

VOLUME 2

LATEST DIRECTIVE OF NATIONAL PEASANT ASSOCIATION

13 June 1927

[Text] Because of the overly fast development of the peasant movement in the past, it has not been perfect organizationally. Coupled with the fierce counterattack of the local despots and evil gentry, this caused the rural struggle to become more and more severe. Unorganized actions have occurred whenever the superior organs failed to point out all possibilities. This association has instructed the peasant associations at all levels to make rectifications, so that the peasants in all places could, under the direction of the Peasant Association, continue to struggle against the reactionary feudal forces of all local despots and evil gentry with organization and planning, to fulfill the responsibility of overthrowing the economic base of the imperialist exploitation in the countryside and the political base of the warlords' domination in the revolution. It has also been pointed out that the present struggle goal should be to establish rural self-government by the peasants everywhere. According to reports from all quarters, the attack by local despots and evil gentry in the three provinces of Hunan, Kiangsi and Hupeh has been most vicious, as more than 10,000 party members, peasants and workers have been killed. A sinister plot to incite revolutionary soldiers against the peasants is being pushed. They have often fabricated facts by calling a deer a horse, and exaggerated things in the hope of provoking the soldiers to clash with mass organizations, thereby alienating the army and the people, splitting the united front and sabotaging the Three Great Policies, in order to overthrow the party and the country. They would have no regret even though this would aggravate the agonies of the people and bring about national destruction. In the meantime, the corrupt bureaucrats have connived with the local despots and evil gentry in smearing the peasants, hoping to alienate the government from the people. For instance, the Peasant Association of Huang-kang has never tried to destroy tobacco crops, but the corrupt bureaucrats made a false report to the Central Government which disbanded the association. This is a case in point. Now, the Military Affairs Committee of the National Government has learned of the vicious plan of imperialism, warlords, corrupt bureaucrats, local despots and evil gentry, compradores and all the reactionary forces to unleash a concerted attack on the National Government just as our armies

are launching the northern expedition against the Fengt'ien armed forces. It has therefore issued a directive to all armed comrades that they should not listen to false accusations and exaggerated propaganda. In order not to fall into a trap of the reactionaries, they should limit their actions to making investigations only. Nonetheless, the slaughtering of peasants by local despots and evil gentry in conjunction with bandits and stragglers in the various cities have become more and more serious recently. Numerous instances have occurred in which conspiracies were hatched by corrupt bureaucrats to undermine relations between the government and the people. The various organs have received several cases of false accusations against peasants everyday. Under these circumstances, the peasant associations at all levels should request that the National Government (1) issue a directive to protect workers' organizations, workers' pickets, and the peasants self-defense army, and punish the reactionaries that slaughtered workers and peasants and sabotaged the rear, in order that such revolutionary organs as the trade union, peasant association and CP may have complete freedom to rally the revolutionary forces and to launch an anti-Chiang expedition; (2) liquidate the local despots and evil gentry in the various counties in Hupeh who connived with enemy soldiers and bandits to slaughter peasants and workers, and severely punish Chiang Kai-shek's agents and all reactionaries who spread divisive rumors in order to consolidate Wuhan; (3) issue a directive to punish Hsu K'o-hsiang [6079 0344 4382], Ch'ou Ao [0092 7663], P'eng Kuo-chun [1756 0948 6874] and Hsiao Yu-k'un [5618 5038 2492] and dissolve such reactionary organs as the Party Salvation Committee and Party Purification Committee, restore the Hunan Provincial Government, Provincial Party Committee, Provincial Trade Union and Provincial Peasant Association as well as all revolutionary organizations that have been destroyed, accept the petition of the Hunan Petition Group, and instruct T'ang Sheng-chih [0781 3932 2535], chairman of Hunan provincial government, to take immediate action to suppress the reactionaries in Hunan; and (4) issue a directive to stop all actions in Kiangsi to oust the CP and worker and peasant leaders, as well as to severely punish the reactionaries who slaughtered the masses. It is incumbent on the Peasant Association itself to redouble its efforts to rally the peasants, tighten up the organization, and carry out armed self-defense in order to resist the armed attacks of local despots and evil gentry as well as to suppress the provocations by all reactionary and feudal forces. This is necessary because if the local despots and evil gentry are not suppressed, it will be impossible to establish rural self-government and democratic power, nor the realization of economic construction, while the foundation of the National Government will never be consolidated.

This directive is issued by the standing members of the Provisional Executive Committee of the National Peasant Association of China: T'an Yen-k'ai [6223 1693 7065], T'an P'ing-shan [6223 1627 1472], Teng Yen-ta [6772 3348 6671], Mao Tse-tung and Lu Ch'en [7120 3089], 13 June.

2077
CSO: 4005

LETTER FROM HUNAN TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE

20 August 1927

[Text] (3) A certain comrade who has arrived in Hunan said that the Comintern has issued a new directive suggesting that the worker-peasant-soldier soviet be implemented immediately in China. We have been very heartened by this news. Although objectively speaking, China has reached the 1917 era, we deemed before that it was still in 1905, which was a great mistake. The soviet of workers, peasants and soldiers is completely in keeping with the objective conditions. We should have the resolve to set up a worker, peasant and soldier soviet regime in the four provinces of Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi. With the establishment of such a regime, we must, henceforth, rapidly achieve nationwide victory. We hope that the Central Committee will unhesitatingly accept this Comintern directive and implement it immediately in Hunan.

In view of the fact that this new directive of the Comintern is bound to affect our attitude toward the Kuomintang, as soon as we set up the soviet regime of workers, peasants and soldiers, we can no longer carry the Kuomintang flag. We should hoist high the flag of the Chinese Communist Party vis-a-vis the Kuomintang flag that has been hoisted by such warlords as Chiang Kai-shek, T'ang Sheng-chih, Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang. The Kuomintang flag has been the flag of warlords for some time now and so only the communist flag is the flag of the people. When we were in Hupeh, we did not understand this too well. But after being in Hunan for a few days, we have seen how the people regard the provincial party headquarters under T'ang Sheng-chih, thus realizing that we really cannot fly the Kuomintang flag any longer or we are bound to be defeated. Previously, we have failed to seek actively the Kuomintang's leadership power, but allowed Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, T'ang Sheng-chih, etc., to seize it. Now, we should return this flag to them, because it has become a black flag completely. On our part, we must resolutely fly the red flag. As for the petty bourgeoisie, we must keep them under the leadership of the red flag, and objectively, they must be placed entirely under the leadership of the red flag.

(4) Land Problem: From my recent investigation on peasant problems in the two rural areas of Ch'ing-t'ai-hsiang, in Changsha and Shao-shan, in

Hsiang-t'an (from where five peasants have come to the provincial capital), I realize that it is the consensus of peasants that their agrarian problem must be resolved completely. Yesterday, I talked with several peasant comrades from the countryside to consult their views. As a result, I have drafted the following outlines:

- (a) Confiscate all land, including [that belonging to] small landlords and owner-peasants, and nationalize it. Land would then be redistributed to all country people who wish to obtain land equitably on these two standards by the peasants association; in accordance with "working ability" and "consumption" (that is, in keeping with the actual amount of consumption by each family).
- (b) In redistributing land, the district peasants association should order the township peasants association to compile a census register, to be handed over to the district association for redistribution of land accordingly.
- (c) In redistributing land, the district, rather than township, should be used as the unit; in a township where there is greater population than land, it can be transferred to a township where there are fewer people but more land. It is only thus that redistribution will be equitable. Temporarily, it won't be possible for people to move from one district to another.
- (d) After the land has been confiscated, measures must be provided to settle the families of landlords (whether they are big landlords or not) in order to pacify the people. There should be four classes: class 1, 4 percent collection; class 2, 3 percent collection; class 3, 2 percent collection, and class 4, 1 percent collection.

This draft proposal has been discussed at the provincial committee meeting yesterday. We must canvass the views of more peasants before we will ask you to make the final decision. The draft is submitted to you for references of discussion. (abridged) 20 August

CHUNG-YANG TUNG-HSIN, No 3, 30 August 1927

2077

CSO: 4005

LETTER FROM HUNAN PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE

30 August 1927

[Text] Brother X X:

Your letter of Character Hsiang No 5 has been received. Concerning the two points of error mentioned therein, what you have said is not in keeping with either fact or theory. We wish, therefore, to reply to you as follows:

(1) From the standpoint of the revolutionary significance as a whole, to capture Changsha and to stage the Autumn Harvest uprising are both for the purpose of promoting agrarian revolution. The Changsha uprising and the Autumn Harvest uprising are the same thing. Whereas the Changsha uprising serves as the starting point of the Autumn Harvest uprising, the Autumn Harvest uprising is to unleash an agrarian revolution in order to seize political power. In our plan to capture Changsha, the main fighters are workers and peasants. The purpose of transferring the two X and X regiments to attack Changsha is to supplement the insufficiency in strength of the workers and peasants. They are not the main force, but are deployed to serve as a cover for the development of the uprising, and so they are not the only important element of the uprising. Your committee has deemed that this is a military adventure here, ordering that the plan for the Changsha uprising be canceled. This shows your ignorance about the conditions here, and it is a contradictory policy in which no attention is paid to military affairs, but in the meantime, it calls for an armed uprising on the part of the masses.

(2) You have said that we have been paying attention here only to our work in Changsha, and neglected the other places. This is not true. It is true that we have been amiss in reporting to you the situation in other places where considerable preparations have been made (please see the plan on the uprising in central Hunan). In regard to the problem of our work in southern Hunan, we must also explain that making Changsha the starting point of the uprising does not mean that we have given up southern Hunan. The reason why we have not made Heng-yang the second starting point is because our strength is only sufficient to stage uprisings in central Hunan. If there should be uprisings in the various counties, our strength will be so diffused that it will be impossible to implement the plan of uprising

in central Hunan. That is why we decided against making Heng-yang the second starting point. Nonetheless, where plans for uprising have been made and preparations are underway in the various counties in southern Hunan, we have already issued orders to them to carry out the uprisings effectively. As soon as the Changsha uprising begins, it will be unleashed simultaneously in the other counties. 30 August

CHUNG-YANG TUNG-PAO No 5, 20 September 1927.

2077

CSO: 4005

REPORT OF THE CHING-KANG MOUNTAINS FRONT COMMITTEE TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY

25 November 1928

[Text] To the Central Committee in care of the Hunan Provincial Committee:

(1) Concerning the Letter From Central Committee

The 4 June letter from the Central Committee, after passing through the Kiangsi Provincial Committee and the Chi-an County Committee, only arrived at the Ching-kang Mountains on 2 December. Very well written, this letter has rectified many of our mistakes and resolved many controversial problems here. Upon its receipt, this letter was forwarded to the army committee as well as to local committees at all levels. On 6 November, the units heading toward Sui-ch'uan were concentrated at Ching-kang Mountains, and some 30 persons including members of the Special Committee and the army's and local active elements (such as Chu Teh, Ch'en I, Ho T'ing-yin [0149 2185 7336], Ho Ch'ang-kung [0149 7022], Yuan Wen-ts'ai [5913 2429 2088], Wang Tso [3769 0146], T'an Chen-lin [6223 7201 2651], Teng Kan-yuan [6772 1626 0337], Li Chueh-fei [2621 6748 7236], Ch'en Cheng-jen [7115 2973 0066], Wang Tso-nung [3769 0146 6593], Hsiao Fang-hsia [5618 5502 0704], Liu Hui-ch'ing [0491 6540 7230], Hsieh Ch'un-piao [6200 2504 2871], Liu Ti [6491 2420], Hsiung Shou-ch'i [3574 4388], Yang K'ai-ming [2769 7030 2494], Ts'ao Shuo [2580 7007], Teng Chiu-t'ing [6772 0036 6599], Mao Tse-tung, Sung Ch'iao-sheng [1345 0829 3932], P'eng Fu [1756 4375], and Yuan Te-sheng [5913 1795 3932] representing the Hunan Provincial Committee) attended a meeting held by the Special Committee to discuss the letter from the Central Committee. The consensus was that with the exception of one or two specific points (such as the guerrilla area being too broad and the abolition of the party representative system), all principles and policies are practicable and should be carried out accordingly. The highest organ of the party is also the front committee. According to the letter, when the front committee is in Kiangsi, it is under the direction of the Kiangsi Provincial Committee, and when it is moved into Hunan, it should be then under the director of the Hunan Provincial Committee. What is regrettable is that among the four attached documents in the Central Committee letter, we have translated only

the two documents on "Confiscation of Land To Set Up Soviets" and "The February Resolution of the Comintern," while the two on "Military Works" and "Organizational Problems" cannot be translated. The last two items are urgently needed. Please tell us about the method of translation or send us another copy.

(2) Border Regimes and the August Defeat

China is the only country in the world today where one or more small areas under a Red Regime have emerged in the midst of a white regime encircling them. When we analyze the cause of this phenomenon it will be seen that it is due to the continuous conflicts and wars among China's compradores and powerful gentry. As long as the conflicts and wars between these two classes continue, the existence and development of the armed entrenchment by workers and peasants will also continue. Where there are continued conflicts and wars between compradores and the powerful gentry, the existence and development of a soviet regime must have the following prerequisites: (1) excellent masses, (2) a sound party, (3) a large, strong Red army, (4) terrain favorable to waging war, and (5) economic power for self-sustenance.

Moreover, the strategy adopted by the border areas vis-a-vis the surrounding ruling classes should vary, depending on whether the political power of the ruling class is stable or in a state of disruption. For instance, when there was disruption in the ruling class, such as during the war between Li Tsung-jen and T'ang Sheng-chih in Hunan and Hupeh, and the war in Kwangtung between Chang Fa-k'uei and Li Chi-shen, we could be more venture-some in our military strategy, and the area of our military occupation could be expanded. Nonetheless, attention must be paid to setting up a firm bastion in the central areas to serve as an impregnable bulwark when the White terror descends on us. Where the ruling class is (comparatively) stable, such as in the southern provinces since April of this year, we should follow a strategy of gradual advance. Militarily, what is most undesirable is to divide the forces for adventurous advances; in mass work (such as distribution of land, establishment of soviets, organization of party and local militia), what is most undesirable is the diffusion of manpower, instead of paying attention to lay a sound foundation for the central areas. The defeat of the small soviets in China has been due either to the lack of objective prerequisites or to subjective errors in tactics. The reason why there have been errors in subjective tactics is because of the failure to differentiate the two different stages of the ruling class--when their regime is stable, and when their regime is in disruption. When the political power of the ruling class is stable, some advocate that the armed forces be divided to make adventurous advances; they even advocate that the Red Guards alone be deployed to defend extensive soviet regime areas, as though ignorant of the fact that the enemy, apart from utilizing the house-to-house levies, is also capable of using regular forces for concentrated operations. In mass work, no attention was paid to laying a firm foundation in the central areas, and, disregarding the potentials of our capacity, they attempted unrestricted expansion. If anyone advocated a policy of gradual military advance, and the concentration of manpower in the mass work in order to set up a solid

foundation in the central areas, to achieve an invincible position, it would be dubbed "conservatism." This is the basic reason for the August defeat in the border areas and the failure of the Red Army in Hunan.

The border area work started in October last year. At the beginning, there was no party organization whatsoever in the various counties, and the local militia consisted only of some 60 old rifles possessed by Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-ts'ai each in the vicinity of the Ching-kang Mountains. The rifles of the peasant Self-defense Corps of the four counties of Yung-hsin, Lien-hua, Ch'a-ling and Ling-hsien have already been surrendered to the powerful gentry, with the result that the revolutionary ardor of the masses has been suppressed. By February of this year, county committees had been set up in Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Ch'a-ling and Sui-ch'uan; a special district committee was created in Ling-hsien. Party organization has also been under way in Lien-hua, which has developed relations with the Wan-an committee. Except for Ling-hsien, all the counties had a few local armed forces. In Ning-kang, Ch'a-ling, Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin, especially in the two counties of Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin, considerable work has been done in unleashing the masses in guerrilla uprisings to kill the landlords, with much success. During this stage, the agrarian revolution has not yet been intensified, and the names used for the organs of political power were "Workers, peasants and soldiers' representatives' committee" and the "people's committee." They were known simply as the Government of the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, without the title of soviet. Soldiers' committees were organized in the army, and salary system abolished. When guerrillas were on active duty, action committees were organized to direct them. These simple measures have been adopted partly by improvisation, and partly on the basis of the announcement (such as the people's committees) of the 11 December uprising in Kwangtung which was reported in the newspapers. This is because we have lost contact with the provincial committee since November, thus becoming completely uninformed about all party policies. It was only in April this year that the resolution of the enlarged conference of the Central Committee in November which was so significant in China's revolutionary history was brought from Hunan to the border areas by Comrade Chu Teh and others. It was also then that the impact of the resolution has reached the party organization in the border area. The leading organ then was the Front Committee (of which Mao Tse-tung was secretary) appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee during the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Early in March, the Front Committee was abolished at the suggestion of the Hunan Special Committee and reorganized as the Divisional Committee (with Ho T'ing-ying as secretary). It thus became a party organ for the army only and had no jurisdiction over the local party and was fraught with shortcomings. Meanwhile, at the suggestions of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, Mao Tse-tung's units were transferred to Hunan, and for more than a month the border area was abandoned. At the end of March came the defeat in Hunan. The units of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, as well as the peasant troops in southern Hunan, retreated to Ning-kang in April, thereby reoccupying the border area.

