

southern africa



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OUR COLLECTIVE

SOUTHERN AFRICA is published monthly, except for a double issue July-August, by the Southern Africa Committee.

barbara barnes	bill minter
jennifer davis	ruth minter
michael davis	antonio naves
charlie abel	angela passaro
mariana edmunds	dipanker ray
carolyn flouvy-lobban	david robinson
lynn goodwin	susan rogers
peggy halsey	christine root
judith hanton	janet siskind
jonat hooper	malba smith
tami hultman	jinni stroman
paul irish	john stroman
bill johnston	stephanie urdang
richard knight	ken vickery
roed kramer	victor vockeraft
richard leonard	roberta washington
richard lobban	dee whitman
edgar lockwood	tony watsen
mary meanally-knight	jim wellart

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A NEW SOUTHERN AFRICA MAGAZINE

Starting in January 1977, the Southern Africa Committee will put out a new and different *Southern Africa* magazine. We are taking this step in view of recent changes in Southern Africa and the expanded US role in that part of the world. Our goal remains the same: to assist in building support for the continuing struggle for liberation in Southern Africa. However, the way in which we can most effectively work for that end has to also expand.

US news reports are focussing on Southern Africa in an unprecedented way as a result of US involvement in Angola and Kissinger's diplomatic efforts to influence the direction of change in Southern Africa to be compatible with US interests. The independence of Mozambique and, more importantly, Angola's victory over South African and US financed forces have led to a dramatic change in the balance of power in Southern Africa. The people of Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa itself are exerting increased pressures on their illegal and repressive minority rulers as they continue to struggle for self-determination.

Previously we at *Southern Africa* magazine have seen our role as making information and an analysis available to people interested in Southern Africa who otherwise had little access to news about that area of the world. Today there is much news on Southern Africa, but it is often presented in a distorted and incomplete form. As a result there is confusion about what is happening in Southern Africa and what are the central issues to the liberation struggles there.

Starting in January 1977, each monthly issue of *Southern Africa* will consist of several analytic articles written in a more popularized style directed toward a more generalized audience than is the case now. These features will seek to clarify distortions of the standard media as well as to provide background information and analysis. The magazine will also include selected news stories and news briefs on events and regions not sufficiently covered in the mass US media.

Given the increased awareness and interest in Southern Africa, we hope to be able to double the circulation of the magazine in the next year. A fund raising drive for promotion is one crucial step in this process. Creating a magazine of more appeal to a broader audience and improving the lay out will also contribute to expanding the circulation. Finally the magazine's production time will be cut by at least half, so that our news can be as up to date as possible.

To carry out these new plans, we must increase our budget by 50 per cent. The bulk of the increase will go toward paid staff and promotion. Until now *Southern Africa* magazine has been put out almost entirely by volunteers, the only exception being occasional part time office workers. We have decided to hire an editor, an office manager, and a promotion and fund raising worker. This will enable the magazine to be more current in its news coverage because of the shorter production time and to be more readable. However, volunteers will continue to relate to the magazine in writing and office tasks.

The *Southern Africa* magazine collective feels very excited and committed to this new direction. With the United States becoming increasingly involved directly in Southern Africa politics, we believe that it is extremely important to improve our ability to provide information, interpretation, and analysis concerning events in Southern Africa to people who are generally sympathetic to the cause of self-determination and justice. We realize that we are taking a financial risk, but we are confident that our readers and the many individuals and organizations committed to the liberation of all of Southern Africa will realize the value of this effort and support the new *Southern Africa* magazine.

feature

Four Months in Angola

by Mike Shuster



Celebrating May Day, 1976, in Luanda (Mike Shuster)

Day breaks grey and cool during Angola's dry "cacimbo" winter over Luanda airport. It's August 31st, and my four month long stay in Angola is ending.

Only a handful of people board the once-a-week Luanda-to-Paris flight, but it will only be empty until we reach Libreville, Gabon. The huge UTA jet sits, being serviced, far out on the runway as the airport bus that shuttles passengers to the waiting plane brings the French crew past the passenger terminal for a quick look at Angola.

A few FAPLA soldiers with AK-47 rifles guard the runway side of the terminal, and MPLA posters—some exclaiming, "There is no political independence without economic independence," others commemorating the heroes of the 4th of February, 1961, when MPLA began its armed combat against Portuguese colonialism—cover the walls.

That will be all that the French flight crew will see of revolutionary Angola. Although Luanda is the end point of this long, almost 12-hour flight with stops at Nice, Lagos, and Libreville, the flight crews have elected to spend their overnight time in Libreville. Angola for them is an unknown, no longer part of their "Western world."

