

VOLUME IX NUMBER 7

# SOUTHERN AFRICA

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1978-1 1978

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**COVER:** Women and children flee tear gas in police raid on Crossroads.

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
# Crossroads — A Community Under Attack

By Stephanie Urdang

The logic of apartheid has sentenced Crossroads, a community housing 20,000 Africans, to obliteration. In September heavily armed riot police moved in to begin the destruction of

were arrested in the first raid on September 5, and were dragged off for pass offenses, or for being in the area illegally. When the police returned in a second raid 10 days later they found the people in an angry mood; homes

intimidate people into leaving the settlement "voluntarily." The government has promised that bulldozers will follow, physically demolishing all houses sometime in the next six to eight weeks.



View of Crossroads

the squatter settlement on the outskirts of Capetown.

Under cover of darkness, throwing teargas and swinging batons, police twice invaded people's homes, smashing doors and demanding passes. Some 400 to 500 men, women and children

*Stephanie Urdang is a member of the Southern Africa collective.*

were defended; stones, sticks and bricks were thrown at the police who immediately retaliated with gunfire. Two men were killed, hundreds more were arrested. A baby, falling off its mother's back was crushed to death as women scattered to avoid teargas.

The Pretoria regime has repeatedly said it would wipe out the settlement. The police actions were designed to

Crossroads will be the fourth squatter camp to be brutally levelled in recent months by the apartheid regime. Modderdam, Werkgenot and Unibell were destroyed last year, displacing close to 30,000 people.

Crossroads has become a new focus of confrontation in ruler/ruled relations in South Africa. The African families have built their own homes and

established a system of governing their community. The men and many of the women have jobs in and around the city of Cape Town. But government policy has decreed that only Whites and those it calls "coloreds" may live in the western Cape region. Africans are allowed there only as labor units under very strictly defined determinations; all others are 'illegal' and must go.

The future of the settlement has become a major issue for the governing National Party leaders. One group—including Foreign Minister Roelof Botha—has pushed for a solution other than demolition, fearing that such drastic action will bring adverse international publicity. But other gov-

ernment members—including Minister of Defense Pieter W. Botha, who is also a leader of the Cape National Party, sponsored a strong resolution on the subject at a party congress late in August. It called for reaffirming the western Cape as a white and "colored" labor preference area; refusal of black urban leasehold rights in the western Cape; measures to prevent uncon-

trolled influx of blacks into that area; increased fines for employing 'illegal' black workers. A section called for rapid provision of housing for 'blacks legally' in the area, meaning those who were born there, have worked for one employer for 10 years 'legally,' or have lived in a prescribed urban area for 15 years, 'legally.'


Minister of Plural Relations Cornelius P. Mulder declared: "Those illegally in Crossroads will not be tolerated there, and no pressure from anywhere in the world can move us. They will be removed with all possible humanity, but also with determination, to where they must be." His deputy minister, Dr. Willie Vosloo,

entail us having to act more strictly but we are here to implement National Party policy, not popular policy."

### Driving Out Africans

For the past twelve years, the explicit goal of the administration has been to reduce the African population in the western Cape by 5 percent per year, after declaring it a "colored preference area." "Coloreds" were given privileges over Africans in both jobs and housing, leaving Africans with even fewer rights to permanent residence in the western Cape than elsewhere in the country.

It is a policy that has not worked. The unprecedented growth of the



Peter Magubane

ernment members—including Minister of Defense Pieter W. Botha, who is also a leader of the Cape National Party, sponsored a strong resolution on the subject at a party congress late in August. It called for reaffirming the western Cape as a white and "colored" labor preference area; refusal of black urban leasehold rights in the western Cape; measures to prevent uncon-

stated that there was "a sickly humanitarian attack" on the government over the Crossroads issue. "We will undertake the task with humanity, but it will be done regardless of what the United Nations says." His boss, Mulder, added: "I will go out of my way to keep the western Cape a preference area and to reserve it as far as possible for white and colored people. This will

modern center city during the past decade has only been possible with an availability of a large pool of African workers. Hence, the number of Africans on contract labor in industry and commerce doubled between 1968 and 1974, while, in the government sector itself, it quadrupled.

The government tried to control the African influx by freezing construction



Roadside grocery store: Demolition will break up families

of family housing despite the shortage that already existed. Even so-called "single" men's accommodation has only been increased by one third since 1966. At least 250,000 "colored" South Africans are also now living in 47 squatter camps around Cape Town, because no housing has been built for them. As long as the economy was booming, squatter camps such as Crossroads were allowed. But now that recession has set in and black unemployment is growing, they are no longer tolerated.

### Born Out of Resistance

First established at the beginning of 1975, Crossroads was an expression of resistance to the intricate laws that govern all aspects of the lives of black South Africans. Its inhabitants would prefer to live illegally and under extremely harsh physical condition, than to have their families split by these laws.

For women and children, the alternative to the camp is to return to a barren existence in the reserves and on the white farms, with little hope of ever living with their husbands or fathers again. While many of the women left the farms where they were employed, or left homes in the Transkei and Ciskei to join their husbands illegally, the average Crossroads woman has lived in Cape Town for over eleven years, and one fifth of the children over the age of 16 were born in Cape Town.

For the men, the alternative is to live in the alienating and tightly controlled single-sex or "bachelor" quarters in the townships.

It is not surprising that they have chosen to be defiant, to risk arrest and

further dislocation, in order to fulfill a basic right—to live with their families.

### Expanded Rapidly

Crossroads was itself a product of apartheid. Its first inhabitants arrived when the authorities rounded up Africans from a number of "colored" camps and dumped them and their few belongings on the open plain.

Crossroads grew fast. So did the harassment of its residents. "I have been in Cape Town a long time," said one elderly resident, "and never have I seen such hardships as now. The inspectors keep saying that the husbands must be arrested because they have no permission to be in Crossroads. How can a wife be separated from her husband? The minister in the marriage service says that he shall be guilty on earth and in heaven who separates a man from his wife."

But guilt is not an emotion likely to hamper the authorities. Nor are only husbands arrested. Both men and women are carted off, as well as "legal" men who are charged with harboring their "illegal" families. Shacks have been demolished on the slightest pretext.

After pressure from community leaders and a lengthy struggle in the law courts, Crossroads was declared an "emergency camp" in July 1976. This gave some slight protection from demolition and brought piped water and toilet bucket and refuse removal services to the camp. It also brought the levying of an \$11.00 fee per month per shanty. Complaints that this was ridiculously high when compared with rents paid for brick houses in other townships went unheeded initially,

but the fee was reduced to \$8 a year later. Non-payment results in demolition of the shack. Other restrictions were imposed: shanties could not be enlarged, change hands or remain vacant; the number of residents was frozen and no new shacks could be constructed. The services provided by the city of Cape Town do not include electricity, while the water is pumped through a mere 20 faucets—that is, over 1,000 people share one faucet.

### Squalid Conditions

Standing on a slight hill, a visitor can look in any direction and view the high-density, makeshift shanties, stretching for miles, one up against the next. In between, barefooted children play in the sand, roosters and hens create a raucous noise, competing with barking dogs. An occasional tree provides a shady patch where a group of people sit and talk or play cards. Washing lines sag under newly laundered clothes and an occasional car can be spotted, parked or slowly driving along the sandy paths that meander between groups of huts.

The crude shacks can barely be called shelter. There is a patchwork quality about the scene. The flat roofed, one-roomed dwellings are constructed from a combination of corrugated iron sheets—the corrugations running both vertically and horizontally—of beaten oil drums, wooden crates, cardboard boxes—or whatever can be scavenged.

During weekdays it is quiet. Eighty percent of the men work in the town earning an average \$40 a week, and soon after 5:30 each morning, they board the busses that are sent to transport them to work. A further 10 percent are employed elsewhere, with 70 percent of the women employed either in the town or on the outskirts.

### Self-Mobilization

But, with the very existence of Crossroads being an act of defiance, the spirit that permeates the community reflects the refusal of a people to be crushed.

It is expressed through the numerous services that have been established by the residents, and by the enormous amount of political mobilization that has taken place. Self-help takes on a new connotation here, for each act of "self-help" is a challenge to the government, and hence more an act of "self-mobilization." It entrenches the community further, mobilizes people further, and moves one more step away from the kind of control the



administration exercises in order to keep the community fluid and responsive to the government's needs.

The community is run by the annually and democratically elected "Committee of Crossroads," which tries to handle a variety of problems—including arrests, rental arrears, threats of demolition on account of extensions made to shacks. Residents have also set up their own policing of the community; the sense of community is evidenced by the almost total lack of theft, petty crime and violence (while in nearby townships, the high rate of crime goes unabated, despite constant police patrols).

A second school was built after the residents conducted a survey and found qualified teachers and educators in literacy and adult pre-secondary teaching living right there. By mid-1976 Noxolo [Peace] School was opened with two teachers and about 20 pupils. The school now has 350 students and a waiting list of 200. School

fees are collected to pay the salaries of the increased staff.

After a year in existence, the leaky corrugated schoolhouse was replaced by a new structure built with the voluntary labor of the residents. Now the simple brick and iron-roofed complex consists of four large classrooms, a large hall and community center, a staff room, store-room and kitchen. The front of the school has been paved with red brick and colorful murals adorn the walls. Adult literacy classes are held five mornings a week. Four evenings a week a night school flourishes, the classes filled to capacity with adults from the community.

Women have begun their own small home industries, knitting and sewing clothes that are sold both inside Crossroads and out. And throughout the community there are grocery "stores," shoe makers, general dealers, clothing "stores," prepared food sellers—who set up shop each day on makeshift tables out on the sand, or do business

through a glassless window in their shack.

The more established and viable the community becomes, the more of a threat it becomes to the regimentation so essential to the survival of apartheid.

The squatter camps are unfit for human life. So is apartheid. The residents of Crossroads, have chosen the former in order to exercise even such limited control over their own lives and in so doing have embarked on a struggle against the latter.

The long term solution is obvious: total self-determination for the people of South Africa. This can be seen in nearby Mozambique and Angola, where the two new nations are using community energy and creativity to improve general living conditions. South Africa, in contrast, readies its bulldozers against such initiatives.

The government can bulldoze fragile structures. It cannot bulldoze spirit. Soweto, one would think, was lesson enough. □

## NAMIBIA

# UN Proposes — South Africa Disposes

Thousands of SWAPO supporters, many sporting the movement's bright yellow T-shirt, gathered at the airport outside Windhoek to greet the UN Special Representative and his team when they arrived in Namibia in August. Here was one indicator that SWAPO, harrassed and repressed by South Africa, with much of its top and middle level leadership in jail or in exile, still could command strong support among the people of Namibia.

Dispatched to the territory following the July 27 Security Council resolution aimed at implementing a peaceful end to South African rule, the fact-finding team was composed of close to 50 UN officials headed by Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Commissioner for Namibia, who had been appointed Secretary General Waldheim's representative. The group spent 16 days in Namibia, travelling and consulting widely, gathering information for the report which was to lead to concrete plans for the implementation of the original, still ambiguous western plan for independence.

The resulting Secretary General's report was issued on August 31. It proposed a transitional plan to be put into effect immediately following confirmation by the Security Council. Elections for a constituent assembly would be held within seven months. The assembly would then be responsible for setting an independence date.

The whole operation would take the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) a year to supervise and could cost the UN up to \$300 million. The steps to be taken would involve:

- cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the withdrawal, restriction or demobilization of the various armed forces;
- the conduct of free and fair elections to the constituent assembly, with preconditions including the repeal of restrictive laws, the release of political prisoners and voluntary return of exiles, and the establishment of effective monitoring by the UN with an adequate period of electoral campaigning;
- the formulation and adoption of a constitution by the elected assembly,

to be followed by independence.

The UN would exercise over-all direction of this process through Ahtisaari acting as the Secretary General's Special Representative. The report projected some 9000 civilian and military personnel would be required to carry out the plan. This would include a military component of 7500, embracing infantry battalions, monitors, and logistical and other support elements. They would be charged with monitoring the actual ending of the fighting, the restricting of South African and SWAPO armed forces to their bases and the withdrawal of all but a specified number of South African troops. The UN military force would also be responsible for preventing infiltration, keeping the borders under surveillance, overseeing the demobilization of civilian forces and protecting the civilian part of the UN operation.

The civilian component of UNTAG would total about 1500 persons of whom 360 would be civil police, responsible for preventing intimidation or interference with the election pro-



Walvis Bay cannery workers salute SWAPO

Reininger/UN

cess. The other 1200 persons would supervise and control all aspects of the electoral process, advise the Special Representative about the repeal of discriminatory laws and assist in arrangements for the release of political prisoners and the peaceful return of refugees.

If it is to work the plan requires the full support and backing of the Security Council and the cooperation of South Africa, SWAPO, the five Security Council members who have pushed the "Western Plan," and the states bordering Namibia.

#### SWAPO's Clarifications

On September 8 SWAPO President Sam Nujoma sent a letter to UN Secretary General Waldheim outlining certain issues on which SWAPO wanted clarification.

Nujoma queried the legitimacy of the continuing South African voter registration, which the apartheid regime had initiated for its proposed "internal settlement" elections. Namibians, said Nujoma, were being ha-

rassed and intimidated into signing up as Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) members in an effort to ensure electoral victory for a party that Pretoria would find acceptable. SWAPO also charged that the South Africans were using the registration campaign to decide who is and who is not a Namibian citizen. Such decisions should not be in South African hands, Nujoma declared.

Nujoma also indicated that the projected police force of 360 was too small to ensure an election campaign climate free of intimidation.

Further the SWAPO leader requested clarification on the role of the South African-appointed Administrator General, who has been exercising virtually dictatorial powers since his appointment many months ago to oversee South Africa's electoral path to independence. SWAPO requested that it be clear that if the UN Special Representative is not satisfied by some measure or decision taken by the Administrator General, such measure or decision would not apply.

#### South African Hypocrisy

On September 6 South Africa presented the UN Secretary General with its initial objections to the plan for Namibia. In a letter to Waldheim, the South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha objected to the size of the proposed military force as favoring SWAPO. He argued that the UN mission in Namibia was to monitor, not keep the peace since peace will already have been established by a cessation of hostilities.

