


southern africa



VOL. VIII, NO. 3

MARCH 1975

We have no heroes and no wars
only victims of a sickly state
succumbing to the variegated sores
that flower under lashing rains of hate.

We have no battles and no fights
for history to record with trite remark
only captives killed on eyeless nights
and accidental dying in the dark.

Yet when the roll of those who died
to free our land is called, without surprise
these nameless unarmed ones will stand beside
the warriors who secured the final prize.

from "Poets to the People"
Dennis Brutus



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Overview

Edging towards Detente.

The network of communication that appears to have been established between the Vorster regime in South Africa and a great many independent African countries is beginning to emerge as a structure of considerable solidity. The "unconfirmed rumor" of 1974 is rapidly becoming the official statement of 1975. Thus within the first few weeks of this year a trade delegation from Nigeria has visited South Africa, (which is no doubt very interested in striking a bargain over oil); an official visit was paid by Prime-Minister Vorster to President Tolbert of Liberia; an official Central African Republic delegation which included two Cabinet Ministers went to Pretoria to negotiate a loan from the South African Government; and President Kaunda arranged a series of meetings for South Africa's Foreign Minister Muller with the Foreign Ministers of Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana.

Observers of this sudden burst of dialogue might be forgiven for searching the newspapers for a second set of headlines announcing dramatic changes in South Africa's internal policy of violent race exploitation and oppression. How else could the African States be justifying their new attitudes towards an old enemy?

It has become increasingly obvious that there will be no such second set of headlines. In an interview in Capetown on February 10th Mr. Vorster made his position crystal clear. He was, he said, doing his "level best to normalize relations with African countries." But, he said, South Africa's internal race policies were "immaterial to the subject". Expanding on his theme Vorster recalled that his predecessor, Prime Minister Verwoerd had always said that "if and when South Africa's policy of separate development is translated into practice, certain historical practices which might be described as discrimination will fall by the board." "That is all that is happening" said Vorster. In fact Vorster continues to make it perfectly clear that his vision of the future for Blacks in South Africa is entirely restricted to a system of Bantustans. No black man or woman is ever going to be a citizen of South Africa if Vorster has his way . . . the people are to be locked into their tribal reservations, deprived in perpetuity of their right to freedom and

nationhood. There are to be no black South Africans, only "a black Xhosa, or a black Venda or a black Sotho with his own language, his own culture, his own tradition . . . He's a man from a different nation altogether." said Vorster.

Until very recently it seemed that the world understood the role and function of this Bantustanisation—the elimination of a united black people, with a consequent protection of white supremacy. Now it seems likely that Africa will have to seek ways to legitimise the Bantustans—in order to sanitize the new relationships being built with South Africa. Perhaps this process has already begun. In December Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, head of the Zulu Bantustan was the main speaker at a ceremony in which an award from the Organization of African Unity was presented posthumously to Albert Luthuli, President of the African National Congress. Not surprisingly Buthelezi called increased contact between the independent African states and his Pretoria overlords, saying that in his view, dealings with Pretoria should not be seen as amounting to a betrayal or sellout of the black man's cause. Buthelezi has acted as frontrunner for the South African Government several times recently—it was his visit to Monrovia that was used to pave the way for Vorster's trip to Liberia.

If African freedom is not the price being asked for the establishment of new links between White South Africa and the rest of Africa, then what is at issue? The answer appears to be closely linked to economics—South Africa's desire for expanding markets and new areas of investment and Africa's serious economic problems, the shortage of capital, of food, of technology, the need for 'trade and aid'. It would be premature to believe that all the deals have been made, that the cause of the South African freedom struggle is going to be deserted in the interests of "growth and development" for the African states. But recent events make it increasingly important to recognise that it is in the nature of States to look to their own interests first—and those who support the ongoing struggle for liberation in Southern Africa will be forced to take this factor into their future calculations. ■

JAPAN IN SOUTH AFRICA — A LOOK AT AN IMPORTANT NEW PARTNER IN APARTHEID

INTERVIEW WITH YOKO KITAZAWA



Yoko Kitazawa

Yoko Kitazawa is a Japanese woman who spent the months of August and September 1974 in South Africa researching Japanese economic links there. Her inquiry was the first of its kind instigated from Japan into this question. It was sponsored by the World Council of Churches, the National Council of Churches [US] and the National Christian Council of Japan. During October and November, Ms. Kitazawa spent over four weeks in the United States and testified three times before United Nations committees on her findings.

Her full research is soon to be published jointly by the World Council of Churches and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. Copies will be available from ICCR (Room 566, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, New York 10027).

On her return to Japan, Ms. Kitazawa's research immediately bore fruit. Along with numerous articles written for Japanese newspapers and magazines, she arranged for questions to be raised in the Japanese Parliament in regard to the Japanese purchase of uranium from Namibia. When the Government stated that it stood by the United Nations position on Namibia, they were forced to admit that buying uranium from Namibia went

against numerous United Nations resolutions. It appears that all Namibian uranium contracts will be withdrawn. Janet Hooper, a member of our collective, interviewed Ms. Kitazawa when she was in New York in November.

A description of South Africa/Japanese economic relations follows the interview.

Southern Africa: Would you first talk about how you personally got involved in this issue of Japanese economic involvement in South Africa and what group and/or movement you represent in Japan. It is an issue that many of us in the States have been interested in but we know so little about.

Kitazawa: I belong to an organization called the Pacific Asian Resource Center, which is involved in research of Japanese foreign economic expansion. Of course, we have also done research on Japanese business practices inside the country, but in 1965 when we began to witness the advance of Japanese business outside the country, we narrowed our focus more directly on this issue.

It is not colonialism of the classic type, but it has overexpanded our economy so that almost all the smaller industries or those which are labor-intensive moved out to Taiwan or South Korea, and later to Thailand or Indonesia or to Malaysia and Hong Kong. In the 1970's Japan has been accused of being "yellow yankees" or economic animals by the people of these countries. Although we don't go out with arms, we are economically invading all these countries. So we were very alarmed by this phenomenon. We have to live as members of the Asian family, and we want to live without exploiting other people. So we decided to investigate these economic activities outside.

My research for the past two or three years was in fact Japanese investment in South Korea. Japan's economic advance into South Korea is not in the usual form, but as loans and economic aid and involvement in the big industrial development of the country. Japan supports the old fascist military regime and has virtually bought over South Korea. The Korean people say that Japanese aid is much, much more than their country can absorb. That's the result of only a few years of this phenomenon.

Also we are heavily involved in South Africa. Recently church people and the international press in the United States and Britain are becoming conscious of economic

involvement in South Africa and what the role of the big powers is in supporting the apartheid regime. And we are also accused of this. The best example is Southern Rhodesia or Zimbabwe where the British nominally withdrew and it was said that the Japanese went in and dominated the whole market. It has been said that all the commodities in Rhodesia are Japanese-made despite the fact that the Japanese Government pledged several times at the United Nations not to support racial discrimination and apartheid, and in relation to South Africa, has even condemned Vorster's government policy of apartheid. But the real facts are not published in my country because of the government position that we are only trading with South Africa.

We assumed in fact that there is heavy involvement by Japan, either in the form of investment or loans. There are no statistics available in my country, except relating to trade and customs. This is the reason why I decided to go to South Africa.

So our organization can be called a pressure group which is not a movement itself. We provide information to the anti-apartheid or peace movement people who oppose the economic engagement of Japan in foreign countries. And we do collaborate with people who are in the movement.

Southern Africa: You are the first person to have actively investigated on the spot the involvement of Japanese corporations and banking interests in South Africa. What were your general impressions of the country and apartheid?

Kitazawa: First of all I have to tell you that I was shocked by two things. One was that my understanding of apartheid before going was things like bus segregation, toilets and so on; that Whites enjoy the privileges of high salaries and that sort of thing, and the police. But I had no idea of the whole picture of apartheid. It is a system, not only a social system, but a political, judicial and economic

system. Apartheid is necessary for industrialization, to the extent that so many people, the overwhelming majority of the people, are not regarded as human beings. That's horrifying.

And also I was shocked that since 1962 we Japanese have been given the status of honorary whites. We always joked about this, but I did not imagine that it was so disgraceful. By accepting this category we are saying that whites are superior to our race and we are opposing all these oppressed people.

The irony or dilemma of the South African system is that because of industrialization they need workers in the towns. But then they are afraid of a large black population being concentrated in the towns. They try to disperse them outside the town, in locations. Only men come to the towns, and women cannot get a house in the town unless she marries a man who is entitled to a home.

But in spite of all these hardships people manage to live on. The black population is very able and very conscious of what they are doing and who they are. A good example is the Toyota Motor Company in South Africa which I visited.

Last February there was an historic illegal strike by black workers, 2,000 strong. During this one week of strike, not one car left the gates of the factory. Usually 300 cars are produced a week. When the Blacks understood that the wealth of South Africa is made by them they understood their potential power. Five and a half million workers are in the industrial area, as opposed to 3.8 million Whites. They don't talk in terms of armed struggle or overthrow of the government, but they are very consciously organizing themselves. I am very much impressed by what they said. That whoever you are—a trade unionist, a student, a woman—you have to be a human being first of all, and then you are conscious. You don't walk with your head down, you have to look straight forward and you see your own power. Then you can become a movement, a student organization—



Toyota—300 cars a week.

anything can be based on the fact that you are a human being. This was very impressive to me.

I witnessed something else—in regard to the whites. In speaking with them, I realized they have no idea about what is going on in the black population. They have daily contacts, they have personal contacts. In the case of domestic servants they don't know where he or she comes from, what problems they have or even their names. Even the liberals who moderately oppose apartheid and who think they want to treat Africans equally don't know the problems. Apartheid through years of practice has given the white population a total ignorance of what is going on in the black population. On the other hand the Blacks know perfectly well what is going on in the white population and they understand their mentality. They know extremely well what power is, what the government is, what the weakness of the government is. It is more than simply cries or slogans.

Southern Africa: You met with certain groups that represent that kind of consciousness. Would you talk a little about that?

Kitazawa: Yes, but of course I can't say whom I met because of the situation. But there are organizations like the South African Student Organization (SASO) which is a black student organization, and also a number of organizations like trade unions. The strikes started about one and a half years ago, first in Johannesburg and now in Durban. Everyday there are strikes in factories or dock-yards. They are organizing trade unions.

I was in South Africa when the Portuguese announced they were going to give FRELIMO independence. FRELIMO entered Lourenco Marques, which South Africa regarded as part and parcel of their own territory. This was a very significant event for the black population. It is very encouraging to them. The white newspaper, the *Rand Daily Mail*, made the arrival of FRELIMO into Lourenco Marques a front page story, with colored photos

of armed FRELIMO soldiers. It sold out immediately, all bought by the Blacks.


Southern Africa: Given your position of hating the status of honorary white, how did you function on a daily basis?
Kitazawa: I decided not to get involved in the troubles. I spent most of the time in Johannesburg and I rented an apartment and avoided getting involved in this small apartheid business.

I was very comfortable, despite my status as honorary white, when Blacks understood that I am sympathetic to the anti-apartheid movement. They knew who I was so they were very kind.

But then I must tell you about being questioned by the security police. When I went to the SASO office and eight of them came up to me as I left the building. They wanted to take me to the police station and I refused because they couldn't provide me with a reason. I asked them whether my behaviour or my actions were illegal or infringing on the existing laws of the country. What was wrong with going to the SASO office? They couldn't answer, so I refused to go with them. Then I held a press conference together with SASO people to tell about the incident. My photo was printed in the Durban papers. When people recognized me—Blacks, Indians, Coloureds and even Whites—they showed much sympathy. Whites said that I must not think that all whites were the same as these people [i.e., the police]. It was a kind of apology which I received.

Southern Africa: Could you describe and talk a little about Toyota as an example of an assembly factory in South Africa, one which was struck against, giving some idea of the conditions under which the workers must work.

Kitazawa: Toyota says it is not investing in South Africa, but in fact their largest assembly plant outside of Japan is in South Africa. It is also their third biggest market after



Japanese have contract to buy uranium from Rossing in Namibia—although it remains under illegal South African control.

the United States and Europe.

Firstly, the question of wages. There are certain minimum wages set—the poverty datum line—which is false anyhow. The Industrial Council for the auto industry in Port Elizabeth decided that the minimum *starting* wage should be 56 cents per hour [\$0.80]. General Motors and Ford are now paying this at least. Toyota pays 38 cents per hour [\$0.45]—not only as a starting wage, but as a constant wage. But even this wage would not have been possible without the strike and the growing workers' militancy. Another result of the strike was permission to form a workers' committee which is a semi-trade union. At another Japanese motor plant, Nissan which produces Datsun, the workers are paid 25 cents per hour [\$0.35].

Besides the poor wages there are no services. There is one doctor for the whole factory of about 3,200 workers. Accidents are called careless mistakes on the part of the worker. Dismissals are frequent.

They live in what is described as a black township. Before they lived in Durban, but were forcibly moved to this area outside Durban where there is nothing, virtually nothing. Water is only pumped at night. There is no public transportation to speak of, very irregular so you have to leave at 5 o'clock to make sure you can get a bus. This is not included in the Poverty Datum Line. There are no shops to speak of or land to cultivate crops. So you have to transport everything, even food for every day, and if your luggage on the bus is over 10 pounds you must pay extra. Whites are never charged for this. Life is just miserable and hard.

Then there are the nice-looking offices where young Black women get typing jobs and everyone can say, "Look, apartheid is being demolished." But they don't see that the offices are built for white people so there are no toilets—they are all white, or one overcrowded toilet for the black male workers down in the basement. And then she has difficulty in getting to work because the buses there go to the industrial areas, not the city, so she has to walk to work.

But to return to Toyota. Generally the auto industry after the so-called oil crisis, is suffering from a recession. Not Toyota. Their net profit is always a record one—something like 20 to 30 percent more than the previous year. So it is a big topic in the stock market exchange.


Southern Africa: And after the strike how did things change?

Kitazawa: The workers demanded a pay rise to 1 rand [\$1.40]. Two cents were given. But a lot of other changes took place. Not on the side of the management. They want to fire the workers, but couldn't immediately after the strike. So they will wait until the contract expires and the worker is not rehired.

But the workers understand what is happening and are busy organizing themselves into a union. Black trade unions are not given the right to bargain, but the strategy is to organize as much as possible, to raise consciousness so that they can oppose the management and get recognition of their trade union rights, get concessions. People understand the potential power of a trade union.

Southern Africa: How does the Japanese government—who says there is no investment in South Africa—hide the fact that there is a Toyota plant sitting in the middle of South Africa?

