

SOCIAL SCIENCES ✓
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New World
✓ **REVIEW**

SPECIAL ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

**40 YEARS
OF THE USSR**

**24 YEARS OF
AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS**

Rockwell Kent

Paul Robeson

G. D. H. Cole

D. N. Pritt

Corliss Lamont

Kumar Goshal

E. H. S. Burhop

Ralph Parker

Diego Rivera

J. D. Bernal

Scott Nearing

Anna L. Strong

Eslanda Robeson

Herbert Aptheker

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Colonial Questions
and UN Correspondent*

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TO OUR NEW READERS

We hope this special enlarged issue will be of interest to you, and that you will become a subscriber. Our regular issues, though smaller, have equally important material on the decisive issues of our times—**EAST-WEST COEXISTENCE AND PEACE.**

Each month we publish an extended article containing material not to be found elsewhere, written by specialists, or our own correspondents in many countries, in addition to shorter pieces.

Thus in the past year, we published two comprehensive articles on Soviet scientific developments, which help to explain why SPUTNIK was possible. Also, a detailed survey of automation in the USSR; a brilliant discussion of the current Soviet literary situation by Ilya Ehrenburg; a detailed analysis of the controversial novel "Not by Bread Alone."

On China, we have covered such questions as Land Reform, the attitude of Chinese capitalists to Socialism, the "Hundred Flowers" policy, new political forms, birth control, many aspects of day to day life.

On Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries we have published articles by first-hand observers which help tremendously in clarifying the news reports in yours daily papers. Eslanda Robeson regularly covers the UN and colonial affairs for us.

Corliss Lamont has said of the regular analyses of American-Soviet relations and peace developments by editor Jessica Smith—"There is nothing like it in the country."

These, and the current issue, are a sample of what you may expect if you take out a trial subscription for five months at \$1.00—or a year's sub. Please use the form below!

TO OUR PRESENT READERS

We hope that you will find this issue up to the standard you have come to expect of us and which your encouragement has inspired us to work for. But this has meant a severe drain on our funds—again we must appeal to you to help us. Please fill out the form below and be as generous as you have always been in the past.

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PEACE ON OUR PLANET

by JESSICA SMITH

EVERY November we publish a special issue marking two anniversaries—that of the establishment of the world's first Socialist State by the Russian Revolution of November 7, 1917, and that of the opening of American-Soviet diplomatic relations on November 16, 1933—sixteen years later.

Sputnik, the new traveler in the skies, has dramatized the special meaning that these dates hold this year.

The opening of the way to the stars is a victory not only for the Socialist Soviet Union and its people, but for all mankind.

Whatever else Sputnik may be saying with its "beep-beep beep-beep" to extend the frontiers of man's knowledge, it carries one ringing message that all can understand as it swings in its orbit encircling all parts of the earth—

"One world at peace—one world at peace—one world at peace."

This message has particular import in the field of American-Soviet relations, the key to the peace of the world.

As Sputnik, extending man's reach beyond the earth on which we live, marks a great turning point in civilization, so may it mark a great turning point in American-Soviet relations, as the guarantee of the continued life and growth of all the precious fruits of that civilization

and of the realization of the shining and boundless new potentialities to which the way is opened.

It is inevitable that man should reach toward the stars even before he has mastered the problems of our own planet. All human progress has depended not alone on the solution of immediate day-to-day problems but on the winged imagination and creative powers of those who see beyond them into the wonders the future can bring.

So let there be competition for the conquest of outer space. But it must be competition for peaceful purposes alone. This is only possible by making an end to the arms and nuclear weapons race—for until it is ended there is a chance that there will be no one left on earth to reach or even see the stars.

The end of the arms and atomic weapons race will turn hundreds of thousands of scientists around the world from the search for ever more monstrous weapons of destruction to the search for ways to save the people here on earth from hunger, poverty, disease and untimely death. How many of these problems the atom could solve!

Peaceful coexistence instead of the cold war and little wars and threats of big ones will open the way to a sharing of scientific knowledge for the advancement of all people. Funds going into huge military bud-

gets could be used instead to find a cure for cancer and heart disease and the other great scourges of mankind, for enhancing the well-being of people everywhere.

In the field of health alone there is no limit to the ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union could help one another and hence all the peoples of the world. What a boon to humanity would be the pooling of their knowledge and methods and that of other countries as well! Already at international conferences doctors have been amazed at the extent of cancer prevention work in the USSR. The Soviet program of public health has achieved a drop of 75 per cent in the general death rate since 1917, of 83.3 per cent in child mortality, and has doubled the life span of the people of the USSR. In the last eight years tuberculosis cases have dropped by two-thirds, and a program has been inaugurated to wipe it out entirely in the next ten to fifteen years.

In a peaceful world, there need be no scientific secrets. All could share their knowledge with all. The competition would be in who could first achieve healing results—and what a glorious competition that will be! This is the great meaning that American-Soviet friendship, peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition, could have for all mankind.

IT WAS Franklin D. Roosevelt who saw and acted upon the need for normal and friendly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, for the mutual benefit of the two peoples and for the peace of the world.

It is deeply appropriate that today, after her first trip to the So-

viet Union, Eleanor Roosevelt is calling for a resumption of the normal and friendly relations inaugurated by her husband but disrupted in the cold war years since his death. She has come back urging greater interchange between the peoples of the two countries, greater understanding and knowledge of each other—"I think we American people should know a lot more than we know"—and convinced that the Soviet people and their leaders sincerely want peace. At a press conference on her return, Mrs. Roosevelt described the Soviet Union as "A going concern that cannot be defeated by military force. We've got to beat it by being better than they are." (*New York Times*, Sept. 30.)

Writing of her interview with Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mrs. Roosevelt said that Khrushchev had fully agreed with her statement, "We will have to do things to create confidence. One thing that can be done is a broader exchange of people." (*New York Post*, October 6.) They agreed also on the need for economic as well as cultural interchange.

In a speech before the Advertising Club, Mrs. Roosevelt said that today American tourists were able to know more than ever before about conditions inside Russia. "But," she continued, "now we are the ones that have the Iron Curtain. We can't have Communists coming into this country unless the State Department says it's of particular value to the United States." (*New York Times*, October 9.)

OUR own work of bringing greater understanding and knowledge

of the Soviet Union to the people of America has been hampered by this lack of contact. While the number is growing, too few Americans have visited the Soviet Union in recent years for us to bring our readers the kind of reliable, firsthand material on all facets of life that we should like to. As the Soviet people celebrate their fortieth birthday summing up what they have accomplished in these years, a great deal of material will be published in the USSR, which we shall bring to our readers as it becomes available.

IN THIS issue, we have tried to assess the meaning of the Soviet Union to its own people and the world in a broader sense, emphasizing above all the need for a new approach, a new basis for American-Soviet relations.

This new approach has been proved essential in recent months even for those circles in our government whose hostility and hatred to the USSR are so consuming that they are willing to bring us to the brink of a new world war in which we would all go down together. Even in their own terms, their policies are self-defeating and are in fact increasing the world influence of the Soviet Union. The terrible blow that has been dealt American prestige by Little Rock on the one hand and Sputnik on the other, could only be retrieved by a change in policies. Instead they drive it lower by refusing even the first steps toward disarmament, by insisting on a continuance of nuclear tests against worldwide opposition, by threats of war in the Middle East (see article by Kumar Goshal) as an answer to

supposed threats of Soviet aggression, when it should be apparent that what the USSR seeks is not its own domination of the area, but independent and neutral governments which will refuse to be pushed into war.

It is our constant concern to influence all those we reach to bring unceasing pressure on our government to end all warlike policies, to make a start towards a disarmament agreement beginning with an unconditional and immediate end to nuclear weapons tests, and to enter on the road of peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union.

It is an equal concern that all progressive forces, all who believe in socialism of one kind or another, by one road or another, all who believe in peace, should find a greater unity among themselves in order to struggle more effectively against the forces of reaction and war. In this, the attitude of all such people toward the Soviet Union is a key question. Frank recognition of grave errors, the purification of socialism, is a legitimate concern of all who strive for a higher form of society. Sharp differences are inevitable and must be aired. The question is to prevent these from perpetuating a hostility that can only retard progress and to find those areas of agreement which will lead to cooperation toward the common goal.

For this reason, we are especially privileged to publish in this issue articles by two British Socialists of differing viewpoints, D. N. Pritt, Q.C., and Prof. G. D. H. Cole, and a reply to the latter by the American Communist, Dr. Herbert Aptheker.

Mr. Pritt's theme is what the atti-

tude of socialists of all kinds, right and left, should be to the USSR. He faces frankly the mistakes and crimes of the past that have been revealed, at the same time showing where all sincere Socialists must stand in the final analysis.

Professor Cole sets forth his basic criticisms, as a British Fabian Socialist, of the USSR, while also affirming that he finds much to admire. Dr. Aptheker expresses his deep-going differences with Professor Cole, at the same time emphasizing those areas in which they can find common ground.

We believe that the spirit in which these three writers express their views is an important contribution to the development of discussions between socialists of the left and right. We recommend an extension of this type of discussion, which we believe can do much toward bridging the disastrous dissensions that have existed. In the shadow of atomic war, greater understanding and reconciliation among all progressive forces, peaceful coexistence among them, can become a powerful factor in helping to bring peaceful coexistence among the nations.

"To Live Without War"

IT WOULD be impossible to encompass in one issue of our magazine all that the Soviet Union has accomplished in forty years, to assess fully the meaning of all that has transpired in that historic period for its own people and the people of the world.

But we should like to emphasize now, at this most grave juncture in human affairs, the supremely positive role that has been played by the Soviet Union in the question that overrides all others in importance, the question of peace, which today resolves itself into the three words—can mankind survive?

As the first act of the young Soviet Republic in its world relations was its appeal to the world for peace, so its actions today are concentrated on that same goal.

Elsewhere in this issue some of the history of that long struggle is recounted, as well as the concrete forms of the current peace proposals of the Soviet Union.

In the grave Middle Eastern crisis, now before the United Nations, the Soviet Union has repeatedly called for a renunciation of the use of armed force and of interference in the internal affairs of the area.

In the all-important question of disarmament, the Soviet Union is on record for a sweeping program to eliminate the danger of war through drastic reduction of armed forces and complete prohibition of manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles. When agreement on this total program proved complex and difficult if not impossible, the Soviet Union then offered a program of partial steps incorporating many of the ideas proposed by the West.

The USSR has persistently proposed as an immediate step separated from all other measures, the unconditional end of testing of all nuclear weapons, for a period of two or three years, demanded by peoples all over the world, supported

by Japan and India and many other nations, with international inspection teams stationed on the territory of the testing powers and in the Pacific. Such a self-enforcing step, it declares, would save mankind from the terrible radiation hazards to which we are all now exposed, would ease international tensions and increase confidence, would facilitate agreement on other aspects of disarmament, and stop the dreadful race toward ever more destructive weapons.

In the current discussions of disarmament in the UN Assembly, Foreign Minister Gromyko has extended the Soviet proposals to include a pledge by the nuclear powers not to use such weapons for five years.

Yet, while there is increasing support for this position within the United Nations, the United States sticks to its complex package proposal which emphasizes questions of control and not disarmament, makes clear its intention of continuing tests and offers its new policy of "limited" war with tactical atomic weapons, which can only increase the dangers of an all-out atomic war.

Every statement by Soviet leaders emphasizes concern for peaceful coexistence. Mrs. Roosevelt quoted Khrushchev as saying in her interview with him that "War is unthinkable and a terrible thing," and expressed her conviction that "without question he is sincere in his desire for peace and eager to negotiate a disarmament plan." (*New York Times*, Sept. 30.)

This desire can best be expressed in Mr. Khrushchev's own words, spoken in his interview with James Reston of the *New York Times*, published in that paper October 10.

To a question of his attitude on peaceful coexistence, Mr. Khrushchev responded:

We have always supported the peaceful coexistence of states belonging to different social systems, the peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist countries.

The fight for peace is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Why? Because we have no classes interested in robbing foreign lands and enslaving other people, interested in making profits out of the arms race. Because we need peace for successful Communist construction, in order to create an abundance of the material benefits for all members of Soviet society.

We live on the same planet with you, and there is enough room on it for all, but distances on this planet, thanks to development of intercontinental missiles, and other achievements of science and engineering, have considerably diminished before the eyes of our generation. Therefore it is more important than ever that we be reasonable and learn to live together as good neighbors.

Naturally there exist and will continue to exist contradictions between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism. . . . However, if people all over the world consciously make every effort to prevent a new war, they will be able to impart to the struggle between the system of socialism and the system of capitalism, the form of peaceful competition, first and foremost, economic competition, that is a competition in peaceful production, in improving the living standards of the entire population.

Asked whether the latest achievements in space travel can be controlled so that they should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, Mr. Khrushchev said:

If we are able to reach agreement on disarmament . . . if we are guided by noble aspirations to strengthen peace, it is quite possible to bring about a situation in which these means would serve exclusively peaceful purposes. . . .

Although the United States does not have the rocket today, you will have it, since science is constantly developing. The same may be said of the Soviet Union: if today we do not have something that you have, we will have it too. This, too, is a form of competition. But we do not want such competition, we want peaceful relations, not the stockpiling of means of destruction. . . .

As statesmen we must do everything possible to prevent wars and to reach agreement on major international problems, including the problem of disarmament. We are ready even now to conclude a reasonable agreement on the entire problem of disarmament, to considerably reduce armed forces or even not to have any army at all, leaving only a police force to protect honest people from robbers and thieves who, unfortunately, still exist. But we do not need wars. . . .

On American-Soviet relations, Mr. Khrushchev spoke as follows:

It is now clear to any reasonable man that in our days it is impossible to solve international issues by force of arms, that there is only one path, the path of peaceful negotiations, taking into account the interests of all the participants of the negotiations, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. . . .

If all the states and, first and foremost, the USA and the USSR, possessing the greatest military and economic might, would in a businesslike way, in a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding, strive for discussion and a resolution of the important international problems complicating the situation and hindering the establishment of firm trust, then the chances for peace throughout the world—and I stress for all countries and peoples—would grow considerably. . . .

In the years of the second World War the Soviet Union and the United States fought together against the aggressors. One can ask why is it that we cannot prevent war. Now, we can and must do this. . . .

The Soviet people believe that the American leaders . . . will ultimately recognize the need for peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union and then

the efforts of the American people will be directed to strengthening the peace and security of all nations.

For its part, the Soviet Union, true to its policy of peace, will continue to follow the course of reducing international tension and of improving relations with all countries, above all with the United States, since our relations at present cannot be regarded as satisfactory. We persistently seek to improve relations between the USSR and the USA and to develop all-round contacts between our countries, between the Soviet and American peoples. . . .

One thing only is needed for this: To recognize what has historically taken place, i.e., to recognize that the USSR exists as a Socialist state, to recognize that China exists as a Socialist state, to recognize the existence of other Socialist states. It must be recognized that these states are developing in accordance with the will and wishes of their peoples, and there must be no interference in their affairs. We, for our part, proceed from the realistic conditions of the existence of such capitalist countries as the USA, Britain, France and others, and the social structure of these countries is the domestic affairs of their peoples.

We believe that all controversial questions must be settled by negotiation without war. If for a time it is impossible to reach agreement on some problems, we must be patient and strive gradually for their solution.

We think that if the United States displays a readiness, there are no questions on which agreement could not be reached, to live without war on a basis of peaceful competition—such is the foundation of coexistence.

Thus the hand of the Soviet Union is proffered to us in friendship. There can be no better way to celebrate these anniversaries than to exert all our efforts to induce our government to offer its own hand in return. Then we can march together towards the goal of human brotherhood, of health and happiness and peace, solving together the problems of man on earth, striving together to reach the stars.

Living and Learning Together

by ROCKWELL KENT

*The world is so full of a number
of things
I'm sure we should all be as happy
as kings.*

AND HOW VERY full of things —things useful, from trains and planes and three-toned, tail-finned motor cars (I'm speaking of America of course), from things to do our work for us, to boil and broil, to roast and bake and fry and freeze for us, from countless, wondrous labor-saving things that all but think for us to myriads of things invented to beguile for us our thing-worn leisure! Ah, yes indeed, how full of *things*, chock full, our world, our native land, America, has come to be! Surpassing all the world in *things*, no wonder that with natural and proper pride we make of things possessed the standard of our "way of life" and of the "ways of life" of others.

And no wonder that a young American girl in Moscow for last summer's Festival, though remarking the people's happiness ("They enjoy themselves. They have more than ever before. There is no unem-

ployment. Everybody seems to have enough of the essentials to eat, and a place to live. They have security," quoted in a West Coast paper) was appalled by the limited variety of goods available in the stores.

"There were the same dresses," she reported, "the same styles in each of the stores, and at the same prices. There were just one kind of shoes. Nobody would say Soviet medicine is backward, but the medical products tasted bad, and nobody seemed to mind it." And life for them, to her, seemed dull. "Everything," she said, "seems to be heavy and monotonous. For the young it is all education and work—very little else. The only relaxation is in the summer when they go to the camps or resorts. Of course there are parks in Moscow; there is the opera and symphony and ballet; and there are lots of motion picture theaters. These are always crowded." And though she might have added the stadia for sports, and observed, as others have, the people's passion for reading, and the worthwhile character of the books they read, still, all in all, for herself and, presumably, for many other young Americans, "it would get," she said, "a little boring."

Some months ago Joseph Wood Krutch in an illuminating article

ROCKWELL KENT, distinguished artist and writer is the new chairman of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. An exhibition of his paintings was held in Moscow this year in honor of his 75th birthday.

recognizing happiness as being the aim of all mankind, questioned the validity of a material standard of living as a yard-stick for its measurement. Citing, as I recall it, the peasantry of Bali, he spoke with the greatest respect of their culture, of the weaving of their native arts into the people's daily lives. Though all but utterly without the resources and commodities that are our boast, they were a happy people.

In my own life I have met what seemed to me great happiness among peoples whose way of life was starkly primitive: the happiness, for example, of the Greenlanders, a people twenty years ago still mainly dependent on their own relatively very limited resources and continually faced with such hazards of existence as made their life span but a fraction of our own. And the peasantry of the remoter parts of Donegal, in Ireland, living today much as did their forebears centuries ago: they too, though having little, were content and happy. It might well have been of them that Pope wrote those verses remembered from our school days:

*Happy the man whose wish and care
A few paternal acres bound,
Content to breathe his native air
In his own ground.
Whose herds with milk, whose fields
with bread
Whose flocks . . .*

But why go on! Throughout the ages poets and philosophers, concerned with human happiness, have found it not dependent upon wealth nor even upon comfort, as material possessions may contribute to comfort, but, rather, on contentment.

"Whoever," wrote Epicurus, "does not regard what he has, as most complete wealth, is unhappy, though he be master of the world."

We Americans are—or, until the advent of the new satellite in the heavens, held ourselves to be—"masters of the world." We are possessed of a vast "number of things." But we are not—unless Robert Louis Stevenson wrote in irony—as happy as kings. And so far from each of us regarding what he has as ample wealth, envy—characterized by the expression "keeping up with the Joneses" and translated into *buying* by the arts and crafts of high-powered salesmanship, *buying* glorified as patriotic duty—envy has become an essential factor in our way of life. It is the corollary of the inequality that competition fosters.

Concerned as I and most of us are with the achievement of happiness, not only for ourselves but for our children and the children of all mankind, we would do well to judge the way of life established or in progress in the socialist countries not by the *things* available to their people—their scant variety of clothes and, maybe, foods; their housing shortage, their lack of innumerable convenience for living—but, rather, by to what extent social and economic equality has been established and whether or not socialism in practice and relieved, of course, of outside strains and pressures, offers an eventual fulfillment. It may be that, with happiness our goal, we have a lot to learn from Russia.

But there are, besides contentment, other facets to the jewel of happiness that need consideration—or, better, factors of contentment itself other than mere lack of envy.

With, for example, the greater leisure time of which technological advancement, particularly under socialism, assures us: what are we to do with time? Or with ourselves for its most full and rich enjoyment? Would education and the cultivation of the arts not add to our contentment? Yet although we Americans, as Mr. Krutch in the article I have referred to reminds us, hear a great deal about a "chicken in every pot" and "two cars in every garage," nothing is said about a book in any living room. It is perhaps again possible that in the fields of education and the arts, as these may be factors in the profitable enjoyment of leisure, we can learn a lot from Russia.

And still another facet of our jewel is the enjoyment of freedom by the individual to be his natural and free, outspoken self. Can Russia be our teacher there? Except in the field of rights and privileges for women, in the matter of workers' freedom of occupational choice, of freedom through security of employment, from economic fears, and freedom to be white or yellow, black or brown, and not lose social status, I would say not anything. What in

the fields of politics Marxism-Leninism is to Russians, our Jefferson and Lincoln are, where freedom is the issue, to Americans. We know what freedom is, what civil liberties are ours by legal right and past enjoyment of them. We have good memories, we older men—or, I should say, we *white* Americans—of freer days. And if we are now to halt their obviously swift evaporation and, expanding them, extend them to us all, that is *our* job. And, remembering Lycurgus' admonition to a critic to "Go . . . and first establish democracy in thy household," we should refrain from criticizing others until we shall have built Jerusalem in our own land.

But there is much that we can learn—from Russia and the socialist states. And there is much, of course, that they can learn from us. They *have* learned much; and they are undoubtedly most eager to learn more. Not—and this we teachers must remember—toward the "overthrow" of our respective "ways of life," but toward such mutual enrichment of each other's "way" as free, unhampered intercourse can yield. Live and let live. Let us have peace.

KHRUSHCHEV ON NEED FOR US-USSR EXCHANGE

FROM THE TEXT of the interview with Nikita S. Khrushchev by James Reston of the *New York Times*, published October 10:

"It is more important than ever that we be reasonable and learn to live together as good neighbors. . . . As for exchange of ideas and information, such an exchange should serve precisely these aims, it should serve to strengthen mutual understanding and friendship between nations and not to sow the poisonous seeds of distrust and hostility between them. The exchange of ideas and information should promote and not undermine the peaceful coexistence of states with different systems. We support such an exchange."

Forty Years Ago And Now

by RALPH PARKER

FORTY years ago the world was knocked off balance by the news that in Russia the Bolsheviks had taken political power into their hands. Reports varied, opinions were sharply divided, but most agreed that for the time being at least the old regime was out and that Russia would never be the same again. Only much later, however, did friend and foe of the Soviet Union see eye to eye on the fact that the thunder of the guns of the revolutionary cruiser "Aurora" had ushered in a new era in the history of mankind.

The Revolution of November, 1917, broke out as an angry protest by the working people against the war that had brought Russia to the brink of catastrophe; against the rule of the exploiting classes whose methods had become more extortionate since the failure of the 1905 revolution; and, in the outlying parts of the Russian empire, against national oppression. It was with the words peace, land for the peasants, social justice and the brotherhood of man on its lips that the Revolution was born—but the strongest of these was peace.

RALPH PARKER, NWR correspondent in Moscow, has lived in the Soviet Union for fifteen years. Formerly representing the "New York Times," he has traveled widely in the USSR. Mr. Parker has translated into English a number of recent Soviet novels.

The Revolution, the greatest in scale and most profound in its aims and purposes of all revolutions, proclaimed the age-old aspirations of the working people, the end of the exploitation of man by man, the end of social and national oppression. This was a challenge to all the forces of the decrepit old world, a challenge immediately accepted: a veritable crusade was launched against the socialist revolution. Fourteen states contributed arms, treasure or manpower to a war of intervention, attempts were made to strangle the Revolution by hunger and blockade, all the forces of propaganda which had been sharpened during the war were turned on to invent lies and slander about the infant socialist state.

Of these slanders two were particularly venomous: it was said that the taking over of power by the workers and peasants would inevitably lead to a fall in production; it was said too that the masses of the people were incapable of governing the state. But as long ago as 1941, when the supreme test came, the Soviet Union showed that Lenin had been right when he foretold that the socialist revolution, the overthrow of the power of the capitalists and landlords, would open up the way to an unprecedentedly rapid development of the productive forces. Moreover, the 40 years

of the life of the Soviet state have proved that the working masses are not only capable of destroying the old social system but also of building up a new, socialist, system of state and society; of overcoming in a brief period of time their country's technical and economic backwardness and of creating a highly developed economy: of establishing new relationships between different nations, and of awakening millions of people to conscious creative endeavor.

Now, in celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the Revolution, the Soviet people recall the words of Lenin: "We have a right to be and are proud of the fact that it has been our good fortune to *begin* the erection of a Soviet state, and thereby to *usher in* a new era in world history, the era of the rule of a new class, a class that is oppressed in every capitalist country, but which everywhere is marching forward towards a new life, towards victory over the bourgeoisie, towards the dictatorship of the proletariat and towards the emancipation of mankind from the yoke of capital and from imperialist wars."

In the early part of the 20th century, the pivotal point of all the contradictions of imperialism and its most vulnerable link was Russia. No wonder that by the beginning of the century Russia had become the center of the international revolutionary movement. The revolution of 1905 marked the beginning of a period of great revolutionary storms; it was the prologue to the victorious battles of the working class in 1917. In February that year the tsarist autocracy was swept out; two months later Lenin, relying on the support

of the masses, advocated a peaceful development of the revolution, a path that presupposed all power going over to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' deputies, the Party's winning the majority in the Soviets, and then changing their policy in the interests of the working-class—in other words, a peaceful, "parliamentary" way to power through the elected, democratic Soviets.

But the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries refused to concentrate all power in the hands of the Soviets and in July, 1917, the shooting down of a peaceful demonstration of workers and soldiers by the Provisional Government signified the establishment of the power of counter-revolution. It was against this power that, at the VI Congress of the Party, Lenin's directives for the preparation of an armed uprising were aimed. On October 25 (November 7), 1917, the workers and soldiers of Petrograd overthrew the Provisional Government. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the transfer of all power to the Soviets and formed a workers' and peasants' government, headed by Lenin. This congress adopted the historic decrees on peace and on land. The Decree on Peace opened the path to a revolutionary way out of the war and laid the immutable foundations of the peaceful policy of the Soviet state. The Decree on Land embodied the centuries-old dreams of the millions of peasants for the abolition of landlord land ownership. So were the foundations of the new Soviet state laid. The workers and peasants became the owners of all the land, its mineral wealth, all

factories and plants, mines, railroads, power stations and all other means of production. The chains of national oppression were smashed and the formerly oppressed peoples elevated to the status of free and equal peoples.

