

# southern africa




VOLUME VIII NO. 11

DECEMBER 1975



**INTENSIVE MILITARY  
BUILD UP IN SOUTH AFRICA**



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VOL. VIII, NO. 8

DECEMBER 1975

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# OVERVIEW

## Detente: A Noose Around Freedom's Neck.

One year has passed since Prime Minister Vorster launched this new campaign for international acceptance with a speech aimed at Africa in which he offered friendship and co-operation to "other African nations" (thus stressing South Africa's legitimacy as an African country), wished the future Government of independent Mozambique well and indicated his willingness to use South African influence to bring about a settlement in Zimbabwe.

Appealing for time (six months to a year) in which to prove South Africa's good intentions, he said that Southern Africa had reached a point where it had to choose "between peace on the one hand or an escalation of strife on the other"—and warned that "the toll of major confrontation will be too high".

These "peace feelers" won a swift response from Zambia's President Kuanda, who greeted Vorster's words as the "voice of reason for which Africa . . . has been waiting". Within weeks the South African propaganda machine moved into top gear around the world announcing a new face for the Republic, and Vorster and his henchmen became welcome guests in a variety of African capitals.

There were some voices that warned that South Africa was pulling a vast confidence trick, gambling on the eagerness for conciliation of many countries hard-pressed by their own internal and economic political problems. Such critics of the new detente pointed out that the terms in which Vorster had expressed the alternatives open in Southern Africa—a choice between peace and escalating violence were totally dishonest. Vorster was implying that South Africa was basically a peaceful country—that violence was only introduced by the forces seeking to change the fundamentally good and stable society.

But South Africa is not a peaceful country. It is a country ruled by an *organised system of violence*; to talk of peace in such a context is simply to hand over ascendancy and permanence to the rulers, while disarming the majority population.

Vorster has had his year. It is quite clear that nothing has changed internally. The pass laws, the forced migratory labor system, the denial of political rights, the vicious brutality of the security system—all these remain untouched by the removal of a few signs saying "For Whites Only" from the park benches.

Perhaps, to be perfectly honest, that does not surprise the African leaders who have been dealing with Vorster over the future of Southern Africa. It seems likely that

they believed it possible to adopt a two stage strategy—first curb South Africa externally, remove its supporting influence from Smith in Rhodesia, possibly bargaining with it to accept an independent Namibia. South Africa, they thought, would be happy to go along with this in exchange for the destruction of the threat of strong armed liberation movements in the region. Then, having removed the threat of prolonged armed conflict from the region the African countries would turn their attention to South Africa internally. In terms of this analysis they probably understand quite well that Vorster's protestations about the desire to do great things in the next six months did not mean any change for the black people of South Africa.

Unfortunately for the people of all of Southern Africa it is becoming increasingly clear that Vorster's protestations were also not to be taken as a serious sign of a changed policy outside the borders of South Africa itself. In other words Vorster was changing tactics—not policy. His policy is designed to ensure the survival of a white supremacist, capitalist South Africa. Where changes across the borders seem to threaten the eventual stability of his system he will strike, and strike mercilessly, to destroy the threat. Hence the events in Angola.

MPLA and the people of Angola are now having to defend the victory they won over Portuguese colonialism against a massive foreign onslaught. South Africa is playing a critical role in the new attack. At least two fully armored columns of regular South African troops have now invaded Angola—determined to destroy the young popular republic. It would seem natural that such an invasion would have brought a strong chorus of condemnation from all the African countries, that they would have seized the issue and forced the United Nations to recognise that there was indeed a "threat to the peace" deserving of Security Council attention.

So far this has not happened. It seems that South Africa's words are still being taken more seriously than her deeds. The countries of Africa still refuse to recognise that South Africa is the implacable enemy of any profound social change in Africa, because all such change is an ultimate threat to continued stability of the white supremacist system in the South. Detente is a dangerous deception—buying time and space only for the rulers of South Africa and weakening the forces of liberation, who find their growth curbed and curtailed by the needs of the diplomatic game.

# FEATURE:

## South Africa's Military Build-up: U.S. on the scene

by jennifer davis

This article is a slightly edited version of the statement that Jennifer Davis made at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Southern Africa on July 24, 1975.

### Hunting Reality—the myth of current change

One of the major problems for anyone trying to understand United States-South Africa policy and relationships is the long established tradition of double talking. To find the truth it is necessary to penetrate behind the coded language and recognize a series of myths which cloak a far more unpleasant reality.

The primary myth perpetuated by South Africa is that it is changing. Critics who call for radical international responses to South African racial oppression and exploitation have for many years been met by the "but things are changing" argument. The initial myth-maker is of course South Africa . . . but the device is most useful because it is so eagerly seized upon by powerful forces such as the United States government, seeking to justify a policy of perpetual tolerance for what is in fact, for those who suffer under it, an intolerable situation. Secretary Newsom articulated such a view very precisely in a 1971 speech:

"We believe change will come in southern Africa. Economic and demographic pressures make this inevitable. In South Africa itself there is a lessening of rigidity. Change is a central theme of discussion; there is psychological and intellectual ferment within the Afrikaner community; there have been isolated instances of acceptance of multi-racial activities; there is a growing realism among businessmen that Africans are important to them as skilled workers and as a market. They are beginning to focus on the need for improvement of working conditions for non-whites. We cannot expect change to come quickly or easily. Our hope is that it will come peacefully."

The system has indeed shown itself capable of considerable flexibility in the past decade. Ten years ago Prime Minister Verwoerd was proud to think of himself as a man of granite. Today's pragmatic South African leaders recognize that building in rock does not meet the needs of a rapidly expanding industrial economy.

At issue is not whether some changes are occurring both inside South Africa, and in that country's attitudes to Africa and the world. The argument revolves around the nature and purpose of those changes and at this core level that there seems to be dangerous confusion. Perhaps it would be useful to re-state, at this point, the basic situation that calls for change.

The 'problem' in South Africa is that of the dispossession of a majority black population and the total usurpation of all economic, political and social power by a white minority. The 'problem' is a system—the apartheid system—deliberately designed to use blacks for the creation of wealth and then guarantee the exclusive benefits of that wealth to the whites. The primary purpose of the whole network of South African law and administration is the protection of this system, which produces for the whites, who benefit from it, the highest average standard of living in the world and for the blacks, who suffer under it, a life of perpetual poverty, violence and humiliation.

The changes that are presently being made are not intended to alter the pyramidal structure in which blacks, the majority, stand always at the bottom, supporting the whole society on their backs. They are designed to help white South Africa deal with internal pressures generated by continued economic expansion.

The increasing sophistication of the economy has for instance shifted the nature of the demand for labor—and so there are announcements that black workers are to be upgraded—what this means is that the pool of unskilled black labor is no longer useful and is to be replaced by a pool of semi-skilled black labor. The landless, voteless, rightless non-person status of the Blacks remains unchanged. Changing labor demands may even bring in their wake some measure of unionisation and more permanent urbanisation—but the rate and direction of all such changes will be controlled by the whites—who will move cautiously to avoid generating dangerously irreversible trends. There are daily reminders of this truth in the South African press. The *Cape Times* of June 13 reports Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Mr. T.N.H. Janson as saying, "*The Government would train the Blacks, but it would not train them to be destroyers of the way of life in South Africa . . . one thing that was sure was that nobody wanted a recurrence of an Angola or Mozambique in South Africa.*"

Internal economic development has brought with it also a need for change in relationships to the world outside. South Africa now seeks external markets for its manufactured goods as well as for the vast stream of raw materials which still continue to flow to major industrial countries, making it a valuable member of the "Western world". The rational place to find such markets is close by; in Africa.

### Foreign Policy—a design to protect apartheid's future

This thrust coincides with a second important set of South African priorities which devolve on its politico/strategic requirements. *For the last ten years South Africa has been carefully developing a four-pronged external policy designed to consolidate and protect its stability.*

While working hard to build powerful friendships in the world South Africa has also sought to achieve three ends in Africa: Firstly, the extension of almost complete control over the so-called captive states—e.g. Lesotho,

Swaziland. Secondly, neutralization of the independent African States, using where possible, the economic inducements associated with what was once Dialogue and is now Detente. (Where neutralization could not be achieved in a 'friendly' manner South Africa was prepared to use the tougher techniques of economic strangulation and political subversion.) Thirdly, there was the attempt to construct a solid Southern Bloc, involving a close-knit alliance with Portugal and Rhodesia. In this way South Africa attempted to ring itself with a series of buffer states, hoping that the combination of a ruthlessly efficient internal security police and border buffers would prevent successful black organization or guerrilla incursion.

Now the buffer states are vanishing rapidly. Indeed Mozambique is not just a country with an independent black government, but one with a very directed political philosophy which is likely soon to be translated into a living model of an alternative society.

In the face of such far reaching upheavals South Africa has already shown signs of considerable re-thinking. It seems clear that the coming period will see attempts to win by political and economic activity what can not be won militarily. Hence the pressure on Rhodesia's Ian Smith to move towards some sort of 'settlement'; hence the generally very 'correct' attitude towards the new Mozambique, with great restraint placed on those who might normally have been expected to fulminate about black savages, red perils and the need for intervention; hence also the tremendous drive towards Detente in Africa.

At the same time, looking realistically into the future South Africa has also embarked on a crash program to double and re-double its military strength, and to cement its international alliances.

In fact this dual response is more closely interconnected than might first appear. In attempting to project a new image of increasing reasonableness and flexibility, coupled with a constant emphasis on its potential role as a bulwark against communism, South Africa seeks to provide the major powers of Europe and America with greater incentives (and justification) for a continued

policy of overt where possible, covert where necessary, alliances.

#### **South Africa's Military Build-up—who are the enemies?**

South Africa has doubled the size of its direct military budget in two years, expenditure rising dramatically from R470m (\$658m) in 1973/4 to R700m (\$980m) in 74/75 and a planned R948m (\$1,327m) for 75/76. In fact a decision was made in 1974 to complete the ten-year plan in five years. This expenditure now represents something of the order of 18% of the entire budget, 3.7% of GNP and an estimated per capita expenditure of \$28, according to P.W. Botha, Minister of Defense.

Minister Botha's arithmetic seems alarmingly weak. Total South African population in 1974 was just under 25 million; this would mean a per capita expenditure of R37.90 (\$53.00). In fact, a far more realistic way of looking at this expenditure is in terms of white per capita expenditure, because this money is obviously being spent to defend a privileged white society against its black members. On that basis per capita expenditure reaches R237.00 (\$331.80)—a figure higher than that for the United States during the Vietnam years.

According to the Defence White Paper tabled in Parliament in March 1975, the main reasons for the increase in expenditure are the need to counter all forms of insurgency and to maintain "a credible and balanced conventional force." Land forces are to be re-organized into a counter-insurgency force and a conventional force, and the Air Force is to be similarly restructured. The budget reflects this pattern, indicating particularly big jumps in expenditure on arms for land defense.

South Africa is not only spending much more on its defense but is also pushing very hard to develop self-sufficiency in the production of weapons, aircraft and ships. Using much imported technology, via licencing arrangements and specialized personnel, as well as internal "know-how", the South Africans now claim to be practically self-sufficient in the production of ammunition and rifles. Aircraft, armored personnel carriers and radio equipment are all being made internally, and Minister

**South African Army Base on the Caprivi Strip, Namibia**



Botha recently announced that South Africa is to begin building tanks, and six corvettes for the navy. This self-sufficiency, which gives South Africa considerable independence and a great tactical advantage, has been deliberately fostered via the ten year old Armaments Board, and the state-controlled Corporation—Armcor—which is responsible for over-seeing the production of all military equipment. South Africa has long sought to make itself relatively safe against the consequences of possible international actions such as an effective arms embargo, and has apparently succeeded to some extent.

#### South Africa's Defense Philosophy.

It seems relevant to speculate at this juncture on the purpose of this continuing escalation of military might. South Africa already has a military force vastly superior to the combined force of most of Sub-Saharan Africa. (*The Military Balance 1974-1975*, published by The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's handbook for 1974, South Africa is the only country in Africa to have an indigenously designed missile system. The system is described as being air to air, with a solid propellant power plant and high explosive war-head. The design was begun in 1966 and production began in 1972. According to the same source, South Africa is also the only country in Africa which manufactures, under licence, foreign designed major weapons, including both aircraft and armored vehicles.

Under licence from Italy, South Africa produces the MB-326 M (Impala) trainer, a light strike aircraft, jet powered, with a speed of 800 km/hr; production was begun in 1967, the craft is 70% indigenous manufacture and by 1973 South Africa had 200 of these planes. A second licence obtained from Italy in 1973 will enable South Africa first to assemble and later produce the light strike, jet powered MB-326 K, with a speed of 890 km/hr; production is reported to have begun in 1974. Licences have also been obtained from France for the assembly and subsequent manufacture of the jet powered Mirage F1 fighters, with initial plans for a run of 100, and the SA 330 Puma utility helicopter, of which 20 had been produced by 1973.

There are other significant areas in which South Africa is building a military capacity that seems either greatly in excess of any African threat, or totally irrelevant to countering such a threat. The increasing South African interest in nuclear development is one such area;\* other striking examples include the development of a complex communications center at Silvermine, in the Cape—designed to maintain surveillance of a vast area stretching from the Indian Ocean to the southern Atlantic—and finally the expansion of facilities and construction of a submarine base at Simonstown, decided on despite the recent cancellation of the U.K. agreement involving the use of that port.

South African military strategy is in fact aimed at two fronts—an internal and an external one. Internally and on its borders the South African government is facing an increasingly threatening situation. Thus much military expenditure is designed to enable greater internal control and South Africa is concentrating on developing counter-insurgency capabilities very rapidly. There are numerous reports of regular 'COIN' (counter-insurgency) practice operations, and as has already been indicated there is growing expenditure on equipment suitable for such operations—armored cars, light aircraft, helicopters, etc. Growing pressure from SWAPO, the Namibian liberation movement has forced South Africa to replace the police that

were defending the Caprivi strip with army units. A special volunteer corp is being established to take over the increasingly serious task of guarding the borders—and such border units will be paid special bonuses!

It seems likely that South Africa sees independent Africa as threatening primarily in this context—i.e. insofar as it provides a base for "internal disorder". It is also probably true that South Africa fears a peasant rebellion in Pondoland more than it does a Chinese or Russian invasion.

#### Cape Town—a new Gibraltar?

If it is not to be used for repelling an 'All African Army of Liberation' of Russian invaders, what then is the purpose of the rest of South Africa's military capacity? It is at this point that we see the coalescence of South African and Western interests—and must pause for a moment to consider a second myth.

The official U.S. position has long been that it "abhors apartheid" and has no common military or other interests with the white minority regime. In fact of course the reality has been very different. The wide publication last year of the NSSM 39 document (See *Southern Africa*, February, 1975) served only to confirm the observations of those who had warned that the U.S. was in fact closely linked economically, politically and strategically to the white racists and colonialists in Southern Africa.

The South Africans themselves have used their knowledge and understanding of Western strategy to push for alliances, and are now concentrating heavily on their potentially crucial role as defender of the gateway to the Indian Ocean, and watchdog of the Southern Atlantic.

They have been quick to recognize the implications of America's Vietnam experience, realizing that U.S. strategic planners will have to rely on building strong regional alliances for the maintenance of U.S. interests, rather than on direct intervention. In particular South Africa seems eager to capitalize on U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean, seeing the Pentagon eagerness to fortify Diego Garcia as a hopeful sign for future joint working arrangements.

In this context the current direction of U.S. policy, particularly as it relates to military linkages and the arms embargo, is cause for considerable alarm.