After April, occupation of the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was effected at a time when the ruling power in the southern provinces was enjoying comparative stability. They were able to send out any time some 8 to 9 regiments and sometimes as many as 18 regiments from Hunan and Kiangsi for their suppression campaign. Yet, with fewer than four regiments of our own troops, we engaged the enemy for 4 months, while the occupied areas expanded, the agrarian revolution was intensified, the soviet organization was promoted, and the Red Army and Red Guards grew in number and strength steadily. The reason for this is that the policy of the party in the border area (both local party and army party) was correct. At that time, the policies of the Border Special Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Army Committee (with Ch'en I as secretary) were: To struggle resolutely against the enemy in order to establish political power in the middle section of Lo-hsiao Mountains and to oppose any defeatist flightism; to intensify agrarian revolution in the occupied areas; the army's party organization should help develop the local party, and the regular army should help develop the local militia forces; to be on the defense in Hunan where the ruling power is stronger, and to be on the offense in Kiangsi where the ruling power is weaker; devote great effort to develop Yung-hsin in order to create a regime of the masses, and to prepare for a protracted struggle; to concentrate the Red Army with a view to attacking the enemy confronting them at the proper time, and to oppose dispersion of armed forces in order to avert the danger of being destroyed individually; to adopt the tactic of expanding the areas under the regime by wave-like advances, and to oppose the policy of adventurist advance. Thanks to the correctness of these tactics, coupled with the topography of the border area which was most favorable to our struggle, as well as the fact that the attacking troops from Hunan and Kiangsi were badly coordinated, we were able to win military victories during the 4 months from April to July and insure the expansion of the masses' regime. Although the enemy outnumbered us by several times, he failed to destroy the regime which was expanding steadily. The impact of the regime was increasingly felt in the two provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. The August defeat was due solely to our ignorance of the fact that it was a time when the ruling class was relatively stable. We adopted the kind of policy that was geared to a ruling class facing disruption. Thus, in dividing our armed forces to make adventurous advance in southern Hunan, we incurred defeats in the border area and in southern Hunan as well. Tu Hsiu-ching [2629 0208 4842], representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Yang K'ai-ming, secretary of the Special Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee, carried out perfunctorily the orders of the Hunan Provincial Committee, taking advantage of the absence of such persons as Mao Tse-tung and Wan Hsi-hsien [5502 0341 2009] who were then in Yung-hsin and had objected to the orders strongly, without canvassing the situation then and disregarding the resolutions of the joint conference of the Army Committee, Special Committee and Yung-hsin County Committee which differed from the views of the Hunan Provincial Committee. They also endorsed the action of the 29th regiment (I-chang peasants) to abandon the struggle to return home. The result was to bring about defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan, thus making a tremendous mistake.

In the middle of July, the Eighth Army mounted an attack on the Kiangsi border, but it was unsuccessful. As the bulk of the Red Army launched an offensive against Ling-hsien and Ch'a-ling, and was changing its plans to turn to southern Hunan, five regiments commanded by Wang Chun [3769 0971] and Chin Han-ting [6855 3351 7844] in Kiangsi, and six regiments under Hu Wen-t'ou [5170 2429 2435], of the 6th Army, 11 regiments in all, laid siege to Yung-hsin. We had only one regiment (commanded by Mao Tse-tung) in Yung-hsin which, shielded by the broad Red masses and resorting to guerrilla tactics on all sides, succeeded in pinning down these 11 enemy regiments within 30 li of the city for 25 days. Finally, the enemy probed our weakness and captured Yung-hsin by a fierce assault, and its loss was followed by Lien-hua and Ning-kang. At that time, some internal bickering flared up in the 6th Army, which withdrew suddenly and engaged Wang Chun's units at Chang-shu. Only five Kiangsi regiments were left, and, panicked, they withdrew into the city of Yung-hsin. Thus, if our main force had not gone to southern Hunan, it would undoubtedly, with the help of the masses, have routed this enemy force, and extended the regimes areas to include Chi-an, An-fu and P'ing-hsiang, and linked it up with P'ing-chiang and Liu-yang. But as the main force was away and the one remaining regiment was too exhausted and worn out, we decided to keep part of it to defend the Ching-kang Mountains, together with the two units under Yuan Wen-ts'ai and Wang Tso, while ordering Mao Tse-tung to lead one battalion to Kuei-tung to meet the main force and escort it back. By that time, the main force, which had started toward southern Hunan, was retreating to Kuei-tung, and the forces joined at Kuei-tung on 23 August.

The 8th Army under Wu Shang [0742 1424] had invaded Ning-kang and again advanced into Yung-hsin. Our enemy from Hunan was anxious to fight but could not (as our army missed his troops when we attacked from a side road). Fearing harassment by our masses, his army then retreated to Ch'a-ling by way of Lien-hua. Just one day later, 11 regiments of our Kiangsi enemy moved into Yung-hsin. At that time, the main force of the Red Army (led by Chu Teh) was attacking Ch'a-ling and Ling-hsien from Ning-kang. Upon reaching Ling-hsien, the soldiers of the 29th Regiment, seized by deep homesickness, demanded to go back to Hunan and refused to take orders. Another segment of our army was opposed to going back to southern Hunan, because they wanted to go to southern Kiangsi, and were also unwilling to turn to attack the enemy in Yung-hsin. Their agitation was aided by Tu Hsiu-ching, and even the Army Committee was helpless in averting this unfavorable turn of events. Consequently, the main force set out from Mien-tu in Ling-hsien on 17 July, moving toward Ch'en-chou via Tzu-hsing. On 24 July a battle was fought against Fan Shih-sheng's [5400 4258 3932] units at Ch'en-chou. Initial success was followed by defeat. It was dusk when we withdrew and we took the wrong road. The 29th Regiment hurried toward I-chang; a part of it was annihilated by Hu Feng-chang's [5170 7685 4545] men at Lo-ch'ang, while another part was scattered and lost in I-chang and Ch'en-chou. Only some 100 rifles were recovered and assembled that night, though fortunately the loss sustained by the main force was small.

Kuei-tung was occupied on 18 August. On 23 August Mao Tse-tung and others arrived from the Ching-kang Mountains, and it was decided to return to Ning-kang. That afternoon, two regiments of Wu Shang's troops in Ling-hsien launched a sharp attack on Kuei-tung and a hard fight lasted until the morning of the ensuing day. Our losses were heavy (though the enemy lost even more heavily). We had to retreat into Kiangsi. When our army was moving into southern Hunan from Mien-tu, the original Army Committee was abolished, and the Front Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee was organized, with Ch'en I as its secretary. After the defeat at and retreat from Kuei-tung, the Front Committee was abolished, and the Action Committee was organized to command it, with Mao Tse-tung as its secretary. On 8 September we arrived at the Ching-kang Mountains via Ch'ung-i, Shang-yu and Sui-ch'uan.

The causes for the failure of our assault on Ch'en-chou were six-fold:

(1) Some officers and men were homesick, thus losing their fighting morale, and some of them were unwilling to go to southern Hunan, thus running counter to mass psychology; (2) it was a hot summer and the soldiers were exhausted; (3) after marching several hundred li from Ling-hsien, we lost contact with the border area and became isolated; (4) the worker and peasant masses of Hunan have not been mobilized and so it became a simple military venture; (5) we were ignorant about the enemy situation; (6) preparations were inadequate, and our officers and soldiers did not understand the significance of the war.

After the rout, one infantry company and one artillery battery under battalion commander Yuan Ch'ung-ch'uan [5913 1504 0350] rebelled. Although these two units were eventually recovered, the regimental commander, Wang Erh-cho [3769 3643 3820], was killed, which was of course a serious loss.

On 30 August four regiments of Wu Shang's Hunan troops and Wang Chun's Kiangsi troops mounted a fierce attack on the Ching-kang Mountains, taking advantage of the fact that our forces had not yet arrived after their defeat at Kuei-tung. We had less than a battalion, but relying on the natural barriers of Huang-yang-chieh (the path of the Ching-kang Mountains from Ning-kang), we fought bitterly for a whole night, repulsing the enemy and killing many of them. This campaign has enabled us to preserve our last bastion, and to frighten the enemy badly. This was one of the famous battles in the border area.

When the Front Committee was in Hunan, it organized two county committees in Kuei-tung and Ju-ch'eng which, together with the original county committees in Tzu-hsing and Ch'en-chou, were placed under the direction of a Special Committee, with Tu Hsiu-ching as its secretary and located Yu-ch'i Shih-erh-tung in Tzu-hsing. A Red Guard corps was formed for Tzu-hsing, Kuei-tung and Ju-ch'eng which received 80 rifles. Ch'en-chou had a Red Guard corps located at Yao-ling, possessing some 40 or 50 rifles. The conditions in Lai-yang and Yung-hsing were unclear. The 30th and 33d regiments of the Peasant Army which returned to southern Hunan in May had long been dispersed, and most of their arms, some 300 to 400 rifles, had been surrendered to the enemy. The broad masses that had been mobilized

by the Red Army during the spring also were totally suppressed by the enemy. When the Red Army was passing through Tzu-hsing, Ju-ch'eng and Kuei-tung, some of the local masses were mobilized to set up soviets. The sand fields in Kuei-tung were distributed, though their present status is unknown. Because of the barriers of communication, no letters have arrived from the newly organized Southern Hunan Special Committee.

(3) Status of Border Independent Regime From September to Present

Since April of this year, the independent regime's areas have been extended steadily. Following the battle at Lung-yuan-k'ou (on the border between Yung-hsin and Ning-kang) on 23 June and the routing of the enemy in Kiangsi for the fourth time, the border areas have reached their zenith [of development] comprising all three counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin and Lien-hua, small portions of Chi-an and An-fu, the northern part of Sui-ch'uan, and the southeastern part of Ling-hsien. Most of the land has already been distributed, and the remainder is being distributed. District and township soviets have been set up universally. There are county soviets in Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Sui-ch'uan, and a Border Area soviet has also been established. In the villages, worker and peasant insurrection corps armed with spears have been organized. At the district and county levels, Red Guards have been organized, armed with rifles. In July, the enemy from Kiangsi attacked, and in August enemies from Kiangsi and Hunan joined forces to attack Huang-yang-chieh, with the result that all the county cities and plains have been occupied by the enemy. The Peace Preservation Corps (armed with rifles) and the levies (armed with spears) acted as their vanguards. They ran amok, spreading the White terror into both towns and the countryside. Most of the party and government organs have disintegrated while the rich peasants and opportunists in the party have become undependable. As a result of the battle at Huang-yang-chieh on 30 August, the enemy realized that it was impossible to destroy the natural barriers of the Ching-kang Mountains. The enemy from Hunan began to retreat to Ling-hsien, while the enemy from Kiangsi began to entrench itself in the county towns, and in the towns and villages on the plains. Nevertheless, they could not do anything to us in our strongholds such as the western and northern districts of Ning-kang, the Pei-hsiang T'ien-lung district of Yung-hsin, as well its Hsiao-hsi-chiang and Nan-nien-shan districts, the Shang-hsi district of Lien-hua, the Ching-kang Mountains district of Sui-ch'uan, and the Ch'ing-shih-kang Ta-yuan of Ling-hsien. During July and August, scores of battles were fought by one regiment of the Red Army and by the Red Guards corps in various counties. Although we were defeated, we lost no more than 30 rifles. Finally, we withdrew deep into the mountains. The enemy deployed its entire force to attack. They combined the armed forces of Kiangsi and Hunan to attack our bastion in the Ching-kang Mountains, but they withdrew dismally. On 30 August we won a victory over the suppression armies at Huang-yang-chieh; on 8 September our southern expeditionary force returned to the Ching-kang Mountains, thus opening up a new situation after September.

As our army was marching to the Ching-kang Mountains through Ch'ung-i, Shang-yu and Sui-ch'uan, the Independent 7th Division of western Kiangsi under Liu Shih-i [6491 1102 3015], taking advantage of our defeat, sent five battalions to pursue us to Sui-ch'uan. On 13 September we deployed four battalions to attack Liu's units, routed them at the city of Sui-ch'uan, captured 250 rifles, a battalion commander and a company leader, 34 platoon leaders and some 200 soldiers. The remnants withdrew to Kan-chou. The Action Committee which directed the army (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Sui-ch'uan county committee collaborated in guiding the masses of Sui-ch'uan and in canvassing supplies for the army. Guerrilla action was conducted in the countryside, divided into four routes, each directed by an action committee. When the eastern route committee reached Wan-an, it made contact with the Wan-an County Committee. On 24 September Li Wen-pin's [2621 2429 2619] Kiangsi regiment came from T'ai-ho, while the Independent 7th Division came from Kan-chou to attack the city of Sui-ch'uan. As our force was not concentrated, we could only deploy two battalions for the battle. We were defeated, but morale remained intact. Our main force returned to the Ching-kang Mountains on 26 September. On 1 October we engaged the 27th regiment of Chou Hun-yuan's [0719 3268 0037] brigade under Hsiung Shih-hui [3574 1709 6540] in a battle at Ning-kang, capturing one battalion commander, one company leader, two platoon leaders, 100 soldiers and 110 rifles. Remnants of the enemy units retreated to Yung-hsin and the entire county of Ning-kang was recovered. While we were attacking Ning-kang, the regiment under Li Wen-pin's command reinforced the enemy forces via T'ai-ho and Yung-hsin from Sui-ch'uan, leaving only the Independent 7th Division (which was the weakest) in Sui-ch'uan. There was thus considerable hope for us to mobilize the masses in Sui-ch'uan, and moreover, we were faced with the urgent problem of seeding the army. We, therefore, reoccupied Sui-ch'uan on 13 October, as the Independent 7th Division took flight without a fight. The Action Committee of Sui-ch'uan (with Chu Teh as secretary) collaborated with the County Committee there to carry out guerrilla tactics in five routes, distributing land, setting up soviets, developing party organization, and collecting funds. At that time, the 3d Division of the Eighth Army under Yen Chung-hsing [7051 0112 5887], with 126 rifles, had defected to our army and been reorganized as a special service battalion commanded by Pi Chan-yuan. On 2 November Sui-ch'uan was again attacked by two regiments of the 21st Brigade of Kiangsi troops commanded by Li Wen-pin as well as the Independent 7th Division. With a view to avoiding any hard battle, we evacuated Sui-ch'uan, trying to make a blitz attack on Ning-kang and Yung-hsin where the enemy forces were weaker, in order to break one side of the siege. On 9 November we routed the 27th Regiment of Chou's brigade at the city of Ning-kang and Lung-yuan-k'ou, capturing 160 rifles, killing one battalion commander and scores of soldiers. We captured two deputy battalion commanders, a company commander and a platoon leader, and more than 100 soldiers. Next day, we advanced to Yung-hsin to attack the 28th Regiment and the remnants of the 27th Regiment of Chou's brigade until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. We defeated the enemy and our vanguards occupied the city of Yung-hsin. However, unexpectedly, the enemy 35th Brigade arrived from Hung-t'ien-ho as reinforcement. We had to withdraw

to Ning-kang in the face of this adverse situation. Although there were heavy casualties to the enemy, we also suffered scores of dead and wounded. This was the biggest battle since our return to the border area. Red Guards and insurrection corps fought in both battles, though they did not do too much. The status now in the border area is: Chou Hun-yuan's 14th brigade and Liu Shih-i's 15th brigade are now stationed in the Kiangsi border, both of which have been defeated and are being reorganized; the 21st brigade under Li Wen-pin and the 35th brigade are crack troops; the 8th Army under Wu Shang is entrenched in the three counties of Cha-ling, Ling-hsien and Kuei-tung on the Hunan border. The area of Red power extends from Sui-ch'uan and the southern foot of Ching-kang Mountains in the south to the borders of Lien-hua in the north, including the entire county of Ning-kang, parts of Sui-ch'uan, Ling-hsien and Yung-hsin, and forming a narrow strip from north to south. The Shang-hsi District in Lien-hua, T'ien-lung District in Yung-hsin, and the Wan-nien shan area are not contiguous, though they have also been occupied by Red power. The enemy is attempting to surround this unbroken bastion by both military attack and economic blockade in order to wipe out this "Communist bandit lair." A hard struggle is bound to be waged with the passage of time, and they will never give us any respite.