Having taken power into their hands, the workers and peasants of Russia began peaceful constructive work. They were attacked by reactionary forces both within and outside their frontiers. The Soviet Government called on the people to rise for a revolutionary war against the foreign interventionists and internal counter-revolution. The Soviet people's victory in that war seemed to confirm Lenin's prophetic words: "Never will a people be vanquished, whose workers and peasants in their majority have learned, felt and seen that they are upholding their own, their Soviet power, the power of the working people, that they are upholding the cause, the triumph of which will insure them and their children the possibility of enjoying all the blessings of culture, everything created by the labor of man."

It was an unknown path that the Soviet people took when, their enemies defeated, they set about building the world's first socialist society. They were in the main guided by Lenin's plans. These envisaged the abolition of Russia's technical and economic backwardness, the creation of a socialist economy, the transformation of the country into a mighty industrial power and high living standards based on the development of all branches of the national economy. The idea of socialist industrialization formed the core of the plan because only the development of heavy industry, es-

pecially machine-building, made it possible to reorganize all branches of the national economy, agriculture included.

The young state started under a grievous handicap. When the "heritage" received by the Soviet system from tsarist Russia is mentioned nowadays, it often implies the low level of economic development attained by Russia in 1913, i.e., on the eve of the first world war. In reality the Soviet state did not even get that meager "heritage." Between 1913 and 1920, enormous damage had been inflicted on the national economy. In 1920, for example, the large-scale industry of Russia put out less than one-seventh of the production of 1913; smelting of pig iron was only 2.7 per cent of the pre-war level; production of cement, 2.4 per cent; soap, 7.1 per cent; cotton textiles, 4 per cent. At that time steel production had dropped to 200,000 tons a year. At the present time the Soviet Union produces this amount of steel in less than two days.

This was the situation when the Soviet people began to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. They could rely only upon themselves, on their own forces and means to surmount the unprecedented difficulties of the economic ruin and exhaustion, poverty and famine, and to pave the way to socialism in a short time. They made enormous sacrifices, consciously limiting their material and cultural requirements since they were aware of the fact that they had no other means of transforming their land into a country with a first-class socialist industry and large-scale mechanized socialist agriculture in a short time.

Industrialization could not suffer delay, every young Russian who went to work on the construction sites of the first and second Five-Year Plan periods knew that. The situation of the time offered no respite. Either the Soviet workers and peasants were to solve the problem of industrialization fast or the Soviet state would be crushed by a new intervention.

During the first Five-Year Plan periods the whole of the country was imbued with the fervor of constructing the giants of socialist industry and mastering the new techniques. Thousands of enterprises, whole branches of industry, unknown to pre-revolutionary Russia, were created in a short time. New cities and industrial centers came into being. New railroads laid for many thousands of miles; the lights of newly built electric power plants were turned on. And the Soviet Union was transformed from an agrarian into an industrial country, equipped with plants that were able to produce all kinds of modern machines. The mockery of the capitalist world at the "Bolshevik economic myth" and its hopes that the Five-Year Plans would fail were replaced with fear of the growing might of the USSR. At a time when capitalism was rocking from the effects of the economic crisis, when in the United States there was a 44 per cent curtailment of production and millions of unemployed roamed the streets of its cities in search of bread and work, when mountains of food-stuffs were being savagely destroyed, burned and dumped in the sea, the Soviet socialist system was forging ahead.

The world read with amazement

of the cultural revolution that was being carried out simultaneously with the socialist offensive along the whole line: of the new network of schools, clubs and higher educational establishments; of the introduction of universal compulsory elementary education in the languages of the peoples of the USSR; of the new respect for labor that followed the abolition of unemployment and the disappearance of the workingman's fear for his future; of the profound changes in the people's consciousness, morality, and their attitudes to society and to each other.

This was the world upon which Hitler fell; this was the progress the Wehrmacht's invasion put a temporary stop to; 1,700 cities, 70,000 villages destroyed, 32,000 industrial establishments blown up or burned down, iron and steel mills which before the war had accounted for nearly two-thirds of the country's steel put out of commission. The invaders plundered and damaged 100,000 collective farms. But the hardest blow was the death of millions of Soviet people.

Some who wished the Soviet Union no good calculated that these losses were so heavy that the USSR would inevitably become enslaved to the United States in the post-war period. But it was by their own unaided efforts that the Soviet people brought the fourth and fifth Five-Year Plans to successful completion. By the end of 1956, industrial output was 3.5 times the 1940 level. The general level of industrial production in 1957 was 33 times greater than in 1913. With this basis the USSR could bring about an increase of consumer goods

production 74 times as great as in 1913. The world's first atomic power station has been in operation in the Soviet Union since 1954 and construction of new, much larger, atomic power stations is under way at present. Soviet science and engineering have solved the problem of constructing and launching an intercontinental ballistic missile and an artificial satellite of the earth.

Forty years ago the share of the Soviet Union in the world's industrial production was less than 3 per cent; today it is approximately 20 per cent.

The Soviet Union has advanced to first place in Europe and second in the world for the volume of industrial output. It is rapidly overtaking the most advanced capitalist countries in per capita production. Per capita industrial production in the USSR, which was only 1/13th-1/14th of the corresponding ratio in the USA in 1913, had grown to 2/13th in 1937, and to 5/13th today. Thus the gap in per capita industrial production between the USSR and the USA has shrunk in Soviet years to 1/3th its former size.

More than fourfold the number of people are at work in the USSR than in tsarist Russia of 1913. In most recent years the Soviet Government has introduced many new measures designed to improve the standard of living of those workers and their dependents. Increases in wages and salaries have been granted to the lower paid categories, pensions paid to aged people and invalids have been raised substantially, the duration of maternity leave has been extended, and tuition fees, never high, have been abolished in the higher and secondary schools (they

never applied to elementary education).

More than 50 million people are studying in the Soviet Union today, the higher and specialized secondary schools having an attendance of over 4 million (it was 182,000 in 1913). More than 6 million specialists with higher education are employed in the national economy today (in 1913 they numbered less than 200,000). Two hundred and forty thousand scientific workers, almost 24 times more than under the tsarist regime, are employed in higher schools and in scientific institutions. More than 770,000 specialists graduated in 1957 alone. The rate of increase in the training of specialists has no precedent in any capitalist land.

Pre-revolutionary Russia had one doctor for each 10,000 inhabitants, the USSR today has 17. The number of hospital beds has grown from 13 to 70 for every 10,000 of the population. Medical assistance is free of charge.

That the cost of these achievements was high—too high—no friend or foe in the outside world knows better than the Soviet people themselves. They also know that the repressions, crimes and violations of legality revealed during the Twentieth Congress, were no part of the normal development of the Soviet State, but distortions of what should have been its true socialist course. They have confidence that the process of correction, of insuring that these things will not happen again is an irreversible one, and that even though it may not be as swift and unwavering as they would like, the guarantee of its irreversibility lies increasingly in their own hands.

That the achievements, too, are irreversible, is the sure foundation on which they are building a society of ever-expanding material and cultural wealth, which they are determined to protect and nurture in a world at peace.

The Fortieth Anniversary of the Revolution sees the Soviet Union pursuing policies that were defined at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party. Briefly speaking, the task facing the country is that of the construction of the material and technical foundation of Communism, of overtaking and surpassing within a brief historical period of time the most advanced capitalist countries in per capita production. An important factor in the struggle to fulfill the decisions of the congress is the fundamental reorganization of the management of industry decreed early in 1957. This affords the best opportunity for combining centralized state leadership with greater local initiative, and stimulates the activity of the masses.

Important measures are also being put into practice in agriculture. These include the reclamation of virgin land, the appointment of good managers and specialists to the farms, the raising of state procurement prices for agricultural products, and a reform of the method of paying collective farmers. Local initiative has been stimulated and greater incentives offered for increased farm production. Results have been so encouraging that in 1957 the Party was able to issue a call to the agricultural workers of the USSR to overtake the USA in the next few years in the per capita production of milk, butter and meat.

In accordance with the directives of the 20th Congress the working day has been reduced in the USSR by two hours on Saturdays and holiday eves, and the general working day has been reduced for some categories of workers and for juveniles to six hours. A seven hour working day will become general within the next two or three years.

Tremendous attention is being paid to solving the acute urban housing problem, created by rapid industrialization, war damage and the need to restore industry first. The Party plans 12 years for the task of ending the housing shortage.

The present leaders of the Soviet Union are determined to secure a wider and more direct participation of the people in the administration of the state, in the management of economy, in the struggle against red-tape. The prestige of the Soviets has been enhanced and public control of the executive secured by reducing its administrative powers.

A vigorous struggle is being waged against the consequences of Stalin's arbitrary rule so that the possibility of any repetition may be precluded. The violations of the law by the secret police have been a matter of particular concern to the present leaders of the USSR.

On the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the 1917 Revolution the Communist Party is laying heavy stress on the importance of the Party maintaining constant daily contact with the broadest popular masses, and concern for the needs and the well-being of the people. And the Soviet people are responding to this by hailing the anniversary as a great national occasion, a day of rejoicing, of renewal of faith in their cause.

The Soviet Union, Peace and the Atom

by **PROF. E. H. S. BURHOP**

EVER SINCE the Soviet Union came into existence forty years ago it has been preoccupied with the need to maintain peace. "Peace, bread, land," the slogan that appealed to countless millions of Russian soldiers, workers and peasants in those grim days of 1917 may seem a simple, and, to some, a demagogic foundation for building a new society. And yet it does represent something that is fundamental in the whole ideology of the Soviet State.

Socialism, a form of society without any need to engage in an inexorable struggle for markets and for regions for the export of capital, requires peace if it is to develop and flourish. This belief is axiomatic in the Soviet Union. The skeptic may question the axiom, but whether or not one is a Socialist, the fact that 200 million people sincerely believe it must be a factor for peace. And such a belief can only be maintained if the government of that country manifestly, in the eyes of its own people, bases its foreign policy on peaceful coexistence and cooperation between all nations.

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This is why the Soviet Union has again and again throughout its forty years of existence, taken the initiative in proposing measures, often of a spectacular kind, for strengthening peace. In the twenties it came to the Disarmament Conference and startled the other delegates by proposing the complete abolition of armaments. In the thirties it led the struggle for collective security, and for the only policy that could have stopped the forward march of the dictators and prevented the Second World War. After Munich, when, as a result of the blindness, indecision, and worse, of the Western Powers, the policy of collective security lay in ruins, the world situation became one of great complexity and danger, the Soviet Union felt constrained primarily to look after its own interests. The measures it took in seeking a *modus vivendi* with Hitler are still the subject of bitter controversy. But by 1941 this period had ended and the USSR was engaged in the most terrible life and death struggle in history, and there began to be forged the great coalition, which, it was fervently hoped, would ensure the peace in the post-war years.

But even in these years of the Grand Alliance, the seeds of mis-

trust were being sown. Under conditions of the very greatest secrecy from their Russian ally the American and British governments began pooling their scientific resources in the development of the first nuclear weapon—a development that ended in the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the piling up of a legacy of hatred of the West in large sections of the Asian peoples.

The Soviet Union emerged from the war without any of the responsibility for the use of weapons of mass destruction on its shoulders. The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision taken by Truman and Churchill. Stalin was merely "informed" at Potsdam, in a guarded way, of the intention to use a weapon of unprecedented powers.

It was common knowledge among scientists working on the Manhattan project that the security authorities were at least as anxious to prevent any whisper of what was afoot from reaching the Soviet ally as they were to keep such information from the Nazi enemy. And there seemed, at least in some quarters, an inclination to regard the nuclear weapon as a factor in the post-war struggle with the Soviet Union rather than as having much importance in relation to the war currently being fought.

Inevitably the question of the bomb has been at the center of political controversy ever since the end of the war. Right from the start the Soviet Government took an unequivocal stand against its production and use. While the Western Powers sought means only to control it and argued that their defense plans were based on the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union firmly and con-

sistently argued the case for its outlawing. Of course, at the time, this stand was analyzed as corresponding only to the interests of the USSR since they had no bombs. It was attacked as a "trick" to persuade the Western Powers to give up their prize weapon in order to leave them helpless victims to the allegedly numerically superior Russian manpower. In view of the course of events since the end of the war some of our Western statesmen can perhaps be forgiven if they just occasionally look back a little nostalgically to those days of 1945 and 1946 when a real prospect existed of exorcising the specter of nuclear war, and of securing the abolition of nuclear weapons under conditions of strict control with the co-operation of all the Great Powers.

But this was not to be. Dizzy with the success of the harnessing of atomic energy in the bomb, the politicians were only too ready to listen to those voices that exaggerated the alleged technical backwardness of the USSR, and claimed that it could not catch up with Western scientific progress. At the Congressional hearings at the end of 1945, the great prestige of General Groves was used to argue that it would take a generation for the USSR to build a nuclear weapon, that even countries like Switzerland would build it first, because of their skill in constructing watches and scientific instruments. Many of the atomic scientists knew otherwise. Some, like Irving Langmuir, had recently returned from the Centenary celebrations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and expressed a healthy respect for Soviet scientific and technical achievements. But the views

of General Groves were those which the politicians wanted to hear. These views prevailed. And listening to Mr. Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, one would have thought that the atomic bomb was divinely sent to save the Western Powers from the barbaric hordes.

The politicians at that time had to make, as it happened, perhaps the most portentous decision in all history. Literally it was the last chance, firmly and securely, to set aside the threat of annihilation of the human race. This does not mean that agreement cannot even now be reached, or that mankind is doomed. But the decision to build up atomic weapons and to equip armies with them, to develop and then to mass produce the hydrogen bomb—these decisions meant that for all time in the future there could be no complete assurance against the use of these weapons. An agreement in 1946 could have been enforced without fear of any illicit stocks slipping through the control net. An agreement today could never be enforced with the same degree of sureness because the stockpiles are now in existence, no certain method is available for detecting them, and none seems possible of development.

Control of production of nuclear weapons, or *abolition* of their production and use—this is the issue that has divided the Western Powers from the Soviet Union through eleven years of tortuous discussions and still, by and large, divides them today.

The calculations of the West, on which their original position was based, were proved monstrously astray. Within three years of the end of the war the Soviet Union was

developing its own atomic weapons, within nine months of the first American explosion of a hydrogen device the USSR had exploded one of its own, and it has taken the lead in the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile. Yet in spite of these developments the policy of the USSR remains the abolition of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of their use, the destruction of the stockpiles, the stopping of their manufacture and of their further testing. So much for those who argued that the Soviet stand for abolition in 1946 was dictated by weakness and fear!

But in the intervening years certain positive features have developed. In 1945 and 1946 the realization of the dangers of nuclear weapons was practically confined to the scientists. Today, the widest circles of the people everywhere have become conscious of their implications and are anxious to see them abolished. As the tests of nuclear weapons continue and radioactive materials become more and more widely distributed in the atmosphere, in soil, in vegetation, in milk and in human bone, carrying with them the threat of leukemia and bone sarcoma to the present generation and of unknown damage to the precious hereditary material of the human race, the conscience of the people everywhere has been roused. People of every imaginable political view and religious faith and in every country are speaking out for the stopping of the tests and the abolition of nuclear weapons. Pope Pius, as well as the leaders of Protestant churches, the eighteen leading West German physicists, hundreds of Japanese, Russian, and British sci-

entists, thousands of American and French scientists, countless millions are on record in statements, petitions, deputations, against the production of these weapons or their testing.

This mighty concord of voices cannot be ignored forever. And yet, just at this moment, months of negotiations in the UN Disarmament sub-Committee in London have ended in an atmosphere of unmitigated frustration. Let us pause for a moment to look at the background for this failure and to see if we can do anything to break the deadlock. In the current negotiations the Soviet Union has taken the position that the question of nuclear tests can be separated from other aspects of disarmament, and agreement on their cessation should not be made dependent on any other conditions. The question of the "cut-off" of production of fissile material for military purposes on the other hand cannot be separated from agreement on the prohibition of the stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. At an early stage of the present discussions the Soviet delegate proposed a suspension of tests for three years and the setting up of control posts on the territories of the major powers, and near the test areas, to ensure the suspension was adhered to. This willingness to establish such inspection posts was welcomed by the representatives of the Western Powers on one of the few occasions when the atmosphere of arid criticism that has characterized the talks gave place to a more understanding approach.

The Western powers proposed first a ten-month suspension of nuclear tests, and later a two-year sus-

pension. This was made conditional, however, on a "cut-off" of production of nuclear material for military purposes being achieved within the two-year period. At the end of the first year substantial progress would have to be made toward achieving a control scheme—the continuation of the test suspension for a second year is made conditional on such progress, and the "cut-off," together with its control arrangements would have to be in full operation by the end of the second year, otherwise the nuclear weapon tests would be resumed.

It is easy to understand the motivation of the different attitudes on these issues. The United States is a "satisfied power" with regard to fissile material. The stocks of it are now sufficiently great to meet any military contingency that can be foreseen. After all it is only necessary to have ample for the annihilation of any possible combination of opponents. It is not necessary to be able to do this many times over. On the other hand the USSR has still some way to go before having stockpiles equal in size to those of the USA. Hence a ban on production in the near future would place her at a military disadvantage relative to the USA, unless such a ban were accompanied by a ban on the stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. And such a ban the Western Powers are not willing to accept. Indeed they argue that, in the event of war, their plans are based precisely on the use of these weapons.

Further, with regard to stockpiles, the Western Powers argue, not, as we have seen, without justification, that no sure methods of detecting illicit stockpiles have been, or are

likely to be developed, while, on the other hand, illicit production of fissile material could be detected if there were an effective system of inspection. The technical case for the Western position on this issue, however, is not quite as strong as has been suggested. After all if production is subject to inspection and control, each side will know the rate of production of fissile material that the other side had attained. They each know also approximately when such production started, so that it should not be too difficult for each side to estimate fairly closely the size of the stockpile held by the other. The illicit concealment of any but a small fraction of the stockpile would not be possible.

The participants of the London discussions are sufficiently experienced to know that, in the present state of tension, diplomatic negotiations will not succeed if they have the effect of altering the relative strategic positions markedly to the disadvantage of one side or the other. The Russians know that if the production of fissile material for military purposes continues a little longer they will reach equality with the Americans with regard to the size of stockpiles. Hence their position that the cessation of military production should be linked with an agreement to ban the use of, and dismantle the stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

There are other points of disagreement too, only slightly less important than those concerning nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government has accepted the need for measures to guard against surprise attack, and that such measures should include not only ground con-

trol posts, but also aerial inspection of the kind proposed by President Eisenhower. The Western Powers have made a number of alternative proposals for such inspection zones, but none of these include such vital strategic areas as Africa, the Middle East, or South-east Asia.

On the level of conventional forces also, an issue on which some years ago agreement seemed near, there is a marked disinclination on the part of the USA to agree to a reduction to a level that would necessitate the liquidation of a large proportion of their overseas bases. Being realists, we should apply the same principle to this matter as has already been applied above in the case of cessation of military production. Since America already possesses these overseas bases, it is unrealistic to think that she would agree to a measure that might mean their disbandment without a quid pro quo.

Furthermore, in the Western proposals, any progress at all in disarmament is made conditional on progress toward the solution of political problems. Some, like the reunification of Germany, are definitely specified, while others are vague and unspecified.

Now it is true that part of the difficulty met with in disarmament negotiations stems from the lack of confidence on both sides. While this atmosphere persists the discussions will only continue on the cynically realistic basis of quid pro quo that has been referred to above. Genuine negotiations in which the aim of disarmament is pursued as desirable for its own sake, and for its effect on the lives and happiness

of the people, will only become possible when the atmosphere of mistrust is replaced by one of confidence. And it is certainly true that political settlements will make possible the creation of this atmosphere. But even granted this, in the present stage of the talks it seems remarkably unhelpful to lay down political conditions as a necessary prerequisite for the acceptance of specific disarmament proposals.

If, as suggested above, the prospect of a lasting disarmament settlement depends on building an atmosphere of understanding between the peoples of East and West, then this is a measure in which we ordinary people, far removed from the diplomatic struggle, can play a hand. The maximum development of cultural and scientific contacts can help to promote this end.

As an example of what is possible in this direction, I would refer to the recent international conference of scientists sponsored by Lord Russell at Pugwash, Nova Scotia, to discuss the dangers of nuclear weapons, and which the writer was privileged to attend. This conference was attended by some very eminent scientists from ten countries, including three from the USSR and six from the USA. At the start of the meeting there was evidence of mistrust, and many wondered whether such a meeting could achieve anything. But when the initial barriers were broken and the scientists were able to get down to quiet, informal talks, it was found that the things that divide were less important than those that united them in the common purpose of ensuring the deliverance of mankind from the threat of annihilation,

made possible by the misuse of modern science.

The desire of the Soviet Union to see the end of the race in the development of nuclear weapons is not difficult to understand. The vast potentialities of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and what these could do to open up the remote areas of their great land, and to increase the wealth of the whole country, has an irresistible appeal to a people, who, like the American people, are used to thinking in terms of projects on a grand scale. I believe that the consistent Soviet policy aimed at securing the abolition of nuclear weapons is due, not only to a desire to reduce the danger of mass annihilation, but also to enable the vast reservoir of human talent and material resources at present locked up in the military program to be released for creative and constructive work. This same yearning is felt by peoples everywhere, not least by the American people. But in the case of the USSR this yearning is strong enough to reflect itself in government policy.

Already spectacular progress has been made. The first power station actually producing electricity on a commercial scale was built in the USSR, although of course, this station was only small and has been overshadowed by the development of the Calder Hall stations in Great Britain. But a very ambitious program for the development of atomic power is going forward in the USSR alongside its other large-scale projects. I have heard colleagues returning from visiting scientific laboratories in the USSR refer with envy to the large scale on which radioactive isotopes are available for

scientific research. And the great accelerator at Dubna for fundamental research on high energy physics, the largest in the world at present, demonstrates the high level of technical and scientific skill available. At scientific conferences in recent years, surprise has again and again been felt at the growth of the importance of Russian science, and the originality of some of the ideas it has thrown up.

The race to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, to harness thermonuclear energy for power production, to tap the vast resources of solar energy, to send the first earth satellite into outer space for scientific research, to discover

how to raise the normal life span to 100 years, to achieve the highest wealth per head of the whole population by the fullest development of natural resources; these are some of the legitimate subjects of competition between the Soviet Union and other countries, particularly the U.S.A.

On this occasion, at the end of forty years of existence of the new Soviet State, let us all resolve to see that in the coming period legitimate rivalries are directed into channels of discovery and control over nature for the benefit of all, and are not allowed to develop along the lines of military rivalry that could only end in war.

From Paul Robeson

WARMEST GREETINGS on this historic day—the anniversary of the great October Revolution.

In 1934 came the first visit of my wife Eslanda and myself to the Soviet Union. For me it was like a visit to another planet—where the people had no prejudice on grounds of color—where indeed a new land was in being. And now in 1957 the scientists of this socialist land—through their collective socialist effort—open up the probability of an actual journey to other planets.

Through the years, we have watched the phenomenal development of this socialist society. We have seen the birth of the People's Republic of China, of the New People's Democracies of East and West, all immeasurably aided by the power and might of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and the change in the balance of world power between the new defenders of the rights of peoples of all colors and the centuries-long imperialist oppressors of the West.

Today we see the hope for peace striding in seven-league boots toward its realization.

Let us look ahead to years of rich cultural exchange in every field—of exchange of the people's creations of every land.

An abiding passion for me has been the inner knowledge that all peoples are much the same. Certainly their ancient music—classic and folk—stem from a similar source of deep human need.

Surely, in the deep need for our very survival, we shall finally find a way to universal peace, understanding and friendship.

The Soviet Union: 1917-1957

by D. N. PRITT, Q. C.

***How should Socialists assess the USSR, its faults
and successes, its role for peace, its meaning
for socialism generally?***

IT IS forty years since the October Revolution, and every Socialist is looking back as well as forward, and trying to "take stock" of the forty years of the first socialist state.

Every Socialist rejoices over the birth, the development, the influence, of the USSR; and every Socialist also wants to keep his feet firmly on the ground, and see the imperfections and the difficulties, as well as the successes, of this state.

I want in this article to consider mainly what the imperfections and difficulties are, and what the attitude of sober Socialists should be today, after the revelations of many grave errors and crimes, to the USSR and to socialism generally.

But, in the light of popular shortage of memory, and of the never-ending torrent of abuse and misrepresentation to which the socialist world is exposed, I cannot go straight to the simple discussion of our attitude to the faults, but must begin

with a few words about the merits of the Soviet Union.

The USSR is now one of the two greatest powers in the world; in a little while she will be the greatest. She has reached this position in forty years. At the start, she was poor, backward, starving, almost wholly illiterate, almost wholly unindustrialized, and encircled by formidable enemies; her future must have appeared hopeless to all observers save the "dreamers in the Kremlin." But her workers and peasants took power, ended the long rule of feudal landowners and capitalists, and began to build their new world. It was the greatest event in modern history.

By their own unaided efforts they built on the war-devastated ruins of a long-decayed tsarist empire. They have done more than just build a powerful state. They have ended exploitation, starvation, illiteracy. They have built vast industries, and created a new agriculture, replacing the "idiocy" of the old peasant life. They have carried education to higher levels, and placed it on broader bases than has been done

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anywhere before. They have developed cultural life to its highest level, on an all-embracing basis—creating indeed the world's first universal culture. And they have virtually ended the inequality of women, and of colored, minority, and colonial peoples.