Kitazawa: Actually there was no money sent from Japan. It's done through a local service agent. In Toyota's case it



New mines are being opened at Sishen—7 million tons iron ore per annum will be exported through Saldanha Bay to Japan.

is an Afrikaner family to whom they give the concession. At the same time they give the franchise rights, technical aid and they also supply the parts. Legally it is not owned by the Japanese company but by South Africa. This is the difference from an ordinary subsidiary. So Toyota says "it is not my company." Of course it is producing the same thing.

Southern Africa: What did you actually observe in terms of the presence of Japanese businessmen?

Kitazawa: I never met a single Japanese person. I don't know where they are. There certainly are plenty of Japanese, more than 500 are listed as resident in South Africa, coming on two or four year visas. Even the Black workers told me they never see Japanese businessmen—they are hidden deep in the business office. They communicate only with the white management or white engineers. There is no social consciousness on their part. I know that businessmen just want to make a profit, but you should have a basic morality or conscience about what is going on. There is total ignorance. It is very sad.

But in my country there is certain racial discrimination. For instance Korean residents are not regarded as citizens despite the fact that they have lived there for a century. They are deprived of all rights. So I realized finally that it is natural for the Japanese businessman to think this way about South Africa. We are oppressing people inside, why shouldn't we do it outside.

There is another factor. Britain and the United States have responded to pressure from back home to increase wages and improve working conditions. But Japan is a newcomer and with the status of honorary white is more careful to follow exactly the course that Vorster's government is taking. For instance Japanese factories are all in the border areas, where there is no security for the worker, no minimum wages, where the rights of the workers are totally ignored. There you don't have to respect even the existing meager labor regulations.

Southern Africa: What about Japanese involvement in South Africa in the future? Is it going to increase?

Kitazawa: The South African government—with typical fascist mentality—is trying to develop its industry. Similar

to the Park Government in South Korea where Park thinks that the only way he can cope with the crisis is to industrialize through the injection of funds into the country. This is what Vorster is trying to do. He hopes to stabilize the government through developing big industrial projects, for example a \$3.5 billion expansion of the iron and steel industry. Five or six projects for industrialization have been launched since 1970, and Japan is involved everywhere, giving its 100 percent assurance for the launching of these projects. First of all Japan has already made advance purchase agreements for all the products resulting from these projects when completed. They are not investing directly—that is what they say they won't do, but they guarantee purchase of the product. They have signed a 10 to 15 year contract, which will begin in 1976.

In addition to this, Japan is supplying materials like the plants, equipment. Japanese firms get loans from Japanese banks to finance production of the equipment and then export the plants to South Africa. Through the purchase

of these huge amounts of equipment, South Africa—in five or ten years time—will be in debt to Japan.

Southern Africa: But don't they hope to regain it by the sale of the iron and so forth?

Kitazawa: But I don't think they can pay it back. This has happened in South Korea. Maybe if production goes as they project, South Africa will pay it back, but I don't think it is possible.

In conclusion, Ms. Kitazawa spoke about the growing consciousness in Japan about Africa. There was an anti-apartheid conference in 1974 which demonstrated this. There has also been increasing involvement in these issues by a number of political and religious groups. It would take a lot of work to educate the Japanese public about these issues as southern Africa is far away, she said. It is extremely important to expose the stated Japanese policy of "no investment" in light of the fact of total involvement in South Africa.

A SUMMARY OF JAPANESE-SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC TIES

Japan has been consistently enlarging its stake in the maintenance of the stability of the apartheid system. The following data on the increasing Japanese trade with and investments in South Africa is a summary of Ms. Yoko Kitazawa's article, "Japan's Alliance with Apartheid," which appeared in the Nov-Dec, 1974 issue of *Africa Report*.

Japan, South Africa's fourth largest trading partner since 1972, has increased its trade with South Africa at a greater rate than either the US or the UK. In 1973 Japanese exports to South Africa increased by 64 per cent and its imports from South Africa increased by 31 per cent. This volume of trade will skyrocket after 1975 because of the particular type of economic involvement the Japanese have in South Africa. Japanese involvement is primarily in projects relating to "the development of underground mineral resources as well as an expansion of the infra-structure which guarantees the exporting of these mineral resources." Additionally the Japanese have concluded long term purchase contracts for these products. The contract between ISCOR and Japan's major iron and steel industry commits Japan (1) to purchase annually, beginning in 1976, large volumes of semi-finished steel products from ISCOR's Saldanha steel mill, (2) to import seven million tons of iron ore annually from ISCOR's Sishen mines, and (3) to purchase annually five million tons of iron ore from two private companies. The contract between Consolidated African Mines (a private South African company) and Japan's iron and steel industry provides for a similar purchase of iron ore exported from the newly planned port facility at St. Croix Island in Algoa Bay. Via the new Richard Bay Harbor, the Japanese iron and steel industry is committed to purchase three million tons annually of coking coal from the Witbank Coalfield. In 1970 the Mitsui Mining Co. agreed to provide long term technical assistance to the Transvaal Coal Owners Association.

In the field of nuclear energy, Japan and South Africa have been involved in secret negotiations designed to enable Japan to provide financial assistance for the construction of the Valindaba uranium enrichment plant, near Pretoria. Japan is importing uranium from mines in South Africa and Namibia (Rossing Uranium Mine-Rio into Zinc). Additionally the Mitsubishi group has entered a tender to provide equipment for the South African nuclear power station, located near Cape Town. "Thus

Mitsubishi is directly assisting South Africa build an atomic reactor and helping South Africa become an atomic power. . . . The construction of a uranium enrichment plant helps South Africa join the World Nuclear Club. South Africa will potentially be able to produce atomic bombs when the plant is in operation."

Japanese businesses supply equipment for the construction and expansion of South African heavy industry. Mitsubishi and Hitachi have provided equipment to ISCOR to expand South Africa's steel industry. Hitachi and Tokyo Shibaura have supplied ESCOM with two hydro-electric power generators for the construction of a power plant in the Orange River project area. These exports of plant equipment to South Africa were financed by loans from Japan's Exim Bank. South Africa has also purchased from Japanese shipbuilders three supertankers and one sugar carrier.

With regard to direct investment, although formally prohibited by the Japanese government, 70 Japanese firms—covering such areas as automobiles, electrical appliances, electronics, and rubber—have subsidiaries in South Africa. These Japanese firms operate through "joint venture (the term used by the press in South Africa and Japan) with South African capital and Japanese blueprints, technical expertise and above all equipment. . . . Many of these Japanese subsidiaries in South Africa [i.e. Toyota, Datsun-Nissan] are in 'border industrial areas' of 'bantustans,' thus assisting the South African government in moving Africans out of the cities on to the miserable reservations." Wages paid to the African workers in the border industry area plants averages around 50 per cent less than the already extremely low wages paid to the African workers in the main urban centers. Therefore, these companies "are involved in gross exploitation of labour and starvation wages." However this cooperation with apartheid is highly profitable for the companies concerned, since, for example, "Toyota South Africa's net taxed profits in 1973 rose by 42% compared to those of the previous year."

In conclusion, from the above data, one finds that the dominant interests in Japanese industry have an important economic interest in the continuation of the apartheid system. Therefore they will be using their power in Japan to pressure the Japanese government into adopting political positions which support the maintenance of the Apartheid regime of South Africa. ■

South Africa

WHITE POLITICS

Crackdown on the Christian Institute

Arriving early in the morning of December 14 at the Executive Office of the Christian Institute, with letters dated December 6, two policemen demanded the passports of Dr. C. F. Beyers Naudé, director, the Rev. Brian Brown, the administrative director, Mr. Peter Randall, the director of Ravan Press (the Institute's associated publishing company), Mr. Horst Kleinschmidt, the organizer of the Program for Social Change (a division of the Institute) and the Cape Town director, the Rev. Theo Kotze. The Rev. Roelf Meyer was also asked to turn over his passport but he refused. The passports of Randall, Kleinschmidt, and Beyers were returned later.

A few days later the director of the Institute, Dr. Naudé, sent two letters to Prime Minister Vorster. The first requested an urgent meeting with him to discuss the reasons for the puzzling confiscation of the passports. The second letter denied a report by a South African morning Afrikaans newspaper, quoting Dr. Naudé as saying that the Institute would support Black "terrorist" movements in South Africa.

Dr. Naudé had spoken at the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church and at a press conference in Holland. It was during the speech he gave there that he allegedly supported the Black liberation movements in South Africa.

The Christian Institute, which has evolved from a white liberal organization to one with a significant black membership and a mailing list of 4,000, has firmly identified itself with the struggle for Christian liberation. It has stressed that it would stick to its policy of non-violence in working for radical social change in South Africa, and that it would seek to identify itself with oppressed people.

According to the Johannesburg *Star* of December 14, the Institute said that apartheid, which was maintained by force, provoked revolutionary violence in South Africa.

Clearly, the harassment of the executive members of the Institute was a direct result of the Institute's policies towards apartheid in South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 14, 1974)

An overview of further effects of the April coup on South Africa

The *Star*, Johannesburg, January 11, 1975, reports that "The April revolution and the swift and frequently tragic turn of events in Mozambique and Angola are known to have had little less than a traumatic effect on Pretoria and have certainly led directly to new initiatives by Mr. Vorster in seeking the best possible solutions to a situation that could explode into a civil war."

Quite the contrary, the effects of the coup have been more than "a little less than traumatic" and South Africa is now trying to ride the waves without sinking, making modifications in both external and internal policies.

South Africa's ambassador to Portugal, Mr. R.J. Montgomery, reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Muller, and departmental chiefs in Pretoria in January. Emphasis was placed on Portugal's timetable for final decolonization in Africa.

Making Apartheid more acceptable?

During the year 1975, more than 1,400 academics at various universities throughout the country, will start an in depth study of apartheid. They will meet in April in Pretoria or Bloemfontein to apportion the various study tasks. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975)

South African Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller has pledged that the South African government will do away with petty apartheid in 1975. Speaking on the radio: "We shall not hesitate to do away with humiliating measures and practices which harm good relations between white and non-white and which have nothing to do with the maintenance of our own identity and sovereignty."



• Dr. Byers Naudé (right) faces two detectives who seized his passport.

(Zambia Daily Mail, Dec. 24, 1974)

In a conference on Strategy for Development organized by the South African Institute for International Affairs, Mr. N. Mkele, a Johannesburg marketing consultant says, "it is not sufficient to merely raise Black wages. The Black worker must have greater investment avenues opened to him so that he may more fully participate in the economy of the country and build up a more prosperous middle class and cadre [sic] of entrepreneurs." (Star, Dec. 14, 1974)

Robert Krafts, the assistant secretary general of the Trade Union Council of South Africa says that the major improvements that could be made include the training of black workers, equal pay for equal work and the advancement of able blacks into more skilled and managerial positions. He added that the only barriers to rapid advances exist where "a few trade unions actively resist what they consider to be encroachment into exclusively white territory." (Star, Dec. 28, 1974)

In the sports world, black sportsmen will be eligible for the Sportsmen of the Year Competition in Benoni beginning this year. But it is up to individual clubs to make known any outstanding performances among their members. The Green Point Cricket Club in Cape Town has accepted a black playing member. Black cyclists have been invited to compete in the 630 km road cycling race to be held over four days in March. The 18 black invited runners in next year's Comrades Marathon will not have to comply with the new entrance regulations requiring novices to submit qualifying times (best times for organised marathons of 42km or more).

Lastly, black sports officials that realize that "multi-nationalism" in sports is a hollow concession have either been banned or have had their passports taken away from them to prevent them from taking their case to international sports bodies.

Dr. G. M. E. Leistner, deputy director of the Africa Institute, a government supporting academic institution, illustrates South Africa's current fears quite graphically when he says: "The collapse of Portuguese power in Africa has shocked those South Africans who believed that we were quite safe as long as the Portuguese and Rhodesians formed a bastion between us and the rest of Africa. . . . We fail to comprehend the forces of Black nationalism and to accomodate them in a fashion acceptable to all population groups. . . . Great wisdom is needed in order to ensure harmony and peace." (Star, Jan. 11, 1974; Star, Dec. 14, 1974, Dec. 21, 1974, Dec. 28, 1974; Guardian, Nov. 9, 1974; Nov. 12, 1974, Jan. 2, 1975; Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 11, 1974; Zambia Daily Mail, Dec. 24, 1974)

The Case of Dr. Neville Edward Alexander

In March, 1974, Prime Minister Vorster appeared with William F. Buckley on television. Justifying South Africa's policy of "banning" political opponents, Vorster told Buckley that "it is the easiest thing in the world for a person who is not furthering communism to prove that there must be *mala fides* on the part of the Minister (of Justice) and to obtain reasons for their being banned."

Dr. Neville Edward Alexander, who served 10 years on Robben Island in a perpetually lit cell under 24 hours surveillance, was released on April 13, 1974, and was banned on the same day.

He had been sent to the island "for conspiring with others to commit unlawful acts which could have endangered the safety of the Republic and the maintenance of law and order," was classified as an A Group prisoner. (Cape Times, Nov. 15, 1974)



Neville Alexander

The current ban prohibits Dr. Alexander from teaching, entering the university grounds or library or from writing or publishing anything. Furthermore, he cannot receive visitors at home, attend meetings, movies, concerts or any "gatherings". He now works as a clerk in a grocery store.

Dr. Alexander knew about Vorster's interview with Buckley and in October of 1974, decided to apply for a court order forcing the Minister of Justice, J. T. Kruger, to disclose to the court the information upon which he made his decision to have Alexander banned. Another part of the application requests that the ban be declared invalid. Dr. Alexander denies being a communist and has also denied that his actions while being incarcerated justify the Minister's actions.

Mr. Justice Steyn, of the Supreme Court in Cape Town, subsequently ordered Kruger to disclose the information that led him to believe that Dr. Alexander is a communist. When Kruger replied that revealing such information would not be in the best interests of the public, he was then ordered to state the reasons for his response.

The case has been postponed to a later date at the discretion of the registrar of the Supreme Court. (Cape Times, Nov. 15, 1974; Argus, Nov. 14, 1974; Sunday Times, Nov. 3, 1974)

Protests at Continued Detention

Church leaders in South Africa have called on the Prime Minister and the Minister of Police to bring to trial the 37 members of SASO (South African Student Organization) and BPC (Black People's Convention) who have been arrested by Security Police under the Terrorism Act since September 25, 1974, following the holding of the banned pro-Frelimo rallies in Durban and at Turfloop University for Africans in the northern Transvaal.