#### NATO and South Africa

In May 1975 the South African press reported the eruption of a storm in the NATO defense and planning committee over American Defense Secretary Schlesinger's proposal that a major monitoring installation be established in South Africa for NATO intelligence purposes. The proposal that such an installation be used to monitor all Soviet fleet movements in the Indian Ocean met with a violent reaction from the Dutch Defense Minister, who threatened to pull Holland out of NATO if there was any cooperation with the South African Government.

Already in 1974 work done by Sean Gervasi and others had made it clear that the Defense Planning Committee of NATO had issued a secret instruction in June 1973 to the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT) to undertake contingency planning for the defense of the southern African region and the Indian Ocean, although this was outside the NATO area. The justification for such a decision was the need to protect the southern entrance to the Persian Gulf, and the sea routes used by the oil tankers serving European and American ports. The secret plans reportedly concentrated on the development of air-naval task forces which would operate in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape and would stand ready to assist South Africa in case of need.

Most recently in June 1975, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement released information alleging that several NATO members including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Holland and Denmark had been engaged in the planning and development of Project Advokaat, a naval surveillance system established by South Africa at Silvermine, which allows South Africa to keep under surveillance an area stretching from South America to Bangladesh. According to the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Advokaat has permanent channels linking it in with the United Kingdom admiralty and the United States Navy. The Anti-Apartheid Movement released documents showing that orders for parts of the system had been placed with companies in all the above mentioned countries, including the United States. Apart from any implications relating to NATO's role in this matter, it seems to us that the provision of electronic equipment for such a military communications system is a clear violation of the arms embargo. Yet apparently at least ten United States firms have been allowed to supply highly specialized devices to this project. The names of some of the Corporations involved in supplying equipment for Advokaat from the United States are now known.

A brief reference to a few of the other many indications of a growing American network of sympathetic contacts and linkages with the minority power in South Africa should be made. There have been high ranking South African military and Government leaders visiting Washington with increasing frequency. 1975 has seen both Democratic and Republican Congressmen, (several perhaps "co-incidentally" on the House Armed Service Committee) visiting South Africa, its Simonstown naval base, Silvermine Communications Center and Atlas Aircraft Corporation. Melvyn Laird, former United States Secretary of Defense, also went to South Africa this year. One might even play with other, more sinister connections—such as the growing collaboration between the United States, Iran and South Africa.

#### **U.S. Planes in South African Skies**

Finally, it is important to be aware of what is probably the simplest—and perhaps also the most disturbing—

#### **South African Airforce C 130**

evidence of the long range direction of United States policy in South Africa. Despite all assurances to the contrary the United States has allowed a situation to develop in which American aircraft, supplied to South Africa after the imposition of the 1963 embargo, are being used by the military for purposes that cannot, by any stretch of the most bureaucratic imagination, be described as non-military.


In 1971 ACOA testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa on the question of the arms embargo indicated that one of the major items of trade between South Africa and the US was an increasing number of light aircraft. Commenting on such sales in that year Secretary Newsom explained US policy as follows:

"There has been no change in the arms embargo which we have maintained since 1963 on the sale of military equipment to South Africa. . . . and which, among other things, precludes the sale of any aircraft to South Africa for military purposes, including military training and reconnaissance. However, normal trade with South Africa in civilian-type goods for non-military purposes continues, and we are prepared to consider licensing for VIP transport purposes limited numbers of small un-armed executive civilian-type aircraft which will not strengthen South Africa's military or internal security capacity."

ACOA pointed out then that such sales of "civilian" aircraft to South Africa showed the fallacy of the licensing system under which aircraft are sold for "non-military purposes". This is little more than a polite legal fiction; any aircraft can be easily converted for military use and in South Africa the existence of a para-military group such as the Air Commandos makes it possible for the military to use civilian aircraft while maintaining the legal fiction.

#### **The Air Commandos**

The all white Air Commandos, established in 1964, can best be described as a flying militia, made up of volunteers using their own planes. These men are not members of the





regular military forces but are paid by the government when they fly in times of emergency or war. The establishment of 12 squadrons was authorized in 1964. The Commandos attend an annual two-week training camp, during which all their expenses are paid by the government. Their training entails radio co-operation with army and mobile police striking forces, reconnaissance, practice bombing and general cooperation in maintaining the internal security of both South Africa and South West Africa. Many of these Commando members fly U.S. light planes, such as Pipers and Cessnas. Thus, even if the licensing procedures were adhered to technically in the sense that no planes were sold to the military, such planes would become available to the military, and, most important of all, form part of the "security planning" of the government. Recent reports from various South African sources, including the military journal, *Paratus*, indicate that the South Africans are now concentrating very seriously on training their military forces to cope with what they term "anti-insurgent" operations so that the importance of the Commando role is increasing. One such recent operation, held in the Kwa Zulu Bantustan in 1974 went on for eight days, involving the Army, Air Force, Navy and Police. The exercise covered the following aspects of counter-insurgency operations:

Integration of Citizen Force, Commando, SAAF, SA Navy and SA Police elements in operations. Intelligence processing at unit and group HQ level. Co-operation with local authorities and other departments.


At unit level:

1. Employment of armored cars.
2. Employment of light fixed wing aircraft.
3. Road movement.
4. Search and destroy operations.
5. Patrolling, road blocks, ambushes, counter penetration operations along a coastline. Follow-up operations.

According to the *Paratus* report the air arm was provided by a squadron of Citizen Force volunteer pilots with their own aircraft. They were used for visual recce, contact recce, evacuation of casualties, communication flights and special operations.

It is now increasingly clear that there have been even more serious erosions in the formal arms embargo, and that both light aircraft such as Cessnas and heavy transport planes, such as the Lockheed Hercules C 130 have been provided directly to the South African Government for military use, long after the supposed imposition of an embargo in 1963. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies there are now at least 7 C-130's operating in transport squadrons of the South African Airforce. Cessnas are used in a squadron assigned to the army, and in both the Reserve squadrons and the Air Commando squadrons.

These aircraft play a direct military role in operations quite openly described by the South Africans in their publications. Thus, in an article depicting the role of *Aircraft on the Border*, *Paratus* refers both to the usefulness of the C 130s and to the invaluable role played by the Cessna, commenting that "without these aircraft, the helicopter, Cessna and Dakota, problems of supplies and communication would be insurmountable." Among the tasks per-



Air Commando Officers

formed by these planes are:

"Reconnaissance: Low-level visual reconnaissance with a pilot and observer is done with the Cessna because of its manoeuvrability and low fuel consumption. These small aircraft keep the one thousand mile border under constant surveillance"

"Aerial observation post: Cessnas can be used to control ground fire onto specific targets and to report subsequent enemy movement."

Thus US aircraft are being built into South Africa's system of military repression in the most direct way possible. It is these aircraft that will be in the forefront of the inevitably bloody suppression of any Black attempt to oppose continued white minority rule. It should be remembered that in South Africa a terrorist is defined, by law, as anyone who attempts to embarrass the affairs of state. Therefore, even peaceful demonstrators or striking workers might find themselves the targets of these US built airplanes, and it is certain that in any development of a liberation war such as that just ended in Mozambique, American planes would be used to search out and destroy African freedom fighters. ●

\* A fuller discussion of this will be dealt with in a second feature by Jennifer Davis on U.S. Foreign Policy towards Southern Africa, next month.

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# south africa

## POLITICS

### TRANSKEI INDEPENDENCE DATE SET

Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima has announced that the Transkei will become "independent" on October 26, 1976, "unless anything unforeseen should occur." However, it seems unlikely that such a state will be accepted into the U.N. or the O.A.U., for there is a serious question as to whether such a state would be independent at all. (This has not stopped the formation of a committee to prepare "independence" celebrations, with an estimated budget of up to R1 million—US\$1,155,000.\*)

The granting of "independence" by the South African government is seen as an attempt to give constitutional and international legal status to apartheid. Efforts towards effecting the trappings of independence are already under way. The Transkei police have taken over "full control" of police activities. Trainee diplomats are now posted with South Africa's diplomatic corps abroad, including London, Washington, Bonn, and Paris, and R1.8 million (US\$2,079,000) is to be spent on the building of a "presidential palace".

Yet despite such trappings, the Transkei "government" will be simply a puppet of South Africa. As independence approaches, emergency regulations designed to deal with any dissent stay in effect. Matanzima's major opponents remain in jail or in forced exile. A look at the economic facts of life are very revealing.

The land for the eight homelands, of which the Transkei is one, was originally set aside under the Land Act No. 27 of 1913 and revised by the Land Act No. 18 of 1936. All together it comprises under 14 per cent of the total land area of South Africa, although these areas are intended to serve as the "home" of 70 per cent of the population.

Since the end of World War II the South African economy has moved strongly into capital intensive industry and manufacturing. Industrial development (thus labor demands) are concentrated in four areas: southern Transvaal, the western Cape, Durban and Port Elizabeth. Correspondingly, the proportion of GNP coming from the homelands has dropped from 6 per cent in the 50s to 1.66 per cent in 1967. According to Punt Janson, Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, 150,000 new black workers come onto the labor market each year, but the homelands can only provide jobs for 13,700. Clearly the homelands remain a place to store labor, and independence will not do away with migratory labor. Passes will become "passports", and "influx control" will still exist. Dependence on South Africa will continue. In other words, independence for the homelands is a fraud. (*Comment & Opinion* October 3, 10, 1975; *Star*, South Africa, September 13, October 4, 1975; *The Daily News*, September 17, 1975; *The Condition of the Black Worker*, Africa Publications Trust 1975; *Basic Facts on the Republic of South Africa and the Policy of Apartheid*, Unit on Apartheid, United Nations August 1974.)


### CONTINUED ARRESTS

Detentions under South Africa's Terrorism Act continues. Jenny Curtis, archivist of the Institute for Race Relations has been arrested. Ms. Curtis is a former mem-

ber of the executive of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and is the sister of former NUSAS president Neville Curtis who escaped from South Africa after five years of being banned. This brings the number of known people arrested under the Terrorism Act since August to 75, possibly 76 because of the unconfirmed report of the arrest of Peter Thomas, an Australian.

The detentions under the Terrorism Act and its political use by the ruling Nationalist Party has caused wide spread criticism. The Christian Institute (CI) has issued a statement in support of its detained assistant director, Horst Kleinschmidt. Numerous white "liberals" concerned about the too naked exercise of power have issued statements saying, for instance, that such a law has "no place in a civilized society and there are quite enough tried and conventional means of combating subversion or real threats to the security of the state." A minister in the puppet Transkei government condemned the use of the Act after he was embarrassed by the banning of his son and daughter-in-law.

More significant was a petition signed by 10,000 people against the recent detentions and calling for the repeal of the Terrorism Act. The five officials of NUSAS who delivered the petition to Justice Minister Kruger were met by over 1,000 students from Pretoria University wearing helmets and carrying baseball bats. Pretoria University is all white and is known for its extremely reactionary student body. One of the NUSAS officials described the event as "an extremely intimidating experience."



Poster for nationwide vigil for detainees.

The Minister of Justice responded to the protests by stating that there was no chance that the Terrorism Act would be repealed; nor would he allow visits to the detainees by either family or legal council.

In response to reports of brutal treatment including torture, General Geldenhuys of the Security Police denied that the detainees were being mistreated, and said that he

\* based on the figure of \$115.50 per 100 Rand.

had proof that Moscow had given orders that people arrested should make allegations that they were tortured. (*Star*, South Africa, Sept. 13, 20, 27, Oct. 4, 1975.)

Despite the denials by General Geldenhuys, six released detainees have filed a suit for damages against Minister of Justice Kruger alleging that they were "assaulted and tortured" while in detention. All of the five were arrested as a result of pro-FRELIMO demonstrations held last year. They had been in detention from 160 to 190 days. Of the six, five are currently serving banning orders for other political activities. (*Star*, South Africa, October 4, 1975.)

### COLOURED COUNCIL ADJOURNS IN PROTEST

Six days after its opening session the Coloured Person's Representative Council (CRC) has adjourned itself until March 19, 1976. The CRC, established by the Government to parallel Bantustan developments for the coloured people, without even the hollow promise of eventual "independence" for a particular land area, has no popular support among Coloureds. The Labor Party ran for election on a platform of destroying it. Labor Party member Sonny Leon, chairman of the CRC executive is expected to meet with Prime Minister Vorster before next March.

White press reactions have mostly been negative. The *Sunday Times* said there are only two choices for the Labor Party, "to take a Black power stance and reject apartheid and all its institutions, or to play the system the way the homeland leaders have done."

Too great a rift with the CRC could be embarrassing for the white minority government. There are no homelands for Coloured people and that possibility has been ruled out. Instead, Coloured people live in "municipalities" that are promised eventual "autonomy". Denied any voice in parliament, they are supposed to express their political aspirations through the CRC which is a powerless body.

It appears that Leon hopes to achieve some kind of constitutional talks or conference as a consequence of his meeting with Vorster. "I maintain what is good enough for Rhodesia and South West Africa is good enough for us," Mr. Leon said. (*Comment & Opinion*, September 19, 1975; *Star*, South Africa, September 13, 20, 1975.)

### BAN ON WINNIE MANDELA EXPIRES

After thirteen years of being banned Winnie Mandela is "free", if that is the word for it. Winnie Mandela is a well known anti-apartheid activist. Her jailed husband is Nelson Mandela, President of the African National Congress, the South African liberation movement. She was banned in 1962 and spent 17 months in jail for her political activities. "I am even more opposed to this system now than I was in 1962. That is what being banned does to people," she said, continuing "I will express my views as I did once. I am aware of the risks I will have to face. I am also aware that as I was unbanned today, so I could be banned again tomorrow." (*Star*, South Africa, Oct. 4, 1975)

### BUS BOYCOTT ENDS IN VICTORY

A bus boycott staged by black South African workers from the townships of Madadeni and Osizweni, located outside Newcastle, has ended successfully. The boycott started following a twenty per cent fare increase. For four weeks thousands of people walked up to ten miles to work and home again every day, while the buses ran empty until the fare increase was withdrawn.

Over a hundred policemen from Durban and a sixty man riot squad from Pretoria were rushed to Newcastle following a confrontation between police and boycotters that left one black man dead and numerous others in-

jured.

Bus boycotts have happened before in South Africa, most notably at Johannesburg's Alexandria Township in 1956. South Africa has an inflation rate of 17 per cent and bus fares have risen close to 300 per cent in the last two years. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975; *Daily World*, New York, Oct. 22, 1975; *Guardian*, New York, Nov. 5, 1975).

## SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMICS

### GOVERNMENT ACTS TO UNDERMINE BLACK UNIONISM

In another step to outmaneuver the growing black union movement in South Africa, the Government has announced that it will propose legislation aimed at establishing black "industrial committees" which will function in both company and industry-wide areas and be granted power to engage in direct bargaining with employers. The committees will be composed of African members of works and liaison committees, instruments already allowed by the South African Government. These committees will have to be approved by the Ministry of Labour and work only in consultation with the government Central Bantu Labour Board. After all these steps carefully monitoring the committees they may then enter into negotiations with employers, and such agreements, once approved by the Labour Board, would be binding on employers and workers throughout the industry. Where Industrial Councils already exist for an industry (as in the case of the clothing, textile and motor industries), the black industrial committee could only submit proposals to the Council.

A Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) spokesman criticized the lack of labor union involvement in the creation of the new government plan, and stated that the new policy did not represent a "distinct recognition of the black man's right to negotiate his own conditions of service." He went on to say that the proposal was an "improvement", but not an alternative to a democratic trade union system. The government plan actually aims to set up a legal framework for black workers' relations with management under tight government surveillance, simply broadening the already controlled works and liaison committees, and thereby attempting to subvert any move to legalize the unions themselves. Minister Viljoen stated that black trade unions would *not* be recognized and the new industrial committees would be an equivalent. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 20, 27; Oct. 4, 1975)

### MIGRANT LABOR SYSTEM GROWING

One out of every two black workers in Johannesburg and the West Rand area is a migrant worker according to the West Rand Bantu Association—a figure which does not even include the unregistered illegal workers present. A study by Ms. Jill Nattress of Natal University has shown that for every five economically active men working in the "homelands", six are away from their homes working as migrants. Sixty per cent of the work force in the "modern sector" is migratory—1,750,000 migrants of which 393,000 are foreign workers and 260,000 women. Another study conducted for the Institute of Race Relations shows that ninety eight per cent of the households in the Ciskei have less than 5.25 hectares of arable land and ninety five per cent of those in the Transkei have less than 4 hectares. These amounts are calculated as barely enough land from which a household could possibly make a living. Sixty per cent of Bantustan families' earnings are derived

from the migrant workers.

In order to increase the internal migration of workers to the mines and farms and to discuss problems of competition for labor, the Chamber of Mines and the South African Agricultural Union met recently with government department representatives. This drive will further expand and streamline the whole migratory system. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 27, 1975)

#### BANTUSTAN INVESTMENT PICTURE

"As I see it the South African market will remain one entity, but that does not imply that our market strategy should be aimed at production in the White areas and distribution in the Black Areas," said the Managing Director of the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), Dr. J. Adendorff. The BIC has released recent figures, and reports that over the last 15 years its investment in the "homelands" has been some R200 million (\$240 million) with the creation of 40,000 jobs. Its current budget, up from R62 to R92 million (\$74-110 million) in 1976, is claimed to be able to create 8-12,000 new jobs yearly. 78,000 jobs have been created by the Bantu Mining Corporation, and share capital in the BIC and the Xhosa Development Corporation has jumped from R1 million (\$1.15 million) in 1960 to R123 million (\$147 million) in 1975. A BIC report states that the Bantustan infrastructure has been created, and now private investment is moving in at a greater rate than that of the BIC and XDC themselves.

Chief Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei has announced that his "homeland" has been flooded with applications for industrial projects, and plans a huge hydroelectric scheme. The interest has no doubt been generated by his recent business tours of Europe, in combination with the new "homeland" concessions offered by the South African Government for businesses desiring to move to the Bantustans. Much of the real cause for European investment, however, is simply that the firms can manufacture more cheaply in a Bantustan including the cost of exporting the goods back to Europe, than they can manufacture at home. Major new investors include a large European textile firm, the Bertrand Group of Milan which plans to build a R2.5 million (\$3 million) plant in the Transkei, eventually plowing in R10 million (\$12 million) more and employing up to 1,400 workers. In Holland there has been protest against a chemical firm Akzo which plans to join with British Chemical Holdings to build a R1.7 million (\$2 million) plant in KwaZulu and pledges to pay its small staff of 40 Africans on an equal work equal pay basis with the Whites. The Xhosa Development Corporation has indicated that 21 new industries employing 5,500 people would be set up in the Transkei and Ciskei, with the Ciskei more dependent upon agricultural projects. Mantanzima himself has reiterated the BIC Managing Director's Statement, acknowledging the Transkei's dependence on its neighbor (i.e. South Africa), but claiming that his "nation" has sufficient agricultural potential to feed its people.

The reality behind the rosy picture painted by the government and Bantustan spokesmen is the growth of migrant labor from the areas, the dependence on the "homelands" on external sources of earnings, and the growing general unemployment among Blacks (particularly in textile, building and auto areas which are hard hit by recessionary trends). As one industrialist commented: "We moved into the homelands convinced that the labour was there and found only the women, the young, the old or the layabouts" (*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, June 20, 1975). Black employment (and unemployment) statistics



Kaiser Matanzima

are not well-publicized in South Africa, but rising unemployment is known in the towns, the townships and the Bantustans. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 20, Oct. 4, Oct. 11, 1975, *SABC Current Affairs*, Radio, July 4, 1975; *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, June 20, August 1, 1975)

#### SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD—ECONOMIC NOTES

Trade between South Africa and *Israel* has increased during 1975 with *Israel* having a slight edge in the balance of payments relationship. South Africa hopes to jump its auto and components exports there. Meanwhile in other parts of the *Middle East*, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi have initiated a policy of boycotting trade with South Africa, and although they are not big trading partners of South Africa it may affect their roles as transfer points for South African goods. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 20, 1975; *Financial Mail*, July 11, 1975)

A *Soviet* paper concern, Ust Ilinsk, will pay a royalty fee for the purchase of a technique created in South Africa for using oxygen to bleach fibers rather than harmful chlorine. (*To the Point International*, Johannesburg, Aug. 23, 1975)

Two-way trade between South Africa and *Latin America* has skyrocketed from R46 million (\$55 million) in 1972 to R131 million (\$157 million) in 1974 with a fairly even balance of trade ratio. South Africa sees the Latin American market as a good outlet for its capital goods, technical skills, and foodstuffs, while South African companies are also investing (*Anglo-American* in Brazilian gold; *AI & CI* in a Brazil explosives firm). South Africa believes that its good relations in Latin America stem from its links with Paraguay and the fact that the countries of South America desire to reduce their dependence on the United States and find trade with Europe expensive and too distant. Target countries for South Africa include Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 11, 1975)

One hundred aircraft companies, mainly foreign, were part of the first Air Africa '75 exhibit held in South Africa recently as proof of the expanding market for planes in South Africa. In the USA there is one private aircraft for every 2,000 people, in South Africa, one for every 2,500 Whites. (*Star*, Johannesburg, October 4,

1975)

*United States Steel* has signed a big deal with Associated Manganese Mines of South Africa to import 3 million tons of ore yearly for the next 15 years, and to provide R6 million (\$7.2 million) worth of loans for mine expansion. USS will also buy shares in the South African company. (*South Africa Digest*, Sept. 26, 1975)

### SOUTH AFRICA DEVALUES THE RAND—CRITICISM FOLLOWS

On September 22 Owen Horwood, the Minister of Finance, announced that the South African unit of currency, the rand, would be devalued by 17.9 per cent in relation to the dollar. Although some devaluation had been expected the huge slash took many by surprise. The aim of such a move is to boost South African exports, which will now be cheaper on the foreign market because formerly 1R=\$1.40 and now 1R=\$1.15. The need to improve the balance of payments through more exports was triggered by the downward trend in the international free market gold price (it is at its lowest in 18 months), the strengthening of the dollar and the weakness of sterling. South Africa depends upon the sale of gold for 50 per cent of its foreign exchange. The high price of gold over the last three years has fed into huge development plans in South Africa and enabled greater expenditures on defense, oil and other projects. With the downward price turn there was more speculation against the rand and flight of currency from South Africa, and it is hoped devaluation will curb this. In addition, imports will now be more expensive, and this should, hopes the Government, induce greater domestic productivity and internal investment. South Africa has been a victim of the generally recessionary trend in the western world which has affected production.

The devaluation has been criticized on two main counts. First that it, in the words of the *Rand Daily Mail* of September 23, adds "a vicious twist to the inflationary spiral" and secondly that devaluation has been caused by government spending policies which of late have been "near lunatic." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975) increasing budgets by some 25, 24 and 19 per cent in the last three years.

The Government is now seeking ways to fight the effect of the increased prices of imports (which will influence the price of fuel, autos, steel, plastics, chemicals, travel) and a dangerous rate of inflation. The rate of inflation is now at 13 per cent and the Bureau of Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosch predicts that it may climb to 30 per cent by the end of 1976. The government, through an Anti-Inflation Committee of the Prime Minister Economic Advisory Council came out with a number of policies in early October. On October 7 nine Cabinet ministers, ten company presidents and four labor union leaders signed an anti-inflationary agreement which stresses maximum voluntary wage and price restraint. It calls for a 15 per cent limit on profits (although there is some debate over how calculations will be made), a limit on wage demands, a review of and cutback in government expenditures, increased training for Blacks (aimed to increase productivity), more jobs for married women (and more child care facilities), and corporate absorption of 30 per cent of increased costs. The government has already promised to keep an eye on price hikes based on the devaluation through its Price Controllers Office and intends to freeze car prices.

"The high standard of living enjoyed by so many is gone. . . ." predicted the *Pretoria News* (September 22),

and the calls for austerity and belt tightening echo in all the South African papers. Of course the inflation cum recession has most severely affected the majority of people—those Blacks who do not participate in government councils or ministry decisions. Their standard of living was never "high"—and now the misery is deepened. Such was reflected in the recent bus boycott in Newcastle, when the bus company announced it would raise the fares by five cents a single ride from 25 to 30 cents. (See *South African Politics*) As the *Star* editorialized:


"The Newcastle riots are symptomatic of a wider South African problem—of the magnified effect inflation has had on the poor and the chilling inevitability of confrontation when a poor community is trapped in an inflationary spiral and lacks the *political* muscle to do anything about it.

The traditional sensitivity to bus fare increases needs to be seen in its true perspective. For its own reasons, White South Africa has chosen to accommodate Black and Brown people outside the main towns, miles from their places of work.

Low wages mean that Black South Africans are being harder hit by inflation than their White compatriots. They have fewer luxuries to forego and must therefore economize on basics, often including food and clothing. But, because they are forced to live so far from town and must reach town to work, transport costs are inescapable. What we are seeing in Newcastle now is to some extent the product of despair." (*Star*, Johannesburg, October 1, 1975)

The peoples boycott has meant the postponement of a bus fare increase in a particular township, but the economic conditions remain. South Africa's inflationary rate is greater than that in many European countries (topped only by Britain and Italy), and a Barclay's Bank Review predicts that economic recovery will not occur for at least a year, with a lower growth rate (2.5 per cent, down some 4 percentage points) forecast by the Stellenbosch economists. A Johannesburg *Star* interview says that business people, bankers and economists are disillusioned with government policy, but of course such divisions are only a matter of disagreement within the generally solid white power structure and constitute no challenge to the system as a whole. In general all white groups would agree with the government SABC radio comment that, "Economic strength is necessary for orderly development within South Africa and for harmony among its people. In a wider sense, too, we have pointed out that South Africa's economic strength is a key factor in establishing good relations with other states." (SABC Current Affairs, Sept. 19, 1975) and that "Economically, South Africa is one of the most favoured countries in the world. Her political stability, progressive entrepreneurial class and labour resources have attracted vast amounts of foreign capital investment. . . . Her huge reserves of gold and other minerals have provided a cushion against adversity many times in the past, and will do so again in the future. The potential is incalculable. With a concerted effort to jump this present hurdle, it will be achieved." (SABC Current Affairs, Sept. 23, 1975)

Do the people of Newcastle have such optimism? (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 27, Oct. 4, 11, 1975; *To the Point International*, Oct. 6, 1975; *Sunday Express*, Sept. 28, 1975; *Daily News*, Durban, Sept. 22, 1975; *Cape Times*, Sept. 22, 1975; *South African Financial Gazette*, Johannesburg, Sept. 26, 1975; *Rand Daily Mail*, Sept. 23, 1975; *Pretoria News*, Sept. 22, 1975; *Barclays Report*, August 18, 1975)



South Africa is totally dependent on foreign oil

### STATE COMMITS MILLIONS TO OIL EXPLORATION

Even before the latest announcement of a ten per cent leap in international oil prices, the South African Government via its Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (SOEKOR) budgeted R75 million (\$90 million) to the search for oil in South Africa over the next three years. Since 1967 SOEKOR and private oil concerns have spent R81 million (\$97 million) in the unsuccessful quest for oil. The huge outlay is justified as a way to counter, if a discovery is made, the huge amounts of foreign exchange the country is paying for its oil, about twice R75 million per year, with estimates reaching R450 million (\$540 million) by 1980. South Africa is dependent upon oil to fill 24 per cent of its energy needs.

The over all energy picture looms large in South Africa's development plans with estimates revealed at a Conference on Southern African Resources of spending some R1 million (\$1.15 million) per day on energy development such as coal, SASOL (see below), uranium enrichment, electricity, etc.

Meanwhile a second coal to oil conversion plant, SASOL II, will be opened in 1981 in the Eastern Transvaal. The plant will cost R1,020 million (\$1,221 million), and calculations show that the conversion oil will cost only 15 per cent more than if, by chance, crude was discovered in South Africa itself. South African government and economic experts are now stressing the economic and technical feasibility of programs such as SASOL rather than their original political necessity. SASOL I was developed because South Africa feared an international oil embargo. (*The Argus*, Sept. 11, 1975; SABC News Commentary, Sept. 11, 1975; *Die Transvaler*, Sept. 12, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 20, Oct. 4, 1975)

### SOUTH AFRICA FOREIGN RELATIONS

#### THE WEST GERMAN-SOUTH AFRICAN ATOMIC BOMB CONNECTION

Documents taken from the South African Embassy in Bonn, West Germany, released by the African National

Congress of South Africa and published in the October 2, 1975 issue of *Der Stern*, have revealed that West German interests are aiding the Apartheid regime in developing their ability to build nuclear weapons. When General Guenther Rall (former commanding officer of the Luftwaffe—air force—and West Germany's representative to NATO) paid a secret visit to South Africa during October 1974, he met with senior South African military officers and toured the Pelindaba Nuclear Center. One document published—a letter from the South African Ambassador (to West Germany) to Pretoria—stated that "the General [Rall] has certainly returned to Brussels [NATO headquarters] as a convinced partisan of the need to recognize the strategic importance of South Africa."

The African National Congress in a letter to the West German Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Schmidt, demanded that West German cooperation with South Africa be stopped. It stated that the West German Government has unofficially helped South Africa obtain information on uranium enrichment. From 1969 to 1974 numerous South African atomic researchers made visits to the Government controlled Gesellschaft Für Kernforschung in Karlsruhe—a nuclear research institute which has recently developed a uranium enrichment process. (The South African uranium enrichment process revealed last April is similar to the one developed in West Germany.) This aid will allow South Africa to develop a uranium enrichment plant by 1984.

There are two West German firms aiding the South African nuclear development. The Gesellschaft—in which the Bonn Government holds a majority of the stocks—is involved in studying the feasibility of South Africa's uranium enrichment plant. The other firm, the Kraftwerk Union of Frankfurt—owned half by Siemens, and half by Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft, two major German electronic concerns—is currently bidding for a contract to build a 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant in South Africa. Under the contract it would provide South Africa with nuclear equipment and technological assistance, estimated to be worth \$720 million. In order to finalize the contract, it needs the approval of the Bonn Govern-

ment and the grant of export credits. According to the *New York Times* the Kraftwerk Union bid was entered in competition with a bid by a consortium which includes a US corporation—General Electric—and Swiss and French firms.

West Germany's need for uranium—no longer freely supplied by the United States—has led it to seek out other sources. South Africa, the world's third largest producer of uranium, has become a major source of uranium for West Germany in exchange for West German nuclear technological assistance to South Africa. If South Africa develops the atomic bomb, West Germany will be one of the countries responsible for that development. Although West German sources deny it, it is very easy to convert a reactor designed for peaceful uses into a nuclear bomb factory. Since the technology is the same, there is only a headline distinction between peaceful and military uses of atomic energy.

An international system of inspection has been developed to prevent the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military uses. But South Africa has refused to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty because it objects to the International Atomic Energy Agency having unlimited inspection rights over South African nuclear plants, enrichment processes and uranium mining operations. Thus the only control upon South Africa's use of its nuclear capability is the self-restraint exercised by the Apartheid regime itself!

Another reason for the West German-South African nuclear exchange is West Germany's need to increase its own export of industrial equipment. According to Volker Hauff, a high official in the Research Ministry, it is necessary for West Germany to pursue overseas sales of nuclear reactors in order to maintain its standard of living. Around 25,000 West German jobs are dependent upon the reactor contracts. South Africa has become a key export target for West Germany, in particular for the export of heavy capital goods—of which nuclear equipment is one component. In 1974 West German exports to South Africa totalled \$1.4 billion, and this was a 53 per cent increase over the previous year.

