


MOZAMBIQUE REVOLUTION



**OAU
IN FREE
MOZAMBIQUE**

**MOZAMBIQUE
REVOLUTION**

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE MOZAMBIQUE LIBERATION FRONT
FRELIMO

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EDITORIAL



CENTRAL COMMITTEE REVIEWS THE WAR

The general strategy which has been guiding FRELIMO is still valid, although certain aspects of our tactics must, however, be brought up to date, in line with the developing politico-military situation in Mozambique.

This is one of the conclusions reached by the Central Committee of FRELIMO, which met from 4 to 30 December this year to analyse the situation of our liberation struggle, to clarify certain aspects of the political line and to draw up guidelines for our movement.

The decision on strategy was taken after the various Departments had submitted reports on their activities. These reports provided the Central Committee with an overall picture of the progress of the struggle in each sector. A summary of these reports gives the following general picture.

Four provinces are at war, and in 3 of them vast regions have already been liberated. In these 3 provinces — Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete — the enemy control only the towns and still occupy a few fortified military centres, but even these are the constant targets of our attacks. The whole people fully support the liberation struggle. The enemy's reaction has been to try to seal them off in concentration camps, while at the same time launching brutal reprisal raids against villages in the war zones. In the liberated areas, which cover about one-quarter of our country, the people are finally living free from colonial oppression and exploitation, engaged in the great tasks of national reconstruction, which include the opening up and development of agricultural fields, handicrafts, schools, medical posts and trading centres. About five months ago, on 25th July, armed struggle was also started in Manica e Sofala Province. The struggle is advancing impetuously there and has already reached the centre of the Province, which is the geographical centre of our country.

In the areas still under enemy control, FRELIMO's presence and influence is daily growing and the people's level of political consciousness is steadily rising. There too the people as a whole support the ideal of independence and follow the policy of FRELIMO.

Internationally, FRELIMO's prestige is increasing and being consolidated as shown by the support we receive and by the recognition of our Movement by a growing number of countries and international organisations. This recognition is not confined to the socialist countries which, by virtue of their policies, are naturally with us; it is even being shown by western capitalist countries which are Portugal's traditional allies. Some of them, concerned to see the day of our final victory coming ever nearer, sustain the hope that by supporting our stand in this phase they will be able to safeguard their interests in independent Mozambique.

The major difficulty we are facing is lack of cadres, able to undertake the multiple tasks imposed by the development of the struggle — in the political



and military field, in health, education, production and commerce, information, external affairs, etc. Also, material difficulties: lack of medicines, school equipment, production tools and seeds, and weapons.

Having thus described and analysed the situation in Mozambique and laid down guidelines for more efficient work by the Departments, the CC proceeded to examine a number of specific situations related to the advance of the struggle. Notable among these were the following:

1. The fact that the struggle has already reached highly urbanised areas with a high concentration of white population, where enemy economic interests are especially powerful.
2. The stepping up of enemy machinations aimed at discrediting FRELIMO through accusations of terrorism and making vague promises about autonomy and social progress, as an attempt to convince the people to desert the liberation struggle.

A general directive was laid down: to make a clear definition of the targets in each phase of the struggle, to constantly explain the implications of enemy's strategies, to increase organisational work among the people, and to continue to implement FRELIMO's popular revolutionary line at every level.

Special importance was attached to the definition of who is the enemy. Owing to the fact that the Portuguese colonialists instituted a system of direct administration and exploitation in Mozambique, the people naturally tend to identify colonialism with the Portuguese, the white man, and to apply this concept generally to all Portuguese, to all whites. However, FRELIMO's popular and revolutionary line is opposed to this generalisation and defines the enemy not on the basis of race or national origins, but rather on behaviour. From the very outset, FRELIMO has maintained that our enemies are not persons of white colour, or of Portuguese origin, or any other nationality, but all those persons, white or black, Mozambican nationals or foreigners, who are opposed to our ideals of freedom and total independence. The CC, through analysing the way in which the war is being conducted in Tete and Manica e Sofala provinces, where there is a very large white population, expressed its satisfaction that FRELIMO's political line, which advocates the total abolition of racism and tribalism, has been fully adopted and implemented in its entirety by the FRELIMO fighters.

Also reaffirmed was the principle that FRELIMO is a Front, which ensures the participation of all the genuinely anti-colonialist forces prepared to struggle for the total independence of Mozambique. Our experience, however, and more concretely the fact that at a certain historical moment there appeared within FRELIMO people who attempted to take power to continue to oppress and exploit the people, has led the CC to qualify this principle. Hence, the CC recognised that although we are a Front, this Front has as its point of departure the negation of the exploitation of man by man.

An important outcome of this meeting was that ideological unity, which was already seen to be so strong at the previous meeting in 1970, has been consolidated over the past two years, and today it ensures almost total cohesion within the movement. This was clearly evident in the depth and far-reaching nature of the analyses, and in the absolute unanimity with which decisions were taken. The CC concluded that this unity and ideological clarity are the reason for our victories and that these must be carefully preserved and even further strengthened.

The struggle continues.

THE ATTACKS THAT SHOOK MOZAMBIQUE

NO. 12241 (Overseas) (D.R.) Nov. 16, '73
**Frelimo launches
new offensive**

FROM PETER NEDERLAND, Salisbury, November 13

**FRELIMO troops capture
important enemy post**

NO. 12241 Daily News (Trans.) Sept. 26, '73
**Frelimo wrecks
19 aircraft**

**Major town
shelled
by Frelimo
fighters**

The thunder of long-range shells which bombarded Chingozi airport in Tete, and the administrative, military and economic centre of the town of Tete on 9 November is still reverberating throughout Mozambique. What is more, its echo is spreading to the whole of Southern Africa, where the racists are closely following developments in Tete and can hardly contain themselves from intervening openly and on a massive scale.

The chief reason for the impact of this operation lies beyond the very heavy losses and damage inflicted — at least 17 aircraft destroyed, heavy loss of life and the destruction of the airport, hangars and technical equipment at Chingozi airport, and in the attack on the town of Tete, the destruction of the General Staff building, administrative and economic building and also the Zambezi Hotel housing senior army officers and technicians for the Cahora Bassa Dam.

The operations in Tete Province, and similar ones like that which took place on 18 September against the Mueda airport in Cabo Delgado Province, are evidence of the constant development of the technical and organisational capacity of the people's liberation forces in Mozambique. At the same time, they show that more important and supposedly invulnerable targets are increasingly at the mercy of our attacks.

Of course, the significance of the use of more and more complex weapons cannot be reduced to its solely technical aspects, although the use of new and more complex weapons means a decided increase in technical capacity.

But owing to the complexity of the logistic problems they pose, they are above all proof of the consolidation of our activity at all levels, especially as regards the mobilisation of the people and the organisation in the areas under FRELIMO control. From this point of view, what they represent, above all, is a political victory.

Moreover, they must be seen within the context of the sustained offensive of our forces which, in the country as a whole, is taking the form of intensified operations and the spread of the struggle to new zones, both in the provinces which are



already at war and in those where the struggle has just been launched. Thus, in Cabo Delgado, the attack on Mueda airport was accompanied by seven simultaneous attacks on other military posts. The attack on Chingozi airport and the town of Tete were followed by sabotage operations on a 120 km. stretch of the Beira-Tete railway, operations on the Rhodesia-Malawi international strategic highway, and attacks on enemy tactical posts and strategic hamlets.

In the eastern region of Niassa Province, six bridges linking the provincial capital Vila Cabral to important strategic points in that eastern region were destroyed in the past three months, which has limited enemy movements to air transport. This has made it possible to spread the struggle to regions further to the south and to free hundreds of members of the civilian population.

In Manica e Sofala, where the struggle was launched on 25 July this year, operations are coming closer to Vila Pery.

As usual, the Portuguese High Command at first continued to deny these developments, claiming that the nationalist forces were meeting with no success. But in so doing, they were overlooking the different conditions prevailing in the new fighting regions. Unlike what was happening in the North, where the Portuguese presence is now almost exclusively military, in Tete and Manica e Sofala provinces the colonial presence and economic activity are much more intense, so that there are multiple and permanent links and contacts with the rest of the country, of which Manica e Sofala is in fact the centre.



Another bridge blown up. This one was in Niassa Province

Portuguese communiqués at first denied or minimised our forces' activity in Manica e Sofala, or else reduced it to «operations in the Tete isthmus.» At that very time, however, substantial information and the eye-witness accounts of civilian traders, truck drivers and others, confirmed our presence and activity in the area around Vila Pery, which is well to the south. The sole result of all this has been to discredit all information put out by the Portuguese High Command.

The widespread distrust of official sources of information has been further aggravated by the fact that the South African and Rhodesian press, which until recently had no qualms about publishing pretty crude accounts of the war in Mozambique, is now showing barely concealed contempt for the military capacity of the Portuguese army.

True, the lack of credibility of Portuguese war communiqués has long been evident to world opinion, but now scepticism mingled with anxiety is gaining a hold on the colonialist population itself.

Owing to their repercussions throughout the country, and especially in colonialist circles, the attacks on Chingozi airport and Tete provided an illustration of the confusion and difficulties besetting the colonial army as a result of its own lies. The Portuguese Command initially chose the tactic of silence. But in the face of the many reports circulating among the

people, which had become a topic of conversation everywhere in the country, on 22 November they issued a first communiqué which denied that our operation had been successful claiming that only three mortar shells had hit the runway, but had failed to explode. Two days later, a second communiqué stated that long-range shells had been fired but that they had fallen short of their target and caused no damage.

