


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# southern africa



Vol. VII, No.6

June 1974

Southwest

Peasants

CAS ARMADOS  
LIBERACION DE LA AFRIKA  
QUE LIBERTAD  
PARTICIPACION  
OFICIALIZADO

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Erratum: The Front Cover of the May issue of *Southern Africa* showed General Spinoia. Behind Spinoia was pictured militants of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau as representative of the continuing struggle in Africa.

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# editorial

## A NEW PORTUGAL IN AFRICA?

On April 25, 1974 Portugal woke up to the end of Caetano's fascist rule. Through a coup d'état almost a half a century of fascism may have come to an end. However, let us make no mistake in understanding the political character of the main figure behind the change, General Antonio Sebastiao Ribereiro de Spinoia. This man has a long history of dedicated service to Portuguese militarism. In World War II Spinoia saw service with the Nazi forces as an observer on the Russian front. Spinoia fought with the fascists in Spain. Spinoia invaded the sovereign nation of Guinea-Conakry in 1970. This Portuguese general was directly responsible for the assassination of former PAIGC Secretary General Amilcar Cabral. Spinoia has seen military service in Angola and was the military governor general of Guinea-Bissau for four years. With this record our optimism for change in Portugal must be guarded even while enthusiastic.

The coup should come as no surprise to any observers of the Lisbon scene. What is surprising is that it took so long in coming. For thirteen years the Portuguese rulers have been under fire, quite literally, at home and in the colonies. In the months preceding the April coup, there was one full-fledged attempt to overthrow the government and strong rumors of such happenings at the turn of the year. Any cracks in a tight-knit fascist regime could only have pointed to a profound rift in the entire structure. This rift was most evident when the book, *Portugal and the Future*, was published by General Spinoia. Spinoia spoke of the futility of a military solution in Africa and the need to create a political solution. Other important and complex elements underlying the Spinoia coup were newer capitalist interests who viewed the wars as a persistent financial drain on Portugal and look to a more significant Portuguese role in the economy of Europe as well as of Africa, and of course younger disaffected military officers disturbed by defeat in Africa and lack of public support at home.

We welcome the liberation of many of the Portuguese political prisoners (although some freedom fighters still remain incarcerated). We welcome the official dismemberment of the notorious secret police—PIDE-DGS. We welcome the restoration of collective assembly, freedom of the press and the return of thousands of Portuguese exiles, deserters and high ranking members of the political opposition. We share the joy of the Portuguese peasants, workers, students, and soldiers in celebrating May Day.

BUT, as with all of the recognized liberation movements we stand ready to continue the struggle until total independence for the colonies. Let us not be fooled, that Spinoia's program for a "better Guinea" or his program for a "federation" of Portuguese states is nothing more nor less than neo-colonialism. The lives of African patriots have not been lost for such false independence.

In the Republic of Guinea Bissau, the PAIGC army is growing stronger every day. The Portuguese investment is the smallest in RGB and the white settler population is

negligible. A majority of the terrain and the people are with the PAIGC. The situation here is encouraging irrespective of what the Portuguese choose to do. The Cape Verde islands present a more difficult problem for the PAIGC, but political mobilization is moving ahead. Most of all the PAIGC is the only movement in Guinea-Bissau. Thus in West Africa the Portuguese are completely on the defensive if not in retreat.

For Mozambique the situation is more complex. FRELIMO has made startling military advances in the last months but Mozambique is a huge country with a considerable white settler population and with much more mineral and agricultural wealth than the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) is the force with which the Portuguese must deal if they truly want an end to the warfare. There are however, disturbing hints that a move toward neocolonialism is already underway. The GUM (Grupo Uniao Mozambique) has just been formed, whose leadership is apparently wealthy white settlers, African and mestizo elite. It is possible that the Portuguese will attempt to negotiate with GUM as the "legitimate" representative of the Mozambican people. It would be most inconceivable that FRELIMO would tolerate such a charade. If the Portuguese really do pull out their military forces from Mozambique one may easily speculate about military invasion of combined Rhodesian and South African forces who must be extraordinarily nervous at this point. A unilateral declaration of independence (a la Rhodesia) could be a possibility in Mozambique.

In Angola the situation is the most complicated. The foreign and Portuguese investment is the greatest. Mineral and petroleum wealth is considerable. The country is huge. The white settler population is the largest of the three African continental colonies. Finally the liberation movement is divided. While national liberation is inevitable in the long-run the immediate future remains unclear. With whom would the Portuguese negotiate? Is it possible that President Mobutu of Zaire might make a strike into Angola as has been rumored? Would a Mobutu-Roberto (leader of the FNLA, a nationalist movement with headquarters in Zaire) alliance seek the oil-rich territory of Cabinda? Will this 'loose' situation encourage hostility between the movements?

What is most clear for Angola is that extremely careful guard must be maintained and military action stepped up to prevent an Angolan neo-colonialist bloc from taking advantage of the circumstances.

In the midst of these questions we may also speculate about the role of the United States. It is well known that Portugal's fascism and colonialism have been an embarrassment to NATO and the United States. It is also known that Portugal under Caetano was striking a hard bargain for the new Azores base agreements. The US was reluctant to pay the price of anti-missile arms to Portugal. Spinoia is also a well known figure to American and NATO military personnel. Last but not least is that making a coup in a European Mediterranean country must be done carefully for fear of provoking NATO or American intervention. Were the State Department and

the CIA getting so impatient with Caetano's colonialism that they gave the go-ahead to Spinoła's neo-colonialism? We stand with the liberation movements in the struggle for total independence and against the imposition of any neo-colonial solution. ●

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## feature

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# THE COUP IN PORTUGAL

## - Some Chronological Highlights

At 6:45 am on Thursday, April 25th, the regular programming of radio Portugal was interrupted. The Portuguese national anthem blared out across the air to startled listeners around the nation, while the army announced that it had taken over the country. The proclamation said, in part:

*Considering that after 13 years of fighting overseas the present political system has been unable to define an overseas policy leading to peace between Portuguese of all races and creeds. . . . The Movement of the Armed Forces, which has just achieved the most important civic mission in recent years, proclaims to the nation its intention of completing a program of salvation for the country and the restitution to the Portuguese people of the civil liberties of which they have been deprived.*

A half-century of Portuguese dictatorship had ended, although the aftermath of the coup left many questions in its wake. Briefly, the events leading up to the coup, and following it, were:

**August, 1973**—General Antonio de Spinoła returns to

Portugal from three years as governor of Guinea Bissau. While there he earned popularity with many troops for his commitment to what he called "social construction" as well as military power. Opponents of Portugal's colonial rule in Africa realized that Spinoła was more threatening than more traditional military leaders, for he was genuinely trying "to win the hearts and minds of the people" as the only sure way to insure Portugal's future in Africa.

**January, 1974**—Spinoła is appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces with responsibility for all African operations. The role is seen by many as the victory by forces in the government who favor a more liberal African policy, as well as more moderation in Portugal.

**February 22**—Spinoła's book, *Africa and the Future*, is published in Lisbon, and is an immediate sell-out. In it he says the African wars cannot be won militarily, and advocates a political solution. He suggested a "Lusitanian federation" of Portuguese-speaking people, based on regional autonomy. He further asserted that the African people were ready for self-government, with no great preparation.

**March 9**—The Armed Forces of Portugal are placed on full alert against unrest by young officers who want to move faster with liberalizing policies.

**March 12**—The alert is lifted, but the internal power struggle in the government continues.

**March 14**—General Spinoła, and his superior General Costa Gomes, are fired, although retaining their commissions. Evidently Spinoła is fired primarily for supporting Gomes. The hard-liners in the government have made their move.

**March 15**—A tentatively planned coup attempt is called off because members of the security police had been tipped off. Two-hundred members of the Fifth Infantry Regiment from Caldas da Rainha fail to receive the word, and march on Lisbon. Thirty officers are arrested.

**April 18**—There are further arrests of journalists and left-leaning political leaders, following the arrest of some 30 oppositionists the week before.

**April 22 (Monday)**—The unofficial head-quarters of young



Seven Man Military Junta in Lisbon

officers planning the coup is established at the Royal Engineers Barracks at Pontinha, one of the poorest working-class districts of Lisbon.

### THE COUP

**Wednesday, April 24**—By late evening, units are on the move in deserted villages all over the country. At midnight a Catholic radio station broadcasts its support for the rebels.

**Thursday, April 25**—Moments after midnight the School of Military Administration is seized, giving the rebels a communications system that reaches all parts of the country as well as the African colonies.

**3 am**—The state-owned radio and tv stations are seized; however, most people hear the news over the commercial pop-radio network, "Radio Club Portuguese."

**6:45 am**—"The junta has taken over" said the radio, calling for popular support. The Seventh Cavalry rumbles into place before the Presidential Palace with its tanks.

**7:30 am**—a crucial barrier is overcome; the Air Force pledges its support to the rebels.

**10:30 am**—Lanceer's Company, a "loyalist" group, defects to the rebel ranks. Political prisoners are released from the Security Police building.

**4:00 pm**—Premier Caetano's surrender is announced by loyalist forces.

**6:00 pm**—General Spínola arrives to take over from Caetano, after being mandated to do so. He refuses to go until approached by an officer at least the rank of Colonel. Caetano says, "General, I surrender to you the government. You must take care . . ."

The afternoon newspapers publish without censorship for the first time in decades.

### THE AFTERMATH

**Friday, April 26**—Caetano and several Cabinet ministers are flown to a plush exile on Madeira. Demonstrators surge into the streets to support the junta, or to demand further moves towards freedom; some stone the US Embassy. (Until then the US assignment in Portugal had been a choice diplomatic plum, particularly among marine guards who boasted that they had no duties as the government kept "troublemakers" in line.) The Spanish border is reopened, and movement in and out of the country is renewed. Spínola and other members of the seven-man junta picked by the army hold a press conference. Among the promised reforms:

- dismissal of all provincial governors, including those in Africa;
- banning of Caetano's National Popular Action movement; general elections within 12 months;
- Directorate General of Security (political police, known commonly by their old acronym, PIDE) abolished;
- choice of a provisional President within 3 weeks;
- dissolution of the National Assembly;
- release of all political prisoners;
- abolition of censorship;
- freedom of assembly and of "political association."

**Saturday, April 27**—Political prisoners are freed from Caxias and from Penich; carnations become the symbol of the coup, and are worn and handed out all over the country.

**Sunday, April 28**—Socialist Mario Soares returns from French exile. Airports are reopened. The United States says its relations with Portugal are continuing "without interruption."

**Tuesday, April 30**—Alvaro Cunhal, Secretary-General of the Communist Party, returns from exile in Czechoslovakia. He and Soares confer with Spínola. There are speculations that Socialists and Communists will be included in the new provisional government.

**May 1**—The first May Day in half a century is celebrated all over Portugal. Workers begin to demonstrate with red banners, and Maoist and Trotskyite groups paint slogans and demand independence for the African territories. The military expresses satisfaction with the orderliness of the exuberant festivals.

**May 2**—Workers gain control of key unions, formerly government controlled organs to which workers were obliged to belong, including those of professional organizations, news media, and the national airline, TAP. Junta offers amnesty to draft resisters and deserters if they return to military service.

**May 3**—Opponents of the African wars demonstrate in front of a bus waiting to take soldiers to the airport for the flight overseas. Several soldiers—reports say 10 to 15—are not on board when the flight departed. The junta warns against workers taking matters into their own hands, saying that the government will take care of supporters of the old regime, and that the disruptions caused by ousting managements might lead to economic difficulties for the country. Socialist leader Soares visits European capitals.

Socialist Party Leader Mario Soares (right) with Communist Party Leader Alvaro Cunhal



**May 6**—General Costa Gomes, a junta member, returns from Angola where he calls for a ceasefire in Africa, and he makes a surprise visit. He said the future of territories should be decided by vote, but that universal suffrage might lead to a "wrong conclusion."

**May 7**—General plans to include Communist and Socialist Party elements in the new provisional coalition government (to be established with Spínola as President and a more politically uninvolved law professor, Adelino Da Palma Carlos, as premier) proceed. The African liberation movements react negatively to ceasefire/referendum proposals of junta members. Wars continue.

Column after column of newsprint in the United States is being devoted to speculation about the impact of all these events on the future in Portugal and in Africa. The African wars, the Portuguese secret police, the strangled unions, the political prisoners are all analyzed at length in publications which seldom noticed them during the last 50 years.

Each of the African liberation movements, and the government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, have condemned any solution less than total independence for the African territories. It appeared obvious, in the early days following the coup, that the military struggle against Portuguese occupation would have to continue. The DGS has not been disbanded in the colonies; thousands of political prisoners are still incarcerated there and in Portugal.

And yet, as FRELIMO noted in its first official statement after the coup, increased democracy for the Portuguese people is to be welcomed, as is any change that loosens the structures that made life so terror-ridden in the African colonies.

There is still an enemy against which the liberation movements must struggle, but its face has changed, and new tools are needed to analyze the new situation. The big business interests, including Companhia Uniao Fabril (the country's largest industrial conglomerate) and the Champalimaud Group, with which Spínola has been intimately connected, both back the General's liberalization policies. They are more sophisticated exploiters than the former ruling aristocracy.

In the end, initiative lies with the liberation movements which have fought for thirteen years and which provoked a change in Portugal itself as Amílcar Cabral always said that they would. But their fight can be made easier or more difficult by events in Portugal. A substantial sentiment in Portugal, particularly among workers is to push the junta into a position that would recognize total independence in Africa. So, in Portugal, too, the struggle continues. ●



May Day, 1974, Lisbon

# SOUTH AFRICA



"And of course, you'll be voting Nat, as usual, on April 24"

## ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The election for the white parliament of South Africa was held on April 24. Predictably, the ruling Nationalist Party won an overwhelming victory, taking 109 of the 169 seats at stake. The election is of special interest however, because the United Party won only 39 seats, compared with 47 in the last election. And the Progressive Party which has only held one seat in its entire history, won six seats.

To understand these results, it is useful to look at the parties, their programs and their pre-election expectations.

### The Nationalist Party

In power since 1948, the Nationalist Party is the architect of the internationally condemned policy of apartheid. The party plans to continue the same policy after the election. However, in this election, the Nationalists' main emphasis has been the need to secure South Africa from external threats, and recent inroads on the already limited civil liberties in South Africa have been justified on this ground. (See *Southern Africa*, April, May, 1974 for a discussion of the Affected Organization Act and the amended Riotous Assembly Act).

In response to the opposition suggestion that a still stronger ruling party would make South Africa virtually a one party state, Dr. Connie Mulder, the Minister of the Interior, said that in South Africa, the real opposition is from the outside. The Nationalists appear to have benefited from the division that existed in the opposition United Party.

### The United Party

The official opposition party since it lost power in 1948, the United Party would make only minor changes in the structures of apartheid. For example, "Petty apartheid" would be removed. (Petty apartheid is segregation in trains, buses, phone booths, etc.). The power structure of the country would not be changed to benefit the majority.

