


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VOLUME VIII NO. 10 - NOVEMBER 1975



ANGOLA INDEPENDENCE, NOV. 11, 1975



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Feature

ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE: NEOCOLONIALISM OR SOCIALISM

by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban



Agostinho Neto among MPLA militants travels through huge, enthusiastic crowds on his return to Luanda after the end of the war.

For the past 13-15 years wars of liberation against Portuguese colonialism have been waged in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and in Angola. While the socialist countries and progressives in the west were aware of these struggles, it was not until the success of these African liberation forces precipitated a coup in Portugal that the general attention of the world focused on the emerging nationalism of the former Portuguese African colonies. Since the Lisbon coup in April 1974, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique have proceeded smoothly to independence and to membership in the United Nations under the leadership of the PAIGC and FRELIMO and the focus of attention has shifted to Angola where events preceding its expected independence date of November 11, 1975, have been turbulent.

Progressive forces are encouraged by the consolidation of MPLA and its successful advances, (see this month's Angola news column); but western reaction remains heavily pessimistic, describing Angola in bleak terms, as an

"African tragedy" or "Africa's Second Congo."

Such allusions mask the fact that for western imperialism, the events in the Congo in the early 1960's were not a tragedy but a success, leading to the elimination of the progressive nationalist forces of Lumumba and the ultimate installation of the U.S. puppet, Joseph Mobutu (now Mobutu Sese Seko). The struggle in the Congo that was interrupted by CIA intervention 14 years ago is similar to the war now being waged on a different front in Angola. If the U.S. is successfully prevented from a full-scale intervention like that of the Congo, then the outcome of this Angolan war will determine the future course of the Angolan nation after independence. It is a choice between neocolonialism under the FNLA and socialist transformation led by Angolans under the MPLA. This was much the same choice faced by the Congo in 1961. A progressive Angola under MPLA leadership would not only threaten the considerable imperialist interests in one of Africa's wealthiest countries, but could also signal the end of



Learning to read in the liberated zones: MPLA established schools in the areas they liberated during the war and produced their own textbooks.

Mobutu's rule in Zaire. Mobutu knows this. Hence the Zairian General is a major protagonist in the Angolan military and political power struggle, and because an important figure for analysis in this article. Other interests, those of the U.S., South Africa and western Europe as well as China and the Soviet Union, will also be examined. Angola is at the crossroads that the Congo was prevented from reaching, and it is a critical time to explore and analyze the historical forces which have molded the current political situation.

Three liberation movements are presently vying for power in Angola, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—MPLA

The MPLA is led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, a revolutionary poet, medical doctor and Marxist, who advocates scientific socialism for Angola. Founded in December 1956, the MPLA emerged from pro-independence political groupings such as the Party for the United Struggle of Angola (P.L.U.A.) and the Movement for the Independence of Angola (M.I.A.). From the beginning MPLA combined political education of revolutionary nationalism with the practice of clandestine organizing, first in the towns and then in the countryside. Early on it allied itself with the most exploited sectors of the Angolan people, the peasants and the workers.

In March and July of 1959, P.I.D.E. (Portuguese secret police) carried out a series of arrests including dozens of leading Angolan nationalists. Agostinho Neto, then Honorary President of MPLA, was imprisoned in Luanda

along with Father Pinto de Andrade, then Chancellor of the Archbishopric of Luanda. In December of that year, 20 nationalists, many from Cabinda, were shot while in a Luanda prison. Several months later in early 1961 armed struggle was formally launched by the MPLA in response to Portuguese massacres provoked by a prisoner uprising in Luanda, and following the FNLA-instigated revolt of March, 1961, in which an estimated 40,000 people were massacred, many of whom were MPLA militants. The Portuguese "crackdown" was swift and NATO-equipped Portuguese troops along with white settler militias hunted down Angolan nationalists and non-political civilians alike in an indiscriminate terror campaign. During this campaign, the FNLA reportedly helped the Portuguese track down the MPLA.

In 1962 under Neto's leadership the MPLA set about the clandestine reorganization of its forces in the towns and commenced guerrilla warfare in the rural areas. Gradually MPLA established itself in Cabinda and in parts of northern Angola despite the presence of FNLA in the north along the Zaire border. The turning point came in 1966 with the successful MPLA opening of the eastern front and the transformation of this organization into a broad-based, non-regional, revolutionary Angolan nationalist movement. Political teams preceded MPLA soldiers into new territories; an excellent socio-political organization grew alongside the increasing military effectiveness of the MPLA. The MPLA created ancillary groupings which were responsible for programs of social advancement linked to the independence struggle. The National Union of Angolan Workers (U.N.T.A.) and the Organization of Angolan Women (O.M.A.) were organized to mobilize people for production. Medical and hygiene care were the responsibility of the Medical Assistance Service (S.A.M.). Military and political training are under the Centers of Revolutionary Instruction (C.I.R.'s) and these schools have been involved in primary education as well as adult literacy programs. Large areas in northern and eastern Angola were liberated by the MPLA not only from the colonial presence but from the social conditions of extreme poverty, poor health and illiteracy that are the legacy of colonial underdevelopment. Portuguese soldiers held captive by the MPLA and then released even reported encounters with Angolan children, who under MPLA education, spoke fluent Portuguese and could articulate well the objectives of the MPLA and the necessity of the struggle. In contrast, the political awareness of FNLA members has never been reported to be particularly high.

The MPLA armed forces, FAPLA, are estimated to be about 30,000 but there are thousands of armed civilians in Luanda, 10-15,000 of whom are MPLA sympathizers but who comprise a mass movement known as "poder popular" (popular power). The people's militias consist of neighborhood, factory and self-defense militias. During the recent fighting it was reported that the popular militias of the *muqueques* (slums around the cities) actually reinforced the MPLA armed forces. It is apparent that these popular defense forces have developed enough strength to exert significant influence on MPLA decision—local meetings are often attended by Central Committee members of the MPLA. In this way links between MPLA cadres and people of the *muqueques* have been strengthened. MPLA has received its strongest outside military support from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries while political and non-military support has also come from the Scandinavian countries.

Following the assassination of P.A.I.G.C. leader Amilcar Cabral by Portuguese agents in 1973, there was a

build up of internal tensions at the leadership level in MPLA which surfaced clearly only after the Portuguese coup almost a year and a half later. At the time of Cabral's death, it was strongly believed by many in MPLA that the same strategy was being used by the Portuguese to destroy MPLA by creating dissension in the ranks and by trying to engineer Neto's assassination. There existed a faction within the MPLA which strongly favored negotiating with the Portuguese as opposed to continuing armed struggle. This faction it was believed, was being used by the P.I.D.E. to divide MPLA and challenge Neto's leadership.

After the April 1974 coup in Portugal these divisions resulted in a clear three-way split of the movement: one led by Neto and still the largest; another led by Pinto Andrade; and a third more threatening faction led by Daniel Chipenda, who was alleged to have been a P.I.D.E. member and has quite appropriately joined the FNLA leadership.

National Liberation Front of Angola—FNLA

Organized by Holden Roberto in 1961, the FNLA appealed primarily to the Bakongo ethnic group where its greatest strength has been maintained up to the present. Roberto is himself a Bakongo who has lived in Zaire all but the first two years of his life; and his movement's appeal is heavily based on the promise of the return and revival of the ancient Bakongo kingdom.

Early in FNLA's history, Roberto attempted to branch out from the Bakongo ethnic and regional base by appointing members of other Angolan ethnic groups to leadership positions in his government in exile. One such appointee was Jonas Savimbi of the Ovimbundu who ultimately left FNLA in 1964 complaining of its "flagrant tribalism." Two years later Savimbi was to form Angola's third liberation movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

In the early 1960's, Roberto received overt and covert support from the United States, with which he was strongly identified. In 1974-75, following the establishment of close diplomatic and political ties between Kinshasa and Peking in the early 1970's, China became a major supplier of arms and military advisers to the FNLA through Roberto's brother-in-law, Mobutu. Like the other Angolan movements Roberto was also offered aid from the World Council of Churches and it has received some arms from Rumania; but FNLA's largest and most consistent source of revenue, military camps, arms and complete political backing has come from Zaire.

The FNLA at one point was thought to have the largest military force of the three liberation movements with a standing army of 33,000, including 15,000 trained in the last year by Chinese advisers in Zaire. In addition, it is reported that more than 60% of the FNLA forces are Zairois. (*Sempre Fixe*, Lisbon, July 19, 1975) But now with the armies of the FNLA and the MPLA put to the test in major battles in Angola, MPLA has achieved undisputed military superiority.

The only territory in which FNLA can claim strength is in the Bakongo region of northern Angola, and this is presently being challenged by the MPLA. FNLA never developed the social infrastructure or the political cadres characteristic of the MPLA, primarily because it has never enjoyed a popular base inside the country. FNLA soldiers, though well-equipped, lack the ideological training needed to sustain and strengthen them during the current phase of the fighting. Increasing numbers of FNLA soldiers are defecting to the MPLA (800 since July) and

they report stories of forced recruitment of *all* Angolan refugees in Zaire to the FNLA. Further reports claim torture was threatened or practiced to keep order and discipline within the FNLA. The defectors reported little or no political education in the FNLA beyond instruction that it alone could liberate Angola. Political discussions were discouraged and soldiers were admonished to simply follow orders. (*Afrique-Asie*, Paris, Aug. 11, 1975)

During 14 years of struggle against Portuguese colonialism, Roberto has remained in exile in Zaire. At the time of this writing, he has yet to set foot inside the Angolan capital.

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola—UNITA

The third group, UNITA, was formed as a breakaway of the FNLA in March 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, who after leaving FNLA attempted to join MPLA but was apparently denied a leadership position and did not join as an ordinary member. Ideologically, UNITA is much closer to the FNLA than it is to MPLA. Usually labelled the "moderate" organization in Angola by the western press, UNITA has had only a recent role to play in the last critical months of fighting during which time major lines of political power have been drawn. It is significant that only Jonas Savimbi, president of UNITA, was free to attend the OAU summit in Kampala during the summer months of pitched battles between the MPLA and FNLA.

Originally Savimbi's base of operation was in Lusaka but he was expelled after his troops attacked the Benguela railroad in Angola, a critical Zambian link to the coast. After some time spent in Cairo, Savimbi re-entered eastern Angola where he is said to have built an army of supporters some 40,000 strong, centered on the Ovimbundu, his own ethnic group. Of this 40,000, it was said that perhaps only a fraction, less than 6,000, were armed. Savimbi has often boasted that UNITA is the only liberation group to operate solely in Angola, but lacking rear areas and financial and military support leaves UNITA the weakest of the liberation movements.

It has been suggested more than once that the Portuguese allowed the militarily weak UNITA to operate in the eastern region to sow confusion among the Angolan people and to increase friction between the two other movements fighting for political superiority. Even more sinister and direct links with the Portuguese fascists formerly in power were suggested in a 1974 *Afrique-Asie* article (No. 61, July 1974) in which documents were published indicating that Savimbi had been an agent of the Portuguese at least since 1972 and that he effectively supported and carried out Portuguese policies, the chief one being the destruction of the MPLA. Although the validity of these documents has not been categorically confirmed, they are consistent with the fact that UNITA opened its front in the eastern region where the MPLA was successfully operating and not against the Portuguese.

UNITA has never been a major contender for power in Angola. Its long isolation in Angolan politics is reflected in the OAU's delay in recognizing the movement until its 1974 session. After the coup in Portugal, the Lisbon government's desire to appear unbiased in Angolan liberation movement politics forced it to give equal recognition to unequal forces and UNITA was considered on the same basis as MPLA and FNLA. UNITA was part of the Transitional Government which has since crumbled, and that may be the closest UNITA has come or will come to the centers of Angolan political power.

Finally, immediately following the change of regime in

Portugal, a number of new political parties emerged in Angola. Some 30 new political groupings were reported a little more than a month after the April coup. The influence of these parties, mainly spawned by white settlers, was never appreciable and now, with tens of thousands of white Angolans leaving the country, these groups have been eclipsed by the larger power struggle between MPLA and FNLA.

Ideological Differences Between The Movements

Too often the ideological differences between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA are overlooked or submerged in a desire to see some kind of magical unity among them take place. But despite the Algarve agreements framing the Transitional Government and despite numerous unity pacts among the three movements, no meaningful or lasting agreements have been effected. Why? Is it the fault of the agreements or are there irreconcilable political differences between the movements?

In Africa today many leaders claim to be "socialist", but often this is not much more than political rhetoric and each political situation must be examined carefully for the material conditions behind the rhetoric of socialism. Many African leaders speak of "socialism" while in fact their "independent" regimes have opened their doors to foreign investors and neo-colonial machinations. Other African leaders have taken serious steps to eliminate neo-colonialist and imperialist interests and have launched economic, political and social programs that are leading towards socialism.

Both FNLA and UNITA's leaders speak of "socialism" for Angola, no doubt because it is a legitimate desire and concern of their constituencies. Both Roberto and

Savimbi advocate a "mild" form of socialism that is "rooted in Angolan customs and traditions."

Holden Roberto has said the FNLA wants Angola to have a kind of socialism "with a human face" that would respect private property, private initiative and basic freedoms while operating an economic system geared to self-management by the entire Angolan people. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, July 5, 1975)

Jonas Savimbi says UNITA wants a mixed economy because "private enterprise can bring about rapid development." (*Guardian*, London, March 29, 1975) With this perspective it is thus not surprising that Savimbi emerged as the 'darling' of the white business community in Angola and as the favorite in the South African newspapers after the Portuguese coup. It was reported that after the summer of heavy fighting in which UNITA did not fare too well, Savimbi was in England trying to drum up business interests in southern Angola in the event of secession. Even prior to the coup in Portugal Savimbi was receiving favorable coverage in the U.S. A series of articles on UNITA by *Washington Post* journalist, Leon Dash, won the Pulitzer Prize in 1974. No such series was ever run in a U.S. newspaper on the MPLA.

Roberto and Savimbi claim that they are "socialists" but disclaim any similarities between their socialism and the "doctrinaire approach" of Neto of the MPLA. This is certainly true—Neto does not speak of socialism with private investment nor does MPLA speak of a special type of Angolan socialism free of class contradictions. MPLA stands alone in Angola as the movement which has consistently identified and opposed imperialism as the main enemy, and MPLA stands alone as the only revolutionary Angolan movement. As a revolutionary organization its political program does not end with the elimination of Portuguese colonialism but extends to the barring of neo-colonialism in Angola and the social transformation of the country. MPLA has said that as long as there is colonialism or neocolonialism in Angola there will be war, and if Roberto or the FNLA seize power in Angola the war will go on.

MPLA has always maintained a non-racialist view of the anti-colonial struggle and MPLA militants were taught to fight Portuguese colonialism and not the Portuguese people. This view has been extended to white Angolans, many of whom in the cities are MPLA activists.


The ideological choice in the current phase of the struggle then is between "independence" and neocolonialism for Angola under FNLA or UNITA or independence with socialism for Angola under the MPLA.

The Hand of Mobutu

A fourth major figure in the Angolan political equation is General Mobutu of Zaire and the international powers he represents. The hand of Mobutu has more than once been behind manoeuvres against the Angolan people as he has repeatedly interfered with the politics of the liberation movements. If unity was needed and disunity resulted, Mobutu was there. Now that imperialist interests in Angola are threatened, Mobutu is working overtime to secure a place for neocolonialism in Angola, recognizing correctly that the fate of his own regime and of Zaire is bound to the outcome of events in Angola.

