


Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 15 No. 1

December 1999

The Angola File



War & the Diamond Trade

**Elections: Mozambique,
Namibia, Zambia**

Cranford Pratt on Mwalimu


COSATU's Alliance Woes

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Ballots and Bullets

Ballots and bullets: a bit of a cliché this title, but the present issue of *SAR* has plenty of news about both as they are to be found in southern Africa. We include, for example, a whole file of contributions on Angola, a country where blood continues to flow mercilessly, grimly, unendingly. And there is also a brace of articles on the run-up to elections in a number of other

countries of the region: Namibia, Zambia and Mozambique.

Angola, first. Ian Spears provides a helpful overview of Angola's continuing travail, a picture not unfamiliar to *SAR* readers who have followed the bleak accounts of Brittain, Darch, Sogge and others in these pages over recent years. But his survey provides a helpful con-

text for the other articles that it frames. Central, certainly, amongst these contributions is an account, written for us by Patrick Alley and Alex Yearsley of *Global Witness*, that reveals the importance of the shadowy world of the international diamond trade to fuelling UNITA's arsenal and Savimbi's overweening ambition, and to keeping the war in Angola alive.

We reproduce here, as well, a strong statement by Angolans from within "civil society" there who have organized under the banner of the Angolan Group of Reflection for Peace (GARP) to press – with equal and even-handed vigour – both parties to the war (UNITA and the MPLA in power) to evidence humane purpose and to give peace a chance. (As we go to press we learn that one of the main actors in this peace movement, the Angolan journalist and a leading figure in GARP, Rafael Marques, has been arrested by the government for his pains: an index, self-evidently, of the difficulties of bringing common-sense to bear in the militarized cockpit that his country has become.) And we also bring testimony of a more modest, but no less positive, effort to keep hope alive in Angola, in an account of the grass-roots development work undertaken in Luanda by Canadian Allan Cain and his colleagues in the Development Workshop. Getting news from Angola is no easy matter: we are pleased to be able to offer these diverse reports on the situation in that embattled country.

From bullets to ballots. What, meanwhile, of elections in southern Africa? These are not much help if politicians choose to ignore their outcome, of course – as Savimbi did earlier in this decade, thus further accelerating, on Spears' account, the downward spiral in Angola. But electoral processes can be perverted in other ways as well, as our articles on Zambia and Namibia demonstrate. Interestingly, in both countries a key issue is the attempt by graceless incumbent presidents – Frederick Chiluba and Sam Nujoma – to bend the rules in order to allow themselves the chance, in forthcoming elections, to win the third terms in office that might otherwise be thought illegal in terms of their respective constitutions.

Both our authors here – Jotham Momba and Paul Kalenga – critique the high-handed manner of these

leaders and their political parties-in-power in this and other particulars. Fortunately, for Namibia, Kalenga is also able to identify the emergence of a potential instrument of on-going resistance to such trends, the freshly-minted opposition party, the Congress of Democrats. The CoD, it seems, is but the latest manifestation of an encouraging mobilization of democratic demands in Namibian politics that we first began to document in these pages a year ago (see Lauren Dobell, "The Ulenga Moment: Swapo and Dissent," *SAR*, Vol. 14, No. 1 [December, 1998]). Whatever its prospects in the present election, so soon upon us, Kalenga suggests the CoD to have an important role for the future.

In Mozambique, as Carrie Manning reports, politicians seem more inclined to follow the rules, a relatively polite "normalcy" of political interactions having descended upon the country. Better than on-going civil war, certainly: just ask the Angolans. But, as Manning notes almost in passing, in socio-economic terms little enough of Mozambique's recent investment surge has "trickled down to the average citizen and travel outside the capital is a sobering contrast to the boom town feel of Maputo." Nor do the two chief contending parties, Frelimo and Renamo-UE, seem particularly preoccupied with such realities. Genuine empowerment, anyone?

Speaking of empowerment, what of the fall-out from South Africa's own election earlier this year, an event we chronicled, both fore and aft, in our previous two issues. Recall, in particular, Carolyn Bassett's article ("Electoral illusion: COSATU and the ANC," *SAR*, Vol. 14, No. 3 [May, 1999]) which noted with bemusement COSATU's virtually unqualified support for the ANC in that election – somewhat surprising since the ANC under Mbeki seemed to offer relatively little to labour and, indeed, to

threaten much. Here, in our lead article, Bassett returns (writing with her *SAR* colleague, Marlea Clarke) to outline the substance, in the ANC's post-election practice, of just such a deepening threat to labour's interests.

Bassett and Clarke's forceful presentation brings to mind an exchange in these pages several years ago, one in which Eddie Webster and Leo Panitch debated the likely implications of COSATU's embrace of a close, post-apartheid alliance with the ANC (*SAR*, Vol. 11, No. 3 [April, 1996]). Webster ("COSATU: Old Alliances, New Strategies") saw in COSATU's approach the seeds of an on-going process of progressive transformation in South Africa, while Panitch ("COSATU and Corporatism: A Response to Eddie Webster"), ever vigilant regarding the dangers of corporatist entanglements on the part of labour, soberly anticipated the worst. Is it too early to say which one was right? The debate continues.

* * *

We join our readers in mourning the passing of Julius Nyerere. His stance on the imperative of southern African liberation, while not without limitations of its own, was well in advance of virtually all his colleagues in the front ranks of African politics during the decades of the war for the overthrow of intransigent white minority rule. This commitment was combined, more generally, with bracing insights as to the costs of a great many other negative dimensions of the African predicament – from self-interested African elites to predatory global capitalist economic practices – and an attractive willingness to experiment with various profane alternatives. We asked Cranford Pratt, who both worked with Nyerere in Tanzania and has written widely on that country, to provide the insightful appreciation of Nyerere that we present in this issue.

SAR

Alliance Woes



Eric Miller – Impact Visuals

SACTWU strike, Cape Town, 8 September 1999, protesting job losses

COSATU Pays the Price

BY MARLEA CLARKE AND CAROLYN BASSETT

Marlea Clarke is completing a doctoral dissertation on the trend toward casualization in the South African service sector. Carolyn Bassett is completing a doctoral dissertation on COSATU and the economic transition.

In our South Africa elections issue, Carolyn Bassett suggested that there was a fundamental divergence in the economic restructuring agendas of the Congress of South African

Trade Unions (COSATU) and the African National Congress (ANC) that was heightening tensions between the two. These tensions, she suggested, remained unresolved despite COSATU's unconditional support for the ANC in the July 1999 elections [*Southern Africa Report*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (May 1999)]. Here, Bassett and Marlea Clarke offer an update on COSATU-ANC relations in the months since.

Two events since the June South African elections have further shown

the incompatibility of the objectives of COSATU and the government. The first was something of a "flash-point": a speech delivered at the August 1999 Special COSATU Congress by Terror Lekota on behalf of President Thabo Mbeki. "The recent trend," Lekota said without a trace of irony, "on the part of some highly-placed comrades, of ascending platforms or by other ways criticising or agitating against policies and actions of the movement, inside and outside Gov-



SACTWU strike, Cape Town, 8 September 1999, protesting job losses

ernment, smacks of a lack of revolutionary discipline." Lekota suggested that criticisms of government policies were confusing the liberation movement's mass base, leaving the Alliance open to exploitation by opponents and opposition parties and creating a climate "in which agents provocateur can thrive and advance their counter-revolutionary

agendas" [!]

Lekota claimed that "[t]he present debates in our ranks, whether on GEAR [Growth Employment and Redistribution, the government's economic restructuring plan], privatisation or wages, are all tactical in nature. They are resolvable by ongoing debates amongst ourselves." He allowed that com-

rades were not wrong to draw attention to the weaknesses of GEAR and privatisation, but said that such discussions must take place "primarily within the structures and discipline of our organisations." While there was consensus among observers that some of his comments were directed at specific individuals (such as Winnie Madikizela-Mandela), the overall message to COSATU was clear. Criticisms of government policy should be voiced within alliance structures and meetings.

It has become common for Mbeki and other ANC leaders to publicly chastise COSATU member unions and the South African Communist Party (SACP) at their Congresses for daring to express positions publicly that differed from those of the government. What surprised many was that Lekota's speech came so soon after the election. COSATU had, after all, thrown its unconditional support and resources behind the ANC and maintained a strict silence on areas of disagreement.

Lekota's suggestion that a common alliance programme could and should be developed nonetheless seems in question. As Bassett explained in the previous article, attempts on the part of COSATU and the SACP in 1996 and 1997 to work within Alliance structures to reorient ANC policy had proven futile. And in the months since the election, the government has renewed its commitment to the neo-liberal restructuring program. Despite ongoing criticisms regarding the fast pace of tariff reduction, including a one day National Strike on September 8 by the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU), the Minister of Trade and Industry has stated the trade liberalisation will continue. In response to the "Jobs Campaign" recently launched by SACTWU, all the Minister could promise was to "look into the issue." The Minister of Finance, moreover, has reaffirmed that there would be no change in fiscal and monetary policy.

Eric Miller - Impact Visuals

Pessimism of the will

On the floor of the Congress meeting, delegates reacted angrily to Lekota's speech. Both the National Union of Mining Workers and Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) reminded Lekota that the government had ignored the Alliance when they developed GEAR and then implemented it as "non-negotiable." TGWU pointed to weaknesses in the movement and questioned how strengthening the Alliance would resolve these weaknesses. Incoming COSATU President Willie Madisha reiterated that "when workers raise concerns – in this forum – about the direction we are moving in, or, about particular policies which affect them negatively, that is their right. Comrades, if workers cannot raise these things here – in this parliament of the working class – then there is something wrong."

The response to Lekota's speech issued by COSATU specifically objected to the ANC's growing tendency to rebuke other Alliance partners at their Congresses and in front of the media, and for giving the impression that COSATU was ill-disciplined or acting inappropriately whenever it raised concerns about government policy. The resolution also took the ANC to task for failing to facilitate Alliance meetings and processes sufficiently.

But once again, COSATU's statement simultaneously asserted the organization's independence, its continuing commitment to the Alliance, the importance of sharing common visions and objectives, and the need to put these into practice through a common program. COSATU apparently still hopes to be able to use Alliance structures to steer the ANC in a different direction.

The federation seems convinced that the ANC can be persuaded to change its policies, almost as if the neo-liberal tint to the government program was simply a matter of "tactics" within a broader

framework of shared goals. "Exaggeration of debates and differences," COSATU's Madisha argued, "in an attempt to portray them as fundamental schisms are partly a result of attempts by reactionary forces to undermine the vision and policy of the movement, in favour of the interests of the powerful in our society."

But only at a level of extreme abstraction or wishful thinking can one really claim that worker interests and the ANC's current economic restructuring program are in tandem, as COSATU leaders including Madisha are well aware. Furthermore, based on recent experience, it is not at all clear how pressuring the ANC from within the Alliance can be expected to produce COSATU's desired results. In fact, it is difficult for the angry accusations by government leaders to mask the fact that it is they, and not COSATU, who have continually acted in bad faith.

Downsizing the public sector

Part of the backdrop of Lekota's intemperate speech was the public sector negotiations that predated the elections but became particularly strained in the months that followed. The dispute began in January 1999, when the Department of Finance presented its budget framework that incorporated public sector wage cuts for 1999 and 2000 even before collective bargaining negotiations with public sector workers had begun.

A coalition of public sector unions, including COSATU member unions National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU), Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) and South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) opened formal negotiations in late January by demanding a 10 to 15 percent wage increase. The government's demand for public sector wage restraint followed several years of wage increases below the rate of inflation. The unions wanted an increase in the wages of the lowest-paid members, at least, to allow them meet their basic needs,

and the wages of the rest of the membership to keep pace with inflation. But Parliament went ahead and approved the Department of Finance budget figures, circumventing the negotiations.

In late May the negotiations went to conciliation. The employer was sent away to get a new mandate. They returned under the leadership of a new Public Service Minister, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, and with a new chief negotiator. The government negotiators then agreed to table a new offer but only if the unions gave up the existing promotion and service-linked wage increases ("rank and leg promotion") for an undefined "new pay system."

Unable to get the government to move at the bargaining table, COSATU initiated a "rolling mass action" program on July 6, which included lunchtime meetings and demonstrations on July 12 to 14, a one-day work stoppage with marches on July 23, and a full-blown strike from July 29, 1999. On July 21 the government urgently convened a meeting of the public sector bargaining council, where they raised their wage offer to 6 percent but officially added new issues to the bargaining table including an end to the "rank and leg promotion" and the development of a new wage policy by December 1999. Meanwhile, the government's media campaign was gaining momentum and public opinion – initially strongly supportive of some public sector workers – was petering out.