South Africa also objected to the size of the civil police force citing the precedent of much smaller UN teams which had monitored referendums held in British Togoland, British Cameroons, and Djibouti.

Most hypocritical was South Africa's reason for objecting to the seven-month timetable laid out in the plan. "Two years ago," Botha's letter states, "the leaders of the Territory told the South African government that they were ready for independence and that they wanted it at the end of 1978. It is something we cannot deny them. South Africa at the time accepted that South West Africa would become independent on December 31, 1978. It is something which cannot be delayed any longer. No one has the right to thwart the will of the people."

Botha also demanded that SWAPO state whether or not it accepted the Namibia settlement plan as drawn up by the Five, and whether it had committed itself to a cessation of hostilities which he saw as the key to carrying out the plan. (A UN spokesman announced the following day that SWAPO had requested a formal cease-fire agreement in a meeting between Nujoma and Waldheim on September 25.)

#### Security Council Delays

Although a Security Council meeting was initially supposed to follow immediately upon the release of the Secretary General's report, none had been scheduled by the third week in September. The maneuvering and pressures which produced this change in schedule can only be guessed at. But the delay meant a delay in the dismantling of the structure of South African occupation. Some observers at the UN were becoming increasingly concerned that South Africa would refuse to go along with the western plan as currently developed by the UN and that it is at this point that hopes for a quick settlement to the Namibian question will founder.

SWAPO remains optimistic. In a recent broadcast to Namibia, Sam



Nujoma assessed the current state of the struggle: "It is the combination of revolutionary armed struggle by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia and the intensive political and diplomatic offensives by SWAPO as a whole which has induced and even forced the Western powers to seek a so-called peaceful change in Namibia through the machinery of the UN. We describe the present phase as a victory for our oppressed people."

### War Continues

Meanwhile the war has continued, spilling across the borders with Namibia's African neighbors as if to underscore that South Africa is a threat to peace in Africa. A major battle took place across the Zambia-Namibia border at the eastern end of the Caprivi Strip in late August.

SWAPO forces launched a large surprise attack on the South African airbase at Mpatsha and two smaller bases, all in eastern Caprivi province. According to Angolan sources the attack was launched from inside Namibia, although South Africa alleged that the attackers came from camps in Zambia. In a mid-September interview Zambian President Kaunda said that SWAPO had told his government that the attack followed the capture of a South African courier with information that an attack on SWAPO bases in Zambia was being planned. SWAPO took "preventive action" President Kaunda said.

South Africa counter-attacked, first using long-range artillery to shell Zambian villages across the border and

then actually invading Zambia both to strike at SWAPO and to punish Zambia for helping the Namibian liberation struggle ("harboring terrorists" South Africa calls it). Penetrating some 70 to 85 miles inside Zambia, South Africa made little contact with SWAPO but did kill some Zambian civilians.

On trying to return to their bases, according to an Angolan report, the South African troops were harassed by SWAPO and Zambian soldiers who were able to split up the South African units. Some isolated groups of South Africans were stuck inside Zambia almost a week later, cut off from the bulk of the force which had succeeded in withdrawing across the border. South African military sources admitted losses of ten dead and several wounded and tried to use the military action as evidence that SWAPO did not want a peaceful solution to the Namibia problem.

Displaying surprising confidence in Pretoria's commitment to the UN negotiation process, President Kaunda told a Johannesburg *Star* reporter in mid-September that Zambia and Angola have indicated to SWAPO that it should not attack South African bases in Namibia unless the process of negotiation breaks down completely.

### Political Struggle

One index of South Africa's future intentions may be its continued program of voter registration. Such registration, without UN supervision, indicates Pretoria's determination to control the outcome of any elections. As reported in *Southern Africa* last month

## South Africa Dumps UN

September 20th.

At press time news came that Prime Minister Vorster had coupled the announcement of his resignation with a statement rejecting the United Nations plan for Namibia. South Africa will now go ahead with its own election November 20 to 24.

According to Vorster his government refused to accept the Secretary General's recommendations which, he said, contained "striking deviations... from the proposal of the Five." According to Vorster these concerned:

- "The size of the UN military contingent;
- The introduction of a UN civil police component;
- The lack of consultation with the Administrator-General;
- The election date."

Repeating the allegation that "the impartiality of the UN is rendered suspect by the continued and sustained assistance to SWAPO..." Vorster told a press conference that his government was determined to meet the desires of all the people of "South West Africa." "This," he said, "will be done on the basis of universal adult suffrage in country-wide elections in order to establish unequivocally who has the right to speak for the people of South West Africa."


No mention was made in the Vorster statement of possible UN observers to the election, although some western reporters have indicated that the South African government may still hope to forestall a tough Security Council response by keeping such doors open.

Commented one UN official, "Allow observers? Sure, thirteen people with telescopes!"

The Security Council will no doubt meet on the issue. Effective action against South Africa could include oil and other economic sanctions, but only the most naive would believe that the western powers are yet ready to abandon their intransigent friends in the south of Africa by allowing such measures to be adopted.



DTA propaganda poster plastered around Windhoek



DIE SWAPO VLAM VERTEER SY EIE MENSE

*Southern Africa*

DTA propaganda poster: SWAPO's Flame Destroys its own people.

Namibians are being harried into signing up as members of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). Visitors to Namibia have noted that apart from overt intimidatory tactics, DTA also appears to have a great deal of money to spend on its pre-election campaign, has produced thousands of color posters, and is distributing matchbooks, candy and other gifts with the DTA emblem very widely, an unusual procedure in a country where the mass of the population is extremely poor.

The DTA is a coalition of the all-white Republican Party and the ethnic-based African political organizations which participated in the South African "independence" negotiations at the Turnhalle two years ago. Heading the DTA is Dirk Mudge, chairman of the Republican Party and, according to the *Windhoek Observer*, member of the white supremacist Afrikaner Broederbond.



UN Commissioner Ahtisaari (right) poses with South Africa's Administrator, Steyn

There are two minor coalitions of even more minor parties in the Namibian political arena—the Namibian National Front (NNF) and the Action

Front for the Retention of Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR). Ethnic tensions within the NNF resulted in the splitting off of some groups in April leaving the National Independence Party (Coloureds), the Mbanderu group, the Damara Council, Federal Party, SWANU, and SWAPO-Democrats, a breakaway group led by expelled SWAPO leader Andreas Shipanga. A white lawyer, Brian O'Linn, leader of the Federal Party, heads the NNF. AKTUR was formed by the Nationalist Party of South Africa as a local ally. It invited only "population groups" not political parties to become members. In fact it fronts for the Nationalists rather than having the independence of even a close ally. Under the leadership of A.H. Du Plessis and Eben van Zijl, it has the support of the hard-liner Afrikaners in Namibia who feel the original Turnhalle proposals went too far in favor of black control. □

## ◀ ZIMBABWE

# Bishop Muzorewa Goes to Washington

By Patrick Lawrence

Bishop Abel Muzorewa is often noted among both colleagues and rivals at home for his lack of political skill. His trip to Washington late in July and early August, aimed at achieving a quick coup—the lifting of economic sanctions against Rhodesia—seems likely to reinforce that reputation. Despite Muzorewa's best efforts, sanctions were not ended, although they were placed under severe strain. And in the process the bishop exposed himself badly by forming an alliance with ultraconservative and racist forces in the US Congress.

It seems that the bishop had little to do with planning the details of his trip, and that his principal sponsor, Senator Jesse Helms (some say Union Carbide lent a hand financially), was really the strategist, using Muzorewa for his own legislative ends.

But what Muzorewa himself really hoped to accomplish in Washington, ironically, may have been much closer to home. His public image since

March 3, when he entered into a political accord with two other Rhodesians blacks and Prime Minister Ian Smith, has been ambiguous; but it seems fairly clear his visit was part of a major effort to consolidate both the Smith government as it now stands and his place in it amid growing political unrest and challenges from his party supporters.

For some time after the Salisbury settlement was reached, Muzorewa projected an image of discontent with, and a degree of independence from, Smith and the other signers. He sometimes refused to attend joint rallies designed to demonstrate Salisbury's political unity, and when his choice as co-minister of justice, Byron Hove, was fired, there was an extended row during which the bishop threatened to quit the government altogether.

But it seems clear that Muzorewa now recognizes that his personal interests are best served through a vigorous defense of the interim government. Two factors are apparently at work. First, the bishop has been under fire from leaders in his own United African National Council for his failures in effective leadership. UANC executives, Hove among them, openly criti-

cized Muzorewa, challenging his position as president and demanding a party congress that eventually met in mid-August.

The congress resulted in a vote of confidence for Muzorewa, and the bishop promptly broke his opposition by expelling its leaders—Hove among them—from the party. But news reports indicated that Muzorewa's critics were to his left in the UANC, and the bishop apparently saw that his strongest defense against such opposition would be to make his more conservative line produce concrete results—such as Western support through an end to sanctions.

The other factor weighing on Muzorewa in Washington was the probability of an all-party conference involving Salisbury and the Patriotic Front. Although the bishop declared in Washington that "there were two empty chairs on the executive council" for Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, at the same time he boasted control of a majority of Rhodesia's 6.7 million blacks. That claim would inevitably have been discounted if Front leaders suddenly appeared on Salisbury's political scene.

*Patrick Lawrence is a New York-based journalist and editor. He is on the Southern Africa staff.*

Even after Smith announced in Bulawayo that he would agree in principle to an all-party conference, Muzorewa was still balking. And a victory against Washington's adherence to UN-improved economic sanctions would have cut off the State Department's efforts to arrange the conference as soon as possible. The timing of the bishop's US visit was thus crucial.

The bishop's Washington effort also took place as news of secret meetings between Smith and Nkomo began to leak in the press. Although those meetings have apparently collapsed for the time being—an outcome Muzorewa doubtless favors—they were one more factor threatening the rapid erosion of the bishop's political position. As a result, the bishop soon found his only allies in the racists who have done so much to keep Zimbabwe from being free.

### Attack on Sanctions

Senator Jesse Helms is a North Carolina Republican who has been a longtime opponent of domestic civil rights in the past and a strong supporter of the Smith regime since Rhodesia's illegal independence from Britain in 1965. The March 3 agreement in Salisbury was hardly the beginning of Helms' support for minority rule in southern Africa.

Hand in hand, Helms and Muzorewa lobbied intensely for the passage of an amendment to legislation that would have ended forthwith US participation in the UN's economic sanctions against the Smith regime. Although the amendment bore Senator

John C. Danforth's name, it was really the second try at an amendment that was earlier advanced by Helms himself. On that first vote, Helms and his supporters lost by a close 48-42 vote. The Danforth amendment was defeated 54-42 in August, and a compromise measure sponsored by Senators Case and Javits was eventually passed by both houses in early September. (See *Washington Notes*)

What emerged as US law was a measure that called for the removal of economic sanctions if the so-called transitional government in Rhodesia manages to hold elections by December 31 of this year.

The second defeat of the Helms proposal was regarded as a victory for congressional liberals and for the administration, which is trying to maintain some degree of credibility with the Patriotic Front. If so, it was a limited victory, and the significance of the current measure should not be lost. "When you add it up, said James Lucier, Senator Helms' aide on African affairs, '96 senators voted for some kind of sanctions lifting. That's practically universal consensus that something ought to be done.'" And a Rhodesian lobbyist speculated that "Helms might have won it if the second vote had come sooner. The tide was in his favor."

In an interview with *Southern Africa*, Lucier explained that Helms, with Muzorewa's help, "changed the debate from the question of whether sanctions ought to be lifted to a question of what kind of measure should be used to lift them." The measure that eventually passed in the Senate was a compromise, and State Department officials downplay its importance to the Carter administration's current strategy in Africa. But as an aide to Senator Clifford Case pointed out, the measure "could eventually shift the parameters of US policy."

### US Policy Under Pressure

Indeed, a number of interviews with Senate aides and other Hill observers showed that the debate on the Helms amendment and the compromise measures was viewed fundamentally as an attempt to shift US policy rightward from its current course. In this it joined with the sharp arguments of recent months within the administration itself on how best to view the US position in Africa—either in global terms, as another theater of great-power rivalry, or in regional terms, in an "African context" that downplays East-West interests. The regionalists are currently prevailing, but the globalists have not gone away.



Bishop Muzorewa

In discussing congressional attitudes, Helms aide Lucier cited "the general feeling that something had to be done in Africa, that our policies were on a slide that would lead to another Mozambique, another Angola situation." To Senator S.I. Hayakawa, a California rightist who visited Rhodesia in late May and returned a staunch supporter of Bishop Muzorewa and the transitional government, Carter's Africa policy, according to an aide, amounted to "giving the Soviets a free ride into the [Zimbabwean] government." Hayakawa did not sponsor Muzorewa's trip, his aide said, but he did play an important role in "facilitating" many of the bishop's press conferences and private discussions with Washington officials.

By the time of Muzorewa's visit, conservative pressure in Congress had grown strong enough to make many Washington liberals nervous. "Something was going to come out of the Senate," said Michael Samuels of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, a neoconservative research institute. Samuels reflected a view also much in evidence on Capitol Hill: many senators felt pressured to take some action on the Rhodesian issue—and thus on US policy—and the Case-Javits amendment spared them their reluctant support of Helms-Danforth. "Given the mood in Congress," a State Department official told *Southern Africa*, "the end result was less injurious to our interests than it could have been."

### Marching in Step

When he arrived in Washington under Helms' sponsorship, Bishop



Smith and Abel Muzorewa Afrique-Asie/Southern Africa

Muzorewa was thus placed in the midst of one of Washington's most important policy debates. And in the two weeks or so of his stay, Muzorewa lined up unflinchingly with the globalists—that is, with the increasingly powerful conservative bloc that has advocated support for Rhodesia and South Africa on the basis of a cold-war analysis of US interests. "To the best of my knowledge," said Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica, a black lobbying organization, "Muzorewa did not meet with any members of the black community at all."

Even Hill staffers representing senators who ultimately supported Case-Javits were critical of the company Muzorewa kept. "Being in bed with Helms did not help his cause," one suggested, while a Case aide speculated that the bishop was simply "getting his allies where he could." But there was apparently some degree of friendship between the two. A Helms staffer quickly pointed to "their basic Christian agreement—that's one reason [Helms] was so attracted to the bishop." And the two managed to leave politics behind long enough to drive to Asheville, N.C., where Muzorewa visited the retired missionary "who first introduced him to Christian principles."