After the disclosure of the atomic connection, the spokesman for the West German Government, Mr. Boelling, denied that his Government had any *direct* involvement with South Africa's nuclear development, but stated that the charges made by the African National Congress would be investigated. Additionally, General Rall was forced into early retirement.

The independent African states have reacted to the threat of South Africa's future development of an atomic bomb by condemning West German policy. Dr. Bolaji Akinyemi, the head of the Government Institute for International Affairs, and Nigeria's chief delegate to a German-African foreign relations conference held in Bonn (October, 1975), stated that if "the apartheid regime acquires the technology enabling it to develop a nuclear bomb, then some African states who have the economic infrastructure may also be forced to try and achieve nuclear know-how." He considers the new German proposed approach to halt nuclear weapon proliferation by tying nuclear technology to strict bilateral safeguard clauses as "child's talk", because—pointing to India's development of the atomic bomb through secretly diverting plutonium wastes from the Canadian supplied reactor—there is "absolutely no ironclad guarantee for the peaceful use of nuclear technology." Additionally, he stated that Nigeria will review its relations with West Germany if the project continues. Dr. Akinyemi's statement was echoed by those delegates from Tanzania, Sudan, Ghana, and Kenya who



Laurent Dona-Fologo, Ivory Coast Minister of Information meets with Vorster in South Africa were attending the same conference. The O.A.U. has called on West Germany to end the nuclear collaboration with South Africa. (*New York Times*, Oct. 12, 1975; *Associated Press*, Oct. 6, 8, 1975; *Daily World*, New York, Oct. 8, 10, 1975)

#### IVORY COAST-SOUTH AFRICA

The Government of the Ivory Coast has openly joined with those western governments—US, UK, France, West Germany, Israel, and Japan—who oppose freedom for the overwhelming Black majority in South Africa. Visiting South Africa between Sept. 10 and 21, 1975 as a guest of the South African Minister of Information, Dr. C.P. Mulder, and accompanied by four Ivorian Coast officials, Mr. Laurent Dona-Fologo (the Ivorian Coast Minister of Information) declared that his Government supports South Africa's dialogue policies and opposes any method which uses violence to change the situation in South Africa. While in South Africa, Mr. Dona-Fologo met with Prime Minister Vorster, Minister Mulder and Dr. Eschel Rhoodie (Secretary for Information), plus various heads of the "Bantustan" governments—including Chief Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei and Dr. Cedric Phatudi of Lebowa. Besides backing South Africa's "detente" politics, the Ivory Coast has declared its support for the "independence" of the "Bantustans"—a policy designed to deny to Africans their birthright by making them permanent migrant laborers without any rights in their own country. It is also interesting to note that the Ivorian Coast Government delegation was flown back to Abidjan by a South African Airways plane. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 20, 1975; *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Sept. 19, 26, 1975)

However, it is not so surprising that the Ivory Coast would join Malawi as South Africa's staunchest ally in Africa. During 1971, the Ivory Coast was one of the governments which attempted to pressure the OAU into accepting the legitimacy of the Apartheid regime. President Houphouet-Boigny is considered by the South African regime to be the "father of the dialogue concept." Houphouet-Boigny's politics place him in diametric opposition to the demands for freedom by Black South Africans. In 1963 he stated that "I [Houphouet-Boigny] prefer injustice to disorder: one can die of disorder, one does not die of injustice." (*Fraternite*, Sept. 13, 1963) Maybe someone should inform President Houphouet-Boigny that innumerable Black South Africans, of all ages and of both sexes, are dying every minute from the injustices created by the Apartheid regime.

# namibia

## THE WIDENING WAR

"... I can tell you with certainty that the situation in Namibia is pregnant with danger and bloodshed as a result of the diabolical policies carried out there by South Africa. Contrary to what he promises the outside world, Vorster is doing everything by means of police and military terror in Namibia to perpetuate his illegal presence. . . . there is now more than ever before a large scale police and military build up all over Namibia, particularly in the North and Northeast."

— David H. Meroro, national chairman of SWAPO, before the UN Council for Namibia, 16 October 1975

War is flaring in northern Namibia, an entwining of the struggle for Namibian independence and the increasingly chaotic situation in neighboring Angola.

"Troops of the South African Defense Force have invoked the principle of 'hot pursuit' and struck across the Namibian border into southern Angola, where they have destroyed two guerrilla camps manned by the South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), killed seven guerrillas and seized a large quantity of equipment" (*Post*, Washington, October 19, 1975, quoting an article by Stanley Uys in the *Manchester Guardian*).

"The South African raids were in retaliation for the raid earlier this week by SWAPO guerrillas on two border posts where ten Ovambos—eight tribal policemen, and a headman and his wife—were killed." The report by the Cape Town journalist was based on a statement from the South African Defense Force in Pretoria, a communique which did not specifically say the action involved an incursion into Angola but the general understanding in South Africa and elsewhere confirms this fact. The report continues: "It was felt that whites in Namibia and South Africa would not allow the South African government to look on idly while guerrillas raided into the Ovamboland 'Bantustan' or tribal homeland. Whites have been asking what the government is doing with its well-equipped Defense Force, on which \$1.5 billion was spent this year".

The *Windhoek Advertiser* (October 20, 1975) reported that at the funeral of the tribal policemen killed in the raid, a message from South African Prime Minister Balthazar J. Vorster was read, promising ruthless action against 'evil infiltrators'.

South African troops in August had secured components of the Ruacana hydro-electric dam complex in Angola (see *Southern Africa*, October, 1975) and there is no word of their withdrawal.

## THE INTERNATIONAL WAR

Repeated charges of South African troops operating in Angola, having crossed over from Namibia, continue to emanate from Luanda and MPLA officials. "The Angolan provisional government, charging that troops from South Africa and Zaire have invaded Angola from across the southern border with Namibia, ordered a general mobilization Friday night" (*Post*, Washington, October 25, 1975). An October 30 Reuters dispatch from Luanda quotes an MPLA communique that the southern port city of Mocimedeas was occupied "by South Africans, Portuguese and members of a right wing movement called the Portuguese Liberation Army". Another Reuters report quoted

MPLA saying South African troops had crossed into southern Angola and were advancing on Sa da Bandeira, 150 miles above the border with Namibia (*Times*, New York, October 24, 1975).

Mr. Mishake Muyongo, acting vice-president of SWAPO, speaking in the UN Fourth Committee on October 20, warned: "South Africa has sent large numbers of armed forces across the border of the international territory of Namibia. Recent reports show that these same forces have also invaded Angola." Mr. Muyongo reiterated the warning before the same body on October 24 and again during testimony at a meeting of the Council for Namibia on October 28.

The *Windhoek Advertiser* of October 27, in a front page story datelined Luanda, says that "White Portuguese units aided by other foreigners have struck just across the South West Africa border and occupied three major centres, pushing the armed dread of the MPLA back to the central areas of the country". The story tells of the newly-formed ELP, the Portuguese Liberation Army, and its occupation of a number of towns in southern Angola. In this connection, it should be noted that South Defence Act forbids reports of troop movements without authorization from Pretoria.

The *Advertiser* of October 28 quotes a South African police official in Oshakati, the capital of the Ovambo Bantustan, as denying that a mercenary force "crossed Ovamboland into Angola". There was no mention by the newspaper or the police officer of South African troops.

## SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES CREATE SECURITY ZONE


South Africa is clearing all civilians from a long stretch of northern Namibia bordering Angola. The *Windhoek Advertiser* of October 17 reports "the entire frontier of 250 km which the Kwanyama tribal area has with Angola will be moved back a few kilometres to become a tight security zone to eliminate as far as possible the chances of a surprise assault as happened during the weekend". Janie de Wet, South African occupation official, said "the Kwanyama tribal authority has decided to move entire villages, kraals, businesses such as shops, cafes and other establishments. In fact, the removal has already started." De Wet stated people would be compensated from "tribal funds" and allocated new lands. He added the strip would be tightly controlled and populated by security forces.

In testimony before the UN Council for Namibia on October 28, the Rev. Frederick L. Houghton, an American Anglican priest who served in the northern Namibia area in the early 1970s, declared that the removals in that heavily populated region, the one favored with the heaviest rainfall in water-scarce Namibia, would cause mass displacement and the splitting of families. The chief minister of the Ovambo Bantustan, Cornelius Ndjoba, was travelling with the puppet delegation when the announcement was made.


## THE PUPPET DELEGATION VISITS THE U.S.A.

"SWAPO!" "SWAPO!" "SWAPO!" greeted the 34-person puppet delegation sent abroad by the Vorster regime to try to impress other countries that there is indeed a government being formed in Namibia. A band of demonstrators—half of them Namibians, half Americans—





Protesting Against the Puppet Delegation



visibly shook the contingent as its members entered a Manhattan building across from the United Nations for a press conference on October 15.

The "travelling salesmen", as Zambian ambassador to the U.N. Dunstan Kamana termed them, were chaperoned-herded about by members of the South African Mission to the U.N., the South African Department of Information and guarded-guided by at least one detective from New York City's intelligence division. The press conference was as close as the delegation got to the UN, except for taking the visitors' tour. They were not received by any UN body or official although several diplomats attended a reception put on by the South Africans in one of Manhattan's swell private clubs.

A demonstration also greeted the puppets in Washington, D.C. at the time of a South African embassy reception. The group was received at the U.S. State Department by middle level officials and was told, according to the *Johannesburg Star* of October 11, "they did not properly represent the people of South West Africa because they had been elected against 'a background of repression of political activity'".

As the group emerged from the New York press conference, they saw a face that must have unsettled them: Mr. David H. Meroro, national chairman of SWAPO, who had eluded the South African police and had just arrived to testify at the United Nations.

#### DETAINEES


The best available sources say that 20 Namibians are now in detention incommunicado under terms of the South African Terrorism Act. Five of the people held

were detained recently. Two women and one 15-year-old girl are among those held somewhere. Four Lutheran pastors are being detained. Seven men are known to have been released without charges.

One man escaped from the security police. The SWAPO Mission to the U.N. has released the text of a letter from Theophilus Kalimba, a store owner from Odibo, near the Angolan border. Mr. Kalimba tells of his arrest on August 26 and his escape on August 28 from the Oshikango jail, right on the border. "Our legs and arms are tied, we are hung by the legs, sometimes by the arms from the roof and tortured. We are given only a cup of water. The South African government is trying to destroy the Namibians physically and mentally. The people in jail are watched over by soldiers so that they do not get a chance to sleep. . . . Vorster says that it is up to the people of the country to say that they want independence and when he says so he just means his puppets like Cornelius Ndjoba, Petrus Kalangula, Clemens Kapuuu and all the others."

Ten Namibian women have recently visited their relatives imprisoned on Robben Island, South Africa's prison colony off Cape Town. They returned by train to Windhoek and gathered at the railway police charge office giving the black power salute and singing a song "in which the words, 'Vorster, Namibia and Zambia' were sometimes discernible" (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, October 24, 1975). The long journey to and stay in Cape Town has been made possible by funds coming from the churches. Many of the Namibian prisoners on Robben Island were tried and convicted in a South African court as far back as the first Terrorism Trial in 1968. There is a rumour that Namibian prisoners will soon be transferred from South Africa to their home country. ●

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# zimbabwe

## WARFARE INTENSIFIES

Zimbabwean liberation forces entered Rhodesia from Mozambique on October 9, killing one white Rhodesian and wounding another. It was the first reported incident of guerrilla forces coming directly from Mozambique. (*New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1975)

A European farm in the northeast was attacked on September 13 by guerrillas. Rhodesian troops report that they killed five "rebels," bringing the total number of guerrillas killed to 659 since December, 1972. Rhodesian forces claim to have killed twelve guerrillas in the Mt. Darwin area and to have captured large amounts of equipment and weapons during the biggest clash in three months. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 20, 1975)

Zambia is sharply restricting the activity of liberation movements inside Zambia. There are reports that many of the ZANU officials and members arrested by the Zambian authorities following the murder of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo in March are still in detention. In early September Zambian military forces entered a camp occupied by three Zimbabwean nationalist movements, allegedly to break-up a factional struggle. In the course of the melee, one Zambian officer and eleven ZANU members, including the commander of ZANU's women's detachment, Pedzisai Mazoródze, were killed. (*International Bulletin*, Berkeley, Sept. 26, 1975)

## ZAMBIA'S STAND

Siteke Mwale, Zambia's ambassador in Washington, denied charges that his country has made a deal with South Africa which would postpone majority rule in Zimbabwe, and he denied that Zambia supports the Nkomo faction of the ANC. (See *Southern Africa*, October) Mwale said Zambia is tired of internal rivalries among the Zimbabwean nationalists and hopes that unity can still be achieved. He also said that Zambia is ready to support guerrilla warfare to bring about change in Zimbabwe. Mr. Mwale said that Zambia considers the recent congress of the ANC held inside Zimbabwe not to be legitimate. It was this congress which elected Nkomo to power in the ANC, leaving Muzorewa and other ZANU supporters out of leadership positions. (*Africa News*, Durham, N.C., Oct. 6, 1975)

Mainza Chona, Attorney General of Zambia, has called for a halt on the "wanton abuse" poured upon Zambia recently by Enos Nkala and other ZANU officials. ZANU alleges that Zambia favors the Nkomò faction in the current struggle within the ANC and that Zambia is holding ZANU cadres in camps within Zambia.

Pro-ZANU leaders within the ANC called another ANC national congress in Zimbabwe to counter the effect of the congress held last month which elected Nkomo to power. Over 35,000 attended the meeting in Salisbury. An address by Bishop Muzorewa was read in his absence before the police forced the meeting to close.

Zambia and other nations involved in the Zimbabwean situation—Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana—have not recognized Nkomo as leader of the ANC. They continue to support Bishop Muzorewa, who has been chairman since the ANC was re-structured in December to include ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI.

Britain has not recognized Nkomo either and is pre-

sumably waiting for Zambia to make a decision. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975)

## NKOMO'S RESPONSE

Nkomo, as chairman of the ANC congress held in Rhodesia, has taken leadership in setting-up committees within Rhodesia to talk to whites. "What are their fears?" he said, "They are frightened of something they don't know and I want to find out what they are really frightened of." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975) A team charged to meet with white professionals and business leaders in commerce and industry was set up in mid-October. There has been no report on how these meetings have been received or of the response of the Rhodesian Front government to Mr. Nkomo's plans.

Nkomo was interviewed by the *Star* about his policy regarding the timing of majority rule and the possibility of a transitional shared government. Nkomo said, "No, I don't think that type of thing can work now. The time for that is gone, you see. You can't think of that. We're think-



Joshua Nkomo

ing of a government that springs from the people. ... If there is to be a transitional government, it's a government that will be agreed on at a conference to run the affairs of the country while constitutions are being drawn. It's a matter of months and then an election where you get a government that gets power directly from the people." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 27, 1975)

## SMITH'S MERITOCRACY

The Rhodesian Front Congress, held in Umtali in early October, turned down a proposal to divide Rhodesia into South African-styled "homelands." The Congress also gave Ian Smith a free hand in dealing with the Rhodesian constitutional situation. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 27, 1975)

Smith stated the previous week that it was not contrary to government principles that Africans could help run the country or that any man of any color could be Prime Minister. "There is a place for Africans in Rhodesia

and in the Government of this country, provided they are the correct people. There are so many things here that affect Africans so why should I say that only white people should deal with these things?" (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975) Smith did not give his definition of a "correct" person; nor did he specify which "things" Africans should deal with.

### PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION

Rhodesian Security Forces will have legally free rein in actions taken in the guerrilla struggle, without fear of prosecution for any atrocities committed. A new Indemnity and Compensation Bill, on its way through the Rhodesian parliament has three main provisions: "No civil

or criminal proceedings can be taken against the state or its employees for acts done in good faith while acting to suppress terrorism. The President may stop proceedings taken against a Minister or member of the security forces if he considers the action was for the purpose of stopping terrorism. It provides for compensation for anyone suffering loss or injury during such acts." (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Oct. 19, 1975)

Church leaders had compiled evidence of atrocities committed by the Rhodesian Security Forces against civilians and had demanded that the government set up a commission of inquiry. This was not done. The new legislation is under attack by church leaders also. (*Reuters News Service*, Sept. 9, 1975; *Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Oct. 19, 1975)•

# angola

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### ANGOLA: AN MPLA STRONGHOLD ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE

Events in October preceding the date of independence, November 11, put MPLA in a leading position. MPLA controlled 12 out of 16 provinces, the capital city of Luanda and all of the major ports on the central and southern coast. FNLA and UNITA each control two provinces; Uíge and Zaire in the north are under FNLA and Huambo and Bie under UNITA. The rest of the country is already beginning the process of political and economic recovery, under MPLA leadership. It seems likely that a free Angolan state will emerge on November 11 under MPLA control.

Portuguese authorities in Angola have declared that they will not hand over control of Angola to any one movement on November 11. According to the Portuguese High Commissioner in Angola, Rear Admiral Leonel Cardoso, the official view is that if conditions are not met for the transfer of power to a coalition government on the day of independence, the situation would be placed in the hands of the United Nations. Cardoso claimed that while the Portuguese must remain politically neutral, "they would not be humiliated in the final hours." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975) The Portuguese government in Lisbon is still planning to withdraw all of its forces in Angola, 24,000 troops, on or before the date of independence. (*Washington Post*, Sept. 20, 1975)

Recent events in Angola have triggered a wave of speculation throughout the circles of Portugal's new "moderate" coalition government. Former Interior Minister Manuel da Costa Bras, now a roving ambassador for Portugal, said recently in an interview that Portuguese domestic problems are being complicated by the involvement of the major powers in Angola, each of whom wants an outcome favorable in terms of its own national perspective. Bras, a conservative, fears a campaign in the Lisbon press that supports the MPLA as the clear and only choice for the Portuguese to invest with power on November 11. Other centrists and social democrats in Lisbon fear a new coup by the Portuguese Communist Party and its allies that would substitute the "neutralist" position of the present regime with a government that would transfer power solely to the MPLA. (*New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1975)

The FNLA has already gone on record as saying that if such a move took place and power was transferred to the

MPLA alone, FNLA would declare unilateral independence. (*Africa News*, Oct. 13, 1975) FNLA's Holden Roberto has paid his first visit to Angola since the heavy fighting broke out. The occasion was the recapture of the town of Caxito from the MPLA. Roberto conducted a tour of the town without giving any interviews to reporters. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975)

As the date of independence draws closer, military clashes throughout the country and around the Angolan capital predictably have escalated. Late in October heavy fighting was reported on all major fronts and FNLA forces were making a final bid for Luanda. FNLA has been trying unsuccessfully for months to wrest control of the capital from the MPLA, but the most they have accomplished is to move from 20 miles to 12 miles north of Luanda. Most observers acknowledge that the MPLA remains in firm control of the capital and that the latest drive by the FNLA is an effort to move its troops close enough to the city to disrupt the independence day ceremony with mortar and rocket fire. (*Providence Evening Bulletin*, Oct. 24, 1975; *Africa News*, Oct. 13, 1975)

It is clear that MPLA ideology and political-military practice have made its leadership in the country a reality. As Agostinho Neto has claimed on many occasions, there is one and only genuine movement in Angola, the MPLA.

### O.A.U. EFFORTS AT CONCILIATION

In the wake of the intensified fighting, the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) has repeated its effort to play a conciliatory role. An OAU Conciliation Commission was set up and held meetings in Kampala in October with representatives from all three Angolan movements. In the opening session Ugandan President Idi Amin called for an end to the fighting, adding that regardless of ideological differences "compromise cannot be achieved by the use of the gun." Prior to the Kampala meetings a UNITA spokesman in Dakar, John Kakoumba, said that the OAU Conciliation Commission will achieve no positive results. At the same time, MPLA leaders made it clear that they went to Kampala *not* to negotiate but to restate their position that the MPLA controls two-thirds of Angola and is the only movement with mass, widespread and multi-ethnic support in the country. MPLA also took the opportunity of the OAU Committee meeting forum to reiterate its concern over the invasion of Angola by foreign mercenaries. An estimated 5-6000 South African



Mercenaries for FNLA

mercenaries have crossed into Angola from Namibia to intervene militarily against the MPLA and to "defend" the Cunene Dam, an important source of hydroelectric power for South Africa. In addition, some PIDE/DGS agents are reported to have arrived from Rhodesia and have been incorporated into the ranks of the FNLA and put in charge of operations. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, Sept. 16, 1975)

Both UNITA and the FNLA vow to fight the MPLA to the bitter end. UNITA has been unsuccessfully trying to wrest control of the Benguela Railroad from the MPLA, but the MPLA firmly controls the towns of Benguela and Lobito at the end of the line. One index of FNLA's increasing desperation is a report that FNLA troops loyal to Daniel Chipenda engaged in a bank robbery in Nova

Lisboa fleeing with the equivalent of two million Rand (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975)

Meanwhile the MPLA has assumed an increasing number of official government functions in the cities and in the rural areas under its control in preparation for independence. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Oct. 3, 1975; Oct. 5, 1975; *Reuter News Service*, Oct. 4, 1975; *Africa News*, Oct. 6, 1975)

#### NUMBER OF REFUGEES DECLINES

The number of white Angolan refugees is reported to be levelling off. Negotiations for the mass migration of Angolan whites to Brazil have bogged down because of Brazil's determination not to risk damaging relations with African nations. Brazilian officials have said they will make no formal agreements specifying numbers of immigrants until a new government in Angola is installed in power and works out an agreement with Brazil. The United States continues to assist in the refugee airlift program understanding full well that the large numbers of poor and jobless conservative Angolan returnees might have an effect on internal Portuguese politics that is favorable to the U.S. government.

Agents for the Portuguese airline TAP have reported a drop in the demand for seats on repatriation flights. This is attributed to the calm which has settled on Luanda since the MPLA took over the city in August. One Portuguese doctor said that many of his friends were wondering whether to stay in Angola in view of the instability now in the Portuguese government. Today many feel that Luanda is a safer city than Lisbon, and there is virtual unanimous relief in Luanda that the brutal occupation of FNLA troops has been ended. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Sept. 10, 1975) In the rural areas of MPLA support the work of reconstruction is already underway and is a high priority for the MPLA. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Sept. 29, 1975) The MPLA believe that the massive exodus of Angolan whites was the result of unwarranted panic and they stress that white Angolans will be welcomed in the free Angolan state. (*New York Times*, Sept. 26, 1975) ●

# The Struggle Continues

## Mozambique

### INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

The People's Republic of Mozambique now has to travel on a road never before taken. Mozambican socialism is not Russian socialism or Chinese socialism or Cuban socialism: it is Mozambican socialism; and that's what makes the journey as hard and protracted as the war of liberation FRELIMO led for some 11 years.

The immediate plan of action includes the spreading of political consciousness involving a small group of people in every locality—dynamizing groups—who's basic purpose is to promote the collective spirit of the people and to replace the tribal unit as the source of local authority.

Robin Wright, an Alicia Patterson Foundation award winner, reported in the June 20 *Christian Science Monitor*: "Previously both production and administration, except in the few urban areas, have been tied to the country's nine main tribes, which were easily controlled by the colonial government. Now, village administration will be reorganized into elected people's committees, and agriculture reorganized so that producers work in cooperatives under the direction of the local party.

The elimination of tribalism and the switch to a 'people's democracy' is a radical one and the FRELIMO leadership is trying hard to make it a smooth and fast one—again for both ideological and practical reasons."

The FRELIMO leadership is likely to face serious prob

lems as it seeks to make the transition from tribalism to a people's democracy a smooth and fast one.

There have already been reports of purges from the party and military ranks on grounds of corruption, dishonesty, immorality, and indiscipline. Also the Sept. 20 Johannesburg *Star* reports: "Travellers from Lourenco Marques report that slogans such as 'Samora earns 65,000 escudos—we, the workers, are getting hunger salaries' and 'Comrade Machel rides in luxury cars—we still have to walk', are appearing on walls overnight." Such slogans are almost certainly the work of provocateurs and agents rather than expressions of popular discontent.

Most Mozambicans seem aware of the dangers facing them. School children sing songs with verses such as "down with imperialism, down with colonialism. . ." and junior high school children perform plays with the theme of "heightening vigilance and beware of enemy agents." Head of Zambesia Province, Bonifacio Gruveta Masamba, pointed out: "Our country has gained independence. On the surface, the enemy seems to be non-existent, but in reality, they still are locked in struggles against us in every field. In this new situation, if our people do not keep vigilance, we will lose everything." (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Sept. 29, 1975)

## FOREIGN MINISTER ADDRESSES GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In his address to the General Assembly on October 6, Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano outlined the historical background of the People's Republic of Mozambique, discussed those obstacles which now have to be overcome, and presented a comprehensive review of Mozambique's foreign policy.

Mozambique, he said, seeks to establish friendly relations between nations and the creation of international economic relations based on equality and mutual respect. "Thus, there is an urgent need to change the current world economic system based on dependency on a few powerful nations of the world and on the tyranny of a small group of nations, as well as on forms of colonialist, imperialist and neocolonialist domination." Chissano urged mutual co-operation between developed and developing countries on an industrial, scientific and technological level. Developing countries should build a special rapport with each other in order to strengthen their dialogue with the developed nations.

The Foreign Minister condemned the United States on its use of veto power to prevent the admission to the U.N. of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam while at the same time it speaks of peace and cooperation.

Mozambique, he said, recognizes that it will not be free until all countries under colonial domination and repressive regimes are free. "This is why we say 'luta continua.'"

Mozambique recognizes the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people have the right to return to their homeland, Palestine, and to recover their property. They have the right of self-determination without any foreign intervention; to sovereignty over their territory and to the establishment of an independent national authority.

He suggested that Israel take the initiative in changing the present state of affairs by evacuating the Arab territories it had occupied in June, 1967, and the territory allocated to the Palestinian State by the Plan of Partition of Palestine included in the resolution adopted on November 29, 1947, by the United Nations General

Assembly.

He said that Mozambique does not recognize any change whatsoever in South Africa and is in solidarity with the people of South Africa in their struggle against apartheid. "We also appeal to those countries which continue to collaborate with the South African minority regime immediately to cease all co-operation, military, financial, or any other—until the rights of the majority of the people have been restored."

Colonialism and racism in Zimbabwe are becoming more and more intensified. "People are being forced out of their ancestral lands in order to give way to foreign settlers. In their repression of Zimbabweans, the Ian Smith forces did not hesitate to violate our frontiers, hence compelling us to an armed confrontation. The illegal Smith regime acts with an obstinacy identical to that of the Portuguese colonialists. The People's Republic of Mozambique will, unreservedly, support the efforts of the people of Zimbabwe led by the African National Council (ANC of Zimbabwe) for their own liberation.

"We appeal to all members of the United Nations to apply a complete and total boycott against Rhodesia.

"For our part, FRELIMO and the People's Republic of Mozambique are ready to assume all responsibility in conformity with their international duty."

Mozambique recognizes the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) as the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people. "The initiation of serious negotiations with that Organization with a view to granting Namibia independence while scrupulously preserving its territorial integrity is the real solution to the problem."

Mozambique recognizes MPLA's attempt at working for a concrete unity of the Angolan people based on the interests of the masses.

"Connected with the question of Southern Africa is the problem of the growing tension in the Indian Ocean. We consider the continuation of such a situation constitutes another threat to our independence. The rivalry of the big powers which compete with each other in the control and domination of that region is manifested by the growing introduction of nuclear armaments into it. The principle of general and complete disarmament, which Mozambique defends, is a principle that must be not only recognized but also applied. . . . We are of the view that the Indian Ocean should constitute a denuclearized zone, free of military and naval bases and fleets, and that the safety of its maritime routes should fall under the responsibility of the coastal states directly interested."

Joaquim Chissano ended his speech with a statement of support for the total emancipation of women and their participation in all areas of society.

## PRESIDENT NYERERE VISITS MOZAMBIQUE

Addressing a rally in the Machava Stadium, Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere stressed to the large crowd that Mozambique is not under any kind of obligation at all to Tanzania. By becoming free, Mozambique was freeing its neighbor.

Those Tanzanians living along the Mozambican border will no longer have to fight Portuguese incursions. In addition, a liberated Mozambique is another notch in the wood in the fight against colonialism and imperialism.

In his speech, Nyerere went on to commend Mozambique on the manner in which it became liberated. He spoke of the differences between Parliamentary and revolutionary liberation. The latter was stressed as the "best" because a people's liberation is burned in the minds of the



Joaquim Chissano, Foreign Minister, Addressing the General Assembly

leaders and the people through war. In parliamentary independence, the new leaders have to learn, while holding a governmental post, that their job is more than holding a high position. Some never do learn.

At the rally, Samora Machel commended Tanzania for its firm support during the liberation struggle.

After touring the provinces of Mozambique and speaking at various rallies, President Nyerere held discussions with President Machel. They signed a joint communique announcing the setting up of a joint commission for development and consular and diplomatic representation.

The signing of the joint communique with Tanzania and the moves to establish close links with other Third World nations—in particular with African countries—on the part of Mozambique, are very important steps towards the goal of unity among the developing nations. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Sept. 1, 1975)

#### NEWS IN BRIEF

While other developing countries are welcoming and applauding the birth of Mozambique, Swaziland seems to be holding aloof. As reported in the October 1 Johannesburg *Star*: "Western oriented, capitalist, monarchist, almost feudal—Swaziland is anathema to everything the Frelimo African socialists stand for, and they are saying so openly. As we report today, Frelimo has snubbed Swazi officials, including the Deputy premier; there is nervousness along the common border, and a Frelimo recruiting drive is in progress within Swaziland."

The people of Swaziland look towards Mozambique with envy and the presence of Frelimo is already raising the political consciousness of Swaziland's intellectuals and growing working class.

A landlocked country dependent on Lourenco Marques for access to the sea, Swaziland does not wish to offend FRELIMO. Yet as the Swazis become more politically aware the country's semblance of tranquility is being shaken: a strike on the railway was recently narrowly averted and there have been other mild instances of labor unrest. (*Star*, Oct. 11, 1975)

Lesotho and Mozambique have established diplomatic relations. The two countries agreed to strengthen the ties

of friendship and to promote cooperation for mutual respect of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Sept. 11, 1975)

Yugoslavia which has established diplomatic relations with Mozambique sent a high powered economic mission to strengthen its trade and technical cooperation with them (*Star*, Sept. 13, 1975)

A four-man medical committee from China arrived in Lourenco Marques to help the Mozambique government solve problems arising from the shortage of doctors (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975)

Mozambique was admitted as a full member of the non-aligned group of nations at the recent conference in Lima, Peru.

En route to Mozambique back from Peru, Joaquim Chissano, the Foreign Minister, stopped off in London for talks with the British government (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 1975)

The World Food Program of the U.N. is providing assistance to about 350,000 people affected by hunger and malnutrition in the northern provinces of Mozambique; almost two thirds of R 2.5 million in food aid to the Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Tete and Manica e Sofala provinces.

