


Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 12 No. 1

November 1996

AIDS, Arms, Migrant Labour...



Can the region respond?



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Southern Africa REPORT

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
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Thirty Something

Between 1960 and 1990 southern Africa was a theatre of war, a war waged, in the first instance, by African liberation movements against intransigent white-minority regimes. Think of this as a period bounded, in its beginnings, by the 1960 banning of the ANC and PAC (thus setting the stage for armed struggle in South Africa), by that year's further build-up in

Angola of the pressures that would erupt so dramatically into violent confrontation early in 1961, and by the gradual emergence of Dar es Salaam as the crucial staging ground for struggles further south.

And think of it as being bounded, thirty years later, in 1990, by both the achievement of independence by Africa's last colony, Nami-

bia, and the release of Nelson Mandela, the latter event then setting the stage for a new phase of developments – negotiations and subsequent elections – in South Africa itself. It is this period of three decades that John Saul has recently labelled “the Thirty Years’ War for southern African liberation” and chosen to treat as a distinctive (and important) historical “moment,” one

characterized by the same kind of claim to the historian's attention as such previously labelled moments as (say) "the English revolution" or "the French revolution."

The costs of such a war were high, of course, not least because apartheid South Africa, in its death throes, was prepared to impose a deadly regional war of its own on those neighbouring states who, once liberated, chose to continue to contribute to apartheid's overthrow. At the same time, the fact that the liberation movements of the region were themselves prepared to take up the war in regional terms and to make an active choice to assume some of the burden of each other's struggles was one of the more ennobling aspects of the thirty year-long campaign.

Moreover, as Saul notes in one of his recent writings, "the realities of common struggle that struck sparks across colonially-defined frontiers were not confined merely to the dealings amongst liberation movements or between liberation movements and host governments." For there was also a popular culture of perceived linkage between different fronts of a united campaign that became quite visible during the thirty years' war. Recall, for example, the resonance in the South African townships, during the run-up to the Soweto events in the mid-1970s, of recent achievements by the forces of liberation in Angola and Mozambique. Such examples could be multiplied many times over.

Why is this history important? As Saul concludes, if southern Africans are now to build a more equitable regional economy in the post-apartheid era, a sense of shared historical purpose and of shared sacrifice could make some contribution to the realization of that goal. Might we also add that, at the very least, it can do no harm for South Africans to be reminded of the price paid by their neighbours in order that they might be free in South Africa itself!

Are these kinds of possible – and positive – residues of the thirty years too much to hope for? The evidence is still mixed, of course. Yet so one might begin to fear as, a half decade or so after the formal ending of hostilities, the southern African region begins to settle into its own freshly-minted territorial grooves of "politics as usual" – with any pan-regional sensibilities correspondingly dulled. Unfortunately, cases in all too sombre point are to be found in several of the articles in the current issue of SAR.

Take our lead piece by Jonathan Crush for example, documenting as it does the lack of any very progressive stance on the part of the new South African government regarding the matter of intra-regional migrant labour – despite the historical centrality of that issue to the exploitative patterns that have characterized the region's economic history. Or consider the apparent lack of concern on the part of the post-apartheid state for the impact of its own negotiations (negotiations painstakingly documented in this issue by Dot Keet) with the European Union on the economies of its neighbours. Or consider the note struck by South African Defense Minister Joe Modise, earnest advocate of an expanded arms industry for his country, in stoking the arms race within the region that informs the escalating border tensions between Namibia and Botswana: thus Alex Vines, in his informative article on the latter hostilities, finds Modise advocating that SADC member states should build up their armies because "no right-thinking person would invest in a country that cannot protect itself"!

It is difficult not to be judgmental concerning these kinds of developments, although we must remind ourselves that the terrain upon which such seemingly uncomradely choices are being made is stern indeed. After all, the presumed im-

peratives of the global economy have already gone a long way towards breaking the ANC's will to battle for humane outcomes even at home. Or such at least would seem to be the testimony of Martin Murray, the widely-published commentator on South African developments whose latest balance-sheet on the situation there appears in this present issue. Then, too, there is the spectre of (amongst other scourges) disease – AIDS first and foremost, as Richard Lee recounts below – that has begun to stalk the region.

Some perspective is necessary, then. Moreover, we need not assume that the picture across the region is merely one of unrelieved gloom. There is, for example, the case of the recent "Women's Budget," a promising step forward in South Africa chronicled here by Debbie Budlender. There are the stirrings of effective democratic opposition in Botswana documented by Happy Siphambe. And there is even the promise of a progressive role for chiefs in some parts of Mozambique, the rather startling claim made by Ann Pitcher elsewhere in these pages.

Still, even these latter developments are not quite what one would have hoped for by way of denouement to the heroics of the thirty years war. Clearly, southern Africans are not to be spared the long hard grind to find a place in the sun that also confronts their counterparts in other regions of a beleaguered continent. What the latter examples do suggest, however, is that there is resilience in the region. And there is also, naggingly, the question of the legacy of all those years of common regional struggle. Recall Chairman Mao's response when asked to assess the impact of the French Revolution: "It is too soon to tell." Can we at least cherish the hope that it is too soon to tell with any real certainty just what, in regional terms, the lasting impact of the thirty years' war is likely to be?

A Bad Neighbour Policy?

Migrant Labour & the New South Africa

BY JONATHAN CRUSH

Jonathan Crush is the Canadian Project Director of the Southern African Migration Project. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and not those of the Project or the funders, the Canadian International Development Agency. For more details about the Project, see the SAMP homepage at the following address: <http://www.queensu.ca/samp/>

Introduction

Maxine Reitzes has recently argued that immigration has come up from behind on South Africa's post-apartheid policy-makers. She notes how, in response, immigration policy is "diverse and inconsistent." Conflicting public statements, resort to the failed policies of the past, no clear sense of direction, an absence of constructive public debate, and a failure to engage with the lessons of the international experience, are all present. Progress towards a new and more progressive immigration policy has been slow. More than two years since the 1994 election, there is still no green paper on immigration and little of the kind of consultation and dialogue witnessed in other areas of public life. Immigration is still governed by the omnibus Aliens Control Act of 1991. The Amended Act of 1995 is far from being a progressive piece of legislation. Indeed, as the name suggests, the premise of the Act is tighter controls on immigration and greater powers of expulsion by the state.

One reason for the lack of movement is that the new South African government has had to contend with an inherited system of migration and immigration management rife with corruption, racial double-standards and special privileges for certain employers. At the same time it has

faced a rapidly escalating influx of undocumented migrants from the Southern African region and further afield. This has prompted rising demands from interest groups within South Africa for a "South Africans first" policy in the labour market. Some employers, particularly the farmers and mining companies, have openly argued for the right of continued access to foreign labour. Others have made few public pleas but continue to employ non-South Africans in considerable numbers. Organized labour has been more equivocal; some call for the outright expulsion of non-South Africans, others acknowledge the need for some form of legal access to South Africa by residents of SADC.

The Department of Home Affairs has struck closely to the "control and deport" script of the ancien regime. Minister Buthelezi has made his own penchant for this model abundantly clear and is followed by most of his senior bureaucrats, the majority of whom are holdovers from the old days. Support for their views has come from the Human Sciences Research Council, who have prepared three problematical reports on "illegal aliens" for the Department.

The thinking embodied in these reports, and in official discourse more generally, suggests that there are still significant obstacles to the kind of creative thinking which would make South African immigration legislation and policy consistent with the country's new commitment to transparency, human rights and constitutional guarantees and its stated commitment to regional cooperation and development. What is required is a fundamental re-evaluation of the purposes of immigration legislation par-

ticularly as it pertains to the migration of Africans to South Africa.

Forgetting the past

The South African media and officialdom often seem to forget that formal and undocumented cross-border migration in Southern Africa did not begin in 1990. South Africa has long been part of a regional economy and a regional labour market and cross-border migration needs to be seen in that context. As part of this system, migrants have been coming to South Africa (and returning home) from countries like Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Malawi since the mid-nineteenth century. Draconian controls to try and stop this movement of migrants from the region have always been spectacularly unsuccessful.

It is a disturbing fact that South African immigration policy is still largely governed by a piece of legislation from the dark ages of segregation and apartheid. The origins of the Aliens Control Act are deeply racist and anti-Semitic. It was originally passed in 1937 to exclude German Jews fleeing Nazi persecution from coming to South Africa. The virulent anti-Semitic rhetoric that accompanied passage of the Act is curiously reminiscent of the language heard in some quarters over the last year or two by those clamouring for tighter controls on "aliens" from the rest of Africa.

Subsequent amendments to this Act were almost always designed to erect higher boundaries, to place greater controls on people's mobility, to give the police greater powers, to circumscribe the legal rights of "aliens" and to extend the range of people to which the Act applied. These amendments were invariably accompanied by moral panics in

which the country was supposedly being “swamped” or “polluted” by “floods of unsuitable” immigrants. A moral panic not dissimilar to today’s prompted the passage of the original Aliens Act in the 1930s.

Policy by numbers


Within South Africa, official and popular discourse is obsessed with the question of how many undocumented migrants there are in the country. The idea has become embedded in the press and official discourse that there are between 4 and 11 million “illegals” in the country. These figures have absolutely no basis in fact. As international experience shows, counting undocumented migrants is a largely pointless, because impossible, exercise. The danger is that in the absence of reliable statistics, officials, politicians, and members of the general public feel free to use whatever figure they like to whip up anti-immigrant sentiment.

One illustration of the massive inconsistencies this produces should suffice. Some South African police sources “reliably” estimate that there are 8 million undocumented immigrants in South Africa. They also claim that an “illegal” enters the country every 10 minutes. Both figures are designed to bolster the idea that a “flood” of undocumented migrants is pouring into the country. The problem here is that at the given rate of entry, it would take over 150 years to reach the given figure of 8 million migrants in the country.

Statistics are not unimportant, of course. There is certainly a need to build a reliable data base and socio-economic profile of immigrants in order to test, and if necessary contest, the unsubstantiated claims that are often made about the harm they cause. But the issue is not primarily about numbers in any case.

Alien voices

There is today a blunt, and increasingly bellicose, mythology targeted at non-South Africans living in the



Paul Weinberg - Afrapix/Impact Visuals

country. This mythology is fuelled by the public utterances of police, some researchers and certain officials in government. “Illegals” take jobs, commit crimes, depress wages, consume RDP resources, spread Aids, and smuggle arms and drugs. Anti-immigrant myths always generalize from the anti-social behaviours of a few and conveniently forget about the positive contribution that immigrants can and do make to a society. The power of a myth is that it does not have to be true for people to act on it. Anti-immigrant myths produce anti-immigrant behaviour. Random attacks on non-South African residents of the country, as in communities like Alexandra, are the almost inevitable result.

South African cities have traditionally acted as melting pots. Despite the best efforts of apartheid’s social engineers to keep people of different ethnic and language background apart, ethnic tensions and strife have always been minimal.

Racial and ethnic differences were often diluted by the power of personal contact or subsumed in the common struggle against white oppression. One of the most troubling features of post-1994 community attitudes in South Africa is a surprising tendency in many areas to redefine non-South Africans as “other,” as the causes of economic and social hardship and as the perpetrators of crime. True, some recent surveys have shown that black South Africans are still much less hostile than their white counterparts to the presence of African “foreigners” in the country. Nevertheless, the levels of xenophobia may be considered dangerously high. Anti-immigrant mythology needs to be systematically deconstructed and debunked. In its place, there is need for a rigorous analysis of the economic contribution that immigrants do and could make to host societies, as well as public education programmes to produce a better-informed public.

Only certain voices are being heard in the debate on immigration. Occasionally stories surface in the South African media concerning the abysmal treatment of undocumented immigrants by South African employers or the police. More often, undocumented immigrants prefer to keep silent for fear of drawing attention to themselves. Migrants are marginalized and silenced by fear. Immigrants have no channels by which to articulate their grievances or contest their treatment in the country. Nor can they present counter-arguments as to why they think they should be allowed to live and work in South Africa.

There is actually a need to listen to the voices of so-called "aliens." Why are they in the country? What do they want? How are they treated? Do they intend to stay? What do they think they contribute to the new South Africa? Would they stay if offered the chance? There is a need for a forum in which the voices of migrants can be heard and evaluated free of fear of persecution and harassment. Rarely do the objects of legislation not have a chance to respond and react. "Aliens" have no voice, by definition.

