. The character of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang was no secret to the Soviet leaders, but they aided them so long as they did not capitulate to the forces that were trying to hold China down. Much later, in pursuance of the same policy, the Soviet Union alone aided the feudal monarchy of Abyssinia in its fight against enslavement by the fascism of Mussolini, and the Kuomintang government of China in its early, and real, resistance



**Forewoman Zubajda Rakhmatova of the Molotov Carpet-Weaving Cooperative of Bukhara, Uzbek SSR, explains the rules governing the elections to the local Soviet of Workers' Deputies to workwomen of the cooperative's embroidering department.**

to Japan. No conditions were set for this. The social transformation of these countries was the task of their own people, but aid to their national independence, under whatever regime, was accepted by the USSR as an international duty.

**T**HE third determinant was the influence of the October Revolution itself, as distinct from that of the Soviet Union as a state and the constructive achievements of that state. Throughout Asia, October 1917 stimulated an interest in scientific socialism and the growth of workers' and peasants' movements. These movements fought not only against imperialism but also against domestic reaction. Their anti-imperialist stand was not opportunist and occasional, not a bargaining stand like that of the ruling classes but unwavering and fundamental. Where the ruling groups utilized the existence of the Soviet Union and its policy when they quarreled with the imperialists but offered themselves as anti-Soviet bulwarks in return for imperialist concessions and support, the progressive movements stood for friendship with the USSR at all times. While the ruling groups wished somehow to duplicate Soviet industrial advances while fighting against internal change, the progressive movements accepted the necessity of internal change as the only road to true independence and national reconstruction.

What I am trying to stress is that the response of the Asiatic nations to the growth of the Soviet Union has been as

different from the response of Western nations as the position of the two is different. Ruling classes in the West tend to see the Soviet Union as an obstacle to their imperialist aims, but even the ruling groups in the East know that the Soviet Union is a friend of their national interests, to be depended upon so long as they are acting for those interests and not as agents for someone else. The peoples of the West have been confused by the fact that despite the overthrow of capitalism in the Soviet Union, material standards there have not yet come up to those in Britain or America. The peoples of the East know where the Russians are, and that the non-Russian peoples of the USSR have partaken fully of the forward movement. Many Americans can and do believe the anti-Soviet slanders of the Pattersons and the Hearsts, but Patterson and Hearst would get nowhere in China or in India—not even among the anti-Communists there.

Owen Lattimore's book *Solution in Asia* is the first good American analysis of the fact that, in the Orient, the Soviet Union is regarded as a shining example not only by the workers, but by whole nations. The Indian may marvel at the technical achievements of England, but he knows very well that these things have been built up at his expense. The Javanese who studies in Holland may admire Dutch prosperity and even Dutch political institutions, but if he wants to fight for these things at home the Dutch put him in jail or shoot him down, as they are doing now. The Chinese, Indian or Indonesian who

comes to America sees not only material progress but race prejudice, and he knows by bitter experience that American interests are tied to those which oppress him at home.

The Soviet Union has grown by its own efforts, not by imposing tribute on others. All Soviet peoples, white or yellow, those advanced in culture as well as those emerging from tribalism, are equal. These things comprise what Lattimore calls the "power of attraction" which the USSR has for the Asian nationalist, and they explain why the Soviet Union is more truly and widely popular in Asia than anywhere else and is disliked only by those sections of the ruling groups which are willing to sell out their national interests through fear of the second "power of attraction"—that of Soviet social change—with regard to their own peoples.

**O**NE of the special characteristics of the war just past was the strengthening of the popular movements in all Asiatic countries which were invaded or threatened by Japanese fascism. In those which were wholly or partly subjugated, such as China, Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma and the Philippines, old and new Communist parties have been the main organizers of the people's resistance, and everywhere the resistance was organized on the basis of rural reform which challenged feudal starvation and gave the peasant masses something to fight for. In India and the Arab countries also, Communist Parties grew and Soviet popularity increased.

This was not the work of "Soviet propagandists" or "Comintern agents." The fact is that America had an OWI and OSS, while Russia, which was not even at war with Japan for most of the conflict, did not have such agencies. And in Burma, for instance, I venture to say there was not a single person who had ever been in or near the USSR. But the Soviet *example* and that of the Chinese Communists were followed, because they were the only ones that were useful under the circumstances. When the war ended, the Soviet Union, of all the great powers, was the only one that did not demand that the land reforms be reversed and the guerrillas disarmed. Molotov's plea for colonial independence at San Francisco and the summary treatment of Japanese troops in Manchuria, as compared with their use as gendarmes in areas conquered by other armies, likewise proved deeply relevant to the facts of life in Asia, whereas "trusteeship" discussions and the *New York Times'* semantic exploration of the

differences between Western and Soviet democracy did not.

Thus India's Jawaharlal Nehru, who is anti-Communist, can speak of the Soviet Union with an admiration that is different from that of many American liberals; while they pay tribute to the Red Army's military exploits, he sees in Soviet growth a lesson for India herself. Marshal Li Chai-sun, who killed Communists in 1927, could say at the thirty-second anniversary of the Chinese Republic: "We had our revolution in 1911 and the Russians had theirs in 1917, yet when we compare what has happened in our two countries since, we can only hide our faces in shame." Chinese and Indian engineers and scientists, with no politics but a great sense of frustration at the imperialist domination and feudal backwardness which has made it impossible for them to use their talents, can speak of Soviet construction not only with technical approbation but with the light of admiring envy in their eyes.