"The public of South Africa is aware of the rumors which are at present circulating concerning the treatment of these persons and we are distressed at the damage being done by these rumors." (Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 11, 1974)

A partial listing of the churches and organizations which have signed the appeal include the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, the most Rev. Bill Burnett, Cardinal Owen McCann of the Roman Catholic Church, the Congregationalists, Lutherans and Presbyterians, leaders of various African churches, the South African Council of Churches, the Christian Institute and the South African Council of World Affiliated YWCA's.

BLACK POLITICS

Government policy:

Economic necessity, international pressure combined with recent change in "Portuguese" Africa, have convinced many white Southern Africans, including those in the government, that some minor relaxation of apartheid and the speeding up of so-called "independence" for one or a few Bantustans is vital for the maintenance of the system as a whole. Recent moves in this direction include government subsidised "in-service training schemes" in private industries for African workers. Police Minister Mr. Kruger stressed the need for African policemen and a proposed "mixed" cricket match in Transvaal.

The South Africa government is also trying to convince the rest of the world that events in "Portuguese" Africa demonstrate that the Portuguese policy of "assimilation" did not work and South Africa's "separate development" is therefore the only feasible alternative. In an apparent attempt to accelerate the process, Dr. Muller, the foreign minister, has indicated that the Transkei may be granted "independence" within a year.

BLACK FEELINGS

a) Bantustan leaders:

However, it does not appear that even the leaders of the government sponsored Bantustans are prepared to accept fully the policy of "separate development". As is well known, leaders of all but one Bantustan have strongly indicated that they will not accept independence under the existing terms. Moreover, contrary to the government plan of dividing Africans into eight or nine "nations", leaders of the Lebowa and Gazankulu Bantustans have indicated that they would prefer the two Bantustans to be united. There is some indication that Vendaland also would like to join the two. Government reaction to this is not yet known.

The head of the KwaZulu Bantustan, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has sharply criticised the formation of industries in white areas bordering a Bantustan because such an industry depends on African buying power but remains under complete white control. He said that if such things continue, he may seek a mandate from the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to impose restrictions and withdraw delivery permits in KwaZulu from all "non-Blacks".

b) Church organizations:

Under the sponsorship of several church and church related organizations a "Black Renaissance Convention" was held recently at Hammanskraal. The purpose of the convention was for Africans, Coloureds and Indians to get together to discuss their common problems in South Africa. The delegates to the convention were mostly clergy and academics. A few Bantustan Government representatives were also present. Although the convention resolved to reject "separate development", called for, "one man one vote" and stressed, "Black Consciousness", it is believed that organizers of the convention were moderates compared to SASO (South African Students Organization) or BPC (Black People's Convention).

c) Outside the system:

African Agenda, a publication from United States, has published an interview with Mr. Duma Nokwe, Director of Political Affairs of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, (ANC is banned inside South Africa), in which he stressed the interest of U.S. companies in the

continuation of the white regime in South Africa and expressed concern over the possibility of American military intervention in support of the South African Government. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 14, 21, 28, '74; *African Agenda*, Oct.-Nov., '74)

SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMICS

EIGHT DIE IN GOLD MINE STRIKE

In the most serious strike on a South African gold mine in recent years, 12,000 black workers walked off the job. Beginning January 6, the strike continued for several days, and before order was restored, eight people were dead and more than 30 injured. The Vaal Reefs gold mine in the Transvaal is owned by Anglo-American Corporation. It is the world's largest gold producer, and it will be months before its operations are returned to normal.

Most of the miners at Vaal Reef were from Lesotho, and many refused to go back to work, demanding instead that they be allowed to return home. The cause of the trouble at the mine has been variously reported. The most important factor was that of pay arrangements for the Lesotho miners. Legislation by the Lesotho Government, effective January 1, made it compulsory for 60 per cent of a miner's pay to be held in a Lesotho bank, earning interest, until the miner completed his contract in South Africa and returned home. A similar arrangement under which the money was held in South Africa had been in effect for a long time, and it is unclear why this caused the strike. (*New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1975; *Guardian*, London, Jan. 7, 8, 10, 1975)


The press in South Africa and some of the press in the United States (the *Washington Post*, for example) has emphasized "tribal clashes" as the cause of the deaths. The South African government is always quick to label disturbances on the mines in this way, and not the basic problems resulting from the labor conditions pertaining in South Africa. On many previous occasions this sort of interpretation of events has proved unfounded.

One ominous development in the face of labor unrest is the introduction of police-trained dogs to keep peace in the gold mines. Anglo-American has had the first contingent of what will be a 100-dog force complete its training. Twenty-eight alsatians and their 25 black and three white handlers, have just graduated from the Police Dog School in Pretoria. Anglo-American is touchy about the dogs. A spokesman said there was nothing unusual about the use of dogs on the mines. They would be there for "general protection duties." (*To the Point International*, Jan. 11, 1975)

THE MECHANICS OF MIGRANT LABOR

In a recent issue of the Black Sash Magazine devoted to Migrant Labour, Sheena Duncan explained how a migrant worker in a Homeland gets a job:

Migrant workers in the Bantustans are processed through labour bureaus which are more like cattle markets than anything else. Men register there as workseekers, then hang around to await recruitment. They wait for days, weeks, months. Then comes the great day. The recruiting agent is expected. He arrives. Two hundred and fifty men line up. He wants 184 labour units for the companies he represents. He walks along the line and beckons forward those he chooses. This one looks strong, this one looks young and teachable, this one is too old, that one looks too thin. This one says he doesn't want to



The mechanics of migrant labor.

White farmers are, of course, a privileged group of employers in South Africa and some of the provisions of the 1968 Regulations appear to be designed to keep them happy, with a ready supply of workers.

When a man registers as a workseeker for the first time he is classified by the labour office in a specific category of employment. The labour officer is supposed to take into account the man's own wishes and qualifications 'as far as practicable' but there is no law which prevents a labour officer from placing a man in a category of labour to which he has the strongest objections. His wishes do not, in practice, count for much.

Mr. Thupudi is a young man who has recently left school in the Orange Free State and, very much against his own wishes, has been classified as a mineworker by the labour officer. When he argued, he was told that he had to work on the mines because his father had done so. Once a man has been classified he may not be employed in any other category of labour unless he is signing a contract for mine or farm work. This means that the type of work he is classified for when he is 15 is the only type of work he may do for the rest of his working life. If he begins as a domestic worker he will have to remain one whatever skills he may acquire, or however he may hate his work in 'the kitchens'.

All migrant workers must now work on annual contracts. When the one year period expires the employer *must* discharge the worker and return him to his home area. This system was devised to prevent workers from qualifying for permanent residence in the urban area. Even if a worker returns to the same employer each year for ten years this is not deemed to be the ten years continuous employment required by Section 10 (1) (b) of the Urban Areas Act. It is not continuous because it must be terminated and renewed every year.

When a worker accepts employment offered to him a written contract is entered into. Everyone has a copy of the contract—except the worker himself. The employer or his agent has one, the tribal labour officer and the labour officer in the work area have one each and the attesting office has one. If the worker wants to dispute any of the conditions of his employment he has no copy of his contract to produce as proof that the employer is not fulfilling the contract.

Workers often seem to have misunderstood the terms of the contract because deductions are not explained. Advances made to the worker for fares or food may be deducted from his pay packet provided that he is left with R1 after 30 days' work.

It is axiomatic that a man should be the owner of his own labour. In South Africa this is an accepted principle for white workers, but African men do not own their own labour. It is controlled, directed, and abused by the State according to a master plan over which the worker has no control. Migrant workers have no choice whatsoever as to whether they will work, how, where, for whom or for what reward. Slave labour? At least a slave owner had a financial interest in the health and strength of his slaves. He paid good money for them. (*Africa Bureau Document Paper*, No. 10, London, Dec, 1974)

work at R8 per week because he was paid R11 in his last job. He must be too cheeky. 'Get back in the line. I don't want cheeky boys'.

Those who are not picked must wait, maybe weeks, maybe months, until the next recruiting agent comes. The 'cheeky' one won't argue next time. He will be ready to accept whatever wage is offered. His children are starving and a little is better than nothing.

These men do not come to the labour bureau to undergo this degrading process of their own free will. Every man who lives in the Bantustans *must*, by law, register as a workseeker at his tribal labour bureau within one month of becoming 15 years of age and must continue to register as a workseeker within one month of becoming unemployed throughout his life until he is 65, unless he is exempted by the labour officer because he is a bona fide scholar or farmer, or has been allowed to be self-employed or is, *in the opinion of the labour officer*, physically or mentally incapable of being employed.

When a man registers at his labour bureau his reference book is stamped that he is registered as a workseeker, but this does not mean that he is actually permitted to seek work. He is not allowed to leave the area of jurisdiction of the labour bureau to sell his labour. He must wait to be requisitioned for.

He cannot choose which area he wishes to work in. If he wishes to work in Pretoria for example, he cannot do so unless an agent from Pretoria chooses to and is allowed to recruit at that particular bureau. If a directive has been issued that agents from Pretoria may not recruit labour at that specific bureau there is no way that he can go to work in Pretoria.

DID YOU RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO
SOUTHERN AFRICA?



"Bachelor quarters" for migrant labor—Capetown.

THE SEARCH FOR OIL

Oil is the one major natural resource that South Africa lacks. At present oil is imported, and petrol, diesel, and other petroleum products are produced from coal, which South Africa has in abundance. The decision has now been made to build a second plant which will convert coal to other forms of fuel. The second SASOL plant will be located in the Eastern Transvaal, and will produce liquid fuels only. SASOL I produces liquid fuels and heavier products like waxes and kerosene. The decision to limit production to liquid fuel is based on the world wide energy crisis.

At the same time, the search for oil continues. Soekor, the state oil exploration corporation, has had its budget trebled. The hope is that offshore oil will be found, perhaps south of the Orange River mouth, near a major natural gas find. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 14, 28, 1974)

SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

Statistics are now in on South Africa's economic performance during 1974, and these are a useful guide to making predictions about the future. Generally speaking, South Africa had a very good year, and experts predict a "brilliant" economic future for the Republic. Reasons for optimism, according to a study by the Economist Intelligence Unit of London, include the abundance of natural resources, the large supply of cheap labor, the large supply of cheap power, plenty of capital, and plenty of entrepreneurs.

In order to capitalize on these conditions, a number of

problems will have to be overcome. These include an unreliable balance of payments, shortcomings in the quality and use made of the labor force, inflation, inadequate infrastructure, and government interference in the economy. Most importantly, the political stability of the country must be maintained for economic growth to occur. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 14, 1974)

Inflation in South Africa is similar to that in the US, especially in food prices. Imports were up by 50 per cent, causing a trade deficit of \$1.6 billion for the first nine months of 1974, which is more than twice the figure for the comparable period in 1973.

Nevertheless, because of the increase in the price of gold and the increased amount of capital investment in South Africa, the deficit can probably be offset.

The fluctuating price of gold and other metals is a continual problem for South Africa. The price of gold has risen to about \$180 an ounce. Some countries that formerly refused to sell at market prices, valuing their gold at only \$42 an ounce, are now needing money to pay for oil. They are changing their attitudes about selling at market prices. This means a bonanza for South Africa. Gold production was down somewhat in 1974, in part because of labor disputes. Nevertheless, in the first seven months of 1974, value of gold sales totalled some \$3 billion, more than three times the year-ago level. (*New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 21, 1974)

That kind of "problem" South Africa is happy to deal with. The picture is not all bright however. Base metals

including copper, chrome, iron, nickel, and other minerals were expected to exceed \$5.6 billion in 1974, compared to \$3.9 billion in 1973. The rise is not expected to continue because of the slowing down of world economic activity. The state of the US automobile industry provides no great grounds for optimism. The owners of copper, platinum and other mines in South Africa are already slowing down expansion and production. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 14, 21, 28, 1974; *New York Times*, Jan 26, 1975)

The conditions for economic growth that South Africa can control also need attention. One of these is the black labor force. Already there are predictions being made that South Africa will do away with the notorious passbook system, and with other obstacles to black participation at higher levels in the economy. It is not inconceivable that black unions of some kind might be recognized.

The international economic community will be quick to publicise these acts, if they occur, as a sign that racial restrictions are being eased, that South Africa is softening, that it is more appropriate than ever to invest in South Africa.

This interpretation of events does not represent the political reality of southern Africa. South Africa realizes that the fundamental condition for economic growth is political stability. And that political stability builds on economic growth. South Africa is very interested in expanding its economic relations with neighboring countries, Black as well as White. Economic interdependence means political neutralization as far as South Africa is


concerned. This is true internally as well as externally, and is the key to understanding South Africa's treatment of Blacks, both within and without the Republic. Any other interpretation is wishful thinking at best, and intentional blindness for economic gain at worst. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 14, 28, 1974; *New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1975)

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

British Foreign Secretary Callaghan Visits South Africa

In January 1975 the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Jim Callaghan, flying to South Africa on a Zambian Airways plane, paid an official visit on Prime Minister Vorster. (This was the first time in 15 years that direct talks had been held between a South African Prime Minister and a British Foreign Secretary.) Although the Rhodesian issue was their main concern, the talks also touched upon the Simonstown Agreement, Namibia, the Bantustans, Mr. Callaghan's meeting with SWAPO representatives in Lusaka, and Southern African domestic racial policies. (*Guardian*, London, Jan. 6, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975)

After the discussions, Foreign Secretary Callaghan stated at his press conference that "If somebody was to ask me if my journey was worthwhile I would say I have a closer picture now of the Southern African attitude on the question of Rhodesia and the way in which they see matters developing there, and to that extent the missing part of the picture of Southern Africa has been filled in and it adds to my knowledge of the way in which Britain



Callaghan—11 day Safari to see ...