Three days later, the unofficial radio station broadcast a commentary on the reasons why the military command, contrary to usual practice, had issued two successive special communiqués on the same attack, which had in any case failed. The commentary in question, apart from the usual recriminations against trouble-makers and rumour-mongers, was permeated with a tone distinctly critical of the Portuguese Military Commander, Kaulza de Arriaga, who, through his haste and clumsy communiqué had merely increased the impact of the Tete operation.

One can speculate on the reason for this criticism, the prelude to disintegration within the colonial apparatus in Mozambique. The foremost cause is doubtless the success achieved by our fighters, which is making each sector of the colonial apparatus wash its hands of the matter, as in every time of crisis, and to blame others for the failure.

The second reason is to be found in what is now common knowledge, i.e. General Kaulza de Arriaga's political ambitions, which have not failed to rouse the anxiety of the Caetano government.

In an interview published elsewhere in this bulletin, we mention the statements made by deserters from the Portuguese army who speak of indoctrination courses based on seemingly nationalist Mozambican watchwords, which are organised by General Kaulza de Arriaga for the troops under his direct command. If one were to relate this strange behaviour with the no less ambiguous ties the General maintains with J. Jardim, a Beira businessman and one of the upholders of the idea of white independence in Mozambique, one might reach the conclusion that having failed in his ambition to become President of the Republic of Portugal, General de Arriaga is seeking the political space he needs to realise his ambitions. Moreover, Kaulza de Arriaga's political designs are clearly connected with his efforts to appear to be a 'politician', as is revealed by the changing tone of the statements on strategic matters and the military communiqués put out by the Portuguese military command in Mozambique. The initial bravado which preceded the big 'Operation Gordian Knot' launched in May-June, 1970 — 'the war will be over in a few weeks' — was followed by attempts to save face over the failure,

with such remarks as: 'No general can foresee the outcome of war'. Later on, Arriaga sorrowfully confided to a foreign correspondent: 'The guerrilla war will always exist'. It was then that the tone changed and military bragging ceased to be the sole content of communiqués, being interspersed with bits of so-called 'political analysis' of which the avowed purpose was to 'win over the hearts and minds of the population'. This had the added advantage of making it possible to minimise the effect of military defeats.

The United Nations debate on terrorism was the opportunity for taking further steps along these lines. In order to label us as terrorists, the Portuguese started to clamour that they enjoyed the people's support and that the FRELIMO fighters were terrorising the people. The underlying reason, however, is quite different. The success of our operations, and especially the political impact of our activity among the people, are such that growing numbers of people of all races, including Europeans, look upon FRELIMO as a serious and effective movement with a clear political line. The most striking example of this has been that of the Lourenço Marques students, whose Students' Union has just been banned on the orders of the colonial government. Mention should also be made of the wave of arrests and prison murders throughout the country, the most recent victims being two Mozambican Protestant priests. But a large number of European civilians

who inhabit or go to the war zones have witnessed or sometimes been involved in a large number of operations in which they have seen in practice the distinction we make between the colonial machinery of repression and civilians who are not involved in repressing or exploiting our people. The lives of civilian truck drivers travelling on roads where our fighters are operating have been systematically spared, although the vehicles and their loads have been destroyed. In this way, these people have become living proof of the political consistency of our movement and of each of its militants.

It is for this reason that Portuguese communiqués are now doing their utmost to present FRELIMO as a terrorist organisation which mainly attacks the civilian populations.

We have seen from past experience how the Portuguese colonialists have had no hesitation in massacring innocent people to this end, then claiming that they are victims of FRELIMO. It is therefore to be feared that similar methods, in which the Portuguese colonialists excel in cruelty, may be used on a large-scale in future, with a view to trying to tarnish the considerable and growing prestige which FRELIMO enjoys throughout Mozambique. A barbarous operation of this type has already been carried out by the Portuguese in Mussowanhati, in Tete Province.

The problems of the repercussions of our

operations is one of the chief preoccupations of the Portuguese administration, not only in Mozambique but also in top circles of the Portuguese government. The frequent publications in the Rhodesian and South African press of reports on the successes achieved by our forces in the liberation struggle in Mozambique has been highly displeasing to the Portuguese leaders. On 14 November, in a nationally broadcast and televised speech, the Portuguese Prime Minister launched a particularly violent attack on Rhodesia, criticising 'inexperienced neighbours who allow themselves to be overcome by panic and who do not conceal their fears, thus playing into the hands of the enemy.'

In these circumstances, it can be assumed that one of the items of the agreement signed by Caetano and Smith during the latter's visit to Lisbon last October was a ban on all news on the Mozambican war in the Rhodesian press. Indeed, a few weeks later, on 27 November, the London Guardian and BBC correspondent, Mr. Peter Niesewand, who had broadcast the news of the sabotage of the Beira-Tete railway line at 20 points over 120 kms. was detained by the Rhodesian police, who asked him to name his sources, and who is now under threat of legal proceedings.

At all events, the agreement between Caetano and Smith was not complete. Only a few days after Smith's return from Lisbon at the end of October, there was a meeting of the Rhodesian and South African Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff in Salisbury, the aim of which, according to information leaked to the press, was to find ways in which these countries could make up for Portugal's inability to halt the advance of the liberation struggle towards the centre and south of Mozambique.

Rhodesia, which is worried at our forces approaching the Beira-Umtali railway, which is vital for its supplies, is burning with the desire to intervene in Mozambique in a more systematic and open way than up to now.

The armed struggle for liberation in Mozambique is therefore entering a more politically and militarily advanced phase, and also a more complex political, social and strategic context. Difficult tasks lie ahead for the FRELIMO militants and the whole of the Mozambican people. But the experience, determination and momentum of our struggle will bear fruit in new successes. The large-scale operations which have just taken place recently and the opening of new fighting zones are a prelude to this.





Wreckage of a helicopter, shot down by FRELIMO, is carried away by militants.

WAR COMMUNIQUE

Cabo Delgado

From August to October, 1972, FRELIMO forces in Cabo Delgado Province attacked 17 military camps and posts; shot down 1 helicopter; destroyed 26 vehicles; blew up 3 bridges and killed more than 325 Portuguese soldiers.

attacks

The following posts and camps were attacked: Namatil, Inhamcoma, Ng'apa, camp on the banks of River Messalo, camp on the banks of River Montepuez, Nantadola, Nangololo, Diaca, Pundanhar, Nangade. The most important attacks were on the 19 September when an enemy platoon from Nangololo tried to reoccupy the post of Muidumbe which they were forced to abandon last year. We attacked them there and as they had no shelter (all the buildings had already been destroyed), they suffered heavy losses and the next day returned to Nangololo. On the 3 October when we destroyed all the houses at the post of Lussoma, situated on the coast; many Portuguese soldiers were killed, including the commander and we captured a lot of material. On the 18 October when we launched 4 simultaneous attacks against the posts of Nazombe, Nangololo, Ntadola and the concentration camp of

Abdala; all the posts were damaged and at least 30 enemy soldiers were put out of action. At the «aldeamento» of Abdala we captured material and freed many Mozambicans.

ambush and sabotage operations

Many operations took place during the period under review, particularly in the zones of Nacatar, Aneuabe, Chai, Mocimboa da Praia, Diaca, Nangade, Pundanhar, Marapwa, Panamozzi, Montepuez, Cuero, and Macomia. In these operations about 90 enemy soldiers were killed and 11 vehicles destroyed.

On 24 September we destroyed a bridge over the river Mwangedi; on 25 October a bridge over the river Nangu; and on 30 October, a bridge over the river Chiumbulu.

helicopter shot down

On 24 September the enemy tried to launch an offensive in the zone of Itanda. We shot down one of their helicopters as it was trying to return to Mueda. The pilot and 6 soldiers were killed.

Tete

Between August and November this year FRELIMO fighters in Tete attacked 17 posts and camps; launched many major

sabotage operations including 11 operations on the international highway Rhodesia - Malawi, in which 52 military vehicles were destroyed, and several operations on the Beira - Tete railway line; sunk 6 boats on the Zambezi River; destroyed 2 bridges; shot down 4 planes and a helicopter; and killed more than 370 Portuguese soldiers. We also launched heavy artillery attacks against the town of Tete and the Chingozi airport where more than 17 aircraft were destroyed.

attack against tete town

On the 9 November, 1972, at 5.30 p.m. FRELIMO forces in Tete Province launched a heavy artillery attack against the town of Tete, the capital of the Province. Our attack was directed against the centre of the town where most of the military and economic installations are located. Our shells hit the Commando's General Headquarters, the Post Office, the National Overseas Bank, and the Zambeze Hotel, which is usually occupied by army officers, engineers working on the Cahora Bassa Dam and high government officials. All these installations were badly damaged. Accidentally some other commercial enterprises and garages were also damaged.

attack against chingozi airport

At the same time that Tete town was being attacked, another group of our fighters was pounding Tete's airport, Chingozi, with a barrage of shells. Between 25 - 30 aircraft were permanently based at the airport. Amongst these there were 2 jet fighters (G-91), 2 reconnaissance planes, 5 «Harvard» bombers, 2 NORATLAS, 1 plane used for propaganda purposes, 8 helicopters, 1 civilian plane for passenger transport (from the Mozambique Air Company, DETA) and a few from the «Development Company» involved in psycho-social activity. At the time of the attack 17 aircraft and helicopters were parked at the airfield: all of them were destroyed. The hangar was blown up together with the aircraft and helicopters which were inside.

