THE TRUE STORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

Andrei Yermonsky

The Path to Peace — a View from Moscow



THE TRUE STORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
AND THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

The USSR steadfastly pursues a Leninist policy of peace and stands for strengthening of the security of nations and broad international co-operation.

Constitution of the USSR, Article 28, Para 1.

Andrei Yermonsky

The Path to Peace—a View from Moscow

General editor: I. I. MINTS, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences

Progress Publishers · Moscow

Novosti Press Agency Publishing House

Translated from the Russian by *Edythe C. Haber*

Андрей Ермонский

ПУТЬ К МИРУ – ВЗГЛЯД ИЗ МОСКВЫ
На английском языке

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Е $\frac{11101\ \ 004}{014(01)-081}$ 17–81

0302030105

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PEACE ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF NUCLEAR BALANCE?

In the mid-1850s a Russian officer, who took part in the Crimean campaign [1], wrote down the following while his experiences and thoughts under enemy fire on the bastions of Sevastopol, besieged by the English and French, were still fresh in his mind:

"A strange thought often occurred to me: what if one of the warring sides suggested to the other that each army remove one soldier apiece? The wish might seem strange, but why not carry it out? Then a second would be removed from each side, then a third, a fourth, etc., until only one soldier would remain in each army (assuming that the armies are of equal strength and that quantity would be replaced by quality). And then, if complex political issues among rational representatives of rational beings really can be settled by a fight,

[1] The Crimean War (1853-1856) was fought between Turkey, England, and France on the one side and Russia on the other.

let these two soldiers fight – one would besiege the city, the other would defend it." [1]

Who except for professional historians remember that war, already so remote from us? Yet, it was no "ordinary", "local" war: it left a significant trace in the history of Europe, which, according to concepts of that time, was the "civilized" world. Not only did it literally rock the entire continent and in one way or another draw into its orbit all the major powers of the time, it also proved very costly: according to some estimates, a million lives were lost.

This figure may not disturb us, who live at the end of the twentieth century and are burdened by the apocalyptic experience of two world wars and, during the past thirty-five peaceful years, constant terrible "local" wars. But it shook the Russian officer. This fact, it is true, does not so much characterize us as the times in which we live.

Even today these words, the thought of a Russian officer – he happened to be the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy, a man who has left a profound mark on world culture and world history – sound strikingly topical. But this is so, I believe, not only because the proposed disarmament plan according to the principles of equal security – as his thoughts might, apparently, be translated into modern political language – is by no means easier to carry out today than it was over a hundred years ago. And neither is it so because the horrors of that war

[1] L. N. Tolstoy, "Sevastopol in May", *Collected Works* in 22 volumes, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1979, p. 103 (in Russian).

themselves, the scale of destruction and ruin, large even by current standards, the squandering of the human, material, and spiritual resources of many states, and the number of victims, quite impressive, even according to our notions, on both sides – stagger our imagination (as they undoubtedly staggered the imagination of Leo Tolstoy). The main reason, I believe, why the Russian officer's thought is close to us today is because he was shaken precisely by men's *habit* of settling their quarrels by means of *massive, armed fights*, that is, by war.

This habit of living in an armed world is one of the hardest to uproot from the psyche of people who have grown accustomed by the experience of many centuries, of hundreds of wars both recent and far off, to considering such a situation as normal, ordinary, natural. Such a habit – always encouraged by arms manufacturers and politicians avowing a cult of force, diktat, and pressure in relation to other states, a striving for territorial usurpation or economic expansion, in a word, imperialist politicians – was invariably utilized and is still being utilized to whip up the arms race. Therefore both in the past and to this day it remains a real hindrance to preventing new wars, preserving peace, constructing a durable and just system of security.

When rising against this fatal habit, Leo Tolstoy seemed to have a premonition that the Crimean, and later the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), were a kind of dreadful warning and, at the same time, a prologue to the 20th century, which put into human hands truly monstrous tools of mass

destruction. His contemporaries, Marx and Engels, the founders of Marxism, foresaw this. In reference to the drafting into the army of all those fit for military service, the appearance of new fire-arms, artillery shells and explosives of a strength unheard-of at the time, they stressed that this in itself had already brought about a total revolution in military affairs "by making any war other than a world war of unheard-of cruelty and absolutely incalculable outcome an impossibility".[1]

Unfortunately, the history of the 20th century, especially its second half, while in principle justifying this sort of forecast, has, so to speak, gone far beyond it in details. The use of machine-guns, long-range artillery, tanks, airplanes, submarines – all of this, it would seem, has not simply qualitatively changed the nature of armed conflicts, but has also placed on the agenda the question of the "expediency" of waging war altogether: about 50 million people slaughtered on the battlefield, scores of millions dead of hunger and epidemics, tormented and annihilated by occupiers, left without shelter and the means of survival, colossal destruction, astronomical expenditures on war, on the development and production of ever newer weapons – such is a dry statistical account of the two world wars.

Everything, however, makes sense through comparison. From our point of view, the armament

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[1] Karl Marx, "The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850". In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 194.

level – not just on the eve of the First World War, but even at the height of the Second World War – might almost seem insignificant. Whatever name we give this – blindness, loss of a sense of reality, or habit in dealing with magnitudes whose meaning the man-in-the-street simply cannot conceive – this conciliatory everyday attitude to the snowballing nuclear arms race, foisted upon the world in 1945 when the United States exploded the first two atom bombs against the already virtually defeated Japan, today may turn into a truly irreparable catastrophe.

Indeed, during the thirty-five years since the war, nuclear arms have not only been granted "citizenship rights", they have already turned into an independent factor in international politics, into an important element in the peace that has been maintained at the cost of immense effort and risk. Figures characterizing the scale of proliferation of nuclear weapons, their potential and variety, have already been cited numerous times. Unfortunately, frequent repetition, apparently, is also making people become gradually accustomed to them, all the more so since it no longer matters now whether they express the present situation or are already somewhat obsolete. According to American estimates, for example, the total power of nuclear arms stockpiled throughout the world has exceeded 50,000 million tons of TNT, which is enough to destroy all living creatures on our planet 15 times over! According to other estimates, if one uses the bomb exploded by the Americans at Hiroshima as a measurement, then today's nuc-

lear arsenal equals 1,300 million such bombs. Against this background, the fact asserted by some specialists that the total armaments of the world's armies include 124,000 tanks, 35,000 fighter planes, almost 12,500 war ships, and other military technology, may not seem so very significant.

The figures are so incongruously great that it is difficult to believe in their reality. The possibility of entirely destroying our surroundings more than once over seems like monstrous nonsense. The fact remains, however, that mankind lives in just such a world. Moreover, every year the continuing arms race only aggravates the situation.

What lies ahead?

Sometimes, it is true, people say: all that is correct, but hasn't the actual consciousness of the threat to mankind already done some good? Hasn't it, for example, served in its way to stimulate the growth of anti-war sentiments and anti-war movements throughout the world? Isn't the very fear of nuclear suicide capable of bringing people to their senses, of serving as a reliable guarantee of peace? Hasn't the comprehension that if nuclear arms were used they would bring about a global catastrophe forced politicians to seek more actively and concertedly for a constructive alternative to military confrontation? Didn't, finally, the balance of terror serve as a foundation for the positive shifts from the cold war to détente which began around 1970?

These questions, of course, should not simply be discounted. Each of them could even be answered affirmatively, but only with one quite essential

qualification. In the 1960s the Soviet Union succeeded through immense efforts in overtaking the initiator, inspirer, and leader of this race – the United States of America. The sources, the roots of the relaxation of international tension that was established in international relations (primarily and to the greatest degree in Europe) were, of course, connected with the establishment of military balance, which the arms race of the 1960s achieved.

The established balance, the parity of military-strategic forces in the international arena for the first time really compelled the West, above all US leaders, finally to heed seriously the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies. Since then the maintenance of this parity has become an important precondition for the normalization and development of Soviet-American relations and for progress of political détente between East and West as a whole. At the end of the 1970s, Cyrus Vance characterized the existence of parity in the following rather terse but quite eloquent way: "When the United States and the Soviet Union each have the capacity to destroy the other regardless of who strikes first, national security takes on new dimensions." [1]

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[1] Secretary Vance's Testimony on SALT II. Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 9 and 10, 1979, *Department of State Bulletin*, August 1979, p. 30.

ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 1980s

Today even the most biassed anti-Communists would hardly seriously attempt to refute the generally recognized fact that the USSR and other socialist countries were the genuine initiators of détente, the persistent and decisive opponents of the cold war. Back in the mid-1950s, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), at its 20th Congress, declared the necessity and possibility of establishing the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, and advanced the thesis that world war was not fatally inevitable under changed international conditions.

In the mid-1960s, at its 23rd Congress, the CPSU proposed – in one package, so to speak – a set of concrete measures which, as L. I. Brezhnev noted in the Report of the Central Committee, would improve the international situation, strengthen peace, and develop peaceful cooperation among peoples. Four groups of immediate problems were put forth: the end of American aggression in Vietnam; strict observance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs

of other countries; a complex of concrete measures against the threat of nuclear war; and finally, questions connected with European security, with military détente and arms reduction on the continent. It was at that time, for example, that a proposal was made to convene a conference of all European states. These tasks became, as it were, the kernel of the Soviet Peace Program, formulated five years later, at the next, 24th Congress of the CPSU, and later developed and supplemented in 1976, at the 25th Congress. Tangible progress in achieving the goals advanced by the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s and early 1970s in essence determined the nature of international development in the 1970s.

Today not a single realistic politician, careful observer, or person who has not consciously turned his back on world events – no one, in other words, can deny that in ten or fifteen years international relations, and most of all Europe, have changed radically. One need only recall how things stood when the movement towards détente began.

The barbaric aggression of the United States in Vietnam was continuing. Vietnam was divided into two parts, the presence of American and other foreign troops in South Vietnam not allowing the Vietnamese people to settle their own internal affairs. The war in Vietnam did not only seriously aggravate the situation in Indochina; it had a negative effect on the international political climate as a whole.

The US-supported aggression of Israel against its Arab neighbors seriously complicated the situa-

tion in the Middle East and stimulated the arms race both in the area and beyond.

The arms race, which had already reached an extremely high and dangerous level, continued with virtually no control whatever: this was related first and foremost to the totally unlimited growth of nuclear weapons, whose proliferation was not yet prohibited by international agreement.

Finally, dozens of explosive problems literally rocked Europe. A sovereign socialist state in the very center of the continent – the German Democratic Republic – was not "officially recognized" by many, among them the largest, countries of the West. Moreover, the GDR was subjected to regular political and diplomatic discrimination; there was an attempt not only to keep her out of the international organizations, but in general to prevent her active participation in solving world problems. The abnormal situation in West Berlin was used by cold warriors and advocates of "containing socialism" doctrines to dangerously exacerbate political tensions. This was compounded with the stubborn unwillingness, totally lacking in political logic, of those ruling the Federal Republic of Germany at the time and of several of their NATO allies to agree that the European borders established as a result of the rout of nazism were final and not subject to "revision", and that their inviolability was an indispensable precondition to peace and security in Europe and elsewhere. Another obstacle was West Germany's unpromising posture on the disgraceful Munich deal of 1938. In

a word, peace in Europe, as elsewhere in the world, was still shaky and unstable in the years of cold war.

The depth and nature of the changes that took place in the international arena in the 1970s confirms that not only a number of important foreign policy problems have been solved but that we have advanced significantly farther, and found ourselves on the threshold of a fundamentally new period in the development of international relations.

Firstly, though the danger of world war has again increased at the turn of the 1980s, there are powerful forces in the world which can prevent mankind's dangerous slipping to a nuclear holocaust.

Secondly, although the arms race, including that of nuclear arms, has not yet ceased, objective conditions are already taking shape which would make curbing the race a realistic goal. Under favorable conditions that goal may be reached within the next few years, leading to gradual progress towards real disarmament. This means that not only have the opportunities of struggling for prevention of nuclear war and for peace increased considerably, but the very nature of the struggle is changing. Its goal today has become not simply the preservation and maintenance of peace, but the elimination from human life of the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

Thirdly, although mutually hostile military alliances still continue to exist in the world, the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with

different social systems has received the official recognition of international law, having become the core of an entire complex of bilateral and multilateral documents whose participants include both capitalist and socialist countries.

Finally, though the foreign policies of certain Western countries, in particular the USA, have made a sharp turn, cooperation between the states of the two social systems is continuing. Contacts between politicians, businessmen, scientists, and workers in art are becoming more regular and exchange of scientific, technical and economic information is expanding. In other words, by bringing mutual benefits to the partners, cooperation among states helps further stabilize international relations according to the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The relaxation of tensions has provided a powerful stimulus for democratizing international relations and for creating a situation which would give every people, every nation, whether big or small, broader opportunities to defend their own interests and to substantially influence the solution of major world problems. A notable feature of the 1970s was the active participation by dozens of developing states in international politics and the more important role played by small and medium countries.

In this way, during the past decade the foundation began to be built – and built successfully – for a system of international peace based on disarmament under conditions of equal security, security supported by the coordinated efforts of states.

Unfortunately, this short sketch of the international situation at the turn of the 80s cannot be ended on such an optimistic note. Now the world once again, as so many times during the present century, seems to be at a crossroad. The end of the 1970s saw a certain chilling of the international climate brought about by the activization of all the opponents of détente. This was expressed in attempts to whip up the arms race, slow down political détente, bring negotiations on military détente to an impasse, and undermine the position of the democratic, revolutionary liberation movement in the developing states. Right-wing and conservative forces gained ground in quite a number of capitalist states, and this naturally made a certain impact on their foreign policies.

To a certain extent the situation was complicated by the appearance of post-Maoist China in the world arena as an active force openly siding with imperialism against détente and security. Peking's political practices at the end of the past decade showed that China's actual course was in essence directed against détente, against curbing the arms race, against the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence as a universal norm in international relations, that this course, in fact, served only to consolidate the position of international reaction.

The following circumstance, however, is characteristic: the prestige of the policy of détente is so great that nobody today can openly oppose détente – neither those who were swept into it, who

became, as they say, "realists in spite of themselves", i. e., who, under the pressure of circumstances, would even now like to use détente in their own egoistic interests, nor even those who until now have opposed these changes, who hope to reverse achievements in the field of political détente, to hinder or to halt entirely the incipient process of lessening the threat of a new global war. Attacks against détente are now being mounted on the pretext of defending it against the "Soviet threat".

Paradoxically, talk about the "aggressiveness" of the Soviet Union, which was used for many years to justify the cold war, has by no means ceased today. One has the impression that such talks are persistently encouraged by all the opponents of détente and that some responsible figures in the West give them a certain amount of weight.

Moreover, talks of the "Soviet military threat" have in recent years turned into a kind of political conception. Thus, in August 1980 (paradoxically, this happened on the 35th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima), the USA proclaimed a new nuclear strategy that oriented the US foreign policy toward a preventive strike against the military and other objectives in the USSR vital for its security.

A distinctive feature of the present recurring "rebirth" of anti-Soviet sentiment is that all the traditionally known elements which for so long have made up the propaganda strategy of all schools and trends of anti-communism are subor-

dinated to the thesis of the "growing Soviet military threat to peace".. Properly speaking, the "proofs" boil down to the following set of assertions.

It is alleged that the Soviet Union is trying in every way to upset parity, the balance of military forces established on the world scene. In other words, a desire is attributed to the Soviet Union to achieve substantial superiority over the West by increasing its own armaments and then to permanently consolidate this superiority.

It is alleged that the Soviet Union is intensifying its military activities all along the line. In other words, there is an attempt to prove that the USSR is expanding the zones of its military-political presence in the world.

It is alleged that the Soviet Union is using its military might as an instrument for acquiring some new spheres of political influence. In other words, a picture is presented of the Soviet Union striving to conduct its policies "from a position of strength", by using its armed forces to exert military-political pressure on the West, on China, and even on its allies.

It is alleged that the USSR, as a "superpower", is striving to consolidate the division of the world into opposing military-political groupings. In other words, there is an attempt to present Soviet foreign policy as the traditional approach of a great power in the international arena, and the Soviet Union as a convinced proponent and practitioner of bloc politics.

It is alleged, finally, that the Soviet Union, since

it has as its goal the building of a communist society, harbors plans for world domination. In other words, that the USSR is striving to "export revolution" and therefore is constantly increasing its military potential, with the help of which it intends to realize its "expansionist" plans.

The bitterness and single-mindedness of the new anti-Soviet propaganda campaign confirms indirectly but quite convincingly how deeply rooted the processes of political détente have become and how closely these processes are connected with the constructive foreign policy line of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. At the same time, international events of the late 1970s clearly confirm what great opportunities the opponents of peace still have at their disposal to try if not to ruin, then at least to substantially hold back or undermine, détente. They are also obviously trying to mount a counterattack in all directions, to change the correlation of world forces in their favor.

First of all, an attempt is being made to block all disarmament negotiations, to undermine the world strategic balance and to restore the former military superiority of the United States and the West as a whole in relation to the USSR and its socialist allies by stepping up the arms race, primarily within the framework of NATO.

Second, the United States has declared entire regions of the world the sphere of its "vital interests" and claims the right to directly and brazenly interfere in the internal affairs of many countries.

Third, contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, the USA and several of its allies have adopted the course of unilaterally curtailing economic, trade, and cultural cooperation with countries which pursue a domestic or foreign policy "displeasing" to the USA.