In this election, the most important aspect of the party's manifesto was the proposal to form a federal council made up of all the races in South Africa. Each race would be represented in the council, not according to numerical strength but according to its "contribution to the South African economy." How that contribution is to be measured is unclear. The United Party is divided on how much power the council should have, and the split between "reformists" calling for more power and "conservatives" demanding less, seriously hurt the party.

The conflict between conservatives and reformists was not limited to the question of the council. It also affected the nomination of candidates for the elections. Each faction tried to secure maximum nomination for its supporters, with reformists dominating in the Transvaal, and conservatives dominating in the Cape Province. Many people, including Mrs. Helen Suzman, the Progressive Party M.P., predicted that the United Party would break up after the election.

### The Progressive Party

The Progressive Party is the only white party in South Africa which claims to want an end to all forms of discrimination based on race. However, the Party does not favor a universal adult franchise. Instead, it opts for a qualified franchise based on education and income. The party has had only one member in the parliament, Mrs. Helen Suzman.

There were some indications that the Progressive Party had entered into a partial electoral agreement with the reformist section of the United Party. This allegedly took the form of Progressives not running against reformist United Party candidates and vice versa. However, no such agreement was admitted to officially by either side.

Among white South Africans, the Progressive Party and the "reformist" section of the United Party are charged with selling out to Blacks. However, the policies of both are grossly inadequate from the point of view of the Black majority. A qualified franchise as proposed by the Progressives would enfranchise one percent of the country's black population and for all practical purposes the country would remain white ruled.

### Minor Parties

The Herstigte National Party is a party to the right of



the Nationalists, and is led by Dr. Hertzog, one time member of Mr. Vorster's cabinet. The party was formed just before the last election, but lost all the seats it contested. It was equally unsuccessful in the recent election.

The Democratic Party, led by Mr. Theo Gerdner, another former member of Mr. Vorster's cabinet, was in the election for the first time. The party sees race relations as the key issue in South Africa and is stressing the need for dialogue with Bantustan leaders.

A few other minor parties and many independent candidates were also in the field. Among them was Mr. Chris Wood, one of the eight leaders of the National Union of South African Students who was banned last year. As a banned person, Mr. Wood was not able to address meetings, issue leaflets or meet voters. Attempts were made to put up Mr. Neville Curtis, banned former president of NUSAS and Mr. Cosmos Desmond, a banned Catholic priest, as candidates. They were both refused permission to contest in the election.

#### **New Political Alignment?**

Another noteworthy feature in recent South African white politics is the apparent breakdown of old party loyalties. Quite a few of the candidates opposed the party to which they recently belonged. In the classic case, the Nationalist Party candidate was an ex-United Party member; the United Party candidate was an ex-Progressive Party member; the Progressive candidate was ex-United Party, and the Democratic candidate was ex-Nationalist.

Many people welcomed this break down of party loyalty and felt that the "right person" rather than the "right party" should be the guiding principle in the elections. Some, including Mr. Vorster, interpret this as the beginning of a new political alignment. (*Manchester Guardian*, March, 19, 22, 1974; *Washington Star News*, March 31, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 16, 23, 30, April 6, 1974; *New York Times*, April 28, 1974)

#### **DEATH OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLICEMEN BRINGS WAR HOME TO SA**

Shaken by the killing of four South African policemen on the Rhodesian-Zambian border, South African Minister of Police, Louwrens Muller, has called the attack "barbarous and uncivilised." According to Muller, in a "civilised war," one doesn't shoot enemy patrols, one takes prisoners. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 16, 1974)

It would be interesting to question Mr. Muller further on his definition of "civilised", particularly with reference to the behavior of his own white South African policemen. Sharpeville springs to mind, as does Carletonville and other incidents involving recent police killings and brutality in South Africa. Specifically, one might query Muller on his decision to settle out of court on a case of assault by police brought by 11 students and a caretaker who were beaten severely at two demonstrations in Cape Town in 1972. This settlement was for \$14,000. In addition, Muller has agreed to pay damages amounting to \$44,800 to 10 students in Johannesburg and Cape Town who were beaten by police in 1972. (*Times*, London, March 2, 1974)

#### **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ISRAEL, PARAGUAY, FRANCE**

In March, Israel upgraded its representation in Pretoria by announcing the appointment of Mr. Yitzhak Unna as the first Israeli Ambassador to South Africa. Unna, who was slated as ambassador-designate to Kenya just prior to the latter's break in diplomatic relations with Israel, previously served for 18 months as Consul General in Johannesburg.

Israel's decision to raise the level of its representation in South Africa (lowered in the early sixties when Israel tried to develop strong relations with newly independent African states) came after most of the Black African states severed their diplomatic links with Israel. Still, political sources insist that a move toward "normalization" of relations with South Africa has been in the works for some time, and that in any case, there are now signs that Black Africa is "having second thoughts about the rupture in relations with Israel." Several influential Israeli newspapers welcomed the elevation of diplomatic relations, looking in particular for the strengthening of trade relations and a "fruitful" exchange in the fields of technology and science between Israel and SA. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 16, 1974)

South Africa's relations with Paraguay have also been strengthened by the signing in April of two agreements which link the countries in cultural, scientific and economic spheres. The first of the treaties calls for mutual cultural, technological and scientific visits, while the second provides for the "creation of a firm basis for economic technical cooperation" and a strengthening of commercial relations. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 6, 1974)

The treaties were signed following a visit to SA of Paraguay's president, Alfredo Stroessner, early in April. Prior to Stroessner's arrival, the University of Cape Town Students' Representative Council (SRC) expressed strong opposition to the visit and resolved to expose "the brutality and oppression for which the regime in Paraguay is notorious." The SRC also expressed its "disgust that the only visit our 'democratic' Government can arrange . . . is one by a man who represents all that democracy is against." (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 30, 1974) For its part, the SA Government promptly banned "all processions, meetings and gatherings that directly or indirectly protested against" Stroessner's visit. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 6, 1974)

Although a superficial glance at Paraguay's UN voting record might make that country's "blossoming friendliness" with SA seem incongruous, a closer examination of recent voting patterns shows that while Paraguay has supported a number of anti-South Africa resolutions, the last two years have seen the country abstaining or absent from the Assembly on almost all critical or condemnatory resolutions affecting South Africa. (*Star*, April 6, 1974)

A third issue and possibly the most significant of the three concerns France's choice of a successor to the late President, Georges Pompidou. In recent years, South Africa's ties with France have been stronger than with any other European country. Thus, the May presidential election in France is regarded as "crucial to South Africa's future" in that the replacement of Gaullism with a

popular-front regime would probably signal an end to Franco-South African relations. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 6, 1974)

### CAPE SEEN AS VITAL TO WESTERN INTERESTS

According to a special report published in London by the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC), oil tanker traffic on the Cape route will increase and continue to be of vital importance to the Western economy. An ISC study group composed of specialists on shipping and energy problems in the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean, found several factors endangering this route, among them possible offensive "terrorist" action against oil installations and tanker traffic and "the future stability of Southern Africa" generally. States the report: "As far as Western countries are concerned there is a strong need for better information about the countries of Southern Africa." (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 16, 1974)

### US AIDE TASTES APARTHEID

A recent visitor to South Africa, who is a black employee of the US Information Service, experienced some of the humiliations of South Africa's apartheid laws. Peter Saunders and his wife were staying at the Blue Waters Hotel in Durban, a prestigious establishment which has government permission to accept foreign guests. However, when they went to the hotel's night club for a meal with three white journalists they were told that the club caters only for Whites, and they were asked to leave. Apparently they were mistaken for local black South Africans. When they protested to the manager that they were guests at the hotel he allowed them to remain on condition that they did not dance.


Saunders is the international editor of *Topic*, a magazine published by the US information agency. The South African Government grants "honorary white" status to visiting and residing black diplomats and special guests. None of the rigid race separation laws which are applicable to the local Blacks applies to them. However, laws governing inter-race contact for "honorary whites" are so complicated that individual hotel owners often find it easiest to apply the much more clearcut and easily applicable laws pertaining to local Blacks. (*Guardian*, London, March 20, 1974)

### BANTUSTAN NEWS

#### Transkei Independence?

The Transkei Legislative Assembly voted overwhelmingly to ask the South African Government to grant the Transkei full independence within the next five years. This is the first such demand by one of the eight homeland governments set up by the South African authorities. The only condition to be met before such a request would be made was that the Transkei get the land promised under the 1936 Land Act, and that this should not prejudice its claim to other land still within "white" South Africa.

A recess committee, consisting of 27 members of the assembly with Paramount Chief Matanzima as chairman, will be appointed to consider the future constitution. The



The New York Times/Feb. 4, 1974

recess committee will also consider the financial implications of independence, the effect this will have on the status of the chiefs and the boundaries of the new state. The committee will be asked to report on the possibility of opening negotiations with the neighboring Ciskei government on the amalgamation of the homelands.

Prime Minister Vorster welcomed this development when he told nationalist supporters in Heidelberg that the Transkei would become an independent country within the next five years. In reply to a question he said that independence for the homelands did not increase the security risk of armed attack against South Africa. He pointed out that this question had not arisen in the case of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland when they had gained their independence from Britain. Apart from this, said the Prime Minister, he had spoken at great length to South Africa's homeland leaders and was convinced that they were just as opposed to terrorism and communism as white South Africans were.

Another official government comment came from Mr. M. C. Botha who said independence would be granted after negotiations and South Africa would make treaties with the Bantustans to regulate matters like the labor

supplied to SA, the financial and technical aid SA would give to them and common services like posts, roads, harbors and customs and excise. Military and defense arrangements would also be made.

A glimpse of how independence would be used by Matanzima was provided by his warning to the members of the Transkei opposition Democratic Party that if they continue to call for revolutionary changes they might find themselves locked up after the homeland gained independence. He has also threatened to annex the Glen Grey district of the Ciskei after independence.

Matanzima wants the Transkei to form a single independent Xhosa state in conjunction with the Ciskei but his earlier overtures on the merger have been rejected. The Ciskei leader, Lennox Sebe, has said that the matter can only be decided by the people, preferably in a referendum. Mr. Sebe said that the Ciskei did not want amalgamation at this stage although he believed that it was inevitable in the long run. At the present he wanted to concentrate on consolidating Ciskei territory which at present consists of fifteen pieces of land. He hoped to convert it into two pieces of land "in the near future."

#### Zululand

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has made a strong demand for control of the Zululand coastline and territorial waters and reiterated his demand for more land. He felt that a country could only exercise genuine independence if it had the ability to maintain personal security. He said that he still wanted to know what the South African Government meant by "independent black states within South Africa." "If white South Africa cannot produce countries for the so-called Black nations of South Africa then we have no choice but to integrate as citizens of one country which is South Africa." He wanted all the issues clearly and unequivocally stated in writing before the offer of independence could be contemplated by his government. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 30, 1974)

#### Bophutswana

A debate is under way in the Legislative Assembly to petition the State President for Chief Mangope's dismissal. One of the main points at issue is the Chief Minister's establishment of the Bophutswana Development fund as a private agreement between himself and eleven trustees appointed by him. Other complaints are that he interfered with tribal chiefs and tribal administration without consulting the cabinet or the legislative assembly. It is alleged that he wrote a letter to the commissioner general asking that Chief Herman Maseloane be dismissed from both the cabinet and the chairmanship of the regional authority.

#### Vendaland

Chief Minister Patrick Mpephu is in danger of losing his majority in the Assembly which consists of 18 elected members and 42 nominated chiefs. Although he started this session of the assembly with 42 supporters, seven members including two most important chiefs in Vendaland have crossed the floor to join the opposition Venda Independent Party led by Baldwin Mudau of

Johannesburg. This is significant because Chief Mpephu has leaned on the support of the traditionalist chiefs to maintain power. Observers say that tribal pressures influenced the defections.

#### Lebowa

Lebowa awaits the consent of the State President to create an upper house of chiefs, and consent is almost certain to be granted. The white government framed the constitutions for the homelands with their mixed assemblies of minority elected commoners and a majority of nominated chiefs so that the power would rest with the chiefs. This was to prevent radical opposition parties of elected members taking over homeland government. The chiefs by the new Act would sit in the upper house instead of in the assembly with the elected members. The opposition parties have already joined the governing Lebowa People's Party. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 16, 23, 30, April 6, 1974; *To the Point*, March 22, 1974; *Guardian*, London, March 15, 1974)

#### MORAL CLIMATE IN SOUTH AFRICA

"The streakers are nothing else but posters for the revolution." According to Dr. A. L. Kotzee, the Transvaal Director of Education, streaking is part of the "permissive revolution" that communism is using to bring about the downfall of the West. Other signs of this permissiveness include long hair, sloppy dress, drug abuse, and the growing disrespect for authority and discipline. Kotzee not only defines the problem, he has the solution: respect for authority. "Healthy discipline results in emotional security in children, for children want clear rules and healthy discipline" he said. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 30, 1974)

What is this healthy authority in South Africa? Aside from the more overt forms of police control regularly reported in *Southern Africa*, there are many examples. Streakers are shown the folly of their ways receiving fines of \$70 to \$280, or being caned. Books like Kurt Vonnegut's *Breakfast of Champions*, are banned, freeing South Africans from having to decide for themselves as to the merit of the book. Controversial shows like the musical *Godspell* are allowed to be performed, but only after all offensive material has been cut from the show, again protecting the audience from any threat to their emotional security.

But let it not be said that South Africa is totally closed to outside influences. After all in 1974, the Johannesburg Art Gallery acquired a painting that has shattered the complacency of viewers in South Africa. It is Pablo Picasso's "Tete d'Arlequin," the first Picasso bought in South Africa. The public has nicknamed the painting "the clown." Perhaps this response justified the faith that the authorities placed in the people. Or is it that now Picasso is dead it is safe to show him? (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 16, 23, April 20, 1974)


#### MAJOR US FIRMS ANNOUNCE EXPANSION PLANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The South African Government has good reason to be pleased by the recently-announced expansion plans of

several US corporations in that country. The announcements—all made in April—involve the establishment of two new mineral processing facilities and additions to an existing tire plant.

These ventures will add about \$65 million to the book value of direct US investment in South Africa, which now exceeds \$1 billion (\$1000 million). But it is not the capital itself which will evoke the South African's gratitude as much as it is the contribution the new mineral plants will make to the country's productive capacity.

South Africa's economy is highly developed, compared with other African and underdeveloped countries. But in its trade and investment relations with the major capitalist nations, South Africa remains the dependent partner. An example of the frustration which results was expressed in a commentary broadcast by Radio South Africa a few months ago. The official government station complained that the great industrial nations were using South Africa as a "milk-cow"—by removing raw materials from the country and processing them elsewhere. The complaint was based on the contention that "it is not the sale of raw materials but the processing of them that is the real generator of wealth."



#### NEW UNION CARBIDE PLANT

A new \$40 million dollar ferrochrome plant in which Union Carbide is involved will greatly increase South Africa's ability to process its metallurgical grade chrome ore. South Africa has the world's largest chrome ore deposits, and its ferrochrome is already an important competitor to US-produced ferrochrome in both foreign and domestic markets.