The government then unilaterally implemented a salary increase of 6.3 percent. So on August 24 the COSATU public sector unions went ahead with their strike action. One NEHAWU unionist in the Western Cape observed that the Minister had succeeded in a few months what the union movement had failed to achieve in the past: to unite all public servants. Unions demanded a 7.3 percent wage increase across the board (almost a full percent below

the inflation rate), with 8.3 percent for teachers. Yet when government negotiators sat down with public sector union representatives at the beginning of September, they simply reiterated that there would be no further wage negotiations. The only thing that they were willing to discuss was a new wage policy. Unsurprisingly, the talks collapsed.

A meeting was scheduled one week later, but adjourned when Fraser-Moleketi announced that the government would not participate in further talks on the wage dispute. By mid-September, representatives from twelve public service unions (representing some 800,000 workers) sought endorsement for further strike action from their members, aimed at shutting down the public service in October.

But the call for mass action appears to be losing support, even though the unions still reject the government's unilateral implementation of the wage increase. The teachers would be the ones to carry the strike, yet their history suggests that striking is unlikely, and in any case that they would be unwilling to stay out long. The "no work, no pay" clause in the Labour Relations Act means that if teachers were out for more than three days, they would have lost the increase they would have received over a year (if the strike was successful). In addition, students have just begun writing exams, so public support for further strike action would be low.

Bigger challenges ahead

The dispute has been seen as "all about wages." Since the government had already determined what public sector wage increases would be even before the negotiations began, however, there was little, if any, room for additional increases. Moreover, the government quite successfully framed the demands of workers as "selfish," undermining the government's ability to address the broader needs of the population. In fact, President Thabo Mbeki claimed that acceding to the pub-

lic sector wage demands would derail the government's reconstruction priorities – in effect accusing workers of frustrating the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The Public Services Minister's message was simple: there is no more money.

Yet salaries were not the only area of dissatisfaction. Restructuring the public sector also remains a critical issue. The unions were surprisingly silent on this, given that the public sector employs about 170,000 fewer workers than it did four years ago and additional retrenchments are clearly part of the government's agenda. Unions had placed transformation high on the agenda during last year's negotiations, but failed to do so this year. As a result, the dispute focused narrowly on wages, ignoring the need to upgrade the skills of lower grade workers, to provide training and skills development, and to have a say in the restructuring of the work environment.

The federation's vision of public sector restructuring is for "[i]ncreased social delivery to the mass of working class and rural communities, the transformation of public sector employment to overcome previous racial and gender inequality and the development of a work ethic which promotes greater service and efficiency." This does "not mean wholesale downsizing, outsourcing and privatisation."

Without any real discussion of restructuring, however, the government is now well positioned to move forward with retrenchments (termed "right-sizing"). The government wants to cut at least 55,000 jobs over the next two years. Even though studies have found that there are fewer surplus public servants than previously suggested, the government has simply ordered a new round of studies to find the over 55,000 that they seek. Thus union leadership did a disservice to the membership by failing to place on the agenda the issue of public service transformation and its relationship with conditions of employment.

End of the alliance?

One commentary on the public sector dispute suggested that the government's refusal to return to the bargaining table "demonstrated that the days of formal unity of purpose between government and labour movement are well and truly over" [*SouthScan* Sept. 17 1999]. This interpretation is supported by the ANC's unilateral decision to cancel an Alliance meeting in the middle of the public sector dispute. Certainly the government negotiators treated COSATU as an enemy rather than an ally – the COSATU unions were well and truly defeated, with no honourable escape route on offer.

Moreover, this is not simply another instance of unilateral government policy, but a direct challenge to the very foundations of South Africa's collective bargaining structure. Madisha commented that "[t]he unilateral actions of the state set a dangerous precedent for other employers to follow. The effects of this will be felt by every affiliate in this room, and by the millions of workers throughout this country."

COSATU's unwillingness, therefore, to take a strong stand against the government is particularly troubling. At every turn, COSATU has tried to give the government the benefit of the doubt, to no avail. Time and again it seems even counterproductive. At the time of writing, COSATU reported that there had been a major reversal on another major worker rights issue. The Labour Minister announced on November 3, 1999, that all businesses with fewer than ten employees had been exempted from several legislative provisions protecting the rights of their employees. "A war has been declared," COSATU General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi responded, "and we shall respond accordingly." With the public sector restructuring negotiations also looming, we shall soon see if COSATU is up to the challenge.

S A R

Angola: A Backgrounder

BY IAN S. SPEARS

Ian Spears teaches political science (international relations, politics and development) at the University of Toronto.

In December 1998, Angola's fragile peace once again gave way to all out war between UNITA and the governing MPLA. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994, became just another temporary respite from Angola's long history of violent conflict. Since independence in 1975, peace has been almost unknown to most Angolans. Only twice since then has an uneasy peace interrupted the violence: for a brief period in 1991-2 and from November 1994 to December 1998. Why has peace been so elusive in Angola?

During the cold war, both the United States and the Soviet Union saw geopolitical value in Angola. Both provided advisers and billions of dollars in military aid to their respective local clients, UNITA and the MPLA. Despite the end of the cold war, however, there remain many other reasons for paying attention to Angola.

Of humanitarianism ... and minerals

The first is Angola's increasing – and largely avoidable – humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. The number of displaced Angolans had risen to 800,000 by May of this year and to an estimated 1 million by June – almost one-tenth of Angola's total population. Maria Flynn, a United Nations official, told Reuters news agency that "we have a combination of no food, inadequate transportation and a growing number of beneficiaries. If

that is not a recipe for disaster, I don't know what is."

Another notable feature of Angola is its wealth which can be found in, among other things, its enormous supply of oil and diamonds. Current production of about 750,000 barrels of oil per day is expected to double in the next decade. As Africa's second largest producer of oil, Angola provides the United States with 7 per cent of its oil imports. Angola's diamonds are among the highest quality and most sought-after gemstones in the world. On a trip to Angola in 1997 one diamond dealer reckoned that its mineral resources were worth "ten times" those of South Africa's rapidly depleting wealth. "You have no idea of the potential wealth here," he kept repeating. "It's unbelievable." Indeed, according to Lee Barker, the vice-president of Southern Era Resources Ltd. in Toronto, Angola's diamonds are plentiful and second in quality only to Namibia's off-shore diamonds.

But a country that has the potential to be an African success story is instead one of Africa's most notorious humanitarian disasters. The most recent violence is the latest of three phases of conflict in post-independence Angola. The first took place from independence in 1975 until the signing of the Bicesse Accords in 1991. When the cold war ended and an increasingly reform-minded South Africa extricated itself from its regional commitments, there was an expectation that the struggle between UNITA and the MPLA might resolve itself. Indeed, with superpower assistance, an agreement eventually signed by the government and UNITA in Bicesse, Portugal, led to elections in September 1992.

When UNITA lost the elections – which were judged free and

fair by the United Nations – it resumed fighting. UNITA had not demobilized as required under the Bicesse Accords and sought to use military pressure to win political concessions from the government. The government did not regain the upper hand in the ensuing war until it invested over a billion dollars in new weaponry and hired Executive Outcomes, the notorious firm of former South African soldiers, to resurrect its armed forces.

Lusaka, and after

The Lusaka Protocol marked the end of this second phase of violent conflict. Under the stewardship of the United Nations special representative to the secretary general, Alioune Blondin Beye, the protocol sought to avoid many of the pitfalls of the Bicesse Accords. The agreement called on UNITA to accept the results of the 1992 elections, to disarm and demobilize its forces, and to hand over territory it controlled to the government. In return, the government would open a new "political space" in which it would share political power and economic wealth with the UNITA rebels in a government of unity and national reconciliation (GURN). The fact that genuine debate could be heard within parliament gave hope of democracy taking root in Angola.

But the situation increasingly had an uncomfortable feeling of *nem guerra, nem paz*: neither war nor peace. Careful to ensure that it would not be caught so unprepared again, the government undertook its own regional initiatives to contain its adversary. Internationally, it ensured that Angola's neighbours were surrounded by regimes friendly to or installed by Luanda. On the domestic front, the government looked to disenchant members of UNITA who were willing to

break with Savimbi and create an alternative political movement. This allowed the government to maintain the image of power-sharing while effectively sidelining the uncooperative and mercurial Jonas Savimbi.

Savimbi, as it turns out, never bought into the new agreement either. A government offensive following the initialing of the Lusaka Accord only gave Savimbi's view another excuse to say that the government could not be trusted. In the subsequent demobilization process, much of the equipment handed in by UNITA was no longer serviceable, and many of the soldiers entering the demobilization camps were reportedly too young or too old to be fighters. Many believed that Savimbi retained a residual force of fighters and military hardware as insurance against further government offensives or to launch one of his own.

UNITA was particularly intransigent, however, when it came to handing over the diamond-rich territories under its control. It was UNITA's refusal to return the towns of Bailundo and Andulo – as they had agreed to do with all territories under the Lusaka Protocol – that finally undermined any semblance of co-operation between UNITA and the government. The final blow to the peace process was the unexplained death of Alioune Blondin Beye in June 1998 in a plane crash.

War ... and power-sharing

The government offensive came on December 4, 1998. But since it was no secret that a strike had been planned, UNITA was prepared. It not only blocked the government offensive but began to push government troops back using heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles. "The government made a wrong decision in attacking us," noted UNITA's secretary general, Paulo Gato, "and we are merely paying them back in their own cur-

rency." The government's chief of staff, alarmed at the unexpected battlefield reversals, publicly admitted that his troops were in trouble and conceded that the "scale had tipped in favour of Jonas Malheiro Sidonio Savimbi's forces." War had returned to Angola.

Under siege, the government accused the United Nations Observer Mission of failing to monitor UNITA's disarmament and demobilization effectively. For the United Nations, which had committed US\$1.5 billion and 7,000 peacekeepers to the Angolan peace process, the breakdown of the Lusaka Protocol was an embarrassment. For its part, UNITA argued that it was the partisan perspective of the international community over the imposition of sanctions and its consent to an offensive against UNITA that encouraged the government to initiate the latest violence. While the international community may have to accept some blame, there are other domestic explanations for this most recent breakdown of the peace process.

First, the Angolan case makes clear just how inherently difficult it is to share power. In fact, despite its appeal, there are relatively few examples in Africa or elsewhere where formalized power-sharing agreements have been implemented or even negotiated between two military adversaries. Interestingly, UNITA officials insist that Jonas Savimbi had reconciled himself to the prospect of some sort of power-sharing arrangement. Jardo Muekalia, UNITA's representative to Washington, stated in an interview that Savimbi had informed the UNITA leadership of his willingness to accept a role in a new power-sharing structure "as long as it was not simply to cut ribbons." Muekalia claims, however, that "from the government's point of view, the idea was simply, look, you come here, we give you the vice-presidency, we give you five Mer-

cedes ... and just forget about everything else. From that perspective, it [was] difficult for somebody like [Savimbi] to take it. It is very hard to simply come out and to say now you are the vice-president but all you do is you wake up in the morning, you read the papers and then you look at your Mercedes."

In short, in the most recent Angolan context, power-sharing failed because the government was reluctant to offer up a meaningful stake in Angola's political process while Savimbi was unwilling to consider anything less (and in any case, the government feared, might very well still want a great deal more!)

Diamonds and such

A second problem is, of course, that Angola's considerable oil and diamond wealth only increases the stakes associated with political power and the need to control it. On a continent where the achievement of political office provides access to the country's economic resources, individuals and parties cannot afford to be left out of the political process. "The diamond issue is the key for UNITA because it determines the survival of the party," noted Jardo Muekalia in a recent interview. "You cannot survive as a political party if you do not have funds. Most of the political opposition parties in Africa die of financial asphyxiation before they die of political asphyxiation."

From the government perspective, however, diamonds were not simply used to ensure UNITA's political survival but to rebuild its military might so that it might eventually undermine the peace process. Now UNITA has had to find innovative ways to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United Nations. De Beers is on record as saying that it is no longer buying UNITA diamonds. Given the nature of the industry, however, and the resourcefulness of the sellers, revenue from diamonds can still be acquired. The origin of diamonds can be difficult to trace;

diamonds change hands through so many middlemen that they are eventually "washed" of their location of origin. According to one diamond executive, "the diamond you see on someone's hand in Toronto could have gone through ten steps before getting there." Moreover, there is speculation that, in the end, De Beers cannot afford not to purchase diamonds from Angola. In October 1997, Gary Ralfe, the executive director of De Beers, noted that one of his company's "essential jobs" was to "ensure that diamonds coming onto the markets do not threaten the overall price structure." While he claimed not to know of any direct relationship with UNITA, he acknowledged that "there is no doubt that we buy many of those diamonds that emanate from the UNITA-held areas in Angola, second-hand on the markets of Antwerp and Tel Aviv." [For more on this issue see the accompanying article: "Diamonds are a war's best friend," below.]