### Rhodesia Lobby

Muzorewa's time seems to have been directed almost exclusively by Helms and his staff and the Rhodesian Information Office, the Salisbury government's illegal lobby, which Washington has tolerated for years. Among other strong supporters were Hayakawa and Senator Harry Byrd, who gave his name to the amendment that first allowed sanctions to be broken in 1971 through the importation of Rhodesia chrome. Most of those who worked closely with Muzorewa in Washington were thus the same officials the bishop denounced as racist supporters of the Smith regime prior to his new proximity to power.

Helms, the RIO, and other supporters were all relatively pleased with Muzorewa the lobbyist. Helms aide Lucier called the bishop "a very effective spokesman for his cause, especially in dealing with people who were undecided or who were leaning away from him." During his visit, Lucier said, Helms made certain that the bishop met with "just a great number of senators," and upwards of 75 Hill staffers. There were also numerous press conferences, receptions, and speeches.

### Muzorewa's US Support

One such presentation—a speech followed by a lengthy question and answer session—was held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where Muzorewa is said to have met with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is now in residence there. A spokesman at the center said that "the bishop's views were strictly his own—we just like to make our facilities available." But at least one influential fellow at the center, Chester Crocker, has written widely on the virtues of such "moderates" as Muzorewa and the folly of US policy in paying any attention to the Patriotic Front. The overall impression gained in contact with the center was of something less than a disinterested party to the occasion.

Muzorewa also met with the editorial boards of the *Washington Post* and the *Wall Street Journal*. The latter paper has been a strong opponent of US policy for some time, editorializing after the March 3 agreement that Muzorewa was "just the sort of moderate leader we've been looking for in Africa."

But unlike the bishop's earlier visit to New York in the spring, when the UN refused to let him address the Security Council, most of his efforts in Washington seemed limited to political contacts. On his earlier US visit, Muzorewa addressed two dozen or so business and financial executives at a reception sponsored by Union Carbide. This time, Lucier allowed, "he did meet with Andy Andrews, who's an old friend of his"—a reference to E. F. Andrews, the Allegheny Ludlum vice-president who acted more or less as a Smith aide when the March 3 agreement was being forged. But that seems to have been one of the bishop's few contacts outside government and foreign policy circles.

## Smith Talks Tough But Takes Beating

The intricate international dance involving various participants interested in achieving an acceptable (read pro-western, non-socialist) settlement is speeding up again. Britain and the US have been urging the holding of an all-party conference, as the background music builds to a new crescendo with the Patriotic Front intensifying the tempo of its military activities.

Probably most important in the lobbying effort was the private office that Muzorewa was given, apparently at Helms' request, off the Senate floor. It was there that he did much of his one-to-one lobbying on sanctions-lifting in private discussions with senators.

What the bishop argued for, according to Kenneth Towsey, director of the RIO, was "to re-energize the economy, open doors to an injection of capital investment . . . and open up the availability of weapons supplies." Towsey, who sat with Muzorewa in the Senate gallery during the debates, added: "Symbolically, of course, [the Helms amendment] would have been a great boost—and an indication to the men with guns that the transitional government did have Western support."

### Bishop Encouraged

Was Muzorewa disappointed in the Case-Javits measure? "It was half a loaf," Towsey and Lucier agreed, using the same phrase in separate interviews. "And you try not to think about the half you didn't get." In a statement released shortly before his departure, Muzorewa told the Senate: "We have not got everything we'd hoped for, but I'm greatly encouraged by the rising tide of support in the US. . . . The Senate vote provided evidence of this. It will fortify us in our determination to ensure that the democratic process succeeds in Rhodesia. We would have liked more help going down the road, but I'm confident we'll get it as we demonstrate further progress."

In time, that assessment could prove accurate; but the road may well be shorter than the bishop apparently thinks it is, and his own position, meanwhile, seems to be eroding rapidly. □

A recent mark of the new level in the conflict was the downing by a ZAPU ground-to-air missile of an Air Rhodesia passenger plane on September 3. The plane was crossing a ZAPU operational area on a regular flight from the lakeside tourist resort of Kariba to Salisbury when it was hit.

Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU co-leader of the Patriotic Front, said in Lusaka two days later that ZAPU had carried out

the attack, in which 38 of the 56 passengers died, but he denied the Rhodesian allegation that his movement had then slain 10 of 18 survivors on the ground. All the dead had been killed in the crash, he said, adding that the Viscount turbo-prop had been believed to be carrying troops and war materiel.

### Roads Vulnerable

Smith's troops have been unable to guarantee security along the roads for many months, but air travel has been regarded by white Rhodesians as perfectly safe. Hence the attack generated enormous anxiety among the settlers, and Smith responded initially by dismissing as "wild rumors" reports that the plane had been shot down.

The first official version was that the plane had crashed because of engine failure, and had then been attacked by guerrillas.

Eventually forced to admit that the plane had been shot down, Smith attempted to play on the white hysteria following the incident by promising new "get tough" measures. His promised elections, in terms of the so-called internal settlement, faded further into the future, and there were demands that he end the "secret" talks he had been holding with Nkomo.

It seems unlikely that Smith will be able to deliver on his get tough promises. His army is already severely stretched, and the war is spreading into new areas. A declaration of martial law seemed little more than a propaganda gesture, but officials in Lusaka expressed concern that Smith might try to undermine ZAPU's support structure by terror attacks on Zambia, in which there are large Zimbabwe refugee camps.

### Salisbury Attacked

A striking indication of the war escalation are the actions taking place inside Salisbury itself. Guerrilla attacks are no longer confined to the countryside, but during the past two months have moved into Salisbury itself, a town which western journalists were wont to describe as a peaceful enclave.

Heavy press censorship makes it difficult to obtain full reports. But even the Salisbury police confirmed "fairly widespread" police operations in Highfield Township after night-time shooting had been heard emanating from the township. The incident was reported as a police hunt for guerrillas who are infiltrating increasingly into the towns.

It was earlier reported that three guerrillas were shot dead in Highfield

and two others captured at the end of July, while three ZAPU guerrillas were reported to have staged attacks on a beerhall, a store and a gas station in Glen Norah Township a few weeks later.

### Miners Strike

Not only guerrillas are being shot by Rhodesian police. In mid-August, four striking black miners were killed at Mangula copper mine, owned by the South African-based Messina Development Corporation. Censorship makes it impossible to judge the full extent of the action, but official reports indicated that 3,000 demonstrating miners were shot at after ignoring orders to disperse. As the miners had recently received a pay raise, it seems that other, more directly political, motives were at issue.

The extent of disruption of administrative control in the rural areas can

be seen in the large number of schools that have closed in recent months.

In a debate in the Rhodesian parliament in mid-August, the number of schools either closed or abandoned, was set at 868. The authorities now admit that many students have left the country, although they still insist students do not join the guerrillas voluntarily, but are 'abducted.'

Not only the blacks are leaving. Whites are emigrating in ever-increasing numbers. While the official figure for the white population is still set at 263,000, the actual figure is less than 210,000. The government now admits to a monthly exodus of 1,000 whites, but observers in Salisbury estimate the real figure to be two to three times larger. It is also rumored that over 37,000 applications for emigration allowances have been made to the Rhodesian Reserve Bank in recent months. □

## Nkomo and Smith — Another Round of Secret Talks

The secret meetings between Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and Patriotic Front co-leader Joshua Nkomo, which took place in Zambia in mid-August, appear to have damaged Rhodesia's internal political situation as well as the prospects for a successful diplomatic effort by the two Western powers involved. They appear also to have increased tensions inside the Patriotic Front.

In Salisbury, the apparent failure of Smith's demarche has left the transitional regime even weaker and more divided than it had been; on the international front, the meetings were a gamble that has left an all-party conference sponsored by Britain and the US in serious doubt.

There were two such meetings, according to news reports, one on August 14 and another on August 20. When news of them leaked to the press shortly afterwards, there were immediate denials on all sides, then admission by both Nkomo and Smith that the sessions had indeed been held. The two men still give widely divergent accounts of the content of the meetings.

The earlier session, held at Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda's country residence, was apparently between Smith and Nkomo alone. But the second session, some news reports say, briefly included the Patriotic Front's other co-leader, Robert Mugabe.

### Nigerian Role

Mugabe had flown to Lusaka with a number of other ZANU central committee members for routine meetings of the Front's coordinating committee, which is trying to forge political and military unity in the alliance. But when he arrived in the Zambian capital, Mugabe was immediately taken to Lagos, Nigeria, supposedly for meetings with Brigadier Joseph N. Garba, until recently Nigeria's foreign minister. (The West African nation has played an increasingly important role in the Zimbabwean issue recently, some say as an African ally to the US-British position.)

In Lagos, Mugabe was told of the sessions between Smith and Nkomo, and here reports in the press have differed. Some say that Mugabe refused to meet with Smith, although Nkomo says that he made the ZANU leader's presence a pre-condition of any further meetings with Smith; other accounts say that Mugabe did attend the session on returning to Lusaka from Lagos, but that he walked out soon after it began.

Mugabe was also told that contact between Smith and Nkomo had been going on for some months prior to the Rhodesian leader's trip to Zambia.

It is well known that Smith regards Nkomo as the most able politician among Zimbabwean blacks—including those in Smith's interim regime.

And it is also known that Mugabe is viewed as far more radical—and therefore less desirable—than Nkomo. As David Martin pointed out in *The Observer* shortly after news of the sessions was disclosed, it must be taken as a measure of Smith's desperation that he agreed to include Mugabe in the talks, whether or not the ZANU leader actually attended.

### Splitting Effort

After admitting that the secret meetings had taken place, Nkomo claimed that Smith had come to Zambia to surrender power to the Patriotic Front. A far more probable explanation is that Smith was attempting to split the Patriotic Front by inviting Nkomo to join the executive council in Salisbury as head of the interim regime. For his part, Smith said simply that the talks were "exploratory."

It was later reported from London that the effort was sponsored by British Foreign Secretary David Owen and had the approval of President Kaunda. As part of Owen's Rhodesian settlement strategy, the Smith-Nkomo talks were thus more than likely designed to split the Front, since it was disclosed several months ago, when transcripts of a meeting between Owen and a black member of Smith's government were publicized that Owen has viewed this as a desirable political option.

It was not clear whether these events will have an effect on unity efforts in the Front, although Mugabe was reportedly as angry at Nkomo's action as he was a year ago, when he learned through the press of another secret visit to Zambia by Smith. The developments do appear to have caused a rift—or emphasized an already existing division—within the front-line states. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere was reportedly very angry over Kaunda's approval of the talks without consulting with other front-liners; Kaunda's action was said to have been the subject of an important meeting among the five leaders after the news broke.

The apparent failure of the talks was said to be an important factor in the decision taken several weeks later in London by Foreign Office and State Department officials—to adopt a lower profile in the Rhodesian issue for the time being. The significance of this decision is not clear. On one hand, it may indicate that Washington and London feel that they have lost control of the Rhodesian situation, and that the war between Salisbury and the Front can no longer be contained. Although there was no immediate evidence of it, however, the US-British decision could also mean that Owen and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance are

satisfied that Smith may ultimately succeed in outflanking Mugabe on the diplomatic front and winning the kind of "moderate" settlement with the Front—or part of it—that the West has all along sought. If that were the case, admitting diplomatic failure would have been a convenient out for the Western powers; but as *Southern Africa* went to press this month, the bargaining situation in Rhodesia was more clouded than it has been for some time.

What was somewhat more evident after the talks was the deteriorating political situation in Rhodesia itself. Shortly after the talks, Nkomo guerrillas downed an Air Rhodesia passenger plane, laying Smith open to renewed attacks from ultra-right political opponents for attempting to bargain with Nkomo. In defense of his right flank at home Smith declared limited martial law early in September, but the combined effect of the talks and the plane incident had been costly for him.

Black members of the interim government were also rapidly losing support. The Nkomo talks were also an indication to supporters of Muzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau that the interim regime itself has no security of tenure, and is still subject to the political strategies of Smith and the West. □

## ANGOLA

# Neto Seeks Peace with Zaire

It was a tumultuous welcome. Hundreds of thousands of Zairian citizens lined the 19 miles from Ndjili Airport to Mobutu Sese Seko's presidential palace in Kinshasa on August 19 to greet Agostinho Neto, the president of Angola and leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Neto was coming to Zaire for the first time in over 16 years. During those years MPLA had fought tenaciously for the independence of Angola, Zaire's neighbor to the south, without the aid and most of the time with the active hostility of Mobutu. But it seemed possible that this day might mark the beginning of a new period.

The Kinshasa meeting was the third between the two leaders in five weeks. On July 19 and 20 Mobutu and Neto held talks in Khartoum, Sudan, where

they were attending the OAU summit conference.

### Fruitful Talks

Bilateral discussions which followed resulted in an agreement to establish diplomatic relations and to reopen the Benguela Railroad. This strategic transport link runs across Angola to Zaire and landlocked Zambia and had been closed since the outbreak of war in Angola in 1975.

After his Kinshasa visit, Neto described the talks as "fruitful" and said that the initial discussions, which had included economic, commercial, cultural, transportation, aeronautical, maritime, and railroad matters, were "an important step." The accords would not only affect local purposes, Neto said, but "all of the continent.

For it is all the peoples who will benefit from the accords established today, contributing to true independence."

### Railway Reopens

The question of the Benguela railroad was a primary concern at each meeting. Contrary to Western press reports, the railroad has been running throughout Angola since the summer of 1976, although it has been attacked, but not crippled, by UNITA guerrillas. It is not yet known precisely how much damage the line in Zaire suffered during this spring's Shaba uprising. But estimates are that the bridge across the border connecting the two lines will be repaired quickly.

That could mean that Zambia and Zaire's copper and cobalt begin rolling on the line to the Atlantic port of  
*continued on page 17*



# Overview

## After the Namibia Collapse

The United States almost pulled it off: a settlement in Namibia that would have avoided further war, included SWAPO in the future independent Namibian government, and left Western influence and South African economic control essentially intact. Almost.