Fourth, great importance is attached to the possibility of playing the so-called China card. Washington, for example, would like to make Peking its accomplice – not only on the tactical, but also on the strategic level. The USA's decisions to offer China the most-favored-nation status (and its refusal to offer it to the Soviet Union), to sell it several types of strategic goods, to assist in its rearmament, as well as the growth of American-Chinese political, diplomatic, and military contacts, which have taken on a clearly anti-Soviet tone, are all signs of the creation of an informal American-Chinese alliance.

Fifth, the United States is trying in all ways to sow discord between the Soviet Union and the developing countries, and thereby to undermine the position of socialist-oriented countries, to cause a split in the non-aligned movement, to split the ranks of the democratic, progressive, anti-war, and liberation movements, and to weaken the cohesion and unity of action of the international communist movement.

Sixth, there is an attempt in the West to justify the counterattack on détente by alleging that the Soviet Union and other socialist states are using détente for their own "insidious" ends, that they

are supposedly guilty of exacerbating international tensions, that socialism is "aggressive" by its very nature, and that the Soviet Union, as an "ordinary great power", and the socialist community, "as an ordinary military bloc", are harboring plans for attaining world hegemony.

Seventh and last, the political counterattack is accompanied by well coordinated ideological counterattacks. The aim is to change people's notion of what existing socialism is by unleashing various kinds of propaganda campaigns against it in the spirit of "psychological warfare" and thereby discredit the goals and ideals for which Communists are struggling throughout the world.

The development of events in the 1980s will be determined by the confrontation between *two tendencies* in the world, *that* to secure political détente, to check the arms race, to achieve real progress in the sphere of disarmament, and *that* to oppose all of these processes. This makes it possible to step up the arms race, which can again hurl the world back to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. Here a great deal, if not all, will depend on the energy, resolution, and consistency of all who supported and still support the first tendency.

How will the Soviet Union act, what line will it follow in the next decade? The leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state have answered this question a number of times in their official statements and documents. In particular, it has been formulated concisely, fully, and exhaustively in one of the speeches of L. I. Brezhnev.

"In essence, there is not a country or a people in the world with which the Soviet Union would not like to have good relations;

"there is no pressing international problem to the solution of which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to contribute;

"there is no seat of military danger in whose elimination by peaceful means the Soviet Union would not be interested;

"there is no type of armament, first of all, weapons of mass destruction, which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or prohibit on a mutual basis, by agreement with other states, and then remove from its arsenals.

"The Soviet Union will always be an active participant in any negotiations, any international action aimed at the development of peaceful cooperation and strengthening the security of peoples.

"We believe, we firmly believe that realism in politics and the desire for détente and progress will, in the final analysis, take the upper hand, and that mankind will be able to enter the twenty-first century under conditions of peace, more secure than it has ever been in the past. And we will do everything that depends on us for this to be realized." [1]

This is the best answer to all possible fabrications about "the Soviet threat", about "Soviet

[1] L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1978, p. 657 (in Russian).

expansionism", about the "aggressiveness" of the Soviet Union, and so forth. This course is not explained by *ad hoc* considerations and therefore does not depend on fluctuations, no matter what they might be, in the state of affairs. It creatively develops and applies to the complex international conditions of the late 20th century the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy which originated together with the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia and which were laid down by Lenin over sixty years ago.

SOURCES AND PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET PEACE POLICY

History has demonstrated more than once that a change of epochs has always been reflected on the political maps of the world: some states have disappeared while others have arisen, borders have been erased and new ones drawn, some names have died and others have been born. The sixty odd years since the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia have witnessed, one might say, an unprecedentedly rapid, truly headlong obsolescence of the political map. The Russian Revolution ushered in a fundamentally new stage in human history – a stage when working people came to power, first in one country and then, years later, in several other states. The very nature of the radical social changes begun by the Revolution also predetermined extremely profound qualitative shifts in the international arena.

The working class of Russia, having set about under the leadership of the Leninist Communist Party to build a new, socialist society, at the same time entered the arena of history, to use a fine

expression of Karl Marx, "no longer as servile retainers, but as independent actors, conscious of their own responsibility, and able to command peace where their would-be masters shout war".[1] This was truly a revolutionary turning-point in history, for it marked the end of the imperialist powers' boundless domination in international affairs.

The foundations of the Soviet Union's foreign policy – a *socialist* foreign policy – were laid by Lenin, who not only formulated its basic, general directions, but guided – as the first head of state – the international activities of Soviet Russia during the first few years after the Revolution. The annulment of all unequal treaties of tsarist Russia; the unconditional rejection of secret diplomacy in favor of open and public diplomacy; a resolute call for peace and just as resolute recognition of the need to build dependable defenses for the revolutionary achievements against all encroachments of the worldwide bourgeoisie on the sovereignty and integrity of socialist Russia; firm and unconditional support of liberation movements – these were the hallmarks of Lenin's foreign policy at the dawn of the Soviet state. Properly speaking, they remain integral elements of the international activity of the USSR to this day.

This was conditioned by the fact that, in Lenin's words, "the economic positions of the classes which

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[1] Karl Marx, "Address to the National Labour Union of the United States", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 2, p. 157.

rule our state lie at the root of both our home and foreign policy".[1] The ruling classes of a socialist society do not have and cannot have any other interests and goals than the creation of a new order without the exploitation of man by man, an order capable of satisfying all the material and spiritual needs of working people. It is clear that from the angle of foreign policy, this requires, first of all, guaranteed peace and security. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union's entire international activity has for over sixty years unfailingly been aimed at accomplishing the main task formulated by Lenin: "the creation of a socialist society" and ensuring "an enduring, just peace between the peoples".[2]

In its first decree – the Decree on Peace – the Soviet Republic proclaimed its central objective in foreign policy to be the struggle for a just and durable peace, for ridding humanity of the nightmare of senseless predatory wars, whose source is imperialism and its aggressive, anti-popular policies. Neither in those far-off years, when the Soviet land was unbelievably ravaged, nor at present, when the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community have been transformed into a power-

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "Report on Foreign Policy Delivered at a Joint Meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet. May 14, 1918", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 365.

[2] V. I. Lenin, "Extraordinary Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, March 14-16, 1918", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 201.

ful economic, military, and political force, has this course been a sign of weakness or fear of confrontation with the world bourgeoisie, or a tactical trick or accommodation to the state of affairs.

The history of the Soviet Union fully bears this out. Once backward Russia has today become a highly developed socialist state. But how much richer might it have been, how much farther might the Soviet people have advanced along the path to communism but for the wars thrust upon it. Suffice it to recall the fight against the armies of the interventionists and the domestic bourgeoisie after the victory of the October Revolution, and then nazi Germany's attack in 1941. Wars in which the Soviet land lost millions of people. Wars which caused colossal material damage.

And there is one more very important, perhaps even decisive circumstance. All these wars were begun by the capitalists who wanted to strangle the first socialist country by force of arms. They didn't succeed in doing this, although they were able temporarily to hinder and complicate the development of socialist society. After all, in the not so very long history of the USSR – barely more than sixty years – for every year and a half of peaceful construction there has been a year of war or of recovery from the destruction of war.

Lenin never tired of stressing that a socialist revolution should be able to defend itself from external enemies. And it is an obvious fact that they tried to destroy the socialist order by force

more than once, and that even today the greatest diehards in the ruling circles of bourgeois society are harboring similar plans. Ideally, socialism needs neither an army nor immense arms expenditures, for by its very nature it is a system which rejects war and aggression. But as long as a real threat of attack from without exists, socialism is compelled to bear the burden of unproductive expenses so as not to be caught unawares, so as to defend what has already been won by the people from encroachments by its enemies.

Imperialist foreign policy has always been (and as international affairs confirm) remains essentially egoistic, self-seeking, cruel, and inhuman. Demagogic calls for peace, hypocritical phrases about the desire to see all peoples free and prosperous, the deceitful language of treaties and agreements with small and weak states, concealing deals profitable for the monopolies at the expense of the working people of foreign countries – all of this is invariably subordinated to one end: to draw peoples apart, to set them against one another, to pursue a policy "from a position of strength", practise blackmail, pressure, and aggression for the sake of enrichment, to capture new markets and sources of raw materials which have become so scarce today, especially fuel.

To this old world, the world of national oppression, national strife, national isolation, the victorious working class of Russia counterposed, as Lenin foresaw even before the October Revolution, "a world of the unity of the working people of all nations, a world in which there is no place

for any privileges or for the slightest degree of oppression of man by man".[1]

Soviet Russia's emergence in the world arena revolutionized the entire system of international relations, ushering in the relations of a totally new type, based on the principles of socialism, that is, as was stated in the Decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of November 13, 1918 on the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, "only those principles which are in keeping with fraternal relations among the working people of all countries and nations".[2]

This new type of relations is characterized by the brotherly, mutually advantageous and equitable ties and cooperation uniting the states of the socialist community.

The new, of course, does not mean a full and categorical negation of everything old. While rejecting the old, imperialist goals of Russia's foreign policy, the discredited, traditionally anti-popular forms of tsarist, great-power diplomacy, the Soviet Union has by no means rejected the defense of the genuinely national, vital interests of the Soviet *peoples*. Lenin, as we know, did not at all doubt the usefulness of diplomatic methods worked out over the centuries, the necessity of observing generally recognized "routine" customs and

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "The Working Class and the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 92.

[2] *Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR*, Vol. I, Gospolitizdat, 1957, p. 566 (in Russian).

norms, etiquette, and so forth. However, socialist foreign policy puts new content even into the old, habitual forms of international activity. Elaborating on Marx's idea, Lenin regarded it primarily as part of the general struggle of victorious revolutionaries for the liberation of workers throughout the world, for the triumph of socialism and communism.

Expressing the fundamental, vital interests of all the citizens of the Soviet Union, the foreign policy of the USSR is therefore directed at the prevention of a new world war, cutting short imperialist aggression, no matter who is its victim, at guaranteeing universal security and the building of a durable, just, democratic peace, at supporting all peoples struggling for their political and economic independence, defending their right to choose their path of development independently, without outside interference. That is why the socialist foreign policy of the USSR is, in essence, profoundly internationalist and contributes to the solution of a central task, as Lenin believed,– the creation of trust "of workers and peasants speaking different languages, without which there absolutely cannot be peaceful relations between peoples or anything like a successful development of everything that is of value in present-day civilisation".[1]

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "Interview Given to Michael Farbman, *Observer* and *Manchester Guardian* Correspondent", *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 386.

An extremely important feature of the Soviet foreign policy is one of its fundamental principles, *the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.*

Lenin demonstrated theoretically the need to develop a socialist country's long-term policy towards capitalist states. As the head of the first socialist government in Russia, he also began to put this policy into practice.

Lenin proclaimed the course of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries during the most difficult years for Soviet Russia. The internal counterrevolution was already defeated, but not yet entirely uprooted. Foreign intervention had been repulsed, but the young republic was surrounded by hostile capitalist states which did not conceal their intention of crushing Bolshevism by force of arms sooner or later, so that the threat of attack from without remained a constant factor to be reckoned with. There was hunger, ruin, and unemployment in the country, and isolation from the rest of the world. The times required a maximum of caution and endurance, so as not to succumb to provocation and in order to start the socialist transformation of society, to make Russia into a strong, powerful state, capable of withstanding any imperialist onslaught.

Emerging victorious from the extremely difficult, bloody struggle with internal counterrevolution and imperialist intervention, Soviet Russia won conditions which, as Lenin noted, allowed it to exist *alongside* capitalist powers. In other words, it

won the right to *independent* existence.[1] The times, the interests of socialism, and concern for the working people's welfare urgently required at the time, as Lenin wrote, to "make the swiftest, most intense and all possible economic use of the capitalist West" for the development of the socialist economy, to make trade with the capitalist states the Soviet country's "economic foundation right away".[2]

Lenin's principles of Soviet Russia's peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world became the foundation of the socialist states' foreign policy with regard to states with a different social system. This course has never had and does not now have, as enemies of communism charged even back in Lenin's time, anything in common with capitulation in the face of difficulties, with surrendering one's position, with retreat, with attempts to "appease" the imperialist aggressor or to "reach an understanding" with him. On the contrary, the policy of peaceful coexistence was and remains the only effective way of preserving universal peace in our day and developing fruitful, equitable cooperation in the world.

And, although at the beginning of the 1920s

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "Our Foreign and Domestic Position and the Tasks of the Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 412.

[2] V. I. Lenin, "To the Comrades Communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan, and the Mountaineer Republic", *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, pp. 317, 318.

many bourgeois governments did not wish to "sit at the same table with the Soviets" the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems was persistently asserting itself. This had immense significance not only for the Soviet people, who in this way were given an opportunity of taking advantage of, as Lenin said, "something much more significant" than a mere breathing-space for peaceful construction. It also had a very healthy influence on the world political climate as a whole, helping to win over "to our policy of peace", as Lenin already noted at the end of 1920, "a steadily increasing number of states which are undoubtedly hostile towards the Soviets".[1]

While he formulated the policy of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, Lenin also used to stress that Soviet Russia would not allow anyone to dictate any terms to it, that it would not budge an inch from the communist principles lying at the base of its internal revolutionary transformations. Conversing with the American correspondent Lincoln Eyre six decades ago, the leader of the Soviet state resolutely declared: "All the world knows that we are prepared to make peace on terms the fairness of which even the most imperialistic capitalists could not dispute. We have reiterated and reiterated our desire for peace, our need for peace.... But we do not pro-

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "The Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 488.

pose to be strangled to death for the sake of peace." [1]

That is why, while devoting so much attention to establishing peaceful relations between the young Soviet republic and capitalist states, Lenin called for vigilance, for a sober assessment, as he often said, of the mad rages of the bourgeoisie. He regarded peaceful coexistence as a specific, peaceful form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism on an international scale, a form responding to the fundamental interests of the working people, and the interests of the security and social progress of all peoples.

The vitality and effectiveness of Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems have been tested for over sixty years by the Soviet Union's practical experience on the international scene and, after the Second World War, by the experience of other socialist countries and many peace-loving governments which in no way share the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. At present this course is meeting growing understanding and support in many non-socialist countries, which are actively coming out against the aggressive policies of the imperialist powers, against the threat of a new world war, and for stopping the race of both nuclear and other arms, for the establishment of a durable and reliable system of security in all regions of the globe, for the development

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "Interview with Lincoln Eyre, Correspondent of the American Newspaper *The World*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 177.

of friendly, mutually advantageous, good-neighborly relations among all countries and peoples.

And this is quite natural. The policy of peaceful coexistence responded and continues to respond to the needs of our time, to the opportunities which the scientific and technical revolution opens to humanity, to the tendency towards internationalization of the world economy, to a closer economic interdependence of different countries, to cooperative efforts in solving important problems in the fields of energy, transportation and raw materials, to the improvement of various forms of communication and transmission of information, etc. Imperialism seeks exclusive economic associations. It practises discrimination in trade and business. Rather than narrow the gap between the developing countries and the former colonial powers, it works to widen it. Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence, on the other hand, is focussed on creating conditions that expedite social and economic progress all over the world.

It would be relevant to recall in this context that one of the points – the sixth – of the Soviet Peace Program, formulated at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971, proclaims the desire of the USSR to extend mutually advantageous cooperation in all fields with states who, for their part, are also striving for this. The USSR, the Soviet Peace Program stresses, "is prepared to participate together with the other states concerned in settling problems like the conservation of the environment, development of power and other natural resources, development of transport and

communications, prevention and eradication of the most dangerous and widespread diseases, and the exploration and development of outer space and the world ocean".[1]

The very concept of "peaceful coexistence" implies that the goal of such a policy cannot be achieved through the efforts of only one state. This is a process, and a two-sided one, assuming the mutual readiness of countries with different social systems not simply to refrain from fighting one another, but also to recognize negotiations as the only way to solve controversial issues, to reject a policy of provocations and aggression, to establish and develop equitable, mutually advantageous cooperation in the economy, science and technology, culture, and politics. The course of peaceful coexistence requires that states and governments strictly observe the principles of sovereignty, equal rights, the territorial integrity of every country, large or small, respect for their sovereign right to freely choose their own socio-economic and political system; it excludes interference in the internal affairs of other peoples.

It is clear therefore that the principle of peaceful coexistence cannot triumph without a struggle against the unwillingness of the most reactionary, aggressive imperialist circles to give up their policies which threaten universal peace. Through the combined efforts of socialist and other peace-loving states, and with the support of the broad anti-im-

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[1] L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 357.

perialist movement, this principle can and should be imposed on those who attempt to subordinate peoples and states to the interests of monopoly capital, using economic and political blackmail, as well as arms, for the purpose. This, in essence, is how Lenin put the question, and this is also how current leaders of the Soviet state put it.

It goes without saying that the policy of peaceful coexistence does not mean either ideological compromise or "guarantees" of class peace within capitalist countries, nor reconciliation or "harmony" in the relations between aggressors and their victims. According to Lenin's concept, it does not and cannot go against the right of oppressed peoples to struggle for their liberation; moreover, it demands that the socialist state display its solidarity with this struggle in practice, for peaceful coexistence concerns only and exclusively interstate relations. This means that disagreements and conflicts *among states* should not be resolved through arms but through negotiations. This does not at all mean, however, that peaceful coexistence can (much less should) somehow regulate the class struggle in individual countries or repeal the laws of this struggle internationally.

The Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence is thus in fact a mighty barrier to the imperialists' plans to solve their internal contradictions by exacerbating international tensions and creating military hotbeds of war. This policy, therefore, cannot be regarded as a means of preserving the social and political status-quo; on the contrary, it creates favorable conditions for the peaceful development

of all humanity along the path of democracy and social progress.