The scions of warlords, such as Yang Lin-hsi, son of the old ruler of Shensi, and Chang Hsueh-shih, son of the old ruler of Manchuria, can go so far as to join the Chinese Communist Party and its armies, alongside of such diverse people as Christian pastors and the children of millionaires. So also, in India, the late famous Communist Saklatvala belonged to the family which produced the directorate of the greatest Indian capitalist enterprise, the Tata Steel Works, and the son and daughter of a British Indian Prime Minister of Madras Province, among many others, are Communists. Here friendship for and emulation of the Soviet Union, often going the whole way politically, are national phenomena, and the only actively anti-Soviet elements are those willing to continue as puppets of the imperialists. At the present time, being a puppet provides the *only* reason for engaging in anti-Soviet tirades in these countries. It is not necessary to be a Soviet puppet to be pro-Soviet; it is only necessary to be a patriot.

As for the workers and peasants of China and India, ask any GI who has been there and has made the effort to get their views. Ask him whether he has ever heard any of them attack the USSR, or reward him with anything but blank incomprehension if he ventured to do so. The reason for this is not Soviet propaganda—the only propaganda the vast majority of these people have been exposed to is that of their own rulers, which certainly is not

(Continued on page 24)

# How We See It

*In connection with the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Soviet Union, NEW MASSES asked several people for their answers to the following question: What factors do you believe impede the development of good American-Soviet relations? The following are three replies received. Others will be published as they come in.*

## Rev. Hugh Weston

North Side Unitarian Church,  
Pittsburgh

IN AN article published in the *Journal of Liberal Religion* in the summer of 1943, I wrote that the end of the war would present to the scene of history a straining of Soviet-American relations. Some persons felt that this was a very pessimistic prediction. It is only to be regarded as pessimistic if we take it out of the context of the tremendous forces available for overcoming the causes of these strained relations.

For the end of the war has presented us, not with one, but with two sets of new factors that enter the picture of history. The first new set of factors is the deepening of the crisis in world capitalism, which naturally strains Soviet-American relations. But the second is the tremendously strengthened political conviction of millions of common people in every country on the earth who are determined to build a new world based on international unity.

It is a disconcerting fact, which can be ignored but which cannot be denied, that some American political leaders are thinking that the Soviet Union must be destroyed by American arms before we "lose" the secret of the atom bomb. When the Hearst papers dare to run such headlines as we have seen recently—"STALIN SEEN PLANNING NEW CONFLICT"—"REJECTS PEACE DREAMS"—and hear the even more blatant American fascists openly charging that Stalin is organizing to conquer the world, we can appreciate just how base the thinking of these reactionaries is. There is not the slightest doubt that the Anglo-American possession of the atom bomb has gone a long way toward swelling the heads of some of the worst of our American political imperialists. But even without the atom bomb, it could have been predicted years ago that the end of the war would see Soviet-American relations strained.

And this is so because there is a deeper reason behind the strained relations. It

lies in the fear and in the confusion with which the Truman and Attlee governments face the economic and political problems of the postwar world. Neither government as yet has had the courage to break with the old schemes of imperialist profit-getting, neither has had the bravery with which to take those steps which will lead on to the establishing of a peaceful, prospering and united world.

But—pessimism? No, there is no need and no room for pessimism. Only the mongers of a Soviet-American war need be pessimistic. For the argument is weighted in *our* favor. It is weighted with such things as happened here in Pittsburgh recently—half the workers coming off a shift at a mill signed petitions circulated by the Communist Party for full employment. No Red-baiting.

Because the workers want peace and security, and not war, they are ready to cooperate with Russians and Communists to get peace and security. And though the American people may still be confused, though still they may talk about "brutal methods" they believe the Russians sometimes employ, they have learned during this war that the Soviet Union is an ally, and a good one, and one we ought to keep.

The people are ready—for *peace*. They want all the help they can get in finding out how to organize and establish it.

## James P. Warburg

Author of "Foreign Policy  
Begins at Home"

THE factors which impede the development of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States relate in part to the two peoples and in part to the two governments.

The two peoples have not yet learned fully to trust each other. This is because they do not as yet fully understand each other. They are each more familiar with past strains and antagonisms than with the realities of their present common interest.

The Russian people remember our military intervention against the early Bolshevik regime. We remember Russian attempts to launch a world revolution, and our memory is kept alive by the continued existence of an American Communist Party which was originally

(Continued on page 30)

# Who's Intervening Now?

*By The Editors*

ON SATURDAY, October 27—Navy Day—President Truman laid down “the fundamentals” of the foreign policy of the United States. On that same day American airplanes, piloted by US Army flyers, were landing 3,000 Kuomintang troops in Peiping. During a nine-day period, including Saturday the 27th, they flew 27,000 troops of the Chungking dictatorship into an area which had already been virtually liberated by China's 8th Route Army but from which Chiang Kai-shek's forces had kept a safe distance during the war.