After the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the eradication of the socialist-oriented Lumumbists and the triumph of neocolonialism in the Congo, Mobutu virtually declared war on the MPLA. This reflected Mobutu's personal view that the MPLA represented the same political





Leaders of the three movements during unity talks in Kenya at the beginning of the year. Left to right: Agostinho Neto (MPLA), Jonas Savimbi (UNITA), Holden Roberto (FNLA)

directions for Angola that the Lumumbists meant for the Congo. Since Mobutu came to power he has led his people away from Belgian colonialism into the arms of U.S. imperialism. Over the last 12 years the U.S. has advanced Mobutu \$430 million, including \$50 million in military aid, more than the aid to any other African country for a similar period. In less than ten years, because of these connections, Mobutu has been able to amass one of the world's greatest fortunes. Israeli aid to Zaire has also become significant during the last five years and Israeli advisers have trained FNLA soldiers as well as Zairian military and intelligence divisions. (*Afrique-Asie*, Paris, Aug. 11, 1975)

Mobutu's interest in Angola should be apparent to even the most casual observer of central and southern African politics. Zaire and Angola share a 1500 mile border. As a result of the 14 year liberation war, as many as one million Angolans have become refugees in Zaire, while as many as 4000 anti-Mobutu Katanga guerrillas are in Angola. The Benguela railroad in Angola serves as a vital outlet for copper, Zaire's main export which accounts for 75% of its foreign currency earnings. A federation between two of Africa's wealthiest countries, Zaire under Mobutu and Angola under Roberto, would create the most powerful financial and political axis in Africa. If FNLA were to become the ruling party in Angola, it would no doubt continue to depend on Zaire financially, militarily and politically, as it has in the past. Secondly, Mobutu's interest in oil-rich Cabinda has hardly been masked. It has been suggested that were Roberto to come to power in Angola he would reward Mobutu for his support with the separation of Cabinda from Angola and the setting up of an independent Republic in the Cabindan enclave under the control of Zaire. Angola-Cabinda could be Mobutu's key to fulfilling his aspiration to become a major leader in African politics.

Given these considerations it is not surprising to learn

that Mobutu spends about 10% of Zaire's budget supporting FNLA and the Cabindan "liberation front", FLEC. (*Expresso*, Lisbon, July 19, 1975) Further it has been alleged by MPLA that over 60% of the FNLA forces are Zairian and have been recruited into FNLA with the aid and consent of Mobutu's government. Zaire has supported one faction of FLEC while the other faction was based in Congo-Brazzaville, and Zaire daily radio broadcasts to Cabinda have urged the local population to incite revolt against "Angolan colonization." (*Sempre Fixe*, Lisbon, July 19, 1975)

MPLA President Agostinho Neto has said recently, "After we are freed from Portuguese colonialism, we must be liberated from the colonialism of our neighbors and brothers." (*Foreign Affairs*, Feb. 1975) The clear reference was to Mobutu who has engineered a series of "dirty tricks" to weaken the MPLA and strengthen the hand of Roberto and the FNLA. To weaken Neto, Mobutu encouraged the internal factionalism that split the MPLA just months after the coup in Portugal was changing events in Portuguese Africa so rapidly. The breakaway of Daniel Chipenda from the MPLA, taking with him 3000 of MPLA's crack troops, was engineered with considerable financial incentives to Chipenda by Mobutu. Before Chipenda decided to join the FNLA, offices for his "Revolt" faction of MPLA were provided in Kinshasa. Once Chipenda joined FNLA he quickly rose to become Deputy Secretary General of FNLA and presumably has easy access to Mobutu's ear. In late May of this year Chipenda was in South West Africa (Namibia) for medical treatment and it was not ruled out that he had contact with South African officials in Windhoek. During this summer's heavy fighting between FNLA and MPLA, the Zaire News Agency, AZAP, was reporting that Neto had been deposed as President of MPLA by the Chief of the Armed Forces, Nito Alves. This report was false, and was

clearly designed to give MPLA the appearance of instability during a critical time.

Since the victories of the MPLA this summer, U.S. interest in the area, through its vehicle in central Africa, General Mobutu, has become more visible. It has been reported that weapons and ammunition are being flown from U.S. bases in West Germany to Zaire to resupply the battered troops of the FNLA. In August and September the MPLA reported that American Skymaster transports were used to airlift these arms to FNLA bases in northern Angola, and that the FNLA has been entering Angola in American-made armored cars. Reports reaching Luanda say that planes of "unspecified markings" are landing at an FNLA base in northern Angola with tons of materiel for the FNLA.

Revelations of the flow of U.S. arms to the FNLA through Zaire has been an embarrassment for U.S. officials, fearful of such publicized international entanglements. Washington has now officially reminded Zaire of the congressional restrictions on the transfer of American arms to a third country or party without prior approval. (*Washington Post*, Sept. 4, 1975) That the U.S. will back up its "reminder" with sanctions to slow down or stop this flow of arms to FNLA is doubtful, especially given the recent reports of long standing and continued CIA support of FNLA. (*New York Times*, Sept. 25, 1975)

Chinese aid to Zaire and FNLA has increased dramatically in the last two years. Initially, China sent 150 military advisers to Zaire to train a 15,000 man conventional army for FNLA. Now it has been learned that Zaire has just received 25 medium-weight tanks from China as well as Chinese self-propelled cannon and artillery. (*Washington Post*, Sept. 4, 1975) As far as is known this is the first time China has given tanks and artillery guns to any African country, and it remains to be seen whether this hardware will be passed on to FNLA by Mobutu.

Fighting in Angola Not "Civil War"

Virtually every western press account of the war in Angola between the MPLA and FNLA has labelled this political situation "civil war." For some journalists this is part of the same African liberation war package that emphasizes "tribalism" and "regionalism" as bases for analyzing the fighting in Angola. For others the label "civil war" evidences a misreading, or an overlooking, of just who is fighting whom in the clashes between MPLA and FNLA that have taken so many lives.

The military-ideological power struggle currently being waged by the MPLA and FNLA has its basis not in 'regionalism' or 'tribalism', but in the choice of whether Angola will adopt a neocolonialist course under FNLA or a socialist course under MPLA. It is a much more fundamental war between certain class interests of Angolans which has international implications for Africa and for the world—FNLA representing Angolan elites and expansionist interests of Zairean president Mobutu, local entrepreneurs with international corporate links, and MPLA representing anti-imperialist forces with mass organizations of workers and peasants. Neto has said repeatedly that Angola's wealth must be put to the service of the people and them alone.

When it is recalled that estimates of 60 per cent or more of the FNLA armed forces are not Angolans but Zairois (with recent reports of even white mercenaries leading FNLA battalions—see Angolan column, October issue) supported by U.S. interests through Mobutu, the war looks more like a war of aggression caused by foreign enemies. For the MPLA, the FNLA is an imperialist move-

ment acting on behalf of western multi-nationals and corporate interests for which it wishes to secure a sure footing in post-independent Angola.

International Intervention

The interest of Mobutu of Zaire in Angolan affairs and by extension the intervention of the U.S. in support of the FNLA has been mentioned. But what exactly are the U.S. policy objectives in Angola? Semi-official government sources state that the U.S. main interests are political—to encourage a friendly government in a large and potentially powerful African country—and economic—to preserve American business interests, particularly those of Gulf Oil. (*Foreign Affairs*, Feb., 1975) American interest in the wealth of Angola cannot be underestimated. In a report prepared by Henry Kissinger in 1970 for President Nixon, made public only last year, Kissinger stated that "the biggest U.S. interest in southern Africa is in Angola." (*Sunday Times*, London, Oct. 20, 1974) Kissinger's plan (the policy option was nicknamed "Tar Baby") foresaw the continuation of Portuguese rule in the area and encouraged good relations with the white minority regimes while publicly stating that the U.S. opposed racial discrimination. The September 1974 coup in Portugal severely undermined these plans for the former areas of Portuguese Africa, and in reassessing its strategy the U.S. has opted to strengthen its assistance to Mobutu, hence the FNLA as the safest liberation movement to maintain U.S. interests in this critically strategic area of Africa. To what degree the U.S. or China will step up their aid to FNLA with increased or more sophisticated military hardware is not clear at this moment. The U.S. clearly has to weigh the potential losses of another international exposé of intervention against the very tenuous possibility of an FNLA victory in Angola. The Chinese are unquestionably motivated by the spectre of the Soviet-backed MPLA ultimately being in power in Angola.

It has also been reported that the French have begun flying in arms and military equipment earmarked for the FNLA into Kinshasa. In August, French President Valéry Giscard D'Estaing made a state visit to Zaire at which time he also held talks with Holden Roberto. The western imperialist governments are lining up strongly in support of FNLA with UNITA as a possible option.

In the southern African equation the intervention of South Africa in one form or another is to be expected. In August and September there were reports of South African troops operating on the Angola-Namibia border (see this month's Angola news column). This action must be viewed as directed against the important gains of the MPLA and an effort to block them from moving close to power. Given the new South African "liberal" policy toward black African regimes in southern Africa, it can be expected that an independent Angola under FNLA is a situation South Africa could live with and an insurance that their considerable interests in Angola would be protected.

The stakes are high in this oil, coffee, and mineral-rich country. Angola under the MPLA following the independence of Mozambique under Frelimo and Guinea-Bissau under PAIGC is one large step closer to the ultimate collapse of white corporate minority rule in southern Africa. For the Angolan people, the choice they are making is between neocolonialism and socialism. *Southern Africa* stands firmly on the side of the MPLA in Angola.

south africa

POLITICS:

WAVE OF DETENTIONS

There has been a wave of detentions in South Africa since August 19 when Security Police detained the well-known Afrikaans author, Breyten Breytenbach, NUSAS President Karel Tip and 14 others from Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pietermaritzburg—most of whom have not yet been identified. In the weeks that followed, the number of arrests known totalled 68.

It is believed that the arrest of Breyten Breytenbach, sparked off the arrests of some of the others. According to South African papers, Breytenbach, who lives in Paris as an exile, entered South Africa August 1, under the name of Christiaan Galaska. Sometime during the 18 days of his presence in the country, the Security Police discovered his real identity, and placed a tab on him. They arrested him once they thought he had made contacts with all people he wanted to see. Immediately following this, Karel Tip, NUSAS President, Megan Rielly, Rev. James Polley, Glen Moss and Gerry Mare were arrested. A few days later, Clara Rohm, the pregnant wife of a Pretoria atom scientist, was arrested. All were arrested under the Terrorism Act. Since then, arrests have continued nearly on a daily basis, encompassing both black and white, mostly students, and in the case of blacks, mostly high-school students.

The arrests led to a number of protest meetings, demonstrations, letters, etc. inside South Africa, especially against the Terrorism Act. The latter law allows the Security Police to detain anyone they think might be in possession of information harmful to the security of the State without trial for life. In terms of the Act the Minister of

Justice and the Commissioner of Police have absolute power. Not even the Courts can order the release of a detainee. No one except an officer of the State is entitled to any official information about the detainee. His/her family are not entitled by law to know that he/she is detained. Further, detention under the Terrorism Act does not necessarily imply being charged under the Act—which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of death. In terms of the Act the 'crime' of 'terrorism' is defined very widely. 'Terrorism' applies to 'any act', to speech and writing as well as to physical actions. Besides provisions relating to 'training' and the possession of explosives and firearms, the law specifies as acts of terrorism such activities as 'obstructing the free movement of traffic', 'embarrassing the administration of the affairs of State', 'promoting by intimidation the achievement of any object', 'endangering the safety of any person' and 'prejudicing any undertaking'. Furthermore the accused is held to be guilty until he/she can prove his/her innocence. The Terrorism Act also relates to the bringing about of social change in South Africa in accordance with or in co-operation with any foreign or international government or institution.

A statement issued by NUSAS said: "the major point to which we would like to draw . . . attention concerns the recent detente manoeuvres initiated by Prime Minister Vorster. Since Mr. Vorster made his statement of intention to "change South Africa" in October 1974, repression and oppression have been maintained and indeed extended in South Africa. Because we work fervently for the establishment of a free and just South Africa, we believe that changes in South Africa's relations with the rest of the world must be matched with changes within South



Africa. It should, therefore, be of interest to those overseas governments and organisations who were prepared to "give South Africa a chance" that these events have occurred since Mr. Vorster's return from a state visit to Paraguay and Uruguay. The tour was an attempt to gain support and international alliance for South Africa".

The South African Council of Churches called for the scrapping of "this terrible Act"—and the charging or release of all those arrested. "The powers contained in this Act are cruel, frightening and have demonic potential. That potential for evil results in their increasing use for purely political ends and for perpetrating blatant injustices. . . . As far as the latest arrests are concerned, let us see in open court whether people like the Reverend James Polley and the Reverend Zephania Kameeta are guilty of 'terrorism'. The incommunicado detention of people for indefinite periods under conditions that give rise to the deepest suspicions, is something no Christian can allow to pass in silence. . . . We deplore the disparity between the laudable attempts to achieve detente abroad and this vicious violation of the rule of law within South Africa".

Hundreds of students staged protest demonstrations in Cape Town and Johannesburg. A petition condemning the detention of NUSAS leaders was signed by more than 5,000 at the Witwatersrand University. Professor G.R. Bozzoli, vice chancellor the University of Witwatersrand condemned the arrests: "Once again the vicious law which permits the detention of people without explanation or the framing of any charges against them has been applied". Fifty-eight prominent members of the University of Cape Town wrote an open letter to the Minister of Justice, Mr. Kruger, calling on him to release all prisoners held without trial and issue a public assurance that "no one held in South African gaols or police stations will be physically or mentally assaulted in any way". The letter particularly notes that "we are mindful of the sworn alle-

Students at the University of Cape Town protest against the detentions



gations of assault upon persons held for interrogation; of over twenty deaths in detention; of the great suffering and emotional disorder to be observed in persons subsequently released from solitary confinement". (*Star*, Johannesburg, September 6, August 23, 30; *SANA*, Cape Town, August 23, 1975; *Muhammed Speaks*, Chicago, September 23, 1975; *Washington Post*, D.C. August 26, 1975; *Comment & Opinion*, Pretoria, September 5, August 29, 1975; *The Observer*, London, August 24, 1975; *The Guardian*, London, August 22, 27, 31, 1975).

Listed below are the names, locations and circumstances known about the South Africans detained under terms of the Terrorism Act as of 18 September 1975. Accuracy is extremely difficult because of the secrecy surrounding actions of the security police and the fright they induce throughout the country. This information comes from many sources, chiefly from the Christian Institute, the Johannesburg-based association recently declared by the Pretoria regime to be an "Affected Organization"; information was published in New York by the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa.

Most of these detainees are members or associates of one or more of the following: South African Students Organization (SASO); South African Students Movement (SASM); Black Peoples Convention (BPC); National Youth Organization (NAYO); Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU); National Union of South African Students (NUSAS).