Diamond wealth also means that government officials can be bought off or persuaded to look the other way. Numerous reports have circulated which suggest that even Angola's generals have been corrupted and collude with UNITA if there are sufficient diamonds and money on the table. In other words, it is difficult to stop the transfer of weaponry or the supply of fuel oil – the latter has long been seen as a point of vulnerability for UNITA – to belligerents because in a country of such poverty and insecurity virtually everyone has a price and can have their loyalty purchased. In a war economy, then, Angola's fabulous wealth does little to slow the pace of war; indeed, it does much to sustain it.

It is doubtful that a new political agreement will occur any time soon. UNITA claims it is open to new negotiations with the government. But, having attempted a negotiated settlement with UNITA twice already, the government is

adamantly opposed to a third. What, then, is the way forward for Angola?

There are members of UNITA who are amenable to the existing peace agreement; the problem is that negotiating with those who do not have the guns does not stop the fighting. Accordingly, the government and the international community face a conundrum. Savimbi's actions have led to a situation in which he has disqualified himself from a political route to the presidency and has no other way to political power except through military means. Yet his ability to deliver peace is contingent on his inclusion in the political process. One diplomat noted in an interview that the position of much of the international community is that "only Savimbi can deliver the peace, whether or not he is the bad guy." He added: "You have to negotiate with him even if you can defeat him – and you will never defeat him militarily." Savimbi may, indeed, be the key to peace. Yet, given his record, many Angolans are reluctant to have him lead a post-conflict Angola.

Sanctions

On the other hand, there are continuing calls for a more robust enforcement of sanctions against UNITA. One diamond mining executive claims that UNITA's weakness lies in its logistics and fuel supplies. "If there was the will to shut [UNITA] down over a six month period, it could be done," he stated in a recent interview. Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and diplomats are considering innovative means of limiting UNITA's military power which rely on sophisticated methods of surveillance of potential UNITA supply lines, including radar and satellite technology and ground-based observation posts in border areas and airports in neighbouring countries. There are also proposals for greater reliance on other institutional watchdogs to monitor financial sanctions against

UNITA and to encourage greater corporate responsibility among companies who may be doing business with UNITA officials.

The irony of sanctions at this point is that they are being imposed against a rebel movement, UNITA, that has at least stated a willingness to negotiate with a government which is no longer willing to negotiate. Moreover, in the short-term, improved sanctions enforcement is akin to closing the barn door after the horse has escaped and to assisting the government to wage its war. There is hope, nonetheless, that over the longer term sanctions may have a positive effect. The Canadian chair of the United Nations Angolan sanctions committee, Robert Fowler, responds to ridicule (some of which comes from UNITA itself) that sanctions are easily circumvented by saying: "I am not dreaming in technicolour. I do not believe that the sanctions are going to end the war in Angola. But they may degrade UNITA's ability to fight." Indeed, the objective has always been to close off the military option and leave open the political option, the democratic option.

Since most observers agree that a negotiation process will be involved sooner or later, what is now required is new thinking on the kind of political settlement that might finally end the cycle of war in Angola. Successful resolution will come only if the leaders and the international community are prepared to consider some new conception of the African state. Some might wish to argue, for example, that radical decentralization, regional autonomy, or even geographical division of the country are plausible and/or desirable options. In any event, if a realistic and acceptable solution is not found soon, Angolans and the international community will have to live with what may truly be an interminable war.

S A R

Diamonds Are a War's Best Friend

BY PATRICK ALLEY WITH
ALEX YEARSLEY

Patrick Alley and Alex Yearsley work for Global Witness, an NGO focussing on the link between environment and human rights. Their web page is at www.oneworld.org/globalwitness.

Since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in Angola has developed into a bloody political and ethnic war funded by diamonds and oil, resulting in over half a million deaths. The fourth richest country in the world in terms of mineral resources, Angola is also the fourth poorest in terms of standard of living. Angola's natural resources, which should bring it relative prosperity, have been at the centre of the country's devastation. This article examines the role of diamonds in the Angolan conflict in the 1990s. It focuses on UNITA's involvement in the diamond trade and the activities of transnational diamond companies, particularly in light of UN sanctions.

Diamonds

Between 1992-1998, UNITA generated up to \$3.7 billion from diamonds mined in areas under their control. These diamonds were an integral part of the peace process which began with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. In return for the handover of territory, UNITA demanded guaranteed revenue from diamonds. Probably with justification, UNITA perceived that losing control of diamond bearing territory would leave them vulnerable to an MPLA double cross. Indeed, in 1997 when UNITA was negotiating the handover of territory to the government, Maurice Templesman, boss of diamond trader Lazare Kaplan, and a close confidante of several US Presidents and National Security Advisors, tried to broker a deal between UNITA and the government which would, in effect, have seen UNITA converted into a diamond mining and market-

ing company. Jonas Savimbi's distrust of the government was probably one of many factors that prevented the Templesman deal going through. However, UNITA was offered control of some mines and entered into joint ventures with De Beers amongst others. UNITA undoubtedly used this period to rearm in preparation for renewed conflict.

When one examines the wealth of Angola's diamond resources it is not hard to understand their pivotal role in the conflict. Only 5%-10% of the world's diamonds are gem quality whilst 70% to 80% of Angola's



production fall into this category. On the nine colour scale used to grade diamond values Angola's diamonds usually fall within the top three. The diamonds are found both in easily exploitable alluvial deposits and in volcanic kimberlite pipes, which require highly mechanised extraction techniques and substantial investment. The Angolan government attempts to administer the industry through its parastatal, Endiama, which is responsible for awarding diamond concessions (and is actively involved in diamond mining). It also issues licenses to buyers permitting them to buy "unofficial" production in the capital, Luanda, and in the provinces. Unofficial pro-

duction is that which is outside of government control. It comprises UNITA's total production as well as that which is in the hands of a variety of freelance operators, including several key generals in the Angolan Army (FAA). Four key companies operate in Angola with licences from Endiama: Codiam (a joint venture between De Beers and Steinmetz), Oderbrecht from Brazil and the Russian Alrosa.

At the time the Lusaka Protocol was signed, UNITA controlled over 70% of Angolan territory including virtually all the diamond producing areas, and 60-70% of diamond production. Between 1992-1994, they controlled 90% of Angolan diamond exports. Thus, Angola's unofficial diamond production comprised the vast bulk of the trade. It is the purchase of this unofficial production by the diamond centres in Belgium, Israel and London on the "outside market" that provides the core funding of UNITA's war effort.

UNITA's diamonds are mined from alluvial deposits which do not require such a high degree of mechanisation as mining kimberlite pipes, relying more on the labour of vast quantities of illegal peasant miners, the *garimpeiros*. In early 1994 25,000-30,000 Zairian *garimpeiros* worked under harsh UNITA control in Cafunfo alone. It is thought that over 100,000 such miners were operating throughout Angola.

UNITA's export routes

Prior to 1997, the majority of UNITA's diamond exports were routed through Zaïre whose then ruler, President Mobutu, was one of UNITA's prime supporters and sometime arms supplier. The fall of Mobutu saw that country, renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), ally itself with the MPLA's Dos Santos - a major setback for UNITA as it lost both its prime supply and export routes.

UNITA was now forced to explore new channels and forge new alliances. It is thought that Rwanda and Uganda, both opposed to President Kabila of the DRC, have become export routes for UNITA gems, and a small quantity certainly pass through Zambia, picking up false Zambian certificates of origin on the way. Given that UNITA possesses significant quantities of recently acquired high power hi-tech weaponry, only discovered when they decisively rebuffed government attacks in late 1998/early 1999, it is apparent that they are still finding a market for substantial quantities of diamonds. However, published export figures from the above countries indicate that the major diamond flows into Antwerp, the world's greatest diamond trading centre, go by other routes, possibly via London and Tel Aviv.

The buyers

One company and one city are pivotal in the world diamond trade, and actions by these two entities are the key to reducing sales of UNITA

gems. Seventy to eighty per cent of the annual world trade in rough diamonds is handled by the British-South African company De Beers and its Central Selling Organisation (CSO), which has a turnover of around £3 billion per year. Because, contrary to popular myth, diamonds are an intrinsically worthless and relatively common commodity, there was a need for the trade to operate within a cartel, and thus the CSO has become one of the most effective and least challenged cartels in the world.

The CSO attempts to buy up as much of the world annual diamond production as possible and regulates how many diamonds are released on the open market, thereby artificially setting and maintaining the prices. The diamond trade relies on the CSO to maintain the value of these "worthless" rocks, even though around 20% of traders exist outside the cartel. The CSO's gems are sold in periodic sales, or "sights" in London, to the less

than 200 registered sight-holders, who comprise some of the leading diamond traders. These and other traders depend on De Beers for their livelihoods and, accordingly, ensure that they will only publicise facts that will not compromise De Beers or others within the industry.


During the 1990s, trading in Angola's and, by default, UNITA's diamonds, was not illegal. Despite the fact that this war caused untold suffering within Angola and destabilised the entire region, neither governments nor the diamond industry sought to close down the trade in UNITA's diamonds. Between 1992-1998 over 500,000 Angolans died: the country was strewn with over ten million land mines, raising it, with Cambodia, to the top of the league of most mined countries.

Not only did the diamond industry not attempt to close down the trade but it boasted of its success in mopping up Angola's "unofficial" production - a euphemism for UNITA's gems. De Beers' 1992 Chairman's Statement



Angolans dive into a muddy river in Lunda Norte in search of diamonds (1996)

John Liebenberg - PictureNET Africa



Global Witness

virtually every business questioned about dubious practices, the arms trade being a prime example.

Europe is not alone as a market for Angolan gems. Tel Aviv is of increasing importance. The Ukraine has become a relatively recent UNITA supplier, selling its Cold War military hardware to the rebels. How UNITA is paying for these weapons is uncertain, but what is certain is that Ukrainian mercenaries and tanks are operating in Angola on the UNITA side.

UN sanctions

On 29th October 1997, the UN Security Council, through resolutions 1127 and 1155, imposed sanctions on UNITA for their failure to adhere to the demands of the Lusaka Protocol. These sanctions restricted the travel of UNITA officials and their families, prohibited supplies to UNITA and closed their worldwide offices. The sanctions did not apply to the trade in UNITA's diamonds because, many believe, the industry effectively lobbied against this possibility. Despite the fact that what was an ethical issue was now endorsed by UN sanctions, the diamond industry, of course operating legally, carried on business as usual; money, UNITA's ultimate lifeline, continued to roll in.

Not until 12th June 1998 did the UN wake up to the fact that without revenue UNITA would not be able to purchase its military and other supplies. Resolution 1173, paragraph (b) stated that "... all States shall take necessary measures: to prohibit the direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the [Government of National Unity and Reconciliation,] GURN."


The diamond industry was now mandated to cease its purchase of UNITA diamonds. De Beers have repeatedly stated that they have abided by Resolution 1173, most recently in a letter from

in their annual report stated, "That we have been able to buy some two thirds of the increased supply from Angola is testimony not only to our financial strength but to the infrastructure and experienced personnel we have in place." In 1993 De Beer's report stated that "Demand for rough diamonds from the CSO was extremely strong. ... This followed the measures taken by the CSO in the second half of 1992 to restrict sales while at the same time making substantial purchases of diamonds (mainly Angolan) on the open market." Though the CSO's purchases of Angolan diamonds declined in 1993 and 1994 because of the war, they were on the rise by 1996.

Over half of the world's rough, polished and industrial diamonds pass through the approximately 1600 diamond companies based in Antwerp, where the industry employs over 40,000 people. Over half the world's CSO sight-holders

(those who are permitted to buy diamonds from the CSO) are based in Antwerp. The majority of these companies trade in the four diamond bourses (markets) with deals sealed by a handshake. The workings of this business are shrouded in secrecy.

Thus, the European diamond market has been the major market for UNITA's gems and, by default, UNITA's major funder. Unlike De Beers, which has consistently claimed that its business benefits the countries and communities where it operates, individual diamond dealers do not even attempt to excuse their activities. In April 1999, an Antwerp dealer told Global Witness that it was tragic that hundreds of thousands of Angolans had died but that "... we are only trying to make a dollar." He said that individual traders did not bear any responsibility for the problem as, if they did not trade, someone else would. This argument has become the stock answer of



Chris Hondros - Global Witness

their Chairman Nicky Oppenheimer to Global Witness on 21st April 1999: "As you know, De Beers has fully committed itself to support UN resolution 1173." In the same letter he states that "The role that diamonds may be playing in prolonging the civil war and suffering in Angola is indeed a matter of grave concern to De Beers." This concern however was not apparent during the bulk of the 1990s when De Beers' annual reports documented their success in buying up Angolan rough diamonds. As De Beers Managing Director Gary Ralfe said in an interview on the Official Kremlin International News Broadcast dated 21st October 1997, "You are absolutely right to say that in fact it is UNITA that has over the recent few years been responsible for most of the production in Angola ... there is no doubt that we buy many of those diamonds that

emanate from the UNITA-held areas in Angola, second hand on the markets of Antwerp and Tel Aviv."