Once a problem is defined, the range of possible solutions is circumscribed. Once migrants are typecast as "illegals" or "illegal aliens" – without regard to differences of age, gender, skill level, resources, economic activity, length of residence and intended length of stay, place of residence, motivations, perceptions, and so on – they are depersonalized, branded as outsiders and treated as if they are a homogenous group requiring a uniform policy response. There is clearly an urgent need to rethink the migration terminology and language which frames current South African policy and legislation, to develop new definitions and policies consistent with a human rights approach to migration, to recognize the internal complexity of the community of migrants, and to give due

recognition and reward to long-term so-called "illegal" residents.

New moves

In recent months there have been some promising moves in an alternative direction. First, although there has not yet been a broad-based national, regional and local consultation on the whole question of immigration, there are signs that this may soon change. In September 1996, following sustained pressure on the Department of Home Affairs by Cabinet and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, the green paper process was taken out of the hands of the Department and placed in the care of a specially appointed Task Force on Immigration that will report in January 1997. There is now a much greater chance of the kind of public input and debate that has not, to date, characterized policy making in the immigration field.

Second, the South African government has offered a limited amnesty to certain categories of foreign resident. The first was an offer of permanent residence in October 1995 to long-serving migrant miners who had voted in the 1994 election. About 40,000 miners availed themselves of this offer; about one-third of those who were eligible. The reasons for this relatively low rate of uptake and the consequences of amnesty for the source areas are the subject of research currently being conducted by the Southern African Migration Project. The second amnesty was an offer of permanent residence in June 1996 to undocumented residents from the SADC states who had lived in South Africa for more than five years. This amnesty was vigorously opposed and reluctantly implemented by the Department of Home Affairs. The Department argued that 600,000 people were eligible for the amnesty and that by a process of family reunification a further 12 million people would be added to South Africa's population. These figures are highly dubious. By late September, af-

ter a last-minute rush, some 150,000 people had applied countrywide under this provision. The unresolved issue is what, if anything, to do about undocumented migrants who came to South Africa after 1991. A more general amnesty is certainly one option. This would allow undocumented migrants to regularize their status without necessarily offering rights of permanent residence.

Third, there is a growing recognition in certain circles of government that migration is as much a regional as a national issue. The South African government cannot go-it-alone on this most critical of questions. Bilateral discussions have been initiated by the Department of Home Affairs with a number of other SADC states. This is a positive sign provided that the South African motive is not simply to secure support for applying the Aliens Control Act on a sub-continental scale.

An alternative model has emerged from within SADC itself. The SADC Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in Southern Africa contains easily the most radical and even visionary model of a future regional migration regime in Southern Africa. The Protocol, initiated and promoted by the SADC Secretariat, has run aground on the opposition of South Africa and Botswana, in particular.

In the words of one South African MP, the Protocol has been "put back on the shelf." The recent South African Labour Market Commission cited the Protocol approvingly but backed off from recommending its acceptance by South Africa following vociferous opposition from the representatives of organized labour. Immigration is a regional issue requiring regional thinking and initiative. Whether by taking the Protocol back off the shelf or through some other mechanism, a multi-lateral and open-ended process of consultation and dialogue around migration within the SADC community of nations is now more important than ever.

Of Arms and Islands: The Botswana Namibia Cold War

BY ALEX VINES

Alex Vines works with Human Rights Watch in London.

A small island along the Namibian-Botswana border has become the excuse for a regional arms race. The 1-km by 3-km island in the Chobe river, known as Kasikili by the Namibians and Sidudu by Botswana, is submerged for many months of the year and is uninhabited.

The dispute is a result of ambiguity in a 1890 Anglo-German Treaty, which in part demarcated the border between the two territories. Border tensions grew in 1991 when Botswana deployed forces on the island and hoisted its flag. Mediation attempts by President Mugabe failed in 1992, resulting in both countries seeking a solution to the dispute through the International Court of Justice in the Hague. The case was submitted to the ICJ on 6 June 1996 and both countries have said that they will commit themselves to the outcome of the Court's ruling. Namibia has initially budgeted US\$1.8 million for the legal battle but the case may cost Namibia up to US\$18 million as the Namibian authorities are intent on hiring high-paid U.S. lawyers to help them.

On three occasions since April 1996, Namibia has accused Botswana of a military build-up over the ownership of the island and of moving its troops to control the movement of diseased cattle across the Namibia-Botswana border. The Botswana government is battling to eradicate a deadly cattle-lung disease in its North West district. Attempts are being made to destroy all 200,000 cattle in the area. The outbreak of Contagious

Bovine Pleru-Pneumonia threatens Botswana's exports of 13,000 tonnes of beef a year worth about US\$45 million in sales to Europe.

Namibia also complains that Botswana Defence Force (BDF) soldiers have stopped Namibians fishing in the river near the island and that tourists feel threatened by having guns pointed at them from look-outs. The Batswana have denied these allegations and urged Namibia to raise its objections through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Joint Commission on Defence and Security.

Botswana's interest in the island may partly arise out of wanting greater access to water resources rather than the island itself. Population is increasing on the Botswana side of the border. But Batswana and Namibian military officials have also used the dispute to expand their armies and airforces. Batswana military spending has risen more than 200% since 1992 and BDF troop strength has risen from 7,500 to 10,000. There has also been increased equipment procurement. Sweden and the Ukraine won contracts in 1995 to supply training equipment, including new weapons. Botswana had also signed an agreement to purchase 50 Leopard-1 second-hand tanks worth about US\$750,000, light guns and 200 troop carriers from the Netherlands.

Increasing firepower

However, the German government, as a member of the European Union, and encouraged by the Namibian authorities, vetoed the Dutch sale on July 22 on the grounds of an old agreement between Germany and the Netherlands that the tanks could only be sold to a NATO

country. The BDF commander Lt-Gen Seretse Khama Ian Khama has criticized Germany, saying that Botswana had previously purchased from NATO and would get tanks from elsewhere if need be. The British firm Vickers has already approached the BDF, offering it substitute tanks to replace the failed Dutch deal. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) the BDF is also awaiting the delivery of 36 Scorpion light tanks from Britain. The Vice President and Minister of Finance, Festus Mogae, visited China for five days in June which included discussions about weapons purchases. Also in June General Ian Khama was a guest of the Pentagon and visited various defence equipment factories in the United States. The BDF has already received a US\$450,000 grant for training officers in the US. Between 1991 and 1993 the BDF received US\$4.5 million in US grants to acquire small aircraft, field kitchens and ambulances. US companies are keen to sell more military equipment to the BDF.

Botswana is also buying 13 CF-5 fighter aircraft from Canada for US\$49 million. All the aircraft have received an avionics upgrade; the ultra-modern Bephatshwa airbase was officially opened in August 1995 to cater for this expansion. (In the past Botswana's Air Force consisted of 500 people and operated only transport, executive aircraft and helicopters.)

Botswana's military doctrine was built up in the late 1980s with the consequences of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in mind. The BDF has been developing a highly sophisticated modern armed forces to de-

lay any potential regional aggressor until international opinion can be mobilized to support Botswana. The recent expansion of the BDF is part of this doctrine and the use of the disputed island has been a convenient excuse to push through a further increase in defence spending.

The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is also expanding. In the past it has received British and US training but also recently signed a military co-operation agreement with Russia that will assist the NDF with training and equipment. "The agreement would increase the combat readiness of the NDF and also support the military industrial complex" of Russia, the Chairman of Russia's State Committee on Technical-Military Policy, Sergey Svechnikov, told journalists on 30 May. Fighter aircraft for the NDF's air wing are an immediate priority.

Namibia has also been looking elsewhere. When visiting Windhoek in May China's President, Jiang Zemin, also discussed areas of potential future military co-operation. President Sam Nujoma, when visiting Spain in June, talked about fisheries and arms purchases. Brazil's Avibras-Industria Aerospacial SA sold several multiple rocket launcher systems to Namibia in May.

Meanwhile, it is startling that this regional arms race appears to have the blessing of South African Defence Minister Joe Modise, who is also chairman of the Inter-Governmental Security Council for Southern Africa. He told the press in early July that SADC member states should build up their armies because "no right-thinking person would invest in a country that cannot protect itself."

Need for disclosure

Both Botswana and Namibia have attempted to procure in secret but their efforts have been frustrated by robust domestic and international press interest. Human Rights Watch believes that states should be willing to provide details about their

weapons transfers and other military assistance to other countries. As a rule, if a country believes that it is in its national interest to make a particular arms sale, Human Rights Watch holds that the country should be willing to divulge the details of the sale and provide its justification. This is particularly necessary in the case of arms transfers to human rights violators, when the possibility of misuse of weaponry is high.

Recognition of the need for disclosure, or "transparency" as it is called in the international security community, led to the establishment of the United Nations Conventional Arms Register in December 1991 to promote "transparency so as to encourage prudent restraint by states in the arms export and import policies and to reduce the risks of misunderstanding, suspicion or tension resulting from a lack of information." (*U.N. Document A/46/301, Report of the Secretary-General, "Study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms,"* 9 September, 1991, p.11.) Nations are requested to voluntarily submit data on their arms imports and arms exports, but

only for seven categories of major weapons systems: tanks, armoured vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers.

Small arms and light weapons are presently not part of the register. Human Rights Watch strongly believes that the U.N. register should be expanded to include light weapons and small arms, since these weapons often cause the greatest devastation among civilians.

Botswana and Namibia have yet to submit an entry to the register in its three years of operation (1993, 1994 or 1995). Israel in 1993 (covering 1992 arms trade) reported the delivery of 4 armoured combat vehicles to Botswana; no other country has registered any delivery either to Botswana or Namibia. Botswana and Namibia and the selling countries, such as Brazil, Britain, China, Russia and the Netherlands should disclose their transactions to the U.N. register. Transparency will help to reduce the misunderstanding, suspicion and tension that these sales are currently creating in southern Africa.



John Liebenberg - Impact Visuals

AIDS: Conspiracy of Silence

BY RICHARD B. LEE

Richard Lee is a professor of Anthropology at the University of Toronto.

"First we were at war; now we have freedom, but now we have this new war. In the old war there were soldiers who were the enemy, but in this war there are no soldiers in sight." Ovambo woman in Namibia speaking about AIDS.

As the HIV-positive rates continue to climb in the SADC countries, there is a growing alarm that the AIDS epidemic may cancel the hard-won gains of the post-Apartheid era and turn into a catastrophe that will subvert the best development efforts. In parts of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana one in every four adults aged 19-44 is HIV-positive, a rate rising to close to half in parts of KwaZulu-Natal. Dr. Marcus Shivute, the Namibian Ministry of Health special AIDS advisor, announced in June that henceforth AIDS patients would no longer be accepted in hospitals as inpatients. They would be cared for in their communities and treated on an outpatient basis. Otherwise, stated Shivute, by the year 2000 one-hundred per cent of all hospital beds would be occupied by AIDS patients.

It is not for lack of effort by governments that the numbers are still rising. All states in the region have mounted massive publicity and education campaigns, in schools, workplaces, and in the media, with free condoms available at clinics and health posts. Citizens of even the most remote areas – such as the San areas of northern Botswana and Namibia – are well aware of the dangers of AIDS and the means of combatting it. Botswana's AIDS office has been particularly effective in putting out straight-talking pamphlets and posters in campaigns that target vulnerable teens and young adults.

In spite of these massive campaigns and the dire projections, critics have faulted the governments for their lack of political will in confronting the crisis. There is a deceptively calm air surrounding the AIDS epidemic in regional capitals such as Windhoek, Gaborone and Pretoria.[†] On a re-

[†]In fact the biggest story in Pretoria was the barrage of criticism of the Ministry for Health for spending a staggering R14 million on a lavish production of "Sarafina!" which was supposed to carry the AIDS message but which closed after a few performances.

cent visit to the region working with Dr. Ida Susser, a medical anthropologist from Hunter College-CUNY and sponsored by the Fogarty Foundation and Columbia University School of Public Health, we found at least five factors contributing to the calm, factors that unfortunately also hinder ongoing efforts to bring the disease under control.

- The private nature of the disease
- The intense stigma still attached to it
- The complicity in levels of government in this conspiracy of silence
- The resistance of key sectors of society such as the churches to mobilize their energies for the AIDS fight.
- The absence of a strong presence in the emerging civil society of volunteer organizations and self-help groups of HIV-positive people taking care of each other and educating the wider public about the dangers.