Their advance, incredibly rapid as it has been, would have been even more rapid and sensational if it had not been for the injury to Soviet economy caused by the Second World War and by the need for preparing for that war. In the four years in which the Soviet peoples were actively engaged in the war, they faced the terrible ferocity, and the great initial successes, of the Nazi invasion. They bore unprecedented losses and suffering before they carried their banners to final victory in Central Europe. Most of the time, they had very little help, direct or indirect, from their allies; the great industrial state of Britain, for example, received far more "lend-lease" aid from the USA than they did. Moreover, Winston Churchill intrigued endlessly to prevent or delay the Second Front in the West, in order to weaken the USSR; and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin boasted in Parliament of his policy of keeping British casualties down to the minimum, whilst Soviet citizens died in millions.

Since the war ended, the USSR has not merely recovered from her vast losses, but has increased the speed of her forward march. At the same time, she has done more than any other government or people to build up a mass movement for peace; and, whilst successfully developing nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, has done much to secure

agreement that such weapons shall not be used.

It is not uninteresting to seek to estimate the achievements of the USSR by the reactions of the capitalist world. These are quite astonishing. Primarily as an answer to the successes of the socialist world—even if also, secondarily, as part of a cunning campaign against the working-class forces of the whole world (encouraged in their advance by the successes of the USSR)—the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist witch-hunt has been carried in the USA, Western Europe, and in many other countries, to an extreme which resembles a paranoiac obsession. In every political speech or broadcast, in every crisis, in every country, everything unwelcome to capitalist rulers is blamed upon the Soviet Union and on "Communist subversion." (It is almost a relief to read the weather report, in which the blame is only occasionally laid on communism.) One is forced to conclude that the rulers of the West at any rate are so completely convinced of the inevitable victory of the socialist world that they cannot get it out of their thoughts for five minutes.

That is a very short statement; it leaves unmentioned many remarkable achievements, and plays down all the color and the glory of a great epic. As I have mentioned, it is no more than an introduction to the consideration all Socialists must give to the unhappy fact that, for a substantial period in the course of that mighty advance, there were injustices, oppression and cruelties which in their total effects involved a great waste of human spirit and life. Whilst this makes the actual achieve-

ments of the Soviet Union even more remarkable than they would have appeared if no such handicap had been present, it calls upon all of us to use our minds and not merely our hearts to assess the present situation and determine our own attitudes.

When we turn to assess the injustices, we have to examine them of course in their historical background, of which the short statement of successful developments I have just given is only a part. A more important part of it, which goes far to explain—although not to justify—the injustices, in that it created conditions of danger in which strong measures of control were absolutely necessary to the very existence of the socialist state, lies in the endless and active hostility displayed by the capitalist world to the Soviet Union (and later to its associates). We should indeed note that the achievements of the USSR as we see them today have been won in the teeth of three obstacles; the first, the drain of the Second World War; the second—far less serious, of course—the injustices we are considering; and the third, the economic and general handicaps created by the incessant and malignant hostility of the capitalist world.

That these last epithets are not too strong will be seen when we recall the facts.

The tale of the third obstacle is a long one, and passes through several phases. In the first, called "intervention," portions of the immense military forces of the "Allied and Associated Powers" of the First World War (enlisting the active aid of some of the *German* forces even before the end of that war!) invaded

the Soviet state with intent to destroy it by armed force. Winston Churchill summed up this policy in a phrase about "killing the old hen before she can hatch too many chicks." That phase lasted nearly four years, did much damage to the Soviet state, and not a little to the capitalist world. It ended in the complete defeat of all the invading forces.

The next phase was one of a long "boycott." It was more vague and variable in content, intensity, and duration than the armed intervention. It consisted not merely in long refusal of diplomatic recognition, but in an almost complete refusal of credits, and even of trade, at a time when the Soviet Union was in desperate need of capital goods. (The resultant delay in Soviet construction was substantial, but not as serious as the damage to the capitalist trade and industry in the long slump of 1929 onwards.)

The most important feature of this period was the development and intensification of anti-Soviet propaganda. Whilst much of this propaganda was absurd, even for a press utterly corrupted by its ruling-class proprietors and ruling-class governments, some of it was more subtle. It was extremely malevolent, and was never supported by reliable evidence, so that Socialists trying to estimate soberly the character and achievements of the USSR had not even the advantage that one can derive from serious hostile criticism. We know now that some of it achieved a measure of accuracy; but in the light of the irresponsibility of the whole body of criticism this must have been accidental.

The phase of "boycott" faded as

the Second World War approached; public demand was growing for better relations with the USSR, and the advantages of cooperation to resist Hitler were beginning to be seen by all except those who wanted war between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The outstanding feature of the new phase was the long negotiation in Moscow, in the summer of 1939, for an alliance to resist Nazi aggression, the breakdown of which was followed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. This brought one of the most flagrant examples of the technique of presenting to the British public the exact opposite of the truth. The breakdown was misrepresented as a treacherous betrayal by the Soviet Union of the British Government's sincere desire to arrive at an agreement, as a "sell-out" to Hitler, and even as "the cause of the Second World War"! The truth was exactly the reverse. The USSR, like the British public, was most anxious for an agreement; the Chamberlain government had no intention of making one, but only of pretending to be ready for it; and Ribbentrop's offers were accepted by Moscow only after it had become fully clear that the British Government had no intention of agreeing.

The next notable step came over the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in the Fall of 1939, followed by the first Soviet-Finnish war of December, 1939, to March, 1940. These again produced a flood of hostile propaganda against the USSR, accompanied by ridiculous atrocity stories, and by the delivery by Britain to Finland of many of our best and newest airplanes, at a time when we were at war—if for the time being

inactively—with the formidable military power of Nazi Germany, and were extremely short of airplanes and other supplies. The false stories, and a false picture of the whole situation, were once again put over through every channel of propaganda. The Nurnberg trials later threw a good deal of light on the Finnish Government of that time.

The next British reaction of importance came not in the field of propaganda, but in the war strategy after the USSR was brought into the war in June, 1941. The great countries fighting Nazi Germany were to outward appearance united in sincerely fighting for victory, but behind the scenes Winston Churchill was maneuvering to avoid or delay opening the Second Front, which was obviously the most important step to victory. He wanted to win the war, but he wanted to do so in such a way that the USSR should be too weak at the end to have much influence in the shaping of the world, and above all of the destiny of the Eastern European countries. His immediate scheme was two-fold; if possible, to open the Second Front not in the West at all, but in the "soft under-belly of Europe" so as to get a grip on the Balkan countries, and maintain in power their existing governments, consisting in fact of fascist collaborators with Hitler; and, if that should not be possible, at any rate he wanted to delay as long as possible the opening of the Second Front in the West.

The first policy was defeated largely by Roosevelt, who really sought to win the war by the best, and not the worst, military strategy; the second succeeded to the extent that nearly three years elapsed be-

tween the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union and the opening of the Second Front—three years of heavy and costly fighting on the Eastern Front and of a virtual truce in Western Europe. Moreover, as has since been disclosed, Churchill was meanwhile circulating his famous wartime memorandum, planning a post-war combination of the “democratic” countries, including Spain and Turkey, to avert what he called the “measureless disaster” of any influence being exercised after the war, anywhere, by the Soviet Union, whose citizens were then dying in hundreds of thousands in order to save us all, you and me and Winston Churchill, from being conquered by the Nazis.

But when the war ended, the USSR was not so weakened that its voice could not count; in particular, the war ended in such a way that the peoples of Eastern Europe were freed by the Soviet armies both from the Germans and from their own rulers.

The end of the war was not, of course, the end of anti-Soviet hostility. The next step was the “cold war.” This is usually said to have started with the speech of Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, delivered under the chairmanship of President Truman, in March, 1946; it had really started many years before. It was in essence a three-fold operation, consisting of an intensification of the campaign of abuse and provocation against the Soviet Union and the socialist world in general (including in due course the Chinese People's Republic); of the open advocacy of war to destroy the USSR and “communism,” and to “liberate” the People's Democracies;

and of a rearmament campaign which carried the defense expenditures of several countries to heights scarcely exceeded at the highest moments of “hot war” in the Second World War. (This latter campaign was no doubt partly designed to “rescue” U.S. industry, for a time, from slump, and to weaken Soviet economy by driving it into an armaments race.)

A particularly sinister development of the campaign to “liberate” the People's Democracies, side by side with general war propaganda and military preparation for war, consisted in steady U.S. preparation for, and incitement of, civil war in the People's Democracies. Congress year after year has voted \$100,000,000, for the purpose of aiding subversive activities in those countries; endless incitement to civil war has been poured out by “Voice of America,” “Radio Free Europe,” balloons, and many other methods; attempts have been made to organize counter-revolutionary bands in the countries in question; and armed and trained bodies of fascist émigrés from several of the countries have been maintained in Western Germany, ready for the moment when risings might be attempted, with the object of restoring what Washington and Wall Street call “democracy,” i.e. capitalism, (and, in those countries, a restored capitalism could only be fascism resting on bayonets).

To the mind of any one reading this account of matters today, the Hungarian events naturally seem to take the stage. What, in essence, is the story of Hungary in the autumn of 1956? That story developed in a complex situation, in which only too many people forgot the lessons

of history, and judged too quickly. Practically all the news that we received in Britain came from the sources which perpetrated all the swindles I have described above; and these sources were particularly implicated in the plans I have also described for creating, in whatever People's Democracy might be susceptible, just exactly the civil war situation which in fact developed. Experience should have warned all of us that we might expect from these sources of "information" absolutely anything except the truth.

Quite frankly, it is clear that there had been many mistakes and failures in Hungary, as there had been in the USSR, and that these had brought about genuine grievances. In a country only recently released from feudalism—and released not by the hard but educative process of fighting for its own liberation but by Soviet armies—these grievances were sufficient, especially when there was apparently a lamentable lack of precaution against subversion, to provide opportunity for hostile elements, with American support from outside, to turn legitimate and peaceful demonstrations into armed civil war, and for a while to carry on a "White Terror" in which Communists were murdered indiscriminately.

It becomes clearer every day that, if the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty had left the country, which in no circumstances was their duty, or had stood idly by, the result would not have been a liberal régime, with genuine elections in which the feudal and capitalist lions and the worker and peasant lambs would

have lain down together by the ballot boxes, but an armed reactionary attempt to undo all the work of the last twelve years, and to put the Hungarian clock back to Fascism, maintained by White Terror.

I come now to my main purpose, to consider what attitude Socialists should take to the problems arising from the grave events disclosed at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and to the events in Hungary. By "Socialists" I mean all those who believe in turning from capitalism to socialism, whether they are inside or outside the Labor Party, the Communist Party, or any Party anywhere standing for socialism, whether they are Marxists or not, whether they are left or right, weak or strong.

It is natural that many should be disturbed, and it is a time for careful thought. We must go back to first principles, consider the facts, make up our minds what are our interests and duties as Socialists, and then act accordingly.

We Socialists want a socialist world. We have to win it for ourselves. We know we can win it if—and only if—we fight for it unremittingly, and with all our strength. And we want at the same time a peaceful world, one not of just barely peaceful coexistence, but of genuine friendly relations with all peoples, especially those of the socialist lands. We have to fight the anti-socialist and the anti-peace forces—they are largely the same—for our future.

In this struggle, we cannot afford to relax our efforts or to weaken our forces. It is "too near a thing," too critical for any unnecessary risks.

The capitalists we have to defeat have still great resources, and are subtle and experienced enemies, dangerous when they secure some advantage, and even more dangerous when they find it prudent to give ground for a time, watching for the first chance to recover.

In such a struggle, each and every Socialist has a positive duty to work unremittingly for socialism, undeterred by difficulties or hostile propaganda. To fall off, to "pull our punches," to weaken our forces, to do anything that can help our enemies to maintain the capitalist *status quo*, or even to delay its dissolution, is a grave offense against socialism, against peace, against life itself; for it delays the march to socialism, and makes a third world war more possible.

But the minds of many sincere Socialists are disturbed. What are they to do? They must, of course, exercise sober and critical judgment. They should not accept anything blindly; rather they should realize that imperfections were and are inevitable in the light of the immense problems the Soviet Union has always had to face, and the long heritage of human weakness and capitalist mentality which has to be slowly eradicated as socialism is built up and consolidated. They should judge the situation quietly; their heads should be cool, not their feet.

On the other hand, they should not "lean over backwards" to nag, nor seek half eagerly—like the worst type of candid friend or the typical British right-wing Labor leader—for something more to blame. And they may reasonably practice a little humility, as they criticize those who have built up the world's first so-

cialist state by their own efforts during a period in which we in Britain, for example, faced by an apparently far easier task, have in truth made but little progress towards our goal.

It is not surprising that the reactions of many Socialists in Britain and elsewhere to the news of these events were strong and unhappy. What is surprising is that many of them, in spite of the lessons of history, accepted at their face value the accounts given by government and press propaganda. Encouraged, unfortunately, by right-wing Labor leaders, a certain number of British Socialists fell away. As time went on, and the swindle was seen through, most of them came back (some to fall away, perhaps, another time, and some not), and the forward march to friendship, peace and socialism was resumed.

So, on balance, what should be the attitude, today, of sincere Socialists everywhere, in the light of the background which I have sketched above, to the events in the USSR disclosed at the Twentieth Congress and to the Hungarian crisis?

The long and unhappy story of shortcomings in the USSR was of course a terrible shock to all who put their faith in socialism and in the socialist USSR. The shock may be lessened a little by the thought that in the historical circumstances grave shortcomings were bound to occur; but sorrow over them remains. Yet one's duty remains surely very clear. We are still Socialists; we still seek socialism; the USSR is still the great country that has built and is continuing to build socialism, still the vanguard of the Socialist struggle. And, incidentally, she is highly unlikely again to get out of touch

with the workers, to allow any cult of the individual to develop, or to let illegalities be committed. Our enemies, too, are unaltered; their standards, motives, methods, objects, and desires remain what they were. The need to fight them is the same, only intensified by such partial successes as they have so far achieved.

We must continue to work actively for socialism, and to present a united front to our enemies. We can and must exercise a sober balanced judgment on all our problems, in the light of our now greater experience—experience both of our friends and our enemies—and in our actions and our words continue our efforts to lead the world forward to the great future which only socialism can give it.

We have, as perhaps a subsidiary but nevertheless an important matter, to form a judgment on the events in Hungary. The most important general question, at the moment, is probably whether the Soviet forces should have acted as they did in the early part of November, 1956, on the request of the Kadar Government. To the whole background I have sketched above must be added the consideration that the Soviet Government, which had to take the difficult decision, was highly unlikely at that particular moment of history, just after the Twentieth Congress, at a time of maximum development of international friendship and cultural exchanges, and of Soviet prestige, to do anything unsocialist or adventurist. In these circumstances, one can surely say with confidence not merely that it would be wrong and irresponsible to condemn the USSR hastily, thus lining up with all her

enemies against all her friends, but that it is by now clear that she had no option but to do what she did, and that to have abstained would have been disastrous to the Hungarian people and to the peace of the world. (And to say, as some people do, that the very difficult situation which she faced was partly due to past errors on her part is surely irrelevant; one does not reproach a man for putting out a fire because one suspects that the outbreak is partly due to his past negligence).

All the arguments that I have discussed above, in relation to the Twentieth Congress, surely apply with equal force here. Socialism and peace, the enemies of socialism and peace, stand where they did; the struggle and the issues are the same. It is easy to understand, however tragic, that people should desert us and join the enemy if they think that we are wrong and the enemy is right; it is not so easy to understand that some should leave us because they think that by doing so they can help the cause to which we and they alike claim to be devoted. We, and the Soviet people, and the peoples of the New Democracies are marching to the same goal, and we cannot help to reach that goal by some of us leaving the march in the belief, well or ill-founded, that some of those marching with us have not always behaved themselves well.

This is no moment for us to falter, weaken, or doubt. Whilst still keeping our critical faculties, we must maintain the struggle for socialism with all our forces. Anything else is surely treason to our deepest faith, and a weakening of the forces that have to save us from a third World War.

A British Socialist's Views On

What Is Wrong With the Soviet Union

by PROF. G. D. H. COLE

IT IS too much to hope that, if I criticize any aspect of what goes on in the Soviet Union, I shall escape being denounced as a class-enemy, guilty of treason to the workers' cause. For arguments about the Soviet Union's affairs are hardly ever carried on coolly, with a real attempt to discriminate the good from the bad: they are almost always hot contentions between rival partisans, with one party refusing to recognize any admixture of good with the evil, and the other any evil as qualifying the good. This is less absolutely the case since it became the fashion to denounce the abuse of the so-called "cult of personality" under Stalin; but the recognition by Khrushchev and others of past "mistakes" does not appear to have been matched by any corresponding mitigation of the denunciations of communism by its opponents, and many even of those who see signs of grace in Titoism or in the new Gomulka

regime in Poland appear to welcome them rather as the initial stages of of a breakdown of communism and of an acceptance of Western liberal ideas than as constituting regimes which have any valid claims in their own right. There are, no doubt, left-wing Socialists critical both of Soviet Communism and of Western Social Democracy, but also desirous of being friendly to both, and of seeing good in both. But they are still rather rare and their attitudes find little or no expression in either the Communist Parties or the parties of the Socialist International, though there are a few parties, such as the Nenni Socialist Party in Italy, through which they are able to achieve expression.

I write this article as a lifelong member of the British Labor Party and as President of the Fabian Society, but also as a long-standing adherent of the democratic Socialist Left Wing. I have always been strongly sympathetic to the Soviet Union, and have continually urged the need for working-class unity, national and international, in the struggle against capitalism and colonialism; and I have consistently refused to be associated with any

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sort of anti-Communist crusade. In this matter, I think my record speaks for itself: at any rate, I do not propose to spend time now in defending it. What I propose to do is to set out, as clearly as I can, what I find to object to in the creed and practice of the rulers of the Soviet Union, not as furnishing any complete account of my attitude—for I also find a great deal in them to admire—but because I believe that no attempt to improve world Socialist relations can be successful unless from the outset the points of difference are unequivocally stated.

First of all, I reject the entire notion of the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat." The proletariat, as a vast mass of individuals occupying certain defined positions in society, cannot possibly exercise a "dictatorship," which can be exercised only either by an individual wielding absolute power or by a closely-knit organized body of persons able to take concerted action. In practice, what Communists call the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is the rule either of the Communist Party as a body or of a ruling group, or elite, within it. It is no doubt claimed that the Party constitutes the "vanguard" of the proletariat, and as such is entitled to represent it; but that is a claim which I am not prepared to admit as self-evident. Nor am I clear of what precise elements the "proletariat," in whose name the Communist Party claims to rule, is supposed to consist. Does it consist entirely of the industrial workers in large-scale industry; or does it include the artisans engaged in small-scale production? Does it include or exclude the peasants, who in the Soviet Union are still

the largest group of all? After much study of Soviet sources I am still in doubt concerning the orthodox answers to these fundamental questions. Yet it is clearly of the first importance to know whether the class on whose behalf the Communist Party claims to be dictating is a majority or a minority of the whole people and, if the latter, what the relation of the peasant majority to the dictatorship is supposed to be.

I am also doubtful about the precise meaning to be attached to the term "dictatorship." Reference is often made to the Western parliamentary countries as living under the "dictatorship" of capital—by which is presumably meant that, despite universal suffrage, the possessors of capital are in a position to get their own way. If so, evidently "dictatorship" does not imply any monopoly of voting rights or any formal exclusion of non-proletarians from representative positions, but refers to the realities of power that lie beneath the surface arrangements; and, in this sense it can be exercised only by a person or a closely organized body of persons, such as the Communist Party or its predominant elite. Communists will no doubt dispute this, because in their view each class is to be credited with the possession of a collective will of its own, which finds its expression in the determinations of a class-party. Such a party is sharply differentiated by the Communists from mere "sects," which stand for peculiar ideologies not resting on proper class-foundations; and the former, but not the latter, are regarded as infallible judges of the real interests of the classes they represent. I am quite unable to accept this notion of an

infallible class-party, or that of a real collective class-will. I do not, of course, deny the existence of class-interests, or the importance of class-solidarity. But I regard it as fully possible for real differences of policy to exist within a single class, without there being necessarily a single correct view expressed in the policy of one particular class-party. It is quite possible, though in most circumstances undesirable, for there to be more than one party giving expression to more than one view of the interest of the same class; and it is also quite possible for different views of policy to co-exist, and to contend for predominance, within a single class-party. In other words, I reject the notion of a single, historically necessitated, body of class-doctrine, divergence from which inevitably constitutes betrayal of the cause of the class in question. Such a view seems to me unduly schematic, and to involve an endeavor to force the march of historical events into a predetermined pattern drawn up without proper continuous references to the objective facts.

One most serious consequence of the notion that there is always a single correct policy line of which the Party leadership is the interpreter is that every dissident opinion comes to be regarded, not merely as mistaken, but as reprehensible, and every attempt to urge the acceptance of such a view as schismatic, or even treasonable. No doubt, in theory members of the Communist Party are free to advocate different opinions on issues on which no official pronouncement has been made; and no doubt in theory such pronouncements emanate from the Party as an organized whole. But in prac-

tice freedom to press divergent views appears to be narrowly limited, and the Central Committee of the Party claims the right to make binding pronouncements on its behalf and to discipline anyone who thereafter ventures to challenge its decision. Thus, in July 1957, three formerly outstanding leaders, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee—Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov—were expelled from the Committee—though not from the Party—on the charge of having persisted in opposing the majority view of the Twentieth Party Congress and of organizing fractional intrigues. The charges against them were set out in a form which involved the accusation that they had violated the principle of “democratic centralism” proclaimed by Lenin, and had thus shown themselves not merely mistaken but morally perverse.

This raises the entire issue of “democratic centralism” as a principle to which all members of the Communist Party are held to be absolutely committed. What exactly is “democratic centralism,” in theory and in practice? In theory, the “centralism” requires that the whole Party, and every member of it, shall always carry out the orders given in accordance with the Party constitution, while the adjective “democratic” involves that such orders shall be issued in accordance with the will of the members, who must accordingly be allowed an opportunity of discussing them before they are issued, and of rejecting or modifying proposed orders of which they disapprove. In practice, the “centralism” unquestionably exists; but is it democratic? In any organization

that needs to take collective action, there has of course to be provision for deciding what the official policy is to be, and powers to affect policy have to be assigned to the various party agencies—from referendum voting to delegate Congress, to regional and branch meetings and to branch, regional and general Committee. These powers can be distributed in many different ways. In the Communist Party the supreme policy-making power is vested in the delegate Congress; but between Congresses very great power is given to the Central Committee and, within it, to the Presidium to decide matters within the overriding precepts of the Congress; and this in practice gives the Central Committee the deciding voice in all matters on which the Congress has not issued clear and unequivocal pronouncements—that is to say, in shaping short-run policies as well as in preparing proposals for the Congress to endorse. The Congress itself is altogether too large a body, and meets too infrequently, to be effective in deciding except on really broad and long-run issues; and even in these it is usually very much subject to the Central Committee's influence, and it in turn to that of the Presidium.

The degree in which such a structure can work in practice democratically depends on the extent to which real opportunity is given for free discussion in the local branches of proposed policy decisions before they are actually adopted. If there is real freedom at this level to discuss alternative lines of action and to pass resolutions up to the higher levels, the democratic character of the process is limited only by the

members' failure to take full advantage of it. But this freedom of discussion over a wide area such as the Soviet Union cannot be real and effective unless it includes the right of those who have particular opinions to put forward to organize for their promotion and to carry on propaganda in support of them. It can also be prejudiced if the central authority of the Party has at its disposal a large bureaucracy of officials, and uses these officials to influence or intimidate the local members.

In both these respects, the "centralism" of the Communist Party appears to fall a long way short of being democratic. There is an acute suspicion of any sort of action that can be stigmatized as "fractionalist." This arises largely out of the view that there is, in any situation, only one possible historically correct course, and that this course is in the Party's keeping and best known to the party elite, as constituting the "vanguard" of the Party, which is itself the "vanguard" of the proletariat. Anyone who sets up his personal view against that of the established leadership is regarded as endangering the Party's unity; and his offense is aggravated if he joins hands with others to organize any kind of opposition group. Moreover, the leaders have no scruple in making full use of the party machine, including its officials, to push their own view against the dissidents, and to threaten them with disciplinary action if they give the latter any support. This attitude is powerfully reinforced by the sense that the maintenance of the Revolution depends on entire unity and that no dissidence can be afforded in a

world in which the Soviet Union is beset by enemies. The general effect is that the "centralism" tends to operate without the "democracy"—if "democracy" involves, as I feel sure it does, widespread active participation in the decision-making forces.

All this is quite apart from such activities as may be carried on by the leadership through a secret or political police, and from such positive villainies as the deliberate framing of persons with false accusations or the coercion of intimidated persons into giving false evidence. I say nothing of these latter; for I am ready to believe that such methods have gone out of use since the days of Stalin and of Beria, by both of whom they were practiced on a large scale. No one in his right senses can defend such practices; but short of this there is room for abuse wherever special police powers are regularly employed.

I have made clear that I reject the conception of a unique Party, constituting the vanguard and inspired representative of a particular class and entitled to serve as its sole agent in prescribing the conduct necessary for the fulfilment of its historic destiny. I do not believe that the march of history is pre-ordained in this sense, or that anyone, or any party, knows nearly enough about the future to be in a position to prescribe on all occasions the correct line of action. I am sure that historical development is a much more complex process than such an attitude allows, and that there are quite often alternative lines for each of which there is a good deal to be said. It follows from this that, in a democratic society, those who favor each

alternative line ought to be free to advocate it, and to join with others in doing so. If that is "fractionalism," then "fractionalism" is a necessary part of democracy. I agree, however, that there are cases in which it is imperative to ensure united action on decisions, when they have been definitely made. This applies where the decisions require, for their effective implementation, something like universal co-operation, or at least acquiescence, among those concerned. In such cases, it is quite legitimate for a party to insist that its members shall renounce further opposition when a decision has been arrived at, provided that it has been reached after really democratic discussion. It is, however, illegitimate to require such acquiescence or positive co-operation, either where the decisions have been made without proper opportunities for free discussion or where their effects can be induced without calling on those who disagree to renounce their criticisms.