"They look worried, don't they?" my Brazilian friend asks me. He is also on his way to Paris, for a holiday, after a year's work as an agricultural cooperative organizer in Malange, central Angola. After six years of exile from Brazil, in Chile, and then France, he came to Luanda almost a year ago, a Brazilian revolutionary looking for work in a newly independent and revolutionary country.

He found his work, and has done it effectively in Malange, the center of Angola's agricultural revolution.

When he returns from Europe, he will be organizing a new national task force for the training of cooperative activists to bring the cooperative movement that started among the peasant farmers of Malange to all the provinces of Angola.

He and I chuckle at the anxiety on the faces of the French crew, an anxiety conditioned solely by what they have read or heard of Angola in the west. We chuckle only because we have come to know another Angola, so different from what even I myself had imagined of Angola before I arrived.

Of all those I've had a chance to meet in the past four months, I think now of people like Kafuxi and Ramos through whose lives I have learned of the recent history of Angola, its agony and its hope. Kafuxi had been a militant in MPLA since the early sixties. For many years people in all of Angola's sixteen provinces had heard him urge the fight against the Portuguese on MPLA's radio program, "Angola Combatente," from Brazzaville. The Portuguese had made it a crime to listen to MPLA broadcasts, yet in cities, towns, and villages, wherever there were radios, thousands heard Kafuxi, and decided to find out "exactly what this MPLA was all about," as one soldier in eastern Angola expressed himself.

Almost killed in hand-to-hand combat with FNLA soldiers in Luso in 1975, from which he only narrowly escaped after having killed his two attackers, Kafuxi at 36 is now President Agostinho Neto's Secretary for Military

Affairs.

Ramos, on the other hand, is one of the small but significant number of whites who resisted the hysterical flight to Portugal last year. He joined MPLA soon after April, 1974, and fought against the combined forces of FNLA, UNITA, the Zairean and South African armies with their Portuguese, British and American mercenary contingents. Born in Angola the son of a Portuguese colonialist who has now fled, Ramos had served time in the Portuguese army in Angola in the early 70s. Fortunately, he says, he didn't see combat.

Ramos admits honestly that he knew nothing of politics or of the MPLA at that time. But in 1973 or thereabouts he married Maria Ester, who had studied in Portugal, and had brought back to Angola a consciousness of the clandestine but powerful anti-war student movement in Lisbon's universities. Less than two years later, after the April 25th coup, Ramos says he had no difficulty choosing MPLA. Now at 27, he is working in the Ministry of Defense, head of a task force that must clothe and feed Angola's Armed Forces. He is in many ways a new human being who says that the revolution in Angola has opened up to him all of life's possibilities.

* * *

Independent since November 11, 1975, Angola had been free of the troops of an invading army only a month when I arrived in Angola. (The last of the South African soldiers had retreated across the Namibian border in late March.) Emerging from the war with profound wounds, the new nation was facing severe problems—political, economic and military.

The Angolan people had been badly divided, especially by the activities of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. The fighting had been vicious, and no one is yet sure how many thousands of people may have died. Cities had been depopulated, factories badly damaged, and over 150 bridges destroyed. The economy was in a state of virtual paralysis, demanding the creation of a totally new state apparatus.

In addition there were, and still are, refugees. Recent estimates place the number of Angolans who fled the country, throughout the years of fighting, and now want to return, at one million. Although Angola is a vast country its current population barely exceeds six million. Absorbing so many people coming back creates tremendous short run problems.

Still immersed in its steamy tropical summer months when I arrived in April, Luanda was at a standstill. All shops were closed. Hardly a car moved in the streets. Occasionally a military truck might pass by the once busy Avenida de Luis de Camoes that connects the central Largo das Lusíadas to downtown Luanda. Not a single restaurant remained open. Although there was no starvation in Luanda, food was scarce, and as I learned later, even scarcer in other parts of the country.

But the situation began to change immediately. Week by week, one could see the city regain its normal activities. Many cars had been taken out of the country during the war; but those left began to re-appear, and by late summer the traffic jam and the automobile accident were again significant factors in Angolan life.

A state agency for the normalization and control of food distribution nationally began to function. Now restaurants have reopened, and despite long lines at all food stores for major staples such as sugar, meat, fish, and oil, the stocks are increasing, as is the people's confidence

that food will continue to be available, not just today, but tomorrow and on the following days.

The problem of food distribution is of course closely linked to that of the transportation of goods in general: the destruction of Angola's transport system—both by willful sabotage and as the result of war damage—was very severe.