Held at John Vorster Square police headquarters, Johannesburg

Mr. Martin Dukhi	
Mr. Amos Masondo	SASM
Mr. Sandile Mfenyana	SASM
Mr. Malabelle Molokeng	NAYO, president; SASM
Mr. Kgotoduwa Molotsane	
Mr. Frank Molubi	
Mr. Wilfred Nkosi	SASM
Mr. Xola Nuse	SASM
Mr. Monemodi Radebe	SASM
Mr. John Ramrock	AFRO, opposed to Coloured Representative Council
Mr. Vuyisile Selanto	SASM

Detained, place unknown

Mr. Clive Mandla Selokane	High school teacher, Middleburg, Transvaal
Mr. Yugen Naidoo	BPC
Mr. Molife Phetoa	Co-ordinator, Mhloti Black Theatre Group

Detained in the Kimberley/Kuruman area

Ms. Phumza Dyantji
 Mr. Kgangelo Kgosana
 7 other African persons whose names are not known

Detained in Durban

Mr. Raymond Suttner	(now formally charged under Terrorism Act) law lecturer, University of Natal
Ms. Jennifer Roxburgh	lecturer, African languages, Natal University
Mr. Lawrence Kuny	student, University of Natal
Mr. Behie Langa	NAYO
Mr. _____ Payne	full name and circumstances unknown

Believed detained in Pretoria

Mr. Breyten Breytenbach Poet
 Mr. Lawrence Dworkin reporter, SAAN (SA Associated Newspapers)
 Mr. Horst Kleinschmidt Christian Institute, Johannesburg; assistant to the director, Dr. Beyers Naude
 Mr. Norman Lewis Former student, Witwatersrand University
 Mr. Gerry Marais NUSAS, social action co-ordinator
 Mr. Patrick Martens Student, University of the Witwatersrand
 Mr. Glenn Moss NUSAS: former president, Students Representative Council, University of the Witwatersrand; Industrial Aid Society
 Rev. James Polley Methodist minister; senior tutor, University of Cape Town; member, board of Christian Institute
 Ms. Clara Rohn Wife of scientist with South African Atomic Energy Board; expecting second child
 Mr. Karel Tip NUSAS, past president
 Mr. Gordon Young Student, University of Cape Town; past vice-president, NUSAS

Held as State witnesses in SASO/BPC Trial

Mr. Ahmed Bawa BPC; detained since 29 September 1974
 Mr. Benjamin Langa SASO; detained since 11 October 1974
 Mr. Jonas Ledwaba Students Representative Council, Turfloop tribal college; detained since January 1975 (detention not known till testifying seven months later)
 Rev. Mashaba Mayatula Lutheran; BPC; detained since 25 Sept 1974
 Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa SASO
 Mr. Harri Singh BPC; detained since 27 September 1974

Detained for from 190 to 230 days. Released and warned they may be called as State witnesses in SASO/BPC Trial. Still bound by sec. 6, Terrorism Act

Mr. Drake Koka SASO, secretary-general; BAWU
 Mr. Benjamin Louw SASO
 Mr. Thomas Manthata SASO; staff, Christian Institute
 Mr. Jerry Mondisane SASO, past president
 Mr. Aubrey Mokoena BPC

Remaining under terms of Terrorism Act, but allowed to return home. Likely State witnesses at SASO/BPC Trial

Mr. Harold Dixon
 Mr. Danile Landigwe SASO; NAYO

The following are charged under the Terrorism Act and on or awaiting trial

Mr. Absolom Zitulele Cindi
 Mr. Rubin Hare
 Dr. Aubrey Mokoape
 Mr. Justice "Muntu" Myeza
 Mr. Nkwenkwe Nkomo
 Mr. Sadecque Variava
 Mr. Bernard Trevor Bloem
 Mr. Sathasivan Cooper
 Mr. Mosioua Lekota
 Mr. Strinivasa Moodley
 Mr. Pandelani Nefolovhodwe
 Mr. Kaborane "Kaunda" Sedibe
 Mr. Eric Molobi

TRANSVAAL NATIONALIST CONGRESS:

For South African political observers, the recent by-election held in Caledon, Cape, was to be a barometer of white-electors confidence regarding detente issues. As it is, the Nationalist Party won the election with a bigger majority over the United party. Most papers interpreted the results of the by-election as a 'green light' from the rural areas for Vorster's policy of detente.

Vorster consolidated further his policy by appearing at the recent Transvaal congress of the National Party in Pretoria on August 26. He reportedly said that "Let the Job's comforters and the prophets of doom say what they will. Nothing and nobody can stop South Africa now". He believes that it was not because South Africa "is pushing itself into the foreground, and not because it is South Africa's wish, but because it is South Africa's calling and South Africa cannot and dare not escape its calling". Regarding apartheid, he re-iterated that "This still is and always will remain the policy of the National Party. It is with this policy that South Africa will be safe to fulfil its calling".

Transvaal leader of the National Party, Dr. Mulder (also Minister of Information and of the Interior) suggested that a new name for the White part of South Africa and for the White nation should be considered once the Transkei became independent. He further stated that in the carrying out of present policy, there were four fundamentals which would be observed. They were the retention of identity, no sharing of political power, the maintenance of law and order and the elimination of points of friction. As examples of things that could not disappear Dr Mulder cited the Immorality Act, the Group Areas Act and separate schools and living areas. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 9, 30, September 6, 1975; *Comment & Opinion*, August 15, 1975).

TERRORISM TRIAL:

On August 7, with the resumption of the terrorism trial of nine members of the South African Students' Organisation (SASO) and the Black People's Convention (BPC), the accused caused a sensation by instructing their counsel to withdraw from the case and then personally applied for the judge, Mr. Justice Boshoff to recuse himself because he had shown bias against them. The accused took this action based on what happened in court on August 4 when the judge refused to give defence counsel two weeks to study the further particulars supplied by the prosecution. The judge continuously interrupted defence counsel

and pointedly said: "At the start of the trial I had sympathy for the defence because they did not have all the facts before them. But now that they have been supplied with all the facts, I am beginning to doubt their bona fides". He then gave them 2 days instead of two weeks.

From the dock, Saths Cooper observed: "I have serious doubts about the impartiality of the judge who has prejudged us in the application by describing our requests as frivolous before even hearing argument". Strini Moodley contended "that in the atmosphere of this court we will not be afforded a fair and unbiased trial. I do not expect the court's sympathy, but I demand impartiality in my trial and the right to have an indictment which I understand". The judge countered by refusing to recuse himself, saying: "I'm certainly not biased against the accused. Your case is a delicate one. The State will have to persuade me that certain documents are terroristic. It's not a clear-cut case". The judge then gave the accused a further three days to consider their position.

The case resumed on August 11, and the defence was back and applied for the indictment to be squashed on the main charge and for further particulars to be supplied on two of the other 12 charges. The government's main charge alleges a conspiracy by the accused to bring about violent or unconstitutional revolutionary change in South

Africa and to foster racial hostility. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 9, 1975; *Anti-Apartheid News*, London, September 1975).

BLACK DEAN INSTALLED

Thousands of Black and White Anglicans witnessed the installation of Rev Desmond Tutu as South Africa's first Black dean. He automatically became Rector of St Mary's Cathedral parish as well as the Dean of Johannesburg. The majority of Anglicans in South Africa are Black, but is also the church of the wealth and powerful English-speaking white establishment in South Africa. It is this section which is seeking a manageable internal detente with a black middle class. (*Star*, Johannesburg, September 6, 1975).

BAN LIFTED:

The banning and house arrest order imposed on Mr Cosmas Desmond a former Roman Catholic priest, has been lifted by Mr J.T. Kruger, the South African Minister of Justice. Desmond was placed under house arrest four years ago just after he published *The Discarded People*, an investigation into the resettlement of Africans by the South African government. (*The Times*, London, September 6, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, September 6, 1975).

BLACK JOURNALISTS IN SOUTH AFRICA ATTACK ASHE:


A recent publication of the Union of Black Journalists in South Africa described their meeting with Arthur Ashe during his first visit there in 1973: "Ashe was told, in no uncertain terms, that his coming to South Africa was doing the Blacks no good at all . . . He was told that his original stand against South Africa was just the right thing to do. Like the gentleman he is, Ashe accepted UBJ's standpoint but expressed a hope that things will change for the better. Ashe and UBJ parted friends that night". However, during his second visit, Ashe felt that he was right and apparently only wanted to talk about progress made. "Once more Black journalists made it clear that there would be no progress until people like him stopped supporting racial sport. At this stage a Black journalist lost his temper and told Ashe and his companions: We last met a year ago and since then we are hearing from you for the first time. Why have you not kept in touch with us . . . Let us make it clear that we Blacks in this country have suffered enough and will not accept flattery from fair-weather friends". (*Daily World*, New York, August 7, 1975)

BLACK FOR CENTRAL LABOUR BOARD

The South African government will introduce legislation to provide for the appointment of a Black to the Central Labour Board. Marais Viljoen, Minister of Labour, said that this and other amendments would ensure that the Black man would be able to make a more meaningful contribution in the determination of his service conditions!

Other proposed changes include the proposition that in industrial areas where works and liaison committees could prove that they were representative of Black workers, they would set up industrial committees that would speak with authority on behalf of the industry concerned.

The general secretary of the Trade Union Council of South Africa, Mr Arthur Grobbelaar said that he learned



Arthur Ashe in South Africa

that the Government will provide for a form of black "in-company" trade unionism. "My information is that company unions will be allowed which will negotiate directly with individual employers". For Grobbelaar, "this is an advance on the present inadequate system but it will still fall far short of adequate black worker representation".

Strikes inside South Africa still continue. A large number of Westville municipal employees from several departments stopped work during August over pay grievance, but resumed work after police told them to disperse.

HEALTH

A note on statistics in the field of nursing: there is one qualified white nurse for every 162 whites and one qualified Black for every 674 blacks. There are 26,322 white nurses for the country's white population of 4.3 million and 31,600 black nurses for 21.3 million blacks.



Young victim of malnutrition which is rife in South Africa among Africans

ECONOMICS

BLACK LABOR FORCE INCREASES—END OF JOB RESERVATION MOTTED

The Government Department of Statistics has revealed that from March, 1970 to March, 1975 the number of workers in the mining, manufacturing, construction, communication, electrical and transport sectors of the South African economy increased by 283,208. Only 32,000 of these were Whites, meaning that for every one white worker hired there were eight new Blacks. The total number of employed persons in those sectors is 2,723,997 of which 588,395 were White, 1,736,431 were African, 308,604 were Colored and 90,567 were Asian. African workers thus make up two-thirds of this part of the work force. (*Daily Dispatch*, Durban, July 29, 1975)

Dr. S.P. du Toit Viljoen, Chairman of the Bantu Invest-

ment Corporation, has estimated that by the year 2000 South Africa would need 3.5 million skilled Blacks, and that job reservation laws which limit this goal should be ended. He stated that there had to be changes in the entire black educational structure to increase technical training, secondary school attendance, and teacher ratio with the introduction of compulsory primary school by 1980. He also stressed the importance of coordination between the Department of Bantu Education and the educational systems being developed in the "homelands." Finally Viljoen called for more family planning programs, since there would be 50 million people in South Africa by 2000. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 23, 1975)

BLACK UNION ISSUE GROWS

The Durban based Trade Union Advisory and Coordinating Council (TUACC), representing some 45,000 workers in six unregistered unions in Natal, announced that it would not join the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), but would rather at this time work for an alliance of other unregistered black unions.

In late August there was a meeting between representatives of 10 black trade unions and two persons from TUCSA. Only three black unions (membership of about 1500) have joined TUCSA since the Council's year old decision to re-allow black members. Included in the meeting was Lucy Mvubelo, leader of the National Union of Clothing Workers with some 23,000 members. Ms. Mvubelo is known in the United States and Europe as an advocate of increased external investment in South Africa, and the South Africa Government has utilized her to improve its image abroad. In reaction to some black unions desire to coalesce outside of the Council, Ms. Mvubelo has said that a black federation outside of TUCSA would be "doomed."

The 21st annual Conference of TUCSA, to be held in Cape Town, will take up the issue of black unions' relationship to the Council. The deliberations and participation of black unionists will be carefully watched by all. The TUACC unions have indicated that TUCSA has not shown sufficient concern about its own affiliates' dealings with the unregistered unions. There has been some conflict between several black unions and some of the registered affiliates of TUCSA. Arthur Grobbelaar, General Secretary of TUCSA, has defended the Council by saying that it cannot interfere in the domestic affairs of the affiliates. He also stated that TUCSA would not agree to the idea of a black federation of unions functioning within the Council because it would lead to divisions along racial lines and be administratively burdensome.

Obviously TUCSA, which is the established predominantly white union organization having some 220,000 members, is eager to pull in the growing black union strength in South Africa, despite its past vacillation on the real issue of black union rights. There are many black unregistered unions which are taking a wait and see attitude towards TUCSA's outreach. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 30, September 6, 1975)

FOUR MORE MINERS KILLED

The incidence of mineworker deaths continues to grow. At the Blyvooruitzicht mine four workers were killed and 19 injured in a fight between Xhosa workers and Rhodesians in late August. It was the first such confrontation involving the workers from Rhodesia and 200 of

them were quickly removed from the compound. After the fight some Tswana workers became restless and some asked to be sent home.

A TUCSA report has shown that in the last year and a half 114 miners have died in such fights and 528 have been injured, and a total of 80,000 miners have been involved with 11,000 sent back home at their own request. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 30, 1975)

TUCSA has concluded that the racial situation in South Africa is the general cause for the problem and has pinpointed seven factors in the situation such as 1) poor communication between workers and management; 2) the statements by some mining companies such as Anglo American which boosted black hopes but were not followed up by action; 3) the existence of white prejudice at the mines; 4) the development of black consciousness over the last years; 5) the issue of deferred pay; 6) the continued practice of companies of placing together workers from groups that have been traditional enemies; and 7) the lack of social amenities especially at mines outside of cities.

TUCSA has called for the recognition by the government of black unions and for better wages in the gold mines. In 1974 there were 485 accidental deaths in the gold mines and 22,000 workers were injured. (*Los Angeles Times*, July 30, 1975)

FARMERS TO FOLLOW MINES' LEAD

The President of the South African Agricultural Union has called for a pension scheme for farm laborers working in the Transvaal. The Union's management has called for an improved image for the farm worker, including better employer-employee relations, and the better utilization of the labor. They stressed that aptitude tests may be used for the workers and that the new image should be projected into the "homelands" because "in future we will to an increasing extent depend on the homelands for our labour. And we will have to compete . . . with the mines." The farm organizations are obviously feeling the pinch of the drive to recruit more South African workers for the mines. One factor which enables them to consider pension plans and other benefits has been the rise in gross farm income some 10 per cent over last year. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 30, 1975)

BIG CHROME INVESTMENT APPROVED BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The Labor Government has approved the plans of the British Steel Corporation (BSC) to invest \$3.6 million in a Transvaal plant which will process charge chrome into ferro-chrome used in making stainless steel. The project which will cost a total of \$48 million is mainly financed by Johannesburg Consolidated Investment which is 50 per cent owned by Anglo-American Corporation. One buyer will be the Japanese firm of Showo Denka.

There has been considerable controversy over the BSC investment plans given the Labor Party's general policy statements of not assisting investments in South Africa. The primary rationale is that investment in mineral resource development is necessary, and that such investment in South Africa (which has 67 per cent of the world chrome reserves) is better than dependency upon the

Soviet Union. A similar argument seemed to win the day when the attempt to end Rhodesian chrome imports was thwarted in the US House of Representatives recently. The Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain has stated that there are metallurgically better grades of ore waiting for development in countries such as the Philippines, Turkey, Malagasy, Finland or Brazil (South Africa has only 20 per cent of such high grade chrome ore).

Another argument presented by the government and the BSC is that the funding will come from so-called "blocked rands", money already in South Africa that cannot be used outside the country. Thus it will not involve the injection of new capital. MP Neil Kinnock states, however, that the monies actually come from BSC-related dividends which could be repatriated, while the Anti-Apartheid Movement says that even if the funds are "blocked rands" they could be reinvested in South African securities which then after five years could be sold abroad. Thus there are apparently ways to remove BSC's monies from South Africa.

Naturally the company claims that production in South Africa is cheaper than other alternatives, and says it will pay its African workers above the poverty datum line level. But BSC working conditions and wages were criticized during evidence before a House of Commons committee last year.

The building of the new plant takes on broader significance in that it could well be used to process Rhodesian chrome ore which would aid Rhodesia's surreptitious export of chromite through South Africa by the processing of it into ferro-chrome. Anglo-American has purchased the US Foote Mineral chrome mines in Rhodesia, and the other big US chrome company, Union Carbide, is building a ferro-chrome plant also in the Transvaal. Thus the complex of South Africa, British and United States interests seem geared to provide support systems to Rhodesia.

Although the BSC was asked by the British Government to look at alternate projects, the South African one has been given the go-ahead. And the government has received the support of a number of the influential British newspapers, including the *Times*, and also the liberal establishment represented by the *Guardian* which has called the opposition to the project "unnecessary fuss." (*Anti-Apartheid News*, July, 1975; *Guardian*, London, July 29, 31; *Star*, Johannesburg, August 2, 1975)

US RESOURCE AND ENERGY INVESTMENTS

American oil companies are essential to South Africa's energy system. Caltex now plans a \$134 million expansion of its Cape Town refinery to increase production there from 48,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. (*Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 9, 1975)

Two American companies, Consolidated Coal and Utah Mining, are involved in a plan to buy anthracite deposits being mined in KwaZulu in mines owned by the South Cape and Ubombo Mines. Anthracite is a rare and hard to mine form of coal used in the production of ferro alloys. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 16, 1975)

WHITE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

Consumer prices rose by 13.7 per cent from July, 1974 to July, 1975. But Prof. G. Trotter of the Natal Consumer Association believes that the Consumer Price Index (CPI)

does not really reflect the reality of price rises in the black community nor even those of prices for consumers who do not live in the sample group from which the CPI is researched. The CPI considers only whites in 12 urban areas living in apartments or houses. Research has shown that the CPI for Africans is even higher mainly because Africans spend a higher percentage of their income on food and food has seen the highest price rises. Food prices have risen by 14.6 per cent in the last year. Africans spend up to 80 per cent of income on food, and Whites only 25 per cent. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 30, Sept. 6, 1975)

INFLATIONARY PROBLEMS CALL FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION


The South African Government has recently announced new steps to fight inflation. In a radio speech on August 27 Prime Minister Vorster called upon workers to refrain from asking for wage increases and also appealed to producers to hold back price increases. He said that inflation poses a serious threat to South Africa's whole economic and social system. It is predicted that a wage freeze will be applied to all public workers.

