

VOLUME XII NUMBER 3

SOUTHERN AFRICA

\$1

MARCH 1979

**FOCUS
ON
ZIMBABWE**



**Phony Constitution
Revealed**



**Private Armies
Exposed**



**Patriotic Front
Winning**

**Also:
Tanzania's Ambassador
Salim Interviewed**

Tanzania 8shs. Mozambique 35esc.

Prisoner Appeal

Each week we receive letters from grateful prisoners who receive the magazine. They are among our most supportive and appreciative readers.

A few prisoners have in fact sent us donations from their very limited income, but with our present precarious financial situation, it is becoming increasingly difficult to send the magazine free.

We are therefore appealing to our readers to help subsidize these subscriptions at \$5.00 each. As the letters printed on this page show, the magazine provides an important educational tool for inmates. We want to keep the magazine going inside. PLEASE HELP!

Comrades:

Received your letter concerning the various financial problems in sending out subs to prisoners. Am writing to inform you that since I am soon to be released from this dungeon back on the streets, that you would no longer have to send me a monthly copy of *Southern Africa* magazine.

Once I am out I will be able to afford the price of a subscription and will take out a regular subscription. I would like to thank the committee for sending, not only me, but many many prisoners free subscriptions despite the known hardships involved in doing so at no cost to the prisoner.

I have been receiving *Southern Africa* since 1974 and have found it very educational and informative concerning the righteous struggles of the courageous peoples of the southern part of the Motherland.

Straight ahead. . .

A luta continua,
Arthur W.

Greetings of Solidarity!

Please continue sending me *Southern Africa* magazine. I share the one I get with four other brothers here. We all really enjoy it and find it very informative. I'm sending \$2.00 and hope it will help in some way.

In the struggle,
Cetewayo J.
Pennsylvania State Institution

Greetings *Southern Africa*:

I recognize the financial difficulties you and other progressive publications are facing. As a result I allowed virtually all of the subscriptions to run out in that I am unable to pay. Of course, others here receive these publications and pass them along. However, I am the only one receiving *Southern Africa* on the second tier. And I insist that all the blacks read it, after which we discuss it on the caged-in exercise yard.

Southern Africa is immensely valuable to us here. So please continue to send the news. Thanking you in advance.

A luta continua!
Shujaa W.
California State Prison


CIA in Rhodesia

CIA agents are currently operating in Rhodesia under cover as American mercenaries, according to former CIA officer John Stockwell. Chief of the CIA's covert operations in Angola in 1975-76, Stockwell quit the agency in 1977 and wrote *In Search of Enemies*, an inside account of the CIA's role in the Angolan war.

"To my knowledge, the CIA is in Rhodesia to have its finger on the pulse," Stockwell told *Internews*, a West Coast based news service. "The agency knows who all the players are. It has people on the ground, in the military, gathering information. Of course, this could be in preparation for a paramilitary operation like Angola."

Based on his Angolan war experience, he said the CIA station in Lusaka, Zambia, is still probably "very active. I would expect they're trying to get lines into all the liberation movements." One CIA agent in Rhodesia, he said, operated out of Johannesburg under the guise of an "adventurer." It may be more than coincidental that veteran mercenary Michael Hoare (*Southern Africa*, January, 1979) is also based in Johannesburg.

Although Stockwell stressed the close relationship between the CIA and BOSS (the South African spy network) during the Angolan war, he said that "traditionally the CIA didn't operate inside South Africa because BOSS was so xenophobic." An exception was made when India suddenly exploded an atomic bomb in 1974 and the CIA was told "to get off its ass and find out if South Africa was on the verge of producing nuclear weapons." Stockwell said a young CIA officer was sent to South Africa under State Department cover to investigate, but was discovered by BOSS and "PNG'd"—declared *persona non grata* and deported. The CIA immediately sent in two replacements, according to Stockwell. This time they had covers as businessmen in the nuclear industry. One was an agent Stockwell had worked with in Angola.



National heroes are returned to Mozambique. Bearing the coffin are (left) Marcelino dos Santos, Minister of Economic Planning and President Samora Machel.

Homecoming for Mozambican Fighters

A high-level Mozambican delegation arrived in Maputo from Dar es Salaam on February 2, bringing the bodies of six FRELIMO leaders who had died during the country's war of liberation. Among them were Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's first president, who was assassinated by Portuguese agents with a letter bomb on February 3, 1969, and Josina Machel, one of the first leaders of FRELIMO's women's detachment, who died of illness in Tanzania in 1971.

President Mondlane was a key figure in the formation of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). It was in large part his legacy which enabled FRELIMO to develop a collective and mass-based style of work, and to fight the dangers of ethnic and racial divisions within the ranks of the revolution.

Josina Machel was one of those who took

the initiative in committing FRELIMO to the liberation of Mozambican women, encouraging their full participation in the struggle.

Of the other four, Francisco Manyanga died of illness, Felipe Magaia was assassinated by an infiltrator early in the war, and Mateus Muthemba and Paulo Kankhomba were killed by a group of Mozambicans who opposed the increasingly revolutionary direction taken by FRELIMO after 1968. Manyanga, Magaia, and Kankhomba were all young men, active leaders in the guerrilla army; Muthemba, at the time of his death was directing FRELIMO's telecommunications section.

February 3 is celebrated in Mozambique as "Heroes' Day." This year the return of the fighters' remains served as a dramatic reminder of Mozambique's own war for independence at a time when the country is under mounting attack from Rhodesia for the critical assistance it is providing Patriotic Front guerrillas fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

Non-Aligned Countries Meet in Maputo

Mozambique gave a warm welcome to the delegations from 23 friendly countries when Maputo was the site in February of a meeting of the coordinating bureau of the non-aligned nations movement.

But the meeting was not without its tensions. One source of conflict focused on the adoption of a very strong and outspoken inaugural speech delivered by Mozambique's president Samora Machel. After deciding to summarize the salient parts of the speech for inclusion in the conference's final communique, discussion became heated on the question of language. It was agreed in the end that the militant language of Machel would be included in the document, which harshly condemned the role of the Western powers in arming and in contributing to the "nuclearization" of the South African regime.

"Imperialism," Machel declared, "is our enemy—economic enemy, military enemy,

political enemy, cultural enemy."

While representatives of the two South African movement (the PAC and the ANC) that have observer status were present, the final communique followed the analysis of Machel in describing the African National Congress as leading the struggle of the masses of the South African people.

In addition, positive moves were made towards the Patriotic Front and SWAPO with the proposal that they be admitted to full membership in the non-aligned movement. At the same time the meeting pledged aid to both movements for the armed and diplomatic aspects of their liberation struggles.

Machel's strength as a leader and the fact that the conference was held in Maputo appear to have contributed to the coordinating bureau's willingness to publish the most strongly worded communique in the movement's history. This included an unequivocal condemnation of the role of South Africa, Rhodesia, and multi-national corporations in the maintenance of oppression in southern Africa. □

Freed ZANU Prisoners Tell Their Story

While the representatives of non-aligned countries were meeting in Maputo to consider the escalating crisis in southern Africa, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), one of the two movements making up the Patriotic Front, released four captured white Rhodesian prisoners. The move signalled that ZANU had both the capacity to escalate the war and also the discipline to keep, transport, and release prisoners. It also underscored the movement's refusal to define the war in purely racial terms.

Johannes Hendrik Maartens, a 54-year-old farmer of South African origin, Thomas Wigglesworth, 47, a British farmer, James Black, 45, a British forestry worker, and John Kennerley, 18, a Rhodesian army recruit, were released after being held captive for periods ranging from five to nine months. All four spoke with the press in Maputo, testifying to good treatment, and Maartens and Black also participated in a government-sponsored press conference after returning to Rhodesia.

The testimony of the two who returned to Rhodesia turned out to be most embarrassing to the Salisbury government. Reporters noted the discomfiture of Rhodesian officials as the ex-captives spoke of the guerrillas. According to Black, who had been captured on August 18, "Their morale was very high, and that surprised me. They had high discipline, and there was no instance of drunken behavior." Maartens reported

that the guerrillas told him they spared his life because of the "good reports" about him from the labor force on his farm, and that they had no objection to whites, but simply wanted to liberate their country and construct a non-racial government.

Earlier in Maputo, Maartens spoke in more detail of his capture on May 18 of last year, and of his time spent with ZANU guerrillas. Both before and after crossing the border into Mozambique, the units he

South African Blacks Welcome US Knoetze Boycott

South Africa's leading black circulation newspaper, *The Post*, carried the following reports about local reaction to US activist attempts to prevent white boxer Kallie Knoetze from fighting in America:

The Post, January 11, 1979, p. 1, headlined: "Joy in the Townships, Knoetze Shock Waves":

"... Blacks were beside themselves with excitement at the U.S. decision which barred the boxer from fighting on Saturday night."

Post editorial comment on January 10 (p.4):

"... our switchboard has in the past week been jammed with calls from our people identifying themselves with campaigns in America to have the fight stopped."

was with were subject to Rhodesian attacks, including three air-borne assaults.

Wigglesworth, an ex-major in the British army, also testified to the guerrillas' discipline. "As a professional soldier," he told *Tempo* magazine, "I was surprised with their efficiency, their discipline, and particularly, their high morale."

UPDATE this month was jointly prepared by *Africa News* and *Southern Africa*.



Thomas Wigglesworth, one of the four prisoners released by ZANU, in Maputo. To his left are (l to r) Robert Mugabe, ZANU president and Sam Nujoma, SWAPO president.

Credit: Tempo



Tanzania's UN Ambassador Salim A. Salim

credit: UN

Tanzania's Ambassador to the UN Salim Salim talks to *Southern Africa* about the war in Rhodesia, the elections in Namibia, and the role of the West.

Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, said in early January that he would favor a U.S.-British military intervention in Rhodesia to bring one-person, one-vote elections. What did he mean by this?

Our approach to the Rhodesian problem has always been that the main stumbling block to any negotiated resolution of the conflict is Ian Smith. The Anglo-American proposals were always based on the assumption that Smith would surrender power. Throughout the negotiations we made it clear to both the British and the Americans that because of our historical experience in dealing with Mr. Smith, we saw no way that he would surrender power of his own volition. Therefore, if the negotiating process was to go through, the responsibility for toppling Smith lay with

the British and the American governments.

We have also always maintained that the British were never reluctant to use force whenever they felt it was warranted in a colonial situation. The only exception was in the case of Rhodesia.

So the point President Nyerere was making was this. If the Americans and the British were really determined to go ahead with the Anglo-American proposals, then they could easily use their military forces for the purpose of toppling Smith.

But what President Nyerere now says he fears most—what Tanzania and I believe African countries fear most—is the spectacle on the eve of the victory of the liberation forces of the British or any other government attempting to intervene militarily in Rhodesia on the pretext of trying to save white people in Rhodesia.

There has been a tendency to take President Nyerere's statement out of context as if

he is now advocating that the only way to resolve the conflict in Zimbabwe is through British and American intervention. But what he is saying is that we on our part—that is, the Patriotic Front, the front-line states, the African states—accepted the Anglo-American proposals as the basis of negotiations. It has always been Smith and his internal collaborators who rejected them. So since Smith is the stumbling block, let them take military action against him.

Was he at the same time implying a lack of confidence in the Patriotic Front, that the Front would not be able to overthrow Smith's government?

No, absolutely not. The Tanzanian government, like all the front-line states, has consistently supported the Patriotic Front. We have always maintained that ultimately

West Blocking Popular Victories in Namibia and Zimbabwe— Says Tanzania's Ambassador Salim

the Patriotic Front will emerge victorious. President Nyerere was expressing an attitude toward the British and the Americans, not an attitude toward the Patriotic Front.

What we are saying is that if the Patriotic Front were to wage the war to its ultimate, logical conclusion, and win in the battlefield, it would be ridiculous for anyone outside Zimbabwe, inside or outside Africa, to expect the Patriotic Front at that point to start thinking in terms of negotiations on the basis of the Anglo-American proposals or any other basis. The only question then would be surrender on the part of the Smith regime.

Do you think that President Nyerere really believes that British and American military intervention to topple Smith is a practical possibility?

Well, it was always a practical proposition, but it becomes impractical by virtue of the lack of determination of both Washington and London to topple Mr. Smith in that manner. It's not the ability or capacity of either the British or the Americans to topple

Smith that is lacking, but the political will. I think you also have to take into account domestic political considerations, which make it impossible.

It wasn't long after President Nyerere's interview that the Hughes Report was released in Britain, and that both the American and British governments essentially admitted that there was nothing they could do now to bring all the parties together at the conference table or to pursue their plans for Rhodesian independence. Is there any reason then for anyone to be optimistic over Anglo-American initiatives over Rhodesia?

Right now, no. There's absolutely no reason for optimism. President Nyerere's statements displayed the extent of our pessimism as far as the possibilities of the Anglo-American proposals are concerned. We have always taken the view that only combined pressure of both the U.S. and

Great Britain against Smith could possibly result in the evolution of a negotiated resolution. But because the principal authors are not prepared to back up their own proposals, Mr. Smith has been allowed to believe that he can still buy more time. There is always the possibility that conservative forces within the U.S. and Britain will make it possible for the British and the American governments to support the internal settlement.

President Nyerere has said that he feared British intervention, by implication, on the side of the Rhodesian government. At the same time, Ian Smith said recently in reaction to the Hughes Report that the British government was "kowtowing" to the Patriotic Front guerrillas. Who is right?

The British have never kowtowed to the Patriotic Front guerrillas. Our fear of a British intervention on the side of Rhodesia is not based on concern about the Whitehall government working out an immediate deal with Smith, though frankly British statements and British positions could confirm our worst fears. Our major preoccupation is with what may happen now in the situation where the battle inside Zimbabwe is going well for the nationalist forces and is likely to be intensified soon. Then we may witness an exodus of some of the white people.

Our fear is that the British government may then use the excuse of saving white people to move its troops in, in which case they will serve to safeguard Mr. Smith's interests against the interests of the Patriotic Front.

So, when President Nyerere called on the British and the Americans to use force, he was saying, "Look, if you want to use force at all, then you must use force to topple Smith. You must not wait until the Patriotic Front is on the verge of victory and then start using force."

President Nyerere also said that he feared the prospect of civil war in Rhodesia between the two wings of the Patriotic Front. Do you think that there is a greater likelihood of that occurring now after Robert Mugabe made his statement quoted recently in the *New York Times* that those who don't do the fighting can't reap the fruits of victory, an implicit criticism of ZAPU?

No, I don't think so. I think that Mr. Mugabe's statements portray some of the difficulties and differences that prevail within the Patriotic Front. I think it would be foolish to pretend that these differences

don't exist. But I don't think that the statement itself would exacerbate the situation.

But I think that there is a legitimate concern that unless there is unity of the fighting forces in Zimbabwe there's always the possibility of internal strife among the fighting forces. That is why the front-line states for several years now have spent much of their time, energy and resources trying to solidify the unity of the Patriotic Front, and more particularly trying to solidify the unity of the fighting forces of Zimbabwe. We have acted on the assumption, in President Nyerere's words, that you can have a multi-party system in Zimbabwe, but you can't have a multi-army system. A multi-army system is an invitation to disaster.

What is the greatest obstacle to the unity of the military forces at this point?