I have been speaking so far entirely of discussion and decision within the Party claiming to represent the class for which dominance is proclaimed. Where there exists only a single party, all others being proscribed either as "sects" or as the champions of other classes to which rights are explicitly denied, freedom of discussion can exist, or at any rate can be recognized, only within the Party. In such a situation, to deny or restrict freedom of discussion within the Party is in effect to deny or restrict it altogether. In the "one-party" society, the only possible scope for democracy is inside the Party; and democracy is thought of as a proper attribute, not of the

whole people, or even the whole proletariat, but exclusively of those who belong to the Party. In proportion as opportunity for democratic discussion as a stage in policy-making is denied even to party members, all claim to democratic behavior is forfeited. The question is, can a system in which freedom of discussion is effectively maintained, but is limited to adherents of a single party, be regarded as complying with the requirements of democratic principle?

The vast majority of Western "democratic Socialists" will deny that it can, and will insist that democracy involves an equal right of every sane adult person to participate freely in the process of discussion. I am not prepared to go so far as this, or to say that it is never legitimate to exclude anyone except on such grounds as insanity or perhaps certain kinds of criminal behavior. Indeed, I think most "democratic Socialists" will agree that it may be legitimate, in exceptional circumstances, to exclude from these rights persons who are in active hostility to the established regime, to the extent of rebellion against it or positive collaboration with its enemies in time of war. They will, however, agree to such exclusions, if at all, only with great reluctance, and will always try to keep them within the narrowest limits consistent with public security. Their attitude is wholly different from that of Communists, who set out from the conception of rights as belonging, not to men as men, but only to members of a particular class, and reject altogether the notion of any common citizenship transcending class barriers.

Even if Communists, in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, accept universal suffrage as the basis of the electoral system, this is for them a matter of expediency, rather than of right, and they have no qualms about rigging the electoral process by preventing the intrusion of unwelcome candidates or by presenting single lists, for which every elector is exhorted by mass-propaganda to record his vote. Nor have they any inhibitions about excluding large bodies of persons, dubbed "counter-revolutionaries," from the right to vote. It is a cardinal tenet of communism that every government is a class-government and that, as long as classes exist, the state is bound to be the representative of the general interest of the class that is predominant by virtue of its possession of supreme economic power. On this showing the vote cannot be regarded as a human right, and the *right* to govern, or to take part in choosing the government, belongs exclusively to the class for which authority is claimed. It may nevertheless suit that class's interest to allow almost everybody to vote, provided that the conditions of voting are so weighted as to ensure a satisfactory preponderance of the right sort of candidates and of persons elected. But, as a further safeguard, in the Soviet Union the power to make binding laws is given concurrently to the legislators elected by universal suffrage and to the governing agencies of the Communist Party. Laws, or decrees, can emanate from either source.

As a "democratic Socialist," I am unable to accept this standpoint; for I do believe in the rights of men as men, and not simply as members of

a class. I do, however, accept the claim that, in a class-divided society, the members of the subject and exploited classes have a right to take the measures that are necessary for ensuring their victory over their oppressors, and for securing themselves against counter-revolution. I regard this right as limited only by the obligation not to invade the rights of others beyond what is indispensable for this purpose and, when the road is effectively open to peaceful change, not to resort to violent measures or to the oppression of their former oppressors beyond what is necessary for the prevention of counter-revolution.

I do not agree that the people can be divided sharply into two groups, one entitled to class-rights and the other to no rights at all. The class-struggle, though real, is not of this absolute character. Nor does each individual necessarily act in accordance with the promptings of class-interest. Every person's right to participate in the electoral process on equal terms ought to be preserved unless clear reasons can be given for disqualification; and the electoral process itself ought to be such as to allow conflicting opinions to be expressed and represented. Moreover, in order to satisfy this condition, "counter-revolution" must not be so defined as to rule out as "counter-revolutionary" every organized expression of opinions divergent from those of the ruling party. It was not, for example, fair or reasonable to characterize the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as a "counter-revolution" merely because certain counter-revolutionary elements attached themselves to it; for it is abundantly proved that it had the

backing of the main body of the Hungarian workers. To denounce every sort of opposition as "counter-revolution" is to deny democracy and to resort to totalitarian oppression, even if this is done on the plea of upholding the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Moreover, what was the "proletariat" in whose name the Hungarian Revolution was suppressed by armed force? It was certainly not the "proletariat" of Hungary; for the suppression was done by means of Russian tanks. Was it, then, the "proletariat" of the Soviet Union; and, if so, by what right did that section of the proletariat suppress the proletariat of Hungary? Presumably because in the view of the leaders of communism in the Soviet Union the Russian proletariat was entitled to act not merely on its own behalf, but no less as the vanguard and representative of the proletariat of the entire world. I do not say that the Soviet Union has ever explicitly claimed the right to do this; but in practice it has often come very near doing so.

It is an old claim of communism that the world revolution is one and indivisible; and on this basis the Comintern claimed for many years the absolute right to issue orders to the Communist Parties in all countries. No doubt, these orders came in theory from an international representative body; but it was a body in which the Communists of the Soviet Union exercised an almost unqualified control. It was again and again asserted that the supreme duty of the proletariat in all countries was to rally to the defense of the Russian Revolution, and that the Russians, having achieved their part

in the world revolution where others had failed, had the right to issue marching orders to every proletariat. This claim can no longer be made today in an unqualified form, now that China too has had its Communist Revolution; for China is too big and important, as well as too different from the Soviet Union, to be treated as a satellite.

There are today at least two great co-equal centers of communism as a world force; and neither can in effect claim to dictate to the other, even if each can still largely prescribe the policies to be followed by lesser countries within its several orbit. The existence of Communist China has shown itself in recent months to be a powerful influence towards making the communism of the Soviet Union less "monolithic," and has reinforced both the earlier success of Yugoslavia in its refusal to act merely as a satellite of Stalinist Russia, and the more recent success of Poland in establishing its claim to build socialism in its own way. Mao Tse-tung's famous phrase about allowing a multitude of flowers to bloom, whatever may be the limitations on its interpretation in practice, has most powerfully reinforced Khrushchev's words at the Twentieth Congress.

There are, indeed, clear signs that Soviet Communism, without relaxing its determination to maintain the exclusive authority of the Communist Party, is coming to interpret these principles less rigidly than in Stalin's days, and to accept a larger element of relatively open discussion as a necessary stage in the determination of policy. These changes are still held within relatively narrow limits, and are subject to sudden

reversals when the leaders take fright at the tendencies towards freer expression of divergent opinions which they necessarily provoke; but it is obscurantism to pretend that the changes have not been real.

It is, no doubt, possible to argue that those who have accepted them are insincere, and have been driven to them only by the intense fear of world war. But if such fears have played a part, what is wrong with that? For are they not abundantly justified? Is it not sheerly imperative by now for every rational human being to seek above all else the means of preventing war, which could bring nothing but sheer disaster to all the combatants and indeed to all mankind? This means that it is imperative to find ways of peaceful coexistence, however deep the disagreements between the nations may be. And surely it follows that all men and all Governments should be intently seeking means of minimizing their causes of quarrel, rather than aggravating them.

Thus, we in the West, as well as the people and governments of the "uncommitted" countries, should be eager to welcome every sign of liberalization of attitude in the Communist countries, even if such signs fall a long way short of what we believe to be called for in the cause of democratic freedom. We should be ready too to recognize that the kinds of "parliamentary democracy" we have succeeded in establishing in the Western countries, while possessing real value which has already been demonstrated by their practical results in terms of popular welfare, are by no means the last word in democracy and may not be capable of being exported, without great

changes, to countries whose traditions and ways of life are widely different from those of the economically advanced societies of Western Europe and North America. Even if we hold that one-party systems are of their very nature contrary to democratic principle, it does not follow that two-or-more-party systems can be simply transplanted to countries which lack all experience of party government in the Western sense.

It may be unavoidable that for some time to come Yugoslavia should continue to be governed by what is in effect a single party, and that tendencies towards liberalization should be manifested mainly in making the ruling party less centralized and less restricted in its freedom of discussion, and also in delegating power to Workers' Councils and to local representative authorities. It may be that, in the Soviet Union, the best immediate prospect lies in decentralization of economic authority, in relaxation of police pressure, and in certain enlargements of freedom of speech and a gradual shifting of the emphasis of economic planning in the direction of increased supplies of goods for consumption, rather than in any overt change in the structure of the so-called "proletarian" state. And it may well be that in China the greatest hope lies in the manifest en-

deavors that are being made to enlist the support of non-proletarians for the Revolution, by experiments in government-capitalist controlled partnerships in productive enterprise and by the encouragement of many forms of co-operative effort.

In short, though Western democratic Socialists cannot and should not conceal their view that the rulers of the Soviet Union have done much evil, as well as much good in building up economic achievement and in the democratic diffusion of education and culture, they should be eager to welcome every sign that the evil features of the Communist regime are being mitigated, and to seize on every chance of building up improved relations across the strong barriers that still obstruct the road to friendly intercourse. In the present state of the world, with the danger of nuclear war still hanging over us it is sheer criminality to do anything that is liable to add to the tension or to make its relaxation more difficult. Somehow, we have all to find ways of living together at peace in the same world; and even if our differences go too deep for us to agree or to forget them, we can at any rate refrain from any action calculated to widen the gulf and thus to aid and abet those enemies of the human race who are still determined to do their worst to set it by the ears.

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"G. D. H. COLE treated Oxford simply as an academic institution for the promotion of learning, instead of (as it is) a social mechanism for the corruption of the young. . . . If Oxford has done any good in the world in the last 30 years, it is thanks to Cole. More than any other man I have ever known he has kept his Radical faith and his Radical modesty unsullied."

*From a tribute to Prof. Cole by his Oxford colleague,
A. J. P. Taylor in the New Statesman, July 27, 1957.*

Reply To Professor Cole

by DR. HERBERT APTHEKER

PROFESSOR Cole's article, it seems to me, continues his enviable record, correctly summarized by himself, as that of one who has "always been strongly sympathetic to the Soviet Union, continually urged the need for working-class unity, national and international, in the struggle against capitalism and colonialism, and consistently refused to be associated with any sort of anti-Communist crusade." Believing, as he does, that "to improve world Socialist relations" it is necessary that "from the outset the points of difference are unequivocally stated," Professor Cole proceeds to state them.

The points of difference are several and serious: a questioning of the validity of the whole concept of proletarian dictatorship; a challenge to the possibility of simultaneously just and efficient functioning of democratic centralism; an excoriation of bureaucracy and a fear that it is intrinsic in certain Marxist-Len-

inist principles and practices; a reminder of the existence of now-admitted gross illegalities and severe malpractices; and the suggestion that there exists a tendency to forget the needs of sheer humanity in the crucible of and the concentration upon the class struggle.

It is axiomatic that it is easier to raise problems than to solve them. This does not mean that it is not a major service to raise problems; this does not mean that without raising problems, there can be no solutions. But this does mean exactly what it says. Within the severe space limitations imposed on me by the editors, it is possible for me only to indicate some approaches to the questions and challenges Professor Cole poses; in several instances, under any circumstances, my capacity to do justice to these questions is highly uncertain.

All of us now have a more sober appreciation of what Lenin must have had in mind when he wrote of "the difficulties of building socialism." To a high degree there was in the past appreciation of the difficulties involved in defeating capitalism; but there was a tendency to assume that once this was accomplished, the rest—the coming into be-

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ing of a socialist society and its continual flowering—would be more or less automatic and painless, so far as the internal forces were concerned.

In a sense it is perfectly natural that this should have been the approach, given the fact that the historic task was to defeat capitalism, difficult enough in all conscience. It is a mark of the enormous progress that humanity has made, highlighted by the Russian Socialist Revolution of forty years ago, that it now faces as an urgent task the actual building of socialist societies, or, as is the case in the USSR, the purification of a socialist society as part of the process of the establishment of communism.

Historically speaking, the task is altogether new; the quality of the undertaking is quite unprecedented. That there have been severe failings is to be understood—which does not mean condoned; but these are failings *that have not caused the process itself to be reversed, let alone defeated.* The failings have hurt the accomplishment; but the accomplishment stands: *the socialist reorganization of society has been achieved among one-third of humanity.* It remains for those hundreds of millions, Communists and non-Communists, to eliminate the failings and injustices which they themselves see and feel, while at the same time preserving inviolate and extending the colossal gains their revolutions have achieved. Or better, the process of purification, which the socialist peoples are themselves conducting, is necessary for that preservation and extension.

On the specific questions raised by Professor Cole, I find it possible

here only to make assertions, rather than develop full-bodied arguments. The concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat" seems to me fully valid and, indeed, vindicated, by the history of the past half century, and by the realities of political science. There have existed in the past, state forms which may be accurately defined as dictatorships of slaveowners, of feudal lords, of capitalists, of monopoly capitalists. This does not mean that the forms of these states have not, in each stage, varied from place to place and time to time; and it does not mean that the variance was sometimes not very considerable. It does not mean that one form was not to be preferred to another; or that one type of particular class rule was not preferable to another. But it does mean that the basic foreign and domestic policies of these states, their fundamental orientations, and the roots of the conflicts within them, lay in the ruling classes' relationship to the means of production and their comprehension of their own interests.

In exactly the same way, with much room for lags and with no dependence on rigid one-to-one responses, working-class ownership and control of the means of production would mean working-class domination of the state. This does open the road, within each country, for fraternal relations with other, non-exploitative elements in the population; for an enormous advance in productivity; for a concerted and successful attack upon poverty, illiteracy, disease, cultural impoverishment and bigotry. This does spur forward, internationally, the demise of imperialism, the lib-

eration of oppressed peoples, and the consolidation of peace. None of this is accomplished automatically; all of it requires tremendous effort and persistent struggle.

Enormous progress has been made in the past forty years in the achievement of all these superb ends. Proletarian dictatorship, in varying forms, has been the state form and the propelling force in all cases. Where this has not been present, Socialists have ruled in name but capitalism has endured in fact; where this has not been present, Socialists have ruled in name, but have in fact helped maintain imperialist domination, from the Belgian Congo to Cyprus, from Algeria to Kenya.

One may add that, with the candor characteristic of Professor Cole, his own references to the necessity for the maintenance of socialist organization and power, once it is achieved, go a long way towards explaining the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat, in some form, during the transitional period of the socialist revolution. His comments on the problems arising from democratic centralism and from bureaucracy surely are well-taken. It is a fact, I think, that the whole problem of the exercise of power, *per se*, has not been dealt with sufficiently in Marxist literature; not surprising in a literature devoted very largely to polemizing against existing power. Now, with socialism a viable institution in one-third the globe, it is past time that the frankest coming to grips occur with problems of corruption, nepotism, division of authority, rotation of office, the fullest activation of *all* elements in the population.

Bureaucratic behavior is of the essence of exploitative societies, just as racist and chauvinist practices and feelings are. These are hostile to socialist society and therefore *can be eliminated* only with socialism. That they are tenacious is true; this must mean the need to intensify the struggle against them, and never to compromise with them.

On certain of the specific points raised by Professor Cole—notably that dealing with Hungary—I have written at length elsewhere. There I have tried to substantiate my understanding of the Hungarian events; here I feel it proper only to say that this understanding differs from that of Professor Cole. Where he raises the general question of the definition of counter-revolution, I think the answer must be that counter-revolution, as applied to socialist society, is that which seeks the restoration of the private ownership of the means of production.

I would add that counter-revolution almost never sloganizes its actual intent—certainly not in its early stages. Further, counter-revolution always promotes its course in the name of those entities or ideas it feels are most precious to as wide a segment of the population as is possible. The fact that in every counter-revolutionary effort considerable numbers of the population participate with the purest motives in the world, does not alter the fact that there have been counter-revolutionary efforts in the past; nor does it alter the fact that imperialists hate socialism and seek its destruction in every possible way, under every conceivable guise and excluding no means.

This observation brings me to

what I feel is a serious omission in Professor Cole's article. I have reference to his consideration of what he sees as the weaknesses or errors in the development of the USSR, quite divorced from contemporaneous developments outside the country. Surely it is not necessary to argue with G. D. H. Cole the fact of the intervention against Soviet Russia, nor the devastation of World War II. It is not necessary, I think, to argue with him the implacable hostility of world capitalism to the USSR, and the measures of defense that this has required from the first socialist country.

I want here only to suggest that when one discusses the limitations of the Soviet Union, or what one sees as faults within its administration, it is absolutely vital that these be placed within the context of imperialist policy to destroy that country. I do not mean that the limitations and errors are to be justified by this environmental fact; many cannot be so justified, though their comprehension will be aided. But I do insist that unless this policy and its attempted implementation is given its full weight, one examines the Soviet Union not only critically but also unfairly, and I know that this is not Professor Cole's intent.

I would suggest another thought. A partisan of socialism who lives in England—or in the United States—has as his first responsibility conditions in his own country. A partisan of socialism, who lives within the home areas of Anglo-American imperialism, is obliged to keep to the forefront, I think, the role of the British and American Governments. Surely when such a one assesses the failures, as he sees them, of com-

rades in the Soviet Union, he should do this not only in the most fraternal and constructive and modest way as is possible; he should also do this while understanding that his own country is yet imperialist and that the policies of that country are responsible, to a considerable extent, for the pressures and difficulties that beset the Government and the inhabitants of the Soviet Union.

But there are two considerations put forward by Professor Cole that far outweigh in importance the points of difference we have argued. One is Professor Cole's insistence on the need for united action of all friends of socialism in support of the central aims they hold in common. And in this call Professor Cole's gentle reminders of rigidity and arrogance and thoughtlessness that have characterized the behavior of many amongst us who are Communists must be taken to heart, so that such obstacles to the vital unity are removed.

For his part, Professor Cole contributes to the forging of such unity by the stimulating challenges he presents, by the reality of his friendship for the Soviet Union, and by his impatience with those who persist in their "denunciations of Communism" and who really fear the success of efforts in the socialist world towards purification and rectification.

The second consideration which Professor Cole raises is nothing less than mankind's survival. This requires the peaceful co-existence of socialism and capitalism; it requires more specifically that there must not be war between the Soviet Union and the United States. To be cherished is all that serves to allay interna-

tional hostility and tension; all that tends to curb the armaments race; all that induces popular good-will and understanding.

I have seen no words which more incisively express humanity's most

urgent need than those in the concluding paragraph of Professor Cole's article. I would respectfully ask that the reader consider them as part of my contribution, too, and re-read them.

From Diego Rivera

THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY of the October Revolution is a day of universal rejoicing, confidence and hope, a day for remembering the struggles and sacrifices that are past, of testifying to the tremendous achievements attained as a result of heroic efforts to build a new and better society.

Hero of this epic is the great Soviet people, but from the very first there were those from all parts of the world who contributed to the creation of a new humanity; each one of them brought back to his people the inspiration gained from the work of their brothers in the Soviet Union.

The results have been stupendous: from 1917 through 1957—a 40 year span—the 600 millions dwelling in the many-centuried, marvelous Chinese land have become part of the peoples' democratic regime, setting their feet on the path to socialism, as have hundreds of millions from other parts of the world.

The USSR has acquired vast power for defending and preserving peace, as well as for producing collective wealth in city and countryside—vast as the longing of its great people for peace and their determination to have it.

In vain the forces of obscurantism have encircled a quarter of the globe, with fantastic resolve to bar out human thought, using for this money and the weapons of mass destruction. This foolish project is absorbing enormous efforts, and condemning us all to constant crises and the hysteria of a terror provoked in order to convert the sweat and blood of the people into atom bombs by means of the war taxation they are subjected to.

But arms are ineffectual because the workers' land continues to make better ones than their enemies make, rendering attack impossible, so that peace shall not be destroyed. And day by day Socialist thought penetrates more deeply into the ranks of the producing masses, oppressed by taxation and by the war hysteria and racial strife set in motion by the depraved gangster ruling elements.

For these reasons every man who loves his country will celebrate this anniversary of the October Revolution with boundless rejoicing, since for the colonial and semi-colonial oppressed peoples, for all countries not yet liberated by the proletarian revolution, the one great possibility for a better, truly human life is the one the people will bring into being thanks to the historic example which the Soviet Union gave us forty years ago today.

How the USSR Grew

by ANNA LOUISE STRONG

"IF THE PEOPLE of the USA could know the simple truth about the Soviet Union," said an American friend to me, "the threat of war would collapse like a punctured balloon."

The truth about so earth-shaking a phenomenon as the growth of the USSR in the past forty years, is, however, by no means simple. It is composed of a million events that no single mind can contain. Some seek to tell it by statistics; thousands of books and articles will appear on this fortieth anniversary by experts who can give those statistics far better than I. What I can add to this collective truth, from this distance in California, kept out of the great anniversary celebration by the US State Department's refusal to grant me a passport, are a few sharp personal memories of how the USSR grew. For I had the good fortune to spend the greater part of these years in the Soviet Union, travelling widely in it to observe its growth.

My first sharp memory, as I entered the USSR by rail from Warsaw in the summer of 1921, was an office worker who got on at Minsk to share my compartment; he was shocked that any American should

want to come to Russia and told me to go home quickly for there was only hunger here. In immediate contrast to this man, two Young Communists got on, while the train stood in the station, to collect money from the passengers for the victims of the Volga Famine. They were barefoot, clad in worn white suits of home-made linen with no underwear. Yet it was clear that they did not consider themselves in any need. They were confident young people, dignified, collecting for a national emergency; they approached each passenger and meticulously gave flimsy paper receipts for each ruble. They were consciously building their land.

Thus from the start I saw the problem facing their country and the way two types of people met it. Seven years of war had ravaged what had always been a backward peasant land. Then two years of drought in the great Volga Valley struck farms whose horses had been taken by war and whose home-made ploughs were worn out by years. So famine shook the country. In the heart of the grain belt, in the city then known as Samara, hundreds of children were being abandoned in the streets by peasants who could not feed them and who hoped themselves to fly to regions of bread.

Samara, where thousands slept

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around the railway station and fought for a place on the passing trains, was a chaos of misery and death. Yet here in chaos worked devoted people, striving not only to save the life around them but actually to create something new. The "health train" on which I was quartered fed 5,000 children daily. The city authorities collected starving, lousy youngsters from the streets into four large receiving homes, fed them, cleaned them and organized them into regular children's homes at the rate of one new children's home per day.

In these, education began under incredible conditions. Many children could not even speak Russian; they came from minor nationalities living in the area and now uprooted by famine. Few of them had ever seen a school. Later I saw in the villages that few peasant children had shoes or coats to go outdoors in winter, even if there had been schools; they spent the winter on the family ovens.

So the first task, after feeding the children, was to teach them to speak Russian. More advanced groups tried to learn to read from a mixture of books picked up in a ruined town. Only the most advanced aspired to learn writing; there were only six pencils in a children's home I visited.

To my amazement, the school authorities decided to use a small shipment of chocolate bars I brought from the Quaker Relief "for an educational problem." The children of the higher groups worked out exactly what the share of their school would be in the chocolate, and how much each children should then get; this was a very small piece. But each

children's home elected its delegate to go and get the chocolate, and then the children divided it accurately. I actually saw one boy put back a second piece that was given him by mistake, saying that he already had his share.

Already, in hunger and chaos, were people confidently training children for the world's first socialist state. The driving force in their confidence was clear. They knew that whatever the land could produce belonged to all its people; this aroused them to develop it as far and as fast as they could.

I recall a woman doctor in Samara who fought, almost without medicines, for "the quality" of the children's hospital. I recall a Finnish miner in Karelia who camped north of the Arctic Circle to develop the first mica mines of the area and who laughingly told me his summer's wages were "my food and one resoling of my boots." Through the energy and faith of hundreds of thousands of such people, life revived under the New Economic Policy and then produced the first Five-Year Plan. It was life on a new base.

People today take five-year plans as a normal routine of socialist building. But the first Five-Year Plan was a new creation; it was like a revolution or a battle. The outside world sneered at it as an extravagant dream of Moscow. But we who travelled the distant part of the Soviet Union saw it take form in villages, factories, cities, provinces. We saw it born from the passion of millions of people, who felt themselves owners of a great land and determined quickly to enjoy its wealth. Then we saw this passion

hammered by the Communist Party and the State Planning Board into a plan to industrialize the country and make it independent of foreign powers.

I first saw the Five-Year Plan not from Moscow but from Central Asia. Travelling on horseback in 1929 to the Pamirs, I met an Uzbek road-mender some days beyond the railroad. He knew three words of Russian: "road, automobile and Five-Year Plan." With these and with many proud gestures he told me that the horse trail would be a road for autos as far as the frontier. The Five-Year Plan would do it. He was already devoted to the Plan.

A year later I saw the opening of the Turk-Sib Railway on May-Day, 1930. A thousand miles of rail had been driven north-south through uninhabited deserts. I went by special train with scores of foreign correspondents and hundreds of Soviet delegates. At every new station the pioneer workers bragged of their great achievements and told the heroic story of how they built through blinding dust storms in summer and blizzards in winter, "when bureaucrats from the Center failed to send warm clothes." They all knew that they were changing the history of Asia, uniting Siberian wheat and timber with Central Asian fruit and cotton, bringing Soviet trade to Western China.

"First of the Giants of the Five-Year Plan to Open," they proclaimed on banners. But it was only one of several score such giants in the thundering Five-Year Plan.

Stalingrad Tractor Works in 1931 was an unfinished war, a war for the first Soviet conveyor. In America the conveyor took a generation to

grow; here it had to be won quickly in battle. Strong men wept when the "camel" went up in their shop, the laughing camel, sign of the shop that lagged. Men who had done their utmost sobbed because their shop had not done its utmost. It wasn't enough that one man or a hundred did the utmost. Organization had to be built.

Each shop had production conferences; the machine shop discussed "quality" and "lack of small tools." They conquered one detail and another slipped past to stop them. A dent in one cutting tool, a green hand and a careless inspector held up 60 tractors and stopped the assembly line for a day. Ten thousand details had to be conquered at once. That had never been done in Russia.