One helicopter which appeared during our attack, coming from Caldas Xavier was shot down. The runway itself was badly damaged.

In addition our fire also destroyed most of the 30 barracks built near the airport and where a company of paratroopers was garrisoned, charged with the specific task of defending the airport. Many of the enemy were killed when their barracks were wiped out.

Prior to these two major attacks, our forces launched a series of small-scale attacks against the strategic hamlets which surround the town and the airport of Tete.

ambush and sabotage operations

Extensive operations were carried out in the regions North of the Zambezi River especially in the zones of Fingoe, Cahora Bassa, Cassula, Bene, Manje and Chiuta.

On 27 August, three boats were ambushed on the banks of the Zambezi River in the zone of Mague and sunk. On 1 November, three more boats going from Mague to the camp of Cachomba, were also ambushed and sunk by our fighters.

A concrete bridge over the River Mussumbe, 2 kms. from Vila Gamito was destroyed, as well as a bridge over the River Nyamphassi.

During the period under review our forces carried out 11 ambushes and sabotage operations on the road between Rhodesia and Malawi; 9 vehicles, including a bus were destroyed and at least 30 enemy soldiers were killed.

actions on the beira-tete railway line

Three sabotage operations on September 11, 25 and 26 in the zones of Galawe, Mecito and Caldas Xavier resulted in one locomotive, 8 wagons and 2 trolleys being destroyed.

Also, during the first fortnight of November FRELIMO sabotage units blew up the railway line Mutarara - Zobe in many different places on the section between Kateme, through Migunga up to Chiweza over an extension of about 120 Kms.

posts and camps attacked

During this period we attacked the following posts, camps and concentration camps: Oliveira, Mpewe, Canverere, Nhangoma, Taibo, Mponda, Mukhunda, Mtawa, Chicoa, Uncanha, Carinde, Mwangzi, Chibwia, Kungua, Manje and Chibovu.

Niassa

In Niassa Province from March to November this year, FRELIMO forces consolidated their control over the province by cutting the enemy's communication lines and attacking posts and strategic hamlets. Thus we attacked 3 posts; destroyed 18 vehicles, 1 locomotive with 8 wagons, destroyed 2 brid-

ges; shot down a plane and a helicopter; killed at least 80 enemy soldiers and freed over 100 Mozambican prisoners.

ambush and sabotage operations

By destroying bridges, laying mines and constant ambushes, we paralysed all enemy movement on the road linking the capital, Vila Cabral, with the military centres, Litunde - Nova Vizeu - Luitize, and Quinas, as well as on the other roads like the main road from Nova-Freixo - Maua, and Marrupa - Chamba - Catembe - Lussanhando. We destroyed the bridges over Rivers Mkalama and Lalawile on the main road from Chipemba - Mecula. We sabotaged the railway line in the zone between Belém and Vila Cabral and destroyed a locomotive and 8 wagons.

aeroplane and helicopter shot down

In March and April our fighters shot down an aeroplane and a helicopter in the districts of Maniamba and Unango respectively.

posts and camps attacked

Between July and August our fighters attacked the post of Lwangwa twice with artillery fire; and on 25 November we attacked the enemy camp at Maua. In this operation a large quantity of equipment was captured and more than 100 Mozambican prisoners freed.

Manica e Sofala

The armed struggle for national liberation started in the Province of Manica e Sofala on 25 July, 1972. A report from the military commander of the province shows that our forces are active in the regions of Mandie, Mungari, Vila Gouveia, and the area between Mungari and Chemba. The following are the first military operations carried out by FRELIMO guerrillas in the new front of Manica e Sofala.

region of mandie

On 29 July a FRELIMO unit ambushed a military car leaving the village of Chief Nhantshica for Nhatiti. The car was badly damaged and several Portuguese soldiers were killed.

On the 6 August another car transporting enemy troops was ambushed when going from the zone of Chief Chimbirimiri to Mandie where they were going to spend their weekend. The car was destroyed and the enemy soldiers were killed or wounded.

region of mungari

On 25 July FRELIMO artillery and infantry forces attacked the enemy camp in the zone of Chief Catunguirení. Some of the tents were destroyed by fire; 7 enemy soldiers were killed and a number of others wounded.

On 5 August we attacked an enemy force camped near the village of Chivanza, killing three Portuguese soldiers and destroying some of their equipment.

On 29 July, a convoy of 4 trucks was ambushed. The convoy had left Tete town, passed through Changara and was on the way to Vila Gouveia. In one of the lorries a high-ranking officer was travelling and the other 3 were serving as escort for him. The ambush took place in the zone of Goera. The first lorry in the convoy was destroyed and the second was damaged.

On 15 August a lorry carrying goods from Changara to Vila Gouveia, escorted by a military truck was ambushed in the zone of Calingamusse. When we opened fire, the military truck which was in front managed to escape towards Goera. Most of the goods in the other lorry were destroyed.

region of vila gouveia

On 25 July a FRELIMO unit stopped a convoy of 7 lorries coming from Beira, loaded with material for Cahora Bassa. This was on the main road, in the zone between Goera and Vila Gouveia. The drivers (all Europeans) did not put up any resistance and were left unharmed by our comrades. Some hours later a car driven by a man, accompanied by his wife, was stopped by our comrades. The couple, after being asked by our fighters, accepted to take the lorry-drivers with them to Vila Gouveia. All 7 of the lorries and the material, which included barrels of tar, drums of petrol, cement and electrical equipment for the dam works, were destroyed.

region between mungari and chemba

On 3 August FRELIMO artillery and infantry units attacked the administrative post of Mungari where an enemy company was stationed. The post was damaged. The enemy suffered heavy losses although we do not know the exact numbers. However, a Rhodesian, a specialist in opening wells, was at the post at the time and was gravely wounded during the attack. He was taken by car to Goera where he was put on a plane for Rhodesia.



Above: Members of the OAU delegation with FRELIMO militants.
Below: Major Mbita with captured Portuguese gun presented to the Liberation Committee.

FRELIMO'S REVOLUTION GOES BEYOND BULLETS



The Liberation Committee of the O.A.U. is independent Africa's link with the freedom movements in the minority-ruled countries of the continent. As such it is vital for the Committee to keep close contacts with the movements and in the case of the Portuguese colonies, there is no better way of keeping in touch than by sending representatives to the liberated areas. In October, a delegation from the Committee visited Cabo Delgado with FRELIMO, and its leaders. Executive-Secretary Major Hashim Mbita, on his return, gave a press conference in Dar es Salaam. The following article is a summary of his statement and replies to questions at that conference.

At the point of entry we were met and welcomed by Comrade Samora Machel, the President of FRELIMO, and his aides and were with him throughout the journey until our return to Tanzania. We crossed the Rovuma and went to Cabo Delgado Province. I and my colleagues (Mr. Sidki, Dr. Kassiga, Captain Makaranga, and one journalist) were the guests of FRELIMO for ten days in Mozambique.

I would like to make it quite clear that we did not go to inspect what FRELIMO was doing; we went to learn what FRELIMO is doing, so that difficulties between the liberation movement and the secretariat would be eliminated. The trip was part of my familiarisation programme since I took office two and a half months ago.

I have been impressed by the progress of the war. The whole area that we covered is completely under the physical control of FRELIMO. No Portuguese troops can move on land freely. Whatever movement the Portuguese can conduct to their isolated camps is by air. Even with air trans-

portation, the Portuguese manage to get their helicopters with troops to these camps only after harassment and bombardment to scare the ordinary people. This was particularly evident during the last six days of our stay in Mozambique. The Portuguese jets and bombers would fly ahead of the helicopters, or the helicopters would be escorted to the camps, where troops are confined to the spot and are unable to get water or food except by air from the far south.

It was clear that FRELIMO had control of the ground. On the ground there was free movement - very, very free movement. All our movement was during daylight, and the fact that we, as visitors, moved during the day was clear indication of the control of FRELIMO. FRELIMO is running the show in Cabo Delgado, and must be doing the same in other areas which I did not visit but which have been visited recently by other groups - from the Liberation Committee, from the newspaper, «Uhuru», and from overseas.

The people identify with FRELIMO. We talked to elderly people in the Cabo Delgado area, and they are confident. One of their main requests to us was to ask that their brothers and sisters who ran from Mozambique to Tanzania during the first offensive should return. The people are engaged in active production, they open up farms, they cultivate, harvest, and market their crops.

We saw the problems that face the people in the form of need for medical care. The health facilities in Mozambique are not elaborate. The Liberation Committee and FRELIMO will be looking to friendly countries and African people all over the continent to aid in the humanitarian needs of the liberated areas. There is a need for school materials for children, and more farm tools for the people to expand production in support of the freedom fight.

It is a completely open secret that the people in Mozambique feed the liberation forces, and they speak of this with pride. Through political education, FRELIMO has been able to arouse political consciousness to the level that people aid the soldiers not only to win the war but to push out the colonial force and to establish national rule in Mozambique, which will look after the interests of the people of Mozambique as a whole.

I would like to mention successes in Mozambique which happened while we were there or just before our arrival. We know that on September 18 this year at



Above: The President of FRELIMO accompanies the OAU team on the march in Cabo Delgado. Right: Major Mbita with another FRELIMO gift to the Liberation Committee. Below: The delegation meets the people.