I think one has to take into account the historical background of the two fighting forces, the difficulties and different experiences they have encountered, the bitterness—the personality bitteresses and rivalries that have all grown up over a period of years. Don't forget that ZAPU and ZANU operated as different organizations from 1961 until 1976. The differences of 14 years cannot be easily resolved in one year.

But I think the prospects for the consolidation of this unity are bright. Frankly there is no alternative, no credible alternative, for a stable, secure, and genuinely free Zimbabwe than the unity of the fighting forces of Zimbabwe.

It's generally held that it is ZAPU which is most unwilling to unify the military wing of the Patriotic Front. Is that your understanding?

No. Since both I myself and my country have been dealing with both ZAPU and ZANU and are actively supporting both, I think it would be irresponsible for me to say which is responsible for the lack of unity. But I think both organizations have a clear responsibility to Zimbabwe and to Africa to unite their forces.

As for the front-line presidents themselves, can you say what extent the opening of the Zambia-Rhodesia border several months ago really affected the unity of the front-line states?

The differences and the reactions were of an immediate and temporary nature. But in terms of the totality of the situation, it has not in any way affected the unity and cohesiveness of the front-line states. And right now, despite these momentary setbacks, we have gone back to where we were before. I think that this is because of the logic of the situation.

It is unconceivable that among five

sovereign states with different particular problems, we could always see eye-to-eye on every single issue of tactics and strategy relating to the liberation struggle.

The thing that has made it possible for unity to prevail despite our tactical differences is that all of us have a common strategic objective. And all of us really believe in the support of the freedom fighters, and are making sacrifices, for the struggle. Zambia, Mozambique and to some extent Botswana are paying a particularly high price for supporting the struggle. To them it's not purely a question of conceptual analysis; it's a question of life and death.

In spite of our differences, the factors that unite us are much greater than the factors which divide us.

Let's turn to Namibia. It appears that the UN is moving forward with its transitional plan for independence. Is there truly reason to be optimistic over Namibia now?

Well, I think there is a possibility of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Namibia. If South Africa acts in conformity with the requirements of Security Council resolution 435 and does not make new demands or raise obstacles, there is a possibility of a breakthrough.

I am somewhat guardedly optimistic. I would emphasize the word guardedly, because the history of the Namibian problem has been a history of expectations and disappointments. There has been prevarication, and sometimes outright deceit in South Africa's behavior on the question of Namibia. So I would be very careful.

Very few diplomats, particularly around the UN, have acknowledged that the internal elections held in Namibia in December have significantly affected the political balance of power on the ground inside Namibia. But isn't it the case that they were an important political event in Namibia, and could significantly change the results of any U.N.-supervised election? Shouldn't they be more realistically taken into account?

I think it would be naive to pretend that those elections did not have an objective, and that to some extent that objective was achieved by the South Africans. Their objective was to try to create a *fait accompli* in the territory which would make it more difficult for SWAPO, the authentic representative of the Namibian people, to win an election. But I don't think that this event will dramatically change the outcome of the new elections, provided that the UN starts the whole election process anew when it moves into the territory. This is an impor-

tant proviso. This would include a new registration of voters, to ensure that the voters are real Namibians—not phantom voters, not exiles from Angola, not members of the UNITA bands operating within Namibia, not South African personnel. There were "voters" from all these groups inflating the ballot boxes in the last so-called elections.

I think under conditions of genuine registration, freely supervised, effectively controlled by the UN, SWAPO will win that election.

If the South Africans have been continually guilty of creating *fait accompli* for their own interest in Namibia, shouldn't the UN have taken stronger action against South Africa when Pretoria decided to go ahead with the internal elections?

Absolutely. It should have.

Why didn't it?

It is one of the tragic ironies of the UN's inability to confront situations that the South Africans have been able to get away with close to murder on the question of Namibia. The responsibility for the UN's inability to cope with South Africa's defiance rests with the Western powers, more specifically with the five Western members who were instrumental in guiding and formulating the proposal which came to be known as Security Council resolution 435.

When South Africa defied both the UN and the very Western countries with which it was negotiating, those five countries avoided challenging South Africa head-on within the Security Council. They were only prepared to condemn South African action but were not prepared to take any meaningful substantive action.

You said the West has helped South Africa get away with murder. Isn't that fundamentally saying that the West has done everything it could to keep SWAPO from taking power in Namibia?

Well, I'll put it this way. By refusing to confront South Africa effectively, the Western governments have given South Africa's plans in Namibia greater possibilities and greater credibility. I do not want to impugn the motives of the Western governments on Namibia. It would be logical that they would want what they consider to be a moderate government in Namibia.

But irrespective of the attitude of the Western governments—what they want or don't want in Namibia—what is important is that their proposal, if scrupulously implemented, has the possibility of allowing the people of Namibia to decide for themselves their own destiny. And if those possibilities are implemented, we are confident that SWAPO will emerge victorious. □

Patriotic Front: Battlefield Victories But Internal Tensions

It appears ironic to many observers and supporters of the Patriotic Front that as its guerrilla fighters close in on the Ian Smith government in Salisbury, the gap between the two wings of the Front, ZAPU and ZANU, appears to grow wider. This trend made its most public appearance in early February in an interview with ZANU's Robert Mugabe in the *New York Times*.

"No one else has done as much fighting as we have done, has undergone as much suffering," Mugabe said, "and therefore is as entitled to the leadership of the people. Those who have fought cannot reap the rewards of a victory to which they have contributed nothing."

Strong words. But Mugabe was voicing a criticism that other ZANU officials have made many times before although less openly. This criticism has been given some credibility lately by reports in the Western press of ZAPU's reluctance to commit itself fully on the battlefield. ZAPU's Joshua Nkomo, these reports say, is holding back most of his troops, letting ZANU shoulder the burden of the fighting. At the same time, ZANU officials have claimed to have liberated up to 80 percent of the Rhodesian countryside.

ZAPU headquarters in Lusaka has issued no formal reply to Mugabe's remarks. But in an interview with *Southern Africa*, Callistus Ndlovu, ZAPU's permanent representative at the United Nations, spoke frankly about ZAPU-ZANU differences and about the state of the war—and his



Callistus Ndlovu.

organization's participation in that war—in Rhodesia.

Ndlovu said that it had always been ZAPU's policy to discuss the progress of the war in detail. He admitted that such a policy could have contributed to a "distorted view" of what has taken place. He said ZAPU would continue with this policy, but he added that ZAPU officials "have read with disbelief" reports that ZAPU has only 1000 guerrillas fighting inside Rhodesia.

Ndlovu said that ZAPU has made many military advances in the last two years, culminating, he said, in the attack on the Salisbury oil depot late last year. ZANU has also claimed responsibility for this attack. Ndlovu said ZAPU followed this quickly with an attack on a communications center in Borrowdale, a suburb of Salisbury.

"The war is going very well," Ndlovu said. "This year is going to be quite decisive. You are definitely going to be quite decisive. You are definitely going to see more dramatic attacks every month and every day."

Plane Shot Down

The ZAPU representative's words were prophetic, to say the least. Only three days after the interview, ZAPU rockets downed their second Air Rhodesia Viscount plane near Kariba in northern Rhodesia. All 59 passengers aboard were killed.

In a press conference in Lusaka, Nkomo said the plane was attacked only because

Colligan

ZAPU believed Rhodesia's top military commander, Lt. Gen. Peter Walls, was on the flight. "Let it be known and put on record that we do not bring down civilian aircraft," Nkomo said. "But when civilian aircraft are used for military purposes then we bring them down."

Little more than a week later on February 20, ZAPU guerrillas attacked for the first time Rhodesia's main international airport on the outskirts of Salisbury. No significant damage was reported, but the use of mortar in the attack means the guerrillas were within very close range of the airport.

Rhodesian officials pledged reprisal attacks, though they were slow in coming. But in late February Rhodesian bombers hit ZAPU camps in both Zambia and, for the first time, Angola. So far the extent of the damage from these raids is not known.

Rhodesia has also stepped up its raids on Mozambique. Mozambican officials have accused Rhodesia of waging "total war" against their country and of seeking to spread "panic" among its people. "They are attacking directly Mozambican economic, military, and civilian installations," Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano said recently. "They are trying to destroy our republic." The latest Rhodesian raid occurred February 19 near the Mozambican town of Chimoio.

Long Arm of the West

In his response to Mugabe's criticism, ZAPU's Ndlovu was quick to express his suspicion that somehow the long arm of the West is involved. Ndlovu said the West's attempt to split the Patriotic Front by "subverting ZAPU from within had been fruitless." The fundamental Western tactic, according to Ndlovu, had been to cast ZAPU as the more moderate wing in the hope of alienating ZAPU's "traditional allies," a reference primarily to the Soviet Union.

After ZAPU downed the first Air Rhodesia plane last fall, Ndlovu said, the Western powers abandoned ZAPU as their prime target and turned their attention to ZANU. "They still want to split the Patriotic Front," Ndlovu said, "by approaching the other wing of the front and making that wing appear as if it is more anti-ZAPU than it is anti-Smith.

"I don't know whether Mugabe said those things, but if he said them, that will show clearly how incapable he is of understanding the strategy of those elements that are praising him in the *New York Times*."

Ndlovu's view may seem overly conspiratorial, but there is some evidence available to back up his claims. One Western diplomat, unidentified by the *New York Times*, was quoted as saying of Mugabe, "Frankly, I think we can work with him," and *Africa Confidential*,

published in London and generally considered to be privy to British intelligence sources, has suggested a possible Mugabe-Abel Muzorewa alliance. A confidential report, written by British Liberal Party head David Still after a trip to southern Africa early in the year, assesses ZANU as the more flexible wing of the front, and also raises the possibility of an alliance with Muzorewa. And Zbigniew Brezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, has been reported to have suggested to the Chinese that they put pressure on Mugabe to join the internal settlement.

So will Mugabe's remarks hurt the Patriotic Front? Both Ndlovu and ZANU representatives in New York say no. But long-time observers and supporters of the Front are more pessimistic. One influential supporter in New York said Mugabe's comments were "unfortunate" and "not necessary at this time."

There is, incidentally, a move afoot in Congress to explore the possibility of inviting both Nkomo and Mugabe to the U.S. but some observers think Mugabe's comments may make such a visit more difficult than it had been before.

While acknowledging all the suspicions and differences between ZAPU and ZANU that have accumulated over more than fifteen years of separation, Ndlovu still held out hope for the future.

"I personally think that in the fighting that is going to take place in Zimbabwe, all the genuine liberation forces will unite. There is going to be a time when we have to push Smith out of Salisbury, out of the country. When that happens, those who refuse to unite will wither away from the movement like dry leaves.

"It doesn't matter whether they are ZAPU or ZANU."

□
M.S.

Smith Hopes for Victory in Washington

The April elections, largely irrelevant in Rhodesia, have taken on major importance in Washington.

Congress has now begun its fifth fight on Rhodesian sanctions, and this time the right wing can smell victory.

Conservative senators and corporate lobbyists are skillfully appealing to the moderates whose votes will be decisive. Beginning in 1971, the political muscle to oppose sanctions came from the corporations with a stake in Rhodesia—at first from Union Carbide, mining chrome there, and then from the specialty steel industry, which uses that chrome in the US.

Smith's small group of friends in Con-

gress are southerners and conservatives motivated mostly by the race issue. But it was their clever shaping of the issue in terms of the need for US access to "strategic and critical materials" that brought them partial victory until 1977, when Congress finally closed the Byrd Amendment loophole during its brief honeymoon with President Carter.

Today, another issue—more emotional and deep-seated in America's political psyche—has been added to the debate, namely the ideological competition between



Meeting of friends in the US: (l to r) Ian Smith, Ndabaningi Sithole and Gerald Ford

the Soviet Union and the United States. The proclivity of American politicians to favor a moderate neo-colonial solution over victory by a liberation movement with socialist principles has grown stronger as the Patriotic Front gains ground.

Until last year, most members of Congress who thought about Rhodesia at all saw it basically as stable, with sanctions only a small impediment to continued minority rule. But Rhodesia has come into focus as a possible serious loss to the West, following in the wake of Vietnam, Angola, and now Iran. The Anglo-American attempt at crisis-management faltered, and the internal settlement, with its veneer of multi-racialism and democracy had a lot of appeal on Capitol Hill. Bishop Abel Muzorewa effectively called for support of "a democratic, pro-Western, anti-communist multi-racial society." Smith and Sithole's *pas de deux* on national TV in October solidified the image that these reasonable, moderate men could succeed with US backing.

Higher Stakes

This is why the fight to retain sanctions is harder to wage today, and why the stakes are also higher. The issue is no longer just US access to Rhodesian chrome, but the complete lifting of sanctions, to permit the flow of critically-needed arms, oil, planes, and capital to the beleaguered Rhodesian regime. The Rhodesian Information Office operating in Washington makes no secret of its desire for US military support in the war against the Patriotic Front:

"If [forces of subversion] are heavily reinforced by the Soviets with the objective of overthrowing a broad-based government in Salisbury and putting the Soviet's clients in power, we would consider that the West had a responsibility to help us resist that aggression. We would be asking for the nor-

malization of relations in trade and commerce, and for access to weaponry with which to defend ourselves. . . ."

Congress's passage of the Case-Javits amendment last July demonstrated how the political ground has shifted. Congress voted to require the president to lift sanctions if he determined that the Rhodesian government was willing to negotiate in good faith, and that a free election had been held with international observers.

The amendment supports the internal settlement by accepting the elections held under its supervision and control as a fair test of the will of the people. As Senator Javits said last July: "Either the country unites under the existing government, and there is an election [which] gives the government legitimacy, or the guerrillas will win. The aim of our amendment is to bring about that legitimacy."

Even liberals who voted for the Case-Javits compromise last year have now adopted the political line it embodied. "Talking about majority rule and the war between the internal settlement regime and the Patriotic Front is useless," one liberal staff member explained. "Senators don't care whether the internal settlement is just; if Rhodesians vote for it in April, that's all that matters." Even though many liberals know that the internal settlement is fatally flawed, they have not been prepared to risk being labeled "pro-terrorist" or "pro-communist" by opposing it. So the April elections, largely irrelevant in Rhodesia, have taken on major importance in Washington.

Senate conservatives are already trying to prove that the internal settlement government will fulfill the requirements of the Case-Javits resolution. In early February, Senators Schweiker and DeConcini introduced a resolution erroneously stating that the internal settlement regime has

agreed to negotiate in good faith, that the planned elections will be free and open to all political groups, and that the president should therefore lift sanctions ten days after the April elections. Groups lobbying to retain sanctions have adopted the same strategy, with the opposite set of facts. The Southern Africa Working Group in Washington, DC, collected signatures in February for a letter to President Carter explaining why elections conducted by the illegitimate Rhodesian regime in the midst of war cannot possibly be free.

Sending Election Observers

Sanctions supporters inside Congress have so far taken a much weaker and more dangerous approach. Senator McGovern, the new chairman of the Africa subcommittee, intends to introduce a resolution in collaboration with ranking minority member Hayakawa appointing a team of observers to go to the April elections and make an official report to Congress. An official observer team would make legitimate the elections, and fall into the conservatives' trap of examining the superficial mechanics instead of the substance of democracy in Rhodesia. But McGovern apparently believes he needs official, specific evidence to refute positive reports that right-wing observers are sure to bring back in April.