Kaunda, Zambia



Vorster, South Africa



Khama, Botswana



Gowon, Nigeria



Kenyatta, Kenya



Banda, Malawi



Nyerere, Tanzania

must exercise her responsibility for the future of Rhodesia." (*Guardian*, London, Jan. 6, 1975)

The South African press has interpreted the British visit as a sign that the British government will be even more sympathetic to the South African regime's position in the future. The *Star* (Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975) stated that "Mr. Callaghan's request to see him [Prime Minister Vorster] and his willingness to come to Port Elizabeth . . . amount to a public endorsement of the key role Mr. Vorster is currently playing in Southern African affairs. The visit also reflects a change in the Labour Government's attitudes [toward the South African regime]." In the *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg, Jan. 6, 1975) it was noted that "one of the most striking aspects of the Vorster-Callaghan talks is the confirmation of Mr. Vorster's emergence as a diplomat and statesman of stature." The *Hoofstad* (Pretoria, Jan. 6, 1975) wrote that "on Saturday Mr. Callaghan and the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, had very frank discussions. The Briton's tune sounded somewhat different after that. He now recognises South Africa's role in the policy of détente." *Die Volksblad* (Bloemfontein, Jan. 6, 1975) stated that "the unexpected . . . visit of the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. James Callaghan, to Mr. John Vorster . . . was evidently well worth it. . . . Whatever he

[Secretary Callaghan] expected to find here, we are sure [it] was put to him very clearly: Both South Africa's views on specific matters and advice on what Britain's contribution to the peace offensive [in Rhodesia] should be. The one big matter that Mr. Vorster put categorically is that Rhodesia and its people must be left alone to work out their own salvation. . . . From Mr. Callaghan's reaction after leaving South Africa, one gathers that this message struck home. . . . He [Callaghan] displayed greater consideration after his visit to Mr. Vorster. . . ." In other words South Africa feels that the British Government will be increasing its support of South African foreign policies.

On the Rhodesian question, the constitutional framework which the South African regime wants the British Government to support and to use its influence to pressure African government leaders into supporting is one based upon "a franchise based on academic and other qualifications." (*Guardian*, London, Jan. 13, 1975) Thus, South Africa hopes to gain British backing of a policy which would only allow the elite of the African community to participate in elections, while denying franchise rights to the African majority. Therefore, this is essentially a policy to maintain White economic and political dominance in Rhodesia. ■

Namibia

SWAPO STATEMENTS

Mr. Sam Nujoma, president of the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia, in a policy statement issued simultaneously in Windhoek, Lusaka and Dar es Salaam on January 17, 1975, said that SWAPO would enter into talks with the South African government "provided they were based on" six preconditions.

They were: South African public recognition of the Namibian people's right to independence and national sovereignty; Namibia's territorial integrity to be inviolate and respected; South African recognition of SWAPO as "the only authentic representative of the Namibian people"; release of all political prisoners; return of Namibians in exile to their country without fear of arrest or victimization; and a prior commitment to withdraw all troops and police from Namibian territory before any talks begin.

Mr. Nujoma stated that unless these conditions were met, SWAPO would have no choice but to continue the armed struggle. The SWAPO statement noted that four days before the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had promised "greatly increased financial and material support to our Movement to oust South African from Namibia".

In Windhoek, SWAPO held a press conference on the same date. A spokesman reiterated the preconditions and further elaborated on the movement's policy. SWAPO formally announced its withdrawal from the nine-organization National Convention of Namibia, saying "The National Convention has been ineffective. It has lacked relevant political direction. It has failed to fulfill the expectations of the Namibian people." (This is a clarification following upon a December 23, 1974, press state-


ment issued by Mr. Axel Johannes, SWAPO secretary in Windhoek, entitled "National Unity and National Dis-Unity", which asserted that SWAPO remained a member of the Convention although warning about attempts within the confederation to undermine SWAPO.)

The January statement spoke of real national unity. "SWAPO of Namibia has fought for, and will go on fighting for, an independent unitary state of Namibia. There will be a true democracy. We pledge ourselves to Namibia and to the world to eradicate racialism in all its forms." SWAPO "offers membership to all those who accept the principles and who reject the illegal racist occupation of South Africa and the reactionary dangers of tribalism and neo-colonialism."

Commenting on how SWAPO had been—"grossly slandered and misrepresented about the future of the white community", the statement said "SWAPO of Namibia is not anti-white. . . . Our struggle is against a system which denies us our birthright . . . to govern ourselves in our own country, Namibia."

The future is envisioned: "A SWAPO Government will promulgate a Bill of Rights. It will guarantee the fundamental human rights of which the people of Namibia have been so long and so disgracefully deprived. It will be based on standards accepted throughout the world. The people of Namibia will be guaranteed equal rights in the political, social and economic spheres. There will be no more discrimination in a free and independent Namibia. We shall live as brothers and sisters."

Regarding the United Nations, the SWAPO statement declared: "SWAPO of Namibia fully supports the United Nations and warmly acknowledges all its activities on



South African troops hunting Namibian freedom fighters.

behalf of the Namibian people. In any transition, SWAPO will ensure that there will be no independence in Namibia before majority rule. Should governmental power be exercised by a transitional authority prior to independence, such authority must be SWAPO—not the United Nations. SWAPO will then reserve the right to seek appropriate help from the UN in a suitable manner, if and when any such need arises."

A UNITARY NAMIBIA THREATENED

In a communication of January 7, 1975, to the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia Sean MacBride, Chief Clemens Kapuuu, vice chairman of the National Convention, attacked SWAPO for its statement of December 23, 1974, and ended by stating: "Geographically South West Africa has different distinct lands and each tribe has its own lands. Tribes and political organizations which owe their allegiance to the National Convention will work out their political future jointly on their lands and SWAPO will work out its own political future on her own land near the Angolan border." This was an accusation against SWAPO as representing only the people of the Ovambo-land region in northern Namibia and precasts a possible scenario for excising that region, by far the most heavily populated in the country with some 45% of the three-quarters of a million inhabitants of Namibia. As the SWAPO Windhoek statement of January 17 puts it: "It is now clear, to all, that the racist occupiers have been seeking to use the National Convention as an instrument in their attempt to divide and rule Namibia. SWAPO predicts that South Africa will now even more openly try to manipulate the remaining rump as a puppet, in its hopeless attempt to delude the world and confuse the people of Namibia."

Chief Kapuuu's statement was backed by Mr. Dirk Mudge, leader of the all-white South West Africa Legislative Assembly. The Windhoek *Advertiser* of January 10, 1975, reports Mudge said that separate independence for

the Ovambos was one of several possible constitutional solutions which would have to be considered.

Meanwhile, officials are hailing the results of an election in Owambo, the bantustan name for the Ovambo-land region, where it is claimed that 76% of the 120,000 eligible voters turned out to elect members for 42 seats in the Owambo Legislative Council. (An additional 35 are nominated by authorities). Outside this area, only 4.2% of Ovambo contract laborers in other parts of the country were said to have cast their ballots.

SWAPO had called for a boycott of the elections and its rallies were broken up by tribal police. Anglican Bishop Richard Wood supported the boycott in a public statement: "Basically, the issue is as simple and clear as this—by voting for any candidates in the elections, an Ovambo is registering approval for the Bantustan policy of the South African Government and renouncing any legitimate claim to citizenship of the country as a whole."

Claims of coercion were made by Lutheran Bishops Leonard Auala and Kleopas Dumeni of the Evangelical Ovambo-Kavango Church. (*Times*, London, January 16, 1975) The leaders of the 250,000 member church said "there is evidence that Ovambos employed as contract workers by South West African administration organizations are being hustled to the polls regardless of whether they want to vote or not." SWAPO official Reuben Hauwanga in Ovambo-land declared people were threatened with loss of jobs and denial of medical attention unless they voted. (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, January 20, 1975)

A brief comment in an interview with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum (reported to be replaced shortly with the nomination of Nathaniel P. Davis, US ambassador to Chile at the time of the overthrow of the government of President Salvador Allende) is pertinent and puzzling. The Johannesburg *Star* Washington correspondent Ken Owens writes: "Mr. Easum also disclosed that the State Department was

'looking at the question' of giving minorities in South West Africa—Herero, Bushmen, Basters and Damara as well as Whites—a separate voice on their own future." (*Star*, Johannesburg, January 4, 1975)

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND EXPLOITATION IN NAMIBIA

International legal action may be taken to impound shipments of copper ore and uranium from Namibia, according to Commissioner Sean MacBride. (*Star*, Johannesburg, February 1, 1975) The commissioner, interviewed in Geneva, said cargoes—bound mainly for the US, Canada, Britain, Japan, France and West Germany—"could be treated as stolen property and seized on behalf of the people of Namibia." Mr. MacBride, armed with a Council of Namibia decree of last year, said that legal measures were inevitable unless South Africa "gave a declaration of intent, 'with clear signs of negotiations in the near future,' on granting independence to Namibia—bearing in mind the May 30, 1975 deadline proclaimed by the UN Security Council in its resolution of December 17, 1974."

Four American oil companies—Texaco, Phillips, Getty and Continental—have now announced they will cease operations in Namibia. Conoco withdrew last fall and the rest in January, 1975. Efforts to achieve these decisions are due to persistent conversations and imminent shareholder resolutions by US churches operating through the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility.

For the past three years the United Church of Christ in the US has raised the issue of Newmont Mining's actions and presence in Namibia at the annual stockholders meeting. This year the church has decided not to file a shareholder resolution because, in the words of its

spokesman, there have been "indications of substantive changes" in management attitudes towards black workers at the Tsumeb mine. Howard Schomer, secretary of the church's Board for World Ministries, and major architect of its policies on such corporate issues, in explaining the decision pointed to the fact that the church was particularly encouraged by a Newmont plan to build houses for 100 black families at the mine. South African Government rules require that the black workers leave their families in the Bantustan when they begin work at the mines, but Newmont had received authority to go ahead with its plan. Said Schomer, "Newmont moved heaven and earth to get that permission, and we're being pragmatic. They got what we wanted and we don't care where they got it." Mr. Schomer said that the church isn't dropping the issue entirely. "We will be watching Newmont very carefully and very prayerfully this year," he said. (*The Wall Street Journal*, February 6, 1975)

The *Windhoek Advertiser* of January 13, 1975, in a front-page "Stop Press" item, reports that the manager of Tsumeb Corporation, the country's largest base metals exploiter controlled by two US corporations, AMAX and Newmont Mining Corporation, confirmed "that there were strong rumours of a pending labour strike." The English-language newspaper says Tsumeb is seething with rumors of the strike and that police are on the alert. The massive Namibia-wide strike of December, 1971, is never far from the minds of people in that country.

The *Advertiser* of January 2, 1975, features stories on violence in workers' hospitals in Windhoek and the port city of Walvis Bay, during the course of which a government official was stabbed to death. The reports carefully stress that the workers are Ovambos. ■

Zimbabwe

SETTLEMENT FALTERS—UNITY SUCCEEDS

Although the settlement talks between the Zimbabwean nationalists and the Smith regime have come to a standstill, one hopeful result was forthcoming from the December meetings. The major liberation movements, ZANU, ZAPU, and ANC (African National Council) signed, with FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe), a smaller movement, a unity pact announced by President Kaunda on December 8, in Lusaka. The full text of the agreement follows:

1. We have agreed to unite under one organization with immediate effect. We have agreed further, that this organization shall be the African National Council.
2. We shall be working for the independence of our country. We assume that on this demand for independence there is no difference among Rhodesians of all races. But there has until now been a difference on the independence which Zimbabwe must have. The Rhodesian Front has, in the past, sought independence on the basis of minority rule. We reject that, the independence we have always sought, and the independence we still seek is independence on the basis of majority rule.

3. For the purpose of achieving that objective we have always been ready to enter into negotiations with others concerned, now that some of us have been released from detention, we believe the time is ripe for us to repeat this offer. Without pre-conditions on both sides we are ready to enter into immediate and meaningful negotiations with the leaders of the Rhodesian Front, and with the British Government in Britain, on the steps to be taken to achieve independence on the basis of majority rule.
4. As a demonstration of our sincerity, all freedom fighters will be instructed, as soon as a date for the negotiations has been fixed, to suspend fighting.
5. We are not racialists. We accept the right of white Rhodesians to live in Rhodesia and share the same rights and obligations of citizenship as their fellow Rhodesians of the majority community, without any discrimination on grounds of race, color or creed.
6. We call upon all Rhodesians, and all who reside in Rhodesia to remain calm, maintain peace and go about their normal business, while these matters are being considered, and while any negotiations are proceeding.
7. We call upon all Zimbabweans, wherever they are, to



After signing the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity, President Kaunda with Sithole, Muzorewa, Nkomo and Chikerema.

remain united behind the demand for independence on the basis of majority rule, and to give full support to the African National Council.

8. We appeal to all our friends in Africa and abroad to continue their support for our struggle until independence is achieved on the basis of majority rule.

Signed: Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa, President of ANC

Ndabaniingi Sithole, Former president of ZANU

Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo, Former president of ZAPU

James Robert Dambaza Chikerema, Former president of FROLIZI

Bishop Muzorewa read the statement of unity in Lusaka, speaking on behalf of all the leaders. The statement included a key paragraph which recognized "the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe." (*Guardian*, London Dec. 14, 1974)

Dr. Kaunda of Zambia and British Foreign Secretary Callaghan met in early January to discuss the Rhodesian dilemma. Ian Smith refused to allow the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders to return to Lusaka for those talks. Callaghan compared the Rhodesian rulers to men on stranded ice. "The ice looks very secure at the start, but then it starts cracking. If they are to save themselves they must move with speed; we have to save them from themselves. That is our task." (*Guardian*, London, Jan. 3, 1975) What this portends is difficult to say. Callaghan has not made any statement about the role Britain will take in the future talks. The Rhodesian regime wants the talks to be an internal matter, without British participation. The new ANC has set as one of its conditions for the resumption of talks that Britain chair the conference.

Further conditions set forth by the new ANC, whose executive includes Sithole, Nkomo and Chikerema, plus other representatives from the movements, under the chairmanship of Muzorewa, are: a general amnesty; an end to political trials and to the state of emergency; release of

all African political prisoners, detainees and restrictees; removal of the ban on ZANU and ZAPU; guarantees of free political expression and activity; and the acceptance of majority rule. No timing for the move to majority rule has been laid down.

After the Lusaka talks, Ian Smith announced to Rhodesia that there was agreement on a ceasefire. He gave no other details of the talks. He authorized the release of some of the 300 to 600 political prisoners. He conditioned the release of more prisoners on the effectiveness of the ceasefire and halted the releases as guerrilla activity continued. Seven South African soldiers have been killed since the ceasefire and twelve Africans have been sentenced to prison terms for failing to report the presence of guerrillas. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 21, 1975) The ANC has been clear in stating that the ceasefire would take effect when meaningful negotiations begin and that it is not related to the release of political prisoners. The Rhodesian government dropped leaflets in the guerrilla war zone calling upon the guerrillas to abandon their arms and surrender or return to their bases. This tactic infuriated the ANC who saw it as a means to undermine their military positions. Rhodesia contends that pamphlets printed in Zambia have been circulated in the zone encouraging the guerrillas to continue fighting. According to the *London Daily Mail*, Rhodesia is trying to recruit 300 mercenaries in West Germany and Switzerland. They will be offered contracts for three to 30 years. The recruitment is being done under the rubric of "safari guides." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975) It is clear that the hostilities have not come to an end and that each side forges the possibility of continuation for some time to come.