* * *

One of the mysteries of AIDS in southern Africa is that although AIDS is recognized as a major threat and epidemiologists are tracking the high rates of seroprevalence (through blind testing at Ante-Natal

**Tsala e e nang
le AIDS e ntse
ke tsala!**



Bumper sticker – "A friend with AIDS is still a friend!"



Gisele Wulfsohn - Impact Visuals

Puppets Against AIDS: Joe is dying of AIDS - he reaches out to the audience for love, care, support

and STD clinics), on the ground very few people *appear* to be dying of AIDS. Instead people are said to be dying of "a long illness" or "unknown causes." The word "AIDS" is in everyday use as a *general problem* but almost never in reference to any specific individual. Who has the disease remains a closely guarded secret, a secrecy which extends even to medical practice. A Namibian Ministry of Health official told of the intense pressure families exert on physicians to omit all mention of AIDS when filling out the death certificate. This complicity of silence even extends to high government circles. At least one head of state in the region is known to have lost an adult child and a close associate to AIDS, but there was no mention of the disease in the extensive media coverage of the deaths and funerals.

The source of this secrecy is the intense stigma attached to AIDS.

To have AIDS is regarded by the majority of people as a source of shame, and individuals make efforts to conceal the nature of their illness, even from their spouses. Or if the spouse knows the wider community is kept in the dark. When the information flow is so constricted, conditions are ripe for wild rumours and misinformation, and these in turn are met by further denial and concealment. By the time the frank symptoms of full-blown AIDS make secrecy impossible, the infection may already have been transmitted to spouses and lovers, as well as an opportunity lost to educate the public about the dangers of the disease.

One of the pioneer campaigners in the AIDS fight, Francistown (Botswana) Mayor, Iqbal Ebrahim, notes the importance of breaking the silence, the use of what he calls: "*scare tactics: actual AIDS victims who are willing to bare their souls.*"

Permission should be sought from those in the final stages of their lives to use themselves, upon death, as examples to be quoted (At present people only whisper in hushed tones at funerals, debating the cause of death). ... At present people say to us, show us one person who has died of AIDS.' We can't because of the secrecy."

Widespread concealment is not without grounding in principles of medical ethics. The distinguished Medical Ethicist, Dr. Trefor Jenkins of Wits University in Johannesburg, notes that the handling of AIDS by medical personnel lies at the intersection of two basic but contradictory ethical principles: the patient's right to privacy and the public's right to be protected from danger. Because of the individualistic nature of medical practice the physicians' guidelines tilt towards the individual over the collective rights, reinforcing dangerously the concealment



Richard Lee

Ida Susser showing the female condom to a village meeting in Namibia

of HIV/AIDS and the possibility of its spread.

Patients' fears may be well-founded. Examples of victimization and banishment of HIV-positive people have occurred. In Durban townships homes known to harbour AIDS patients have been torched by vigilantes; and elsewhere there is a general anxiety that revealing their illness will result in ostracism by the community.

The tragedy of this culture of concealment is that often the individual has to bear alone the heavy psychological burden of knowing that they are carriers of the disease. Maria Kaundjua, a Lecturer in Nursing at Onandjokwe Hospital, Ovamboland, believes that this concealment may have a significant impact on morbidity. Unable to seek emotional or practical support, HIV carriers more quickly develop the frank symptoms of AIDS and more quickly succumb to the disease.

Why is AIDS so much more stigmatized than say, TB or even other STDs, such as gonorrhoea since both

are widespread? This has puzzled researchers and much further study is required. But key societal institutions – for example, the church and the family – deserve scrutiny. In Namibia during the long and brutal South African occupation the Churches were among the staunchest opponents of the Apartheid regime and today enjoy widespread support. Among the Lutherans, the clergy and church hierarchy are almost entirely decolonized, with the great majority of positions occupied by Namibians. But whereas the Lutherans in Europe are liberal on issues of gender and birth control, the Namibian hierarchy has strongly resisted pressure both from below and from their sister churches abroad to accept a women's right to choose and to adopt condom use as a major protection against AIDS. As one senior minister commented

“Our basic life message is based on the principle of one man, one woman, so recommending condoms would be a contradiction of our basic message.... Some people say that the church will punish those who use

condoms. That is not so, but neither will we advocate them.”

This senior official acknowledged that a number of clergy took an even less sympathetic view and than he did, preaching that “If you are HIV positive you are evil. You have been sleeping around, and now you are paying the price.” The official agreed that secrecy and concealment were a major problem and that few if any people acknowledge the disease. He added the revealing statement that, in spite of the national statistics “I am 100 per cent sure that half our pastors have never seen an AIDS patient,” unaware that the churches own policies and doctrines may be a major factor contributing to the pastors' ignorance and the wider culture of concealment.

Another significant source of the problem lies in the area of child rearing. Many people interviewed acknowledged that traditionally parents and children maintained an extreme avoidance of any discussion of sexual topics. As a result children grow up knowing very little about their anatomy and intimate behaviour; yet a majority become sexually active in their mid-teens. It was left to the government and the schools to pick up the slack. One result is that there is a widely reported view among teenagers in the region that AIDS is a myth, a government/Imperialist propaganda ploy to make teenagers conform to an outmoded moral code. In Durban townships it was joked that AIDS was the acronym for “American Invention to Deter Sex.” In interviews parents of children at risk repeatedly referred to the need for change in this area and many described the opening of communication with children as a major step forward in their family's battle to combat the disease.

Because of the tabooed nature of the subject of both sex and AIDS as a cause of death there remains an artificially wide gulf between the two ends of the AIDS continuum. The concealment of

AIDS as the cause of death and the lack of frank discussion of sexual matters means that the links in the causal chain that are central to the epidemiologist's understanding of the disease become two distinct and unrelated discourses in popular belief.

Thoughtful observers in the region agree that it is of great importance for the effectiveness of campaigns that more HIV positive-people be encouraged to come forward and tell their story: to show that there really is a disease and it has no cure, and that it is possible to live a productive life even if you are infected. Several interviewed used the phrase "coming out" to describe the process that was needed, although the current wave of homophobia in countries in the region such as Zimbabwe make the analogy between Gay Rights and AIDS not likely to win converts. There are some promising signs at the grass roots. In all three countries visited there are major movements to set up communities

of AIDS patients, where they can give each other moral and practical support along with, in later stages, hospice care. A tiny handful of HIV positive persons have appeared on television and radio to tell their story and these acts of courage have had a powerful impact on the public consciousness. The major social-political groundswell that will be necessary to bring the epidemic under control begins with the acts of individuals. We saw boxes of condoms on the night tables of fourteen year-olds in Ovamboland. The sociology department at the University of Botswana has made the study of AIDS part of the core curriculum. And in locations as diverse as the remote San areas of northern Namibia and the faculty clubs of the region's universities we met individual women (and some men) who are consciously changing their behaviour, choosing the partners with great care or deciding to forgo relationships if the partners are not absolutely committed to the use of condoms.

Finally governments, by re-deploying scarce resources, could do much more to lessen the spread and destructive force of AIDS. Health professionals noted that counselling services in hospitals are woefully understaffed. People receive the news of their blood tests in a brief interview and are sent back into their communities in shock and with almost no followup support. Governments could put resources here, as well as into community-based AIDS hospices, job creation, and housing. In fact some read the recent Namibian decision to transfer the burden of AIDS care onto communities as not simply a callous act of neo-liberal cost-cutting. Rather redirecting health-care resources to communities is seen as a means of raising the visibility of the disease, making evasion and concealment impossible. Only when the magnitude of the problem is clear and the terrible stigma overcome will it be possible to make the critical behavioral changes that will prevent the further spread of AIDS.



Billboard on the highway between Windhoek and Katutura township

Tom Benton - Impact Visuals

Cap in Hand?

South Africa & the European Union

BY DOT KEET

Dot Keet is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Southern African Studies, the School of Government, University of the Western Cape.

It's significant that one of the first decisions South Africa's newly elected democratic government made on international economic relations was to take the country into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Also significant was its application to be admitted to the Lome Convention, the multilateral development aid and preferential trade arrangement that Europe maintains with some 70 former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP).

Many criticisms can be made of Lome's inefficiencies and dependency-reinforcing effects. Recent studies do suggest that technical and financial benefits to the ACP may be less than supposed. However, in terms of favourable trade access to the European market, Lome has been very important. The Convention not only allows traditional primary exports of the former colonies into Europe duty-free; it makes it possible for ACP countries to evade prohibitive tariff barriers. Under Lome's "regional cumulation" terms, its members can jointly accumulate the necessary local (ACP and/or EU) content in their products to qualify for duty-free entry to the EU market.

This provision has worked mainly to ensure that European investors in ACP countries can freely export goods produced there back into Europe - and to try to prevent

other foreign investors in the ACP from doing the same. But regional cumulation could provide a boost to the weak domestic manufacturing sectors in most ACP countries by encouraging them to enter into joint production ventures amongst themselves. Such combined and complementary manufacturing ventures would not only allow greater economies of scale and improve competitiveness, but could also produce mutual benefits and promote more equitable and effective development.

Lome was an important option for South Africa to gain greater access to the EU for its agricultural exports, as well as to improve project tendering and other rights. But above all, Lome membership could provide South Africa's relatively weak industries with preferential access to EU. Equally importantly, it could encourage collaboration between South African enterprises and their counterparts in the other SADC member states, all of which are members of Lome. With South Africa's relatively developed industrial base, plus Lome access to the EU's vast market, joint manufacturing ventures in Southern Africa could help to advance economic development and diversification across the whole region. This, in turn, would play an important role in the consolidation of an effective new economic grouping in Africa.

An economically integrated Southern Africa would have a combined population of more than 130 million and constitute one of the most richly endowed regions of the world in mineral and other natural resources. With the addition

of the relatively advanced industrial, financial, transport and communications infrastructures, and scientific/technical resources of South Africa, SADC could:

- create the basis for more integrated, balanced, self-sustaining and sustainable development for all 12 member countries;
- provide a base for its members, separately and together, to negotiate better terms for their relations with the international economy;
- provide, at last, one of the economic 'building blocks' for the recovery and development of Africa, both by example and through future support and cooperation; and
- play an important role in the necessary revision of some of the more invidious terms of the new world trade order.

Initial European response to South African interest in Lome was that the least developed countries (LDCs) in Lome would feel threatened by South Africa's relatively higher level of economic development.

The more likely underlying reality was that European authorities were not prepared to see a country, rather more developed and competitive than the ACP countries, get duty-free access to the European market. Whereas many of South Africa's agricultural exports are the same as those produced in the EU countries, very few of South Africa's potential exports to the EU would compete with those of the ACP countries. Furthermore, South Africa had promised the ACP members that it would not claim the right

to draw on Lome financial/technical aid programmes and would settle for qualified Lome membership.

With the SADC countries stressing that South Africa's entry into Lome was important for the consolidation of the Southern African region, the ACP countries supported South Africa's admission. It was also felt that South Africa's economic and political weight could strengthen the ACP countries in their negotiations with the EU on the current functioning and future prospects of the Lome Convention itself.

Another argument against South Africa's admission to Lome is that World Trade Organization (WTO) criteria officially classify it as a developed, middle-income country. The South African government has, hitherto, seemed somewhat reluctant to oppose this categorisation – possibly in order not to 'discourage foreign investor confidence'. However, South Africa is one of the most grossly uneven economies and distorted societies in the world, a fact recognized by the European Commission during the apartheid years. South Africa is characterised by 'first world' institutions and infrastructures superimposed upon a vast 'third world' base. Life ex-

pectancy, child mortality rates, the incidence of TB, adult illiteracy and a host of other indicators for the majority black population are as bad as, and often worse than, those in many other less developed countries.

Viewed in this light, and as part of a region that includes a number of the very poorest countries in the world, South Africa has a strong case that its admission to Lome would not – despite the EC's argument – be incompatible with the WTO's provisions for LDCs. Despite much discouragement from Europe, in November 1994 South Africa formally communicated its desire to be admitted to Lome. Although the European Parliament indicated its support for South Africa to be granted "non-reciprocal market access equal or similar to that available under Lome," the European Commission shifted the goal posts and offered instead a 'two track' approach. South Africa could be admitted to some of the provisions of Lome, as outlined above, but not to the trade access it offers. Instead, the EU proposed separate bilateral trade relations through a reciprocal free trade agreement (FTA). Qualified access to Lome was linked to progress in such free trade negotiations.