The South African Reserve Bank will act to tightly control the money supply and keep interest rates high. There have also been calls to cut government spending and reduce the financing of imports. It is felt, after examining the main economic indices (wholesale trade, retail trade and manufacturing output), that a "strong recovery" of the economy is not in the offing and that inflation may not drop as fast as in other countries. Yet South Africa is better off than certain European nations. Its growth rate is estimated at 3-4 per cent (versus the 7 per cent rate in 1973 and 1974). A balance of trade deficit remains and may mount with the increase in oil prices, but South Africa is less than 25 per cent dependent upon imported energy.

But much of South Africa's economic situation is tied up with its whole international position, its dependency on foreign capital and imports, and the sale of gold. In an interview, the Minister of Finance, Owen Horwood underlined this in referring to South Africa's attempt to create a stable climate in Southern Africa. He said: "Although there is much appreciation abroad for South Africa's policy of detente, current events in other parts of Southern Africa are causing some hesitation among investors in respect of investment in South Africa . . . If detente proves to be successful I would expect a substantial increase in foreign investment in all parts of Southern Africa." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 23, 1975) (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 16, 23, 30; Sept. 6, 1975; *Argus*, Cape Town, Aug. 28, 1975)

PROBLEMS WITH GOLD

South Africa's massive industrial growth in the past decade involving great imports of capital equipment and the use of foreign loans has been enabled by the sale of gold. Refined gold sales make up 36 per cent of South Africa's exports (even though the industry only employs some 400,000 workers or five per cent of the total work force). These exports were worth \$3.8 billion in 1974, up some 300 per cent since 1971. Yet refined gold output has dropped some 20 per cent since 1971, sometimes because the increased income resulting from the high price



Prime Minister Vorster

of gold over the last several years has made it economically feasible for the mining companies to develop the poorer grade ores which contain less refined gold.

But over the last several months the world price of gold has dropped from more than \$190/ounce to the current price of less than \$150 per ounce. Costs have increased with the jump in workers wages (see *Southern Africa*, October, 1975) and general capital costs. The precariousness of the gold position and the economic dependency upon this one mineral is clear from noting South Africa's continued balance of payments deficit. (*Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 8, 1975)

In early September the International Monetary Fund met in Washington and made several important decisions about gold output and price which affected South Africa. The full interpretation and ramification of these developments are not known and opinion fluctuates as to whether or not the decisions portend well or not for South Africa. First of all the IMF abolished the former two-tier pricing system for gold. The low price of \$42.22/ounce which was the official price and the only one which could be used by governments in transactions has been stopped. This means that each government will have to decide the worth of its gold more closely related to the much higher market price used on the open market. The countries cannot as yet change their total holdings in gold, but it does mean that in international transactions gold will be a more mobile currency. The end of the two tier system is a victory for South Africa, a policy it has long wanted. But the other decision by the IMF to sell over time one sixth of its own gold stock on the open market using the proceeds to help developing nations and their balance of payments problems is worrisome to South Africa. This dumping of large amounts of gold is predicted naturally to mean a lowering of the market price, but despite the steady decline of the market gold price recently it is un-

likely that the IMF sales will do anything to push them down further. Pro-gold countries such as France apparently went along with the IMF sales.

An interesting aspect of the alteration in the system will be its impact on the Mozambique Convention between South Africa and Mozambique. Under the terms of the Convention until now Mozambican miners who worked in South Africa were paid a part of their wages in a deferred payment which was given to the Portuguese government. That payment was made in gold at the official price. The Portuguese Government then sold the gold on the free market meaning a possible profit to Mozambique of \$140-\$210 million a year. There are different ideas a foot for new systems of payment but essentially it will have to be renegotiated between the new FRELIMO government and South Africa and the gold will have to be valued differently. Decisions which emerge will then affect the way in which South Africa relates to other country's miners such as Lesotho.

South Africa's own gold reserves will also be revalued since they are pegged at the lower old price, as will the system whereby the Government buys the gold from the mines. Whether the changes will lead to an increase in the gold reserves held by the government or go to the mining houses is not clear yet.

South Africa is dependent upon good high prices for its gold and the ability to increase output. In the latter area there has been a large surface ore strike in the western Transvaal near Botswana and partly in the Bophuthatswana "homeland." The Government broadcasting system boasted the find saying that this discovery and others of anthracite and platinum are "further proof that South Africa's mineral potential is far from exhausted . . . In February last year the British Mining Journal forecast that South Africa's mineral riches would help her (sic) to be-

come one of the world's greatest economic powers. Certainly evidence is mounting that this is an accurate forecast." (SABC News Commentary, August 29, 1975) (*Washington Post*, August 30; *Star*, Johannesburg, August 30, Sept. 2, 6; *Die Transvaler*, Sept. 2; *Beeld*, Sept. 1, *Financial Mail*, August 29, 1975)


FOREIGN RELATIONS

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FRENCH "ARMS EMBARGO"

In August 1975 the French President, Giscard d'Estaing, announced during a state visit to Zaire that France would no longer continue to supply arms to South Africa. However, upon analyzing the actual effects of the "arms cut-off," the announcement is revealed as simply a public relations ploy aimed at undermining the critics of France's close military and economic ties with the Apartheid Regime. A distinction is made between "continental and air weapons" and "naval weapons." While the former will no longer be *directly* supplied by France, the latter will flow freely into South Africa's military arsenal. But even in the first category there are extremely important loopholes. All current contracts for armaments will be honored. Thus, South Africa in the future will receive 45 Mirage F-1 jet fighters, a number of helicopters, and two conventionally powered submarines (which are due for delivery in 1978). Additionally South Africa has been provided with the technology which enables it to manufacture, domestically, military hardware which it once bought directly from France. (For example, the French electronic company, Thomson-CSF, has provided South Africa with the technology to produce the ground-to-air Crotale Missile.) Also this policy in no way affects South

The photo and caption below appeared in the South African Digest a government publication, in September

An international aviation alliance was responsible for this giant troop-carrier, and for its name, the Transall. Manufactured by Aerospatiale (France), it has a Tyne 20 Mark 22 engine designed by Rolls Royce, manufactured in France under licence by Hispano-Suiza. With a cruising speed of 500 km/h, the Transall has a maximum payload of 16 000 kg, and is capable of carrying 92 passengers, 62 stretchers, or 64 fully-equipped paratroopers



Africa's ability to purchase "civilian" type of aircraft which can be easily converted to military uses. (The US Government attempts to hide its own violation of the UN declared embargo on arms to South Africa by claiming that only "civilian" aircraft are supplied to South Africa for use by "business executives.")

France's continued support of the Apartheid Regime is demonstrated by the fact that the economic ties between the two countries are increasing. After the visit of the French Secretary of Foreign Trade, Norbert Segard, to South Africa, prospects have been raised concerning South African-French projects in the fields of nuclear energy, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles. The four container ships which South Africa has already ordered and the several medium range airbus transport planes which South Africa plans to order will be delivered by France. With regard to these planes, if used for inflight refueling of the Mirage fighter planes, the result would be that all of Mozambique and most of central Africa could be subject to South African aerial surveillance. This would increase South Africa's capability to threaten the security of the independent African states. ("Short Circuit Franco-South African Connection," *Africa*, London, Sept. 1975, p. 43.)

More importantly, the South African rulers feel in no way threatened by the French "arms embargo." The *Star* (Johannesburg, Aug. 23, 1975) reports a French Foreign Ministry official as stating that "there is no question of France taking the lead in anti-South African diplomacy." According to the *Star's* Paris correspondent: "the French Government aims to make a determined effort to retain South Africa's friendship. . . . There is an important segment of opinion within the French Foreign Office which believes that Pretoria's attempts at rapprochement with more moderate Black African states, as well as its intervention in Rhodesia, represent a highly positive development in the African context and furthermore, stand a fair chance of success. . . . France would like to certainly see South Africa's current diplomatic campaign in Africa win out. . . . Equally significant . . . [is that] South Africa is an important and growing market for French exports. At a time of domestic recession, the French are anxious not to lose it" (Thus, the French Government is trying to fool public opinion concerning its support of the South African regime and its lucrative investments in Apartheid, while attempting to aid South Africa in its "detente" strategy in Africa.)

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE THIRD WORLD

It seems that the independent African states are not the only area of the Third World which is a target for South African political and economic expansion. Between August 13 and 18, 1975, Prime Minister Vorster, accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, General Hendrik van den Bergh (chief of the Bureau of State Security-B.O.S.S.), General Mike Geldenhy (chief of the security police) and 38 additional government officials, paid an official visit to Paraguay and Uruguay. On August 15, Mr. "Pik" Botha South Africa's ambassador to the UN and the US, joined Vorster in Asuncion, Paraguay. The Paraguayan visit was highly profitable for South Africa's economic interests. Four agreements providing for South African loans to Paraguay of \$7 million (for eight years), \$700,000 for housing, \$5.6 million to enable Paraguay to buy South African agricultural equipment (for 15

years), and \$980,000 (for three years) were signed by Dr. Muller and the Paraguayan Foreign Minister Dr. Raul Sapena Pastor. While in Uruguay Prime Minister Vorster met with the Uruguayan President, Mr. Bordaberry, and Foreign Minister, Dr. Blanco. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 2, 1975; *Guardian*, London, Aug. 14, 1975; *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Aug. 22, 1975)

To the South African press, the importance of the Latin American visit was that it aided South Africa's strategy to (falsely) portray itself as a "member" of the Third World and that it opened up Latin American markets to South African capital investment. *Die Vaderland* comments that "further links are being forged with the Third World. Geographically South Africa forms part of the bloc of Afro-Asian and Latin American states and in many cases we have to deal with the same political and socio-economic problems. . . . The Third World will have an increasingly important role in new world politics, [thus] it is essential that South Africa already plays its part at this stage." The *Diamond Fields Advertiser* writes that "we [South Africa] have much to give in the form of trade and technical assistance to poor and underdeveloped countries, and Mr. Vorster has already said he hopes for encouraging results in fields such as finance and tourism. . . . South American countries are a moderate group forming a significant bloc in bodies like the United Nations where their membership is 26. South Africa has diplomatic links with 10 of them. Thus the mutual benefits springing from normalising relations with countries on the South American half continent are both economic and diplomatic." (*Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Aug. 15, 22, 1975)

With regard to the African continent, the Apartheid regime is again baiting its trap with offers of generous technical and financial assistance. Speaking at a ceremony opening the Orange-Fish River Tunnel, Vorster stated that "we [South Africa] offer the knowledge we have gained—our engineering skills and scientific and technical knowledge—to our neighbouring countries. . . . To . . . the governments of neighbouring states and all states to the north, this offer is open to whoever wants to make use of it in a spirit of goodwill, co-operation, mutual understanding and respect. . . . South Africa was a part of Africa and would like to assist other African states on this basis with whatever knowledge and know-how at our command." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 23, 1975) In connection with this aid offer, there is speculation that the current Zambian policy in cooperating in South Africa's "dialogue" offers is the result of secret agreements between South Africa and Zambia in which South Africa has promised technological and financial assistance in exchange for Zambia's cooperation in restraining the activities of the South African, Namibian, and Zimbabwean liberation movements. (*W.B.A.I.*, New York, Sept. 19, 1975)

Meanwhile, interviewed at the UN, Zaire's Foreign Minister, Mr. Mandungu Bula Nyati, stated that his government opposed "any suspension or expulsion of any state from any international organization" and preferred to pressure South Africa from inside the world organization, plus that "it is necessary that countries backing . . . the blacks in South Africa bring pressure to bear not only on . . . the white racists, but also on the great powers that support them—the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany." (*New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1975) However, when one compares this policy statement with the

traditional French policy on South African UN membership, one begins to wonder who has been pressuring whom. Maybe the recent French announcement in Zaire of an "arms embargo" happened to have been a bargaining chip for Zaire's support of the official French policy towards South Africa. Commenting on those African states that have bitten the South African regime's bait, Mr. Thami Mhlambiso (African National Congress delegate

to the UN) stated that "this dialogue is on Vorster's own terms and he has not admitted to any change in his attitude. Vorster is firmly for apartheid." For the Black majority the repressive conditions have worsened. "Nelson Mandela, leader of the ANC is still imprisoned on Robben Island, hundreds are under house arrest, under detention and in exile. . . ." (*Daily World*, New York, Sept 13, 1975)

zimbabwe

COUNCIL EXPELS NKOMO

Bishop Abel Muzorewa, chairman of the African National Council, has ordered the expulsion from the ANC of Joshua Nkomo, former head of the ZAPU contingent within ANC. Two other former ZAPU members were expelled also. Muzorewa accused Nkomo of collaborating with Ian Smith, head of the Rhodesian Front government in Rhodesia. There was speculation among ANC members in Lusaka that Nkomo would meet privately with Smith and attempt to reach an agreement now that the August 25 round of talks has failed. (*New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1975)

After the talks aboard the South African railcar over the Zambezi River ended in a deadlock, Smith said he would seek to settle Rhodesia's future with "other African leaders." Nkomo, Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and ten other ANC delegates were present at the talks. Nkomo

returned to Zimbabwe after the negotiations broke down. Muzorewa and Sithole remained in Zambia because both face arrest if they re-enter Rhodesia.

Following the unsuccessful talks, Sithole was made head of the re-activated Zimbabwe Liberation Council, based in Zambia. The ZLC functions as the external wing of the ANC, handling external affairs as well as the military wing of the struggle. Nkomo and other less militant Zimbabweans were excluded from the leadership. The Nkomo group saw this as an attempt to strengthen Sithole's role and to weaken Nkomo's in the ANC leadership positions.

Commenting on the re-activation of the ZLC and Sithole's selection as leader, Nkomo charged that the ZLC was "either going to form a new party or was attempting to hijack the ANC." He said the formation of the council was illegal, "a plot by people who shout unity when they are wreckers of unity." Nkomo attacked Sithole as a "militant little reverend . . . nothing less than a runaway." (*Los Angeles Times*, Sept 4, 8, 1975)

Shortly after Nkomo returned to Zimbabwe from the Zambesi River talks, he and 37 members of the 69 member executive of the ANC met in Salisbury. Sithole, Muzorewa and other former ZANU leaders were not there. The Salisbury group issued a bitter attack on Muzorewa's leadership, accusing him of failing to return to Zimbabwe in time of need. They also called a late September national congress of the ANC for the purpose of electing new leaders. (*Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 8, 1975; *Guardian*, London, Sept. 17, 1975)

It was this national congress which Muzorewa postponed earlier this year because he thought it would bring out antagonistic elements, destroying the unity built-up within ANC. It is quite certain that Nkomo would be elected chairman at such a congress because former ZAPU members have predominant influence at the branch level of the ANC. Sithole, speaking from Lusaka, denounced the outcome of the Salisbury meeting, calling it "an act of rebellion." (*Los Angeles Times*, Sept 8, 1975)

In an interview in Lusaka, Sithole said that Nkomo "will do anything to get to power. . . . He is more interested in getting to power than in liberating Zimbabwe. . . . One of the things that he dreads most is the second alternative, namely the armed struggle. We maintain that if peaceful negotiations fail, then we have no alternative but to intensify the armed struggle. It is this second alternative of which Joshua is so much afraid. . . ." Sithole

Abel Muzorewa (left) and Joshua Nkomo appearing together at the UN as representatives of the ANC in May this year



commenting on the plan the Salisbury group made for electing new leadership, said, "It is an open secret that he (Nkomo) is plotting day and night to see that Bishop Muzorewa is overthrown." (BBC Broadcast, London, Sept 14, 1975)

RHODESIA WEAKENS

The economic and military situation within Rhodesia becomes more desperate each month. South Africa pulled all of its troops out of Rhodesia in early August. Prime Minister Vorster argued that the South African troops were there to protect South Africa from invasion by "terrorists" entering South Africa through Rhodesia, and that these conditions no longer existed. The pull-out was considered a sell-out by many conservative elements in

South Africa and Rhodesia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 9, 1975)

Economically Rhodesia is in trouble. South Africa has said definitely that Rhodesian chrome and maize cannot be carried on South African rails to ports in South Africa. South African railways are over-burdened already and the ports are clogged. President Machel of Mozambique is ready to close the border to Rhodesian rail traffic as soon as the ANC gives the word. This link has been left open during the attempts to negotiate a settlement.