Mueda, FRELIMO forces destroyed 19 enemy planes, 18 on the ground and one coming in to rescue which was shot down and fell behind the FRELIMO lines. In this plane, FRELIMO troops found a sub-machine gun belonging to the pilot which they gave to me as a presentation to the Liberation Committee. This gun is of Belgian make, and shows that the Portuguese have support from the NATO countries.

On September 24, another aircraft was shot down. On October 4, FRELIMO forces attacked an enemy post at the coast at Lussoma and captured a lot of military material and equipment, and freed many people who were imprisoned there. One of them, who had been working at Lussoma in one of these guarded camps, concentration camps as it were, told us his story: he was working for some Portuguese people who paid him one or two shillings a day – that was his pay.

While we were in Mozambique, the Portuguese were bombarding various areas – bombing started on the 7th and continued on 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th. In many cases the bombings were aimless, but on one occasion killed two people and injured sixteen. On the following day FRELIMO forces brought down one of the aircraft at the Beira base, which had been the scene of serious fighting in 1970 – 71, particularly in 1971. We brought with us a piece of the fragmentation bomb dropped on the 10th.

When the Portuguese had the upper hand in Mozambique before the armed struggle, and when the Portuguese were in control of all the areas, not much commerce had been developed and the communications system was very poor. In Cabo Delgado, which I visited, there is still not much of a communications system, but the main roads I did see were those built during the offensive with high costs in air cover and bombing to allow the Portuguese to move their troops to combat FRELIMO. Under FRELIMO's own programme of economic construction, a barter trade is now growing up. FRELIMO's priority is liberation. But the economy and commerce are developing. Farms are being opened up, cultivated by soldiers and by the people. The people farm on a co-operative basis. Villagers come together, clear the bush and cultivate co-operatively.

As I saw it in FRELIMO, the armed struggle is not an end in itself. The purpose of the armed struggle, as I understood from FRELIMO, is to try and bring sense to the Portuguese colonialists,



Above: Dr. Kassiga, Mr. Sidki, Major Mbita and Captain Makaranga hold a working meeting in Cabo Delgado. Below: Mr. Sidki on a difficult section of the march.

to stop their inhuman acts of oppression, and their denial of self-determination and dignity to the people.

In trying to suppress the voice of freedom the Portuguese have used force – they are using force now. They are being aided by friendly countries, particularly NATO countries, and we have evidence of this. The aeroplanes are NATO aeroplanes, the weapons the Portuguese use are NATO weapons. It is no illusion that the aircraft which are being shot at are either Canadian, American, French or Italian. The Portuguese are killing and oppressing. FRELIMO cannot rely on prayer when they are being oppressed, killed, tortured. The only chance is to fight back and fight vigorously.

But beneath all this you can see FRELIMO as a humanitarian organisation that wants to build a nation and has a programme for reconstruction in the liberated areas. This is a clear indication of their value for human-life – giving health services, giving mental liberation to people through education, and broadening their horizons on life. This side of the story is not often told. A bullet echoes a great deal. The quiet revolution that takes place beneath the bullet is not told.

I am confident of FRELIMO's victory. After the recent African stand at Rabat on armed struggle, and the successes that have been achieved by FRELIMO, I have no doubt in my mind that victory is just around the corner. With total African support there should be no difficulty at all.



Jenerali Ulimwengu, a journalist with Tanzania's English-language national newspaper, The Daily News, accompanied The OAU Liberation Committee delegation on their trip to Cabo Delgado. In a series of articles for his newspaper, he gave a detailed account of the visit. Here Mr. Ulimwengu summarises his impressions for «Mozambique Revolution.»

FRELIMO: an inspiration for the youth of Africa



President Samora Machel introduces Jenerali Ulimwengu to villagers and militants in Cabo Delgado.

Even in the articles I wrote for the «Daily News» I failed to convey my real emotions on what I witnessed in Mozambique. The experience was too novel, too surprising for me to record with the necessary accuracy and intensity.

But one thing rests in my mind: FRELIMO's successes do not depend on chance. They stem from the fact that the guerrillas are clear ideologically about what they are doing, and regard their struggle as more fundamental than the mere wielding of guns.

Here are young men, as young as I, some of them initially trained in western ways, but who have managed to surrender their whole selves to the struggle, damning all else that does not relate to this noble cause. They can offer nothing less than inspiration for me and for the whole body of youth in Africa.

The fact that a new life thrives in Mozambique today is a monument to what the ideological clarity of any fighter can do. The liberated areas have no electricity,

no motor transport, no concrete houses, no tarmac roads. But they have confidence, they have freedom, they have will-power.

And all this they put into practice, by making the lives of the people better, through economic production, to prepare the people for the inevitably protracted struggle. Soldiers and civilians, working shoulder to shoulder, produce the revolution.

Education is growing, and here are young Mozambicans trained in the virtues of being men, thinking men. The whole future is taken care of by teaching these young people what it means to fight for liberation.

The outmoded nonsense of male chauvinism no longer has a place in free Mozambique, where men and women fight alongside each other having shed all complexes. The women guerrillas help to prove one point: women are also human beings.

Tough soldiers, that is what FRELIMO guerrillas are. Flexibility, constant mobility — the cardinal rules of guerrillas warfare — make FRELIMO such a force as the unprincipled colonial army cannot cope with. I must admit that the tough march was a test for me, but one I happily took as the education I got out of it is simply invaluable.

Then of course, the company of learned-in-the-struggle men was simply overwhelming. The cheerful but serious Comrade Samora; the analytical Armando Guebuza; the thoughtful Alberto Sithole; the compact Joaquim Chipande; the swift and humorous Candido Mondlane; the kind Verónica — in fact all the guerrillas that accompanied us to Cabo Delgado were to me teachers, but above all comrades.

One day Mozambique will be free and, just as I said while in Mozambique, we shall cross this artificial border to learn from the wisdom of the struggle that FRELIMO has successfully waged so far.

THE MAN FROM NEWSWEEK

A reporter from the American magazine «Newsweek» visited Cabo Delgado in November as a guest of FRELIMO. In an article which appeared in the November 27 issue of the magazine the reporter, Mr. Andrew Jaffe, described his eight-day trip to our country.

He saw how a FRELIMO school operates with classes of 50 students being led by our teachers. He also watched a newspaper being produced in the liberated areas and viewed an abandoned Portuguese post.

Mr. Jaffe reported that «the guerrillas clearly hold sway over the rural areas in the north». By chance, however, he witnessed a Portuguese raid as he was leaving a village. At the time he was accompanied by FRELIMO militants led by Comrade Alberto Joaquim Chipande.

Mr. Jaffe's report said: «We were trudging

REPORTER
ANDREW
JAFFE:
"THE
GUERRILLAS
HOLD
SWAY"



up a hill when, suddenly, the forest ahead exploded in gunfire. At first I thought that Chipande had arranged a mock battle to impress me, but the look on his face told me this was no drill. As the ground shook from rifle, rocket and mortar fire, I was sure we had been caught in a Portuguese trap. But with consummate tactical skill, Chipande moved a squad up to pin the Portuguese down and then led our column on a flanking movement that took us safely round the ambush. There was no pursuit; we suffered no casualties».

The reporter was also given a sharp reminder of our strong hostility to racialism of any kind. While marching alongside Comrade Alberto Sithole, he reported, he found himself exhausted in the searing daytime heat. «I jokingly chided Sithole for walking so fast in order to demonstrate his racial superiority over the white man. It was the only time I ever saw him become angry.» Comrade Sithole's reply was: «What is the point of our fighting racism if we are going to become black racists instead? Our fight is against Portuguese colonialism.»



Images from Mr. Jaffe's eight-day visit to a liberated area of Mozambique.



MY BROTHER

My brother
is not he who was born
from the womb of my mother.

My brother
is he who grows with me
in revolt.

He is the one who was born
in the shadows —
the sun was not his,
his land was not his,
his strength was not his
his wife
was not his.

My brother is the one who does not bend
does not accept.

He is the one who in the free paths
drinks with me today the water of the same river,
sleeps
under the same sky,
sings with me
the same songs of war.

My brother is the one who forgets himself:
the liberation of his people
is his reason for living.

My brother
is that one
at my side
who fights.

WHY WE DESERTED



THREE
MOZAMBICANS
EXPLAIN THE
SITUATION
IN THE
PORTUGUESE
ARMY

Last July three young Mozambicans deserted from the Portuguese Grupos Especiais (Special Groups) to join FRELIMO. In this interview, the 3 men — Antonio Anselmo Seremenga, Pedro Alvaro Cabral da Camara and Dias Boaventura — describe their experiences in the Portuguese armed forces.

Q: What made you desert the Portuguese army?

Pedro Camara: It is because I am a Mozambican, a nationalist, and could not accept to fight against my own people. I decided to join FRELIMO because it is the force which is fighting for the independence of Mozambique, and is following the right path.

Boaventura: I deserted because I did not like what the Portuguese told me to do. I could not kill my brothers. And as I knew there is FRELIMO, I decided to join it and participate in the struggle to free my country. I am Mozambican and logically this is the side where I should go.

Seremenga: I deserted because in the first place I did not want to join the army, I was forced to do so. Even during the training in Goba, my idea was always how to desert to FRELIMO.

Q: From your experience, how do our people consider the struggle?

Camara: In the colonial army everybody knows that the whole people agree with and openly support the liberation struggle.

Nobody has any doubts about it. We saw it ourselves — when we were taking the people to the «protected villages» they would run away into the bush at the first opportunity. And in fact, one strong reason that made me desert was to see that the people supported FRELIMO and we were looked on with hostility by them.

