J. B. Baillie. The Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic 1901
The problem of the Phenomenology is the “Inquiry into and Examination of the reality of knowledge."[1] This is not the only or the fullest expression for it; others will meet us as we proceed, and some have been already indicated. But the above is, on the whole, the most accurate and precise, and we will therefore at the outset make clear what it means. To begin with, it must be noted that the discussion does not in any way concern the possibility of knowledge; it does not inquire whether there is knowledge at all or whether knowledge is of the “real.” Hegel simply accepts in the first instance the fact that there is knowledge, and accepts this fact in much the same way that it is accepted by the ordinary consciousness.[2] And with this he must also admit the claims of all forms of knowledge to be actual knowledge, at least prima facie. Whether knowledge is possible, what are the conditions of possible knowledge, or, again, what are the limits of knowledge, he does not investigate.[3] Now knowledge taken in this very general sense is not, strictly speaking, merely “science,” and yet is wide enough to include the latter. But it is science with which Hegel is primarily concerned, and this is its highest stage as speculative science, Philosophy. This ideal knowledge is present to Hegel throughout the whole argument, and is as much a reality for him as knowledge in general. He does not merely lead up to this conception; it is active all along. It was presupposed, as we saw, before writing the Phenomenology; and the conception of it is operative throughout the investigation. It is not an “ideal” of science which cannot be attained, it is actual science and the truest form of science attainable; indeed, strictly considered, it is the only true science. Only in this its highest form does knowledge become really science or “true knowledge.” The phrase “reality of knowledge” has thus a double meaning.
All knowledge is real knowledge which is knowledge at all; and the highest, being a form of knowledge like all the other forms, is “real” in the same sense as they are. But just in virtue of this common element in all forms of knowledge it is necessary to signalise the difference between what is par excellence knowledge, true science, and what is ordinary knowledge. The distinction is secured by regarding true science as the only real knowledge; in it we have knowledge “as it truly is,” knowledge “really.” And this twofold interpretation of “reality” gives rise, as we shall see, to a twofold conception of the problem. On the one hand it is an investigation into every form of knowledge, on the other an inquiry concerning true or absolute science.
When knowledge is taken in its widest significance there is only one general characteristic common to all its forms. It is that by which knowledge is knowledge, viz., the relation of a subject to an object, the presence of an object for and to consciousness. Such is, indeed, the ordinary conception of knowledge; but the ordinary view distinguishes between the presence of an object for consciousness and the existence of the.
object by itself, as it is apart from such a reference. And this distinction it expresses by maintaining that while in the former case there is certainly knowledge, only in the latter case, when we have the object as it is by itself, is there truth; for the truth is the essence of the object, the object as it is in itself without further reference.[4] This general view of the difference between knowledge and truth Hegel agrees to adopt without close scrutiny, partly because it is the ordinary conceptions of knowledge with which he has to deal (and by accepting this he has committed himself likewise to the ordinary interpretation above given), and partly because it provides him with a distinction of immediate use for his own inquiry or a point of departure for it. For it is clear that in that distinction between Knowledge and truth we have the means at once of determining what true science is, and of investigating all other forms of Knowledge as Knowledge.[5] This will become evident if we consider what is the relation between the two factors named.
All Knowledge has for its content truth of some sort; truth is not merely the goal or aim of knowledge, it is simply what any form of Knowledge contains. Knowledge in general may be even asserted to be identical with truth. But this statement would be ambiguous, for if truth is taken to mean the whole truth and nothing less, then there is obviously a difference between Knowledge and truth; and it was to assert this that the above distinction[6] was drawn. At the same time, how ever, it must be maintained that in some measure Knowledge at all times, and in every form, claims to contain truth. Hence it is necessary to distinguish between the truth which there is for consciousness in every form of Knowledge, i.e., the truth which is possessed by consciousness merely in virtue of its relation to an object, and the truth obtained by relation to the object in itself, the complete essence of the object, which may or may not in a given case be for consciousness, but which is all that the object is, “the truth” of the object per se.
Now it seems in the very nature of the case that these two forms of truth will approximate. For, since all knowledge contains truth, and since “the whole alone is what is true,"[7] it is impossible to rest content in anything short of the complete truth. And it is equally manifest that this truth will be attained more completely by some forms of knowledge than by others, more completely according to the measure in which the object in itself is for consciousness. Hence we can easily see that for every degree of approximation to the truth in its completeness there will be a corresponding specific form of Knowledge. And thus we obtain the starting-point for Hegel’s inquiry. Every form[8] of Knowledge, every mode in which an object is for and to consciousness, is different from every other just in the degree of identification of the object in itself with the object for consciousness, and can be investigated from that point of view.
Further, truth, according to the usual conception, consists in the “agreement of thought with its object.” Translated into the above terms, this means that truth is the agreement of the object for consciousness with the object as it is in itself. If, then, the only truth is the whole, and if partial truth means merely partial agreement between the object for consciousness with the object in itself, the only complete resting-place for knowledge is where the agreement becomes absolute, where thought and the object are identical. Such an identification, therefore, is the truth of knowledge, “the absolutely true.” Now this is precisely the meaning of Speculative Science in Hegel’s sense; and with this as an ideal all other forms of truth and of knowledge can be compared.[9] If we give these abstract statements more concrete shape we shall see at once their significance for the investigation we are considering.
Truth is realised when thought “agrees,” “corresponds,” with its object.
But “thought” is simply the abstract expression for the Ego; for the Subject, or Mind, as Hegel is never weary of saying, is essentially Reason, Thought. Consequently that with which the object is to “agree” in order to attain truth at all (whether partial or complete) is the Subject itself. In absolute truth we saw thought, or notion, was to be identical with object. In Absolute Science, therefore, subject and object, mind, and its other, will be one. But if so subject will be to itself object, Ego will be to itself other Ego, Consciousness will be simply Self-Consciousness.