The Senate fight over sanctions will build until the president decides whether the elections held in April are genuine. If he decides in the negative, Smith's friends in Congress are sure to introduce legislation to lift sanctions without conditions.

Even then, the battle over Zimbabwe will not go away. Congress has caught on to what the American foreign policy establishment has known for years—that the outcome of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe is critical to the future of the West's strongest outpost in Africa, South Africa itself. For exactly this reason, the American anti-apartheid movement must organize to retain sanctions and isolate the bogus internal settlement regime. □

C.R.

Private Armies Terrorize Zimbabwean People

"The guerrillas demand food from the people on a roster basis and failure to produce it means certain death. They demand meat and meat only and the people have now run out of chickens and goats and very soon will be forced to slaughter their cattle. Most of the girls in the area are pregnant as a result of being raped. The women whose husbands they kill are sometimes taken to sleep with them."

This description comes not from the Smith regime's propaganda machine bent on discrediting Patriotic Front freedom fighters, but from a church source. It is testimony given to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace by a witness in the Nembudzia district of Rhodesia, and it refers to the private armies of Bishop Ndabaningi Sithole—also referred to by some as Sithole's "guerrillas." The men who make up this army are apparently on the rampage in at least nine districts of the country. Many of these areas are so-called frozen or free zones, which are exempt from martial law and are controlled by militias recruited by Sithole's and Bishop Muzorewa's parties.

Details of the operations of these private armies—Sithole's in particular—are disclosed in a Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia document recently supplied to *Southern Africa*.

Shortly after the signing of the internal settlement a year ago, a local journalist reported that Sithole's "ZANU" party and Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) were busy recruiting young men who could be passed off as "returning guerrillas" taking advantage of the "safe return" policy. Recruitment has since increased to a point where both parties have substantial militias although no estimates of actual numbers have been given. Statements by UANC and "ZANU" (Sithole) spokespeople are typically contradictory. While condemning the existence of such private armies, each group claims that their "military wings" operate in the best interests of the country. But in reality it would seem that the private armies and the



"OK, Generals, get your bloody armies moving!"

"military wings" are one and the same thing.

The armies are, for the most part, being trained inside Rhodesia, although there are reports that at least some of the men are undergoing training in Malawi and Uganda.

Quoting from Commission contacts in four of the eleven known areas of operation, the CCPJ report focuses mainly on the havoc created by Sithole's men.

There is a basic similarity in the reports from the four areas.

- People are forced to pay 50 Rhodesian cents to join the party, as well as contribute 25 cents weekly for the upkeep for the party. Those that refuse, even if they have no money, are accused of supporting the guerrillas and are tortured or shot. One informant said that he knows "one headman whose brother and that brother's wife were killed because they refused to support Sithole. People [are] killed because they do not pay contributions."

- The men demand the best food, particularly meat, every day. Thus, these areas,


barely above starvation level, are being further devastated.

- Numerous propaganda meetings are disrupting vital agricultural work. A source in Nembudzia district told CCPJ that, "There are frequent meetings lasting for hours on end, sometimes beginning at nine in the morning and ending at 5 pm." Another person is quoted as saying that "the people are so oppressed they feel they cannot go on."

- Beatings, torture and killings are commonplace. A man from Gandachibwawa-Njanja described how he had been harassed. After Sithole's people had called a meeting attended by very few people, he was accused of having told people not to attend. In his own home, "they beat me up with fists and kicked me. I went away and came back in the morning, and they were still there and started beating me again. I was made to lie down and they beat me with a big stick. I was given 20 lashes and told to get the people back by 11 am or

Continued on page 26

The "New" Rhodesian Constitution: Illusion of Majority Rule



credit: Tempo

Ian Smith: I don't see the Patriotic Front anywhere

by Michael C. Beaubien

On January 30, an overwhelming majority (85 percent) of 67,000 white Rhodesian voters approved the constitution drafted by Ian Smith and his black associates in the "internal settlement." The black majority of 6.8 million had no similar vote for accepting or rejecting the document.

Although Smith and his right-wing US supporters claim that this constitution will guide Zimbabwe to majority rule, the constitution in fact represents a design for the continuation of white power for at least the next ten years. It provides the white population with a representation entirely out of proportion to its real numbers in the electorate, while the new parliamentary procedure makes it virtually impossible for blacks to change anything without white

Michael Beaubien is a freelance journalist who has worked for many years with liberation movement solidarity groups.

The Rhodesian Constitution:

Conservatives in the US and Britain have seized on the new Rhodesian constitution as proof that all is now well in Zimbabwe. They are demanding the immediate lifting of sanctions as a first step in a propaganda campaign that may soon call for the open re-arming of Smith's hard-pressed army. Southern Africa is therefore reprinting major extracts from this document as the most direct way of exposing this most recent deliberate entrenchment of white control in Rhodesia.

Chapter I: The State

The name of the country will be Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Chapter II: Head of State

Appointment and tenure of office. The President will be the Head of State. He will be appointed by an electoral college consisting of the members of the Senate and the House of Assembly. His term of office will be six years but he will be eligible for re-election for one further period of six years. The President will only be able to be removed from office if at least two-thirds of the members of the Senate and the

House of Assembly voting together have recommended his removal on the grounds of misconduct or inability to perform efficiently the duties of his office.

Powers and functions. The President will have such powers and duties as are conferred or imposed upon him by the Constitution or any other law. The President will be a "constitutional type" President acting on the recommendation of the Executive Council or some other person or authority. He will act in his own discretion only in certain limited instances.

Chapter III: The Legislature

The Legislature. The Legislature will consist of the President and Parliament which will comprise a Senate and a House of Assembly.

The Senate. The Senate will consist of thirty Senators, of whom—

- (a) ten will be Blacks elected by the seventy-two Black members of the House of Assembly; and
- (b) ten will be Whites elected by the twenty-eight White members of the House of Assembly; and
- (c) ten will be African Chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs, five of whom will be from Mashonaland and five from Matabeleland.

If, however, at any time there are not at least two members who are legally qualified for appointment to the Senate Legal Committee, the President will be empowered to appoint one or two additional Senators with those legal qualifications, as may be required for the purpose.

Senate Legal Committee. The President of the Senate will be required to appoint a Senate Legal Committee, the composition and functions of which will be the same as those relating to the present Senate Legal Committee.

House of Assembly. The House of Assembly will consist of one hundred members comprised as follows:—

- (a) Seventy-two members will be Blacks elected by voters on the Common Voters Roll for seventy-two constituencies. However, for the first general election these members will be elected on a party-list system and not on a constituency basis. The existing provinces will each be allocated seats as follows—
 - (i) Manicaland ten; (ii) Mashonaland Central five; (iii) Mashonaland East fifteen; (iv) Mashonaland West six; (v) Matabeleland North ten; (vi) Matabeleland South five; (vii) Midlands eleven; (viii) Victoria ten; and any registered political party will be entitled to submit a list of candidates for each province. If at the election in any province a party gets less than 10% of the votes actually cast, that party will be excluded from the allocation of seats.

- (b) Twenty will be Whites elected on a preferential voting system by voters enrolled on the White Voters Roll for twenty White Roll *constituencies* on a preferential voting system. For the purposes of the Constitution, the term "Whites" will mean persons who are Europeans as defined in the present Constitution.

- (c) Eight will be Whites elected by the ninety-two members referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) above from sixteen candidates who have been nominated by the twenty-eight White members of the House of Assembly. For the purposes of the first election, the sixteen candidates will be nominated by the fifty White members of the present House of Assembly.

Electoral qualifications. All citizens who are eighteen years or over will be eligible to be enrolled on the Common Voters Roll. In addition, all Whites who have attained the age of eighteen years or more will be eligible to be enrolled on the White Voters Roll. The Electoral Act will provide for—

- (a) the establishment of a Delimitation Commission to delimit the seventy-two Common Roll and the twenty White Roll constituencies for the second and subsequent general elections;
- (b) the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates for election as members of the Senate or the House of Assembly;
- (c) the establishment of an Electoral Supervisory Commission and the functions thereof in connexion with the supervision of general elections.

Life of Parliament. Ordinarily, the life of any Parliament will be five years.

cooperation. Furthermore, the constitution guarantees continued white control over the judiciary, civil service, and the military, and provides whites with more than a quarter of the cabinet seats.

By re-naming the country Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, whites have demonstrated their commitment to racism and colonialism through perpetuating the memory of Cecil Rhodes, the architect of colonial rule in southern Africa. And while the constitution provides for Zimbabwe-Rhodesian citizenship, it also allows persons to retain dual citizenship, a special privilege for the white settlers, most of whom emigrated to Rhodesia from elsewhere. They will keep that second citizenship alive as an insurance against having to accept real majority rule.

There will be no popular election of the president, who serves as head of state. Instead, the president will be appointed for a term of six years by the legislature. Because the constitutional plan for the legislature insures white power, the president will have to be someone that whites approve of and who will serve white interests.

The allocation of parliamentary seats is grossly disproportionate to the population distribution. Whites, who are at most four percent of the population, will have a guaranteed 28 percent of the seats in the House of Assembly and one-third of all Senate seats.

The House of Assembly will have one hundred members—28 reserved white seats and 72 black seats. The 72 black representatives will be elected by voters on the Common Voters Roll, which means that whites will also vote for the black candidates, allowing them to block any "undesirable" black contender.

In the first election, black members will

Parliamentary procedures. The procedures to be followed in the Senate and the House of Assembly and the powers of the two Houses will be much the same as those applicable to the present Senate and House of Assembly. The Senate will not be able to amend Money Bills, though it may recommend amendments. In relation to other Bills, if the Senate has not passed such a Bill within one hundred and eighty days, the House of Assembly may resolve that it be presented to the President for his assent. However, since the Declaration of Rights will be justiciable, the Senate, if it considers any provision of a Bill to be in contravention of the Declaration of Rights, will have to refuse to pass the Bill, whether or not the provision might be in the national interest, and in that event the House of Assembly will only be able to resolve that the Bill be presented to the President for his assent after a delay of three hundred and sixty days.

Chapter IV: The Executive

Executive powers. The executive government will vest in the President who will act on the advice of the Executive Council except where he is specifically required to act on the advice of the Prime Minister or some other authority.

Prime Minister. The President will appoint a Prime Minister and, in doing so, will appoint the person who, in his discretion, he considers to be best able to command the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly.

Appointment of Ministers and the Executive Council. The President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, will appoint Ministers and Deputy Ministers who will hold office during the pleasure of the President. A Minister or Deputy Minister who is not a member of the Senate or the House of Assembly may not hold office as such for longer than four months unless he becomes a member of either House. The President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, will appoint Ministers to the Executive Council.

During the first five years or the life of the Parliament, whichever is the longer, the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, will be required to appoint Ministers from each political party which is represented in the House of Assembly by five or more members in the proportion of seats held by each such party. Each Minister appointed will be a member of the Executive Council. In recommending the appointment of Ministers from members of another political party, the Prime Minister will be required to act on the advice of the leader of that political party.

State of emergency. The President may at any time declare that a state of public emergency exists. Unless such a declaration is approved by a resolution passed by the House of Assembly it will cease to have effect at the expiration of fourteen days after the declaration or, if Parliament is dissolved within that period of fourteen days, at the expiration of thirty days after the declaration.

A declaration, if so approved, will continue in force for not longer than six months and may be renewed from time to time by resolution of the House of Assembly. The House of Assembly may approve or renew a declaration for a period shorter than six months and may at any time resolve that a declaration should be revoked.

Chapter V: The Judicature

High Court. Judicial authority will be vested in the High Court which will consist of an Appellate Division and a General Division as at present. The Chief Justice and other judges of the High Court will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. There will be a Senior Puisne Judge who, subject to the directions of the Chief Justice, will be in charge of the General Division.

Qualifications of judges. A person will not be qualified for appointment as a judge unless he is or has been a judge in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language or he has been qualified to practise as an advocate for not less than ten years in Rhodesia or in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language.

Removal of judges. A judge will be subject to removal from office by the President only on the grounds of inability to discharge the functions of his office or misbehaviour and if an independent tribunal has recommended that he be removed on one of these grounds. In considering whether a tribunal should be appointed to

not be elected on a constituency basis, but on a party-list system, with seats allocated regionally in a way that seems deliberately aimed at deepening inter-African rivalries.

The eight provinces to which the constitution apportions blocks of seats are mostly dominated by heavy concentrations of a particular ethnic group. Matabaland North, which is allocated ten seats, has a large Ndebele population. Mashonaland Central is allocated five seats, the Eastern region has 15 seats and the Western region has six seats. All are areas in which there are major concentrations of the Sezuru and Korekore groups. The Victoria area with ten seats is dominated by the Karanga population. The allocation of seats appears carefully designed to encourage divisions among Africans in the face of white unity.

The 30 Senate members will not be elected by popular vote. Instead, whites are guaranteed ten of the 30 seats, to be elected by the 28 white members of the House of Assembly. Ten of the remaining seats will be elected by the seventy-two black members of the House, and ten will be assigned chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs (five from Mashonaland and five from Matabeleland).

This allocation of Senate seats gives whites representation even more disproportionate to the population distribution than in the House. It also gives significant influence to the most conservative element among the African people, the chiefs, who in most instances are government appointees, while again emphasizing divisive ethnic factors.

The proposed composition of the executive branch of the government reflects the same careful preservation of white control so obvious throughout the constitution.

inquire into such inability or misbehaviour of a judge, the President will act, in the case of the Chief Justice, on the advice of the Prime Minister and, in the case of any other judge, on the advice of the Chief Justice.

The tribunal will consist of not less than three members selected by the President from the following—

- (a) retired judges of the High Court;
- (b) judges or retired judges of a superior court of a foreign country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch and English is an official language;
- (c) an advocate of not less than ten years' standing from a panel nominated by the association representing advocates;
- (d) an attorney of not less than ten years' standing from a panel nominated by the association representing attorneys.

Judicial Service Commission. The Judicial Service Commission will consist of the Chief Justice, who will be chairman, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission and one other member appointed by the President on the advice of the Chief Justice. The third member must be a person who is or has been a judge of the High Court or who is an advocate or attorney of not less than ten years' standing.

Law to be administered. The law to be administered by the courts will be the law in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the 10th June, 1891, as modified by subsequent legislation having in Rhodesia the force of law.

Chapter VI: Commissions and Public Offices

The executive will include the president, appointed by the heavily white-influenced parliament, and the ministers, appointed by the president. Whites are effectively guaranteed more than one-quarter of all ministerial positions because ministers will be appointed proportionally from each political party with five or more members in the House. So the whites, with their protected 28 seats and probable high degree of party unity, may well exercise a predominant role in the executive council, given the likelihood of a number of black parties, each of which will have ministerial representation.

Here Comes The (White) Judge

Continued white control of the judicial system also seems assured because the president will appoint the chief justice and all other judges. To make doubly sure, the proposed qualifications for judicial appointment will effectively exclude almost all blacks for many years to come. To become a judge a person must have practiced law for ten years, or must already have been a judge in a country where the common law is Roman Dutch and the official language is English. The only qualifying countries are those directly under the influence of South Africa, which has a Roman-Dutch system of law. Few, if any, Africans will be able to qualify as judges under these provisions.