(4) Current Problems

A. Military Question

(1) The Military Stage: Since the struggle in the border area has become exclusively military, both the party and the masses must be militarized. How to deal with the enemy and how to fight have thus become important items on the daily agenda of the army and local party organs at all levels. The so-called independent regime must be armed; that is, where there is no armed force, or an inadequately armed one, or though armed, the tactics are wrong, then it will be, instead, captured by the White armed forces immediately (White army, peace preservation corps and levies). This kind of struggle is bound to become more violent every day, and so the problems will also become more complex and aggravated.

(2) The Sources of the Red Army: They may be divided into the following six categories: (a) units formerly under Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung at Swatow; (b) the Guards Regiment at Wuchang; (c) peasant armies of Liu-yang and P'ing-chiang; (d) peasant armies of southern Hunan and the workers of Shui-k'ou-shan; (e) soldiers captured from the units under Hsu K'o-hsiang [6070 0344 4382], T'ang Sheng-chih, Pai Chung-hsi, Chu P'ei-teh, Wu Shang and Hsiung Shih-hui; and (f) worker and peasant elements from the various border counties. The first four types are the main force. However, after more than a year of fighting, the old units of Yeh and Ho the Guards Regiment, and the peasant troops of Liu-yang and P'ing-chian have lost two-thirds of their strength, leaving only one-third intact. Even the Red Army of southern Hunan has also suffered terrific losses after 8 months of fighting. Thus, the first four categories, because of their excellent quality, have remained the basic strength of the 4th Red Army, but are outnumbered by the last two categories. Of the last two categories,

captured soldiers form the majority. Without this replenishment, it would have been impossible to fill up the 4th Army. Moreover, its quality has also suffered considerably. The increase in men has not kept up with the increase in rifles. Rifles are not easily lost, but soldiers are wounded, killed, fall sick or desert (during a defeat). Among peasants in the border area, very few were willing to enlist. With the distribution of land, most of them have gone out to plant the fields. At present, the number of worker and peasant elements is extremely small in the 4th Army in the border area. Thus, the problem is still rather serious. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send us workers from An-yuan and we hope this will be done soon.

(3) Composition: One portion consists of worker and peasant elements while the other is formed largely of the vagabond proletariat (the Hunan Provincial Committee has alleged that they are all vagabond proletariat, but this is not true). This vagabond proletariat portion must be replaced by worker and peasant elements, though it is difficult to find them. The vagabond proletariat elements seem to be excellent in combat and, as the war goes on every day casualties have been heavy. Thus, the vagabond proletariat are indispensable, but it is not easy to find replacements from among them. Under these circumstances, we must intensify political training in order to improve their quality.

(4) Character: The majority has been converted from mercenary forces but the mercenary system is abolished as soon as they join the Red Army. There has never been any pay, but there there is rice money and petty cash for miscellaneous expenses. In regard to land distribution among the Red Army officers and men, with the exception of those soldiers in various counties in the border areas whose families are given land as a rule, it is rather difficult for officers and men from remote places to obtain land. This is because, first, there is very little land in the occupied area which is mountainous. Moreover, peasants have complained that the land distributed to them is insufficient, and so there is no surplus land. Secondly, because of the constant changes in the fortunes of war, the occupied area is very unstable. The land distributed by Red power yesterday could be easily taken away by White power today, in which case one must pay rent to the landlord. Thus, it is not only the officers and men in the Red Army who are wary toward the concept of land distribution; even among the peasants, many are aware of the uncertainties of the situation. This is due to the fact that the White power is too strong, and the struggle between White and Red has been too recurrent and too severe. Nonetheless, that the Red Army officers and men should receive land is an irrevocable principle, though the methods of implementation remain to be discussed.

(5) Political Training: The Red Army soldiers have learned class consciousness and such essentials as distribution of land, the establishment of soviets, the arming of workers and peasants, etc. They realize that they are fighting for themselves and the workers and peasants. Because of this, they have not complained even though they have had to endure hardships in the midst of this bitter struggle. There is a soldiers' committee at the company, battalion and regimental levels whose duties are to supervise the officers, represent

the interests of soldiers, participate in army administration, undertake political training internally (in the army) and launch mass movements externally. With a sound soldiers' committee, it may not be necessary to have a political department. The working personnel can be incorporated into the soldiers' committee, which is better than maintaining a political department separately. Before April this year, there was a political department in all army units here, but it has been abolished because the results have not been too satisfactory. With the political department, there was a feeling on the part of the officers, soldiers and masses that political work could be done by a few people of that department, and so they deemed that the duty of the remaining people was limited to fighting. But after its abolition, everybody realized that they not only have to fight, but also must undertake political work (political training and mass movement). This has resulted in breaking the simple military-minded tradition. Based on past experience, it has been held that the party representative system should not be abolished. Party representatives at the army and divisional levels, however, could be abolished (there being no divisional level here, while the regiment is directly under the army). Party representatives cannot be abolished at the regiment, battalion and company level, particularly at the company level at this time. This is because the party branch is built upon the company. The party representative of a company has the duty of supervising the soldiers' committee to carry out political training and to direct mass movements, and he is also the branch secretary in the party. As it has been borne out by facts, where the company's party representative is better, that company will also be better. Among the lower echelon cadres, it often happens that because of the heavy casualties, some of the enemy soldiers captured only yesterday would be promoted to serve as platoon or even company leaders today. Among those enemy soldiers that were captured in February and March this year, some have become battalion commanders. It seems rather absurd to think that just because ours is now called the Red Army, there is no need to have party representatives. When Chu Teh's units were in southern Hunan, the system of party representatives was abolished. Later, he felt that it was not too good, and so when he came to the border area, the system was restored. If the name is changed to "director," this would be confused with the directors of the Kuomintang, whom most of the captured soldiers detest. Moreover, any change of name will not change the nature of the system. Hence, it has been decided that there should be no change. There have been too many casualties among party representatives. It is hoped that apart from conducting training classes, the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will send us at least 30 persons who could serve as party representatives.

(6) Military Training: It usually takes other people from 6 months to 1 year to train their soldiers before they can fight: our soldiers might have entered the army yesterday, and required to fight today with no time for training at all. Consequently, among some middle and lower echelon cadres and many soldiers, the military technique is rather poor. Their only advantage in combat is courage, and this is very dangerous. Since it is impossible to have long periods of rest and training, the only thing is to try to avoid fighting in order to gain the necessary time for training. We

have established a training corps of 150 members and we intend to continue this practice. We hope that the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will send us at least 30 more officers at the company and platoon level, to the border areas as soon as possible.

(7) The Problem of Supplies: The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us to pay attention to the material life of the soldiers to make it at least a little better than the average worker and peasant. At present, however, army life is just contrary to that, and we feel that no one else lives so badly as the Red Army soldiers. Because of the shortage of silver dollars, we have found it difficult to continue to give each person 5 fen for their food (rice is supplied locally) each day. The soldiers' adage that "down with the capitalists, as we can eat pumpkin every day" is an indication of their distress. They can endure hardships; no others can endure hardships better than the 4th Army. They need only money for food--all other expenses have been curtailed, and even this requires some 10,000 silver dollars a month. They can get this money only by making the local despots pay. But first, wherever they have been, there are no more local despots from whom to collect it; second, as the siege of the enemy is so tight, unless one side of it has collapsed, it would be impossible to venture out too far to strike at the local despots; and third, the enemy threat being so serious, it is impossible for one or two battalions of soldiers to go out to look for funds, and if you want to get more, you have to have more soldiers. This is no simple problem. Now, although we have the cotton for winter clothing for the 5,000 soldiers of the entire army (regular Red Army), we are still short of cloth, and do not know when this can be solved. It is already so cold now, but many soldiers are still wearing two layers of thin clothing. Fortunately, they are used to hardships, and they are equally poor regardless of who they are. From the army commander down to the cook, each person gets 2 fen uniformly for their food. When the expense money is 20 fen each, they would all get the same amount, and when it is 40 fen, they would all get 40 fen each. Because they all understand this is "suffering hardships for the proletariat," they do not complain. Although this is so, the economic problem remains rather serious.

(8) The Problem of Wounded and Sick Soldiers: After each engagement, there are some wounded soldiers. Because of the lack of nutrition, the cold, and other causes, there are many sick. The Red Army's hospitals are built in the Ching-kang Mountains. They treat patients with both Chinese and Western medicine, but both drugs and doctors are in short supply and the problem is grave. In September there were more than 200 wounded and sick soldiers, and this number has increased since the recent battle at Yung-hsin. There are now more than 800 patients in the hospitals, including some nursing staff. Morale will be affected if the wounded are not given proper care. But to do this requires adequate equipment and supplies which are unsatisfactory and difficult to obtain. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send some medicines, but no delivery has been made so far. We hope that the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will loan us a few doctors [trained in] Western medicine and some iodine.

(9) Democracy in the Army: Although the material life of the Red Army is poor and although there have been incessant engagements, it has managed to maintain its morale. Apart from the role played by the party, this is due largely to the thorough implementation of democracy. The officers do not abuse their soldiers; officers and men receive equal treatment: they eat the same food and dress alike. The soldiers enjoy freedom of speech and assembly. All formalities and protocol have been abolished and economic management is open; the representatives of the soldiers can look into the budget and accounts. They also manage their own mess, and though each person gets about only 5 fen for their mess, they could still put aside 60 or 70 coppers a day for personal expenses. These measures have proved to be most satisfying to the soldiers. This is especially true for the newly captured soldiers who realize how different their new army life is from their old army life, so much so that they seem to be two different worlds. Although they may feel that the material life of the Red Army is not as good as that of the White, their spirit is liberated and they get along well. Although they are the same soldiers, they did not fight so bravely for the enemy as they do now for the Red Army, and this is due to the influence of democracy. The Red Army is like a melting pot in which captured soldiers can be melted as soon as they come over. This is a fact. In China, there is great need for democracy not only among the worker and peasant masses, but also for the army, and even more urgently. To practice democracy thoroughly in the army constitutes an important policy to destroy China's feudalistic mercenary armies. This is because the life of soldiers in China's feudal mercenary army is simply intolerable.

(10) Party Organization in the Army: There are now four levels in the party organization of the army: the company branch, battalion committee, regimental committee and army committee. The party branch is established in each company; and a small group is established in each squad. An important reason why the 4th Army has remained intact after so many battles is due to the fact that "the party branch is organized on the company basis." Two years ago, our party organization in the Kuomintang army failed to grasp the soldiers, and even in Yeh T'ing's units, there was only a party branch in each regiment, which was most absurd. Now, the ratio between party members and nonpartisans in the army is one to three, which means there is a party member in every four persons. Recently, we decided to develop more party members among the combat soldiers so that the number of party members and nonpartisans will attain a fifty-fifty ratio. There is now a shortage of good secretaries in the company branches. Therefore, we are asking the Central Committee to send more active elements who find it difficult to stay in their respective localities to come here to serve as company party representatives. Among the working staff who came from southern Hunan, almost all of them are doing party work in the army (and they do political work simultaneously). In August we lost some of them in southern Hunan, and so it is even more difficult now to spare them. Since the Army committee (Army party committee) was elected by the first army representatives conference at Ning-kang in April, six army party representatives conferences have been held in the past 7 months, the last on

14-15 November. This conference was held after receipt of a letter from the Central Committee. Thus, decisions have been adopted on political, military, organization and propaganda affairs, and it was a better conference than all previous ones. The conference elected an army committee of 23 members, with Chu Teh as secretary (designated by the Central Committee). It is the highest party organ in the army and is under the jurisdiction of the Front Committee. Externally, this is the military council of the border area soviet, commanding the Red Army and local militia forces. The party organization in the army has been set up with considerable success, and some party members are very determined in their revolutionary outlook, though the majority of them do not have a good education. We must pay more attention to this later.

(11) Local Armed Forces: The local forces consist of the Red Guards and the worker and peasant insurrection corps. The insurrection corps is armed with spears and shotguns. It is based on the village as the unit, each village having one detachment, whose strength is based on the size of the village. Its duty is to suppress counterrevolutionaries and to protect the village regime. When the enemy comes, the insurrection corps will help the Red Army or the Red Guards in combat duties. A secret organization used to launch uprisings, the insurrection corps was founded in Yung-hsin. Later, it seized the political power of the entire county, thus becoming an open organization. This system has since been extended in the border areas, and retains its original name. The arms of the Red Guards corps consist of five-, nine- and single-shot rifles, with five-shot ones in the majority. The numbers of rifles in the various counties are as follows: 140 in Ning-kang, 220 in Yung-hsin, 43 in Lien-hua, 50 in Ch'a-ling, 90 in Ling-hsien, 130 in Sui-ch'uan and 10 in Wan-an, for a total of 683. Most of these have been supplied by the Red Army, while a small portion has been captured from the enemy. Most of the Red Guards units have been fighting constantly with the peace preservation corps and the levies of the big gentry in the various counties and as a result their ability to handle weapons and their fighting capability have increased steadily. Before the Ma-jih (21 May) incident, the number of rifles held by the peasant self-defense corps in the various border counties was as follows: 300 in Yu-hsien, 300 in Ch'a-ling, 60 in Ling-hsien, 50 in Sui-ch'uan, 80 in Yung-hsin, 60 in Lien-hua, 60 in Ning-kang (Yuan Wen-ts'ai's units) and 60 in the Ching-kang Mountains (Wang Tso's units), totaling 970. After that incident, with the exception of the Yuan and Wang units, which remained intact, only 6 rifles were left in Sui-ch'uan, 1 in Lien-hua, all the remaining rifles having been seized by the big landlords. As a result of the opportunist line, they were unable to hold on to their rifles. Now, the Red Guards units in the various counties are still short of rifles, and the big landlords possess far more rifles than the Red Guards. This is why the Red Army must continue to supply rifles to the various counties, and where it will not impair the Red Army, everything must be done to help arm the local militia forces so that they can be strengthened steadily. The Red Army conference has stipulated that the four-company system be adopted, with 75 rifles in each company (when this number is added to the rifles of the special services company, machine-gun company, mortar company and the battalion and regimental headquarters, each regiment should have 1,075 rifles). Moreover, weapons

captured from the enemy should have been distributed as much as possible to the local militia forces of workers and peasants. The officers of the Red Guards corps should be trained at the training corps maintained by the Red Army. Hereafter, the number of officers commanding Red Guards who have been sent by the Red Army must be curbed gradually. In the meantime, Chu P'ie-teh has also been massively arming the peace preservation corps and the levies, and the number and combat strength of the armed forces equipped by the big gentry in the border counties are also formidable. Thus, expansion of the Red local militia forces in the border area cannot be delayed any further.

(12) The Strategy of Red Army and Red Guards: In addition to recognizing guiding principles (that where the enemy is small in number, it should be eliminated immediately by superior force, and where the enemy is numerous and strong, mass war strategy should be adopted instead of fighting a hard battle), the Red Army should concentrate its strength while the Red Guards should disperse its strength. Now, the bourgeois regime is comparatively stable, the enemy is in a position to deploy an enormous number of troops against the Red Army. Thus, it would be most inimical for the Red Army to disperse its strength. In our experience, we have almost always suffered defeat when our strength was spread thin. But we have invariably won when we have concentrated our forces to attack enemy forces that were smaller than ours, equal to ours, or slightly larger than ours. The area of guerrilla warfare as prescribed by the directives of the Central Committee covers thousands of li in length and breadth. This is too extensive and was due probably to the over-estimation of our military strength. (Since the number of rifles in the 4th Red Army is known to the Hunan Provincial Committee, we have asked Comrade Yuan Teh-sheng to make a report orally, and so it is not listed here.) In regard to the strategy of the Red Guards corps, it would be better to disperse their strength. This method is being adopted by Red Guards in the various counties.