Scheduled to be finished late in 1976, the Transvaal plant will produce about 120,000 tons of ferrochrome per year. Union Carbide will own 49 per cent, while the other 51 per cent will be held by General Mining and Finance Corporation.

Ferrochrome is an important component in stainless steel and is used in products ranging from eating utensils to jet engines. Some of the new plant's output is expected to be exported to the United States.

The US has no significant deposits of chrome ore, but until recently produced most of its ferrochrome

domestically. During the past 18 months, however, several ferrochrome plants have reduced their work force or closed down completely, due to foreign competition.

Based on current figures, workers in the new South African plant will probably be paid about one-tenth of what an American ferrochrome worker is paid. In its press release on the new venture, Union Carbide asserts however that "no effect on employment in the United States ferroalloy industry is expected." The company explains that the Marietta, Ohio plant which currently makes ferrochrome will be changed over to ferromanganese production.

#### TSUMEB-O'KIEP REFINERY

In an unrelated move, two US-owned mining companies announced plans to construct a \$40 million electrolytic copper refinery near Cape Town. The project is a joint venture of the O'Kiep Copper Company and Tsumeb Corporation. Both are managed by the Newmont Mining Corporation of New York, which owns about 30 per cent of Tsumeb and 58 per cent of O'Kiep. American Metal Climax Corp., also of New York, owns a similar share of Tsumeb and 17 per cent of O'Kiep. O'Kiep in turn owns 9.5 per cent of Tsumeb.

Both O'Kiep and Tsumeb are engaged primarily in copper mining—O'Kiep in the Namaqualand area of South Africa and Tsumeb in Namibia. They are involved in joint exploration ventures in both South Africa and Namibia.

The new facility will have a capacity of 132,000 tons and will handle all the output of blister copper from both companies' mines. Currently, their blister copper production is refined in Japan and Europe.

#### GOODYEAR EXPANDS TIRE FACTORY

The Goodyear passenger car tire factory in South Africa is to undergo a \$6 million expansion. This follows immediately on the heels of a \$8 million expansion of the company's earth-moving equipment tire plant. Both facilities are located in the Eastern Province town of Uitenhage.

The latest investment will bring Goodyear's total South African capital to about \$19 million. The company has also just completed a \$150 thousand facility for training skilled workers.

The expansion of the car tire plant will involve adding more space, modernizing existing equipment, and purchasing more modern equipment. The recently-completed plant which makes tires for earth-moving vehicles is the biggest factory of its kind in Africa. (*Union Carbide release*, April 11, 1974; *Wall Street Journal*, April 18, 23, 1974; *South African Digest*, April 5, 1974) ●

# —namibia—

## Brutality backed by law

by **JO HERBERTSON**, formerly of the British Foreign Office, who recently returned from a visit to Namibia.

**BRUTAL** flogging of men and women is to continue in Ovamboland, a black Homeland in South West Africa (Namibia).

The Supreme Court of South West Africa has rejected on a technicality petitions brought by local church leaders and others. The Court refused leave to appeal, but the petitioners believe they have legal grounds for contesting this decision and still hope to be heard by the Appeal Court in South Africa.

The petitioners seek to restrain the Ovambo tribal authorities—sponsored and encouraged by the white South African Government—from inflicting this savage punishment on those who oppose the Bantustan policy in Namibia.

The hard central rib of a Makalani palm branch is used in the flogging. It is carried out judicially and in public and often leaves its victims bleeding and unconscious.

The aim is to intimidate and coerce Ovambos who dispute South Africa's right to dictate the political future of a former trust territory declared independent by the United Nations in 1967.

Ovamboland, close to the border of Portuguese Angola, is one of the nine Homelands into which Mr Vorster's Government has sub-divided Namibia. Eight of them are, like Ovamboland, black. But the ninth, covering the greatest part of the country, is retained for whites. In the black areas South Africa has transferred power to the tribal authorities.

Angered by the unrelenting militancy of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in its campaign for full independence—operating in exile through guerrillas along the frontier and through a legal political wing at home—South Africa has stepped up the punitive powers of their allies, the tribal authorities. The normal

courts have been deprived of jurisdiction in local Ovambo affairs and tribal courts have been given the right to reach summary judgment and to impose punishment, including unlimited flogging.

The grim record of this archaic punishment is revealed in 30 sworn affidavits, which I have brought back from Windhoek, the old capital of South West Africa. They formed the basis of the legal action initiated there, in vain, by the Anglican Bishop, the Rt Rev. Richard Wood; the Lutheran Bishop, the Rt Rev. Leonard Auala; and Mr Komati, a SWAPO member.

The affidavits—none of which was legally challenged in court—disclose a pattern of systematic brutality directed against middle-aged family men, teachers, respected political, community and religious leaders, young students and girl student nurses.

In many cases no charge is laid against prisoners of the tribal courts, which issue sentences of up to 30 lashes without explanation. Mere membership of an opposition group is evidently enough.

The affidavits also show that the South African police regularly hand arrested members of SWAPO over to the tribal courts, knowing the severity of the punishment they will get.

Elisa Nghilwano, a nurse in her early twenties, said in her affidavit that she was arrested with two other young women and a man and detained for six days last September before being brought before a tribal court where she was asked why she had joined SWAPO. 'I replied that I had joined because it struggled for our betterment.'

The four of them were sentenced to receive six strokes each with the Makalani cane. When one of her fellow-accused, Rachel, asked why they were being punished, she was told that

the court was under no obligation to give a reason.

Rachel was the first to be flogged. She was compelled to lie over a chair in the 'hall' (a structure comprising a roof without walls), in full view of a gathering of men, women and children. Four policemen each held her by a limb and she was flogged by a tribal policeman—with extreme violence. The tribal policeman wielded the Makalani cane, using two hands which he raised high in the air before striking.

'I was flogged in the same way,' Elisa states. 'After my flogging I was hardly able to walk. I walked as if I was crippled. . . . When I removed my panties I found that I was bleeding. I was unable to sit for a week thereafter.'

One man of 47 testified: 'On 16 August 1973 I was arrested by members of the South African police and detained until my release on 8 November 1973. I was released without being charged. When I emerged from the police station I found a number of tribal police waiting.' He was then questioned on his involvement in politics. Later, he and his fellow-accused, Franz, were handcuffed together and taken to the house of a headman, Nakwafila, in the location.

'We were placed in a filthy dark room with our legs chained together. We spent the night sitting. The chains around my legs were bound so tightly that the next morning my legs were swollen and I have to this day marks on my ankles which were made by the chains. The irons caused my ankles to bleed. Nakwafila was angry with us. He was under the influence of alcohol.'

The following day the man was sentenced to 15 strokes for political activity in Ondangwa. 'I asked the tribal secretary if I was allowed to say anything and he answered that I was to undress immediately. I loosened

and pulled down my trousers and took my underpants down so that they were below my knees. I saw members of the public, men and women, looking in through the window. I am a family man and a member of my church congregation. I am 47 years of age and felt deeply degraded and humiliated. I lay down over a chair and the blows descended. They were agonising. . . . That day, as also the previous day, his [Nakwafila's] breath smelt of liquor and from his speech and his red eyes and his behaviour, I thought he was under the influence of alcohol. I was terrified that he would not only strike my buttocks but possibly injure my spine. The pain was terrible and produced open wounds. By the eighth stroke I lost consciousness. . . .

One man of 26 had been arrested at the Anglican Mission because he was wearing a SWAPO flag on his shirt. The South African police kept him in a cell from 20 August to 2 October. He was not charged with any offence. On the morning of 2 October he was handed over to the tribal secretary. At the court he was flogged unconscious because he was a member of SWAPO.

The well-known Johannesburg barrister, Mr David Soggat, who

argued the case before the Supreme Court for the floggings to be suspended, said that punishment without trial, without defence and without evidence was contrary to the spirit of the Roman Dutch law. There was no evidence to show that the regular practice of flogging was part of the customary law of the Ovambo.

Bishop Auula, himself an Ovambo, and a 90-year-old pastor, both affirmed in affidavits to the court that flogging was not a traditional punishment and had been used systematically only under the direction of one white Commissioner of Bantu Affairs, known as 'Sjambok Hahn.' Even then it was not known that sentences of more than 10 strokes were inflicted. Nor was it known that women were flogged.

The Supreme Court rejected the application on the technical grounds of late submission by the defence and that the applicants had no *locus standi* in the case.

Despite the widespread public condemnations in Namibia and in South Africa, the Vorster regime has refused to put an end to the flogging because it does not wish 'to intervene in the affairs of the Homelands' or 'in tribal customs.'

It is clear from my experience in Ovamboland that the Homeland authorities, backed by the Pretoria regime, are faced with a tough political challenge in their concerted attempt to impose their ideas of a 'Bantustan Government' on the Ovambos, who comprise nearly half the total population of Namibia.

Wherever I went I saw young children, from five upwards, giving 'Victory for Namibia' signs. Teenage girls speak of the liberation of their country. Women are organising church and other meetings to explain what is wrong with the present political system. The men are actively engaged in political organisation, demanding the fulfilment of the UN and World Court decisions that the former trust territory should be made fully independent.

Since 7 February over 30 SWAPO leaders, many of them young students, have been arrested under the Terrorism Act. They include the SWAPO leader, David Merero, who like the others has not yet been charged with any offence.

(Observer, London, April 7, 1974)



Public executions under German rule — A Violent History Repeating Itself

# ZIMBABWE

## NEW FRONT OPENS

The Zimbabwe African Peoples Union claimed responsibility for the March 8th raid of a South African Police patrol near Victoria Falls. The attack coincided with a visit of South African Police Minister, Louwrens Muller, who was presenting a swimming pool to South African police stationed at the Falls. The action, in which nine South Africans and Rhodesians were killed, was the first activity in the northwest for a long while. ZAPU said a South African claim of five dead discounted four Rhodesians who were killed also. Observers in Salisbury believe that guerrillas are planning to open a new military front in the northwest and that this was not an isolated incident. It had been anticipated that ZAPU would work in the northeast while Zimbabwe African National Union forces moved southward along the eastern border with Mozambique.

The Rhodesian authorities are afraid that tourism will be hard hit in the area. South African radio has cautioned against reprisals against Zambia, where the guerrillas may have fled after the attack. ZAPU denies that the guerrillas fled to Zambia. Soon after the incident, Ian Smith said he received assurances from the Zambian government that direct incursions into Rhodesia would not be permitted. (*Guardian*, London, March 11, 16, 1974; *Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, March 13, 1974; *Nation*, Nairobi, March 14, 1974)

## VILLAGERS HELD FOR COLLABORATION

About 200 villagers from the Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands in the northeastern war zone are being interrogated, along with a chief and a Salvation Army headmaster, after being accused of giving food and shelter to guerrillas. Reports of widespread collaboration between villagers and guerrillas in the Madziwa area were highlighted in January by the killing of a district assistant, an African

government official. Villagers openly helped the "terrorists" capture the man and watched as he was executed. About 110 villagers in the area have been moved from their homes to Bindura police station. Others not being prosecuted will be resettled "for their own protection and rehabilitation," according to the *Rhodesia Herald*. In order to deny the guerrillas food and shelter, the crops and huts of the Musiqa Kraal have been destroyed by Rhodesian security forces. (*Rhodesia Herald*, Salisbury, Feb. 16, 1974)

The Rhodesian Front Party is pressuring the government to introduce a mandatory death sentence for acts of "terrorism" or for aiding guerrillas. Lardner-Burke, the Rhodesian Minister of Justice, has opposed such pressure, stating, "I can understand the emotions of the people pressing for it. But we will not look at this with emotion. Do you hang a woman who hands over a handful of beans to a terrorist at the point of a gun?" (*Guardian*, London, March 16, 1974)

## TORTURE CLAIMED

Mr. R. Sadomba, an African Member of Parliament in Salisbury, accused two South African police of murdering the baby of a woman who refused to give police information regarding guerrillas. He said other Africans had had their heads placed in buckets of water and were threatened with death, or were tortured with electric shocks while under interrogation by security forces. Mr. Sadomba said these practices were well-known by Africans in the area. Lardner-Burke, the Minister of Justice, refused to set-up a commission of inquiry on the subject.

A Roman Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace has said that a mere denial of the charges made by Mr. Sadomba is totally inadequate. The commission has long been aware of charges of brutality by members of the police and army against African civilians. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 30, April 6, 1974)


## SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS A MAJOR BLOW TO SMITH REGIME

*On Christmas Eve last year Kenneth McIntosh posted from Salisbury what may have been the most damaging packet to leave Rhodesia since UDI.*

*Sunday Times*, April 14, 1974

The documents, which eventually reached the *Sunday Times* in London, outlined a \$90 million international scheme to increase Rhodesian iron and steel production by 240 per cent. Two-thirds of the financing was to come from foreign sources, and this had to be arranged in spite of the international sanctions in force against the illegal Rhodesian regime.

Ken McIntosh, British born, worked in a Salisbury merchant bank known as Nefichro. After a time the 37-year old banker "developed a distaste" for the sanctions-busting operation of which he was a peripheral



part. So, he began photocopying documents, and last year mailed the one described above to his brother-in-law in England.

Stealing documents from one's employers is frowned upon anywhere, but in Rhodesia it can be a serious crime carrying a heavy penalty. The iron and steel industry is central to that country's economy, and every detail about that sector is classified information.

What the McIntosh documents revealed was a clever plan to obtain the needed international financing for the project.

The new plant was to be built by an Austrian firm, Voest (Vereingte Osterreichische Eisen-und-Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft), at a cost of \$20 million. A large German company had agreed to buy the additional steel produced, for which \$9 million was to be advanced. That company is Neunkircher Eisenwerk.

The financing was to come from a Swiss and an Austrian bank, for a total of \$25 million.

This basic plan was approved by the Rhodesian Reserve Bank on August 8, 1972, the *Sunday Times* documents show. Later, two other groups joined in. First, the European American Finance (Bermuda) Ltd. agreed to make a \$30 million loan to the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation, "through the medium of Handelsgesellschaft of Zurich." European American Finance (Bermuda) is a subsidiary of the New York-based European American Banking Corporation (EABC). This bank is jointly owned by six of the largest European banks, and it is this bank which organized the large series of loans to South Africa which were revealed by *Southern Africa* and other organizations last fall.

EABC, however, denies that it had any knowledge of the purpose of the loan to the Swiss company. The bank told the *Sunday Times*, that the loan was paid to "some German and Swiss steel companies of the highest quality" and that EABC did not ask what it was for. After being contacted by the newspaper, the New York bank cancelled the loan and demanded immediate repayment. "It is off our books. Thank God," the EABC manager, Klaus Jacobs told the *Sunday Times* just two days before the story was printed.

McIntosh could not wash his hands of the matter so easily. In January, he submitted his resignation to the bank to return to England. Five days before his resignation was to take place, he was summoned to the Rhodesian Reserve Bank for "discussion." That evening, before being questioned, he quietly boarded a plane to Malawi. Having arrived there unmolested, he must have breathed a sigh of relief. But, his troubles were just beginning.