In the 1920s and 1930s, when the Soviet Union was the only country that actively and consistently struggled for the triumph of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, the alignment of world forces was only just beginning to change – gradually, slowly, almost imperceptibly. But even under those immeasurably more complex and totally unfavorable conditions, this course bore remarkable fruit, in many respects determining the outcome of the Second World War unleashed by German fascism.

In those years the Soviet Union not only took all possible measures to prevent war, but also persistently came out for disarmament, for the creation and guarantee of a reliable system of security in Europe, and tirelessly proposed that the bourgeois-democratic governments of the West join efforts to counter the threat of nazi aggression. The blind anti-communism of the ruling circles of several capitalist states prompted them to reject cooperation with the Soviet Union. For millions of people this short-sighted policy ended in tragedy.

Now that the alignment of forces in the world has changed radically, when it favors more and more the socialist community and other democratic and peace-loving states and forces, the struggle for the triumph of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems opens a real possibility of preventing a third world war. While striving for this noble

goal and for a radical improvement of the entire international climate, the Soviet Union is not, however, weakening its vigilance, since it is concerned about constantly maintaining its defensive armed forces at the necessary level. Lenin taught us this, pointing out that we must not "underestimate the danger and ... deny the possibility of future military intervention by the capitalist countries".[1]

The foundations of the Soviet foreign policy, its principles, formulated by Lenin, its guidelines set and tested by him, have remained the unaltered basis, principles and general directions of the Soviet Union's international course for sixty odd years now. In 1977, when a new Constitution was being drafted in the Soviet Union, it was proposed for the first time that a special chapter on foreign policy be included in it. Article 28 gives the following characterization of the Leninist policy of peace:

"The USSR steadfastly pursues a Leninist policy of peace and stands for strengthening of the security of nations and broad international cooperation.

"The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring international conditions favourable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Our Foreign and Domestic Position and the Tasks of the Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 412.

social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

"In the USSR war propaganda is banned."

There is apparently no need to especially stress the significance of this fact: it speaks for itself. The point is that now the goals already proclaimed by Lenin, which the Soviet Union has striven and is still striving to attain on the world scene, cannot be treated – either in the Soviet Union or elsewhere – as a declaration or merely a solemn statement of intentions. From now on the Soviet government is obliged to *realize these goals unswervingly and consistently through legislative measures*. This confirms the faithfulness of the Soviet foreign policy to the principles laid down by Lenin. It shows the consistency, continuity, and stability of this policy, which in its turn served and continues to serve as an important factor in maintaining stability in international relations in general.

Here I would like to draw the readers' attention to a fact which is disregarded by some Western commentators who thus fall into error. When we speak of the immutability, continuity or consistency of Soviet foreign policy, we mean precisely this, and not a dogmatic adherence to some particular formulas, some particular devices or methods, some particular practical solutions or proposals called for by specific international developments. It would be fruitless and, to put it mildly, not very becoming (or, more frankly

speaking, even indecent) to drag to light one of the literally hundreds of Soviet disarmament proposals made, say, twenty years ago, and try to compare it with current Soviet initiatives in an attempt to find some "contradictions" in Soviet policy.

None other than the founder of the Soviet state, Lenin, provided brilliant examples, both in theory and in practice, of the creative, rational, and constructive application of the underlying principles of socialist foreign policy to actual situations. For example, he never tired of calling for the conclusion of the "obscene" Brest Peace Treaty in 1918, when Soviet Russia's position was critical. He demonstrated the need to become "defencists" when Soviet Russia found itself encircled by imperialist states who launched an intervention against it. He persistently strove for the establishment of diplomatic relations with capitalist states but refused to enter into them with those states that attempted to impose their will on Soviet Russia. He demanded the beginning of disarmament negotiations and strove for the establishment and maintenance of "peaceful coexistence" with capitalist governments on a long-term and stable basis.

Under Lenin, Soviet Russia had to expend very great efforts on war, on warding off armed attempts – both domestic and foreign – to restore capitalism in the country. If one reads Lenin's works and documents of the time, one is struck not only by reflections on war, on how to defend the country from external attacks in the best and most effective way, but also by the fact that works

devoted to wholly peaceful, political and economic problems literally abound in military terminology. The time demanded it. But it was Lenin who was, perhaps, the most passionate opponent of war, of armed conflicts, in which it is the workers and peasants who suffer most of all. As a faithful and consistent proponent of the teachings of Marx and Engels, he opposed war, which "is corrupting people both in the rear and at the front; people who are working on war supplies are paid far above the rates, and this attracts all those who hid themselves to keep out of the war, the vagabond and semi-vagabond elements who are imbued with one desire, to 'grab' something and clear out".[1]

Lenin's policy of peace defines the essence, the spirit of Soviet foreign policy today as well. The immutability of Soviet foreign policy does not mean a slavish following of models established once and for all, but a vital, creative, and strict application of Leninist principles to accomplishing whatever tasks life puts forward – each time in a new way – on the international scene.

In our day three fundamental circumstances determine the approach to any practical problem in world politics: first of all, the confrontation of the two systems – imperialism and socialism – remains the pivot and main theme of current international relations; second, we are living in a nucle-

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, January 10–18 (23-31), 1918", *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 468.

ar age, i.e., under conditions in which the few states possessing weapons of mass destruction are capable, if they put them to use, of wreaking a monstrous catastrophe on mankind; third and last, military-strategic balance, parity between the two opposing blocs, has been achieved, which means that any attempt (no matter what its origin) to achieve superiority may so exacerbate the international situation that it would be difficult or completely impossible to control, and could bring about a global crisis and nuclear conflict.

It is precisely for this reason, L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, stressed that "the CPSU has always assumed, and still assumes, that the class struggle between the two systems – the capitalist and the socialist – in the economic and political, and also, of course, the ideological domains, will continue. That is to be expected since the world outlook and the class aims of socialism and capitalism are opposite and irreconcilable. But we shall strive to shift this historically inevitable struggle onto a path free from the perils of war, of dangerous conflicts and an uncontrolled arms race. This will be a tremendous gain for world peace, for the interests of all peoples, of all states".[1]

This is the point of departure of Soviet foreign policy in our day. In the 1970s it determined the Soviet Union's approach to all basic international issues, and will continue to determine it in the future.

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[1] L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 94-95.

THE SOVIET CONCEPTION OF DISARMAMENT

The assertion has been repeated any number of times, even if we consider only the most recent period, that the shortest and most logical path to peace lies through disarmament. Attempts to take the first step on this path have also been made more than once, but the fact remains that arms have been continuing to pile up for hundreds of years now, and humanity today, in the late 20th century, is only just preparing to set out on the road to a world without arms, a world without war.

The situation seems paradoxical only at first glance, for nothing is easier than to provide oneself with arms and nothing is more complicated than to give them up. This is the bitter lesson man has learned from a past so rich in bloody conflicts. Arms have become a symbol of reliability and security, while their inadequate supply, not to mention their absence, has become a sign of weakness and impotence.

Only the revolutionary workers' movement, the Communists, began for the first time, in fact, to

speak of disarmament not as a beautiful but unattainable dream, but as a realistic and feasible goal, associated with a radical transformation of society, with the coming to power of the working people. Lenin said even before the Russian Revolution that "disarmament is the ideal of socialism", and added: "There will be no wars in socialist society; consequently, disarmament will be achieved." [1]

There is no contradiction in that right after the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia, i.e., the victory of revolution in *one* country, the struggle for disarmament was proclaimed as a *practical* task in the foreign policy of the socialist state. And it was not only proclaimed: literally from its earliest days, Soviet Russia began to act, arousing other states to join forces to accomplish it. It is indicative that at the Genoa Conference in 1922, representatives of the new Russia already submitted a proposal for universal arms reduction; that in the same year, 1922, the first disarmament conference in history took place in Moscow (the participants were the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic [RSFSR], Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland), at which the Soviet delegation tabled a draft for reducing the participating countries' armies by three-fourths in one-and-a-half to two years; that at the beginning of the 1930s (1932-1934), at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the USSR put forth a concrete plan for universal arms reduction.

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "The 'Disarmament' Slogan", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 95.

It would be hardly possible here to present a list of all the disarmament initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union during its more than sixty-year history. The list would be very long, for the USSR has constantly put forth both general and specific proposals. They would have to be numbered, it seems, not in the tens, but in the hundreds. But the main point is not the number, of course, but the interest in getting disarmament moving which has distinguished the Soviet Union's approach to this problem. Virtually until the late 1950s and early 1960s, the USSR did not encounter such interest among its Western partners. This, properly speaking, is eloquent commentary on the fact that until that time no substantial progress was achieved in such an important area.

The history of disarmament negotiations provides an excellent illustration of two directly opposed approaches to this problem, whose origin is the fundamental difference between the socialist and capitalist social systems; this is such an obvious fact that many recognize it even in the West. The point is that in socialist countries there are not and cannot be classes, groups, and people who gain from the arms race, and that, on the contrary, such classes, groups, and people do exist in capitalist countries.

Here, for example, is the testimony of the highly authoritative US newspaper, *The Christian Science Monitor*, one not at all "infected", as they say, by communist propaganda. In the United States, it wrote, there exist politically influential circles which "have their special reasons for opposing any

transactions of any kind with the Soviet Union which might improve or ease the relationship between Washington and Moscow. If that relationship is strained, their interests flourish. If that relationship becomes easier, their interests languish." And later the newspaper added that it is precisely the defense industry which "instinctively and inevitably ... nourishes the doctrine of Soviet hostility".[1]

In the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries there are armies, there are military staffs, there is a defense industry, but there is not the social stratum, very influential militarily and politically, which in the USA and in general in the West is known as the military-industrial complex. Here lies the essential difference defining the positions, say, of the USSR and the USA on disarmament matters.

"In the Soviet Union we have neither classes nor social strata nor professional groups which would be interested in war or in preparations for it, who would count on getting rich on it," said L. I. Brezhnev. "Of course we have military plants, an army – but the heads of these plants, army officers, workers, soldiers, do not connect their personal well-being with war and military orders. We would very much want to switch the military plants – for the immense benefit of all of society – over to the manufacture of peace-time products, to peaceful, constructive purposes".[2]

[1] *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 26, 1979.

[2] L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State*, p. 723.

The many Soviet proposals, which in their totality represent an integral program for curbing the arms race, a shift to arms reduction and disarmament, can serve to confirm the justice of these words, the Soviet Union's sincere striving to achieve real progress in the sphere of disarmament. In working out its proposals, the USSR strives, of course, to give the utmost consideration to national and state interests, the necessity for a firm guarantee of the security of the USSR and its allies. At the same time, any one of the Soviet proposals or all of them taken together are based upon a sober account of the lawful rights and interests of all states and peoples, and aim at guaranteeing universal peace and security.

What are the basic elements of the Soviet conception of disarmament?

First of all, and this should be particularly stressed, the struggle to end the arms race is the pivot of the Soviet Union's entire international policy. The explanation is simple: disarmament is, on the one hand, an instrument for guaranteeing a durable peace throughout the world, and on the other, an important, decisive condition for rapid achievement of internal political goals and accelerating the rate of peaceful communist construction. That is why the Soviet Union is always ready not only to conduct business-like negotiations on all disarmament issues, but also to bring them to a conclusion, i.e., to achieve real results.

The Soviet Union therefore lays special emphasis on practical measures to end the arms race and puts forward initiatives which are realistic

and realizable. At the same time, the Soviet Union takes into account, of course, that reaching agreements on such complex and exceptionally delicate matters requires patience, a careful study of the agreements' conditions and consequences, and certain compromises to be reached in the course of negotiations.

Here, incidentally, I would like to make a small digression. Sometimes people say: yes, back before the Second World War, in the 1930s, and in the cold war period, in the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet Union advanced many disarmament proposals, but did this make any sense? After all, not one of them could be accepted at the time: distrust of the USSR was too strong, the country itself was too weak and the alignment of forces, military forces included, did not at all favor the USSR and the socialist community.

All of this is so. Already before the war, and to an even greater extent after it, the USSR set forth, in essence, a coherent, consistent program whose realization could have led long ago to détente and to a sharp decline in the threat of thermonuclear war. Here we may recall that back in 1946 the USSR proposed a ban on the production and use of mass destruction nuclear weapons. During the cold war years, the USSR made an entire complex of proposals (from banning atomic weapons to calling for a world conference on general arms reduction, the creation of atom-free zones, ending nuclear tests, reducing military budgets, and so on). In the 1950s, the USSR three times (*sic!*) unilaterally reduced the size of its armed forces, and

in 1958, also unilaterally, stopped its nuclear tests in the atmosphere (five years before conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on Banning Nuclear Tests in the Three Environments).

At the time these actions did not produce any real result, at least immediately and directly. But they did play a very important role: they fertilized the ground, as it were, exerting an immense influence on public opinion. They were also significant in another respect: the Soviet Union drafted well considered solutions to a majority of issues, or, to be more exact, to all disarmament issues on which negotiations later began. And this made matters substantially easier.

Disarmament is too difficult a problem, politically, psychologically and practically, and very thorough preparation is therefore needed for its solution. Without this, without work on future prospects, things will not get moving. That is why the present forward-looking proposals of the USSR are not utopian or propagandistic, but an attempt to help achieve progress as quickly as possible in the field of disarmament.

Secondly, the programs of concrete measures for ending the arms race and for disarmament worked out and advanced by the Soviet Union are all-embracing and comprehensive in character. What does this mean? The point is that there are no disarmament issues on which the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community would not be willing to advance constructive, clear-cut and realistic initiatives.

The Soviet Union, as has been stressed more

than once in its official statements, and as is written down in the Soviet Constitution, proceeds from the need to achieve universal and complete disarmament under effective international control as the final goal on the long and thorny path of ending the arms race and securing military détente. It is clear, however, that today it is just that – a *final* goal. Not only is its immediate attainment impossible, but simply the very setting of *such* a task might only hinder the gradual advance towards it. After all, achieving universal and complete disarmament requires not only great, one might say large-scale, preparatory work. It undoubtedly requires serious "undertakings" in the field of détente (political and military), and growing trust among states. That is why the USSR now attaches such great importance to various partial measures, whose realization would at first permit the limitation, and then a complete cessation of the arms race.

It is important, however, to note one fundamentally essential factor. When putting forth such proposals, the USSR unfailingly strives to subordinate them to the main, final goal – that is, universal and complete disarmament. From the Soviet point of view, only such an approach is fruitful, rational, and expedient. To separate solutions of particular questions from a solution to the principal issue – at least in the long run – is essentially tantamount to superficial cosmetics of the arms race. Conversely, a gradual, step by step, systematic implementation of particular measures (of which there should be more and more, and which should embrace an

ever larger circle of problems connected with the limitation and elimination of the arms race) will finally permit the achievement of universal and complete disarmament.

In other words, the Soviet Union regards all concrete steps as having independent significance for military détente, and as a measure which facilitates the advance to the final goal – universal and complete disarmament. The USSR does not therefore advocate "linking" all such issues in a single bundle: such "linking" can complicate the regulation of already complex questions to such an extent that in practice it will prevent a solution to any of them.

Thirdly, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, any concrete measures on controlling the arms race and on disarmament should in all their aspects and at all times follow the principle of not damaging the security of any of the sides participating in the agreement. The Soviet Union attaches fundamental importance to the principle of equality and equal security, and a rejection of attempts to gain unilateral advantages. This is the most effective guarantee that any agreement, if based precisely on this principle, will prove to be equally advantageous to all participants; at the same time, only such an agreement will help preserve parity, a balance of forces, but at a lower level than now. Obviously, what has been said also applies to agreements on limiting strategic arms, the most dangerous type of modern armed forces.

In this connection, it is necessary to make an immediate reservation: the doctrine of the

"balance of terror" or "mutual deterrence" has nothing in common with the conception of equal security: on the contrary, they directly negate one another.

Any attempt to build peace on a balance of terror will increase global thermonuclear risk. After all, the balance of terror, mutual deterrence, are effective only when the military potential of both sides is rising, that is, when new systems and ever more dangerous destructive arms continue to be stockpiled under the pretext of "perfecting the means of mutual containment". Such an approach to security is patently absurd. It is also patently clear that there can be no lasting peace on the balance of terror principle, for it presupposes the constant rivalry of both sides in their attempts either to gain military superiority over a likely enemy or not to allow each other to gain the lead.

This, incidentally, is a clear illustration of the paradoxical nature of the race for modern weapons of mass destruction. The point is that now, in essence, it has become *disadvantageous* to attempt to achieve military superiority over a potential enemy, for any such attempt will inevitably evoke a corresponding reaction, which means it would step up the arms race, that is, would increase still more the risk of nuclear catastrophe and, as a result, *would in the final count weaken the security of both sides.*

Characteristically, in recent years this has become better understood in the West as well. Speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1979, US Secretary of State Cyrus

Vance stated that the USA was in a position "to achieve effective deterrence and essential equivalence at any level that unlimited competition brings about. But the higher the level, the greater the sacrifice from our own citizens and with less assurance of achieving these objectives".

The sooner the awareness of this reality of the nuclear age is embodied in actual policies, the more quickly the world will be able to go ahead with reducing the level of military danger, armed forces and armaments, while retaining their existing balance, in other words, acting on the principles of equal, aquivalent security and not causing damage to either side.