The EU's FTA proposal to South Africa

The EU's proposal is that such a free trade agreement between South Africa and Europe should eventually cover 80-90% of their respective exports and be phased in over 10 years, according to WTO rules. In practice, this means that the EU would have to increase the coverage of duty-free imports from South Africa by about 7% to fulfil WTO requirements. South Africa would have to increase the coverage of duty free imports from the EU by about 46% to do the same. Analysis of the EU's terms for the proposed FTA shows it to be thoroughly uneven in detail, and in the immediate and future implications for the respective sides.

Despite the 'asymmetrical' phasing in of free trade – with Europe opening up more rapidly to South African exports than vice versa – it's clear the product coverage of such an FTA would require far less immediate adjustment costs for the EU than for South Africa. Furthermore, EU members have excluded over 40% of South Africa's agricultural exports to the EU which are considered to be competitive. South Africa, on the other hand, would be required to remove tariffs on a total 95% of

The EU's Proposal

Agricultural products

- EU – eliminate duties on 55% of imports from South Africa,
 - in three phases over ten years; starting with 25% in the first year, 5% over next three years, 25% over 10 years;
- SA – eliminate duties on 95% of imports from European Union,
 - in two phases over ten years; starting with 50% in the first year, 45% over the remainder of the ten years.

Non-agricultural products

- EU – eliminate duties on 97% of imports from South Africa,
 - in two phases over three years, starting with 93% in the first year;
- SA – eliminate duties on 88% of imports from European Union,
 - starting with 53% in the first year, 15% in the next three years, 20% up to 12 years.

European agricultural exports; 50% within the first year of the agreement. Furthermore, under the terms secured for the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the Uruguay Round, South African producers would, in the early stages of such an FTA, be competing with European agricultural exports that are still heavily subsidised.

Similarly, the increasingly free movement of up to 88% of EU manufactured goods into South Africa would start with 53% in the very first year and, under the current competitiveness of South African industries, this would certainly favour European enterprises. In fact, an internal assessment by the European Commission of the proposed FTA, concludes that "*it is obvious that the European Union has much to gain from an FTA with South Africa.*" From South Africa's point of view, such an industrial trade liberalisation would be more profound and rapid than that presently envisaged under its existing GATT terms, although even these terms are being questioned by business and the trade unions in some of the more vulnerable industrial sectors in South Africa.

An EU-SA free trade agreement also poses immediate questions about its effects upon the other members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) of which South Africa is the dominant member. SACU is based upon a common external tariff (CET) around all five members, which would be reduced and removed by a free trade agreement between South Africa and the EU. The most immediate effect would be the loss of the customs duty revenues upon which the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) governments are heavily dependent. In the interim, it would also result in complicated and destabilising revenue changes year by year with rapidly changing customs duty income. The longer term effects are even more difficult

to quantify, but free trade access of European goods into South Africa, and therefore into the rest of the customs union, would aggravate the impediments to industrial development that the BLNS have long suffered under South African economic domination. Similarly, for other members of SADC, the duty free influx of European products into the South African market would exacerbate their own existing difficulties in competing with other producers and importers in what is one of the few sizeable markets where they could have some competitive advantages.

The potential benefits of preferential trade arrangements within SADC would be countered by an extensive external free trade agreement between South Africa and Europe. An FTA also carries broader implications for the anticipated negotiation of investment cooperation and industrial development agreements between South Africa and the rest of the Southern African Development Community. The orientation towards such an FTA with Europe reflects, and will reinforce, the tendency in some quarters within South Africa to prioritise trade relations with Europe and 'the global market' over and above South Africa's strategic/development relations with the rest of Southern Africa. While Europe is the focus of some 40% of

South Africa's exports, these are overwhelmingly in the traditional commodity fields – precious stones and minerals. South Africa's rapidly expanding trade with Africa, and more specifically Southern Africa, although a smaller proportion at about 32%, and into much smaller markets, consists mainly of manufactured consumer and capital goods and processed food and chemical products.

Markets in Europe are undoubtedly important but so – for different reasons – are South Africa's trade, and industrial development relations with its immediate neighbours. Trade relations with Europe cannot be restructured in a manner that will actively prejudice South African industrial development – directly and through its economic relations with its neighbours. A free trade agreement between Europe and South Africa could pre-empt, and will certainly complicate long-standing and essential plans for the creation of an effective and stable regional economic grouping in Southern Africa. The European Commission is exerting considerable direct and indirect pressures upon South Africa not to question the 'carefully negotiated, joint European mandate,' and to expedite the process. Yet such pressures militate against the kind of careful scrutiny and debate required within South Africa and between SA and its SADC partners, to respond to this new EU strategy.

Development analysts in Europe are pointing out that this proposed EU-SA FTA is of significance not only to South and Southern Africa but to all the ACP countries and other least developed countries throughout the world. The projected EU-SA FTA is something of a 'pilot project,' a precursor of what will be proposed as an alternative to Lome. EC policy analysts are already arguing that the preferential and 'discriminatory' provisions within the Lome Convention



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are bound to come into conflict with the terms of the new multilateral world trade system and WTO rules. This position can be queried on the basis of the 'special and differential' concession towards the particular needs of LDCs inserted into the Uruguay agreement – although the full import of this fragile gesture needs to be spelled out and given substance.

At this stage, however, it is being argued that Lome as an encompassing multilateral preferential arrangement between the EU and the ACP, cannot be renewed at the end of its current phase at the end of the century. One suggestion is that more focused and variable regional agreements should replace the current Lome system. On the face of it, there could be some merit in such an

approach. However, if the EU were motivated to defend Lome in something of its broader current form, it could argue for a WTO waiver on the basis of the concession towards the development needs of LDCs incorporated into the WTO. What is, however, now emerging in the EU is a dangerous combination of neoliberalism and New Realism in its global strategies. In a multilateral free trade world dominated by neo-mercantilist struggles between giant economic blocks, a new drive is underway to divide up the rest of the world into free trade adjuncts to, or extensions of the dominant blocks. The competition between the EU and NAFTA to 'co-opt' the South American economic grouping, MERCOSUR, illustrates this. Similar struggles are beginning in relation to

the Asian Pacific Economic Community (APEC).

The European Commission's assessment of the advantages the FTA offers the EU concludes that "[t]he further opening up of the South African market in the context of such an agreement will create competitive advantages for EU exporters compared to exporters from the USA, Japan and other suppliers to South Africa." The danger for South Africa is that Europe's plans to steal a march on the US and Japan through a bilateral free trade agreement with South Africa will, under current WTO rules, almost inevitably have to be extended to them as well. This would be to the prejudice of the EU's plans, but it could be very much more serious for South – and Southern – Africa.

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South Africa: The Woman's Budget

BY DEBBIE BUDLENDER

Debbie Budlender works with the Community Agency for Social Enquiry, and the Law, Race and Gender Project, University of Cape Town.

In March 1996, the first South African Women's Budget was introduced to the public. It was produced by a group of researchers, both university- and NGO-based, with the full support and backing of the Joint Standing Committee on Finance. This was not a separate budget for women. The allocations directed specifically at women formed only a very small part of its content. Rather, it was an examination of the national and provincial budgets to see how each and every expenditure within the chosen sectors might affect the lives of women and men, and the relationships between them. The Women's Budget Initiative helped South African women expand the gender debate from an exclusive preoccupation with the politics of race and gender representativity within the civil service to focus also on the gender implications of policy in a wide range of spheres by giving substance and clarity to their demands on these various fronts. Thus the Women's Budget Initiative is also proving to be a significant example of collaboration between people inside and outside government while at the same time providing a space or focal point for women in civil society to engage more effectively in discussions around policy formulation and implementation.

The Women's Budget Initiative was a joint project of the Gender and Economic Policy Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Finance (JSCOF), Idasa's Public Information Centre, the Community Agency for Social Enquiry and the

Law, Race and Gender Research Unit at the University of Cape Town. It focuses on the budget as the single most important economic policy instrument of government. However perfect the policy, we argue, it is ultimately the budget which determines what government does and its effect – or lack of it – on each and every citizen. Yet the budget is usually seen as a rich man's issue, as something for the finance and business sectors. The meaning and implications of the budget for the unemployed, rural communities and women – for the majority of the population are seldom explored and laid out for consideration. This is precisely what the Women's Budget Initiative sets out to do.

The official launch of the Women's Budget was held three days before the Budget Speech of March 1996. The launch workshop was attended by nearly one hundred people, including national and provincial parliamentarians, media people, staff of government departments and statutory bodies, staff of non-governmental organisations, trade unionists, academics and a range of other activists.

It, and lobbying around it by women parliamentarians, clearly had an impact. In his Budget Speech days later the then Minister of Finance included three far-reaching commitments in respect of gender. He committed his department to:

- the development of a statistical database to provide information on the impact of expenditures disaggregated by gender;
- the implementation of targets and indicators of gender equity in spending; and

- the development of a performance review mechanism in respect of gender.

In the week after the budget, the Women's Budget team was invited to participate in the hearings of the JSCOF. In his own submission to the hearings the Minister of Finance undertook to include unpaid labour in the national accounts. Representatives of the Women's Budget Initiative (WBI) have also participated in hearings on the Katz Commission on Taxation. These interfaces with parliament have been very successful with MPs, both men and women, making a point about the importance of this "new" way of looking at budgets.

Since the launch, there has been further publicising of the budget to a broad spectrum of interested groups. WBI members have participated in workshops, interviews, and discussions with media (including a women's fashion magazine), trade unions, government and NGOs at national and regional levels.

We were not the first country to produce a Women's Budget. In Australia the Office of the Status of Women (OSW) was responsible for overall coordination of the Women's Budget Initiative, and each department bore responsibility for submitting reports on their specific sectors. The Australian Women's Budget report was tabled annually in parliament together with the main annual Budget (but has been quickly abolished by the new government). In other countries such as Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States women's budgets were produced by groups in civil society. The South African Women's Budget Initiative is a hybrid in that it involves

cooperation between people both within and outside government. It is this cross-over which almost certainly accounts for much of the success which it can claim to have achieved. In addition to the team of researchers, a reference group was set up to include members of the national and some provincial governments and women based in NGOs and quasi-NGOs (e.g. the Development Bank of Southern Africa). There were also specific links with MPs on the relevant Select Committees in Parliament. In particular, the Initiative would never have come about without the intervention of MP Pregs Govender, a member of the JSCOF. But it also enjoyed the active support of other members of that Committee, of the current Deputy Minister of Finance Gill Marcus and the Acting Director-General of Finance, Maria Ramos.

The broader context

The work and achievements of the Women's Budget Initiative should be seen against the background of gender and women's politics in the transitional and post-apartheid government, and in the context of the strong commitment to gender equality that has been institutionalised in the interim and final constitutions. South African women, entering the realm of "state feminism" rather later than other countries, have been able to learn from their experiences in deciding what forms of representation for women to push for and what policy options are most effective.

Women are comparatively well represented in the current government. Largely as a result of the ANC's quota system, a quarter of all national MPs are women, as are just under a fifth of the elected public representatives at regional and local levels. At the national level women are also increasingly being elevated to positions of Minister and Deputy-Minister. These women have not been confined to the "soft," social sectors, but have penetrated "male"

domains such as Finance and Trade and Industry.

In regard to government machinery, the consensus has been that we need a "package" of structures in government, the legislature and in the form of independent bodies, to ensure that no one structure carries the full responsibility for addressing gender equality issues, and that gender considerations are mainstreamed. The Interim Constitution made provision for a Commission on Gender Equality (CGE), a government-appointed but independent body, like the Human Rights Commission. One of its central tasks is to monitor the operations of government in relation to discrimination on the grounds of gender. Much delayed in implementation, the government's recent call for nominations for commissioners is a sign that the commission will soon be established.

Early this year Deputy President Thabo Mbeki announced that we would be getting an Office of the Status of Women (OSW), most probably to be situated within his Office. Again there have been delays. One significant delaying factor has been the government's stated commitment to cut the public service, and questions as to the level of staff to be allocated to the OSW. On National Women's Day - 9 August - President Mandela said he hoped that the OSW, like the CGE, would be established before the end of the year. In late October OSW posts were advertised.

Despite the delays with this "apex" structure, there have been other developments in setting up structures to intervene on women's issues within national and provincial governments. Many of the national departments have established gender units. These sometimes consist of only one person, and often a relatively junior one with other tasks besides the gender portfolio. However most of the people concerned are committed to the issues and eager to make an impact.