The Malawi security police detained him for questioning, and after a weekend of interrogation in jail, he was returned to Rhodesia and handed to the security police there. Malawi has offered no explanation for its action, despite an official protest from the British foreign office. But, some observers think that the documents McIntosh was carrying also implicated President Banda's government in sanctions violations.

The young banker was first sentenced to five years in jail. Then, the Rhodesians offered to reduce his sentence

if the *Sunday Times* would not print the story on the iron and steel venture. When the paper refused, McIntosh was "tried" on additional charges and given 20 more years.

It is unlikely he will have to stay there that long. The scheme he exposed, and thereby destroyed, was a crucial part of the Smith regime's efforts to construct an economic super-structure to withstand sanctions. It is that structure—transport, basic manufacturing, communications—which is not being built fast enough or is even deteriorating. And, this bodes trouble for the beleaguered Whites.

Further, the liberation movements are pressing their struggle forward. And with the new uncertainty in Mozambique created by the Portuguese coup, the Rhodesian and South African forces are likely to take even greater set backs on that front. Mr. McIntosh may be out of prison before too very long, and he is sure to receive warm thanks from many Zimbabweans. (*Sunday Times*, London, April 21, March 24, 1974; *Guardian*, London, April 15, 1974)

#### US AIRLINES, TOUR AGENCIES ILLEGALLY TRADE WITH RHODESIA

Any form of trade between the United States and Rhodesia is illegal, but if you call up Eastern Airlines they will confirm a reservation for you on Air Rhodesia. So will Delta, Pan American, United, or any of twenty-one American air line companies named in a recent report by the Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ.

The report, given to the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council, listed ninety airlines from various nations that are breaking United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia. The sanctions were imposed in 1968 in protest of an illegal independence declaration by Rhodesia's white minority, who wanted to avoid democratic government in a country that is ninety-five per cent African.

The United Nations resolution specifically forbids airline companies of member nations from "linking with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia." It also prohibits "making available ... to any commercial, industrial, or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises, any ... financial or economic resources."

The report of the Center for Social Action (C.S.A.) charges that airlines violate the resolution by accepting fees as agent for Air Rhodesia. This constitutes "making available financial resources", and, since Air Rhodesia is a national airline, the money goes directly to the illegal Rhodesian government.

The report also indicts a number of tourist agencies and airlines for arranging or sponsoring package tours to Rhodesia. For these tours, again, the foreign intermediaries receive a sizeable fee. The tours documented by the C.S.A. for last year alone brought in well over six million dollars in revenue to Rhodesia.

Tourism is the second-largest source of foreign exchange in Rhodesia today, and it is the only Rhodesian industry to show a consistent growth since the Declaration of Independence. Most of the increase has



been in tourism from Western Europe and North America, and many of the agreements between Air Rhodesia and western airlines have been made since the sanctions were applied.

Whether or not action will be taken against the offending companies however, is an open question. A similar report on credit card companies last August

frightened at least one company—Hertz Rental Agency—into planning the termination of its Rhodesian offices. But when no action ensued after several months, operations were resumed. Spokesmen for other companies said there would be no change of policy unless they were prosecuted. (*Africa News*, Durham, April 25, 1974) ●

## Struggle in Portugal and Africa

*Articles for the June issue of Southern Africa were due prior to the military coup in Portugal. Therefore in this issue we provide some news and analysis of the events both in Portugal and the African territories, but by no means consider this to be an exhaustive account. Included in this issue are: an editorial; chronological highlights in Portugal; radio broadcasts as primary documentary sources on African and Portuguese reactions; and a longer report on early African reactions and developments based on Africa News radio programs through May 6. We plan to have more detailed reporting in the July-August issue.*


### The Coup and Its' Aftermath

#### PORTUGAL'S JUNTA BALKS AT INDEPENDENCE FOR AFRICAN COLONIES

The leader of Portugal's new military junta has not surprisingly rejected the idea of independence for the country's African colonies. In a statement to newsmen in Lisbon, General Antonio de Spínola emphasized that self-determination, which he advocates for the African areas, should not be confused with independence.



General Spínola.



Observers note that the distinction between self-determination and independence seems to revolve around the issue of which group takes over power in each of the colonies. Spínola and the military leaders oppose any conciliation with the liberation movements which for over a decade have been fighting Portugal in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. The movements seek to end Portuguese control and have vowed to fight for total independence.

The junta apparently favors the formation of more moderate African political leadership which would not be hostile to continued Portuguese influence and economic interests.

Mário Soares, leader of the Portuguese Socialist Party, who returned to Lisbon Sunday after five years of exile in France, said he favored negotiations with the African liberation movements on the future of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Other political groups including the Communist Party have also expressed support for a similar negotiated end to the wars.

How Spínola and the military/economic interests in the new government will try to accommodate or alter the political left's position on the colonies is a big question.

### Open vote would bring "wrong conclusion" says junta

A senior member of Portugal's new military junta expressed doubts that a referendum to determine the future of the African colonies could be held on the basis of one-man, one-vote. He was speaking in Luanda, the capital of the Portuguese colony of Angola, where he flew for an on-the-spot investigation.

General Costa Gomes, who returned to Lisbon on May 6, was formerly the Portuguese army chief of staff, who was dismissed in March, along with his deputy, General Spínola.

General Gomes told a BBC correspondent in Luanda that the future relationship between Portugal and its African territories would eventually be decided by the Portuguese people as a whole. In this he included the Black and white residents of the colonies, but, said the General, a large number of people in those African areas are not "politically conscious." A referendum conducted on the basis of universal suffrage, at this time, he said, would probably result in a "wrong conclusion."

On his return to Lisbon, Gomes told a news conference that he had appealed to the guerrilla groups to lay down their arms and join in working for a peaceful solution. The guerrilla groups, however, have expressed skepticism about the new regime's intentions in Africa. And this view has been endorsed by a number of African states. A full Portuguese program vis-a-vis the colonies has not been enunciated.

Four African nations may be taking action this week to attempt to strengthen the independence forces in Angola, where politics have been clouded by disputes among three liberation movements operating there. Two of them, FNLA and MPLA, both recognized by the Organization for African Unity, announced a merger in 1972. But there has been little concrete evidence of effective cooperation since.

However, the foreign ministers of the four African nations which negotiated the 1972 merger announced a meeting this week. Though the Tanzanian Foreign Minister said there was "no fixed agenda" for his discussions with colleagues from Zambia, Zaire, and the Congo, there was speculation that the talks would focus on a renewed effort to forge unity among the Angolan movements. (*Africa News*, Durham, May 2, 9, 1974)

## REACTIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE COUP

### Initial Angolan and Guinean Responses

African reaction to the coup against Portugal's 40-year-old dictatorship is a mixture of optimism and caution. Although Africans are generally glad to see the old regime fall, they are reserving judgement about the implications for Africa until the new government has had a chance to act.

Liberation movements in Portugal's three African territories, where 140 thousand Portuguese troops are pinned down by guerrilla warfare say they will continue their independence struggles. The PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, which already controls two-thirds of the country, declared independence from Portugal last September, although Portuguese forces still control the capital and several towns and forts.

The PAIGC yesterday praised the coup in a radio broadcast. As translated into English, the broadcast said: "The overthrow of the regime in Lisbon gives the Portuguese people a chance to end facsim in their country. The African Party for the liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde will now step up the war to bring a speedy end to Portuguese colonialism."

President Augustino Neto, of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), pointed out that Angolans had always been ready to negotiate, and would be glad to talk with the new government. But he stressed that nothing short of total independence would be acceptable.

Two other Angolan liberation movements had similar reactions. Both criticized the Federation of Portugal and its former colonies that has been proposed by General Antonio de Spínola. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) says that the Angolan people "will not accept neo-colonialism as advocated by Spínola, just as they have not accepted the colonialism of the government that was overthrown."

### Mozambican Complexities

The liberation movement in Portugal's African colony of Mozambique, FRELIMO, has rejected the idea of a federation between Portugal and its three African territories. In a statement over Dar es Salaam radio, FRELIMO said there is no such thing as "democratic colonialism."

"The Mozambican people," said the broadcast, "will not accept that democracy for the Portuguese people should serve as a cover to prevent the independence of Mozambique."

An organization in Mozambique which appears more ready to cooperate with a Spínola solution is emerging. The United Mozambique Group's (GUM) existence as a "cultural" group is many months old. Last January, an African school teacher, Johanna Simiao, held a press conference in Lisbon to say that Mozambique should be for Mozambicans. She later returned to Mozambique to become the prominent African spokesperson for GUM. The fact that she was allowed to speak publicly in Lisbon was regarded as a sign of government approval for the group, and is confirmation that Premier Caetano supported the Spínola plan to Africanize the Mozambican government. On April 28 GUM issued a manifesto calling for the end of Portugal's unjust restrictions on the African territories, but stressing pacifism and political autonomy. It also held a public rally in Lourenco Marques. Other figures in the group are white business interests and other professionals from the mestizo (mulatto) class with long-held government links.

A further factor in the Mozambique situation is the attitude of the white Portuguese settlers. The former governor of the territory, Pimental dos Santos, was replaced and flown back to Lisbon following speculation that he would lead a rebellion against the junta. Some opposition to feared plans to have more Africans in the government was shown by the formation of a group (interestingly enough more than a week after the coup) called FICO (the Front for Occidental Community or Continuity), which held a rally of several thousand whites.

... The way to solve the problem is clear: recognition of the Mozambican people's right to independence. If however, the objective of the *coup d'etat* is to find new formulae to perpetuate the oppression of our people, then the Portuguese leaders are warned they will face our firm determination. ... Just as Caetano's era clearly proves that liberal fascism does not exist, it must also be understood there is no such thing as democratic colonialism. ...

*Excerpt of Statement by FRELIMO Executive Committee, Dar es Salaam, April 29, 1974*

The new government will not be entirely without Portuguese support in Mozambique, however. Large segments of the army are apparently loyal to Spínola, and on April 29 two thousand young students and professionals demonstrated in the Mozambican capital with banners saying "Long Live Democracy" and "Long Live Freedom of Expression." For the moment, at least, forces loyal to General Spínola appear to be in control.

#### Other African Reactions

In Rhodesia, security is the chief worry. Rhodesian forces frequently pursue rebels across the border into Portuguese-controlled Mozambique. A free Mozambique would help African challengers to Rhodesia's white regime. Land-locked Rhodesia is also concerned about continued access to the sea via Mozambique's port of Beira.

In contrast to the US press, which generally interprets the coup as meaning an end for Portuguese colonialism in Africa, African newspapers are more sceptical. The *Ghanian Times*, for example, said it should not be taken for granted that the wars in Africa are over and that the people of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau are automatically free as a result of the coup.

The Congolese government, over national radio, released a communique urging continued resistance to Portuguese colonialism. The fight, it said, should now be intensified.

In Zambia, the *Daily Mail* predicted that the fighting in Portugal's colonies would continue unless the new government comes to terms with liberation movements there. But the paper welcomed the coup as a serious crack, not only in the Portuguese dictatorship, but in what it called "the unholy alliance between Portugal and white racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia."

#### South Africa Recognizes New Regime

The South African Government of John Vorster became the second country, after Brazil, to recognize Portugal's new military regime, despite initial uneasiness among the country's white rulers over the effect the coup would have on southern Africa. According to a commentary on Radio South Africa, observers are wrong to assume "that General Spínola favors capitulation to terrorism." The views of Portugal's new rulers are very similar to those of the South African Government, said the commentary. (See full text of radio broadcast.) Quoting South African radio again: "In the short-term,

therefore, there is no prospect of a Portuguese withdrawal from Africa." Lisbon's long-term plan to gradually hand power over to locals differs little from South Africa's policy of granting self-rule to what it calls the black nations of South Africa.

#### The New Portuguese Situation Watched in US

The Gulf Oil Corporation says its operations in the Portuguese colony of Angola have been unaffected by the events in Portugal and are operating normally. Cabinda Gulf Oil, a subsidiary of the US oil giant, pumps about 200,000 barrels a day from the offshore waters of that territory. The company has been heavily criticized by American church, civil rights, and political groups, who charge that its investments support Portuguese colonialism.

A company spokesman told *Africa News*, that Gulf is watching the situation closely. Company data shows that Gulf receives six per cent of its profits from the Angolan operation, which accounts for about one-tenth of its world-wide reserves.

One important factor which remains unclear is the status of the chairman of Gulf's Angolan subsidiary. Vasco Garin, before becoming chairman in 1971, served as ambassador to the US and UN for the now-deposed Lisbon regime. Since a major part of his function for Gulf is to maintain good relations with the government, the military take-over might make him a liability rather than an asset.

The Gulf spokesman declined comment on the matter, except to say that Garin was a career diplomat and not a political appointee, and thus might be unaffected by the change.

Meanwhile, in Washington, the State Department is also maintaining a "wait-and-see" attitude. Negotiations between the US and Portugal are now pending over the status of the US military base in the Portuguese-controlled Azores islands. There are some hints that the new package was to provide the islands with more development aid, yet not give the Caetano regime all it demanded.

(*Africa News*, Durham, April 26, May 2, 6, 9, 1974)

## REACTIONS TO COUP IN PORTUGAL: Transcripts of Radio Broadcasts in Portugal and Africa

*RADIO PORTUGAL: 8.20 EDT, April 25, 1974. (Translated from Portuguese)*

#### Proclamation of the Junta for National Salvation

In obedience to the mandate that was entrusted upon us by the Armed Forces following the victory that was carried out in time for the survival and the well-being of the Portuguese Nation, the Junta of National Salvation which I (Spínola) preside, formed by the imperatives of securing order and defining the true national objectives, the Junta assumes the ... [following] ... compromises:

-To warrant the survival of the country as a free nation in its continental whole;

-To ... [free] ... the Portuguese conscious of their responsibilities in permitting encouraging and respecting all types of opinions in order to assure the constitution of civic associations and ... in order to facilitate the election by direct suffrage in a national campaign ... for a constitutive national assembly. ...

In order to warrant the freedom of expression of thought, the Junta should abstain from any political activity that might condition the free elections. ...

The Junta will, by all means, avoid. ... It will take its action from the elementary norms of morality and justice, assuring to each citizen the fundamental rights stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Junta [is] to limit the objectives of its power, to respect the freedom of the citizen, to respect the commitment to international institutions.

... In order that in the shortest time possible the Portuguese people can govern themselves through institutions that they have freely elected, ... [the Junta will] hand over the power to constitutional institutions as soon as a President is elected.

**RADIO CONGOLESE BRAZZAVILLE: 3.00 EDT, April 26, 1974: A voz de Angola Combatente-MPLA Broadcast of News. (Broadcast from French)**

General Amin's reaction to the Portuguese Coup d'etat. General Idi Amin of Uganda sent a telegram to General Spínola to whom he expressed his satisfaction on the result of the coup and asked for immediate independence for the Portuguese colonies. "It is with satisfaction that Africa welcomes an end to the evil government, action that we hope will lead, in the near future, to an end of the vicious wars that for the last 13 years Portugal has systematically carried out against the Angolan, Guinean and Mozambican people." Amin added among other things that he was sure Africa would forgive Portugal of its atrocities when it liberalizes its policy toward the colonies. ... and if necessary they will establish [diplomatic] relations with her (Portugal).