Q: Did you talk about FRELIMO among yourselves, while in the Portuguese army?

Camara: In the colonialist army we were under enormous pressure, we were controlled, we knew that among ourselves there were spies, PIDE agents. So we could speak about FRELIMO only with those whom we knew and in whom we had absolute confidence, when we were sure we would not be heard by somebody else.

Q: How are the relations between the white and black soldiers in the Portuguese army?

Boaventura: There is racialism. Maybe less than in civilian life, but it is still present. For example, there are extremely

few African officers. And even concerning the privates, when the officers distribute the daily tasks among the privates, they give the heaviest and dirtiest to the black soldiers. In my unit we were many Africans, but all sergeants and officers were white.

Q: And what about the mulattoes — what kind of treatment do they get?

Camara: It depends on the whiteness of one's skin. If you are fair, you are treated almost as a white. If you are dark, you are more or less discriminated depending on how dark you are.

Q: Are there any differences in the behaviour of the white soldiers coming from Portugal and those born in Mozambique?

Camara: The white soldiers from Mozambique are more racist than those recently arrived from Portugal. I think the reason is that the soldier just arrived from Portugal has not yet had time to be influenced by the colonial mentality of racial superiority — he comes usually directly from the land he was toiling on

(and which as a rule is not his) and brought here almost by force. He himself was oppressed in Portugal. But here in Mozambique he is encircled with privileges, most of which are connected only with his colour. And being illiterate he tends to believe, after a while, that he is in fact superior to the blacks (otherwise he would not have such privileges!) and starts acting accordingly.

Q: Boaventura, you said before that in your unit there were many Africans and very few whites. Does this mean that more Africans are joining the colonialist army?

Boaventura: What I can say is that there are now more Africans in the colonial army. I heard the Portuguese telling us that all were volunteers — but I know that many of them were coming directly from the prisons, and conscripted into the army. On the other hand, we were told in the political classes that it was we, the Mozambicans, who should deal with the present situation. I fail to understand the meaning of all this.

Camara: I think I know. It is something related to a special Portuguese manoeuvre. I knew, being a sergeant, that the G.E. are responsible to only Kaulza de Arriaga, who is the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief in Mozambique. That means, that we were something like a personal army of Kaulza de Arriaga. Also, the G.E. are composed almost exclusively of Mozambicans — whites and blacks. Soldiers coming from Portugal are not as a rule accepted in the G.E. If and when they are, they must have been in Mozambique at least 18 — 24 months, that is, one-half of their normal time of service. Relating both things, and other things which I heard, I conclude that Kaulza has in mind some kind of independence for Mozambique, with a puppet regime controlled by himself, with his Mozambican army controlled by whites faithful to him.

Q: Do you have any more evidence of this that you are saying?

Seremanga: In our unit we had political classes, given by a white Mozambican. And he told us that important events are about to take place in Mozambique, aimed at putting an end to the exploitation of the Mozambicans by the Portuguese «bourgeoisies».

Q: Did they tell you in these classes that it was the white Mozambicans who would rule Mozambique, without the intervention of Portugal?

Seremanga: They did not dare to say this openly, because most of us were black and

could revolt. But they made it clear that they wanted independence and that it was time to put an end to Portuguese exploitation.

Q: Did your instructors tell you that?

Seremanga: Precisely. Their words were: «We need to free ourselves from the continued exploitation by the Metropolitan Portuguese. This thing of being ruled by outsiders must finish». And they also talked about FRELIMO. They said that FRELIMO is fighting for a just cause, but following a wrong path.

Q: Did they say that FRELIMO is fighting for a just cause?

Seremanga: Yes. And they explained. They said that the just cause is independence. And the wrong path is socialism.

Q: Did you have foreign instructors?

Seremanga: Yes. We have Rhodesian instructors whose task it was to establish the programme. We learnt about the anti-guerrilla tactics used by the Americans in Vietnam, the French in Algeria and the British in Borneo. But we followed basically the American programme.

Q: How is the morale of the Portuguese soldiers?

Camara: As a rule it is very low — they are afraid of fighting but it all depends on the level of military training they were given. For example, we the GE are a very aggressive force due to the special technical and psychological preparation we have received.

Q: What do you think is the aim of creating your unit, the GE?

Camara: As I told you, I believe the GE are the instrument of a political manoeuvre aimed at independence under a white minority.

Q: During the operations do you participate together with the ordinary units or do you act as a separate group?

Camara: It depends. Basically we are a shock force, and in this way we operate as an autonomous group. When there are ordinary forces on the spot their task is to give us cover while we assault. But this is not a fixed rule. It depends much on the concrete situation.

Q: How do the GE treat the people in the war zones?

Boaventura: The Portuguese soldiers are mentally deformed by colonialism. When they locate a village they kill, loot, violate the women, rob, burn everything. We had to pretend to be participating in the massacres — otherwise we should be

in trouble. That was one of the reasons that made me desert.

Q: What is the justification you are given for those massacres?

Camara: We are told that we are in a war situation, and as the population supports the guerrillas, then the population are our natural enemies — and we are justified in killing them. Thus if we met people and called to them but instead of coming to us they would try to run away, we had orders to shoot at them. Another objective is to gain them to our side through terror. However, we are told not to exaggerate the massacres as this could make the people support the guerrillas more strongly.

Q: Don't the Portuguese have another method of «winning the hearts of the people» — as they say is now their main concern — other than through terror?

Camara: The other method which is used is to concentrate the people in «protected villages». But as this process is carried out by force and as the people are not given any explanation and are very badly treated, all they want is to run away. When I arrived here in the FRELIMO controlled zone, I met many people whom I myself had taken to the «aldeamentos» some months ago.

Q: Did you participate, or did you witness some atrocities practised against the people?

Camara: Yes. When my unit entered a village, the first thing to do was to burn the granaries and destroy all the food. This we did several times. I remember also that once when we were in the bush we saw several people approaching. When they noticed us they started running away. One old woman who could not run was killed by our fire. Another occasion, we received information that the son of an old man who was in a protected village had joined FRELIMO. Some soldiers of my unit went to that village and brought the man. He was beaten throughout the day. At night he died.

Q: What is the feeling of the Mozambican soldiers when they do these things?

Camara: Many are against it, but they are forced. If they refuse, they are accused of being in favour of FRELIMO.

Q: How do you foresee the development of the struggle?

Boaventura: One of the real reasons why we deserted, to be honest, was that we knew we were on the losing side; we were certain that FRELIMO will inevitably win.

Success at the UN-

BUT THE ARMED STRUGGLE MUST GO ON



An historic moment, as the FRELIMO representatives take their seats at the UN

The decisions recently taken by the competent organs of the United Nations on the question of the Portuguese colonies crowned a year of victories for our people and our Organisation on the international level. The recognition of FRELIMO as the single and true representative of the people of Mozambique and of the legitimacy of our liberation struggle; our status as observer at the UN Fourth Commission; the condemnation without reserves of Portuguese colonialism; the call for the Portuguese government to

enter into negotiations with the Liberation Movements with a view to the speedy independence of our peoples — are clear signs of Portugal's discredit and isolation and our growing prestige in the world.

Following the UN meeting, the Political Commissariat of FRELIMO issued a message to the FRELIMO militants, explaining the importance and significance of the resolutions and placing them in their correct context. The following is the translation of the message.

Comrades,

In its last working session in October and November, this year, the United Nations took very important decisions with regard to our movement. It is true that every year the question of the Portuguese colonies is discussed there — but this year it was the object of particular attention on the part of the most important organs, which resulted in decisions highly relevant to our struggle.

Thus, the IV Commission (Trusteeship Commission) decided to invite the representatives of the liberation movements to participate as observers at the examination of the question of the Portuguese colonies. This status of observer which

has been accorded to us has great political significance because it means the recognition on the part of the international community that it is FRELIMO which represents the people of Mozambique and exercises the political control over the country and no longer the Portuguese government; this is the first step towards our more direct and active participation in the international problems with which the U.N. deals.

The authentic representatives

The General Assembly in its turn started its work on the colonies by approving certain resolutions. One establishing a week of solidarity with the peoples of Southern Africa and Guiné-Bissau who

are fighting for their freedom and independence starting on 25 May, Africa Liberation Day; another recommending the competent organs of the U.N. to do all in their power to intensify and improve the activities of information centres on colonialism with a view to mobilising more effectively the world forces against this evil; and a third one determining the realisation in Oslo next year of an International Conference of Experts for the support of victims of colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. Entering into substantive matters, the General Assembly once more condemned the colonial policy of the Portuguese government, its criminal alliance with Rhodesia and South Africa and the support that its allies of NATO give to it. Referring con-

cretely to the national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guiné-Bissau, the General Assembly of the U.N. reaffirmed that they are the authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the respective peoples. A new note in the Resolution of the General Assembly was a statement on the need for negotiations; «The General Assembly deems it imperative that negotiations should be initiated at an early date between the government of Portugal and the national liberation movements» with a view to the speedy independence of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guiné-Bissau. This organ recommended also that in the event of the non-compliance by the government of Portugal with its recommendations, the Security Council should urgently consider taking all affective steps with a view to forcing Portugal to recognise the right of the peoples of the colonies to independence.