(13) Military Organization: We are still following the old Kuomintang method of organization. We are unable to decode the Central Committee's "Resolution on Military Work." Also we cannot surmise what was the military system of the T'ai-p'ing regime. Please send these documents again so that we may discuss them.

(14) Propaganda Aimed at the Enemy: The most effective propaganda is to release captured soldiers and to give medical treatment to wounded enemy soldiers. When enemy soldiers and enemy battalion company and platoon commanders are captured, they are, after some propaganda work on our part, divided into those who want to stay and those who wish to go. We should allow those who want to leave to get their wish and give them the necessary traveling expenses. This kind of propaganda will shatter the enemy allegation that "Communist bandits kill anyone in sight." As a result of this policy, the "Ten-day Bulletin of the 9th Division" issued by Yang Chi'ih-sheng said that our method is "sinister." The officers and men of the Red Army are most enthusiastic in welcoming and comforting captured enemy soldiers. At each "rally to bid farewell to new brothers," the captured soldiers responded with warm gratitude in their speeches. Medical

treatment for the wounded enemy soldiers also has a great effect. Some clever enemy (such as Li Wen-pin) have imitated our method by not killing our captured soldiers and by treating our wounded soldiers. However, after our men have been captured by the enemy, they often bring their rifles back with them at the next engagement. Such incidents have occurred twice. Very few Red Army soldiers have been captured by the enemy in the border area. This is because the Red Army has rarely lost any battle there. Additionally, we have also done much in written propaganda, such as slogan-writing. Whenever we reach a new place, we cover the walls with our slogans. We are, however, short of persons who have drawing skills and so we hope the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will send us some.

(15) Military Strongholds: The first stronghold is the Ching-kang Mountains located at the juncture of the four counties of Ning-kang, Lin-hsien, Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin. Its northern foot is Mao-p'ing, in Ning-kang, and its southern foot is Huang-pa in Sui-ch'uan, a distance of 90 li between them. Its eastern foot is Na-shan in Yung-hsin and its western foot is Shui-k'ou in Ling-hsien, 180 li apart. It has an area of 550 square li, extending from Na-shan and Lung-yuan-k'ou (in Yung-hsin) to Hsin-ch'eng, Mao-p'ing and Ta-lung (in Ning-kang), to Shih-tu, Shui-k'ou and Hsia-ts'en (in Ling-hsien), and then to Ying-pan-yu, Tai-chia-pu, Ta-feng, Tui-tzu-ch'ien, Huang-ao, Wu-tu-chiang, and Ch'e-ao (in Sui-ch'uan). In the mountains are located such places as Ta-ching, Hsiao-ching, Shang-ching, Chung-ching, Hsia-ching, Tzu-p'ing, Hsia-chuang, Hsing-chou, Ta'ao-p'ing, Pai-ni-hu and Lo-fu where paddy fields and villages are scattered. These places have been historically the lairs for bandits and stragglers. The population is less than 2,000, and the grain crop is under 10,000 piculs and so all the grain for the army must be supplied from Ning-kang, Yung-hsin and Sui-ch'uan counties. All strategic passes in the mountains are defended by heavy fortifications. Located in the mountains are the Red Army hospitals, clothing shops, arsenal and the rear offices of the various regiments. Foodstuffs are now being hauled to the mountain bastions from Ning-kang, and if we can get sufficient supplies (grain and cash, the most important being cash), it will be impregnable. There is a defense committee in charge of local defense, with Wang Tso as its director. The second stronghold is Chiu-lung, located at the juncture of the four counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Ch'a-ling. This base is not as important as the Ching-kang Mountains, but is fortified and serves as the rearmost base for the local militia forces of the four counties. Surrounded by White regimes on all sides, a military bastion with strong natural barriers is indispensable for the existence of the Red regime. Because of the fact that it is surrounded by the enemy, it is necessary to defend every side, and so natural barriers are important in reinforcing the inadequacy of human resources. However, when the bourgeois political power is stable, protracted Red occupation will be difficult.

(B) Agrarian Problem

(1) Agrarian Status in Border Area: Generally speaking, over 60 percent of the land is controlled by landlords, and less than 40 percent is in the hands of peasants. Individually speaking, land ownership is most concentrated in Sui-ch'uan in the Kiangsi border, where 80 percent is owned by

landlords, Yung-hsin comes next, with 70 percent owned by landlords. In Wan-an, Ning-kang and Lien-hua there are more rich peasants. With the exception of Wan-an where no direct investigation has been made, although we say that there are many rich peasants in Ning-kang and Lien-hua, landlords still own more land there--the ratio being 60 : 40. In Ch'a-ling and Ling-hsien on the Hunan border, conditions are similar, as some 70 percent of land is owned by landlords.

(2) The Problem of the Intermediate Class: Under these circumstances, it would seem that confiscation of all lands and redistribution of them would be supported by the majority. However, there are roughly three classes in rural areas, namely, the big gentry consisting of big and medium-sized landlords, the intermediate class of small landlords and rich peasants, and the poor peasants. In the intermediate class, the rich peasants often align themselves with the interests of the small landlords. Although the land owned by the rich peasants is a small percentage of the total, if combined with the land owned by the small landlords, the amount is sizeable. This situation seems to be prevalent throughout the country. The policy in the border areas has been to confiscate all the land and then to distribute it thoroughly. Thus, both the big gentry and the intermediate class have been attacked in the areas of Red power. Although this is the policy, it has been hampered by the intermediate class during its implementation. In the early days of the revolution, the intermediate class capitulated to the poor peasants superficially, but in reality conspired to use their former social status and their clannishness to spread rumors intimidating the poor peasants, thus delaying the distribution of land. When they were pressured to such an extent that no further delay was possible, they either concealed the actual extent of their land, or kept the rich land for themselves and reported the poor land to the authorities. During that period, because of the protracted persecution and the uncertainty of revolutionary victory, the poor peasants were deceived by the intermediate class and did not dare to take positive action. It is only when the revolution has become resurgent and seized political power in one or several counties, when the reactionary army has been defeated repeatedly, and when the prowess of the Red Army has been demonstrated effectively that positive action has been taken in rural villages against the intermediate class. For instance, the southern section of Yung-hsin has the largest intermediate class. It has also been most stubborn in delaying redistribution of land and in concealing landholdings. But it was only after the Red Army won a huge victory at Lung-yuan-k'ou on 23 June, and the district executed several people who tried to postpone land redistribution, that land was actually redistributed. Nonetheless, in almost any county, the feudal system of family organization is prevalent; usually one single family dominates one village or even several villages. The result is that it could take a long time before class splitting in the village is realized and the clan sentiment overcome. In rural villages dominated by family organizations, it is not the big gentry but the intermediate class that creates the biggest problem.

(3) Defection of the Intermediate Class Under the White Terror: As the intermediate class had been under attack during the revolutionary upsurge,

it immediately defected as soon as the White terror came. The small landlords and rich peasants of Ning-kang and Yung-hsin led the reactionary troops in burning down the houses of the revolutionary peasants there. Pursuant to the directions of the reactionaries, they proved to be most courageous in burning houses and arresting people. When the Red Army again reached Ning-kang (in September), several thousand peasants of Hsin-ch'eng, Ku-ch'eng and Lung-shih, persuaded by the propaganda of the reactionaries that "the Communists would kill them," followed the reactionaries to Yung-hsin. It was only after we proselytized to them that "peasants who had defected would be killed" and that we "welcome peasants who had defected back to reap grain" that many peasants slowly returned.

(4) When the revolution is at a low ebb in the nation, the most difficult problem in the occupied areas is that the intermediate class cannot firmly be held. The main reason for the betrayal by this class is that it has been dealt heavy blows by the revolution. However, if the poor peasants are undaunted during the revolutionary upsurge, the intermediate class might be scared and not dare to run amok. When the war between Li Tsung-jen and T'ang Sheng-chih spread to Hunan, the small landlords in Ch'a-ling tried to make peace with the peasants, some of them even sent pork to peasants as a New Years gift (At that time, the Red Army evacuated Ch'a-ling to go to Sui-ch'uan). After the conclusion of the Li-T'ang [action], such incidents have also disappeared. Now that the counterrevolution has reached its high tide in the whole country, the intermediate class that has been under attack has become completely subservient to the big gentry in the White areas, and the poor peasants have become an isolated force. This is a rather serious problem.

(5) The pressure of daily life as an influence on the intermediate class to defect: Red occupation and White resistance have created two enemy states. Because of the enemy's stringent blockade and because of our mishandling of the petty bourgeoisie, trade has been completely stopped between the two areas. The shortage and the high prices of salt, cloth and medicine as well as other daily necessities, and the difficulty of exporting such items as timber, tea and oil have affected the people in general. It has also curbed their income. Although the poor peasants can endure hardship the intermediate class cannot and will go over to the gentry when conditions become intolerable. This economic problem is most serious. Thus, unless the splits and wars between the big gentry and the warlords of China continues, and unless the national situation moves forward, the small independent Red regimes will be gravely threatened economically, and the protracted existence of the regimes will become a problem. This is because such economic pressure is not only intolerable to the middle class, but also unendurable to the worker and peasant classes as well as to the Red Army. Both Yung-hsin and Ning-kang have no salt to eat, and the supply of cloth and medicine, not to mention other things, has been completely disrupted. Salt is now sold, but at an exorbitant price, and there are still no cloth and medicine. In Ning-kang and the western part of Yung-hsin as well as the northern part of Sui-ch'uan (which are still occupied areas at present), it

is still impossible to export timber, tea and oil which form their staple products. There is an acute shortage of money, and if captured local despots refuse to deliver money, there is no money to spend. That is why the problem is very grave.

(6) The Standard for Land Redistribution: The township serves as the unit for redistribution. Where it is mountainous and there is very little farmland, such as the Hsiao-chiang District in Yung-hsin, three or four townships form a single unit for redistribution, though such cases are very rare. In regard to human standards, then land is redistributed equally among all persons regardless of age and sex. Now, however, in keeping with the new measures prescribed by the Central Committee, the labor force is used as the standard; those who can work receive twice as much as land as those who cannot.

(7) The Question of Concessions to the Owner-peasants: This problem has not yet been discussed in depth. The rich owner-peasants have suggested that the standard of redistribution be based on productivity, that is, those who have more labor and capital (farm implements, etc.) should be given more land. The rich peasants feel that neither equal distribution nor distribution according to the labor force are to their advantage. They indicate that they are willing to work harder which, coupled with their capital, would enable them to raise more crops. If they are given land on an equal basis, it would be tantamount to ignoring (and negating) their special efforts as well as their surplus capital, and so they are unwilling. The measures prescribed by the Central Committee have been carried out here accordingly, but the problem must be discussed further, and a report will be made as soon as conclusions are drawn. On the other hand, we request the Central Committee and the two provincial committees to inform us as soon as possible the measures adopted by Soviet Russia to treat its kulaks (rich peasants), and especially what measures had been adopted by the Soviet Government within the White regime during the time of its democratic revolution. As to the question of not confiscating the land of rich-peasants, where the land has been completely confiscated in the occupied border areas, it of course will not arise again. However, as the area is expanded, the policy of nonconfiscation will be applied during initial stages in order to enable the rich-peasants to strike against the big gentry and to help the poor peasants.

(8) Land Tax: In Ning-kang, the tax is 20 percent, which is about 5 percent higher than that prescribed by the Central Committee. Since collection is now under way, it cannot be changed, but could be reduced next year. In Sui-ch'uan, Ling-hsien and Yung-hsin, the terrain is mountainous and the peasants are so poor that it is inadvisable to collect tax from them. The funds for the government and the Red Guards must be obtained from the local despots in the White areas. The rice for the sustenance of the Red Army can be obtained for the time being from the land tax in Ning-kang, while cash has also been obtained from squeezing the local despots. As a result of guerrilla operations in Sui-ch'uan in October, some 10,000 yuan have been collected which may last for some time, and we will try to look to some other means after this money is gone.

(C) The Question of Soviets

(1) Soviets of County, District and Township Levels: Soviets on all levels have been organized in the border area, but more in name than in reality. Among the worker and peasant masses, and even among party members, the meaning of "soviet" is not widely understood. In many places, they do not have the so-called workers, peasants and soldiers representatives conference. The executive committee of the soviet at the district and township levels, and even at the county level, is usually elected at a mass rally. It can neither discuss problems, nor give political training, though it can be easily manipulated by intellectuals and opportunists. This is due to the fact that they do not understand what constitutes a soviet, that the representatives of workers, peasants and soldiers form the highest permanent organ of political power, while the executive committee is merely an administrative organ during the recess of the representatives' conference. This is the biggest mistake of many localities in the border areas regarding the organ of political power. In some places there are representatives conferences, though they also merely regard the conference as an ad hoc elected organ vis-a-vis the executive committee. After the election, the power is controlled by the executive committee, and the conference will not even be mentioned. This does not mean that there are no bona fide soviet organizations, though the number is extremely small. This is due to the woeful lack of propaganda and education on this new political system of soviets. The evil habits of dictatorship and dogmatism during the feudal era have become steeped in the minds of the masses and even party members. They still cannot eradicate these habits. They are prone to follow the easy course, and dislike the complex democratic system. In order that democratic centralism may be applied to mass organizations, its efficacy must be demonstrated in the revolutionary struggle. This will enable the masses to understand that this kind of organizational method is most conducive to mobilizing the strength of the masses, and most beneficial to struggle. Only after they have gained this understanding will it be universally and truly established. We are now enacting detailed organic laws for soviets at all levels (based on the outlines of the Central Committee) in order to correct some of the previous mistakes. The soldiers soviet (soldiers' representatives conference on all levels) in the Red Army is also being established regularly. This would also rectify the mistake of having only soldiers' committees but no regular soldiers' conferences.

(2) The Executive Committee on All Levels: The masses now generally understand the "soviet government of workers, peasants and soldiers" at all levels, to be the "ai government," so dubbed by the masses of Ning-kang ("ai" meaning "us" in the local dialect, and so this means "our government"), or the "su government" dubbed elsewhere, both referring to the committee. This is because they have not understood the powers of the representatives conference, thinking the committee is the only authority. This kind of executive committee does not have the backing of a sound representatives conference and is apt to deviate from the views of the masses when decisions are made. This is often manifested by its wavering and compromise in the

redistribution of land, its recklessness and corruption in economic affairs, its fear of the White Terror, and its lack of resoluteness in the struggle. Very few plenary meetings are held, and there are also very few standing committee meetings on the district and township government level. Matters are decided by the chairman, secretary, treasurer or Red Guards commander (or insurrectionary leader). As a result, the practice of democratic centralism even among government members has not become uniform.

(3) The government committee is dominated by the bourgeoisie. During the early stage, especially in government committees on the township level, small landlords, rich peasants and intellectuals vied with each other in seeking power. They pretended to be enthusiastic, wearing red ribbons, and wormed their way by deceit into the government committee to play dominant roles, while poor peasant members were relegated to secondary roles. It was only after they were unmasked during the course of struggles and the peasants rose up that it became possible to get rid of them. Although this state of affairs has not been universal, it has occurred in many places.

(4) The Relation Between the Party and Organs of Political Power: Although there is no such thing as the party issuing orders to the government organs, this does not mean that the government is independent. The party still enjoys very great prestige among its members and the masses, while the prestige of the government is much less. This is because the party, for the sake of convenience, has often handled matters directly, paying no regard to the government. This kind of mistake has been recurrent in many places. In some government organs there are no party or corps organizations; in other places, they have not been used efficiently. Hereafter, the party must be the master behind the scene; the party's policies and measures, with the exception of propaganda, must be carried out through mass organizations. We must avoid the Kuomintang's mistake of interfering with the government directly.

(5) The Supreme Soviet: The shingle of the "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area" was hung out in May. Nonetheless, it has been established hurriedly and is rather imperfect. It is now decided to reorganize the border soviet government and its committee as the supreme organ of political power in the border areas.