From Lomé, where he is attending the 14th anniversary of Togo's independence, President Mobutu Sese Seko declared in his address to the Togolese people that what comes to mind is to know whether the new regime just established in Lisbon is going to work out a solution that will soon lead to an end of the war against the African people although the Angolan, Guinean and Mozambican people are determined to fight until they win or die.

Lucio Lara, member of MPLA, defines the position of his party toward the coup in Portugal. In an interview that he gave to some journalists in Brazzaville ... What happened in Portugal is an internal affair that will in no way impinge upon our determination to fight, unless the new regime changes its country's policy toward Angola and Mozambique. Under the direction of MPLA, the fight continues, until Victory is Certain.

**VOICE OF ZAIRE: 2.00 EDT, April 27, 1974: A Voz De Angola Livre (FNLA Broadcast)**

At the very moment in which we are celebrating the 13th anniversary of our struggle, very significant events have just taken place in Portugal—it's about the overthrow of Caetano's fascist government. What the Armed Forces did in Portugal we have been trying to do in Africa and for stronger reasons: we have been the object of an insidious attack for our freedom, dignity and ... This event comes only to confirm what for years we have told the world and therefore, it does not surprise us. President Holden calls upon you to abandon your acts of treason and join the FNLA forces against liberation. This is the time for salvation, let he who has ears hear.

(Holden Roberto's voice): "In face of this situation, who is the Angola that does not feel rejoiced? Only the traitors and collaborators. To these I would simply like to ask: on which side will you be on the day of victory? For the Angolan people will not be the first nor the last to free itself. History is irreversible and the just cause always wins."

Holden's speech to the diplomatic corp accredited in Kinshasa: In his address, Holden appealed to the Portuguese of Angola to reexamine their actions and policies so that a mutual cooperation can take place between Angola and Portugal in an independent Angola.

The speech centered on the theme that the Portuguese of good will, will have a place in independent Angola and that upon the end of the war the Angolan people will not manifest any resentment against the Portuguese people because they themselves have for 40 years, been victims of the same fascist regime that we are fighting against.

**RADIO CONGOLESE BRAZZAVILLE: 3.00 EDT, April 28, 1974: A Voz de Angola Combatente-MPLA Broadcast. (Broadcast translated from French)**

The fascist regime of Caetano no longer exists. It is dead! Our President who is in Canada at the moment said: "The uprising of the Armed Forces in Portugal seems to me to be a comedy. General Spínola foresees a federal constitution, grouping Portugal and its Colonies. This is unacceptable to the liberation movements that want complete independence. ... The proposed solution of Spínola in his book is inadmissible. ... Our people struggle for total and unconditional independence." The struggle continues and Victory is Certain.

**VOICE OF ZAIRE: 2.00 EDT, April 28, 1974: A Voz De Angola Livre (FNLA Broadcast) (Translated)**

Appeal to the Angolans of good will to join the ranks and fight. ... Angola belongs to the Angolans and any solution that might treat the country as a part of a federation is not to be accepted. Angolans want independence, nothing more nor less.

**RADIO SOUTH AFRICA 6.38 (South African Government) p.m. EDT, April 28, 1974.**

**"Africa Survey—Commentary"**

The biggest impact of the military coup d'etat in Portugal is likely to be greater in Africa than in Portugal itself. Already there is intense speculation on whether the coup foreshadows a total or partial withdrawal of the Portuguese presence in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. Much of this speculation centers on the views and outlook of General de Spínola, the new Portuguese leader and a hero of his country's African Wars against communist-backed terror groups. A great deal is made of the opinion expressed in his book *Portugal and The Future* that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea.

But this does not mean, as some have assumed, that General Spínola favors capitulation to the forces of terrorism. What it does mean is that while the military role in combating terrorism is indispensable in order to restore and maintain stability, the real answer to terrorism lies in socio-economic upliftment and progress.

I quote the following passage from the General's book: "We are able to arrive at the conclusion that in any war of this type, an exclusively military victory is not viable."

Note in particular, the word "exclusively." This in my view is a valid argument that takes note of the realities of the situation. But it does not mean capitulation to terrorism. On the other hand, it is known that General Spínola favors greater autonomy for Portugal's African States while hoping to retain some sort of continued association between Portugal and these African States—either in a federal or commonwealth structure.

In the short-term, therefore there is no prospect of a Portuguese withdrawal from Africa although we can expect to see greater powers of self-government conferred on the African States and separate development is all to the good.

In the long-term, therefore there could be a gradual handing-over of power to the local population.

How does this affect South Africa? [Misleading] overseas reaction to the coup in Lisbon that this signals the beginning of the end for the white man in Africa is just so much poppycock.

The South African political standpoint—as confirmed in emphatic terms by the electorate only last week—is that each and every distinctive nation has the right to self-determination.

The ultimate implication of this standpoint will be reached within the next 3 or 4 years as the first of the black nations in South Africa becomes independent and joins other independent black states in Southern Africa.

Were the Portuguese in some future date to grant self-determination to Angola and Mozambique, this would be perfect with the South African political standpoint and in

practical terms would merely mean that South Africa would have two more sovereign black neighbors

What if they are hostile to South Africa under black rule? Well, this too would not be unique. We already have our Zambians, and South Africa has been able to cope quite adequately with her Zambians.

But, why need Angola and Mozambique if they were under black rule be hostile. I believe that as South Africa's 'bona-fides' are acknowledged and accepted with the independence of her Bantu homelands, there will be new winds of change—as black states in Southern Africa and farther afield take up South Africa's long-standing offer of friendship and goodwill and work together towards the objective that all who have the interests of the sub-continent at heart desire—namely, stability and progress for all the peoples and nations of Southern Africa.

**DAR ES SALAAM RADIO: April 29, 1974. Frelimo's Broadcast.**

The Mozambican people will not accept that democracy for the Portuguese people should serve as a cover to prevent the independence of Mozambique. . . . There is no such thing as 'democratic colonialism.' The people of Portugal's colony will continue the just struggle for their deserved rights.

**RADIO NIGERIA: 2.06 a.m. ESD. April 29, 1974.**

**Commentary**

Will Portuguese imperialism end with the coup? The fear is that it may not. The new government might offer a more humane alternative to the African nationalists but it is not likely to yield to the demands of the nationalists for full independence. . . . Nevertheless the overthrow of the reactionary government of Dr. Caetano may well be the first step towards the [break] between Portugal and Africa.

Monitored and Translated by Southern Africa Committee-South, Durham, North Carolina.

# angola

## MILITARY REPORTS

MPLA activities on the military front continue to increase in the first quarter of this year with the heaviest activity in the January to March period in the eastern front. This fact confirms the continued presence of MPLA in Angola's eastern region. Most significant are reports of MPLA anti-aircraft guns shooting down two planes during January. On January 10 a PV2 bomber was demolished when it was shot down in the Lufwigi area of Mexico district. Again on Jan. 23, MPLA reports that a plane flying over one of its bases was shot down. Other details were not available. The same day two military trucks were destroyed on the road between Gago-Coutinho and Lutembo. During the operation 13 Portuguese soldiers were reported killed.

On Jan. 17 an enemy platoon near the Lumbala barracks entered an MPLA mine-field and suffered a number of losses; the victims were evacuated by two French helicopters.

During February and March there were MPLA attacks at the post of Lovua in the eastern region, and the Miconge barracks, the Betina barracks and the Alto-Sunda administrative post in the Cabinda district. During the latter attack, a number of local colonial administrators were taken prisoner, while 15 bodyguards of the administrators were "disarmed, politicized and later released." (*MPLA war communique*, Feb. 4, 1974)

During March, MPLA reported significant successes

during 12 days of heavy fighting beginning March 22. The reports indicated more than 90 Portuguese soldiers killed and a number captured. (*Africa News*, Durham, April 15, 1974)

MPLA reported a Portuguese attack on an MPLA base near the Luntaco river in the Kazombo area which MPLA successfully repulsed. (MPLA war communiques, March 9, 14, 30, 1974; *MPLA Angola in Arms*, special issue, February, 1974)

The South African *Star* using Portuguese military communiques reported 70 guerrillas killed and 26 wounded during the month of February in Angola. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 24, 1974)

The *Times of Zambia* has reported stepped-up military activities by UNITA (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola) including a surprise New Year's day raid on the Alto-Cuit barracks in the province of Bie. The Portuguese troops at the barracks, still sleeping off the effects of the celebrations the night before, were awakened by gunfire in the early hours of the morning. A simultaneous attack was reportedly under way in the northeast region of Bie near Malange Province. UNITA reports 60 enemy casualties and 400 people freed from "ndandandas", the Angolan equivalent of "aldeamentos" or "strategic hamlets" in Mozambique.

Another attack on Jan. 20 resulted in the capture of a major military post at Mwangi-Lutuai in Moxico province, and its second largest town, Gago-Coutinho.

UNITA reports that documents indicating the complicity of the United States with Portugal in fighting the colonial war were taken, including a US Marine Corps document, an American document on psychological operations and a US Army publication entitled "The Army and the Subversive War" (written by the American-trained Lt. Col. P.A. Machado who is currently training Portuguese troops in Angola).

It is interesting to note that this *Times of Zambia* report gives strong support to UNITA despite the Zambian Government's official stand of non-recognition of the movement. UNITA has been seeking, without success, recognition from the governments of Zambia and Tanzania and from the OAU. The OAU only recognizes MPLA and FNLA. (*Times of Zambia*, special report by R. Makayi, March 6, 1974)

## MPLA LEADER NETO PUBLISHES BOOK OF POETRY

Copies of *Sacred Hope*, a new book of poetry by Dr. Agostinho Neto, President of MPLA, were presented to the author and to President J. Nyerere of Tanzania at a ceremony honoring the publication of the book in Dar es Salaam. The Tanzania Publishing House has put out the book and Nyerere has encouraged its use in secondary and university education in Tanzania.

A Tanzanian reviewer said of this collection of poems that it reflects a "vitality and strength that are the consequence of the creative power of the people." *Sacred Hope* is a poetry of struggle in which the artist and the revolutionary flourish side by side. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, April 23, 1974)

# mozambique

## ON THE BATTLEFRONT

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) has launched a new attack on the Beira to Malawi rail line. On March 22, the guerrillas riddled a freight and passenger train, wounding two Portuguese security guards and four other people, and killing one passenger. The incident took place about 2 miles south of Inhaminga—one hundred miles north of Beira, only two weeks after the liberation forces were supposedly routed from the Inhaminga area. It was the first attack on the rail line in a month.

Moving northward to Cabo Delgado province, the Mueda airfield has been the scene of at least two air attacks, approximately two weeks apart. In mid-February, FRELIMO shot down a Dakota reconnaissance plane taking off from the airfield. Killed in this action was Lt.-Col. Alvares Pereira, a top Portuguese combat officer who commanded an artillery unit in northern Mozambique. On March 4, another small plane was shot down, killing the pilot, Carlos Fernando Machado de Cruz, one of a number of civilians who are aiding the Portuguese military. (*Daily Telegraph*, London, Feb. 13, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 23, 1974, April 6, 1974; *Sunday Nation*, Dar es Salaam, March 24, 1974)



Cabora Bassa Dam Site (David Lomax, Camera Press, London)

## PORTUGUESE TACTICS

In a defensive move by the Portuguese, the district Governor of Beira, Colonel Sousa Telles, was dismissed early in March. Apparently, this came as a result of the support which he gave to the January protests of Beira residents. (See *Southern Africa*, April, 1974) Telles also incurred official displeasure, when approximately two weeks later he stated that FRELIMO controlled parts of Beira District and was attacking six of seven *aldeamentos* ("protected villages") each night in the northern half of Mozambique. This was the first official admission of such facts.

Things are back to normal in the Chimoio plateau, after the uproar caused by the death last month of a

farmer's wife by "guerrillas." (See *Southern Africa*, April, 1974) Steps have already been taken to protect the area from more such attacks—a radio communications system is being installed, an airstrip is being built, a helicopter has already been based at Vila Pery, and auxiliary forces have been moved in.

Five new towns are to be built alongside the 528 mile long Cabora Bassa power lines between Songo and Malvernia. They will be utilized by maintenance personnel for storing equipment, and as bases for security forces to protect the lines. (*Noticias*, Lourenco Marques, Feb. 4, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, South Africa, March 9, 1974, April 6, 1974; *Times* London, March 7, 1974)

## MOZAMBIQUE NEWS ROUNDUP

Finland's Foreign Minister, Abu Karjulainen, paid an unprecedented visit to FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. This came in the wake of a request to the Finnish Government from the liberation force for a consignment of medical stores needed for a hospital which serves the liberated areas of Mozambique. The Foreign Ministry is going to study the matter.

Turning to Mozambique itself, a Nampula based air charter company has ordered three aircraft for crop spraying, the first to be locally owned. Previous to this such planes were always chartered from neighboring countries.

Moving southward, the Cabora Bassa dam is nearing completion (See *Southern Africa*, April, 1974) with close to sixty feet of the main wall already constructed. Allowance had been made for water to flow over the dam in February and March, when the rainy season draws to a close. However, it is now feared that the opening of a third floodgate at the Koriba Dam further up the Zambezi River, will cause the river to overflow dikes constructed to safeguard a large sugar plantation and cattle herds in the Sena area of Mozambique. As to the dam itself, the latest news is that the first two generators will begin to function in October, 1974, with sales of the electricity scheduled for the following January, several months before the dam officially opens.

An ITT Space Communications and the Portuguese Marconi Company are planning to spend over four million dollars on a ground satellite communication center at Boane near Lourenco-Marques. (*New York Times*, March 28, 1974; *Noticias*, Lourenco Marques, Jan. 30, 1974, Feb. 6, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 16, 30, 1974; Radio report: Helsinki home service in Finnish at 1530 gmt, on February 11, 1974)

# portugal

## NEWS FROM BEFORE THE COUP

The censored Portuguese press has been able to do very little to clarify the effects of the March events on the shaky "stability" of the regime. The Lisbon Government has not proved so successful in gagging the international press and public opinion. The attempted coup and its aftermath were reported in virtually every newspaper in democratic countries.

Caetano is reported to have read Spínola's *Portugal and the Future* before publication. He discussed the 243-page book with ageing president Tomaz who opposes any political solution for the colonial wars. The gap between the right-wing and the "liberals" was thus widened. Spínola is of the opinion that Portugal is at the limit of her power, while liberation movements in the colonies get stronger. He proposed that a plebiscite be held in all the colonies and that a Lusitanian federation be formed. He advocated that it would be preferable to maintain cultural and spiritual ties with the Portuguese-speaking community, even if that meant loss of political control over the colonies.