Rhodesian tobacco prices have dropped from \$1.50 per kilogram in 1973 to \$1.30 at the beginning of this season. If the price is not raised, 60 per cent of the Rhodesian tobacco farmers will be put out of business. (*Observer*, London, July 20, 1975; *X Ray*, London, Vol 5 No. 5, August, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, Aug 23, 1975)

namibia

TERRORISM IN NAMIBIA

South African occupation forces in Namibia have, since August 17, 1975, been conducting yet another terror campaign against Namibians opposed to the rule of Pretoria in the United Nations territory.

At least 32 Namibians are known to be in detention under the terms of the South African regime's Terrorism Act. Information is difficult to come by. A Lutheran Church official commented: "Still others are rumored to be in custody, but nobody knows for sure. Arrests are taking place in the greatest secrecy". Names and instances have been put together from reports from the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Namibia National Convention (NNC), the Lutheran and Anglican churches, the *Windhoek Advertiser*, the *Johannesburg Star*, *The Times* of London and the Christian Institute of Southern Africa.

Virtually the entire top leadership of SWAPO inside Namibia has been detained. Members of NNC, seven Lutheran pastors, a woman and a 15-year-old girl are among those held incommunicado somewhere by the South African security police.

Mr. David H. Meroro, SWAPO national chairman and a Windhoek businessman—who spent five months in detention under torture last year and who was convicted last April of illegally possessing subversive literature and released on suspended sentence—eluded the South African police and escaped into neighboring Botswana. Mr. Meroro is expected to fly to New York in mid-October to appear before the United Nations.

The Rev. Zefanja Kameeta, principal of the Lutheran Paulinum Theological Seminary and a seriously ill man, was held in detention for three weeks. Shortly after his release, security police approached him and demanded that he sign a 50 page statement. Pastor Kameeta refused. At last report, he was still ill though safe at home.

The most hideous act of terror known to have been committed was against Ms. Paulus Nailenge and her husband, a Lutheran pastor at Ongenga in the northern re-

gion. On 26 August, white South African soldiers attempted to attack two girls of Pastor Nailenge's congregation. Later two of them did assault and rape Ms. Nailenge, who is in her seventies and half-blind. Her 85-year-old husband tried to intervene and was beaten to the ground and kicked. Both are in hospital; Ms. Nailenge's condition is critical.

In late August, the home of Anglican Archdeacon Philip Shilongo at Odibo near the Angola frontier, was burned to the ground by South African army troops or bantustan strong-arm men. Army units raided the home of the Rev. Stephen Shimbode at Epinga and stole money. In January, 1972, six members of Father Shimbode's parish were shot dead by South African Police.

The *Windhoek Advertiser* reports that on September 11, police raided some of the offices of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Windhoek paying particular attention to "those rooms occupied by Mr. Daniel Tjongarero who works for the Church and is at the same time publicity and information secretary for the Namibia National Convention." Bishop Lukas de Vries, president of the Church, demanded: "What in the world gave them the right to search my Church offices and for what purpose?"

The United Nations Council for Namibia, in an August 29th statement, declared: "The South African regime justified this new wave of terror by the recent death of 'bantustan' chieftain Filemon Elihas. However, the real purpose of these renewed acts of terror and brutality against the Namibian people is to arrest and imprison all the real and suspected political opponents of the regime in Namibia before the so-called constitutional conference, which is designed to divide the Namibian people and thereby perpetuate South African domination in the Territory."

THE "CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE"

The South African-sponsored constitutional conference opened in the Turnhalle in Windhoek on September 1,



Sam Shivots, Secretary of SWAPO in Northern Namibia, was one of the many people arrested recently

1975—celebrated as Settlers Day by the whites—with great fanfare. The concept publically emanated from the South West Africa National Party, the dominant all-white political entity in the Territory, and ten months of talk and planning has gone into this effort to begin forming a 'government' which South Africa and its white minority allies in Namibia hope will stave off international pressures for independence for the Territory.

The Turnhalle, an old German-era gymnasium building, had been completely and expensively refurbished for the occasion—widely hailed as the "summit conference". Over 150 delegates of 11 "ethnic groups" attended. Luxurious appointments, air-conditioning, conference side rooms and a bugging device discovered in a lounge during a meeting of some African delegates completed the modernity of the great occasion (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, September 4, 1975).

Consternation developed early in the two week conclave when Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo (who arrived back in Windhoek from a hasty trip to London—his third overseas this year) introduced as a member of his delegation an American attorney retained as a consultant. Mr. Stuart Schwartz, a New York City lawyer once active in the reform Democratic Party on Manhattan's West Side, was billed as a "constitutional expert". Some delegates objected to his presence in the main meeting hall and the American was relegated to a side room, although provided with loud-speaker facilities for following the discussions and with transcripts. Interest was further centered on him because the bugged room was one in which Mr. Schwartz conferred with certain African delegations.

A demonstration greeted the first days' events, but dispersed without incident (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, September 2, 1975). The conference continued until September 12 and adjourned after issuing a Declaration of Intent. Commencing with "We, the true and authentic representatives of the inhabitants of South West Africa" the document speaks of "peaceful negotiation and co-operation", of "respect" for the wishes of "population groups", of the creation "of a form of government which will guarantee

to every population group the greatest possible say in its own and national affairs and will fully protect the rights of minorities" and resolved "promotion of and deference towards human rights and fundamental freedoms of all without discrimination merely on the basis of race, colour or creed". The delegates said they would draft a constitution "if possible within a period of three years". The conference is set to reassemble on November 3. The text of the Declaration was being circulated at the United Nations in New York on the afternoon of the 12th by the South African Mission.

"After reaching consensus on the Declaration on Friday, the conference turned to the second point on its agenda—a proposal that action be taken against organisations and individuals 'indulging in intimidation and instigation of violence'" (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, September 15, 1975). There is no further word on this agenda item.

"The principle of one man, one vote, or South West Africa becoming a unitary state was out, Mr. Eben van Zijl, MEC, said yesterday" (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, September 18, 1975). Mr. van Zijl is a white delegate to the conference and member of the powerful executive committee for South West Africa. The other white delegate, Mr. Dirk Mudge, senior member of the South West Africa Legislative Assembly, was reported to have declared "the Republic of South Africa would not withdraw from the Territory of South West Africa until such time as the problems of the Territory were solved" (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, September 19, 1975).

Pastor Cornelius Ndjoba, the new chief minister of the Ovambo homeland replacing the assassinated Chief Elifas, opened the constitutional conference with a prayer. He announced in Windhoek that "he would leave his people in the lurch if he abandoned his aim of full political independence for the Ovambo nation" (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, September 25, 1975). The chief minister went on to say that Angola, which borders his area, was an example of a country that had "destroyed itself" because of a lack of law and order. "But I wish to assure you that law and order will be maintained in Ovamboland. I shall see to this."

SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY RESTATED

"South Africa agreed that the people of South West Africa should express themselves freely about their own future but would never under any circumstances consent to United Nations' supervision for such expression, the Prime Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster said in Windhoek last night" (*Advertiser*, September 24, 1975). The South African chief minister was speaking as he officially opened the 32nd Congress of the National Party in South West Africa.

KISSINGER REPEATS U.S. POSITION

In New York on September 23, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger offered a toast at a dinner he hosted at the U.S. Mission across the avenue from the United Nations in honor of foreign ministers and permanent representatives from nations of the Organization of African Unity. Dr. Kissinger asserted "The United States also continues to support the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion of 1971 affirming the General Assembly's 1966 decision which terminated the South African mandate over Namibia. The United States will take no steps that would legitimize South Africa's administration of the territory . . . we believe that all Namibians should be given the opportunity to express their views freely, and under UN supervision, on the political and constitutional structure of their country."

SOUTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN FOR PUPPET RECOGNITION

The *Windhoek Advertiser* first broke the news (September 16 and 24, 1975) that a group of 33 persons, leading representatives from each of the 11 "ethnic groups" at the Windhoek conference, was being taken on a three-week overseas tour of Britain, West Germany and the United States. The contingent is due in America on October 5. It will visit Washington, D.C. for three days and see people at the State Department (a spokesman avers "we will speak with anyone about Namibia—after all, they are Namibians"). It will be honored at a reception October 7 at the South African embassy in Washington. It will visit Arizona, and return to New York for October 11-14. Doubtless an attempt will be made to see officials at the United Nations, presenting the lawful authority over Namibia with a full-blown diplomatic problem. At this writing, it is quite conceivable that at that time the South African ambassador to the U.N. (and the U.S.) "Pik" Botha will seek to claim his seat in the General Assembly.

Denunciations of South Africa's clumsy ploy are mounting. SWAPO's representative in New York, Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, reminded the public of his organization's dedication to "the complete and total freedom and independence for 'ONE NAMIBIA, ONE NATION'". A communication from the information secretary of the NNC in Windhoek to the UN Council for Namibia lists many of the organizations and groups opposed to the constitutional conference, including SWAPO, other members of the NNC and various tribal groups. All those were excluded from the conference not only by their own decision but by the decision of the National Party. The communication poses the question: "Will the groups who do not accept the summit (conference), accept a decision

reached at the summit? Or will they only accept it if they are confronted by additional police pistols, the army in Ovamboland and the tribal police. Are the police able to shoot someone's dissatisfaction out of his heart with a pistol?"

The message concludes: "Yet another question, will the Namibian question be solved this way or will this summit create yet another set of political problems for Namibia?"

A SHOW TRIAL?

South African Minister of Police J.T. Kruger indicated that there will be a trial connected with the August 16 assassination of Chief Filemon Elifas (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, September 25, 1975). South Africa's top cop addressed a session of the National Party congress, "amid cheering and applause". "The investigation into the assassination was continuing 'vigorously' and it was hoped that certain people, although not the real assassin, would appear in court . . . The Minister added that there was now clear evidence that members of SWAPO were involved in the case. Those to appear in Court were not necessarily directly involved in the murder but they were at least suspected to have had a hand in it."

A SWAPO CONSTITUTIONAL DISCUSSION PAPER

A SWAPO proposal for a constitution for an independent Namibia is being circulated (*Times*, London, September 2, 1975). Projected as a discussion paper, the document envisions "Namibia to be an independent country rather than an agglomeration of federal states". It proposes that the country become a republic with a popularly elected president and cabinet members chosen by a single-chamber legislature.

angola

MPLA IN THE VANGUARD

In the past months of military confrontation between the ideologically and politically distinct Angolan movements, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, the MPLA has scored decisive military and psychological victories. These victories place MPLA in the strongest position of the three movements as the Angolan date scheduled for independence (November 11) approaches. FNLA failed to "fight its way back to Luanda", as promised by FNLA Deputy Secretary General, Daniel Chipenda, in July and FNLA has lost ground in northern and central Angola where it had claimed some military and political strength.

It appears MPLA now controls 12 of Angola's 16 provinces, and it is maintaining firm control of the major Angolan towns and cities. The threat of a partition of Angola into areas controlled by MPLA, FNLA and UNITA has not materialized, and FNLA and UNITA show increasing signs of weakness on the military front and even greater political isolation from the Angolan people. MPLA has emerged the clear victor in the latest round of fighting with its rivals.

In fighting which has raged from May until the present, the MPLA has gradually expanded its influence and control outwards from Luanda. In nearly every phase of the

military struggle the MPLA has defeated the FNLA and has driven its forces back into the Bakongo ethnic regions of northwest Angola.

UNITA forces have never seriously threatened MPLA and UNITA has signed unity agreements with the FNLA to bolster its relatively weak position. UNITA has recently opened an office in Kinshasa, capital of Zaire, where FNLA is already headquartered.

By early August MPLA was in firm control of the capital city, Luanda, and of the provinces of Lunda, Moxico in eastern Angola (long claimed to be controlled by UNITA), Porto Amboim and Novo Redondo on the coast, the southern coffee-growing center of Gabela and the northern oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. (*Reuter News Service*, August 6, 1975) By late August MPLA controlled Malange, Lobito and Benguela, also on the coast. Caxito was temporarily taken by MPLA, but in a counter-attack FNLA has regained its control of the town.

In spite of its victories the MPLA has cautioned Angolans to be alert to the realities of outside intervention in Angola. In the past month there have been repeated reports of South African and Portuguese mercenaries massing on Angola's southern and eastern borders.

In the past year an estimated 10,000 Angolans, mostly

...vilians, have been killed in the fighting among the liberation groups. Additionally thousands of refugees are streaming across Angola's borders into Zaire, Zambia and Namibia. In the western press the bulk of attention has been paid to the white Angolan refugees whose numbers are said to be 200,000 of Angola's estimated 500,000 white population. This figure is expected to rise to 350,000. The conditions for black Angolan refugees is virtually ignored in the press and therefore estimates of numbers of refugees are impossible to make. Zaire has offered to take in as many as 400,000 white refugees from Angola, but the offer came just before a massive airlift of some 200,000-300,000 Portuguese was to begin. (*New York Times*, Aug. 31, 1975; *Washington Post*, Sept. 5, 1975) The refugee airlift, in which the US is participating by donating two DC-8 aircraft, is somewhat larger than the Portuguese government would have desired. Not surprisingly the US government is anxious to aid in the airlift return to Portugal of hundreds of thousands of conservative Angolan whites. A smaller percentage of white Angolans, not afraid of black majority rule in the country, have chosen to stay.

An equally severe result of the fighting has been the sharp downturn in the Angolan economy as production halted in the areas of heavy fighting. In the coffee-growing regions of the north, where MPLA and FNLA have had some of their most serious clashes, coffee production is estimated to be about one-quarter of last year's yield. Luanda port is barely functioning because of strikes and because transport workers feel it unsafe to carry goods by truck from the port to the interior. While oil production in Cabinda has not been affected by the fighting, the Luanda oil refinery ceased operations after the summer fighting resulting in severe gas shortages and rationing.

MERCENARIES ADD TO ANGOLAN CRISIS

Throughout the military power struggle between MPLA and FNLA, there have been constant reports of white mercenaries fighting with FNLA and of troops of white mercenaries marching into Angola from the south and east. MPLA has accused South African troops of having invaded Angolan territory from Namibia and destroying a minor border post before continuing their advance. (*Washington Post*, Aug. 31, 1975) MPLA said the invaders, numbering about 800 men, included South African and Portuguese mercenaries recruited from the former DGS, the fascist secret police. The invaders penetrated as deeply as 70 miles inside Angola and were reported to be using armored vehicles, helicopters and tear gas. UNITA reports from Nova Lisboa corroborated the presence of South African troops inside Angola. Later an MPLA communique said that the mercenaries took several towns near the Namibian border and appeared to be heading for Sa de Bandeira about 150 miles north of the Namibia-Angola border. (*Providence Journal-Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975)


Only two weeks after these reports MPLA announced that a large force of white mercenaries had invaded Angola from the east along the Angola-Zaire border. The mercenaries are reported to have seized the border town of Vila Teixeira de Sousa (see map), just across from the Zaire province of Katanga which was the center of white mercenary activity in the Congo during the 60's. Vila Teixeira de Sousa also lies along the Benguela railroad which carries copper ore from Katanga to the eastern Angolan port of Benguela. (*Daily World*, New York, Sept. 12, 1975)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CABINDA

As reported in *Southern Africa* (September 1975) the President of the Cabindan "Liberation Front" (FLEC), Luis Ranque Franque, proclaimed the independence of Cabinda in August at a press conference following the OAU summit in Kampala. All three Angolan liberation movements however have agreed that Cabinda is an integral part of Angola. Further it has been alleged that FLEC is nothing more than a creation of Gulf Oil and the question of the "liberation" of Cabinda has often been interpreted as Gulf Oil increasing its control over the oil-rich territory in which it has substantial investments.