Thousands of the country's trucks were either taken from the country in the flight of the Portuguese, or destroyed. The movement of goods, particularly food, in April from one province to another had ground to a halt. Great stores of rice, for example, on farms outside of Malange could hardly be moved to the town itself to alleviate food shortages there, let alone meet the more serious shortages in the south, hundreds of miles away.

Luanda was a city of well over 600,000 before the war: approximately 400,000 now. But only eighteen buses remained in a city transit network that had counted on a bus fleet of over 200 to move the working population of the most important industrial city in Angola, to and from its factories.

Transport is only one of the tremendous problems that Angola was facing, but it affected all of the other areas of national reconstruction—in agriculture and industry. By the end of July and early August, new trucks and buses were beginning to appear on Luanda's and Angola's roads. Received as aid from countries like Yugoslavia, or purchased on good credit terms from Sweden, they represent only one facet of the beginning of MPLA's plans to reconstruct the country.

In April, though, it was clear that the MPLA was under intense pressure to solve, or begin to solve these problems, for what hung in the balance was the power of the government itself. It needed to act swiftly to reduce the hostility that it faced from some sections of the population; an attitude particularly strong among the people who had been under UNITA influence in the south and were ignorant of the MPLA programs. It also needed to respond to the growing expectations of most of Angola's people that the end of the war and the coming of political independence would bring an end to the crushing poverty of the colonial period. It had to show the people of the south that it would not persecute them for having supported Savimbi's movement. It had to satisfy all the people's immediate needs for food. It had to bring schools, hospitals, and basic commodities to even the most remote villages. And it had to convince Angolans that they needed to continue to work hard, perhaps even harder than before, if MPLA's political and economic programs were to succeed. MPLA needed time to consolidate its power, time it just didn't have.

No sooner had the war ended than MPLA's enemies, sensing its weaknesses, began military activities along the borders. President Neto, the Minister of Defence, and other top MPLA leaders were already speaking of attacks, "from the north and from the south," when I arrived. Now, contrary to reports in the Western press, Angola faces a more serious threat from continued external attacks than it does from continued sporadic anti-MPLA guerrilla activity in the interior of the country.

In a speech in early August made from the coastal city of Benguela, President Neto mentioned Zaire by name for the first time in connection with bombardments that had taken place in Cabinda province, specifically an attack on the village of Saba Massala. In addition, he told the workers at a local sugar plantation that "a short while ago, along the northern frontier in the Angolan province of Zaire, individuals who came from the Republic of Zaire,

armed and equipped to attack our territory, were taken prisoner."

The South African army has also struck against Angola across the 850 mile long southern border with Namibia. Neto referred several times in August to mortar and air attacks on the population living principally in the southernmost province of Cunene. Sources in Angola report that these attacks have continued through September.

In early September also, Defence Minister Iko Carreira announced that during a military operation in the southern border province of Cuando Cubango, "FAPLA forces had obtained irrefutable proof of the continued aggression of the racist South Africans in our country." Carreira said that a soldier of the regular South African army had been captured.

* * *

once commented to an MPLA militant in the eastern province of Moxico that MPLA faced endless work, without rest, under intense pressure. "How can you do it?" I asked:

"You see," he said, "we can do it because we've taken back our own country. Angola can now be governed and developed for all Angolans. We don't need anything more than that. That's where our energy comes from."

The MPLA and government leaders in Moxico indeed seem to have boundless energy. Perhaps more than in any other region I visited, the leaders of MPLA in Moxico have spent their time travelling throughout the province, visiting even the remotest villages to talk to the people, find out about their problems and their needs.

I had only returned to Luanda a week before I was to leave Angola. The village meetings, the dancing and singing, the stories of the first war against the Portuguese and of life in the liberated zones of Moxico were still vivid in my memory.

I traveled with the Provincial Commissioner for two weeks, throughout the Upper Zambezi region of Moxico province, not far from the Zambian border. Among the villages we had visited was a small isolated settlement called Caripande, right on the border where the Zambezi river flows south from Angola to Zambia, then continuing its long journey to the Indian Ocean.

We traveled by land rover to Caripande. The last 40 miles took three hours for there was no road through the forest.

Caripande had been the scene of intense fighting between MPLA and the Portuguese army since 1966 when MPLA first opened its Eastern Front, and it was here that one of MPLA's legendary heroes, Commander Hoji ia Henda died in 1968.