Samora Machel, President of FRELIMO, told a liberation committee of the O.A.U. that FRELIMO would support guerrilla warfare against Rhodesia unless there is settlement with the nationalists by June, when Mozambique becomes independent. It is believed that FRELIMO may use its own crack troops in addition to the Zimbabwe forces with supplies and know-how. (*Guardian*, London, Jan. 11, 1975)

President Nyerere said that if Rhodesia wants to avoid war and to have sanctions lifted, it can accept immediate majority rule or it can, as a British colony, go through intermediate stages leading to majority rule. Its independence will be accepted only after majority rule is established, whether this comes peacefully or after prolonged fighting. (*Guardian*, London, Jan. 9, 1975)

Ian Smith says he is willing to allow black Rhodesians of merit and ability to play a part in Rhodesian affairs, but, "...there are going to be no dramatic changes in Rhodesia." (*Guardian*, London, Jan. 2, 1975) In a BBC interview in December, he said he believes in multi-racial rule in Rhodesia but, "... it would be a tragedy if we got to a stage where one day there was White rule and the next day there was Black rule. . . I honestly believe that what we have to accept is that Rhodesia is going to be governed by all the people of Rhodesia, that is White as well as Black." He said he would step down as prime minister if he were a stumbling block to a settlement, and he wishes outsiders would let Rhodesia handle her own affairs. Mr. Smith's statement was shown on Rhodesian TV. He concluded by saying "... I believe in majority rule with, of course, the qualification that we have a qualified franchise." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 21, 1974) The ultra-right-wing in Rhodesia, calls this a sell-out.

Ndabaningi Sithole announced that a constitutional

conference would be held soon, but he had grave doubts about its success. He predicted that an all-out war would follow any failure at the conference table. Sithole said that Vorster was the key to the success of a settlement; if he withdrew his troops from Rhodesia, the Smith regime would see the inevitability of victory for the freedom fighters. If Vorster kept his troops at the disposal of Rhodesia, war would continue until Zimbabwe is liberated. A white Rhodesian, former independent Member of Parliament, Dr. Arhn Palley, has made a similar analysis of the role of South Africa in the Rhodesian crisis. Dr. Palley believes that South Africa has put very little pressure on Rhodesia and is waiting to see the outcome of the conference before making any major decisions. (*Washington Post*, Jan. 17, 1975; *Guardian*, London, Jan. 14, 1975) *Africa*, London, Jan, 1975; *British Weeklies*, London, Dec. 30, Jan. 5, 10, 1975; *Guardian*, London, Dec. 9, 18, 21, Jan. 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14; *International Bulletin*, Berkeley, Jan. 17, 1975; *Times of Zambia*, Dec. 16, 22, 23, 1974; *Washington Post*, Dec. 17, 18, 19, 21, 1974; *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, dec. 16, 1974; *New York Times*, Dec. 17, 18, 1974; *Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Dec. 14, 18, 1974; *Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Dec. 9, 10, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 21, 28, 1974; Jan 11, 14, 1975; *Zimbabwe News*, Lusaka, Nov, 1974; *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 11, 1974.)■



ANGOLA

ANGOLA INDEPENDENCE SET FOR NOVEMBER 11
months after the coup in Portugal and with
agreement for Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and
Mozambique secured, the stage has finally been set for
Angolan independence. Portuguese President Francisco da

Costa Gomes signed the independence agreement with
MPLA President Agostinho Neto, Holden Roberto of
FNLA and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA providing for an
interim government and Angolan independence November
11, 1975. The agreement was signed in the Portuguese

coastal town of Penina in the Province of Algarve, ironically just a few miles from the site where Prince Henry the Navigator launched his expeditions to Africa over five centuries ago.

Officially the agreement ends 14 years of guerrilla struggle by the Angolan people against Portuguese colonialism. In a short speech following the announcement that the agreement had been signed, President Costa Gomes said the agreement "closes a chapter where blood and tears fell in a bitter trial of fraternal suffering." (*Journal-Bulletin*, Providence, Jan. 16, 1975) As Agostinho Neto of MPLA addressed the Portuguese people thanking them, his voice broke and tears filled his eyes. With the pact signed, the last vestiges of the world's last major colonial empire ended—as Costa Gomes observed, "In this summit meeting we worked a generation behind the currents of history." (*Journal-Bulletin*, Jan. 16, 1975)

Before independence the Angolan people are to elect a constituent assembly that will choose a president and draft a constitution. The transitional government will have a Portuguese Governor-General at its head with a 12 member cabinet composed of three representatives each from MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. The premierships will rotate among three deputy prime ministers who have been selected—they are Vukulukukta of UNITA, Johnny Eduardo of FNLA and Lucio Lara of MPLA. A Portuguese high commissioner (presently Admiral Rosa Coutinho) acceptable to the national liberation movements will act as an arbiter to the decisions of the interim government without executive or decision-making powers. The armed forces will consist of 18,000 Portuguese and 6000 men from each of the liberation movements for a total force of 36,000. (*Guardian*, New York, Jan. 22, 1975)

The build-up to the independence agreement in Portugal was slow and fraught with problems of false starts and subsequent set-backs in earlier attempts to unite the three liberation groups. With unity still not achieved last November, and with the situation inside Angola growing more tense after a series of urban riots, the Armed Forces Movement pressed for an agreement by

which a provisional government could be set up before the Portuguese elections in March.

Initially talks were held between MPLA President Neto and Portuguese negotiator, Major Ernesto Antunes in Algiers. It was reported that Portuguese Foreign Minister Mario Soares met with FNLA's international relations representative, Johnny Eduardo in Zaire, and that Jonas Savimbi met with Roberto and possibly Soares in Kinshasa. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 21, 1974) Major Antunes, who played a leading role in the formal negotiations and secret contacts which preceded Mozambican independence, left the Algerian talks with Neto for a week's tour in selected Arab countries. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 19, 1974)

As reported in last month's *Southern Africa* it was Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi of FNLA and UNITA respectively who first signed an agreement in Zaire forming a military and political alliance. MPLA did not appear at the negotiating table formally until its own internal divisions had been resolved to some degree. On December 16 it was reported that MPLA expelled Daniel Chipenda, the leader of the strongest faction in opposition to Neto's leadership in the MPLA. Chipenda was accused of assassination attempts and various political ruses to eliminate Neto from MPLA top leadership. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Dec. 16, 1975) On December 20 MPLA and UNITA, represented by Dr. Neto and Dr. Savimbi, signed a cooperative agreement binding them to a common front in negotiations with the Portuguese for the formation of a transitional government in Angola. The agreement was signed in the city of Luso inside Angola. Before the signing Neto and Savimbi held separate talks with Angola's High Commissioner, Admiral Coutinho, who flew to Luso from Luanda for the event. In the ten-point Luso Agreement MPLA and UNITA pledged to end every type of hostility between them and they agreed to stand against any secession attempts in the Cabindan Enclave. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Dec. 20, 1974; *Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Dec. 26, 1974) In an interview following the meetings Savimbi said that he believed that now the possibility of civil war may be avoided in Angola.



The signing of the accord at Penina.

(Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, Dec. 24, 1974)

The three Angolan liberation movements met for an historic first summit meeting in Mombasa in early January with President Jomo Kenyatta acting as host. After only two days of talks MPLA, FNLA and UNITA agreed to a common political platform for negotiations with the Portuguese in which a critical feature was the declaration that Cabinda is an "integral and inalienable" part of Angola. (*Journal-Bulletin*, Providence, Jan. 4, 5, 6, 1975) Formerly Daniel Chipenda and Jonas Savimbi had favored Cabindan autonomy and there were rumors of a deal between Holden Roberto and Mobutu of Zaire involving Cabinda as a prize.

With the provisional government established and an independence date set, Angola apparently has a clear path to independence barring political reversals in Portugal or renewed hostilities between the liberation movements. At any point an intensification of the rivalries could result in civil war. In the past, in 1961, in 1966 and again in 1973, MPLA and FNLA signed agreements calling for an end to political and military hostilities, and each time these pacts failed. However, at none of these times was Portuguese colonialism coming to a close, and at no time has the necessity for unity been greater.

CABINDA, AN "INTEGRAL AND INALIENABLE" PART OF ANGOLA

Part of the unity forged by MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in their "common platform" concerns the future of the enclave of Cabinda, which has been described as potentially the Kuwait of Africa because of its rich oil resources.

For some time a "liberation" group known as FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) has been conducting operations and recently there have been allegations that Gulf Oil has been supporting this group of separatists. In November, 1974, a FLEC force with

Portuguese captives crossed the Congo Brazzaville border escaping a Portuguese air raid in Cabinda. The Congolese troops rescued the Portuguese soldiers and arrested a French mercenary who had been fighting with the FLEC forces. Jean Kay, the arrested mercenary, had served as a mercenary in Yemen, Biafra and the Congo in 1961. Congo Brazzaville announced that he would be tried for crimes against Africa. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 19, 1974) A government statement issued in Brazzaville said, "the presence of mercenaries in the ranks of this movement cast a sombre light and doubt on the present direction of FLEC." (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 20, 1974)

Meanwhile Luis Ranque Franque, President of FLEC, urged the Portuguese to hold an immediate referendum to decide between separation or continuation as part of Angola. (*Washington Post*, Dec. 10, 1974) With the unity agreements' declarations concerning Cabinda and with the exposure of French mercenaries operating within FLEC, it would appear that this movement will be eclipsed by larger political events.

MERCENARIES OPENLY ORGANIZE

Sam Cassidy, a self-styled mercenary Major, claims in London that he has a commando force of 500 men ready to go anywhere in Africa. He claims to have recruited 450 men in South Africa alone. While in Salisbury, Cassidy told reporters that his mercenary force was "ready and waiting for action in either Mozambique or Angola." (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 15, 1974)

In Stockholm a Swiss mercenary is openly recruiting for a 1000 man army of mercenaries designed to engage in "open warfare with free governments in Mozambique and Angola." (*Herald Dispatch*, Los Angeles, Nov. 21, 1974) Both mercenaries were involved in the Congo in 1961 and obviously are hoping to participate in a repeat performance in Angola or Mozambique.

MOZAMBIQUE

NOTES ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Mozambique's first stage of independence was winning the war against Portuguese colonialism. Independence is scheduled for June 25, 1975. Mozambique is now well into its second phase of struggle, reconstruction. On FRELIMO's agenda for rebuilding the country is "liberating people's minds poisoned by colonial rule, and establishing structures which will ensure that [the] country's policy reflects the people's will." (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 27, 1974; *Daily World*, New York, Jan. 24, 1975)

Recent political appointments of Africans are stepping up the transition process. Paulo Simangue is now district commissioner for Beira and Benjamin Tamele is district commissioner of Busi. Armando Tanguene has been named Governor of the Province of Nampula. (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 15, 1975) Also Beira, Mozambique's second largest city, now has its first black mayor, Alberto Congeahde Mendonca, 33 years old. He says he plans to serve the people "and that does not mean the African, the European, the Asian or the coloured. But

the people as a whole." (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 11, 1974)

Under Portuguese colonialism medical aid was sparse. For example, Inhambane Province in the south, with a population of 800,000, had only three doctors. Fleeing whites have even further reduced technical expertise. Health care is a FRELIMO priority and aid is expected from various countries. (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 30, 1974)

In the past three months the FRELIMO transitional government has done much to "defuse racial tension." A political education campaign has been launched for both Black and White. "White people are now actively participating in party committees and attending political meetings." (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Dec. 28, 1974)

Traces of Reaction

Suspected reactionaries have been detained, questioned and released. Seventy white persons were arrested early in January. They were suspects in the September 7, 1974 attempted coup. (See *Southern Africa*, Dec. 1974)

There were isolated grenade explosions during the month of December. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 28, 1974)

AT THE CABORA BASSA DAM SITE

After five years of construction and at a cost of \$38 million, water began flowing December 6, 1974, at the Cabora Bassa dam in northwest Mozambique. It will create one of the world's largest man-made lakes, taking two years to fill up, and encompassing an area 150 miles in length and 23 miles in width. "Test transmissions of electricity from the three giant generating units at the dam are due to begin early this year and by the middle of 1975 constant power should be produced." (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Dec. 7, 1974) Some 65 per cent of this electricity will be consumed by South Africa. (*Sunday Times*, Lusaka, Dec. 1, 1974)

"Hydroelectric power will be only one of the many benefits accruing from the dam. Plans include:

- The establishment of a fishing industry on the Cabora Bassa Lake.
- The irrigation of the surrounding land for agriculture and forestry.
- The exploitation of local mineral reserves such as coal, iron and copper.
- The development of local steel and fertilizer industries.
- The taming of the Zambezi downstream from the dam, making the river navigable for commercial shipping.

Apart from all this, there are also plans to build another power plant on the north bank of the dam, giving it a final generating capacity of 4,000 megawatts." (*Sunday Times*, Lusaka, Dec. 1, 1974)

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Mozambique does have outlets to deal with the "economic crisis" left as a remnant of Portuguese colonialism. Diatomites, a mineral used in cement and concrete has been prospected 45 miles from the capital, Lourenco Marques. According to Walter Fuchs, a Swiss chemical engineer who owns three mine concessions at Manica, over six million tons of the mineral may be present and this has possibilities of enhancing Mozambique's economy. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 21, 1974)

SONAREP, the Mozambique oil refinery in which the

French petroleum company *Compagnie Francaise des Petroles* (CFP) has a 24 per cent shareholding, has become the first major industry in the country to begin an all-out "Mozambicanization" programme. SONAREP, with a majority Portuguese shareholding, and 10 per cent Mozambican public shares, recently agreed to provide its managerial and technical expertise for training Mozambican nationals for the company. (*AFP Interafrican News Survey*, Nov. 29, 1974)

FRELIMO has banned the transport of certain goods through Mozambique to Salisbury. "The loss of the transit trade through Beira will be a severe blow to a country with a \$950 million foreign debt." But at the Liberation Committee meeting of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) it was decided to appropriate large scale funds to Mozambique. Funds have already been received and will continue. Further negotiations on rail export are expected to be made after independence. (*Guardian*, London, Nov. 29, 1974)


INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

A new air charter now links Mozambique to other parts of Africa and Europe. Transaerea International will operate two Boeing 707's and two freighters beginning April 15, 1975. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 21, 1974)

FRELIMO President Samora Machel and a FRELIMO delegation is visiting the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and Romania. The purpose of the visit is to "strengthen the already existing relations between FRELIMO and the Communist parties of the three countries." (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Dec. 3, 12, 1974)

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will establish an office in Lourenco Marques early next year to coordinate aid to Mozambique. Mozambique's Prime Minister Joaquim Chissano requested UNDP begin investigating areas for aid to Mozambique in early 1975. (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 27, 1974)

FRELIMO is cooperating with its colonized African neighbors. According to official sources, FRELIMO is providing assistance to Zimbabwe freedom fighters in mounting their struggle in Northeast Rhodesia. (*Guardian*, London, Nov. 27, 1974)



The first East African Airways Super VC 10 on the new Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique run lands at Lourenco Marques airport.