The obstacle to this nifty little gambit was South Africa. The apartheid regime had long delayed any sort of settlement in mineral-rich Namibia. Now that it was on the brink of giving up the territory, it could see the future clearly. Despite the political and military advantages given South Africa by the western clan, Pretoria said that ultimately power would fall to SWAPO, whom the South African Defense Minister Pieter Botha only a few weeks ago described to a national party congress as a "gang of Marxist terrorists," and "the forces of darkness." So, after almost two years of diplomatic wrangling South Africa pulled out, announcing it will proceed with its own election plan.

There is a crystal clear logic to the Afrikaner position. If the Carter administration views the struggle for southern Africa as a problem of managing change and to maintaining its influence, the Afrikaners see it as a fight for survival. Namibia is the last buffer that remains between white supremacist South Africa and the on-rushing tide of African liberation. Why give it up now? Why make the last stand with the enemy only 500 miles from Johannesburg? The choice is simply to fight now or fight later.

It can't help but appear that Andrew Young and Donald McHenry, his second-in-command at the US mission to the United Nations, have badly misinterpreted the flow of events. The struggle for southern Africa is ultimately the fight for South Africa itself. US policy has been, in some sense, purely hit-and-miss—an attempt to solve peripheral problems (Namibia and Zimbabwe) without a strategy for dealing with the fundamental one, South Africa. A policy of simple buying time will always eventually run out of time.

From San Juan Hill to Da Nang Americans have always exercised power arrogantly in foreign policy. For years the US maintained its interests in southern Africa through what seemed to be unassailable surrogates, the subcontinent's white rulers. The Nixon and then the Ford administration in the Kissinger area underestimated the strength of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau and thus overestimated the power of Portuguese fascism. Shocked by the coup in Portugal in 1974, US policy has really never recovered. It has been overtaken by events in southern Africa ever since.

So far the US is not admitting that anything has gone wrong. The UN should go ahead with a Security Council

meeting to accept the report of the special representative. By that time, the State Department hopes it can revive talks with the new South African government. Maybe South Africa can be returned to the negotiating table. In the meantime, SWAPO or the African nations at the UN should not take any drastic measures, such as escalating military action or calling for economic sanctions.

Certainly there is the possibility that the US can again engage South Africa's guarded participation in a UN transition plan, particularly a plan significantly scaled down from its present specifications. But we think this possibility is remote, and actually has been remote all along.

So what will the US do? If the past is any guide, the US looks to a "third force" as a solution. In this case, that would call for a moderate African figure, untainted by association with the South Africans, who could give a future government the appearance of independence. No such obvious figure exists in Rhodesia as the Patriotic Front closes in on Salisbury; there are several outside possibilities in Namibia, but the effort to install them "legitimately" is likely to be too late.

The fact is that the effort of the US and other European powers to forestall the ascent to power of SWAPO, and the Patriotic Front, have failed. In the process both guerrilla groups have gained in strength. The options that are left to the west are largely military.

If South Africa is unwilling to allow the UN to decolonize Namibia it is even more improbable that it will permit the Patriotic Front a military victory in Rhodesia. At this point no one should discount South African military intervention in Rhodesia, even as it reinforces the northern border of Namibia. If South Africa is to have a fight, it will not only attack the liberation movements. Mozambique and Angola will become even greater targets than they are now.

Where does this leave the US? It would be uncomfortable indeed for the Carter administration to involve itself with or even tacitly support a South African-created "independent" government of Namibia. It would be more embarrassing, of course, for the administration, especially for Andrew Young to cast a veto in the Security Council against economic sanctions. But the US (and Western) stake in South Africa, economic and strategic, is immense. In the end the US will see itself as having little choice.

Of course, the US may not have to lead the way in supporting South Africa. France (or West Germany) is certainly willing to play that role. But no one should argue that the US is not close behind.

—M.S.

# Ba Ye Zwa — the people live

*Ba Ye Zwa—the people live—is a direct encounter with the oppression and brutality that 18 million black people in South Africa experience daily. Judy Seidman has penciled a series of drawings of men, women and children living and working under apartheid. At the same time she has included news-clips from South African newspapers, passages from South African writers and her own writings and poems to further illuminate the message of her drawings. Ba Ye Zwa, published by South End Press, Boston, Mass., is a powerful depiction of the humanity, the pain and the courage of the African people in South Africa who endure and challenge the cruelty of the society in which they live. Judy Seidman is a painter, born in the United States, and has spent much of her life in west and southern Africa. She has created an important book, a beautiful book—a book that reflects the truth about South Africa and those who are its victims, as the excerpts on these pages show.*

**Soweto**

A playground  
Where hippos bark  
And nylons rip into the crowd  
And children die  
For hope to be born.

J.S.

Slang: *Hippo*—an armored truck which carries riot police;  
*nylons*—Black Marias so full of arrested people  
that they burst at the seams



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The homelands have a more sinister side. On the one hand, they are a labor pool for industry; on the other, they are a rubbish heap for the people industry has no use for—the old, the sick, the very young. By law, if you cannot work you must go to your homeland, and there you are dumped. Sometimes there are “resettlement camps” of tents or huts for groups who are moved to a countryside that they do not know. Sometimes people are just left on the land, and told to survive off relatives. Schools are bad or non-existent, medical facilities the same. Some people survive. Many die. The homelands policy is a policy of polite extermination. Gas chambers are not needed when people can simply starve to death.



The most common type of house in Soweto is the 51/6. Although there are several variations on the standard model, it is basically a four-room house (with one room serving as the kitchen and another as a living-cum-bedroom).

Further details of the 51/6 include:

- Steel outside doors but not internal doors
- Outside WC
- Corrugated iron or asbestos roof; no ceilings
- Cement floors
- Windows in every room
- No stove, basin or running water in Kitchen. Tenants expected to install them at their own cost. No hot water unless house electrified (installment cost paid by tenant).
- Size: Stand—12 m by 22 m (40 x 70 feet). Rooms—length and breadth varies from about 3 m to about 4 m (9 ft 6 inches x 12 ft 6 inches)...

Another prototype model house in Soweto is the 51/9, an improved version of the 51/6. The improvement consists of an internal bathroom and lavatory (although the “de luxe” version has five rooms instead of four).

*Rand Daily Mail*  
May 2, 1977

# update

## South Africa, UN at Odds Again

Longstanding differences between South Africa and the UN over Namibia have surfaced again, damaging perhaps fatally the independence plan worked out during the past eighteen months of multilateral negotiations.

Following former prime minister John Vorster's September 20 statement rejecting the UN's proposals for implementing the UN plan, South Africa has been threatened with both sanctions and war. The Namibian independence movement, SWAPO, has pledged a stepped-up guerrilla campaign against the South Africans, and the Africa Group at the UN will press for some form of sanctions against Pretoria by the world body.

South Africa's primary objection to the UN plan is the size of the proposed peace-keeping force, set at 7500.

Observers believe that the South Africans are now likely to proceed with their plan to hand over power to a Namibian government excluding SWAPO.

The next move on Namibia is but one of the several key policy questions that will confront South Africa's new prime minister, following Vorster's resignation for reasons of health on September 20. Other controversial issues include police handling of the Crossroads squatter camp near Cape Town and labor law reforms pushed by the verligte faction of the ruling party.

## Apartheid Insurance

Although many American companies are finding their South African investments more controversial and less profitable than they used to be, one US giant has just acquired a substantial stake in South Africa's expanding insurance industry.

Frank B. Hall (FBH), a New York-based insurance broking firm, recently concluded a deal for takeover of Britain's Leslie and Godwin (L&G). The arrangement gives FBH part ownership in one of South Africa's leading insurance firms, Nedsual Insurance Brokers, which L&G has held in partnership with South Africa's fourth largest bank.

The American firm's entry into the South African market comes at a time

when the insurance industry is preparing to offer a new type of high-risk policy, covering riots, bombings, and urban unrest.

## Carter Faces SA Trade Decision

A White House task force is expected to report early this month on a proposal to limit purchases of a major South African export, ferrochrome.

The curb was recommended by the International Trade Commission, an independent government agency, in an effort to protect the American ferrochrome industry from foreign competition.

Imports of ferrochrome, which is used in the production of stainless steel, have risen drastically in the past year, and domestic producers of the material accuse South Africa of "predatory pricing," selling below cost.

Presidential Special Trade Representative Robert Strauss opposed an earlier ITC recommendation for a 30% duty on imported ferrochrome, and he is expected to veto as well the current move for a 32% duty.

## Nerve Gas at Cassinga?

According to France's *Le Nouvel Observateur* there is evidence that the South African troops who attacked a Namibian refugee camp at Cassinga, Angola, on May 4 used bombs containing a paralyzing nerve gas.

Angolan and Cuban troops who were the first to arrive at the scene are said to have been intrigued by the strange positions of some of the victims. Later, in checking the cause of death, it was found that many of the deceased, including SWAPO guerrillas assigned to guard the camp, had been killed by a single shot in the neck, seemingly without resistance. Survivors then testified that these victims were in a state of paralysis when shot by South African troops.

Angola, which has not yet made any official charges, is reportedly still collecting evidence with the help of Soviet and Cuban experts.

## Angola Ups Oil Control

Angola has just issued a new law regulating the petroleum industry. It

states that "all liquid and gaseous hydrocarbon deposits existing in the subsoil or on the continental shelf of the People's Republic of Angola are the property of the Angolan people."

Exploitation of these resources is to come gradually under greater Angolan control through the state-owned SON-ANGOL. The law says SONANGOL holds concessionary rights for research and production of petroleum products but may work with competent, experienced, and financially able foreign firms under mutually advantageous terms.

Gulf Oil, which already produces 95,000 barrels of oil a day through an Angolan subsidiary, has not yet signed an agreement with the Angolan government, although discussions have been under way for about a year. The existing offshore operations in Cabinda are not expected to be affected by the new regulations.

SONANGOL already works in cooperation with Texaco and with Petrangol (Portuguese and Belgian interests) in oil producing areas of Angola inland from the capital city of Luanda.

## Botswana Student Unrest

Botswana police fired tear gas into a crowd of demonstrating students on the university campus near the capital of Gaborone last week in a successful effort to keep the protesters from marching into the city.

The students were angry at a government decision to prosecute a platoon commander for the killing of a British tourist and two South Africans. The three were slain after being taken into custody by a unit of the Botswana defense force in the tense eastern border area.

The tough measures against the university protesters, a correspondent reports, may be part of a general crackdown on left-wing activity. The government recently impounded passports of a group preparing to fly to Cuba for the youth festival there.

## Rhodesia Journalist Kidnapped

Black journalist Justin Nyoka, one of the best known reporters in Rhodesia, is still missing after being abducted by armed men from his farm three weeks ago. Both the Rhodesian government and the Patriotic Front have denied responsibility for the incident, and both have pointed the finger of blame at the opposing side.

As a reporter for the BBC, French national radio, and the *Zambia Daily Mail*, Nyoka had written a number of stories unfavorable to the internal settlement in recent months.

UPDATE is written by Africa News Service, which also publishes a weekly digest available to individuals for \$20 per year. Address correspondence to P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.

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Lobito before the end of September. This used to be the quickest and cheapest export route for Zambian and Zairian minerals. At one point Zambia was sending over half its copper down the line, and it would like to do the same today, as it has over 120,000 tons, more than two months' production, stuck on the Tanzam (now called Tazara) railway to Dar es Salaam, an extremely overtaxed port. Zaire sends most of its copper south through Rhodesia to South African ports.

### Western Attitudes

Just as the immense crowd in Kinshasa welcomed Neto by flying MPLA flags and shouting the MPLA slogan, "The struggle continues, victory is certain," most Western observers, in government and the press were enthusiastic about the agreement between the two former enemies.

Most Western reports claim that US diplomatic efforts were largely responsible for the reconciliation, and that Angola, tiring of "dependence" on the Soviet Union, is particularly anxious to establish closer ties to the West. Neto did tell the press during the OAU summit that he had "no reservations" about establishing diplomatic relations with the US, but he reminded reporters that this has been Angola's position since its independence. Neto also added that the US "will have to take us as we are, and not in any other way."

"The US cannot oblige us to change," he said.

President Carter has stated publicly—and apparently the deputy head of the US mission to the UN, Donald McHenry, reiterated the position when he visited Luanda earlier this summer—that the establishment of diplomatic ties would depend on a reduction of the Cuban forces in Angola.

Neto and other MPLA officials have emphasized that the Cubans would leave only when Angola was able to ensure its own national defence and could fill, with its own citizens, the gaps in technical manpower caused by the departure of over 400,000 Portuguese.

### Strengthening Security

It is in the area of national defence and security that there is so much optimism about the agreement in the West, and so much unexpressed anxiety in Africa. Under the agreement, both countries will respect each other's existing borders and will seek to prevent rebel groups from crossing into each other's territory. The two countries agreed to set up a border control

commission, which is expected to be composed of observers from Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria and Rwanda, under the auspices of the OAU.

Luanda has already announced that it will disarm any Angolan based forces of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) which led the recent uprisings in Zaire's Shaba province. Angola is also moving the 250,000 Zairian refugees in its territory further away from the sensitive border area.



Angola's President Neto

*Afrique-Asie*

Both Angola and Cuba disclaimed responsibility for the Shaba uprisings. Sources close to the Cuban government report that Havana is said to believe that the FNLC's actions have been poorly carried out while jeopardizing Angolan sovereignty and providing an excuse for Western intervention in Africa.

The thinking in Luanda, according to sources close to the Angolan government, is similar. Government strategizing, according to these sources, goes this way. We know we didn't organize the uprising in Zaire, and most of the world knows it. The propaganda against us was nothing but a pretext to intensify preparations for anti-Angolan destabilization. After more than 15 years of liberation struggle, we are quite aware that the revolution can't be exported. Our most important task now is the restoration of our economy and the assurance of the most elementary well-being of our people. For this, we must have peace and true security.

Well placed observers also view this reasoning as the motivation behind MPLA's support for the recent "settlement" in Namibia. Despite South Afri-

can maneuvering and obvious flaws in the Western proposals, MPLA officials believe SWAPO will win an election if it is held now in Namibia, thus providing greater security for Angola on its southern border.