In other words, the absolute truth of knowledge is the presence to consciousness of its own self. Self-consciousness is the truth of that relation of mind to its object which constitutes knowledge. Only when the externality of the object to mind has ceased, only when thought is identified with its object, have we absolute truth or Absolute Knowledge; and such identity has no place except in Self-consciousness.
Now what object is it that the self has to itself in such knowledge? What is its “self"? This is nothing other than Thought. But if the presence of thought to itself is the absolute truth, then the truth of the object as it is in itself (above signalised as distinct from ordinary knowledge) must simply be Thought, the Notion. The object in itself is the truth of the object; for the object in itself is its essence, and this essence is just the notion of the object, the thought which constitutes it. If so, then, it is not the object in all its details, in all its plurality of content, which is expressed in its notion, but the essential meaning of the object, the object as it is an sich. Hence the self which is present to itself, and thereby constitutes absolute truth, must be the totality of the notions which constitute and determine reality as a whole. Thus the complete and systematic exposition of these will give Absolute Knowledge. Speculative Science, and only this, will satisfy the demand for the “supremacy of mind,” “the omnipotence of reason.” As compared with this ideal of science, ordinary knowledge presents a decided contrast. Here all we have is the presence of an object to and for consciousness; and this is distinct from the truth, from the object as it is in itself. In knowledge, as we usually find it, consciousness falls in some sense apart from and outside its object. These are not so much identified as set over against and opposed to each other. Far from subject and object seeming identical, they appear separated by the “whole diameter of being.” Still, let the difference be asserted to be as absolute as possible, it is evident, even from the view currently taken concerning their relation, that on the one hand consciousness has in knowledge some truth, that is, there is always some identity, some agreement, between subject and object; and on the other, there is a closer intimacy, a nearer agreement between consciousness and its object in some spheres of experience than in others, though in none short of absolute truth is the distinction and opposition removed entirely. Now that there is truth at all implies that the essence of the object, the object as it is in itself, is in some manner or degree present to consciousness; and that the agreement should vary in extent simply means that consciousness can differ in its relation to truth.
These two facts, combined with that conception of absolute truth already outlined, not merely suggest the analysis of the various forms of knowledge with a view to establishing the degree of truth they contain, but indicate at the same time the line along which the inquiry is to proceed.
For in the Phenomenology Hegel investigates knowledge with a view to discovering that kind of knowledge which is absolutely true.
But to do this Hegel does not consider the object qua object without reference to the subject knowing.[10] He has to investigate the relation established in any form of knowledge, the way in which mind (consciousness) appears when an object is present to it. In other words, it is consciousness in relation to object, and the form which that relation assumes, that is the object of his inquiry. All these forms are forms of knowledge, and the point of the investigation is just to disclose the true form, “the truth of knowledge.” Now the truer form of knowledge meant a greater “agreement” between consciousness and its object, and vice versa. Hence it is that, since in all knowledge there is, besides distinction of consciousness and object, “agreement” between them according to the truth contained in any given form, a change in the truth means a change at once of the object and of the forms of consciousness. A difference in the form of knowledge is only possible by a difference in both form of consciousness and object of consciousness. That this should be the case follows at once from the nature of truth and of knowledge.[11] These are constituted by a relation, the former of the notion of an object to the object itself, the latter by the presence of an object to consciousness; and these two apparently different relations become, as we see, essentially one and the same relation by the identification of thought and consciousness. That relation, then, being necessary, it is obvious that a change in the degree or form of knowledge means a change in both terms through which the relation is constituted. And when, therefore, we investigate knowledge with a view to determining its truth (that form of it in which alone the goal of knowledge is absolutely realised), it lies in the very nature of knowledge that the determination of a “higher,” a “truer” knowledge should mean an alteration both of the form of consciousness and of the object.[12] Now there is only one way in which this inquiry can be prosecuted.
It is assumed at the start that there is absolutely true knowledge, that there is only one such form of knowledge, and that all other forms of knowledge cannot give absolute truth. At best these latter contain only implicitly that absolute truth, and if we regard truth as one, the truth they do contain is truth in virtue of this implicit identity of their form with absolute knowledge. The investigation of these forms, then, with a view to discovering their truth can consist solely in the comparison of the truth of knowledge with the actual knowledge in a given case. And this comparison cannot and must not be external, in the sense that the standard by which knowledge is judged is brought to it from a sphere outside consciousness. The criticism is immanent. For the truth of knowledge and the knowledge itself both fall inside the one experience. It must not, however, be supposed that the conception of absolute truth is explicitly present at every stage or form of knowledge, and that by means of this the comparison is made. This is neither necessary nor possible; in fact that this should be the case would be absurd. It is not necessary, because every form of knowledge, as we saw, has its own specific truth, that which is the essence of the object presented in each case; by this alone the comparison can be made. And it is not possible, because the conception of absolute truth is not attained by consciousness till the end of the investigation itself. No doubt we may say it is absolute truth which is implicitly present in the truth possessed by any given form of knowledge; still this is not that which is actually present, and by which the truth of each particular stage of knowledge is determinable. Each mode of actual knowledge contains the truth of that form of knowledge; the object[13] as it is for consciousness, and that which consciousness in each case accepts as the essence of that object, are both in consciousness at every stage. Consciousness has in itself both the standard and the knowledge compared by the standard.[14] The investigation is of consciousness by consciousness, and the inquiry just consists in examining whether the knowledge of the object corresponds with the truth of the object, both being present in consciousness.