The police and defense forces will also effectively remain under white control. The president will appoint the police commissioner upon the recommendation of the white-controlled judicial service commission. To qualify for commissioner, a person must have held the rank of assistant commissioner in the police force for at least five years, which would currently exclude all

Public Service and Prison Service. There will be a Public Service Commission which will be responsible for regulating and controlling the organization of the Public Service and the Prison Service. The Commission will consist of a chairman and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President. The Chairman and at least one other member or, if there are more than three members of the Commission, at least two other members shall be persons who have held the post of Secretary of or Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary in a Ministry of the Public Service or a post in the Public Service of a grade equivalent to or higher than that of Under Secretary for periods which in the aggregate amount to at least five years. When considering candidates for appointment to a vacant post in the Public Service or Prison Service, the Commission will be required to give preference to the person who, in its opinion, is the most efficient and suitable for appointment.

Police Force. The Police Force is established for preserving internal security and maintaining law and order and will be under the command of the Commissioner of Police who will be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. A person may not be appointed as Commissioner of Police unless he has held the rank of Assistant Commissioner in the Police Force or any more senior rank for periods which in aggregate amount to at least five years.

There will be a Police Service Commission which will consist of a chairman (who will be the Chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President. Of the members appointed by the President, at least two must be persons who have held the rank of Assistant Commissioner in the Police Force or any more senior rank for periods which in the aggregate amount to at least five years. The functions of the Police Service Commission will be to consider grievances by members of the Police Force, to consider and, if it deems fit, to confirm any proposal to dismiss a member who has had more than two years' service and to make regulations for the general well-being and good administration of the Police Force and the maintenance thereof in a high state of efficiency.

Defence Forces. The Defence Forces will consist of the Army, the Air Force and any other branch established by law. There will be a Commander of each branch who will be responsible for the administration of and determining the use and controlling the operations of the branch concerned. Each Commander will be appointed by the President, acting on the recommendation of a board appointed for the purpose which will consist of the retiring Commander or, if he is not available, the Chairman of the Defence Forces Service Commission, one of the other Commanders and a third member appointed by the President who is a Secretary of a Ministry in the Public Service. There will be provision for the Prime Minister, if he considers it to be necessary, to appoint a person recommended by the Commanders of the Army and Air Force to be Commander of Combined Operations.

There will be a Defence Forces Service Commission which will consist of a chairman (who will be the Chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President. Of the members appointed by the President, at least two must be persons who have held the rank of Colonel in the Army or Group Captain in the Air Force or any more senior rank for periods which in the aggregate amount to at least five years. The functions of the Defence Forces Service Commission will be to consider grievances by members of the Defence Forces, to consider and, if it deems fit, to confirm any proposal to dismiss a member who has had more than two years' service and to make regulations for the general well-being and good administration of the Defence Forces and the maintenance thereof in a high state of efficiency.

CHAPTER VII: FINANCE

There will be one Consolidated Revenue Fund into which all revenues shall be paid unless a law provides for the payment of any such revenues into another fund or that they be retained for the defraying of expenses. All withdrawals from the Consolidated Revenue Fund will have to be authorized by or under an Act of Parliament. There will be a Comptroller and Auditor-General who will be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. His functions will be to audit and report on the accounts of the State and his reports will be laid before the House of Assembly.

Pension rights of public officers. The pension rights of public officers and former public officers and of their dependants will be protected. In addition, a scheme will be introduced to encourage officers of the Public Service and members of the Police Force, Army, Air Force or Prison Service who were in office prior to the 1st October, 1978, to continue to serve on and after the 30th April, 1979. The basis of the scheme will be that if such an officer or member continues to serve for at least one complete year, he will be eligible to receive a pension and for each complete year of service thereafter the factor on which the pension is calculated will be improved. After five complete years have been served, the factor will be the same as that applicable under his present conditions of service if he were to retire on reaching pensionable age.

CHAPTER VIII: DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

The Declaration of Rights will be justifiable and the High Court will have the power to declare any law which is in contravention of the Declaration of Rights to be *ultra vires*. The new Declaration of Rights will follow the general pattern of previous Declarations in the country. The following rights will be protected, with the more important changes being mentioned:—

Protection of right to life.

Protection of right to personal liberty. The Legislature will be able to introduce a law providing for preventive detention but such law will have to provide for the establishment of a tribunal to review cases within thirty days of the person concerned having been detained and thereafter at intervals of not more than one hundred and eighty days. The Government will be obliged forthwith to release a detained person on the recommendation of any such tribunal, which will consist of a chairman (who shall be a person who is a judge of the High Court or qualified to be appointed as such) and two other persons, one of whom is a judge or has been a magistrate for ten years or is an advocate or attorney of not less than ten years' standing. A detained person will be entitled to appear before the tribunal in person or by his legal representative.

Protection from slavery and forced labor.

Protection from inhuman treatment.

Protection from deprivation of property. No person's property may be compulsorily acquired unless the High Court or another court established for the purpose is satisfied that the acquisition is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, the utilization of that or any other property for a purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section thereof or the settlement of land for agricultural purposes. In the case of the settlement of land for agricultural purposes, the land may only be acquired if it has not been substantially put to use for agricultural purposes

blacks from consideration.

The defense force essentially follows this same pattern. The president will appoint the commanders of the army and the air force upon the recommendations of a board consisting of the retiring commander (white), one of the other commanders, and a third member. The Rhodesian army only commissioned its first black officers, 13 of them, in 1977. Black commanders are obviously not even on this constitution's horizon.

Ironically the constitution includes a declaration of human rights that proclaims the right to personal liberty, protection from slavery and forced labor, protection from discrimination, and freedom of expression and movement. In reality the preceding sections of the constitution, which entrench white control of the vital state structures, make this "Declaration of Rights" almost meaningless.

There is one declared right, however, that has tremendous significance for whites who now control 50 percent of the land. No white person's property can be compulsorily acquired, even if it has been abandoned for several years. Only the high court, which will be white-controlled, can authorize that property be acquired for the public interest, and then only with compensation, which can be taken out of the country.

On the other hand, the acquisition of black land will be facilitated under the Tribal Trust Bill, which will make it legal to "move tribespeople away from an area to make way for a scheme of national importance."

Pension rights of past and present officials are also protected, with a similar concern for the property rights of whites. Such

ANOTHER

Some say it will never happen again.

Why, then, has the U.S. allowed illegal arms shipments to South Africa and Rhodesia?

Why is the U.S. supporting "elections" in Rhodesia and Namibia which exclude the independence movements?

Why is the U.S. blocking United Nations economic sanctions against South Africa?

In Vietnam each intervention took Americans deeper into war. Now the U.S. is moving steadily towards intervention in Africa.

What does the record show so far?

ANGOLA: The U.S. government has already intervened militarily in Angola. John Stockwell, former chief of the CIA Angola Task Force, has revealed that the U.S., together with South Africa, started a secret war in Angola in 1975. The aim was to prevent the MPLA, the present ruling party, from forming a government of the majority and to install instead a regime that would "protect Western strategic and economic interests" in the region. To justify American intervention, the CIA told Congress the covert war was necessary to prevent a takeover by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The CIA, Stockwell points out, has falsely accused both nations of initiating intervention.

NAMIBIA: The Namibian people have been fighting for their independence for more than twelve years. Although the South African occupation of Namibia is illegal, Pretoria regards the country as a "buffer zone" for the protection of apartheid and refuses to leave. The U.N. has been trying to force South Africa out and has called for free elections in Namibia. The Western powers, believing that a colonized Namibia will preserve "stability" in southern Africa, have sought to prevent U.N. action. They have allowed South Africa to reject the U.N. election plan and to install a puppet "Constituent Assembly." The South West Africa People's Organization, recognized by African countries

and the U.N. as the true representative of the Namibian people, is being excluded from power. With 50,000 South African troops in the country enforcing apartheid and using Namibia as a base for operations against Angola, the danger of a bloodier, wider war grows.


RHODESIA: The Smith regime has not accepted majority rule. It is digging in to defend white supremacy. War now rages throughout the country. Hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans are imprisoned in "protected villages." Bombing has forced the rural population in many areas to flee to the cities. Smith's war effort has been helped by Western countries. The Rhodesian air force now uses Bell helicopters and other U.S. aircraft. Thousands of mercenaries from the U.S., Great Britain and other Western countries fight in Smith's army. Smith's trip to the U.S., authorized by the State Department, was seen as a great political victory. On his return Smith declared that it amounted to a de facto recognition of his administration. The Carter government, meanwhile, does nothing to stop the flow of arms, oil and mercenaries to Smith. It is clearly moving towards acceptance of Smith and his fraudulent "internal settlement."

SOUTH AFRICA: The Carter administration, despite its proclaimed

support for human rights and majority rule, has consistently sought to protect South Africa from international action against apartheid. The U.S. has done nothing to stop American loans and investment which strengthen apartheid. It allows a continuing clandestine trade in arms with South Africa. It is also preventing the United Nations from imposing oil sanctions against Pretoria. In short, for "strategic and economic" reasons, it continues to act as if apartheid can last forever, ignoring the repressive and exploitative character of that system and the misery and suffering which the vast majority must bear.

ZAIRE: France and Belgium used the Shaba rebellion last spring as an excuse to intervene militarily in Zaire. At that time, the Carter administration helped to transport troops and equipment and sent 325 U.S. military advisors to Africa to support Franco-Belgian operations. The 82nd Airborne Division was alerted for possible intervention against a population driven to rebellion by the Mobutu dictatorship. Since then, the U.S. has continued to prop up that corrupt and tottering regime with further aid. Evidence mounts that the NATO powers intend to use their new base in Zaire to assist South Africa and Rhodesia in suppressing the liberation struggles in southern Africa.

VIETNAM?



CONCERNED CITIZENS' COMMITTEE ON AFRICA (Partial list of Endorsers)

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Iris Berger | Linden P. Martineau |
| Sophie Black | Ruth S. Meyers |
| Coalition of Black Trade Unionists | William Meyers |
| James D. Cockcroft | Donald Morton |
| Gerard Colby | Prexy Nesbitt |
| Robert and Johnnetta Cole | Jack Newfield |
| Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee | Hailu M. Paris |
| Heather Cottin | Mitchell C. Pratt |
| Eleanor Crain | James M. Read |
| Frances and Thomas Crowe | Susan G. Rogers |
| David Dellinger | Marty Rosenblatt |
| Charlotte Dennett | Mary Russak |
| James Dingeman | Joel Samoff |
| Terry Dintenfass | Roger Sanjek |
| Dr. John Domisse | Charles G. Santora |
| Furriers Joint Council of New York | William E. Schleicher |
| Salvatore Galioto | Stanley Sheinbaum |
| Gladys Gates | Kathleen Sheldon |
| Sean Gervasi | Herbert Shore |
| Ellen Gesmer | Mike Shuster |
| Sol Gorelick | James J. Silvers |
| Jay M. Gould | Sisters of Notre Dame Justice Committee |
| David Grad | Patrick Smith |
| Susan Hall | Alan D. Sokal |
| Herbert Hill | Kent J. Spring |
| Professor Alan Hyde | L.S. Stavrianos |
| Lionel Henry Irons | Paul Sweezy |
| Rev. Dr. Edward F. James | Stanley Swerdlow |
| Bill Johnston | Michael Tanzer |
| Stephen J. Karakashian | Terisa Turner |
| Flo Kennedy | Immanuel Wallerstein |
| Irving Lerner | Timothy J. Whalen |
| Jennifer Leaning Link, M.D. | Dale Wiehoff |
| Shirley Magidson | Sybil Wong |
| David Mandel | Sol Yurick |
| | Claudia Zaslauskay |
| | Lillian Zerwick |

We should not have supported colonialism in Vietnam. We should not support the suppression of human rights, white supremacy, apartheid or any other form of colonialism in Africa.

Intervention in Africa would divide our country once again. Another war will not only add to our problems abroad but also to those at home—overwhelming problems such as inflation, unemployment, deteriorating race relations and decaying cities.

We must learn to ignore the “experts” who gave us Vietnam—the same generals, politicians and businessmen who under the guise of preserving freedom were advancing their own narrow interests.

Intervention in Vietnam led to the deaths of 55,000 Americans and more than a million Indochinese.

We must start to mobilize against a series of interventions which can only lead to another disaster.

What can we do? We can begin by telling President Carter and Congress where we stand.

Please fill in and mail the coupon below.

Here is my contribution for this ad and for other ads to help prevent another Vietnam in Africa:

\$500 ___ \$250 ___ \$100 ___ \$50 ___ \$25 ___ \$10 ___ Other ___

Please make checks payable to Concerned Citizens' Committee on Africa, 521 Fifth Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

for a continuous period of at least five years unless the failure to use the property was by reason of public disorder, in which case any period during which the property was not used will be disregarded. Where property is compulsorily acquired, the owner will be entitled to receive adequate compensation promptly and, if he is a citizen or permanently resident in the country, he will be entitled to remit the compensation outside the country within a reasonable period of having received it. Any law which extinguishes or diminishes any right to pension benefits will be regarded as a law providing for the acquisition of a right on property.

Protection from arbitrary search or entry.

Protection of the law.

Protection of freedom and conscience.

Protection of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression will be guaranteed and no religious denomination or person may be prevented from establishing and maintaining schools.

Protection of freedom of assembly and association. Persons will be guaranteed freedom of assembly and association and to form or belong to political parties or trade unions or other associations for the protection of their interests. The freedom will include the right not to be compelled to belong to an association.

Protection of freedom of movement. Freedom of movement, including the right to reside in any part of the country and to enter or leave the country, will be guaranteed.

Protection from discrimination. Discrimination in written laws or by persons acting under a written law in the capacity of a public officer or officer of a public authority will be prohibited.

Savings. Existing laws will be saved from the provisions of the Declaration of Rights for a period of ten years, i.e. during that period a court will not be able to declare any such law *ultra vires* because of any contravention of the Declaration of Rights. This saving will not, of course, preclude the amendment or repeal of any such law. However, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act [Chapter 141] will not be saved and, therefore, that Act will have to be amended in order to bring its provisions into conformity with the provisions of the Declaration of Rights relating to the protection from deprivation of property. (The National Service Act, 1976, will be saved but it has recently been amended so as to provide that it expires on the 31st December, 1979, and any new Act providing for National Service will have to be in conformity with the Declaration of Rights.)

CHAPTER IX: CITIZENSHIP

Persons who are at present citizens of Rhodesia will continue to be citizens of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. In addition, persons who at the fixed date possess or are entitled to dual citizenship will be able to retain such dual citizenship or their right thereto. A person who holds a foreign passport will not be required to surrender that foreign passport, nor will he be denied a passport of Zimbabwe Rhodesia because he is the holder of a foreign passport.

CHAPTER X. OMBUDSMAN

There will be an Ombudsman who will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

CHAPTER XI. ENTRENCHMENT OF PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION AND OTHER LAWS

Certain provisions of the Constitution such as those relating to the Head of State, the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, the Service Commissions and the Services and Forces, Finance, the Declaration of Rights and the amendment of the Constitution and the transitional provisions will be specially entrenched. The effect of this special entrenchment will be that such provisions will not be capable of amendment unless the amending Bill receives the affirmative votes of at least seventy-eight members of the House of Assembly. The amendment of any other provision of the Constitution will require the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the total membership of the House of Assembly. In addition, any Bill to amend the Constitution will re-

Continued on page 29

rights will be protected, and the pensions paid, even if the officials have fled the country.