Fourthly, the USSR consistently supports combining disarmament measures with the establishment of strict international control over their implementation. It is not a question of whether or not the Soviet Union wishes to believe the promises of its partners. The bitter experience of armed interventions and aggressive wars against the Soviet state, the breach of solemn commitments, the application of the "policy from a position of strength" against the USSR – all this is a reminder that it is impossible to come to agreements directly affecting the material basis of the country's security without at the same time establishing measures for strict control over their implementation by the partners in the agreement. For all that, it goes without saying that the Soviet Union is opposed to control turning into an independent, self-contained measure that would have little or no connection with disarmament. This is why

the control system should unfailingly correspond to the volume, character, and specific features of the disarmament measures it is meant to check. In this case the control will fulfil another and no less important function as well: it will further deepen the mutual trust among states and strengthen their desire to continue along the road of disarmament.

Fifth and last, the USSR regards disarmament as a task in which all humanity has a stake and which can only be accomplished by the joint, coordinated efforts of all states. The Soviet Union considers therefore that one of the most important conditions for progress towards disarmament is the participation in negotiations and agreements of a maximally broad circle of countries, first and foremost nuclear powers, and also those possessing the most formidable armed forces. It makes sense that to achieve full success in containing the nuclear arms race, in reducing and eliminating all arms, the participation of *all* the nuclear powers is essential. The adherence by *all* states to international agreements already in force in this field could serve as a condition for further progress in curbing the arms race.

This conception, forming the basis of the Soviet disarmament position, is clear and constructive. Essentially, it is close to Leo Tolstoy's reflections one hundred and twenty-five years ago on the bastions of besieged Sevastopol (which, as the reader recalls, is where we began our story): the gradual reduction, figuratively speaking, "one soldier apiece", of military potentials, presuming that they, as Leo Tolstoy expressed it, are "of equal

strength and that quantity would be replaced by quality".

The first attempts, as yet quite modest, to apply these principles to the solution of certain issues connected with curbing the arms race, on the whole inspire a faint hope that they might bring considerable success. This is a fact of some importance, all the more so because the development of world events, especially the increasingly complex situation at the end of the 1970s, makes disarmament a problem of prime importance today, the key issue of contemporary international relations.

There are several new and quite alarming circumstances that support such a view. The decisions of the 1978 and 1979 NATO sessions, in particular the adoption of an expensive, long-term program for perfecting and modernizing the Atlantic Bloc arms and for deploying new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, have aggravated the situation, and are one more reminder that political détente and the arms race cannot go on developing indefinitely side by side. Moreover, even at the present time the political and economic consequences of the arms race slow down the rate of détente and deform the processes that it gives rise to.

This is expressed, above all, in the fact that the growing arms race is undermining the already quite unstable trust which began to be established among states in the process of détente. And this in turn is a real hindrance to agreements and understandings that might broaden and deepen détente.

The constant growth of the arms race poisons

the political atmosphere and hampers the improvement of the international climate. As a result, there is a danger that détente can, at best, mark time or even begin to lose ground (the worst possible consequence which, however, it would be naive to entirely discount).

Finally, such a development could produce a feeling that it is senseless to struggle against the arms race and useless to conclude any international agreements on these matters. Such moods can under certain conditions become a factor that would block active opposition to the policy of the foes of détente and disarmament.

In this sense, those who are directing the vociferous propaganda campaign designed to prove that the "Soviet military threat" is the main stumbling block on the path to real disarmament, are performing a disservice to the cause of peace and security. They try various approaches here, but in all such cases invariably resort to lying, juggling and garbling facts.

For example, with feigned horror they attempt to conjure up (citing, it is true, only "their own" and not Soviet sources) the great amounts of Soviet weaponry, its potential, etc. Moreover, they would make people believe that Soviet arms are dangerous for the sole reason that they are Soviet. In such cases the Western press tries to pass over in silence not only authoritative statements made by responsible political figures in Moscow, but even those made by their own spokesmen, such as the highly significant remark by the American president in October 1979 that US military poten-

tial is still better (*sic!*) than the Soviet Union's and that it should be kept that way.

Nobody, of course, denies that the USSR possesses powerful modern arms capable of ensuring its own security as well as that of its friends and allies. However, according to official sources, the quantitative and qualitative level of the Soviet armed forces is determined precisely by such defense purposes. This level also takes into account bitter past experiences and, of course, the geo-strategic position of the USSR, the length of its borders, and the real international situation. The Soviet Union is forced, in particular, to take account of the fact that one of its neighboring states makes territorial claims against it.

Quite frequently the Soviet Union is accused of aggressiveness precisely for its striving to maintain international parity.

Some politicians argue, for example, the importance of preserving the military-strategic parity, a balance of strength; they do not even deny that at this moment such parity is a reality. But at the same time they try to spread panic, feigning "indignation" over the fact that the Soviet navy is allegedly "present" somewhere or other, that it has such-and-such ships, and so on. Such perplexity and indignation is, to put it mildly, dishonest. For several decades already the Soviet Union has been trying to prove that a balance of military power between the two antagonistic military blocs is a shaky and uncertain foundation for a durable and just peace.

But a politician must look at things soberly. The logic here is simple and inexorable: one side must possess everything to prevent the other side from gaining the advantage. This is the logic of an armed world, of the arms race. It is a very costly logic, and very dangerous for the destinies of mankind. It is a monstrous, inhuman logic, and there is only one way to escape it: to achieve radically new solutions to problems of curbing the arms race and of military détente; to replace the arms race by effective reduction of arms and by disarmament. There is no other way out.

Sometimes opponents of détente suggest another, just as worn-out argument. They admit that parity, the balance of strategic forces, exists today, but, they say, the Soviet Union has achieved it by arming at a faster rate than the USA and the West as a whole. Therefore, they conclude, the Soviet Union is to blame for the arms race. Such arguments, however, are refuted by simply comparing them with the actual history of the postwar decades. One can hardly dispute the obvious fact that it was the USA after all that first acquired and used the atom bomb, being so far the *only* country who used it, and for approximately twenty years it was *the first* to develop and produce practically all the latest types and systems of weapons. Throughout those years the Soviet Union had to work to catch up because, as the Russian proverb says, laggers are beaten up, and we did not and do not want to get beaten up. But catching up means covering more quickly the same road which your rival *has already covered.*

Today, when we have achieved balance, we have no intention of disturbing it or of *outstripping* others: after all, efforts to win this nightmarish race for nuclear weapons may only lead to the holocaust. We are "running" at the same rate as our rival, proposing, I repeat, not to increase, but to decrease the rate of the "run". This is the essence of the Soviet disarmament conception discussed above.

By the way, a whole mountain of facts, well known today and virtually having become truisms, demonstrates that every new escalation in the arms race was provoked, not by the Soviet Union, but by the West, and was each time preceded by a hysterical propaganda campaign claiming an increase in the "Soviet threat", the "lag of the West" in the field of military production, the modernization of its own armed forces, etc., I will only recall a few generally known facts.

After the USA exploded two atom bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Soviet Union, which at the time did not possess atomic weapons, proposed renouncing them, that is, renouncing the path of a nuclear arms race. The West rejected this proposal, and the Soviet Union was compelled to develop its own atomic weapons.

In 1949 there arose in the West the North Atlantic Pact, a military bloc of states hostile to the USSR and its socialist allies, which concentrated the military might of the USA and its

partners into a single fist, as it were. Only *six years later*, in 1955, those whom this fist obviously threatened signed an agreement in Warsaw on setting up a defensive alliance to confront the *real danger from the West.*

In the 1950s hysterical hullabaloo was suddenly started in America over the alleged "lag" of the USA behind the USSR in the production of the latest bombers. This served as a pretext for developing powerful strategic B-52 bombers that are still in use. When this was an accomplished fact, there was an official admission that the campaign was based on unfounded, i. e., to put it bluntly, on juggled and fabricated facts.

In the early 1960s, history literally repeated itself, but this time it was a question of a "missile gap" between the USA and the Soviet Union. The USA deployed over a thousand inter-continental strategic missiles, equipped its submarine fleet with missiles, and then again admitted that it was a false alarm.

The same thing occurred in the 1970s with the multiple independently targetable warheads, cruise missiles, the neutron bomb, and the mobile M-X missiles system.

In 1979 an entire propaganda storm burst over the threat which, it was claimed, the Soviet SS-20 missile represented for the West, primarily for West Europeans. One can hardly believe that the authors of this well-orchestrated campaign did not know the basic facts, for example, that the setting up of SS-20 missiles, which, incidentally, began quite a while ago, represented only ordinary

modernization of Soviet defensive weapons. Or that this was undertaken *in response* to similar modernization carried out earlier by NATO. That, finally, the USSR concealed its programs of *responsive* modernization from no one, that they had been known in the West for a long time and had not aroused any special "emotions". Nevertheless, now an attempt has suddenly been made to "justify" the need for placing new American missiles in Western Europe precisely by these actions of the USSR; this means a *qualitative* improvement – no longer just in words but in deeds – of NATO's weapons aimed against the USSR and its allies and a real disturbance of the present balance of forces to the detriment of the Soviet Union, and therefore serves as a stimulus to a new and still more dangerous leap in the arms race.

Such "mistakes" occur almost every time before the USA is preparing to discuss its next military budget. The cost of such "mistakes" is far too great: acceleration of the arms race, and hence a rise in the military potential levels of the opposing sides and an increase in the risk of a thermonuclear conflict.

At times, however, the Soviet Union is accused of aggressiveness, so to say, in the perspective. It is agreed that the Soviet Union does not actually now possess military superiority. But precisely this fact is seen as a threat to the West. The reasoning is as follows: in principle, the Soviet Union can overtake the USA in the arms race in about five years, and therefore as a preventive measure the

Americans should today, well ahead of time, speed up the arms race. Such argumentation, to put it bluntly, does not stand up to criticism.

It is characteristic that in the 1940s, 50s, 60s, and at the present time the Western countries, although they frightened themselves and the whole world with the "Soviet threat" tale they themselves fabricated, nevertheless were in no hurry and are not now in any hurry to conclude agreements with the USSR to decrease the arms race in general and thereby in the Soviet Union.

Let us take a different view of the problem. The Soviet Union has never considered its armed forces as instrument for conducting expansionist policies on the world scene, for it has never pursued such policies. It is not the Soviet Union that proclaims as its goal the attainment of military superiority. On the contrary, it has stated numerous times that it adheres to the principle of equal security and is determined to bring about a decrease in the level of military potentials based on a maintenance of general parity and a balance of military-strategic forces. It is not the Soviet Union which regards its armed forces as a kind of "police", called upon, as it were, to establish "peace and order" throughout the world; it is not the USSR that has formed a "rapid deployment force" for strategic armed interference in any, even the most remote, region of the world. It is not the Soviet Union which advances such military doctrines as, for example, "limited strategic nuclear war" and "local nuclear war". It is not the Soviet Union which allows for

the possibility of a preventive nuclear strike, etc., etc. Taking all this into consideration, it would probably be much more logical to speak not of the "growing Soviet threat", but of the growing anti-Soviet threat.

An ever increasing awareness exists today of the need to limit and finally end the arms race. The UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament, held in 1978, provides important confirmation of this. The Soviet Union took an active part in preparing the session and in discussions held at it; it introduced its proposals on practical ways to end the arms race, which gave an overall view of the Soviet position on disarmament and a concrete program for bringing it about. The Session's concluding document stresses that disarmament has become the most pressing task facing the international community, that all states are obliged to join efforts in the field of disarmament, and that at every stage their goal should be to refrain from damaging security and to maintain their arms and armed forces at the lowest possible level.

This point of view, shared by the overwhelming majority of states, fully corresponds to the Soviet conception of disarmament. The task now, however, is to embody the consensus achieved at the UN General Assembly's Special Session on many essential problems of disarmament in real actions, and the ongoing talks – in concrete results.

For all the complexity of this task, one must not forget that the 1960s, and especially the 1970s, saw

a certain progress achieved in limiting the arms race, although it is quite modest in comparison with the final goal. I have in mind a whole series of treaties and agreements, in particular banning nuclear tests in the three environments, and banning emplacement of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, as well as in outer space. I also have in mind the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction, etc. There was also a whole series of fundamentally important Soviet-American bilateral agreements which have, however, a broader international significance: on the prevention of nuclear war, on measures to decrease the danger of nuclear war, on the prevention of incidents in the open sea and the air space above it, the treaty on the limitation of anti-missile defense systems, and the interim agreement on some measures to limit strategic offensive arms (SALT-1).

All these multilateral and bilateral commitments (and others not mentioned here) represent, on the whole, the first real attempt to lessen and reverse the threat of world war, to get the race for nuclear and other mass destruction weapons under control, and to clear the way for further progress along this road. It is true that not all the measures on which agreement has been reached in the past twenty years have had the effect one might have expected. Suffice it to say that some nuclear powers have not

acceded to the nuclear test ban and non-proliferation treaties, and not all of them have so far taken part in negotiations on various aspects of disarmament. Incidentally, quite a number of such negotiations are being conducted now; a kind of negotiation mechanism has been created, which is already of great significance in itself.

The Soviet-American Vienna summit meeting of June 1979 and its results should undoubtedly occupy a special place in the history of the 1970s and, perhaps, of the postwar period as a whole, first of all because it was crowned with the signing of the SALT-2 Treaty, whose full implementation would without doubt bring about a new stage in controlling the arms race, would open the way to substantial arms reduction and finally to a total end of the production and stockpiling of nuclear arms.

We will not give a detailed description of the Treaty's contents here. It is well known already. I would only like to remind the reader that its significance goes far beyond the bounds of simply guaranteeing the mutual security of the USSR and the USA. This is so, first of all, because it deals precisely with strategic offensive nuclear-missile weaponry and opens the way for the next, larger step on this path. Secondly, its implementation would certainly move the process of disarmament forward in general by providing a stimulus for faster and more constructive progress in all negotiations being conducted at present. Third and last, the general results of the Vienna meeting can have

a favorable effect on the process of political détente as well.

Indeed, in examining the SALT-2 Treaty, it is necessary, first of all, to bear in mind that it goes much farther than the SALT-1 Treaty. It both puts a broader range of weapons under control and provides for a substantial quantitative reduction in the total of strategic weapons, as well as a tangible quantitative limitation in the level of certain types of these weapons. Furthermore, the SALT-2 Treaty puts significant qualitative limits on these arms and bans a number of new types of strategic offensive arms. In this way, from a purely military view, the Treaty creates better conditions for ending the stockpiling of nuclear-missile arsenals and ensuring their effective reduction in both quantity and quality.

No less important, however, is the political aspect of the SALT-2 Treaty and the results of the Vienna meeting as a whole.

Of primary importance in this regard is Article XIV of the Treaty which, in particular, records the commitment of both sides to begin immediately after the Treaty enters into force "active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms". The substance of this statement is that both the USA and the USSR are reaffirming their intention, proclaimed more than once, of progressing consistently along the path of arms limitation, military détente, and disarmament, in a document of obligatory force for their governments.

In other words, the SALT-2 Treaty is called upon and might indeed open the door to real progress in the field of military détente as a whole and thereby help to consolidate political détente.

It is very significant, furthermore, that in Vienna the USSR and the USA made a solemn statement of their political goals and intentions for the coming years in the Joint Soviet-American Communique. Here, it seems to me, three circumstances deserve particular attention.

First of all, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that "an armed world conflict can and must be avoided"; this, as is well known, was and remains the starting point of Soviet foreign policy, which was announced back in 1956 at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. In this connection, it is interesting to recall the words of the former President Carter in his address before a joint session of the Congress on June 18, 1979. Presenting the Treaty which had just been signed the day before in Vienna, he considered it necessary to warn that SALT-2 would not put an end to competition between the two countries, which is based on "fundamentally different visions of human society and human destiny". And as long as that basic difference continues, some degree of tension between the USA and the USSR will remain. However,—and this, I believe, is the most important point—Carter found it necessary to stress that the USA wants such competition to be peaceful.[1]

Secondly, proceeding from this conviction, Wash-

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, July 1979, p. 1.

ington and Moscow declared they would make all efforts to end the arms race and prevent war, i.e., accomplish a task which, as the communique says, is the most important and urgent for mankind at the present time.

Thirdly, "each Side stated that it is not striving and will not strive for military superiority, since that can only result in dangerous instability, generating higher levels of armaments with no benefit to the security of either Side".[1]

Of course, it is difficult to say now, in the early 1980s, whether and to what degree advantage will be taken of the favorable perspectives opened up by this Treaty, as well as by new constructive initiatives of the USSR and its Warsaw Organization allies and by efforts by many political and public leaders to prevent a new escalation of the arms race into which the dangerous plans adopted and worked out by NATO in the late 1970s and early 1980s are pushing mankind. Opportunities exist, and they are real and quite substantial. But at the same time opposition to détente and disarmament has also noticeably increased.

What is needed now are joint practical efforts by many states to end the arms race, as well as broad support for these efforts by worldwide public opinion, which has always served and continues to serve as an important element in creating an atmosphere favorable for détente, both political and military. Time truly does not stand still.

The international situation now is such, as

[1] *New Times*, No. 26, 1979, p. 31.

L. I. Brezhnev stressed in the autumn of 1979, that it demands not common-places about peace and disarmament, but real steps to curb the arms race and strengthen trust among peoples and among states. He added that it is precisely by their concrete actions serving to bring this goal closer that peoples will judge the policies of governments, parties, statesmen and public figures.

This formula expresses the essence of the foreign policy which the Soviet Union intends to pursue in the 1980s. It is also a basic element underlying the Soviet conception of disarmament.