(C) The Status of the Party in the Border Areas

(1) History of Struggle Against Opportunism: About the time of the Ma-jih (21 May) incident, all party organizations in the counties in the border areas may be said to have been opportunistic. For this reason, they did not wage a resolute struggle when the counterrevolution set in. When the Red Army (the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division of the 1st Army of the Worker and Peasant Revolutionary Army) arrived in the border counties in October last year, there remained only a few party members in hiding, and the party organizations had been totally destroyed. The period from November to April this year was one of rebuilding the party and the period since May one of great expansion. In the past year, the phenomenon of opportunism within the party has been found everywhere. Some of the party members, lacking the will to fight, laid in ambush (by hiding themselves deep in the mountains when the enemy came); others were more active, but they

became idealistic adventurists as a result of their bourgeois mentality. This situation diminished after an extended period of training and struggle within the party. In the meantime, even in the Red Army, this kind of petty-bourgeois restiveness has also lasted a considerable length of time. When the enemy came, they would put up a fight, or they would take flight. This kind of ambivalence was often found in the same person and on the same issue. This has been gradually rectified only after prolonged inner-party struggle and through lessons learned from actual events (for instance, from losses incurred in reckless battle and defeats suffered during flight).

(2) Localism: The economy of the border area is not only an agrarian economy, it has remained in the age of the hand pestle (the wooden hand pestle is used in the mountains, while in the plains there are many stone mills). The social organizational unit is the clan, consisting of people with the same name. The party organization in the villages consists usually of one clan of the same surname living close together, forming one branch. So the branch meeting is tantamount to a family meeting. Under this circumstance, it is of course very difficult to have a "fighting Bolshevik Party." To say that the Communist Party does not have any national or provincial demarcations is, of course, also incomprehensible to them. They do not even understand that there are no county, district or township differences. There is localism to a serious extent among the various counties, and is strong even in the different districts and townships in the same county. Reasoning is only partially successful in overcoming localism and it takes White oppression--which is not localized--to gradually convince the people to abandon their localism for common interests and struggle (for instance, such as joint suppression by two provincial forces). Localism is declining considerably as a result of a series of objective lessons.

(3) The Question of Native Inhabitants and Outsiders: There is another unique thing in the border area, namely, the rift between the native residents and the outsiders who have settled down there. There is a great rift between the native population and the immigrants from Kwangtung and Fukien who arrived several centuries ago. Historically, there has been a deep enmity between them which has become almost a "national" struggle. These outsiders comprise a few million people, from the Kwangtung border, to the borders of Hunan and Kiangsi, and even to southern Hupeh. The outsiders, who live in the mountains, have been traditionally oppressed by the native residents on the plains and have never had any political power. The outsiders have welcomed the national revolution in the last 2 years, thinking it was the prelude of better fortune for them. But the revolution became a counter-revolution, and the outsiders have been repressed by the native population as before. Within the border area, such as Ning-kang, Sui-ch'uan, Ling-hsien and Ch-a-ling, the problem of natives and outsiders is very serious, especially in Ning-kang. Last year and the year before, the indigenous revolutionaries and the outside settlers of Ning-kang joined forces under the leadership of the Communist Party to overthrow the rule of the native gentry, thereby seizing political control throughout the county. In June of last year, Chu P'ei-teh's government launched a counterrevolution,

and in September the local gentry led Chu's troops in an attack on Ning-kang which continues to the present. In theory, this kind of rift should not extend to the exploited workers and peasants, much less to the party, but in point of fact, because this has been a historical relic, there is still a big gap between the native inhabitants and the outside settlers. For instance, following the border defeat in August, the native gentry led troops back to Ning-kang, announcing that the outside settlers would massacre the indigenous residents. As a result, the native peasants began to change their allegiance by wearing white ribbons and acting as guides to the troops to search the mountains and burn down houses. When the Red Army routed the White troops in October and November, the native peasants fled with the latter, while the outsider peasants confiscated their cattle and belongings. When this situation is reflected in the party, it often leads to meaningless controversy. To deal with this situation, we must tell the masses that "peasants who have defected will not be killed" and that "they will be given land when they return," thereby inducing them to desert the local gentry and to return home without fear (many of them have already returned). In the meantime, the county soviet ordered the settler-peasants to return the confiscated cattle and belongings to their original owners, and posted notices that the native peasants will be protected. Efforts have also been made within the party to eliminate the causes of friction as well as to intensify education so that there will be greater unity.

(4) Defection of Opportunists: During the revolutionary upsurge in June, many opportunists wormed their way into the party, with the result that the number of party members in the border area grew to more than 10,000. Responsible persons in the party branches and in the district committees consisted largely of new members, so good inner-party education was impossible. As soon as the White terror arrived, the opportunists defected. They frequently helped the reactionaries to arrest our comrades. Thus, most of the party organizations in the White area have collapsed.

(5) Party Purge and Establishment of Secret Organizations: After September, a stringent purge has been enforced in the party, imposing strict limitations on the composition of membership. In Yung-hsin and Ning-kang, all party organizations were dissolved and a new registration was implemented. Registration in Yung-hsin has already been completed, while registration in Ning-kang will be completed soon. Though the number of party members has been diminished greatly, combat strength has been bolstered. Whereas the party organization was open to the public before, thus losing any secrecy, since September, all organizational work has been undertaken secretly. In the meantime, the party has been able to extend its influence into the White area, so that it can play an effective role there. However, there is as yet no foundation in the towns. This is due, first, to the fact that the enemy is stronger in the towns, and second, we have done too much damage to bourgeois interests in the towns, where business is slack and the handicraft industry disrupted. As a result, we have no foothold in the towns. We are now rectifying our former errors and are trying to set up our organizations in the towns, though the results are still small.

(6) The Guidance Organs on All Levels: The branch executive has been renamed the branch committee; above the branch is the district committee, and above the district is the county committee. Because of certain unique conditions, a special district committee is formed between the district committee and county committee, such as the Pei-hsiang special district committee and the southeastern special district committee in Yung-hsin. There are five border area county committees, namely: Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua, Sui-ch'uan and Ling-hsien. There used to be a county committee in Ch'a-ling, but because it was difficult for our work to expand there, a number of the organs set up last winter and this spring have been destroyed by the White forces. During the past half year, party work has been done only in the mountainous regions near Ning-kang and Yung-hsin, and so the county organization has been changed to a special district committee. To carry out our work in Yu-hsien and An-yuan, it is necessary to pass through Ch'a-ling. We tried to send some people there, but it was abortive. In January the Wan-an county committee held a joint meeting with the Front Committee in Sui-ch'uan but since then, it has been cut off by White forces for more than 6 months. We did not resume contact with Wan-an until September, when the Red Army conducted guerrilla operations there. According to a letter from the Wan-an county committee, there used to be nine district committees in Wan-an, but their 120 rifles have all been lost. We still have our organization in the Police guards there, and our comrades have some rifles. One battalion of the guerrilla units of the Red Army has reached the vicinity of Wan-an city, but our men there failed to come out to contact us. Nonetheless, some 80 revolutionary peasants followed us to the Ching-kang Mountains, and were organized as the Wan-an Red Guards, with 10 rifles. An-fu has no party organization. The Chi-an county committee has only contacted us twice, though it is a neighboring county of Yung-hsin. They have not given us any help at all, which is rather strange. In the Sha-t'ien district in Kuei-tung, land was redistributed in March and again in August. There, a party organization was set up under the jurisdiction of the Southern Hunan special committee with its center at Shih-erh-tung in Lung-ch'i. Above the various county committees is the Hunan-Kiangsi border area special committee. On 20 May the first border area congress was held at Mao-p'ing in Ning-kang. It elected 23 members of the first committee, with Mao Tse-tung as secretary. In July, the Hunan provincial committee sent Yang K'ai-ming over as acting secretary. Yang became ill in September, and was replaced by T'an Chen-lin. When the main force of the Red Army went to southern Hunan in August and the border area came under heavy pressure from the White forces, an emergency conference was held in Yung-hsin. When the Red Army returned to Ning-kang in October, the second congress was convened at Mao-p'ing. Beginning on 4 October, the congress met for 3 days. It adopted resolutions on political problems, the tasks of the party in the border area, and propaganda, organization and agrarian problems. It elected 19 members of the second special committee (namely: T'an Chen-lin, Chu Teh, Ch'en I, Lung Ch'ao-ch'ing, Chu Ch'ang-k'ai, Liu T'ien-ch'ien, Yen P'an-chu, T'an Szu-ts'ung, T'an Ping, Li Chueh-fei, Sung I-yueh, Yuan Wen-ts'ai, Wang Tso-nung, Ch'en Cheng-jen, Mao Tse-tung, Wan Hsieh-hsien, Wang Tso, Yang K'ai-ming and Ho T'ing-ying). Five of them were elected to the standing committee, with T'an Chen-lin (a worker) as secretary, and Ch'en Cheng-jen (an intellectual) as deputy

secretary. On 14 November, the 6th plenary conference of the Red Army was held, electing an army committee of 23 members, with a standing committee of five members, with Chu Teh as secretary. The special committee and the army committee are under the jurisdiction of the Front Committee. On 6 November the Front Committee was organized which, pursuant to the directive of the Central Committee, comprised of five members, namely: Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, the secretary of the local party committee (T'an Chen-lin), a worker comrade (Sung Ch'iao-sheng) and a peasant comrade (Mao K'o-wen), with Mao Tse-tung as secretary. For the time being, the Front Committee has set up a secretariat, a propaganda section, an organization section, a trade union movement committee and a military affairs committee (which has been elected by the above-mentioned Red Army conference). The Front Committee is placed in charge of the local party organizations in the various counties. Because the Front Committee sometimes must move with the army, it is still necessary to keep the Special Committee.

The problem of proletarian ideological leadership in the party is extremely important. The party organizations in the various border area counties, which can be said to be a party of peasants, will go astray unless they accept the leadership of the urban proletariat. Besides rectifying the previous errors and paying close attention to the trade union movement in the various counties and towns, it is also necessary to increase workers' representation in the soviets. It is extremely important for the workers, poor peasants and soldiers of the party to participate in the local party organizations and in the guidance organs of the party in the army. We have concentrated on this point for the past year, with the result that the number of workers and peasants has been increased in local party organs at all levels. Although in the Red Army, participation of soldiers in organs on all levels has been satisfactory such participation must be further increased, and attention must be paid to the quality of the participants so that they will be able to undertake "practical leadership," gradually eliminating bourgeois ideology completely.

(D) The Question of Revolutionary Character

(1) We completely subscribe to the Communist International's resolution on China: China is still at the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution. The thorough completion of democratic revolution in China includes, externally, the overthrow of the imperialist special privileges in order to achieve national liberation and unification, and, internally, the elimination of the influences of compradores in the cities, the eradication of feudal relations in the countryside, completion of the agrarian revolution, and the toppling of the warlord system which has served as another kind of political organization for the big gentry. It is only by such a democratic revolution that it will be possible to lay a true foundation of a workers' regime and then advance to socialist revolution. Based on our experiences of fighting in various places during the past year, we are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide has steadily declined. Although Red political power has been established in a few small areas, there are as yet no democratic rights in

the nation as a whole. The workers, peasants and even the bourgeois democrats have no right of speech or assembly, and the worst crime is to join the Communist Party. The Red Army has met with apathy everywhere it has gone; it is only after propaganda work has been done that the masses come out slowly. The Red Army has to fight hard battles, there being few or no instances of enemy defection or mutiny. This is also true with the 6th Army, which recruited the most "hooligans" following the Ma-jih (21 May) incident. This is merely fighting for the sake of fighting, and this method will not be conducive to victory. This is so because there a nationwide revolutionary upsurge is completely lacking. Under the ruthless feudal rule of the big gentry, the broad strength of the oppressed classes has not yet been mobilized, and consequently we have had to fight desultorily. We are keenly aware of our isolation and hope that it will end soon. In order for the revolution to reach its upsurge throughout the country, it will be necessary to launch and consummate political and economic democratic revolution which includes the bourgeoisie. Thus, the resolution of the Comintern is most correct.

(2) Policy Toward Petty Bourgeoisie: Up to February this year the work in the border area was done fairly well. In March, Chou Lu, a representative of the Southern Hunan special committee, arrived at the border. He said that we did not do enough killing and burning, and had failed to carry out the policy of "converting the petty bourgeoisie into the proletariat, and then forcing them into the revolution," as a result of which the policy has been changed. After the entire Red Army reached the border area in April, although there was still not much killing and burning, rigorous measures were carried out to confiscate the property of urban middle merchants and to squeeze the rural small landlords. The slogan of the Southern Hunan special committee of "All factories to the workers," has also been proselytized vigorously. This policy of striking excessively at the petty bourgeoisie has resulted in driving the majority of them to the side of the big gentry. They put on white ribbons to oppose us. Recently, this policy has been changed gradually, and conditions have improved somewhat. Salutory effects have been achieved in Sui-ch'uan particularly where the small merchants in the county and townships no longer tried to avoid us, and some even said good things about the Red Army. Some 20,000 people are drawn to the market fairs in K'o-lin and Shang-feng (the fair is held every 3 days at noon) which is unprecedented. This proves that our policy has changed. Previously, taxes were levied on all kinds of agricultural produce in transit, and heavy taxes were imposed by the pacification corps in Sui-ch'uan. From Huang-ao to Ts'ao-lin, a distance of only 70 li, there were five toll stations. We abolished such exploitation by the feudal gentry and our action has been endorsed by the peasants and small merchants.

(3) Since the Central Committee has asked us to promulgate a policy platform that includes the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, we suggest that the Central Committee enact a democratic revolutionary program which encompasses the interests of the workers, agrarian revolution and national liberation, as well as a list of slogans for guidance in the border area.

(4) A unique characteristic of the Chinese revolution is that it is based on agriculture as its principal economy and uses armed forces to promote insurrections. We suggest that the Central Committee exert great effort to develop the military movement. This movement should be launched primarily in the enemy forces, with the development of the Red Army being secondary.

(E) The Question of the Area of the Independent Regime

The area from the Kwangtung border to the Hunan-Kiangsi border, and even to southern Hupeh all belongs to the Lo-hsiao mountain range geographically. After traversing the entire Lo-hsiao mountain range, we have found out that, comparatively speaking, the mid-section of the range which centers on Ning-kang is most suitable for our occupation. The terrain in the northern section is not as good as the middle section, which can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes. Moreover, it is too close to some of the big political centers. Unless plans are under way for the rapid seizure of Changsha or Wuhan, it would be rather dangerous to station large forces in such places as Liu-yang, Li-ling, P'ing-hsiang and Tung-ku. Although the terrain in the southern section is better than that of the northern, its mass foundation is not as good as the middle section, and its political impact on Kiangsi and Hunan is smaller. On the other hand, any action in the middle section can have a tremendous impact on the lower river valleys of Hunan and Kiangsi.

A stocktaking of the advantages of the middle section reveals: (a) there is a mass foundation that has been built up for more than a year; (b) the foundation of the party is strong; (c) local armed forces with rich fighting experiences which has reached its present scope after more than a year of building up; this force, supplemented by the 4th Red Army, cannot be annihilated by any enemy; (d) an ideal military bastion in the Ching-kang Mountains, and each county with its own armed bastions elsewhere; (e) it can influence Hunan and Kiangsi, and the lower river valleys of these two provinces which, compared to southern Hunan and southern Kiangsi which can influence only one province or the upper river valley and the remote areas at that, is very different in political significance. The setback of the middle section is that because it has been occupied for a long time, it is confronted with enormous enemy forces of suppression, and its economic problems, especially the problem of cash, are very serious.