It might, indeed, be asserted that the inquiry is impossible, for the only knowledge to be found is of the object as it is known, that it is impossible to get behind this to the truth of the object, the object as it is in itself; or again, that the only truth is just the object as it is for consciousness.
But the mere fact that in consciousness there is knowledge of an object implies the distinction between this and the essence of the object itself.[15] If, then, it is found by the above method of procedure that knowledge does not correspond to the truth, the knowledge must be altered.
But this alteration is at once a negation of the former knowledge and the introduction of a change in the object, a “new truth.” It is the latter, because the object formerly present to consciousness, and of which there was knowledge, was simply the object necessary to that form of knowledge and appropriate to it; any other object would mean another knowledge.
The change, therefore, in the knowledge arising out of the above comparison necessarily implies change in the object, would not be a change without it. But by this change consciousness becomes aware that what was previously regarded as the essence, or the truth in contrast to the knowledge, is not in reality the final essence, but merely the essence appropriate to that stage of consciousness, not really the truth, but the truth “for it.” This, in fact, is just what the change means.[16] Again, it is the former (the negation of the previous knowledge), for that knowledge has shown itself not to correspond to the truth of the object present to it, and is in that sense false, and is removed and replaced by the succeeding knowledge. Still, it is not simply abolished as utterly false.[17] The mere fact that the changed knowledge proceeds from, and succeeds to, the previous form means that this new knowledge gets its specific character from the preceding, and is therefore not the bare denial of it. It is the negative in relation to the preceding knowledge, has thus a content derived from the preceding, is not mere negative. In virtue of this the preceding form is, while negated, at the same time preserved, and maintains its reality in the succeeding, for it determines the character of the latter. And further, because the truth which is compared and contrasted with each form of knowledge is the truth of that knowledge and of no other, the changed form of knowledge is the direct and only outcome, i.e., the “immediate negation,” of the preceding.
It is by the combination of all these factors, then, that the science of the phenomenal forms of experience is constructed and obtained. None are thereby omitted; all have a place in the context of experience. All are limited, finite, and in part untrue; yet their untruth does not mean their annihilation; their untruth means no more and no less than that by the immanent process of their own content (a process which is inevitable, because experience is a process, a living activity) each brings to view its inner truth, and becomes, therefore, absorbed in that truth. This again, because it is a new content of experience, establishes a new form of experience ipso facto, the negation of, but at the same time the result of, and therefore containing, the preceding. It is this character of negation as negation with a specific content, as a determinate result, not pure negation, which is the nerve of the process.
No other method could lead up to, by inner and immanent necessity, the truest form of knowledge; and only by it could it be ascertained that all modes of experience had been included in the system. By no other method, therefore, could the two ends of the inquiry be realised, to exhibit all experience as the organized content of the Absolute, and establish the position of Absolute Idealism, that Substance is Subject. And, again, this method would only be suitable for this purpose, for the method is one with the content itself, is not brought externally to it, is essentially bound up with it; to refuse to acknowledge the one is to deny the claim and meaning of the other. It is the content which imposes upon itself, and reveals itself through, this method; for that content being the moment of the one Mind with one experience which can abstract itself from any particular content, and yet posit each moment as itself, must thereby have its own immanent movement.
This process, then, is the inner critical exposition of the mind’s content (experience) to itself, and is named a dialectic movement. It consists in nothing other than in bringing into explicit and complete distinctness that identity, through which, and in virtue of which, the opposed elements, subject-object, exist in inseparable unity throughout experience. Instead of leaving them opposed, and expressing them as is done in the judgment or proposition (where their separateness is emphasised), this method regards their identity, their unity alone. Hence the propositional form, and with it the process of proving by reference to and by means of “reasons” and “grounds,” are sublated in but are not appropriate to the true speculative procedure.[18] It accomplishes by that movement of inner connexion what is otherwise established by more or less external proof. And just this insistence on complete and full presentation of that inner unity constitutes the distinctive feature of dialectic process as compared with that method which leaves to Anschauung[19] the insight into that unity without exposing its entire content to view.
Such is the ground plan of this Science of Experience. All the forms, modes of mind are taken simply as they exist side by side, as facts in the history of conscious experience, as “appearances” of mind. Phenomenal they are too in another sense, that, namely, of being appearances of true and perfect science.[20] In either or both cases the science which gives the analysis and synthesis of all these phenomena of mind’s experience is accurately named “Phenomenology of Mind.” In passing from this general statement of the matter and method of the inquiry itself, we must remove at least one possible obscurity which seems to hang over the investigation from the start. It is not evident from the above whether the process as described is to be found actually taking place in the consciousness investigated, or whether the several moments in the process are due to the significance ascribed to them solely by the consciousness investigating. Does the consciousness which is engrossed in actual experience become aware that on the appearance of a new truth, the form of consciousness, the form of knowledge must likewise be altered, that the new truth present to the mirror of consciousness implies that the mirror itself has likewise revolved, and must necessarily revolve with it? Clearly, the ordinary consciousness is not actually aware either of the process of change or the conditions by which it is effected, but solely of the fact that there is a new determination of consciousness. The change is produced by the inherent necessity of its own constitution and “in spite of itself.” Consequently there is a moment of this experience which does not come to light in the consciousness immersed in actual experience, but only in the investigator. Still, this is obviously only a formal difference; for the content of each new truth must be present to the ordinary consciousness, must indeed be explicitly present. It is merely the process by which it enters and becomes aware of the truth, and so possesses a new experience, i.e., it is only the origination of the new forms, which becomes explicit to the investigator in a way which is not present to the consciousness which merely “has” the experience.[21] This double reference of the problem gives rise to the double significance of the truth, the object in itself which appears in the investigation and is necessary to it. For the truth, while at first simply taken as distinct from knowledge alone, was seen to possess a twofold aspect, that in which it appeared as truth for consciousness, and that in which it was the truth apart from this reference to consciousness, and in virtue of which the mode of consciousness was changed and a new truth constituted. Actual consciousness is only explicitly aware of the former, the mind investigating is aware of both.