### No Guarantees

Angola's leaders know, of course, that there is no guarantee that Mobutu, or his western backers, will carry out their part of the bargain. Both South Africa and Zaire have been important bases of operation for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. The major Shaba mining center of Kolwezi was reported to be UNITA's general headquarters in early 1978, while Namibian church leaders have recently accused the South African army of recruiting UNITA soldiers into its own ranks.

As South Africa has not yet committed itself to leaving Namibia, and has done nothing to curb UNITA activities, the threat from the south remains.

### US Interest

The US is reported to have assured Neto that it will not now provide fresh covert support to UNITA despite plans to do so at the time of the Shaba crisis. This may well be the position of some US forces which see the combination of economic and political chaos in Zaire as threatening severely the security of massive Western investments there, and would like to see a period of stability in the area. The International Monetary Fund and a private bank consortium led by Citibank of New York have gained tight controls over Zaire's economy, and are said to be pressing for measures to ensure greater political stability in the region as a precondition for further credit to the already deeply indebted Zairian economy.

It is certain, though, that there are powerful forces in the US which agree with the South African view of the Zaire-Angola negotiations as appeasement.

One South African newsmagazine, *To The Point*, lashed out at the US State Department for its dovishness, remarking that "the Russians must be laughing all the way from Moscow to Havana."

Not all those in official circles in Washington—nor even all those in the Carter administration—will take the agreement completely seriously. At least some CIA members must agree with *To The Point* that "the odds are that, deal or no deal, Zaire will remain a major staging-post for recruits, foreign advisers, envoys and supplies" for anti-MPLA forces. □

# Resistance and Repression

Given its past record, South Africa's white supremacist government could hardly have come up with a more fitting memorial. On the eve of the first anniversary of Steve Biko's murder September 12, police rounded up 11 of the slain leader's closest friends and relatives. Among those thrown into jail under the Internal Security Act, which allows suspects to be held indefinitely without trial, were Biko's sister and brother-in-law.

Even before these arrests, the government had been pressing ahead with another ironic tribute to Steve Biko's legacy—the trial of 11 young Soweto students on charges of "sedition."

The 11 students were all members of the Soweto Students Representative Council. All are between the ages of 17 and 24. And all now face possible sentences of life imprisonment or death by hanging for their part in the 1976 Soweto uprisings.

According to the government's 100-page indictment, the 11 students' seditious activity consisted of trying to mobilize black students with the "ultimate object of contributing towards the liberation of blacks." For that, certainly, Steve Biko would have been proud of them. And in fact, the indictment cites the South African Student Movement, high school counterpart of the South African Student Organization which Biko was instrumental in founding, as the main ideological force behind the uprising.

SASM and SASO were both among the 18 Black Consciousness Movement organizations banned in October 1977. For the anniversary of that wave of arrests and bannings, too, the trial constituted a symbolic government commemoration.

## The Struggle Continues

If the government marked the passing of a year since Biko's death and the October crackdown with continuing repression, other reports from South Africa make it clear that blacks are honoring the tradition of dead and banned leaders and organizations in the most fitting way possible—through continuing struggle.

An honest appraisal of events during recent months cannot dismiss the genuine damage inflicted on the liberation struggle a year ago. The murder of a leader who had sought to avoid



Military training for women in a country that still regards them as the "weaker" sex means only one thing: fear of being overwhelmed by the liberation forces.

personal and organizational rivalries, the arrest of most other recognized leaders, the banning of almost all activist organizations, all this repression has taken its toll. It can be measured in many ways—in increased factional disputes, in difficulties in organization, communication and coordination. But there has been no measurable decrease in commitment, courage of clandestine activity. Quite the contrary.

In fact, recent reports indicate that there has been a marked increase in the number of armed actions undertaken inside South Africa. Perhaps the most dramatic report came from the African National Congress on August 11, detailing a battle between guerrillas of the ANC's Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) and South African troops on August 1. For more than four hours, the ANC stated, "a small detachment unit of the gallant sons and daughters of South Africa" fought both South African troops and soldiers from the BophuthaTswana "bantustan" who were rushed in as reinforcements. And when it was over, 10 South African soldiers lay dead on a battlefield less than 75 miles from the South African capital, Pretoria, while several more had been injured. According to the report one guerrilla was captured before "at dusk our heroic fighters broke off from enemy encirclement and engagement."

The South African government insisted that the ANC report was "devoid of any truth." But a report in *The Citizen* newspaper confirmed much of the guerrillas account... with one noteworthy exception. The newspaper

account mentioned nothing whatsoever about South African casualties. "Police from South Africa's elite Task Force and Counterinsurgency Unit (TSCU), assisted by the BophuthaTswana police, fought a running gun battle on Tuesday afternoon with a terrorist gang near the Botswana border," the newspaper stated. "One terrorist was arrested, another believed to have been wounded. By last night no further trace of the men had been found but police were still actively searching the area which is hilly and bush-covered."

Unable to locate the escaped guerrillas, the Defense Forces followed up with one of the time-honored strategies of counter-insurgency—they turned their fire on the civilian population. Helicopter gunships were called in and "ceaseless and aimless gunfire from low-flying helicopters plowed the area," the ANC reported. Meanwhile other helicopters swept over nearby villages squawking through loudspeakers that the guerrillas were in fact "ritual murderers" to be hunted out and destroyed.

It seems highly unlikely that many black South Africans will be deceived by such proclamations. But the effort to label political resistance as criminal activity has become a constant in the regime's official statements. And it has proved quite successful in camouflaging signs of continuing resistance that do leak into the press.

## Policeman Attacked

For instance, on June 26, hated black policeman "Hlubi" Chaphi was shot down in his home in Soweto. A



frontpage article in the black newspaper, *The Post*, pointed out that Chaphi was "feared by both gangsters and the ordinary Soweto man," and that he "played a leading role in suppressing unrest after the 1976 disturbances and has been the target of student hatred and abuse." But Chaphi's superiors rushed into print the next day with offers of a reward and assertions that the killing might well have been a "gangster's revenge" rather than a political assassination. Curiously, the killing followed the pattern of three other reported political assassinations of prominent policemen and police informers in the last year. And it was followed a few weeks later by the gunning down of two policemen outside Central Police Headquarters in Johannesburg's John Vorster Square.

Other incidents also reveal the extent to which the government has been suppressing information about both resistance activities and its own repressive response. After months in which reports of deaths in detention had halted completely, abruptly and somewhat suspiciously, along came one such death that couldn't be covered up. On July 11, nineteen-year-old Lungile Tabalaza was dumped out of a window on the fifth floor of the Port Elizabeth Security headquarters in full public view. Justice Minister Jimmy Kruger hastened to explain the next day that Tabalaza was *not* actually a political detainee. Rather, he had been arrested on criminal charges for "a petrol bomb attack on two vehicles and robbery of the drivers, and setting fire to a school in the New Brighton Township on July 8." But the explanation only added to confusion and suspicions surrounding the case. For one thing, none of these acts had ever been reported previously. And for another, if they were indeed non-political, they would not explain how Tabalaza came into the hands of the same security police unit which killed Steve Biko.

The government's own investigation into the incident answered neither of these questions, although it did concede that proper police procedures "may not have been strictly adhered to." But the government did take unusually strong action against the offending officers—the commanding officer of the security police unit was transferred to another post and two of his subordinates were demoted to the criminal division.

### School Boycott

Meanwhile, other signs of continuing resistance do manage to slip through the information blockade.

Even seemingly neutral statistics, such as figures for school enrollment in Soweto, contain evidence of ongoing resistance. For example, the latest official count shows that enrollment in Soweto secondary schools has plummeted from over 36,000 before the June 1976 rebellion to only 14,000 this year, a drop of more than 60 percent. The original demonstrations in Soweto were aimed directly against the system of "Bantu education" (apartheid's version of separate and unequal schooling). And a year-long boycott of the Soweto schools has been followed by a substantial exodus of students to attend



# STOP

## THE EXECUTION OF SOLOMON MAHLANGU

MACSA

Postcard distributed by Madison support group: reverse carries message addressed to Vorster.

classes in the black "homelands" in the countryside.

As a clandestine pamphlet which appeared recently on the streets of Soweto argues, "While the system boasts there is peace, law, and order, our schools are open but the abominable system of Bantu education is still being forced down our throats."

"Nothing has change for the better," the pamphlet added. "Our leaders are detained, imprisoned or banned . . . Empty promises have been made about houses and work, but rents are increasing, unemployment is rising, sales tax is going to hit us, people are going hungry."

### Stepped-Up Repression

Black leaders are indeed "detained, imprisoned or banned." Latest figures from the International Defense and Aid Fund place the number of political prisoners at 440, with at least 650 more people being held in indefinite detention without trial. A year after the massive wave of arrests last October, many of those picked up remain behind bars. Others have been released . . . only to be banned or slapped back in jail as soon as they ventured to open their mouths.

The best known example has been Dr. Nthato Motlana, who as head of Soweto's Committee of Ten was an

acknowledged leader of South Africa's largest city until he was jailed last October. Motlana's imprisonment resulted not from any radicalism, but from his consistent opposition to race discrimination and apartheid. Released in a gesture of liberalization just before the government attempted to stage elections in Soweto last spring, Motlana showed little willingness to hold his tongue. After he led a crowd celebrating the anniversary of the June 1976 uprising in chants of "Power is ours!" he was threatened with permanent detention should he address more meetings. And just before he was due to speak to another meeting, a university gathering scheduled for September 7, Motlana was handed a one-month banning order, specifically prohibiting him from attending any meeting at which principles of government are discussed or criticized.

Motlana may well have been spared a stiffer penalty only because of his prominence. Certainly other activists haven't been so fortunate. For instance, Curtis Nkondo, chairman of the Soweto Teacher Action Committee, was finally released from detention on July 8 after his October 19 detention. Just five days later he was thrown back into detention.

Once in detention, prisoners of the South African regime simply disappear. They are not allowed visitors, and the whereabouts and often even the fact of their detention can be kept secret. And while reported deaths in detention have fallen sharply, other reports suggest that a detainee's disappearance still runs a chance of becoming permanent. For instance, *The Post* recently reported the case of "a Soweto mother [who] was shocked last week when police brought clothes her son wore when he disappeared in March last year. . . . Police say he was released from detention about three months ago. . . . When the police brought her son's clothing last Monday, she says, 'I was told he had long been released. They told me they were not prepared to answer questions and went away.'"

So while the official toll of 42 deaths for political detainees is appalling, it is probably also grossly understated.

The high mortality rate extends equally to prisoners held on other than political charges. Last year, for instance, 128 are reported to have died according to the government minister in charge. And that does not include the official killings, the executions by a country that uses the death penalty more than any other nation in the world. Last year, 90 people were exe-

cuted in South Africa. According to a report in the British newspaper *The Guardian*, a South African professor has calculated that "South Africa accounted for 90 percent of all executions in the Western World." His definition of the Western World included India, Japan and South America, but his estimate did not take into account the death squad executions in Argentina.

### Solomon Mahlangu

One case, in particular, has focused increased attention recently on the use of the death penalty in South Africa. Solomon Mahlangu, a 21-year-old

former Pretoria school student, was sentenced to the gallows last March by an all-white court. Mahlangu had joined the banned African National Congress soon after the June 1976 uprisings and had escaped from the country to undergo military training. Within days after he returned to South Africa, Mahlangu and two companions were stopped by police in central Johannesburg. In an exchange of gunfire that followed, two white garage mechanics were killed. And for those deaths, Mahlangu is now sentenced to hang, even though the judge accepted that he had no part in the actual shoot-

ing. Perhaps that was because his co-accused, Mondy Motloutse, could not stand trial. He was so severely tortured by the police that he suffered irreversible brain damage and was declared unfit. Or perhaps it was because Mahlangu has held to his principles. As the sentence was read, he raised his fist and shouted "Amandla" (power).

While supporters of the liberation struggle in South Africa are mobilizing support for Mahlangu and other freedom fighters, the white supremacists are showing increasing signs of strain in the face of ongoing resistance.

## washington notes

### Congress Moves to Lift Sanctions

Congressional right wingers began a whirlwind campaign in June to lift sanctions against Rhodesia and to give legitimacy to the internal settlement. They also hoped to win election points by linking the Carter Administration with what they termed the "Marxist-backed" Patriotic Front.

The right-wing strategy began with an attempt by Senator Helms (D-N.C.) to lift sanctions on June 28, and culminated in an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Bill by Senators Case and Javits that provided for the lifting of sanctions if the President determined that "free and fair elections" witnessed by international observers had been held and there had been an attempt to negotiate in "good faith" at an all-parties conference. The Case-Javits approach proved to be a blessing for "moderate" members of Congress as they clamored to "vote on something."

On the House side, Congressman Ichord (D-Mo.) ran a skillful game. Through some highly-polished maneuvers he and his conservative colleagues were able to pass an amendment which had even less teeth than the Case-Javits amendment. Where the Case-Javits amendment called for "free and fair elections with international observers" and negotiations at an all-parties conference, Congressman Ichord dismissed the need for international observation and stated that good faith in negotiation had already been shown.

The right wing's big bomb was none other than the sometime black nationalist stalwart, one-time sanctions advocate, Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Sounding like a 1950's recording of Joe McCarthy, the Bishop added a bit of harmony to Helms' song when he stated that Rhodesia was in danger of being overpowered by "forces determined to create Godless, anti-Christ, one-party Marxist regimes."

In the background stood the Administration, a bit unsure as to which song to sing as the right wing continued its assault on President Carter's foreign policy. The "get tough on communism" theme which Carter had emphasized during the Zaire crisis in May had now backfired, damaging his

Rhodesia policy. With the Administration talk of Soviet weapons and Cuban troops in Africa, Muzorewa's voice in the wilderness became the right wing's clarion call, which Administration officials could not counter.

The Senate-House conference, in mid-August, passed language very similar to that in the Case-Javits amendment, and this compromise was eventually endorsed by both Houses in September. The amendment as adopted states that sanctions cannot be enforced after December 31, 1978, if the President determines that two conditions have been met: "the government of Rhodesia has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate in good faith at an all parties conference held under international auspices on all relevant issues"; and "a government has been installed by free elections in which all political and population groups participated freely with observation by impartial internationally-recognized observers."