There was other American-Chinese activity on Saturday October 27. A large flotilla of American transports and LST's were en route along the China coast north from Shanghai to Chinwangtao, a city which commands the narrow land passage between Manchuria and that part of China which lies south of the Great Wall. They carried more Chungking troops and they were manned by American naval crews.

The transportation, by air and sea, of Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers was not the limit of American intervention into China's internal affairs. By October 27 about 62,000 American soldiers, mostly Marines, had been landed in Chinwangtao and other points on the Gulf of Pechili and along the Shantung Peninsula. This number far exceeded the combat force which the United States had put into China before the Japanese surrender. But that occasioned no surprise, for the American government had made it plain that what it was interested in was not the eradication of the sources of Japanese aggression but the prevention of a democratic upsurge on the part of the Chinese people.

It was therefore strange to hear President Truman on Navy Day list the following as the fourth of “the fundamentals” of American foreign policy: “We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the United States will not recognize any such government.” What else is the American government doing in China if it is not forcing upon the Chinese people a government which the great mass of them have repudiated and which, if it were not for our intervention, they would have eliminated some time ago?

Obviously if the Truman administration finds it impossible to prevent this forceful imposition of a discredited and hated dictatorship upon the Chinese peo-

ple it will find itself in the exceedingly embarrassing position of having to deny recognition to the very government it has set up! Either that, or the American government will be violating one of “the fundamentals” of its own foreign policy. A very awkward situation indeed!

The policy is hardly clarified by Lieut. Gen. Wedemeyer's statement that American troops would not intervene directly in the Chinese civil war. One wonders what the general is talking about. The use of 62,000 American soldiers at the scene of strife, the transportation of Kuomintang armies by American planes and ships, manned by Americans, and the training of some nineteen of Chiang Kai-shek's divisions by American officers and equipping them with American arms sounds to us like direct intervention, no matter how the general puts it.

By what conceivable mandate does the American government undertake this armed intervention against the democratic aspirations of the Chinese people? Certainly the American people have not given such a mandate. The American people approved overwhelmingly a mandate to President Roosevelt based upon the unity of the United Nations and particularly of its leadership by the Big Three. Such a foreign policy would encourage democracy, not obstruct it. Instead of betraying us it would serve the Chinese people as well as ourselves.

**WE THEREFORE** hold strongly with the appeal being made by the newly-formed Committee for a Democratic Policy Toward China, which under the heading “ACT NOW” urges you to (1) write a personal letter to President Truman and to your Senators and Representatives demanding the immediate withdrawal of American troops and war material from China; (2) to demand a policy toward China which will avert civil war and encourage the formation of a genuinely democratic government representing all political groups; and (3) to urge your own organization to take action on this matter immediately.

To this timely appeal **NEW MASSES** adds one further point: all democratic Americans must organize great mass protest against the American “gun-boat” policy in China, against American imperialism wherever it is today disturbing the postwar world, and in favor of a democratic foreign policy based upon the Anglo-American-Soviet coalition.

## Einstein and the Bomb

PROF. ALBERT EINSTEIN'S *Atlantic Monthly* statement on the atomic bomb is an illustration of how the best intentions can sometimes lead to the worst results. Aghast at the vision of the possible slaughter of two-thirds of mankind in a future atomic war, Professor Einstein argues that the secret of the atomic bomb should not be entrusted to the United Nations or the Soviet Union on the ground that this might lead to competition in atomic bombs. Instead, he urges that the secret be retained by the United States for the purpose of committing it to a world government. This world government is to be founded by the United States, the USSR and Britain, and its constitution is to be written by three men, one from each of the Big Three. Other nations would be invited to join the world government, but would be free to decline. Besides having full power over all military matters, the world government would also have power "to intervene in countries where a minority is oppressing a majority and creating the kind of instability that leads to war."

For those who have come to regard Dr. Einstein as not only one of the titans of world science, but a warm supporter of many progressive causes, this statement was something of a shock. In response to a request by the Independent Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, he issued a clarifying statement in which he said that "nothing is more important than to create an atmosphere of confidence between the great powers so that the great problem of abolition of competitive armament can be solved." Nevertheless, he reiterated his belief that sharing the atomic bomb secret would accelerate the armament race.

We are deeply convinced that all evidence points to the contrary. Dr. Einstein's assumption that only the United States can be trusted with the bomb secret unwittingly gives comfort to American imperialist forces. Dr. Einstein isolates himself from most of the scientists who worked on the bomb and who demand that it be placed under some form of international control. And he in fact refuted his own assumption when in an interview


with the New York *Herald Tribune* he indicated his distrust of our government's intentions by sharply criticizing the May-Johnson bill as "a measure of such reactionary tendency as has never been thought of by any modern state."

Dr. Einstein further reveals his confusion when he echoes malicious or ignorant prejudice against the Soviet Union, describing it as a country where "the minority rules." Concerning socialism he makes the fantastic statement that "it might more easily lead to wars than does capitalism"—a statement which the twenty-eight years of socialism in the Soviet Union completely refutes.