REPUBLIC of GUINEA BISSAU

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Vasco Cabral, Minister of Economy and Finance for the Republic of Guinea Bissau recently described the economy of the country as being "in shambles" as a result of a massive transfer of funds and of years of colonial abuse. Sharp controls must be placed on the economy (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Dec. 16, 1974)

The first national development plan will soon be launched and will give the first priority to agriculture. The second in priority will be to take a national inventory of natural resources. The National Bank of Guinea will be nationalized and the currency renamed the "peso" rather than the "escudo" as was known during colonialism. In short there will be a program of breaking down the "old colonial structures so that new ones like those already existing in our original liberated zones can be set up." (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Dec. 1974)

Development aid has been promised by the United Arab Emirates and by Kuwait. (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Dec. 9, 1974) Guinea Bissau has become the 134th member of UNESCO and is expected to attend various Paris conferences of this organization. (*Marches Tropicaux*, Paris, Nov. 15, 1974)



Vasco Cabral, Minister of Economy and Finance

INSIDE THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

In late August and early September the UPICV (Popular Union of the Cape Verde Islands) and the UDT (Democratic Workers Union) created serious incidents with the idea of "destabilizing" the political situation in the Islands. Both movements are linked to reactionary Portuguese interests and are opposed to the PAIGC. Neither group existed until after the Lisbon coup. In Mindelo some 500 sailors attacked the homes of PAIGC supporters and elsewhere police sought to brutally suppress pro-PAIGC demonstrations in Santa Antao, Sao Nicolau, Sal and Sao Tiago.

To counter these acts the PAIGC organized the GADCVG (Democratic Action Group of Cape Verde and Guinea) which was behind the very successful general strike in the middle of November. The 24-hour strike shut down all public services and private firms and 90% of the Cape Verdeans in the armed forces left their barracks to join the demonstrations calling for support to the PAIGC

and an end to fascism in the Islands. (*Daily World*, New York, Jan. 15, 1975; *Sunday Nation*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 17, 1974)

Pro-PAIGC signs are everywhere, in shops, in private homes, on public buildings and on tee-shirts. These evidences of mass support have been overwhelming despite some reports of difficulty in finding work for those who have expressed strong sentiments of unity with Guinea. (*Sodra Afrika Informations bulletin*, Sweden, Dec. 1974)

Major Pedro Pires of the PAIGC arrived in the Islands on November 23 to hold final discussions towards self-determination. At last it was resolved that the PAIGC was the only legitimate voice of the Cape Verdean people and the selfish interests of a handful of large landowners were put aside by representatives of the Armed Forces Movement from Lisbon. (*Africa*, London, Jan. 1975) By early December Pires announced that the formation of a provisional government was "certain." (BBC, London, Dec. 8, 1974) On December 20 negotiations were at their formal conclusion with the announcement of a six-member Executive Committee of the transitional government. Half of the members are from the PAIGC and the other half are Portuguese headed by Almeida d'Eca. (*Le Monde*, Paris, Dec. 27, 1974) The accords have promised elections for June 30, 1975 which will be "as representative as possible"; independence was announced for July 5, 1975. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 21, 1974; *Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Dec. 19, 1974)

A commission of Inquiry will be set up to investigate the turbulent events in the Islands amid strong charges that there was an assassination conspiracy against the PAIGC. Some PAIGC members were killed in various incidents and numerous arrests were made for perpetrators of "common crimes"; other Cape Verdeans allegedly involved in the anti-PAIGC activities have been placed "under military protection." (*AFP*, Paris, Jan. 3, 1975)



Major Pedro Pires

Meanwhile U.S. diplomats continue to say that "we don't want a base there [on the Cape Verde Islands], but we don't want the Russians to have it either." The PAIGC has responded to such statements by saying that the Portuguese base will be dismantled and that no foreign power will be offered base facilities. Major Pires has also indicated that South African Airways may continue to use the international airport at Sal for refueling until July 5, but a new policy will be formulated after that date. (*Africa News*, Dec. 26, 1974; *Financial Times*, London, Dec. 20, 1974)

REACTIONARY CAPE VERDEANS PLAN ACTION IN US

In the New England states in northeastern United States, six anti-PAIGC Cape Verdeans have proposed a rally in an effort to halt the moves towards independence and unity with Guinea-Bissau. The group is led by Dr. Aguinaldo Veiga, currently of Providence, Rhode Island. Three Boston lawyers, Roy F. Teixeira, his son Roy E. Teixeira, Jr., and Antonio J. Cardoso, as well as Harry I. Fernandes of Hyannis, and Edmundo J. Ramos of Bridgeport are all coordinating this event. PAIGC supporter Salahudin Matteos has denied that there are any plans for forced annexation of the Cape Verdean Islands as the lawyers have charged. Matteos pointed out that the

PAIGC has mass support in the Islands and had worked underground for years. (*Sunday Journal*, (Providence), Jan. 5; *Journal*, (Providence), Jan. 13; *Evening Bulletin*, (Providence), Jan. 15, 1975) The rally is now scheduled for February 22-23 at the Boston Sheraton Hotel; delegates from around the world have been invited.

Dr. Veiga, a 59-year-old lawyer, born in Sao Tiago served 24 years in Angola as the legal representative of the colonial government in many capacities. In his private practice he represented major Angolan interests in coffee, diamonds, and construction. During 1961-62 Veiga represented Angolan labor interests from the colonial point of view. For a number of years Veiga also served as a colonial administrator in Guinea.

An Open Letter was sent to the United Nations by Dr. Veiga in which he protested the PAIGC's "foreign" activities in the Cape Verde Islands. In this letter he also outlined a development program for the Islands. Veiga said in the plan for internal security "Capeverdean young women" will be dressed in "elegant" and "impeccable" white uniforms and will "direct traffic with their sunny smile and they will dispel agitators and lawbreakers with their black cudgels . . . while robust men carry on their indispensable competitive work in industrial establishments."

SAO TOME and PRINCIPE

The two islands 150 miles south of Nigeria will have elections prior to their independence scheduled for July 12, 1975. The islands could be very rich in the cash crops of coffee and cocoa if the 372 square miles are farmed efficiently and fairly. (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 27, 1974)

These two Portuguese territories were colonized in the early 17th century when a plantation economy was begun. The islands also served as a hub for the slave trade from Angola and the "Slave Coast". During the Portuguese administration the islands were also used as a penal colony for political prisoners. The current Portuguese Foreign Minister Mario Soares once spent eight months incarcerated in the islands. Since the coup d'etat in Lisbon in April 1974 there have been violent confrontations and chaos in efforts to speed the independence movement. (*Jeune Afrique*, Paris, Dec. 14, 1974)

The MLSTP (Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe) was formed in 1960 in neighboring Gabon where it waged political struggle towards self-determination. After intense negotiations in Algiers, accords between the MLSTP and the Portuguese government were reached on November 26, 1974. The MLSTP team was headed by Miguel Trouvada; the Portuguese were represented by Antonio de Almeida Santos. The Armed Forces Movement (AFM) in Portugal had already called for a transfer of power to the MLSTP. (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 24, 27, 1974)

At present a transitional government of five MLSTP members and one Portuguese official has been set up until the election of a national assembly. The first concern of the new government will be disease control, improvement in nutrition, and a literacy program. (*Africa News*, Dec. 26, 1974)

NEIGHBORS


ECONOMIC NEWS FROM LESOTHO

After months of negotiation, the South African Government has agreed to pay Lesotho \$2.1 million in compensation for the rand currency circulating in Lesotho, Frasers, as it has already done in Transkei and other homelands, has agreed to sell some of its enterprise in Lesotho and provide management training to Lesotho citizens; the company hopes to use the funds released in this way for further investment in South Africa. In 1973, Lesotho's unfavorable trade balance increased from \$49 million to about \$72 million, based on imports of \$84 million and exports of about \$12 million. The Department of Information of Lesotho has announced that the South African Permanent Building Society and

the United Building Society will cease business in Lesotho after 1974 because of a new law designed to supervise the transactions of all financial institutions involved in banking. To fill the gap, the Lesotho Bank plans to establish the Lesotho Building Society. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 14, 21, 28, 1974)

LESOTHO LAND CLAIMS

On the basis of treaties with Great Britain in the nineteenth century and land control exercised by Moshesh, the first king of Lesotho, the Lesotho Government is pressing its claim for restitution of areas now controlled by the Orange Free State. Foreign Minister Kotsokoane said that South Africa would be



The shaded areas represent Lesotho's land claims from the OFS.

approached first on the question but that the issue might go to the UN or the World Court. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975)

MALAWI OUT AS CENTER FOR TALKS

When Dr. Elliott Gabellah, vice-president of the African National Council, visited Malawi recently, speculation arose that Malawi might be the venue for talks on Rhodesia. Gabellah, however, indicated that he had

gone to inform ANC representatives of the latest developments and had only paid a courtesy call to President Banda. In Salisbury, there was speculation that, should South Africa and Rhodesia rule out Lusaka and London, Gaborone in Botswana might be the center for the talks. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 28, 1974)

THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY AND DETENTE

In several recent articles (Dec. 28, 1974, Jan. 11, 1975), the Johannesburg *Star* suggests that Zambia is concerned to bring about detente in Southern Africa in order to improve its outlets to the sea. This makes President Kaunda ready to compromise on the question of immediate majority rule in Zimbabwe, a move which President Nyerere will not accept. The Zimbabwe discussions could drive a wedge between the leaders, whose countries already have somewhat strained relations due to difficulties in exporting Zambian products through Tanzania. Dar es Salaam does not have the facilities to handle all of Zambia's copper and has unilaterally raised freight and port fees. In addition, Tanzania recently banned the use of vehicles weighing over 18 tons from using its northern roads. Kenyan trucks had been using these routes to bring Zambian products out through Mombasa. The Zambian maize crop failed this year because of a rare blight, and officials hope that detente would allow use of South African and Rhodesian experts, whose countries had bumper harvests.

Six senior expatriate officials of the Kitwe City Council have resigned because of alleged mismanagement and confusion. The town clerk warned them to "keep quiet" about their reasons for quitting upon their return to Europe, for fear of discouraging other expatriates who may wish to come to Zambia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 14, 1974)

UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA

NEW GOVERNMENT—THE LATIN AMERICANIZATION OF AFRICA

The White House announced on January 9 that Nathaniel Davis, former Ambassador to Chile at the time of the military coup that toppled Allende, has been nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, replacing Donald Easum. (see *Southern Africa*, February, 1975)

Meanwhile, Ken Owen of South Africa's *Argus* chain has published the story that the President will soon appoint William Bowdler, another diplomat with experience in Latin America, to replace John Hurd in the key post of U.S. Ambassador to South Africa. While the White House has not as yet announced the appointment, State Department press officers confirm that Bowdler's appointment is probable.

The proposed appointments have raised serious questions in the minds of seasoned Africa-policy watchers. Is Kissinger moving toward a clearer and harder line in his pursuit of US tangible interests in minerals and energy resources in Southern Africa? Would these diplomats,

given their experience in destabilizing Latin American governments, be likely to implement a policy of intervention in the new governments in Angola and Mozambique in an attempt to weaken the socialist forces there?

It is noted also that Deane Hinton, appointed in June, 1974 to serve in the key post as Ambassador to Zaire, is also a veteran of anti-insurgency efforts in Latin America. Hinton was AID chief in Guatemala during the years when a US-assisted pacification program took the lives of thousands. Davis was Ambassador to Guatemala then (1968-71), before he went to Chile. Bowdler was a political officer in Havana from 1956-61 when Castro rose to power, then served as the officer in charge of "special political problems" as a Cuba-expert in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and was a member of the US delegation to the OAS when the US removed Cuba from the organization. Davis was a senior member of the National Security Council in Washington in the mid-1960's. He had previously spent many years as a US anti-communist expert, in the Moscow bureau 1954-56



The Latin-Americanization of Africa.

and at the State Department's Soviet desk from 1956-60, at the height of the cold war.

While all three appointees are career diplomats, none have any significant Africa experience, although Hinton served as a vice consul in Mombassa in the late 1940's and Davis says he visited African states during his tour as deputy associate director of the Peace Corps. But all present Assistant Secretaries of State for regions have had experience in countries of their area. Davis has none; he doesn't even speak French, a necessity for communicating with Franco-phone Africa.

Protests and questions are beginning to surface even before confirmation hearings have been set by the Senate. President Mobutu of Zaire, addressing the African American Institute's (AAI) conference of African leaders and American representatives in Kinshasa on January 21 praised the former Assistant Secretary Easum as a "great diplomat" who listened because he believed in learning and being informed. "We were surprised to learn not only that he was fired, but also that his successor is the former US Ambassador to Chile at the time President Allende died."

Congressman Charles Diggs, who attended the AAI conference, labelled Davis' appointment "pure folly" in view of the rapidly growing African "dismay," and called on President Ford to withdraw it. Secretary Kissinger cabled Diggs in reply that it was unfair to stigmatize Davis "who did what he was told to do," and insisted that Davis was a leading Foreign Service Officer with a distinguished record at home and abroad. "We have selected wisely," Kissinger stated.

Chances of Davis' nomination being blocked are remote. Most Senators are not prepared to ask more than routine questions of the nominees, since the Senate rarely opposes executive appointments. Congressman Michael Harrington, however, is studying the possibility of testifying against Davis (and against Harry Shaudeman, another Chile veteran recently appointed Ambassador to Venezuela) in order to raise questions about CIA clandestine activity abroad in support of corporate interests. The American Committee on Africa, and

perhaps other groups, intends to testify in opposition to Davis' confirmation. The National Publishers Association, a group of black publishers and journalists, accused Kissinger of cloaking the Davis appointment in secrecy and called for its retraction. (White House press release, Jan. 8, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 11, 1975; Kinshasa Domestic Service Broadcast in French 1130 GMT Jan. 21, 1975, as monitored and translated by Africa Bureau of the State Department; Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr., press release, Jan. 22, Press Release, American Committee on Africa, Jan. 10, 1975)


SOUTH AFRICA WELCOMES NEW BATCH OF CONGRESSMEN—BUT DIGGS EXCLUDED

Six right-wing Republican Congressmen have stepped into a controversy by accepting an invitation for an all-expenses-paid week's tour of South Africa's military facilities.