There is undoubtedly a real problem trying to enforce such sanctions, especially in an industry that keeps paperwork to a minimum and regards silence as a norm. However, there is undoubtedly a lot that can be done that is not being done. Global Witness has been told by various Antwerp traders that around four Antwerp based companies specialise in the purchase of UNITA gems - but will not name them. So the knowledge is there but not the will to expose a brother trader. Many regard the problem as an African one, i.e. if the diamonds do not leave Angola then they cannot be purchased in Antwerp; this neatly avoids responsibility and ignores the main economic principle of supply and demand.

This view was confirmed by the Managing Director of Antwerp's Higher Diamond Council, Jan De Kesel who said on 11th March 1999 that "I don't think the true problem lies in Antwerp. It lies in Angola and in neighbouring countries."

A key part of the enforcement of the UN sanctions relies on whether diamonds can be positively identified as of Angolan origin. Officially this relies on GURN issued Certificates of Origin (COs) - a system which is far from perfect as GURN paperwork is confused by the use of different stamps, and the CO system does not apply to non Angolan diamonds. Thus, as long as a smuggler can slip diamond parcels into a neighbouring country and pay for a false CO, which are certainly available in Zambia and probably elsewhere, the UN sanctions can no longer be applied.

Furthermore, there is a great debate as to whether the origin of diamonds can be discerned by visual inspection. There is no doubt within the diamond trade, as evidenced by various traders, geologists and personnel within the Harry Oppenheimer Diamond Training School in Johannesburg, amongst others, that a parcel of rough diamonds (anything from ten to thousands of carats) from the same source can absolutely be identified, by colour and size. Only when mixed with diamonds from other areas or after cutting does visual identification become impossible. The majority of diamonds entering Belgium arrive in identifiable (relatively) unmixed



parcels. The fact is that there is little incentive to mix them in Africa as this would necessitate taking diamonds legally or illegally across borders: either process costs money in official taxes or under the table payments. Thus, what Antwerp claims is an African problem is in fact a Belgian problem but this is an inconvenient truth. It appears possible that it is those for whom identification would be embarrassing and/or bad for business who declare that such identification is not possible; De Beers is amongst them.

It is clear that the diamond industry and some of the countries who are home to it have a long way to go to address the fact that diamonds fund conflict, and that they have a moral duty to do all they can to prevent the purchase of any gems that fund combatants.

It is disturbing that, presuming their claims are true, the CSO and

De Beers only ceased purchasing UNITA diamonds when obliged to by the UN, indicative of the fact that although operating within the law, their often stated concern for the countries in which they work did not prevent them from purchasing "unofficial" gems from Angola during the height of the conflict. Furthermore, presuming that the CSO has ceased purchasing UNITA sourced diamonds, either UNITA is now unable to sell its production or these diamonds are being purchased outside the cartel. If the latter scenario is correct then a downturn in the price of diamonds is to be expected; it will be interesting to see if this actually happens.

Conclusion


Now that sanctions are in place, illustrative of widespread international concern about diamonds' role in the Angolan wars, the diamond industry in London, Antwerp and Tel Aviv either divest themselves of any responsibility for purchasing Angolan gems, stating that it's an African problem, or they put up smoke-screens as to why they cannot identify UNITA sourced diamonds, whilst many privately admit they know exactly who is involved.

It is good that the UN is involved; it is good that many press articles are informing the public that diamonds from Angola and Sierra Leone, amongst others, could be equipping armed factions leading to untold suffering and thousands of deaths, but the problem will only be solved in this or in similar situations when the diamond industry follows the lead of some other industries and undertakes to adopt corporate and socially responsible standards in the conduct of their business. Botswana and Namibia are examples of the positive benefits of a healthy diamond industry, which proves that an ethical approach is possible and profitable. The diamond industry should take the ethical lead and cease purchasing, directly or indirectly, diamonds from combatants, and not wait until the

UN or other bodies force them into a corner.

Postscript

Since this article was written a consumer campaign called *Fatal Transactions* was launched on October 3rd by four leading European human rights organisations. The campaign is calling on consumers to find out where their diamonds have been mined from. If the retailer cannot provide satisfactory proof, then they should go to someone that can. Failing that they should ask companies such as De Beers to help them with their question. This is not an embargo on diamonds, which would be grossly irresponsible owing to the legitimate economic diamond interests of Botswana, Namibia and South



Africa where diamonds are crucial to the country's economies.

Initial reaction has been literally staggering with an announcement by De Beers on the 5th of October that they would embargo the purchase of all Angolan diamonds, not just the UN and EU embargoed diamonds. It remains to be seen how meaningful they are in regards to this statement. It appears that De Beers are finally feeling the heat of consistent and concerted pressure and, as ever, what gets them moving is consumer action. The diamond world is set to enter some very interesting times in the next few months with the national governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and the USA introducing groundbreaking legislation and controls on the diamond industry to ensure that these "conflict diamonds" do not enter the market place and thus fund rebel armies.

S A R

The Angolan Peace Manifesto

Luanda, 27 September, 1999 (AIA/
Mercedes Sayagues)

Peace activists have launched a campaign calling for an immediate ceasefire in Angola's civil war and the opening of corridors to deliver humanitarian aid countrywide.

The group includes church people, trade unionists, human rights activists, journalists, academics and others. Their loose coalition, the Angolan Group to Reflect on Peace (GARP, from its Portuguese acronym), is led by a respected theologian, Pastor Daniel Ntoni-Nzinga. About 500 people have adhered to its manifesto since July.

"I know my people well and I see how exhausted they are with war. In villages and cities, people from all walks of life want to do something to stop this madness," says Ntoni-Nzinga. "This is an important determination for the Angolan people."

"We have to organize civil society to pressure the warmongers, to stop this culture of war and violence," says Professor Carlinhos Zassala, secretary-general of the trade union of university professors and a GARP member.

One key ally will be the churches, both Catholic and Protestant de-

nominations, quite strong in Angola. Until recently, the hierarchy of the Catholic church enjoyed a cosy relationship with the ruling party. But in July the bishops of Angola issued a pastoral letter. In no uncertain terms, they condemned "this war that has become a double assassin: it kills with weapons and it kills with starvation."

The bishops deplored attacks against civilians, shelling of cities and ambushes of civilian cars. That is pretty much UNITA. But they also condemned "those who make a profitable business out of war. To stash accounts in foreign banks

Manifesto for Peace in Angola

The Angolan people desire a lasting peace, social justice, good Governance, and the rights of citizenship and mutual respect for the diverse peoples and cultures that form the Angolan nation. These fundamental principles are essential for establishing mutual understanding among the Angolan people. Ultimately, they will serve as the basis for a profound revision of the concept of the Nation, and, while promoting respect for the rights of Angolan citizens as individuals, help to create a popular vision for Angola and its direction in the future.

Unfortunately, war is still being used against the Angolan people, as those who hold power plunder the country's wealth, in partnership with adventurous outsiders and foreign countries. Oil, diamonds and their revenues are the major foci of the greed of the government, the armed opposition and the multinationals, especially the oil companies. All are being aided by the complacency of countries like the United States, France, England, Brazil, Russia, Portugal and South Africa. Instead of pursuing their immediate economic and political interests, these countries should elevate their efforts in the plane of moral values, so as to contribute to reconciliation among Angolans.

The war in Angola will only come to an end when civil society, encompassing the people as a whole, accepts that there is no definitive military solution to the Angolan conflict. Angolans must be aware of the process of destruction in which they are targets, and assume the responsibility of reclaiming their lives and dignity.

What is even more perilous, in this regard, is that the silencing of guns will not by any means signify the end of the war. Angolan mentalities, especially those of the politicians, ruled as they are by selfish interests, are more aggressive than the armies under their command. In Angola, peace has always been seen as the end of fighting, followed by the process of the disarming and demobilization of soldiers. This vision, while reflecting internal sentiments, is especially favoured by some foreign institutions. In reality, however, it provides little more than a tranquilizing illusion for those who desperately seek true peace. Meanwhile, it supplies attractive cover to those who plan to exploit an immediate settlement as the means to position themselves strategically and geopolitically in the race for Angolan riches.

We have reached the extremity of suffering, social humiliation and the total perversion of the use of power. Hence, we have come to the conclusion - a difficult one, because it is so fundamental and evident, though one of consensus - that we, the Angolan people, should establish a common understanding of the causes as well as the consequences of the military and political conflict that we are facing, if we are



Rodger Bosch - Afrapix/Impact Visuals

and to make a profit out of the hunger, the suffering, the blood and the death of your own brothers is a repugnant infamy that should not occur in the heart of any Angolan.”

This clearly applies to the MPLA.

The government ignored the letter. But every Sunday, from the pulpits across Angola, priests preach against the culture of war, violence

and profiteering. Says the bishop of Malange, Luis Perez de Onraitia: “Humbly, we believe we speak as the voice of the voiceless, and we say war cannot solve Angola’s problem. The solution lies in negotiations and dialogue.”

GARP is meeting with the bishops to explore an alliance that would boost the peace movement. Next will be a commission of eminent people tasked with beginning negotiations.

Perhaps the time has come for an Angolan mediation and an Angolan solution. “Foreign countries are unable to see the roots of the problem, that you can’t build a nation on politics of exclusion and marginalisation,” says Zassala. This time, Angolan peace activists want a home-made solution.

excerpted from Africa Information Afrique

S A R

to find definitive solutions and arrive at a national reconciliation. It is fundamental that we, the Angolan people, recognize with courage and determination, that we are all accountable, whether actively or passively, for the political and military devastation as well as the social and economic chaos of the country. As well, we must recognize the serious mistakes and abuses committed by ourselves during our historic journey.

We, the Angolan people, should take full responsibility for the solution of our own problems. We should not keep on blaming the colonial heritage and/or third parties for our grievances. It is a testament to our own immaturity that we so systematically transfer responsibility for the resolution of the national conflict to the intervention of foreigners.

Faced as we are with the suffocation of what still remains of Angolan society, the moment has come for us to act persistently, in a peaceful, courageous and moderate manner, in order to rescue the treasure that Angolans most desire and deserve: Peace through Dialogue. It is the Angolan people who defend peace in this way, while the belligerents assume that war is the way to reach peace, even if this means the humiliation of one part of the nation by the other. Such a war, however, makes no sense to true patriots.

Therefore, we, Angolan citizens, demand :

1. that the government, UNITA and FLEC observe an immediate cease-fire, throughout the national territory;
2. the urgent opening of formal communication lines

between the belligerents, through the mediation of organized civil society;

3. the immediate opening of humanitarian corridors to assist the people affected by the war, especially in the countryside;

4. that the government and UNITA, in co-responsibility, include in their military budgets assistance to deprived people, instead of transferring the burden of their war against the Angolan nation to the international community;


5. the definition of an agenda and schedule for peace talks, by the government (MPLA), the armed opposition (UNITA and FLEC) and organized civil society, for the definitive resolution of the causes of the Angolan conflict;

6. the establishment of conditions for the inclusiveness and safe participation of Angolans in the Process of National Dialogue for Peace, throughout the country;

7. that the government and UNITA include in their military budgets the necessary funds to make peace, with patriotism and dignity, because, if there is enough money to sustain the war, then there should as well be enough money to achieve Peace effectively.

We have decided to fight with persistence and determination for the full accomplishment of our demands and to work actively for the achievement of a lasting peace in Angola, through a patriotic vision of social justice and national equity.

Luanda, July 15, 1999



Development Workshop

Small Victories: Water in Luanda

BY CAROLYN BASSETT & MARNIE LUCAS

Carolyn Bassett and Marnie Lucas are PhD candidates in the Department of Political Science at York University in Toronto.

In 1992 the Angolan war became a war of the cities. UNITA gained the upper hand over the government after the breakdown of the 1991-1992 peacebuilding period by maintaining its military strength. When UNITA returned to war, one of the most important features of their strategy was to force rural populations into the cities, rendering them dependent on humanitarian assistance. Shifting people into the government-held areas was a particular objective of UNITA, adding to the pressures on the governing MPLA. By 1999, more

than half of the country's population was living in urban areas.

