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DISARMAMENT AND LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

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SOVIET EDUCATION

Murray Young

PRESIDENT SUKARNO OF INDONESIA ON RUSSIA AND THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES

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NATO AND PEACE

by JESSICA SMITH

THE POWER of world pressure for peace was never more strikingly demonstrated than at the NATO Conference at Paris.

The fight for peace is still far from being won. What has been accomplished has been a slight slowing up of the forces driving for an accelerated arms race and war, signalized by their enforced compliance with the worldwide demand that a new effort be made for East-West negotiations.

But the dangers that exist, and what must still be done to overcome them, should be clear to the American people after hearing the Eisenhower-Dulles report of the NATO meeting on December 23. To President Eisenhower was assigned the humiliating role of uttering a few generalities about the importance of the quest for peace while Secretary Dulles monopolized the rest of the program. His performance, according to the *New York Post* of December 24, "destroyed any remnant of excuse for Dulles' continuance as Secretary of State"; and was devoted mainly "to a description of the hopelessness of negotiation and the inflexibility of the enemy."

Listening to Mr. Dulles, one would have thought that all peace and disarmament offers have been on the part of the United States; one would never have guessed that there had been an offer from the

USSR for a ban on nuclear weapons tests or to talk things over with President Eisenhower. He made clear that the United States contemplated no change in its own policies or program, but was simply asking again that the USSR accept U.S. terms. This, of course, is no basis at all for negotiations. The focus of all current efforts of peace must therefore be insistence on a type of negotiations that will bring results.

What Happened at Paris

The United States was forced to agree to the idea of negotiations with the Russians in order to get even an agreement "in principle" to place nuclear warheads and intermediate range ballistic missiles at the disposal of the NATO powers, which had been the main Dulles' aim. Concrete details are to be worked out with the states directly concerned.

Secretary Dulles had stated repeatedly before the conference that he was against any further negotiations with the Russians, yet he had to agree to this. He had said before departing for Paris that he didn't favor "agreements-in-principle," but that was in fact all he got.

Yet, in his defeat Mr. Dulles tried to put forward the question of negotiations in a way that would doom them in advance. The NATO meeting communicate bristles with anti-

Soviet statements and places entire blame for the disarmament deadlock on the Soviet Union. (The course of the negotiations and the positions of both sides is outlined by Prof. J. D. Bernal on page 30 of this issue).

It proposes to promote further negotiations through the new enlarged UN Disarmament Commission (in which the USSR has categorically stated it will refuse to participate since it retains the preponderance of West and West-oriented nations which has so far rendered all disarmament negotiations sterile).

Taking in to account the Soviet position on this question, the NATO Declaration offers as an alternative "a meeting at foreign ministers' level to resolve the deadlock."

That, of course, means Mr. Dulles as negotiator for the US. The same Mr. Dulles who went to London last summer to make sure that no disarmament agreement should be reached when it looked as though some beginning might be made; the Mr. Dulles who says it's no use negotiating with the Russians because you can't trust them; the Mr. Dulles whose main idea of diplomacy is dancing as close as possible to the dreadful brink of atomic war.

As Walter Lippmann wrote in the *New York Herald Tribune* (Dec. 19) "What Mr. Dulles has accomplished by his loud and public protests against negotiations has been to disqualify himself as the negotiator in negotiations which will nevertheless be carried on."

Lippmann further pointed out the "crude miscalculations" of the Dulles program of rallying the Europeans to two ideas—one of arm-

ing them with intermediate range missiles, the other that they should steadfastly reject the notion of negotiations with the Russians:

As the missiles do not now exist, and will not be ready for at least a year, we were asking the Europeans to be highly provocative though they remained undefended. They are to provoke the Russians by agreeing to set up missile sites long before the missiles could be stationed at the sites. And they were to provoke the Russians further by refusing to talk seriously with them.

While the NATO powers never took up the offer the Soviet Union made some time ago to join their organization, the USSR was very much on hand during the Paris conference. "Have no doubts about it," wrote Roscoe Drummond in the *Herald Tribune*, December 18, "there has been an extra sixteenth chair drawn up at the NATO conference table. . . . It has been occupied by none other than the enigmatic, goateed figure of Premier Nicolai Bulganin."

The occupancy of this sixteenth chair was in the first instance, of course, guaranteed by the Sputniks and all that they represented, plus the sad fate of the US Vanguard project.

And Mr. Bulganin insured his place on the agenda by his series of peace letters to the top NATO powers and India, and then to all NATO members and all members of the United Nations.

The Bulganin Letters

All these letters made a series of positive peace proposals, and urged a top level East and West conference. The letter to President Eisenhower also urged particularly a

personal meeting between US and USSR heads of government to consider the Bulganin proposals and any others. The U.S. Government has not seen fit to release the official text of the Bulganin letter to Eisenhower, but it is important that the American people know just what was proposed. Mr. Bulganin, after declaring the readiness of the Soviet Union to continue to seek an overall disarmament solution, wrote:

We propose the following: Let us undertake, for the time being, together with the Government of Britain, merely to refrain from using nuclear weapons and announce, as a start, the suspension of test explosions of all types of these weapons as of January 1, 1958, at least for two or three years to begin with.

Let us agree, together with the Government of Great Britain, that no types of nuclear arms are to be deployed on the territory of Germany either in the West or in the East. If the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic supplemented this agreement by one of their own, rejecting the manufacture and deployment of these weapons in Germany, then Poland and Czechoslovakia, as officially announced by their governments, would also undertake not to manufacture or keep nuclear weapons on their territory. Thus a vast zone free of atomic armaments, a zone with a population of over 100,000,000, a zone where the risk of atomic war will be reduced to the minimum will emerge in Central Europe.

Let us work out and submit to the member-countries of the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty a joint proposal to conclude some kind of non-aggression agreement between these two groupings.

To help normalize the situation in the Middle and Near East, let us pledge ourselves not to take any steps infringing upon the independence of the countries of the area and renounce the use of force in the solu-

tion of questions bearing on the Middle and Near East.

Let us conclude a treaty proclaiming the firm resolve of both our states to develop relations of friendship and peaceful cooperation between them.

It is time to take measures to halt the present propaganda in the press and radio generating mutual distrust, suspicion and ill-will.

It is also necessary to restore the conditions for the normal development of trade between our countries, for mutually profitable trade is the best of foundations for the development of relations between countries, for the establishment of confidence between them.

Let us extend scientific, cultural and sports contacts to the utmost. One can envisage, for instance, what great benefits would accrue from cooperation between Soviet and American scientists in the further harnessing of the elemental forces of nature.

Premier Bulganin went on to say that measures such as these would go a long way in establishing the confidence so needed today among states and in opening the way to more fundamental measures such as a substantial cut in armed forces and armaments, a complete ban on nuclear weapons, ending of their manufacture and destruction of their stockpiles, withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of all countries, including NATO and Warsaw Treaty members, and replacement of present military alignments by a system of collective security.

The Bulganin proposals corresponded very closely with the things that some of the most distinguished and wisest people in our own country have been saying, such as the Quakers and the Women's International League which have been carrying on an unceasing campaign for

peaceful negotiations and ending tests. The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy reports that advertisements like that in the *New York Times* (Nov. 15) have appeared in many other leading U.S. newspapers, and that a nationwide campaign is building up. The Church Peace Mission has initiated a statement signed by 47 leading religious and educational features for a moratorium on all nuclear weapons tests. The National Council of Churches has called again for ending the arms race. Many leading individuals continue to speak out, such as industrialist Cyrus S. Easton, banker James Warburg, ACWA President Jacob Potovsky, a few Senators—even Adlai Stevenson took a more positive stand than heretofore in urging on the Administration an affirmative attitude toward the Bulganin note. In two remarkable articles in *The Nation* December 7 and 14, C. Wright Mills, author of *The Power Elite* and historian Walter Millis have offered positive programs for peace that coincide in many respects with the Soviet offers. Recent Gallup polls have shown the American public overwhelmingly in favor of American-Russian negotiations and exchanges.

Among the most influential voices has been that of George F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow and now on leave from the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton as visiting Professor at Oxford. In a series of broadcasts over BBC (now being repeated in part in this country) Kennan, himself the author of the "containment" policy which spurred the cold war, now calls for negotiations with the USSR, German unification on the basis of

neutralization and troop withdrawal by both east and west, an end to the nuclear arms race. He strongly opposed the U.S. thesis that war can be restricted by the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and on the eve of the NATO conference warned of the fatefulness of the proposed plan to supply such weapons to West European countries.

Mention should also be made of the strong peace statement by Lester B. Pearson, former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs in his Nobel peace prize lecture, urging big power negotiations; continued appeals by Premier Nehru of India, who welcomed Bulganin's offer to end tests and the nuclear weapons race, the position of Ernest Bevan and many British Labor MP's, large sections of the British population, intellectuals such as Bertrand Russell and many others urging a break with U.S. foreign policy.

Thus it was that even America's great friend Dr. Konrad Adenauer called for a "very thorough study of recent Soviet approaches," and mindful of the growing sentiment in West Germany for disarmament, unification, neutrality, indicated no desire for U.S. missile bases (in any case, he prefers that Germany should produce its own nuclear weapons.)

Premier Gerhardsen of Norway made clear his country wanted no foreign troops, atomic stockpiles or missile bases on its territory, but favored new East-West disarmament negotiations, including direct exchanges between the U.S. and USSR. Premier Hanson of Denmark associated himself with these remarks in relation to his own country, also urging negotiations. In fact, of all

14 of America's NATO allies, only Britain, the Netherlands and Turkey were prepared to accept U.S. missile bases. And even British Foreign Secretary Macmillan was constrained to urge consideration of Soviet proposals, unable to ignore the growing weakness of the Conservative Government's position, and rising British resentment over U.S. policies, especially since the recent revelations that U.S. planes leave their bases in England armed with A-and H-bombs.

All the efforts of all the King's horses and all the King's men have not been sufficient to put Humpty Dumpty together again after the crash at Paris.

Soviet-hater Ludwell Denny wrote in the *New York World Telegram and Sun*, Dec. 19.

This summit conference shows there's not much in the NATO compact's guarantee of "one for all and all for one." To many of our allies it's as meaningless as their pledge six years ago to raise 96 divisions. There aren't eight full, modern non-American divisions on the main NATO front today.

In this conference called to strengthen NATO most allies say either they will not allow NATO nuclear bases in their countries, or they are not willing to commit themselves. They want to consult Russia, who has again warned them against fulfilling their NATO pledges...

Under the heading "Retreat from Paris," Seymour Freiden wrote in the *New York Post* the same day:

President Eisenhower flies home this evening with his mission virtually unaccomplished. . . . The Americans sought to the last breath to convey the idea that we had won a major diplomatic victory. In truth we were soundly trounced. What we had never intended for this conference—arranging talks with the Russians—was accepted.