The former is aware of the process after the new result is established, the latter while it is proceeding; the latter knows how a new, how a higher moment of consciousness is arrived at, why it is truer, and what the process aims at; the former simply knows that a new and higher result is obtained, and that a process has taken place.[22] It will not serve our purpose directly to furnish any systematic account of the actual argument of the Phenomenology itself. Our primary interest in it lies in its plan and purpose which we have already given, and more particularly in its conclusion. We must restrict ourselves, therefore, to stating in a sentence by what steps Hegel reaches the result of the Phenomenology.
Taking experience as it “naturally” presents itself, there are three primary and specifically distinct objects to which consciousness can stand in relation, with which it can identify itself. These, broadly distinguished, are (a) what exists as object in space and time, as “external” to mind; (b) the self, mind as such; and (c) what is at once self and “external” object, what is neither of the former specifically, but is both at once. These three give the general attitudes of mind, known as Consciousness (of objects), Self-consciousness, and Reason. Each has its own special modi. In the first, for example, the simplest mode is that where Consciousness and objectivity meet at particular points, so to say, the stage of merely immediate awareness of objectivity – Sense-knowledge, sensuous consciousness. Another mode, again, is Understanding, where that original opposition is still found, but is implicitly overcome. And so on for the various modi of these three fundamental forms of mind.
Now the argument consists in beginning with that general form where the essential identity[23] between the opposed elements in the relation is least asserted, namely, at the stage of mere consciousness. Moreover, it begins with that particular mode of consciousness in which there seems least of all identity, where mind and object stand furthest apart – at the stage named Sense consciousness.[24] It then proceeds by the method and means already indicated to show that one mode when examined leads on to and finds its truth in another, the modes of consciousness finding their truth in Self-consciousness, where the identity is more manifest, and this latter, again, finding its ultimate truth in Reason, where mind attains its richest expression, where mind is “at home with itself,” its object being its inner self. Reason is thus the truth of consciousness, the highest mode of mind. It embraces all reality, and is all reality; in it objectivity and subjectivity are one. This is, therefore, the final general stage of the whole inquiry.
But the argument is not yet exhausted. For when we first reach Reason, that identity is merely abstract and formal. The rest of the inquiry is then devoted to completely exhausting all that this, the chief result which was to be established, contains.
The procedure is again determined in the manner in which the three ground forms of the whole inquiry were established, namely, by reference to the distinctive spheres in which in the form of Reason mind can stand in relation to its object, i.e., to itself. It is one with and is found in that kind of object which as a whole is named “Nature,” which is immediately identical with it, but which qua Nature, and because merely immediately present to Reason, is only implicitly identified with mind as Reason. Again, by consideration of the unity of Reason with Nature, we are led on to the unity of Reason with its self, self-consciousness of Reason, concrete mind proper – the sphere of Ethical experience. From this, again, we pass to what is the truth of both the outwardness, the external identity of reason with Nature, and of the inwardness, the internal identity of Reason with its self. This is the completely explicit identity of Reason with all reality without exception, where individual mind is one with Absolute Mind, where the absolute Reality is absolute Reason, absolute Personality, Subject. This sphere is in the first instance that of Religion, and in the second instance that of Absolute Knowledge.
This last, then, is the final and, without qualification, the truest mode of mind, the highest truth of experience, and the result of the whole inquiry.
This conclusion of the Phenomenology of Mind is of the greatest significance, not merely as regards the various forms of mind which have appeared in the course of the inquiry, but also in regard to Hegel’s philosophy as a whole, and more especially, as we shall see presently, in regard to the Logic. It is essential, therefore, for our purpose that the import of “Absolute Knowledge” should be fully appreciated.
Let us recall the problem which the Phenomenology seeks to solve.
We saw that it sought to state systematically all the attitudes which consciousness takes up towards what is presented to it as an object, and to exhibit the truth of each form which showed itself, and by consequence, therefore, to state that form which was, without qualification, the final relation which consciousness could take up to its object. The inquiry presupposed the separation of consciousness on the one side from the object of which mind is conscious on the other, and presup posed also the conception of truth which, equally with the other presupposition, is found in ordinary thought as it currently appears. By means of the connexion and the distinction between subject and object implied in these two suppositions the inquiry proceeds, and the stages of its movement are determined. It is in virtue of the fact that the object is for consciousness (and in that sense external to, separate from it) that it is possible for mind to be cognisant of its truth, and it is because in truth mind knows the object as it is in itself that the separateness of mind from the object can be shown and can be found to vanish.
Now it lies in the very nature of such an examination into the “truth of knowledge” that the results arrived at should in effect be double-sided in character. The inquiry affects mind on the one side and the object of consciousness on the other, and affects them simultaneously; a determination of the one implies a determination of the other. There is not merely a certain object present to consciousness, but a certain mode of consciousness peculiar to that object present to it; and these proceed pari passu.[25] Hence it is that an analysis of the truth contained in a given moment or form of knowledge has reference to both sides of the relation constituted in and by knowledge. The truth of the object in any given case means also a truth of consciousness, a specific pulse or moment of its life, a phase of mental (spiritual) experience. The development of the one proceeds throughout side by side with the other; a higher truth in the one case means, at the same time and in the same sense, a higher truth in the case of the other. The knowledge of the truth and the truth of knowledge pass from stage to stage together.