Giving in to pressure from Tomaz, Caetano addressed the "National Assembly" on April 5. It was only the third time since his coming to power in 1967. Its appointed members promptly gave approval to a firm stand on Africa. Caetano, until then reportedly divided between official policy of never abandoning Africa and Spínola's theses, waited for the right moment to dismiss Spínola.

At the peak of the military and political crisis Caetano and Tomaz were taken to a secret bunker in the Monsanto hills outside of Lisbon, and placed under the protection of a special squad of paratroopers from the Tancos base.

Some 33 officers and a 180 enlisted men were arrested as a result of the Caldas da Rainha uprising. Other important military figures were arrested, among them Admiral Bagulho, Military Academy commander Amaro Romão, and Lt. Colonel Carlos Fabio, a faithful follower of Spínola. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 16, 1974; *Washington Post*, March 20, 1974)

#### OTHER CRISES

The Portuguese Government had hardly recovered from the Spínola crisis when new developments rocked its "stability".

On April 9 a bomb exploded in a ship that was ready to sail for Guinea-Bissau with more than 1,000 troops aboard. Departure of the 10,742 ton vessel had to be delayed while repair work took place. Although damage was not extensive, the psychological effects of the explosion were debilitating to nervous Portuguese officials. The families of most departing soldiers were on the pier when the bomb went off. The Revolutionary Brigades claimed responsibility for the blast.

Between April 12 and 17 a total of 16 missionaries were expelled from Mozambique, adding to 21 the number of those who faced expulsion in less than a month. The missionaries were accused of signing, together with 100 others, a document condemning Portugal's colonial policies and criticizing the Catholic Church for failing to denounce the massacre of African populations by the Portuguese Army.

Bishop Vieira Pinto of Nampula and his secretary were expelled from Mozambique and were brought to Lisbon. Relations between Lisbon and the Vatican were thus further strained. Although the Vatican has been extremely mild in its criticism of the Portuguese Government, a state of tension has existed since June of 1970, when Pope Paul received the leaders of the African liberation movements in a special audience. Arrests and expulsion of several



Spanish Priests who reported on Portuguese Massacres in Mozambique

missionaries have not helped ease this tension. Claiming to be one of the last protectors of Catholicism, the Lisbon regime has reacted violently whenever Catholic organizations have criticized or failed to condone its African policies. In June of 1971 the International Order of the White Fathers decided to leave Mozambique because of police repression, and immediately the colonial authorities served its members with an expulsion warrant.

In Portugal itself repression is reaching alarming proportions. During the second and third weeks in April, at least 55 persons were arrested. No official account was given for the arrests. It can safely be predicted that those rounded up will be accused of being Communists and under torture forced to sign confessions. José Tengarrinha, a leading historian and member of the Democratic Opposition, and at least six journalists were sent to the notorious Caxias prison-fortress in the outskirts of Lisbon.

Lisbon authorities were disturbed at the disclosure of news that Canada, following the example of the Scandinavian countries, will give aid to African liberation movements. Canada, a NATO member, based its decision on anti-racist, anti-colonialist considerations, but requested that its aid be used for peaceful purposes. (*New York Times*, April 10, 14, 19, 1974; *Africa News*, Durham, N.C., April 15, 1974)

## republic of guinea-bissau

#### ON THE BATTLEFIELD

In the significant victory at Copa in February in the northeast of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (RGB) (see *Southern Africa*, May, 1974) the regular armed forces (FARP) of the PAIGC introduced heavy military vehicles for the first time in the history of the war. Ground actions and attacks on Portuguese river craft continued along with urban sabotage. (*Revolution Africaine*, Algiers, March 7, 1974)

Military reports for 1973 were compiled by the PAIGC

which indicated 2,076 enemy troops killed. 196 vehicles were destroyed and 35 vessels sunk in 883 engagements for the year. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 11, 13, 1974)

#### ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT

At the end of March the RGB was made a full voting member of the Geneva Conference on International Law on War despite the objections of American officials (*New York Times*, March 31, 1974) The US Government has permitted visas for PAIGC officials attending UN meetings on 'observer status.' (*Los Angeles Times*, March 16, 1974) Lisbon officials are outraged at the formal UN presence of the PAIGC 'observers.' (*Financial Times*, London, March 19, 1974)

PAIGC representatives attended the Lahore Islamic summit conference upon the suggestion of Algeria. Support for the PAIGC cause is being sought to counterbalance some of the counter-revolutionary Islamic elements within Portuguese sectors of Guinea-Bissau.

In the Republic of Guinea (Conakry) the first Ambassador of the RGB, H.E. Alexandre Pereira, has given his credentials to President Sekou Toure. (Conakry Radio, Feb. 8, 1974, 1945 gmt) In backing up his earlier statement that "Africa has declared war on Portugal," Guinea President Toure has spoken of the possibility of a temporary fusion of the two Guinea armies to deal decisively with the liquidation of colonialism in Guinea-Bissau. (*Le Monde*, Paris, Feb. 4, 1974)

Meanwhile a Swiss group led by Jean Ziegler is seeking to have the Swiss and Swedish Governments open information offices for the liberation movements. This group is also trying to have the Scandinavian nations call for Portuguese negotiation with the PAIGC by September, 1974. If not they ought to make diplomatic recognition of the RGB. (*Tribune de Geneve*, March 8, 1974)

Groups in New Zealand and Australia have pledged support to the PAIGC and the OAU has authorized a grant of \$500,000 in continued aid to the liberation movement (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Dec. 29, 1973;

*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Feb. 1974)

President Nyerere of Tanzania visited Australia and asked the Whitlam Government to recognize the RGB, or at least give humanitarian aid. Nyerere also said that the liberation movements would welcome military aid from Australia and Western nations. (*Tribune*, Australia, March 26, 1974)

In Canada a significant departure from former foreign policy has just been announced, although previously rumored, to aid a number of African liberation movements including the PAIGC. The aid will be exclusively humanitarian (health and education needs) and not military. Canada's major foreign policy advisor indicated that this move was made because of "the inevitability of majority rule." (*New York Times*, April 14, 1974)

#### RGB, SPINOLA, AND PORTUGAL

In early April a group of foreign journalists were invited to Bissau to witness what the Portuguese authorities called "The Fifth Annual People's Congresses." These events are part of the Portuguese psychological war effort to counter PAIGC diplomatic victories. The "Congresses" are held in various fortified towns in the country with local delegates participating. (*Africa News*, Durham, April 8, 1974)

Such tactics were developed by General Antonio de Spínola, former Portuguese military governor of the RGB, and new leader of the Portuguese military junta.

It was rumored that the late PAIGC leader Amílcar Cabral had met "at least three times" with Spínola in Senegal. (*Christian Science Monitor*, March 28, 1974) These alleged meetings were apparently inconclusive since the PAIGC is fighting for total political independence, not a neo-colonial solution proposed by Spínola. Naturally the PAIGC has been watching the Lisbon events with great interest. (See feature.)

#### PAIGC OFFICIAL ADDRESSES UN COLONIALISM COMMITTEE

Minister Abílio Monteiro Duarte, of the PAIGC Executive Committee on Cape Verdean questions, addressed the United Nations Committee on Independence to Colonial Countries on March 29. His long and informative address outlined the history of the Cape Verde Islands under Portuguese colonial domination and lack of a serious development program for the archipelago. Duarte reiterated the PAIGC position that they are prepared for negotiation talks at any time, but that the PAIGC is also ready to fight for the islands in order to establish unity between them and the mainland. (UN Document, A/AC.109/PV.966, March 29, 1974) ●



Pres. Sekou Toure of Guinea-Conakry



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# Lesotho

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## LESOTHO MINERS RETURN HOME

Last September in Carletonville at the Western Deep Levels gold mine, South African police shot and killed eleven mine workers. Five of the killed workers were from Lesotho. The workers were protesting work conditions in the mine. The Lesotho Government complained about the inadequacy of the official explanation and suspended recruitment for that mine for some time. Some people in South Africa construed the suspension of recruitment as a test of the validity of the notion that South African mines need Lesotho's labor as much as Lesotho needs cash wages from the mines.

Last month in Carletonville at the Western Deep Levels seven people were killed and 40 injured; this time it was not the police shooting the workers but Xhosa and Basotho workers fighting each other. The total number of people killed between March and April was 32.

The situation has become so tense that 10,000 Basotho terminated their contracts and returned home.

The causes of these clashes are not known yet, but there are some speculations being made.

With the price of gold going up on the world market, the mine companies may be trying to maximize production and in so doing overwork laborers and in their frustration workers fight among themselves.

There are very few semi-skilled and skilled jobs open to black workers, and the keen competition that ensues may cause ethnic friction.

There may be favoritism of one ethnic group over another.

It may be an engineered situation directed at weakening the solidarity of black workers so that a united stand like the one taken last September in Carletonville does not occur again.

The repatriation of the 10,000 to Lesotho has brought serious economic and social problems to Lesotho, and the South African mines will feel the slowdown in production.

Over 80,000 Basotho, more than half of the country's adult male population, are generally employed in South Africa's mines. Their repatriated earnings account for over one third to one-fourth of Lesotho's national income.

The Lesotho Government is now faced with a problem of having to find jobs for these workers in the country, for social and political unrest is a serious possibility. Lesotho may face a child-boom since men who usually spend at least nine months of the year in South African mines are now at home.

The coming home of these ten thousand men shows some flaws in the policy of "good neighborliness" which Lesotho and South Africa had pursued.

This policy is intended to uphold good relations between the two countries, so that Lesotho is assured of its men being allowed to work in the mines and South Africa is assured of a steady supply of mine labor. The situation that has now occurred, that is withdrawal of

Basotho workers was not engineered by either of the two Governments but by the workers themselves.

Mine workers from Lesotho and other countries of Southern Africa who work in South African mines are a vital source of unskilled cheap labor for South African mines. Nearly 80 percent of the workers in South Africa's mines come from outside the country and a quarter of them come from Lesotho. (*Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, April 30, 1974; *Washington Post*, April 18, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 6, 13, 20; *Africa News*, Durham, April 18, 1974) ●

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## UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA



Sec. of State Kissinger with Dr. Hilgard Muller, SA Min. of Foreign Affairs

### SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE CHIEF VISITS THE PENTAGON

Admiral H. H. Biermann Chief of the General Staff of the South African Defense Force arrived in the United States on May 5 on what has been described as a "private" visit. However private the visit, one of the Admiral's first ports of call was the Pentagon, where he spent some time with Acting Secretary of the Navy Middendorf.

Admiral Biermann is one of the chief architects of South Africa's current military strategy which seeks to involve the US and other NATO countries in a close alliance with the racist white minority regimes of southern Africa.

South Africa occupies a strategic location astride approaches to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans with one of the best equipped naval bases in the southern hemisphere. 600 million tons of oil destined for Europe and the US go past the Cape each year—and the recent establishment of a US base at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, despite international protest, indicate rapidly increasing US interest in the whole region.

Given that background it is difficult to believe that Middendorf and Biermann did not discuss the Indian Ocean, the dramatic military successes of the liberation movements throughout Southern Africa in the last few months and the coup in Portugal—which is a direct result of defeats inflicted on the Portuguese by the people of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola.

The US is still an official adherent of the United Nations arms embargo on South Africa. There have been several signs lately, that at least within the Pentagon, and probably at other levels of the Administration, there is a growing desire to establish friendly military relationships with South Africa. In December South Africa's Minister of Information was warmly received in Washington. (See *Southern Africa*, April, 1974) There is the increasing relaxed interpretation of prohibited materials—so that South Africa now buys all the light aircraft and helicopters it needs, ostensibly because these are for civilian use.

Now, for the first time in at least ten years there is a visit being paid to the US at the highest level by the head of the South African Defense Forces.

Officially Admiral Bierman's visit is being organized by the "United States Strategic Institute" a conservative group of former Army and Navy officers concerned with the "study and discussion of problems of national security in the nuclear age." One of his hosts is Admiral John McCain, an aircraft-carrier task force Commander in the Pacific for many years.

Biermann is visiting many Congressmen and Senators and will attend a dinner especially set up for him by Congressman Barman of Maryland, at which it is reported 17 Admirals will be present. (*American Committee on Africa Press Release*, New York, May 9, 1974)

#### US STRATEGIC AIMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA— SECRET NATO PLANS TO AID SOUTH AFRICA

While the liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique are winning victories in Africa so powerful that their reverberations have shaken loose the 46 year old dictatorship in Portugal the United States still refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the movements and continues to give military, economic and political aid to the colonial regime in Lisbon.

The reasons for this support are not difficult to detect. The whole of Southern Africa is important to the United States both because of its direct and growing economic stake there (over \$1 billion in South Africa alone) and because of the importance of the region as a source of raw materials. The US is a mineral hungry country; its 6 percent of the world's population consumes 25 percent-50 percent of most of the world's minerals. In 1972 it was already importing over 50 percent of 20 important non-fuel minerals, and an even higher percentage of minerals such as platinum, chrome manganese and nickel, for which Southern Africa is a crucial supplier. Finally the US looks at the whole region as an area of tremendous strategic importance. First there is the position of the Cape as the guardian of the sea-route (Indian Ocean) along which 600 million tons of oil now travel annually. Above

all there is the underlying US assumption that the whole enterprise and communist (or close to communist)—and that US national interests are identifiable with the continued existence and expansion of private enterprise economies. The US and Western interests in general demand stability in Southern Africa. Violent confrontation and change is likely to generate new situations which do not favor those interests while the current white minority regimes can be relied on to adopt policies basically consistent with US requirements.

Thus as pressures mount on the minority and colonial regimes, the US and its Western allies have moved to their defense.

#### Secret NATO Plans to Aid South Africa

In an important article in the *Washington Post* of May 2 Tad Szulc revealed some of the elements of this position:

*As long as a year ago, when it became obvious that the rebels were gaining in strength in Mozambique, the US and NATO began to draw up secret contingency plans for air and naval defense of South Africa. In June, 1973, NATO's Defense Planning Committee instructed SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic) headquarters in Norfolk, Va., to draw up plans for an allied air-naval task force to stand ready to assist South Africa, should the need arise.*



Portuguese Amb. Themido with Friends in Washington

... Following a December 1969 National Security Council decision to preserve a "balance" in southern Africa, the United States has been quietly selling Portugal "non-lethal" military end-items such as jeeps, radio systems and spotter planes as well as defoliants. It has trained Portuguese officers in counter-insurgency at the jungle warfare Army school at Ft. Gulick, in the Panama Canal Zone and helped in training Portuguese pilots at bases in Western Germany.

Some of these US dealings with the Portuguese were described at hearings before Congressman Diggs' Congressional Subcommittee on Africa in March. In particular,

details were given of the continuing sale of American helicopters to the Portuguese Government in Mozambique.

#### Helicopters for military use sold to Mozambique

The sale of 12 of these helicopters was first announced in the Portuguese press in December 1972. Although the US Export Control Office of the Commerce Department refused to reveal the model numbers it was finally discovered that the helicopters sold included two Bell Jet Ranger 206B and four Bell 47G 5A.