The policy of the southern Hunan special committee toward us here was changed three times during a few weeks in June and July. First, a message was delivered by Yuan Teh-sheng which endorsed a plan to set up a government in the middle section. Then, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang K'ai-ming came with the message that the Red Army should without any hesitation move toward southern Hunan, leaving only 200 rifles behind to protect the border area in conjunction with the Red Guards corps. The letter also said that this policy is "absolutely" correct. After only 10 days, Yuan Teh-sheng returned with the message that the Red Army march for eastern Hunan which was also described as an "absolutely correct" policy. The letter, besides scolding us at some

length, also wanted us to go "without any hesitation." This rigid directive has placed us in a great predicament, because if we should disobey it, it would be disobedience on our part, and if we should observe it, it would mean certain defeat. When the second message came, a joint meeting of the special committee, army committee and the county committee of Yung-hsin was held. The consensus was that it would be dangerous to go to southern Hunan, and we decided not to obey the views of the provincial committee. A few days later, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang K'ai-ming insisted that the view of the provincial committee should be carried out. The 29th Regiment which was composed mostly of recruits from southern Hunan, used the directive of the provincial committee as its excuse to pull the Red Army along to mount an attack on Ch'en-chou. This resulted in a disastrous defeat to the Red Army and the border area. About one-half of the Red Army was lost, while countless houses were destroyed and many people were slaughtered in the border area. Other counties fell into enemy hands successively, and they have not been recovered even now. In regard to eastern Hunan, before there is disruption in the political power of the big gentry in the three provinces of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi, it is also inadvisable to send the main force of the Red Army there. Had it not been for the march toward southern Hunan in July, it would have been possible to avert the border defeat in August, and, taking advantage of the fighting in Chang-shu between Ch'eng Ch'ien's [4453 3383] 6th Army and Wang Chun's [3769 6874] forces, to smash the enemy at Yung-hsin, thus engulfing Chi-an and An-fu and enabling the vanguards to reach P'ing-hsiang to link up with the 5th Army in the northern section. Even so, our general headquarters should still have been in Ning-kang, and only guerrilla units should have been sent to eastern Hunan. Since fighting among the big gentry had not yet erupted, and there were large enemy forces in P'ing-hsiang, Ch'a-ling and Yu-hsien on the Hunan border, when our main force turned northward, it would have been overwhelmed by the enemy. The Central Committee has deemed that it would be perilous to march either toward eastern Hunan or southern Hunan. Although we have as yet had no experience in eastern Hunan, our experience in southern Hunan has borne out that once a wrong move is made, the entire game is lost. Contact was lost between the border area, southern Hunan and the 5th Army stationed in P'ing-chiang and Liu-yang, whole losses were also suffered at An-yuan. This painful experience should be borne in mind at all times.

At present, the big gentry has not yet been broken up. There are now 10 or more enemy regiments surrounding the border area. If we can continue to find some cash resources (the problem of food and clothing is not too serious), then, with what foundations we have already built up in the border area, it will be possible for us to cope with the existing enemy forces or even more. For the sake of the border area, if the Red Army should depart, then the kind of trampling that happened in August may recur immediately. Although they might not be able to completely annihilate our Red Guards units, the foundation of the party and the masses will be seriously damaged. Although it might be possible to preserve some mountain strongholds in the manner of bandits, in the plains we would have to go underground as in August and September. But if the Red Army should determine

to stay, it will be possible, with its existing foundations, to gradually expand to the surrounding areas, and the future will be bright. For the sake of the Red Army, in order to bring about this expansion, a protracted struggle must be waged in the environs of the Ching-kang Mountains (namely: the four counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Ling-hsien and Sui-ch'uan) where we have a mass base. In this situation, we can take advantage of the conflict of interest between the enemies in Hunan and Kiangsi which render it impossible for them to concentrate their forces against us. We must also adopt some profitable strategy so that when we go out to fight we must be able to win, and with victory there will be captives which can be used to enlarge the Red Army gradually. Thus, with the preparations made by the masses from April to July, if the Red Army had not gone to southern Hunan, it would have greatly expanded itself in August. Although the mistake had been made, now that the Red Army has returned to the border area where the terrain is favorable and the people are friendly, the prospects are still good. It is, therefore, necessary for the Red Army to be resolved to struggle and to have the stamina and patience in fighting before it can augment its arms and train good soldiers. There is no other easy way than this.

The red flag has been hoisted in the border area for more than 1 year. Although this has aroused the hatred of the big gentry in the three provinces of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi, and even throughout the nation, nonetheless, this has also aroused the hopes of the workers, peasants and soldiers in the neighboring provinces. Consequently, "bandit suppression" in the border area has been regarded by the warlords as an important event. As has been said by Lu T'i-p'ing [7627 3321 1627], "one year of bandit suppression has cost a million dollars," and by Wang Chun, "though they claim to be 20,000 soldiers, they have only 5,000 rifles." Such laudatory propaganda like this has gradually attracted the attention of enemy soldiers and the enemy's lower-echelon officers, and more and more will defect to our ranks. This provides another source for the expansion of the Red Army. Moreover, the fact that the red flag has flown over the border area consistently shows not only the strength of the Communist Party, but also proves the bankruptcy of the ruling class, and it is fraught with political significance nationally. Thus, we deem that unless we have reached a dead end economically so that we will not be able to maintain ourselves unless we go to southern Kiangsi, we must not take such a course. Maybe we will go to southern Kiangsi when it comes to the end of the ropes, but this will be for economic reasons, not political reasons. Politically, we have always deemed that the policy of establishing and expanding political power in the middle section of Lo-hsiao mountain range both most necessary and entirely correct.

(F) Communications and Others

(1) Establishing of communication organs is extremely important. We have handed over to comrades Yuan and Hsiao 200 yuan (4 ounces of gold) and asked them to assume full responsibility in setting up the organ. We will continue to be responsible for the funds. The location should be at P'ing-hsiang. A communications organ should also be set up at Chi-an, which will be handled by the Kiangsi provincial committee.

- (2) When this letter was about finished, we received a letter from the Central Committee. The letter from Hunan contains circular No 47 (on the problem of secret organization), though we are still without the resolution on military work. Besides, there is the letter from Comrade Yung-hsien dated 15 August which said the letter and the circular from the Central Committee had not been received, and the three poems also cannot be found.
- (3) We have been able to get newspapers and so we are much happier than before when we did not see a newspaper for 2 or 3 months. We still hope that you will keep us posted on political conditions and analyses.
- (4) In regard to Tu Hsiu-ching's error, the representatives' conference of the southern expeditionary forces which reached Sha-t'ien in Kuei-tung in August has decided to request the provincial committee to punish him because Tu represented that committee.
- (5) The Front Committee has completely endorsed Mao Tse-tung's letter to the provincial committee as well as his long letter to the Central Committee which will be forwarded thereto by Comrade Yuan.
- (6) Comrade Yuan Teh-sheng has just returned to the provincial committee because he has had to wait for the discussion of and reply to the letter of the Central Committee.
- (7) Hereafter, when you give any direction to us, please refer to our reports instead of basing unilaterally on the reports of inspectors. The report made by Inspector Tu Hsiu-ching to the provincial committee in June contains views that are entirely wrong (such as, if the Red Guards have 200 more rifles, they will be able to defend the border area, and the Red Army was conservative, etc.). The provincial committee has made decisions on the basis of such reports, thus causing our defeat. Moreover, when you give any directions on military movements in the future, they must not be too rigid. The Central Committee's letter asked us to make our own choice in accordance with the environment, which is more flexible and so very proper. During last winter and this spring, the Hunan provincial committee and the southern Hunan special committee listened to the rumors of Su Hsien-chun, a regimental commander who was dismissed from the party and later made secret charges which resulted in Kuo Liang's arrest, and Ho Chieh, a chief of staff who later was responsible for arson and murders in Chen-chou. This is even more dangerous, and please don't listen to irresponsible rumors and allegations.
- (8) Yang K'ai-ming is seriously ill, and Wan Hsi-hsien has important assignment here, and so they cannot go to eastern Hunan.
- (9) The status of the Youth League will be reported to the provincial committee by the league's special committee.

(10) This letter is written in three copies; one being forwarded to the Central Committee care of the Hunan provincial committee; one being forwarded to the Kiangsi provincial committee through the Hunan provincial committee; and one being forwarded by the Chi-an county committee to the Kiangsi provincial committee, and then to the Central Committee. One of these is bound to be delivered duly.

Mao Tse-tung, secretary of the Front Committee

2077

CSO: 4005

NOTICE OF THE FOURTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS OF THE RED ARMY

January 1929

[Text] The principle of the Red Army is to prosecute the revolution for the people's rights. The fame and prestige of the army in western Kiangsi spreads far. The plan this time is to advance in separate groups. The officers and soldiers must obey orders. Fair buying and fair selling, let the facts be the proof. Indiscriminate burning and killing are strictly prohibited. Oppression is excessive in all areas in the nation. The workers and peasants are extremely miserable. Local tyrants and evil gentry lord it over the towns and villages. Everyone is angry over the high interests and rents. The soldiers of the White army suffer hunger and cold. The petty bourgeois are overburdened by taxes and levies. Foreign commodities crowd out domestic merchandise. There is no one who does not hate imperialism. The Kuomintang, a bandit party, is completely reactionary. What they say is not what they think, and they cannot be very tough. Sleeping in the same bed, Chiang [5592], Kuei [2710], Feng [7458] and Yen [7051] dream different dreams. The conflicts have arisen and the warlords are encountering bad luck. Like rice which satisfies hunger and medicine which cures illness, the principles of the communist party are extremely just. The peasants will take over and cultivate the land of the landowners. No debt will be repaid nor rent delivered. The wages will be increased and the bosses will be responsible. Work will be limited to 8 hours. The treatment of the soldiers will be improved. They will have a share in land division. We will accept enemy officers and soldiers, and ask no questions of their prior behavior. The progressive method of taxation is the most suitable, and all harsh taxes and levies will be swept clean. The urban merchants save their dimes and nickels. As long as they follow our principles, we will not inquire into their past activities. We must be strict toward the foreigners. Industrial plants and banks will be confiscated. We will not recognize foreign capital and foreign debts. We will not allow foreign soldiers and foreign ships on our soil. Knocking down the foreign powers, everyone is happy. Ousting the warlords, we must be thorough in eliminating all evil. The whole country will rejoice when China is united. The Manchurians, Mongolians, Mohammedans, and Tibetans will have their own laws. The rascals of the National Government must be eradicated and their chaotic politics cleansed. The workers and peasants of the entire nation must arouse themselves, and the day of seizing political power is

drawing near. The success of the revolution depends on the masses. This notice is published everywhere so that everyone will rise and give attention.

Army Commander Chu Teh
Party Delegate Mao Tse-tung

January 1929, Western calendar

° "Notice of the Fourth Army Headquarters of the Red Army," Exhibition
Hall of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Memorabilia

6080

CSO: 4005

HSING-KUO COUNTY LAND LAW

April 1929

[Text] 1. All public land and land belonging to the landlord class are confiscated and made into the property of the Hsing-kuo Worker-Peasant-Soldier Delegates' Conference Government, to be allocated to peasants who own little or no land, for their cultivation and use.

2. After confiscation of all public land and land belonging to the land-owner class and allocation by the Worker-Peasant-Soldier Government, no land may be bought or sold.

3. The criteria for land allocation are:

a. Use the population as the criterion and equally divide the land among the male and female, old and young. b. Use the labor force as the criterion and allocate twice as much to those who can labor than those who cannot. Of the above two criteria, the first should be followed, and the second is only for areas under special conditions. The reasons for adopting the first criterion are:

a. Before the facilities for caring for the old and the young are completed, if the land allocation to them is too little, they will not be able to maintain a living.

b. It is simpler and more convenient to use the population as the criterion to divide the land.

c. Very few households are without old and young members. Meanwhile, though the old and the young do not have the ability to farm, the government may, after land allocation, assign them certain public service tasks, such as communication work.

4. The criteria for this area of land allocation are:

a. Use the township as the unit in land allocation. b. Combine several townships as the unit in land allocation (such as the Hsiao-chiang area in

Yung-hsin. c. Use the district as the unit in land allocation. Of the above three criteria, the first should be followed, and the second and third may be used under special conditions.

5. The methods of dividing hills and woods are:

a. The division of tea hills and firewood hills follows the method of land division--equal division with the township as the unit.

b. Bamboo hills belong to the soviet, but the peasants may have the use of the bamboo with its permission. For less than 50 stalks, permission of the township soviet is required; for less than 100 stalks, that of the district soviet is required; and for over 100 stalks, that of the country soviet is required.

c. All bamboo is marketed by the county soviet, and the proceeds are handled by the superior soviet.

6. The levy of land taxes is as follows:

a. Land taxes are divided into three categories according to the production situation: (1) 15 percent; (2) 10 percent; (3) 5 percent. Of the three categories above, the first one should be followed. The second and third may be applied under special conditions with the approval of the supreme soviet.

b. In case of natural disaster or other special conditions, application for land tax exemption may be submitted to the superior soviet for its approval.

c. Land taxes are collected by the county soviet and transmitted to the superior soviet.

7. Rural handicraft workers may, if they so desire, receive a half share of the allocation to the peasants.

8. The officers and soldiers of the Red Army and Red Guards, and the personnel of the government and other public organs will receive land allocations in the same amount as the peasants, and the soviet will hire people to cultivate the land for them.

Note: This version of the land law was promulgated when the Red Army arrived at Hsing-kuo in southern Kiangsi from the Ching-kang Mountains in the 4th month after the formulation of the previous land law. One important revision in the contents was to change "the confiscation of all land" to "the confiscation of public land and land belonging to the landlord class." It was a fundamental change. There was no other change. Changes were not made until 1930. Both land laws are kept to show the development of our understanding of the land struggle.

o "Rural Survey," Liberation Press, July 1949

RESOLUTION OF THE NINTH CCP CONGRESS OF THE RED FOURTH ARMY

West Fukien Ku-t'ien Conference, December 1929

[Text] I. Rectification of Incorrect Tendencies Toward Non-Proletarian Ideas in the Party

The many kinds of non-proletarian ideas in the party in the Fourth Army exert an extremely powerful influence and constitute a great obstacle to the implementation of the party's correct line. If not thoroughly rectified, the Fourth Army will definitely not be able to shoulder the tasks assigned it by China's extensive revolutionary struggle. The source of such incorrect ideas naturally lies in the fact that the foundation of the party organization is largely built on peasants and other petty bourgeois elements; yet the failure of the party's leading organs to wage a concerted and determined struggle against such incorrect ideas and to educate the party members along the correct line is also an important cause for their existence and growth. This Congress, in accordance with the spirit of the September letter of the "Central Committee", now points out the sources and manifestations of the incorrect tendencies of the many non-proletarian ideas in the party in the Fourth Army and the methods of rectification and calls on the comrades to eliminate them thoroughly.

A. The Purely Military Viewpoint

1. The origin of the purely military viewpoint:

a. A low political level. Those with this viewpoint fail to understand political leadership and the fundamental difference between the missions of the Red Army and the White army.

b. The mercenary concept. This is especially so in the numerous prisoners of war captured in the various campaigns who joined the Red Army and brought with them a strong mercenary concept, thus laying a foundation for the purely military viewpoint in the lower level.

c. From the two above factors arises the third, over-confidence in military strength and lack of confidence in the strength of the masses.

d. The party's lack of active attention and discussion of military work is also a factor for the purely military viewpoint of some of the comrades.

2. The purely military viewpoint is unusually widespread among a number of comrades in the Red Army. Its manifestations:

a. They regard military affairs and political work as opposed to each other, and fail to recognize military work as only one of the tools to accomplish the political tasks. Some even declare: "When military work is well done, political work is naturally done well; when military work is not well done, political work cannot be well done either." This is to go one step farther and regard military work as leading political work.

b. They regard the task of the Red Army as similar to that of the White army--merely fighting. They fail to recognize the fact that the Red Army is an armed force for carrying out the political tasks of the class. In its work, especially in China today, the Red Army definitely does not exist merely for the sake of fighting. Besides fighting, it must also shoulder such important tasks as agitating, organizing, arming and helping the masses, and building political power. The Red Army does not fight merely for the purpose of fighting. It fights in order to agitate, organize, arm and help the masses and build political power. Apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.

c. Therefore, organizationally, they subordinate the political work organ to the military work organ and propose the slogan that "the army headquarters deals with the public." If this idea continues to develop, it may lead to estrangement from the masses, to usurpation of political power by the army, and to a departure from the class position--similar to the path followed by the Kuomintang army.

d. Meanwhile, they overlook the importance of the propaganda team in propaganda work and ignore the soldiers' council and the worker-peasant masses in mass organization work. As a result, both propaganda and organization work are abandoned.

e. They are conceited when a battle is won and dejected when one is lost.

f. They subscribe to departmentalism of the Fourth Army, approaching everything in the interest of the Fourth Army without understanding that to arm the local masses is one of the Red Army's important tasks. This is an enlarged form of cliquism.

g. Limited by the immediate environment in the Fourth Army, a small number of comrades think that no other revolutionary force exists, resulting in the extremely deep-rooted idea of conserving its strength by avoiding action. This is a remnant of opportunism.

h. Disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, they suffer from revolutionary impetuosity, are unwilling to perform detailed and careful mass work, and only want to do big things, filling their mind with illusions. This is a remnant of adventurism.