Meeting of the Supreme Soviet

As the NATO meeting ended, the Supreme Soviet in Moscow heard Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, on questions of foreign policy and peace and the NATO decisions.

Mr. Gromyko said "It is time for responsible statesmen of the West to realize that disarmament is not a question for diplomatic bargaining but the most urgent task of our times."

Mr. Gromyko expressed satisfaction in the affirmative response of NATO and UN members to the Soviet Government's appeals for the strengthening of peace. At the same time he charged that the conciliatory tone of the NATO communique was in fact intended to mislead the peoples "who really desire an end to the arms race and the cold war," and in reality proposed only a continuation of the same type of sterile discussions which have so far failed to advance the cause of disarmament in any degree.

Repeating Bulganin's peace proposals, Mr. Gromyko proposed on behalf of his government a special session of the UN General Assembly or an international disarmament conference, and also a summit conference of representatives of socialist and capitalist countries.

Mr. Khrushchev renewed the Soviet offer to end nuclear weapons tests January 1, 1958 if the United States and Britain do likewise, and jointly with those countries to renounce use of atomic and hydrogen weapons; the dissolution of military blocs and a system of collective security in Europe and Asia, or at

least non-aggression treaties between the opposing blocs; a nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe; renunciation of use of force in Near and Middle East; an American-Soviet treaty of friendship; measures to end war propaganda and to extend trade scientific, cultural and sports contacts, and the five points of peaceful co-existence to be put into effect among all nations.

Finally, Mr. Khrushchev stressed again the importance of a top-level conference of socialist and capitalist countries on disarmament and other problems, which could be greatly helped if preceded by a meeting of

US-USSR representatives. He concluded:

If the heads of government of the NATO countries sincerely strive for peace, they will meet full understanding and support on the part of the Soviet Union, of all the peace-loving states, which deem it their sacred duty to strengthen peace and international security. If everyone honestly strives for peace, war will be excluded as a means of settling outstanding problems between states.

The peace program put forward by Gromyko and Khrushchev was embodied in a resolution of the Supreme Soviet, adopted December 21, and presented to all foreign representatives in the Soviet capital.

FROM PEACE RESOLUTION OF SUPREME SOVIET

... For the states in possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons—as the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain—to refuse to make use of such types of weapons.

A pledge made by the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain to stop, as from Jan. 1, 1958, all tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

An agreement by the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain to give up the distribution of any types of nuclear weapons on the territory of Germany, both Western and Eastern, and the acceptance of the proposal made by Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) that the production and distribution of nuclear weapons should not be carried out on the territories of those countries and of West Germany.

A considerable reduction in the number of armed forces and armaments of states, mainly of the great powers, which have at their disposal the most powerful armed forces.

Agreement on non-aggression between the states which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the states which are members of the Warsaw Treaty.

Agreements not to take any steps infringing the independence of the countries of the Near and Middle East and that force should not be used in the settlement of problems involving that area.

Cessation of war propaganda in the countries in which such propaganda is still being conducted, and a general extension of international trade, scientific and cultural contacts between states.

The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is convinced that a personal meeting between the leaders of the states and a discussion by them of the outstanding international problems would help to find ways to reduce the existing tension in the relations among states and to strengthen mutual confidence among them.

SOVIET EDUCATION

by MURRAY YOUNG

THE U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as a part of its publication of studies on education in other countries, has just released a report on Soviet education.*

Appearing in the wake of Sputnik I and II, this report has a general interest not ordinarily aroused by governmental publications. Referred to by President Eisenhower in his report to the nation on November 13, this published version was vigorously protested in a letter to Marion B. Folsom, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, by Mrs. Eleanor S. Lowman who wrote the first draft, from which she claimed it differed in many respects. She characterized the report as guilty of "suppression, inaccuracy, distortion and delay of material of national import." (*New York Times*, Nov. 20.)

In answer to Mrs. Lowman's charges, the Department offered the explanation that its revision of her draft was for "the purpose of improving it from the point of view of clarity, accuracy and objectivity." (*New York Times*, Nov. 21.)

However, Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, who originated the international student exchange program under a law that bears his name, called upon the Department to answer Mrs.

Lowman's charges and to make available to interested persons the original manuscript, declaring:

Aside from the question as to whether the report as published is completely objective, this incident has created the definite impression—not erased by any official statement of your department—that the Office of Education has failed to give to Soviet education the attention the subject so urgently demands. (*New York Times*, Dec. 4.)

In an interview with the *New York Post* (Nov. 11), Mrs. Lowman said her version of the report which had been authorized for publication by the government a year ago was twice as long as the 225-page version finally published. She read from her letter to Secretary Folsom:

Much valuable information on Soviet education, especially included in the manuscript at the request of the Department of Defense, the Committee for the Development of Scientists and Engineers, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the National Science Foundation, and intelligence agencies in the government—to name but a few—was deleted from the book after the author left and without her knowledge.

Mrs. Lowman pointed out that the published report implied that Soviet education neglected the liberal arts in its concentration on sciences and mathematics. "Actually," she said, "Russian students are given just as good a foundation in history and literature, for example, as in science and mathematics."

* *Education in the USSR*, by Division of International Education, International Educational Relations Branch. Bulletin 1957, No. 14. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. \$1.25.

Mrs. Lowman's point is borne out by a letter printed in the *New York Times* (Nov. 23), from Professor William R. Edgerton, Associate Professor of Slavic Languages at Columbia University:

... according to the Soviet entrance examination in Russian language and literature for 1955, which I have before me as I write, every ten-year school graduate wishing to enter a Soviet university can expect to be examined, among other things, on Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and Part I of Goethe's *Faust*. This means that every graduate of every Russian ten-year school (the equivalent of our American twelve-year high school) is expected to have read those two works in Russian translation.

Not long ago at a very large university elsewhere in America (which mercifully shall be nameless) I mentioned this fact to a group of twenty undergraduates and asked how many of them had read Goethe's *Faust*. One of them said he had, and three others asked what it was.

It is of special importance in understanding the Soviet education system to grasp the basic difference between the aims of Soviet higher education and our own. Not to grasp this is to fail to appreciate both the preparation for higher education and the qualitative difference in the courses pursued in Soviet colleges and universities. A reading of the Department's version makes clear Mrs. Lowman's point that this essential difference has been left out. In the United States, higher education is mainly a continuation of secondary education, up to the B.A. degree; in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, higher education is the beginning of professional training.

It is this basic difference that makes clear why the Soviet educational system is in line with the needs of a society prepared to utilize every new development of the scientific

revolution through which all technically advanced countries are now moving. It is this that accounts for the astonishing number of engineers and highly trained technicians now being developed by the USSR.*

That we have fallen far behind the Soviet Union in training personnel to function successfully in our increasingly complex production system has been pointed out by any number of disturbed leaders in education and industry in the past few years. It would be reasonable to expect that such a report would discuss this difference, explaining that our system of higher education has not realistically faced the new stage of technical development forced upon us by the rapidly advancing scientific revolution, and therefore we have not seen the necessity to produce mathematicians and scientists on the professional level that has given the Soviet educational system its present great advantage.

Perhaps the most important objection raised by Mrs. Lowman is in relation to what she calls a "key" translation—Article 121 of the Soviet Constitution. Mrs. Lowman claims that her translation was replaced by a new, but inaccurate version which failed to mention that Soviet education is free from the first grade through post-graduate training.

Here is the version as published:

All citizens of the USSR have the "right" to education—according to Article 121 of the Soviet Constitution. This right is "guaranteed" by free, universal, compulsory primary-secondary schooling; by a system of State stipends for students considered likely to be of greater

* See March, 1957 NWR, "Soviet Technical Education," by J. G. Crowther and April, 1957 NWR, "Science in the USSR," by J. D. Bernal.

service to the State as a result of semi-professional or higher education; by provision for instruction in the native language of pupils; by provision of industrial, technical, and agricultural training in factories, on State and collective farms, and at machine-tractor stations for those who are employed.

This is presumably a translation of the pre-1956 article, interlarded with interpretive phrases and gratuitously garnished with quotes around the words *right* and *guaranteed*.

The following translation of Article 121 as amended in 1956 is taken from the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Vol. VIII, No. 29). In the sparse bibliography the *Current Digest* is listed but apparently not used by the revisers of the original text:

Article 121. Citizens of the USSR have the right to an education. This right is insured by universal compulsory seven-year education, extensive development of secondary education, by the fact that all forms of education, both secondary and higher, are free of charge, by a system of state stipends for students who have distinguished themselves in higher schools, by instruction in the schools in one's native tongue, and by the organization at plants, state farms, M.T.S. and collective farms of free production, technical and agricultural training of the working people.

It is important to indicate that from its inception Soviet education was free except for the years 1940-1955, when the coming war, the war itself, and the post-war period put an especial strain on the economy. Even so, fees for the last two years of high school and for college were extremely low and in most cases covered by the stipends which were regularly paid to those who attended college.

It is hardly necessary to point out to parents who have children at present in college what an educa-

tional system *free of charge* as guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution means. Higher education in the USA today, making full allowance for state and municipal institutions of higher learning and for scholarships, has increasingly become possible only for families of considerable economic status and even on them the strain is very burdensome. Actually only 25 per cent of American high school graduates go on to college and of those only 40 per cent are graduated—in the private colleges like Harvard and Princeton the percentage graduating is, of course, very much higher.

Apart from these economic barriers to college attendance, there is the whole ugly problem of quotas which Senator Paul Douglas recently declared had "in great measure, contributed toward thwarting the development of American scientists on the same level and with the same volume as the Soviets have done. In short, our George Washington Carvers and Dr. Jonas Salks have been the shining exception, but not the rule." (*New York Times*, Nov. 17.)

In her letter to Secretary Folsom, Mrs. Lowman called "most distressing of all" the cutting down of the bibliography on which she had worked for six years. And indeed the 19 items included in the English language bibliography seem singularly useless. Slightly less than half of the items are merely articles, and the majority of the books recommended are characterized by a deep anti-Soviet bias—with, of course, the exception of Volume I of Marx's *Capital*, surprisingly cited.

The books essential to a serious understanding of Soviet education are far too many to list here, but

it is interesting to point out that the great Soviet educational theorist, Anton Makarenko, all of whose books are available in excellent English translations, is mentioned neither in the text of the report nor in the bibliography. There is, it is true, included in the report a brief and wholly superficial history of the various stages of the development of Soviet educational policy, but to leave out Makarenko's role in formulating a real socialist philosophy of education is to leave the fundamental philosophical basis of Soviet education undefined. In its place appears such a fatuous sentence as this in the concluding section: "Authoritarianism characterizes the Soviet philosophical base; the goal of education is to meet the needs of the State."