In fact, as Portugal then declared a few days later that it would not renounce its colonial policy and would not recognise the liberation movements, the Security Council met following the instructions of the General Assembly. The Security Council again confirmed the right of the peoples of Angola, Guiné-Bissau and Mozambique to self-determination and independence, and the legitimacy of the struggle they are waging to achieve that right. Addressing itself to the government of Portugal, the Security Council called upon it «to cease forthwith its military operations and all acts of repression against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guiné-Bissau; and to enter into negotiations with the parties concerned with a view to achieving a solution to the armed confrontation that exists in the territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guiné-Bissau and permitting the peoples of these territories to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.»

Portugal isolated

We can see that this formulation of the Security Council is weaker and less clear and direct than the one from the General Assembly. Thus, Portugal is not told to enter into negotiations with the liberation movements, but with the «parties concerned» without specifying who those parties are. This was a concession that the progressive forces in the Security Council made to the imperialist powers, who still try at any cost to avoid the complete collapse of Portuguese colonialism. However, a very important aspect was that even those countries traditionally allied with Portugal like the USA,

France and Great Britain, voted against colonialism in favour of negotiations for the independence of our people. This is one of the reasons why the decisions of the U.N. this year represent a great defeat for Portuguese colonialism.

Comrades,

We must make sure that those victories at the UN are properly understood. In fact, it is possible that certain comrades among us get the idea that the end of the struggle is in sight, that within a short time negotiations between the Portuguese Government and our Movement will take place under the auspices of the U.N. and thus shortly we shall be independent. And, what is more serious, those comrades may start to think of a change of strategy for FRELIMO. They may say: since the U.N. has espoused our cause, we must stop or at least relent our armed struggle and concentrate our efforts at the U.N.; many African countries have won their independence without armed struggle, with the help of the U.N.

We must be aware that this is not an imaginary danger, but something likely to happen in a protracted struggle like ours. What must be then our attitude?

It is evident that only complete ignorance of the nature of Portuguese colonialism and of the relationship of the world forces can explain that position. Other colonial powers such as Great Britain and France could give independence to most of their colonies because being economically developed and having solid bases in those territories, they hoped to continue exploitation even after independence. Portugal cannot have the same hope because being herself extremely underdeveloped, the independence of the colonies represents for her a certainty of losing all our riches. This is the reason why Portugal is so obstinately opposed to our independence, in contrast with the attitude of other colonial powers.

On the other hand the imperialist countries which today support Portugal do so not so much out of friendship or solidarity with the regime of Caetano, but because through the Portuguese government they have access to the exploitation of the labour of our people and of the riches of our country. Proof of this is their recent change of attitude at the U.N.; as they see our struggle advancing, as they see Portugal progressively losing control of Mozambique, Angola and Guiné, those countries, to a certain extent, abandon Portugal and declare their support for our cause, in the

hope that we shall respect their interests after independence.

The armed struggle must go on

These two considerations are enough to show those who could think of changing strategy that they are wrong. The successes we are achieving at the U.N. are the fruits of the progress of our armed struggle. Our victories in the political and military fields and in national reconstruction in Mozambique are the basis of the action of our African and socialist allies who in the U.N. launched the offensive against colonialism. The preambles of the U.N. resolutions demonstrate this when in order to justify the resolutions they state for example, «noting with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the national liberation movements in the colonial territories of Southern Africa and Guiné-Bissau, both through their struggle and their reconstruction programmes, the General Assembly decides...» To stop the struggle would be an irreparable retrogression as it would enable Portugal to reestablish its military force and in the long term its political position in the colonies.

We must understand the international arena within the context of our present strategy, which the Central Committee which has just met declared to be still absolutely valid. Our strategy is: on the internal plane to spread the struggle to the whole country in order to gradually increase our forces and reduce those of the enemy. On the international plane, to isolate Portuguese colonialism and to win support for our struggle. These two sides of our strategy are complementary, they cannot be realised independently one from the other.

Thus, whilst congratulating ourselves for the successes we have just achieved at the U.N. to which the action of our African brothers and socialist comrades there also contributed a great deal, we must be aware that they do not represent any spectacular change in the process of our struggle, nor do they justify any hopes of a quick independence. Our independence is being built step by step. It is the sum of an attack against one post, an ambush, the opening of a new school or a new shamba, the adherence of the population of one village more, the stronger support of one and another country, a more favourable resolution at the U.N. All these small victories summed up will constitute the great victory which will be our independence. This is the way we must go.



Caetano's reforms sink in a sea of contradictions



*THE
THE GHOST
OF SALAZAR
IS STILL
AT THE WHEEL*

When Marcelo Caetano took over from Salazar as Prime Minister of Portugal, there was widespread speculation that «liberalisation» in the areas of colonial policies, internal economic policies, and the rôle of opposition would occur. At the same time, it was unclear what the power base inside Portugal for such reforms would be – given the strong rôle of the ultra-right in the state, corporate, and church machinery – and what the motivation behind such «reforms» was. Caetano had moved into the top position at a time, when after 40 years of Salazar, some kind of change had to occur. The colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné were becoming more and more difficult to finance within the rigid and deteriorating economic structures which characterised the latter years of the Salazar dictatorship. This led to increased

economic hardship inside Portugal and spurred opposition to overall government policies. Also, in the international sphere it was important for the Portuguese to gain political and military support from abroad for the colonial wars, and to attract foreign capital into the Portuguese and colonial economies. To be successful in all arenas, Portugal needed an image of «change.»

But this was certainly not going to mean a change which altered the power relationship within Portugal or in regard to the colonies. The changes that followed were essentially the verbiage of pacification, to consolidate a slightly more expanded power base. Simultaneous with these «reform» measures, internal opposition and subsequent repression in the Salazarist manner have continued. The

political ideology and goals of Caetano and Salazar have been the same. Yet, the methods that Caetano initially attempted to maintain control were more attuned to the internal and external demands of the twentieth century.

However, in viewing the past few years, this strategy has not worked. Caetano has turned in retreat. The inevitable hollowness of his reforms have become obvious to the opposition, and pressures from the right have demanded a continued hard line in order to preserve fascism.

Portugal under Salazar

Portugal was much the same when Sala-



zar died, as when he took power 40 years earlier, except for an increased consciousness and awareness in the colonies and at home of a people that saw a world changing around them that did not include Portugal. Salazar's prime preoccupation throughout his reign was the establishment and maintenance of order and the strengthening of Portugal's finances. Colonial policies were never questioned, and when wars broke out in the early sixties the logical response was the deployment of more and more military force. Gold and foreign reserves may have accumulated, but the economy stagnated trapping the majority of the people into near subsistence existence. A feudal agricultural model, an all powerful church that was a vital part of state machinery, leaderless urban workers straightjacketed into state controlled unions, and a population that was 40 per cent illiterate all worked together to insure the maintenance of control by the Salazarist elite. A long history of political repression as the response to any form of political opposition, dealt with any forces that questioned the fascist power structure.

However, because these political and economic structures were clearly not moving, new forces developed towards the end of his rule which emphasised the necessity for some kind of change after his death. The economic standstill, which reduced Portugal to the poorest country in Europe, forced large numbers of workers to emigrate due to the lack of jobs. This eventually created labour shortages, and increased the opposition from those workers who did return. The forced conscription of all men between the ages of 18 and 45, and the drain that the wars had on the economy, led to more frequent questioning of colonial policies and increased support for the liberation movements.

This was the situation when Caetano moved in. Some kind of change was apparent. But the important point about the changes which have occurred is that they have been designed to preserve the status quo. Caetano was the right hand man of Salazar for many years, and had played a vital role in the drafting of the 1933 constitution which established the fascist «unitary and corporate republic». They had their differences, but these

were mainly on the tactics and methods of maintaining and sustaining the fascist, corporate state. They were in agreement on ideology. For, in fact, it is Caetano's adherence to this ideology, which in an historical context must be viewed as «Salazarism», that encourage modification in tactics in order to ensure the continuance of unitary, state power.

Continuity with reform—not liberalisation

Caetano's sensitivity to internal and external pressures, and awareness of more sophisticated tactics can be seen on many levels. First, there are the concrete changes to attack the problems of the economy, to neutralise growing discontent among the politically unorganised social groups, and to divert and stifle opposition to colonial policies. Working with this is the psychological aspect, which attempts to sell to the Portuguese people, as well as to the outside world, that there are, and most important, that there will be «changes». Yet as he himself, refers to it, it is not liberalisation, but «renovation».

The machinery of the state must be remoulded to fit the pressures of the times. But the fascist state will continue to exist. The allocation of power will not change, and the basic contradictions and conflicts within Portugal will still remain. For these cannot be resolved within the context of small modifications in the fascist state. If we examine the first three years of Caetano's rule, we can see the nature of this renovation, the political strategy behind it, and the growing consciousness within Portugal of the vacuous nature of this so-called change.

«Liberals» reforms

From the time that Caetano took office, he tried to avoid strong identification with the previous regime. He barely mentioned Salazar's name, though he was alive for another two years. In his first speech as Prime Minister, his adherence to doctrine while maintaining a flexible strategy became clear, as he emphasised that «fidelity to a doctrine is not obstinate attachment to formulas and solutions». Yet in all that was to follow,





Caetano also had to be continually aware of the strength of the old guard ultra-rightists (particularly in the army), who were carefully watching his response to colonial policies and opposition, to make sure that his moves did not threaten political order and the existing consolidation of power.