Alan Cain, a Canadian who has been based in Luanda for nearly fifteen years working with the Canadian and French organization Development Workshop and who spoke in Toronto on September 22 of this year, has seen the impact of this war of the cities first hand. According to him, the urban services for Luanda's more than 3 million people rely upon a crumbling infrastructure originally designed for 400,000. But 75 percent of the city's population lives in 'informal' settlements - called *musseques* - where they have no access to city drinking water or sanitation services.

As a result of the humanitarian crisis caused by the war, Cain

argued, Angola's public health problems are staggering. Despite its rich natural resources, it is 160th of 174 countries on the United Nations human development index. Three of 10 Angolan children don't see their 5th birthday - an extremely high mortality rate. Life expectancy for women is 48.1 years. For men, it is less than 45. Inflation is more than five thousand percent per year. Only 3 - 4 percent of the national budget is spent on health - more than six percent, according to official statistics, goes to the war. This statistic, of course, excludes what UNITA spends.

Public health problems

The poor urban infrastructure in Luanda contributes to the humanitarian crisis. The incidence of mor-

tality due to diarrhoeal diseases and malaria is extremely high. Ensuring that poor households have adequate access to safe water and sanitation has been one of the biggest challenges that Development Workshop has tried to address.

People living in areas without formal urban infrastructure have been forced to rely on the services of informal water truckers, currently paying more than \$20 US per cubic metre for drinking water, Cain reported. "It's a tremendously inefficient way for delivering water," Cain commented, "as opposed to piping water," and extremely inequitable. In fact, he continued, "people who have access to formal services in the centre of the city pay subsidized rates for water and get services almost free. But people in the periphery of the city – the poorest, and the poorest of the poor – pay far more for water. You can actually read the scale of poverty according to the price of water (an inverse relationship)."

Development Workshop estimates that some poor families spend as much as 20 percent of their regular salaries on water. And yet, an elderly man living in the *musseques* in Luanda commented, "Angola has lots of rivers. We do not need to be short of water. If we are short of water, it is because of poor organization and maybe not enough technicians. We have water but the price is so high that sometimes we eat less food in order to buy water."

Water vendors located in the *musseques* purchase water from water truckers, store it in underground water tanks in their houses and then resell that water by the bucket to individual households. The average price in 1996, a Development Works study estimated, was \$9.46 US per cubic metre but could reach as high as \$17 US per cubic metre, with prices depending on the location of the *musseque*. This amount ranged from 800 to 10,000 times the official price of piped water in the downtown core. The informal

water economy generates approximately \$40 million in income per year for the informal water truckers and vendors. If this income could be invested in the extension of piped water services to the poor communities, Cain suggests, local financial resources would permit many current water (and other urban infrastructure) problems to be overcome.

Working with communities, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local government, Development Workshop has developed a strategy to try to redirect some of these resources back into communities in order to improve urban infrastructure on a neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood basis.

Community water program

Piped water, Cain explained, is provided from the city system (with the cooperation of the local government) to communities that had relied in the past on water purchased from the private water sellers. Community seminars are held to let Luanda residents know about the new program. On a community by community basis, local groups have constructed and now manage water standposts, public, community-run water collection points with one to four water taps. One of these standposts serves as many as 100 families.

The standposts offer a better source of water to people living in the *musseques* in a number of ways. According to Cain, the standposts offer a more hygienic means for water collection and have explicitly built-in features to reduce the incidence of water-borne diseases and avoid malarial breeding grounds. Users run the water standposts as a small enterprise, electing a committee to collect water fees to pay the water company and for maintenance and repairs. They are still able to sell water at rates much lower than those charged by the private water vendors – about twelve percent of the price.

The much lower price for water for the urban poor of Luanda now

permits households to divert some of their modest incomes to other needs. Women seem most likely to be able to take advantage of the cost savings since they head 23 percent of *musseque* households and in any case contribute a good deal to household income through their informal economic activities. Women currently occupy 64 percent of the positions on the standpost committees and "are often the most committed members," Development Workshop reports, giving them a role in key management decisions. Women also make up 60 percent of the community mobilizers that promote the projects to new communities.

Local authorities, Cain pointed out, have also shown a strong interest in this approach to local service delivery since it covers its own costs. Since Luanda city officials are dependent on an unreliable flow of revenue from the central government that offers at best meagre resources for local development, the user fees provide an additional source of revenue.

Building on a community by community basis, the pilot phase of the community water program has been such a success that it is now city-wide. The water standposts, Cain stated, even generate a surplus that is used to promote other community activities such as sanitation and rubbish disposal.

Toilets and rubbish

A sanitation program based on the same methodology as the community water program has followed. Dry-pit latrines, explained Cain, are introduced to areas where there is no sewage system at all. The sewage disposal system used by the dry-pit latrines renders the toxic human waste harmless. The project again incorporates local economic development – latrine workshops are set up in different neighbourhoods that sell latrine slabs to the community and offers credit to families to purchase them.



Development Workshop

Already, 4,386 household latrines have been built in addition to 300 latrines in refugee camps. Statistics are not yet available on the extent to which the latrines have reduced disease but anecdotal and comparative evidence suggests that they will improve community hygiene considerably.

Development Workshop's efforts to develop effective strategies for solid waste (trash) collection has revealed a more complex problem that is not as amenable to community-based, small scale solutions. "While communities deal with solid waste in a logical way," Cain reported, "depositing rubbish on roadsides in


areas where a government removal system could easily pick them up, it's a city-wide problem and without a strategy at a city-wide scale, community action is limited." Nonetheless, their relationship with the local government, built on the basis of the success of the other two strategies and the fact that the Luanda provincial government begun to invest in a program to remove solid waste, has made Cain confident that they will be able to work towards a community strategy to address this problem.

Getting the World Bank to support the initiatives of Development Workshop, based on findings that contradicted the Bank's own dearly-held assumptions about how to undertake local development projects, has also been a challenge.

Showing up the World Bank

In an effort to convince the World Bank to re-evaluate the merits of its traditional "trickle down" approach to water and sanitation development projects (i.e. investing services in upper and middle class communities first, assuming that the income produced by this sector for the city would eventually be used for developing the poorer areas) the Development Workshop shared the findings of their project study with the World Bank. The study, Cain noted, directly challenged the World Bank's approach to development since "it debunked the whole series of assumptions that planners had made that were absolutely wrong in the Angola context."

Indeed, as consistent with numerous other development studies, the Development Workshop revealed that, as usual, the funds from the upper and middle class communities were not trickling down to the poor. And again, consistent with other development studies, they argued that funds should be re-channelled to the poor squatter areas of Luanda that obviously exhibited a greater need for relief than did the middle class communities in the city centre.



Development Workshop

However unlike numerous other development studies, the Development Workshop made the argument that the poor squatter communities were actually a better investment target than the middle class communities since the poor were more accustomed to paying for services and thus more likely to be willing to pay: "In terms of cost recovery those who are used to paying high service prices are actually the poor." Therefore, Cain argued, if the World Bank were to follow its classic arguments and invest only in the upper and middle class communities "one would be investing in areas where communities were unwilling to pay – the wealthy – and by inverting the traditional approach and investing in the poorest areas some of that \$40 million could be used for upgrading the water system!"

Indeed, Cain pointed out that as a result of this study the World Bank has since either cancelled or modified several components of their water program for Luanda. Using the Development Workshop's research as justification, he explained, the World Bank has redesigned its water system project to target the poor squatter areas of Luanda rather than the new, middle class, housing developments. Since the study demonstrated successfully that poor

neighbourhoods have a higher "willingness to pay" for services, the World Bank has conceded that it simply makes more sense to invest in the poor. "This, of course, turns 'conventional wisdom' on its head" Cain acknowledged, "but this is the reality in many other poor countries as well."

Basing peace in civil society

For today at least, peace remains elusive in Angola. Political elites have failed to lead Angola out of the misery of many decades of war. However, Cain argued, a new ray of hope for peace might be found elsewhere in Angola ... in civil society. There was "a real flowering in civil society" with the publication of the first freedom of association laws during 1991-1992. NGOs and church organizations have since offered an alternative leadership in the quest for peace.

Despite the resumption of the war (twice!) many of Luanda's civil society organizations, including those active in local services, have been able to build on this base to begin to transform Angolan society from below. Such participatory approaches, Cain argued, are even beginning to transform the Angolan government, again from the bottom

up. The precise role of local government in the Luanda local programs is still evolving, but Development Workshop suggests that the attempt among community organisations, local government and service providers to communicate and develop joint projects based on concrete activities contributes to local democratic development and good governance. Solving problems with the joint participation of people and their local authorities has an accumulated value: both are taking this work more seriously.

With little by way of a policy and legal framework to guide them, all stakeholders involved in local service provision – including Luanda's city government – have been obliged to consult and negotiate until they achieve some form of consensus. Though not the fastest way to get things done, Cain admitted, he argued that it generates goodwill and builds relations of trust and mutual respect among stakeholders. On this basis, new approaches to dealing with communities and incorporating user participation have been introduced. *Mussequé* residents can exert influence and control over decisions and resources that affect their lives and negotiate with other parties.

This bottom-up, participatory democratic approach may ultimately provide a more durable basis for peace in Angola than UN-brokered elite mediations. "There is," Cain notes, "for the first time in Angola's history, an emerging peace constituency, and an indigenous leadership, largely from the church, lobbying for peace." While only time will tell whether or not such groups might be able to achieve what government and international 'experts' could not, if the success of the community water program is any indication, it wouldn't be the first time that community initiatives succeed where official policy-makers have failed.

S A R

Julius Kambarage Nyerere 1922-1999

BY CRANFORD PRATT

Cranford Pratt was the first Principal of the University College of Dar es Salaam from 1960 to 1965. He returned to Tanzania for briefer periods during the next 14 years and wrote several books and many articles on Tanzanian affairs, most notable The Crucial Phase in Tanzania: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy in Tanzania. He is an emeritus professor of political science at the University of Toronto.

President Julius Nyerere, world statesman and President of Tanzania from 1962 to 1985, died of leukemia on October 13th. In the immediate 24 hours after his death many SAR readers will have heard Stephen Lewis's moving tribute on the CBC, and read Hugh Winsor's fond reminiscences in the Globe and Mail. Each expressed admirably the respect and affection felt for Julius Nyerere by themselves and by so very many others, including myself, who had occasion to meet him and to work under his leadership in Tanzania. I am confident that were he alive, he would be moved by such public expressions but would soon prefer discussion of some major issue to which he had devoted his life. With these sentiments, I am grateful to the Collective of SAR for this opportunity to reflect on his legacy. C.P.

In the final years and months of his life, Julius Nyerere devoted much time to two major issues – the search for justice and reconciliation in Burundi and the strengthening of the still tiny and fragile South Centre, a non-governmental organization seeking to provide for the world's poorer states an international voice and a range of professional advice and aspiring to be the seed of a southern parallel to the OECD. It was totally in character that his last major involvements were African and international rather than narrowly Tanzanian. More than thirty five years earlier he had been one of the first African leaders to support the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. He remained one of the most resolute, assisting its organizations, aiding its operations and sheltering its leaders (although on some important occasions failing to check severe violations of the human rights of some within their movements whose loyalties such leaders suspected). He also persistently reminded other African states of their obligations towards the liberation struggle and urged western states, in vain alas,



Mwalimu with Chissano in 1994 in Arusha

“to refrain from giving comfort and help to those who would deny freedom and dignity to us.”[†]

Nevertheless, his primary contribution was, of course, in Tanzania. It is an inauspicious time to offer an assessment of that contribution, especially a sympathetic one. Over the last 20 years, Tanzania's efforts to accomplish a socialist transformation have been

[†] From his address to a Convocation of the University of Toronto on the occasion of his receiving an honorary D.C.L. in 1969.

Reflections on his Legacy

severely discredited. This hostility pervades the current conventional view about Nyerere. Repeatedly, many of the assessments of his legacy which have appeared in the international press since his death, have praised his personal qualities and his international role but have dismissed his domestic record as disastrous. A far more nuanced judgement is required.

A re-reading of Nyerere's major essays and hindsight reflection on the first 25 years of Tanzanian independence, suggest that his central domestic preoccupations were four-fold: (1) the development of the Tanzanian economy, which he saw as a *sine qua non* for the accomplishment of most if not all other objectives; (2) securing and retaining national control of the direction of Tanzania's economic development; (3) creating political institutions that would be widely participatory and sustain the extraordinary sense of common purpose which in these early years united Tanzanians under his leadership and that of the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU); and (4) building a just society in Tanzania that would be genuinely equitable for all its citizens.

Nyerere shared the preoccupation with economic development with almost all of the Third World leaders of his generation. From Nehru to Nkrumah to Manley, all were determined that their peoples should more fully enjoy the improvements in personal welfare that economic development should entail.