Most of the provinces have established their own regional "apex" gender structures. Eastern Cape has a Ministry of Youth, Gender and Development. The Northwest and Northern Provinces have gender structures within the Premiers' offices. In Mpumalanga and Western Cape the "central" gender structures are found within line departments. Within many of the legislatures there are also women's or gender structures, usually on a multi-party basis.

Outside government and parliament, organising and lobbying around issues of gender equality continues, with both gains and losses over the last few years. On the one hand the umbrella body, the Women's National Coalition, was seriously weakened when several of the key leaders went to parliament and government. Within labour, the SA Domestic Workers Union (SADWU) very recently announced it was disbanding. While this Union always experienced difficulties in organising this dispersed and oppressed sector and was heavily reliant on overseas donors, its demise further weakens the position of domestic workers, by far the single largest occupational category of women employed in the formal economy.

On the other hand the World Conference on Women at Beijing in 1995 provided an exciting focus for organising and inspiration, again promoting the cooperation of women within government and civil society. The Welfare Department, under Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi (first as Deputy, and now as Minister) played a leading role in ensuring that the Beijing message got spread within government and without. After the Conference each Ministry made specific commitments as to how they would take "Beijing" forward. With the signing of CEDAW (the UN Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women) and the looming deadline for our first CEDAW report, there is now an

other focus around which NGOs, if not grassroots women, can organise. Participation in international events and initiatives has been particularly important for those women who, during the apartheid years, remained inside the country and excluded from developments within international feminism.

The challenge of gender policy

Women's machinery, international support, women's organisations and lobbying strategies are all critical to the struggle for effecting gender equality in South Africa. But so is the formulation and implementation of gender policy. In conditions of enormous competition for government's limited economic resources, personnel time and energy, movement on the policy front has been slow. The drafting of a national Policy for Women's Empowerment was spearheaded by the RDP Office. Both government departments and organisations and individuals within civil society were asked to put forward suggestions for programmes and policies. For a number of reasons – including the closure of the RDP Office and the lack of clarity as to who was responsible for taking it forward – the policy has not yet been finalised, although the draft has been distributed quite widely. It is in this overall context that the Women's Budget Initiative is having its impact.

When the Initiative started, the new, democratic South Africa was just over a year old. Many people within and outside government were still trying to work out what changes were needed, and how to bring them about. Within the different sectors white papers and other policy papers abounded. Across sectors there were a range of moves concerning budget reform. The Initiative was able to learn from these various policy and budgetary initiatives, to piggy-back upon them, to form alliances with their proponents, and sometimes to question the extent to which they addressed gender inequalities.

The South African Women's Budget of 1996 was a pilot. It covered four sectors – housing, education, welfare and work – and the cross-cutting themes of public sector employment and taxation which affect all sectors. Below are highlights of the arguments the budget lays out:

- The Housing paper, by Sue Parnell, acknowledged that the new subsidy schemes are a great improvement on past apartheid housing policy. But the new schemes still have their blindspots in relation to women. For example, to receive the capital subsidy, the applicant must be over 21 years of age and have dependants. Yet approximately half of South African mothers have their first child while in their teens.

- Education is the biggest single item in the SA budget – approximately a quarter of total expenditure. Yet only 1% of the education budget is allocated to pre-primary education. In addition to other benefits, a more generous allocation would relieve the burden on the primary care-givers, i.e. on women. At the other end, only about half a percent of the budget is allocated to adult basic education and training (ABET). Here, it seems, the government is hoping that the private sector and NGOs will fill the gap. This discriminates against women, who are less likely to be in formal employment and in the big companies which will provide ABET for their employees. It discriminates against the many rural women who will not be reached by NGOs.

- Welfare is “doubly gendered.” It is mainly women who both need support (because they are generally poorer and more vulnerable), and provide support (because they are the social workers and unpaid carers in the home and community). This chapter in the Budget used a range of case studies to spell out the implications of women's unpaid labour and of the ways people could fall through the gaps in the Welfare

system. It pointed out that the resultant burden often ultimately falls on women. But it also pointed out the financial burden on the state itself. Where, for example, the Department of Justice does not provide adequate resources to pursue a father who is not supporting his child, the mother will turn to the state for a maintenance grant.

If the state does not provide this grant, a poverty-stricken mother could end up giving the child up to foster-care, at the higher cost to the state of a foster grant. If this is not a possibility, the child could be institutionalised, at still higher cost.

- An examination of women's income-earning work has to look beyond the Department of Labour. While many women work, fewer women than men are employed in formal industry – in the shops, offices, factories and mines. But more women than men work in the informal sector or in subsistence agriculture. In the past the budget of the Department of Trade and Industry favoured large companies rather than small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs). There has been some movement in a direction which could lessen the gender discrimination against women. However even in 1995/6 only R80 million (2.2% of the DTI budget) was allocated specifically to the SMME sector. Even this was unlikely to reach the survivalist sector where women predominate. Within formal industry, a rapid phasing out of import and export controls has already cost many thousands of women clothing and textile workers their jobs.

- On public sector employment, 49% of public sector employees are women, and this sector accounts for approximately 9% of total female formal employment. Yet – as elsewhere in the world and in the South African economy – women congregate at the bottom of the scale. In addition to the gender disparities, there are those among women, and particularly

between white and African women. Women within the public service are concentrated in certain occupational families. The Educator family is the largest, accounting for 27% of all public sector employees. 67% of the educators are women. When we compare average wages of the different race-gender groupings, we find that white men earn 1.72 times as much as African women, and White women 1.43 times as much. In the Administration and Human Sciences group – where women account for 68% of the total – white men earn 1.64 times as much as African women and white women 1.14 times.

• On taxation: There are virtually no gender-disaggregated figures relating to taxation. Nevertheless, from employment and earnings statistics it is clear that far fewer women will be direct tax-payers. Firstly, fewer women are employed

in the formal sector. Secondly, women generally earn less than men, so a smaller proportion will earn enough to reach the tax threshold. Nevertheless, women bear a substantial tax burden. Firstly, there has been a significant shift over the last twenty years from corporate to personal tax. In 1976 individual tax accounted for 25% of tax revenue and there was no sales tax. In 1995 individual tax accounted for 41% of tax revenue and VAT for an additional 26%. The Department of Finance's own calculations show that VAT is regressive, with a higher effective rate on poorer people. Because women predominate among the poor, they bear the greater burden of this tax.


Since before the elections South African women have been discussing, debating, workshoping and politicking about the most appropriate ways of engaging with the

post-apartheid state. Devising the most effective forms of government machinery for the representation of women's interests has been a major focus of concern and progress is being made, slowly. Pressing for more attention now is the question of the gender content of policy which, as always, is vying for priority with all the other urgent issues. With clear analysis, backed up by solid research and statistics, the Women's Budget Initiative is working to transform the post-apartheid state's significant but amorphous commitment to gender equality into debatable issues and concrete considerations for the engagement of both women and men in civil society, and policy-makers in government.

The book containing the reports of the first Women's Budget Initiative is available from Book Promotions, P.O. Box 5, Plumstead 7801, South Africa.

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The South African Transition: More Trouble than it Looks

BY MARTIN J. MURRAY

Martin J. Murray teaches Sociology at SUNY Binghamton and is the author of, among numerous other books on South Africa, The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa (London and New York: Verso, 1995).

The long and complicated transition to representative democracy in South Africa brought about the end of white minority rule and the apartheid system, along with its racially discriminatory laws, regulations, and procedures. For the most part, commentators have focused their attention on the most visible aspects of this political transition: nonracial elections; the Government of National Unity, a fragile coalition which brought together (temporarily, as it turned out) the dominant African National Congress (ANC) and its junior partner, the National Party; and the continuing strife in KwaZulu/Natal pitting ANC supporters against Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

Yet in the rush to emphasize the novelties of the "new South Africa," some important features of this political transition have been largely ignored. The point of departure for understanding both the form and content of the 'new South Africa' is the recognition that the political transition resolved one set of contradictions only to replace these with new ones. The following list is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to highlight some of the main contradictory impulses unleashed with the end of apartheid and the transition to representative democracy; intra-elite wheeling and dealing ("elite-pacting") versus participatory democracy; entrenched socio-economic privilege versus radi-

cal redistribution; political activism versus petty criminality; and the ANC as a political party versus the ANC as an enduring social movement. These polarizing currents tear away at the political compromise reached through four years of negotiations and culminating in the 1994 nonracial elections that established the ANC leadership in the administrative seat of political power.

In this context, political stability in South Africa rests largely on the ability of the top ANC leadership clustered around President Nelson Mandela to maintain a delicate balance between opposing forces. The main problem they face is clear: how to reconcile the rising expectations of the largely impoverished black majority with the demands of the privileged and powerful – mostly white property-owners – that their opportunities to reproduce their way of life will not change too much. Of course, the ANC leadership realizes that political uncertainty only triggers fears amongst investors and speculators, and this reluctance to commit capital only exacerbates economic stagnation. But how to meet the demands of both these constituencies at once: that is a very thorny question.

Perhaps the ANC's uncertainty of direction in this respect is also exacerbated by internal tensions, tensions raised by the demands of other of the "privileged and powerful" – those within the black community (and even within the ANC) itself. In this sense the political trajectory of Cyril Ramaphosa may illustrate something important about the evolving political situation in the "new South Africa." Ramaphosa emerged from the Black Consciousness Movement in the 1970s. During most of the next decade, he

built the powerful National Union of Mineworkers into one of the most formidable trade unions in the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). In the early 1990s, he was elected secretary-general of the ANC. Recently, he announced his decision to resign both his ANC post and his seat in parliament to take up a new job as deputy executive chairman of New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL), a consortium of black investors which seeks to spearhead black economic empowerment via property ownership!

The inheritance

Of course, any verdict passed on the economic performance of the post-apartheid executive so far has to take into account what the ANC-led government inherited from the previous white minority regime. South Africa has one of the most unequal distributions of income and wealth in the world. The labour force, particularly the African majority, is poorly educated, underpaid and, to a considerable extent, locked into irregular, casualized work. Unemployment hovers around 40 percent; and recent investment has drifted toward capital intensive sectors. Despite the fact that South Africa in aggregate terms is an economic power in Africa, economic growth and development is hindered by a number of contradictions, including limited domestic market in terms of size, purchasing power, and sophistication; an exhausted potential at the lower end of import substitution; inadequate skills development of the labour force; and weak global competitiveness of key industrial sectors. These problems are exacerbated by the lack of a comprehensive and coherent development strategy and the reluctance of the large capitalist con-

glomerates to commit much-needed capital to long-term investment programmes that would absorb unemployment, restore global competitiveness, and elevate the skill level of the labour force.

The ANC-led government has attempted to address these structural imbalances through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an ambitious blueprint aimed at generating economic growth and development by meeting basic needs of the most marginalised sectors of the population, enhancing human skills through training programmes, promoting technological development, and improving the competitiveness of stagnant industries. At the beginning, much of the political left, including the South African Communist Party (SACP), portrayed the RDP as the political vehicle upon which progressive po-

litical forces would ride the high tide of rising expectations. It was hoped that by empowering local communities the RDP would launch a wider assault on entrenched power and privilege.

Yet almost from the outset, the main tenets of the RDP were gutted. The impact of progressive policies has been limited. Unemployment has not changed appreciably, economic growth has stagnated at levels far below those expected by key government policy-makers, and the gap between rich and poor is increasing. The narrow focus of the post-1990 negotiations process virtually ensured that the post-apartheid government would have limited powers to mobilise the productive assets of the country toward a massive state-sponsored economic restructuring programme. It was agreed, either explicitly or im-

plicitly, that the new government would not resort to nationalization of privately-owned assets and would not use massive state spending to offset the socio-economic inequalities inherited from the past. Without a state-led programme along the lines of the post-World War II social-democratic indicative-planning models of Western Europe or 1930s New Deal unemployment-absorbing programmes undertaken in the United States, the new government is largely dependent on winning the favour of reluctant owners of capital to make the kinds of investment decisions that would allow policy-makers to realize their goals.

Social conflict

The end of formal apartheid and the transition to representative democracy has brought about a shift in the locus of social conflict. Dur-



Rodger Bosch — Impact Visuals (21)

Cape Town gang members during a march protesting actions taken against drug dealers and gangsters, Aug 1996

ing the years of white minority rule, political struggle focused on state power. For the most part, the anti-apartheid movement encouraged, aided, and abetted unrest in the townships and squatter camps because continuing strife undermined the legitimacy of the white minority regime. With the transition to representative democracy, yesterday's "freedom fighters" are today's unemployed township youth. There has been a displacement of social conflict downward and outward, to every level of the social structure, particularly on the margins and peripheries. Intense competition for land, housing, and access to other scarce resources has triggered conflicts in local communities in urban as well as rural areas. During the apartheid years, conflicts between "haves" and "have-nots" were generally regarded as "political" in nature, but now they are seen as disruptive and unsettling.