It is unfortunate that in discussing the social and political implications of the atomic bomb Dr. Einstein has not maintained the same rigorous spirit of scientific investigation that has made him one of the foremost geniuses in the realm of natural science. In a blundering sort of way he is recognizing that the development of atomic energy is incompatible with the existence of capitalism. We hope he will see, however, that the attempt to bypass the United Nations Organization can only strengthen the most reactionary tendencies within capitalism. At the same time, to seek fundamental solutions by changing, not capitalism, but merely its political superstructure through a synthetic world government, is just as utopian as to expect an orange, an apple and a banana to acquire the same outer skin without altering their inner substance.

### Berle in Brazil

THERE is no doubt but that Adolf Berle, the American ambassador to Brazil, is implicated in the overthrow



of the Vargas government. Last September he addressed the Journalists' Union and stated that he was against the postponement of the national elections in order to hold a constituent assembly first. The junta of reactionary military figures took his remarks as an endorsement of their plans for a coup. The new government itself will probably stop short all the reforms which Brazilian democrats had been pressing on Vargas, notably the dissolution of the fascist Department of Press and Propaganda and the National Security Tribunal. It will pretend to be following democratic procedure by holding elections next month—elections that are meaningless because the president-elect will hold office under the fascist constitution of 1937, which established Brazil's corporate state modelled after Mussolini's Italy and Pilsudski's Poland. It was for that reason that Brazil's anti-fascists demanded that a constituent assembly be held before the elections to write a democratic constitution. The Communists, headed by Luis Carlos Prestes, lead in the movement for an altered constitution, without which the next Brazilian president could rule by decree and make impossible the gathering of an Assembly. Prestes, after long years of imprisonment, has been arrested again, the Communist paper suspended, and Communist headquarters raided.

Directly behind the coup is an assortment of generals headed by Pedro Aurelio de Goes Monteiro, once decorated by Hitler. A key to the character of the present government is his reappointment as Chief of Staff. The whole dirty business is a black feather in Adolf Berle's cap. If Berle had kept his nose out of Brazil's internal affairs, the reactionary military leaders would have found it more difficult to move ahead with their plans. As matters stand now, the United States is in effect supporting them and helping to terrorize the democratic movement. The Council for Pan-American Democracy has strongly protested Berle's intervention and the State Department's failure "to carry out in deeds the high-sounding principles which its leaders enunciate." Apparently the Golden Rule is a one-way affair to be applied only where it gilds the pockets of American imperialists.



## Two-Way Truman

THE Roman God Janus who faced two ways must be the principal desk piece in Mr. Truman's office. The President's address on wages and prices sounds as though it were delivered under the dubious auspices of the two-faced deity. It was the sort of speech that could evoke simultaneous praise from certain labor leaders and from the *Journal of Commerce* which represents the employers on a sit-down strike against reconversion. Philip Murray, however, must have spoken the mind of most workingmen when he termed the speech "disappointing."

For central in the President's speech was a repudiation of a solemn pledge made by his predecessor that wartime take-home pay would continue after the war. This must have evoked sighs of relief from many a big corporation executive, even though the latter did not like certain passages in the President's speech, passages which, unless implemented by aggressive policy, will remain in the realm of pious generalization, a realm in which Mr. Truman is fast becoming a master.

Of course, there is little doubt that a man like Alfred Sloan, of General Motors, did not stand and cheer when Mr. Truman called for "substantial" pay increases, nor when the President reiterated a statement which labor, by now, has rendered a truism, that wage increases promote national welfare by maintaining spending power that helps every man in this country. Nor would Mr. Sloan like the President's declaration that substantial wage increases can be given and high profits maintained. As a matter of fact, government economists have already proved labor's contention that corporations could afford to pay at least twenty-four percent increases and still maintain more than double pre-war profits.

Insofar as he reiterated these truisms, Mr. Truman afforded labor some aid in its critical negotiations with corporations. The unions can point to the President's own words as they sit at the conference tables with the hard-fisted employers. But the latter know this all too well: labor cannot rely upon the President to back words with action. Mr. Sloan knows as well as you and I that Mr. Truman failed to implement his previous proposals with vigorous, crusading action. The fact that in his speech he singled out the various congressional committees for responsibility in the failure to enact decent unemployment insurance proposals and the full employment bill, must have caused less than a chill of fright either in the halls of Congress or in the counting-houses of Wall Street. As a matter of fact, Congressional

reactionaries are, at this moment, fashioning violently anti-labor bills, aimed at destroying the political, as well as economic, power of trade unions. And they hope to jam them through before the people are aroused.

For big business and its proponents in Congress read the President's omissions as well as his declarations: when he failed to castigate industry for the current unrest and strikes, he bolstered the intransigence of the employers. For the latter know full well that *they* are on a sitdown strike against reconversion, hoping to starve labor into submission, and to sabotage whatever remains of price controls. And they must feel they are getting away with it when the Chief Executive failed to bring this reality to the people. And when Mr. Truman called upon labor and capital to behave with sweet reasonableness, Mr. Sloan must have suppressed a smile.