THE SOVIET CONCEPTION OF SECURITY

Strictly speaking, it is impossible, especially in our day, to draw a clear line between the struggle for disarmament and for security. One is unthinkable without the other, and we can even say that they are the two most essential, closely interconnected elements for preserving balance of forces on the world scene, without which it would simply be impossible to imagine a durable and dependable peace corresponding to people's concepts of justice and equality.

It was already said above that in the nuclear age security would be fictitious if based on a "balance of terror" or, even worse, on terror on one side caused by the clear military superiority of the other. It was also said that security presupposes a constant reduction in the level of the opposing military potentials, with a strict maintenance of parity. Security will not, however, be at all stable or complete without implementing a whole series of measures closely connected with ending the arms race and with military détente. In a certain sense it would therefore be logical to

speak of the conception of security in its purely political aspect.

In essence, the tendency to oppose war and build a sound peace, which has always been central to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, attained what was in many ways a new dimension precisely in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, when a transition began from the cold war to détente and cooperation. A qualitatively new situation was gradually taking shape in international relations, wherein destructive tasks (the struggle *against* the cold war, *against* exacerbating tensions, etc.) began increasingly to be supplemented by constructive tasks (the struggle *for* consolidating détente, *for* its materialization, *for* cooperation, etc.). The new situation required a shift in accent and a start to elaborate practical solutions to problems that had earlier remained a far-off, almost unattainable goal.

The *first* and most important element in the Soviet conception of security is undoubtedly the *principle of non-use of force in international relations.*

Characterizing détente as overcoming the cold war in international relations, as a transition to normal, smooth relations among states, L. I. Brezhnev considered it necessary to emphasize: "Détente means a willingness to resolve differences and disputes not by force, by threats or sabre-rattling, but by peaceful means, at the negotiating table." [1] On the contrary, the threat of force, a "position of strength" policy and finally

[1] *New Times*, January 14, 1979, p. 5.

the open use of force (in Korea, in the Middle East, in Vietnam), were the sources and foundation of the cold war, foisted by imperialism on mankind in the late 1940s.

It cannot be said that the principle of non-use of force is new or that it has only recently come into circulation. On the contrary, even back before the Second World War the Soviet Union worked persistently for its inclusion in bilateral and multilateral agreements in which it took part. This principle is also recorded in the United Nations Charter, which proclaimed as one of its goals the prevention and removal of "threats to the peace" and "adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace" (Ch. 1, Art. 1), for which UN members "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with The Purposes of the United Nations" (Ch. 1, Art. 2).

Unfortunately, the postwar decades have shown the disdain with which many countries regard the solemn and unambiguous commitments they have undertaken. In March 1979 a journal as serious as the Paris monthly *Le Monde diplomatique* told of an astonishing, even sensational report by the American Brookings Institute (the report was financed by the US Defense Department). The report, entitled "Force Without War: The American Armed Forces as a Political Instrument", states that from January 1, 1946, through December 31, 1975 its authors discovered 215 instances when the USA

threatened to use its armed forces. This means that during these thirty years the Americans resorted an average of once every two months to this means, condemned by the UN, to achieve their foreign policy goals.

"There is something stupefying in these conclusions," the author of the article in *Le Monde diplomatique* notes. And he is absolutely right, for, as it turns out, US threats of military intervention are much more closely connected with political changes within the country than with real threats to American security.

A particularly dangerous fact cited in the investigation is that in the thirty years the USA resorted 19 times to nuclear threats, i.e., more than once every two years, and four times directly addressed to the Soviet Union. And one more thing to which *Le Monde diplomatique* draws attention: the majority of these 19 incidents occurred when the USA possessed nuclear superiority over the USSR. In other words, it is not difficult to conclude that, as the French magazine writes, "if the United States once again succeeds in gaining the advantage in this regard, it will foster local conflicts that suit it." [1]

The USA's disregard for the principle of nonuse of force is demonstrated by Washington's decision to create a rapid deployment force and by its policy of gross pressure on sovereign Iran.

Postwar history knows numerous other examples when the threat of force, of intervention was used,

[1] *Le Monde diplomatique*, March 1979, p. 3.

or real aggression was undertaken to achieve selfish political, economic, or ideological goals, for territorial seizures, for changing the alignment of forces in a given region in one's favor. One might even say that the cold war decades were a period when the imperialist and colonial powers relied chiefly on threats of force in international affairs. And the attempt of the West to make this "principle" the basis of its relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states (the doctrines of "rolling back" and "containment" of communism) became, in essence, the main reason for the cold war.

In the mid-1970s, as it seemed, a "position of strength" policy started to recede into the past: at least the progress of political détente, the end to the US aggression in Vietnam, the prospects of a just settlement of the Middle East crisis, and several other signs inspired hope that this was the case. The developments in various regions of the world, however, have not confirmed such optimistic hopes. A certain cooling of the atmosphere in connection with attempts of the opponents of détente to fan the arms race again, complications in Africa as a result of intrigues by racist, imperialist and neo-colonialist circles, the separate deal between Israel and Egypt, the spiralling tensions in the Middle East, the expansionist, great-power policies of China, its unprovoked aggression against Vietnam – all this has again shown the importance of the struggle to affirm the principle of non-use of force or threats of force in international relations.

Moreover, great concern is caused by China's specific activities on the international scene. Pe-

king has ended its isolation and passivity in international affairs characteristic of the years of the "cultural revolution", and has begun to take part in world relations, conducting a kind of policy of "selective coexistence", a rapprochement with major capitalist states, crowned by normalization of relations with the USA and Japan. It is developing ties with many Asian countries, and openly declares its desire to influence political life in Europe. At the same time, its hostility to its neighbor, the USSR, and its allies, its attempt to isolate the USSR from other socialist states, its opposition to the Soviet peace-loving course on all major international issues are closely bound up with its policy of link-up with the West, support of NATO, and of a military and political integration of Western Europe in general, support of conservative, reactionary forces wherever they are striving to crush anti-imperialist movements (in Africa, Chile, the Middle East). All of this gives grounds to suggest that China's policies may become, if they have not already become, a substantial long-term factor opposing the processes of détente.

China's aggression against Vietnam has shown that Peking is striving to put its hegemonistic plans into practice. Moreover, it should be stressed that China acted here with a degree of cynicism which the world had not seen for a long time. The world was confronted with an official declaration of Peking's desire to "teach a lesson to Vietnam", that was conducting a policy China did not like, rather than with empty rhetoric in support of its unsavory policies, or with jabber about defense of freedom

and human rights, and other pretexts usually used by imperialist powers. The intervention in Indochina was a kind of visiting card for post-Maoist China, out to join those in the international community who oppose political and military détente.

All of this is, I would think, a weighty argument in the debate over whether the principle of non-use of force should or should not be included in bilateral and multilateral international documents. Its opponents refer to it having been already formulated in the UN Charter. The practice of the postwar years, however, has convincingly demonstrated that this is clearly insufficient for either preventing aggression or putting a stop to other violations of peace.

Both before and after the Second World War, the Soviet Union has attached paramount importance to the principle of non-use of force in international relations. Since the end of the 1960s, the USSR has put forth a whole series of concrete initiatives aimed at attaining this goal. Thus, the Peace Program adopted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU stated that "repudiation of the threat or use of force in settling outstanding issues must become a law of international life", and also proposed that those countries which agreed with this point of view should "conclude appropriate bilateral or regional treaties".[1] This idea was embodied in treaties of the USSR, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia with

[1] L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, p. 356.

the Federal Republic of Germany, in the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, in the Soviet-American agreement on preventing nuclear war, and in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The 25th Congress of the CPSU held in 1976 called for a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. In the same year the USSR submitted the draft of such a treaty to the UN General Assembly. Finally, in the autumn of 1979, the Soviet Union proposed the adoption of a resolution on the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations, in which the policy of hegemonism was condemned in whatever form as incompatible with the basic principles of the UN Charter and with the task of preserving peace and strengthening international security. The General Assembly supported this initiative and an appropriate resolution was adopted in December 1979.

Thus the USSR, in accordance with its principled approach to practical measures of guaranteeing and strengthening international security, has put forward a set of concrete initiatives whose implementation could place substantial moral as well as international law barriers against those who tend to structure their relations with others "from a position of strength" or strive for domination on a regional or world scale. The real results are as yet quite modest, but they are a stimulus for continuing to pursue the same course with the same persistency.

The *second* element in the Soviet conception of

security is the *struggle to eliminate existing hotbeds of aggression and international tensions.*

Nobody questions the importance of this task. Nevertheless, its accomplishment, as the total experience of postwar development confirms, turns out each time to be extremely difficult. Meanwhile, it is obvious that as long as such hotbeds smoulder in several regions of the globe (or even just in one), it is absolutely impossible to talk about the creation of a reliable system of world security. In our day or, to be more exact, during the final decades of the 20th century, when nuclear arms and the division of the world into opposing blocs are the political reality within which the problems of guaranteeing regional and world security have to be solved, any aggression or any growth of tension in any corner of the globe can negatively affect the prospects of achieving these goals.

At the same time, the postwar experience has also shown that reactionary circles in imperialist countries and advocates of the cold war have tried more than once to make negotiations on some concrete issue of disarmament or political détente dependent on developments in some region of the world that had, or potentially could, become a hotbed of aggression or tension. The Soviet Union has consistently and firmly opposed this type of "linkage", which in fact results in attempts to revive "a position of strength" policy in other forms as the universal norm of international relations. In essence, this was an attempt to turn the question on its head: not to eliminate a "local"

crisis and simultaneously make progress in other fields, in solving other questions, but to continue to stoke up the fires of tension and block progress in other regions and on other urgent questions.

The Soviet position boils down to the formula proclaimed by the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "The Soviet Union has countered the aggressive policy of imperialism with its policy of active defence of peace and strengthening of international security." [1] In other words, it combines firm rebuff of aggression and of armed or any other kind of provocations against friends and allies of the Soviet Union, with the constructive line of regulating outstanding international issues, supporting normal and, where circumstances permit, good relations with states with a different social system.

The *third* element of the Soviet conception of security is *solidarity with peoples struggling against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, against all forms of domination and oppression.*

Events of the late 1970s have shown once again that without such support, without eliminating the widening gap – caused by imperialism – between the economic levels of dozens of young developing countries and industrialized states, without doing away with political, economic, and other forms of discrimination, it is impossible to fully restructure international relations on the principles of equal rights, mutual advantage, and equal security for all peoples and states. These events have demonstrated just as eloquently that détente is still threat-

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[1] L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, p. 356.

ened by the imperialist policy directed against peoples fighting for liberation from colonial and racist oppression, against neo-colonialism, and for independence and social progress.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have always regarded and now regard the national liberation forces as their natural ally on the international scene, in the struggle against the policy of aggression and the arms race, and for the triumph of the principles of peaceful coexistence. It is precisely this circumstance and the striving of big monopolies to maintain their economic positions and the "right" to exploit the natural resources of former colonies with impunity – their raw materials and fuel resources – which have prompted the more conservative and aggressive circles within the ruling classes of the imperialist powers to aggravate the situation, even in the years of détente, in certain regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. We have seen how the imperialists in the 1970s provoked hostility and conflict among peoples of the liberated countries, have sent mountains of arms and mercenaries there to support their stooges, and have fostered various military groupings and blocs in countries ruled in fact by the regimes subsidized by them.

Moreover, it is indicative that in such cases Western politicians forget about both the UN Charter and the basic principles of détente. Even in the final decades of the 20th century, it is still possible to encounter the "classic methods" of the old colonialism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America – military interventions, open interference in the

internal affairs of sovereign states and peoples, infringements upon their territorial integrity and national independence, attempts to dictate ways for nations to arrange their domestic life. The fate of the peoples of Palestine, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, and South Korea is possibly the most eloquent, although far from the only, confirmation of this.

The Soviet Union has actively supported by word and deed, and will continue to support, the just struggle of peoples against imperialism's attempts to impose its will upon them and prevent them from following an independently chosen path, as well as their struggle for détente and peaceful coexistence in all parts of the world. And when the victims of imperialist or other foreign aggression turn to the Soviet Union for help, this country also helps them with arms. For, as Karl Marx stressed, the war of slaves against their oppressors is the only legitimate war known in history.[1]

But as a matter of principle the Soviet Union, in contrast to imperialist powers, those who pursue a neo-colonialist policy, strictly observes in its relations with liberated countries (as with all others) the principles of equality, mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutually advantageous cooperation. The Soviet Union is taking

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[1] See Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France". In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 2, p. 237.

every step, including support of these nations' just struggle against political, economic, or military pressure from without, in order to strengthen world peace and international security.

In recent years, together with talks of the "Soviet military threat", rumors have again become quite widely circulated that the Soviet Union is allegedly using its relations with newly-independent countries, its help to them, including the military help, to establish its spheres of influence there, build military bases, or receive some economic and political privileges. It is symptomatic, however, that such allegations (just like those of a military lag of the West) are intensified every time another imperialist "operation" has fallen through in Africa, Asia, or Latin America.

When the war was still raging in Vietnam, when the American military were barbarously suppressing the people in the southern part of the country and conducting gross aggression against the North, there was a great deal of talk about a Soviet "presence" in Indochina. Of course the fact was ignored that the Soviet Union's military aid to socialist Vietnam was a manifestation of its natural solidarity with the people of a fraternal country, a response to imperialists' interference in its affairs, interference which, moreover, represented a real and serious threat to world peace and international security.

In precisely the same way there were and still are attempts to distort the goals of the Soviet "presence" (i.e., support for peoples who are defending their independence and territorial integrity) in the

Middle East and Africa. Bourgeois propaganda intentionally forgets to add that the USSR, when "present" wherever attempts are made to intensify international tensions, to trample down the peoples' sovereignty and will, to crush the national liberation struggle by means of armed aggression, does not only not gain anything "for itself", but intentionally makes certain national sacrifices to strengthen world peace and security, considering this its internationalist duty to the working people of all countries.

The striving of imperialists to portray the Soviet Union as being "just like anybody else", i. e., just like the Western powers, pursuing their selfish interests in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, is mainly and perhaps exclusively aimed at setting the USSR and the newly-independent states against each other, and tarnishing the Soviet Union's internationalist policies in their eyes. In this way they are trying to weaken overall position of the forces opposed to war and imperialism's interventionist and neo-colonialist strategy, those who support the equitable cooperation among all states – both large and small, bloc members and non-aligned, industrialized and those just taking their first steps towards industrialization.

It is no accident that during the preparation for and work of the Sixth Non-Aligned Nations' Summit Conference at Havana (1979), such ideological and political subversions were activated in the West. Their goal was the same as before: to break up the non-aligned movement, which has become an influential factor in world politics that has

played a considerable part in strengthening peace and international security; to try to dull its anti-imperialist edge, and thereby once again to lessen the contribution made by dozens of newly-independent countries in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and apartheid and for restructuring international economic relations on a just and democratic basis, for the establishment of a new international economic order, for rejection of all discrimination, and for the elimination of exploitation by imperialist monopolies of the natural and human resources of developing countries.

"The socialist countries are not seeking privileges for themselves, are not soliciting military bases or hunting for concessions in any single region of the world," states the Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, adopted at a conference of its Political Consultative Committee in Moscow on November 23, 1978. "They are opposed in principle to the imperialist policy of creating spheres of influence and never participate themselves in the struggle for such spheres.

"Guided by their principled policy of strengthening world peace and security, the socialist countries represented at the conference consistently come out for peaceful political regulation, by means of negotiating all disputes both among new liberated states and among all states in general."

The *fourth* element of the Soviet conception of security is the *struggle for the creation of systems of regional security.*

The Soviet Union's approach to the problems of

building, preserving, and strengthening security systems (just as its approach to disarmament and foreign policy aims in general) is not tinged with any maximalism or any rigidity. And it would be ridiculous to choose which is better: to wait until conditions are ripe, for example, for extrapolating the principles of peaceful coexistence to international relations as a whole, or to begin working towards this final goal by solving – one by one – particular problems, going step by step, so to speak, moving ahead in some regions while, of necessity, lagging behind in others. Politics does not tolerate such a way of posing the problem even in theory.

Of course the peace and security of nations are indivisible, especially in the modern nuclear age, when there is no place on earth where one could hide oneself, wait out, and survive a military catastrophe should it break out. It is, of course, naive to assume that, having created a spot, even an entire island, of security in the world – which could still not be called entirely secure, because it is for the time being based only on parity, on a balance of forces maintained at a very, almost critically, high level – it would be naive to assume, I repeat, that an island of security in such a world, even if it is the size, say, of Europe, could serve as a haven or panacea against all misfortunes.

But there is also another way of looking at the problem. The creation of such islands or, to be more exact, systems of security in various regions of the globe, are something like steps leading to a strengthening of world peace. At the same time

it provides practical proof that in our age security is not a utopia, but a system of relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, that it is not a mirage, but an attainable, real, and by no means infinitely distant goal. But, here, as with disarmament issues, the main point is not to forget the final goal while accomplishing partial tasks and moving forward gradually and not always by the shortest path. Every step, every initiative aimed at strengthening the security of some part of the globe must be subordinated to this final goal, which is the building of a secure, just, democratic peace in the world.

This is, properly speaking, what the Soviet approach to regional security systems means, and the postwar history of Europe has confirmed its correctness and, most importantly, its realism and effectiveness.