Further, it results from the nature of the initial contrast between truth and knowledge that the inquiry should be a determinate process towards a definite conclusion. The “truth of knowledge” means not merely the truth at a given stage, but the final and absolute truth. In this sense also the inquiry has a double reference, a reference not merely to the nature and significance of the knowledge immediately under consideration, but also to the highest and truest form under which knowledge can appear in spiritual experience. It is just as true to say that the truth of any given form of knowledge determines the final truth as to say that the latter is what implicitly determines the former. For it is the nature of any given form of knowledge (except the first) to be the truth in the first place of what immediately precedes it, and by implication the truth of all that has gone before; that it should include it in itself as a moment in its own content, and thereby determined by itself. Thus, just as in any given case the truth in question is determined by what precedes, so the final form is the last determination of the truth, depending on because containing, and evolved out of, the preceding. On the other hand, again, it is equally and perhaps more obviously true that it is the presence of the final form as the ideal and end at each stage in the process which determines the truth of each form of knowledge. The mere fact that in each there is truth, and that this truth is not annihilated, implies that it shares in the nature of the perfect form of knowledge.
What this final form must be is evident from the contrast between truth and knowledge already mentioned. Since knowledge consists in the presence and yet opposedness of an object to consciousness, and since the consciousness of the object in itself (its truth) means the dissolution of the opposition between the object in itself and the object for consciousness, it follows that the final and complete truth of knowledge can only then be attained when the objectivity of the object and the truth of the object have been entirely and without reserve identified. Now the objectivity of an object just consists in its being for consciousness, in the maintenance of a self-subsistence in contrast with, and in that sense apart from, consciousness; its presence to consciousness and its objectivity are interchangeable terms. But it only maintains that subsistence and apartness in so far as, and so long as, the contrast persists between the object in itself and the object for mind; because it is in virtue of the “in itself” of the object that it is possible for the object to subsist over against, to be for consciousness. If, then, this “in itself” which constitutes its positive substantiality becomes itself object of consciousness, is itself for consciousness, then clearly objectivity, opposedness of the object to consciousness, has ceased to exist. Thus we see that the final form of knowledge means and contains not merely the identification of the object in itself and the object for consciousness, but also the identification of the object itself with mind.
Reciprocally, again, such a conclusion equally signifies that mind is identified in true knowledge with the object; for since the opposition has vanished, the result leaves neither of the factors necessary to knowledge alone and by itself to constitute the perfect form of knowledge. The final truth of the object is the complete truth of mind; the ultimate being of the one is identical with that of the other. And this highest form is not simply an ideal to which all the preceding forms point and which determines the process of the inquiry; it is itself a definite actual form among other forms of experience. The truth of knowledge is at once the absolute truth of mind, that form in which it most completely exhibits its essential, self and the absolute content of objectivity, the ultimate essence of reality as a whole.
Now we have but to bear in mind these various aspects of the inquiry in order to make more explicit the special content of Absolute Knowledge. The three significant elements are: the double reference first mentioned, the character and conditions of the process of the inquiry, and the result at which it finally must arrive. Since the truth obtained at each stage registers a moment of the object as well as of mind, the deepening of the knowledge of the truth of the object means at the same time a mere explicit expression of the essential and ultimate content of mind. But since mind becomes explicit only to itself, this unfolding of its content is simply the increasing of the consciousness of itself by mind, the development of self-consciousness. And again, since the evolution of the content of consciousness is synchronous with the gradual disappearance of the distinction between mind and its object, the abolition of external objectivity is the establishment of complete self-consciousness; the objectivity which is there found is also and essentially subjectivity, and conversely. The process of the inquiry thus leads first of all to the assimilation of the object to the content of mind as such, and thereafter evolves into complete explicitness the entire nature of mind in all its determinate relations to itself; the whole argument being, therefore, a gradual approximation by mind to its own essential self.
We found the first steps in this self-consciousness actually reached when the moment Reason was attained; and thenceforward it will be noted mind is occupied solely and consciously with its, self in some one or other of the forms under which it is presented to itself. Reason is not simply a “function” of mind among other functions; it is a phase or form of actual mind. It is that form, namely, in which mind abstractly but explicitly expresses its oneness with itself. It is the first, the immediate, and therefore merely general statement of the mind’s own nature; for the bare consciousness that its object is its self, and that itself is one with all reality, is the first moment in which mind appears explicitly as what in truth it is. Mind is not in Reason conscious of its self as distinct from the reality of which it is conscious; it is conscious of its self in all reality.
In Reason, therefore, mind first appears in its truth, having the character of universality, as conscious only of itself wheresoever and whensoever it has an object presented to it, as subjective and objective at once. And this, which is the first statement of the truth of mind, is the first indication of the result of the whole inquiry. For Reason is not merely the nature of mind, it is at the same time the nature of all reality.
Reason is not to be set over against reality; that would take us back to the opposition already overcome. Reason is therefore the “truth” of objectivity.
Reason pure and simple, however, is not completely realised mind, and it is thus distinct from further developments of mind. It is merely the first approximation to the ultimate truth regarding mind. In short, Reason is essentially mind, but Reason as such does not exhaust its truth. Only when Reason is further developed does it exhibit the complete reality of mind.
This step having been taken, the argument from this point onwards slightly alters in complexion. The further process of the argument consists in mind becoming more inward to itself, in the deepening of its consciousness of its own reality. The only development which remains possible must consist in the more intimate consciousness by mind of its self, a process by which mind is shown to be more concrete, richer in content, and which finally lays bare the absolute truth of mind, the highest form under which it appears.