The independence declaration has stirred little concern or attention even inside Cabinda itself which is well known to be controlled by MPLA forces. MPLA is estimated to have some 2,200 well-equipped troops in the enclave, especially in Cabinda town and along the Zaire border.

Gulf Oil operations have not been affected by the FLEC independence move or by the fighting in Cabinda town or in other parts of Angola. However Gulf oil is facing serious shortages in skilled manpower—of Gulf's Cabinda staff of 450 approximately 150 have left in the last four months. MPLA has made no attempt to interrupt oil production (since the fighting has disturbed other sectors of the economy oil income now amounts to most of Angola's revenues) in the Cabindan enclave it controls. In fact Gulf is planning to increase its output of 155,000 barrels per day by another 15,000 barrel a day later this year. Most of the oil extracted by Gulf was shipped to the U.S. and the Gulf installations at Malongo terminal in Cabinda accounted for roughly one-half of Angola's export revenue last year. (*Christian Science Monitor*, Washington, Sept. 2, 1975)



Something for Everyone ~ Gulf

Dave Bragin

The Struggle Continues

mozambique

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Cabora Bassa

On November 7, the Cabora Bassa dam will initially generate 680 megawatts of power from the Zambezi River to South Africa. The present generating capacity approaches 12,000 megawatts. Fifty-five megawatts will be preserved for Lourenco Marques.

Since direct current (DC) is the most economic form of power to transmit over long distances, the electricity will be converted to the latter at the dam. At Pafari, which is at the South African border, the DC power will be converted back to alternating current (AC) and fed into Escom's grid. The 55 megawatts for Mozambique completes the two way link. Presently, Lourenco Marques receives its electricity from Escom sources in the Eastern Transvaal.


The operation of the Cabora Bassa dam is of mutual financial benefit to both South Africa and Mozambique. For the latter, supply of power to South Africa is essential to pay off the \$530 million cost of Cabora Bassa. South Africa has invested \$140 million into the Apollo station and the South African powerlines.

Virtually all electrical power from the Cabora Bassa dam is destined for South Africa. By 1980, its generating capacity will be 2000 megawatts and according to the 20 year contract between South Africa and Cabora Bassa Ltd., by 1980, Escom will be buying 1500 megawatts (Star, Johannesburg, Sept. 16, 1975).

Workers Take Control of Their Plants

As of July, the number of firms in Lourenco Marques working in a system of self-administration had grown to

Cabora Bassa Dam



50. These firms had been neglected by, or abandoned by their previous owners; and have now been transformed into production units based on collective labor. Fourteen of the firms work with an administrative committee appointed by the Transitional Government. The other 36 work through workers committees which includes one technical official.

One firm in Beira province, "Socojol" and another in Nampula, "Anacleto" will also shortly adopt the self-administration system. (Noticias, Mozambique, July 11, 1975)

Agricultural Development a Priority

Mozambique has promulgated its first decree outlining the functions of the various ministries. The Ministry of Agriculture is seen, in Mozambique as the most important:

"Agriculture constitutes the primary base of Mozambican economy, therefore the mission of the Ministry of Agriculture is of the greatest importance. The action of the Ministry will envisage two objectives: to guarantee to the people and in particular to the rural masses, an amelioration of the present life conditions and notably an improvement adapted to their needs under a qualitative and quantitative plan. The dispersion of the rural population reinforces the Ministry of Agriculture to give priority to the re-organisation of the people. Therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of implementing the creation of communal villages which will be the instrument through which definitive elimination of exploitation of man by man will be demonstrated" (Marches Tropicaux, France, Aug. 8, 1975).

Travel Regulations

New regulations for entering and leaving Mozambique have been recently announced by Minister of Interior, Armando Emilio Guebuza, some of which are as follows:

1. All Mozambicans resident or non-resident in Mozambique may on any occasion and when there is need leave or enter the country as soon as they fulfill the necessary legal requirements and show proof of Mozambican citizenship.

2. Resident foreigners may leave the country as soon as legal requirements are met and must declare whether their leaving is permanent or temporary and in the latter case, the duration of such an absence. Non-resident foreigners may leave as soon as legal requirements are fulfilled.

3. Foreigners who wish to enter Mozambique may petition their respective consulates or apply directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tanzania Daily News, Tanzania, Aug. 20, 1975).

News Flashes

President Samora Machel married Graca Simbine, Minister of Education and Culture early in September (New York Times, Sept. 7, 1975).

Beginning 1976, a three-year inoculation program against smallpox and tuberculosis will begin. (Star, Johannesburg, Aug. 2, 1975).

All segregated clubs that still exist in Mozambique have been banned. Addressing a rally in the Nampula Province

Samora Machel assured the people that any divisive institution will not be tolerated in Mozambique (*Tanzania Daily News*, Tanzania, June 6, 1975).

Private funeral homes, private manufacturers of coffins and urns have been banned in Mozambique. A decree published in July announced the immorality of death being used as a source of private enrichment. A department of funerals will be set up in the Ministry of Health. All workers previously employed by private concerns will be employed by the new department. The continuation of private activities in these areas is punishable by a six month term in jail (*Rueters News Service*, July 14, 1975).

Mozambicans will have to do at least two years national service with modest pay and will concentrate on building communal villages in which people will be grouped for easier access. This was decided upon by a conference in the Mozambiquan department of Defense. The conference was presided over by President and Commander-in-Chief, Samora Machel.

The Mozambican army, Popular Liberation Forces of Mozambique (FPLM) is expected to participate in all aspects of the national reconstruction program. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 9, 1975).

The work week for health services has been extended to 44 hours. This announcement was made by Health Minister, Dr. Helder Martins as another effort to cope with the present health conditions. The country has fewer than 100 doctors.

In July, private clinics were nationalized and private practice was banned. Top priority has been given to establish rural health services where, for example, in the Lourenco Marques area, a population of some 750,000 had about 50 doctors. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam Aug. 20, 1975).

During the month of July, students of the Lourenco Marques university participated in national reconstruction by working in the fields and in the factories. This was part of Frelimo's unification program. Organized brigades of students were sent to the northern provinces of the country to take part in manual labor. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, July 4, 1975).

RELATIONS WITHIN AFRICA

A new road connecting the industrial center of Zambia with the Mozambique port of Beira has been just recently been put into operation. The road is of great importance to Zambia: its dependence on Rhodesia can be ended by a direct connection with the Mozambican ports. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, July 17, 1975).

An African National Council delegation, which included Joshua Nkomo and James Chikerema, visited Mozambique and discussed with governmental officials there, Mozambique's support. The topics of discussion with the Mozambique leaders included the use of Mozambique territory for bases for a possible guerrilla war against Rhodesia and the cessation of the transport of Rhodesian products via Mozambican ports. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, July 15, 1975).

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Mozambique has signed an agreement with the German Democratic Republic for technical and scientific assistance. The appropriate personnel will train the local staff and fill vacancies in the agricultural and health fields. (*Diario de Noticias*, Portugal, Aug. 14, 1975).

The Minister of Planning and Development, Marcelino dos Santos, announced by radio on July 19, that Mozambique and North Korea have signed an agreement promising economic and technical assistance from the latter to

the former. (*Marches Tropicaux*, France, Aug. 1, 1975).

Japan will donate \$400,000 (120 million yen), through the United Nations, to the Mozambican government to aide the victims of a flood which occurred in March (*Angola Report*, Angola, June 13, 1975). Along with other countries such as Great Britain, Brazil, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland, Japan will also make financial contributions to Mozambique through a UN program initiated in June, for the repatriation of those Mozambicans who left the country for Tanzania during the war. (*Marches Tropicaux*, France, July 11, 1975).

President Samora Machel recently sent a message of thanks to President Nikolai Podgorny of the USSR for the latter's consistent help throughout the eleven years liberation struggle. (*Daily World*, New York, Aug. 22, 1975).

India plans to take part in the rebuilding of Mozambique by providing doctors, teachers, engineers, agriculturalists and other experts (*Times of Zambia*, July 17, 1975).

A Yugoslav film team accompanied Samora Machel on his journey to Lourenco Marques from Cabo Delgado in May. The results of the trip are recorded in three films entitled "From Rovuma to Maputo", "Unity, Labor and Vigilance," and "Nachingwea." The films also give coverage of the June 25 celebrations. (*O Seculo*, Portugal, July 10, 1975.)

West Germany will help Mozambique in its struggle for total liberation by making a donation of 10 million German marks. (*Frankfurter Rundschau* West Germany, July 3, 1975.)

Dr. Albertino de Almeida is the new Portuguese ambassador to Mozambique. He was born in Angola, studied law in Lisbon and returned to Angola in 1968. He was legal advisor to the MPLA and UNITA trade union movement, and co-author of the book "Massacres em Luanda." (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, June 26, 1975.). Portuguese consulates in Rhodesia were closed down in July. (*O Seculo*, July 7, 1975).

The French consulate also closed down in Mozambique in July. Although diplomatic relations were recently established between the US and Mozambique, such has not yet occurred between the latter and France. (*Marches Tropicaux*, France, July 25, 1975).

Along with other countries, Sweden will help Great Britain in aiding Mozambique for the foreign exchange it will lose should it impose sanctions against Rhodesia by closing the borders between the two countries (*Daily News*, (Tanzania), May 19, 1975).

China gave a R64 million loan which is interest free and "string free" to Mozambique. Chinese technicians have already arrived in Mozambique to implement assistance agreements between the two third world countries (*Star*, Johannesburg, July 5, 1975).

guinea-bissau

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

The Second Session of the Legislature of the National Popular Assembly was held from April 28 to May 7. Beside the regular members from the Republic of Guinea-Bissau there were observers from the MPLA of Angola and from Cape Verde. The Assembly passed new laws nationalizing specified lands, and providing for the confiscation of lands and property of former collaborators with Portuguese colonialism. It also determined special rights for disabled veterans of the liberation war, and established

that the death penalty could be given to both traitors and to those involved in any drug traffic. A national income tax at about 1% per year, with an annual minimum of about \$12.00, was set to boost the government's reconstruction budget. (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, May 8, 1975; *Provincia*, Luanda, May 8, 1975; *Noticias*, Lourenco Marques, May 15, 1975)

Four million dollars have been spent on the repatriation and resettlement of some 150,000 refugees from the Gambia, Senegal, and Guinea-Conakry. The UN Commission for Refugees supported this relocation with money, food, trucks, and medical facilities. At the same time there were reports that a few former colonial collaborators were fleeing in early April and moving into Senegal's Casamance region after the abortive coup attempt in Bissau in late March. (*Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, Aug. 8, 1975; *West Africa*, Lagos, May 12, 1975)

In mid-May seven former PIDE-DGS collaborators and plotters were arrested; these had been posing as doctors. (*No Pintcha*, Bissau, May 12, 1975). These arrests bring the number of political detainees to 188 held on charges ranging from treason to activities as PIDE agents. (Reuter, Aug. 20, 1975) While rumors have appeared that some have already been executed, the PAIGC says that a public trial will soon be held.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRESSES

Two main immediate tasks in the Guinea-Bissau development program are those of assessing the national resources and needs, and starting to provide for financing various development projects. Guinea has become the 39th member of the African Development Bank and the OAU has promised some economic aid. President Senghor of neighboring Senegal recently paid a short visit and made a grant of seeds to help with the high priority given to agriculture. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, May 5, 1975; *O Seculo*, Lisbon, June 5, 1975)

The two major sources of assistance for the new government are the Soviet Union and Portugal. In May the Republic signed a cultural pact with the USSR which will grant scholarship aid and technical assistance. An agreement for joint operations of a USSR-RGB fishing company has been fulfilled with the delivery and use of a fifth fishing boat. At present the crew is mostly Soviet but the concurrent training process will reduce their numbers to half in a proscribed period and in the last phase fully trained Guineans will take over complete control of the fleet. The Soviet Union will also provide helicopters for the new nation's small air force. A Soviet technician, Vladimir Potikhinsky was involved in an accident in a mine clearing operation in Bissau harbor; he lost two limbs and the sight in one eye when a mine exploded. Finally a joint Soviet-Swedish project is investigating the hydro-electric potential of the River Corubal. (*Provincia*, Luanda, May 20, 1975; *Noticias*, Lourenco Marques, Aug. 13; *Reuters*, Aug. 20; *Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, Aug. 8, 1975)

Meanwhile the Portuguese are now providing some 500 people in educational and medical services, and in the maintenance of aircraft and airport facilities. The Portuguese organization, CIDAC, (Center for Anti-Colonial Information and Documentation) has sent a team to lead an educational program for primary school teachers. Other Portuguese and French are involved in technical and planning areas. The third phase of the RGB/Portugal negotiations reached agreement on cooperation in scientific,

judicial, air service, fishing, and maritime matters. These negotiations were coupled with a loan of \$8 million to be spent within Portugal in the next eight years. The RGB will stay within the escudo zone for some time to come; the 'peso' currency will not be put into circulation until some future date. (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, June 3, 23, 1975; *Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, Aug. 5, 7, 12, 1975)

The Dutch are said to be involved in organizing a sugar refinery in the town of Mansoa and Cuba has sent several teams of doctors. (*Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, Aug. 8, 1975; *Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, July 4, 1975) The Arabian nation of Qatar has promised a \$4 million development loan. (*Provincia*, Luanda, May 9, 1975) Relations with the EEC (European Economic Community) are expected to be opened soon. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, July 21, 1975) Other smaller non-governmental groups have provided office and laboratory equipment and some scholarships.

In July a three-man delegation from Guinea-Bissau visited Peking where they met with Chou En-Lai. A short while later a \$16 million credit was granted to the RGB for trade and agricultural items. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, July 7, 1975; *O Seculo*, Lisbon, July 16, 1975)

cape verde

A NEW ERA BEGINS

After 500 years of continuous Portuguese colonial rule and slavery the new Republic of Cape Verde was granted its full independence on July 5, 1975 in celebrations held in the Varzea Stadium in the capital city of Praia on Sao Tiago island. This day came after six months of transitional government and after Portuguese General Spindola had failed in efforts towards a neo-colonial relationship between the archipelago and Portugal. Vasco Goncalves, then Portuguese President officially transferred power to the PAIGC, the single party representing the Cape Verdean people. Also in attendance were various African and foreign delegations including Alvaro Cunhal, Secretary General of the Portuguese Communist Party who sat next to the personal representative of the Pope. Among the 10,000 people were also many Cape Verdeans from Europe, North and South America, and various African countries. To add to the festivities, Portuguese planes circled overhead dropping red flowers. (*AP*, July 6, 1975; *Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, July 7, 1975)

ELECTIONS AND AMNESTY

The June 30th election results showed that 85% of those eligible voted and of these 92% endorsed the PAIGC candidates. The small UPICV (Popular Union for the Independence of Cape Verde) in the southern islands, and the equally small UDC (Capeverdean Democratic Union) in the northern islands did not participate in the elections as they had initiated violent acts which almost caused the postponement of the elections.

The spirit of victory and unity was so overwhelming that the President of the Republic of Cape Verde, Aristides Pereira (and Secretary General of the PAIGC) declared an amnesty for some thirty PAIGC opponents from the UPICV and the UDC; Pereira noted that other criminals would be re-educated and brought back into society. On independence day there was a ban on liquor sales and most police officers were on duty along with members of FARP (Peoples Revolutionary Armed Forces)

who were stationed at key points. These units of FARP and other para-military self-defense units are to be trained by the RGB and Cuba. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, July 7, 1975; *Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, July 7, 1975)

A NEW GOVERNMENT

The first government of the Republic of Cape Verde was announced on July 11, 1975. The following are the central leaders and cabinet members.