The fact remains that Mr. Truman in his executive order included only a minority of labor in this action for limited wage increases, and he set a precedent for big price concessions to the employers.

In brief, the President failed when he refused to take a stand on the amount of wage increases government would demand that big business concede; he failed when he neglected to lay the blame at big business' door for the general state of unsettlement in the country. When he blesses dubious arbitration set-ups as the limits of federal responsibility he departs from the philosophy that underlies the Wagner Act—i.e., that labor, in its struggle for elementary rights, requires the conscious aid of government. Finally he failed utterly when his speech omitted a specific program to implement those generalizations which reflect the needs of the country.

For these reasons, the middle class and professional allies of labor, must realize that the nation's stake can only be protected by cementing their unity; and labor itself must achieve a singleness of policy as the Chief Executive moves further and further from the position—domestic as well as international—of his predecessor. The nation must realize that Truman, though he is not Hoover, is certainly no Roosevelt, that the Missourian is departing from his predecessor's role as leader of the democratic-labor coalition. This connotes the imperative for an increasingly responsible and aggressive role of all progressives, all democrats, in fashioning a powerful, anti-fascist, democratic front to protect our nation's interests.

## What They Think

(Continued from page 21)

weighted on the pro-Soviet side. The reason is again the facts of life and experience in Asia.

THE American people should know these facts of life. Those who hope to create "strategic positions" against

the Soviet Union in Asia should also understand that the creation of such positions involves not only fighting against "Red influence," but against the national feelings and democratic aspirations of the peoples of Asia. Rather than "fighting Soviet influence," the *national* interests of the American people demand that American democracy in Asia show itself in other ways than by backing the

suppression of national liberation movements.

To create hostility to the USSR among Asiatic peoples is impossible. But to prevent them from lumping the Americans with every other imperialist who has ever oppressed them, which hitherto they have not done, is an urgent and necessary job for the people of the United States.

# Simonov's "Days and Nights"

Reviewed by Dorothy Brewster

"SO FAR as the publishers know, this is the first non-political serious novel to come out of the Soviet Union." \* Non-political? I wish the publishers could be turned over to the definition-seeking Socrates for a few hours of talk on the banks of the Ilissus. But we shall have to let their pronouncement go, along with thousands of other pronouncements that in some new era may provide documentation for a treatise on book advertizing in the twentieth century. Isn't it upsetting, though, to reflect that calling a novel non-political is considered the way to the pocket-books of American readers? Do Americans really shy away from anything that might make them aware of other political systems than their own? In *Days and Nights* there are, it is true no orations by leaders, no exhortations by commissars, no discussions of Marxism. Stalingrad under siege was too busy for that. The longest speech by Stalin himself is the hidden promise of relief for the city: "Soon there will be a parade on our streets, too." But in all its implications the book is profoundly political. Whence came the strength to do the impossible at Stalingrad? Politics, H. G. Wells used to insist, is the state-making dream, the dream of a world better ordered, happier, finer, more secure.

The people who held out at Stalingrad had been dreaming such dreams. The woman we meet on the naked steppe east of the Volga names one by one the streets of her city that have been destroyed, but about her own home she says nothing. And Captain Saburov reflects that the longer the war lasted, the less people remembered their abandoned homes, and the more often and obstinately they remembered the cities they had left. "How much money! How much work!" says the woman. "What work?" asks someone, and she answers simply, "Building it all up again." Vanin, the senior political instructor of Saburov's battalion, had helped build the city; he and others had planned the green belt of trees around it that would protect it from the dust of the steppe. "We didn't think then that those three-year-old linden trees we were planting

would be broken up in about ten years by war, or that the fifteen-year-old boys who helped plant them would never live to be thirty but would die along these streets." Maybe, Saburov argues, "we should have paid less attention to all your planting of green trees," and more attention to things like drilling soldiers. But whatever they should or shouldn't have done—tried to build a happier life or made soldiers of everybody—now, at last, "there are just these three buildings, that's all"—and he put his finger on the map—"How about it? We won't give up the buildings, will we?"

Petya, the orderly, has his dream: to go back working on supplies, and "some-time when this war is over, they're going to tell me, 'Petya, rustle up for the workers' dining-room some oysters and some Chablis.' I'll tell them, 'If you please, my friends,' and for dinner there will be oysters and Chablis." Petya had been talking from his heart, thinks Saburov; these had been his dreams and dreams are never ridiculous. And he thought, "how many dreams, how many thoughts about the future, belated regrets and unfulfilled desires, had been buried deep in the Russian ground during the last year and a half, and how many people, dreaming, desiring, thinking, eager people had been buried in the same soil, never to accomplish now whatever it was they had dreamed about." Saburov's dream had been to be a teacher of history, and he had at last entered the university in June 1941. His generation (he is not yet thirty) had begun their independent lives in the years of the first Five-Year Plan, had been shifted from construction site

to construction site in the fever of building, had their education again and again interrupted by urgent needs of their country, and had learned such discipline and self-control that war itself could not break them with its hardships. So he held the three houses, and found love and comradeship and treachery among the ruins—to phrase it non-politically and tempt the reader.