Earlier this year, the World Food Program provided 75,000 people in the Limpopo valley who were affected by floods with food aid.

In addition to receiving aid from the World Food Program for the above and for the re-patriation of refugees from Tanzania and Zambia with a considerable amount of assistance from UNICEF, the U.N. development plan is to purchase seven diesel generators for use in rural areas without electricity. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 11, 1975)

## Guinea-Bissau

### THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION CONTINUES

Agricultural production has increased as the government of Guinea-Bissau continues to transform the economy. The export of rice and palm products is expected to return to pre-war levels in a relatively short period of time. Exports of peanuts, palm oil, and cashews have all increased although cooking oil is still imported from Algeria, cement from Portugal, sugar from Cuba, rice from Argentina, books, plastic items, and various utensils from Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. While luxury goods have not been banned they are heavily taxed. The big Portuguese monopolies of Gouvea and C.U.F. have retreated and have not yet tried to interfere with the distribution of goods. The system of 'Armazens do Povo' (People's Stores) that was established in the liberated zones during the war is constantly expanding and guarantees fixed, low prices for basic commodities. Small merchants show increasing confidence in the PAIGC and have been asked for their full cooperation. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Sept. 13, 1975)

As reported in *Southern Africa* last month, the fifth fishing boat of the joint Soviet-Guinea Estrela do Mar Fishing Company has been delivered. Five more boats are expected. Initially the crew will be entirely Soviet but will be phased out until the whole operation comes totally under Guinea control. With the new ships in operation the

price of fish has fallen by 50% so more people will be able to have a new source of protein in their diet. (*Noticias*, Lourenco Marques, Aug. 13, 1975). Other projects such as a sugar refinery of 60,000-ton capacity under joint Dutch-Guinea control will help to cut imports of sugar and will aid the economy of Cape Verde. Another scheme allows new areas to be flooded to expand rice production by 30,000 tons with two annual harvests. In addition, expansion of the port at Bissau and development of hydro-electric power in Bissau and on the Corubal river have been given top priority in the development program which will cost some \$100 million. (*Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, Aug. 8, 1975)

The Portuguese have aided Guinea in the transformation process by providing teachers, development workers, and air service personnel. They are also cooperating closely in the areas of trade and culture. At present some 500 Portuguese are working in Guinea, proving once again that the PAIGC was fighting Portuguese colonialism not the Portuguese people. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, Aug. 7, 1975) In addition to the Portuguese, several French planners recently arrived in Bissau to sign agreements for sales of seeds, cars, and communication equipment and to organize a French cultural center. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon,

Aug. 5, 1975) The UN has provided five trucks, six hospitals, 12 dispensaries, seeds, water pumps for agriculture, 6,000 tons of grains, 600 tons of oil and 600 tons of fish, while the first phase of the UN Commission for Refugees is almost completed with the return of Guineans from Senegal, the Gambia, and Guinea-Conakry.

#### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The World Peace Council held its meeting in Bissau this year from September 9-12, focusing on problems of neo-colonialism and national liberation struggles in southern Africa. Representatives of 44 countries and 10 African organizations attended. (*Peace Courier*, Aug., 1975)

President Luis Cabral traveled to Europe in September where he spent six days in Rome and met with the Italian President and the Pope before continuing on to Algiers. (*Washington Post*, Sept. 10, 1975)

The eighth annual conference of Arab-American University Graduates which met in Chicago in mid-October saluted the victory of Guinea-Bissau and passed a resolution expressing firm commitment to national liberation. This resolution comes at a time when Afro-Arab unity is being strengthened particularly at the United Nations where zionism has been linked to racism and apartheid.

## Cape Verde

#### THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE

Since full independence on July 5, 1975, the people of the Republic of Cape Verde have been hard at work seeking to implement the start of development. The first priority is to improve and restore agricultural potentialities and seek support for water development and certain industrial and port programs. For the first time in seven years the rains have been reported to be very good and Sao Tiago is

now covered in green with the agricultural lands showing new growth. In Sao Vicente many people have gone to the interior to help with agricultural production. The flow of Cape Verdean refugees from Angola is beginning to diminish, following the return of several thousands to their native land. While it is still very early to report drastic changes, the government is stable and enjoys wide

People's Stores in the liberated zones during the war



popular support. The Republic is now a full voting member at the OAU and at the UN where its flag now flies.

Union with Guinea Bissau moves steadily forward and may be realized either by the end of this year or in early 1976. Members of the popular assemblies of each republic have formed a joint commission and have been meeting to study questions of military, economic and political unification. Both Republics are currently governed by the same party, PAIGC.

#### CAPE VERDEAN POLITICS IN THE NORTHEASTERN U.S.

The tens of thousands of Cape Verdeans in North America have been forced to decide where they stand now that the Republic of Cape Verde is independent under the PAIGC. Those who oppose the PAIGC are grouped around Aguinaldo Veiga of the "Capeverde Juridicial Congress", an offshoot of the Cape Verdean meeting held in Boston in the Spring of 1975. They have made it clear that they preferred Portuguese colonialism and fascism to independence with the PAIGC. (*The Cape Verdean*, Lynn, Mass., Oct. 1975) Veiga himself was a lawyer with the Portuguese administration in Angola and was never known to criticize colonial rule.

However, in recent months, the C.J.C. seems to have significantly declined in numbers and strength, particular-

ly evident from the public resignation of Dr. Charles Fortes, an important leader in the Cape Verdean community who realized its shallow and conservative program. (*Portuguese Times*, New Bedford, Sept. 11, 1975)

On the other hand, TCHUBA (Criolo from Rains), also a New England-based Cape Verdean organization, seems to be growing among those Cape Verdeans who are genuinely interested in improving the conditions in the islands of their national origin. TCHUBA has already sent tons of supplies, food, and equipment to Cape Verde in an on-going series of programs which are coordinated through the PAIGC's Capeverdean Solidarity Institute.

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#### THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME AND PRINCEPE

The flag of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe now flies at the United Nations. The new Republic's Council of Ministers has banned all aircraft with South African registry, or any aircraft in transit to or from South Africa. (*O Comercio*, Luanda, July 31, 1975)

## Neighbors


#### THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY

In order to check rampant inflation, advancing at an annual rate of 24 per cent, the Zambian Government plans to institute a compulsory savings scheme for Zambian workers.

The prices on imported cars and on all Chinese goods have been cut 15 to 50 percent in an effort to eliminate gross profiteering and to encourage the buying of Chinese goods, which are Zambia's cheapest imports.

The Tanzania-Zambia railway (Tazara), completed one and a half years early, began operating almost two months ahead of its scheduled opening (designed for Independence Day, October 24) and has already carried 35,000 tons of goods. Eventually it will handle 17 trains daily and four million tons annually. Passenger service will be tried soon.

Zambian Copper Awaiting Export



52 heavy trucks have now arrived at the Dar harbor and it is hoped that this will help solve Zambia's current critical transport problem, which has been intensified by the closing of the Benguela railroad in Angola. Zambia hopes to increase her copper exports from 25,000 to 30,000 tons per month and her wheat imports from 5,000 to 10,000 tons a month. Wheat is being given priority among the imports because it is badly needed. Dar harbor facilities are strained, however, and Zambia is investigating the possibilities of increasing the tonnage carried on the Nacala route. The cost of diverting copper exports from Lobito (Angola) to Dar will cost the Zambian Government more than \$1.4 million. (*The Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 20, 27 and Oct. 4, 1975)

#### ZAIRE AND SOUTH AFRICA

Zaire has just lifted a ban on visas for South Africans and allowed five delegates, including the director of the National Parks of South Africa, to attend the 12th General Assembly of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature in Kinshasa. The arrangement was worked out by a Pretorian representative who has been in Kinshasa for several months. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 1975)

#### MALAWIAN MINE WORKERS

The Malawian Congress Party has recommended the resumption of the flow of Malawian mine labor to South Africa, but the general manager of the Chamber of Mines Labour Organisation said that the mines would only be able to absorb about 25,000 Malawians. The number of Malawians employed on the mines has dropped from a peak of 130,000 to a figure of 65,000 at the beginning of 1975 to about 12,000 now. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1975)



# at the u.n.



David Merero, SWAPO Chairman

## **COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA HEARS MERERO, CONDEMNS PUPPET DELEGATION**

David Merero, SWAPO National Chairman, testified before the Council for Namibia on October 16. Merero succeeded in fleeing Namibia in early September, during the wave of repression which followed the assassination of Bantustan Chief Filemon Eliphias, South African-appointed head of the Ovambo "homeland." Merero said that under the South African régime arrest, torture, imprisonment and cold-blooded murder of Africans had become the rule. At the present time, all the leaders of SWAPO inside Namibia were under arrest on suspicion of involvement in Eliphias' assassination, and he would have faced the same fate had he not managed to escape. South Africa has blamed SWAPO for the assassination and launched a brutal campaign of repression, against the leaders and members of SWAPO. Besides the dozens of SWAPO members still under arrest, countless others had disappeared and perhaps would never be heard from again. Those in the hands of the South African administration were undergoing daily torture and assault. They could be sentenced to death or long prison terms.

Merero pledged an intensification of the liberation struggle under SWAPO's leadership, and appealed for continued United Nations support, reaffirming SWAPO's acceptance of the role of the United Nations as the legal authority over Namibia. Merero further indicated that SWAPO had endorsed the candidacy of Ambassador Kamana of Zambia and of Sean MacBride for a further one-year term as President of the Council and Commissioner for Namibia, respectively.

On the same day, following Mr. Merero's statement, the Council adopted a statement condemning the visit of "a group composed of alleged representatives of the ethnic groups attending a so-called constitutional conference organized by the illegal occupation régime. . . . The members of the group were not elected by the people of

Namibia but were handpicked by the South African authorities. Their visit . . . was planned, organized and financed by the South African régime. South African agents follow and shepherd them wherever they go." The Council "urged all Member States of the United Nations to refrain from any dealings with this group." In another statement issued on August 29, the Council had rejected the conference as contravening United Nations resolutions and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and had called on "the international community to frustrate the South African manoeuvre in Namibia and to exercise pressure on the South African racist régime in order to compel it to withdraw from the Territory."

The group apparently tried to make contact with high-ranking United Nations officials, but was not allowed to do so. (United Nations document A/AC.131/SR.226; press release NAM/204)

## **ANTI-APARTHEID ACTION TAKEN A STEP FURTHER**

The United Nations approach to the question of South Africa has undergone a gradual radicalization over the years, from consideration of the situation as a human rights problem to a recognition of its character of domination by one race over another; from appeals to South Africa to change its ways to the call for an international boycott, and, more recently, increasing support for the liberation movements and recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle "by any means of their choice, including armed struggle." Two years ago, the United Nations declared the liberation movements "the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the oppressed people of South Africa" and granted them observer status in the Committee against Apartheid and in the General Assembly for the duration of the apartheid debate. Last year, the South African delegation was barred from participating in the Assembly after its credentials had been rejected.

This year, in a report submitted to the General Assembly, the Committee against Apartheid has taken a further step in the direction of giving the liberation movements full legitimacy as the spokesmen of the South African people. The report asks the General Assembly to "proclaim that the United Nations and the international community have a special responsibility towards the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements" and to "exclude the racist régime of South Africa from participation in the United Nations and all its agencies, and welcome the effective participation of the liberation movements as the authentic representatives of the South African people, thereby strengthening the true universality of the Organisation." In another section, the report states that "the so-called 'Republic of South Africa' " was declared unilaterally by the white voters and that therefore it is "not entitled to recognition by the United Nations or the international community." If carried to its logical conclusions, this line of thought would appear to attempt to equate South Africa's international status to that of Rhodesia, i.e. an illegal settler régime which is not recognized internationally as a sovereign state.



Jeanne Martin Cissé, New Committee Against Apartheid Chairperson

The report further states that "the United Nations should promote much greater assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements" and calls on the international community "to provide all types of assistance required by the liberation movements in the present stage of their legitimate struggle."

Expressing its concern over the "so-called independence" to be granted to the Transkei in 1976, the Committee recommends to the General Assembly that it "denounce the establishment of the Transkei and other 'bantustans' and call upon all Governments and organizations not to accord any form of recognition to any institutions or authorities of the 'bantustans.'" The Transkei will thus certainly meet with an unfavourable reaction if it decides to apply for United Nations membership next year.

Finally, the Committee's report recommends several measures for strengthening the international boycott of South Africa, including an embargo on oil supplies as "an effective first step towards a general embargo on all strategic commodities, as a supplement to the arms embargo."

These recommendations now to go to the General Assembly in the form of draft resolutions, and are certain to be adopted at this session.

A further element in the growing radicalism of the Committee against Apartheid may be its newly appointed Chairperson. Madame Jeanne Martin Cissé, Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea, who replaces Edwin Ogebe Ogbu, recalled by the Nigerian Government after the coup in August. Madame Cissé, a former trade unionist and high-ranking member of the Democratic Party of Guinea, is likely to take a strong stand in opposition to "détente" and in support of the liberation movements. (United Nations documents A/10022; A/AC.115/SR.312)

#### ANC SPEAKS BEFORE FOURTH COMMITTEE

Michael A. Mawema, representative of the African

National Council of Zimbabwe, spoke before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (on decolonization) on October 6. He declared that the ANC was convinced that Ian Smith had not been prepared to negotiate a peaceful settlement with it, and that his desire to enter into the dialogue had been a way of postponing the armed confrontation that would have destroyed his government by the end of 1974. The fact that some political prisoners had been released and the ANC had reached a measure of unity had been positive elements in the détente exercise, he said. However, Smith had failed to meet most of the détente requirements set out in the Lusaka Declaration (of December 1974). He had refused to release all political prisoners, had continued to execute freedom fighters and, in general, had persisted in his policies of intimidation and torture. The withdrawn South African forces had been quickly replaced by United States Vietnam veterans who had been recruited as immigrants to Rhodesia: there were at present more than 500 United States citizens fighting as mercenaries under the Rhodesian army. Mr. Mawema commented that the cumulative effects of détente had been "very discouraging": the past ten months of détente had given the enemy sufficient time to reinforce his forces. Détente had created "problems of trust" between the parties in the exercise and among the followers and supporters of the liberation movement. He went on to declare that "nevertheless, ANC would participate once again in any constitutional discussion with Ian Smith, should its supporters create a more meaningful situation." (United Nations document A/C.4/SR.2139)

#### SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION IN ANGOLA CONDEMNED

On October 24, the Council for Namibia issued a statement strongly condemning the attacks carried out by South African troops in the southern part of Angola under the pretext of "hot pursuit" against alleged SWAPO bases. The Council declared, "This arrogant violation of the territorial space of Angola by South Africa is a malicious act of aggression. . . . South Africa's continued presence in Namibia poses a threat to peace and security in Southern Africa. Its avowed intent to continue the policy of 'hot pursuit' threatens the future existence of Angola as an independent State." The Council also condemned the "huge withdrawal of Namibian civilians and the removal of entire villages, kraals and businesses along the border with Angola" carried out by the South African forces. It called on the international community "to condemn South Africa's illegal actions of repression and intimidation and to support the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people until their independence is achieved." (United Nations document A/AC.131/39)

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# UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA

## EVIDENCE OF US INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

As more becomes known about the covert CIA activity in Angola and the large US aid package that is quietly being sent to Zaire, Angola observers and the press are seeking evidence of US political and military presence in Angola. Although data is still scanty, reports of direct and indirect US involvement have increased in the last three months.

According to a few press reports, from the *Journal of Angola* (August 17), the *Sunday Times of Zambia* (Aug. 17), and the Portuguese *A Capital*, the FNLA has US arms in its arsenal, including "heavy machine guns and light mortars of diverse origins, plus rocket launchers and grenades from several countries including the USA" (*Journal of Angola*). But none of these weapons have yet been produced for members of the press from the battlefield, suggesting that the US appears to be avoiding the use of easily identifiable US military equipment, preferring to finance the operations of a client-state, Zaire.