All along, be it observed, mind is both objectivity and subjectivity; its realisation of itself is not confined to a subjective sphere. Its explicit reality is essentially the negation of any opposition between the two. It may be said that in “Morality” the argument seems to have passed away from any reference to the objective sphere; but such a view can only be entertained when “objective” is restricted to a very narrow meaning (to what lies “outside” consciousness), and if so entertained the whole argument becomes meaningless. For mind has already been shown in Reason to be at home with itself and one with objectivity, even in that narrow sense in which objectivity is restricted to “nature”; and Reason as it is more fully appears in “morality” and its allied forms, still more completely reveals the identification of mind with objectivity, the moral life being simply the “externalisation,” the objectification of Reason. In these forms, therefore, mind is yet more explicit and more truly itself.
Further, because mind has been established as the one all-determining reality, this gradual process of realising its content reaches a stage (in the sphere of inner morality) where objective self-subsistent mind is opposed to the inner consciousness of its self which the individual mind possesses. Out of this contrast, which is also an inner though not explicit union, Religion arises. Now it obviously lies in the very nature of Hegel’s principle as hitherto developed that the Absolute Reality, which is the object with which consciousness in Religion is concerned, should be convertible with Absolute Mind. This, after what has been said, hardly needs to be proved. But in Religion it is characteristic that emphasis is laid not so much upon the individual who is religious, but upon the object with which the religious mind is concerned, namely, the Absolute Reality. That is the one all-absorbing fact before the religious consciousness, before which the individual consciousness seems to fade into insignificance.
In Religion, in short, the individual reality is transcended, and another reality asserts itself as higher than and containing in itself the transcended finite reality. Hence it is for this reason that in Religion mind reaches a deeper consciousness of its own reality, makes more concrete its inner nature, than was possible in the case of Morality. For in the latter mind is conscious of itself in individuals; its reality as the universal principle is explicitly and concretely exhibited in the sphere of finite individual minds, without direct implication in that result of the Ultimate and Absolute Mind which contains and is the fundamental reality of both the merely “immediate reality” with which Reason is concerned and of the self-mediated reality which appears in morality.
But in Religion it is this ultimate Reality as such, in the totality of its content, whose nature is specially, indeed solely, determined. Instead of Absolute Mind being either implicitly present or insufficiently realised, we have in the religious consciousness its actual content as it is in itself made explicit and determinate. And the development of mind towards concreteness being simply the expression of its consciousness of itself, we see that in Religion Absolute Mind becomes actualised and self-conscious.
In other words, in Religion we have the absolute nature of mind, as the ground reality of the world, completely and definitely expressed.
Now we have just seen that Religion has its whole significance and its main interest in the Absolute Reality which is its object; it eliminates the individual in the sense that the religious mind occupies the sphere of Supreme Reality, is consciously one with it, and claims direct relation with and cognisance of it. It places itself at the point of view of Absolute Reality. But if this is the nature of Religion, only a very short step is required in order to assume consciously and without qualification the actual position of the Absolute as such. In fact, such a step is already implicit in that transcendence of the individual just spoken of. And this step Hegel has no hesitation in taking. Indeed he was logically compelled to take it, not merely by the above consideration, but by the very nature of his principle, a principle which also made it easy for him to do so. For since mind has been established as the absolute essence of all reality, individual mind and Absolute Mind are thereby identified. And since the concreteness of mind consists in self-consciousness, we have in the self-consciousness of individual mind the concreteness of Absolute Mind itself; the realisation of the one combines with it and expresses that of the other. When, therefore, in Religion the individual asserts and maintains its unity with Absolute Mind, and claims that in Absolute Mind it is conscious of its own life, that the Absolute Mind is its self, it is evident that the identification is as emphatic as it could be, and that the standpoint of the Absolute is deliberately assumed.
This position is still further secured when it is shown that the highest and final form of Religion is Revealed Religion. That this should be the highest form is simply the direct consequence of the nature of Hegel’s fundamental principle. For given that Reality is essentially mind, and that the self-consciousness which appears in Religion finds the self of which it is conscious in the absolute essence of the world, it is in the nature of the case that the highest form under which that relation to the Absolute is expressible should be that of direct consciousness of its content and nature, or, in other words, should be the direct manifestation by the Absolute of its inmost reality to the mind whose self it is. If true religion is found where Absolute Mind is the self of the religious consciousness, it obviously follows that the truest expression for the relation established between the Absolute and the religious mind is that of “manifestation,” immediate outgoing of its reality, direct “communication” of the content of the former to the latter. And this is precisely the character of “revealed” religion.
But while in Revealed Religion the standpoint of the Absolute as such is assumed without reservation (for otherwise it would not be revelation at all), yet in Religion the individual is not explicitly and positively eliminated. If this were the case it could not strictly be called revelation, for this implies necessarily relation to a mind which in some sense is distinct from the source of the revelation. Still, the individual is only preserved in a way which is compatible with the direct presence of the Absolute. This can be brought about only by the identification of the individual with the Absolute Mind, or, as it is otherwise expressible, of the human with the divine nature. And such a union Hegel explicitly maintains to be a reality of experience. But while this seems to reassert the separate existence of the individual, it really takes up the position of the Absolute in virtue of the inseparableness of the content of individual and Absolute Mind. Still the maintenance of that distinction is necessary to the religious life as such.[26] Hence it is that in Religion the Absolute is not explicitly determined as it essentially is. In Religion the absolute content is merely “represented” (vorgestellt) to consciousness; it is not explicitly expressed in terms adequate to its nature, but in symbolic or incomplete form. The content is certainly revealed in its fulness, but the way in which this takes place is not the form which expresses that content in its truth. This insufficiency of the form to the content lies in the nature of Religion, which at once insists on as well as denies the distinction between absolute and finite mind.