President, Secretary General of PAIGC	Aristides Pereira
Prime Minister	Pedro Pires
Foreign Affairs, President of National Assembly, Chairman of Unity Commission	Abilio Duarte
Defense and Security	Silvino da Luz
Education, Youth, Culture, Sport	Carlos Reis
Economy	Oswaldo Lopez da Silva
Finance	Amara da Luz
Transport and Communication	Herculano Vieira
Agriculture and Water	Sergio Centeio
Justice	David Hopffer
Health and Social Affairs	Almada
Public Works	Manual Faustino
	Silvino Lima

NEW POLICIES

One of the first tasks of the new government is to make an inventory of basic needs and resources of the RCV. With widespread poverty the gap between maximum and minimum salaries will be cut. Worker control has been instituted in some of the agricultural lands abandoned by foreign landlords. The policies of the RCV will also include non-alignment, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, austerity, hard work, and reform in agriculture, finance, administration, and education. The Prime Minister noted that the islands would not be used as foreign bases and that the RCV was in complete solidarity with African liberation movements. Another government spokesman indicated that unity with the Republic of Guinea Bissau was in process but must go step-by-step pending the final report of the unity commission. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, July 23, 1975; *Tanzania Sunday News*, Dar es Salaam, July 6, 1975; *Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, July 18, 1975)



Aristides Pereira (left) and Vasco Goncalves shake hands after the transfer of power

Cape Verde has been granted \$40 million in foreign aid so far. It is estimated that \$18 million alone is necessary for the coming six months to pay some 70,000 public sector workers and to begin programs of cultivation, irrigation, and reforestation. The United States will provide some \$5 million in aid and credits. Senegal has granted about \$63,000 and the United Kingdom has given about \$500,000 in various types of aid. (*Provincia*, Luanda, May 16, 1975; *AFP*, Paris, July 1975; *AP*, July 6, 1975)

CAPE VERDEAN AMERICANS HELP THE RCV

Tchuba, a Cape Verdean American solidarity group, has signed an agreement with the Cape Verdean Solidarity Institute in Sao Tiago to arrange for donations and aid from the United States to Cape Verde. Special drought resistant 'jojoba' beans were sent along with school supplies, a technical resource library, and materials to revive the traditional 'pagne' textile industry. Some support has also been generated for those Cape Verdeans returning from other countries such as Angola. A cooperative store on Santo Antao and the Granja project of Sao Filipe are already in operation.

neighbors

ZAMBIA FACES DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION

The closure of the Lobito railroad due to the struggle in Angola has complicated Zambia's already difficult economic situation. Over half of Zambia's copper customarily goes through Lobito. While copper prices soared to ten-month highs on the London Metal Exchange because of the news of the shutdown, the Zambian Government and its two mining companies (Nchanga Consolidated and Roan Consolidated Copper Mines) declared a twenty percent *force majeure* (an inability to meet contractual demands by twenty percent) on 1975 copper shipments

beginning in September. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 23 and Sept. 6, 1975)

Problems in maize production are threatening the economy from another direction. Maize is the staple foodstuff of the country's five million inhabitants. Internal monthly consumption runs at 450,000 bags. By the end of April 1976 maize stocks may be depleted, with Zambia facing a shortage of nearly two million bags. The Government had hoped for seven million bags from this year's harvest but will be lucky to get four and a half million now. The principal problems are a cob rot called *fusarium* and, ac-

ording to the country's 480 commercial farmers, the low price (seven dollars for a top quality ninety kilogram bag) which the Ministry of Rural Development has set. In 1971 Zambia had to import one and a half million bags from Rhodesia. Imported maize next year will probably run about \$28 a bag. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 16, 1975)

In addition, the Government's attempts at economic reform are meeting resistance from White workers and criticism from businessmen. Wage increases, ranging from seven to twenty per cent in the copper industry and from one and a half to thirty-six per cent in government service have been given. The largest increases went to the lowest paid workers. These indications of reform have led to many White workers leaving the Copperbelt because of changes in the wage structure and increasing pressures for Africanization. Businessmen, upset at the idea of economic reform, are objecting to workers' participation in decision-making and ceilings on gross profits. They point out incompetence in semi-government-run enterprises. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 9 and 30, Sept. 6, 1975)

Kenya would like to resume handling Zambian exports and imports again through its Mombasa harbor, but the decision depends on Tanzanian permission to use the roads, closed earlier in 1975. The Tanzam railway is due to open in October and has a potential capacity of 1.7 million tons of freight annually, more than Zambia's total current requirements. A South African firm (Photosurveys Pty. of Johannesburg) has recently completed an aerial survey and routing model for the proposed 125 kilometer railway between Lilongwe and the Zambian border. (*Star*,

Johannesburg, July 19 and Aug. 30, 1975; *African Report*, July-August 1975)

FRANCO-ZAIROIS TALKS

French President Giscard d'Estaing made a state visit to Zaire in early August. He and President Mobutu were scheduled to discuss the situation in Angola, with the Frenchman expected to endorse Mobutu's support for Holden Roberto and for an autonomous Cabinda. Zaire has not joined the African criticism of the close French ties with South Africa and may be expanding its existing supplies of Mirage-5 planes, Puma and Alouette helicopters, and other military equipment. Giscard may agree to train Zaire officers and military specialists in France and apparently has suggestions for stabilizing the volatile price of copper. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 9, 1975)

SWAZILAND'S CHANGE IN ATTITUDE

Three recent developments suggest a new orientation in Swaziland's traditional coolness towards liberation movements in Southern Africa. Last year the Prime Minister visited Lusaka for meetings with Presidents Machel, Nyerere, and Kaunda. Henry Isaacs, a member of the South African Student's Organization, escaped via Swaziland from efforts of the South Africa regime to arrest members of the organization. Recently King Sobhuza gave encouragement and financial support to Oliver Tambo, President of the banned South African ANC, who was visiting Swaziland.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

u.n.

NEW UN MEMBERS

Just a few days before the celebration of the eleventh anniversary of the launching of the armed struggle in Mozambique, the new Frelimo Government received a

rousing welcome in the General Assembly as Mozambique was admitted by acclamation to UN membership. Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano, head of the Mozambican dele-



The delegations of the People's Republic of Mozambique seated at the UN, headed by Joaquim Chissano, Foreign Minister (left)

gation to the Assembly's thirtieth session said that Mozambique's admission was "one more victory in the struggle of its people against colonialism" and wished the Portuguese people "success in their continued struggle in order to consolidate their victory over fascism."

Cape Verde and Sao Tomé and Príncipe were also admitted to UN membership by acclamation on the same day. Monteiro Duarte, Foreign Minister of Cape Verde, thanked "all freedom- and peace-loving people throughout the world for their support." Referring to Cape Verde's important strategic position, he declared that Cape Verde was "determined to make it impossible for its territory to be used as a point of departure for aggression against any other country."

The delegation of Sao Tomé and Príncipe is headed by Prime Minister Miguel Trovoada. (UN press release GA/5310.)

SOUTH AFRICA AVOIDS UN CHALLENGE

The South African seat is empty at the current session of the General Assembly. "I cannot see us participating in hostile atmosphere," said Pik Botha, South Africa's ambassador to the UN and Washington before his departure to take up his new post in Washington. Dealing with his work in Washington, Botha said he would try to improve the "good relations" already existing with the United States. The Americans were like South Africans in many ways, declared, and he regarded it as a privilege to communicate "with those who make the decisions" and "to

convey to them what we really stand for." Apparently a preliminary sounding of the attitudes of UN ambassadors to a possible South African presence at this year's Assembly convinced Botha that it would be wiser for him to avoid the UN for a while. South Africa did not attempt to attend the Assembly's special session which met in September to discuss economic questions. (*The Star*, Johannesburg, July 21, 1975; weekly edition, August 16, 1975).

PAC TO OPEN OFFICE IN NEW YORK

The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), one of the two liberation movements of South Africa recognized by the OAU and associated with the work of the UN, is to open a mission to the UN in New York. PAC representative in New York will be David Sibeko, a member of the PAC Central Committee and Director of Foreign Affairs. PAC intends to use its new office to: press for permanent observer status at the UN rather than just observer status in the Apartheid Committee and in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly only for the duration of the debate on apartheid as at present; establish links with the many progressive countries which are present at the UN; familiarize the American public with the situation in South Africa and the work of the PAC; expose the role of the US and the other imperialist powers in bolstering the Vorster régime. The PAC is ready to co-operate with all "democratic groups" active in support of the liberation movements of South Africa. (Interview with David Sibeko)

u.s. and southern africa

HOUSE UPHOLDS BYRD MOVEMENT

On September 25, the House of Representatives defeated an attempt to close the loophole in US compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia allowed by the 1971 Byrd Amendment. The vote of 187 to 209 came after almost three years of effort in support of sanctions by Congressional sponsors, the Washington Office on Africa, labor unions, church and civil rights groups. The defeat will probably end Congressional action on sanctions at least for this session.

Many factors contributed to the defeat. Probably the most decisive one was the complete failure of the Administration to act on its statements of support for the measure. Only two days before the House action, Secretary of State Kissinger told representatives of the Organization of African Unity in New York that "President Ford and his entire Administration continue to urge repeal of the Byrd Amendment and expect this will be accomplished during the current session of the Congress." Up until the morning of the vote, the White House told the bill's sponsors that they would lobby on their behalf, but they did not contact one "swing" member of Congress to urge him or her to vote for HR 1287. The empty support from the Administration was reflected in the vote results: only 22 Republicans voted for sanctions.

Political pressure from the stainless steel industry also had a decisive effect on the vote. Several Representatives

who generally support "liberal" foreign policy measures voted against sanctions because of pressure from industry in their districts. Industry lobbyists, co-ordinated by E.F. Andrews of Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, had worked against the bill for two years with as much determination as their opponents.

Deep-seated political issues far beyond the scope of sanctions against Rhodesia also had an important impact on the vote. For example, the principal argument offered by opponents of the bill was that the Soviet Union would manipulate the supply and price of chromium available to the US if Rhodesia were excluded from the market. While proponents of the bill responded that imports of chromium products from the Soviet Union have actually increased while the US has been breaking sanctions, this reasoning did not affect the firm anti-Communism of the House. As Congressman Runnels of New Mexico said, "I do not understand the word 'detente' they keep talking about. If what I see is what I think it is, I have had all the detente I want." Other members cited the "misbehavior" of the United Nations and the "right" of Americans to free trade as reasons to oppose the bill.

Anti-Communism and economic pragmatism were arguments also used by the bill's proponents. Several sponsors, especially among the Republicans, supported sanctions because they believed that sanctions would

increase the chance of a "moderate" government in Rhodesia, rather than a "leftist, anti-American government" which would be virtually guaranteed if armed struggle breaks out again in Rhodesia. Several supporters of the bill argued that Rhodesian chrome would be excluded from the US market soon because of the probable cut-off of sanctions-breaking traffic through Mozambique and the over-burdened rail and port facilities in South Africa. They concluded that the US should reimpose sanctions now to enhance the prospects of long-term access to Rhodesian products from a majority government.

The defeat should not be seen wholly as a failure, however. Even the industry opponents admitted that the uncertainty of the US chromium market had hurt US industrial consumers and, by implication, Rhodesian suppliers, during the last two years. While the vote to retain the Byrd Amendment is a psychological victory for the Rhodesian Front regime at this point, the Congressional fight for sanctions yielded an affirmative vote in the Senate at the end of 1973 and forced the Administration into a hypocritical position of rhetorical support for the measure.

The defeat by 22 votes also represented an actual increase in the support for sanctions since the last vote in 1972, which failed by a margin of 113. Several Representatives became more knowledgeable and concerned about southern Africa during the fight for sanctions. In the three-year period, twenty-one Representatives changed to support the measure, while eight switched to oppose it. Several of the newly-gained supporters were important victories, including Thomas Morgan and Robert Giaino who were significantly influenced by constituent pressure. Four of the eight negative switches, however, showed decisive right-wing and industry pressure in the South. (*Congressional Record*, Sept. 25)

KISSINGER PRESENTS "US AFRICAN POLICY"


On September 23rd in New York, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger delivered a lengthy "toast" at a dinner for OAU foreign ministers and representatives to the UN. The statement may well have been a trial balloon for the "major African policy statement" which Kissinger promised the Congressional Black Caucus in August.

The Secretary offered to "define clearly and to state candidly our policy toward the continent of Africa." Even a cursory look at recent US actions toward Africa, however, reveals that Kissinger may have been considerably less than candid.

Kissinger said that the US has three major concerns in its policy: 1) economic development for the continent; 2) the spread of self-determination, racial justice and human rights to all of Africa; and 3) that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict.

He elaborated the last point by adding that "the US seeks neither military allies nor ideological confrontation in Africa. As Adlai Stevenson once said here at the United Nations, 'Africa for Africans means Africa for Africans, not Africa as a hunting ground for alien ambitions.'" With specific reference to Angola, he said "we are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence."

Ironic, then, that two days after the toast the *New*



York Times carried a major article, detailing secret US/CIA covert operations in support of at least one and possibly two anti-communist liberation movements in Angola. Kissinger and President Ford were informed of the operations and approved them.

On Rhodesia, Kissinger said the US "intends to adhere scrupulously to the UN's economic sanctions against Rhodesia. President Ford and his entire Administration continue to urge repeal of the Byrd Amendment and expect this will be accomplished during the current session of the Congress." Two days later the effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment failed in the House of Representatives, 209 to 187. The White House never lifted a finger to press for repeal, while the State Department pressure on House members was, to say the least, low-profile.

On economic matters, Kissinger stressed greater bilateral aid from the US to black Africa, and reiterated the agenda on international trade, development and finance which formed the basis of discussion at the recent UN special session. It remains to be seen whether there will prove to be more substance to this policy objective than to those of great power non-intervention and the fostering of self-determination.

US INTERVENTION IN ANGOLAN STRIFE

Since the Portuguese coup, circumstantial evidence has suggested that US national security managers are prepared to fight a MPLA victory in Angola. Official leaks and news stories now make it clear that the US is funneling CIA military and financial assistance to movements presumed more friendly to US economic interests in Angola.

In a front page *New York Times* article, Leslie Gelb revealed that the CIA is buying arms for FNLA and UNITA to offset the increasing military success of MPLA, which now controls the major ports, the center and the southwest of Angola. MPLA had earlier charged that the U.S. was airlifting arms from U.S. bases in West Germany in Skymaster transports and that Zaire troops and equipment were assisting FNLA.

Earlier in September, the *Washington Post* had broken the news that Secretary Kissinger had decided to replace Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, whose appointment had raised unanimous OAU objection because of his involvement in CIA activities in

Chile. President Mobutu of Zaire had, in fact, attacked Davis in January and had refused to let him in the country during his frustrating Africa tour in June. At the same time, Mobutu had charged the CIA and Ambassador Hinton, a former colleague of Davis in Latin America, with involvement in a plot against him. It was thus apparent that Kissinger's plans could not be executed by his "Latin American team." (*Southern Africa*, April 1975)

In June, therefore, Sheldon Vance, ambassador to Zaire before Hinton and a personal friend of Mobutu, was dispatched to Zaire to patch things up. Thereafter he began to seek rescheduling of Zaire's short-term debts, which now run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. In July Vance in company with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Edward Mulcahy, was sounding out key Congressional Africanists to gain support for an astoundingly large aid package for Zaire. Senators Clark and Humphrey and Representative Diggs were told that AID and State would prefer as little Congressional fuss as possible about the \$60 million package for the Mobutu regime. The \$20 million in Eximbank credits and the \$20 million of PL 480 and commodity credits proposed did not require Congressional approval, but the \$20 million of Security Supporting Assistance projected to help with "balance of payments" problems will probably be part of the Military Aid request which will be submitted in October.