THE narrative focus is on these three buildings, mainly, but on the Volga, too, and the many perilous crossings with wounded and supplies, and on the narrow strip under the bluffs along the shore, where Saburov has to crawl under fire to make contact with groups separated by German advances. It was bad luck, he reflects, that the west bank of the Volga was high and steep, like all the western banks of all the rivers in Russia; all the western banks were steep and all the eastern banks sloping, and all the Russian cities stood on the western banks—Kiev, Smolensk, Moghilev, Rostov—every town he could think of. And all of them were hard to defend because they were close to the rivers, and all of them would be hard to take back, because they would all lie beyond their rivers. Even in the cellars of the ruined buildings in the city, we are kept conscious of the sweep to the west, of all that is to be regained.

But most of all one feels one has lived in those cellars. Strangely cozy that life is sometimes, during lulls in the fighting. Human beings who remain warm and friendly are there; such as the woman, her husband dead, her three children with her, who has taken her store of cabbages and potatoes and her goat to the lowest cellar of this house where she had once had a comfortable apartment. "If you want something cooked, I'll cook it . . . let him tell me when you need anything; I can cook cabbage soup, too, only without any meat. Or I could kill the goat. If I kill him, there'd be soup with meat." She saw in Saburov's eyes that he understood and would not insist on her going across the Volga. Her talk about cooking was not to persuade him to leave her there, but simply part of the "deep desire of all old Russian women to take care of soldiers far from their homes." Petya the orderly constructs a kind of bath—a special dugout



Deckinger.

\* DAYS AND NIGHTS, by Konstantine Simonov. Translated from the Russian by Joseph Barnes. Simon & Schuster. \$2.75.



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with a ceiling made out of broken doors and a floor of bricks on which hot water could be thrown to make the steam of the Russian bath. It was pretty smoky in the bath and dirty, but nowhere had anyone ever bathed with such satisfaction as here. And coziest of all, sometimes during the night Saburov could squeeze in half an hour to read the books blown out of the building by artillery explosions and picked up among the rubble by the soldiers.

Simonov has complete command of a narrative movement that can pause for moments of sensory and emotional realization, and pick up breathless speed in moments of crisis. Joseph Barnes has so handled the translation that we are never aware of barriers between languages. The tension steadily grows until it seems utterly impossible for the besieged to hold out another hour. Then, one snowy dawn, Saburov is aroused by a phone call from the general, and runs out of the cellar into the snow, and stands there for a minute or two until he hears far in the distance a kind of unbroken rumbling that seemed to come from the north, and produced a feeling that something monstrous was going on, unheard-of in its size. "Is this really it?" he thought, and turned to the soldier near him. "Do you hear anything?"

"Of course I hear it. It's ours. You can tell by its voice. It has been going on for an hour and it never lets up." And it never did, till the two Russian armies, like two hands coming together on a map, met in the Don steppes, far to the west of Stalingrad.

## Russian Businessmen

PROSPECTOR IN SIBERIA, by *Jonas Lied*. Oxford University Press. \$3.75.

BUILDING LENIN'S RUSSIA, by *Simon Liberman*. University of Chicago Press. \$3.

JONAS LIED reiterates that he is not an enemy of the Soviet Union, but its friend. In tracing his evolution from Norwegian to British, to German and finally to Russian businessman, he points out that so great was his love for Russia that he actually became a Czarist citizen—a love obviously animated by his trading and lumbering interests in Siberia, under contracts from the imperial Russian government. From this he goes on to the description of his life under, and eventual escape from, the Soviets. It is one long wail over the difficulties of conducting trade under socialism (with the exception of the NEP period) and the further difficulties of acting as an agent of the Soviet

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government in its trade with other nations. Lied felt entitled to more trust than he was shown—and, of course, more profit. If he presents a true picture of himself and his relations with members of the government, then the Soviets would have had to be the most naive of political tyros to have trusted him, unsupervised, with a ruble.


Lied's pen portraits of Soviet leaders, his recital of intrigues and of the processes of social change so distasteful to merchants, show affinities to the complaints of other disappointed enemies of the socialist revolution. For comedy relief there is the chapter in which he plots to rescue the Czar from the revolutionary armies. Staggered by the other heroic feats he ascribes to himself in the course of the book, one is almost prepared to read that he had carried out that job successfully, too.

Of a different stripe is Simon Liberman, who writes "the autobiography of an industrialist who pioneered in nationalizing Russia's economy." Mr. Liberman, a native of Russia, was, like Lied, a businessman with interests in timber. He was also, however, a Menshevik, which fact presumes flickerings at least of an understanding of socialism. Unlike Lied, Liberman closes his book with a chapter of rare insight into Soviet motives and Soviet being. It is a convincing argument for friendship between the peoples of the USSR and the USA. Nevertheless, being both a businessman and a Menshevik, Liberman's viewpoint up to that point reflects these hostile bases of approach.

One of the first businessmen to work for the Soviets, Liberman was director of the nationalized lumber industry. For eight years of what the author described as unselfish and backbreaking work at home and abroad in the interests of Soviet lumber and other Soviet trade, he suffered from the attentions of the Cheka. But to judge from some of Liberman's alleged open expressions and whispered opinions exchanged with malcontents, there was basis for these attentions. Liberman's tapped telephones and sinister whispers and glimpses take on the characteristics of an obsession.