Thus in Religion Absolute Mind is not determinately and absolutely self-conscious. In order to become so one step and one only is necessary, that the form in which it is conscious of its self should correspond and be adapted to the self of which it is conscious. But to obtain this the individual must be completely eliminated, and the Absolute Mind must be that for which and by which its own content is explicitly determined.
But this result can be accurately attained where to its content is given the form of its inmost self. The absence of this is all that is wanting to that content as it appears in Revealed Religion; and to adopt this step is to express completely and truly the final nature of Absolute Mind. But to know itself in and through the form of self is to have as its object the self for which the object is present. And this is simply to realise its own notion, the notion of its self, that by which it essentially is. Now this self which knows itself in its own notion, and in that notion has realised itself, is Absolute Knowledge; knowledge of the content of Absolute Mind by Absolute Mind is perfect and final knowledge, is true Science.
Not, be it noted, merely knowledge about mind, nor, again, simply a knowledge which is for mind; it is a form or mode of mind which is absolute knowledge. Highest mode of mind is literally convertible with Absolute Knowledge; for here we are dealing with knowledge as a living activity, as an active process, not as a product. Here, then, Absolute Mind is completely explicit and concretely realised. And with this it is clear that the standpoint of Absolute Mind has been fully and unequivocally adopted. This knowledge of which we speak has no limiting reference to individual finite mind; it is solely the standpoint of the Absolute from which such knowledge is regarded, and from which the knowledge is furnished. It is without reserve infinite and perfect knowledge to which we have attained.
Such a point of view is again the logical and final outcome of the result arrived at in Revealed Religion; no other step was left to take, and this step taken was at once possible and necessary. Absolute knowledge is thus the necessary conclusion of the Phenomenology. It follows, indeed, from the two ground principles and vital contention of the inquiry, viz., that reality is essentially mind, and that mind is in its essence self-consciousness.
Thus in Absolute Knowledge the limitations of individual knowledge are removed; the conscious contrast and opposition between the object and the consciousness to which it is present have been completely overcome; “natural” consciousness has been conducted up to the point of view of true knowledge;[27] the various forms and moments of universal mind have been successively passed in review and made explicit to it as its own.[28] This result, however, does not mean, indeed it seems both paradoxical and absurd to suppose it can mean, that when we reach Absolute Knowledge in the course of the inquiry we are literally transported out of all possible and actual contact with and relation to the individual self-consciousness which had to be regarded when dealing with Religion, and which, in fact, is the mind we as thinkers are in the first instance more immediately aware of. We saw that in Revealed Religion Absolute Mind was explicitly identified with the individual finite “human” mind; that the content of the former is “revealed” to, and is identified with, that of the latter. Now this relation is double-sided; the very meaning of such revelation implied that the reality of both was actually the same in content; the individual was conscious of the Absolute as its self, the Absolute was conscious of its self in and through the individual. And it is admitted that the content of both Religion and Absolute Knowledge is the same.[29] Hence, therefore, the further determination of that content in the form of Absolute Knowledge is likewise and at the same time the determination of the content of our finite self-consciousness. We are bound to admit this if we would make all those elements consistent which we have already mentioned. But if so, we see at once that there is no inherent impossibility in the assumption of the standpoint of Absolute Mind, and no need to suppose that in such an assumption we are transported into a sphere out of touch with actual reality. The complete knowledge of self and by self which absolute knowledge furnishes is expressible by and is determinative of our own self-consciousness; that is to say, mind as we know it attains to and furnishes absolute knowledge.
We might state this position otherwise by saying that while in both Revealed Religion and Absolute Knowledge the content is the same, and in both the individual is essentially identified with Absolute Mind, the content in Religion is regarded primarily as appearing to the individual; in Absolute Knowledge it is considered as it is in itself for mind per se.
And this agrees with the relations existing between the “particular” and the “universal” individual which were indicated at the outset.[30] Now it is not difficult to determine from the nature of Absolute Science what in detail the content of such knowledge will be. The knowledge in question is absolute, is knowledge of the Absolute. That which is absolute is mind, or, more particularly, mind in its own essence. Now it is this absolute essence which is asserted to be the self of the religious consciousness, and it is this essence which is the content of both absolute and individual mind. But the essence of mind, that which in it is both objective and subjective, is Thought, expressed as a multiplicity of thoughts. And thought which has the form of self, and therefore possesses that active movement of self-distinction and self-reference which is the nature of mind, is a Notion.[31] In Absolute Knowledge, therefore, which is the realisation of the nature of mind, not merely is the nature of the knowledge the notion of Mind, but the knowledge supplied is simply of the notions which constitute the mind’s own essence. Mind knowing its self (thought) in the form of self (self-referring unity), notion which is self-constituting, self-determining – that is, the principle, nature, and content of Absolute Knowledge.
Since, then, it is only these notions constituting the essence of mind of which absolute knowledge consists, and since the individual mind in its inmost nature has been identified with Absolute Mind, we see that it is possible at once to attain to absolute knowledge without qualification, and yet in such knowledge still remain within the sphere of individual finite mind. The notions which are the ultimate content of finite mind are identical with those of Absolute Mind, and the determination of the notions of the former is the exposition at the same time of the essential content of the latter. The essence of individual mind is a competent guide to that of universal mind.