Would all the ten thousand things ever be done right? All at the same time? The American specialists doubted it. Party Secretary Tregubinko, lying exhausted on a sick-bed, handling his work by phone while giving an interview to me, said: "We have forces to call on that they do not know."

Four months after my August visit the Works reached a steady 110 tractors daily; it was "up to plan." Twelve years later the men of the Stalingrad Tractor Works beat the armies of Hitler back from the ruined yards of the Works, driving their own tanks.

The same years saw an equally swift revolution in farming. Between 1930 and 1933 some 14,000,000 small, inefficient peasant holdings were combined into some 200,000 large farms, collectively owned, serviced by tractors and machines. This was the more difficult change; countries have been industrialized before,

but farm collectives were new. There were millions of errors, some of them very tragic. But years later, in the test of war, *Life Magazine* noted (1943): "Whatever the cost of farm collectivization . . . these large farm units . . . made possible the use of machines . . . and released millions of workers to industry. Without them Russia could not have built the industry that turned out the munitions that stopped the German army."

In January 1933 Stalin reported to the Central Committee that the former peasant Russia had become the second industrial nation in the world. The cost of the Plan had been heavy; it had moved millions of people from their homes and deprived other millions of goods and even of food. But never in history had so great an advance been made so swiftly. Had the pace been less swift, the young socialist land would have been unarmed in the midst of a hostile capitalism, which was armed with the latest technique.

This everyone knew. And therefore the ruthless advance was made, not only by orders from leaders, but by a zeal to create that was born in millions who saw new roads to life. Illiterate peasants became farm scientists; unskilled workers became engineers. Even greater changes took place among more backward nationalities.

The freeing of women of Central Asia was only one of a hundred triumphant struggles. Yet it was a revolution that broke the oppression of centuries, raising the status of millions of women.

For generations the Moslem women of Central Asia had been chattels sold in child marriages and there-

after never seen in public without the hideous "paranja," a long black veil of woven horsehair that covered the entire face, hindering breathing and vision. Russian Communist women led the struggle for freedom; they met with bloody opposition. Husbands killed wives for unveiling; they were supported in this by the Moslem mullahs. When a girl went from her school in Tashkent to agitate in her home village, her dismembered body was sent back to the school in a cart with the words: "That for your women's freedom."

Thousands of women sprang to take up the struggle. Soviet power supported them by schools, by demonstration trials, proving to citizens that wife murder was really a crime. The chief weapon in freeing women was the new industrialization. In 1928 there was only one small silk mill in Old Bokhara, running at a loss. Its pale, weary director told me: "We do not try to make profit. We are training the women workers for future great silk mills. We are using this mill to fight the *paranja*. We demand that women unveil in the mill."

While Central Asian women fought their way to a new freedom, at the other end of the land young Nina Kameneva parachuted from icy space in a world's altitude record. Her words, on landing, were seized by Soviet youth as a slogan: "The sky of our country is the highest sky in the world."

These are a few of the million pictures that make up "the simple truth" of the USSR. No one can list the achievements; no one can even remember them all. One recalls the opening of great canal systems, from Leningrad to the Arctic, the Baltic

to the Volga, the Volga to the Don, which made water transport continuous over the broad plains of Russia, and made Moscow a port on five seas. One recalls in 1937 the first trans-polar flights to America, the opening of the Northern Sea route across the Arctic top of Europe and Asia, the first floating camp of Papanin on the ice of the North Pole. More important for human welfare were the victories in public health, the reduction of mortality, the growth of a sound, healthy people, the new medical discoveries in which the USSR stands pre-eminent in the world.

These years of Soviet Power have changed not only the life of Russia. They also changed the life of the world. Let us recall the days of 1940 when the armies of France collapsed before Hitler, and all Europe feared a Dark Ages of a thousand years. Let us recall that infamous Nazi dogma of a master race over slave races, and how this assault against mankind was broken by the men and women of Stalingrad.

For this the world is in their debt. And not for this only. These forty years of Soviet power built not only the world's first socialist state and the strength that stopped Hitler. They built the economic base for all those socialist states that today are one third of mankind. They built the economic surplus that can give to ex-colonial peoples of Asia and Africa the freedom to choose their development in open market. They thus have built a base on which can arise the prosperity of many nations,

each freely choosing its path, all united in peace.

The base exists for a world of plenty. But will that possibility be achieved? This depends not alone on the Soviet Union. The USSR is only one of the factors that determines the destiny of mankind.

The past ten years have brought to us all the power of the atom. And all of us now must answer the question: Shall we advance in peace through atomic power to world prosperity, or shall we destroy the human race by war?

So let me try to state what seems the simplest most vital truth about the Soviet Union. Here are people like all of us, full of errors and triumphs, of sins and of glories, striving for a better life. But forty years ago, when their land was ruined, they chose a social system in which all the productive wealth belonged to them all. Thus they built in forty years a great industrial power, and the strength that blocked Hitler, and a base to supply other newly developing lands. And what they ask of the world is peace to build.

And if we have peace, we shall all advance to a planet of plenty, and even learn the way to other planets. But if we have war, we shall none of us have any good life left.

Is it any wonder that the youth of 140 countries, whose life depends and creates the future, came to Moscow this past summer and cheered?

The above article is also appearing in the November issue of "Soviet Woman."

"AS I LOOK BACK on all my experiences in the Soviet Union, I want to say first that I understand well the love of the Russian people for their own country. . . . In the life of the ordinary man and woman in Russia, all that is good has happened to them since the Revolution."

Eleanor Roosevelt, *New York Post*, October 18

The USSR in the UN

by ESLANDA ROBESON

ONE OF THE fascinating aspects of the United Nations is the fact that it continues to change, however slowly, to meet the realities of a changing world situation.

During the fortnight between September 24 and October 8, however, the atmosphere at the United Nations underwent an extraordinarily rapid, profound and far-reaching change in leadership.

The United States delegation had pursued relentlessly the question of the situation in Hungary; Mr. Dulles had laid down a challenge for domination in the Middle East, and had reaffirmed U.S. policy for "liberation" of peoples whose governments we do not approve; Mr. Lodge had successfully maneuvered once again to prevent the admission of China.

Then, suddenly, two historic events occurred which took the wind out of the billowing sails of the U.S. delegation: the affair at Little Rock and the launching of the first earth satellite by the USSR.

When Governor Faubus called out the National Guard of Arkansas to prevent nine Negro children from entering the Central High School of Little Rock, delegates from every country to the United Nations watched and listened with amazement; they gazed incredulously at the revealing pictures on television and in the press, and their estima-

tion of "democracy" in the country "leading the Free World" went down, down, down. But many of them probably decided that the United States, however undemocratic, was nevertheless too powerful to "cross," so they continued to follow its lead and to deliver their votes.

Then came "Sputnik." The scientists of the USSR captured the imagination and the respect of the world by successfully launching the first earth satellite into outer space, and thus the Soviet Union stepped out in front in the minds of millions of people—including their leaders—all over the world, and in the United Nations.

These people had already been immensely impressed by the arrival of the two jet airliners bringing the Soviet delegation to the UN. The Soviets lead in use of jet airplanes for passenger travel, and everyone, including Western (British and American) pilots who made part of the journey at the controls, was properly respectful of this splendid achievement.

For days the Number One news item in the UN corridors was the Soviet airplanes. Then for days the Number One topic was Little Rock. Now the Number One item is "Sputnik."

During all this time Mr. Gro-

myko, Soviet Foreign Minister, and other members of the Soviet delegation to the UN were speaking in terms of peaceful coexistence. They made concrete suggestions and definite concessions to end the cold war and the devastatingly expensive arms race.

But now—and herein lies the profound and far-reaching change in the international situation and at the United Nations—it is the Soviet Union who is speaking from "positions of strength." Yet Mr. Gromyko, in his policy speech to the General Assembly on September 20 was in no way arrogant. On the contrary he was diplomatic and reasonable:

The Soviet Government believes that it is our common duty to . . . enable people fully to devote themselves to peaceful pursuits. . . . The first thing to be done, of course, is to give up trying to settle international issues by force. . . .

We have no need for foreign territories . . . moreover, we have in our country enormous deposits of almost all known metals, minerals and fuels. There is no need for us to consider seizure of foreign markets: our planned economy, which does not experience crises of overproduction, secures a stable and steadily growing internal market for the products of our industry and agriculture. There is not a single social group in the Soviet Union who to any extent could be interested in war, or could hope to draw advantage from war. . . .

Therefore, Mr. Gromyko went on, the Soviet Union wants and needs a stable and permanent peace in which to get on with its gigantic program of industrial and agricultural development and the mastery of its natural resources.

But of course, Mr. Gromyko continued, all this does not do away with the differences which exist be-

tween the two social systems or with the ideological controversies between them; however, these should not be a hindrance to peaceful cooperation, he declared.

Not to recognize states belonging to the socialist system—which now embraces more than one-third of the population of the globe—was rather like "non-recognition of the earth's rotation around the sun," said Mr. Gromyko. He continued:

In spite of all the efforts of the advocates of the "positions of strength" policy, the principles of peaceful coexistence have for a long time been gaining ground in relations between States. At the Bandung Conference twenty-nine Asian and African countries proclaimed these principles which are fully shared by the Soviet Government. . . .

The principles are: (1) Mutual respect for one another's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Non-aggression; (3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs for any motives of economic, political or ideological character; (4) Equality and mutual benefit, and (5) Peaceful co-existence.

Mr. Gromyko, on behalf of the Soviet Government, formally submitted this declaration of principles for consideration to the General Assembly, urging their approval by the member states.

Declaring disarmament the most important problem before this session of the United Nations, he also introduced for consideration the Soviet proposals for partial disarmament including reduction of armed forces and military budgets, liquidation of military bases on foreign territories, reduction of all armed forces on German territory, reduction of Western armed forces in the

NATO countries and of Soviet forces in the Warsaw Pact countries, and ending of war propaganda.

To the previous Soviet proposal regarding an undertaking to renounce the use of all types of nuclear weapons by the nations possessing them, the concrete suggestion of a pledge not to use such weapons for five years was added.

The Soviet Foreign Minister renewed the proposal for an immediate and unconditional end to the testing of all nuclear weapons under suitable control, to be considered separately from all other aspects of the disarmament question. India has introduced a resolution to the same effect, and Japan has also urged UN action to end tests.

Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, happily now elected to a second term as Secretary General of the United Nations, had, as usual, some statesman-like and thought-provoking words to say about the role of the United Nations in this present difficult, radically changing world situation. In his Introduction to the Annual Report On the Work of the Organization this year, our wise Secretary-General wrote:

The greatest need today is to blunt the edges of conflict among the nations, not to sharpen them. If properly used, the UN can serve a diplomacy of reconciliation better than other instruments available to member states. All the varied interests and aspirations of the world meet in its precincts upon the common ground of the Charter. . . .

With its present increase in membership, the UN more fully mirrors the realities of the present world situation than ever before. . . . The renaissance of Asia, the awakening of Africa, and other great changes that are under way in the balance of power and relationships of peoples are part of the dynamics of history itself. As always, they bring with them many grave problems of adjustment. . . .

In an organization of sovereign States, voting victories are likely to be illusory unless they are steps in the direction of winning lasting consent to a peaceful and just settlement of the questions at issue. . . .

The 82 delegations to the United Nations are now in the process of trying to adjust themselves to some of the many grave problems which this present wholly new world situation presents. Millions of people throughout the world wish them good journey on the road to peaceful coexistence.

SCIENTISTS URGE BAN ON H-BOMB TESTS

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE of the Federation of American Scientists, speaking for 2,200 members, on October 10 urged an international ban on testing of long-range weapons and the H-Bomb, with a UN inspection system to monitor the agreement. Saluting the Russians for the launching of Sputnik, they warned of the dangers of letting this achievement lead to a stepped up arms race rather than competition for peaceful purposes. Declaring the time short to reach agreement, the statement continued:

"In the predictable future the technological problems will be solved and stockpiling of intercontinental missiles armed with H-bomb warheads will begin. Concealment will then be relatively easy, and defense—except by retaliation—will probably be partial at best. The era of push-button mass destruction will be upon us."

Peace Pattern in Asia

by SCOTT NEARING

JAPANESE peace forces, during the summer of 1957, held a World Peace Conference in Tokyo for ten days, from August 6-16. Judged by the number of delegates, the conference was predominantly Japanese, but representatives were present from 25 foreign countries, which gave the affair its world character.

Each year when August 6 rolls around, Japanese peace organizations memorialize the day on which the first atom bomb incinerated the city of Hiroshima. Hiroshima Day is not celebrated. It is remembered. The white heat of the sun loosed suddenly and unexpectedly in a crowded city of lightly-built homes; the resulting concussion, followed by an all-consuming conflagration; the tens of thousands of dead; other tens of thousands of frightfully burned and wounded men and women and children; the nameless disorder and terror among the survivors; their frantic efforts to put out the fires, to give first aid, to secure untainted water, to pre-

pare food and shelter; and then the revelation that the insidious after-effects of atomic fission and fusion are less apparent but more devastating than the immediate, visible damage to health, life and property. Hiroshima scars are still visible on Hiroshima Day. Likewise burned into the consciousness of the Japanese people by the atomic explosion is the awareness of the awesome fact that exposure to radiation modifies the physical life of future generations.

These shattering experiences, with their fearsome memories and as yet unknown consequences, are a part of the consciousness of the Japanese people, and only of the Japanese people. In one 'awe-ful' sense, the people of Japan are the chosen people of this generation—chosen for the purpose of determining, by callous experiment, what the energy of the split atom can do to human multitudes, crowded together and heaped up in the narrow confines of a modern city. Only the Japanese have had a Hiroshima and a Nagasaki, and therefore only the Japanese can memorialize atomization, with all of its horrible accompaniments and consequences.

We write these things not to horrify readers but to explain the success of the 1957 Japanese Peace Conference. There were 3,981 dele-

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gates at the conference, from every part of Japan. This is no mean achievement. Japan is still repairing war damage; is still poor in this world's goods; is working day and night to regain the position that it lost during the 1941-45 war as the economic leader of Asia; is struggling, with tightened belt, to convert a maximum of income into capital forms that will replace the stupendous war losses; is subsisting on an extremely narrow standard of shelter, food and the other necessities and decencies. In Japan, as in no other country which we visited during our recent tour of Asia, did we see an entire people—men, women, children, in the city and in the country—pouring out their energies in a coordinated effort to recoup their fortunes and restore themselves to the coveted position which they had held for so many years, as way-showers to the peoples of Asia.

Despite this engrossment in an all-but-superhuman task of recovering quickly from the vast destruction wrought by a modern war (or perhaps because of the factors which lie behind this engrossment) 3,981 Japanese men and women, young people and their elders, were able to lay aside their daily occupations and preoccupations, finding the time and the means necessary to attend an extended peace conference and to report the collection of 34,000,000 signatures on a petition to stop testing atomic weapons. So far as we know, no such demonstration has been held in Poland or Germany, both of which suffered extreme war damage, but no atom bombing. Nothing approaching or even suggesting such a demonstration has been organized in the United States,

which is more populous, far richer in worldly goods, and with much more leisure than Japan.

Among the world's peoples, perhaps none was more severely shaken up during the 1939-45 war years than the Japanese. In their case, at least, the shock treatment has worked wonders. It is impossible to travel for a day in Japan without realizing what a grip the drive for peace has on the people. In schools, in factories, in offices, in trade union headquarters and public meeting places there are peace posters, peace notices, peace slogans. Five nationwide organizations in Japan are preoccupied with the struggle against atom bomb tests, for disarmament, against conscription, for the abolition of war. Japanese chiefs of state take part in this struggle side by side with workers, businessmen, farmers, students and housewives. "End bomb tests; no more war" is a slogan which echoes and re-echoes throughout Japan.

It may seem a distortion to begin a description of "Peace Patterns in Asia" with so much space devoted to the Japanese, who at the moment do not have even a foothold on the Asian continent, but live on a thousand-mile-long chain of islands which skirt the eastern shores of the Asian continent. Yet, at the moment, the peace movement in Japan stands head and shoulders above that in any Asian country that we visited. In no country did we see indications of better organizational techniques. In none had the peace movement penetrated more deeply into all strata of society. In none were more people more actively engaged in the various aspects of the peace movement. Japan's 1957 Peace Confer-

ence was not a flash-in-the-pan, but the result of years of painstaking preparatory work carried on by Japanese from every walk of life and on every income level. "End war! Make peace!" is a slogan which has a special appeal to the Japanese people; it is in terms of this widespread appeal that the preparatory work for the 1957 Peace Conference was done.

Peace forces are strong in many other Asian countries. Ceylon is a good example. It is a tropical island lying off the southern tip of India. Ceylon's nine million people won their independence from British rule a decade ago. The present Ceylonese government has been in office for only a year. In one sense affairs in Ceylon might be described as in a state of flux and transition. Yet when the question arose, at the executive meeting of the World Council of Peace, in March, 1957: "What Asian peace movement is most strategically located and best prepared to sponsor a World Peace Conference?" the choice fell on Ceylon.

The 1957 sessions of the World Council of Peace were held in Colombo in June, 1957. For the seven days of meetings and discussions conducted by the World Council of Peace administration, the people of Ceylon were in no way responsible, but the multitudinous preparations and the boundless hospitality which greeted the delegates from forty-nine countries who attended the conference, were offered under the direction of the Ceylon Peace Council. From Prime Minister Bandaranaike, who tendered an official reception to the Conference delegates, to the hundreds of Colombo citizens who enter-

tained delegates in their homes, and to the thousands who turned out on a rain-swept Saturday afternoon for an open-air demonstration and reception to the Peace Conference delegates (arranged by the Ceylon Peace Council) the people of Ceylon did themselves proud.

At the Saturday demonstration, a mile-long procession wound its way through Colombo streets to Independence Square. The streets were lined with cheering people. Those of the Conference delegates who could stand the ordeal of an hour's mid-afternoon walk through the heat of a tropical June day were cheered and applauded. Marchers chanted slogans such as "We want peace," to which the crowds responded "Stop nuclear tests" or "End war," to which the response was "Make peace." Most of these slogans and responses were shouted in Singalese and Tamil. Some were called and answered in English.

Ceylon is a small, new and relatively poor country. By Western standards, its level of comforts and conveniences is low. But the people, from Ministers of State to primary school children, wanted peace, and said so in no uncertain terms. Furthermore, the Ceylon Peace Council and its supporters were well enough organized and soundly enough based to provide efficiently and hospitably for peace delegates from every continent.

Another matter is noteworthy. In both Japan and Ceylon, the most highly placed among government officials gave their support and added their voices to the pro-peace chorus. In both countries the parliament passed pro-peace resolutions. In both countries the chief executives and

foreign ministers went out of their way to support and promote the activities of private associations working for peace.

Pro-peace activities in Japan and Ceylon are outstanding examples of the peace pattern which visitors, interested in peace, will find widely distributed in East and Southeast Asia. In India, where we spent nearly two months, we were in touch with what might be called the ethical peace movements as well as its political counterpart. The ethical peace movement is based on the principles of love, reverence for life and harmlessness. The Jains, a religious sect of considerable dimensions, teach these principles and seek to put them into practice. Followers of the Buddha support them in theory if not always in practice. Gandhi advocated tradition and current teaching which is pro-peace. There is also an Indian Peace Council, with local committees scattered all over the country, which carry on active pro-peace work. Representatives of this Indian Council attended the Ceylon and Japanese peace conferences and take an active part in the world struggle for peace.

Nowhere in our travels have we encountered more serious, varied, efficient and devoted peace work than we saw in Asia. We came away from these experiences with several clearly defined impressions.

First among these impressions is that Asia and Asians are passing through a profound social transformation. An old order is disappearing. A new social pattern is taking its place.

Among the forces which have brought about this transformation, three are outstanding. Industriali-

zation, the democratic way of life and the determination to establish and maintain the practice of self-determination. Those ideas are not new in the West, nor are they new among Asian intellectuals. Today they have penetrated into all levels of Asian society. Many Asians are opposed to these "innovations." For generations, in collaboration with the Western imperialists they kept the Asian lid clamped down tight. Today, in virtually every part of Asia the lid is partly or wholly lifted. Industrialization, democratic procedures and self-determination have won a preferred position, especially among members of the younger generations.

Industrialization, democratic practices and self-determination are all linked to peace. In every country we visited, people said to us: "Give us ten or twenty years of peace and we will show the world what a generation of liberated Asians can do."

Next to "End war! Make peace!" the phrase we heard most in Asia was "spirit of Bandung." Twenty-nine Asian-African nations were represented at the Bandung Conference in the Spring of 1955. Unanimously they decided for independence and self-determination, against war and in favor of peace maintained by a strengthened United Nations. Today Bandung Day is widely celebrated in Asia.

Asians are confident that the former Western masters of Asia—the British, French and Dutch, cannot reoccupy Asia. First, because the Asians will oppose reoccupation by every means at their disposal; second, because the Soviet Union, which is committed to self-determination for Asians, will not tolerate

the imperial reoccupation of the continent.

Asians are keenly aware of the danger of counter revolution, financed and armed by Washington. This awareness was sharpened by events in Hungary during the autumn of 1956.

There is a feeling in Asia that the Chinese People's Republic is blazing a path which self-determining Asians may follow to their own advantage. The lessons of the Korean War of 1950-53 have been thoughtfully evaluated in Asia. While we were in Asia, Chou En-lai was criss-crossing the continent from capital to capital, acclaimed everywhere by the people as well as listened to by the chiefs of state.

Asians believe that there are three

major powers today—the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Of these three, one is wholly Asian, while the bulk of the Soviet land mass is in Asia. If a fourth power is added to the list, they believe it must be India. In that case, two of the four world powers will be wholly Asian and only one Western.

"Preserve peace for ten or twenty years," the Asian people tell the world. "Give us a breathing spell to get our economies and our governments functioning, and the hold of the West will be permanently broken. We Asians, who make up a majority of the human race will be the major force in establishing and maintaining a peaceful world through a stronger United Nations, which we shall control."

FESTIVAL OF YOUTH AND FRIENDSHIP

STAFF CORRESPONDENT Ramdass reports from Moscow: "Thirty thousand young people from over a hundred countries of the world drove in open trucks and buses along a 13 mile route through the city while eight million citizens of Moscow and many who had come from outside turned out into the streets. They were on the pavements along the entire route. They were on the rooftops and at every window of the apartment houses. They were in every conceivable place one could stand or perch upon. One of the new buses (there were 13,000 busses, 600 cars and 700 trucks placed at the disposal of the Festival) sped toward a road crossing. Its driver, smiling broadly at the policeman on the corner, called out, 'Look at the passengers I'm driving. They are songs and laughter, friendship and peace. From morning till night they are always in a hurry. So give us the green light.' 'It is always the green for peace and friendship,' answered the policeman as the bus sped past."

New Age, Delhi, India, Aug. 4, 1957.

My Visit to the USSR

by VIRGINIA EPSTEIN

as told to MURRAY YOUNG

VISITORS to the Soviet Union these days are still unfortunately not too easy to come upon, therefore the news that Mrs. Virginia Epstein, for many years co-chairman of the Women's Committee of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, had recently returned from a month's stay in the USSR seemed a happy stroke of luck. Mrs. Epstein was, of course, only too glad to share her observations and experiences with the readers of our magazine.

"Many of my friends," Mrs. Epstein smiled, "thought I was much too old to go off by myself on a trip that promised to be taxing, even for a much younger tourist. I am, you know, not only a mother, but a grandmother as well—a grandmother of 72."

Talking to this vigorous, enthusiastic woman who was so eager to share a whole world of new experiences, one could only accept the age she gave on the principle that people do not go about adding years unto themselves.

"Of course I paid no attention whatever to the warnings of my friends," she added, laughing warmly, "and I came back feeling younger and more physically fit than ever."

"This visit," Mrs. Epstein began, "was the realization of a dream

I had long cherished of seeing for myself the country whose struggle to build socialism I had watched with great interest for so many years. Increasingly to me, and of course to millions of other women throughout the world, the over-riding problem of our time seemed the establishment of peaceful relations between all peoples. Having lived through two great world wars and these last anxious years of the cold war I came to understand that peace could mean only the living side by side of two differing economic systems in a world that seemed daily to grow smaller. This fact became especially clear as the Soviet Union grew stronger and China began in 1949 her long march to socialism."

It was her deep conviction that further wars must be prevented that led Mrs. Epstein, like so many other women, to seek an understanding of the development of the Soviet Union and to share her understanding with others. Not an easy task in light of the complex events of the past 40 years, but made all the more important as dangers grew and the drift towards war seemed on occasion hopeless. Mrs. Epstein worked not only through the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, but as a teacher, a mother and a grandmother she

sought constantly to make the gravity of the problem of peace clearer to other people and to bring them like herself into action for peace and for friendship with the new socialist society.

Always, of course, she met the same questions: what is socialism like; can we really live in the same world with socialism; do the people of the Soviet Union truly desire peace; what, indeed, are the people who live under socialism like; what are their hopes, their values?

It was with these questions in her mind and with the determination to answer some of them at least that Mrs. Epstein went to the Soviet Union this summer.

Her interpreter through the visit was Elena Shibarana, a young historian who last year accompanied the Soviet delegates to the Status of Women's Conference at the UN. Twenty-five years of age, a product of the Soviet educational system, Elena Shibarana came to represent to Mrs. Epstein after long days of travel and endless hours of conversation, all the serious, cultivated and purposeful young women she encountered everywhere.

"Indeed," Mrs. Epstein said, "one of the strongest impressions I brought back was the long distance women had come in the Soviet Union. I found them in all important posts—in research institutes, hospitals, factories, as teachers, agronomists, or serving in key positions in the administration of local and national government. At the same time, and probably because of the evident progress so many women had made, I was struck with the very high proportion of heavy, unskilled jobs—in road building, construction work,

and in the fields—still done by women."