His second central concern – that Tanzania not surrender control of the direction of its economic development to international capitalist interests or international agencies dominated by the major industrialized states – reflected not only nationalist aspirations but also a profound sense that integration into the international economic system would bring little advantage, especially to the poorest countries, if they were unable to manage skillfully and selectively their relationships with the major capitalist coun-

tries. This remained a central concern to Nyerere thought throughout his life. It contributed to the decision to launch the socialist initiatives in 1967 and it drove his desperate and finally unsuccessful efforts in the early 1980s to break free of the policy directives of the World Bank and the IMF. His attempts first with the South Commission and then the South Centre to build a powerful counter-weight to the OECD, were essentially an internationalization of his continuing conviction that the Third World had to find ways to avoid being dominated by the developed countries.

Nyerere's originality emerged in particular in his efforts to realize his third and fourth preoccupations. Let us consider these in turn. TANU, under Nyerere's leadership, re-ordered the constitution of Tanzania in 1965, replacing the rootless Westminster model that the British had hurriedly transplanted with an original, hybrid constitutional order, the democratic one-party state. Nyerere saw it as an interim arrangement which would provide for genuine political participation by ordinary Tanzanians while protecting Tanzania from the emergence of divisive ethnic, regional and religious factionalism which could easily destroy its fragile unity.


The democratic one party state was never without its flaws and contradictions. The strong oligarchic tendencies of many within the party were never successfully contained and indeed there were recurrent detentions and human rights abuses that should never have been tolerated. Nevertheless the 1965 constitution must be judged an extraordinary feat of creative political engineering. It fitted Tanzanian realities. For over 20 years it provided a largely unchallenged framework within which Tanzanians ordered their public affairs, enjoyed continuous and stable civilian rule and engaged in the public discussion of party and government policies more freely than was then possible in most African states. Then,

peacefully and within the framework of this constitution, Nyerere stepped down, there was a change of political leadership, and a transition to a competitive party system. These crucial changes were a realistic response to emerging Tanzanian aspirations, but their peaceful accomplishment owed much to the fact that they were strongly advocated by Nyerere. Since then, again through established political processes, though without Nyerere's active support, there has been a near-180 degree change in the direction of economic policies.

It is more difficult to assess the consequences of Nyerere's commitment to equality, the fourth core element of his political values. The central importance attached to this commitment separates him from western liberalism with its primary emphasis on individual liberty and its much weaker attention to equality. The roots of Nyerere's attachment to equality can only be surmised. I expect that his Christian faith and his aversion to racism and colonialism were crucial, along with his perception of the traditional heritage of most Tanzanians. The equality that Nyerere valued was not an equality of initial opportunities for autonomous individuals. Rather it was the equality enjoyed in closely integrated and caring societies such as Nyerere assumed most Tanzanian tribal societies had been and indeed still were.

Many in Africa at the time, rationalizing their personal ambitions, took the position that economic growth should be the primary task and that pursuing greater equity could be left to later generations, when African countries would have more to redistribute. Nyerere never embraced this rationalization. He knew very well that Tanzania would long be a very poor country and that the building of a just society would become vastly more difficult once severe class differences were entrenched. He recognised that the communal qualities of traditional Tanzania were rapidly being

mwalimu



Mwalimu around 1970

Tanzania Information Services

undermined and that the acquisitive ambitions of the emerging African bourgeoisie were powerful and hard to contain. Nyerere feared that unless development could be pursued in socially equitable ways and modern national equivalents created to the communal values of traditional Tanzanian societies, Tanzania would lose any chance of remaining united and harmonious.

However, within the African community, income differences were still not vast, if only because most were still very poor. Oligarchic ambitions and the morally corrosive power of consumer acquisitiveness had only just begun to erode more socially responsible traditional values. Thus, far from being ready to leave to a future generation any concern with equity, Nyerere was convinced that Tanzania had, but only briefly, a unique opportunity to create a pattern of economic growth that would not generate morally indefensible and socially destructive inequalities, and to develop a national public ethos that would contain the selfish acquisitiveness of the political and bureaucratic elites.

The major initiatives taken in the 10 years following 1967 to accomplish this transformation in Tanzania were breathtaking in range and scope. These included: the nationalization of the banks, the foreign owned plantations growing Tanzania's export crops and parts of the limited industrial sector; the introduction of a stringent leadership code which sought to contain corruption and to block the emergence of private economic activities by political leaders and by senior party and governmental officials; a major effort by TANU to induce peasants to farm collectively; the movement of very large numbers of peasants from their rural holdings to newly created villages; an attempt to regulate in detail a wide range of private economic activities; and an extensive state takeover of household properties that were not occupied by their owners.

Few would now claim that many of these were appropriate instruments for the development of a very poor country, especially one whose public service was already over-extended. Indeed, by the late 1970's, Nyerere and TANU were themselves coming to recognize that most were inappropriate, indeed counter-productive, to the accomplishment of their objectives. These socialist measures cannot alone be blamed for the dramatic economic decline that Tanzania experienced, for these were also the years of soaring oil prices, the collapse of world commodity prices and the severe and extensive drought, which together reversed the development accomplishments of a great many African states, whatever their ideological orientation. However, they did make their own not inconsiderable contribution to Tanzania's economic decline.

* * *

The story should not end on this note, however. In the past decade and a half or more, the view of Nyerere's socialism taken by the IFIs, by many western governments and by most North American development economists went beyond criticisms of specific initiatives, to an impatient rejection of the very idea that Third World governments should seek actively to intervene in their economies either to advance social justice or to control the direction of their economic development. The Tanzanian experience instead was taken as evidence, by counter example, that African states must embrace a development strategy based on a minimal state and an open market economy, integrated into the international capitalist economy and pursuing an outwardly oriented development strategy.

The intellectual crudity and ideological nature of this view was challenged from the beginning by the Economic Commission for Africa and by many others outside the "Washington consensus." The valid-

ity of these criticisms has become all the more painfully obvious in recent years as the implementation of the full neo-liberal package of policies – thrust upon so many poor countries as the price of international assistance – has had such disappointing consequences in a great many of them. We are painfully relearning that the pursuit of economic growth through neo-liberal policies, both domestically and in relation to the international economy, and without regard to their social and political consequences, is often disastrous for such countries. As a result, those concerned with the welfare of the peoples of the poorest states, African, Asian, Caribbean and Latin American, and including, happily, the governments of many of the poor countries themselves, are increasingly identifying two questions as centrally important:

- (1) How can a poor country best manage its relationship with the international economy so as to maximize the advantages that can be derived from that relationship while also minimizing the risks inherent in it, including notably the disadvantages that are often a consequence of the power imbalance which is embedded in it?
- (2) What are the domestic social and economic policies most likely to ensure that economic growth is not pursued at the expense of the equally or even more important objectives of reducing poverty and advancing equity and social justice?

Finding workable alternatives to the neo-liberal policies that have been pressed upon the world's poorest countries by the industrialized countries in the 1980s and 1990s is certainly not as straightforward as Nyerere had initially hoped. But we need to remind ourselves that it was he rather than the World Bank, the IMF and the industrialized states who had identified, decades ago, these two central development challenges facing the world's poorest countries.

S A R

The Congress of Democrats

BY PAUL KALENGA

Paul Kalenga is a Namibian who is a researcher with the Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town. His major interest is in the field of regional integration issues in southern Africa.

On November 30 and December 1, Namibians will go to the polling stations to elect their State President and Members of the 72-seat National Assembly. These will be the country's third democratic presidential and general elections since the end of South Africa's colonial rule in 1990.

The current President, Sam Nujoma, received 74 percent votes in the presidential ballot of the last elections in December 1994. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), led by former president Mishake Muyongo, polled 23 percent. (Muyongo now lives in exile and led the Caprivi secessionist uprising a few months ago.) In the same general elections, Nujoma's Swapo won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, accounting for 53 seats. This time, however, Swapo is not at all certain that it will keep its electoral dominance, particularly its two-thirds majority. It will have to contend with a new party – the Congress of Democrats (CoD) – headed by ex-Swapo combatant and trade unionist Ben Ulenga [for background, see "The Ulenga Moment: SWAPO and Dissent," *SAR*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (December 1998)].

In the period since the formation of the CoD, Swapo has intensified its campaign to discredit CoD's activists, and in particular, Ulenga. The CoD has alleged that their activists have been monitored and intimidated by state security intelligence agents. Their telephones are being tapped, they claim, and the party's activities continue to

be severely censored by government media institutions, including the national radio and television stations.

The party, nonetheless, is reported to have made significant inroads in areas in the far northern parts of the country that are Swapo's traditional strongholds. This has provoked a smear campaign by Swapo supporters and acts of intimidation against CoD supporters. Jerry Ekanjo, the country's home affairs minister (who is a notorious demagogue, also famous for his homophobic utterances), has openly accused Ben Ulenga and his supporters of being "spies" and "traitors." He suggested that the CoD "want[s] to bring back a white government like that of the [colonial] Boers during the liberation struggle."

Sources of dissent

The ruling party's fear of the new party was also demonstrated during the recent separatist plot in the Caprivi. A South African newspaper, *Die Beeld*, carried an article linking the CoD leader to the Caprivi secession uprising. The reporter cited "highly-placed" sources in the Namibian Government. In reaction to the allegations, Ulenga said that CoD did not support the dismemberment of any part of Namibia. He attributed the Caprivi problems to the "failure of government of the day to create a vision and a Namibian dream which all communities in their rich diversity can buy into."

Generally, the majority of the 110,000 Caprivians consider themselves to be part of Namibia. Due to the perception that the Swapo government has not shown interest in the development of the region, a few have become victims of Muyongo's personal ambition for political power.

The resignation of Ulenga from Swapo and the subsequent formation of the CoD can be explained by the failure of Swapo to transform itself from a secretive and exiled armed nationalist movement to a mass-based governing party. As a movement in exile, Swapo operated in a very centralized and clandestine fashion, and did not encourage democratic participation among its rank and file. A culture of unquestioning loyalty to its leadership was nurtured. Those that questioned some of its practices were labelled "enemy agents" and many ended up in detention.

As a ruling party after independence, Swapo failed to transform its hierarchy and decision making channels to suit the new circumstances. Some of its former activists, particularly those who were not in exile, continued to privately express their disillusionment with the way the party operated. The space to constructively differ within the ruling party without being victimized, however, was very limited.

In the 1994 general elections, Swapo obtained a two-thirds parliamentary majority. This was accompanied by a growing centralization of political power in the hands of President Nujoma. A recent editorial put it bluntly: "just as the continent is taking its first tentative steps towards an African renaissance, Namibian President Sam Nujoma's unfettered power is increasingly pushing him in the direction of despotism" [*Sunday Times*, October 24, 1999]. Confronted with a shrinking economy unable to generate jobs, growing dissent from unemployed ex-People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) combatants and displeasure over the slow pace of land reform and unfair land management practices, Nujoma has tended to copy the tactics of his old ally

and good friend, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. To distract citizens' attention from burning national issues, he has lashed out at the media, the interfering judiciary, importunate donors, whites and foreigners in public speeches.

Arbitrary rule

Perhaps the clearest illustration of this arbitrary rule was the decision to amend the constitution to allow Nujoma to run for a third presidential term. The amendment provoked a public outcry. Even party activists had anticipated that the issue would be discussed at the Swapo Extraordinary Congress that took place on 27 and 28 August, 1998, but they learned just before the convention that the issue had apparently already been approved at the earlier full congress. To some concerned Namibians, this was a clear sign of the ruling party's abuse of power. In the words of Ulenka, the country's constitution had been "re-tailored like a dress

to fit the expanding aspirations of individuals."

Then came the President's decision to deploy Namibian troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to prop up the Kabila regime without consulting the appropriate authorities. Judging from their public denials, it seems that even Cabinet members were not consulted before the deployment of the troops. Nujoma has not offered a clear explanation of the country's involvement in the DRC war to date beyond citing pan-African solidarity.

The public was outraged that human lives would be lost in a war that offered no benefit to the nation. Already, this has happened. In addition, critics argued that the country's coffers could not afford to foot the bill for a foreign war when such resources were needed to deal with high unemployment, rising crime and the sluggish economy that has fuelled public debt. When western donors started to question

the logic of the pro-Kabila intervention, president Nujoma, like his Zimbabwean counterpart, lashed out at "these foolish Europeans," labelling them "white imperialists who want to control the country, take out its riches while the Congolese people live in poverty." [*The Namibian*, September 21, 1998].