In neither of these books will a reader arrive at any understanding about the Soviet Union. What should be basic studies fritter into anecdotal odysseys. It is ironical that still, after so many years, it remains necessary to recommend a study of Marxist books for an understanding of the phenomenon of a Marxist society in a still largely capitalist world. Nothing less will do.

KURT CONWAY.



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
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## Brief Review

THE HIGHER HILL, by Grace Campbell. Duell, Sloan & Pearce. \$2.75.

Mrs. CAMPBELL fills in one of the gaps in our knowledge of our Northern neighbor with this well-written historical novel. It recreates the life of the Scotch pioneers who played an important part in the settlement of Canada, with the events of the war of 1812 as the background.

## Worth Noting

THE Committee of the Arts of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, will hold its first conference on American-Soviet cultural cooperation on Sunday, November 18, at the Engineering Societies Building, 29 W. 39th St., New York. There will be panels on music, theater and literature. Noted representatives of the various fields will speak, including Dr. Serge Koussevitsky, Aaron Copland, Elie Siegmeister, Marc Blitzstein, Margaret Webster, Cheryl Crawford, Harold Clurman, James Gow, John Martin, Arthur Upham Pope, Howard Fast, David Burluk, John Hersey, the Hon. Pavel P. Mikhailov, Edwin S. Smith and Charles J. Child. Sessions begin at two o'clock; admission is \$2.50 for panel sessions and evening sessions, and \$1.50 for evening sessions only.

RICHARD LAUTERBACH's *These Are the Russians* is the latest selection of the Book Find Club.



## MUSIC

THE practice of presenting a major modern work on the programs of the New York Philharmonic Symphony has made for vitality and freshness, noticeably lacking in the past. Mr. Rodzinski has been offering recent Russian music on this season's programs, and on October 21 he presented, in addition to Mahler's *First Symphony*, the *Third Piano Concerto* of Prokofieff, with Zadel Skolovsky as soloist. Though this is not a new composition (it was written almost thirty years ago), it is still interesting. It belongs in style and conception with the *Classical Symphony*, rather than with the later piano sonatas and the violin concerto. To me it is especially interesting for the light it



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
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throws on Prokofieff's development as an artist. Here we find the astonishing versatility we have come to know so well, the capacity of moving almost at will from one mood to another, from style to style—the neat combination of lyricism and whimsy. What was still to come was depth. The first two movements are more predominantly lyrical in character, and appear less original today than the vibrant and meaty *finale*. Skolovsky played with expertness—on the technical side—but with more than necessary emotional restraint.

Prokofieff was again represented on the program of October 27, this time with the children's suite, *Summer Day*, originally written for the piano. This is a delightful and simple thing, with the feeling and touch of the composer of *Peter and the Wolf*. The other new work on this program was Lopatnikoff's violin concerto. (Lopatnikoff, though Russian born, is at present living in America.) Whether it is—as I am coming to suspect more and more—that the violin as a solo instrument has become an anachronism, or that it is not sufficiently evocative of the best creative efforts of contemporary composers, this concerto struck me as painfully eclectic, as something of a cross between Tchaikovsky and those interminable Chausson monologues which still appear in violinists' repertoires. Joseph Fuchs, the soloist, brought to the work all the deftness and affection he could command, but these could not encompass the miraculous: i.e., endow the work with inspiration.

I cannot forbear one further comment in mentally reviewing these and other Russian compositions which I have been listening to recently. There is a shameful myth, current in certain musical circles in America, that the Russian musician is being "regimented." If the Kabalevsky concerto (on which I commented some time ago) and the Prokofieff works are examples of that "regimentation"—well then, the latter is either frightfully inefficient, or extremely intelligent and stimulating.

WHAT to hear in New York: Opera, New York City Center, to November 11. . . . New York City Symphony, Monday evenings. . . . City Center, Landowska, Town Hall, November 18. . . . New York Philharmonic (Darius Milhaud premiere), Carnegie Hall, December 6 and 7. . . . Maggie Teyte, soprano, Town Hall, December 19.

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**How We See It**

(Continued from page 21)

an outpost of world revolution and which still seems to owe its first allegiance to Moscow.

Both our past aggression against Russia and hers against us were based upon a belief that the world would have to be all capitalist or all socialist. Today both we and the Russians know better. We know that the mere existence of a socialist state—even so large and powerful a state as the Soviet Union—does not threaten the life and prosperity of our capitalist system; and Russia knows that a socialist state can live and prosper in a capitalist world.

There are two major reasons why the two peoples have not yet eradicated the prejudices which grow out of the past:

The Soviet government does not permit to its own people free access to information about the outside world; nor does it permit free access to information about the Soviet Union to the other peoples of the world.

A large part of the privately-owned press in the United States frequently, if not constantly, misinforms the people of the United States about the Soviet Union by expressing a strong anti-Soviet bias not only in its editorials but in its presentation of news. The Soviet policy prevents friendly American newspapers from successfully presenting a fairer picture of Russia to the American people; and the unfairness of a part of the American press in turn hardens the determination of the Soviet government to stick to its present policy.