It should be noted, however, that the content of Absolute Knowledge is, as a matter of fact, in a sense circumscribed and limited. It is not all or every kind of knowledge; it is, as becomes evident indeed from the whole inquiry, one form or mode of knowing among the various other forms which have appeared in the course of this genetic history of knowledge. It is and furnishes a specific kind of knowledge, is one determinate relation of consciousness to an object, and for that reason is limited in character. The fact that it is solely with notions that it deals indicates of itself that its nature is restricted. It is noteworthy that as we approach in the inquiry towards true knowledge, the object of knowledge, that which is presented to consciousness, becomes gradually more universal and abstract in character. This lies in the nature of the problem. For the attainment of absolute truth means at once the extension of the area of experience covered by the object of knowledge, and the determination of that object as the absolute essence of reality as a whole. Only so is ultimate truth ascertained. But these qualifications are obviously limitations of the nature of the truth arrived at. It is not the whole of Absolute Reality in its detailed entirety that is professedly the content of Absolute Knowledge; it contains simply the essential content, the notions which are the ground realities of the Absolute. We may, indeed, go so far as to say that it is only such elements in the Absolute that could be known in their absoluteness, for only such elements are common to individual and Absolute Mind, only by these does individual mind share the life of Absolute Mind. That in Absolute Knowledge we have literally the Absolute as it is completely aware of itself in its infinity of detail, would be too grotesque and impossible for Hegel seriously to maintain. And in reality, as we have already shown, such an assumption is not by any means necessary in order to justify the claims of Absolute Knowledge.
The restriction just asserted requires, however, to be carefully guarded and qualified. For in a sense it can be maintained that such knowledge is not limited. It embraces within its compass the whole of reality. So far as it is only one form of knowing (though the truest) among the other forms which have appeared and which are necessary to mind, and again, so far as it deals merely with the notions of Absolute Reality, the knowledge is limited in character. But in the sense that it deals with the concrete essential content of all reality it is not restricted.
1. WW. ii. 64.
2. ibid. 65.
3. Here, then, at the very start of Hegel’s philosophy we find a fundamental difference between his conception of the problem regarding knowledge and that of Kant. For the Phänomenologie has the same philosophical significance as the Krit. d. rein. Vernunft. Hegel re gards the latter as a phenomenological inquiry, for it starts from and remains within the duality of consciousness and object. To this initial divergence we may fairly trace all that finally distinguishes the character and results of their philosophical positions. The difference between their conceptions and interpretations of knowledge is due to their conceptions of “truth.” Kant seems to have considered that “truth” referred solely to science or systematic knowledge, in the narrow sense of the term (v. Krit. d. r. V. Trans. Elementarlehre, ii. 3). Hegel considered that the term applied to every sphere of experience, wherever we have a relation of subject to object. Hence for Kant there was only one kind of truth; for Hegel truth had many forms and differed in degree.
4. This distinction obviously cannot be taken too strictly. For “truth” appears through “knowledge,” and all knowledge has some truth.
And this is the interpretation Hegel proceeds to put on it. Broadly, however, the distinction holds good – between the complete “truth” and approximate knowledge of it.
5. Phän. pp. 64 ff.
6. Between existence of object for us and existence by itself.
7. Phän. p. 15.
8. “Form” here and throughout this statement of the Phän. (unless otherwise indicated) = Gestalt.
9. In this way Hegel’s inquiry may be said to rest upon, and to be justified by, the usual conception of the nature of truth.
10. This is the point of view, e.g., of ordinary science which eliminates reference to the conscious knower as such.
11. The very wide meaning which is given to knowledge in this inquiry must be carefully kept in mind. It is the presence of “anything” (etwas) for consciousness.
12. Phän. pp. 66 ff.
13. In the widest sense.
14. Phän. p. 66.
15. Phän. p. 68.
16. Phän. p. 69.
17. Phän. pp. 29 f.
18. Phän. pp. 49 ff.
19. e.g., as is done by Schelling.
20. Phän. p. 60.
21. Phän. pp. 68 ff.
22. A simple illustration may help to make the above more concrete, which in itself, however, is obviously the ordinary process of experience.
Take the course through which we gradually come to determine that the object perceived in the obscurity of a misty landscape is a human being. First, a mere thickening of the mist in a certain direction – “ something there, a this, a form of matter.” Then a definite shape maintaining its continuity amid external change – “a substance.” The body moves – “there is force, activity, causality.” The body moves of itself “it has life.” It is moving towards a certain point – “it has conscious purpose.” And in external shape and activity it resembles man – “it is a human being, a self.” Now every one of these different steps represents the adoption by consciousness of a different category, and by the different categories the nature of the object, i.e., “the truth of the object,” is gradually arrived at, and finally determined.
Each one is a truth for that stage, but the process at the same time is a growth towards the final truth, the nature of the object in itself. At one stage consciousness brings out one category; the content of perception changes, and thereupon, or rather therein, appears another category. The object is different at each stage, and is only ideally the same in all; the change of category, e.g., from “substance” to “life,” just means that the object is different, and therefore the consciousness of the object has changed. A change in the angle of incidence means a change in the reflexion, and in the object reflected.
This transition from category to category, from stage to stage in the development of the truth of this object is the unconscious and mysterious procedure of the ordinary or “natural” consciousness. It only knows the result; the process takes place “of itself.” Now to make the nature of this process explicit, and to show its inner necessity – that is the aim of such an inquiry as the Phenomeology.
23. This, as we saw above, exists all through experience, which is simply the unity of subject and object.
24. The “this” of sense is as far from exhausting the nature of the object as of the subject. Yet it is in a “this” that subject and object meet in sense-experience.
25. This is simply because we are dealing with experience as such, and experience is at once subject and object.
26. Religion being an experience necessary to finite consciousness only.
27. Phän. pp. 21, 61.
28. ibid. p. 574.
29. ibid. pp. 21 ff., etc.
30. Phän. pp. 21, 22.
31. Phän. pp. 26, 42, etc.