The gap between the number of those technically trained and those without skills was much wider than she had anticipated. To her queries about this difference, she was reminded of the narrow limits of technical training which the Soviets had inherited from the tsarist period and of the tremendous losses in trained personnel during the war.

"But by 1960 every child in the Soviet Union will receive ten years of education and this education is increasingly polytechnical. Everybody I spoke to about this was aware of the still large number of men and women doing unskilled work, but they were all confident that this gap was rapidly lessening and that a wholly new level of technical training was being reached as a result of the ever-widening educational system.

"The confidence reflected in the answer was typical of the calm assurance I always encountered when I asked questions about points that puzzled me or about achievements I felt fell short of what I had been led to expect.

"I felt this confidence in the future was particularly evident in the care and consideration for Soviet children. As both a teacher and a mother, I have always felt that a people's treatment of its children was the key to its deepest values. I was immediately struck in all the large cities by the fact that I saw no children playing in the streets although my visit was during the summer vacation. On asking about this, I discovered they were all away either in summer camps in the country or spending the day in the many parks

each city afforded, under expert guidance.

"This constant concern for children was also evident in the wide and embracing systems of kindergartens, and Young Pioneer Circles where the majority of the older children spend their free time, and in the relatively new system of rapidly expanding boarding-schools throughout the country.

"What particularly impressed me was the fact that I saw no guns or other military toys in the hands of children in any of the many summer camps and Pioneer Circles I visited."

At this point Mrs. Epstein displayed the most treasured memento of her trip—a snapshot of herself and a group of sun-tanned children in animated conversation against the side of a large sailing boat belonging to the summer camp she was visiting. The name of the boat, boldly inscribed on its prow, was the Russian word for Peace.

"When I asked teachers if the children were ever taught to hide beneath desks in air-raid drills, they incredulously replied that of course there were no such drills in the schools. They pointed out with a good deal of feeling that their aim was to help children understand and love the rest of the world—surely I had observed this? To instill hatred and fear of other people was unthinkable in a socialist society, they told me."

Mrs. Epstein found the housing situation bad. There was no attempt to conceal this from her, rather the whole serious problem was a matter of constant discussion. She was reminded of the low level of housing inherited from tsarism, the concentration on establishing basic indus-

try, and the destruction of the war years. At the same time evidence of a renewed drive for better housing was everywhere before the eyes: vast apartment complexes in all the cities, tens of thousands of new homes in the countryside, and the great encouragement for building houses either through trade union organization or by individuals themselves.

"But it was in the beauty of the great newly rebuilt cities like Kiev with its spacious tree-lined streets, its generous parks and endless rows of new apartment buildings, where—you must remember—just 12 years ago there was only the terrible destruction left by the retreating Nazis, that the proof of their ability to solve the housing problem was most impressively displayed."

Turning to the more personal matters about which she is always questioned, Mrs. Epstein said, "From all I had read and a great many of the pictures I had seen I expected a sort of universal drabness in women's clothes. But I was pleasantly surprised to see the colorful summer dresses worn everywhere. Stylish they were not by our standards, but bright, feminine and attractive they certainly were. And I thought the tailored suits generally worn by the many professional women I met were, if not smart, neat and most serviceable. Indeed my own traveling suit hardly offered any particular contrast to theirs."

As for food there seemed to be no shortage. Like so many visitors, Mrs. Epstein felt that in their warm generosity the Russians tended to overdo the pressing of food on their guests. With refrigeration only recently coming into general use, there was naturally not the variety we have be-

come accustomed to in the United States but the amount of food was plentiful and for a guest somewhat overwhelming.

Of the more sensational events of the past two years there was much discussion. Particularly this centered around the role of Stalin whose pictures and statues were to be seen everywhere throughout the country. The revelations of the 20th Congress on certain aspects of his career, especially the later years, had obviously shocked the people.

"But it was shock tempered by a deep recognition of the great contribution Stalin had made to their lives," Mrs. Epstein said, "the establishment of a solid industrialization, the collectivization of the farms, the training of tens of thousands of technical and scientific experts, and above all the leadership he had given to the country in the war years. Time, they felt, would bring a more rounded evaluation."

In the meantime there were the daily problems with all their urgency and the increasing number of successes to record in all fields of Soviet life. "From this, I believe," Mrs. Epstein went on, "comes their admiration for Khrushchev. His daring projects—the cultivation of the virgin lands, the encouragement of new methods in agriculture, the decentralization of industrial management—have caught the imagination of the people as against Molotov and his group with their tendency to hold back, to go slow. Khrushchev clearly reflects the present tempo of the people, it seems to me, with their confidence of now being able to realize the potentials they struggled and sacrificed so long to make possible."

On Hungary the general feeling

was one of bewilderment that people outside of the Soviet Union should not have understood that the action of the USSR in the crisis had in fact lessened the threat of a new world war which they were convinced was a real danger.

"It was difficult for the Russians to understand the incapacity of people in the West, even many friendly people, to grasp the real meaning of imperialism with its implacable hatred of socialism and its unceasing plotting against it, as well as the ignorance, or forgetfulness, in the West of Hungary's own bitter history of fascism."

Mrs. Epstein went on to say, "The problem of peace is so continuously in the minds of the Soviet people, as you must have noticed Mrs. Roosevelt pointing out in her reports, that there was always bewilderment and downright incomprehension at the lack of any broad action for peace in the United States. 'What are the women of America doing about peace?' was a constantly repeated question I always felt embarrassed in attempting to answer."

"I was charged," Mrs. Epstein went on, "by some of my friends to inquire particularly about reports of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. But it was evident that any feelings of anti-Semitism were completely lacking among the people with whom I raised the question. Even among the Jews I talked with there was no personal sense of being discriminated against in any way. Their explanation of past repressions of Jewish leaders and Jewish cultural institutions always emphasized the fact that this was a tragic part of the whole period of repression of peoples of many nationalities, falsely sus-

pected of having engaged in treasonous activities. They firmly believed it could not be attributed to anti-Semitism as such. Moreover the present process of correcting past mistakes, they felt, applied to the Jews as to all other victims.

"At the same time I realized that this explanation did not answer by any means all of my questions, nor did it sufficiently explain why Jewish cultural institutions had not been restored as seemed to be desired by some of the Jewish population.

"The questions I have been asked since I returned have made me aware of how agitated many people, otherwise friendly to the Soviet Union, are about this issue. I do not pretend to have all of the answers. It is a complex question which can only gradually be settled within the Soviet Union itself.

"In the meantime," she said with deep feeling, "I believe with all the strength in my being that it must not be permitted to be an obstacle to friendship and understanding between our two countries."

From the brilliant young editor of the leading Georgian newspaper, to the chairman of a large collective outside of Kiev, the admonition at the end of all discussions was always, "Tell the truth about us—but always within the historical framework."

"In other words," Mrs. Epstein further explained, "they recognize, as we so often fail to do, that one

arrives at the deepest understanding of the truth only in the light of historical development, by grasping clearly the sequence of past, present, and in the case of the Soviet people, the future they have determined for themselves.

"It was this future, based upon the terrible backwardness they had started from and which one could see they had overcome by such incredible suffering, that seemed to explain the sense of hope, confidence and security that everywhere expressed itself among all the people I met, in the factories, on the increasingly prosperous collectives, and among the cheerful efficient professional men and women who ran hospitals, schools and administered the details of local, district and national life.

"But of course the guarantee of the future the Soviet people are so confidently building for themselves depends, as does any confidence in the future for ourselves, upon the fundamental question of peace and free exchange among all the peoples of the earth. The repeated question, 'What are the women of America doing about peace,' asked with such urgency, I cannot forget.

"I hope," Mrs. Epstein ended with great seriousness, "that the answer to this question will not be so embarrassing to other American women who in the future go in increasing numbers to find out, as I did, 'what socialism is like.'"

ON SOVIET WOMEN: "Their great desire is to see the U.S. and to know the women of our country better. And I am convinced that one of the things that will benefit us is to have greater interchange between the people of the Soviet Union and our own. They need to know about us, just as we need to know about them."

Eleanor Roosevelt, *New York Post*, Oct. 10

What the USSR Means to Science

by PROF. J. D. BERNAL

I WILL NOT try here to make any assessment of the importance of the Russian Revolution or its consequences in general for the world. That is being done by far more knowledgeable and competent people. My contribution will be more personal and limited to the influence of the Soviet experiment on a scientist outside the Union. I want to give some impression of what it has meant to someone who has been conscious during all his working life of what has been attempted and achieved in the Soviet Union.

I can still remember the occasion when the schoolmaster read out to us from the newspaper that the extremist Lenin had seized power in Petrograd. I felt then that something important had happened but I could not know what it meant and I was not to learn until I went to the university nearly two years later. It was only then that a few of us

really awoke to what had happened, tried to find out everything we could about the aims of the Bolsheviks and began to study Marx. We felt then that what was happening in the establishing of the Soviet Union in the face of all its enemies, was the beginning of a great new phase in the history of mankind, where untrammelled by the traditions and interests of the past the people could build their own future by their own efforts with the help of the technology and science that capitalism had used for its selfish ends.

The specific role of science in which I was concerned only came to the fore a little later with the launching of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928. It was already apparent that a new attitude towards science was growing up, one which treated it no longer as merely an ornament to culture or even a casual gift to be exploited for profit. It was to become a part of the whole productive cultural process, a major element in all education instead of an optional annex for a few.

This concept of the social function of science was to become a guiding principle of my own life and work. It was impressed forcibly on a generation of British scientists by the Soviet delegation to the History of Science Congress in London in 1931. It brought out the contrast between the new organized science

J. D. BERNAL, distinguished British scientist, is world famous in the field of crystallography. Among his many books "Science in History" is outstanding. He is a professor at Birkbeck College, University of London. In our April, 1957 issue, we published a comprehensive article by him "Science in the USSR." The Moscow "Pravda" beat us to it in requesting an anniversary article, which they published August 25. Unable because of previous commitments to write another such article at this time, Professor Bernal was good enough to let us have a copy of his original manuscript.

in the Soviet Union and the old individualist free science in the rest of the world. "This forces on us," I wrote at the time, "two insistent questions, as to whether our individualist methods in science are not as obsolete and as effectively doomed as was the craftsmanship of the Middle Ages, and whether after all they are worth saving. Is it better to be intellectually free but socially totally ineffective or to become a component part of a system where knowledge and action are joined for one common social purpose?"

I understood in principle what was being attempted in the USSR but I wanted to see in practice how it worked and went on three long visits to the Soviet Union in the ensuing years. I could see the great privations of that time but what seemed more important to me were the intense efforts that were being made to raise the economy of the country to a modern industrial standard. There I met scientists, most of whom have remained my friends to this day, and saw something of their efforts to contribute to the general advance of the economy while increasing the quantity and scope of science teaching as an insurance for the future. I got to understand also some of their difficulties. What they were trying to do was quite new in human history. Scientists are highly individual persons and do not naturally fit well into organizations and if they are forcibly fitted in are apt to lose their essential gifts of imagination and inventiveness. The planning of science is radically different from planning industrial and agricultural production and this was not always understood by bureaucrats.

I was, however, convinced by what I saw that, in their organization of science, the Soviet Union had found a method which even if used imperfectly was a necessary condition for social and economic advance and, further, that scientists could cooperate fully with such an organization if they took the trouble to go outside their particular faculties and understand the place and consequences of their own work.

This was the lesson that I took back with me and, within limits, I was able to test its validity in practice in the ten years that followed, which were taken up with the struggle against Hitler and with the war. In that struggle the attitude of British scientists towards the Soviet Union was very confused. On the one hand they were upset by the trials and other evidences of political tension which included a shutting down of scientific contacts. On the other, they recognized the great role of the Soviet Government in its resistance to fascism and its support for a policy of collective security and peace. After Munich the confusion increased until we were all engulfed in war.

In that war we in Britain were forced to mobilize and organize all our science with the one aim of resisting the attacks of the enemy and finding means of defeating him. This degree of organization did not outlast the war but it did lead to some understanding of the problems that faced the Soviet scientists. It was at that time also that our common struggle with the peoples of the Soviet Union brought about the greatest degree of friendly attitudes between our scientists and those of the Soviet Union. Many scientists

in Britain realized then for the first time the new strength of the Soviet Union and learned something of the degree in which the development of science was responsible for this. This friendship was not, however, allowed to express itself in actual contacts, for already the shadow of the cold war was imposing a division between us.

In the years after the war, at least up to 1953, friendship gave way to some estrangement. Very few in the outer world could imagine the degree of strain and effort of the postwar years in the Soviet Union. What we heard very largely was of the campaign to exalt the achievements of Russian science and culture and to impose a new dogmatic orthodoxy on the science as well as the arts. The genetics controversy in particular was of great assistance to the enemies of the Soviet Union in detaching the sympathies of a majority of scientists. The abuses of the last period of Stalin's rule, even though they were not fully known, added to the estrangement. Only a few realized that the difficulties were not only on one side, and that the acceptance almost without protest on the part of scientists in Britain of the great concentration of science on the perfecting of nuclear weapons would be bound to produce a painful impression in the Soviet Union.

These differences, however, did not go so deep as to affect the fundamental affinities between men of science all over the world. This was shown in the period of relaxation of tension from 1954 onwards and was particularly evident at the Geneva conference on Atoms for Peace and the numerous friendly interchanges of visits since.

Scientists of different countries working under different economic systems do not want to be divided: they want to find the opportunity of working all together for the common purpose of furthering human welfare. That should not mean any abandonment or depreciation of national traditions and achievements but a willingness to learn from each other. In these last years the majority of British scientists and engineers have begun to realize the meaning of the developments in the Soviet Union in the direction of universal scientific and technical higher education. Here is a step in peaceful competition which all welcome for it is now becoming evident that the future of the peoples of the world, and particularly of the underdeveloped parts of it, depends on the rapid evolution of an atomic powered, automatically directed industry for which a universal acquaintance of science is a necessary condition.

The last two years have been clouded by the events in Egypt and Hungary and by the overhanging threat of an annihilating nuclear war. I feel, however, that these are passing difficulties and that the essential unity of man in his task of conquering nature and directing society will reassert itself against all dividing tendencies. The great value of the forty years of formative effort of the peoples of the Soviet Union to the peoples of the whole world lies in the example they have given to a conscious and scientific attempt to improve the lot of man for the benefit of all by his own efforts. That example, through its mistakes no less than its successes, will be a major factor in remolding a happier world.

Can Man Survive The Nuclear Age?

by DR. CORLISS LAMONT

WITH this novel the prolific English author, Nevil Shute, has produced a book which, steadily climbing towards the top of the best-seller lists, could become the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of mankind's worldwide struggle against nuclear weapons.* It is the scientifically based and all too plausible story of the terrible effects on the human race of the Third World War (1962), with its devastating use of atom, hydrogen and cobalt bombs.

Mr. Shute's drama opens with a quiet little domestic scene near the port of Melbourne, on the southernmost coast of Australia. Lieutenant Commander Peter Holmes of the Royal Australian Navy, his wife Mary and their baby daughter Jennifer are waking happily to a bright, hot December day shortly after Christmas. Peter Holmes, who has been out of a job since the end of the war, goes off to Melbourne where he is assigned to his new post as Australian liaison officer in the American submarine *U.S.S. Scorpion*.

DR. CORLISS LAMONT, teacher of philosophy, writer and lecturer, has made outstanding contributions in the struggle for civil liberties, international understanding and peace. Among his many noteworthy books are "Soviet Civilization," "Humanism as a Philosophy" and the recently published "Freedom Is as Freedom Does."

He reports promptly to the captain of this ship, Commander Dwight Towers, a fine young American from Connecticut.

The *Scorpion* soon sails on a special mission to find out how the war has affected the more northerly Australian ports such as Cairns and Darwin. At both cities the submarine comes to the surface; but the radiation level is so great that the officers and crew do not dare expose themselves on the bridge. Hence they are compelled to make their observations through the periscope.

At Cairns "they could see streets of shops shaded with palm trees, a hospital, and trim villas of one storey raised on posts above the ground; there were cars parked in the streets and one or two flags flying. They went on up the river to the docks. A large black dog appeared and barked at them from a wharf. All they could see was a silent waterfront, exactly as it would have looked upon a Sunday or a holiday, though then there would have been activity among the smaller craft. . . . They had stayed in the river off the wharves for a couple of hours, hailing through the

* ON THE BEACH, by Nevil Shute. William Morrow & Co., New York, 1957. 320 pp. \$3.95.

loud hailer at its maximum volume in tones that must have sounded all over the town. Nothing happened, for the whole town was asleep."

At Darwin they discover precisely the same situation. "Fishing boats lay at anchor and they cruised around these, hailing them and examining them through the periscope. They learned nothing, save for the inference that when the end had come the people had died tidily." Radioactive dust blown down from the Northern Hemisphere had apparently annihilated all human life in the northern half of Australia.

As the *Scorpion* heads back towards Melbourne, the officers talk about the Third World War which had started about a year previously. It had lasted only thirty-seven days, but the seismic records showed that in this brief period at least 4,700 nuclear bombs were exploded over Europe, Asia and North America. Most of them were hydrogen or cobalt bombs. The atmosphere was so poisoned by massive radioactive fall-out that all inhabitants of the belligerent countries—and all human beings throughout the Northern Hemisphere—were soon dead. Then the winds started to blow the fatal dust southwards—noiselessly, ceaselessly, irresistibly.

A year after the war ended human beings survived only in the southern parts of Australia, Africa and South America and in islands of a comparable latitude. Yet all of these survivors were also doomed, since, as the scientists irrefutably demonstrated, the winds were certain to carry the radioactive particles to every corner of the earth. As the year 1963 opened, the citizens of

Melbourne and vicinity, it was estimated, had seven or eight months to live. Animals would last somewhat longer.

Mankind's last war began by the Albanians dropping a nuclear bomb on Naples and the Egyptians exploding one over Israel. Then the Americans and British intervened and made a demonstration flight over Cairo. Egypt retaliated next day by dropping one bomb on Washington and two on London. When it was discovered that the bombers were of Russian make, the Americans and British did not wait to remind themselves that Egypt had obtained the planes from the Soviet Union, but immediately launched a full-scale nuclear attack on the USSR. Then Communist China came in against the Soviet Union.

Within a very short time all the chief statesmen and government leaders in the belligerent countries had been killed. There was nobody left with the authority to negotiate peace, and anyway all normal international communications had been destroyed.

Despite the incongruity of China's waging aggression against the Soviet Union, Nevil Shute's account of the origins of World War III makes considerable sense. As a scientist on board the *Scorpion* says, nuclear bombs became so cheap that every little pipsqueak country could have a stockpile of them. "Don't go blaming the Russians. It wasn't the big countries that set off this thing. It was the little ones, the Irresponsible."

The inhabitants of Melbourne and its environs remain remarkably calm as inevitable death closes in upon them. They do not in general

even bother to protest their fate. There are no extraordinary outbreaks of violence, robbery, murder or open immorality. The people go about their daily tasks much as usual, except that the drugstores stock up on large quantities of special white tablets in small red boxes. These tablets are designed to cure the drastic unpleasantness of radiation sickness by causing instant death. At the end, as the invisible lethal dust infiltrates the pure Australian air practically everybody takes the pills and dies quietly, painlessly.

The one note of unreality in *On the Beach* is that the characters in the book are seemingly so little concerned over their own approaching extinction and that of the whole human race. The scientists make no great effort for the avoidance of the "inevitable." And nobody in Melbourne tries to prolong his life by fleeing farther south to Tasmania or the southern shores of New Zealand.

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While Mr. Shute's novel belongs in the category of science fiction, it is fiction far too close to reality for comfort. We do not need to rehearse here the warnings of scientists throughout the world as to the dangers to health and life inherent in radioactive fall-out. But it may be worth while to remind ourselves that only during 1957 the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to put atomic weapons at the disposal of several West European governments, including that of West Germany. This decision opens up splendid opportunities for Irresponsibles,

among the smaller nations of the NATO bloc.

We cannot recall too often that it was the United States that first invented, manufactured and dropped atomic bombs. It was this country, too, that undeniably started the armaments race in nuclear weapons. America, then, cannot avoid a moral responsibility beyond that of all other nations for the outlawing of these implements of absolute horror and destruction. Yet at the London disarmament talks which faded away at the end of last summer the American Government turned down the simple, self-enforcing Soviet proposal of suspending further nuclear bomb tests as a first step; and insisted on such complicated conditions for reaching even an initial nuclear agreement that we must doubt whether Secretary of State Dulles seriously wanted any disarmament at all.

Now that the Soviet Union has launched the first earth satellite and thereby dramatically demonstrated to the entire world its tremendous technological capabilities, the working out of a nuclear disarmament agreement becomes more urgent than ever. Yet the embarrassed American Government and the screaming American press have laid primary emphasis, since the Soviet moon appeared, on catching up to and beating the USSR in an earth satellite race.

But there will be no profit in winning the satellite race, and the intercontinental missiles race, if the net result is to bring the American people and all mankind closer to atomic annihilation.

That is the horrifying lesson of *On the Beach*.

Soviet Aid to China

by HSUEH PAO-TING

Among the many achievements the Soviet Union can proclaim on its fortieth anniversary, nothing perhaps illustrates the nature of socialism better than the way the USSR extends help and shares its experience with less developed areas of the world. A basic factor in the close relations between the USSR and China is the extensive aid the former has given to China's program of industrialization as described in this article condensed from the Chinese English-language magazine "China Reconstructs." The author, Hsueh Pao-ting, is deputy director of the Heavy Industry Bureau of the State Construction Commission of the Chinese People's Republic. He holds a M.Sc. degree from the University of Pittsburgh.

WITH the end of the first Five-Year Plan in December 1957, China will complete her initial big stride toward industrialization. Already, it has meant a leap from a steel output of only 1.35 million tons in 1952 to over five million tons this year; from the manufacture of her first textile machines to that of jet aircraft. China could never have achieved this without the Soviet help she has received.

At the heart of this aid are 156 key large-scale industrial projects which the USSR is helping China to build or modernize—under the terms of economic agreements of 1953 and 1954. They provided Chinese industry, up to then a handful of scattered and unrelated units, with a coordinated foundation of

"parent enterprises." These will produce the capital goods needed for China's industrialization. Among them are 7 iron and steel works, 27 power plants, 27 coal mines and coal-washing plants, and dozens of engineering works. They include, besides, China's first tractor plant at Loyang in Honan province, her first auto plant at Changchun, non-ferrous metal mines and processing works, and basic plants in the fields of chemicals, oil refining, aircraft and electronic and radio equipment.

Of the 156 projects, nearly 60 are already operating, 70 more are being built, and the rest in various stages of preparation.

Soviet aid provides China with those things which she still lacks herself: complex basic equipment not yet made domestically, and advanced technical knowledge pending the training of sufficient Chinese personnel academically and on the job. In every one of these projects, the Soviet Union helps with geological surveys, selection of sites, collection of data, plant designing, construction, installation and trial production. Soviet engineers and technicians work closely with their Chinese counterparts. The basic equipment, generally about half the machinery in such a plant, is shipped from the USSR.

Long before even the first spade-

ful of earth can be moved for a new factory or mine, China's economic planners must think in terms of power to turn the wheels. Among the 92 new power stations built or begun during the first Five-Year Plan, 24 of the largest and most complex have received all-round Soviet aid.

Huge thermal-power stations at Paotow in Inner Mongolia, and Wuban on the Yangtze, are already providing electricity for the construction of new iron and steel bases there, and later they will provide the energy for their operation. Other such stations are serving industries in Loyang and the growing textile centers at Chengchow in Honan province and Sian in Shensi province.

The Hsiao Fengman hydroelectric station in Northeast China, renovated and expanded with Soviet aid, now has a generating capacity of 500,000 kw., or four times its preliberation peak. The new Hsiankiang hydro-electric plant on the Chientang River in Chekiang province, which will succeed Hsiao Fengman as China's largest, will be Chinese-equipped. The designs for it were made by Chinese engineers with assistance from the Soviet Union. Its huge turbines will be produced in our own shops in Harbin.

Among the 156 projects are a number of large mechanized coal mines, including those at Fuhsin, Fushun and Hokang in the northeast, and China's largest oil refinery, now under construction in the northwestern city of Lanchow. Also going up at Lanchow, with Soviet aid, are units for the production of oilfield machinery.

In iron and steel, China is benefit-

ing from Soviet experience, technique and equipment. Key are the three ferrous metallurgy bases which the USSR is helping China construct.

The first centers on Anshan, China's only older "steel city." Anshan's peak output before the liberation, reached in 1943, was 800,000 tons. Now, output has risen to 3 million tons. New construction at Anshan has included 6 blast and 10 open-hearth furnaces, 5 rolling mills, a seamless tube mill, 7 ore-dressing and sintering plants and 10 huge coking furnaces.

Construction of the other two bases, at Wuhan and Paotow, began last April and July. Designed and built with Soviet aid from the bottom up, they will be equipped with the most up-to-date Soviet-made 1,500 cubic-meter blast furnaces and 500-ton open-hearth furnaces. When the first phase of construction is completed (in 1961-62), they will each be producing 1.5 million tons, enough to raise China's annual quota above the 10 million ton mark.

Another important respect in which the Soviet Union has given a hand to China is in the setting up of many machine-building plants. These are already providing her steel mills and power plants with a large quantity of home-produced equipment. In the northeastern city of Shenyang, one of China's chief machine-building centers, it has aided in setting up a pneumatic mining-tool plant and three for various types of up-to-date machine tools. In Shenyang too is a new plant not in the list of 156 but Chinese-designed with Soviet help, that turns out blast furnaces with a rated

daily output of 1,300 tons and open-hearth furnaces of 150 tons capacity, meant mainly for Anshan. A mining-machinery plant at Loyang is supplying equipment for digging new shafts in the coal-rich provinces of Shansi, Shensi and Honan.

In Harbin, two of the 156 projects, now in partial operation, will supply boilers and turbines, and a third, approaching completion, will make 25,000 kw. steam power and 72,500 kw. hydraulic power generating equipment. In what were once open pastures at Fularki, northwest of Harbin, Soviet engineers are helping erect a plant to produce steel rolling and smelting equipment.