The 47G.5As, although classified as commercial models—this being the most recent model in the particular Bell range—are designed to be used with Bell's Ag Master "chemical application system." Bell boasts that the system can be installed by two people in twenty-five minutes!

Flying at 60 mph. a helicopter fitted with this equipment can spray up to 14.4 acres a minute. The model can be fitted to carry external loads, such as litters. It can also be easily adapted for amphibious operation by adding two air inflated nylon floats. (This would be a particularly useful adaptation for use in operations on the Zambezi and Cabora Bassa.)

The Jet Ranger 206 B is a V8 1971, more powerful version of the standard Jet Ranger. 206 A. Although this too is described as a "commercial" aircraft it is interesting to note that in 1968 Bell developed a very slightly modified version of its then standard commercial 206 A Jet Ranger for military use in response to US Government requests. The modified version, designated OH-58 Kiowa by the US Army was extensively used in Vietnam.

In fact the differences between the military and commercial models are described by experts as minimal.

In addition to sales of the special models to the US Army and Navy, Bell has sold both the commercial and militarized versions of this model to other military purchasers including the Canadians and Australians. Seven Jet Rangers have been sold to the Brazilian Airforce and four of these machines have been reported as being used for counter insurgency operations! Standard easily mounted optional equipment for the 206 Jet Ranger includes high intensity night lights a camera access door and a wide range of electronic gadgetry. Thus two points emerge clearly. The "commercial" models of these Bell helicopters are so designed that they are ideal for many military operations (herbicide spraying, photo reconnaissance night searches etc.). Further the variation between the so-called commercial and the military version of the Jet Ranger are so slight as to make their adaptation after purchase a very simple task.

The purchase of these helicopters appears to have been at least partly financed by US Government (Export-Import Bank) loans.

As already reported by *Southern Africa* (April 1974) such sales are continuing. Thus in February, 1974 a new contract for almost \$3 million was announced as having been entered into by Bell and the Mozambique Government for the supply of 12 more helicopters. (*Washington Post*, May 2, 1974; Subcommittee on Africa Hearings, March 14, 1974)

#### HOUSE APPROVES DIEGO GARCIA BASE EXPANSION

On April 4, the House of Representatives approved a supplemental appropriation of \$29 million to enlarge the United States naval base on the British-owned Diego Garcia islands in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Representatives Pike (D, N.Y.) and Leggett (D, Calif.) offered an amendment to strike this appropriation from the 1974 military supplemental appropriation bill, but it was defeated by a vote of 255 to 94.

Support for the Diego Garcia expansion was led by Representative Stratton (D, N.Y.), a well-known hawk on military matters. Stratton played down the size of the expansion, saying that "what is involved here is simply a desire for putting a little 'gas station', if you will, down here in the center of the ocean so that any American ships operating in this very large and strategic ocean might be able to get some fuel once in a while." Mr. Stratton said that the recent Middle East war demonstrated that the United States must be able to protect oil routes, and that the US must not be fooled in an atmosphere of detente that possible Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean need not be met. The Defense Department wanted to hurry the Diego Garcia appropriation through in a plea for urgency following the recent Middle East war and the Arab oil embargo, and the impending opening of the Suez Canal. Including the provision in the supplemental bill meant that it could be moved through Congress with little scrutiny.

Opponents of the Diego Garcia appropriation said that it was never demonstrated in the limited hearings how these needs would be met by enlarging the Diego Garcia base. Opposition spokesmen also felt that this small appropriation could lead to larger future expansion and to a major foreign policy and military commitment. The liberal Democratic Study Group analysis of the bill stated that "upgrading of Diego Garcia could require an additional naval task force (three new carriers, escort and support vessels, new aircraft, etc.) at a cost of tens of billions of dollars. Such major foreign policy commitments are generally scrutinized by Congress outside the context of supplemental funding bills."

In the Senate, there has been a success in getting at least a delay of the Diego Garcia appropriation. The Senate Appropriations Committee, with both liberal and conservative backing, deleted the appropriation from its version of the supplemental appropriation bill, deferring consideration to the regular 1975 military appropriation bill. Meanwhile, Senator Case has successfully urged the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to include in the State Department Authorization bill, which is now being readied for floor consideration, a provision which would allow no further steps to be taken in expansion of the base until the agreement with Great Britain for its use is submitted to the Senate as a treaty or to Congress for its approval as a law. The bill also now includes a more general provision requiring all major military base agreements, or any significant alteration in present base agreements, to be submitted to the Senate or the full Congress for approval. The Senate has passed similar

language in the past using the Azores and Bahrein agreements as specific instances of the objectionable practice. But the Bahrein issue is now moot since the Bahreini want the US out in a year. And Case is sure that no one will want to scrutinize an agreement guaranteeing

use of the sole base on European territory which the United States was permitted to use en route to Israel last fall. The stumbling block has always been the House, which is as eager as it ever was to give the military new areas of the world to supervise and police. ●

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## at the U. N.

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### NEW PRESSURE TO FREE NAMIBIA

United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, Mr. Sean MacBride, on a visit to Zambia in February, stated at a press conference that new ground must be broken in the struggle for Namibia and suggested that an oil embargo on South Africa as well as more pressure on countries with investments in South Africa should be part of a new drive against the illegal occupation of Namibia. Mr. MacBride said he would also consider using force to get South Africa out of South West Africa but this would be subject to Security Council approval. The Commissioner spoke strongly against the "conspiracy of silence" by which the South African Government was able to suppress news of the kinds of repression taking place in Namibia including the suppression of the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), and said that all international news agencies should have a full-time correspondent in Windhoek. Mr. MacBride also said he intended drawing up a long-term program for independence which would include the training of Africans to take over, and that a research institute would be set up, probably in Lusaka, to study the economic aspects of the territory in preparation for a UN program aimed at economic and social progress. The commissioner held talks with Zambia's President Kaunda and Foreign Minister Mr. Vernon Mwaanga to discuss a number of concrete projects he is considering to bring about self-determination in Namibia. (*Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Feb. 20, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 23, 1974; *Times*, Lusaka, Feb. 20, 1974)

### SANCTIONS BUSTING

The Special Committee of 24 in response to recent reports of widespread violations of United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia and to the critical and deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), (which the Security Council, in its resolution of March 18, 1970, reaffirmed as a threat to international peace and security), adopted a new resolution on April 2, 1974, which again condemned the continued importation by the United States of chrome and nickel from Zimbabwe and condemned again the failure of the United Kingdom to take effective measures to put an end to the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. The resolution called upon all governments to take measures to ensure strict compliance with the sanctions; to prevent or discourage the emigration to Rhodesia of any individuals or groups; and to refrain from taking any action which might confer legitimacy on the regime. In particular, it called upon the US to put an end to the operation within


the US of Air Rhodesia, the Rhodesia National Tourist Board, and the Rhodesian Information Office. The resolution further invited the Security Council to take measures aimed at the unconditional confiscation of all shipments to and from Rhodesia, the nullification of all insurance policies covering shipments, the invalidation of passports for travel to Rhodesia, and to consider imposing sanctions against Portugal and South Africa. (UN A/AC.109/444, April 2, 1974)

The UN Committee on Rhodesian Sanctions declared in its report that more than \$280 million in exports were smuggled to world markets in 1972 and that similarly, more than \$154 million in imports were unaccounted for. Japan is reported to have been in violation of sanctions in fraudulently listing part of its chrome imports as coming from South Africa, when they came via that country from Rhodesia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 16, 1974; March 16, London, April 17, 1974)

### UNDP ON NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

In a recent report the United Nations Development Program reviewed its assistance to national liberation movements and to the populations in the liberated areas of those territories under colonialism. In January, 1972, the UNDP Governing Council approved guidelines for cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, which envisaged three types of assistance: a) training for OAU Headquarters staff up to \$50,000 per year; b) financing of large-scale OAU-identified projects of a regional or sub-regional nature; and c) programs, primarily in education, for persons displaced or subject to racial discrimination. To date UNDP assistance has undertaken: assistance to refugees recommended by the Liberation Movements recognized by the OAU, and the financing of missions to assist in the preparation of projects for possible UNDP support. In January, 1972, the UNDP approved a regional project for educational assistance to African refugees from colonial territories. This project is executed by UNESCO and involves the "Institut de L'Amitié" organized in Conakry by the PAIGC, the Mozambique Institute of Bagamoyo in Tanzania which has the support of FRELIMO, and, in Zambia, the Mkushi Agricultural Training Centre and Nkumbi International College, where refugee students are offered secondary education and agricultural training. Approximately 600 refugees are enrolled in the program. The project is receiving counterpart support from the Governments of Guinea, Tanzania and Zambia. Other projects being prepared include one for agricultural training of refugees in Tanzania involving 2,500 families, and a large-scale project in collaboration with WHO which will include training medical personnel, nurses, mid-wives and lab technicians, and the establishment of rural health facilities and nutrition programs for refugee mothers and children. (UN DP/WGTC/L.7, March 25, 1974) ●

# action news and notes



## ECONOMIC

### BANK VICTORIES GALORE

The Maryland National Bank, participant in the multimillion dollar loan system of the European American Banking System to South Africa, has responded to pressures (especially by the Montgomery County (Maryland) government (see *Southern Africa*, May, 1974). In a letter of April 5, a bank official wrote: "In order not to convey the impression that we support South Africa's policy of apartheid, the bank will neither make nor participate in loans to the Government of South Africa. In order that there be no confusion and that our position in this respect be perfectly clear, we will divest ourselves of the South African Government loans presently on our books." (Letter from Mrs. Margie H. Muller, Asst. Vice President, Public Relations, Maryland National Bank). The bank decision followed the threatened withdrawal of \$500,000 payroll accounts by the Montgomery County Board of Supervisors. (National Council of Churches, Press Release, April 24, 1974).


On the West Coast, the Wells Fargo Bank, another participant in the EABC loan, announced that "it is not at this time contemplating additional loans to South Africa. . . ." (Letter from Chairman, Ernest C. Arbuckle, April 19, 1974.) Mr. Arbuckle is also a Trustee at Stanford University where students and faculty met with him over the South African issue.

As a result of local pressures and publicity a total of six US banks have altered their policies towards loans to South Africa, including not only Maryland National and Wells Fargo, but also Merchants National Bank of Indianapolis, City National of Detroit, Central National of Chicago, and Wachovia Bank of North Carolina. Other banks which have *not* changed either through forbidding new loans or immediate divestment are: First National Bank of Louisville, Ky., Bank Leumi of New York City, Republic of Dallas, and United Virginia Bank of Richmond. For more info., contact: Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, New York 10027.

### GULF PROTESTS

The Black Student Union at the University of Houston protested against Gulf Corporation recruiters' presence on

campus. It was the second time that the company had led a recruitment drive during the University's Black Awareness Week. When company officials were questioned about their attitudes towards continuing protests, a Pittsburgh spokesman said, "... We're just tired. . . ." (Gulf Boycott Coalition Newsletter, Dayton, Ohio, April, 1974)



### GULF PUSHING IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY

The National Newspaper Publishers Association has refused an invitation by Gulf Oil Corporation to send a delegation to Angola together with selected black ministers and former civil rights leaders. *Muhammed Speaks* revealed the accelerated efforts by the company vis-a-vis the black community through the company's spokeswoman, Brenda Joyce. She apparently blundered at a meeting of the Publishers when she tried to defend the Gulf offer of a trip by saying that her company did not have to "bribe" black publishers when it could have easily simply bought some outright. . . . The head public relations man, Bill Cox, tried to cover up for Ms. Joyce's insulting slip saying that what Gulf really wants is "constructive criticism" and exposure of the facts about Cabinda Gulf. It is not clear yet if the religious and civil rights Blacks will take up the Gulf offer. (*Muhammed Speaks*, Chicago, Feb. 8, 22, 1974) Some of the new Gulf facts which Cox does not loudly proclaim include the new figures for 1973 payments to the Portuguese; last year Gulf gave the colonial government almost \$91 million in taxes and royalties, more than \$20 million above the projected Angolan military budget. (See ICCR Brief on Gulf; write NCC, Rm. 846, 475 Riverside Drive, N.Y. 10027)

### NEW YORK AFRICAN LIBERATION SUPPORT COMMITTEE PUSHES PORTUGUESE WINE BOYCOTT

Walt Frazier, the famed "Clyde" of the New York Knicks basketball team, owns a liquor store on 125th Street in Harlem. He and other black liquor merchants have been asked by the New York Citywide African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) to end sales of all

**PORTUGUESE PEOPLE KILL BLACK PEOPLE :  
WALT FRAZIER SELLS PORTUGUESE WINES**



WALT FRAZIER SELLS PORTUGUESE WINES  
THE PORTUGUESE CUT OFF THE HEADS OF FRODO BILBO BAGGINS  
THE PORTUGUESE RIP OPEN THE BELLS OF PERDANT BLACK BIRDS  
THIS PORTUGUESE IS ONLY ONE OF THE BLACK OIL FROM BLACK BULLS  
WALT FRAZIER SELLS PORTUGUESE WINES  
WALT FRAZIER SELLS PORTUGUESE WINES  
WALT FRAZIER SELLS PORTUGUESE WINES



New York Citywide  
AFRIKAN LIBERATION  
SUPPORT COMMITTEE

P.O. Box 119, Lefferts Harlem Bookshop, N.Y. 11225



Poster used by the New York African Liberation Support Committee to urge New York Basketball Star Walt Frazier and other Black liquor store owners to end the sale of all Portuguese wines.

Portuguese wines. The group leafletted Madison Square Garden during one of the Knicks' games (one in which Frazier was a low scorer and the crowd booed him for the first time) and the New York police removed the leafletters. The ALSC held a meeting in early April with films and speakers for the Harlem merchants saying that the ALSC was compiling a list of the "Friends of Portugal who Support the Decapitation of Black People by selling Portuguese Wines," and warning that if the liquor salesmen did not stop selling Mateus, Lancers, Costa del Sol and other Portuguese wines they would be put on the list. (ALSC information, *Daily News*, New York, April 8, 1974)

**POLITICAL**

**WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA'S WORK ADVANCES**

On December 18, 1973 the Senate passed the historic bill to renew sanctions against Rhodesia, an issue still being considered by the House of Representatives. The positive vote, reversing the former passage of the Byrd Amendment was much the result of the hard work, lobbying, information gathering and education of the Washington Office on Africa. The office is the one central location in the capital which relates to the government aspects of Southern African issues. It has just produced a good brochure about its work, its focus and its resources which all concerned with Africa should order. The Office also needs financial support to continue its particular part in the struggle. For information, write: THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA, 110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002 or call (202) 546-7961.

**AFRIKAN LIBERATION DAY-1974**

For two successive years there has been growing support and involvement in the annual celebration of African Liberation Day. In 1972 Blacks numbering more than 35,000 gathered in Washington and a few other cities; in 1973 more than 80,000 came together in a dozen or so cities in the USA, Caribbean and Canada. From these demonstrations and local organizing have emerged some 45 African Liberation Support Committees in these countries. Afrikan Liberation Month in May of 1974 involved three main political foci: the energy crisis, police repression and Nixon's impeachment and its relationship to the black community. Also there was the goal of raising \$75,000 for the African liberation movements and a mass demonstration on May 25 (the founding date of the Organization of African Unity in 1963) in Washington, D.C. (*Unity and Struggle*, Newark, April, 1974; ALSC, P.O. Box 14093, Houston, Texas 77021).

**SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS**

Several conferences have been held lately concerned with specific aspects of the Southern Africa situation. A



African Liberation Day - US

high powered and reportedly Ford Foundation funded one was held on South Africa, at Yale University from April 12-16. It was sponsored by the Departments of Political Science, History and Afro-American Studies, Council on African Studies, the Yale Lecture Series and Morse College. Invited from South Africa itself were: David Welsh and Francis Wilson of the University of Cape Town; from Cairo, Heribert A. Adam, sociologist; from England, Sam C. Nolutshungu; and Albie Sachs; and from the US, South Africans, Bernard Magubane, Andrew M. Lukele and Chris Nteta; with economist Sean Gervasi. At Hofstra University in Long Island, a conference on Zimbabwe was held on April 27 involving a number of Zimbabwean scholars, teachers, and activists, including Callistus Ndlovu, Charles Utete, Henry Moyana, E. Zvogbo and many others.

Smaller meetings were held in Philadelphia on March 29 concerning the role of the Christian Church in perpetuating racism sponsored by a Black evangelical organization, and in New York on April 27 on "Which Way Africa—the struggle against imperialism" held to commemorate Kwame Nkrumah and sponsored by the African Youth Movement.

## INTERNATIONAL ACTION

### LIBERATION SUPPORT

While Canada debated whether or not its International Development Agency should go ahead with its planned aid to the liberation movements, other governments and organizations proceed to take definite steps. (For more on Canadian plans see section on Guinea-Bissau and next issue of *Southern Africa*.) Sweden has decided to triple its donation to FRELIMO to \$39,200,000 in 1974-75. Aid to the other movements will also be increased. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 23, 1974) Finland has set aside \$2.8 million to assist the movements, and will be sending a consignment of medical stores to FRELIMO and is considering supplying arms to ZANU. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Feb. 18 and 19, 1974; *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Feb. 15, 1974) The Dutch Government has given \$1,960,000 to the World Council of Churches' Program to Combat Racism, part of the total of \$4 million given to the movements by Holland. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 6, 1974) India has given \$1,260,000 worth of medicines to three Tanzania-based movements. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 10, 1974) The Organization of African Unity has authorized a contribution of \$560,000 towards the needs of the newly proclaimed state of Guinea-Bissau, and is setting up a special fund at the OAU Headquarters for other contributions. (*Daily Nation*, Nairobi, Feb. 6, 1974) Among the individual member-state donors are Swaziland (\$1 million) and Liberia (\$25,000).

The Norwegian Government has boosted its aid to liberation movements also, and will be giving \$50.4 million for humanitarian and non-military aid. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, March 6, 1974; *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 9, 1974; *Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, March 6, 1974)

A medical committee for Angola based in Amsterdam has given about \$4,640,000 in aid to MPLA, FRELIMO


and PAIGC. The committee has built a 75-bed hospital in Sikongo, Zambia for MPLA and opened a medical school there. There are plans to build a 20-bed hospital at Ngangola on the border of Zambia and Angola. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Jan. 12, 1974)

The Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika (UWT) has donated \$16,800 to help in the construction of a maternity wing at the FRELIMO Hospital in Mtwara. The Tanzanian Women's Union has also donated 100 dresses to FRELIMO, and has organized an international dinner and dance gala to raise more funds for the hospital. Along with the event was a public rally and seminars. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, January 24, March 22, 1974)

### INTERNATIONAL CHURCH ACTION

The National Christian Council of Kenya urged Kenya's churches recently to give material and moral support to the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. The Rev. John Gatutu, general secretary of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa, also spoke out strongly against all oppressive systems of rule such as those in Southern Africa. These and other supportive stands were part of a week of emphasis on the Southern African liberation struggle in Kenya that culminated with commemorations of the Sharpeville massacre. (*Daily Nation*, Nairobi, Feb. 14, March 18, 1974; *East African Standard*, Nairobi, March 15, 1974)

Canon Burgess Carr, general secretary of the All Africa Conference of Churches, during the same emphasis week in Kenya, proposed that African governments should offer sanctuary to Portuguese soldiers who were defecting from their military assignments in Africa. (*East African Standard*, Nairobi, March 22, 1974; *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, March 22, 1974)



Demonstrators march in a procession, organized by the National Christian Council of Kenya to commemorate the killing of African demonstrators against White oppression at Sharpeville in South Africa in 1960. The march, which went off peacefully, started from Kamukuni and ended at City Hall, Nairobi.

The Reformed Church in the Netherlands has decided to advise its members not to emigrate to South Africa. The church synod also adopted a motion in which the church's governing board was ordered to ask the Dutch Government for immediate recognition of Guinea-Bissau. (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Feb. 22, 1974) Further, Holland's state-sponsored world radio network, Radio

Nederland, has suggested in a program beamed to South Africa that the Dutch Reformed Churches in Holland and South Africa break their ties rather than continue their "mostly fruitless discussions." (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 6, 1974)

A Danish church committee has called on Denmark to oppose business and trade agreements between the European Economic Community and South Africa. The Committee on Race Relations of the World Council of Churches also called for the abolition of state guarantees for Danish exports to South Africa. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 21, 1974)

#### OTHER SUPPORT ACTIONS

Gambian workers have established a National Committee Against Apartheid in response to the resolution of the International Conference of Trade Unions. (Letter dated Oct. 24, 1973 from the Secretary-General)

March saw a number of commemorations of the Sharpeville massacre, two of which were Kenya and Tanzania's weeks of solidarity. Among the leading figures giving public addresses was Mwalimu Nyerere, who urged the African people and nations to present a strong challenge to white minority governments. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 17, 22, 1974) In Kenya there were widespread demonstrations, and a number of organizations such as the Central Organization of Trade Unions joined in the protest march on Sharpeville Day. Events of the emphasis week included an exhibition of art, films, and books, a Kenya Press Club luncheon, a public lecture, and a rally and march. (*East African Standard*, Nairobi, March 19, 20, 22, 1974; *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, March 20, 22, 1974)

Kenyan students launched massive demonstrations against Sir Alec Douglas Home when he arrived recently in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in protest of Britain's stance vis-a-vis Rhodesia. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Feb. 8, 1974; *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, Feb. 7, 1974; *East African Standard*, Nairobi, Feb. 5, 1974)

The Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC) has sent a representative to the Easter conference of the liberation movements in London. TCLPAC has also decided to make representations at the Annual General Meeting of Gulf Canada, scheduled for April 25 in Toronto. Gulf Canada imported over one-third of the total 1972 Angolan exports (2,269,161 tons). (TCLPAC News Release)

The British Anti-Apartheid Movement has announced a campaign calling for a boycott of South African goods and an end to emigration to South Africa and British investment there. The drive was launched during "Sharpeville Week" in March. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, March 21, 1974)

Nigeria has strongly protested British sales and delivery of helicopters to the Vorster regime, and General Gowon promised that "necessary steps will be taken to ensure that such action is discontinued." (*Daily World*, New York, Jan. 8, 1974) The Belgian Peace Movement asked NATO to end arms supplies to Southern African white regimes also. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, Feb., 1974)

Twenty-five British MP's have sent a letter to the US

House of Representatives urging them to vote for a ban on chrome imports from Rhodesia. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, Feb., 1974)

In the area of trade, Ontario's Premier Bill Davis has promised to end provincial trade missions to South Africa, and the Tanzanian Government will be taking stern measures against officials who appear to disrespect Government directives against importing goods from the white minority regimes. (*Sunday Nation*, Dar es Salaam, Feb. 3, 1974) A New Zealand licensing body has decided to ban the purchase of South African wines for any of its outlets. (Letter dated Nov. 28, 1973 from CARE, Auckland)

New Zealand's anti-apartheid groups are developing campaigns vis-a-vis economic contacts with South Africa, and will be focusing on wine, citrus fruits, and grape boycotts. Some other campaigns will include termination of cooperation between the various New Zealand producer boards and their South African counterparts, such as the International Wool Secretariat, the Apple and Pear Board, and the Dairy Board (which exported over \$6 million of dairy products to South Africa last year.) The National Anti-Apartheid Committee (NAAC), which is composed of some 20 student, church and civil rights groups, will also pay attention to Air New Zealand, which acts as general sales agents for South African Airways. (NAAC Newsletter)

Anti-apartheid groups in England are in the midst of their six-month drive to free victims of apartheid, launched last December. The campaign will be marked by a national petition, to be forwarded to the United Nations, an international conference, and a national march in June to mark the 10th anniversary of the Rivonia Trial, which resulted in the incarceration of leading South African movement people. It aims at obtaining the improvement of detention conditions, the reduction of some sentences, and the release of all political prisoners. (NAAC Newsletter) •

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## books

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#### BOOK REVIEW

William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West: New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, 200 pp. Hard Cover and Paper back*

William Minter is an ideal person to write a book about the relationship between Portuguese Africa and the "West." He has been an active supporter of the struggles for independence in Portuguese Africa for more than ten years. Between 1966 and 1969 he and his wife worked with FRELIMO (The Mozambique Liberation Front) in Dar es Salaam teaching in a secondary school. Recently he received a doctorate in Sociology from the University of



Wisconsin where he wrote his dissertation on the American Council on Foreign Relations and its impact on American foreign policy. Again the Minters are in Tanzania with FRELIMO. These experiences have enabled Minter to combine the qualities that go into a thoroughly researched and documented analysis with a political perspective which comes from first hand experience with a revolutionary struggle.

The result is an extremely important contribution to our knowledge of the substance and the goals of the American Government's policy toward Portugal and Portuguese Africa; the political framework through which it has evolved since World War II; and the rationale behind its course of action up to the present time. Such an understanding is essential if we are to work against that policy and try to bring about its change.

Minter begins *Portuguese Africa and the West* by tracing briefly the historical development of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, explaining how it has been different from other European colonial systems and showing why, because of Portugal's "neo-colonial" position in Europe, it had had to be so. "Ultracolonialism" is the label given to the Portuguese version because it is considered both the most primitive and the most extreme of all European colonialisms.

Minter also gives a succinct yet cogent picture of the African response to Portuguese colonialism: the growth of the liberation movement in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. African sources are used to describe the conditions leading to resistance, the early unsuccessful attempts by Africans to bring about change, and finally the inevitable armed struggle which goes on today.

These two chapters are particularly helpful to the reader who has not studied events in Africa or in Portugal from an historical perspective, and provides a background for understanding American government policy toward Portugal and Portuguese Africa from WW II to the present day.

The rest of the book deals primarily with the multiplicity of factors governing American foreign policy toward Portuguese Africa. European relations with Portugal and Portuguese Africa are dealt with only briefly. An important thesis is that the US attitude toward Portuguese Africa must be viewed in the context of American-European relations. Minter believes US policy toward Africa is fundamentally an offshoot of American policy toward Europe. He contends Europe has been and will continue to be for some time of supreme importance to US foreign policy makers. The European minded government officials, who have controlled foreign policy decisions since World War II, believe that anything which might threaten the stability of American-Portuguese relations, and therefore the composition of NATO (which is viewed as the most important American military alliance) would be highly detrimental to American interests. They fear if any European ally is deserted, all of Europe will begin to question the US ability to live up to its commitments in that area. The Azores Islands have also been considered very important to American security in the post World War II era. However, since the sixties, they have been used as bait against elements within the US

government, which felt African interests should be given higher priority, to keep American foreign policy pro-Europe. This bait was sweetened with Portugal's allowing the American use of the Azores during the Mid East October war in 1973.

From this analysis Minter is able to explain that the change in attitude toward Africa by the US Government in the early 1960's was one of image and illusion, not of substance, and that President Kennedy was always careful not to antagonize the Europeanists in Congress.

Efforts to get Portugal to loosen the colonial yoke in the 1960's were made, according to Minter, because American foreign policy makers believed a less rigid position would allow Portugal more power in the long run over its territories in Africa. Both a hasty Portuguese withdrawal or the ousting of Portugal by force would be highly undesirable, and "self-determination" was viewed as a means of preserving Portuguese influence in changing times. The national liberation movements were thought to be "the Soviets best tools and the free world's greatest liabilities."

Minter contests the official American government position that peaceful accommodation between the Portuguese colonialist and the African nationalists would be the most profitable to both sides. He asserts the conflict of interest between the two is real, not illusory, and thus cannot be smoothed over by clever diplomatic strategies.

The use of American military weapons by Portugal is analyzed in some detail. Excellent data on the extent of American military aid to Portugal is presented. Minter points out the American government argument made often in the mid-sixties that Portugal has pledged no newly supplied weapons will be used in Africa is based on the totally false assumption of a distinction of the role of Portugal's military in Europe from its role in Africa. The Portuguese make no such separation. To them the purpose of the armed forces is to defend the national territory which includes by the Portuguese government's own definition the overseas provinces.

A continuing Portuguese presence in Africa is assumed by those who operate at the high levels with American foreign policy. This is particularly evident in business, which has increased its stake in Portuguese Africa. After Britain the United States is the second largest outside customer of Portuguese goods and American corporate investment is increasing rapidly. Again, in this area as well, Minter documents his assertions with useful facts and statistics.

Minter concludes his book by carrying the story of the liberation struggles and the western response to them up through the middle of 1973. He describes the new US government strategy toward Southern Africa and particularly the Portuguese colonies under the Nixon administration which he contends: 1) recognizes the strategic importance of Southern Africa to the United States for its vast minerals and resources because it is located on the sea route from America to the oil rich Middle East; 2) calls for America's cooperation with the existing white-dominated regimes; and 3) encourages limited efforts by these regimes to broaden African


participation in order to maintain stability. All much more explicitly than in the past.

*Portuguese Africa and the West* will be particularly useful in reflecting on the recent military *coup d'etat* in Portugal. The US policy aim of retaining the "West's"

control of Southern Africa may in fact be forwarded by the Spinoza takeover with its new "liberal" look and neo-colonial approach. (See Feature Article)●

## resources

*On April 7, 1971 a leading revolutionary woman of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) died. FRELIMO has produced a moving portrait of Josina Machel in a 16 page booklet containing bibliographic material, poetry by and dedicated to her, liberation movement messages, pictures and maps.*



**TCLPAC FACT SHEETS.** The Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies has begun to produce a series of FACT SHEETS which are short and meaty. The first is on "Portugal in Africa" and "Gulf Oil in Angola." A series of 12 costs only \$2.00. Write TCLPAC, 121 Avenue Road, Toronto 5, Ont., Canada

**GULF BOYCOTT**—Leaflet on "Organizing the Gulf Boycott during the 'Energy Crisis' ". Write Gulf Boycott Coalition, Box 123, D. V. Station, Dayton, Ohio 45406.

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WRITE: Richard Lobban  
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
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