The major provisions of the constitution are very difficult to amend. So are a range of laws—many of them with fundamentally apartheid provisions—which allow for segregation of housing, education, health facilities and more. The 28 white house members will have veto power over any significant legislation, because a minimum of 78 votes is required to pass any constitutional change for the next ten years, and blacks will have only 72 members in the House.

At the end of ten years, a Commission will be set up to "review" the question of retaining the disproportionate 28 white seats in the house. The commission will consist of the chief justice, two members of the House, and two members appointed by the president. In effect, this means that the commission to decide representation will consist of a majority of whites.

If the commission recommends that the white seats be abolished or reduced, it would also require the approval of 51 of the House members to take effect. There is, however, no constitutional directive if the commission affirms the continuation of the 28 white seats. Consequently, this means that a white group of three can perpetuate indefinitely this system of disproportionate representation without the approval of the legislature.

Thus, an analysis of the "new" Rhodesian constitution reveals not a single article or chapter that demonstrates any potential for a transition to true majority rule. In defiance of world opinion and basic human rights, Ian Smith and the minority white population have again illustrated that they are determined to hold on to power for as long as possible.

UN Namibia Plan Still in Doubt

The United Nations independence plan for Namibia seemed a step closer to getting off the ground in late February with the release of a new report by Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. Among other things, the report finally sets March 15 as the date for a ceasefire between the South African Defense Force and SWAPO guerrillas. If both sides accept the terms of the report, UN peacekeeping troops would also begin their deployment on that date.

But immediately after the release of the report, South Africa indicated, as it had done at every stage of the two-year-long negotiations over Namibia, that it had objections, and the report itself gave no details on important questions such as the composition of UN peacekeeping forces.

In the weeks preceding the release of Waldheim's report, Waldheim's special envoy for Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari, made two trips to Africa—one to Namibia and South Africa in mid-January and another late in the month to the front-line states. His mission: to fill in all the parties involved, including SWAPO president Sam Nujoma, on the UN's plans, and to finalize the details of implementation. But as the first week of February dragged on into the second and Ahtisaari had not yet returned from Africa, it gradually became clear to most people around the UN that the plan was still in deep trouble.

Discussions Deadlocked

Those troubles were finally acknowledged publicly when Waldheim went before the press February 15. Looking thin and unhappy, Waldheim said discussions over the implementation of the UN plan were virtually deadlocked. The specific points of disagreement were all key: the composition of the peacekeeping force known as UNTAG (UN Transitional Assistance Group), the "modalities" of the ceasefire, and the monitoring functions of UNTAG itself.

Throughout the weeks of Ahtisaari's consultations, South African officials had worked hard to reverse their well-earned reputation for intransigence and to portray themselves as the flexible side. In condemning a SWAPO raid in mid-February on a



Ahtisaari in South Africa.

South African base at Nkongo, Foreign Minister Roelof Botha wrote to Waldheim, "South Africa has reached agreement with your Special Representative [Ahtisaari] on all the controversial issues relating to implementation of the proposal." Botha also asserted that the South African army in Namibia had maintained "a low profile" in recent months, and that SWAPO had "constantly displayed bad faith during two years of negotiations."

"I must sound a warning," Botha solemnly proclaimed, "that the whole delicate edifice of agreement which we have built so carefully over the past period is in danger of collapse in light of SWAPO's dastardly attack."

Of course, no ceasefire had been agreed upon at that point. One UN official close to the Namibia consultations called South Africa's claims, to paraphrase, horse manure, and added, "if the war continues, the South Africans have only themselves to blame."

Even Waldheim was displeased with the content and the tone of Botha's letter. "I cannot agree with everything he says," Waldheim told reporters. "Many things do not correspond to the facts." Waldheim

stated that violent acts were "not helpful," but he added, "The basic issue here is that the South African government is illegally in the territory. This has to be stressed."

Waldheim's low-key criticism of the SWAPO attack particularly annoyed the South Africans. "In the circumstances," Botha wrote to Waldheim on February 20, "I find the description of the SWAPO attack as 'not helpful' to be inappropriately generous."

Nevertheless South Africa persisted with its rosy self-characterization. "South Africa cannot be one of these parties," wrote Botha, "now placing an interpretation on the settlement which differs from the plan. In the view of the South African government, there are no outstanding issues of such magnitude as to present insuperable obstacles. There are no outstanding issues of such a nature as to prevent the commencement of the implementation of the settlement plan."

How inaccurate a statement that was became quickly apparent after the release of Waldheim's report. South Africa raised immediate objections, implicitly threatening to back out of the agreement once again.

Where Are the Bases?

Throughout the consultations, a key argument centered on the location of the bases to which SWAPO guerrillas would be restricted after the ceasefire was in force.

The original plan had simply referred to the restriction of all armed forces—SWAPO and South Africa alike—"to base." Because SWAPO had no bases inside Namibia that the South Africans recognized, they interpreted the clause to mean bases outside Namibia. SWAPO argued that the plan provided for the establishment of bases inside Namibia.

The UN agreed with SWAPO. "Any SWAPO armed force in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire," Waldheim's report states, "will be restricted to base at designated locations inside Namibia."

South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha could hardly conceal his rage, calling

Continued on page 30

Sharpeville Remembered



March 21, 1960. The Sharpeville Massacre. A date, an event, which loom on this nineteenth anniversary, just as they did at the time, as a watershed moment in South African history. Sixty-seven blacks shot dead, most of them hit in the back as they tried to flee the barrage of gunfire leveled at a peaceful demonstration against the pass laws.

For people around the world, the photographs of demonstrators scattering from a field littered with bodies remain a stark and terrifying glimpse of the naked brutality so scantily camouflaged under the

rhetoric of "separate development." Nineteen years have brought other massacres, other forms of struggle, other photographs—including eerily reminiscent shots of Soweto schoolchildren scattering before volleys of gunfire. Nineteen years have brought no fundamental change in the system of apartheid or in the pass laws the Sharpeville victims were protesting, although some of those passes are now called passports, some of their holders now officially classified as citizens of independent "homelands" spawned by apartheid. Nineteen years, and the struggle continues.



Sullivan Principles Produce Few Changes on Factory Floors

US corporations defend their presence in South Africa by claiming great progress in implementing the Sullivan principles. Facts rather than company fancies tell a different story.

During Henry Ford's January 1978 visit to South Africa to inspect Ford operations there, a reporter for an American newspaper asked an African employee of Ford how company workers viewed Ford's endorsement of the so-called Sullivan principles.

"When the manifesto was announced," the worker responded, "there was a general feeling of, 'Good, this will force those white people in the management to do something for us.' But nothing has happened. Now there's a lot of disappointment. People are saying, 'So, America hasn't got the power we thought it had,' or, 'They don't care after all.'"

In 1976 Chrysler, one of the three US auto firms in South Africa, merged its South African operations into a subsidiary of the huge, South African-owned Anglo-American Corporation. In so doing, Chrysler provided the basis of what is now the country's largest motor company, Sigma.

Since assuming a minority role in this new firm, Chrysler has been disclaiming any responsibility for conditions in its former plant while continuing to make a profit on its South African investment.

By contrast, Ford and GM, the other US auto giants in South Africa, have been enthusiastic proponents of the Sullivan principles.

Using these principles as a yardstick, though, and disregarding the question of whether even full implementation would have any effect on apartheid, the record currently shows US firms proceeding at a snail's pace, moving ahead only as fast as they are forced to by the pressure of US public opinion.

Principle One: Non-Segregation of the races in all eating, comfort and work



Strengthening the ties: Henry Ford (1) in South Africa last year meets with current Prime Minister Vorster. facilities.

In its 1977-78 Public Interest report, GM states: "All signs restricting access to GMSA plant and office facilities on the basis of race have been removed, and all working areas are open to all employees." It adds, "Eating areas are non-segregated, with the exception of one facility now used by hourly non-white employees."

Fortune magazine, in a June 1978 article which was very positive toward US investment in South Africa reported that: "In line with the Sullivan code, GM duly removed the offending written signs from the lavatory doors in its Port Elizabeth plant, only to replace them with color-keyed doors: blue for whites and Chinese (the latter considered honorary whites for lavatory purposes), orange for blacks and coloreds." *Fortune* also reported that, "black hourly workers at GM eat in a segregated cafeteria, while white hourly

workers are allowed to use the cafeteria for salaried employees (pending the planned construction of a new, integrated facility)."

GM announced in August 1978 that it would spend \$4.5 million to upgrade and integrate dining and other facilities and to provide additional training facilities.

Principle Two: Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.

Principle Three: Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time.

GM and Ford have stated repeatedly that they practice no discrimination in hiring or in pay. The reality however, is that for the most part Africans do the lowest jobs at the lowest pay. A better provision might have been a commitment to pay all workers at all levels a living wage.

In April 1978, the absolute poverty line in Pretoria was estimated at \$163.30 a month. This figure, called the Household Sub-

Apartheid Rides on US Wheels

Ford, GM, and Chrysler constitute an important economic force in South Africa. Together, their investments total about \$300 million, or 17 percent of all US investment in the country.

Currently, the three firms account for about one-third of all motor vehicle sales in South Africa. The US share of the market has been cut in half in the last 20 years by competition, mainly from Japanese firms, but it is still a substantial figure.

The three firms employed well over 11,000 workers in mid-1978, or about one-third of all motor company employees. Of these, about 3,000 were African, 3,500 "coloured" and 4,700 white. There are few Asian workers.

Aside from representing a key element in a vitally important sector of the South African economy, the US motor firms also help to serve South Africa's defense needs.

On a day-to-day basis, the US companies produce many vehicles with both commercial and military uses. These include troop transport trucks (such as GM's Bedford trucks), police vans, and four-wheel drive vehicles of the type used on Army patrols.

It is not known how much of the US firms' business—direct or indirect—consists of defense-related sales. Until recently, the companies gave out no such details at all, and even though they now release limited information, it is likely that these figures represent only a portion of true sales.

Prior to 1978, according to a GM letter to the Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington, GM supplied "in the area of 1500 units" annually to the police and military. Ford

has told the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility in New York that between 1973 and 1977, it sold 128 cars and 683 trucks directly to the South African Ministry of Defense, and 646 cars and 1,473 trucks to the South African police.

While US Commerce Department restrictions on sales to the South African police and military, which were imposed last year, have decreased sales somewhat, both GM and Ford have indicated that the effect was minimal. This is not surprising, given the loopholes in the regulations (see *Southern Africa*,

reduction and refining, mining primary metals, transportation, machinery—industries which generate the lifeblood of any economy—also assume equally strategic importance in time of emergency. Any of our plants can be converted to war production as clearly demonstrated in the United States in 1941."

GM already has agreed to cooperate with the white government in the event of "civil unrest," as evidenced in two secret memos made public last year (see *Southern Africa* June/July 1978). In such circumstances, the memos suggest, white personnel could double as military guards, under the direction of military authorities, while the plants could turn

EMPLOYEES OF US MOTOR COMPANIES BY RACE

Company	hourly	African	"Coloured"		White	
		hourly	hourly	salaried	hourly	salaried
GM(Jan/July 1978)	371	4	1341	40	782	1119
Ford(June 1978)	1244	19	1986	55	674	1305
Chrysler/Sigma (May 1978)	1345	5	95	5	200	500
Total	2960	28	3422	100	1656	2924

November 1978).

The US motor plants in South Africa would assume an even greater significance in time of war or serious internal conflict, when they could be converted for military production.

Thomas Murphy, GM chairman, acknowledged this in a letter to the American Committee on Africa in 1978 in which he stated: "It is apparent to us that manufacturing plants involved in such basic industries as petroleum pro-

out whatever items the government requested.

One of the memos notes, "Unless civil unrest or industrial interruptions precluded the plant from operating by reason of reduced supplies, withholding of labor, failure of transportation systems or a combination of these factors, normal plant operation is assumed."

In other words, business as usual. — K.R.

sistence Level (HSL), (formerly the Poverty Datum Line), is calculated regularly by the University of Port Elizabeth. It provides for only the barest essentials of life for an African family of six, and makes no provision for such basic items as medical treatment or education, which is free for white children but not for Africans.

Sigma, whose Chrysler plant employing 1,300 Africans is right outside Pretoria, was paying its lowest-level African workers just under \$30 a week at the time of the April calculation. This amounts to about \$130 a month—well below the absolute poverty line. Chrysler has declined to give out recent information on wages and job categories, but judging from the past, most of Sigma Chrysler's African workers are in

the lowest-skill jobs.

The poverty line in Port Elizabeth in April 1978 was calculated at \$157. According to Ford, its entry level wage in June 1978 was \$200 and its average African wage was \$233.

GM's latest figures are for July 1978. Based on testimony delivered before Congress by a GM official, 250 of GM's 400 African hourly workers at that time were making between \$211 and \$214 a month, with none lower than \$211.

While these figures indicate that Ford and GM are paying above the poverty line, it must be remembered that the HSL is hardly a realistic figure. The researchers responsible for arriving at the HSL calculate that what they call the HEI—the

Household Effective Level—requires a budget of 150 percent of the HSL. By this measure, in April 1978, an African family of six in Port Elizabeth needed a minimum of \$235 a month. The majority of Ford and GM African workers did not earn this amount.

Moreover, GM slashed its African workforce when it found it expedient to do so. Between August 1976 and the end of 1977—a period of recession—the company laid off two out of every five African workers, cutting African employment by 40 percent. By comparison, GM laid off 30 percent of its "coloured" workforce and only 14 percent of its white force.

The company attributed the uneven nature of the layoffs to seniority.

Continued on page 30

Monitor Refuses Ad

See our center page for a copy of the ad the Monitor would not print

Last spring, following the uprising in Zaire's Shaba province and the swift US assistance to European troops flown into the area, a group of Americans alarmed by the possibility of US intervention in Zaire or elsewhere formed the Concerned Citizens' Committee on Africa.

The group, ranging from academics to clergy to union officials, grew to include at least 150 people, according to Sean Gervasi,

ADMINISTRATION DOUBLESPEAK

"Ian Smith has made some concessions in the Salisbury agreement, but they do not provide for an irreversible transfer of power to majority rule. . . We must maintain our neutrality among all the parties. . ."

—Secretary of State Vance,
May 12, 1978

"Our constant negotiation and use of shuttle diplomacy has brought the problem very close to successful settlement. Rhodesia's recent establishment of a mixed government and their announced commitment to full majority rule prompt us to plan for the re-opening of our embassy in Salisbury in FY 1980."

—Congressional Presentation
Document for FY 1980
State Department
Authorization bill,
January, 1979

The administration has claimed for weeks that the second statement was all a mistake. But so far officials have neither amended it nor retracted it, and the original was apparently cleared in the African bureau of the State Department.

Someone had obviously meant it seriously—it was originally accompanied by a carefully worked out budget to implement the proposal. So far the only explanation offered by State spokespeople for where the vigorous support for the internal settlement came from is "a little man in a green hat" in the basement of the State Department. It all seems a little hard to believe. □

one of the Committee organizers. After discussion, it was decided that the Committee's first project would be the placement of an ad opposing any move toward US African intervention in one or more major US newspapers.

In January, an ad elaborating this theme was submitted to Steven Cogswell, New York advertising manager for the *Christian Science Monitor*. (While not a factor in its selection, the quality of the *Monitor's* coverage of Africa is regarded as generally high.) According to Gervasi, the *Monitor* "practically solicited the ad—they were eager to get it."