At present China is able to supply about 60 per cent of her needs in machinery. By the third Five-Year Plan China, so recently a backward agrarian land, will be basically self-sufficient in equipment for her power and iron and steel industries, as well as a number of others.

All 156 Soviet-assisted projects are "schools" where Chinese engineers and technicians learn plant design, construction and operation. They are not the only such "schools." Whenever a branch of production new to China is initiated, a number of engineers, administrators and skilled workers are sent to the Soviet Union to acquire experience. For the first motorcar works, 500 Chinese were trained at the Likhachov Auto Works and others in the USSR. They brought back the know-how and subsequent training programs were set up in China.

A similar transference has taken place in plant designing, for which old China had virtually no experience or personnel. Today, China has

her own corps of industrial designers. In the iron and steel industry, for instance, the Peking designing office, with its two branches at Anshan and Wuhan, has become a major domestic training center. Chinese metallurgical designers now number several thousand. Last year they completed plans for a large integrated iron and steel works with a rated annual output of over a million tons of special high-grade steels for precision instruments and other fine machinery, to be built in North China.

Soviet technical aid to China extends far beyond the 156 projects. On many other construction sites, along the lines of the new railways and in many older plants, advisers invited from the Soviet Union are passing on their experience and knowledge. Soviet engineering skill contributed to the feat of sinking all the piers for the giant Yangtze River Bridge without the use of caissons. The adoption of the Soviet high-speed smelting method netted China more than 600,000 extra tons of steel (as compared with 1952) from open-hearth furnaces last year. Comparable benefits have come from application of techniques developed in the USSR to the machine-building, oil, coal and some consumers' goods industries.

Of inestimable value to China have been the exchanges of blueprints and technical data under the Sino-Soviet Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreements, the first of which was signed in 1954. These arranged for either country to receive on request—free of charge except for the cost of reproduction—any industrial or technical data the other possessed. The resultant ben-

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efits, besides facilitating China's progress in all fields, make it possible for her to begin her own industrial research from very near the top of scientific knowledge.

All blueprints for machinery and factories thus acquired are studied by Chinese engineers for direct use or adaptation to our own needs. In return, China has been able to supply the USSR with useful information and sample products for use in the coal and metallurgical industries, and in agriculture, medicine and handicrafts.

With the specifications and blueprints freely supplied, many factories in China have succeeded in producing a large number of new and varied products. As a result, China now has a range of 300 different types of steel, including high-grade alloys for trucks and jet planes, and 3,700 kinds of steel products. She is producing combine harvesters, giant transformers, locomotives, and coastal and inland shipping vessels. The Dairen shipyard recently completed a design, based on Soviet blueprints, for a 22,000-ton ocean liner capable of sailing from Tientsin to San Francisco without refuelling.

Thanks to the aid of the Soviet Union and the efforts of her own scientists, China is embarking on experiments in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Before the end of this year, an atomic reactor of the heavy-water type with a power output of 7,000 kilowatts and a cyclotron for producing alpha particles with up to 25 million volts, will be installed.

Through trade channels, the Soviet Union also sells a great deal of equipment to China—apart from

that of the 156 key projects. Between 1953 and 1956, such imports included 2,580 metal-cutting machines, over 2 million tons of special steels and 5 million tons of gasoline. These have been paid for with commodities, or out of the two long-term loans at 1 per cent interest extended to China by the USSR. China has also received Soviet loans of 1,200 million rubles in 1950 and 520 million rubles in 1954. Although only a few per cent of China's total state revenue during the first Five-Year Plan, they were a great help in enabling China to begin purchases before her own economy, then suffering from war and inflation, had begun to produce sufficient goods for export.

In return for most of what she receives, China supplies the USSR with farm commodities, animal products, minerals and products of light industry such as woollen goods, knitwear and leather goods. Prices are basically pegged at rates prevailing on the world market in April 1950, when the first trade agreement between the two countries was signed, but a few have been adjusted from year to year. China pays for what she needs with what she has. Constant care is taken to reach an annual balance of imports and exports. Last year, Sino-Soviet trade was $4\frac{1}{2}$ times as great as that for 1950.

Although equality and reciprocity are the basis of our relations, the Soviet Union has often been more generous than a strict interpretation of these principles would warrant. In the exchange of blueprints and scientific data, her degree of development places the overwhelming benefit on China's side. Never in

history has a highly industrialized country shared its "trade secrets" with a non-industrial country on such a scale.

Often, Soviet industries have adjusted schedules or equipment to supply some specific Chinese need. More than 70 Soviet factories worked to turn out over 10,000 tons of equipment for the fertilizer plant which recently went into operation in Kirin province. In 1955, China ordered heavy steel plates to be used in building the Yangtze River Bridge, which were longer and wider than the Soviet standard. Because it would have been a very costly thing for China to revise her original designs, Soviet workshops re-tooled to meet these specifications.

The machinery sent from the USSR is always its most up-to-date. Chinese workers are sometimes delighted to find that some Soviet machine numbered 0001 has been installed in their plant. This means it is the first of its type, not yet supplied to the USSR's own factories.

In conclusion, I want to stress

that the Soviet-aided projects are not "new patches on a threadbare garment." They could be undertaken only against the background of the general economic upsurge in China. In the first Five-Year Plan period, we built 694 big projects. The Soviet-aided 156, though they form the backbone of the Plan, make up less than a quarter. All the other factories and mines were built with our own forces. It is the completion of the First Five-Year Plan as a whole that provides a preliminary groundwork for our future socialist industry.

As the second Five-Year Plan progresses, the completion of a great many of the 156 projects will make it possible for China to provide a much greater percentage of her own equipment. At its end, we will be able to tell our Soviet friends that we can do more and more things independently. And they will be as glad as we are. This is the most fundamental indication of the nature and benefits of Soviet aid to our country.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN NEW CHINA

THE CHINESE MINISTRY of Education announced in September that 369,999 in all have graduated from colleges in the past 8 years. This is 150,000 more than the total number of graduates in the 50 years preceding liberation.

Total enrollment in institutions of higher learning has averaged an annual increase of over 41,000 since 1949, the year of liberation. The total enrollment for the beginning of this college year is 447,000—treble the peak figure of 1947.

The development of engineering colleges has been given priority. Newly established departments in colleges include those for remote automatic installation, industrial electronics, machinery installation and geo-chemistry.

Among the minority nationalities 11 colleges have been set up with a total enrollment of 14,000.

Crisis in the Middle East

by KUMAR GOSHAL

BARELY twelve months after the war in Egypt, another crisis arose in the Middle East, sending war jitters throughout the world. At the United Nations last month Syria protested against Turkish troop concentrations on its border, called on the UN to set up an "impartial and international commission" to inquire into a situation "fraught with the possibility of an armed conflict breaking out at any moment."

The Soviet Union supported Syria, declaring it had information leading it to believe that Turkey planned to attack Syria soon after the October 27 Turkish elections. Moscow said it could not ignore conflicts so close to Soviet territory, and warned it would support Syria against "aggression."

Turkey flatly contradicted Syria, explained that its troops near the Syrian border were on "routine maneuvers." In Washintgon, Secretary of States Dulles warned that if Turkey were attacked, there would be "no privileged sanctuary" for the Soviet Union, and that such an attack would bring retaliatory action by the United States against the territory

of the Soviet Union. (*New York Times*, Oct. 17.) The UN General Assembly voted in favor of full debate on the Syrian-Turkish crisis, as it was reported that Egypt had sent troops and a naval force in aid of Syria and that the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean had been alerted.

The Syrian-Turkish crisis was the climax of a series of crises plaguing the Middle East during the last twelve months.

During the invasion of Egypt, U.S. oil interests were alarmed by Syria's cutting the pipelines through which flows a third of the Middle East's oil. In January of this year, the U.S. Congress approved the Eisenhower Doctrine, which threw a protective mantle around the U.S. oil investments in the Middle East. The doctrine proposed to buy the allegiance of the Arab governments—as cheaply as possible—and to extend enough military aid to them to keep them in power but not enough to assert their genuine independence. It also empowered the Eisenhower administration to intervene with American forces if any of the governments tried to detach itself from Washington's embrace. The intervention would be under the pretext of saving such a government from "Communist aggression."

Early in April, the U.S. doled out

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\$10,000,000 to Iraq and \$50,000,000 to the more insistent King Saud of Saudi Arabia to obtain a five-year renewal of the Dharan air base. The first serious test of the doctrine, however, came in Jordan.

On April 10 King Hussein of Jordan suddenly dismissed the government of Premier Nabulsi, a coalition of the National Socialists, the left-of-center al Baath (Arab Resurrection Party), the National Bloc and the Arab Constitution Party. An uneasy period under military rule followed, during which there were huge mass demonstrations against "American imperialism," and Hussein himself felt such great insecurity that he kept his Vampire jet fighter plane on the ready at the tiny Amman airfield so that he could flee at a moment's notice.

On April 23, Secretary Dulles announced at his press conference Washington's "desire to hold up the hands of King Hussein." The following day the King's loyal Legionnaires again had to forcibly disperse a large crowd of hostile demonstrators. Hussein went on the air and accused "international communism and its followers" of creating the crisis in Jordan. This excuse was required for invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine.

"The U.S. took its cue," the *New York Times* reported (April 28). Things then moved fast, as if they were prearranged. Secretary Dulles phoned President Eisenhower, who was playing golf at Augusta, Ga. At 3:30 a.m. on April 26 loudspeakers on board the huge U.S. aircraft carrier Forrestal summoned all hands on deck, announced that the Sixth Fleet had been ordered to leave the French Riviera and proceed imme-

diately to the eastern Mediterranean.

The sailing of the Sixth Fleet to the troubled waters of the Middle East was a powerful demonstration of the Eisenhower Doctrine in action. It was a calculated show of force, as Washington officials privately admitted. With this show of powerful support and with the help of the more feudal-minded Bedouins, Hussein salvaged his throne, set up a docile cabinet, placed the big cities under martial law and a tight curfew, outlawed all political parties and padlocked their headquarters, jailed nearly a hundred civilians and soldiers.

As fighter planes from the carrier Forrestal at the nearby port of Beirut, Lebanon, flew practice missions with live ammunition, Hussein cracked down on fifty trade unions and civil service employees' associations. He cancelled the licenses of newspapers of political parties and ordered the Jordan branches of the Arab Student Congress dissolved.

Another test of the Eisenhower Doctrine came when the Syrian government, which had already aligned itself with Egypt, took a turn to the left late in August, and installed in office those who unqualifiedly subscribed to the policy of "positive neutralism." Damascus said it had foiled a U.S.-supported attempt to overthrow the Syrian government and replace it with a more openly pro-Western administration. Washington hotly denied the charges and threatened to invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine, but was frustrated from carrying it through because there seemed to be no Syrian opposition leaders who would give the signal by crying Syria was being threatened by "international communism."

There was some plausibility to the Syrian charges against Washington. When the U.S. Sixth Fleet was covering Jordan's King Hussein with its umbrella, it was freely predicted in the West that Syria was next in Washington's list of countries to be saved from "international communism."

When Turkey massed troops on Syria's border last May, *Newsweek* foresaw "a showdown" between the Syrian Right and Left; *Business Week* predicted "another test of the Eisenhower Doctrine"; and the Paris *Liberation* anticipated the ushering into the Syrian government of "political personalities more conciliatory toward U.S. policies in the Middle East."

Syrian economy at the time was in a precarious condition, as a result of a dwindling foreign trade due to the closing of the Turkish, Lebanese, Iraqi and Jordanian frontiers. France had withdrawn her foreign aid to Syria's promising experiments in modern agriculture. Washington had tightened the screws, as the London *New Statesman* said, by "manipulating the Syrian pound in the Beirut free market and undercutting Syrian exports to Italy."

In this critical situation, the landlords and businessmen, with the support of a section of army officers, seemed to be ready for a coup. "There was no doubt," the *New Statesman* said, "which faction America was backing [and] it looked as if American policy would succeed."

But the Soviet Union stepped into the picture with a \$300,000,000 loan and technical cooperation for the construction of railways, high-

ways, oil refineries, a dam on the Euphrates River and irrigation projects, new industries and a survey of Syria's natural resources.

Pressure on Syria has continued ever since, although, as the *Christian Science Monitor's* Joseph C. Harsch said, for the time being Washington's search for some "person in high place in Syria with the courage to play the role which King Hussein played in Jordan" had been "unavailing." The U.S. State Department's trouble-shooter Loy Henderson was sent to size up the situation in the Middle East. Upon his return, Henderson reported that Syria's neighbors felt the events in Damascus threatened their security. Washington immediately rushed to the rescue of its Arab allies by airlifting loads of arms to Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. But this rush to the brink was halted for the time being by a Soviet declaration of support for Syria against aggression from without.

The Soviet declaration brought about a sudden reversal of attitude on the part of Washington's Arab allies. Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq almost fell over themselves in their rush to deny that Syria threatened their security. It became obvious that the Eisenhower Doctrine had boomeranged.

The U.S. threw the mantle of the Eisenhower Doctrine around the Middle East and its neighborhood to protect the more than \$2 billion American investment in Middle East oil, to maintain the feudal rulers who give away oil concessions and fatten on the profit, to "contain" the Soviet Union whose influence would topple the feudal rulers.

Besides the previously obtained

oil concessions, more recently Sahara Petroleum (Continental Oil, Richfield Oil, Cities Service and Ohio Oil) has been prospecting for oil in Egypt; Texas Gulf Producing Co. and W. R. Grace and Co. are in Libya; Sinclair has gone into Italian Somaliland; a group headed by former RFC head George E. Allen has entered Yemen; California oilman Edwin Pauley is probing the sands of Jordan; and Tidewater Oil is dickering for concessions in Turkey. Special U.S. interest is focused on Jordan and Syria because oil pipelines pass through both countries.

Although willing to play along with the U.S. to maintain themselves in power, the Arab rulers now face a dilemma. There is so much popular discontent in their lands that they are afraid a shooting war involving the East and the West may mean their downfall.

King Hussein's throne remains shaky, despite U.S. support. "Troops and police are thick in the streets," the *Nation* said. "Culverts and bridges are blown along the roads at night. People here in Amman look to left and right and behind them before they speak."

Iraq is an armed camp, with student protests, brutally suppressed last year, driven underground but still powerful. Prominent members of the medical and legal professions as well as eminent educators have been jailed. King Saud has failed to stifle popular protests by flogging and torturing strike leaders in U.S.-owned oil fields and newspaper editors; by the most unspeakable savageries against his critics; by forbidding his people "bicycles, tobacco and listening to music on the radio";

by "herding them to prayers like cattle" while he travels with his entourage in Cadillacs and his kinsmen "spend enough in one night in a Beirut cabaret to keep an average Saudi family alive for several years" (London *New Statesman*, September 7).

In this situation, as columnist Walter Lippmann said, "the Dulles pacts and the Eisenhower Doctrine do not come to grips" with Asian-African desire for a modern economy and a higher standard of living. "It is here," Lippmann said, "that the Soviet Union has the advantage of us" because Moscow is practicing "peaceful competition" in the Middle East. "In the age of peaceful competition," the *New Statesman* said, "the Sixth Fleet is the wrong kind of hardware."

A program of peace in the Middle East requires first of all acceptance of Moscow's legitimate security interests there, a relaxation of tension by an immediate embargo on all arms to all countries and a Big Power declaration guaranteeing the frontiers of all countries—including Israel—and a determination to solve outstanding issues by peaceful means. This must be followed by a region-wide economic development program under the auspices of an impartial, international agency like the UN Special Fund for Economic Development. As far as the feudal rulers are concerned, their peoples must be allowed to decide their fate without outside interference.

This is the kind of program that Moscow has for some time been proposing to the countries concerned and recommending to every distinguished visitor to the Soviet Union. First Secretary of the Communist

Party, Nikita Khrushchev, in fact, has repeatedly told visitors of the urgent need for another summit conference with a prepared agenda.

Mr. Khrushchev told British Labor leader Aneurin Bevan, when he visited the USSR in September:

"We have all the oil we need, but without Middle Eastern oil you cannot live [but] you should get the oil on commercial terms, and under conditions which maintain the independence of the Arab peoples and their right to choose the governments they desire. . . . We offered some time ago to stop the supply of

arms to the Middle East if you and the Americans would do the same. But you had committed yourselves to the Baghdad Pact which is aimed at us. What did you expect us to do?"

Washington must realize, as Walter Lippmann said, that "Russia cannot be excluded" from this region. "The Eisenhower-Dulles policy so far," Lippmann added, has been "a refusal to recognize the facts of life. A policy which is not grounded in the realities will have objectives that are unattainable and will produce consequences that are unforeseen."

THE OUTLOOK FOR RUSSIAN LITERATURE

. . . the outlook for Russian literature is not at all bleak. What it needs is a continuation of the "thaw" to free it still further from administrative restraints and to allow it to rid itself of ruinous conditioned reflexes. Once it has rid itself of these, a literature so rich in tradition as the Russian will hardly need a long time to recover its lost ground and to recapture its genius. Waiting for its genius are the untapped resources of Russia's national experience in this century, an experience unique in dramatic grandeur, in intensity of suffering and despair and of achievement and hope; an experience which could not but enlarge the nation's mind and give a new and unfathomable depth to its emotions, the ultimate sources of great literature and art. Perhaps the well of Russia's experience and emotions is too deep and still too agitated for contemporary literature to draw from it—it took more than half a century for the epic of 1812 to find its artistic expression in *War and Peace*. But sooner or later Russian literature is bound to draw from this well; and when it does so the world may hold its breath.

From *The London Times Literary Supplement*,
August 16, 1957

Balkan Holiday

by GEORGE AND ELEANOR WHEELER

FOR a long time we have been fascinated by the "Orient Express" with signs of "London-Athens" and "Berlin-Sofia" on the cars. This year our holiday satisfied part of our curiosity. We took the Express from Prague down through Slovakia and along a beautiful sunset-lit and castle-bedecked Danube to Budapest. From there the train cut across Yugoslavia through the mountainous west part of Bulgaria to Sofia. After three days there we flew to Varna for ten days at the "Golden Sands" ten miles from Varna on the Black Sea. We returned by train to Bucharest, from there up through the Sub-Carpathians, across the Hungary Steppe to Budapest and back to Prague.

It was only in Bulgaria that we stopped to gather data and talk with people about economic and political problems. But so few Americans have reported on the Balkans in recent years that we beg indulgence for a few observations about things that were obvious even from a train window.

One thing that impressed us most was the tremendous number of new houses being built and which had

been built within the last year or so. Even in the small mountain villages which seemed poorest in natural resources there are brand new homes and two or three going up. We first noticed this in Yugoslavia. We were not so much impressed with the big eight-story apartment building built in Belgrade—these could go mainly to bureaucrats—but no one could argue that this is true of the tens of thousands of small houses scattered throughout the countryside.

In Bulgaria there was the same burst of house-building, and we had a chance to get some data to back up our impressions. At the "Stalin" co-operative, which we visited near Sofia, they had built 100 houses in the last two years and were still going strong. This was in a village of only 700 families! There, special, trained crews were hired by the co-op to build the houses, and they stopped to help with the farming only for peak work during harvest.

For the most part these houses are small two-and three-room cottages made from local materials. In many places we saw bricks being hand made and dried in the sun. Sometimes crude kilns were made of the brick to fire them. The main materials the farmers needed to buy were only roof tile, cement and win-

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dows—but with these materials it is possible to build clean, warm houses that are a great advance in living standards.

Many of these new houses, we noticed, had electricity, even those in remote areas. This was true in Rumania as well as in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. New power lines are a conspicuous feature of the Balkan countryside. And anyone who has lived through a change in country living that comes with electricity will assure you that this is the greatest single advance possible. At the end of the war only 679 of the 5,000 Bulgarian villages had electricity. Now 3,165 have it. The output of electricity is more than five times that of 1944.

Generally the crops in the Balkans have been better this year than for several years past. In the Danube plains of the Vojvodina the Yugoslav farmers have had their first year with enough rain since 1950. The corn looked good, but there was too high a proportion of it for a proper rotation of the land and there was not enough fertilizer for such intensive cropping. South of Belgrade the country became rougher, much of the land poorer, deforested and eroded. Here there is still real poverty. We saw barefooted women, spinning wool with a little stick spindle while watching a cow or a goat and pig. Almost all of the stock is poor in quality. For example we at first mistook a Yugoslav sow for a skinny three-months old pig until we saw three little pigs trying to get milk from her. Such livestock results from impoverishment of the soil and in turn breeds further poverty.

The only escape is through large capital investment in industry which

will free the people from dependence on agriculture, and further investments to rationalize agriculture itself. A start has been made in all of these countries, but it is not so easy to accumulate capital and rise from the poverty left by centuries of foreign oppression. New factories do appear in the midst of the most desolate areas, as in these highlands between Belgrade and Nis. Around such factories are modern apartments and many new houses, solid evidence of progress in spite of great natural difficulties.

At the end of the war the industrial base in all of these countries through which we passed was very small. And, because of this, agriculture itself was primitive, with too little fertilizer, little machinery and poor seed and animals. In Bulgaria industry was practically non-existent. Now 45 per cent of the workers are employed in industry and construction. Proceeding from this base it is now possible to transform agriculture. Two years ago only 100,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizer were produced. By 1960, big new plants will be turning out a million tons of fertilizers—and the rate of use will be equal to that in England.

Furthermore, despite the dry Bulgarian climate only 35,000 hectares (1 hectare equals 2.47 acres) of land were irrigated. Now 400,000 are (nearly a million acres) and the plans call for irrigation of two million hectares or 40 per cent of the arable land of Bulgaria. This involves a very heavy expenditure for dams, pumps and canals. One reason the Bulgarians are going on confidently with this expansion of their agriculture is because they have signed long-term (to 1970) contracts with Czecho-

slovakia, Germany and the Soviet Union for their output. Bulgaria is on its way to becoming the "California" of Central Europe.

The Bulgarian people are quick to tell you that they have a long way to go before they have scientific agriculture. But they do have a good start. Before the advent of the cooperatives, the land was so cut up that the average farm had only about ten acres, and much of this was stony mountain soil. Now 80 per cent of the land is in cooperatives and another five per cent is in state farms. More than 200 machine and tractor stations serve these farms.

Bulgaria has wisely decided to import its tractors, but makes much other farm machinery, including combines. Equally important is the improvement in quality of livestock and in varieties of crops. Professor Titko Chernokov of the Academy of Science in Sofia told us, for instance, that as recently as 1950 the average cow in Bulgaria produced only 572 liters of milk a year. (A liter is a little over a quart.) By 1956 the average had jumped to 1210. This is still less than half that of Denmark, but now it is possible for eager young scientists, such as the zootechnician we met at the Stalin co-op, to work on the problem.

Among other things, the Bulgarians are experimenting with the improvement of water buffaloes, a traditional work animal in that country. These buffaloes give cream—their milk has 8 to 10 per cent butterfat—and one of them has produced 2,000 liters a year!

The story of the Stalin co-op's chairman showed the truth of the statement frequently made in the People's Democracies that success

does not come automatically to a co-op. Poor leaders can mess up the production program and kill the initiative of the members, while in the next village, with the same general rules and conditions, a cooperative will make steady progress. The Stalin co-op had evidently been one of the backward ones, since in 1955 its average payment had been only 10.5 leva per work unit—much below the average. (A work unit is a unit of payment adjusted according to skill and difficulty of the work performed; a gooseherd might earn a half work unit in a ten-hour day, while a tractor-driver would earn two or two and a half.)

In 1956 Petr Vasillo Lekov, a former partisan and army colonel, was assigned the job of taking charge of the Stalin co-op. He is a big, genial man who told us, over glasses of rakia (plum brandy) that he liked his job. It was true that he had had to give up a car and chauffeur, and that the problems he had to deal with on the farm were very complex. However, there is a satisfaction in good results. The average income had been doubled in two years with little change in equipment, but a much better organization of work, and more scientific farming. They aim at 30 leva per work unit by 1959, tripling in a four-year period. Similar results must have been obtained on many other co-ops because their output per acre now runs from 30 to 50 per cent above that of private farmers.

Lekov shot questions at us about American farming methods: how silaging is done, whether stubble is plowed under immediately after harvest, what barn construction is like. The weather-beaten women in the

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field also asked questions, for instance: "Do American farm women work as hard as we do?" We had to concede that the American farmer does not use whittled forked branches of hard wood to pitch hay. (This contrasted with the efficient straw cutter and blower working near the women, and the silage cutter and conveyor a little farther on.) But their memories are long enough to cover the period (up to 1945) when there were no rural hospitals—now there are 216, plus 704 maternity homes; when there were no rural nurseries, and now there are several thousand; when there were only 37 village cinemas—now 876; when illiteracy was 30-40 per cent and now done away with; when free medical care out in the village was unheard of—now cooperative farmers are covered as are workers. So their kidding was good-natured, more to keep us from being too starry-eyed about progress, than anything else.

We also felt free to ask frank questions. When we asked in Sofia about the current reports in the Western press that there are unemployed in Bulgaria, we were referred to Professor Anastas Totev who is a real expert on the subject. He pointed out that he had made extensive studies of rural employment in the pre-war period—and had published them as League of Nations documents. He readily admitted that there was now unemployment ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 according to the season.

"But why does the bourgeois press discover it only now? Why did they pay no attention when I published studies before the war showing a million unemployed? Now we have absorbed half a million in industry

and other thousands in construction. We still have the problems of a new regime, but why do they attack us now when for the first time we are grappling with the problem?"

Totev added that it would not be long until sufficient capital had been accumulated to put the rest to work. However, a country that had been so poor could not do everything at once. Big discoveries of coal, iron ore and other minerals have just been reported in Bulgaria, so that a much broader base for industry is opening up.