One of the most serious deletions pointed out by Mrs. Lowman in her interview with the *New York Post* dealt with teacher salary scales, refresher courses available to teachers and other methods employed in the Soviet Union for keeping high the quality of the teaching profession. One can only draw the conclusion that the Department of Education felt unprepared to face the embarrassing comparisons that would be made among the notoriously underpaid teachers of our country, or to answer the questions such details would raise about the status of the teacher in American life.

It would be possible to go on at much greater length about the distortions of this report. Some of the information which Mrs. Lowman mentions as having been deleted from her version covered the policy of draft deferment for students, the program for the blind, the deaf

and mute, the mentally retarded. And it would be possible to dwell at length on the general tone of the report, its constant unsupported generalizations, its sneering attitude of skepticism toward Soviet stated aims and purposes, its whole air of smug complacency about the achievements of American education in the present period. But the important point is: whose purpose is served by such a report?

Indeed, whose purpose is served by the fact that out of the 1200 Russian technical magazines subscribed to by the Library of Congress, only some thirty are regularly translated? (See *Life*, Dec. 14.)

Whose purpose is served by our continued resistance to the broad program of cultural and scientific exchanges proposed by the Soviet Government?

Sputnik I, whose debut in the skies above had been announced in the June issue of a Soviet technical journal, which had remained untranslated, has most profoundly changed the attitude of millions of people in our country towards the whole question of Soviet educational, cultural and scientific achievement. They realize they were misled.

Too long the so-called Soviet "experts" have poured their biased, false and hysterical fantasies into books, magazines and newspapers. By not serving the interest of truth, they have done great disservice to the honest, decent people of our country. This distorted, hopelessly inadequate report published by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, is a governmentally blessed monument to an era that is, hopefully, past.

Let it be forgotten.

A College Student In Czechoslovakia

by FRANK WHEELER

This article was written by Frank Wheeler who is the son of George and Eleanor Wheeler, both contributors to New World Review. The Wheelers and their four children have lived in Czechoslovakia for the past ten years. Their children have had all, or at least most, of their education in Czech schools. With education under socialism so much the center of attention these days, we feel particularly fortunate in having a first-hand account by a young American most of whose education has been obtained in the socialist education system of Czechoslovakia.

WHEN I graduated from the Kladno Technical School and qualified as a steel mill technician, I decided to continue studying in my profession and become an engineer. My path to the Technical School had led through two years of apprentice school combined with work in the mills.

The town, Ostrava in Moravia, where the engineering college is located, is in the midst of a mine and mill region, much more "wide open" than Prague or even Kladno, and is often called the Czechoslovak Klon-dike. This caused me less concern, however, than getting through the exams in math, physics and chemistry. After going through all the worries students have to bear before

exams, I managed to pass them. So on September 9 I showed up at the Mine and Mill Engineering College in Ostrava.

When I first hit Ostrava I couldn't help thinking of Pittsburgh, or my idea of it, since I have never seen this American steelmaking center. Mines are scattered through the area around Ostrava, fields seem to be sandwiched in between factories and slag piles, one town seems to overflow into the other. You have to look pretty hard to discover the beauty of the countryside.

I felt more at home than most of the new students, because of my two years' work as apprentice, and because I've always spent part of my summer vacation working in the steel mills. To me that row of chimneys off to the left of the view from my windows recall the open hearth furnaces I've so strangely fallen for.

The Engineering College is new in Ostrava, but the school itself has an old tradition. It was founded in 1849 in the mining town of Příbram, the center of the Czech mine and mill industry at that time. (It was near here that Dvorak had his summer home, and he not only enjoyed the deep woods all around, but also chats with old miners in the South Bohemian inns.)

Not until 1945 did the school move to Ostrava, which in the course of a century had become the heart

of the steel industry. During the Nazi occupation it had been closed, as had all Czech colleges and universities.

On registering this fall I had a much wider choice of fields to specialize in than did those who entered the college in 1945 or before the war. In fact the school was not formerly divided into faculties. During the last few years it has developed tremendously and now has five faculties: mine engineering, steel engineering, geology, economic engineering and machine engineering. My choice was steel engineering; by the third year the course branches out into specialized fields such as metallurgy of ferrous metals, science of metals, surface processing (including rolling mills, galvanizing, etc.)

The number of students has greatly increased, and is now about 1,500, or six times the pre-war figure. This, of course, creates certain problems. The school is not all on one campus, but has different faculties scattered all over town. When it moved to Ostrava it didn't move into new buildings. But from where I sit during lectures I can watch the workers finishing our faculty's new, modern building. In boring moments I spend my time guessing which departments will get which floor, where the new labs will be located, whether there will be an elevator or not. I won't have to guess long, because we'll be moving into it next year. Eventually the whole block is to be rebuilt and modernized.

I might be wronging Pittsburgh, but I think that one difference between it and Ostrava is that Ostrava has an opera house, a good legiti-

mate theater and one for operettas. It is even considered one of the republic's cultural centers. Just about every foreign dance, song or opera ensemble visiting Czechoslovakia stops in Ostrava. The foreign musicians either perform solo or with the Ostrava Philharmonic.

In general you have to have a strong will or an exam leering at you to make you stick consistently to studies, when so many things are going on. I just tossed out a fellow who keeps trying to persuade me to join a folk dance group! He came too late, I've signed up for basketball. So far I've been rather backward about organized sports, and twenty-two seems a little late to start trying for a team. But my height helps in basketball, although I can't compare with the Harlem Globetrotters, and I may make it through main strength and awkwardness.

The first year of studying is considered the hardest. It is then they weed you out, finding out whether you are capable of studying, and also during the first year you have to get used to a different system of studying from that used at high schools.

We start out in the first semester with math, chemistry, descriptive geometry, mineralogy, Marxism-Leninism, plus two languages and physical training. Our time schedule is divided between lectures and practice. During the practice hours we go over what was in the lectures. For instance, we do math problems according to formulas demonstrated at lectures.

But most of the studying is done at home. For those of us who come from towns outside of Ostrava, this means the dorm. Greenhorns live three to a room. If you make it to

the third year it's two to a room. Like almost all of the buildings in Ostrava, our dorm looks very drab from the outside. But inside you'll find neatly furnished rooms, club rooms, etc. Our lodging is very inexpensive—32 crowns a month or \$3 to \$4, according to how you figure the exchange rate. Meals at the school cafeteria are also inexpensive and are sufficient. That's something for me to say, because I'm pretty spoiled by home cooking.

I think many of us do not realize how low the cost of a college education is. All we have to pay for is room and board and textbooks. The rest is paid by the state. On top of that about half the students receive a stipend. This is allotted according to the income and the number of members of the family. The lower the income and the bigger the family, the higher the stipend. Like the preponderant majority of Czechoslovak citizens, students are entitled to free medical care. To us it's a matter of course just to go to a doctor when we need one and never think of paying a cent.

All this adds up to the fact that it's not your social background, but your abilities, that decide whether you can study or not. And that's not only theory, it's also practice.

The ice on international relations has been melting lately and some of the bureaucracy has been broken so that senior classes can get to foreign countries on study trips, mainly on an exchange basis. But you don't have to go abroad to find foreigners. Our school would seem like a Tower of Babel, except that there is a common language—Czech. I know of at least eleven nationalities studying here.

Sometimes it happens that there are six of us in the dorm washroom, each from a different nation. The Chinese will be giving the Syrian tips on cooking rice, the Bolivian will be doing his washing, the Russian humming a "chastushka."

I thought it was a funny sight, my Bolivian schoolmate trying to get along conversing in Czech with a Chinese fellow—both of them here only a few months. But I soon found myself in just about the same predicament. After wandering around the dorm hunting for someone patient and smart who was willing to explain the last lecture on descriptive geometry to me, I at last landed on Pang Kan-yin. Despite language difficulty he got it across to me.

Although I have ten semesters ahead of me before I become an engineer, I already am looking forward to the day I get my diploma. And to be frank, I'm not worried about my future (at least I wouldn't be if the warmongers would pipe down over there). I'm sure I'll be assigned a job in my profession for the first three years, after which the choice is mine. To some the word "assigned" may seem cruel. But not to us students. And why should it? The state takes most of the financial burden, assures us a job according to our qualification. To me it seems like a better system than "study if you can afford it, find a job if you can." I think it's easier to study knowing that you'll be a useful and capable member of society after graduating. And there is so much exchange of experts among the socialist countries and study trips even to western countries, that there is room for travel and adventure within the stable framework.

Wuhan: China's Chicago

by **ELSIE FAIRFAX-CHOLMELEY**

THE opening of the first new two-decker railway and highway bridge across the Yangtze at Wuhan (the triple city of Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang), which I witnessed this fall, was impressive in a good many ways. Among the many foreign journalists, East and West, who attended, the most common comment was, "How quickly things are moving in this country." And indeed, there are few places in which this speed can be observed as strikingly and as fully as in that city—not only because of the bridge but because of the many deep transformations that are going on there.

Wuhan's History

Wuhan's history is briefly this. The center of a rich agricultural area with waterway connections with nine provinces—to the east and west by the Yangtze; to northwest China by the Han River; to south China by the Tungting Lake—it became one of the foremost trade and transit marts of the country as far back as the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.). Then, exactly a century ago, through the Treaty of Tientsin that ended the Second Opium War, it was forced open to imperialist penetration. In

1861, British traders, backed by a naval landing party, marked out the Hankow British Concession. Tsarist Russian, French, German and Japanese concessions followed in rapid succession. The foreign powers established themselves high up in China's lifeline, the Yangtze, to cart away her raw materials and push in their own manufactured goods.

The effect of the five foreign concessions, virtually five separate kingdoms, was to prevent the growth of China's own industry, for which Wuhan was early recognized as an ideal site. Although there were extensive iron deposits nearby and an iron-and-steel works, equipped with machinery from Germany, was built in 1880 in the borough of Hanyang by the imperial viceroy, Chang Chih-chung, it never really functioned. Only during World War I, when the powers were busy with their own hostilities, were a few hundred thousand tons of pig iron and 90,000 tons of steel produced. But with the armistice in 1918, dumped imports closed down the plant once more. In 1938 some of the movable equipment was taken to Chungking ahead of the advancing Japanese, but the regime never really got it going. So it came about that, at the liberation, this city had even less basic industry than a half century earlier.

Politically, Wuhan has a proud tradition of struggle against the old

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order that impoverished it economically. It was the rising of a part of the Hankow garrison that set off the revolution of 1911, which toppled the Manchu monarchy. In 1923, Wuhan was the source of China's first great railway strike. In 1926-27, again, it was the seat of the revolutionary government of the first Communist - Kuomintang united front, and it was then that the British concession was taken back by the workers—the first piece of alienated Chinese territory ever to be recovered. But the Kuomintang betrayal of 1927, when the streets of Wuhan ran with workers' blood, put a stop to progress.