The cost of the pro-Kabila military intervention has started to bite. Government postponed tabling additional budget figures before the elections. Political observers warn that high military spending dominates the budget, which may cause a public outcry and cost the ruling party some votes. According to media reports, the Cabinet has approved an additional budget for 1999-2000, with an additional \$173 million (Namibian) earmarked for the military. This amount represents almost 50 percent of the total additional budget. Most of this is expenditure for the DRC war. Despite reports that hospitals and clinics have shortages of basic drugs, the health ministry's request



Local Elections in Rehoboth

Orde Eliason - Link/Impact Visuals

for more money to buy medicines was rejected.

Launch of the CoD

When Ulenga resigned as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom last August and subsequently from Swapo, he was welcomed by those who believed that a new political vehicle was needed to take Namibia out of widespread disillusionment. At the launch of the party in March of this year, Ulenga pointed to a gloomy situation in Namibia, characterized by socio-economic hardship, a stagnant economy, a dysfunctional education system, marginalized communities and bogged down policies of nation building and poverty alleviation. He remarked that by the look of things, corruption, self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement apparently had become virtues while democratic accountability had turned into a vice.

Ulenga's followers had only three months to mobilize. On July 30, more than 400 delegates from all over the country, representing a diverse spectrum of Namibian society, gathered in Windhoek for their party's inaugural congress. In his opening speech, Ulenga told excited delegates that the Government had failed to perform in key areas of education, health, the economy and combating of crime. He attributed this failure to corruption, noting that government leaders continued to heap perks upon themselves and spend limited resources on expensive luxurious planes and cars. He said that it was time to save the nation from another five years of Swapo's mismanagement and plunder.

Although Swapo is unlikely to be ousted in the upcoming elections, it is clear that Namibia's political landscape will not be the same again. Already, the most influential leader of the Swapo Youth League and Deputy Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Ignatius Shixuameni, has quit the ruling party. Like Ulenga, he cited a lack of inner-party democracy, a lack of vision

and a rising tendency towards self-enrichment and intolerance of criticism as main reasons for his resignation. Shixuameni is number three on the CoD's electoral list and is likely to regain his seat in the next parliament, albeit this time on the side of the new opposition.

Meanwhile, Nujoma is taking serious steps to win over influential critics in order to keep his two-thirds majority. Gabes Shihepo, former president of the Namibia National Farmers' Union, has replaced Shixuameni as Deputy Minister of Information and Broadcasting. Just two weeks before his appointment, he had led a protest march of nearly 800 farmers to State House to register black farmers' discontent with the failed land reform policy. H9 claimed that farmers had waited patiently for eight years and had become tired of being ignored. Now, Shihepo is a depts minister and occupies a favourable position on the ruling party's parliamentary list. Analysts regard this move as a strategy aimed at silencing him and containing popular discontent against the ruling party at this critical late hour.

Efforts by the ruling party, through its weekly paper *Namibia Today*, to link Ulenga and Shixuameni to some form of corruption have as yet failed to discredit them. In fact, Shixuameni has become the first Namibian politician to declare his interests publicly. He challenged Swapo leaders to also come clean by declaring their economic and financial assets and share-holding. He also called for Swapo leaders to disclose their offshore accounts, property dealings, dual citizenship and foreign passports.

After December

The battle between Swapo and the CoD is intensifying daily. Whatever the outcome of these elections, the new party is bound to play a positive role in strengthening democracy and good governance in Namibia. The party has received tremendous

support from the country's youth and students and the intelligentsia across tribal and racial lines. The CoD is also succeeding in reaching out to the country's enlightened white community. Its challenge is to reach out to the rural masses whose loyalty to Swapo is traditionally stronger. In any case, judging by the delegates to its inaugural congress and composition of its leadership, the CoD stands to be a formidable force in the process of nation building.

The CoD wants to revitalize the economy, create new businesses and job opportunities, intensify rural agricultural development, encourage development in all regions, overhaul the education system and provide proper care for the elderly, the sick and the very young. It has committed itself to fight against corruption, self-enrichment and nepotism. In this regard, it advocates establishing an independent anti-corruption agency that will be granted all necessary powers to initiate and pursue investigations of corruption. The CoD plans to reform the public service by cutting the size of Cabinet to a maximum fifteen ministers. (At present, this small country has approximately fifty ministers, deputy ministers, ministers-without-portfolio and Directors-General at the Cabinet level. This makes the Namibian Cabinet one of the largest in Africa, if one takes account of the size of the population - 1.7 million).

Seven parties are expected to contest for 72 seats in the National Assembly, which are allocated on the basis of proportional representation. About 850,000 voters have registered for the polls. Although it is widely believed that Swapo will again win a majority, the CoD is expected to put a halt to their two-thirds majority. Considering what Swapo's overwhelming majority has meant to the country since the last elections, the realignment will be a victory for democracy in this fragile nation.

S A R

Chiluba: The Third Term Temptation

BY JOTHAM C. MOMBA

Dr. Momba teaches in the Department of Political Science at the University of Zambia

Zambia will enter the next millennium without the same ebullience that characterized the coming to power of the ruling party, the Movement for the Multi-party Democracy (MMD), and its promises of democracy, good governance and economic prosperity. Zambia had one of the first multi-party governments in Africa and was hailed as a leader on the continent. Despite this euphoria and rhetoric, however, the democratization process has not been the success it promised.

Although the next elections are still two years away, political manoeuvring in preparation has already begun in earnest. The current constitution bars the two main contenders – current President Chiluba and former President Kaunda – from running. On several occasions in the previous months, Chiluba has maintained that he will not attempt to seek a third term, saying that to change the constitution to allow it would undermine development and the democratic process in the country. As late as September this year he told a journalist in Libya that Zambia's democracy "is based on the constitution, which must be respected and abided by. Leaders must not stay too long because they can run out of ideas at a certain stage."

However, Chiluba's possible candidacy is now being actively discussed. In a style reminiscent of United National Independence Party (UNIP) tactics under Kaunda, the youth wing of the party has demanded in the past few months that the constitution be amended to allow Chiluba to run for a third term. Chiluba's response has been to publicly welcome the debate as "part


of plural politics" and "healthy in a democracy." That reaction merely intensified the demand and it is a move that may succeed.

The idea of amending the Constitution to accommodate a possible third term for Chiluba has been condemned by a number of opposition parties, human rights organizations and monitoring groups. One opposition official suggested that amending the constitution to allow Chiluba to run for a third term could bring conflicts such as those witnessed in countries like Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia. However, as the 2001 election approaches, all that could change.

Political process from the 1991 to the 1996 elections

Misgivings about the MMD's commitment to democracy began shortly after its election in 1991. It was criticized for the way it treated opposition leaders, particularly the former president, Kenneth Kaunda, the way it ran elections, its reluctance to undertake constitutional and legal reforms and other practices.

Criticism was strongest when the Zambian leadership inserted clauses in the 1996 Constitution that put restrictions on who could



Zambian President Frederick Chiluba

Henner Frankenfeld – PictureNET Africa

run for the presidency. Although the MMD leadership denied the charge, the general view from within and outside the country was that the restrictive clauses were aimed at Kaunda. According to the proposed constitutional changes, only persons whose both parents were Zambians by birth would be eligible to contest the presidency and anybody who had twice been elected President of Zambia would not be eligible for re-election. The two provisions eliminated Kaunda from the presidential race.

Kaunda's party, UNIP, other opposition parties and several non-governmental organizations rejected the two provisions. Several donor countries, among them the United States, Japan, and Britain raised serious concerns about the amendment and threatened to withhold aid to the country.

Besides the manipulation of the constitution, the structures established to run the elections together with the way the electoral process had been managed were also sources of conflict. The opposition parties and several NGOs objected to placing the election office under the control of the Vice-President. Even the 1995 Constitutional Review Commission alluded to the inappropriateness of this decision, saying that "the whole outcome of the elections may be prejudiced." The government subsequently gave in. However, even after this concession, there were further disputes. Opposition leaders alleged that the election Commissioners would not be impartial because they were members of the ruling party.

The opposition parties and a number of civic organizations also objected to the way the 1996 elections were managed. The major disagreement was over the decision to award a contract to an Israeli company, NIKUV Computers, to undertake the registration of voters, a task that had been carried out by the elections office in previous elections. The opposition parties charged that

the company was hired to rig the elections. Several political parties, including the former ruling party, unsuccessfully took the matter to Court.

The absence of an "even" playing field also adversely affected the 1996 elections. Most important was the unequal access to resources and the extent to which the government leaders, including Chiluba, used state resources to their advantage. In 1991, MMD had campaigned to eliminate UNIP's unfair access to state resources in those elections. However, once in power, the MMD never addressed itself to the issue. Their use of state resources was most evident during the 1996 elections. Besides the use of state vehicles, and aircraft in the case of Chiluba, government leaders began a series of donations to schools, community projects and charitable organizations and other causes as the campaigns progressed.

Perhaps the most outstanding example of misuse of state resources was the Cabinet decision to order the municipal councils to sell their houses to sitting tenants. Most of the houses were sold below their market value. Houses that had been valued at K4 million (US\$3,082) were slashed to K920,000 (US\$709) following presidential directives. The cabinet also decided that houses built before 1958 should be given away for free. Sitting tenants were only required to pay the legal fee of K23,750 (\$17.50).

As in previous elections, the state's ownership of the mass media was again an issue. Opposition parties have accused the government-owned media of bias towards the ruling party, especially during elections, which has led since 1992 to calls for the privatization of the media. Journalists, civic organizations, politicians and some outsiders – such as a group of British parliamentarians who visited Zambia in 1993 – failed to move the MMD away from state ownership of the *Times of Zambia*, the *Zambia Daily Mail* and

the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). This was despite the government's strong commitment to the principle of privatization in general. Thus the state has continued to control both electronic and print media, giving the MMD a virtual monopoly access to the media.

Chiluba himself admitted that this constituted a problem during the 1996 elections and promised that "subject to availability of funds, the electoral commission may arrange for some broadcasting for media space at its own cost, to allocate equally to all political parties taking part in the elections." However, the state media continued to give extensive and positive coverage to the ruling party and scant and mostly negative coverage to the opposition parties. Analysis of coverage by the ZNBC and the two government-owned dailies, made by the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC) during the 1996 elections, established extensive bias in favour of the government.

All these factors led UNIP and several smaller parties to boycott the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections. This more than any other factor contributed to the discrediting of the elections. Several international organizations declined to take part in official observation of the elections, and four local monitoring groups declared the elections were not free and fair. Almost all commentators on these elections have been very negative.

Post-1996 manoeuvring

With Chiluba's commitment to democratic processes very much in question, a number of factors may influence the further amendment of the constitution to allow him to run again. For the MMD, there is no obvious successor to Chiluba. The Party's vice president is not the country's vice-president. This situation has created two leaders who can claim to be the logical successor to Chiluba. But perhaps more importantly, there is no leader

within the party who is widely regarded as Chiluba's successor. This situation has created apprehension among some MMD leaders, especially those without presidential ambitions. Pressure on Chiluba to go for a third term could intensify rather than diminish in the coming months before the elections.

Added to this is the fact that MMD's retaining power in 2001 is not as assured as it was in 1991 and 1996. And the possibility of defeat is even higher if Chiluba does not run and the party fails to unite behind an alternative. MMD faces a challenge from a new political party, the United Party for National Development (UPND). Formed on December 23 1998, UPND is quickly establishing itself as a serious contender, and is encroaching on some of the areas that were traditionally MMD strongholds. The party managed to win a number of seats in the local government elections that took place on December 30, 1998. It is the only party besides MMD and UNIP that controls a District Council. Several by-elections have indicated that it has significant support throughout the country, especially in the Southern, North-western and some parts of Central Provinces and the rural areas of the Copperbelt Provinces. MMD's political control of the Southern Province, which was one of the main strongholds of the ruling party, is slowly being lost to the UPND.

MMD's dominance of the Northern Province is seriously challenged by UNIP, judging from the results of several local government by-elections. UNIP is firmly entrenched in the Eastern province and some parts of Lusaka province. The newly formed Zambia Alliance for Progress, formed out of the alliance of several smaller parties with the runner up in the 1996 elections, Dean Mung'omba, as one its leaders, is also likely to make claims to some areas in the Northern Province. This leaves MMD

with only Luapula and Copperbelt provinces where they are sure of doing well in the 2001 elections. *The Monitor* could not have been far from the point, therefore, when it alleged that the party leadership was behind the campaign by the MMD Youths to have the constitution amended. UNIP has alleged that Chiluba himself was personally behind the call. Nonetheless, there remain factors that mitigate against Chiluba's candidacy. One problem is how to ensure that Chiluba can contest the elections without losing face in light of his public statements about leaders who want to stay in power forever (specifically Kaunda) and his posturing as a defender of democracy.