The largest-scale documented foreign intervention in Angola to date is Zairi support for the FNLA, in the form of both military equipment and manpower. The MPLA characterizes the military activity in northern Angola as an "invasion by Zaire." The MPLA has amassed considerable evidence of Zairi involvement in the fighting, especially in the August battle at Caxito. In an MPLA press conference on August 23, prisoners captured in the battle said that the tanks used by the FNLA forces were "no more than units of armoured cars of the Zairian army, commanded and crewed by officers and men of Mobutu's army." According to the Portuguese *Diario de Noticias* of September 6, the MPLA captured a Zairois Army corporal who was driving one of the armoured cars.

There is every indication that Zaire is acting not only on its own behalf but also as a conduit for United States and French support to the FNLA. This conduit relationship fits into an historic pattern. According to a former senior State Department official, the US sent arms to FNLA through Zaire in the mid-1960's, treating the FNLA as an eighth division of the Zaire Army. Currently, US military sales and aid to Zaire are skyrocketing, while most of the weapons captured from the FNLA are Belgian or French ones, which could well have been transferred from the Zaire Army. US Department of Commerce export figures show a leap in military sales to Zaire in 1975. "Special Category" exports, which are not identified for "security reasons" and which are generally assumed to be military goods, jumped from \$350,000 in 1974 to \$16 million from January-July, 1975. Considering Zaire's growing foreign deficit, it can be assumed that at least some of these sales were financed by US private or public sources. Furthermore, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edward Mulcahy acknowledged under questioning from Senator Clark at a hearing of the Senate Africa Subcommittee on October 24 that a \$19 million request for military credit sales to Zaire is on the President's desk awaiting approval for submission to Congress as part of the military aid bill. David Ottoway of the *Washington Post* reported that the US is said to be



Elisio de Figueiredo, MPLA Representative to the UN

prepared to supply M-16 rifles as part of this package.

MPLA has also alleged that US mercenaries are being used by the FNLA. Mr. Saydi Mingus, leader of an MPLA delegation to Washington, D.C. in October, said that there were many black Americans in Luanda during the summer who were acting as CIA agents. He also said that several black Americans serve as bodyguards to FNLA President Holden Roberto. The MPLA has already arrested a naturalized American, Jose Dias, a cattle rancher, accusing him of being a CIA agent, according to the American consulate in Luanda. (*Washington Post*, October 24, 25)

The United States and Zaire appear to be trying to strengthen UNITA as well as FNLA. This support for both movements is perhaps exemplified by an American diplomat quoted by the *Times of Zambia* of August 14 as saying that Mobutu "expected something more for his money that this string of FNLA defeats." David Martin of the *London Observer* and a BBC correspondent saw arms being unloaded in Nova Lisboa, UNITA's military headquarters, from a camouflaged Hercules transport plane which apparently came from Zaire. The US has sold considerable numbers of aircraft to Zaire recently, including five C-130 transport planes financed by the Export-Import Bank in 1974.

According to some observers and participants in the Angolan fighting, the movement that obtains the most airpower will win the military confrontation. In this context, several sketchy reports of US-produced aircraft and US airmen involved in Angola bear further investigation. The *Johannesburg Star* of September 27 reported that an

employee of Alaska International Air, a company close to the Nixon and Ford White House, was in a charter plane flying from Luanda to Dundo (in MPLA-controlled territory) which mistakenly landed at a Zaire Air Force base across the border. Approximately three weeks later, a Zaire pilot was shot down at Dundo flying a US-made Cessna, according to Elisio de Figueiredo, the MPLA representative to the UN. The October 18 *Johannesburg Star* reported that a Cessna bombed a radio station near Luanda which was presumably being used by the MPLA.

### SCHAUFELE TO REPLACE DAVIS IN AFRICA POST

According to late October reports of Associated Press and the *Washington Star*, William Schaufele, Jr. is the most likely candidate to replace Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Schaufele's official nomination by the White House, and Davis' long-anticipated resignation, were expected to take place the last week of October.

After Davis' controversial and somewhat ineffective six-months in office, Secretary Kissinger seems to want to avoid attention to or criticism of his new appointment. His choice of Schaufele will probably meet the more superficial criticism of Davis, which focussed on his lack of knowledge and inexperience in African affairs. Schaufele is a career diplomat with more than a dozen years of experience with African issues. Starting in the early sixties in the former Congo, Schaufele served in Morocco and Upper Volta, and in Washington was desk officer for West and Central Africa and for the Malagasy Republic and Mauritius. Schaufele spent most of the last four years as part of the US mission to the United Nations serving in various capacities, including unofficial liaison with African states.


While the Schaufele appointment appears to some observers to be a simple case of replacing Davis with "a more experienced man for the job", it also suggests a continuing US interest in influencing the affairs of central and southern Africa, especially through Zaire. Until recently, most observers had expected the top African post to go to Sheldon Vance, a senior aide to Kissinger with long experience in Zaire. It was Vance who "repaired" relations with Zaire this summer after Mobutu's allegation of CIA involvement in a coup attempt against him, and who then prepared a massive economic and military aid package for Mobutu. While Schaufele has not had such high visibility in regard to Zaire recently, he did serve in the Congo from 1962-64, during the Katanga revolt when the CIA was assisting in the defeat of the rebel forces and in the accession of General Mobutu to the presidency. He was also the desk officer covering Zaire in Washington later in the 1960's.

Schaufele's anticipated nomination is expected to be routinely approved by the Senate. Davis is expected to be assigned to Switzerland as Ambassador at the same time. (*Washington Post*, October 22, *Washington Star*, October 23)

### US AID FOR ZAIRE ZOOMS TO RECORD \$81 MILLION

In a move clearly linked to the struggle for Angola, the Ford Administration on October 24th unveiled a record-breaking \$81 million Aid package for Zaire which will include \$19 million in military credit sales.

Under pressure from Senators Dick Clark, Hubert Humphrey and Jacob Javits, Secretary of State Kissinger reluctantly sent Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Edward Mulcahy, Assistant Administrator of AID Philip Birnbaum and former Ambassador to Zaire Sheldon



Vance to testify publicly to details of the aid proposal for which they have been privately seeking Congressional support since July. In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Aid, Mulcahy stated that the aid package would consist of \$20-23 million in Exim Bank credits, \$8 million of PL 480 food, \$11 million in Commodity Credit Corporation agricultural commodities, \$20 million of Security Supporting Assistance and probably \$19 million of Military Credit Sales.

According to Mulcahy, the principal purpose of the aid package is to rescue Zaire from a crisis brought about by the fall of copper prices from an average of \$.92 in 1974 to \$.55 today. Since June Zaire has fallen \$8 million behind in meeting its debt obligations to Exim Bank and U.S. international banks such as First National City, Chase and Continental Illinois. When copper export earnings were high, Zaire borrowed \$500 million on the Euro-American dollar currency market for short terms and at high interest. But with the fall in copper earnings since early 1974, Zaire's foreign exchange reserves have fallen from \$280 million to nil.

In a well-briefed, courteous but searching cross-examination, Senator Clark was able to establish facts which tended to show that Zaire's present crisis was not entirely due to the fall in copper prices and that the U.S. desire to aid the Mobutu regime had to be explained by political factors rather than by the prospects for copper mining. It is not normal to make loans to a government in arrears and regarded as a high risk nor to make loans without first instituting corrective policing of budgets, economic plans and procedures. Furthermore, Zambia's exports of copper account for 92% of export earnings while Zaire's are only 60%; yet the Administration witnesses were forced to admit that they had no plans to aid Zambia nor any other of the countries now experiencing debt service problems.

Secretary Mulcahy admitted that one factor in granting aid was that Zaire was a long-time "client" of the United States, the U.S. was a beneficiary of 15 years of political support, "civility" for tens years and "we have a warm spot in our hearts for President Mobutu." Vance, Mulcahy and Birnbaum all echoed the assessment of the private

sector that the medium- and long-term economic prospects of Zaire were glowing in cobalt, copper, industrial diamonds and petroleum. Furthermore, a consortium of US multinational banks and the World Bank were prepared to risk their funds to refinance Zaire's debt and to finance longterm development projects such as the mining venture in Shaba in which Standard of Indiana and Anglo-American have interests which will total \$800 million.

According to the witnesses, the aid package would be used as follows: The Exim Bank loans would be used to finance essential imports for Zaire's industries and development schemes, avoiding a social crisis precipitated by unemployment. PL 480 would mostly purchase 20,000 tons of rice. Commodities to be imported under CCC credits would go for rice, tobacco and tallow. Security Supporting Assistance is to be used to buy fertilizer, agricultural equipment, machinery, gray cloth and vehicles but can be used "for the full range of eligible AID commodities." While the witnesses did not say what the military credit sales would go for, David Ottoway of the Washington Post reports that Zaire wishes to buy M-16 rifles to equip troops in Angola. In 1973, military credit sales were \$6.4 million and in 1974 \$3.9 million. But in 1974, Zaire purchased \$50.8 million worth of US aircraft for cash, over \$30 million for military cargo aircraft known as Hercules or C 130s, which are now being used to supply FNLA and UNITA. In the first six months of 1975, Commerce Department figures show \$16 million of Zaire purchases in a "special" category, which includes arms.

When pressed to explain what precautions the Administration would take to see that Aid to Zaire would not end up as Aid to FNLA or UNITA, Secretary Mulcahy resorted to unconvincing assurances reminiscent of similar assurances in regard to the Azores Base agreement with Portugal: The US was against interference in Angola by extra-territorial powers but was "not in a position to dictate what others might do."

Of all the items of assistance proposed, only the \$19 million of military credit sales requires Congressional authorization, which will be sought in early November when the President is expected to forward his Military Assistance request to Congress. Under a continuing resolution and under section 113 of standing foreign aid legislation, the Administration has already acted to give the 15 days notice required by law in order to advance \$20 million of Security Supporting Assistance to Zaire. The Exim Bank credits and the agricultural assistance credits are already authorized under long-standing legislation which set up these self-financing agencies.

Thus while Senator Hubert Humphrey was angrily expostulating that Zaire should not get "one damned dime" until New York City is taken care of and while Senator Javits denounced the "callousness" of helping Kinshasa but not New York, Senator Clark voiced the real ques-

tion: "Does it really matter what Congress does? Aren't you just going ahead anyway?" Clearly, the Administration wants to get at least informal encouragement of the Security Supporting Assistance because it knows that it must come back next year for more of everything.

#### AMERICAN MERCENARIES HELD BY BOTSWANA

On October 21, the government of Botswana released details of a series of recent incursions into Botswana territory by Rhodesian military forces. One incident involves the arrest in Botswana of two Americans who were serving as mercenary soldiers for the Ian Smith regime.

The US State Department confirms that Joe T. Belisario of Philadelphia and Craig C. Acheson of Watertown, New York are being held in Botswana, and are slated to serve six-month sentences for illegal possession of firearms. Other charges may be pending. Botswana says that the pair were captured September 14 in Palapye, a rail-line town in the eastern part of the country. The government adds that "they had entered Botswana from Rhodesia and were carrying out a mission for the Rhodesian Special Branch. They were instructed to locate so called terrorist training camps in Botswana and to report on them to the Rhodesian authorities." There is no work at this point, however, on whether the Americans will be tried on more serious charges such as espionage.

Belisario is one of the few American mercenaries in Rhodesia whose background is known. He is twenty-five years old and served two years in Vietnam. Late last year, with the Saigon regime near collapse, Belisario was deeply involved in organizing a mercenary force—to be composed of Vietnam vets—to go to the aid of the Thieu government. When Thieu fell before the Americans could get there, Belisario began casting about for other areas where he could fight "communist-backed" liberation movements. He contacted several embassies in the process, and eventually settled on Rhodesia. Belisario also visited the State Department before departing, where his venture was reportedly discouraged.

It is unclear whether Robert K. Brown of Arvada, Colorado, who has been under investigation concerning alleged mercenary recruiting activities for the Rhodesians, was involved in getting Belisario and Acheson into the Rhodesian armed forces. Brown and Belisario have known one another, however, for some years. An interview with Belisario and others related to the Vietnam mercenary project was carried in the first issue of Brown's *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, Summer 1975.

The Botswana government is circulating its charges at the United Nations. A US delegate to the UN said in debate October 9 that "if there is any specific evidence that Americans are serving in military forces under Ian Smith, my government wishes to be made aware of it in detail in order that appropriate legal action may be considered under our laws."

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## ACTION NEWS and NOTES


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#### WORKING CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICAN GROUPS AT MADISON

About 100 persons, most of them delegates from some 35 local and national US and Canadian groups with programs relating to southern Africa issues, gathered in Madison, Wisconsin, October 11-13 for a major three day

"working conference". The conference was initiated by the Washington Office on Africa, sponsored by local and national groups, and hosted by the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa.

The conference structure allowed time for plenary meetings, small group discussions, workshops on tactical



a much needed basis for sharing strategies, developing national priorities and laying the basis for greater future co-operation.

### NEW YORK TIMES KEEPS ADVERTISING FOR DISCRIMINATORY JOBS

The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision October 21, overturning the New York City Human Rights Commission, which had ruled that the *Times* should no longer carry advertisements for jobs in South Africa, since these discriminate against black Americans. The case was originally brought by the American Committee on Africa. Ironically, the *Times* lawyer was the same one who successfully won publication of the Pentagon Papers. The Commission, ACOA, the African Heritage Studies Association, One Hundred Black Men and Judge William Booth will again appeal the case. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has agreed to join the appeal.

### ZIMBABWEAN FINED \$1000 IN DELAWARE

Synos Mangazva, the Zimbabwean convicted in the racist incident in a restaurant in Harrington, Delaware last June, was sentenced as follows October 10: \$230 for resisting arrest; \$50 for disorderly conduct; \$50 for "offensive touching"; and \$669.35 in court costs charged against the defendant, or a total of \$999.35.

William Kunstler, noted activist lawyer, has filed an appeal in the case. However, Mangazva must pay the fine within 30 days of the sentence. The appeal will likely focus on the barbaric Delaware practice of saddling the defendant with the prosecution's costs, and the Delaware law that does not permit a defendant to resist arrest, even if the arresting officer is acting illegally. In this case, Mangazva was attacked and hurled through a plate glass door by the Harrington police, after he was refused service in the "People's Restaurant". Tapson Maware, ZANU representative, who was with Mangazva, was earlier acquitted of "obstructing the police" in attempting to stop the beating of his companion.

### NEW VOICES PROTEST SUPREMES S.A. VISIT

The N.Y. *Amsterdam News*, America's largest weekly newspaper, featured the protest against the Supremes visit to South Africa in a special cover story in the Arts and Entertainment Section on Oct. 15. The report was entitled "Supremes Bow to South Africa's Apartheid ... And Show Biz Wonders if the Beat Will Go On!"

Executive Editor James Hicks wrote: "The questions being asked are 'Did the Supremes need the money that badly? Will other Black stars follow their example? How much Black pride should one have where money is concerned? What effect will their actions have on their audiences when they return?'"

Frederick O'Neal, president of the actors union, wrote the Supremes "Actors Equity Association adopted a resolution some years ago against members performing in that country as long as the current racial policies exist."

One week later, the *News* featured an editorial and cartoon about the visit (see *Southern Africa*, November issue) which noted that "such is the gravity of the situation in South Africa that we believe the SUPREMES—and Barry Gordy, Motown Head, should take time to explain to Black Americans just why they choose to honor with their presence the world's most outspoken practitioners of Black genocide."