In World War II, Wuhan was badly damaged by Japanese bombing, and then, after Japan occupied it, by American bombers aiding Chiang Kai-shek.

So it was only the shell of a city that was inherited by the People's Government in 1949. Now, eight years later, Wuhan is on its way to becoming the main industrial and educational center of central China. Thirty-three big new plants are operating, and 166 older enterprises are being enlarged or re-equipped. The population, less than 1,000,000 in 1936, the last year before the Japanese war, is now around 2,250,000.

The Bridge

Now to return, for a moment, to the bridge, a spectacular engineering feat of tremendous economic importance. In the marble-lined hall of one of its terminal towers, the day before the opening, I spoke to a 21-year-old girl welder, Hsia Shu-chen, who helped to build it. Like all its workers, she knew the sig-

nificance of the job—the People's Government was the first in all China's history to span her fastest river, the Yangtze, and connect the northern and southern halves of the country. The imperialists, with all their technique, had not done it. Chiang Kai-shek had not done it. Now it had been constructed in only two years of work. "We had a new technique which shortened the time, and we learned on the job so we can now build more such bridges and do it faster," she said proudly.

The new technique was the sinking of piers by lowering tubular columns and drilling through them instead of using caissons. The suggestions, made by the chief Soviet adviser, Konstantin S. Silin, was picked up by Chinese engineers and developed on the spot. What made its use possible was the availability of a Soviet-invented mining drill which can bore shafts 20 feet in diameter. Since no workers had to go below the surface, work could continue through the high-water season—seven or eight months of the year. The use of caissons in the deep, fast flowing Yangtze would have been extremely difficult and entailed working under the tremendous pressure of four atmospheres. Builders could have stayed in it for only a half-hour or so at a time, and even then at the risk of the dreaded "bends." The Chinese engineers, helped by Soviet advice, found another way.

It was not only the technique that was new but also the workers. Hsia Shu-chen, with her broad, open face, easy manner and capable hands, was typical of the young people who do the big jobs in China today. I asked her how a girl like

her happened to become a bridge welder. She said she chose this profession because geography lessons at school had impressed her with the country's need for better communications and especially for bridges to cross the great rivers. But when, on volunteering, she was sent to Wuhan with 81 other graduates of her technical training course, the man in charge took one look at her and the seven other girl welders and suggested that they had better work in the office. They all refused and got welding work—but were forbidden to go where the water might endanger them, or at great heights. It was only when an emergency required all hands in the building of Pier Seven which had its foundation in the sand, that they won their point and began to work wherever the men did.

"How it is," I asked Hsia Shuchen, "that though you volunteered to do anything you were asked, you turned down the first job you were given in the bridge construction office?" She came back like a flash: "Since the government trained us as welders, it needed welders. Besides the office job was offered to us as a measure of 'special care' because we were girls. Well, we didn't want that kind of special care." That is the spirit of young Chinese womanhood today—and the over one-mile long bridge, the longest in the eastern hemisphere, stands as a monument to it.

Wuhan Steel

When I went to the steel mill construction site, near Wuchang on the south bank of the Yangtze, a gale was blowing and all ferries

across the river had stopped. In other years this would have disrupted both city communications in Wuhan and all traffic between the two halves of China. But not now. Our bus took us across the bridge in a few minutes. The steel works, a few miles distant in the suburbs, is second only to the great north-eastern complex at Anshan in size. The site today is an amazing picture. About 30,000 men are at work on it, a mechanized army of earth-movers maneuvering back and forth with graders, bulldozers, cranes and dump trucks. Out of the maze of craters on the eleven-square-mile area, blast furnaces, huge coking ovens and a rolling mill are emerging. The plant's 25,000 kilowatt thermo-electric plant, equipped with Soviet machines, dominates the scene with its huge bulk. It is already supplying current to Wuhan. Two tall chimneys for the coking ovens give another point of focus. In construction sheds, girders, and other steel elements for building are being assembled. Since work began in August, 1955, two hills have been leveled off and 26 million cubic yards of earth—enough to build a wall one yard high and one yard wide nearly five times across the United States—have been moved.

I was deeply impressed with the concern the construction headquarters and the trade unions are showing for the workers and their families, as new and striking for China, where until so recently methods and labor conditions were equally primitive, as the new techniques. For several miles to leeward of the rising mill—in an area which will normally be smoke-free—a whole new city of three and four-story red brick apart-

ment houses has already arisen. The total of floor-space built, I was told, already adds up to over one million square yards. There are 7 primary schools and one middle school, as well as nurseries and kindergartens. There is a 200-bed hospital, a sanatorium and clinics. Provision for entertainment already includes two theaters and seven cinemas.

Though things are still a little raw—on the day I was there the wind was picking up the dust from the still unpaved roads and whirling it around so ferociously that it was hard to make headway—a well-planned, modern city, is already going up. It is a socialist city—skipping the shanty stage that marked the early days of new industrial towns under capitalism in other parts of the world. Incidentally, in Wuhan as a whole, 80 per cent of the dwellings have indoor running water now and on the new sites, of course, 100 per cent.

The housing, now occupied by the builders, will later be taken over by the steelworkers. Many of these workers are now being trained in the steel mills of Anshan and Chungking. Others are trained in the Soviet Union, to get ready for operating some of the most modern automated machinery from that country, now being installed the Wuhan steel plants.

When the Wuhan steel mill opens, other large-scale industries will be developed around it, mainly in machine-building, ship-building and chemicals. A factory for the production of precision instruments will specialize in water measuring, ship and surveying equipment, others will manufacture synthetic fibers, especially nylon.

The Stockyards

Wuhan reminds one, in its situation and potentialities, of Chicago. It is becoming a great railway center, and one of its big new industries is meat-packing. It is a growing industrial plant, a great grain handling center, and it has an outstanding university.

I went to the new meat-packing plant because I knew the Chicago stockyards and I was interested in seeing the conditions of such work in a relatively economically backward country like China.

The plant has 2,700 workers and a maximum capacity of 4,000 hogs a day—almost $1\frac{1}{2}$ million a year. The meat, stored in modern refrigerators, is mostly sold fresh, but there is some canning and a small part is exported. Killing is done by the most humane method possible, with electric stunners. The processing is not yet fully mechanized, but it will be by the end of this year. In the meantime everything has been done to ease the heavy work. The latest addition was an electric saw for splitting the carcasses. But scraping for removal of bristles is still done by hand, a very arduous job.

Many of the workers are former small private butchers who used to slaughter animals from the countryside and peddle the meat without any inspection or sanitary precautions. Now every carcass goes through several inspections as well as a laboratory test. Workers are supplied with white coats and caps as well as rubber boots. Bath houses with a plentiful supply of hot water are conveniently located for each shift as it leaves the job. Workers participate in management through

their Plant Congress which is convened every three months. When the Congress is not in session, the delegates meet each month with their own work groups to discuss problems and make suggestions.

I found the walls of the plant, and special billboards, covered with cartoons and wall newspapers. This was part of the nationwide campaign of criticism and improvement designed to improve working procedures and relations between workers and administrators, to cultivate a socialist outlook and socialist democracy. There were criticisms of the food served in canteens, the tightness of housing that has appeared as workers have acquired families, and so on.

Rural Suppliers

In an extremely flourishing nearby agricultural producers' cooperative, I saw one of the factory's sources of hogs. The co-op is essentially a rice farm, with 276 families working on 630 acres, on which they also raise sorghum and barley for pig-feed. It is successful pig-breeding that has made the members prosperous. The number of pigs kept had increased from 190 in 1956 to 1,824 this year. They expect to have 10,000 by the end of 1958. The native Chinese pig was being crossed with large white Soviet boars which seemed to produce large litters and faster growing, larger animals. In the shed I visited, I saw many litters with 14 piglets, few with less than 8.

Income per working member, which averaged Y520 in 1956, was expected to be over Y1,000 this year—about three times the national average.

The co-op was run efficiently and economically. Everybody, including the three administrators (manager, accountant and the chairman) was required to work in the fields for at least 40 per cent of his time—no bureaucrats here. Only 5 per cent of total earnings, enough for essential improvements, were set aside for capital investment—another reason why members' incomes were high.

Here too I was told about one of the processes that makes for the progress in China today—the purposeful forging of close links between intellectuals and workers in factory and farm. In its busy season, the Ching Li pig-raising cooperative had been helped by a hundred volunteers from government offices, army units and schools in Wuhan. Students from Wuhan University also did voluntary labor on the bridge—on the technical level they helped solve many problems, and on the purely physical side they turned out to landscape the approaches.

Universities and Colleges

Wuhan is growing into the biggest educational and scientific research center in south and central China. It now has 19 institutions of higher learning with 28,000 university students, 13 times the number in 1926. There are also 15 designing institutes, 75 middle schools with 100,000 students and 300 primary schools averaging over 1,000 students each.

Wuhan University has eleven colleges (before liberation it had six). Sixteen per cent of the enrollment is in chemical engineering—a part of the new stress on chemicals for fertilizer for the farm, and synthetic fibers to clothe the people. Sixteen per cent of the students are women,

and the number is rising. A third of the students are of worker or peasant origin.

There is a teaching staff numbering 450. More than half of the professors are engaged in some kind of research in addition to their teaching program.

Tuition, lodging, books are all free. Additional allowances, for those that need them, cover food and also pocket money. All students receive free medical care.

The capacity of the old university, standing like some medieval castle on a high hill overlooking the extensive East Lake at Wuchang, has been doubled—160,000 square yards of floods space has been added in the last few years.

When I was there the struggle against the Rightists, both professors and students, was in its sixth week. A Rightist professor in the faculty of natural sciences was still giving his lectures; but those in literary and political courses had stopped teaching for the time being. Rightist students were continuing with their studies. The aim of the struggle is to eliminate exploiter psychology. Its form is that of debate. Buildings in the university were plastered with wall newspapers, arguing and reasoning. Otherwise the atmosphere was one of calm concentration, such as dignifies universities the world over.

On the campus, I ran into Richard Corden, one of the ex-prisoners of war who stayed in China after the Korean war. He is one of three of these Americans at the university and is studying Chinese literature.

Vitality and Energy

Sung Tse, the director of the city planning commission, attributed the vitality and energy in Wuhan today to a reaction of the people against the conditions of the past. The successful carrying out of plans in Wuhan, he said, is made easy because the people are anxious for improvements. He did not belittle the difficulties however. Although the pace at which things are changing is not slow, he modestly said, "the pace of our work never seems to catch up with the need."