This involution of conflict has gone hand-in-hand with rising criminal violence, petty theft, and gang "turf wars." Middle class communities – white as well as black – are demanding more police protection and stricter policies toward crime. In Cape Town, a well-organized vigilante group in a settled working class "coloured" area took matters into its own hands, killing one gang leader, and vowing to rid their local community of known criminals.

The transition to liberal democracy has exacerbated some old social cleavages and even created new ones. Even though the idea has existed in embryo for quite some time, the emergence of a distinct movement promoting "Coloured identity" reflects a growing social fragmentation that cuts against the grain of the "universalising" politics of the anti-apartheid movement. The National Party in the western Cape has blatantly used "anti-African" themes in its election campaigns to drive a wedge between voters in the (mostly African) townships and squatter camps, and the (mostly

coloured) residents of settled working class communities. Despite efforts to counteract these divisive tactics, the National Party – with a number of prominent coloured politicians in its camp and a large following of coloured voters – has established itself as the dominant political party in the region. All in all, the emphasis on parliamentary and local elections has brought about a reshuffling of "politics"



Carolyn Bassett

from broad national concerns dealing with equality under the law, toward the "politics of social closure." The demands of home-owners for zoning regulations to expel squatters, the demands of politicians to build an electric fence along the borders to keep Mozambicans from illegally crossing, the demands to maintain "standards" in the schools, are all examples of this trend toward establishing social boundaries between "us" and "them."

Class formation

The end of apartheid has also accelerated the growth and develop-

ment of a new middle class in South Africa, comprised mainly of a technically-trained, and skilled salariat, a technical-managerial stratum located between small-scale entrepreneurial owners of capital (not to mention the large-scale capitalists), on the one side, and the semi-skilled and unskilled working class, on the other. This intermediate class is increasingly comprised of upwardly mobile (so-called) African, coloured, and Indian college-educated young people who, for the first time, share the socioeconomic privileges long associated with being white and comfortably middle class. Competition for access to the limited spaces in this privileged middle class has detonated social conflict, much of which centres on the definition and implementation of so-called "affirmative action" programmes.

The political left, including the trade union movement, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and smaller socialist groups, had hoped that the process of ushering in political democracy would give rise to new pressure from below. This would lead inexorably toward wider demands for participatory democracy and, at the very least, some state-led, proto-socialist programmes that would address problems linked to poverty and unemployment, landlessness, lack of resources, and blocked opportunities for upward mobility and socioeconomic advancement. Without a blueprint for an "actually working socialism," the political left has generally lost its sense of direction. The internal mass base of the anti-apartheid movement, once located with COSATU and the United Democratic Front, has been more or less successfully co-opted into the mainstream ANC. For the most part, progressive forces remain loyal to the ANC. Yet this support amongst the mass base is not as deep and enduring as it once was. Once Nelson Mandela leaves office, the cracks in the once-solid firmament will become much more visible.

Botswana: Diamonds Aren't Forever

BY HAPPY SIPHAMBE

Happy Siphambe is a lecturer in Economics at the University of Botswana.

Botswana proudly celebrated its 30th anniversary of self-rule on September 30th, its status as an "African miracle" secure. Botswana is touted in mainstream development circles as a model of stable, functioning democracy and market-driven economic success. Yet as *SAR* has pointed out [in "Botswana: Miracle or Mirage," vol. 7 no. 4], beneath the surface, the Botswana miracle does not look so promising. Now, as the governing Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) faces slower economic growth, a serious political challenge for the first time, and demands from other civil society actors, these new factors seem destined either to force the BDP to change its policies, or to face its first real political challenge at the next national election.

On the economic front, slower economic growth, and the failure of the previous period of rapid growth to lead to gains for the majority will shape the immediate future. With the discovery of minerals, especially diamonds, soon after independence, Botswana quickly became the fastest growing economy in the world. Its growth rates averaged 13% through the 1970s and 1980s. The growth pattern is different for the 1990s, however, with the rate slowing to between four and six percent.

Future economic growth prospects seem mixed. World recession in the early 1990s depressed the diamond market, which accounts for 75% of Botswana's exports and contributes the largest single share to the national economic accounts (GDP). The (de Beers) Central Selling Organization (CSO), which markets all Botswana's diamonds, deferred fifteen percent of Botswana's purchase quota, creating a stockpile of diamond production. The

global diamond depression is compounded by large Russian diamond sales outside their agreement with the CSO, further depressing global diamond prices. A diamond marketing deal between CSO and Russia is believed to be crucial if Botswana is to escape a crisis in their foreign exchange earnings. Even so, the manufacturing and agricultural sectors will have to play larger roles in Botswana's economic future.

Drought affected arable agriculture over the last few years, but after the good rains of 1996 it is expected to do well. Manufacturing also improved over the last few years, yet no leading sector emerged. Growth is limited by the extent of the domestic market, since even successive devaluations of the Pula failed to make Botswana's goods competitive in the South African and Zimbabwean markets. Botswana's domestic market itself is limited by high unemployment in the formal sector and highly unequal income distribution.

With most growth fuelled by the capital intensive mineral sector, the employment impact was minimal. Moreover, the mineral sector has no direct links with the rest of the economy, since it does not rely on inputs from other domestic sectors nor supply other domestic industries. The establishment of two diamond processing companies had only a marginal impact on employment. Therefore, the only way for growth to be redistributed was government revenue from diamond sales. This revenue was successfully channelled into health and education but had little impact on employment or the distribution of wealth.


Statistical economic indicators illustrate part of the story. The most recent Household Income and Expenditure Survey (1994-95) shows that income distribution is very unequal, and little improved from

a decade earlier. In 1995, the top 20% of income earners still earn 16.5 times what the bottom 20% earn, a degree of income inequality surpassed only by Brazil among the countries measured. The number of people below the acceptable poverty level remained at least forty percent (based on 1989 data), and some believe it is rising.

Formal sector employment also failed to keep pace with the growing population and workforce, despite the two decades of higher than 10% growth. Today, the unemployment rate stands at twenty percent or more, with significant underemployment as well. Thus the strong economic record of the 1970s and 1980s, and continuing growth in the 1990s, was not successfully translated into development in the sense of transforming the lives of the majority. If development is a transformative process which can be measured in economic gains but also political and economic empowerment, then the record of the last thirty years is not good, nor is the immediate future promising.

Statistical indicators on human development paint a more promising picture. The United Nations Development Programme index of human development (HDI), which bases its measurement of human development on health and education indicators, ranked Botswana 74th of 174 countries in its 1995 report. This gave Botswana the highest HDI score of any country in sub-Saharan African, including South Africa, reflecting the Botswana government's commitment to providing for basic health and education. Yet consistently high HDI scores in themselves apparently do not create employment or redistribute wealth, as the Botswana case shows.

Since the Botswana model mirrors precisely the latest neo-liberal advice for economic development -



Bruce Paton - Impact Visuals

invest in people, but allow the market to provide investment, jobs, and the overall economic direction of the economy – the implications of Botswana's socio-economic transformation serve as a warning to the region. Neither economic growth nor investment in basic human needs has transformed the economic situation of most people of Botswana.

To date, however, the BDP has failed to acknowledge the failures of its economic policies. The major themes of previous government economic development plans, like economic diversification from the capital-intensive mining sector and employment creation, reappear in the development plan currently in preparation. Nonetheless, in these plans, actual employment creation schemes have been few, and relied on the private sector, in line with the market-oriented economic philosophy of the BDP. Consistent with the advice of international financial institutions and other neo-liberal doyens, the schemes attempted to provide an enabling environment for the private sector to take the leading

role in employment creation. However, such schemes did not create enough employment for the expanding young labour force, as the statistics cited above indicate.

Thus the lessons the Botswana government and the region should draw from Botswana's post-independence history are precisely the opposite from those taught by the neo-liberals. An enabling state that supports private sector growth and merely invests in the health and education of its citizens will not create self-sustaining development that is meaningful to the majority. The government must accept a role in the economy, not just as a facilitator, but as a major participant. A government cannot continue to shy away from engaging in production, especially in areas where the private sector is not forthcoming. Going the pure capitalist route has created uneven development that can seriously threaten the stability of a country. Clearly the BDP will have to change its economic philosophy and reduce its reliance on the private sector to provide development, jobs and redis-

tribute wealth, if it wants to remain in power after 1999.

For the socio-economic problems indeed have shifted the political terrain. Perhaps the most significant change was the emergence, for the first time in Botswana's post-independence history, of an opposition party with real prospects to influence the direction of the country, perhaps even take power. In the 1994 elections, the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF), formed immediately after independence, made significant gains for the first time, now filling thirteen of forty seats. The party is led by Moscow educated Dr. Kenneth Koma, a member of Parliament for Gaborone South since 1984, and the Vice President is Mike Dingake, who served with Mandela and other prominent South African political prisoners on Robben Island.

Initially advocating socialism, with a very limited private sector, today the party sees itself as 'united front' of people with mixed ideologies, including Dr. Koma's self-proclaimed socialism, brought together to overthrow neo-colonialism,

feudalism and foreign domination. They proclaimed a "National Democratic Struggle": national, they claim, because the interest of the nation is at stake, and democratic because it seeks to replace political oppression with political freedom, economic exploitation with economic prosperity. Yet their major programme document argues that national democratic tasks are not to be confused with the tasks of a socialist revolution. A dynamic market economy, they claim, also serves the public interest, but the private sector must be harnessed by the government. Thus while the BNF portrays itself clearly as anti-capitalist, it is not clear to most of its supporters whether they advocate a socialist programme.

The BNF argues that Botswana's economic growth has been impressive but its inequitable distribution is unfortunate. Their main economic proposal, therefore, is to adopt measures to ensure equity and social justice accompany growth. They have long proposed economic empowerment through employment provision, and the "right" kind of education.

Certainly, no one can deny their growing influence. The BNF's share of national polling rose from 12% to 36% between 1974 and 1994, while the ruling BDP saw its majority fall from 77% to 56% over the same period (Botswana's 6 other political parties have not drawn sufficient support to pose a challenge to the BDP). The BNF's support base is the urban working class, enjoying close ties to worker's unions, and it has a stronghold at the University of Botswana. Ten of the BNF's thirteen seats are in urban and peri-urban areas, where, it has been suggested, voters are more politically conscious and literate, concerned about the level of unemployment (particularly acute in urban areas), income inequalities, poverty, corruption, poor accountability of ruling party members including the leader, internal division in the BDP

and the impact of the economic recession. While some of their support may be because they are not the BDP, I would argue that the policies they advocate are an important magnet for support.

Rural people also have begun to challenge the paternalism and *bona fides* of the ruling party, for example in the North West where a cattle lung disease jeopardizes pastoral farming. The government has proposed that all cattle be killed to prevent the disease from spreading, a proposal which has been mired in political controversy, and hotly contested by pastoral cattle owners, who want solutions to be considered other than 500 Pula per head compensation for the slaughter. The issue also is at the centre of debates between the BDP and the BNF, with some groups in civil society even speculating that the government is using the lung disease to push farmers out of the region so it can expand the wildlife area in a bid to promote tourism, a growing component in Botswana's GDP with considerable future potential.

With its new, stronger oppositional voice in Parliament, the BNF was able to push for major political reforms. These culminated in the recent proposals by the BDP to allow 18-year-olds to vote in the next elections, to limit the presidential term in office to two terms, and to introduce an independent electoral committee. Previously, the BDP easily dismissed such demands, but now, with its political survival in jeopardy, it cannot.

Social movements have taken the lead in promoting human rights and equity issues. One contentious constitutional rights issue is the "majority-minority" clause, which guarantees permanent seats in the House of Chiefs (Botswana's upper house of Parliament) to eight powerful ethnic groupings. Other ethnic groupings, constituting perhaps a majority of the population, elect but four between them. Al-

though the role of the House of Chiefs is advisory, the provisions entrench stronger group rights for the permanent members. The numerous and economically powerful Bakalanga, organized into the Society for the Promotion of the Ikalanga Language, were instrumental in pushing for the removal of the constitutional clauses, now under consideration in Parliament.