Furthermore, MMD must figure out how to ensure that they can stop Kaunda from running while allowing Chiluba to contest. UNIP is the main opposition party, and if Kaunda wins his appeal at the Supreme Court against a lower court ruling that he is not a Zambian since he did not follow the right procedures to renounce his Malawian citizenship, any change that will enable Chiluba to run again will have the same effect for Kaunda. Unsurprisingly, UNIP may very well be supportive of a constitutional change. The clearest indication of UNIP's position was given by the Party's Secretary for Information and Publicity when he urged the MMD government to "stand by its promise to the Paris Club" that it would amend the Constitution to remove discriminatory clauses that restrict the choice of presidential candidates.

The future

Whichever decision is made regarding a third term for the president will have great impact on Zambia's politics in the next few years. Should he decide not to contest, Chiluba will have set an important political precedent that future presidents may find difficult to ignore. Such a decision would enhance

respect for democratic institutions, and bolster Chiluba's claim to be committed to democracy. Furthermore, his departure is likely to open the electoral process to real competition, both within his own party and in the country at large.

If the constitution is amended, however, it will make a mockery of the constitution itself. Such an amendment would set the stage for introducing all kinds of devices or manipulations of the constitution to guarantee future electoral results.

Editor's note

On November 4 1999, as SAR was going to press, Kaunda's son, Wezi Kaunda, was shot and killed, ostensibly by carjackers. It was the second killing of a high profile opposition figure in 18 months. Business Day (November 5 1999) reported speculations that Kaunda's death had been inspired by a power struggle within UNIP regarding the continuation of his father as leader. A UNIP spokesperson, however, accused the government of assassinating Kaunda. Kenneth Kaunda survived a similar attack last April. A report in the Mail and Guardian (November 5 1999) gave more credence to the latter possibility. It suggested that Kaunda might have been killed to prevent a coup against Chiluba orchestrated by Angolan and Zimbabwean interests in the region. Chiluba's regime had been condemned by the Angolan government at the United Nations for allowing military assistance and logistical supplies destined for UNITA to pass through their territory. Zambia has also long served as a diamond trading centre for UNITA. Wezi Kaunda, a former army major, had allegedly been training guerillas inside Angolan territory in preparation to oust Chiluba. What impact this assassination and the growing tensions in the region will have on the upcoming Zambian elections is not yet clear, but certainly may inspire Chiluba to strengthen his hold on the Presidency.

S A R

Side-step into "Normalcy"?



Santos Finiosse - AIM/Impact Visuals

BY CARRIE MANNING

Carrie Manning is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Her work on Mozambique's war to peace transition includes "Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as Political Party," which appeared in the *Journal of Southern African Studies* in March 1998.

When Mozambique's 16-year civil war ended in 1992, the establishment of a formal multiparty democracy formed the centrepiece of the peace agreement. The success of Mozambique's democratic transition has therefore been key to the success of its simultaneous transition from war to peace. So far, the country has fared remarkably well. Mozambique's second multiparty general elections, scheduled for December 3 and 4, will provide an important test of this good fortune.

The first post-transition general elections are seen by some as

important indicators of a new democracy's consolidation. In Africa, as Michael Bratton has pointed out [in "Second Elections in Africa," *Journal of Democracy*, 9, 3 (1998)], the results have generally been disappointing. As a rule, second elections in Africa have been characterized by reduced voter turnout, opposition boycotts, and further entrenchment of incumbents who win by increasingly large margins.

Mozambique's first electoral outing since the 1994 transitional elections, the local elections held in 33 municipalities in June 1998, seemed to confirm these trends. Marked by acrimony between government and opposition from the beginning, those elections were boycotted by virtually all of the opposition parties, most of whom had not in any case managed to meet onerous requirements for submission of party lists to the National Elections Commis-

sion (CNE). Voter turnout averaged less than 15 per cent, and fell below 6 per cent in some areas. Conduct of the elections was marred by strong accusations of irregularities, including stuffing of ballot boxes, and election administration in general was roundly criticized from all quarters. Frelimo won control of all of the assemblies and all mayoral positions, though significant gains were made by newly formed independent citizens' groups in Maputo, Beira, Manhiça and Nampula.

Election administration

For the upcoming round, the hard lessons of the municipal elections have been lost on no one. Thus far, preparations for the December elections promise a more satisfactory process, and the most important weaknesses of the municipal electoral process have been squarely addressed. Yet some of the issues that haunted that vote remain visible.

Foremost among these are the related questions of trust and transparency. As the municipal elections demonstrated, in Mozambique even technical decisions are still freighted with political implications, both real and imagined. In response to opposition complaints about political bias in the administration of the municipal elections, a new electoral law was passed this year that allows political parties to nominate personnel for a limited number of positions in the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE). In addition, the CNE and its sub-national counterparts are once again comprised of members nominated by the parties in proportion to their representation in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, disagreement over when these party-nominated STAE officials could begin work has prompted Renamo once more to claim that it has not been effectively represented in STAE, and that therefore the way has been paved for fraud. For its part, Renamo was slow to nominate people even for those positions which were not in question. In general, Renamo has demonstrated a lack of faith in the accountability of STAE to CNE. This perhaps reflects a more general suspicion of the accountability of bureaucrat to politician in a system in which there was no separation between party and state until very recently.

The decision to conduct an entirely new voter registration for these elections, rather than simply update existing rolls, constitutes further acknowledgment that technical and political questions remain inextricably intertwined in Mozambique. Yet even though the planned registration period was shortened from 90 to 60 days due to wrangling over election dates, the voter registration process was a resounding success. Eighty-five per cent of eligible voters were registered, surpassing even the 81% registration rate reached in 1994. Registration was observed by both domestic and international monitoring groups, none

of whom cited serious problems with the process. In addition, both Frelimo and Renamo had party monitors in most polling stations, with very few reports of problems.

Who lives where and how population patterns may or may not have changed since 1994 have been important questions in this electoral period. Mozambique conducted a national population census in 1997, yielding an estimated eligible voter population of some 8.3 million (about 11 percent more than in 1994). Early debates about the number and distribution of voter registration brigades reflected Renamo's belief that the centre and north experienced greater population growth in the intervening years. The new voter registration figures provide partial support for this claim, and parliamentary mandates have changed accordingly. Provinces with the greatest growth in number of registered voters were Manica (30.7%), Tete (26.7%), and Niassa (26.3%), although Gaza also experienced a significant increase (16.8%), and the north-central provinces of Nampula and Zambezia, which together account for almost 40% of the nation's registered voters, saw relatively low growth (5% and 9% respectively). There was a net gain of one seat among provinces in which Renamo prevailed in the 1994 parliamentary elections, and a net loss of one seat in areas where Frelimo dominated.

As in past elections, logistics remain a problem this time, with some areas inaccessible except by helicopter. Despite major improvements in infrastructure in some parts of the country, road travel in much of rural Mozambique has improved little or not at all since 1994. Logistical problems are perhaps inevitable. What matters is whether they can be handled in a way that strengthens confidence in the electoral process. The efforts of STAE and CNE officials to overcome these hurdles during the registration process, with evident success, give credit on this score.

Contenders

The ballot for the presidential contest will be considerably shorter than in 1994, with just two names: incumbent Joaquim Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama of Renamo. Thirteen groups (ten parties and three coalitions) will compete in parliamentary elections.

Two other would-be presidential candidates, Yaqub Sibindy and Wehia Ripua, of the UMO coalition, registered their intent but were disqualified by the Supreme Court on technical grounds. The candidacy of Wehia Ripua, president of the small PADEMO party and head of the UMO coalition, was rejected for insufficient signatures. (Ripua turned in 6,000 signatures, and told the Supreme Court that papers containing 7,000 more signatures were destroyed by Frelimo Dynamizing Groups in Matola as UMO members were collecting signatures.)

The parliamentary race will be contested by Frelimo, Renamo-Uniao Eleitoral (a coalition of Renamo and 10 small parties, all but three of which contested elections in 1994). Also running are six veterans of 1994 and also five new parties [the Greens (Partido Verde), PADELIMO (Democratic Party for the Liberation of Mozambique), PANAOC (National Party of Workers and Peasants), PPLM (Progressive Liberal Party of Mozambique), and PASOMO (no name published by CNE)]. This is for the most part a familiar field. But while the players are essentially the same as in 1994, the emergence of coalitions may well change the dynamics of the game.

Both UMO and Renamo-UE have had a very brief and tumultuous history. UMO emerged last spring as a coalition of nine parties, dwindled to four by midsummer and is now reduced to two or three. UMO's leader, Ripua, finished a distant third in the 1994 presidential race. Early this summer UMO looked like a strong contender, and one likely to bolster Frelimo in parliament. However, since

the defection of a number of parties to Renamo-UE, UMO has been substantially stripped down.

Renamo-UE emerged in mid-July and includes three "third party" presidential candidates from 1994 (Carlos Reis of UNAMO, Maximo Dias of MONAMO, and Padimbe Kamati, of PPPM, each of whom pulled just over 2% of the vote in the 1994 presidential race). The ten parties in the coalition have agreed to support Dhlakama as the presidential candidate of the coalition, in exchange for key positions on the parliamentary lists. The existence of Renamo-UE may well mean that a number of the more visible presidential contenders from 1994 will find themselves in parliament.

This dynamic field is in stark contrast to the 1998 municipal contest, in which even before the opposition boycott was conceived, only one political party, PT, had managed to register with the CNE. However, the 1998 municipal elections also saw the emergence of a new "non-party" political force, the independent citizens' groups. These organizations declared themselves to be non-partisan citizen's groups interested in the nuts and bolts of governance. Their ability to get on the ballot and their showing at the polls made the parties look feeble by comparison, and there was some speculation that some of them might run a presidential candidate (only organizations officially registered as political parties may contest the parliamentary elections). None did.

Campaign funding

New to this campaign period are visible efforts by both parties, but primarily Frelimo, to raise funds from the Mozambican private sector and from Portuguese and other foreign investors. President Chissano has hosted two dinners for Mozambican and foreign businessmen, which reportedly raised \$700,000 US. There is speculation that many of the same businesses are also contributing to Renamo. Dhlakama, however,

has denied this, saying the party will campaign with the money made available to parties by the state and the international community.

In addition, donors are weighing in with support. Approximately \$3 million US has been allocated to support political party campaigns. Four donor countries – the US, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands – are expected to contribute a total of \$1.5 million, with the same amount provided by the Mozambican government.

What is at stake?

The last five years have seen Mozambique emerge as a model of stability in a turbulent region. Internationally, President Chissano has gained stature as an elder statesman for his role in mediation attempts in the region, culminating in his selection as President of SADC in August of this year. Renamo has forged ties internationally with conservative parties; Dhlakama is currently serving as vice president of the African Democratic Union, a regional organization of right-leaning parties, and recently attended the meeting of the International Democratic Union, hosted by Britain's Conservative Party.

Mozambique has also done relatively well economically, having been rewarded by the IMF, the World Bank, and foreign investors for efforts at structural economic reform. Maputo itself visually trumpets the impact of all of this investment, with a welter of new hotels, restaurants, and boutiques. Of course, this says little about how much all of this has trickled down to the average citizen, and travel outside of the capital is a sobering contrast to the boom town feel of Maputo.

Finally, despite the occasional boycott of parliamentary votes and debates by Renamo, both sides seem to find the political arena a satisfactory place for the resolution of their differences. These elections, if successful, have the potential to mark the beginning of an era of "normalcy," in which the formal

political mechanisms designed to contain elite conflict within peaceful political boundaries expand their focus from conflict management to competitive, representative politics.

To achieve this will require enormous effort by all of the political parties to carve out distinctive identities and constituencies based on a clear vision for Mozambique's economic and political future. There is still a long way to go in this regard. At this point, the platforms of the major parties are long on broad goals, with less to say about how those goals will be achieved. Both Frelimo and Renamo are focusing on bread and butter issues – improving living standards, reducing poverty – and measures to fight corruption appear set to hold prominent spots in the campaigns of both parties. Renamo-UE will likely run on the claim that Frelimo has had its chance to govern and that it hasn't done enough for the average citizen. Frelimo can be expected to counter that it has laid a solid foundation for growth and socioeconomic improvement for all, and that continuity is required for these changes to bear fruit.

The challenge of democratization in Mozambique, as in any post-conflict society that attempts democracy, is to balance the divisive tendencies of electoral competition with the ongoing need for political reconciliation and accommodation. Campaign season naturally brings competition to the fore, placing enormous stress on common ground painstakingly reached over the last five years. But at their best, elections can also serve to demonstrate to all parties that even at the height of its intensity, political competition obeys impartial, mutually agreed rules, both in letter and spirit. That was the message in 1994, with Mozambique still in the shadow of the United Nations observer mission. One hopes that the December elections will confirm early indications, and reaffirm the lesson.

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