### House Looks at Investment in South Africa

The House International Relations Committee is holding extensive hearings on a bill that would regulate US investment in South Africa. The hearings focus on HR 12463, introduced by Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), which would require US companies in South Africa to follow fair employment practices under penalty of losing export licenses for South Africa, US tax credits, federal government contracts and Export-Import Bank financing. It would also ban new investment and bank loans to South Africa, with the exception of the substantial category of reinvestment of profits.

Several major investors are strongly against the legislation. Ford Motor, General Motors, National Cash Register and Control Data testified against this or any other effort to legislate on investment in South Africa, saying companies should be left alone to take voluntary steps to improve their labor practices.

Administration witnesses also opposed the bill. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Richard Moose, explained in diplomatic lingo why nothing should be done:

A major shift in the US government's position with respect to US private investments in South Africa would represent a fundamental change in our policy toward South Africa. . . . I hope that positive changes in South Africa's racial policies will obviate the need for any such action. . . . We do not feel, for various reasons, that now is the best time [for] acting in the economic area.

Commerce and Treasury Department witnesses were more vehement, describing what Rep. Cavanaugh of Nebraska called "an economic chamber of horrors" if the legis-

In early September, the government appealed to South Africans and foreign businessmen in the country to train, arm and operate their own private armies. Although the government's own military budget has shot up 300 percent in the last five years, Pretoria explained candidly, "We haven't enough police and defense forces to go around."

Recent news items indicate that pressures on the security forces will continue to grow in the coming months.

• There are "over 400 black youths from the Reef alone" undergoing guer-

rilla training, according to Johannesburg's Security Police chief.

• Police have already captured 91 trained guerrillas, 600 "untrained terrorists"—and they admit that more are coming.

• There are 60 political trials in progress, another 60 in the works, and the trials themselves frequently focus new demonstrations, as well as reflecting continuing organization.

• White intransigence remains unshaken. A recent poll at Stellenbosch University, the top school for South Africa's Afrika ner population, found

nearly 60 percent of the students claiming they would be prepared to die to retain white control over the country. And the "siege mentality" is inculcated at an early age, according to a recent report in the *Chicago Sun-Times*. A Johannesburg dispatch reported that the sale of toy weapons has soared during the past year in a "gun-happy nation" where one of every three whites already owns a firearm. In the schools, cadet programs are being doubled to take in 150,000 children. And a Johannesburg toy store reports that sales of a game called "Attack on Moscow" are booming. □

lation were passed. Treasury's Fred Bergsten said the Solarz bill would be "contrary to the national interest." He said it could "trigger retaliation against important US economic interests," citing the possibility of South Africa's nationalizing investments or withholding the export of strategic minerals.

Support for the Solarz bill came from Bill Cotter, President of the liberal African-American Institute, and Rev. Leon Sullivan. Sullivan urged Congress to "endorse, utilize and promote" his fair employment principles, since they are "something that the companies have created themselves."

Several church and anti-apartheid groups have raised questions about how effective the Solarz bill will be. While it would prohibit new investment and bank loans, the exception for reinvestment of profits is a major loophole, since about seven-eighths of all current new investment is in this form. Criticism has also focused on the fair employment section of the bill. Not only does it implicitly support the compromise position that US companies can make a contribution toward change in South Africa by improving working conditions, but it also explicitly provides that any section of the bill would be waived if it violates South African law. Rep. Charles Diggs suggested that this section made a mockery of the whole bill, since a bill has already been tabled in the South African Parliament which would prohibit companies from responding to directives or even requests for information from outside the country without the expressed permission of the Minister of Economic Affairs.

Despite its moderation, there is virtually no chance that the Solarz bill will be acted on by either the House or Senate this year. Solarz may try to bring it up again next session, but the prospects for passage of even this limited proposal are not good.

## Conservative Attack on Southern Africa Aid Fails

Conservatives in the House of Representatives failed in an attempt this summer to expand a ban on bilateral aid to Mozambique and Angola to include assistance through multi-lateral channels as well. Strong opposition to a floor amendment to the foreign aid appropriations bill to this effect came from the Administration and from such diverse groups as the Chamber of Commerce and the human rights lobby. The main issue was US relations with multilateral banks like the World Bank, rather than the specific questions of aid to southern Africa, since the World Bank has made it clear that it will not accept US contributions linked to specific-country restrictions.

The amendment that would have prohibited multilateral aid to Mozambique and Angola failed by a voice vote after a similar amendment on aid to three Indochina countries plus Uganda was defeated by a six vote margin.

The House also took specific action on Angola which demonstrated continued animosity toward the Neto government, despite recent praise from the Carter Administration for its pressure on SWAPO to accept the western-designed plan for Namibia, and its rapprochement with Zaire. The House exempted from the ban on bilateral assistance one program, funding scholarships for 24 students selected by UNITA and FNLA during the brief transitional government in Angola in 1975. As Rep. Hanley (D-N.Y.) said when he offered the amendment:

We can all understand . . . [preventing] American tax dollars from being used to support a Marxist regime under heavy Cuban and Russian influence. It was not designed to halt the education of young students whose views coincide with our own.

## End Note

Jesse Helms, the conservative North Carolina Senator noted for his opposition to civil rights in the US and majority rule in southern Africa, is looking for new allies—in the US anti-apartheid movement. The issue is his Gold Medallion Act of 1978. In August Helms' office suggested to the Washington Office on Africa that it might want to testify before the Senate Banking Committee in favor of his proposal for the Treasury Department to issue a gold coin, on the grounds that it would compete with South Africa's Krugerrand!

It's hard to believe that Jesse Helms *really* wants to hurt South Africa's economy by cutting into the half billion dollar flow of foreign exchange it gets annually from Krugerrand sales.

In 1977, South Africa sold 3.3 million of the coins, at an average \$145 each, and over a million were sold to Americans. 1978 sales have soared. 2.47 million Krugerrands had been sold by the end of May—average price \$190. Americans, along with Germans, were still the big buyers.

An American gold coin might hold down US sales of the Krugerrand. But the creation of a new coin will help maintain the overall market for gold, and so keep the price high. South Africa's mining companies should benefit from high profits. But African miners, whose average monthly salary of \$124 is less than the price of just one Krugerrand, certainly won't.

So thanks Senator Helms, but no thanks! □

# Church Conservatives Attack Liberation Support

The question of Zimbabwe's future has become a heated issue within some church organizations and a focus for the mobilization of ultra-conservative opinion. The World Council of Churches, in the wake of its decision to grant \$85,000 to the Patriotic Front, has come under fire for criticizing Smith's internal settlement.

At the same time, the Women's Division of the United Methodist Church has been condemned by an evangelical group for an April resolution which called the internal settlement inadequate and said any transitional government should be representative of all parties, including the Patriotic Front.

The controversy focuses on differing assessments of the internal settlement's workability. In its statement announcing the grant, the WCC says the settlement "leaves the illegal white minority regime still in effective control and gives it a veto over real change for the next decade."

Critics of the decision, who include the Salvation Army, which has temporarily suspended its WCC membership, say the action supports violence. One liberal American denomination, the United Church of Christ, has called for a review of the grant. And several prominent Methodists have expressed opposition.

The issue is particularly sensitive for the 10-million member United Methodist Church (UMC). Muzorewa, one of the four parties to the "settlement" is himself a full member of the UMC Council of Bishops.

In an article which appeared in the August 4 edition of the *Texas Methodist/United Methodist Reporter*, Muzorewa made an appeal to Methodists to reverse the Women's Division stand, which he labelled "hasty and premature."

A few days after the article was published, the Evangelical Missions Council (EMC), a task force of Good News, the unofficial forum for scriptural Christianity within the United Methodist Church, called upon the Women's Division staff to resign. The EMC resolution referred to Muzo-

rewa's appeal and charged that "the Marxist views of staff persons in the Women's Division have long been a topic of conversation in United Methodist Church circles."

One Women's Division staff member recalled with some irony that until recently the Bishop's United ANC representative had been constantly in and out of the Division's UN office, using typewriters and other facilities without seeming disturbed by any taint.

The EMC resolution has been termed "irresponsible, incomprehensible, and uninformed" by Dr. Tracy Jones, Jr., general secretary of the church's Board of Global Ministries, the mission agency which encompasses the Women's Division. He said all policy decisions like the April stand on Rhodesia were not made by the few paid staff members, but "by women elected by the United Methodist Church."

At the same time, several Methodist officials have come out against the WCC action. Indiana Bishop Ralph Alton, one of five UMC representatives on the world body's Central Committee, has written WCC General Secretary Philip Potter protesting the grant. And Lois Miller, staff executive of the United Methodist World Division, has said the grant "appears to ignore the growing needs of a number of the other black people in that sensitive situation."

## Explaining Grant

William Howard, a Reformed Church in America executive and moderator of the WCC Commission which recommended the grant, cites two main reasons for the Council's decision. "We felt it unconscionable that the funds be left sitting collecting interest in a Swiss bank while the victims for whom the funds were intended continued to suffer," he says. "And we concluded that it was clear to the most casual observer that the internal settlement could not bring about majority rule."

The Special Fund of the Program to Combat Racism, from which the grant was made, derives its income solely from designated gifts by churches and

other donors, who include the Swedish, Norwegian, and Dutch governments.

## Reactionaries on Tour

Dr. Paul Mickey, chairman of Good News, believing that opposition to such WCC actions is widespread among evangelicals and Christians in general, is one of the organizers of a North American tour by the Christian League of Southern Africa. This group, which shares Good News' conservative theological and political outlook, have been billed as a "team of experts from Africa" and will spend a month in the US (mid-September to mid-October).

The League describes its work as "warn[ing] Christians against the infiltration of Marxism and the destruction of the Christian faith throughout the free world." The group visiting the US consists of Rhodesians and South Africans—four whites, one Indian and an African. All are united in their belief in the evils of communism.

This, according to the League publicity sheet, Ndabazinhle Musa, the only African 'team' member, was "drawn to Communism and studied in Czechoslovakia. He returned to Rhodesia determined to destroy Christianity and all which the White man had built up in the country, to replace it with Marxism/Leninism. To this end he staged strikes, engineered riots, recruited men for terrorist training and use of fire bombs."

But the "Lord broke into Musa's life" and he was transformed. Now he is no longer a "terrorist." Instead he teaches "teams of black and white workers who go to Tribal Trust lands where terrorists are most active [and] expos[es] Communism."

"In Pseudo-Christianity," he says, "people talk of liberating the oppressed, whereas in true Christianity, a man who is in Christ is Free, because he no longer thinks of color and class."

Luckily, those talking of "liberating the oppressed" far outweigh the Musa's of Zimbabwe—and they are not only talking—they are achieving liberation, as the WCC recognizes.

*This report was compiled from dispatches from Africa News and other sources.* □

# New Life in the Canico

## A Mozambique Information Agency Feature

There is nothing particularly remarkable about the see-saw fashioned out of tree trunks, the two old automobile bodies spruced up as playthings, the swing hanging from the bough of a cashew tree in the little clearing in Bairro de Maxaquene in the suburbs of Maputo. Nothing remarkable except that they were put there by the government, whereas four years ago they would have been destroyed by the government.

Maxaquene is one of many *bairros* in the vast shanty area around Maputo which burgeoned in the last decade of colonialism, housing nearly half a million people by the time of independence in June 1975. The Portuguese colonial regime used these *bairros*, collectively known as the "canico" after the thin cane which constitutes the main housing material, as a vast camp of cheap labor for the settlers' factories, kitchens and gardens. About 20 percent of the canico men were unemployed.

As in Soweto in South Africa, the canico residents were regarded as temporary. Their houses were bulldozed at the whim of any land speculator or government bureaucrat. Facilities such as children's play centers were a sign of permanence and therefore not tolerated.

A similar situation developed around the country's other main towns.

Today, FRELIMO is leading a generalized struggle against poverty and unemployment and there is no place for slum labor reserves in the party's program for socialist development. But the canico is there. It will not disappear overnight and the cost of building new homes for its population is way beyond the country's means at the present stage of development.

After independence, several thousand families in canico areas worst affected by flooding were moved to apartments or serviced plots in Maputo. But even when this process is complete and—in the longer term—when the unemployment problem is resolved, the area will still be home for hundreds of thousands of people.

### Planning for Change

Efforts have therefore been launched by the government to up-



Children's playground — making use of what's available

AIM

grade those parts of the canico which offer the environmental potential for healthy living conditions.

Maxaquene is one such area and its children's playground, probably the only one in the whole of the canico, is one of the first signs of change visible to the visitor.

It is by no means the only change nor the most important one. The government has initiated a process that is dramatically altering the living conditions of 10,300 residents of the area known as Maxaquene One, 8,000 people in Maxaquene North and 17,000 residents in the nearby Polana-Canico.

The Housing Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing is in charge of the project, which began last June with three main objectives: to install a basic road and water network in accordance with a new plan for the area; to introduce social services; and to improve house construction.

The planning aspect is crucial. If people start building better houses before planning is done, they may have to knock them down again once the plan is drawn up and they find a road scheduled to pass through their front room.

### Bringing Water

The project began in Maxaquene One, an area not subject to flooding. In fact, too much water has never been a problem for the area's 10,300 residents. Portugal's 500 year "civilizing

mission" in Mozambique left them to share precisely five water faucets, three of which are on the same fountain.

For many residents, that means that when you want a cup of water on a hot day you may have to walk a kilometer to the faucet and line up alongside 2,000 other parched throats when you get there.

The government does not have the economic means to pipe water into the thousands of canico homes in the near future. So an interim solution has been found. Work has begun—as one of the first stages of the upgrading project—on the installation of a water supply network which will provide 30 new faucets in Maxaquene One within the next few months. To get a cup of water next September, the Maxaquene resident will have to walk a maximum of 100 meters and there will be one faucet per 300, instead of 2,000 people.

The residents themselves defined water supply as a priority for the project. Like the residents of the "cement city"—as the modern part of Maputo is known—the people will have to pay a water rate. But this will be less than a dollar a month—not even one-fifth of what they had to pay to private water speculators who sold water to canico dwellers at a huge profit in the colonial period.

### Roads

Perhaps the most striking change already apparent in the Maxaquene

One pilot project area is the appearance of a new road network through the hitherto impenetrable maze of simple dwellings and fenced-off yards. Apart from the general convenience of this development, for the first time ambulances and fire engines can reach the area—crucial in an area of such highly-combustible housing. It has also permitted the establishment of public squares which can include the kind of children's playground already described.