It is only a few weeks ago that I was talking to Sung Tse. Already the papers are full of the plans to establish a huge 675,000-acre state farm, the biggest in China—near Wuhan to supply the city with a large variety as well as enough vegetables. In the first month after the opening of the bridge, 800,000 tons of freight and 200,000 passengers have been carried by rail over the Yangtze, without a moment wasted in waiting for ferries. Wuhan's construction is going ahead. It is on its way to becoming a major metropolis in the heart of new China.

A NEW CHINESE CHEMICAL CENTER

THREE CHEMICAL PLANTS were opened in Kirin, China on October 25, a fertilizer plant, a calcium carbide plant and a dyestuffs works.

Vice-Premier Po I-po said at the ceremonies: "Your plant is a starting point." Many more chemical plants will be built throughout the country and will play an important role in promoting agricultural development and the production of synthetic fibers. Built with Soviet help, a representative of the Soviet chemical industry wished the workers and technicians well in his speech at the ceremonies.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES

by DR. SUKARNO

President of Indonesia

AT THE time of the October Revolution, almost all of Asia and Africa was colonized. With the very important exception of Japan, Asia was suffering from imperialism in various forms and from various quarters. Asia is a very big continent, containing nations, and those who colonized that continent themselves had differing colonial theories and practices. Therefore it is natural that the effect of the October Revolution showed itself in widely differing ways in the various countries of Asia. Nevertheless, every nationalist movement in every colony was affected in some way. How could they not be affected by an event of such proportions and such significance?

In reviewing this question, however, I reach the conclusion that, important as the effect of the October Revolution was, by far the most important fact was the existence of the Soviet State. The October Revolution had a catalytic, a transforming action upon the national movements of Asia: the existence of the Soviet State has had a continuing effect, and one which is still powerful.

This article by the distinguished President of Indonesia, Dr. Sukarno, was written for the Anniversary issue of the Soviet Magazine, "New Times" (No. 44, Nov. 1957) by whose courtesy we are reprinting it.

The fact that varying imperialist theories and practices were imposed upon various nations of Asia meant that the social structure of these various nations had reached different levels of development. The colonizing countries had differing objectives. Some sought cheap raw materials and labor; some sought markets for manufactures; some capital investment. In all cases, the indigenous social structure of the colonies was undermined and drastically changed.

Consciously or unconsciously recognizing the danger of this, the colonizers in some places encouraged the development of other social forms, more fitted to their own interests. This process had gone far in some colonies, but in others, such as China, where there was a conflict of colonial interest, the old structure had not been replaced by anything else. It was those territories, with their comparative social vacuum, which provided the most fertile soil for the seed sown by the October Revolution. In other colonies, such as India, a new social structure had been outlined, and there the effect of the October Revolution was felt in different ways. Indonesia fell between those two extremes. To a considerable extent the colonizers had deliberately preserved the old social structure as a feudal bulwark for themselves. At the same time large con-

centrations of proletarian manpower had made their appearance, often alongside the traditional village structure. Socially, therefore, Indonesia was neither the fallow soil of, say, China or Annam, nor the well-cropped soil of say, India. Thus the impact of the October Revolution was different.

Asian Nationalism

It will, of course, be understood that the October Revolution was not the only impact on Asia at that period. For a generation before 1917, Asia was moving. Quite apart from the many external events which reflected themselves on Asia, in the colonized countries themselves nationalist movements were developing under their own impetus. The ferment of change was at work, and was irreversible.

External events could, and did, alter the course of those changes. The changes themselves had their roots in the history and society of the colonized peoples and in the fact of colonialism.

As in Europe, Asian nationalism in its earlier forms was a simple reaction and resistance to foreign rule. European nationalism developed as the most effective resistance to Napoleonic conquest. Asian nationalism grew under the comparable stimulus of imperialist aggression. Both were to some extent backward-looking: neither had positive economic, social and political doctrines. It took the passage of years and much struggle before those doctrines were developed, but when they did develop, the ending of the colonial and imperial era was inevitable.

What were the external forces which influenced Asia in the decade

before 1917? One of the most important was the Russo-Japanese War. In this context it must be recalled that, for us of Asia, the vague and nascent nationalism of that war was closely intermingled with racial feelings. We felt the weight of white man's imperialism, and, not understanding the issue very deeply, equated the white man with that imperialism. For us, tsarist Russia was a white family. Equally we did not well understand the explosive and aggressive nature of Japanese nationalism and capitalism. For us, Japan was Asia. We saw the white man beaten at his own game—the game of war—by Asia. It was a stimulant to nationalism over the whole of Asia.

The whole of Indonesia had not, at that time, been brought under foreign domination. Parts were still struggling for their traditional and precious independence. Amongst these was Atjeh, in North Sumatra. The colonial apologist historian Vlekke thus described the effect of the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War on Atjeh: "In Atjeh, the party hostile to the Dutch braced itself for a last struggle when the news of the Japanese victories over the Russians first brought home to them that an eastern race might have a chance of success in war against the men of the West." That which inspired the men of Atjeh, who were fighting a gallant but losing battle against imperialism, also stimulated those who throughout Asia were beginning to see the future in terms of nationalism.

Again, the revolution in Turkey was of great importance. The breaking up of the Ottoman Empire, and the rapid modernization of Turkey

itself made a great impression, especially on the Moslem parts of Asia and Africa.

World War I

The first world war had tremendous moral and practical implications. To a very considerable extent, the intellectuals of Asia—the only group aware of the implications—regarded that war as a civil war between basically similar predators. In so far as they had sympathies they probably lay with the Central Powers, for Germany was not a colonizing country in Asia, and, as ally, she had Turkey, still an emotional Magnetic North for the unscientific nationalists of the day.

However, very many thousands of Asian troops were directly involved in that war, and on them the effect was profound. The white man was divested of more romance and fear. He was seen to be no more immune to shot and shell than was the Asian. Furthermore, it was appreciated that the Western countries were not entirely filled with sahibs and tuans. The comradeship in common danger and discomfort broke down many barriers between nationalities, and led to a much better understanding and sympathy.

It would be equally wrong to deny the effect of developing Western ethics and morality in the prewar decade. European writers and scholars were becoming increasingly exercised over the morality of colonialism. The intellectuals of Asia, aware of this and influenced by it, were tending more and more towards the bourgeois nationalism of Europe. Liberalism, even in the colonies, had become respectable.

In the midst of that intellectual

effervescence in the pre-October Revolution period, it was rather surprising that Marxism played little part. To some extent this was due to the simple fact that Marxism was little known, and was actively kept from us. The leaders of the bourgeois nationalisms of that age were themselves intellectuals with strong intellectual connections in Europe. Marxism, even where it was known about, could be expected to make little appeal in such circles. I think it is probably true to say that the national struggle of the Irish people had a greater effect than did the teachings of Marxism. Furthermore, at that point, Marxism had not achieved a clear expression of its views on colonialism and imperialism, and it seemed to be just one more political theory with its roots in Europe.

It will of course be understood that nationalist movements existed in Asian countries long before the first world war. In some cases, they were already old and well established. In others they were new and delicate. Almost without exception, however, they were of the type which I have already characterized as being bourgeois and liberal. Some were political in character, some sought freedom from foreign domination, but none had clear social and economic aims. For that reason they remained without roots in the great oppressed mass of people. And for that reason, too, they were often, as in Indonesia, study groups and meeting places for intellectuals who felt themselves oppressed and deprived of their intellectual birthright by colonialism. The objective conditions in which they existed made a revolutionary approach impossible.

The October Revolution

Into this picture, the Russian Revolution burst like a ray of sunlight. The Kerensky Revolution, coming in the midst of a desperate struggle for supremacy amongst European and American nations, seemed to presage the possible break-up of the Western state system. That Revolution in itself directed the attention of Asia towards Russia. Then came the October Revolution. I think it is true to say that the leaders of Asian nationalism almost unanimously gave their support to that Revolution. But it was support for negative reasons. The Soviet State was seen as a threat to the oppressors, and not as something positive and constructive. From this distance it seems clear that the October Revolution was valued, at first, for its destructive potentialities—the destruction of the unity of the Western states of oppression. Only later did the constructive and the positive become clear.

In this process, there were, beyond any doubt, two turning points. The first was the realization that this was a proletarian revolution, and thus differed in character and aim from any previous revolution. The second was the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of the Soviet Union. That document, signed by Lenin and Stalin, proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the right to freedom of development for national minorities.

Whatever the practical application of this document, the emotional impact was great. "Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the right to freedom of

development." This applied to the Asian, as well as the European peoples. Here was a new line of political thought. A state was to be built up on such ideas, and Asia was watching. Was this to be just another mouth-ing of fine phrases, or would content be given to those words?

Naturally, the leaders of Asian nationalism were not unaware of the implications of this program. Obviously the great Eurasian plain has always presented immense political and social problems. The tremendous diversity of race, language, culture, civilization, religion and tradition was a challenge to any political theory. It was recognized, too, that in spite of the continuity of land surface over that vast plain, tsarist Russia had been, in fact, a colonial and imperialist empire, not so very different in character from that of the Dutch or British. Compulsory "russification" was the system, and unrest was its result.

Another effect of this program of nationalities was the further examination of Marxism as a political theory and guide to action. There seemed to be a dichotomy between communist theory and the communist promises of action.

The Communist Manifesto, in so far as it was explicit about nationalism, indicated a belief that proletarian revolution would lead to the passing away of national differences. Furthermore, European development generally was in favor of united nationalist states. On the other hand, it was recalled that as early as 1903 Lenin had, at the London Conference, insisted on the passage of a resolution stating that the Conference "stands for the complete right of self-determination

of all nations." The proof of this would have to be in action, not in words, if the October Revolution was to wield its full effect on Asia.

As it was worked out, the Soviet theory of nationalities led to a complete revision of ideas on state organization. The Bolsheviks declared their belief in a genuine equality of citizenship, irrespective of race, religion, color or language. Even the expression of such beliefs necessarily had profound effects in colonial territories. This followed, because the apologists for colonialism still relied on the *mission sacrée* argument. Indeed, incredible as it seems, they still do.

President Wilson's 14 Points

Another factor of some importance appeared at this period. That was the enunciation of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, which included the famous "Self-Determination of Peoples." It really seemed that the day of colonialism was ending. But the question remained—what was to be the implementation of these principles. So far as the colonies of West-European countries were concerned, the answer came quickly. Self-determination of peoples, yes, but as a dim and distant aim in an indeterminate future. Besides that, self-determination alone was recognized to be of little significance.

There could be self-determination, but continued economic imperialism, using various strata of indigenous society as a tool. Thus the eyes of Asia, fully open now, turned again to the implementation of the Soviet theory of nationalities.