The old guard was hesitant of anything that appeared to be even the smallest change. Caetano had the task of pointing out through the success of his strategies or the reliance on repression, that he was in control. The right had to be shown that his petty reforms did not mean any change in ideology while other social forces were sold the same reforms as the beginning of real change within Portugal. In all practical reforms, the most important aspect is the appearance of change as a mechanism of political manipulation and pacification. To this end, Caetano used the press to a much greater extent than Salazar, and claimed during his first few months of office that a new press law was to be introduced. Widely publicised small changes did occur at first, but were instituted and used in order to consolidate support for Caetano. For example, in the election this so-called increased freedom of the press meant controlling information on the opposition to point out its disorganisation and to show that their demands were similar to what Caetano «said» he wanted. Any efforts to discuss meaningful freedom of the press were dismissed by familiar arguments that Portugal was not ready for this because a prerequisite was «proper education of both the press and the public», which of course was difficult in a wartime situation. Accordingly, the new Press Law put into effect on the 1st June, 1972, limits the freedom of the press even more than before. The consistent contradiction referred to above appears clearly in the new Law. Thus, Art. 128 abolishes the Censorship Services, but Art. 129 imposes «Previous examination for all texts and images to be published in the press». The reaction to this law in Portugal can be seen by a decision taken by the National Trade Union of Journalists, which in its General Assembly, resolved to «express to the Government

their deep dissatisfaction for the new Press Law, which increases their burden of responsibility without giving them a concurrent right of freedom of expression».

All his practical reforms, from the start were aimed at alleviating opposition from the various social forces within and outside of Portugal. He immediately issued statements which claimed that economic development and social reforms were priorities. One of his first moves on this front was to move younger professionals who were untainted by office under Salazar, into the ministries in the restless areas of education, social welfare, and the economy. This he hoped would integrate some of the younger, educated and potentially discontent elements into the established order. It would also hopefully, develop more effective internal economic and social policies which could pacify the urban workers and the rural peasantry with slight increase in wages and minimal changes in educational, health and social services. Of course, in the two most important ministries, the interior and the army, two hardliners were kept on, indicating what the fundamental source of power is.

In dealing with students, Caetano attacked the most glaring yet artificial grievances. In response to the realisation that large numbers of educated and skilled manpower would be needed to pull the country out of economic stagnation – and to neutralise student criticism – he announced an investigation into the efficiency of higher education. Caetano's experience in the University as professor and one-time rector, led him to believe that, if possible, it was better not to use crude methods of repression and imprisonment against student leaders, since this often led to more opposition, and turned imprisoned leaders into martyrs. Following this line, his new appointment as minister of Education, Professor José Veiga Simão, cancelled criminal proceedings against some student leaders and sacked the unpopular rector of Coimbra University. Such small concessions he felt would have no effect on the security and stability of the coming change within Portugal. It would also give the state

justifiable grounds for interference if the students moved too far into the opposition camp.

The students, however, proved less easy to control than he had imagined. In April and May, 1969, there were large demonstrations against the suspension of some student leaders, culminating in a strike and on May 6th, the University was closed down. Many students were arrested and the following month the cabinet announced that only students with good behaviour would be deferred from military service. In July the students boycotted their exams, and in August the president of the Coimbra students union was brought for trial. The trial was later adjourned, but the following month the elected leaders of the student union were dismissed on orders of the government – so much for their new right to elect their own leaders. The removal of petty grievances within the context of the fascist state, inevitably cannot neutralise opposition – except on the surface and in the short run. For as Caetano assured the ultra-rightists, and as opposition forces such as segments of the students, were quick to realise, the minimal changes in form did not reflect any fundamental change in the political and economic structures.

Caetano's approach to workers organisations was similar. Free elections of leaders in the state controlled workers' syndicates and a national minimum wage were instituted in an effort to combat the growing discontent. Workers outside the syndicates (particularly agricultural workers) were to be organised into syndicates and subject to government protection. This could be sold as increased workers participation, while allowing the state to control the form of organisation that was created. Voting rights were extended when qualifications changed from tax-based criteria to literacy. But since 40 per cent of the population was illiterate, you were still locking out the most oppressed classes. Again these measures were equivalent to the removal of petty grievances at no cost to the control or influence of the state, since the existing unions and the right to vote have very little to do with the allocation of power in the Caetano dictatorship. Their only



function is to give the minimal appearance of worker and voter participation.

The abolition of PIDE, the secret police, was another widely publicised reform which helped to confuse people into thinking that «liberalisation» was taking place. But it was immediately replaced by an identical institution, the DGS. Caetano admits that Portugal cannot be governed without a powerful, all-pervading secret police. There must be such control, in the view of the state, because if the people suddenly had freedoms, «only chaos would ensue». But most important, powerful subversive forces threaten the country from within. By abolishing PIDE, the well known secret police, and replacing it with a similar force more directly responsible to himself, Caetano can more easily contain internal opposition. Also, being more closely controlled, the secret police will be less likely to fall under outside influence, from groups like the American CIA, a fear of such rightists. The new DGS is under the Interior Ministry, one of those still dominated by Salazarist hardliners – further indication that no substantive change in policy was intended.

These «renovations» of the fascist state in the area of moderate practical reforms certainly do not get at any of the basic problems in Portugal: the continuation of the colonial wars and the state of the economy. They could not because, in fact, the problems are the fascist state. The «renovations» are merely designed to pacify and neutralise various social groups within Portugal; and together with minor changes in the economic structure, to expand the Caetano power base in order to ensure the continued existence of state machinery and ideology.

The economy

Another aspect of the Prime Minister's renovation attempt has been an attack on the inefficient monopolies of Portuguese industrialists, and the simultaneous encouragement of foreign investment to try to pull Portugal out of its economic lag. Restrictive industrial licensing codes, custom duties, terms of credit, and tax and mer-

ger incentives were all revamped. Special funds have been allocated for tourist and agricultural investment, and drastic reforms in the notoriously inefficient and cumbersome Portuguese bureaucracy were promised. All have been viewed as incentives to Portuguese as well as Foreign investors.

Caetano's Secretaries of State for Industry have been particularly active in encouraging foreign investments. Important selling points in this campaign have been the ease of transferring profits and the repatriation of capital. An industrial promotion institute specifically designed to encourage an increase of foreign capital penetration in Portugal and the colonies has been set up to facilitate this effort. The Industry's Secretaries have been on several trips abroad

to solicit foreign capital, emphasizing that «liberal renovation» has gotten rid of some of the more distasteful elements of Salazarism. This image building abroad is particularly important since foreign capital would rather be linked to a semblance of change than overt reactionary fascism. But even if there is an upsurge of foreign capital into Portugal and the colonies, it serves primarily to consolidate political power and increase economic profitability for the ruling elite within Portugal and to the foreign interests more closely to the maintenance of fascist rule.

Another serious problem in the economic arena is emigration, induced by the political and economic situation. This has created serious labour shortages, particularly in agriculture, that has led to a subsequent rise in food prices. There are now





about 2 million emigrant workers living outside Portugal, and they are leaving at a rate of about 170,000 a year. These workers generally have above average skills and education, which are greatly needed within Portugal. The wage reforms instituted in the first few years under Caetano, were in large part directed at encouraging this group to remain or return to Portugal.

The economic situation is full of contradictions, and is unresolvable within the context of the fascist, corporate state. All the weaknesses are so intertwined that to alleviate one, merely exacerbates another. On the one hand the economy is stagnant and to get it moving an increase in the labour force is necessary. But, there is an intense labour shortage due to the massive emigrations to Europe and the colonies over the past decade. In turn, the stagnating economy and the labour shortage obviously hurt the Portuguese war efforts in the colonies. However, on the other hand, emigration is also beneficial to Portugal. Settlers are needed in the colonies to aid in maintaining Portuguese control, and Portuguese workers outside the country sending money back have given Portugal its largest source of foreign exchange. So, despite the fact that criminal charges against those illegally emigrating have been loosened, if too many returned it would cut into the valuable foreign exchange that they feed into the lagging economy.

Caetano hopes to avoid the issues raised by these conflicts by importing cheap labour from the colonies. It has been estimated that 15,000 Africans have arrived in Lisbon in the last few months, two-thirds of them from the Cape Verde Islands. But he is locked in. Again, Caetano can try to make petty reforms in the economy, but given the political and economic structures, and the continuation of the colonial wars, these small changes can barely even stabilise the situation.

Foreign policy

Changes in Foreign Policy have been a response to the growing need to increase support for the colonial wars and to draw more foreign capital into Portugal and the colonies. The new Foreign Minister, Rui

Patricio, made it clear at his first press conference in July, 1970, that an important aspect of foreign policy making would be the development of a positive national image.

A solid relationship with NATO allies is considered critical by the government as seen in the great importance Portugal gave to the NATO ministerial meeting in July, 1971 in Lisbon. But Caetano's strategy within NATO has changed in order to alleviate charges of the misuse of NATO supplied weapons in the war, and to temper the criticisms of some of the NATO allies who oppose the wars. Caetano now lays great emphasis on the fact that Portugal is fighting the colonial wars in Africa without outside assistance, but fails to mention the continuing use of NATO equipment in Africa, a clear violation to NATO regulations. In relation to extending the areas NATO serves to include the South Atlantic, Portugal has carefully refrained from taking any pub-

lic initiatives. But at the same time, Caetano pushes the strategic location of the colonies for NATO security.