Our sole occupation in Sofia was not going around looking at agricultural and economic progress and asking weighty questions. We also enjoyed visiting the very splendidly equipped swimming pool and balcony restaurant in a huge park with beautiful playgrounds, lavish flower arrangements, food stands, tree-lined paths. We also had a pleasant time window-shopping in the huge Univermag or department store. Compared to the situation a couple of years ago, the stocks are large and the selection good. It is not yet on the Czechoslovak level in variety, and textiles are higher in price (while furs are cheaper). But people were buying in large numbers, groups from the country were nervously trying the escalators, and our Bulgarian guide was proud of their new store.

The atmosphere of Sofia is very pleasant. The streets are broad, the side walks are tree-shaded, people stroll, the children are loved and cared for (we later had a chance to see this at close hand when we were packed in eleven to a compartment for eight on a midnight train.)

In the National Art Museum the

subject matter is often the "Turkish Yoke" and the liberation by the Russians (in the nineteenth and early twentieth century painting) or the Nazi occupation and again the liberation. There is a tremendous pro-Russian feeling. Even the sexton at the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral said, "Oh, that's splendid," when he found he could speak with Eleanor in Russian. And Tsar Alexander the Liberator sits his horse undisturbed in front of the University. This intangible atmosphere helps in propagating the idea of following the first socialist country in the world. That and the rising standard of living, such social services as pensions for women at 55 and men at 60, and the construction program we mentioned, with the feeling of well-being that comes with it.

At the shore of the Black Sea we had the benefit of some of the new construction that has taken place. In the last two years 22 new hotels with restaurants and recreation facilities have been built, new roads laid down and a whole long stretch of magnificent beach opened up. Eastern Europe needs such facilities.

Not everybody likes the changes in the post-war period. One road worker heard George buying a melon and spotted him as a foreigner. He grabbed the American by the sleeve and held on to it for a half hour while he denounced everything. He started with the work norms, saying they were too high and going higher. Yet we saw that no one minded his taking time off and the tempo seemed pretty well suited to the heat. He did have a personal grievance, however. He had the usual road costume of shorts and sandals, rather ragged ones. Before the land

reform he had had 240 acres of land, when the average was ten. Now he said he had been "liquidated" and his land was in a co-op. He declared that 50,000 others had been wiped out, and that now there was real poverty. Our system of communication broke down when we asked him about poverty in the old regime. He could not understand, but he relaxed control on the traveler's sleeve.

More typical was a waiter who said ruefully, "This is no Riviera yet." Then, after pointing out some of the shortcomings he listed items of progress and urged us to come back in a few years to see further advance. We hope to make it, all six of us, even before they get the place slicked up.

Especially do we hope that the little restaurants, which we remember as part of the "Bulgarian way of life" come through the reforms unchanged. No reason why not! A good example, and seemingly typical, was a little roadside cafe with about eight tables on a terrace under a huge grape vine, and a few more in the whitewashed interior. It was in a small village called Boyana set on the side of a mountain near Sofia, noted only for a church dating back to the tenth century. The customers of the cafe were the villagers and the people who walked up from the tram stop to see the church. Attracted by the peppers broiling on charcoal in a brick-lined open fire, we ordered lunch and white wine. As we tore off hunks of the delicious wheat-germ white Hungarian bread, and sopped up the olive oil, tomato juice and sauce around the broiled peppers and piquant meat patties, we thought, "Socialism and this, too!" Our program.

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Some Figures on Living Standards

The following material has been taken from an article by S. Partigul in the Soviet magazine "Problems of Economics," No. 7, 1957. The source of the figures is given as surveys by the Central Statistical Board of the Soviet Union.

On Growth of Consumption. Per capita consumption of meat and animal fats in workers' families increased in 1956 over 1940 by 99 per cent; fish and fish products, 69 per cent; milk and milk products, over 100 per cent; eggs, 76 per cent; sugar, 100 per cent. In collective farmers' families, per capita consumption of meat and animal fats increased during this period by 63 per cent, fish and fish products by more than 100 per cent, milk and milk products 48 per cent, eggs more than 100 per cent, sugar 340 per cent.

With regard to the share of goods other than food in the total purchases of the population, from 1940 to 1956 total sales by state and cooperative trading associations rose by 130 per cent, with other types of consumers' goods increasing in greater measure than foodstuffs. Thus per capita purchases of fabrics by workers' families increased on the average by 75 per cent from 1940 to 1956, woolen fabrics by 250 per cent, silk fabrics by even more. Purchases of leather footwear rose 78 per cent. Collective farmers' families bought twice as much fabric per capita in 1956 as in 1940, including a 330 per cent increase in woolens; their purchases of leather footwear increased by 93 per cent. Sales of radios, sewing machines, wrist watches, bicycles, motorcycles, autos, etc., have grown many fold.

In 1954 sales of manufactured goods and foodstuffs to the population amounted to 481.9 billion rubles; in 1955, 501.9 billion rubles; in 1956, 547.2 billion rubles. In the first half of 1957 the population purchased 16 per cent more goods than in the same period last year.

Successes in the virgin land program in increasing grain output and advancing ani-

mal husbandry have resulted in substantial increases in the supply of meat, milk, butter and other products. In 1955 and 1956 the sale of milk nearly doubled. In the first half of 1957 the sale of milk rose by 34 per cent.

On Wages and Prices. In 1956 real wages of factory and office workers exceeded the 1940 level by 82 per cent, 95 per cent in the case of industrial workers. Wages of lower-paid factory and office workers were increased on the average about 33 per cent as of January 1, 1957, pending measures for a general adjustment of all wages.

From 1947 to 1956 retail prices in the USSR were reduced by 57 per cent, with the biggest reductions in staple foods: bread and butter and sausage by 67 per cent, for example. Real wages were also influenced by the drop of prices on the collective farm market by 75 per cent as compared with 1947 and by the fact that the population is now buying more goods at lower state prices in state and cooperative trading establishments.

Real wages are also determined to a considerable extent by the rates for services, especially rent. Whereas in pre-revolutionary Russia workers had to spend from 20 to 25 per cent or more for shelter, rent in the Soviet Union today is in most cases only 5 or 6 per cent of the earnings of factory and office workers.

Large scale collective farming equipped with up-to-date machinery, the virgin land program and abolition of the bureaucratic planning system and higher procurement and purchasing prices have brought about an expansion of agricultural production and hence improvement of living standards of the collective farmers. In 1956 monetary incomes of collective farms nearly doubled as compared with 1953. The abolition of obligatory deliveries of all agricultural products to the state by households of collective farmers, factory and office workers as of January 1, 1958, will mean a further rise in living standards.

On Social Insurance and Other Benefits. Social insurance and maintenance; allowances to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers; paid maternity leave; free medical aid and accommodations in sanatoria and vacation rates free of charge or at reduced rates; free tuition from elementary school through college; guaranteed annual paid vacations of two weeks or more—these and other benefits must be included as part of the Soviet citizen's income.

Payments and benefits to the population from the state budget and Soviet enterprises increased from 42 billion rubles in 1940 to 169 billion rubles in 1956, with a further 20 per cent increase for the first half of 1957 over the same period last year. Payments and benefits will amount to nearly 1,000 rubles per capita in 1957.

In pre-revolutionary Russia extremely curtailed social insurance (introduced only in 1912) covered no more than 10 per cent of all factory and office workers who contributed the bulk of it from their own wages; there was no disability, old age or unemployment insurance. Today insurance against temporary disability owing to sickness, pregnancy, accident on the job, is fully provided at state expense and covers all factory and office workers. Pensions to factory and office workers, servicemen and students are also paid by the state. Pensions to collective farmers and members of producers' cooperatives are paid by the enterprises. Factory and office workers have the right to old age pensions, men at 60, women at 55, with ages still lower in underground or other difficult types of work. Under the new pension law, pensions amount to 50 to 100 per cent of previous earnings. Pensions for disability or loss of breadwinner reach large amounts. Annual state appropriations for pensions reach 38 to 40 billion rubles.

An extensive public health system—dispensaries, hospitals, research institutes, clinics—gives free medical care to all. In 1913 Russia (within its present frontiers) had only 28,000 doctors (exclusive of the military). In the USSR in 1956 there were nearly 354,000 doctors, or one for every 600 persons.

There has been no unemployment in the USSR since 1932, and employment is now four times as high as in 1913. In 1940 the total number of factory and office workers

was 31,200,000. In 1956 it was 50,500,000, and in addition the producers' cooperatives had 1,200,000 members.

The eight-hour day is in process of being gradually changed over to a seven-hour day with, as before, still shorter hours for workers in harmful occupations and young people 16 to 18; the changeover means no reduction in wages. In addition to the paid vacations for all factory and office workers, many collective farms grant paid vacations according to average work days of their members.

On Housing and Municipal Services. Total housing facilities have increased 3.7 times since the 1917 Revolution. However, industrial construction has increased faster than housing construction, and this, together with wartime destruction and population increases means that a severe shortage still exists. (Mortality in the USSR today is one-fourth what it was in 1913; the population growth is 3,000,000 per year. Urban population has tripled in the past 30 years.)

During the war 1,700 cities and settlements were wrecked. 750,000,000 square feet of housing destroyed, over 25,000,000 people made homeless. Even under wartime conditions 540,000 square feet of housing were built or restored. From 1946-56, 3 billion square feet of housing were built anew or restored in towns and industrial settlements and 5,700,000 houses built by collective farmers and other rural residents. In 1940 per capita floor space in the towns was 75.35 square feet, and by 1955, though the urban population had considerably increased, it was 80 square feet. (In St. Petersburg, before the Revolution, it was 26 square feet.) Stepped up plans for housing construction are now under way.

New houses have vastly greater conveniences than the old ones. Compared with 1950, capital outlays for water and sewage lines, central heating, gas, municipal transport and other facilities, increased by 50 per cent in 1955.

On Education. Before the Revolution, 75 per cent of the people were illiterate; today mass illiteracy has been wiped out. Universal seven-year education has been effected throughout the countryside, ten-year education in most urban centers, while universal secondary education by 1960 is

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the goal. In 1956, 35,000,000 pupils attended the secondary general technical and specialized schools as against 9,800,000 in 1914-15. The number of pupils in the 8th-10th grades of secondary schools in 1956-57 was 41 times higher than before the Revolution.

In 1956-57 Soviet colleges had an enrollment of 2,001,000, 15 times more than before the Revolution; there is now one college student for every 100 persons, as against one for every 1,250 in pre-revolu-

tionary Russia. In addition to the regular educational system there is a wide network of courses and short term schools. In 1955-56, approximately 50,000,000 people took one course or another—which means that more than one out of four persons in the USSR are studying. Some 6,300,000 persons with a higher or special secondary education now work in the various branches of the Soviet economy, whereas in the Russia of 1913 the number of such specialists barely reached 200,000.

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(Signed) JESSICA SMITH
Editor

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 3rd day of October, 1957.

(Seal) MURRAY M. TITTLER
(My commission expires March 30, 1958).

BOOK REVIEWS

The Way to Abundance

a review by ROBERT W. DUNN

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH, by Paul A. Baran, *Monthly Review Press*, New York, 1957. 308 pp. \$5.00.

ALMOST every day there is something in the press about the supposed economic dangers posed by the new strength of the USSR and its associated nations in the field of foreign economic relations. Harry Schwartz, Russian expert of the *N. Y. Times* (7/15) reports on a multilateral clearing system that will make trading easier between the members of the Socialist bloc in eastern Europe. Joseph R. Slevin, Washington reporter of the *N. Y. Herald Tribune* (7/29), sounds the alarm on new trade agreements being discussed between the USSR and various African countries, following what he calls its recent "economic breakthrough in the Middle East and South Asia." He speaks in sinister tones of an "economic offensive" during which some \$1.4 billion of Red credits have been granted to underdeveloped countries—in addition to some \$7 billion to countries in the Soviet bloc. He reports also that, "The Red bloc members are fulfilling their contracts, are delivering goods of excellent quality, and are delivering them on time. The recipient countries appear to be satisfied and the Red bloc is making friends."

He details the Soviet help to various countries, including India, and concludes that the economic efforts have been small when compared with the U.S. "massive multi-billion-dollar economic aid program." But the Red foreign assistance program

has been "carefully whittled to fit the needs of the recipient countries and has been presented at psychologically shrewd times."

Also, we have the Public Affairs Institute of Washington, with a grant from the William C. Whitney Foundation of New York, putting out a popular pamphlet that summarizes all the arguments for the U.S.-type foreign aid based primarily on our self-stimulated fear of the Red aid above described. It likewise talks darkly of the "skillful game played by the 'Communist bloc' in the Asian-African theatre," this game being played "not with troops at present but with ruble diplomacy."

The main reason for pushing U.S. aid to the underdeveloped countries is explicitly stated to be the fact that they are as yet "uncommitted." In other words, they have refused to join the cold-war bloc against the USSR and China. The PAI pamphlet quotes a report to the Senate, entitled "Foreign Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc," prepared by the Council on Economic and Industry Research, which admits that the Red credits to underdeveloped countries were "up to 30 years and at low rates of interest—2 and 2.5 per cent."

This pamphlet gives all the usual arguments about the need to aid such countries in order to stop the Reds who are already helping them modestly, and apparently to the complete satisfaction of the recipient nations.

Such current reports make doubly significant the new book by Prof. Paul A. Baran of Leland Stanford University who writes with vigor and discernment on economic growth in the capitalist countries, the socialist countries, as well as in the "uncommitted" and largely underdeveloped ones. His book should be of particular interest to readers of *New World Review* because it discusses cogently what he calls "the historic confluence of the restiveness in the underdeveloped countries with the spectacular advance and expansion of the world's socialist camp." He deals with the

ROBERT W. DUNN, Executive Secretary of Labor Research Association and author of "American Foreign Investments," "The Americanization of Labor," "Soviet Trade Unions" and other books. He is editor of "The Labor Fact Book" series of which No. 13 has just been published.

growth factors in both of these areas. He is persuasive in his answer to such "great engineers" as Herbert Hoover who long regarded the Soviet Union as an "economic vacuum" and the present day prophets of reaction like David Lawrence who try to depict the USSR as an economic shambles sinking into chaos and poverty. (See almost any issue of *U.S. News and World Report*.)

Baran states bluntly that, "The time-honored 'scientific' and 'objective' finding of economics that socialism is impossible was dramatically refuted by the success of the industrialization effort in the USSR." And he considers the socialization of agriculture in the Soviet Union one of the greatest achievements in history, quoting the Russian non-Communist Baykov who concluded that, "The socialization drive in agriculture achieved to a large extent its major economic purpose of serving as a basis for the industrialization drive." This drive, in turn, showed a rate of growth of industrial production of over 18 per cent a year, "while aggregate output increased at the rate of approximately 16 per cent per year." Such a rate of growth, the British economist Maurice Dobb found, was nearly twice as great as that recorded in exceptional boom periods in major capitalist countries such as the U.S. in the 1890's.

Baran, like Dobb and other scholars on the Left, admits that the "revolution from above" that consolidated the socialist order in Russia "did lead to a sharp temporary deterioration in the economic situation and a drop in the standard of living. But while this economic illness was acute and painful it was "an illness of growth," which "reached its crisis with enormous speed and yielded to convalescence within a few years." After the destructive interruption of World War II living standards by the end of 1954 were roughly 75 per cent above those of the last year before the war.

The author's main conclusion from the Soviet experience is that "Under conditions of socialist planning there can be no question as to whether development should proceed through industrialization or through improvement in agriculture. It can take place only by a *simultaneous* effort in both directions." He details the enormous difficulties in such a course, but concludes that the experience of the USSR

and other socialist countries is that both "tremendously high rates of investment and economic expansion" can be obtained "fully compatible with a consistent and sizable rise of people's standards of living."

His discussion of foreign investment and foreign aid to underdeveloped countries reminds us of the fact that the USSR itself was helped in its early years by a few loans from abroad. We recall that some were extended on a small scale by organized workers in the U.S., notably the Amalgamated Clothing Workers in its loan of some \$300,000 to the Russian Clothing Syndicate when it was getting on its feet with modern production methods after the civil war and famine years.

But on the whole Baran observes, the governments of advanced capitalist countries can hardly be counted on to provide such loans to less developed countries, unless they can "tie such credits to political and economic conditions unacceptable to socialist countries." Or they may merely extend them on a short-term basis in time of depression in the capitalist country, "when the need for additional sales temporarily overcomes the basic unwillingness to help socialist countries." So, actually, only socialist countries can be expected to lend on adequate terms to other socialist countries. But, Baran believes the possibilities for such loans are "as yet rather limited in view of the still pronounced poverty" even of the most advanced or, rather, least backward socialist countries, meaning obviously the USSR.

Discussing further the trade relations between countries, he indicates the shallowness of UN preachments about the international division of labor, when actually the "free world," headed by the U.S., and especially since World War II, has tried to boycott and strangle the socialist countries. But fortunately, he says, the latter, with various rates of development, were able to trade among themselves and thus to avoid the sort of "liberation" Mr. Dulles and his associates had in mind for them. The Dulles doctrine, as Baran makes clear repeatedly, is "to prevent social revolutions wherever possible, and to obstruct the stabilization and progress of socialist societies wherever such revolutions have taken place."

As for the real division of labor, he agrees

with Oskar Lange, leading Polish economist and former University of Chicago professor, that (in Baran's words) "it is only in the framework of international collaboration among socialist countries that international division of labor and the principle of comparative costs come into their own and are transformed from ideological phrases masking the exploitation of the weak countries by the strong ones into operating principles of economic activity."

Baran draws a picture of future economic relations between states that, as he admits, sounds a little like "a symphony of the future." But the more you think of it the more you agree with him that "the first movement" of such a symphony "can be heard by all who succeed in freeing themselves from the mental and psychic stupor into which they are continually drugged—systematically, implacably, and purposefully—by all the manifold and elaborate agencies of capitalist ideology."

As you can see from such quotes, Prof-Baran is an economics scholar who is also a writer of power and sensitivity. His char-

acterization of capitalist hypocrisies and "crude apologetics" is sharp. He explains, for example, that the "pure democracy" for which Wall Street bankers and lawyers such as Dulles, claim they are fighting, is nothing but pure freedom of exploitation as "can readily be seen from the membership roster of the so-called free world: Spain and Portugal, Greece and Turkey, South Korea and South Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan and the sheikdoms of the Middle East (including, as we write, the oily Sultan of Muscat and Oman), the military dictatorships of Latin America and the Union of South Africa—all have been promoted by the imperialist crusaders to the status of 'democratic states.'"

Every reader of *New World Review* will derive from Baran new insights on the old "free world" as well as on the new world. And it will, incidentally, be a great aid in understanding the ideological struggles going on in the new lands and the economic and political problems facing the leaders of the USSR, China, Hungary and many other countries.

Prisoners of Liberation

reviewed by SUSAN WARREN

PRISONERS OF LIBERATION, by Allyn and Adele Rickett. *Cameron Associates*, New York, 1957. 288 pp. \$4.75.

THIS quiet book, "Prisoners of Liberation," by Allyn and Adele Rickett is in many ways an extraordinary one. It is not extraordinary in the sense of great literature written by practiced artisans of the craft. It is extraordinary in the unique nature and quality of the human experience it describes and probes. It is moving and powerful because it is told simply, honestly, courageously and with great humanity. It is most significant because, while the experience it recounts is supremely personal, history has conspired to make it one which today commands universal interest.

Allyn and Adele Rickett, a young American couple, students in a Chinese university, were arrested by the Chinese Govern-

ment on charges of espionage. During their imprisonment a fundamental change took place in their political, social and moral outlook. This phenomenon which is sincerely puzzling to some has, hysterically, and not so innocently, been called "brainwashing" by others. Admittedly, the Chinese set out to change their viewpoint. How was this accomplished? What is the result of drugs, pills, torture or intimations of torture? Was it the sinister manipulation of the theories of the Russian physiologist, Pavlov, or the magic and hocus-pocus implied in all the undertones and overtones attached by professional opinion-makers to their use of the term "brainwashing"?

All of the "popular" references to individual Korean Prisoners of War, or others who have been affected by the Chinese process of re-education, have carefully inculcated the idea that these people were of the emotionally unstable, uprooted,

jackpot variety to begin with and/or were maltreated as to make them susceptible to a kind of twentieth century necromancy wherein a whole grab-bag of alien ideas funneled into a paralyzed brain deprived of all normal mental processes. The entire history of the Ricketts is a refutation of this facile and deluding explanation. Far from being unpatriotic, unstable or immoral their backgrounds were such as could only have elicited approval from the most sober citizen with the narrowest concept of these virtues. Allyn Rickett had an excellent war record as a Naval Intelligence Japanese language officer in the Marine Corps. He kept his reserve status after release from active duty. When approached by Naval Intelligence he was not only willing but eager to engage in gathering information while a Fulbright student in China. Both he and Adele Rickett showed no signs of erratic behavior in their ability to adhere in a disciplined way to a demanding program of study. Their professional careers were pursued in terms of long range goals and organized endeavor. Their relations with each other and none of the irresponsibility characteristic of the "unstable." In fact they came perilously close to being "the very model" of the conventional portrait of the 100 per cent plus young American couple.

With so correct a background one of the most difficult things for the Ricketts was acceptance of the idea that they were or could be guilty of anything. They were steeped in the values of the society from which they came and that society is a supremely pragmatic one. Morality, at least in practice, is adjustable. Right and wrong are not intrinsic qualities of thought and behavior but do they "work," do they help one "get ahead," are the touchstones of values and social approval. "I had all along had no feeling that I was an espionage agent such as one reads about in paper backed books," writes Dell Rickett. "From the time Rick had been contacted by ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) in Seattle I had never taken that part of our story in China as anything criminal. . . . I certainly could not deny the facts but I rationalized them wherever possible." For months after his imprisonment Allyn Rickett cherished the notion that he could turn this experience into "the best thing that ever happened to me." He had only to play the

angles right. His mind was preoccupied with visions of the hero's welcome waiting for him on release. "My story for the press was all prepared—how I had been unjustly arrested, mistreated and forced into making a confession. I wondered if I would be asked to go on a lecture tour, maybe even appear on the radio . . . my capital for becoming an 'expert on China' was growing daily, my dreams of Hong Kong and after more expansive."

So deeply conditioned (shades of Pavlov!) was this "adjustability" that it is interesting and a little amusing to note that when the Ricketts finally began to comprehend the seriousness of their situation their individual and separate responses were, as Adele Rickett put it, to try to give the Chinese "what I felt they wanted . . . not . . . what I considered wrong myself." At the same time Rick was coming to the conclusion to give them "what we thought our wardens wanted to hear. Land reform was wonderful. The Korean war was just. America was imperialistic and Chiang Kai-shek a dirty traitor. It was a long time before most of us came to realize how much we had underestimated our captors."

The distinction between changing for the sake of doing good in the world and changing to impress others was the heart of the contradiction. For as long as they could the Ricketts evaded its implications. Like most of us they shrank from any real self-facing. From the beginning the Chinese attitude toward them was not solely or even primarily to obtain information about their spying activities but relentlessly to pose the question of what was morally and ethically right and wrong. They gave no answers themselves and scorned those with easy ones. In this story there are no quick conversions. No one was moved by a carefully staged performance replete with mood lighting, music and high powered oratory to come forward and "make a decision." The process was the long, tedious, painful one of examining themselves and their social milieu along with the testing of new ideas and convictions in their relations with their fellow prisoners who were themselves involved in the same process. They frequently suffered the panic of those moving away from the security of entrenched patterns of living and thinking. It was, strangely enough, in moments of major crises of self-interest that they made

real leaps in understanding. Since the Ricketts were essentially people of conscience and humanity as well as strong moral fiber they survived these crises and the words of their fellow countryman, Tom Paine, spoken long ago, became true for them: "Panics in some cases, have their uses; they produce as much good as hurt. Their duration is always short; the mind soon grows through them and acquires a firmer habit than before. But their peculiar advantage is, they are touchstones of sincerity and hypocrisy, and bring things and men to light, which might otherwise have lain forever undiscovered."

In the Publishers Introduction to "Prisoners of Liberation" a practicing psychiatrist is quoted who magnificently sums up the principles of socialist morality behind the Chinese process of re-education as he observed them in the Ricketts' story:

"One sees the specific application of this morality in many different ways: the respect for the dignity of the individual prisoners; the concept of punishment as education and not as revenge or mere physical deterrent; the criticism of the acts of an individual without condemning his inner most personal self; the constant emphasis on the ability of humans to change; the emphasis on the common, basic rights of mankind; the emphasis on the moral questions involved in every act; the emphasis on giving the prisoners something positive to work for; the emphasis on giving them first the hope and then the understanding that they, too, could be integrated into a decent world and at last be friends with their fellow man."

Brainwashing? Novelist and social commentator Aldous Huxley, in a recent television discussion of the term (CBS, "The Last Word") warned that those who use it were ill-advised and jumping into a cul-de-sac. Education and re-education, according to Mr. Huxley, has always, in every society, been a process of conditioning, although ominous references to Pavlov notwithstanding. The question still remains: conditioning to what? Of the reporters, diplomats, personnel and sundry others who, when he returned to Hong Kong after his release, pronounced him "hopelessly brain washed," Allyn Rickett commented, "... I had just come from a society where the one argument a person could never use to justify an action was self-interest, yet this was the only one which appeared valid to them."

In *Prisoners of Liberation* things happen as they do in life. That is why the book evokes an immediate recognition of truth. Nothing here feels "made up." It is not only that, as in life, the most extraordinary experiences when they once happen soon take on an ordinary "every dayish" quality but the opposite of this truth is apparent: the spontaneous, always new, surprising ways in which life makes them happen.

When the Ricketts returned from China they considered that they were better people than they were before. This is still the greatest glory; to strive constantly not to be better than others but to be better than we have been and share our knowledge and experience with others. The Ricketts have done this for themselves and for us in their fine book.

ON "NOT BY BREAD ALONE"

NOT BY BREAD ALONE by Vladimir Dudintsev, the controversial new Soviet novel, now available in translation in this country (E. P. Dutton, New York. \$4.95) was the subject of an extended article by our Moscow correspondent, Ralph Parker, in the February 1957 issue of NEW WORLD REVIEW. We will publish a review of the English translation in a future issue.

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