By this single action alone, by this declaration of beliefs alone, the October Revolution was bound to

have great effects on nationalist movements. But, and this is no less important, the October Revolution introduced another conception into the political arena. This was the introduction of economic and social aims to the existing political aims of the Asian nationalist movements.

By this time, nationalist movements were definitely moving towards the aim of independence. In the proclamation of these aims, however, they received no support from those who paid lip-service to "Self-Determination of Peoples." But they did note that the Soviet Union, stating that imperialism is the culminating point of capitalism, announced its support of their struggle for independence. Thus, to the home-grown nationalism of Asia was added the catalyst of the October Revolution, and out of it grew the modern drive to national independence, a movement fully armed in the political, social and economic fields.

Sun Yat-sen

Perhaps naturally, the leaders of Asian nationalism tended to look for concrete action, and not just words. The experience of China seemed pertinent. The Soviet State sent its representative Adolph Joffe to China, and in a joint statement with Joffe, Sun Yat-sen declared that "China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and full national independence." Further, the Soviet state specifically proclaimed support for Asian nationalism.

The effect of this on, for example, Sun Yat-sen was great. Aware of the attitude of the West to a strong and united China, Sun Yat-sen de-

clared: "We no longer look to the West. Our faces are turned towards Russia." In his Manifesto to the Chinese people on the 25th of July, 1919, Sun Yat-sen stated: "The Russian people will be the only ally and brother of the Chinese people in their struggle for freedom."

Although not stated so explicitly, nor perhaps so extremely as by Sun Yat-sen, the effect on other nationalist leaders in Asia was unquestionably great. For one thing, it encouraged the discussion and explanation of Marxism.

In Indonesia, Sneevliet, a Communist from Holland, was arrested and tried on charges of advocating revolution. He had drawn striking parallels between the condition of the people in pre-revolution Russia and the still existing condition of the Indonesian people. His brilliant defense in court was an exposition of Marxism and nationalism. It had a profound effect on all those who were seeking a way forward out of the bonds of liberal nationalism. In particular, it demonstrated the essential need for an economic program.

In this, the way had to some extent been shown by the three principles of Sun Yat-sen. One of these three principles was given the concrete form of "Land to the Tiller." It was a simple statement of aims, but had an explosive effect. In particular, it brought into the nationalist movement the wide mass of people. It had been true that the great voiceless majority of Asia was not interested in nationalism. The struggle for life and a full rice-bowl was enough. Governments would not change that. Suddenly, because of this injection of economic content, the nationalist movement became at-

tractive to the masses. The feudal elements, the dilettantes, the bourgeois nationalists found themselves breasting a flood of nation-wide proportions. Some of them sank, others, reorientating themselves in the changed conditions, led the national movements to final victory.

Effect of the October Revolution

The effect of the October Revolution was not a single shot, as the Fourteen Points had been. Again and again the Soviets and Comintern expressed their support for independence. For example, in 1924, the Fifth Congress of the Comintern expressed its "recognition of the right of all nations, irrespective of race, to complete self-determination." This resolution was referred to repeatedly as a guiding factor in the relations between the Soviet Union and the independence movements. Can there be any surprise that the October Revolution was seen as a watershed of the national movements?

The nationalist movements would have developed in any case. Even without the October Revolution they would have triumphed. But they would have triumphed in different ways, and in a different world. Almost certainly the struggle would have been much longer, and much more bloody. Certainly victory would have been delayed.

From Indonesia comes one clear example of the revolution in nationalist thinking during the years spanning the development of the Soviet Union. In 1916, Sarekat Islam, the leading nationalist organization, declared its aims to be "cooperation with the government for the benefit of the Indies." In 1927, the President of Sarekat Islam made the pregnant

statement that "King John signed the Magna Charta with his pen, but not until his people had taken to the sword."

Those years, too, saw the twilight of the intellectual and cultural domination of the West. Nationalist writers, poets and musicians arose, aware and proud of their nations, owing little to the West, and seeking inspiration amongst their own people. These added their considerable weight and strength to nationalism, and thus the movement grew, with cultural, social, economic and political powers supporting and buttressing each other.

It is necessary now to make one point very clear. The effect of the October Revolution did not necessarily mean the increased power of Communist parties, the adoption of communist ideology or the acceptance of Marxism. As I have said, that Revolution was a *catalyst*; it was not necessarily seen as an example to be followed. Indeed, it was not clear how a class revolution (within a nation) could serve as an example for nationalist movements, where the struggle was against a foreign system, against a foreign oppressor, and to some extent against an alien race. Certainly, in many countries Communist parties flourished and gave unflagging support to the ideal of independence. But it was not generally accepted that the path to national independence lay through the same kind of struggle as the peoples of the Soviet Union waged.

Contribution of Marxism

If I had to sum up in a few words the effect of the October Revolution, I would say this. Asian nationalism

had received influences from many quarters before 1917. The revolutions in England, America and France, the struggle for the unity of the Italian nation and the Irish struggle, all exerted influence. Within the history of Asian nationalism, both the Turkish revolution and the Russo-Japanese War had their effects. But all of those influences were on the emotional and sentimental side. They inspired us, but could give us little guidance in our particular problems. It was left to the October Revolution to do that. Even there, we did not aspire to imitate, but we learned much. In particular, we learned a new scientific approach to our problems. We absorbed Marxism and used its methods to analyze our own problems.

Those problems were unique to ourselves. And the solutions we found had therefore to be unique. We learned an approach: we learned methods, not slogans. From what we learned, we separated that which was useful and befitting from that which we had no wish to imitate.

Out of the culture and history of each separate Asian nation, a separate road was trodden to national independence. In the case of China, that road lay through the Three Principles. In the case of India, it lay through Satyagraha. In the case of Indonesia, it lay through Marhaenism* and Panch Shila, [The "Five Points" of peaceful co-existence.]

Applying the method of scientific analysis, each nation went its own way, not, usually, through the same sort of upheaval as the October Revolution, but through an upheaval having a nature dictated by the

* Marhaen—common folk, working people; Marhaenism—orientation by a political party on common people, in defense of their interests.—Ed.

unique problems of unique nations.

Indonesia, for example, is a country of small farmers, small traders, agricultural laborers and workers in small factories. As in China, the classical Marxist analysis seemed inapplicable. How can the proletariat triumph where there is no real proletariat? Furthermore, in the closely-knit village communities of Indonesia, the individual can and does exert a degree of influence which is out of proportion to his economic strength. There is a strong interaction between the individual and society, and reciprocal influences are at work. Furthermore, non-material interests (religion, culture, personal loyalties, traditions and so on) are very important in Indonesia, much more so than in an industrialized and individualist society. There is an interplay between the material and the non-material, and a synthesis of them, and this has presented Indonesian nationalists with particular problems.

Without tracing the full analysis of the situation, it will be clear that the conventional Marxist analysis and views—which are based upon European conditions—did not apply. But the Marxist *method* of analysis did, and still does. Out of these circumstances there grew the movement which led to national independence of Asia.

The Indonesian State was born in the midst of revolution, and its life has so far not been smooth. But although social changes will certainly take place in Indonesia, and although the methods of government will certainly be amended, we do not foresee those changes taking place by means of bloody revolutions.

Revolution takes place when conditions become intolerable. Our state, nation and society are changing so rapidly that conditions will not become intolerable. We look to a future of rapid, very rapid, almost explosive, evolution, but not to revolution. That is true of most of Asia and Africa. One main reason for this, of course, is that the nature of colonialism and imperialism has changed. It no longer seeks to hold vast territories; it looks, rather, to economic aggrandizement.

To sum up, therefore, it is clear that the October Revolution had a most profound effect. It was not a simple desire to tread the same road, but the realization that nationalism must embrace whole nations and must be attractive to whole nations. It was the achievement of a scientific analysis. It was the realization that Asia, having achieved independence, could progress more rapidly than nations passing through the phase of national capitalism. *Djakarta*

ASIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE UN

"UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Nov. 29—The General Assembly rejected today a proposal for new negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the future of West New Guinea, also known as West Irian, occupied by the Netherlands and claimed by the Indonesia government as part of its territory.

"The vote was 41 to 29 with 11 abstentions. The Soviet block joined most of the Asian-African nations in backing the Indonesian proposal. Britain and France voted against, and the U.S. was among the abstainers. The 41 votes in favor of new negotiations did not constitute the two-thirds required in the assembly."—*New York Times*, Nov. 30.

Disarmament And Limited Nuclear War

by PROF. J. D. BERNAL

THE question of disarmament has again been before the UN General Assembly after nearly ten years of deliberation. The UN Disarmament Sub-Committee concluded its latest session in August without reaching agreement and yet the problem of disarmament is now both more urgent and nearer a solution than it has been before. New developments in missiles and in the strategy of their use have now exposed the whole world, rather than only part of it, to direct atomic attack, without any possibility of defense. The doctrine of deterrents and negotiation from strength are rapidly losing their effectiveness. At the same time the strains in the Middle East are threatening to set off a chain reaction of intervention and counter-intervention that would lead, unless it was checked, almost immediately to general war. Now the risk is not merely for the powers that might be directly engaged in this war, but for every country in the world.

It would be possible to trace step

J. D. BERNAL, internationally famous scientist, Fellow of the Royal Society, and professor at Birbeck College, London, contributed an important analysis of Soviet scientific education to the April 1957 issue of NWR; this article clearly explains the reasons for the successes of Soviet science now heralded throughout the world. Prof. Bernal is a member of the World Peace Council.

by step the negotiations of the last Disarmament Sub-Committee, insofar as they have been made public, but it would not, I think, be profitable. This is partly because they have been overtaken by subsequent events, and partly because they concealed rather than exposed the real reasons for failure to agree. It should be sufficient to recall the summaries of the points of the Soviet and Western proposals as put forward in their opening speeches to the UN General Assembly by Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Dulles. The general form of both is, in appearance, extremely similar; indeed, one effect of the prolonged negotiations on disarmament is that the main elements of a disarmament agreement have now been drawn up and, in fact, are agreed by both sides. The disagreement lies in the way in which these outlines are filled up. An outline disarmament agreement would comprise three main headings: conventional armed forces and armaments; nuclear weapons; and immediate safeguards against sudden attack by either side.

On conventional armed forces there is a general agreement on reduction by stages, but no agreement as to the amount to be reduced or to the conditions attached to the passing from one stage to another. Nor is there agreement on the question of budgetary control of the ex-

penditure on armaments. On the question of nuclear weapons there is a general agreement on the cessation of tests for a limited but disputed period, but no agreement on the conditions under which such agreement to suspend tests should become operative. As to the major question of the prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons themselves, it is now evident from the proposals of the Western Powers that there is no prospect of the renunciation of the use of such weapons, but only the limitation of their use to that of defense. The Western proposals include a ban on the production of new fissile material of which they have ample stocks, but not on the production of more nuclear weapons or new types. On the question of safeguards against sudden attack there is less disagreement. Both sides now accept the system of ground inspection together with aerial cover, but differ as to the areas over which the aerial cover should operate.