3. The methods of rectification:

a. The political level of the party must be raised by means of education, and the theoretical source of the military viewpoint eradicated. The remnants of opportunism and adventurism must be eliminated, and the departmentalism of the Fourth Army broken down.

b. The political training of the officers and soldiers must be intensified, especially the education of the captive elements during the period of their induction. Meanwhile, local political power organs must select, as many as possible, worker and peasant elements with struggle experiences to join the Red Army, in order to weaken and eliminate the source of the simple military viewpoint organizationally.

c. Local party units must be activated to criticize the party in the Red Army and mass political power organizations (soviets) encouraged to criticize the Red Army, in order to influence the party and the officers and soldiers of the Red Army.

d. The party must actively pay attention to military work and hold discussions on it. All tasks, after discussion and decision by the party, must be implemented through the mass line.

e. Rules and regulations must be formulated, clearly defining the tasks of the Red Army, the relations between the military work and political work organs, the relations between the Red Army and the masses, and the powers and functions of the soldiers' council and its relationship with the military and political organs.

B. Ultra-Democratization

1. After the party in the Red Army accepted the directives of the Party Central, ultra-democratization has definitely diminished considerably. That party resolutions are better implemented, and that such slogans as "democratic centralism from the bottom to the top" and "discussion at the lower level first before decision by the higher level," for instance, are no longer heard are facts. Nevertheless, such diminution is only superficial, and ultra-democratization definitely has not been fundamentally eliminated from the mind of the party members in general. In other words, the poison roots of ultra-democratization still lie deep in the minds of many comrades. The reluctance in carrying out resolutions is one of the instances.

2. Methods of rectification:

a. The roots of ultra-democratization must be eradicated. First of all, it should be pointed out that its danger lies in the tendency to damage and even completely destroy the party organization, to undermine and even completely wipe out the party's fighting power, and to incapacitate the party from shouldering its fighting tasks, thereby causing the failure of the revolution and prolonging the counterrevolutionary life of the ruling class. Next, it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democratization lies in the nature of the petty bourgeoisie (small farm production and urban small capital)--its individualistic aversion to discipline. Such nature, having found its way into the party, manifests itself politically and organizationally as the idea of ultra-democratization. Such idea is basically incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat. Objectively, it is actually one of the counterrevolutionary ideas. If not vigorously rectified, and if permitted to develop, those with such idea will inevitably follow the counterrevolutionary path.

b. Organizationally, the democratic way of life under centralized guidance must be strictly enforced. The line for this is:

(1) The party's leading organ must provide a correct line of guidance and find solutions when problems arise, in order to establish itself as a leading center.

(2) The higher level organ must understand the conditions of the lower level organs and the life of the masses, in order to secure the social source of correct guidance.

(3) The party organizations of all levels must not make decisions without due deliberation. Once a decision is reached, it must be firmly implemented.

(4) All decisions of any importance made by the party's higher level organs must be promptly transmitted to the lower level organs and the membership masses. The method for doing so is to call activists meetings, party branch meetings, or even party membership mass meetings in the columns (when circumstances permit) and to assign men to make reports at such meetings.

(5) The lower level organs of the party and the membership masses must discuss in detail the directives from the higher level in order to understand their significance thoroughly and decide on the methods of implementation.

C. The Non-Organizational Viewpoint

The non-organizational viewpoint in the party in the Fourth Army is manifested in many aspects. The most apparent are the following three categories:

1. The minority refusing to obey the majority:

If a proposal is rejected, the individual concerned becomes extremely dissatisfied and is insincere in implementing the party's resolution. This is one of the instances.

The methods of rectification:

a. At a meeting, all the people should be made to voice their opinions fully. They must understand that the right and wrong sides over a controversial issue must be clearly established without compromise or equivocation. Anything that cannot be settled at one meeting can be discussed at another (provided no work is affected) in order to reach a clear-cut conclusion.

b. Party discipline requires, among other things, that the minority obey the majority. The minority, after their proposal has been rejected at a meeting and before the holding of the next meeting, must support the decision of the majority. Besides bringing it up again at the next meeting, they must not show any opposition in their action.

2. Non-organizational criticisms:

a. Inner-party criticism is a weapon to re-enforce the party organization and increase the party's fighting power. Yet many in the Red Army do not understand this significance and erroneously use inner-party criticism for personal attacks. As a result, it damages not only the individuals but the party organization. This is a manifestation of petty bourgeois individualism. The method of rectification is to make the party members understand that the significance of criticism is to re-enforce the party's fighting power in order to attain victory of the class struggle and that it must never be used as a tool for personal attacks.

b. Many party members make their criticisms not inside the party but outside it. This is because of the failure to implant the political significance of the party organization into the concept of the party members in general; therefore, they do not understand the importance of the party organization (meetings, etc.), finding no difference between criticizing inside or outside the organization. This may also result in leading the party to destruction. The method of rectification is to implant the political significance of the party organization into the concept of the party members in general. Only thus will all the irresponsible non-organizational criticisms giving the masses an unfavorable influence be wiped out.

3. Elitism of some party members:

On ground of being busy, some party members are actually unwilling to associate with the masses and fear their criticisms; therefore, they do not attend the party branch mass meetings and cell meetings. When they do attend, they do not make work reports. In everything, they differentiate themselves from

the general party members. As a result, they are severed from the masses, from the party. On this point, the responsible persons of the party branch have not only failed to rectify the situation, but seemed to fear such elite party members.

The creation of this situation is due to the following reasons:

First, the Red Army has always made a serious error: The party organ seldom pays attention to the discussion of military affairs; therefore, it has not urged the responsible comrades of the military affairs organ to make reports on military plans (such as training, management and combat plans) at party conferences. As a result, party discussions are separated from military affairs, and the responsible military affairs comrades forget that they must accept party guidance and make reports to the party. In consequence, the military affairs work of the Red Army becomes a special part not understood by the party organ and the general party members. Thus, it not only greatly hampers the task of the militarization of the party members, but also severs the party from military affairs, endangering the party's leadership of the army. Next, due to the serious error of the party in its tasks discussed above, some of the responsible military affairs comrades have become an elite group in the party. Meanwhile, the responsible comrades in charge of other work have also become elite individuals who are unwilling to attend meetings or to express themselves at meetings. This is one reason for the party branch of the Red Army to become so abnormal and unsound.

The methods of rectification are: First, the meetings of all levels of the party (from the party branch to the Front Committee) must include the plans and reports of military affairs work in their daily agenda for discussion and decision. Next, regardless of their functions, party members must attend party branch mass meetings and cell meetings and make work reports. They must not be absent without cause.

D. Absolute Equalitarianism

1. At one time, absolute equalitarianism in the Red Army developed to a very serious extent. After many struggles, it has certainly diminished considerably, but some dregs still remain, such as objecting to different allowances to the wounded soldiers according to the extent of the injury but insisting on equal amounts, denying the necessity for officers to ride horses in performing their duties but regarding riding as an inequality, demanding absolutely equal distribution of supplies and objecting to larger allotments to special cases, demanding equal assignment for all persons in carrying rice, regardless of age or physical condition, demanding equal space in billeting and even condemning the headquarters for occupying larger quarters, demanding equal assignment of duties and refusing any extra work, and even abandoning both wounded men when there is only one stretcher rather than carrying only one of them. All such instances indicate that absolute equalitarianism among the Red Army officers and soldiers has not been fundamentally eradicated from the mind of the masses. Whatever that has been eradicated is merely partial or superficial.

2. Similar to ultra-democratization in politics, absolute equalitarianism is a product of the handicraft and small peasant economy, except that one is manifested in the political aspect and the other in the material aspect.

3. The method of rectification is as follows: It must be pointed out theoretically that not only is absolute equalitarianism merely an illusion of the peasants and petty bourgeois in the days before the disappearance of capitalism but, even in the period of the socialist economy, material distribution must be adjusted to the needs of the individuals and the tasks. There definitely cannot be absolute equality. The maximum equality in material distribution in the Red Army should be attained, such as equal pay and equal rations for the officers and men, because it is the need of the struggle in the current environment. But absolute equality beyond reason must be opposed, because it is not the need of the struggle. On the contrary, it will hamper the struggle.

E. The Idealist Concept

1. The idealist concept is extremely serious among party members in the Red Army, and it constitutes an extremely great obstacle to political analysis, work guidance, and the party organization. The inevitable accompanying result of idealist analysis of politics and idealist guidance of work is either opportunism or adventurism. As for the idealist critical spirit inside the party, random talk not based on evidence, or mutual suspicion, it often leads to controversies in the party not involving principles and without significance and to disruption of the party organization.

In regard to the issue of inner-party criticisms, besides the idealist critical spirit, we should also mention the non-political critical spirit. The major function of criticism is to point out political errors. Pointing out organizational errors comes next. As for defects in personal life and minor technical mistakes, if they are not closely connected with political or organizational errors, it is not necessary to be so censorious as to place the comrades concerned in a quandary. Moreover, once technical criticisms develop, the attention of the party may become entirely diverted to commonplace technical trivialities, and everyone may become cautious and timorous, thereby forgetting the party's political tasks. This is the greatest danger. Similar to the unscientific idealist critical spirit, the inner-party technical and non-political critical spirit in the Red Army will inevitably produce (and has already produced) the worst result.

2. The only method of rectification is to raise the political and scientific levels of the party members in their thinking and inner-party life. To attain this goal, it is necessary to: a. Educate the party members to make political analysis and class strength assessment with the Marxist method, in order to replace the idealist method of analysis and assessment. b. Make the party members pay attention to survey and study of the social economy as a basis to determine the struggle strategy and work method, so that the comrades know that, apart from practical survey, they will fall into the abyss

of fantasy and adventurism. c. Eliminate the idealist and technical spirit in inner-party criticism, basing all statements on evidence and giving attention to the political significance when discussing work.

F. Individualism

1. The individualist tendency in the party in the Red Army manifests itself as follows:

a. Vindictiveness: After being criticized inside the party by a soldier comrade, the individualist will seek a chance to retaliate outside the party--beating or scolding is one way of retaliation. There are many such instances. Sometimes, retaliation is sought inside the party: You attack me at this meeting, so I shall retaliate by finding fault with you at the next. There are also many instances of such. Such vindictiveness proceeds solely from the personal viewpoint. The individualist is ignorant of class interest or party life as a whole. He only knows himself. His target is not the enemy class but other individuals in his own ranks. It is a corrosive which can weaken the organization and its fighting power.

b. Cliquism: On the surface, it is an expanded individualism, but underneath, it is still the narrow individualism. It also produces a strong corrosive and centrifugal effect. In the Red Army, cliquism has all along been rampant; although it has now become less serious as a result of criticism, its remnants still exist and further struggle is needed.

c. The mercenary concept: A person with a mercenary concept fails to recognize that the party and the Red Army are the tools to implement the class tasks, and that he, himself, is a member thereof. He fails to realize that he, himself, plays a main role in the struggle, but feels that the struggle has nothing to do with himself, and that he is responsible only to the superior officers of the Red Army or the party organ, not to the revolution. Such mercenary concept of revolution is rather widespread in the Red Army. It is the reason why there are not many unconditional, enthusiastic, and positive activists. If the mercenary concept is not eliminated, the number of positive activists will not increase, and the heavy burden of revolution will always rest on the shoulders of a few, much to the detriment of the struggle.

d. Hedonism: In the Red Army, there are also quite a few whose individualism finds expression in hedonism. They constantly hope that the troops will march to the big cities. They want to go there not to work but to enjoy themselves. What they dislike most is to work in the Red areas where life is hard. The result of hedonism is thinking of personal interest only, without consideration of the entire revolution or group action.

e. Passive slowdown: With the least bit of dissatisfaction, an individual with this tendency becomes passive and slows down in his work. Though the basic reason is individualism, because he has not accurately recognized his

own class tasks, there are also objective reasons such as improper handling of incidents, work assignments, or enforcement of discipline in the party and the army.

f. The desire to leave the army: The number of people who ask for transfer from the ranks to local work is on the rise. This is not entirely due to subjective individualism, but also to (1) the material hardships in the Red Army; (2) exhaustion after a long struggle; and (3) objective environmental reasons of improper handling of incidents, work assignments or enforcement of discipline.

2. The origin of individualism is the influence of the small peasant and bourgeois ideologies in the party. The method of rectification is mainly through education, rectifying individualism in thinking. Next, the handling of incidents, work assignments and enforcement of discipline must be proper. In addition, measures must be taken to improve the material life of the Red Army, utilizing all opportunities for rest and rehabilitation, in order to better the objective conditions.

G. The Idea of Roving Insurgents

1. The origin of the idea of roving insurgents in the Red Army is as follows: a. Homeless proletarians constitute the majority of the Red Army. This is the immediate cause. b. The remote cause is the existence of large groups of vagrants throughout the country, especially the southern provinces. With these two causes, the political thinking and action with the idea of roving insurgents are created in the Red Army. However, in today's China under imperialist control, especially with the import of advanced weapons (grenades, steel cannon, machine guns, etc.), advanced communication methods (military telephones and radios), and advanced transport means (motor vehicles, steamships, railways), the large-scale roving insurgent actions in the style of Huang Ch'ao, Li Ch'uang or Hung Hsiu-ch'uan are no longer feasible; therefore, the idea of roving insurgents naturally cannot become the final and effective idea of the Red Army in its actions. Nevertheless, its influence, as manifested in the various aspects, is still very strong, such as: a. being unwilling to help the masses build political power by strenuous work for the purpose of expanding political influence, but thinking only of accomplishing the purpose by the mobile guerrilla method; b. in the organizational line of expanding the Red Army, following not the line of expanding the local Red Guard, the local units of the Red Army, or even the non-local units of the Red Army, but the line of "recruiting soldiers and buying horses" and "recruiting captives and accepting rebels"; c. being impatient to wage a hard struggle together with the masses, but only hoping to go to the big cities to eat and drink. All such manifestations of the idea of roving insurgents seriously hamper the Red Army in performing the momentous tasks assigned it by the revolution. Thus, the elimination of this idea is indeed one of the important goals of the inner-party ideological struggle in the Red Army.

2. The methods of rectification:

a. Change the incorrect ideas in the party coming from the vagrant elements through education in order to eliminate the idea of roving insurgents.

b. Intensify the anti-vagabondism education of the current basic troops of the Red Army and future captives.

c. Recruit active elements among the workers and peasants with struggle experiences to join the current ranks of the Red Army in order to change its components.

d. Raise new troops from the struggling worker-peasant masses.

H. Remnants of Adventurism

1. The party in the Red Army has exerted a great effort in the struggle against adventurism but not yet to the full extent. Therefore, remnants of adventurism still exist in the Red Army even though much of the adventurist idea and action has been overcome. Adventurism comes from a combination of the lumpen proletarian ideology and the petty bourgeois ideology. Its manifestations are: a. Blind action without regard of the subjective and objective conditions. b. Inadequate and irresolute implementation of urban policies. c. Slack military discipline, especially when suffering a defeat. d. Setting fire to houses without consideration of the mass foundation, which is a misconduct to varying extents in all the units. e. The practice of executing deserters and of corporal punishment which are partially due to adventurism.

2. The methods of rectification: a. Eliminate adventurism theoretically. b. Rectify adventurist actions by systems and policies.

II. Organization of the Party

The issue of the party organization in the Red Army has reached a very critical stage, especially the inferior quality of the party members and the slack organization, which affect the leadership of the Red Army and the implementation of policies. The Congress has made a careful analysis of the issue and come to a decision. The comrades must follow the spirit of the Congress and strive to reform the party organization, in order to enable it to truly shoulder the party's political tasks. Only then can we consider it successful.

A. The Party's Organizational Line

1. The combat soldiers are the main objectives in the development line of party members. Meanwhile, the noncombatants, such as porters and orderlies, must not be neglected.