It is no accident that Europe has become the first continent to advance far in erecting a structure of security through the joint, collective efforts of all the states in the area, where, in essence, security has already brought its first results. It is no accident that problems of European security have always been regarded both in the East and the West as the most urgent problems demanding an immediate solution. After all, it is here that the two world wars broke out, that in the 1940s the most critical front of the cold war took shape; it is here that outstanding issues, including territorial ones, created an explosive situation, and, finally, that the confrontation of the two opposing systems attached a most critical and dangerous pitch and

by no means only for the Europeans. That is why the state of affairs here influenced the political climate of the entire planet. Europe set and perhaps still sets the climate for the whole world. To a certain extent this may also be said about Europe both on the eve of the First and Second World wars, but this would take us too far away from problems of *current* politics.

While the war was still under way and immediately after its conclusion, the victorious nations repeatedly took up problems of a future Europe and its security. Incidentally, the Potsdam agreements (1945), which were the outcome of the last summit meeting of the heads of the anti-fascist coalition, already contained a concrete program for building a firm European peace on the basis of security and equitable cooperation among all states of the continent. The postwar history of Europe, however, has followed a path fraught with danger both for Europeans and for the whole world.

The Soviet Union expended great efforts to improve the situation in Europe, the key to which lay in eliminating the consequences of the Second World War and consolidating its territorial and political results. In the mid-1960s, the 23rd Congress of the CPSU for the first time proposed as a practical task convening an international conference in Europe for discussing questions of military détente and arms reduction on the continent and for developing peaceful and mutually advantageous ties among all European states.

In 1966, a Conference of the Political Consulta-

tive Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, held in Bucharest, adopted a Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe. This was an important programmatic document, in which the USSR and its socialist allies advanced an entire complex of concrete, constructive, and realistic initiatives whose implementation could radically improve the general climate on the continent and beyond. Characteristically, many of the solutions proposed were not new. The plan for practical action proposed by the socialist states was not simply the result of a serious analysis of the European situation, but a kind of synthesis of ideas that had already been advanced by that time by politicians, including those from non-socialist countries. The Declaration was by no means regarded by its authors as an ultimatum, and did not consider their program as the only way out of the situation. On the contrary, they hoped that the security program they proposed might become a rational basis for a general European dialogue.

Let us briefly recall the contents of that program.

It urged that:

– it was necessary to take all possible measures to further the development of good-neighborly relations in Europe on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems;

– it had become necessary to relax military tensions in Europe, and that the radical way to achieve this would be to simultaneously disband existing military alliances; but should it prove im-

possible to do it at once, then it would be expedient to agree on disbanding the NATO and Warsaw Treaty military organizations;

– in order to create a normal atmosphere on the continent, it was extremely important that all European and non-European countries recognize the actually existing borders between the European states;

– a general European conference to deal with burning issues could become a major landmark in the current European history, and it would be expedient for the agreement reached at it to take the form of a general European declaration of co-operation in the interest of maintaining and consolidating security on the continent.

Now, almost fifteen years later, it is evident that the authors of the Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security did not err in their estimates and hopes. It indeed became the basis, the framework for the dialogue which was consummated in Helsinki in 1975 by the historic Final Act adopted at the history's first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The path to Helsinki was long and difficult. It was a path from the cold war and confrontation first to a thaw in international relations and then to détente and cooperation. It would be no exaggeration to say that détente and cooperation received the status of international law at the European Conference, for in addition to Europeans, top state officials from the USA and Canada also sat at the negotiating table in the Finnish capital.

We are not now in a position to give a detailed

account of all the stages on the path leading to Helsinki. But we must mention one circumstance, viz. that the late 1960s and early 1970s proved decisive in this respect. At that time treaties were signed between the USSR, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other, a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin was concluded, and both German states admitted to the UN. This marked the actual beginning of Europe's transition to building a security system.

This work, of course, is far from complete. The Helsinki Conference, as ensuing years have confirmed, has provided a new stimulus to it and has become a kind of code of cooperation norms, a code of behavior approved and accepted as a guide by 33 European states, and the USA and Canada. But the Conference and its Final Act could not by themselves instantly solve all the outstanding issues in Europe. And they were not supposed to do so, for they, first, recorded in international law and on a multilateral basis the real political and territorial situation on the continent formed as a result of the Second World War and postwar development, and, second, opened up new opportunities for a constructive solution of the main problem – strengthening European and international security, European and world peace.

The Final Act is undoubtedly a unique document, since it was the first to reflect such broad agreement of diverse states on issues that are now of literally critical significance for the destinies of

mankind. It has been analysed numerous times in detail and from different angles. There is no doubt that it will also be examined in detail in the future by historians, politicians and philosophers, because, apart from everything else, it exactly reflects the contradictions, fears, and hopes – in a word, the difficult reality of a period when mankind has to decide one and main problem – how to survive. We want to draw attention to three circumstances here.

First of all, the Final Act brings together for the first time the ten principles that comprise the essence of peaceful coexistence and which the signatory states undertook to abide by in their mutual relations. It is also the first time that a distinctive methodology and a concrete program for putting these principles into effect were worked out in such detail, one might say scrupulously. Of central importance here are respect for and application of the principle of non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations, of a rejection of all policies involving force (including economic coercion and invasion of other states' territory), as well as creation of an atmosphere of trust and respect among peoples.

Further, although the Final Act does not specially deal with concrete ways and forms of solving the disarmament problems, it nevertheless devotes considerable attention both to practical measures for strengthening trust and to some aspects of security and disarmament. In particular, an agreement was reached at the Helsinki Conference on prior notification about large-scale military exer-

cises, on exchange of observers, on prior notification about large-scale troop movements, and also on general notions which the participating states agreed upon as guidelines for examining questions related to "strengthening European security by joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament".[1]

In other words, Helsinki laid the foundation for conducting concrete negotiations both on further strengthening political détente in Europe and on disarmament issues (in particular for the Vienna talks). It would not be out of place to recall here that in October 1977, two years after the Conference, the Soviet Union put forward an integral platform of action which, based on the content of the Final Act, aimed to strengthen military détente in Europe. In particular, the USSR proposed that all participants at the Helsinki Conference conclude a joint treaty on the first non-use of nuclear arms against one another (later the USSR proposed that such a treaty be expanded to include conventional arms); to agree (and to record such an agreement) not to expand NATO and the Warsaw Treaty by including new members; to extend the measures of trust provided in the Helsinki Conference Document to the southern Mediterranean, and not to conduct military exercises involving more than 50,000-60,000 men.

Two years later, on October 6, 1979, the head of the Soviet state, in a speech in Berlin, advanced

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[1] *In the Name of Peace, Security, and Cooperation*, Politizdat, 1975, p. 31 (in Russian).

new proposals which supplemented the 1977 platform and in many respects developed it. The USSR expressed its readiness to reduce the existing levels of medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in the western regions of the Soviet Union provided that additional new medium-range nuclear missiles not be placed in Western Europe. The head of the Soviet state also announced the decision to reduce unilaterally the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe.

Among other initiatives, of special significance is the solemn pledge of the USSR to refrain from using nuclear weapons against states which refuse to produce or acquire such weapons, and which do not have them on their territory. Also of importance are proposals dealing with measures of trust. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to agree on notifications about large-scale exercises if they involve 20,000 and not 25,000 men, to refrain from exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 men, and to give prior notification on the movement of land troops numbering over 20,000 men. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, all questions connected with military détente in Europe could be examined on the political level at a general European conference, with the participation of the USA and Canada.

It is quite obvious that full implementation of the ideas contained in the Soviet proposals of 1977 and 1979 would definitely advance the military détente and would therefore strengthen security on the continent.

And the last point, which cannot be ignored

when discussing the significance of the Final Act signed at Helsinki. European developments do not only exert a direct, immediate effect on the nature of current international relations. They also prove that in our nuclear age security of entire continents is not a utopia, but a realistic, attainable, though not an immediate goal. In this sense, the Final Act is an extremely valuable example of how, while not erasing differences in ideology and social systems, it is possible to achieve a complex of important agreements that fully take into account the points of view, positions, opinions and interests of several dozens of states. These are agreements, moreover, that, by not damaging a single country or people, are a gain for all participants, for they lessen the threat of war and strengthen the security of all and further the development of mutually advantageous, equitable cooperation on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

A characteristic feature of the Final Act, and one of significance not only for Europe, is that it does not fix limits to what may be achieved in the struggle for security. It reflects only the maximum which may be achieved today. But it simultaneously describes today's maximum as a starting point for further progress in the directions outlined. In this way the Final Act serves simultaneously as a summary, fixing what has already been won, and as a stimulus in the struggle for full realization of the goals formulated in it.

Finally, the *fifth* element in the Soviet concep-

tion of security is the *struggle to overcome the division of the world into blocs.*

This goal might seem frankly utopian if one takes into account the structure of present-day international relations, as well as recent history and the political maps of past centuries. Indeed, it was precisely combinations of interests of various groups of states constituting formal coalitions, alliances, and pacts, or not officially binding themselves by multilateral obligations, that usually served in different periods as mechanisms which set in motion, so to say, intrigues on the world scene. Historians have grown accustomed to this, as have politicians and the "man-on-the-street".

And nevertheless the Soviet Union has long and persistently come out against dividing the world into opposing military-political groupings, and has more than once affirmed (as we mentioned a few pages above) its readiness to disband the Warsaw Treaty Organization if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is simultaneously disbanded. As a first step it proposed eliminating their military organizations, beginning with a mutual reduction of military activity. Moreover, aware that it is difficult to accomplish this task – that it is impossible to accomplish it in the near future, not to say at once, at one go – the Soviet Union nevertheless advances it as a practical task: it is one of the programmatic demands of all recent congresses of the CPSU, and unfailingly appears in all important official Soviet statements and in the Warsaw Treaty documents. How can such constancy be explained?

The primary reason is that the very fact of the world's division into blocs, in the context of the confrontation of the two socio-economic systems – imperialism and socialism – and the nuclear arms race, is capable of aggravating to the extreme any conflict, even a comparatively local one, and raising it to a global scale. Another reason is that in the contemporary situation the very logic of the world's division into blocs is a kind of negation of the logic of détente, both in the political and in the military spheres.

The very fact of the existence of blocs in our day (unlike all previous epochs, including the twenty years between the wars) is a major brake on the path to a full restructuring of international relations into those based on the principles of co-operation and security.

Let us, however, return to reality. Blocs in their present form were not so much a product of the cold war, as is sometimes asserted, as its source. Or, to be more exact, not blocs in general, but the North Atlantic Pact. It arose in 1949, six years before the Warsaw Treaty, which was formed only in 1955 as *response* to the NATO's aggressive policies aimed against the USSR and its socialist allies. This is a generally known and highly material fact. But, still, it is not, perhaps, the main point.

From the very beginning, NATO was conceived as an instrument of anti-communist strategy, as a means of bringing military and political pressure to bear on the Soviet Union and its allies, as a tool for carrying out the West's imperialist policies

"from a position of strength". This determined the development of events in Europe and throughout the world in the late 1940s and in subsequent decades. Incidentally, the creation of analogous alliances in other parts of the world demonstrated that the West regarded its anti-communist line as a global and long-term strategy on the international scene.

Its core were American might and American policies.

It is a curious fact that back in the 1960s Zbigniew Brzezinski, at the time a professor who held no official posts, wrote that American power had become "applicable power", since the USA had developed and armed itself "with a long-range delivery system, with the means of asserting itself on the basis of a global reach".[1] NATO and other imperialist blocs served at the time as an instrument for the USA to gain total domination in the world. Since then a lot of water has flowed under the bridges but, judging by everything, the concept of "applicable power", although under other labels, has by no means been shelved by certain circles in the West, first and foremost in the USA. Even today it serves as the main threat to détente and underlies such NATO decisions as the long-term weapon modernization program, plans for placing new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, and so forth.

The Warsaw Treaty is an alliance of socialist countries within which they coordinate their *peace-*

[1] *International Affairs*, No. 11, Moscow, 1967, p. 6.

loving foreign policy. Its numerous declarations have invariably formulated constructive programs for ensuring European security, achieving military détente and disarmament. Its military organization works to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Treaty's participants.

Hostile anti-Soviet propaganda often deliberately equates the world socialist system with the Warsaw Treaty, calling the socialist community a military-political bloc. This is by no means an innocent slip of the pen.

The world socialist system took shape in the 1940s, after the victory of socialist revolutions in a number of countries. United by common strategic goals in domestic policy (construction of a new, communist society) and in the international arena (ensuring peaceful conditions for such construction, preventing a new world war), these countries also worked out a fundamentally new type of mutual relations with one another. It is based on what is usually called socialist internationalism – mutual support and help, equitable, mutually advantageous, fraternal cooperation in accomplishing economic tasks, socialist integration, coordinated efforts in the political and ideological struggle against imperialism on the international scene, etc.

The growth of the economic potential of each fraternal country naturally increases the economic and political weight of the socialist community as a whole and affects the alignment of forces in the world. In the 1970s this allowed many of the foreign policy goals proclaimed by socialist countries

in previous years to be put into practice. First and foremost, it permitted to begin and greatly advance the process of détente during the past decade. In general, the power of the socialist community can by no means be calculated by a simple mechanical addition of its forces, and the community itself is not the arithmetical sum-total of its member-countries. It is not a traditional coalition of states united for a certain period of time by the transient aims and egoistic considerations of each of its participants, of which the history of international relations has known and still knows quite a few. And least of all is it a bloc, i. e., gravitation of small countries towards large ones, as is the case under capitalism.

The socialist community is a voluntary alliance of sovereign states. And the Warsaw Treaty is a political and military organization created to accomplish tasks which confronted the fraternal countries during the years of the cold war as a result of the formation of the aggressive NATO bloc, whose goal was first to "roll back" and then to "contain" communism.

It is for this reason that the Constitution of the USSR sets as one of its central and invariable foreign policy goals the utmost strengthening of the fraternal community of socialist countries. This is what Article 30 says: "The USSR, as part of the world system of socialism and of the socialist community, promotes and strengthens friendship, cooperation, and comradely mutual assistance with other socialist countries on the basis of the principle of socialist internationalism, and takes an active

part in socialist economic integration and the socialist international division of labour." But it is highly characteristic that the Constitution does not mention the Warsaw Treaty.

Nevertheless, military-political groupings are today a political reality with which we not only have to live, but which we must take into consideration when paving the path to peace and security.

Elimination of the division of the world into opposing groupings is a task which, realistically speaking, can apparently be accomplished only as the result of gradual, step-by-step advance towards extending and developing the political and military détente. But this is by no means a reason not to place it on the agenda today, not to expose the dangerous, aggressive NATO's policies, or not to oppose bloc politics.

The latter circumstance is quite important, because bloc politics are often confused, whether consciously or not, with alliance politics. But there is a difference, and a significant one. The coordinated course of countries, parties to alliances, is in the interest of each of them, is conducted by each of them voluntarily, and necessarily takes account of the vital interests of all other states in the world, the interests of international security.

This course might be called alliance politics. If, however, allied countries, under outside pressure or even completely voluntarily, act in the world arena as a force pursuing only its own, what might be called, collective egoistic goals, and are not

concerned with the interests, sovereignty, advantage and security of other states and with universal peace, such policies bear all the traits of bloc policies, in other words, imperialist expansionist policies, representing a serious threat to détente.

The realities of the late 20th century are such that peace and security have to be built under far from favorable conditions, under conditions of the existence of blocs. Their elimination is a goal which cannot be achieved very soon. But it goes without saying that the elimination of blocs would hardly mean the elimination or "prohibition" of any kind of political or economic alliances or associations. The only requirement would be that they not undermine the security system, i.e., not remain closed groupings directed against third countries but, on the contrary, further the development of cooperation and mutual understanding among peoples. These, however, are truly the problems of tomorrow....

The ten principles which the participating states of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation are obliged to follow in their mutual relations and which are recorded in the Final Act, can also be found in the Constitution of the USSR, in the Chapter "Foreign Policy". They comprise a special article, 29, which says: "The USSR's relations with other states are based on observance of the following principles: sovereign equality; mutual renunciation of the use or threat of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes;

non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; the equal rights of peoples and their right to decide their own destiny; co-operation among states; and fulfilment in good faith of obligations arising from the generally recognised principles and rules of international law, and from the international treaties signed by the USSR."

This is in essence, a constitutional formulation of the Soviet conception of security.

THE SOVIET CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL PROGRESS UNDER PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

All arguments about the threat to peace allegedly posed by the Soviet Union, about the striving by Moscow for "world domination", about the Soviet Union's attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states so that its "placemen" could carry out revolutions there, and other such allegations from the indispensable propaganda arsenal of all foes of the Soviet land, are based on what is often considered the propaganda trump card: since the core of the political system in the USSR was and remains the Communist Party and Communists are for revolution and allow for the violent overthrow of capitalism, then there can be no talk about their peace-loving aspirations.

It is a strange business: there is probably no other problem about which Marxists have spoken so much and with such clarity and unambiguousness for over a century as the problem of war and peace. But there is also, perhaps, no other problem which the opponents of Marxism have tried so hard – whether intentionally or not – to muddle, around which they have heaped as much

absurdity and simply open nonsense as the attitude of Communists to war and peace.

This paradox, however, has its own, class logic, as any Marxist would say. Before the Communists' first victory – in October 1917 in Russia – the "muddle" about their attitude to problems of war and peace helped to intimidate the man-in-the-street, to spread and nurture anti-communist prejudices as a reliable barrier (so it was thought many decades ago, and so it is still thought in some places today) to a socialist revolution. When the Bolsheviks emerged victorious, they were portrayed as criminals and murderers who thrived on bloodletting. This made it easier to justify imperialist intervention and the atrocities of internal and foreign counter-revolution.