Another fundamental difference applies to the method of reaching and implementing any disarmament agreement. The proposals put forward by the Western Powers at a late stage in the Sub-Committee's discussions, and again summarized in a resolution put to the UN General Assembly, are conceived as a united whole—to be accepted or rejected but not amended. On the other hand the Soviet proposals are for a series of *ad hoc* agreements, not necessarily connected with each other: on the peaceful co-existence of states; on the ending of nuclear tests; and on states undertaking not to use atomic weapons for a period of five years. A summary of the Western and So-

viet proposals are set out side by side for comparison. (See page 36)

The only way in which the Western proposals differ from those put forward at the Disarmament Sub-Committee is an additional demand for a Committee to study the possibilities of controlling weapons involving outer space. This is a fairly natural reaction to the Soviet achievement in this field, but it also shows the characteristic attitude of a study proposal rather than any form either of prohibition or of international control as proposed by Mr. Khrushchev.

It would, however, be quite impossible to understand the disarmament deadlock if one confines one's attention to disarmament proposals and counter-proposals. The difficulty in reaching agreement is due to the determination of the NATO Powers to retain nuclear weapons on the use of which their whole strategy is based. This has been further confirmed by many statements, including that of General Norstadt this summer. Here it is provided that not only American but all Allied troops should be in possession of nuclear weapons and trained in their use, though the actual weapons themselves would not for legal reasons be handed over to them until the beginning of hostilities. This strategy has not been shaken but rather reinforced by the new ideas about the nature of future warfare that have been developing principally in the United States and Britain, at least after the NATO decisions of 1955.

These have been set out in the recent book by Mr. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, representing opinion of important military and business circles in the

United States, and in a shorter pamphlet issued by the British Institute of International Affairs with the title *On Limiting Atomic War* and arising from discussions by Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, Professor P. M. S. Blackett, Denis Healey, M.P., and Richard Gould Adams. The doctrine continued in these books, however, is essentially a theoretical justification of a policy which is now at least two years old, namely that of relying on nuclear weapons as a main arm for all kinds of warfare, land, naval and in the air. The British Defense White Paper of 1957, with its somewhat premature reliance on American rockets instead of on the further developments of British bombers, is another official confirmation of this doctrine. More recently, it has been strongly urged by Mr. Dulles himself in his address to the UN General Assembly.

The dependence on nuclear weapons in itself is nothing new. Ever since Hiroshima or Mr. Churchill's Fulton speech, the idea that the Western Powers could use nuclear weapons to counter the superiority of manpower of the Soviet Union has been the essential doctrine of all Western strategists and has absolutely blocked any serious attempt at disarmament in the interval. It has, however, been successively modified. At one time, when only the United States had a nuclear weapon—it was the basis for the doctrine of massive retaliation which depended on a strategic bombing force able to wipe out the enemy's cities and factories, hoping that by its mere threat it would prevent them moving their conventional forces.

When the USSR achieved production of the atomic bomb, this

doctrine changed its emphasis and became that of the great deterrent. It was admitted that most of Europe, England in particular, could be wiped out by Soviet atom bombs, but it was still believed that the fear of continued bombing from immune American bases using atom and later hydrogen bombs would prevent such an attack. Even the production by the Soviet Union of the hydrogen bomb did not shake this doctrine, but it received its first serious blow in the development from 1954 onwards of a Soviet long-range bombing force capable of reaching American cities. It began to be realized at last that all-out nuclear warfare would mean total national suicide even for the United States, and this threat was made all the more certain by the development of Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles, confirmed by their successful launching of an earth satellite.

The new modified doctrine of limited war by no means gives up the idea of the use of nuclear weapons and even attaches relatively more importance to them. The object of limited war is to make the first effective use of so-called tactical atomic weapons against specific military targets over a defined area and thus to avoid the danger that such weapons would be used against the centers of population and industrial plant of the main contestant parties. In such a war there should be no aim of total victory or unconditional surrender, but sufficient damage should be done to persuade the enemy that he must give up a particular piece of territory or political objective. Kissinger writes:

Thus, if limited actions are implemented as part of a policy which offers

the other side a way out short of unconditional surrender, they may bring about local reversals. These in turn may set off chain reactions which will be difficult to control and which may magnify the tensions within the Soviet bloc. A strategy of limited war, then, would use our retaliatory power as a means to permit us to fight local actions on our own terms and to shift to the other side the risk of initiating all-out war.

The doctrine of limited war, although it has such strong service support on both sides of the Atlantic, is by no means accepted as an alternative to all-out warfare, but rather as a convenient supplement to it. Even its strongest advocate, Dr. Kissinger, points out that it is necessary to retain the full striking force of all-out war, should the limited war prove impossible to keep within bounds. The importance of the doctrine of limited war, however, is that it adds enormously to the difficulties of disarmament and particularly to those of the cessation of atomic tests. Mr. Dulles, in his address to the UN General Assembly (September 19, 1957), made a very strong plea for the continuation of tests, precisely in order to perfect such tactical weapons:

We seek, by experiments now carefully controlled to find how to eliminate the hazardous radioactive material now incident to the explosions of thermonuclear weapons. Also we seek to make nuclear weapons into discriminating weapons, suitable for defense against attacking troops, submarines, and bombers, and for interception of intercontinental missiles.

The Soviet Union seems not to want the character of nuclear weapons thus to be refined and changed. It seems to like it that nuclear weapons can be stigmatized as "horror" weapons.

Does it calculate that, under these conditions, governments subject to mor-

al and religious influences will not be apt to use them? And would the Soviet Government, not itself subject to moral and religious restraints, thereby gain a special freedom of action and initiative as regards such weapons?

And does the Soviet Union not want nuclear weapons to be refined into effective defensive weapons which could repel an aggressive attack by those who control the most manpower?

The size of the proposed tactical weapons has not yet been precisely stated, but Dr. Kissinger thinks they should be below the half megaton class, that is, not greater than twenty-five times that used at Hiroshima. That the extensive use of such bombs, even with the greatest military carefulness, could not avoid appalling civil casualties and extensive radioactive contamination, is not seriously considered in Dr. Kissinger's book.

The Soviet Union has consistently opposed the whole conception of tactical weapons as an excuse for maintaining nuclear weapons at all costs:

The Soviet Government cannot agree with attempts to present the situation as though the employment of atomic and hydrogen weapons were lawful and as though the matter to be considered were not the renunciation of their use but merely the establishment of certain limitations on the use of these weapons.

Nor is it at all certain that when it comes to the point the United States is really in favor of limiting war. One of its essential doctrines—that the bases in a major enemy's country are not to be attacked for fear of retaliation—has been explicitly rejected in the particular case of the Middle East in Mr. Dulles' statement that a Russian attack on Turkey "would not mean a purely defensive operation by the United

States, with the Soviet Union a privileged sanctuary from which to attack Turkey" (*The Times*, October 17, 1957.)

Difficult as it may be to maintain the limitations on nuclear warfare once hostilities have broken out, there is no question that it is useful in the pre-war state in justifying an enormous expansion of military expenditure and a great number of types of weapons. Indeed, Dr. Kissinger's argument in favor of limited warfare is that it would give a great advantage to the United States, which is in a position to build up a greater variety of such tactical weapons and to use them more effectively than the ostensibly less flexible and backward forces of the Soviet Union.

The choice between conventional and nuclear war then becomes an essentially practical one: which side is likely to gain from adopting limited nuclear war? Here our superior industrial potential, the broader range of our technology and the adaptability of our social institutions should give us the advantage. . .

And a society like that of the Soviet Union, in which everything is done according to plan and by government direction, will have extraordinary difficulty inculcating these qualities. . .

To conduct a nuclear war, manpower must be trained in a wide spectrum of abilities; here rewards go to initiative and technical competence at all levels. Such a utilization of manpower would seem to take advantage of the special qualities of our society. (*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, H. A. Kissinger, Harpers. New York 1957, pp. 194, 196.)

Even if success is not to be achieved in this field, it is at least hoped that the burden of producing such extensive and varied armaments will be in the long run too great for the USSR to bear, or impose such strains as will enforce a

change of regime. This armaments race policy, however, is already having a most serious effect among the allies of the United States; the economic difficulties of Britain and less directly of France are a product of the degree in which they have been driven to rearm and it is quite clear, if only from the British Defense White Paper, that armaments on the scale required by the doctrine of limited plus unlimited war, will be too much for any other powers except the two great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile it is holding up any serious possibility of assisting the under-developed countries and even of relieving them from the acute crisis which present economic trends are provoking among primary producers. These strains are also responsible for the political instability that in turn is liable to set off a war, notably in the Middle East and in North Africa.

Even if war is avoided, the prospect of continuing the arms race in an accelerated form and extended into outer space, is not one which is compatible with any degree of human prosperity or happiness. The debates which will go on at the UN General Assembly will almost certainly express the anxiety of peoples all over the world to achieve immediately a degree of disarmament and particularly the stopping of nuclear tests. At the moment only the United States, Britain and a few of their more identified allies are in favor of their retention. The bulk of the countries seem to be against them, and they are not reassured by the defenders of the tests, who claim they are necessary to produce more and better nuclear weapons,

even if labelled as "clean weapons."

Technically, the producers of tactical atomic weapons, even of the relatively feeble Hiroshima type, are faced with a great impasse in their use; if they are pin-pointed on a military objective, they will produce the maximum amount of local contamination and fall-out; if they are exploded at a great height the radius of their damage is likely to be at a maximum and more certain to include the civilians rather than military forces. What is worse, in any so-called limited war a very large number of weapons would have to be exploded on account of the number of military targets presented, and the cumulative effect of the fallout will only be of a slightly lower order than that of full-scale strategic hydrogen bomb warfare, especially as most of the areas in dispute are highly populated industrial districts such as those of central Europe. People are at last becoming alive to the danger of even small amounts of nuclear material widespread over the country.

We need to unite all forms of public opinion to resist the use of nuclear weapons as a matter of principle. How to do this most effectively, however, is one of politics. The discussions of the Labor Party Conference bring this out very clearly. There was an almost complete unanimity of opinion against the continuation of atomic tests, and yet the conference was so confused by the issue of unilateral or negotiated abandonment of nuclear weapon manufacture as to arrive at a conclusion which was widely, if wrongly, interpreted as one in which the Labor Party favored the continuation of the tests until successful ne-

gotiations with the United States could agree on multi-lateral abandonment of them.* This misinterpretation has been felt inevitably as a setback in the campaign to abolish atomic weapons and to stop tests on them. Nevertheless, its real lesson should be one of requiring a greater and wider understanding of the issues at stake.