The sheer size of the aid proposal—four times that proposed for 1975 and eight times the amount of 1974—suggests that the aid is for political "stabilization" rather than economic development. Historically, the US has supplied black African countries with meager amounts of economic assistance unless it felt its military and economic interests justified a heavy expenditure.

Furthermore, past US practice indicates that the Zaire aid package has Angolan implications. The United States supported FNLA through CIA and other funds from 1962-69. FNLA has always been Zaire-backed and Mobutu, whose rise to power was promoted by the US, is a brother-in-law and political associate of Holden Roberto. The Bakongo people, the mainstay of FNLA support, span the Zaire-Angola border.

For what will the aid be used? Eximbank credits were used in times past to buy Boeing 707s, Bell helicopters

and light planes to assist Portugal in her African struggle, and so it is logical to expect that Zaire's purchases may end up fulfilling Holden Roberto's military necessities. According to a reliable source, Roberto told Senator Clark in August that the first movement to have aircraft would win the war. In addition Mobutu could assist his brother-in-law either with funds or with food by giving FNLA food brought into Zaire under Public Law 480 or by sales of PL 480 food on the local market. PL 480 was used in Vietnam to put cash in the hands of Thieu. Security Supporting Assistance has been used in the Middle East and earlier in Indochina to buy "stability" by underwriting the finances of rightwing governments.

US AID was clearly backing FNLA when it recently tried to earmark \$25 million of the proposed \$40 million economic assistance to the former Portuguese territories to take care of black Angolan refugees. Most such refugees are Bakongo seeking to resettle in Angola except for 5-10,000 stranded refugees from Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, who are seeking to leave the country. Senators Clark and Brooke, who had proposed the \$40 million in the Senate subcommittee markup of the economic assistance authorization act for 1976, prevented this unequal division from being written into the bill and insisted on evenhandedness in application.

The prospects for Congressional blockage of US intervention in Angola are dim. The six subcommittees informed of the CIA's activities seem not concerned. Only Senator Clark and the Black Caucus have questioned the wisdom of US involvement so far. Congressman Diggs plans to hold hearings on Angola but his major focus will be on aid to developing countries. And in this context, it is hard to visualize any hard opposition to financial assistance to Zaire or Zambia, which may be playing the same role for UNITA as Zaire plays for FNLA. Furthermore, substantial Soviet aid to MPLA is likely to overcome any conservative antipathy to "giveaway" programs. Multi-national corporations are likely to favor assistance which supplements the aid they are already supplying directly to FNLA and UNITA. (*New York Times*, Sept. 25, 26, 1975. *Washington Post*, Sept. 1, 4, 23, 26, 27, 1975. *The Capital Times*, Madison, Wisc., Sept. 16, 1975)

action news and notes



POLITICAL ACTION

ZIMBABWEANS ON TRIAL IN DELAWARE

Tapson Mawere was acquitted of "obstructing the police" and Synos Mangazva was acquitted of "public intoxication", September 6 in the latest stage of the trial of these two Zimbabweans who were attacked by police in a racist incident in Delaware in June. Mangazva, however, was found guilty of "resisting arrest" "offensive touch-

ing" and "disorderly conduct", charges that carry a maximum combined term of 3 years in jail and/or \$1,000 fine.

The case has gained particular notoriety because of a letter from Charles James, deputy secretary of State for African affairs, to Delaware Governor Sherman Tribbitt

suggesting that the case carried internationally "disturbing overtones". The FBI, it was disclosed through testimony at the trial, was also interested in the case, apparently investigating possible civil rights law violations (the men were refused service in a Delaware restaurant).

The twelve person jury, with but one black person on it, deliberated for two days, before returning its verdict. The verdict was ironic, since the state built its whole case against the two around the charge that they were drunk, with a virtual parade of witnesses stating this. The virulent racism of the witnesses from Harrington, Delaware was quite apparent throughout, as witnesses would only refer to Mr. Mawere as "the short coloured fellow" and Mr. Mangazva as "the tall one over there".

Sentencing of Mangazva is set for October 10, and the case may be appealed on a number of grounds, e.g. that Delaware law, according to the presiding Judge Merrill Trader, does not permit one to "resist arrest" even if the arresting officer is acting illegally. William Booth, a New York Judge and president of the American Committee on Africa, William Johnston of the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa and Davis M'Gabe, a Zimbabwean who teaches at Staten Island Community College in New York, all testified as character witnesses for the defense, and joined the picket line outside the courtroom organized by the Wilmington branch of the Congress of Afrikan Peoples.

Over \$2,000 has been raised and spent by the African Defense and Aid Fund of the ACOA for the legal defense, but additional funds are necessary. Contributions can be made to the Fund and sent to 164 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

EXPULSION SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE U.N.

The National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation (NAIMSAL) emerged from a conference on African liberation held in Chicago two years ago.

The Movement's main project has been a petition campaign to get one million voices to expel South Africa from the United Nations. The petition also calls for government, economic, sports and cultural boycott of South Africa, due to its suppression of human rights. The petition will be submitted this fall to the Congress, President Ford, Vice President Rockefeller and U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

A brochure on the petition campaign lists numerous trade union, academic and black political figures who support the campaign. The movement launched its petition drive at a press conference held across from the U.N. featuring Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton. NAIMSAL picketed the offices of the South African Mission to the U.N. on August 8, South African Women's day, and held a cultural event in Brooklyn that weekend.

Booths to gather petitions have been set up in cities around the country. For example, the September 2 *Daily World* reports 25,000 signatures gathered in the Chicago area at such events as Democratic ward picnics; Operation PUSH's "Black Expo"; and outside "The Wilby Conspiracy" a movie about South Africa featuring Sidney Poitier. The *World* also notes support from peace and university constituencies. "It is especially important to bring this campaign to the white and Latino communities" according to Ms. Leona Kimmons, Chicago organizer for the campaign.

NAIMSAL has also been active in working to stop the Supremes from going to South Africa, and has published a

booklet on the U.S. and South Africa available at \$.25 a copy written by NAIMSAL executive secretary Anthony Monteiro. The group's headquarters are at 1 Union Square West, Rm 203 New York, N.Y. 10003 tel. (212) 929-5686.

FREE NAMIBIA

Operation Namibia (ON) describes itself as "a transnational, non-violent, direct action campaign to aid the cause of freedom in Namibia." It was inspired by British peace activist Roger Moody's idea for a flotilla to blockade the Walvis Bay port in Namibia, in order to halt the export of Namibia's critical natural resources.

In the U.S., ON is a project of the Movement for a New Society, a Quaker-related network of "action communities working for radical nonviolent social change." The groups sponsored a demonstration outside the South African Mission to the U.N. May 31, the date that was set by the Security Council for South Africa to withdraw its administration from Namibia. Near Philadelphia, the group's U.S. headquarters, an ON delegation confronted a distribution manager for Del Monte corporation about the company's continuing importation of pilchard "sardines" from Namibia that are sold in supermarkets throughout the country.

The latest proposal of the group calls for a boat sailing from Europe to Namibia carrying books—books that are banned by the South African government in Namibia. Interested persons should contact Operation Namibia, 4811 Springfield Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa. 19143 tel. (215) 724-1858.

PROTEST SUPREMES VISIT TO SA

The Supremes are already back from their trip to South Africa, but the anger in the black community over their trip will not be forgotten. A congressman, black theatre groups and other important persons in the black community all raised strong protests addressed to the Supremes, and to Motown Records, which has collaborated in bringing numerous black entertainers to the land of apartheid.

Wrote Marcia Ann Gillespie, editor-in-chief of *Essence* "Say No to Apartheid! We must ensure that Black people need never again sing for the 'massa'".

Wrote Joan Sandler, executive director of the Black Theatre Alliance (which represents thirty black repertory groups) "This comes as a shock . . . the Supremes draw upon the African-American community for support and artistic inspiration . . . we find it difficult to believe that you would support South Africa's apartheid policies by acceptance of booking in that country."

Wrote Robert S. Browne, director of the Black Economic Research Center: "I am quite distressed to learn that the Supremes are considering lending their support to the segregationist policies of South Africa. I would hope that they would not allow themselves to be used in this way."

Congressman Charles C. Diggs, who was chairman of the former House Subcommittee on Africa telegraphed the Supremes: "As a fellow Detroitter and spokesman for many years on African affairs, I do not encourage American artists to perform in South Africa because of its policy of strict segregation against black people."

Ann Early, executive director of Writers in Residence wrote Motown: "On behalf of five teen age repertory companies . . . and as a former ghetto brat from Detroit's Black Bottom, where the roots of your corporation's

foundation lay, we urge you to cancel your forthcoming engagement. For none is free till all is free!"

A protest was sent by black actor Brock Peters on behalf of the American Committee on Africa, which for ten years has sought signatories to a pledge not to perform in South Africa under present conditions. Recent signatories include Sammy Davis, Jr.; Richard Roundtree; Woody Allen; Bill Cosby; Rafer Johnson; Wilt Chamberlain and Diahann Carroll.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

SPORTS SUMMARY

The Unit on Apartheid of the United Nations has published the following list of successful efforts to isolate South Africa from international sport:

1956 South Africa's all-white Table Tennis Union expelled by International Table Tennis Federation. Affiliation given to non-racial Table Tennis Association. South African government has persistently refused passports to non-racial teams entered for World Championships since 1956.

1963 South Africa barred from Tokyo Olympics in 1964 because stipulated conditions not fulfilled.

1964 South Africa suspended from world football by International Football Federation (FIFA).

1964 South Africa barred from international competition by World Fencing Federation.

1967 Mexico refuses visa to South African team for Mini-Olympics.

1968 South Africa expelled from world boxing by International Amateur Boxing Association (AIBA).

1968 Cricket tour of South Africa by British team cancelled by Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC).

1968 Mexico refused to invite South Africa to Olympics, International Olympic Committee (IOC) Executive Board confirms this decision by withdrawing invitation.

1969 Hungary refuses visas to South African team for World Pentathlon Championships.

1969 International Judo Federation refuses South Africa membership.

1970 British Government requests cancellation of cricket tour by an all-white South African team. MCC cancels tour.

1970 South African team barred from World Netball Championships.

1970 South African team barred from World Gymnastics Championships in Yugoslavia.

1970 South Africa suspended from Davis Cup following boycotts by most European countries and demonstrations in Norway, Sweden and Britain.

1970 South Africa expelled from Olympic Movement by International Olympic Committee (IOC).

1970 South Africa barred from World Cycling Championships, and expelled by International Cycling Federation.

1970 South Africa barred from international athletics competitions by International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF).

1970 Following countries withdraw from South African Games after accepting invitations: U.S.A., Belgium, Italy, and Federal Republic of Germany.

1970 Australia suspends athletic relations with South Africa.

1970 South Africa suspended from World Wrestling by International Amateur Wrestling Federation (FILA).

1970 South Africa barred from World Softball Championships in Japan.

1972 South Africa non-starter at Munich Olympics and Southern Rhodesia barred.

1973 Argentine Government bans all sports contact with South Africa, including Davis Cup (lawn tennis) match.

1973 Brazil Government bans Davis Cup match on Brazilian territory because of South African participation.

1973 New Zealand Government forces cancellation of rugby tour of an all-white South African team.

1973 South Africa expelled from World Swimming by the International Swimming Federation (FINA).

1973 New Zealand Government decides to refuse entry to South African Women's team for Federation Cup (Lawn Tennis).

1973 President of International Football Federation (FFNA) forced to back down and reverse decision taken by FIFA Executive Committee to lift South Africa's suspension to allow football matches at South African Games. Prior to reversal of decision both Brazil and West Germany had withdrawn their teams.

1973 Australian Government decides to refuse all visas, including transit visas, to all South African sportsmen belonging to racial sports organizations.

1973 Supreme Council for Sport in Africa repeats call for expulsion of all racist South African organizations from international sports federations and decides to grant affiliation to non-racial organizations which apply for membership of African sports confederations.

1973 The South African Amateur Swimming Federation (non-racial) is given full membership in the African Swimming Confederation.

1974 Bulgaria barred South Africa's entry in World Gymnastics Championships in Varna.

1974 India refused to play South Africa in finals in the Davis Cup.

This list is reprinted from the United Nations publication *Notes and Documents*, Issue No. 29/75, August, 1975, which also included recommendations to the United Nations by Trevor Richards, national organizer of the New Zealand National Anti-Apartheid Committee and Chairman of Halt All Racist Tours (HART). Mr. Richards suggested that a campaign should be conducted around the world which would:

(1) Ascertain all sports associations of which South Africa is still a member.

(2) Obtain the constitutions of these associations together with a list of all member organizations.

(3) Write to those organizations which belong to international associations of which South Africa is still a member. The letter should state U.N. policy vis-a-vis

sporting contacts with South Africa and urge each sporting association to deny membership to South Africa at its next annual general meeting.

Recent developments include an expected ruling by the World Water Ski Union on the question of South Africa in the Sept. 3 championships. The British Government has promised to withdraw its \$50,000 grant for the championships if a South African team competes. (*Guardian*, U.K., Aug. 4, 1975)

resources

"Why not take a trip to South Africa...?"—An illustrated flyer on tourism to South Africa produced by the Programme to Combat Racism of the World Council of Churches tells you exactly why not. The English edition of this flyer is available free of charge to groups and organizations which will accept responsibility for its careful distribution. If you wish to distribute this flyer, describe your plan for doing so and write for copies to: Baldwin Sjollema, World Council of Churches, 150, Rt. De Ferney, P.O. Box No. 66, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland.

A Study of the Weyerhaeuser Company as a Multinational Corporation, which includes an informative twenty page section on the company's South African subsidiary and investments, has been produced by a group of students at Evergreen State College. For further information, write to Charles T. Nisbet, Faculty member, The Evergreen State

Also, the Canadian Government has decided to cut off all financial assistance to any sports event held in Canada to which teams from South Africa have been invited. The decision was an extension of one made about 18 months ago which denied financial aid to Canadian teams that compete in South Africa. (*Montreal Star*, August 8, 1975)

College, Olympia, Washington 98505.

Africa Today, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July-Sept. issue) is entitled "Mozambique: Free at Last" and contains a number of important articles on the past, present and future prospects of Mozambique as well as poetry by FRELIMO militant Jorge Rebelo. For copies, write to Africa Today, GSIS, University of Denver, Colorado 80210. Single issues: \$2.50.

The Tricontinental Film Center has published its 1975-76 sales/rental catalog of "Third World Cinema." Copies are available free on request from any of the three Tricontinental offices across the country—333 6th Ave., N.Y., N.Y. 10014; 1034 Lake St., Oak Park, Il. 60301; or P.O. Box 4430, Berkeley, CA 94704.

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS RECEIVED

W. de Klerk, *The Puritans in Africa*. London: Rex Collings, 1975. Hardback, c. \$7.00.
Joao Salva-Rey, *Ku Famba*. Lourenco Marques: Edicao da

Minerva Central, 1975.

South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 3, August, 1975.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Just the other day I had the opportunity to read the September edition of *Southern Africa*, and found the article on the People's Republic of Mozambique to be highly stimulating and informative. . . . Your account did much to satisfy my hunger for news concerning events there. Obviously there seems to be some kind of news blackout on the Independence Celebration, and up until your article, I knew practically nothing about what was transpiring there.

I would like to address myself to the article, "Overview," and the questions raised in it. I agree with your policy to continue reporting about the problems newly independent countries have to deal with, because their solutions might be utilized by other peoples and countries trying to rebuild their societies.

If honest reporting is not constant, a vacuum occurs where all the politically slanted forces immediately rush in

to set up their distorted views, and history shows that if no alternative objective information is available, people have little choice but to believe what they read everyday. We know that those forces control the means of communication whereby they can drum erroneous conclusions and outright lies into the mind of the public at every turn. As providence would have it, the people who are sincere in building a new world must carry the additional burden of limited means by which to correct the situation.

The other countries, like Zaire and Zambia would be informative to know about in relation to their position in Africa's struggle. . . . I would also like to hear from you in regards to whether you intend follow ups on Mozambique. All of you are doing a great job, keep on truckin' (excerpted)
A Prisoner



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