Now criticism of Marxist-Leninist views and positions on war and peace intensifies every time there is a warming trend in international relations and when mankind takes one more step on the path to détente. In the 1970s, which saw a very profound shift from the cold war and confrontation to constructive cooperation, this criticism was not simply activated, but was becoming, and, perhaps has already become, one of the indispensable and important tendencies in the foreign policies of at least some of the Western states.

Of course, as the Russians say, new times bring new songs. Nobody today, perhaps, would risk seriously accusing the Soviet Union of organizing worldwide conspiracies. But it is as before blamed for a sympathy towards the Communists of other countries. Soviet Communists are no longer por-

trayed as "Commissars with knives in their teeth". No, the Soviet Union is now pictured as "an ordinary superpower", conducting an ordinary "imperialistic" policy. And so on and so forth. And the more crucial moment is approaching on the international scene, the more bitter the anti-Soviet campaign becomes. That was precisely the case at the end of the 1970s, when some tried to justify their counterattack on détente with allegations that human rights are violated in the USSR. Incidentally, this only confirms the correctness of the Communists' conclusion that peaceful political coexistence by no means implies what might be called ideological disarmament, and a relaxation of international tensions is not at all tantamount to the disappearance of class contradictions among states with different socio-political systems.

Bourgeois propaganda often resorts to open forgery. It portrays Communists as publicly expressing their devotion to peace, but carefully concealing the fact that they allegedly want to use peaceful coexistence and disarmament to facilitate the armed "overthrow" of capitalism and cast it into the dump heap of history. "We make no secret of the fact that we see detente as the way to create more favourable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction," L. I. Brezhnev stressed in this connection in the Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU. "This only confirms that socialism and peace are indissoluble. And when we are rebuked for this, we can hardly help thinking that those

who rebuke us are not sure that capitalism can survive without resort to aggression and threats of force, and without encroaching on the independence and interests of other peoples." [1]

While examining the sources and principles of Soviet foreign policy, we attempted to show how Lenin approached questions of war and peace, how he conceived of a *socialist* foreign policy, or, what is one and the same thing, of the international activities of the victorious working class which had taken power into its own hands and of its revolutionary party. Here it might be useful to return briefly to the same problem, viewing it from a somewhat different angle.

A striving for a firm, permanent, and just peace, for the total elimination of war from human life, was and remains an integral part of the program of every Marxist-Leninist party. Strictly speaking, Marxists cannot be called innovators in this regard. Humanists throughout the ages from all countries have passionately called for the same thing. The *innovation* of the Marxists consists in their scientifically substantiating the *reality* of attaining this goal, their pointing to the direct, organic connection of the struggle against wars and for peace with the struggle against an exploitative society built on violence and inequality. They have shown that capitalism and later, at the turn of the 20th century, imperialism, as its highest stage, are the main source of wars, aggres-

[1] *Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1976, p. 39.

sion, what today is called policies "from a position of strength".

At the same time, the communist movement, which has always striven (and still strives today) to apply its revolutionary teaching not dogmatically, but creatively, to changing conditions, has come to the conclusion that socialism and capitalism can coexist in the international arena. Such living together will always be characterized by a sharp, essentially uncompromizing, class struggle, but not one waged with arms: it will take the peaceful forms of political, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation, which at the same time will be competition, rivalry. It is precisely this active and broad approach to questions of war and peace which distinguishes Communists from pacifists.

But just such an approach frequently seems inconsistent, contradictory, even insincere to people who are far from Marxism. How is it, these people say to the Communists, that you declare yourselves advocates of peace, while in your programs you call for revolutionary violence; you call yourselves champions of the security of peoples and peaceful coexistence, while in your programs and statements you support revolutions and wars of liberation. Here, of course, there is no contradiction, much less insincerity.

Revolution, which is always *force*, coercion (whether military or not), in the sense that it is always a leap forward in the history of human society, was by no means "invented" by the Communists. Long before Marx and Engels, the world had already been confronted with violent uphea-

vals, with armed action of the laboring masses, with revolutionary wars, and so forth. Suffice it to recall that capitalism as a social formation almost everywhere originated by non-peaceful means. Feudal rulers did not leave the stage without a battle, spilling literally a sea of blood. Quite frequently this was a lengthy process, unlike a momentary outburst or headlong overturn which we have grown accustomed to identify with proletarian revolution, but, after all, those were other times.

Marxism, however, performed a great service in that it revealed and explained the class origins of revolutions, which objectively ripen in an exploitative society, serving as a "midwife" of history. This is the reason why Communists also regard the socialist revolution as an unavoidable stage through which mankind must pass on the path to full liberation from exploitation and violence, and the construction of a genuinely free society.

Today even people who are far from the theory of scientific communism are familiar with the Marxist attitude to the forms of revolutionary transition to socialism. Both in theory and in practice, the Communists hold that the forms of such a transition depend on the concrete situation in a country and on the general situation in the world as a whole. It is precisely the nature of these objective conditions which determines how a socialist revolution might be accomplished at a given moment in a given country, in other words, what forms it will take, peaceful or non-peaceful. In the first case, it is a question of the specific means of

achieving a transition to socialism without workers' and their allies' armed action against the exploiters, and in the second – of an armed struggle.

History has convincingly shown that the choice of one path or the other depends not on the desire of the Communists, but on the development and nature of the revolutionary struggle in a country, on the strength and forms of the opposition of the exploiting classes.

Lenin used to say that it is much easier for the workers and peasants to seize power than to hold on to it – to defend it against internal and foreign enemies, and to successfully build communist society. The history of the Soviet Union and other countries where the working class has been victorious allows one to speak of the transformation of this thought into a sort of axiom of the revolutionary struggle. This is approximately how it goes: a victorious socialist revolution is vitally interested in peace, and the success of a revolutionary transformation of society in one or several countries is very closely connected with the international situation as a whole.

Such strictly "rationalistic" considerations, of course, were also taken into account when, after the victory of the socialist revolution, Lenin laid the theoretical and practical foundations of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. But at the same time, what was and remains the main, decisive factor is the sincere striving of Communists to do away with wars for good, to build an entire system of international

relations on foundations guaranteeing the security of all peoples, their right to decide their own fate independently, on foundations creating the most favorable conditions for mankind's advancement towards social progress.

A hudred years ago Engels wrote in his letter to K. Kautsky that "the victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing. This does not of course exclude defensive wars of various kinds...." [1] These words, essentially, express in very capacious form the communist conception of struggle for social progress under conditions of peace. Moreover, the forms and methods of such a struggle would not only not undermine world peace but, on the contrary, would strengthen it.

Communists are convinced and long-term opponents of the "export of revolution", i.e., attempts to "make" a revolution for the working class, the laborers of another country by force, by interference from without. Plans to "Bolshevize", "Sovietize", and, finally, as is said today, to "communize" the world, are, however, attributed with striking persistence to Communists and of late to the countries of the socialist community.

Marxism-Leninism is a science based on the objective laws of social development. It rejects messianic attempts to force a happy and free life

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[1] "Engels to Karl Kautsky in Vienna". In: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 331.

upon mankind with a rifle, to "plant" revolution where objective conditions do not yet exist for it. That is why Communists have always and everywhere stressed so insistently that the policy of exporting revolution is fruitless and mistaken because revolution, they say, is a fruit which ripens in every country in its own good time. Lenin recalled this many times. For example, in 1918 he wrote, in his article "Strange and Monstrous", that Marxism "has always been opposed to 'pushing' revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender revolutions".[1]

The crisis which struck the world at the end of the first imperialist war, the mighty rise of the revolutionary workers' and anti-war movement, the fall of tsarism and the victory of the Bolsheviks – all of this heralded a real storm. The general alignment of class forces on the international scene, the explosive situation in many European states, gave real grounds for Lenin and the Bolsheviks to hope for the success of socialist revolution in other countries besides Russia. These possibilities were not realized for a number of reasons, and in Hungary and Germany the Soviets were simply crushed by the counter-revolution.

What stand did the young Soviet Republic adopt at that time? It noted with immense enthusiasm every success of the Communists outside its bounds, awaited their victories with impatience

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Strange and Monstrous", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 71-72.

and hope, hastened to support them in any way it could – by advice, its meagre experience, bread, but not by direct interference, not militarily. And by no means only because it itself was weak and encircled by enemies. The situation at the time was such that the victory of revolutionary workers in any European country, no matter what it might cost Russia, would be her best support in the struggle against internal and foreign counter-revolution, so that, as far as "hot heads" were concerned, it seemed worth risking all. But even in those years (as in the course of its entire history) Soviet Russia consistently tried to achieve international peace and strictly observed its commitments.

Solidarity, support, the provision of all necessary help, including arms, to comrades in revolutionary struggle, as occurred in Spain, Korea, Vietnam, and as is occurring now, but not export of revolution, not "communization" of the world. In recent years, however (this has become especially noticeable, perhaps, since the middle of the past decade), a somewhat improved version of "Soviet expansionism" began to gain legitimacy in bourgeois propaganda. Its active proponents have become Peking officials and the Chinese press. Pursuing its own far from altruistic goals, China set the Kampuchean ruling clique of Pol Pot – Peking's puppets who had literally slaughtered nearly half the population of the country – upon socialist Vietnam. Provocations and border clashes finally took the form of virtually undeclared "small" war against Vietnam, which had barely begun to recover after American aggression. Incidentally, the world and

Chinese press tried to hush up this direct and totally unjustified violation of the elementary norms of international law.

The propaganda storm began, however, when the democratic forces of Kampuchea rose against Pol Pot (whose crimes against humanity, as everyone who is unbiassed will recognize, are comparable in scale only with those of Hitler) and when these forces turned to fraternal Vietnam for help. At that time all the traditional anti-communist arguments were set in motion. And a comparatively "fresh" one also appeared: the Soviet Union was accused of allegedly acting "like all imperialist powers", and of using others to pull its chestnuts out of the fire. Vietnam, it was said, was its "Asian Cuba".

They didn't remember Cuba by chance, of course. Its consistently firm, internationalist, anti-imperialist policies have become a real thorn in the side of all anti-communists. Its fraternal aid to several sovereign African states which had become victims of claims and attacks from without – that is, actions wholly in accord with the spirit and letter of international law and the UN Charter, which recognizes the right to defense, including collective defense, against aggression – enraged those who stood behind the aggressors and counter-revolutionaries. The noisy, hysterical campaign pursued a single goal: to discredit Cuba, discredit the African countries that took the path of socialist orientation, the path of socialism, and to discredit the Soviet Union and its policies of peace, détente, and security.

As one might expect, arguments were disregarded in such a campaign: there was silence about the fact that any sovereign nation, if it needs and desires to, may ask another country for aid, including military aid. There was silence about the fact that any sovereign nation has the full right to respond to this request and help another defend its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity from encroachments from without which are a gross violation of international law. There was silence, finally, about the fact that such cases involved precisely the strengthening of international security and defense of international law.

Time, it is said, not only heals but sometimes also makes one understand. The campaigns in question are behind us. Fewer and fewer people approach such "arguments" uncritically, or fail to see the true goals and targets which imperialists and all advocates of the cold war and the policies "from a position of strength" are trying to attain.

Facts, to somewhat paraphrase a well-known expression, are not only a stubborn thing but, most importantly, are capable of convincing. And facts show that Communists do not conceal their goals – the universal victory of the new, socialist system. But they proceed from the conviction that every people will arrive at this victory by itself – without interference from without, following a path which it will choose on its own, and at a time when all the conditions within its country are ripe. They also proceed from the conviction

that there is no higher right for man than that to life and peace. And therefore they consider it their duty, their contribution to the struggle for human emancipation, to wage a persistent, selfless, resolute struggle for a truly durable, just system of international security, meeting the interests of all states and peoples.

Communists, as noted in the final document of the Berlin Conference of the Communist Parties of Europe held in the summer of 1976, "consider the fight for détente to be an important contribution to the creation of international conditions favouring social progress. They are of the opinion that the ever more comprehensive implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, especially – concerning Europe – of the principles contained in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, creates favourable conditions for the full independence and the self-determined development of countries and promotes the struggle of the peoples for economic and social progress. It creates more favourable conditions of struggle for the movements for democratic and socialist transformation in the capitalist countries. It creates more favourable conditions for carrying out the programmes for the economic, social and political development of the socialist countries and the ever more comprehensive realization of the potentialities of socialism.

"The aspiration of the peoples for justice and peace is growing as a result of all these factors. At the same time, the ideals of socialism are gaining an ever greater place in the conscious-

ness of ever broader masses."[1]

I have included such a long quote in order to demonstrate how serious, detailed, and comprehensive the Communists' approach to peace is.[2]

[1] *For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe, Berlin, June 29-30, 1976*, Moscow, 1976, pp. 39-40.

[2] This conclusion is no less valid for being based on documents of only European Communists. First of all, almost half the world's Communist parties operate in Europe, including such powerful and influential ones, as the Italian Communist Party, the French Communist Party, the Communist Party of Spain, the Portuguese Communist Party, and the Communist Party of Finland. Secondly, similar points of view have recently been expressed in documents of all Communist parties and many regional conferences. Thirdly and finally, the communist movement has unfailingly held the same position for many years now. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a document adopted by the Moscow International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of 1969:

"The attempts of imperialism to overcome its internal contradictions by building up international tension and creating hotbeds of war are hampered by the policy of peaceful coexistence. This policy does not imply either the preservation of the socio-political status quo or a weakening of the ideological struggle ... Directed as it is against the warmongers, reactionaries and monopoly arms manufacturers, this policy meets the general interests of the revolutionary struggle against every form of oppression and exploitation, and promotes friendship between all peoples and the development of fruitful economic, scientific, technological and other spheres of cooperation between countries with different social systems in the interests of social progress.

"Communists regard it as their duty to combat the imperialist policy of whipping up international tension and any attempt aimed by them at bringing back the cold war, and to work for a relaxation of tension, which is one of the most insistent and urgent demands of the peoples." *International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, Moscow 1969*, Prague, 1969, pp. 31-32.)

This policy of theirs is first and foremost constructive, realistic, and vigorous. It has never been built on abstract schemes, and rejects a narrow dogmatic approach to international events, as well as beautifying and empty slogans and declarations, removed from real life, no matter how loud, bold and uncompromising they might seem. It always sets tasks for itself which may be successfully accomplished in the interests of socialism, peace, and the whole of mankind under concrete conditions and the alignment of world forces at any given moment. It is precisely for this reason that it is a revolutionary policy in the genuine sense of the term.

This sober revolutionary realism (if one may coin such an unusual phrase which, however, quite precisely reflects the essence of the matter) of the socialist foreign policy underlies the Communists' ideas of the world towards which they are striving. They are sickened by the pseudo-revolutionary, adventuristic maximalism which follows the slogan: "all or nothing". Their final goals, about which, I repeat, they have always spoken and continue to speak openly, remain unchanged – the worldwide victory of socialism, the elimination of the exploitative system, and with it the source of wars everywhere on earth. But Marxists-Leninists categorically reject the foolish conceptions of all varieties of the "extreme left", who are prepared to sacrifice (in words, at least) half the world, and on the ruins of the remaining half to "build a new society". By "communization" (a favorite term of bourgeois propaganda) the Mar-

xists-Leninists do not mean a nuclear strike at imperialism or the attainment of world domination by "Moscow and its allies", nor the export of revolution, but a steady strengthening of the position of the Communists and their allies, who are forging the inevitable victory of socialist revolution in all countries.

Unexpected confirmation of this thesis came from Washington – from Z. Brzezinski, no longer a professor, but the then President Carter national security adviser. Speaking at the annual meeting of the American Association of Newspaper Editors (May 1979), he referred to the changes (revolutionary, as the Communists would say) which are taking place across a broad "arc of crisis that stretches across southern Asia to southern Africa". We, i.e., Americans, this politician who holds unambiguously anti-communist views stressed, "must not make the mistake of assuming that change and turbulence, by themselves, are evidence of external mischief...." On the contrary, "they were usually the result of the internal dynamics of a particular country".[1]

Unfortunately, such frankness is not a frequent occurrence and, most important, anti-communist propaganda, American in particular, tries to cast doubt on such a point of view. It is a paradox pure and simple!

The Communists, while opposing the adventuristic conception of the "export of revolution", which has nothing in common with their philoso-

[1] *The New York Times*, May 2, 1979.

phy, ideology or politics, at the same time also resolutely condemn the opposite conception – the "export of counter-revolution". International reaction and imperialism go to the extreme in their attempts to establish their "right" to crush the revolutionary, democratic liberation movement in the world. In our nuclear age such an anti-popular, anti-humane, arch-reactionary policy is fraught, apart from everything else, with the danger of critically aggravating international tensions and, conceivably, causing a nuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet Union has more than once stated its attitude towards the conception of "export of counter-revolution", which contradicts both the spirit and the letter of international law. In essence, it is one of the expressions of the same imperialist policy "from a position of strength". And its pivot, its foundation, is an open unwillingness to observe one of the underlying principles of peaceful coexistence and détente, stated in the Final Act of the European Conference. This is the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

It must be said that in the 1970s the Communists more than once pointed to the actual growth of the rightist and even neo-fascist threat, as a reaction to the advance of the processes of political détente and the growing prestige and consolidating position of left, democratic forces, including Communist parties, in many countries. Recent facts provide convincing proof that a certain cooling of the international climate, a result of the active opposition by foes of détente, is very close-

ly interconnected with the whipping up of socio-political tensions in a number of Western countries, a strengthening of the position of the right and extreme right, growth of terrorism, and a new wave of anti-communist hysteria.