The large scale foreign investment in the colonies that is now being encouraged, will also serve to push these countries to support the Portuguese war effort to protect their growing economic stake. But in order to make the idea of colonialism more palatable to these North American, Western European and Japanese interests, the Portuguese have made very minimal increases in the African wage scale, and slightly expanded the number of schools and hospitals. These token pacification measures, mostly only on paper, are sold under the rubric of «economic and social development» to increase outside support for the war.

All these programmes and petty changes discussed so far have been aimed at neutralising opposition, pacifying discontent and expanding the power base of Marcelo Caetano. But they are complemented and enhanced by on-going efforts, to «split» established opposition groups and render them less effective. Forces which do not respond to the more co-optative method of repression then are confronted with crude force and secret police tactics.

In his first few years Caetano was more successful in his pacification techniques than he has been recently. Increased opposition from the left and heightened pressures by the right have reduced Caetano to the Salazarist tactic of blaming subversive elements for most of Portugal's problems. Then his use of secret police and heavy repression becomes justified.

Pacification through propaganda

Caetano has pushed himself as a man who communicates easily with the people in hopes of undermining opposition and consolidating a power base, by creating the impression of «consulting with the people». He has instituted regular informal T.V. appearances where in simple terms he presses home the same points: the need for social improvements; the importance of defending the colonies, and the threat to Portugal's stability from inside and out. He has also travelled extensively within Portugal and to the three African colonies reinforcing this image.





Bringing the question of the colonial wars out into the open for the first time, he hoped to rally support behind the banner of patriotism and duty.

Established opposition groups

The election provided a good opportunity for Caetano to try out these policies. At first these strategies were quite successful, since the groups had little in common except their general opposition to the government, in particular 'Salazarism' and the fact that they had been suppressed. Caetano felt confident enough to permit the return from exile of the veteran opposition leader, Mario Soares, and he met with various opposition leaders to create the impression that he was open to dialogue. This was in part effective, and Soares even stated he would support Caetano in the event of a rightist military coup. Limited criticism in the form of calling for minimal social democratic reforms was allowed, in the early period, as long as there was no serious questioning of the colonial wars. In May, 1969, the second Republican Congress was allowed to be held. The press attended, and a 14 point programme for liberal social reform was passed. Many of their proposals were the same measures that Caetano professed to be advocating, thus he could undercut the strength of part of the opposition. By allowing 'free elections', the government brought the rivalries and differences of the opposition groups into the open. But the parties were so harassed and restricted, they never stood a chance in challenging Caetano. That of course, was not the plan. The idea was to make it appear that there was increased freedom, and that the 'people' had decided whether or not to abandon the colonies. Yet, with rigid election controls and a voting population of 1.8 million, success of the governing party was assured. The election made it appear that Caetano was more secure than he had ever been before. He had discredited the opposition, and enhanced his 'liberal reputation' without challenging the political or economic structures. This aided in winning the support of the die-hard Salazarists, a group which had been watching very carefully. Although small, this is a powerful force which must be a part of Caetano's power base.

Dealing with the old guard

The maintenance of the colonies with no compromises is a first priority of the old guard, as are related domestic issues such as the necessity of police control. Their basic fears are that even minimal discussion will lead to more serious questioning of the war; that social improvements can only be implemented at the expense of revenue currently going into the war effort, and that growing interest in the European Common Market will adversely affect Portugal's relationship with the colonies. Their strength as a group was first seen by the slight delay in Caetano's appointment after Salazar became incapacitated. All army leaves were cancelled, and troops were recalled to the barracks. The possibility of an army coup existed at that time, but because Salazar hung on for two years, Caetano was given breathing space which allowed him to manoeuvre for stronger support.

Cabinet reshuffles and the replacement of hardliners increased fears of Caetano's impingement on the old guard's power role. Caetano was forced to move cautiously in some areas. For example, though Nogueira, the Foreign Secretary, was bad for the country's external image, and a subversive force within the government in terms of undermining the new foreign policy, Caetano waited for him to resign rather than dismissing him.

Unorganised opposition

Caetano tried to integrate opposition from both sides into his base of support. However, this has become increasingly difficult. When he must make a choice, obviously the preservation of the state machinery is primary. Since the strong old guard is more powerful and Caetano does not have basic disagreements with them on goals and ideology, as the internal situation has deteriorated he has moved in alliance with the old Salazar forces against the more 'liberal' social groups. This can be seen most clearly in Caetano's dealings with opposition forces that are not part of 'established' groups, but which comprise the majority of the masses of the Portuguese people.

Early in 1971, large demonstration took place at the University in Lisbon demanding that Portugal pull out of the colonial wars. These were brutally broken up by the police, and the law faculty was closed down. Along with this, there were widespread arrests among students and members of the opposition. In a strongly worded statement the new secret police, the DGS, attributed the problems to 'communist agitators who stirred up the students against the wars, and wanted to whip up support for terrorist activities.' When asked in an interview about the numerous arrests Caetano replied that the police must act when they have information or suspicion of criminal activity. He indicated that a subversive network had been uncovered in Angola which had links with student groups in Portugal. At that time, about 600 people were known to have been arrested in Angola and about 10 in Portugal. Demonstrations against the trial led to the arrest of 8 of their leaders, and subsequent demonstrations ended with 300 riot police patrolling Coimbra University.

As it increasingly became clear that the social reforms spoken of in the early days of Caetano's rule were hollow, and the colonial wars continued to take its toll in Portugal, more and more people moved into this group of unorganised opposition. Increased repression, designed to silence this group, merely fanned the increasing consciousness.

Opposition to the colonial wars has also increased within liberal church circles. In August, 1970, a former army chaplain was arrested after voicing opposition to the colonial wars. Two months before that, the secret police announced that a Catholic publishing group G.E.D.O.C. had been suppressed because of their circulation of documents and literature against Portuguese colonial policies which violated state security and four people were brought to trial. The Bishop of Oporto has been another vocal critic of the regime. All these activities coming from within the church, coupled with the Pope's meeting with leaders of the liberation movements in the colonies, the withdrawal after 25 years missionary work in Mozambique, of the White Fa-



thers, in condemnation of Portuguese atrocities against the population, and churches outside of Portugal giving overt support to the movements, have created difficulties for Caetano. Subversive priests given the religious traditions within Portugal, could quickly undo Caetano's propaganda efforts, as well as, challenge the charges that only communist forces are behind dissension in Portugal.

Another area of growing discontent and opposition is among labour and in the state controlled unions. There have been several strikes, and demands for wage increases which the acute labour shortage makes inevitable. As a response the Caetano government has dismissed several leaders of the state controlled unions, once they proved dysfunctional as puppets of the state.

The emergence of militant underground opposition groups, the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA), in August, 1970 and more recently the Revolutionary Brigade, is of particular concern for Caetano and the rightist elements. The fact that they have been successful in carrying out a number of bombing attacks, and that their targets have been visibly associated with the colonial wars increases their significance and impact. They are also an indicator of what is to come, what is naturally developing out of the internal contradictions in the Portuguese political and economic structures. And their success serves as an example which will and can encourage the large numbers of discontent social groups to act, rather than passively accept.

What does this mean for Portugal

All these developments have reinforced the old accusations guard's that Caetano cannot control the country through liberal «renovations» and a stepped up propaganda effort. As the number of arrests increased, his liberal sounding statements of the early days are getting fewer and fewer. These are being replaced with warnings of subversion from within and without. The strongest to date has come from his defence minister in April, 1971, who proclaimed «In this war there is no front and rearguard. It is everywhere

where the adversary tries to implant his ideas of defeat, favouring the abandonment of the overseas territories, inciting the young people and soldiers to emigrate or desert from military service, undermining the morale of the youth. . . There is a vast international conspiracy with its headquarters in the UN, but which has numerous obedient followers under the communist command who orchestrate the propaganda against Portugal's overseas territories.»

If we view this rhetoric together with increased police repression, a return to Salazarist tactics to maintain Salazarist ideology seems evident. The internal

situation, manifested by the increased mobilisation of opposition forces on many different fronts can only be attempted to be controlled through heavy repression. And the focus on the threat of subversive elements is then used to justify this increased and open repression.

In response to questions, on the recent changes in his regime, Caetano emphasised that it is necessary to distinguish between long term objectives and short term tactics. Caetano might like to still sell the early days of «renovation» as his long term goal, but that is now impossible. Contradictions and a new consciousness within Portugal have created forces which are now beyond his control.



Dr. Marcello Caetano, the Portuguese Prime Minister, announces his constitutional reform plans to the National Assembly in Lisbon.

Giving the background to his plans for reform, Dr. Caetano said that when he took over the reins of government in September, 1968, he made it plain he would not fail to make reform "according to the principles I thought suitable for the country, but free from the spirit of destructiveness or of mania for change simply for the sake of change."

Referring to his predecessor as Prime Minister, Dr. Salazar, he said it was quite wrong to think the administration had failed to take decision in deference to the former leader.

He said: "The respect I feel for him, his ideas, his work, now that he is dead is exactly the same I felt when he was still alive".

CAMPANHA DE ALFABETIZAÇÃO

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educar o homem para vencer a guerra,
criar uma sociedade nova
para desenvolver a pátria

In FRELIMO
we always emphasise
the importance of production.

To our army
we give the tasks of
fighting, producing
and mobilising the masses.

To our youth
we give the tasks of
studying, producing
and fighting.

In our discussions,
in our documents,
we constantly stress
the importance of production,
pointing out that this is
an important front
in our fight
and a school for us.

We can see that
production is satisfying
our everyday needs
at the same time as
liberating and uniting us.

SAMORA MOISES MACHEL