Opening roads created problems. The planners had to draw up a scheme dividing the haphazard housing into blocks of 60 to 80 families. Some houses lay in the path of the new roads and this meant demolition.

This was recognized as a political problem and was dealt with in a political way. Just as FRELIMO sent preparatory groups into northern Mozambique's rural areas in 1963 to explain the need for a guerrilla war and to seek a public mandate to wage that war with all its consequences, this time teams went around the canico mobilizing for the new task.

These teams included Housing Directorate staff and the elected com-

munity leaders—the dynamizing group.

One of the residents, Minera Fernando, explains what happened: "We had a lot of meetings here in the *bairro* before the work got started, and the work was done because of the way these teams and the residents got together. The job of demolishing and constructing houses was not done just by the owner of each house. We all got together and did the job."

Another Maxaquene woman, Celestina Manuel, adds: "What is happening now is very different from what we saw during colonialism. In those days our houses were demolished, just knocked down, without the slightest explanation, and they sent us to some other place without even considering the living conditions there."

### Popular Participation

The extent of enthusiastic popular participation has been the most impressive aspect of the upgrading scheme. From early on, elected committees at block level have been involved in the project, first of all in the fairly uncontroversial matter of regis-

tering all the residents but later dealing with stickier problems like plot allocation.

The planners have presented the local committees with a basic blueprint of how each block could be divided up with an equal space allowance for each family. But it is being left up to each block to decide how to tackle the question of plot allocation, using the planners' blueprint as only a suggestion.

In their meetings, the residents are also discussing the hows and wheres involved in establishing the social facilities—the school, the shopping center, the childcare center—which will make the final transition from ramshackle slum to organized urban community a reality and a model for the rest of the country.

So the existence of a swing and a seesaw in Maxaquene may be a small advance in itself. But to the people there, these things are a symbol of the recognition of their right to a home. It is only four years since the fascists' bulldozers last came, but that is already a fading memory. Freedom and justice have come to the canico. Prosperity, built by the people themselves, will follow. □

## People's Power = People's Development

Although in a state of war and operating with an external debt of \$640 million inherited from colonial times, Mozambique is pressing ahead with the task of developing a socialist society and a people's democracy under the guidance of FRELIMO.

In August, the Mozambican government announced that it was assuming administrative and financial management of the Sena Sugar Estates, the financially troubled British company which produced 46 percent of Mozambique's sugar output in 1975. Sugar constitutes approximately 27 percent of the country's agriculture exports.

The charges against Sena Sugar, which employs 12,000 workers, center on several issues integral to Mozambique's strategy of development. In the 58 years that the company has been in the country it has failed to train a Mozambican technical staff. The company has also been criticized for discriminatory practices on the Sena plantations as well as technical incompetence and mismanagement. Dissatisfaction has been compounded by the company's failure to bring a 6,000-ton-a-day mill into operation, although the plant had been commissioned in

mid-1976. Though the company's property and assets have not been taken over, the state action is another indication of FRELIMO's commitment to following along the historic course set in the early 1960s.

### Agriculture in Trouble

Mozambique is committed to the immediate task of bringing the levels of agricultural production back up to the pre-independence levels. Since independence the concentration has been on the State farms, land controlled by the former colonialists which produce 80 percent of the country's rice, tea, vegetables and citrus fruit. This has brought into sharp focus the problems of mechanized development as opposed to the use of intermediate and local technologies. In 1977, for instance, 1200 tractors and 50-100 combine harvesters were imported at the cost of 40 million dollars. Of the more than 1000 tractors which were distributed to the state farms, much of the machinery is being underutilized due to the lack of spare parts and skilled mechanics.

As the mechanization of the State farms increased, some critics inside

Mozambique urged that more attention be given to the peasant sector, still operating on 2 million hectares, a greater area than that occupied by the State farms. At the Third National Agricultural Congress in June, there was a call for better control of machinery and a warning against the "pre-occupation" with using machinery as the basis of agricultural production. Mozambique has now recognized the importance of animal ploughing and transportation, herbicides, grain storage and the development of cooperative shops to boost agricultural production.

Moving to deal with problems in agriculture, FRELIMO recently dismissed four members of its Central Committee, including Agriculture Minister Joaquim de Carvalho because he "refused to implement the priority defined by the leading bodies in relation to communal villages." The former minister was criticized for allocating the limited resources available to the State farms, rather than concentrating on the development of the communal villages which FRELIMO had determined should be the basis for rural socialist development.



## Economic Difficulties

Mozambique's problems are no secret. Not only has it resisted 250 air and ground attacks since it closed its common border with Rhodesia but South Africa has also intensified its economic pressure on the young nation. In April South Africa terminated the agreement under which it paid a portion of the salaries of Mozambican miners to the Maputo government in gold valued at a price far below the market price. Mozambique will lose an estimated annual \$30 million in foreign exchange because of the change. (See *Southern Africa*, August/September 1978, page 15.)

## Tackling Problems

Still in the early phases of national reconstruction Mozambique is tackling its problems head-on. In March of this year a law was approved by the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly introducing compulsory military service for all men and women over 18. Meanwhile, Mozambique is supporting 70,000 Zimbabwean refugees, of which 40 percent have arrived this year.

In terms of prison reform, a correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times* who recently visited the Codzo Re-education Camp in Mozambique noted that it was a prison "with no walls, no gates, no clanking steel doors. There is nothing sinister about the place." Codzo is one of eight re-education centers in Mozambique, one of which is for

women. All those who come—petty criminals, drug addicts, prostitutes or 'enemies of the revolution'—learn a trade, from carpentry to farming, and the government finds them a job once they are released.

As President Samora Machel said in his nine hour independence day

speech, "Our fight is a fight for the creation of the new man, of a new mentality. Whoever wants to grow fruit trees must constantly struggle to get rid of the pests." In Mozambique, the fruits of socialist development are successfully challenging the pests of exploitation. □

# Returning American Delegation Reports Progress

At the end of August an independent delegation of eleven Americans led by documentary film producer and writer Robert Van Lierop, director of the Mozambique Film Project, returned from an extensive two week tour of Mozambique.

The group met with numerous people including President Samora Machel, Robert Mugabe, President of the Zimbabwe African National Union and co-leader of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and a member of the national Secretariat of the Organization of Mozambican Women. In their travels part of the delegation went to the southern province of Gaza where they visited communal villages and an agricultural-industrial complex which is damming the Limpopo River to irrigate 300,000 hectares of land.

At a press conference in New York in September members of the delegation

noted the positive response of Mozambican people moving to communal villages. This revolved around the increased availability of social services such as health clinics, schools, and water supplies. The delegation also commented on the high degree of organization in the Zimbabwe refugee camps which had large vegetable gardens and small animal projects despite a desperate shortage of tools, equipment and medical supplies. In one area a single thermometer had to serve the needs of some 16,000 people.

The purpose of the group's visit to Mozambique was to observe first hand the realities of Mozambique in its third year of independence. Members of the group criticized the coverage of southern Africa by the western media and urged that there be more detailed and comprehensive reporting by western writers. □

*Fine Face for Apartheid: South Africa's US Image Makers* by Shelly Pitterman; *The Krugerrand: Facts About South Africa's Gold Coin* by Karen Rothmyer and Shelly Pitterman; *US Policy in Southern Africa: Preaching Freedom, Investing in Oppression* by Susan Roger; *African Women Under Apartheid* by Elizabeth Landis. The contents of the South African Information Packet is also available in bulk individually.

Also available from The Africa Fund:

*African Workers and Apartheid* by David Davis. International Defence & Aid Fund-London. \$1. This 40-page pamphlet is a good introduction to the apartheid labor system including the pass laws, migrant labor, job reservation, wages, and African trade unions.

*For Their Triumphs and Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa* by Hilda Bernstein. ID&A. \$1.75. 70pp. A description of the conditions of women in South Africa in both the ban-

tustans and the towns and a history of their resistance.

*Divide and Rule: South Africa's Bantustans* by Barbara Rogers. ID&A. \$2. 78pp. A good introduction to South Africa's bantustans including the basis of the apartheid theory. Includes sections on the economy, political control and life in the bantustans.

*A Window on Soweto* by Joyce Sikanane. ID&A. \$2. 80pp. An introduction to life in the urban townships in South Africa from housing to crime. The author, an ANC militant who grew up in Soweto, describes her experience up to the time she was forced into exile.

*The Great White Hoax: South Africa's International Propaganda Machine*. Africa Bureau-London. \$2. 110pp. A study of the multi-million dollar campaign of the South African government to improve its image and make apartheid acceptable to the world.

*Zimbabwe: The Facts About Rhodesia*. ID&A. \$2. 74pp. A useful introduction to the situation in Rhodesia.



Available from The Africa Fund, 305 East 46th St., New York, NY 10017:

*South Africa Information Packet*. \$1.50 each postpaid. Over ten, \$1.00 plus 15% postage. Contents: *Fact Sheet on South Africa* by Karen Rothmyer; *US Dollars in South Africa: Context and Consequence* by Jennifer Davis; *American Firms Subsidiaries and Affiliates Operating in the Republic of South Africa*; *US Business in South Africa: Voices for Withdrawal*; *Too Little, Too Late: The US Corporate Manifesto for South Africa* by Jennifer Davis; *GM in South Africa: Secret Contingency Plans "in the event of civil unrest"* by Jennifer Davis; A

**The Propaganda War** by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia. Africa Fund. \$1. This 24-page pamphlet describes oppression of the African majority in Rhodesia by the Smith regime as documented by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia.

Now available from The Africa Fund:

A new series of studies of the current situation in Rhodesia soon to be independent Zimbabwe published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations-London.

**Alternatives to Poverty** by Roger Riddell. \$1.50. 22pp.

**The Land Question** by Roger Riddell. \$1.50. 38pp.

**The Unemployment Crisis** by Duncan G. Clarke. \$1.50. 34pp.

**Skilled Labor and Future Needs** by Colin Stoneman. \$1.50. 52pp.

All four pamphlets in this series contain a large amount of useful informa-

tion on specific aspects of the Rhodesian situation. Add 15% postage and handling to all orders.

**Zimbabwe: Winning Hearts and Minds.** Analyzing US media coverage of struggle in Zimbabwe. Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20002. 1-10, 15¢ each; 11-50, 10¢ each; over 50, 5¢ each.

**US Bank Loans to South Africa.** Corporate Data Exchange. This new 46-page study researched by Beate Klein, describes US bank support for apartheid in even greater detail than Senator Clark's recent subcommittee report. The report identifies over 20 banks never before tied to South African lending and documents a greater dollar involvement by US banks than previously revealed. Detailed information is provided on all identifiable US bank loans, including Ex-Im financing, from 1972-mid-1978. One

hundred US controlled and related banks are listed, and data is cross-referenced for easy analysis. An excellent tool for expanding the campaign to oppose bank loans to South Africa. Single copy: \$3. Ten or more: \$2. CDE, 198 Broadway, Room 707, New York, NY 10038.

**DO YOUR HOLIDAY SHOPPING EARLY.** Africa Fund is selling the 1979 South Africa Freedom Calendar now. Twelve individual posters in their original vivid colors. These dramatic works of art were selected from the entries in the first nationwide anti-apartheid poster contest. Produced by the American Committee on Africa in cooperation with the United Nations Center Against Apartheid. Proceeds to The Africa Fund for aid to the victims of colonialism and apartheid. \$5 each. Bulk discount: 5-9 calendars, 20% off; 10-19, 30% off; 20 or more, 35% off. The Africa Fund, 305 East 46th St., New York, NY 10017.



**DIVESTITURE CAMPAIGN HAS SUCCESS . . .** Because of efforts by the Southern Africa Liberation Committee of Michigan State University, the Board of Trustees of that University has decided to begin actions on divestment of its holdings in South Africa.

Copies of the resolution passed will be sent to the President of the United States, the Chairman of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, the Secretary of State, each member of the Michigan Legislature, the government of South Africa and the US Ambassador to the United Nations.

While the resolution does not support outright divestment, it is one of the stronger stands taken by university trustees so far. Included in the clauses are:

- 1) No new investment in South Africa.
- 2) No reinvestment of profits in South Africa.
- 3) No expansion of facilities and operations in South Africa.
- 4) No new licenses, affiliates or subsidiaries in South Africa.
- 5) No operations in Bantustans, homelands, or Namibia.

6) No importation of technologies, processes or equipment for use by the police, military or special control.

The University will withdraw its deposits from and not invest in banks granting or renewing loans to South Africa and it will vote its proxies in support of proposals to withdraw from South Africa.

**QUAKERS MAKE MOVE . . .** The American Friends Service Committee co-recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947 recently announced their decision to sell stocks worth over 1.3 million dollars in US firms operating in South Africa. The Quaker organization sold all its Mobil Oil Corp. stock in 1976 after reports that the company, through its affiliates in Southern Africa, had violated sanctions against Rhodesia.

AFSC's recent decision came after discussions and meetings with representatives from fifteen firms involved in South Africa. Louis W. Schneider, Executive Secretary of AFSC, said, "We don't think anyone should be making profit from apartheid." Michael Simmons, national coordinator of AFSC's Southern African Peace Education Program said, "We realize there are many other places in the world where human rights violation are extensive but South Africa is the only country we know about that has a sys-

tem of racial oppression built into its laws."

AFSC shares to be sold are: Borden Inc., 2,000; Colgate Palmolive Co., 5,300; Nabisco, Inc., 2,100; Phelps Dodge Corp., 955; US Gypsum Co., 6,400; Warner-Lambert Co., 3,200; Black and Decker, 4,100; Dresser Industries, 3,800; Eaton Corp., 6,100; Dow Chemical, 1,060; Timken, 700; West Point Pepperell, 3,400; Bank America Corp., 2,000; and two of the largest firms doing business in South Africa, Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M), 3,000 and 1,245 respectively.

**NO MORE BOOKPLATES . . .** The Antioch Bookplate Company of Yellow Springs, Ohio, has announced that it will stop doing business with firms in South Africa. The company will give preferential treatment to suppliers that do not actively trade with South Africa and do not have South African affiliates. Current and prospective South African customers are being notified of the company's new policy. The company's new policy was adopted following discussion and votes by the firm's stockholders, directors and employees.