2. A party branch must be organized in every company and a cell in every squad. This is one of the important principles of party organization in the army. In units where the number of party members is too small and a cell cannot actually be organized, the platoon may be used temporarily as the unit to organize a cell and its members must be assigned systematically to the squads. But it must be understood that this is only a transitional measure.

3. The current organization method of cells in the Red Army, i.e., the method of mixing the cadre and general elements and the intellectual and laboring elements is correct, but those with different occupations and different abilities must also be systematically and successfully mixed when organizing. Hereafter, more attention must be given to this point. As for simply organizing the cadres into cells, it is undesirable.

B. The Slack Organization of the Party

1. The current situation of the party organization in the Fourth Army:

a. Enrollment is too easy. Many without the proper qualifications are also dragged into the party, especially officers, who do not have to satisfy any requirement to join the party. Therefore, the quality of the party has become very inferior.

b. The party units of the various levels solve the problems in their work but forget the task of educating the comrades. There are very few training meetings, such as activists mass meetings, joint meetings of secretaries and propaganda sections, joint meetings of committees, party branch mass meetings, column or detachment party members' mass meetings.

c. Discipline in general is lax. This is especially true in regard to individuals in charge of important work and who are irreplaceable. Their mistakes are often overlooked, and discipline is not enforced. When one person is treated this way, others have to be treated the same way. Thus, discipline in general is slackened.

d. All the officers are party members. As a result, all those working in military affairs and political organs pay little attention to their social occupational work, feeling that social occupational work is party work and failing to distinguish the two. The military affairs work conferences and the political work conferences of the various levels are almost never held. They think that, whatever it is, once it is decided by the party, that is the end of it. That the party member produces a nucleus effect in social occupation is never discussed.

e. The higher and lower levels do not have a close relationship. The higher level seldom comments or makes instructions on the reports of the lower level, and it seldom sends men to attend the meetings of the latter. While this is due to the lack of soundness of the organization of the higher

level, the lack of positivity in its work attitude is also one of the reasons for the absence or inadequacy of its guidance of the lower level. This is especially true in regard to directing practical work, such as the lack of detailed instructions to units embarking on guerrilla work. In some units, even rough guidance is almost nonexistent.

f. Many party branch mass meetings and cell meetings are not held on time.

2. The line of rectification:

a. The old foundation must be thoroughly overhauled. Those with erroneous political concepts, smoking opium, making illegal profits, or gambling, and refusing to reform after many warnings, be they cadres or not, must all be expelled from the party.

b. The requirements for new party members hereafter:

- (1) No mistake in political concept (including class awareness).
- (2) Honesty.
- (3) Possessing the spirit of sacrifice, and able to work positively.
- (4) No desire for illegal profits.
- (5) Abstinence from opium and gambling.

Only those meeting all five requirements will be introduced into the party. The introducer must verify in advance whether the introduced truly satisfies the requirements, and the necessary procedure of introduction must be followed. After joining the party, the new member must be informed in detail the party branch life (including secret work) and the important points to be observed by party members. The introducer must shoulder certain responsibilities toward the introduced. The party branch committee must assign someone to interview the membership applicant and ascertain his qualifications.

c. In addition to solving problems and directing practical work, the party units of the various levels also have the tremendous task of educating the comrades. They must systematically hold all kinds of training conferences and other modes of training, such as training classes and discussion meetings.

d. Discipline must be strictly enforced, and the practice of merely paying lip service to discipline stopped.

e. The natures of the party members' social occupation and their party work must be distinguished. Each and every party member must undertake a social occupation, and perform the work assigned him by the party in his social occupation (except those responsible for important functions or specialized tasks in the party who are professional revolutionaries).

f. The work attitude of the party units of all levels must become more positive than ever before. The lower level must make detailed reports to the higher level, and the latter must discuss and reply to such reports in detail and, whenever possible, assign men to attend the meetings of the lower level. It must not borrow the excuses of shortage of personnel, inadequate work capacity, and insufficient time to cover up its own lack of enthusiasm and negligence in work.

g. The party branch committee and the party units above it must systematically decide on the material for discussion at the party branch mass meetings and cell meetings every month, determine the meeting schedules, and strictly enforce the holding of meetings.

C. How to Make the Meetings Interesting

1. The reasons for the party members' lack of interest in attending meetings:

a. They do not understand the significance of meetings. The important significance of the party branch meeting is primarily to solve problems. All struggle and internal problems must be solved by concentrated discussion at the meetings. If a party member does not attend, or if he does not actively express his opinions when attending, it will indicate his failure to understand the political significance of the meeting and his lack of interest in struggle. Anyone with a positive feeling toward struggle will attend the meetings enthusiastically and express himself eagerly. The next significance is to educate the comrades. Meetings not only solve problems but, in the process of solving problems, the circumstances of the problems must be investigated and the instructions of the higher level studied, thus activating the mind and talent of the comrades. As the meetings become political and practical, the mind of the comrades also become political and practical. Then, the party's fighting power is increased. This is the educational significance of meetings. The failure of the party members of the Red Army to understand such significance constitutes the first reason for their nonattendance or lack of interest.

b. When resolutions are not implemented or inquiries to the higher level are not answered for a prolonged period, the party members lose interest in the discussions.

c. The responsible persons fail to make proper preparations in advance, to formulate an agenda, to clarify the contents and circumstances of the problems, or to form some opinions ahead of time on the solution of the problems.

d. The chairman often interrupts at will a party member. When a statement is slightly off the subject under discussion, the chairman will immediately stop him, and the party member becomes discouraged and keeps quiet. If there is any mistake in the statement, the chairman will also ridicule him in addition to stopping him.

e. The feudal style order of meeting is inflexible and stereotyped, and attending a meeting is similar to sitting in jail.

2. The methods of rectification:

First, the meetings must become political and practical. Second, the comrades must constantly be reminded of the important significance of meetings, especially in regard to new members and members who are not positive in their work. Third, resolutions must not be passed lightly. Once a resolution is passed, it must be firmly implemented. Fourth, the higher level must be prompt in answering the questions of the lower level. It must not delay too long, causing the lower level to lose its fervor. Fifth, the responsible persons must prepare the agenda in advance. They must make the agenda concrete, clarify in advance the contents and circumstances of the problems, and give some prior thought to the solutions. Sixth, the chairman must handle the meeting skillfully and channel the current of discussion toward the topic on hand. However, should there be any development of important significance beyond the topic, he must not only refrain from interrupting the speaker and discouraging him, but must carefully seize upon the development, introduce it to everyone, and form a new topic of discussion. Only then will the meeting become interesting, the problems truly solved and the educational significance of the meeting truly realized. Seventh, the feudal order of meeting must be abolished. The meeting of communist party members must reflect the positive, lively and joyful spirit of the proletariat and incorporate it into the order of the meeting.

D. Youth Organization in the Party in the Red Army and Its Work

1. The interests of the youths and adults in the troops cannot be separated, and the league has no special work objectives. Moreover, only when the party cell is built with the squad as the unit will it benefit the struggle. Therefore, there is no necessity to establish league cells in the party branch.

2. As the youths among the party members possess different feelings from the adults, besides general party training, they must receive a special youth education. Furthermore, in view of the fact that fighting for the young worker-peasant masses is one of the party's important tasks, there must be a special organization to handle it. Therefore, young party members in the party under 20 years of age (except those under special conditions, such as being in charge of the party's important work) must be assigned to form a youth work conference. In regard to such conferences, besides regular and systematic meetings with the battalion as the unit, the detachments and columns must also deliberate on the time and call meetings.

3. For the purposes of planning the education of youth party members, devising means to fight for the young worker-peasant masses, and directing the youth work conference, five-member youth work committees must be formed in the Front Committee and column committee, and youth commissars appointed in the detachment committee and party branch committee, under the guidance of party units of the various levels.

E. Relationship Between the Political Commissar and Inner-Party Work

Party secretaries of battalion and detachment levels must not, in principle, also serve as political commissars. However, in units with personnel shortage, they may temporarily serve in both capacities. In regard to political commissars who do not also serve as party secretaries, the higher level party unit must study the situation and, under suitable circumstances, assign them as special emissaries of the party with the duty of directing the party work of their levels.

F. The Highest Party Organization of Directly Subordinate Units

The directly subordinate units of the army and the columns must organize directly subordinate unit committees as the highest party organizations, consisting of five to seven members.

G. The Question of Establishing Party and Youth League Organizations in Soldiers' Associations

No party or youth league organizations should be established in soldiers' associations at the battalion level, and the work of these associations should be guided by the party branch committees concerned; but party and youth league organizations should be established in soldiers' associations at the column level, and the work of these organizations should be guided by the party committees of the columns concerned.

III. Inner-Party Education

A. Significance

Education must be considered the most urgent issue in the party in the Red Army. For the purpose of improving and expanding the Red Army and enabling it to shoulder the struggle tasks, we must start from inner-party education. If the political level in the party is not raised, if the many biases are not eliminated, we definitely cannot improve and expand the Red Army, nor enable it to shoulder the momentous struggle tasks. Therefore, carrying out planned inner-party education and correcting the unplanned and laissez-faire situation of the past constitute one of the important tasks of the party. The Congress has decided to educate the party members with the following materials and methods. The leading organs of the party must hold more detailed discussions to implement the task.

B. Materials

1. Political analyses.
2. Discussion of documents from higher level leading organs.
3. Organization knowledge.
4. Rectification of eight erroneous ideas in the party in the Red Army.
5. Discussion of anti-opportunism and the opposition faction against Trotskyism.

6. Strategy and technique of mass work,
7. Survey and study of the social economy of guerrilla areas,
8. Study of Marxism-Leninism,
9. Study of social economics.
10. The current stage of the revolution and its future.

Of the 10 items above, except for a portion (such as the study of social economics) which actually is limited to the cadres, they are all suitable for the general party members.

C. Methods

1. Party newspapers.
2. Brief political reports.
3. All types of pamphlets for educating the comrades.
4. Training classes.
5. Planned reading assignment.
6. Reading of books and newspapers to illiterate party members.
7. Individual conversations.
8. Criticisms.
9. Cell meetings.
10. Party branch meetings.
11. Joint meetings of party branch committees and cells.
12. Activists' mass meetings of cell leaders and above with each column as a unit.
13. Activists' mass meetings of party branch secretaries and above of the entire army.
14. Party members' mass meetings with each column as a unit.
15. Joint meetings of secretaries, propagandists, and organization officers of all levels with each column as a unit.
16. Joint meetings of secretaries, propagandists and organization officers of the detachments and above of the entire army.
17. Political discussion meetings.
18. Suitable assignment of party members to practical work.

IV. Propaganda Work of the Red Army

A. Significance of the Propaganda Work of the Red Army

The goal of the propaganda work of the Red Army is to expand our political influence and fight for the broad masses. Only when this goal is realized will the general goal of the Red Army, such as organizing the masses, arming the masses, building political power, eliminating the reactionary forces, and promoting the revolutionary high tide, be realized. Therefore, propaganda work is the foremost task of the Red Army. Overlooking it is abandoning the main task of the Red Army and equivalent to helping the ruling class undermine its power.

B. Current Situation of the Propaganda Work of the Red Army

1. Defects of the propaganda contents:

a. No concrete political outline has been published. (The political outlines published before, such as the four-word announcements, were not concrete.)

b. Propaganda and encouragement of the daily struggles of the masses are overlooked.

c. Winning of the urban poor is overlooked.

d. Propaganda to the women masses is overlooked.

e. Propaganda to the youth masses is inadequate.

f. Propaganda to the lumpen proletariat is inadequate.

g. Propaganda against the armed organizations of the landowner class (Civil League, Ching-wei League, etc.) is very little.

h. There is no proper choice of time and place in propaganda.

2. Defects of the propaganda technique:

a. The propaganda team is not sound.

(1) The number of propagandists has been reduced from five per battalion to three, or even down to one or two, or none.

(2) The quality of the propagandists is too inferior. They include captives, cooks, grooms, opium smokers, suspected deserters who are disarmed, those who failed as clerks, and cripples unwanted by other work units. Today's propaganda team has actually become a receiving station and is completely incapable of performing its duties.

(3) Almost all the officers and soldiers reject the propaganda team (partly because of the inferior quality of the propagandists and their lack of achievement, resulting in the dissatisfaction of others). "Loafers" and "fake medicine peddlars" are the nicknames given them.

(4) The propaganda teams do not have adequate funds.

(5) The training of the propagandists is not systematic, nor the supervision of their work adequate. Therefore, the work of the propaganda team is very sketchy, and no one pays any attention whether it does anything or not.

b. The handbills, announcements and declarations are outmoded and stale, and distribution and mailing are not properly handled.

c. There are very few wall bulletins; the brief political reports are too simple in content and too few; and the characters are too small and too hard to read.

d. There is practically no revolutionary songs.

e. Only a few pictorials have been published.

f. There is no costumed propaganda.

g. Clubs with the double significance of recreation for the soldiers and association with the worker-peasant masses have not been organized.

h. Verbal propaganda is too little and too inferior.

i. The discipline of the Red Army is a practical propaganda to the masses. Now discipline is more lax than before; therefore, it produces an unfavorable impression on the masses.

j. Putting up the gate boards, bundling rice straw, sweeping the floor, friendliness in conversation, fair buying and selling, returning intact borrowed things, and reimbursing for losses all constitute a kind of the Red Army's propaganda work, but now they are not fully performed.

k. Mass meetings are seldom held, and not successful when held.

l. The method of propagandizing to the White soldiers is not good.

C. The Lines of Rectification

1. Propaganda contents:

a. A concrete political program should be published, and be called the "Red Army Political Program."

b. Propaganda must be compatible with the struggle sentiments of the masses. Besides the general riot slogans, there must also be slogans on daily life, in conjunction with the riot slogans, in areas where the struggle sentiments of the masses are still low, in order to activate the daily struggles.

c. The urban poor (middle and small merchants and students) constitutes a considerable strength in the civil rights revolution. Overlooking this strength is equivalent to presenting it to the big business bourgeoisie. Hereafter, in regard to the urban middle and small merchant and student masses, intensive propaganda work must be performed in order to win them over.

d. Women constitute half of the population. The economic position of the laboring women and the extreme oppression suffered by them not only indicate that they are in urgent need of revolution but also that they will constitute

a determining force of the revolution. Hereafter, there must be effective slogans and extensive propaganda toward them.

e. The toiling youth masses constitute over 30 percent of the population, and they are also the bravest and firmest in struggle. Therefore, propaganda to win the youth masses is an important task in the entire propaganda program.

f. In regard to China's broad lumpen masses, if they take the side of the revolutionary class, they will become an instrument of the revolution; if they take the side of the reactionary class, they will become an instrument of the counterrevolution. Therefore, winning them over from under the influence of the reactionary class is one of the party's propaganda tasks. When performing propaganda work, attention must be given to the life and nature of the different groups of vagrants and appropriate propaganda measures adopted.

g. The destruction of the armed organizations of the landlord class and the winning over of their masses constitute one of the conditions for the victory of the rural land revolution. Hereafter, special attention must be given to the propaganda work on the membership masses of the civil defense and pacification units.

h. The propaganda and agitation slogans must be adapted to the particular areas, and different slogans must also be created according to the different times (such as fall harvest, year-end, the Chiang [5592]-Kuei [2710] war period and the Wang [3076]-Chiang [5592] war period).

2. Propaganda technique:

a. The propaganda team:

(1) Significance: The Red Army propaganda team is an important tool of its propaganda work. If the propaganda team is not well organized, a large part of the Red Army's propaganda task is wasted. Therefore, the reform and training of the propaganda team is one of the tasks at present requiring the party's re-enforced endeavor. The first step is to correct, from the theoretical aspect, the contempt felt by the officers and soldiers for propaganda work and propaganda teams. Such odd nicknames as "loafers" and "fake medicine peddlers" must be deleted hereafter.

(2) Organization:

(a) Take each detachment as a unit; the detachments directly subordinate to the army and column command will each form a unit. Each unit will organize a propaganda team composed of a commander and a deputy commander, 16 propagandists, 1 porter (carrying propaganda materials), and 2 orderlies. The propagandists of each company are divided into a number of subunits (the number of subunits to be decided according to the number of battalions or other troop units and organs), and each subunit has a leader and three propagandists.