Cogswell forwarded the ad to the *Monitor's* head office in Boston, where it was rejected.

Cogswell recalls, "The ad was submitted to the standards board, which is done with any political ad. They had editorial people check it."

Cogswell says he received a list of specific objections and the statement that the ad contained "half truths, misrepresentations, and outright inaccuracies." Among the allegations that were challenged were that the US has allowed illegal arms shipments to South Africa and Rhodesia, that the US has blocked UN economic sanctions against South Africa, and that Ian Smith has been aided by Western countries to continue his war efforts.

Cogswell relayed the objections to the Committee, whereupon, according to Gervasi, unsuccessful attempts were made to speak with *Monitor* officials.

Earl Foell, managing editor of the *Monitor*, says he was not familiar with the ad or the controversy surrounding it until inquiries were made by *Southern Africa*.

Foell says (in contrast to Cogswell) that responsibility for accepting or rejecting any ad lies with the advertising department. Particularly if an ad has a fund-raising component, he says, "they will occasionally ask someone for background advice." In the case of the Committee's ad, he says, the overseas news editor was consulted.

If it had been up to him to decide on whether to run the ad, Foell says, "my own feelings would have been on the negative side."

Why? "I guess I feel that we would not want our readers to feel that things are going downhill rather than uphill. Certainly there's been some waffling on the part of

Continued on page 26

Congressional Line-Up

Here is the line-up in the Africa subcommittees in the new Congress:

SENATE

Democrats:

George McGovern (S.D.)
Edmund Muskie (Maine)
Richard Stone (Fla.)

Republicans:

S.I. Hayakawa (Calif.)
Jacob Javits (N.Y.)

HOUSE

Democrats:

Stephan Solarz (N.Y.)
Charles Diggs (Mich.)
William Gray (Pa.)
Howard Wolpe (Mich.)
Cardiss Collins (Ill.)
Floyd Fithian (Ind.)

Republicans:

William Goodling (Pa.)
John Buchanan (Ala.)
Millicent Fenwick (N.J.)

Battles over Africa policy in the Senate will begin in the subcommittee. Senator McGovern, who replaces Dick Clarke as chairman, returned from a trip to southern Africa in November convinced that Rhodesia looks more and more like the last days of the Vietnam war, and that the US should recognize Angola. Senator Hayakawa, the ranking Republican and one of Rhodesia's closest friends, spearheaded the invitation to the United States for Smith and Sithole last October. After years of a liberal subcommittee, the new expanded membership is much more reflective of the Senate as a whole.

The House line-up is one of the most liberal subcommittees on any issue. Congressman Charles Diggs was forced to give up the chairmanship because of his felony conviction. He has been replaced by New York liberal Stephan Solarz, who had shown shrewd judgment on Zimbabwe but who wants to lead a moderate "fair employment" approach on South Africa. William Gray, a new member of the Congressional Black Caucus from Philadelphia, will be an excellent addition to the subcommittee, as will Howard Wolpe of Kalamazoo, Michigan, a scholar on Nigeria. Millicent Fenwick, a liberal Republican, backed cutting off Export-Import Bank financing to South Africa and opening up aid to Mozambique and Angola.

Writing Plays for Freedom's Sake

Selaelo Maredi is a black South African dramatist who believes that all artists should 'sing songs for the struggle.' Southern Africa's Malik Stan Reaves talked to him recently in New York about his life and work.

"There is this tremendous education that has to happen," says South African dramatist Selaelo Maredi. "We were surprised when we got here that a lot of people did not know anything about the situation in South Africa. People were supporting US corporations in South Africa, because they really didn't know what these corporations do in my country."

Selaelo Maredi, who prefers to be called by his first name, has been telling the story of his country via the stage since the mid-sixties. He first became known to audiences in America through his performance in "Survival."

Working in that production with three fellow black South Africans, Selaelo toured the US, teaching and at the same time learning—so that the play grew and changed with each audience.

A powerful drama, played on a bare stage, "Survival" uses the symbol of four blacks caught in a South African jail to demonstrate the conflicts of all black life in South Africa. The play highlights the struggle of the four men to live without being broken or betraying one another. It shows their strengths and weaknesses and the dignity they draw from supporting one another, so that they can eventually find the courage to mock their jailers, to laugh, to sing and to survive.

Touring the US

James Bethel, head of the drama department of Orange Coast College, California, was so excited by the play when he saw it in South Africa that he asked Selaelo and his colleagues to bring it to the West Coast. Eager to accept, they were forced to resort to a subterfuge in order to get permission to leave South Africa. "We had to make it appear that we were getting grants to study," Selaelo told me. The government would not have let them go if it thought they were going to play "Survival" in front of American audiences.

After touring college campuses with



Selaelo Maredi.

"Survival," Selaelo concluded that "people in the US needed to know more about South Africa. The more they knew the more they would support our struggle."

Because divestiture from US companies investing in South Africa was becoming a major issue on campuses, the cast was constantly bombarded with questions about the issue. According to Selaelo the group itself had wanted to look at the question more closely.

His thinking about the issue finally crystalized into another production, "Homeland." Co-authored with Steve Friedman of New York's Modern Times Theater, "Homeland," which recently completed a successful first-run in New York, shows the connections between racism in the US and South Africa, and the links between black people in both countries. The play reveals the experiences of a black maid, Keentseng, working for a white "liberal English" family in South Africa. The husband—*baas* as Keentseng has to address him in South Africa—works for General Motors. When he is called to the US on business, his family comes along, bringing their maid because to be without a servant is unthinkable.

In the US where the family stays with its American counterpart in the home of a GM executive, Keentseng also meets her counterpart—a black maid from Harlem. This strong proud woman challenges Keentseng, and helps her to stand up for her freedom.

A key element in "Homeland" is the revelation of the General Motors contingency plan for South Africa, a document first widely published in this country by *Southern Africa* (June/July 1978). Believing itself safe from public scrutiny in the US, General Motors cold-bloodedly devised this plan to support the apartheid government in the event of a black insurrection. Its white workers are to be mobilized as a militia to guard the plant against blacks. Control of the facilities is to be handed over to the police and army. Military vehicles and supplies are to be produced if the government so orders. Obviously in GM's view, rebellion against the apartheid white minority government is not legitimate and should be suppressed, with American aid.

"We did 'Homeland' because a lot of people are saying that the American corporations should stay in South Africa because they are helping the blacks. We wanted to show that that is untrue, that the

corporations should get out, not only for our benefit but for the benefit of Americans themselves."

"I am pleased with 'Homeland,'" Selaelo told me recently. "I talked to the audience after every performance and a lot of people said that they felt they had learned a lot."

Vivid Reality

A large measure of the impact of "Homeland" and its predecessor, "Survival," comes from the vividness with which the plays present the reality of the lives of black people in South Africa.

Selaelo's adeptness at reproducing that experience, using a mixture of comedy, music, and emotionally-riveting scenes, moved many New York audiences. Young Keentseng, the South African maid, is visibly torn by the enraging struggle to protect her job and yet protect her dignity as well. The smug corruption of people exercising illegitimate control over the lives of other humans is sharply drawn in both white couples—South African and American. Particularly effective is the white American executive who raves about the importance of "public relations," as distinct from reality or truth, in the image-making of corporations and governments.

"Take for example your term 'homeland,'" the character says, referring to a great example of public relations because of what it means—nothing. The word sounds good; it "sells" well, particularly abroad. But as the play's climax shows, black people have another definition of "homeland," a place to fight for, and that message presents an important warning for the powers that be in both South Africa and America.

Political Drama

Selaelo believes intensely in the role of the artist as a political educator. "You see, with drama we found that we could reach more people than with a speaker because you can have more people exposed to the message for a longer period. They will come for the entertainment but while they are there, they are learning. We found that people will respond if you bring them in and tell them what your problems are, what it is all about, and what they can do."

Selaelo has had long experience with political theater, beginning in school. Originally an actor, he began performing in 1966 while still in secondary school. Then having left school, he moved on to writing plays for the Thabisong Youth Club, a community center for youngsters. One of these plays, "It's Not Me They Hate, It's My Blackness," was awarded first prize by the South African Youth Club National Theatre, one of the largest black theater organizations in South Africa.

Encouraged by the award, Selaelo began writing plays for high school students. The



Survival in performance. Selaelo Maredi, second from left.

principal of Alexander High School, in a ghetto on the outskirts of Johannesburg, offered rehearsal space, and Selaelo and other young blacks worked there—writing, acting, and performing for churches and other school hall presentations.

Working during a time of tremendous development in black political consciousness, he was continually encouraged by the times to step forward on behalf of his people. This led Selaelo into several scrapes with the security police, and several stretches in jail.

In 1971 he and other progressive dramatists—black, white, and brown—formed a major theater group of actors, playwrights, directors, technicians and other theater workers. Under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg, "Workshop '71/Experimental Theatre" was the first group to train black people in all phases of theater work without regard for profit.

Workshop '71

Although it started out as a multi-racial assemblage, Workshop '71 eventually

became almost all black. "The whites left on their own," Selaelo recalled. "We had sensitivity sessions for racism and many of them couldn't handle it. Out of forty whites who started only three stayed on."

Workshop '71 produced plays on the basis of group improvisation and performed at the few facilities available to them in Johannesburg at the Institute, at the University of Witwatersrand which allowed mixed audiences, and at a church in Pretoria.

Their first play, "Crossroads," helped give birth to the modern black political theater movement in South Africa. It dealt with the passbook system and how oppression affected blacks so that, among other things, they were often afraid to help each other. "Crossroads" was featured at the Wilgespruit Festival, sponsored by the white student union, NUSAS. (Then-Prime Minister John Vorster called the cultural gathering a "den of iniquity.")

After "Crossroads" gained national prominence, a ripple effect occurred throughout the townships. Playwrights began producing increasingly militant and

political plays. "This was really the beginning," Selaelo said.

Ronnie Kwei, a photographer for the *Rand Daily Mail*, commented about the play, "I wish people could see this play before you all go to jail." His words were prophetic. "At that time, the government did not see plays as effective in politicizing people," Selaelo remarked, "so they did not interfere much. 'Crossroads' and the plays that came after helped to change that."

In 1974 the government cracked down. Legislation was passed requiring all scripts for public performance to be submitted for governmental approval. "Scripts were being banned for having words like 'freedom' and 'black power,'" Selaelo recalled. "But we never submitted our scripts."

Since all the theater halls in the townships were owned by white South Africans, groups such as "Workshop '71" were forced into the few sympathetic private halls and church facilities.

Yet the movement had gained a momentum that could not easily be arrested. "The South African government is really very stupid," Selaelo said. "They think that they can weed out all the plays that criticize apartheid, but the message has become more disguised, like in 'Survival.'"

Also produced by "Workshop '71," "Survival" was never banned. "The government is also very unpredictable," Selaelo added, "because you never could tell how they would react to things. For example, 'God Forgotten,' which was written by an anti-apartheid Afrikaner playwright, and which dealt with revolution in South Africa and with how conditions might be afterwards, ran for a long time and was then banned. It is impossible to produce a play that the security police do not see. They are at all the plays. A playwright in Soweto was banned because of incidents which occurred after his plays."

Today, many playwrights refuse to submit scripts for government approval, preferring to take their chances instead. The efforts of black dramatists are complicated by the lack of black-owned facilities and the fact that the few facilities available, such as the Market Theater, which is owned by progressive whites, are located far from the black townships.

Selaelo and other black South African dramatists-in-exile face similar problems, but not in such severe terms. In spite of this, they are continually taking their message to new audiences. Currently, he and a company of seven actors and musicians (including one black American) are completing a five-week tour of Scandinavia. Selaelo describes the new show as "a variety show by South African freedom fighters—music, dance, and 'songs for the nation.' We don't sing love songs, we sing songs for the struggle. So when people leave the theater, they know." □

Political Films on Africa For Public Television

The Public Broadcasting Service will devote three hours of prime time this spring to a trilogy of films on history and politics in Africa: the "Black Man's Land" series.

The films and their airdates are:

1) "White Man's Country," dealing with the imposition of colonial rule in Africa and the origins of African resistance. National airdate: Tuesday, April 3, 1979, 10:00 p.m.

2) "Mau Mau," the first film to examine the armed struggle in Kenya in the 1950s and the myths that were created to discredit it. National airdate: Wednesday, April 4, 1979, 10:00 p.m.

3) "Kenyatta," a biography of Kenya's late president, a man whose life spanned the entire colonial era and who was closely associated with the Pan African movement. National airdate: Thursday, April 5, 1979, 10:00 p.m.

Local airdates and times may vary and should be confirmed with individual public television stations.

The "Black Man's Land" series has been praised by many critics for its detailed and perceptive treatment of colonialism and nationalism in Africa. The series has been shown on television in Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean. Its themes are particularly relevant to the current liberation struggles in southern Africa, and to the questions of neo-colonialism and underdevelopment in independent Africa. □

Monitor

Continued from page 23

the administration. But this administration is going in the right direction and ought to be encouraged. I would have wished such an ad would have been to encourage what might be called the Young initiatives."

Foell concedes that trying to pass judgment on the accuracy of ads "is probably an impossible type of task." But, he says, "Our intentions are always the best. Sometimes we're too altruistic, but we try to do our best."

A look at recent *Monitor* ads suggest that at least some guiding principles seem to be at work, but truth may not always be among them.

Private Armies

Continued from page 10

they would kill me."

•Reports of women being sexually assaulted are particularly widespread. "The whole morality of the areas has been destroyed," said a Gokwe source. "Not a girl has been left unmolested. Husbands are powerless to protect their wives. If they defend them they are shot by Sithole's people."

"They are killing the old, raping the young," said a report from Brunapeg.

Sithole's army is not the only one carrying out such atrocities. Similar reports have been coming from areas in which Muzorewa's army is operating. An article in the *National Observer* (Rhodesia) quoted a report that Africans working on his farm were being harassed, subjected to demands for money to pay for a membership card and assaulted for refusing to pay. "We know [the private armies] have knocked off a lot of blacks—women and children among them." A letter quoted in the same article from an African is a so-called tribal trust land accused that Muzorewa's UANC of carrying out atrocities. Referring to the regime's co-minister of justice, UANC member Zindoga, he said "his UANC part is recruiting young men. It turns my stomach to hear all these people saying they don't know about all these goings on. It's better for you to ask those who send those unenlightened youths to intimidate, loot and kill our uncles and grannies in the TTLs in the guise of 'boys' [guerrillas]."

A recent article in another Rhodesia publication quote UANC militia recruits as saying they were used "to teach people how to vote." Intimidation and brutalities may get people to vote—but not according to their wishes. If there were any doubts left, these reports should underscore the conclusion that Smith's forthcoming April elections will be nothing more than a brutal farce. □

Mobil, for example, has sponsored a series of ads that describe nuclear power as fully safe and the government's policy "a failure" in not supporting it more aggressively. Mr. Foell explains that even if such material might not be totally accurate, "it is not inflammatory."

As for a February 1 ad sponsored by the Committee For a Free China, which quoted Barry Goldwater saying that US recognition of Peking "was one of the most cowardly acts by any president of the United States," Mr. Foell says he was surprised that the ad ran, particularly because, like the Africa ad, it asked for money.