A SIMILAR vicious circle exists as between the two governments. Each recognizes that the only hope of lasting peace and prosperity lies in whole-hearted cooperation with the other, yet each is suspicious of the other and inclined to erect a second line of defense in case cooperation should prove unsatisfactory. This again is largely a matter of mutual understanding.

It is hard to find a point where the vital interests of the Soviet Union and of the United States are in conflict. Both nations desire peace. Both are rich in manpower and natural resources. Neither desires territorial expansion. And neither competes seriously with the other for markets or raw materials. In spite of language difficulties the peoples of the two countries appear to like each other wherever they meet and work together.

They seem to have many characteris-

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in common—especially a certain youthful ebullience which sets them apart from the more sedate and serious-minded Europeans.

The outstanding difference between the two peoples lies in their varying concepts in regard to the relationship between citizen and state. Both peoples seek "freedom" and "democracy," but their ideas of what these words mean are very different. Once each understands the concept of the other, it should not prove difficult for each to respect, even though it disagrees with, the attitude of the other.

### **Robert W. Kenny**

*Attorney General, California*

**T**O MY mind there is no necessary cause for bad relations between the United States and Russia. There is not even a conflict of material interests. Even where there are controversies relating to some geographical areas or concerning the mechanics or personnel of government in one of the liberated countries, these controversies are not themselves matters of substance, there are not evidences of genuine antagonisms, but arise out of the following factors:

First, an anti-Soviet tradition in large sections of the press initiated in the twenties, and only slightly diminished during the war.

Second—and more important—is the inability or reluctance of many of our leaders today to think in terms appropriate to world organization. Many seem to find it impossible to deal with the world as a unit, and these tend to continue to think of balance of power, regional organization for defense, *cordons sanitaires*, and the other paraphernalia of past decades. This kind of thinking by necessary implication divides the nations into potential foes and potential enemies; it creates suspicion, engenders antagonism, and makes good relations difficult.

Third, failure of the *peoples* of the United States and Russia to know each other more thoroughly, to communicate more directly through labor organizations, cultural organizations, scientific associations, and purely social groups, and thus to build a common and friendly heritage.

I believe that these are the real difficulties. Disputes concerning Hungary, concerning voting procedures among the Big Five, concerning sharing atomic secrets, and the others are merely the means by which the countries implement these more fundamental obstacles.

# USSR



# FOREIGN POLICY

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# Stop the Spanish Atomic Bomb!

By **JOHN M. COFFEE**

*Member of Congress*

"EVEN as the first of the atomic bombs crashed down on Japan, the world was hit with the terrible knowledge that Nazi scientists in Germany were within a few months of being the first to successfully harness the terrible destructive powers of uranium. But the bombs which fell in Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not destroy the Nazi scientists who had spent a decade or more in working on the development of atomic power.



\* The German cartels, who hired and supervised the researches of the Nazi atomic scientists, today control more than forty per cent of the industrial resources of fascist Spain. Many of the German Nazis who worked on atomic bombs in Nazi Germany are now safe and working in laboratories in Nazi-Falange Spain.

On July 3, 1945, I introduced a resolution (H.R. 312) in the House of Representatives which called for a complete diplomatic and commercial break with the Franco regime. I said then, and I repeat it now, that such a move on our part would severely curtail the life of the Nazi-Falange regime in Spain.

Franco Spain is, today, the last outpost in Europe of Axis fascism. It is the last refuge where Axis cartels and Axis scientists can function without interference. It is the one spot left in Europe from which the Axis fascists can launch still another attempt to seize world domination.

I must remind those who think my warning is far fetched that it was in Spain that the Nazis in this war did much of their experimental work on the rocket bombs which hit London and Antwerp, killing British civilians and American soldiers alike. I need only point to the map of Europe to show how dangerous Spain can be as a launching point for rocket bombs carrying atomic explosive warheads.

The atomic bomb makes the continuance of Nazi fascism in Spain the personal problem of every peace-loving American. Once deprived of diplomatic and commercial relations with the United States, the Franco regime will fall. I therefore, call upon all Americans who

love their country to immediately wire or write to the President of the United States, asking him to follow up the gains of San Francisco and Potsdam by immediately breaking all diplomatic and commercial relations with the Franco regime in Spain. I also ask all Americans to write to their own Representatives in Congress urging their support of H.R. 312, the resolution calling for a diplomatic and commercial break with Franco Spain.

Franco mortally fears the Coffee Resolution.

When the American Committee for Spanish Freedom, headed by Bishop Lewis O. Hartman, launched a drive to get one million signatures to a petition favoring the passage of H.R. 312, the Madrid radio savagely attacked the American people. Franco's radio spokesman said that it would be impossible to find one million Americans to sign this petition. There is only one way to answer this slur: clip the coupon below, and send it to the Committee for as many copies of this petition as you can distribute. It is up to the American people to determine our national policy towards Nazi-Falange Spain. The Coffee Resolution is the people's mandate on Spain. When it passes in Congress, Franco falls. Your future is in your hands."

*John M. Coffee*  
M. C.

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