Public opinion, and not only conservative public opinion, in both Britain and the United States, is still acting under the impression of the relative strength of the two great power blocs as they existed six or seven years ago, and not as they are today. Much of the determined and so far completely effective desire to retain the production of these weapons and to refuse any limitation on their use, stems from the belief that they are a peculiarly Western weapon, and in the absence of these products of science the world would be over-run by primitive hordes from the East. The successful launching of the satellite, which is as much a scientific as a technical triumph, should demonstrate that this picture is completely out of date, if, indeed, it had ever been true. There are in the world today only two powers each of which has the ca-

(Turn to page 37)

* On this point the actual resolutions read: "Conference declares that constant stockpiling of nuclear weapons and H-bomb tests are an obstacle to international agreement and calls upon the British Government to seek the support of all nations in the councils of the United Nations for:

- (a) an end to H-bomb tests;
- (b) a ban on nuclear weapons and the destruction of existing stocks with international control and inspection;
- (c) progressive disarmament with adequate supervision by the United Nations.

"This Conference reaffirms the view of the Labor Party that Britain should propose the immediate cessation of H-bomb tests: It believes that such action, on an international basis, would be a step towards world peace and urges the Parliamentary Labor Party to press the Government to give a moral lead to the world by announcing that no further nuclear bomb tests will be undertaken by this country."

SUMMARY OF 1957 DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS

WEST

USSR

A. ARMED FORCES

Both sides agree that armed forces should be reduced in stages.

	US & USSR	UK & FRANCE
Stage 1	2,500,000	750,000
Stage 2	2,100,000	700,000
Stage 3	1,700,000	650,000

Transition to Stages 2 & 3 are dependent on "progress towards the solution of political issues" and no "other essential States" becoming parties to the convention.

Originally proposed (30/4/57) same Stage 1 and a firm commitment to reductions to 1-1.5 million (USA & USSR) and 650,000 (UK & France) in Stage 2.

Later agreed to same numbers and stages but insisted that transition from one stage to the next "should not be made dependent on any conditions not provided for by the agreement itself."

B. CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Both sides agree that conventional arms should be reduced in stages and that in Stage 1 specific quantities of designated types of armaments be stored in depots under international supervision.

There is no agreement on Stage 2 and 3 reductions, which would have to be related to reductions in armed forces, with the same provisos as in A.

C. MILITARY BUDGETS

Information to be supplied annually on military expenditures from the year preceding the agreement, to assist in verifying A & B and "looking forward to the reduction of military expenditures."

A 15 per cent cut in military budgets during Stage I of A & B.

D. FOREIGN BASES

No proposals.

(Not prepared to consider elimination of bases in Stage 1).

Question of dismantling all foreign military bases on the territory of other countries be examined. Agreement on which bases to be dismantled in Stage 1.

Ban on stationing nuclear weapons abroad.

Reduction by one-third, or agreed figure, of foreign troops now stationed in Germany. Agreed reductions of foreign troops in NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

E. USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(Not mentioned in General Assembly resolution).

In Sub-Committee proposals: obligation "not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense."

Immediate and unconditional renunciation of use of nuclear weapons for a 5-year period.

Question to be reconsidered by UN at end of period if no agreement on disarmament has been reached. (General Assembly resolution.)

In Sub-Committee: Obligation by States in Stage 1 to renounce use of all types of nuclear weapons.

WEST

F. PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and complete devotion of further production to non-weapons purposes (cutoff).

G. NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Suspension for 12 months with possibility of further 12 months extension if "cut-off" arrangements are proceeding satisfactorily.

H. SURPRISE ATTACK

Both sides agree on the need for both ground and aerial inspection system.

a) *Aerial*

Inspection of all or part of the Arctic, Soviet Union, N. Europe and N. America.

b) *Ground*

General agreement on areas and methods.

USSR

"Cut-off" of fissionable materials must be "linked inseparably with the prohibition of atomic weapons, their withdrawal from the armaments of States and the destruction of stockpiles."

Unconditional suspension for 2 to 3 years.

Zone of aerial photography in Europe and Far East but considers "the exclusion from aerial inspection of some NATO countries and also countries which, although not members of NATO have on their territories foreign military bases, would place the Soviet Union and its allies under the Warsaw Treaty, whose territories, it is proposed, are to be open for aerial inspection, in inequitable conditions."

capacity of wiping out the other and, in the process, of destroying and killing most of the rest of the population of the world. Very few people, even in the United States, think that the issue between them now can be fought out.

The alternatives, short of war, are the continuation and even the acceleration of the present arms race, with all the risks it entails; or going over to a purely friendly form of competition in the economic and scientific field. A foretaste of this is being given to us in the International Geophysical Year, of which the satellite program is a part. There is now going to be plenty of scope for such competition in the conquest of space. It may be that the launching of the satellite will prove to be a turning point in this direction. However much we may deplore it,

many scientists found in the preparations for war some possibility of realizing their scientific and technical dreams. Now much of this same interest and energy could be transferred to these regions of outer space, at the same time releasing a much greater scientific effort for the solution of the far more urgent terrestrial problems of food and health.

This is, however, only a hope. The shock of the satellite may just as easily turn to a still further acceleration of the arms race and even to preventive war. It is now, therefore, that scientists whose prestige has been raised still more by recent achievements need to exert themselves more than ever to ensure that we turn away from war once and for all time.

The above article, was written by Professor Bernal for the International Institute of Peace.

LIVING THE GOOD LIFE

a review by JOHN ABT

MY NATIVE GROUNDS, The Autobiography of Royal W. France. Foreword by Alexander Meiklejohn. Cameron Associates, New York. \$3.75.

THE first sentence of Royal W. France's autobiography, *My Native Grounds*, asks only that the reader credit him with having tried to live the good life. But the pages that follow tell an inspiring success story.

The author attributes his start in life to his choice of brothers, Joseph Irwin and Clemens France. Joseph, a United States Senator from Maryland, visited the Soviet Union in 1921 to study the infant socialist state at first hand. The first American legislator to make the trip, he met with Lenin and other Soviet leaders. What he saw convinced him that the future peace of the world depended on the establishment of friendly relations between the USA and the USSR. Upon his return, he campaigned vigorously for American recognition of the Soviet government, undeterred by the intense anti-Communism of the times which cost him re-election. The second brother, Clemens, "a dyed-in-the-wool radical," was for many years director of public welfare of Rhode Island and, at seventy, ran for governor of that state on the 1948 Progressive Party ticket.

Like his brothers, Royal France has never been content merely to have high principles; he has always acted upon them. In 1917, he resigned his partnership in a leading law firm rather than agree to refrain from publicly opposing American entry into a war which he opposed as imperialist. In 1920, he risked and incurred arrest by participating in a meeting to protest the ouster of the Socialist members of the New York legislature. And in 1929, he threw up a

lucrative New York law practice to become a teacher of economics at Rollins College, Florida, where he spent twenty-three years, as rewarding for a host of students as they were for him.

In 1951, at the age of sixty-seven, he was again impelled to go into action to defend the principles by which he lived. "I felt increasingly," he writes, "that I was too much at ease in Zion while one of history's great struggles for the preservation of free speech was taking place right here in our country." Accordingly, he resigned his professorship to make his talent as a lawyer and his prestige as a citizen available for the defense of the victims of cold war repression and McCarthyism. He writes of his experiences in the court room and in the forum of public debate with a passionate conviction in the cause of peace and freedom which he has advocated so ably. And he demonstrates a complete understanding of the motivation and integrity of his clients, even when differing from some of their political views.

Mr. France concludes his eloquent story by saying, "To be engaged in the struggle for that which one holds dear. to be doing one's part, as one can, to help to save that which has been won for us at such great cost by those who have gone before, to have before one the vision of the world that is to be, that is good life enough for any man. And, oh, what fun life is when compounded of love, beauty, humor, wonder, and a firm belief that whatever happens man, despite gullibility, cruelty, fear, tyranny, and self-betrayal, is and has been creator and conqueror, dreamer and fulfiller of dream."

We are deeply indebted to Royal France both for the example which he has given us and for helping to make life better for all Americans.

SOLIDARITY

a review by MURRAY YOUNG

A LONG DAY IN A SHORT LIFE, by Albert Maltz. International Publishers, New York. 1957. \$3.75.

MR. MALTZ has written a moving and powerful book centering on the events of one day in a prison in Washington, D. C.

In the classic milieu of writers who go in for so-called "tough" books—demoralized men in the violent world of penal brutality—the author sets his story, whose essence is sympathy, understanding and sensitive awareness to the awakening of consciousness and moral growth even under the most debased circumstances.

With deep pity the world of the caught criminal is described for us, a pity based upon getting beneath the surface callousness of the prisoners to the sources in their past and the influences of an unjust society that maimed them and brought them to the "death in life" of prison existence.

The two focal characters are an intelligent, ambitious young Negro caught in a police trap set for him as a result of his taking part in a demonstration against segregation in the local high schools, and a middle-aged Georgian who has had the experience of working in Detroit during the great days of the organization of the Automobile Workers Union, where he learned the meaning of solidarity in opposing injustice and oppression. His testimony will either close the trap—and for this the police have offered him reward—or allow its intended victim to go free. The heart of the book is the tension built around this situation with all its human and social implications.

Surrounding these two men, whose relationship involves the whole question of race and class solidarity in face of wanton official power, are the sad vic-

tims whose course of life has led them by a kind of remorseless logic to the inhuman isolation of prison life.

Mr. Maltz, who spent a number of months in prison as one of the Hollywood Ten, knew himself the isolation of prison life and came to realize the sense of solidarity and brotherhood that does not die even behind prison bars. This profound truth he has creatively demonstrated in his fine novel.

This is a book that will warm your heart and strengthen your own faith in man's essential humanity to man.

ALGERIA

LIEUTENANT IN ALGERIA, by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. \$3.50.

SERVAN-SCHREIBER, editor of the Paris newspaper, *L'Express* and a political supporter of Mendes-France, has written a stirring narrative of his experience as a draftee in the French Army in Algeria. The story that he tells is of one of France's "dirty wars." Launched as a campaign of "pacification" against armed Algerian "rebels," it inevitably became a war against the entire Arab population.

The author sees that this attempt to terrorize the Algerian people into submission and drown their aspirations for independence in blood is doomed to failure. And he shows how the war is brutalizing the generation of young Frenchmen who wage it and corrupting the financial interests and government officials who support it. The author believes that some middle ground can be found between a colonial rule imposed by arms and Algerian independence which would cost France its last claim to being a "great power." But the facts which he presents with the honesty and skill of a fine reporter make it clear that the Algerian people, like their Asian and African brothers, will not compromise their right to self-determination.

J. A.

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