In the case of the China ad, Foell says, no one in the advertising department saw any need to ask for guidance. □

April Action Week Planned

The Northeast Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa (NECLSA) reports that planning for an April 4-11 week in solidarity with the liberation movements is now moving ahead rapidly. Activities will be coordinated nationally with coalitions in the West, Midwest and Southeast.

NECLSA has for some time been plagued by internal difficulties. There have been tensions over leadership and strategy between established political groupings, such as the Socialist Workers Party, and the independent activists involved in trying to build a campus movement in support of Southern African liberation.

Some of these difficulties were confronted at the January 27 meeting of the NECLSA steering committee. After long hours of heated debate, two major decisions were taken, which may help clarify the future direction of the coalition and clear the way for a renewed organizing effort.

A change was made in the organizational structure of NECLSA in an attempt to give concrete form to the campus-based character of the movement in the Northeast, and to strengthen the accountability of the organization at its grass-roots base.

There was also a formal censure of the SWP and its youth organization, the YSA, for what was described as consistent anti-democratic actions in NECLSA and attempts to dominate the coalition.

Progress toward April 4-11

With the coalition established on a firm basis, members report that progress has been made on planning the April 4-11 actions, which are seen as particularly important in the current period of intensifying struggle in southern Africa. Planners hope to expand and intensify the anti-apartheid movement, thus countering the increasingly rightward thrust of US policy in the area.

Most activists feel that the primary emphasis of the week should be on strengthening the divestment movement. At the same



Columbia University sit in last year: call to intensify campaign for this year.

time organizers will aim at building ties with third world campus groups, in an attempt to heighten awareness about the link between racism at home and abroad. Efforts will also be made to unite with unions and community groups for actions in the larger urban centers such as New York and Boston to increase the week's impact. Foreign policy issues will be discussed during the week, but divestment will remain the main focus.

The success of the week will depend on an explosion of grass-roots activity on campuses and the coordination of activities through strong press-work and common focuses on a regional and national level.

With these two necessities in mind, NECLSA members recently described for *Southern Africa's Action News* the range of possible activities that groups, old and new, might undertake:

Each campus has its own particular conditions, and the level of struggle varies enormously from campus to campus. Nonetheless, there are two basic aims that every campus committee should have during the week:

- (1) An intense effort should be made to politicize the campus throughout the week, which means a daily presence, whether agitational or educational.
- (2) Media (both on- and off-campus) should be bombarded and contact kept with other anti-apartheid activists, especially those with responsibility for doing media work.

Beyond these two general aims, there are

a wide variety of possibilities:

—*Press-work*: Get your college paper to do a special "South Africa" issue, or ask third world organizations (many of which have papers on campus to do so). This could be a way of linking up with these organizations.

—*Pickets*: Daily or semi-daily pickets of administration buildings are idea. Also picket company recruiters and trustee meetings.

—*Dorm Work*: Arrange discussion groups as dorms (perhaps as a prelude to demonstrations) possibly involving showings of the film *Last Grave at Dimbaza* or the slide show *Freedom Rising*. Also remember door-to-door petitioning to show and build support for your position.

—*Information Tables*: These should be set up in central areas on campus such as the post office and dining rooms, and have a regular rotation of personnel.

—*Cultural Events*: Music, poetry readings, guerrilla theatre are all effective ways to spread ideas. Use such events to raise funds for liberation movements and refugee camps.

—*Educational Events*: At films, get sign-ups lists. Have teach-ins on the role of the US government and corporations and the history of the liberation movements. Persuade progressive teachers to have one class during April 4-11 dealing with South Africa and disinvestment.

—*Open Meetings*: Demand such meetings with trustees for April 4-11 in the form of a debate. If the trustees refuse, that's another issue!

—*Demonstrations*: Where possible, large actions are best. Combine speeches with music and guerrilla theatre. Try to end with a march to the administration building or a trustee meeting.

—*Symbolic Actions*: Posters to commemorate Sharpeville, March 21, can have a powerful impact. Distribute black armbands for April 11.

—*Sit-Ins*: These must be planned with care. It is vital to have a large demonstration outside as well as the sit-in. When a sit-in is well organized, it is effective because it will attract the media.

—*Sit-Outs*: You can do this on the steps of administration buildings with signs, leaflets and speeches. Just sit and don't move. It's a good way of informing passers-by. Do it as night as a vigil.

Regional and National Strategy

There are several ways that decentralized activity can be unified during this week. Two major targets seem ideal:

(1)*The Banks*: Without compromising the demand for "total divestment," activists can stress a demand for the sale of bank stocks or transfer of school accounts from offending banks and can point to campuses across the country calling for divestment from banks. This is a demand that can be won in the short run. It has another strength because it can link the campus group to an existing national organization, the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA).

In addition where possible, local banks, which often have correspondent relations with the largest banks, are natural places for joint actions with churches and unions, many of which have accounts in those banks. Press-work regionally and nationally will stress the bank focus during the action week.

(2)*The Oil Companies*: These are key to apartheid's survival, especially after the Iranian revolution. Stress that divestment of oil stocks is a common national demand. There will also be actions at several oil company annual meetings.

During the week itself and in planning for it, a great deal of coordination of actions should occur. In this respect, not only NECLSA, but city and area coalitions such as those in Boston, Amherst, Delaware Valley, and New York can play a large role in mobilizing activities. April 4, the anniversary of Martin Luther King's death, is a key day for actions, as is April 11 which NECLSA and other groups have designated national armband day. Campuses in the same geographical area can plan coordinated timing of actions for these days.

According to NECLSA, publicity throughout the week will include, as a political focus, support for the liberation movements because the movement being built here aims at more than just a "moral" position to "get the US out."

Central Contacts

Throughout the week and in its aftermath, it will be important for groups to communicate quickly with each other. The following organizations have taken on central responsibility for press-work and communications during the week.

South Africa Catalyst Project
East Coast: Box 177,
Amherst, MA 01002
(413) 586-6343
(413) 549-1916
West Coast: 3470 Middlefield,
Palo Alto, CA 94306
(415) 494-0355
American Committee on Africa
198 Broadway,
NYC, NY 10003
(212) 962-1211

Bank Forum Exposes Redlining and Racism

The campaign against bank loans to South Africa got a major push in New York recently with a late-February forum, "Runaway Banks: The Misuse of Our Money at Home and Abroad." The forum was sponsored by the NY Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA).

The forum, attended by more than 200 people, was impressive in the range of interests and organizations brought together for the event. A well-balanced presentation drew seven speakers from various fields of experience to strengthen the forum's purpose—increasing pressure on the banks through the mobilization of broader activist constituencies in the bank campaign.

Speakers included Congressman Stephen Solarz, new chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, Reverend Wyatt Tee Walker, a Harlem minister long active in black human rights struggles, and Ben Magubane of the African National Congress.

The more than 20 sponsors included several church organizations, civic, community and political groups that have come to support the campaign.

The COBLSA groups also used the occasion to unveil a startling document detailing domestic lending practices of New York's largest retail banks, all of which lend millions to South Africa. The study is focused on Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Chemical, and Bankers Trust—the second, third, fourth, sixth and eighth largest banks in the US.

The report reveals that these banks lend less than half as much home mortgage money to residents of New York's major black communities than they do to selected white neighborhoods, though the black neighborhoods have more than three-and-

a-half times more money on deposit.

Thus, Flatlands, a mostly white Brooklyn community, with 116,500 people of which only 3 percent are black, and 2.7 percent are Hispanic, had \$85.5 million on deposit in the five largest banks. Flatlands received \$12 million in home mortgage money or about \$138 per \$1000 on deposit.

By contrast, Harlem, with 471,000 residents, 65 percent black and 30 percent Hispanic, had more than \$247 million on deposit in these banks. Yet Harlem received only \$1.14 million in home mortgages or about \$4.60 per \$1,000 invested as deposits.

Total US-to-South Africa lending stands at about \$2.8 billion as of 1978, according to former Senator Dick Clark of Iowa.

NY-COBLSA encourages other activists in the bank campaign to conduct similar studies of banks in their areas. The group will be following up with a teach-in on organizing in March and a major city-wide demonstration on April 11.

Copies of the report, "The Home Mortgage Loan Practices of the Five Largest Retail Banks," are available from NY-COBLSA, 313 W. 78th St., #4R, New York, NY 10024. (212) 865-8972. □

STUDENTS WITHDRAW \$1 MILLION FROM BANK OF AMERICA. . .

The world's richest bank came out the loser recently in a struggle with one of America's richest student organizations over the issue of apartheid investments. The Associated Students at San Diego State University in California recently withdrew more than \$1 million from the Bank of America despite a last ditch effort by a senior bank official to reverse the decision.

John Bell, a senior vice-president of B of A met with Associated Students President Steve Glazer in late December in what one correspondent called "something of a first for the US financial industry—the largest bank in the western world coming to a college campus to explain itself to students."

The Associated Students decided in October to put their \$1 million reserve account in local savings and loan associations rather than use banks that invest in apartheid. Controlled by the students, the money comes from a \$42 fee paid annually by each student.

Glazer expressed disappointment at the bank's explanations for South African lending. "We kept hearing about the bank's economic responsibility," he said, "But I never heard him [Bell] say that their social responsibility was important. I kept waiting for that concession, that one very minor concession. But we never got it." □

BRITISH BANK ACTIONS. . . British activists continued the anti-lending campaign by burning giant banking cards outside Barclays banks in nine British cities in early December as a part of the international day

of action against bank loans to South Africa. Pickets were mounted at over 70 branches of the bank which is a big investment in apartheid. Letters signed by public figures, including the Bishop of Liverpool and liberal members of Parliament, which called for an end to all South African lending, were also delivered to Barclay's London head office. □

DOCTORS MOVE TO QUARANTINE APARTHEID. . . New efforts are under way in international medical circles to isolate South Africa. A recent issue of the British journal *World Medicine* urges that reciprocal medical agreements between South Africa and other countries be ended.

Attempts will be made at the British Medical Association's June meeting to expel South Africa from medical organizations and to boycott conferences in South Africa. □

ST. AUGUSTINE EPISCOPAL CHURCH. . . of Santa Monica, California, has joined the growing number of community-based US groups actually concerned with supporting the struggle for liberation throughout southern Africa.

In a resolution passed unanimously in January, the governing body of the church resolved "to support the churches of Namibia, SWAPO, and the Secretary General of the United Nations in their condemnation of the December election as null and void." It further urged the US government to support the attainment of "fair and free" elections under UN supervision.

In affiliation with the Namibia Peace Center, the church has also been active in opposing Krugerrand sales and bank loans to South Africa as well as providing support for the Church in Damaraland in Namibia. □

INTERNATIONAL UNION ACTIONS. . . Food workers around the world made trade union history late last year by displaying well-organized international worker solidarity with a black union seeking employer-recognition in South Africa.

Members of the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF) targeted the British multinational, Unilever, throughout the last week in October. "Solidarity strikes" hit Unilever facilities in seven countries—Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Sri Lanka, New Zealand, Jamaica, and Italy.

Moreover, leafletting, in-plant meetings, letters of protest and other "solidarity actions" short of strikes were reported in numerous countries on all continents.

In the US, IUF's American affiliate, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchery Workmen, informed Unilever that "our union is joining with food workers' unions around the world in [the week] of protest

against your practices in South Africa."

At issue is the struggle for access to the workers and recognition for the black Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU), which is seeking to organize in Unilever's Durban and Boksburg plants. Unilever employs some 4,000 Africans in South Africa.

Founded in 1974, SFAWU claims 3,200 members and is presently engaged in

negotiations with the South African subsidiary of Kelloggs, an American multinational food firm. Slow progress has been reported by both sides.

The situation with Unilever, however, remains at an impasse. "Management still believes the workers don't need a union," said SFAWU general-secretary Skakes Sikhakhane. "As long as they believe that, we're going to remain deadlocked."

Constitution Text

Continued from page 18

quire the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the total membership of the Senate, but if this cannot be obtained, the Bill may, after a period of one hundred and eighty days, be sent to the President for his assent despite the failure of the Senate to approve it.

At the end of ten years or after the second Parliament, whichever is the later, a Commission will be established to review the question of retaining the twenty-eight White seats. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Chief Justice or a judge of the High Court nominated by him and four other members, two of whom will be elected by the twenty-eight White members of the House of Assembly and two will be appointed by the President. If that Commission recommends that the White seats should be abolished or reduced, a Bill to give effect to the recommendation may be passed by fifty-one members of the House of Assembly and the Bill will not be submitted to the Senate. If the White seats are abolished or reduced, the existing seventy-two Black seats will not be reserved exclusively for Blacks and the twenty members of the Senate who are not Chiefs will be elected by all the members of the House of Assembly and not the two groups of members referred to earlier.

Various provisions of the Electoral Act, the Education Act, the Medical Services Act and the Housing Standards Control Act will be declared in the Act concerned to be specially entrenched provisions and consequently will not be capable of amendment unless approved by seventy-eight members of the House of Assembly. Similarly, there will be provision that an Act which has the effect of—

- (a) reducing the area of Parks and Wild Life or Forest Land by more than one *per centum* of the extent of the area thereof as at the fixed date; or
- (b) amending the law relating to the establishment or abolition of municipalities, towns, rural councils or local boards, the fixing of the areas or boundaries thereof, the composition thereof or the qualifications of voters at or candidates for election to such councils; or
- (c) reducing the powers, functions and duties of a municipality, town, rural council or local board conferred by the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 214], the Rural Councils Act [Chapter 211] or the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, 1976;

will be subject to the same procedure.

CHAPTER XII: GENERAL

English language. English will be the official language of the country.

Chiefs and Councils of Chiefs. The system of appointing Chiefs will be retained, as will the establishment of a Council or Councils of Chiefs.

Remittability of pensions. The remittability of pensions payable to persons who cease to be ordinarily resident in Rhodesia will be guaranteed, as will be the remittability of any commutation of a pension which is received—

- (a) after the 30th April, 1979, on the recipient reaching normal retiring age of on his discharge on the grounds of ill-health; or
- (b) on or after the 30th April, 1984;

but the guarantee will not apply in relation to private pension schemes entered into after the 3rd March, 1978. In the case of a commutation not referred to in paragraph (a) above which is received during the period from the 30th April, 1979, to the 30th April, 1984, the amount that is guaranteed remittable will depend on the period that has elapsed since the 30th April, 1979, on the basis of one-fifth being guaranteed remittable if only one year has elapsed, two-fifths of two years have elapsed and so on. The balance of the amount received would be guaranteed remittable over a specified period after the 30th, April, 1984.

Sullivan Principles

Continued from page 22

In mid-1978, in response to considerable criticism and pressure, assurances under Principle Two were expanded to include "the right of black workers to form their own union or to be represented by trade unions where unions already exist."

Ford's decision in March 1977, to withhold dues for African workers who belonged to the United Auto and Rubber Workers Union, an African union, won the company much notice and approval in the U.S. While Africans in South Africa are not forbidden to join unions, under South African law their unions have no automatic standing as bargaining units, although no law prohibits any company from bargaining with an African union. Ford's action was interpreted as company recognition of the African union, a first in labor relations for US firms in South Africa, which generally have gone along with other employers in refusing to grant any legitimacy to African unions.