While allegedly paid for by South African chain-store magnate, Mr. Ackerman, the tour seems to have been arranged by the ubiquitous South African Ministry of Information headed by Dr. Connie Mulder and Dr. Eschel Rhoodie, his Secretary for Information, who see an important part of their US strategy as promoting a vigorous Congressional advocacy of a US military alliance with South Africa.

From the Congressional side, the main organizer was Bob Wilson of California, now the ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee. Several other tour participants have districts with important Navy installations: Burgener of San Diego, Whitehurst of Norfolk, and Ketchum of Kern County, California (which includes China Lake Naval Air Station and Vandenburg Air Force Base). The other members of the delegation are Norman Lent of New York and Philip Crane of Illinois.

The Congressmen will visit Simonstown and the Cape's Silvermine communications center; the Atlas Aircraft factory, where military jets are made, and will be briefed on South African military strategy. The Department of Information is throwing a cocktail party for them where they will meet Dr. Mulder. They will visit Transkei Chief



Congressman Diggs—refused a visa.

Mantanzima at Umtata and see the sugar plantations at Durban. They will also be briefed at the pro-government Africa Institute.

The visit has raised a furor in South Africa following front-page coverage by *Rand Daily Mail* reporter Richard Walker. Defense and Information officials denied that they had arranged or paid for the trip. Junkets paid for by foreign governments are illegal and unconstitutional, according to an advisory opinion issued by the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, dated June 26, 1974, unless they are specifically consented to by Congress. While this ruling has been widely disregarded and breached, it is reason for enough public embarrassment to have caused one Democrat, Bill Chappell of Florida, to withdraw from the trip and to have caused the South African Government to try to cover up its own involvement.

Two other recent Congressional visitors to South Africa are members of the Black Caucus, whom the South African Government hopes will furnish support for its alleged "progress": Andrew Young of Georgia, who is making his second trip to South Africa in three months, and Cardiss Collins, a new member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. But South Africa is also clear that it views one black Congressman as a hopeless case.

In mid-January, South Africa declined to issue a visa to Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr., and declared him a "persona non grata." This is the fourth refusal of a visa in six attempts by Diggs, but it also marks the most strenuous effort to date by South Africa to prevent Diggs' direct involvement in South Africa. The South African Government barred him from leaving Jan Smuts Airport in transit on his month-long Africa tour, even preventing him from going to the Holiday Inn across the street, from receiving South African visitors, and from holding press conferences.

Diggs blasted the denial and said, "I can only conclude that the South African government fears my presence may somehow have what the authorities may consider a 'negative' impact on the Blacks in South Africa—who have displayed in recent months . . . a stronger than ever determination to achieve their own liberation." Diggs

called on the US government to press South Africa for "viable changes," leading to "participation by the majority in the political system of the country," but not through the sham Bantustans. (Statement, Cong. Charles C. Diggs, Jan. 16, 1975)

While Diggs is away on his month-long trip, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House may be about to reduce Diggs' powers by reorganizing its Subcommittees along subject lines, thus eliminating all geographic regional Subcommittees. A Committee meeting to be held January 29 may determine that there will be no Subcommittee on Africa for Diggs to preside over. While Diggs' seniority (as sixth ranking Democrat) may assure him a Subcommittee chairmanship, organizing the work of the Subcommittee on an issue basis may have the effect of diminishing the time and energy which the Subcommittee he heads can devote to Africa.

ANOTHER TRY ON SANCTIONS

Proponents of Rhodesian sanctions in Congress are preparing to try one more time to repeal the three-year-old Byrd Amendment. In the 94th Congress, the legislation will be starting from scratch, from introduction of the bill, through committee consideration to a final vote in both houses of Congress.

The sponsors are trying again with the hope of winning this time. Last December, they felt that there were not enough votes to pass the sanctions bill, but a possible increase of about 25 votes among the new members of Congress may be enough to win this spring. So far, they have reason to be optimistic. Twenty-two first-term members have already agreed to co-sponsor the sanctions bill. About half of their predecessors would have been expected to vote against sanctions.

The major sponsors intend to move as quickly as possible to a final vote. They recognize that US strengthening of sanctions may become a purely symbolic move which will improve the image of the US Government, if too much delay means that action by Congress is overtaken by progress in the negotiations on a political settlement in Rhodesia.

Surprisingly, there are indications that the steel industry will try to use the possibility of significant progress in southern Africa as a reason to support its position of continued opposition to ending sanctions. Their argument is that United States involvement (through Congressional action on sanctions) could upset the delicate negotiations between the Rhodesian Front and the African National Council. Sanctions proponents counter that continuation of the Byrd Amendment is just as significant an interference in the balance of power between the minority regime and the African nationalists, but on the side of minority rule, which the United States professes to oppose.

The House leadership on the sanctions bill hopes to get a final vote by the end of March, and then take the fight to the Senate. While Senator Gale McGee (who will probably return as chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa this session) is willing to move the bill through the Senate again, no one expects him to work on the bill until a successful vote is taken in the House.

US AID TO FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES

The first public consideration of the US aid policy toward Portugal and its former colonies was in the Foreign Aid Authorization bill in December, 1974. Senator Kennedy, whose Massachusetts constituency

includes the largest Portuguese and Cape Verdian population in the country, offered an amendment proposing that \$5 million in grants and \$50 million in loans be authorized for Portugal, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, with no more than 50 per cent going to metropolitan Portugal. In conference, however, the measure was changed to allow Presidential discretion over how the aid should be divided. According to a spokesman at the State Department's Africa Bureau it seems likely that, given this change, the African countries will receive less than half of the total. While Portugal has expressed publicly that it hopes to help develop its former colonies, Portuguese officials reportedly requested of the new US Ambassador, Frank Carlucci, that Portugal be granted the bulk of the aid authorized in this bill. Only \$10 million for loans has actually been appropriated as yet, and the allocation of the small amount has not yet been considered. It is likely that most of the aid which does get to Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau will be in the form of loans for the purchase of US goods which will free up foreign exchange for other purchases.

Meanwhile, two specific aid agreements are being

worked out. The US Government has already decided to grant about \$450,000 worth of scholarships for post-secondary education to students from Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. The African American Institute, which administered the State Department Southern African Student Program for years, has been contracted to administer the project. It is currently consulting with the African governments on student selection.

According to a State Department Spokesperson, FRELIMO has also made a specific request for food aid: 16,000 metric tons of wheat for northern and north-central Mozambique where harvests have been poor. The request would come out of existing resources of the PL 480 program. No decision has yet been reached.

The longer-range economic relationship between the new African states and the United States is far from worked out. An AID Study Mission will be going to Mozambique the second week of February to consult with FRELIMO officials about specific aid needs. A clearer picture of US aid policy may begin to come out of this visit. ■

AT THE U. N.



United Nations

Opening of Twenty-ninth General Assembly

PERSPECTIVES ON THE TWENTY-NINTH SESSION

The twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, which adjourned on December 18, was in many respects a significant one, both for Southern Africa and in terms of the whole relationship between the so-called "Third World" and the Western powers. Undoubtedly there is a growing economic and political confrontation between these two forces, which can ultimately be ascribed to their historical relationship as colonizers and colonized. Al-

though the lines are by no means clearly drawn as yet, the trends are beginning to emerge. Many of these conflicts are being played out in the United Nations or its subsidiary bodies, as the major international forums available.

In this sense, the developments in Southern Africa cannot be separated from developments in other areas of confrontation, most importantly the Middle East and the oil/raw materials issue.



Yasser Arafat, President of PLO

The main focus of the twenty-ninth session was on the liberation movements and on the role they should be playing in the Organization (and, by implication, in international politics as a whole). The appearance of Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) at the General Assembly, and the recognition accorded his group as the representative of the Palestinian people, unprecedented as it was, culminated a trend which has been developing for some years at the United Nations. The large majority of "Third World" countries (and this includes countries which were colonies of the Western powers only a long time ago, such as the Latin American countries) have shown an increasing determination to do away with the last political vestiges of colonialism—though not necessarily the economic ones. Within this broader trend, there has been a growing alliance of the African and Arab countries aimed at solving the two political problems which concern them most and which they see as being similar, if not interrelated—Israel and Southern Africa. While there have been accusations that such an alliance is a myth and that the Africans have let themselves be manipulated by the Arabs in return for oil subsidies, it is the common colonial past and the common problems of the nations of Africa and the Middle East which provide the bond between them. This alliance does not exist on all issues, but it can certainly be counted on to continue and be strengthened on the questions of Israel and Southern Africa, at least as far as political/diplomatic action at the United Nations is concerned. The same can be said concerning support by the other Third World—and Socialist—countries. The result has been a growing trend towards legitimization of, and support for, the liberation

movements. FRELIMO, PAIGC, MPLA and FNLA acquired observer status with the United Nations Committee of 24 and with the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (on decolonization and trust territories) in 1973, followed by ZANU and ZAPU, SWAPO and, at the last session, the ANC and PAC. The P.L.O. was the first liberation movement ever to be admitted to the general debate in the General Assembly itself, and Arafat the first leader of a liberation movement to be granted honors similar to those accorded to a head of state. In a resolution passed at the end of the last session, the General Assembly decided to grant observer status to the liberation movements for all United Nations activities concerned with their countries, thus assimilating them in practice to the P.L.O. And, if this were not enough to chagrin the Western powers, primarily the United States, it was announced recently that the Secretary-General has granted permission to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam to open an office in Geneva—a move strenuously opposed by the United States.

The growing legitimacy of the liberation movements on the international scene has been accompanied by action aimed at undermining the colonial regimes, and at discouraging Western countries from supporting them. In this respect, Southern Africa has occupied, and continues to occupy, a unique position within the United Nations context. The campaign launched by the United Nations for the total isolation of the white minority regimes of Southern Africa has no parallel in United Nations history—although the results have not always been as satisfactory as the effort involved might have warranted. The attack against South Africa reached an unprecedented level at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, with the Credentials Committee (a small body so far under the influence of the United States) voting for the first time to reject South Africa's credentials. The decisive vote was cast by the Philippines delegation, an ally firmly within the United States camp and who had until this year voted in favor of the South African delegation. The question of South Africa's membership in the United Nations was then brought before the Security Council, where the Western powers were clearly isolated in their effort to keep South Africa in the United Nations. Australia, another ally of the West, voted with the Third World countries for the expulsion of South Africa, and the resolution was quashed only because of the triple veto of the Western powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France. When the General Assembly began a special debate on the question of Palestine, the South African delegation was barred from participating in the debate on the basis of the earlier decision against recognition of its credentials. The Security Council is to meet again in the spring to consider establishing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. South Africa also has the threat of sanctions hanging over its head on the question of Namibia, after the Security Council adopted a resolution granting South Africa time until May 31 to come up with acceptable proposals for the territory's independence. On Namibia, the Assembly also approved wide-ranging decisions concerning the protection of the natural resources of the territory against foreign exploitation, the financing of a SWAPO office in New York, and the establishment of a training center for Namibians in Lusaka. The recent decision by four major American oil companies to pull out of Namibia was at least partly due to United Nations action against South Africa on the issue. Similarly, United Nations sanctions



Members of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau delegation. Left, Victor Saude Maria, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and Gil Fernandes.

(and the threat of their enforcement by an independent Frelimo government in Mozambique) have played a role in Ian Smith's recent decision to begin negotiations with the Zimbabwe liberation movements. Portugal, which for years had been subjected to an effective boycott by the African and Arab states, and to a lesser extent by the United Nations as a whole, sent three high-ranking members of the new military government, including its President, to report to the General Assembly on the process of decolonization and to ask that sanctions be terminated.

These developments in the General Assembly and the Security Council have been paralleled by action in the specialized agencies and other bodies in the United Nations system. The furor over UNESCO's decision to exclude Israel from some of its activities has obscured the fact that the specialized agencies have long been involved in the campaign in support of the liberation movements and against the white minority regimes of Southern Africa. The arguments over the "non-political" role of the specialized agencies resemble those over "academic freedom" in the universities in the years of the anti-war movement, and refuse to recognize that economic, social and cultural institutions are not neutral areas outside of existing power relationships. The Western allies of the white regimes of Southern Africa have argued time and again in the United Nations against enlisting the help of the specialized agencies in support of the liberation struggle, saying that this would be contrary to their charter and would mean "politicizing" them. Obviously, they regard assistance given to the white governments as being somehow "non-political". More than concern for the purity of the specialized agencies, the recent controversy over UNESCO reflects the Western powers' fear that Israel might be made the object of the same kind of United Nations action as that against the white minority regimes of Southern Africa.

The developments at the last session of the General Assembly brought a strong reaction on the part of the Western powers. In what was obviously a concerted move, the United States and the other Western countries seized the opportunity of a debate on an obscure agenda item on strengthening the role of the United Nations to launch into a diatribe against recent political trends in the world body. They accused the Third World countries of taking advantage of an "automatic majority" to push through political decisions which are unimplementable without the support of the West. This was accompanied by not-so-veiled threats to cut off financial support for United Nations activities, and in January, in fact, the United States again took the lead in announcing that it was going to review the various aspects of its relationship with the United Nations. To argue that the Western powers should respect their own democratic beliefs when it comes to the will of the international majority is idealistic and even beside the point. In spite of all the high declarations of intent, the United Nations was clearly conceived and brought into being to maintain the political and economic realities of the post-war world, which was essentially a bi-polar world hegemonized by the United States and its satellites and their colonies. So long as the world remained small and manageable and the United States and its allies were in control of United Nations activities, especially those in disputed areas of the Third World (one need only recall Korea, the Congo, the Middle East), Western support for the United Nations remained high. The situation, however, was drastically reversed with the accession to independence of the former colonies in the 1950's and 1960's. While United Nations membership was about 50 in 1945, there are some 140 members today, most of them non-aligned. The admission of China to the United Nations and the consequent withdrawal of the Taiwan regime—the first major United Nations action in opposition to United States will—marked a watershed in

United Nations history and symbolized the shift in the relations of forces which had taken place. The United States and its allies have not only lost control over such important political developments as the growing support for the liberation movements and the campaign against the white regimes of Southern Africa and against Israel; they are also faced with increasing opposition on a number of vital economic issues, ranging from control over natural resources by the producers to the "recycling" of oil money, from the establishment of a law of the sea to population policies.