The gender equality struggle is waged by "Emang Basadi" (literally "Stand Up Women"), a pressure group primarily of educated women. The group has been hampered by a seeming insularity and illegitimacy in Botswana society, as most either are unmarried or married to foreign men. As a result, they are often seen as a group of frustrated women, unable to secure a Motswana (Botswana citizen) man for a husband. To date, this group has had little impact on the lives of ordinary rural Botswana women, who are most hampered by gender inequality, but individuals associated with the group have made gains. Best known is the Unity Down case, where a woman won a court battle against the government when she was denied the right to pass her citizenship on to her children born with a foreign father. As a result of the court case, women's legal equality of citizenship was introduced. Dr. Attaliah Molokomme campaigns to make women aware of their rights to child maintenance, and the advantages and disadvantages of different marriage arrangements, since 'in community of property' marriage law makes women legal minors while 'out of community of property' does not.

With challenges on several fronts, the indications are that the people of Botswana may now be ready to test a different political party. If the opposition BNF can continue to campaign as a 'united front' of popular discontent to government policies, and avoid major political blunders, then a change of government is possible in 1999.

Chiefs, Companies and Cotton: Observations from Rural Nampula

BY M. ANNE PITCHER

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Since the signing of the peace accord between Frelimo and Renamo in 1992, one of the most controversial political changes in Mozambique has been the recognition of "traditional" authorities or village chiefs (also known as *regulos*). After independence, the Third Frelimo Congress accused chiefs of collaborating with the Portuguese during the colonial period and condemned their customary practices as "obscurantist" and "traditional." The Congress labelled chiefs divisive, reactionary elements of an archaic tribal-feudal structure and charged them with exploiting local communities for their own gain. The government then outlawed chiefs and replaced them with village Presidents and party secretaries.

But after a 17 year civil war, in which its enemies sought and sometimes secured the support of these "obscurantist" leaders and their followers, the Frelimo government changed its position. It agreed to accept "traditional" authorities for both pragmatic and political reasons. First, recognition of chiefs was a central plank in Renamo's traditionalist agenda so agreeing to this demand would help to end a costly, brutal, and lengthy war. Second, by 1992, evidence had begun to accumulate that in spite of Frelimo's abolition of chiefs, some were *de facto* representing communities. This was particularly true in the centre and north of the country, where colonialism had not severely disrupted customary lineage systems and the state had been forced to ne-

gotiate compromises with local leaders. Here, chiefs had remained more integrated in their communities and were more legitimate than in the south. In many of these areas, Frelimo's condemnation of chiefs together with the creation of communal villages had led to sympathy, if not active support, for Renamo by disaffected rural leaders and their followers. Thus, the agreement to recognize traditional authorities again was an attempt to re-capture a disaffected population while at the same time meeting a central demand by Renamo.

In 1994 and 1995, I had the opportunity to observe the process of recognition and re-emergence of chiefs in the three districts of Monapo, Meconta, and Mecuburi in Nampula province. Nampula is located in the north of Mozambique and is largely inhabited by the Makua, the largest ethnic group in the country. It is an agriculturally productive area; it not only has the potential to be self-sufficient in food, but also its cotton and cashews contribute greatly to the overall value of Mozambique's exports. The majority of Nampula's rural inhabitants also voted for Renamo during the 1994 elections. Thus, the political and economic changes of the Frelimo-led government must make a positive impact here if Frelimo wants to regain support in this part of the country.

Chiefs in Nampula – informal recognition versus formal institutionalization

Informal recognition and a renewed reliance on chiefs are obvious and widespread in Nampula. In all three districts I studied, chiefs reported that shortly after the 1992 accords, govern-

ment members contacted them to tell them "they should do the things they did before." Following this pronouncement, government officials such as village or district administrators, company agents, and non-governmental organizations contacted and consulted with chiefs in order to transmit information to local communities, or to encourage agricultural production, or to set up training schemes. Chiefs I interviewed in the three districts reported that they now mobilize the local population to repair streets or plant crops, consult with their own councils, allocate land, and settle conflicts within their communities. Most importantly, local peoples also recognize the chief as their legitimate representative. When respondents in the three districts were asked which person has the most authority in their community, 70% of the 90 people I interviewed answered that it was the chief (*regulo* in Portuguese or *muene* in Makua). A majority of those interviewed also answered that they would consult the chief if they had disputes over land or domestic difficulties (e.g. divorce).

Although their roles have expanded considerably and both communities and officials now rely on chiefs, many chiefs feel these measures fall short of their expectations. All of the chiefs that I interviewed in the three districts of Nampula expected the government to institutionalize formally their position in the administration, to give them uniforms, and to pay them as in the colonial period. Yet the government hesitates to articulate clearly what the functions of chiefs should be, to institutionalize their roles, or to formally cede power to "traditional" authorities.



Anne Pitcher

Cotton market in Corrane, Meconta district, where the cotton strike occurred in 1995

Three reasons may explain the government's reluctance. The first is that it fears that chiefs are strong supporters of Renamo and that the Frelimo-led government will lose further support if it defines their roles or shares power. These fears are not unfounded, of course. In Nam-pula, nine out of the twelve chiefs I interviewed claimed to have voted for Renamo in the 1994 elections and had encouraged their communities to vote for Renamo too. All of them attributed their revival by the government to Renamo's efforts and were grateful for Renamo's emphasis on "traditional" authority. Moreover, in those areas where Renamo was able to exercise some control during the war, the government has been experiencing difficulties re-establishing authority. In some places, there are dual administrations and sometimes dual chiefs. For example, in Momane, Mecuburi, old and young people actually split over the selection of the chief after the 1992 accords. Initially, older

members of the community selected the first chief who was loyal to Renamo. When the government disapproved of the choice, younger members of the community chose the second chief, who was from the same family as the first chief, but a Frelimo supporter. Now the community has two chiefs and inhabitants choose the one with whom they prefer to discuss land conflicts or disputes with other members.

Although chiefs appreciate Renamo's contribution to their restoration, many are quite ambivalent about Renamo. Most lamented and deplored the destruction of their communities as a result of the war. Thus, even one chief who had been targeted as a collaborator and ridiculed after independence because he had served in the colonial armed forces, took a neutral stand in the conflict between Renamo and Frelimo. Now he says that while he does not feel secure with Frelimo, he does not know what Renamo wants either. With regard to the Frelimo-led

government, surprisingly, chiefs were not openly hostile, but mostly confused and distrustful of government measures. Many said they were willing to work with the government if their expectations about their jobs could be met. Most wanted to help their communities. But it is not clear to them whether they are the last rung of the state administration or just unofficial community liaisons. Particularly in the districts of Meconta and Mecuburi where Renamo activity was great during the war, not surprisingly many chiefs are unsure as to whether they should follow orders from the Frelimo-led government or from Renamo. It seems the government needs to close the gap between its understanding of the role of chiefs and the expectations that chiefs themselves have of their position in the administration.

The second reason why the government is reluctant to institutionalize the position of chiefs is that the selection process for chiefs does not accord well with the government's

recent commitment to democracy. Succession is based on hereditary principles: one becomes a chief not through democratic choice or through merit, but by birth. Among the matrilineal Makua, who inhabit parts of Zambezia and Niassa and most of Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces, it is customary that when an old chief dies, a council of elders will meet and select his nephew – the son of his sister – to become the new chief. Although Frelimo condemned this practice, it continues in many parts of the north. Among the chiefs I interviewed, I found that most of them had succeeded to their positions in the customary way. They were the nephews of chiefs who had died and were chosen on the basis of that connection.

Although there is no formal election and members of the community do not vote, the customary practices

are actually more flexible and the selection process is more competitive than a formal description suggests – at least in Nampula. For example, if the chief who dies has many sisters, the council of elders may choose from quite a selection of nephews for the new chief. If there are nieces but no nephews, a woman may be chosen. Secondly, the council of elders sounds out public opinion and considers other criteria before making a selection. It might consider whether the candidate has “good standing” in the community, is a fair man, and has “heart.” For example, the current Mocapera, a chief who comes from a long line of powerful chiefs in Corrane, Meconta district, was actually the younger brother of the heir apparent when his uncle died in the 1960s. The older brother was supposed to become the chief but because he drank too much and the

local population objected to him, the council of elders in charge of the nomination chose the younger brother, now the present Mocapera. Third, communities can split over their choices and settle disputes by choosing two chiefs, as the case in Momane illustrates above. Fourth, chiefs cannot operate at will once selected. If they are young, they must confer with the council over many decisions. Their decisions and behaviour must benefit their subjects. For example, two “traditional” authorities I interviewed in Monapo district feared that they would be replaced if they were unable to help their communities..

The flexibility and discussion accompanying the choice of chiefs suggest that they could be accommodated by the democratic process, but their functions must be clearly defined and their power balanced



Anne Pitcher

Cotton producers at Corrane cotton market

by other channels of representation. To counter the hereditary basis of chiefly selection, the government (after local consultation) should establish alternative mechanisms through which citizens could express grievances and preferences. The 1990 Constitution makes a provision for democratically elected, local, legislative bodies and it will be interesting to see if the forthcoming local elections will enact it.

Even if the process of selection could be resolved, there is a third factor that explains why the government is reluctant to incorporate local chiefs into the formal administration. The reluctance stems from the same reasons that the government condemned chiefs just after independence. That is, it perceives them to be traditional and oppressive, reactionary and divisive. They symbolize, and many were associated with, a period that saw the worst abuses of Mozambicans. Understandably, Frelimo hesitates to share or formalize power in light of those features. But while forces on the political front stall, economic changes are defining the function of chiefs anyway.

Privatization also shaping roles of chiefs

The privatization of cotton production in Nampula is one of the greatest factors hastening their reinsertion into the local political economy, though in quite contradictory and ironic ways. To illustrate this claim I am going to focus on a strike I witnessed at a cotton market in Corrane, Meconta district, in July of 1995. The strike only lasted two days but the role of the local chief in the strike challenges some of the government's perceptions about traditional authorities. More importantly, who was involved and the way the strike's ending was negotiated offer us ominous as well as optimistic scenarios about what the future may hold for the state, companies, chiefs, and the peasantry.

Corrane lies in the "zone of influence" of SODAN, a joint ven-



Anne Pitcher

Cotton producers at Corrane cotton market

ture cotton company formed between João Ferreira dos Santos and the Mozambican government. Cotton is one of the major cash crops in the province of Nampula and contributes greatly to the total value of Mozambique's exports every year. For that reason, the Frelimo-led government, like the colonial government before it, has been concerned to increase production. After a series of losses in the 1980s by state farms in charge of cotton production, the government decided to privatize them, forming joint ventures with national and international companies. Under the terms of an agreement signed in 1990, the government granted SODAN monopsonistic privileges to purchase all peasant produced cotton in its "zone of influence." This zone covers several districts (including part of Monapo and Meconta districts) in eastern Nampula and one district in southern Cabo Delgado. It includes around

80,000 smallholders producing cotton on half to one hectare (on average), in addition to food crops for their own subsistence.

The strategy that the company has adopted to encourage and increase production assigns a prominent role to chiefs. SODAN officials contact them at the beginning of the cotton season to inform them about production plans. SODAN may negotiate with chiefs about increasing production or ask them to get their communities to engage in road repair. During the season, company employees work alongside or through "traditional" authorities to exhort people to weed their cotton or apply pesticides. At harvest time, the company will contact chiefs to tell them where the markets to buy the cotton will be held.

SODAN compensates chiefs for the integral role they play in the cotton cycle. For example, the fields

of the chiefs around Corrane had clearly received more pesticides than those of the common people. Their cotton plants were taller and fuller and the bolls were larger. Moreover, chiefs in the districts of Monapo and Meconta reported receiving money and bicycles from the company in recognition of their contribution to production.

But compensating chiefs does not necessarily buy their whole-hearted collaboration as SODAN officials learned. Last year, as the cotton markets began in early July, producers in both Netia, Monapo district and Corrane refused to sell cotton to the company, arguing that the price of \$1500 meticaïs per kilo (about 17 US cents) that the company offered was too low. On the day of the strike in Corrane, many people had gathered at the chief's abandoned and bullet-ridden former home to sell their cotton. Thousands of cotton sacks were carefully stacked around the yard, the sack of one producer distinguished from another by the presence of a piece of coloured ribbon, or a symbol on a sack, or a distinct method of closing the sack. Men and women, poor and not so poor, community leaders and ordinary people, spoke in animated voices about how the government-run, Cotton Institute had set the price of cotton in collusion with the cotton companies and without consulting producers. One producer said that he knew the export price of cotton and peasants were being exploited. The *cabo* (assistant to the chief) said it was unfair and they should be paid \$2000 meticaïs per kilo (about 22 US cents). Other people mentioned that they heard producers in Netia had demanded \$2000 meticaïs per kilo and that several Indian traders had actually offered this price to producers. Collectively, heatedly, and spontaneously the peasants decided that they would stand firm at \$2000 when the company arrived.