The Antioch Bookplate Company markets its products throughout the English-speaking world, with foreign sales representing over ten percent of

the firms rapidly rising \$2 million annual business. Based on sales to other countries, company officials estimate the potential South African market at \$50,000 annually.

**ACTIONS SPEAK . . .** The Committee for Medical Aid to Southern Africa is a group of doctors and health workers in the Durham-Chapel Hill area. Their drive to collect medical supplies began in the fall of 1977 and has netted over \$30,000 worth of aid for Zimbabwe. This group along with the Greensboro chapters of the African Liberation Support Committee is preparing to send its second shipment of medical supplies and clothing to ZANU (Patriotic Front) refugee camps in Mozambique. Shipping for the most urgently needed antibiotics and anti-malarials is being arranged by the Africa Fund and funded by the United Nations High Committee for Refugees.

Supplies and money are urgently needed. Anyone wishing to contribute to this effort should write:

The Committee for Medical Aid  
to South Africa  
P.O. Box 3051  
Duke University Medical Center  
Durham, NC 27710

**'KRUGERRAND' SUCCESS . . .** Activists in Providence, Rhode Island, have been successful in stopping a local bank from selling Krugerrands.

Hospital Trust National Bank—the only distributor of the coin in the state—bowed to the pressure exerted by a coalition of groups and announced that “because the coin has become a symbol of racism to some groups, and because of the implication that Hospital Trust supports policies that it does not in fact support, the Krugerrand will no longer be available [from us].”

The action, organized by the South African Solidarity Committee of Brown University and the RI Chapter of the National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation (NAIMSAL), began last March, meeting with success in mid-August, after the bank had weighed their minimal profits from the sale of the coins against the adverse publicity their sale was generating.

**WINNIE MANDELA APPEAL . . .** The Boston-based US branch of the International Defense and Aid Fund has launched an appeal to assist Winnie Mandela to improve the security of

her small house in isolated Brandfort, where she lives out her banishment.

In yet another incident of harassment, she was recently attacked in her home by a knife-wielding burglar, in circumstances reminiscent of previous police-condoned—if not initiated—attacks on political activists. Her teenage daughter and sister happened by chance to be in the house at the time, and they managed to drive off the intruder. Next time she may not be as lucky.

Those wishing to help the protection of her home can send earmarked tax-deductible contributions to IDAFSA, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138.

#### **UPCOMING CONFERENCES:**

**New York: November 17-19**

The Northeast Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa, a campus-based coalition working around the call for American withdrawal from apartheid, is planning an organizing conference for the fall. It will be held at New York University, New York city, November 17-19. The aim of the conference is to work out ways of building an effective movement in solidarity with the liberation struggles in southern Africa—to discuss strategies and plan a united campaign.

For further information (and for copies of the NECLSA newsletter) write:

NECLSA  
44 Green Street  
Northampton, MA 01060

**Durham, NC: November 11-12**

The Southern African Coalition at Duke University is planning a conference on “Universities and Southern Africa”—aimed at setting up a southeastern network to strengthen campus work around southern Africa issues.

Panels and workshops will include discussion on community and work-

place mobilization and campus mobilization.

For more information write:  
Southern Africa Coalition  
Duke University  
917 Lancaster Street  
Durham, NC 27701

**SPORTS CAMPAIGN . . .** In New Zealand, Prime Minister Muldoon has threatened the anti-apartheid organization Halt All Racist Tours (HART) with legal action following the withdrawal of Nigeria from the Commonwealth Games in August 1978. Nigerian Sports Minister Mr. Williams said his country would boycott the games because of New Zealand's continuing sporting contact with apartheid in violation of the Gleneagles Agreement in which Commonwealth countries pledged no further sports contact with South Africa.

Muldoon claims that the Nigerian decision was made on the basis of false reports they received from HART. The PM said that HART National Chairperson, Trevor Richards, had influenced Nigerian Ambassador Harriman during a three month appointment Richards had at the UN. The PM also claimed that he got Richards fired from his job after talking to Ambassador Harriman. In fact Richards never intended to stay at the UN after the expiration of his three month contract.

HART points out that New Zealand has had numerous sporting contacts with South Africa recently and that the government has even issued visas to South African sporting representatives. Further all information provided to Nigeria and others outside New Zealand has also been issued to the press and the government, says HART, has not disproved a single one of its claims.

## **A LIFE FOR AFRICA**

Bram Fischer was born into an elite Afrikaaner family, yet rather than accept the advantages of apartheid he chose to fight it, by any means necessary. He was eventually arrested and imprisoned, and died in prison in 1974.

Fischer's biography has been written by Naomi Mitchison, a novelist and prohibited immigrant who knows South Africa firsthand. Her book “is probably the quickest way to understanding the context of the present conflict. . .” (*In These Times*) **A LIFE FOR AFRICA: The Story of Bram Fischer**, is available in radical bookstores for \$3.00 or \$3.50 postpaid from Carrier Pigeon, Room 209, 88 Fisher Ave., Boston, Mass. 02120.

# NEWS Briefs



**THE SOUTH AFRICAN** regime now prohibits "the furnishing of information relating to any businesses" operating in the country. The Protection of Business Act specifically forbids compliance with any attempt from abroad to obtain business data. The law, aimed at anti-apartheid efforts to expose South African employment practices, at the same time undercuts initiatives such as the "Sullivan principles." These evaluate "liberalization" of South African businesses and foreign subsidiaries by examining employment data.

The law, passed June 20, reads in part: "No person shall in compliance with any order, direction or letters of request issued or emanating from outside the Republic, furnish any information as to any business whether carried on in or outside the Republic."

The agency responsible for black education has changed its name—from Bantu Education Department to Department of Education and Training. But little else has changed.

According to the Department's annual report submitted to Parliament in April, only 22 out of every 1000 African students who start school graduate from high school. At present only 16 percent of African teachers hold school leaving certificates. While white children benefit from spacious and well-equipped schools, black children have to make do with a chronic shortage of the overcrowded and sparse amenities provided them. This past year, the facilities backlog in Soweto alone was 700 classrooms, or 40 schools.

In 1974/75, the per capita spending on African students was only \$36.00 (as against \$550 for each white student). There was a slight rise the following year to \$38 (while white expenditure jumped further to \$585 per capita). During the past year, the figure increased to \$52.50, and the increase for the coming years has been projected at \$60.

These "changes" have been heralded in Parliament and the press as great steps forward, but when compared with the figures for whites and with the rising cost of living, they remain insignificant.

A recent survey of students at the primarily white University of Witwatersrand showed that 64 percent of the final year students planned to leave South Africa, according to the *London Guardian*.

Apologists for apartheid constantly claim improvements in conditions for blacks. Favorite current statistic: since 1970 average white household income has increased by 85 percent, while the average black household income has increased by over 180 percent.

Sounds good so long as one ignores the effect of the wage gap.

According to a recent study by Market Research Africa, average monthly white household income last year was \$846, with 3.4 people in a household. Average monthly African household income was \$122 with 6 persons in a household. White households can spend \$248 on each person, African households can spend \$20.

The survey shows further that nearly 89 percent of African households have a monthly income of \$230 or less. In contrast, 87 percent of all white households have incomes of more than \$345, and 35 percent have incomes of \$920 or more each month.

The South African regime continues to make infrastructural changes aimed at stemming threats to white dominance that were brought to critical proportions with the Soweto uprisings. Among several new apartheid schemes is a so-called "five-year development plan" for the African population.

Currently being fashioned by Connie Mulder's Ministry of Plural Relations, the plan envisions building eight black cities the size of Soweto to "accommodate future expansions" of the burgeoning black population. These cities would be located close to white industrial areas to which black workers could commute. However, this development would be coupled with increased "influx control" of the movements of blacks, according to Mulder, "to avoid more problems in the white areas."

As part of a very deliberate drive for increased self-sufficiency, the South African Industrial Development Corporation is planning to construct a diesel engine manufacturing facility.

The IDC, a para-statal corporation, has asked eight commercial motor vehicle assembling companies to submit detailed proposals. Included among those approached are Ford and Cummins in the US, Leyland in Britain and several European groups including Mercedes Benz.

It is estimated that the capital cost of the basic plant would be \$46 million for assembling heavy vehicles, tractors and other machinery and equipment.



**THE RHODESIAN** regime has produced a new weapon in its attempt to stem the tide of the war. It fires 9,000 pieces of jagged metal in a circle with 36 guns bristling at 10 degree angles from each other. The guns can be fired automatically if a vehicle carrying the weapon is attacked.

It was invented by Andre Holland, a member of the rebel parliament. He demonstrated his new weapon at a farm outside Salisbury, blasting the side of a barn into fragments. Among the observers was the Smith regime's Combined Operations Commander, Lieutenant-General Peter Walls.



**ANGOLANS** who fled their country during the second war of liberation (1975-76) are being allowed back as part of the agreement signed between Angola and Portugal a few months ago. More than 400,000 left the country, of which 70,000 were Angola born.

Most fled following propaganda about "communist atrocities" and arrived in Portugal without passports or other documentation. Portugal has been unable to provide sufficient housing or jobs for the refugees, who have become known as "desalojados" or "homeless ones." It is estimated that 1,500 have so far applied for repatriation.



**IN BRITAIN**, a growing number of companies are reducing their holdings in South Africa or leaving that country altogether. Since March of this year, six companies have made moves toward disengagement involving about \$185 million.


The firms cite economic reasons for their actions. But the fact that David Owen, British Foreign Secretary, said six months ago that "prudent businessmen and prudent investors, no less than the British government, should be taking a hard look at their South African connections," suggests that political pressure (both in South Africa and Britain) played a major role in the companies' decisions.

The firms involved include Racal, a defense electronics firm, and United Dominions Trust, which sold off their subsidiaries; General Electric (GEC), which sold off half its South African subsidiary and granted management control to Barlow Rand, a South African firm; British Leyland, the auto manufacturer, which sold 51% of its subsidiary to Anglo-American, another South African firm; and Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, which sold the bulk of its interest in Guardian Assurance, which controls Liberty Life, the third-largest life insurance company in South Africa.

Still to be completed is the sale of Nampak, owned by Reed International, a paper and publishing group, also to Barlow Rand.

But despite industry's response to David Owen's warning, British government policy itself appears to be geared towards continuing trade with the apartheid regime.

Since his March statement, the British government has sponsored three trade missions to South Africa at the cost of \$19,000. In addition, six missions have been sponsored by the British Overseas Trade Board and at least seven are planned.

 **U.S. MERC RUNS FOR CONGRESS:** Major Mike Williams, the notorious American mercenary leader, who most recently served in the Rhodesian army, is running for the seat of retiring Congressman Sikes. Williams, a Democrat endorsed by *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, is after leadership of the first Congressional district in northern Florida, which has the largest concentration of military bases and installations in the nation. This district absorbs some \$500 million in Defense Department expenditures yearly.

Williams served as an officer in the Rhodesian Army from 1976 until recently, combatting nationalist forces near Salisbury and Bulawayo and re-

portedly leading the Grey Scouts black anti-nationalist troops in the eastern part of the country. He is also well known for his extensive participation in anti-popular campaigns in Korea during the war, and in Katanga (Shaba) province during the Congo crisis in 1964.

Possible Republican presidential candidate John Connally told South African audiences recently that he "totally disagreed" with the disinvestment movement in the US and promised a "hands off" South Africa policy emerging from the US congress in the future. Speaking during a tour of that country late August, Connally reportedly said that the US should encourage investment and create more jobs in South Africa. He was well received by the apartheid regime, with one pro-government publication terming his views a "heartening aspect of the American view of South Africa." Connally also paid a visit to illegally occupied Namibia and praised its South African administrator.

Connally was Secretary of the Treasury under Nixon during a period of massive investment in South Africa by US banks. He is a multi-millionaire, currently director of six major corporations, and former Governor of Texas.

Also in South Africa was retired US Admiral Thomas Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1970 and 1974.

Moorer is a long time apartheid sympathizer; in 1974 while still head of US military forces, he held a hush-hush meeting in Washington with Admiral Hugo Biermann, then head of South Africa's armed forces. This in spite of the official arms embargo policy supposedly enforced by the US against South Africa.

This time round Moorer was quite open about his support for the Pretoria regime in its war against the liberation movements.

Describing SWAPO's attacks on the illegal South African forces in Namibia as "scandalous and tragic" terrorist activities, Moorer warned Zambia that if it allowed the aggressor to make use of its territory in such a way it should expect to be attacked in return!

No doubt Moorer was once again involved in top level strategy consultations with South African defense planners.

The *New York Times* has signed a deal to sell advertising in South Africa for the paper, according to a report in the London *Sunday Times*. Les de Villiers, a former South African Information Department official who is now a member of the New York public relations firm of Sydney S. Baron, obtained the contract on behalf of the firm. Baron's has a sizable contract with the South African government which it represents as the official lobbying organization for that country in the US.

General Motors chairman T. A. Murphy responded to questions about the company's South Africa contingency plan (see *Southern Africa*, June/July for full document). The confidential plan developed in South Africa in mid-1977 outlined procedures to be followed by GM South African in case of "severe civil disturbance or unrest." It specified that GM vehicles were requested by the South African military, and it described a citizen defense force including "GM commandos" to protect operations.

In a letter to William P. Thompson of the United Presbyterian Church, who had written for clarification of the memo, Murphy commented:

"With regard to your apparent revelation that the auto industry in South Africa is of highest strategic and military importance to the government of South Africa, we have never denied that in virtually every country where we operate our plants would be among the first to be expropriated or at least controlled during a military emergency. It is apparent to us that manufacturing plants involved in such basic industries as petroleum production and refining, mining primary metals, transportation, machinery—industries which generate the lifeblood of any economy—also assume strategic importance in time of emergency. As I mentioned at the Annual Meeting, any of our plants can be converted to war production as clearly demonstrated in the United States in 1941. . . .

"Another of your specific points involved the sale of trucks to the government. GM South Africa and all other local vehicle manufacturers, regularly bid on all contracts to supply vehicles to the South African government's central purchasing activity. The trucks you mentioned in the GMSA plan are all general purpose vehicles which may be adapted by the purchaser for an almost infinite variety of tasks."

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