Complaints by the United States and its allies over an emerging "tyranny of the majority" in the United Nations and threats of curtailing their financial contribution are as much an expression of unhappiness over these developments as a manipulative tactic. The United States and the other Western powers are determined to make full use of their economic and political power to reach the desired results within the United Nations framework, rather than doing away with the framework itself. The speeches

condemning recent political trends were shrewdly timed to precede the vote on the question of Cambodia, which was very important to the United States and was resolved in favour of the Lon Nol regime. The United States also succeeded in obtaining a majority on the issue of South Korea, including several votes from African and Arab countries which had consistently opposed the United States on other issues which they considered vital for themselves. Since the so-called non-aligned group includes countries with many different forms of government, ideological perspectives and economic and political links, the Western powers still have much room for maneuvering. The Kissinger strategy of direct bilateral diplomacy can very well live with a United Nations, but only with a weakened and divided one. The aim of the United States, and its friends, must therefore be to break up and disorient the power blocs which might confront them with inconvenient political decisions. "Divide and rule" obviously did not die with the demise of colonialism. ■

action news and notes



ECONOMIC ACTION

US CHURCHES LAUNCH 1975 STOCKHOLDER CAMPAIGN

Members of a sixteen group coalition, the Church Project on US Investment in Southern Africa, plan to file resolutions this spring on Southern Africa with seven different corporations. The following Protestant and Catholic church agencies are involved in the effort—American Baptist Home Mission Society, Atonement Friars, Christian Church, (Disciples), Home Mission Sisters of America (Cincinnati), Mt. St. Joseph Female Ursuline Academy, Inc. (Kentucky), National Council of Churches, Protestant Episcopal Church, the Province of St. Joseph of the Capuchin Order, Reformed Church in America, Sisters of Charity (Cincinnati), Unitarian Universalist Association, United Church of Christ, Board for World Ministries, National, World and Women's Division of the Board of Global Ministries, United Methodist Church, United Presbyterian Church, USA, Tressler Lutheran Service Associates, and Glenmary Home Missioner (Cincinnati). The number of involved groups has tripled since five agencies started the project in 1971.

Fourteen churches and orders are co-filing a resolution with IBM Corporation, following up the two days of hearings held on the company's operations in South Africa. They are seeking to prevent the sale, leasing or service of IBM computers to South Africa. (see January,

1975, *Southern Africa*) The groups hold almost \$9 million worth of stock. The resolution states that while computers are not military arms per se, "we believe that computers sold to the South African government ostensibly for peaceful purposes are of real assistance militarily and strategically." Thus the spirit of the US arms embargo against South Africa is broken by IBM's computer sales. The computers also increase the ability of the government to control its citizens.

There are also resolutions filed with ITT and Union Carbide which call for the companies to establish review committees on their South African involvement. ITT conducts 50 per cent of its business with the South African government, including connections with the South African Navy and the Simonstown base, while Carbide is involved in a \$38 million construction of a ferrochrome plant. A newcomer to the list of target corporations this year is Southern Company which is being called upon to stop the import of coal from South Africa, a response to the mineworkers and others who have continually protested the imports. Finally, the coalition had planned to file three resolutions vis-a-vis Namibia, but only one calling for the withdrawal of Standard Oil of California still stands as Phillips Oil and Getty have both recently announced their exodus from the territory. Continental Oil withdrew earlier in 1974.

(See *Southern Africa*, December, 1974).

A press conference was held by the church coalition at which Canon Burgess Carr, General Secretary of the All Africa Conference of Churches, spoke. The AACCC passed a resolution in May, 1974 calling upon companies to get out of Southern Africa. Canon Carr expressed support for the US church action pointing to the progress of liberation in Southern Africa and the US government policy of hypocrisy. He called the IBM resolution "minimum" saying that South Africa uses computers "to implement its notorious pass laws" and condemning "the use of technology to foster alienation of families." Other speakers at the conference were Brother Robert Taylor, SA of the Atonement Friars and Dr. Donald Wilson, chairperson of the Church Project. Dr. Taylor cited the growing involvement of the Roman Catholic community in corporate actions saying that "Denominations, which are multimillion dollar shareholders, are looking beyond dollar returns on investments and exercising responsibilities to make corporations more responsive..." (Press Release, National Council of Churches, Jan. 14, 1975). For more information on the companies and the resolutions contact the Church Project Room 556, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027.

CHURCH GROUP INITIATES BOYCOTT IN WASHINGTON, DC

The Board of Directors of the Council of Churches of Greater Washington (D.C.), which involves 500 area churches, voted to start a boycott of four corporations on January 1. The companies to be boycotted are IBM, ITT, Control Data and Motorola, as a response to the call of the South African Boycott Project of the Action for World Community Group. (see *Southern Africa*, November, 1974) In presenting the resolution, the Social Justice Task Force of the Council states:

"The reason for such a position is simple. The South African government rules by a system of apartheid where 80 per cent of the population—all black Africans and other 'non-whites'—are subjugated and oppressed. Such blatant racism has been almost universally condemned by the world community and is in continuing violation of the principles of the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Apartheid Convention.

A major reason for the continuing strength of this apartheid regime has been the diffusion of outside capital into the system. These investments provide great economic benefit for the minority elite, an important revenue base through taxation, very significant psychological support, and an internal source of products which reduces international dependency (and answerability to international social and legal standards).

The Council hopes that the Protestant decision will evoke a response from the Washington Jewish and Catholic groups. It may also sponsor a hearing on the companies for more public involvement. The SABP had called for a Washington School Board boycott, but internal board disputes have delayed action. For more information contact the SABP, 1424 16th St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036. (SABP, *Progress Report* # 5, Jan. 2, 1975)

AFRICAN LITERATURE STRESSED

At the 17th annual meeting of the African Studies

Association in Chicago in late October, 1974, a number of African literature specialists gathered to create an independent African Literature Association (ALA). A steering committee was selected, and the inaugural meeting of the ALA will take place at the University of Texas in Austin on March 20-22, 1975. Coinciding with this meeting will be a Symposium on Contemporary Southern African Literature at the African and Afro-American Research Institute of the University of Texas in Austin. A number of leading South African literary figures will be present. Dennis Brutus, South African poet who is currently Visiting Professor in Austin, is chairperson of the ALA. Individual memberships cost \$2.00 (institutional: \$5.00; patrons: \$10 or more) and can be secured by writing Thomas Hale, Secretary for ALA, French Dept., Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Penna. 16802. The ALA also publishes a regular newsletter with news of jobs, fellowships, scholarships, grants, conferences, theses, textbooks, and other items related to African literature.

LIBERATION SUPPORT ACTION

GROUP SUPPORTS ANGOLAN UNITA MOVEMENT

The Friends of Angola was formed by some 50 persons in Washington, D.C. in September, 1974 as a group supporting liberation in Angola through aiding one of the liberation movements, the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). Since then it has helped purchase office equipment for UNITA's Lusaka (Zambia) information office and collected 12 cartons of educational materials with the aid of the Washington Chapter of the Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority. The group is divided into five sub-committees including health and medical, education, information and publicity, fund-raising and special projects. The press release states that the Friends Committee aims to be broadly based, contains people of divergent political views and is open to "any person of African descent." It will work closely with UNITA's representatives in the US. For more information contact Friends of Angola, 1648 Roxanna Rd., NW, Washington, D.C. 20012 ■





After the Sharpeville Massacre.

On March 21, 1960, South African police fired on a peaceful demonstration gathered to protest apartheid and the Pass laws. Sixty-nine people were killed and hundreds injured by police bullets.

reviews

"SIZWE BANZI IS DEAD" and "THE ISLAND"

by Athol Fugard,
John Kani and
Winston Ntshona

"Sizwe Banzi is Dead" and "The Island", provide two deeply moving evenings of theatre in their own right, but with a special meaning for those who are involved in southern Africa affairs. The setting is South Africa and the actors are black South African, John Kani and Winston Ntshona. The playwright, Athol Fugard, is a white South African whose works have been performed in the US in recent years, most notably "The Blood Knot" and "Bosman and Lena."

Though the plays share a common setting, and themes are directed against the oppressive system of apartheid, each is different in approach and mood. "Sizwe Banzi" offers much sardonic humor through its sharp barbs at the relations of black and white workers. For the first 40 minutes John Kani is the sole figure on stage. He gives voice to his private thoughts with wry humor as he assumes the roles of himself as worker, his white "baas" foreman, and Henry Ford "number two" during the latter's visit to the Ford factory at Port Elizabeth. Singlehandedly, he acts out the elaborate preparations that have to be made so that Blacks and their work conditions will appear in the best light for the Ford visit. Then he turns ruefully to the many bureaucratic obstacles which have delayed him from securing a license to open a

photographer's shop in the black township. It is truly a masterful performance. Sizwe Banzi, beautifully played by Winston Ntshona, finds himself in pass-book trouble and must return home or risk arrest should the police discover his illegal presence at the home of his friend, Buntu, also played by John Kani. By accident they stumble upon the body of a dead man in the street. This offers the possibility of exchanging pass-books with the dead man and assuming a completely new identity. The intense conflict of having to face the implications of that choice gives the drama its unique impact.

"The Island" (performed only on Wednesdays—matinee and evening) is Robben Island, off the southernmost coast of South Africa where persons who have committed "serious" political offences are confined. The play opens on two prisoners, bathed in sweat, slaving in the stone quarry and is a masterpiece of pantomime by Ntshona and Kani. They return to their cell utterly exhausted, yet not too tired to tend to each other's hurts and to try to raise their spirits as they prepare for the prison entertainment in which they are planning to do a scene from *Antigone*, a thinly veiled attack upon the prison system and the government of South Africa. There is joy and sadness when Kani learns suddenly that he will be a "free" man in 90 days and then considers what that means to the relationship he has shared with Ntshona, who will remain in prison.

John Kani and Winston Ntshona complement each other magnificently, not the least because their performances cannot be separated from their lives in

South Africa. The plays "devised" by Fugard, Kani and Ntshona are a rare fusing of art and life in a society where blacks cannot claim acting as their employment, but must travel in a master-servant, pass-book context.

If one were to ask, "What is the most moving and

eloquent way to communicate to Americans the human tragedy of apartheid in South Africa?", the answer would have to be "Sizwe Banzi is Dead" and "The Island," now playing at the Edison Theatre at West 47 Street in New York City.

Raphael Gould

update

VORSTER MAKES PROGRESS ON WEST AFRICAN DETENTE

South Africa scored a major diplomatic coup in February, when Prime Minister Vorster met with Liberian President Tolbert in Monrovia. Possible South African trade links with Africa were discussed by the two leaders, along with the Rhodesian and Namibian situations.

The Monrovia summit immediately gave rise to speculation that a number of moderate African states were pushing for South Africa's admission to the Organization of African Unity—a rumor quickly denied by the O.A.U. Ministerial Council.

Pretoria's breakthrough in Liberia was underscored by the February visit to South Africa of a "good will delegation" from the Central African Republic. In addition, reliable London sources say that a Nigerian delegation also toured South Africa, and that several other such visits are in the offing.

MPLA DIVISIVENESS PLAGUES ANGOLA'S TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

The smoldering MPLA factional dispute erupted into violence in the Angolan capital last month, as loyalist and Chipenda forces engaged in a gun fight near the Luanda offices of the Chipenda faction. 17 persons were killed in the shoot-out.

A transitional government police force comprised of Portuguese and MPLA soldiers later occupied the Chipenda office, and arrested some 30 supporters of "Eastern Rebellion" group. Chipenda himself was reported to be in Zaire.

FNLA leader Holden Roberto condemned the violent incident in a prepared statement issued in Abidjan, and proposed that Angola's transitional government intervene in the Chipenda dispute. Leaders of the other two movements, meanwhile, are suggesting that Chipenda's eastern Rebellion group join forces with one of the three movements, and work with the transitional administration.

PRETORIA BANS MILITANT STUDENT ORGANIZATION

South African authorities have banned SASO, the South African Student Organization, in order to create a campus climate in which "the university would be able to carry out its task." A number of SASO leaders had been arrested under the Terrorism Act last year for their involvement in pro-Frelimo rallies.

MACHEL VISITS PEKING

A FRELIMO delegation led by President Samora Machel has paid a historic visit to the People's Republic of China, and the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea. The delegation included Mozambique's Minister of Justice, as well as agricultural and health officials.

UNITED PARTY SPLIT FURTHER FRAGMENTS SOUTH AFRICAN WHITE OPPOSITION

Fifteen legislators have left South Africa's second largest white political party, the United Party, to form a new party. Ten members of the Transvaal Provincial Council announced their defection from the U.P. and their formation of the Reform Party. Five Members of Parliament, booted out by the U.P. for failing to support the party line, joined them within the week.

Press reports say the new party will be more liberal than the United Party, advocating an eventual sharing of power with the African population. But rampant speculation that a new liberal coalition to oppose the ruling Afrikaaner National Party will arise from the split, seems unfounded. The ranking M.P. of the Reform group said in a press conference that he could not join forces with the anti-apartheid Progressive Party because of "fundamental differences" with their policies.

SOUTH AFRICA ACCUSED OF COERCION IN NAMIBIAN ELECTIONS

South Africa's claim to triumph in the recent Ovamboland elections in Namibia has been dimmed by allegations from Namibian clergymen that Ovambos were coerced into voting. South Africa had cited the 55% voter turnout as a rejection by the Ovambo people of the independence demands of the SWAPO liberation movement, which had called for a boycott of the election.

But clergy in Ovamboland say that anti-government political gatherings were banned in the region, and that pre-election SWAPO meetings were violently disbanded by police. Many Ovambos, they say, were threatened with loss of their jobs or old-age pensions if they did not vote.

The churchmen also pointed out that the summary detention, beatings, and torture of many SWAPO members, following a successful boycott of a similar election attempt in 1973, have resulted in the flight of thousands of SWAPO members into neighboring Angola, leaving few organizers in Namibia to spread the boycott appeal.

FORMER AMBASSADOR TO CHILE APPROVED AS STATE'S AFRICA CHIEF

The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee is expected to approve the nomination of Nathaniel Davis as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, after hearing testimony that questioned the Davis nomination on grounds of his lack of African experience, and his probable role in carrying out the "destabilization" program against the Allende government in Chile, where he was Ambassador from 1971-73.



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