By mid-afternoon, company employees arrived with their scales,

weights, cashboxes, rubber stamps, receipts, cranes and trucks to find people sitting next to their cotton sacks grumbling about the price of cotton. The officials attempted to set up their operation but the *cabo* and a large producer surrounded by the people said they would not sell. As the negotiations became louder and louder, the officials repacked their things, promising to return the next day. As they left, the crowd clapped and cheered.

On the second day of the "greve dos camponeses," or the peasant strike as its participants called it, the company officials returned. But this time, they brought the assistant to the District Administrator of Meconta (in which Corrane is located) and two armed guards, one sporting an old Carbine and the other, an AK-47. Although the two guards were brought ostensibly to protect the cashbox from being robbed, they stood menacingly next to the assistant District Administrator as he harangued the producers to sell. The chief took the brunt of the abuse as he tried to represent the peasants' interests. Eventually, the crowd capitulated not through victory or compromise but through resignation. They knew they could not win against a joint-venture of company and state coercion.

One tale about one chief who acted on behalf of his community for two days against one cotton company does not mean that chiefs are local heroes. But it does mean to suggest that some chiefs presently have interests that coincide with those of their communities and that for some, legitimacy rests on tangible local support and not some mystical sense of tradition or worse, coercion. In reality, chiefs have played different roles at different times in different parts of the country. Decisions about what is "traditional" and "obscurantist" or, which local leaders are legitimate and which are not, demand thoughtful attention to local variations in customary practices. Aided by local input, the gov-

ernment needs to confront this complexity on a case by case basis, without making universal assumptions about the "oppressive" and "traditional" nature of chiefs.

Finally, the cotton strike asks us to consider seriously what the dynamics of power will be in the "new" Mozambique. One scenario is that the Frelimo-led government continues to recognize chiefs without formally incorporating them into the government while it openly supports private companies. It is then possible that we will continue to see some chiefs and their communities pitted against an anti-peasant state that has lined up with private companies to exploit them. This will be both sad and ironic considering that Frelimo once vowed to end the "exploitation of man by man." Another possibility is that the government will drop its earlier objections to chiefs. Along with economic interests, it will seek to co-opt their support and shape their roles to facilitate the needs of business, much as the colonial government did in the past. Indeed, a little extra income and a little more recognition by the government or companies might buy the unscrupulous collaboration of a group of leaders who are only slightly less impoverished than the people they lead. But let's consider a third scenario, even though in many settings it may prove too difficult to realize, given the current political and economic constraints existing in Mozambique. Then, if the Frelimo-led government is still interested in social justice, as it claims to be, it might try to facilitate those chiefly tasks that would enhance the wellbeing of communities, rather than siding with private companies against "traditional" authorities and their constituents. This approach would do much to correct the mistakes that Frelimo made towards chiefs and their supporters in the past and might secure for Frelimo a new base in the countryside for the future.

Promise/Practice: Reviewing Township Politics

BY DAVID POTTIE


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Township Politics: Civic Struggles for a New South Africa by Mzwanele Mayekiso (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1996), 288 pages.

Township Politics is structured as a memoir of a political activist, grounded in the growth of the civic movement in the 1980s and 1990s, with particular reference to Alexandra township outside Johannesburg. Mayekiso, a young leader of the "civics," involved especially with The Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO) and now serving as international representative of the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) has also contributed to ongoing debates on the role and nature of civil society in South Africa. As a result, this book not only provides a highly politicized and personalized account of those developments, it also carries us forward to the current challenges of the transition in South Africa. In his own preface Mayekiso writes that the book is an attempt to restore a class conscious perspective on civil society from an insider's perspective. In this respect it is a further extension of themes published widely in South African journals and magazines such as *Work In Progress*.

Mayekiso opens the book with an informal walk about Alexandra township, pointing out the local street gangs, informal traders, polluted river and the general proliferation of overcrowded shacks. Through both style and content, Mayekiso brings us inside the daily rhythm of township life – his familiarity with a rich and varied set of influences on this life a welcome addition to previous works on township struggles. As the book traces the nature of township resistance to changing housing conditions throughout the 1980s, that daily rhythm takes on a fully politicized significance as funerals become charged confrontations with state authorities – when a taxi ride becomes a life and death issue and when community organizing serves as the basis for alternatives to apartheid. This pattern of blending daily life with complex political questions is the basis of this book's appeal.

TOWNSHIP POLITICS Civic Struggles for a New South Africa



Seeds of change

But *Township Politics* is not simply a political biography. It is also a political testament of Mayekiso's commitment to building a working class civil society as a critical step in South Africa's transition to socialism.

His tale of constant neglect in Alex is chilling, particularly as the pattern of neglect shifts from development issues to outright war with Inkatha, hostel dwellers and third force

operations through 1991. Moreover, Mayekiso is convinced that there is a connection between the civics and socialism because his experience in Alexandra demonstrated to him that the more the civics made basic developmental demands the more they confronted the need to set up an alternative to township capitalism.

On this count Mayekiso does capture some of the flavour of forging worker-resident, workplace-community links in lieu of race-based opposition to forced removals, rent increases and the like. The civics in Alex appear to have been most successful when the resolutions on building people's power (advocating a wide range of consumer boycotts and rejection of the Black Local Authorities at an April 13, 1986 civic workshop) culminated in the collapse of the Alexandra Council.

Mayekiso claims that such events reflected the ascendance of the political hegemony of the working class in South Africa and a shift from a politics of protest to a politics of development. As further evidence of this he cites the marshalling of large rallies, the organization of street committees and the operation of people's courts. For Mayekiso and others, these activities demonstrate the enormous potential of Alexandra and the organizations that were contributing to the township becoming a liberated zone (he goes so far as to compare Alex to the Paris Commune of 1871). Yet Mayekiso acknowledges the vulnerability of township leadership to repression, and here his own prison experiences stand as a stark reminder of just how close to the edge civic leaders ran.

Mayekiso rejects the view that the civics instilled a culture of violence and non-payment for services in favour of the view that the civics and their objects of struggle were rooted in a clear sense of shifting strategies, organized in the end around a popular program of democratic resistance and development.

He writes that, "civics grounded in an ideology of working class civil society can help build a strong socialist movement through experimenting with new relations of production in the future, and by concretely challenging the modalities of capitalism in the present."

This is an especially tall order.

Promise exceeds practice?

Mayekiso's discussion of the history of township resistance, highlighting in particular the important shift from protest politics to the pol-

key expressions of this civil society is inclusive, but it is also marked with the usual mantra-like recitation of women's groups, youth groups, churches, burial societies and other organizations that represent working class people. What is lacking in this discussion is a more detailed account of the depth and scope of these alliances and concrete evidence of how such linkages were successful in advancing democratic, economic development in the townships.

True, these links were critical in mobilizing township residence and in



Back in the township for the first time after our acquittal, April 1989. From left to right: Mdakane, Tshabalala, me, Obed Bapela, and Moss. Photo courtesy of the Star, Johannesburg.

itics of community-controlled development, gives the reader a sense of the urban struggles to realize community control of the local economy. There is, however, a creeping feeling that the promise of Township Politics (democracy building, building new institutions based on the goal of achieving non-racial, non-sexist, economic democracy) exceeds the real impact of the practice it documents. For example, Mayekiso fails to convey exactly which institutional machinery and democratic processes governed the operation of yard committees. To be sure, his list of the

ensuring the representation of the community's needs and interests. This was not always an easy task - Mayekiso explores more than a few wrenching contradictions in township politics for us to know that such solidarity was not easily achieved. And here I fully agree with Mayekiso that "the organs of civil society must be considered in the context of the base from which they emerge." And yes, this evaluation requires a class analysis as an important vector of a full analysis. My main problem is not with class analysis but with the way

in which, despite his rich account of the township struggles for liberation, Mayekiso's generalizations tend to outstrip his evidence. *Township Politics* evokes working class society as exemplified by the struggles for community control of capital which took place, but hasn't actually shown us working class society in action.

Mayekiso's story is worth hearing, and since, by his own admission, the leadership layer of the civic movements was so thin and vulnerable to state repression, it is important to evaluate just how deeply embedded were the emergent civic traditions. Mayekiso's inside view would be very helpful here, especially in putting to rest those with scepticism or outright hostility.

In and out of prison through the 1980s, Mayekiso is particularly effective when he is writing about his prison experiences. Here the strength of this inside view is demonstrated in his discussion of community building and political education inside the prisons. For example, Mayekiso and the other prisoners developed cleaning routines, shared their meals equally and formed study groups, all in an effort to restore a sense of normal patterns of life inside the prison. For Mayekiso, these years stand as living proof of the concept that the self-organization of the working class was a crucial aspect of liberation politics. These examples, along with his discussion of civic consumer boycotts and actions against the apartheid local government begin to demonstrate how the politics of anti-apartheid protest began to move beyond resistance to become the basis of the politics of reconstruction through working class, community controlled development.

Still, somehow the immediacy of these accounts is lost when we look for the actual institutional and organizational linkages that one might expect to find. These shortcomings make it difficult to evaluate Mayekiso's broad argument

about the pervasiveness of working class civil society.

Solidarity forever and the civics

My misgivings are reinforced when Mayekiso turns to explore the tensions in the period since the unbanning of the ANC and other national liberation organizations in 1990, tensions that would indicate difficulty in transforming the civic movement into a "watchdog" role for a post-apartheid South Africa.

Mayekiso informs us that, in keeping with its grassroots orientation, the Alex Civic Organization (ACO) wanted direct community involvement in negotiations around municipal services, thereby retaining affordability as a prime issue. However, Mayekiso argues that even as the civics were responding to the pressure to shift from protest to development, the preoccupation with nationally based negotiations threatened to erode the leaderships' connection with communities. Formalized negotiations, Mayekiso seems to suggest, threatened to push to the background community based struggles so important throughout the 1980s and still key to the politics of reconstruction and development.

The position of the civics becomes even more complicated in the post-election period, but Mayekiso argues that the civics will still have an important role to play in post-apartheid South Africa. Their primary role will be to serve as watchdogs over state policy, political parties and local government. Their agenda must include challenging the government's "market-centred development" and continuing to counter this with a strategy of "community-driven development." Yet, there is little evidence to suggest that the civics have measured up to their role as efficient watchdogs in this period. Recent issues of *SAR* have also shown how housing advocates have struggled to keep even a modestly transformational interpretation of the RDP housing program on track (See *SAR*

vol. 10 no. 3, March 1995 and vol. 10 no. 5, July 1995). I don't doubt that the civics might have a role, but more evidence of their post-election record would help to cement Mayekiso's argument that a strong working class civil society can weather the shift to electoral participation and party politics.

If Mayekiso has failed to settle the question of civil society in South Africa he has nonetheless made an important contribution to keeping the issues on the table. In particular, as an exploration of Mayekiso's own experience with consciousness building and political activism, *Township Politics* is an important addition to our understanding of urban politics, development and the ongoing struggle for South Africa's national liberation to deliver a measure of redistribution of wealth and new social relations.

And as a polemical text, *Township Politics* is unflinching in its belief in the strength of grassroots political organization. At one level arguments about the nature of civil society will be as perpetual as those on the nature of socialism. The civics in South Africa are not inextricably bound to the transition to socialism. Those links have to be made and remade. At the book's closing, Mayekiso demonstrates his optimism in this project by briefly citing a round-up of civic organizations around the world. He sees them as promising signs for a global dialogue on development and ultimately, as laying the groundwork for a global working class civil society.

As an agenda for action for the civics, Mayekiso raises key strategic points. While he may not firmly demonstrate the role of civics in this process, *Township Politics* certainly sets an agenda for engaging in the reconstruction process in the post-elections period. Calls to organize against the corporate agenda that appears to now be steering much of what passes for RDP implementation can hardly be sneered at.



One struggle, many fronts

Days of Protest
Toronto, October 25, 1996



PHOTOGRAPHS BY DAVID HARTMAN

The Contest

Guess how many people are in this protest. The Toronto police say 70,000, the organizers say 300,000, what do you say? (If it matters, the highest number wins)