However, a closer look reveals that what Ford has done falls far short of true recognition. Ford, along with other auto firms in South Africa, negotiates overall industry contracts with an industrial council on which no black union is permitted to be represented. What Ford has done is to permit some black union officials to go to this all-important council as observers. It has not pushed to let the black union be permitted to engage in the actual bargaining process.

Within its own operations, Ford management discusses matters such as interpretation of the council-set wage agreements with a liaison committee, made up of representatives of employees within the company. Black union leaders are not permitted to sit on the liaison committee as official union members, but only as worker representatives.

The only place in which the union actually does function, it appears, is in individual grievance proceedings. Here, union shop stewards are permitted to represent workers.

What all these arrangements amount to is that true power has in no way passed to a black union at Ford.

General Motors has not at this point recognized any African union. It says that it will do so if it can be shown that 50 percent of African employees want such a union.

Chrysler has had a reputation for paying poorly and trying to thwart organizing efforts. During the time its operations were located in Cape Town, it was criticized by both whites and non-whites for discriminatory and arbitrary practices. Following its move to Pretoria, a white

trade union official was quoted in 1975 as charging that Chrysler and other foreign-owned motor firms in the Transvaal were trying to keep wage levels below those in Port Elizabeth.

Following the Sigma merger, there was a wage strike at the Pretoria plant in May 1978, involving most of the plant's 1,350 African and 100 coloured workers.

The *Star* reported that Sigma declined to recognize a black union at the plant because it estimated potential membership at less than 200. Managing director Chris Griffiths was quoted elsewhere as saying the company didn't oppose a union, but the unrecognized black union maintained that it was not even permitted to have a member on the employee-management liaison committee, contrary to company claims.

Principle 4: Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs.

GM has not given out any recent detailed information on training programs for high-level jobs.

In December 1976, Ford reports show that the company had a total of 26 Africans in training programs for other than safety programs. This number increased to 304 in mid-1978, but 261 of these were at the very lowest level of training, being shown how to operate machines. Only three Africans were being trained as technicians, and 21 as artisans.

Principle 5: Increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions.

Of the total of more than 11,000 workers employed by US auto firms, Africans and "coloureds" account for only a minute fraction of any white-collar jobs. At best estimate, there were at most about 30 Africans in such jobs in 1978, or about 1 percent of total Africans employed, and about 100 "coloureds," or 3.5 percent of "coloureds" employed. This compares with a figure of more than 3,000 whites, or close to two-thirds of all white employees.

In January 1978, GM's African employees totaled 375 out of a workforce of 3,657, or about 10 percent of total employment. Out of this, only four Africans were employed at salaried jobs (compared with three in 1976): an industrial nurse, a printing clerk, a personnel officer, and a computer operator.

As of mid-1978, Ford had 1,278 African workers, out of 5,376. Of these, 21 Africans, or less than 2 percent of all African workers, were salaried. In 1976, Ford had 13 salaried African workers.

There were seven African supervisors at Ford out of 294; four African artisans out of 260; three "professionals" (below top

management) out of 131.

The last figures for Chrysler date from 1973. At that time the company reported it had five blacks among 650 salaried staff.

Principle Six: Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.

One gesture by Ford toward its black workers, which gained considerable attention in the US, was its announcement in early 1978 that it would give \$575,000 over

five years to the Urban Foundation. This foundation was set up by white business leaders after the Soweto uprisings, ostensibly to improve the lot of blacks.

The foundation has been completely rejected, however, both by the Black Peoples Convention and by the banned South African Congress of Trade Unions. Both groups describe the foundation as designed to placate a small number of blacks, thus helping to perpetuate the current system. Even *The Star*, a moderate white newspaper in South Africa, has described the foundation as "designed to help keep the country stable so that businessmen can preserve and extend their businesses." □

Namibia

Continued from page 19

Waldheim's ruling "disconcerting." "There is absolutely no such provision in the accepted plan," he told the South African parliament, adding that now he would have to "consult" with the so-called constituent assembly in Namibia, installed in office after the December elections that the UN considers null and void.

A South African spokesman in New York refused to say what action South Africa might take next, but he called the situation "very sticky."

South Africa had also insisted that the UN monitor SWAPO bases in neighboring countries, particularly Angola. Waldheim has proposed that all SWAPO forces outside Namibia would also be confined to base, but the plan does not call for specific UN monitoring outside Namibia. In an attempt to please South Africa, Waldheim stated that he had received "repeated assurances" from the neighboring states that "they will ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the settlement are adhered to."

So, will South Africa stick to the agreement? UN officials are waiting cautiously for both sides to respond to the ceasefire proposal. Even Ahtisaari admitted that the UN plan was precarious. "If somebody wants to stop this exercise," he said after Waldheim's report was released, "there is ample room to do it." □

M.S.

news briefs

EARNINGS FROM SOUTH

Africa's gold mines rose by more than \$1 billion in 1978 over the previous year. This spectacular increase was due almost entirely to escalating gold prices, as the volume of production remained almost constant.

Last year's earnings totaled \$4.4 billion compared to \$3.2 billion for 1977. The government earned about \$1 billion in taxes from the mines, compared to about \$540 million paid the year before.

The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) recently revealed that South Africa's foreign liabilities stood at \$8.3 billion as of June 1978, up from \$7.2 billion for 1977.

The recently published Corporate Data Exchange (CDE) handbook, "US Bank Loans to South Africa," based on BIS figures, put South African indebtedness at \$7.8 billion at the end of 1977. Of that figure, CDE put US lending at \$2.27 billion.

The new BIS report indicates that about half of South African liabilities had repayment periods of less than a year, indicating continuing concern by lenders about the stability of the economy. South African sources, however, expect that a large proportion of these short-term claims will be refinanced.

As political and social conditions grow less attractive to foreign investors in South Africa, the South African government has taken special measures to attract foreign capital.

Following the recommendations of the recently issued de Kock Commission report, the government took steps in late January to raise the rate of return on investment through currency manipulation. Until now, foreign firms have had to buy plant and equipment after trading their own currencies for expensive South African rands, so called "commercial rands."

Now they will be able to invest with "financial rands," currency which costs multinationals only about 60 percent as much for each dollar as the commercial rand. Since dividends will continue to be paid out in commercial rands, which exchange back for more dollars than the financial rand, the net effect is to raise enormously the dollar rate of return on investment.

Fearing the political and economic consequences of their country's economic slowdown, financial officials have lowered the interest rate in South Africa from 8.5 to 8 percent as a further spur to investment, and have increased the amount of capital which foreign subsidiaries can raise on the South African market.

Despite the worldwide arms embargo introduced in 1977, South Africa has apparently succeeded in importing at least \$345 million worth of arms and military equipment during 1978. Researchers for the *Africa Research Bulletin* contrasted the third quarter figures given by the South African Central Bank for total imports with the Customs Department import figures (which do not include oil and arms) for the same period. Projecting these figures over a whole year's time they found that roughly \$1.8 billion worth of oil and arms had been imported in 1978, of which less than \$1.5 billion was accounted for by oil imports.

The Israeli Olympic Committee has reversed an earlier decision to break all sports ties with South Africa. Following pressure from the Israeli Minister of Education and protest from the South African ambassador, the Israelis now say they will continue to compete against South African teams.

The president of the committee, Yitzhak Ofek, said that the original break had been made so as not to jeopardize Israel's entry into the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

South Africa has been expelled from the Olympics, and the UN has requested that all nations boycott South Africa's sporting endeavors.

Some strange people still seem willing to play with apartheid. Four of the world's top chess players will soon join the ranks of those violating the United Nations call to end all links with South Africa. Two Russians, Boris Spassky and Victor Korschnoi, Czech Lubosh Kavalek, and Briton Tony Miles all plan to be playing in Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, and Johannesburg in the coming months.



ZAMBIA'S MINISTER OF

agriculture reports that the country is facing its most severe agricultural crisis since 1971.

Sparse rainfall over the last few months has damaged the maize crop to a point where the harvest may not exceed 2.5 million bags.

Even combined with the surplus left over from last year, stocks from a harvest of this size would be depleted by the end of the year. This would leave a four to five month gap before the 1980 crop comes in during which grain would have to be imported. Zambia's difficulties in raising foreign exchange will complicate the problem of importing food during this period.

Recent shifts in international mineral prices and some new promises of aid may ease this foreign exchange problem in coming months. The Yugoslavian enterprise "Partiyanski Put" has begun constructing a highway through Zambia to the Mozambique border. Such a road link will help ease the transport bottleneck which cripples Zambia's capacity to export.

Zambia has won contracts from the United States to supply 6,000 tons of cobalt in 1979, up from 3,500 tons last year. Perhaps most important, the world market price of Zambia's key export, copper, has shot up dramatically in the last few weeks, climbing more than \$200 a ton on the London metal exchange during one week in early February to over \$2,000 per ton. Revenues from copper sales to the Eastern bloc will be increasing as well. Zambia expects to sell 15,000 tons of copper to Romania alone this year, up from 5,000 tons in 1978.



MOZAMBICAN MINERS

working in South Africa recently offered 10,000 rands (\$12,000) to Mozambique for the reinforcement

of the country's defensive capacity. This exceptional gesture from the economically hard-pressed miners came during a meeting with President Samora Machel in Maputo, during the miners' year-end vacation.

The miners said that they have been encouraging Mozambicans who emigrated during the colonial era to return to see their country. "Those who left Mozambique for South Africa did not do it because they did not love their country," one of the miners told Machel, "but because they could not stand the exploitation in their own country."

Before independence an average 100,000 Mozambicans went to work in South Africa's mines each year. This figure is now down to 34,000, but the flow is unlikely to stop completely until the re-organization of Mozambique's economy is able to provide work for all its people.

Studies have already been initiated at Mozambique's Eduardo Mondlane University to assess both the size and impact of the migratory flow and the problems and possibilities of developing alternatives for Mozambique's workers.

Mozambique has nationalized the import and export of all medicines and medically-related materials. A new state firm, "Medimoc," will take over these operations in conjunction with the national health service and other state firms. The nationalization was undertaken, according to the Ministries of Health and Foreign Trade, because of continuing over-invoicing and fraudulent practices despite government efforts to stop them.



ANGOLA'S RECENTLY opened Benguela railroad is in need of a major modernization program, according to Luis de Almeida, the Angolan ambassador to

Belgium. He said that Zairean copper has yet to be shipped along the rail line even though it has been open since November of last year. The railway is not being repaired in Zaire, still needs further repairs inside Angola, and is unable to carry heavy loads from Zambia to Zaire.

The Angolan news agency recently reported a decline in sabotage efforts against the line by UNITA insurgents, noting that they have been unsuccessful in attempts to paralyze the railroad.



ZIMBABWE'S POLITICAL FUTURE may be affected by political changes in Britain that seem to be moving that country closer to recognition of the internal settlement in Rhodesia. The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who spent ten days in England during late January, reported that the Tory government likely to be elected later this year would recognize Rhodesia-Zimbabwe.

Clearly in this case the Reverend has his facts straight. Tory right-wingers in England, when not thundering against

striking workers, have been busy gathering support for the internal settlement.

In a motion in early February, they urged the British government to acknowledge Smith's transitional regime, and gave hearty congratulations to the Rhodesian white electorate for its "massive endorsement" of the internal settlement.

The British House of Lords meanwhile is proving uncooperative in the investigation of the role British government officials played in the breaking of economic sanctions against Rhodesia. A motion to appoint House members to a special investigating commission was roundly defeated by the Lords.

The first black prosecuted for refusing to report for the draft was sentenced in Salisbury to six months in jail at hard labor. The late sentence was suspended on condition that the prisoner report immediately for service.

As of mid-January, only 200 black conscripts had reported for duty out of 1,500 called up for training in the first call. □

News Flash

At press time, the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was holding hearings arising out of a proposal jointly sponsored by Senators McGovern and Hayakawa to send 30 - 50 observers to the Smith government's proposed April elections.

Such a move, which would be arranged in collaboration with the current illegal "internal settlement" government, gives both recognition to that government and credibility to the fraudulent new constitution.

Southern Africa is strongly opposed to such action.

The African group of States at the United Nations has issued a protest condemning this move. We reprint below extracts from this important statement.

The African Group of States at the United Nations has learnt with dismay and indignation the moves within the United States Congress where the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Senate is contemplating to send, in April 1979, a team of observers to monitor the Rhodesian elections. The African Group has learnt that officials of the United States Department of State have tacitly endorsed American observance by suggesting to Senate planners that the team be objective and carefully balanced in its

composition. In the view of the African Group, the permission given by the United States Government which enabled the rebel Ian Smith to visit this country last October in spite of the United Nations and the OAU protests, has already cast serious doubt on the Administration's much vaunted "new policies" towards Africa.

The United Nations and the Organization of African Unity have already condemned and rejected the so-called internal settlement which Ian Smith and his black collaborators have worked out and are claiming will guide Zimbabwe to majority rule. This so-called internal settlement represents a design for the entrenchment of white domination. Elections held under such circumstances are inherently unfair as well as illegal. The rebel Rhodesian Government which the Security Council has determined to be illegal, under International Law cannot conduct its own elections and have them accepted by the international community.

This new development in the United States Congress would appear to be intended to give credibility to the "internal settlement" which has not only been rejected but also condemned as a colossal fraud by the Security Council resolution 425 (1978). . . called upon all States not to accord recognition to such a settlement. The United States voted positively for this

resolution and is therefore bound by its terms. . .


To send observers to such an election is in fact to give encouragement to the maneuverers of the Smith regime calculated to defeat a genuine settlement of the conflict in Zimbabwe. Such a move can only comfort Mr. Smith and his collaborators, provide them with a false sense of hope. It would as a consequence only lead to the escalation of the conflict and prolongation of the suffering and bloodshed of Zimbabweans. The international community will hold the United States Government responsible for any action taken by any of its institutions or private citizens in violation of a United Nations Security Council decision or mandatory sanctions. The Government cannot exonerate itself from hearing the responsibility of such a condemnable action.

The African Group, conscious of the seriousness of this development and the repercussions for the prolongation of the conflict, urges the Government of the United States to take appropriate measures in order to avoid sanctifying Smith's forthcoming fraud. Needless to say, any such encouragement of the Smith regime will seriously erode American credibility in Africa.



NEW... from the South Africa Catalyst Project:
**ANTI-APARTHEID ORGANIZING
ON CAMPUS... AND BEYOND**

- Case studies from campus divestment movements across the country.
- Info on the Bank and Krugerrand campaigns.
- How to make the media work for you.
- Extensive bibliography of material on Southern Africa.
- List of resources—organizations, periodicals and films, and how to get hold of them.
- And Much More...



South Africa Catalyst Project
Box 177
Amherst MA 01002
3470 Middlefield
Palo Alto, CA 94306

...up to 10 books— \$2.00 each
...10 - 25— 1.75 each
...over 25— \$1.50 each

Please include .25 per book for postage.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Name _____

Address _____

New

Renewal

CHANGE OF ADDRESS
ATTACH OLD LABEL HERE
FILL OUT NEW ADDRESS ABOVE

SUBSCRIPTION RATES:

Individuals (Domestic and Foreign) \$10.00 per year

Institutions (Domestic and Foreign) \$18.00 per year

Airmail:

Africa, Asia, Europe \$22.50

South & Central America \$19.50

Southern Africa Committee
156 Fifth Avenue
Room 707
New York, NY 10010

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
NEW YORK, N.Y.
PERMIT NO.1613