Frightened by the scope of the left, democratic movement in Western Europe, by the role which some Communist parties, e.g., the Italian and French, play in the lives of their countries, and aware that a warming of the international climate largely favors this process, certain imperialist circles have, in essence, attempted to make the Communists' agreement to preserve the social status quo a condition for further progress in détente. The position of the most conservative right-wing European circles was formulated very clearly at the time by one of their most consistent and toughest leaders, Franz Josef Strauss. In March 1978, in an interview in an Italian newspaper, he stated that "if in the future the Communist party were to acquire decisive influence in the government of such a major Common Market member-country as Italy, then the Federal Republic of Germany would be forced to reconsider all its decisions".

It is characteristic that, in principle, official circles in the USA reacted in the same way to the mere possibility of a victory by French Communists in parliamentary elections and of the Italian Communists joining the government. A representative of the US Administration made it understood at the time, although not in as open a form as Strauss, that in such a case the USA would hardly remain uninvolved. In January 1978 the

Paris *Le Monde* found such an approach shocking and considered it necessary to note in plain words that for 30 years, whenever the Communists seemed to be in a position to seize the reins of power in some particular country in the US "zone of influence", the United States intervened, and not always discreetly. This influential bourgeois newspaper had reason to ask whether such official threats were compatible with the commitment which Washington had undertaken for example in Helsinki, which prohibit any interference in the affairs of other states in Europe. "But what would the United States do if the Communists nevertheless came to power in a country? Besides, the United States has other means at its disposal for pressuring a country such as Italy, which has become so bogged down in debts. But its support of democracy acquires a strange accent when it is accompanied by such interference." [1]

Judging by the development of events at the end of the 1970s, imperialist circles would like more and more definitely to turn this "strange accent" into its version of détente and peaceful coexistence, which would be directed against existing socialism and against the Communists and the entire democratic movement. This is indicated primarily by attempts within certain circles in the West to use all the possibilities of NATO for a maximal increase of the arms race, on the grounds, so to speak, of détente. World public opinion has properly evaluated such plans as an attempt to hinder

[1] *Le Monde*, January 14, 1978, p. I.

political détente and to cast doubt upon the possibility of any degree of substantive progress in the field of military détente.

This is also indicated by the striving to transform NATO into an effective tool of the imperialist struggle against the national liberation movement, primarily in Africa. This question has been discussed for a long time, and came up at the recent sessions of NATO. Such ideas, taking the form of quite urgent recommendations, are discussed more openly within the Atlantic bloc at a "public level". The so-called Atlantic Treaty Association, whose purpose is to publicize NATO in Western countries (and in which quite eminent politicians take part), has already been in existence for over a quarter of a century (since 1954). At the XXVth annual assembly of the Association, held in the autumn of 1979 in Washington, it was stated quite frankly that "without widening NATO's formal zone of responsibility, we believe that the action needed to deal with problems arising outside the treaty area can, and should, be taken as the need arises by those member governments which believe action is necessary".

Translated into simpler language this means: if it is advantageous for some NATO member – in violation of international law – to intervene in the affairs of an Asian, African, Arab or Latin American state, then let it intervene. And NATO will provide encouragement and help. Strictly speaking, the creation of US rapid deployment force for surgical, instantaneous interference in the af-

fairs of countries situated far from US borders is a materialization of this idea. It is highly dangerous from the point of view of world peace, détente and security.

An ever clearer attempt is being made by certain circles in the West to knock together a "broad anti-communist front", in which Western powers, as well as China and reactionary regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, would join forces against détente, peace and disarmament. This is indicated, in particular, by NATO politicians' schemes to coordinate more closely the ideological attack on Communist parties in the member-countries of this aggressive bloc. A seminar held in Lisbon at the end of May 1978 by the Atlantic Treaty Association can serve as a strikingly cynical illustration of the intentions of the NATO leaders and masters. An attempt was made there to work out a "model" of a Communist party which would suit monopolistic and militaristic circles. It is not surprising that the fundamental criteria put forward were demands for a rejection of the principle of international solidarity ("independence from the CPSU"), organizational disarmament of the party (rejection of the principle of democratic centralism), agreement on the so-called Europe of monopolies and on pluralism, by which the bourgeoisie invariably means freedom for counter-revolution.

This is indicated, finally, by the fact that anti-communism and spurious phrases about the "Soviet threat" are used today, as they have been through all the decades since the Russian Revolution of October 1917, as the main and sole "argu-

ment" by which the West tries to justify the unending arms race, the unabating pile-up of the most modern weapons in its arsenals, primarily of nuclear arms, and its course of crushing all anti-war, left, and democratic movements and organizations which support security and the social progress of peoples.

Since the mid-1970s, when détente, especially in Europe, was gaining momentum, the CPSU and other Communist parties have more than once warned of the possibility of this type of ideological and political counterattack by NATO reactionary circles and other conservative, anti-democratic forces, and emphasized that the counterattack could be launched only under the banner of militant anti-communism.

"Anti-communism," the Final Document of the Berlin Conference of European Communists says, "was and remains an instrument which imperialist and reactionary forces use not only against Communists but also against other democrats and against democratic freedoms. These forces are conducting campaigns against the Communist parties, the socialist countries, beginning with the Soviet Union, against the forces of socialism and progress, campaigns which aim to discredit the policy and the ideals of Communists among the mass of the people and to prevent unity within the working-class movement and cooperation among the democratic and popular forces. It is in the interests of the aspiration of the popular forces for progress and for democratic development to isolate and

overcome anti-communism."[1] The subsequent course of events eloquently confirmed the correctness and timeliness of this stating of the problem. Judging by everything, it will also be highly topical in the 1980s.

The communist movement's real contribution to strengthening peace and security and to changing the alignment of forces in the international arena, which in the final analysis was both the reason and foundation of the turn to détente occurring in the late 1960s and early 1970s, is indisputable today. This contribution did not take the form, I repeat, of slogans and declarations, but of concrete, constructive policies of the socialist countries, of a persistent struggle by Communist parties – independently within their countries and jointly on the world scene – and finally of collectively worked out realistic programs proposed by the communist movement for the struggle against the threat of war, imperialist aggression, and for peace and disarmament. One might recall, for example, that under the extremely difficult conditions of the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was precisely the Communists who cleared the way for a radical change in the world by combining the struggle against war and the aggressive policies of imperialism with the struggle for peace and socialism. It was they who helped to create an atmosphere in which world public and responsible politicians began to believe more and more in the

[1] *For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe, Berlin, June 29-30, 1976*, Moscow, 1976, pp. 41-42.

necessity of ending the cold war and confrontation in inter-state, especially European, relations. The Communists also played a decisive role in the peace movement, which made a significant contribution to improving the political climate. Their business-like, one might say, workmanlike approach to international affairs, their constant readiness to engage in a dialogue and cooperation have largely helped unite the broad peace-loving and democratic forces which have today become an integral part of European politics, a factor of strengthening détente and consolidating the principles of peaceful coexistence.

One might use many facts to illustrate this point; in 1967, at the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties in Karlovy Vary, the Communists put forth a program for détente on the continent; the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of 1969 adopted a platform of struggle against the dangerous aggressive policies of imperialism, the platform that played an important role in the formation of the modern anti-war movement, which includes representatives of parties, organizations, and social groups of various political and ideological orientations; the Communists have been in the forefront of the campaigns of solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, the Arab countries, Chile, South Africa, etc. All of this, however, would lead us far from the theme of this book.

Therefore, I will only dwell on one circumstance. At the Berlin Conference of the Communist Parties of Europe (which I have already men-

tioned several times above), an extremely detailed political program was approved for perhaps the first time in the history of the world communist movement; it contains literally dozens and dozens of practical tasks whose accomplishment, either individually or all together, could promote détente and ensure more dependable security on the European continent. In the opinion of the Conference participants, this program could become the starting point both for a broad dialogue and for joint or parallel actions of the Communists, Social Democrats, and all who cherish peace.

This platform has, however, a very important feature. It is the first time that political and social problems are so closely intertwined, as its title indicates – "For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe". A special section is devoted to uprooting fascism and defending democracy and national independence. The Communists' internationalism is manifest in the platform suffering from no Eurocentrism: its last part contains concrete proposals for activating the struggle for peace, security, cooperation, national independence and social progress throughout the world.

Finally, the last and, perhaps, most important remark to be made in this context. The Final Document of the Berlin Conference is the first to set forth the position of the Communist parties on human rights and freedoms in such detail – a question which in the 1970s became one of the most acute in the ideological struggle on the world

scene. Supporting the principle of respect for human rights and freedoms included in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, the European communist movement called on all the European states to make it a binding norm both in international and in internal affairs.

The Communists, however, went significantly farther. They demanded real guarantees of the basic human rights. An essential prerequisite for this is the ratification and strict observation by all European states of international covenants on human rights worked out by the UN, which most of the Western governments had not yet acceded to by that time. Ratification of these covenants, the participants of the Berlin Conference stated, "is in the interests of the struggle of the working class and all working people for genuine social and political rights, such as the right to work, to an education, to housing, to the requisite social services, to adequate support when old, ill or disabled, for the accomplishment of equality for women and for the genuine participation of working people in social and public decision-making".[1]

Such an approach clearly shows that the Communists stand out as the most consistent champions of man's emancipation from all forms of exploitation, national and social inequality, for the creation of social, economic and political conditions which would not only provide a dependable guarantee of man's basic civil rights and freedoms,

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[1] *For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe, Berlin, June 29-30, 1976,* p. 53.

but would further the comprehensive and harmonious development of his personality. At the same time the Berlin Conference again affirmed the principled position of the Communists, who regard the struggle for democracy as indissolubly linked with the struggle for socialism and peace.

Both the document of and the entire discussion at the Berlin Conference were marked by the Communists' firm conviction that the connection between the struggle for peace and struggle for democracy and socialism is of two-fold nature, as it were: peace furthers social progress and social progress strengthens peace. It is precisely for this reason the European Communists considered it essential to state in the Conference's Final Document that the policies of peaceful coexistence, the active cooperation of states with different social systems, and the relaxation of international tension assist in the peoples' struggle for economic and social progress, and thus create the best conditions "for the implementation of the inalienable right of each and every people freely to choose and follow its own course of development".[1]

L. I. Brezhnev, speaking at the Berlin Conference, stressed very clearly that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regards the Final Document "as binding on our Party to wage a vigorous and persistent struggle for the aims collectively set by European Communists".[2]

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[1] *For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe, Berlin, June 29-30, 1976*, p. 31.

[2] Ibid., p. 26.

This is quite natural, for the CPSU has always considered itself a component part of the international communist movement, a member of a voluntary alliance of sovereign revolutionary parties of the working class, united by common international goals – the struggle for peace, security and the social progress of peoples. That is why I gave this chapter, devoted to the problem of "Communists, peace, and social progress", the title: "The Soviet Conception of Social Progress Under Peaceful Coexistence."

PEACE ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF MORALITY

At the dawn of the revolutionary workers' movement – it was in 1864 – Karl Marx, in his "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association", stressed that it was the duty of the working class "to master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power". And several lines later he wrote words which have been quoted very often since that time: the working class is called upon "to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations".[1]

Such a clearly and simply formulated task has proved to be incredibly complex, however, for

[1] Karl Marx, "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association". In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 2, p. 18.

morality and humanism in their traditional meaning, i.e., the meaning which a politically inexperienced man usually gives to these words, are alien to imperialist politics.

Nevertheless, immediately after the victory of the October Revolution in Russia, the goal indicated by Marx was adopted by the Soviet republic. In essence, Lenin made it the basis of Soviet Russia's foreign policy. Today it still serves as the foundation for the international activities of each state in the socialist community, representing its joint line in the world arena. And, of course, it still remains a kind of foundation for the Soviet foreign policy, for its conception of a universal, just, and democratic peace.

Peace has always been indivisible, and it is all the more so today, at the end of the 20th century, in the nuclear age. This means that there cannot be a "Soviet peace", "American peace" or "Chinese peace". The choice of a path to peace is not a matter of tactics, political intrigues or egoistic calculations. It is a serious matter which requires good will, mutual understanding, and mutual trust. Success hinges here on an equitable dialogue, a comparison of ideas and views, discussion and argument, which are subordinated to one goal: a search for optimal solutions to current problems of political and military détente.

The Soviet Union proceeds precisely from these considerations when putting forth its conception of peace. This conception has always been distinguished – and is distinguished today – by its open

character. It has never been either rigid or uncompromising, and much less has it taken the form of an ultimatum. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has unfailingly stated its sincere readiness to discuss any projects and initiatives, to introduce any corrections and changes into its proposals, making only one condition which, it seems, is wholly justified and natural: that their authors also assume the need to secure world peace and security and are determined to further the achievement of this goal by deeds.

Of course, it would be wrong to underestimate the real threat to peace posed by the propagandistic and political counterattack launched by the United States and several of its allies and partners at the turn of the 1980s. It is important to emphasize here what the Soviet Union stressed numerous times throughout the past decade: that any relapses of the cold war, all kinds of reversals and chance occurrences, including a sharp exacerbation of the situation even fraught with an armed conflict, are possible as long as détente has not become truly irreversible. Quite a lot was done in the 1970s to accomplish this task, but of course a great deal remains to be done. It would be naive to suppose that such a large and complex task, and one, moreover, which is constantly running into attempts by détente's opponents to prevent the goal from being achieved, could be accomplished in a mere ten years. And since this is the case, since détente has not yet become totally irreversible, one cannot exclude the possibility that the world will once again find itself on the

brink of war if all those who care about the destinies of mankind would not act in concert and repulse the counterattack by the enemies of peace.

But for all that, one should not forget what is most important: as mankind enters the 1980s, the political situation is fairly promising; détente has taken quite firm root and, on the whole, the alignment of forces on the world scene does not favor supporters of aggression and diktat, of politics "from a position of strength" and the cold war. That is why the Soviet Union looks optimistically to the 1980s, to the future. It is realistic and well-grounded optimism, for we understand, as L. I. Brezhnev stated in an interview to *Pravda*, that "American imperialism's intentional exacerbation of the international situation is an expression of its dissatisfaction with the consolidation of the position of socialism, the upswing of the national liberation movement, and the strengthening of forces championing détente and peace. We know that, in spite of all obstacles, the peoples' will has paved the way to the positive trend in world affairs which is broadly expressed by the word 'détente'. This has deep roots. Powerful forces support it, and it has every chance of remaining the leading tendency in the relations among states".[1]

Precisely these considerations determine the stand of the Soviet Union, which declares that its

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[1] *Pravda*, January 13, 1980.

foreign policy, combining consistent peacefulness and firm rebuff to aggression, a policy fully vindicated in the past decade, will be continued in the 1980s as well.

If one should attempt to define the essence of the Soviet conception of peace in just a couple of words, one might say the following: it is humanistic and realistic. Indeed: what, for example, is the Soviet Union trying to achieve in the international arena? What tasks does it consider of prime importance now, at the beginning of a new decade, the next to the last of the 20th century? What steps, in its opinion, must be taken in order that a secure, universal and long-term peace, based on the principle of equitable cooperation and peaceful coexistence, might become a reality? The Soviet point of view on this score has been set forth numerous times in speeches by Party and state leaders and in official statements by the Soviet government. It has also been expressed clearly and unambiguously in numerous concrete projects and initiatives which the Soviet Union has put forth in recent years, primarily at the turn of the 1980s.

What issues are involved?

It is, first of all, a matter of putting an end to the arms race, stopping it, and then reducing arms, armies, and military budgets, keeping the final goal in mind – universal and complete disarmament under effective international control. In other words, it is a matter of securing material progress in the field of military détente, which

should accompany, supplement, and reinforce political détente.

Second, it is a matter of eliminating all hotbeds of military and political tension, of furthering a just and full settlement of all outstanding issues caused by the policies of aggression and foreign interference. In other words, it is a matter of furthering normalization of the situation and the creation of centers of security, so to say, in places where regional conflicts which are not yet settled represent a serious threat to world peace.

It is a matter, finally, of making détente universal, of its embracing the entire globe, of transforming the principles of peaceful coexistence, once they have become firmly established, into a natural norm of modern international relations. In other words, it is a matter of maximally broadening and deepening effective, mutually advantageous, and equitable cooperation in the political, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural fields on a bilateral and multilateral basis, in the interests of all peoples and states – large and small, those that have achieved a high level of economic development and those that have just started to modernize their economies.

This is the road to peace as viewed from Moscow now, at the beginning of the 1980s. No single state in isolation can, of course, master it on its own. Common efforts are needed here, joint searchings, coordinated steps by all states and by all those interested in preventing man from stray-

ing from this path and plunging into the abyss of nuclear war. Only then might one count on successfully travelling the entire road to its end, without losses, and thus to build a peace which would be in the interest of all humanity, every people and every state, a peace which really would become genuinely democratic, genuinely equitable and genuinely just, because it would be based on the simple laws of morality and justice.

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Novosti Press Agency Publishing House

Andrei Nikolaevich Yermonsky is a Soviet commentator on international affairs. He was born in 1936 and in 1958 graduated from Moscow State Lomonosov University. He has published articles in the Soviet press on foreign policy, disarmament, and peaceful coexistence.