When the Supremes return, the editorial continued, "Perhaps they, and Motown will tell us then what we are barred from observing at first hand ourselves: 'How is it with our brothers and sisters who bury their babies at Dimbaza'".

issues such as boycotts, media work, etc., presentations by liberation movement representatives and concluded with plenary discussions on a basis for unity and a structure for greater coordination and implementation of priority projects proposed by conference participants.

A steering committee of up to a dozen members will be formed by ballot vote of the organizations represented at the conference. Project priorities included a boycott of Union Carbide products, a hotline network of information sharing among groups, and vigilant action to stop U.S. intervention in Angola.

Plenary sessions of the conference were addressed by Ben Magubane of the African National Congress of South Africa on the current situation in southern Africa; Jennifer Davis, research director of the American Committee on Africa on U.S. links in southern Africa and by a panel on racial and class conditions and developments in this country affecting work on southern Africa.

Representatives of SWAPO of Namibia, ZANU of Zimbabwe, ANC and PAC of South Africa, MPLA and UNITA from Angola, all held group discussions with conference participants.

Despite considerable differences of ideology and tactics among the groups it was clear that most people felt the most important immediate issue facing groups working on Southern Africa was the creation of greater unity. This recognition tempered the often heated discussions on issues such as the CAP proposal that the Conference condemn both imperialism and what it termed Soviet Social Imperialism, especially as this related to foreign intervention in Angola.

Most participants agreed that the conference provided

## PROTEST SOUTH AFRICAN SPORTS ADS & "WHITES ONLY" TENNIS

The Committee for Fairness in Sports, a Johannesburg-based apologist for apartheid sports, has again embarked upon an expensive campaign in the U.S. to win support for South African participation in international sports competition.

Three ads in the *N.Y. Times* (Oct. 20) heralded the "fact" that "In South Africa . . . a Coloured tennis player was chosen to represent his country at the Wimbledon Junior Championships, 1975 . . . more Black golfers play on the PGA circuit than anywhere else in the world. . . . White and Black compete for the national amateur boxing championships."

Only a short while before the *Johannesburg Star* (Sept. 25, 1975) had quoted the secretary for Bantu administration as saying that "on the club, provincial and national level, the different racial groups should exercise their sporting activities separately," thus effectively refuting the Committee's "facts".

The American Committee on Africa issued a statement which read in response: "Now, to confuse its international critics, South Africa is allowing blacks to compete with whites in what it calls 'multi-national' games. What that means is that the whites are South Africans and the blacks belong to the other 'nations'. This is a fraud, and to accept it means to accept the dispossession of the black majority."

ACOA calls on persons to protest the recent readmission of South Africa to the International Lawn Tennis Federation, allowing participation in the Davis Cup. It is likely that South Africa's all-white team will play the United States. Readers are urged to write: Stanley Malless, President of the U.S. Tennis Association at 51 East 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

## HEAD BISHOP CALLS FOR CONSIDERATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

The Most Rev. James G. Rausch, General Secretary of the United States Catholic Conference, has issued a statement on the United Nations and South Africa.

As expected, Bishop Rausch did not call for the immediate expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, but he did say "The time may indeed come when the Security Council is compelled to expel the Republic of South Africa (RSA) from UN membership." He noted that "mere exhortation" against South Africa's policies "appears to be ineffective" and continued that "Article 41 of the Charter provides a number of options, including mandatory sanctions, within the framework of the United Nations, to attempt to affect" South Africa.

"In the case of the RSA", he concluded, "its conduct warrants serious consideration for the U.N. Security Council to invoke mandatory sanctions".

The Bishop's statement traced the history of UN charges against South Africa, its "flagrant violations of both the spirit and the mandate of the UN Charter" through the policy of apartheid and South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia. He noted "The history of RSA's relations with the United Nations provide ample evidence to question RSA's status as a member in full standing in the United Nations."

Bishop Rausch concluded by quoting Pope Paul, in a statement the Pope issued after meeting with the Chairman of the U.N. Special Committee Against *Apartheid* in 1974:

"For as long as, within the individual national communities, those in power do not nobly respect the rights

and legitimate freedoms of the citizens, tranquility and order (even though they can be maintained by force) remain nothing but a deceptive and insecure sham, no longer worthy of a society of civilized beings." (Press release 10/9/75)

## INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

### INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY GROWS

As a number of national anti-apartheid groups around the world continue to stress support for South African political prisoners, the Special Committee of the United Nations has appealed for observance of an International Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners, to be celebrated each year on October 11th. (Unit on Apartheid Document No. 33/75, September 1975) As a part of this campaign, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement led a series of demonstrations and rallies in September and October in protest of the new wave of detentions that is taking place in South Africa and Namibia. Over 60 people are now being held incommunicado by the South African security police under the Terrorism Act and the General Laws Amendment Act without any reason being given for their arrest. The latest detainees include the President of NUSAS (National Union of South African Students) and other NUSAS leaders, a Natal University lecturer, two other white academics, the Afrikaans poet Breyten Breytenbach, and a large number of black and Indian detainees. More than 11 black detainees have been held for over a year in connection with the current trial of members of SASO (South African Student Organization) and BPC. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, October, 1975)

As a worldwide sign of support, November 11 has been designated by liberation support groups as International Solidarity Day with the youth and people of Angola (*WFDY News*, No. 1, 1975)

### OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

The governments of Czechoslovakia and the United Arab Emirates have signed the International Convention on Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, respectively August 29 and September 9, 1975. This Convention, approved by the U.N. General Assembly in resolution 3068 (XXVIII) on November 30, 1973, provides that international responsibility for the crime of apartheid shall apply to individuals, members of organizations and institutions, and representatives of a State. So far it has been ratified by Bulgaria, Dahomey, Ecuador, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Mongolia, Qatar, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. It has been signed but not yet ratified by 21 other countries: Algeria, Argentina, Byelorussia, Chad, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad, and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. (Unit on Apartheid Document No. 8/75, September 1975)

On September 2, the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations announced his government's action in closing the South African immigration offices in Rome and Milan, stating that "Italian emigration to South Africa has virtually ceased" and that "in the view of the Italian Government, therefore, the presence in Italy of two South African immigration offices appears at this stage to be superfluous. . . ." (Unit on Apartheid Document No. 8/75, September 1975)

In a report published in The Hague, the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement said it is considering boycott measures to induce five Dutch banks to sever ties with apar-

theid South Africa. The five banks concerned are Amro Bank, the Netherlands Bank, Van Lanschot Bank, the Central City Bank, and Mees and Hope. (Unit on Apartheid Document 8/75, September 1975)

The General Synod of the Anglican Church in Canada recently adopted a number of resolutions calling for specific action against apartheid, including: (1) the immediate withdrawal of Canada's preferential sugar agreements with South Africa and ceasing to purchase its sugar; (2) immediate withdrawal of government trade commissioners in South Africa; (3) prohibition by law of any direct loan to the government of South Africa or to any corporation wholly or partially owned or controlled by the government of South Africa by any Canadian institution, public or private, or any tax deduction in Canada by any corporation doing business or holding investments in South Africa; and (4) obtaining the Canadian government's clear commitment to oppose any NATO agreement with South Africa. (Unit on Apartheid Document 8/75, September 1975)

The anti-apartheid movements in Canada and West Germany have recently announced that they will oppose the holding of the "Mr. Universe" contest in South Africa Nov. 4-11, 1975. (Unit on Apartheid Document No. 8/75, September 1975)

**BOYCOTTS AND CAMPAIGNS**

Arthur Ashe's capitulation to the publicity and money he has made as a result of playing tennis in South Africa

notwithstanding, a number of sports, literary, and acting personalities are giving increasing support to a total cultural boycott of South Africa. In Britain, several major literary figures have made statements to the press promoting a cultural boycott. They are Rosalyn Tureck, Brigid Brophy, and Michael Thornton Spike Milligan, John Dankworth, and Jeremy Taylor (Anti-Apartheid News, U.K., October 1975)

The British Anti-Apartheid Movement has half fulfilled its goal of raising \$25,000 for the liberation movements. Their campaign to support the liberation struggle has a second thrust involving pressure on universities and other institutions to withdraw all investments from any corporation which has dealings with South Africa. (Anti-Apartheid News, U.K., October 1975)

As a part of the growing campaign to expel South Africa from the United Nations, 45,000 signatures were gained in Chicago to a petition to the United Nations for the expulsion. Among the leaders in the campaign were church and community organizations, the Chicago Peace Council, organized labor, and black political and community leaders.

A September Trades Union Congress meeting in England passed overwhelmingly a motion urging the British Labour Government to take steps against British investment in South Africa and giving support to SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions). (Anti-Apartheid News, U.K., October 1975)

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# MPLA Solidarity Committee Formed

This is a critical time for the future of Angola. The victory of the Angolan people is being threatened by an alliance of Western interests, conservative internal elements, South Africa and Zaire.

The MPLA Solidarity Committee has been formed to support the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which in the years of armed struggle since 1961 has proven to be the driving force in the Angolan people's struggle for independence. The MPLA is both a popular and a revolutionary movement. Ever since the start of the war of liberation, it has been engaged in building a transformed society. In the liberated areas MPLA mobilized the people to determine and control their own future, not just change the color of the faces of the rulers. Its program has aimed at ending all exploitation, making Angola's great resources work for the benefit of the Angolan people, not foreign corporations or small local elites. Mobilizing nationally, in the towns and the country, the MPLA has broken down ethnic barriers. In the crisis of the last few months, the MPLA's slogan has been 'Poder Popular'—people's power—and it has made this real by arming the people so that the people themselves can be responsible for defending their revolution.

The MPLA's firm position against foreign domination makes the movement feared by Western economic interests, like Gulf Oil, and by governments that represent those interests. FNLA and UNITA are seen as more pliable—thus the aim of Western interests is to destroy the MPLA.

The US government is intensifying its efforts to prevent the establishment of a truly independent Angola. Financial and military assistance is being sent to both the FNLA and UNITA to support their fight against the MPLA. The Zaire government has a history of close ties with the FNLA. Their troops make up much of the fighting force of the FNLA which has invaded Angola from the north. Zaire's assistance to the FNLA has been increased in the last few months with the help of massive US aid. Despite efforts to conceal the extent of US involvement, funds flowing into Zaire have jumped from less than \$20 million to more than \$60 million with more still under Congressional consideration.

South Africa is leading an intervention from the south to prevent an MPLA led independence. A large force of mercenaries, renegade Portuguese army officers who support Spinola, right wing Portuguese settlers, and South African military officers has illegally invaded Angola using South African air transport and equipment. They have crossed into Angola from Namibia, a United Nations protectorate which South Africa is occupying in defiance of international law. Both South Africa and Zaire have already used air power in their assault on the Angolan people. This makes it increasingly urgent to stop continued Western military assistance to enemies of the MPLA.

Our purpose is to support the MPLA by spotlighting the military and political developments in Angola and exposing the escalation of U.S. intervention. We see this as a critical first step in building solidarity between the people of the United States and the people of Angola in their common fight against exploitation and U.S. imperialism.

October 1975

MPLA SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE, 825 WEST END AVE., APT 14F, NEW YORK 10025  
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## COLBY REVEALS U.S. ROLE IN ANGOLA

Former CIA Director William Colby disclosed details of covert US support for two Angolan liberation movements, during a November series of secret Senate Intelligence Committee hearings.

Sources close to the Committee told *Africa News* the two groups named in Colby's secret testimony were the FNLA and UNITA. The sources also said Colby described Soviet aid to the rival MPLA as much larger than the American effort.

Former US government officials say the FNLA has been getting American help since about 1961. The decision to assist UNITA, taken several months ago, was based in part on FNLA's apparent inability to maintain an effective military and political campaign against the MPLA.

The CIA has been using US airforce Starlifter transport planes to fly weapons and supplies to Zaire worth tens of thousands of dollars since the Spring. This airlift has been considerably intensified since November 11.

## EVENTS IN ANGOLA

Since November 11, when Angola became independent, some important towns have been captured from MPLA by UNITA and FNLA forces, helped by South African troops and mercenaries, as well as mercenaries from other countries. Novo Redondo, Malanje, Gabela and Quisangando (the latter about 25 miles from Luanda) were taken in the 10 days following independence. MPLA is still in control of Luanda, and has managed to stop incursions from the North by FNLA. Six bridges were blown up by the MPLA on November 20 which stopped the FNLA advance.

## SOVIET ROLE IN ANGOLA SPARKS AFRICAN CRITICS

In what was seen as a surprise move, Nigeria last month joined several other African governments in protesting Soviet involvement in Angola. The Nigerian Federal military government condemned the Soviet Union for the large supplies of weapons it has allegedly sent to the MPLA and demanded an end to Moscow's "interference" in the affairs of a sovereign African state.

Nigeria's protest came in the wake of similar statements by Zaire, South Africa, and Ugandan President Idi Amin, current chairman of the Organization of African Unity.

## NKOMO FORECASTS RENEWAL OF STINKWOOD SUMMIT

Joshua Nkomo, leader of one faction of the Zimbabwe African National Council, has predicted the renewal of Constitutional talks with the Smith government. After a series of preliminary meetings with the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Nkomo said there would be a second round of formal talks in the future, to be held on the Zambian-Rhodesian border between the ANC and the white government.

Nkomo made the forecast during a week-long trip to Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania, where he briefed top officials on his talks with Prime Minister Smith. There was no immediate reaction from the Muzorewa wing of the ANC.

## SOUTH AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT DENIES MERGER

The UN representative of South Africa's Pan-Africanist Congress, David Sibeko, says there has been no merger with two other banned political organizations, the African National Congress and the Unity Movement. Sibeko's statement comes in response to reports broadcast over Radio Uganda that the three groups had agreed to merge.

Sibeko did say, however, that leaders of all three groups are interested in a united front, and that the PAC seeks unity "with all progressive forces that are genuinely opposed to apartheid." Only in this way, he said, can the people of South Africa fight a successful war of liberation against the country's white government.

## SOUTH AFRICA CONFIRMS NUCLEAR PLANS

South Africa has formally announced plans to construct a nuclear enrichment plant, capable of producing material for atomic weapons.

According to some sources, the plant will be constructed in cooperation with a West German firm. The projected date of completion is 1984.

## SENATE VOTES POSTPONEMENT OF INDIAN OCEAN BASE

Legislation to postpone expansion of American military facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia passed the Senate last month by a narrow margin of seven votes.

If passed now by the House, the postponement bill, authored by Iowa Democrat John Culver, will delay until July 1st, 1976 any work on a refueling station for naval warships on Diego Garcia. The Ford administration supports immediate approval of the construction, which would enlarge an already functioning US communication facility on the islands.

Culver says he does not expect his legislation to prevent the building of the new base, but he hopes to postpone it so the US can test out an Indian Ocean arms restraint policy with the Soviet Union.

## TALKS RE-CONVENED IN WINDHOEK


Representatives of Namibia's eleven ethnic groups held a second round of talks last month to work out details on the proposed timetable for independence.

The conference, organized by Pretoria to exclude Namibia's political parties, is preparing to draft a Constitution for the territory. Delegates say they hope to secure Namibia's independence in three years, and do not want any involvement by the United Nations, which has dismissed the Conference as unrepresentative.

## BOTSWANA HOLDS AMERICANS FOR ESPIONAGE

Botswana last month complained to the United States that Rhodesian troops had crossed the border and fired on an unprotected village. The Botswanans also said they are holding two Americans they suspect of spying against them for Rhodesia. The two are currently serving a six-month jail sentence for illegal possession of firearms.

A subsequent border incident in Botswana claimed the life of a police Sergeant, who was shot by an unidentified man driving a Land Rover with Angolan license plates. Police officials said the vehicle carried rounds of machine gun ammunition.



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