This was the first time that an MPLA delegation had reached Caripande in over a year. The people of Caripande had not known that Angola had become independent last November. They did not know that MPLA had won the war. Hundreds of people poured out of the forest village to greet the MPLA militants, some of whom had slept in this village in years past, the same guerillas who had fought the Portuguese here.

The villagers brought fruit and vegetables, goats and chickens, manioc flour and rice to feed us all.

The Provincial Commissioner had brought representatives of MPLA's women's and youth organizations from the provincial capital, Luso, as well as other villages in the Upper Zambezi region. He had also brought the people in the provincial government responsible for health, road construction, radio communication, education, informa-

tion, military affairs, agriculture. We were more than a hundred.

That night we slept on the ground in front of blazing fires. It was cold, as cold as it gets in Angola anywhere. My companions told stories of the guerrilla struggle here.

"It's from villages like Caripande all over Angola, that we will find the energy to solve our problems," the head of MPLA's information department in the province, Messonge, said. Messonge had been a clandestine member of MPLA while he worked for the Banco de Angola in Luso during the fight against the Portuguese. After April 25th, 1974 he joined FAPLA immediately, with little military training, because, he said, MPLA needed everyone available. "The energy too, to create our own future. The Portuguese used to say that the languages we spoke were dogs' languages. Now we have defeated them. No one will ever rule us like that again."

As we talked the people of Caripande sang on into the crisp night air the songs that I had heard all over this region of Angola, songs of the guerrilla war.

"Let them beat us, kick us, tie us up" the Luvaie words say, "but we will never leave Neto's side. We will always stay with the MPLA."

Mike Shuster

Mike Shuster, long time supporter of the Southern African liberation struggle has written widely for both Liberation News Service and elsewhere, both about these struggles and the lies told about them in the United States press. During the war against the Portuguese he spent time with the PAIGC in liberated territory in Guinea Bissau. He spent the spring and summer of this year in Angola, where he traveled extensively, and had the opportunity to see both the problems and the continuing struggle of the Angolan people to overcome those problems and build a new society.



(Mike Shuster)

At Caripande, in Moxico, a political meeting

Special

The Hidden War in Namibia

FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIER BILL ANDERSON TALKS TO *SOUTHERN AFRICA*

Pretoria has a combined force of up to 50,000 soldiers and airmen in the thousand-mile border region adjoining Angola and Zambia. This army is supported by special units, paramilitary police, intelligence officers and local Namibians who have been recruited into a fledgling bantustan military force. This assemblage faces the increasingly active and successful guerrillas of the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia, the military wing of the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia.

Now a South African soldier who served in that area has revealed how Pretoria's army of occupation operates in Namibia and how Pretoria's legions use that International Territory as a base for incursions into neighboring states.

Bill Anderson, a 21-year-old conscript from Cape Town, first told his story to the *Manchester Guardian* after having left South Africa last July. *Southern Africa* talked to Bill in New York in October. His eye-witness revelations give exact and grisly details from inside the South African military which complements information provided by Namibians.


Anderson was sent from Namibia into Angola on November 22, 1975. The Angolan civil war was raging, South African equipped and manned columns were penetrating far north into the newly independent state. Anderson's unit, the 6th battalion, South African infantry, was assigned to guard the multi-million dollar South African financed Ruacana power and irrigation complex which taps the waters of the Cunene River and which by 1977 is expected to water large areas of northern Namibia and send cheap electric current southward for the general economic growth of the country.

Bill Anderson was a member of a unit guarding the Calueque dam and pumping station 20 kilometres into Angola. There he witnessed the first instances of what became months of seeing a widespread pattern of brutal treatment of Africans by white South Africans. "I saw three of them beaten by my battalion commander with his stick and I saw one of them subjected to water torture. A rag was placed on his face and water poured on continuously until he suffocated. My battalion commander was there and ordered this to be done."

He reports a fellow soldier cutting off the ear of a dead prisoner whom he had shot and sending it home in a medicine bottle. "He cut off the scrotum and tried to cure it, for his gear lever, but it rotted. He had been ordered to take the three suspects down to the river by the battalion commander and shoot them."

In mid-February, 1976, Anderson's unit moved back into Namibia and spent two months patrolling downriver from Ruacana. After a short leave home, his battalion returned to northern Namibia late in April of this year—to the huge South African army and air force base at Grootfontein.

A year ago, the West German magazine *Der Spiegel*,



Bill Johnson


Bill Anderson—witness to South African atrocities

disclosed that South Africa was speedily constructing a major military installation—with topmost secrecy—at Grootfontein. Bill Anderson, reading this story of Project "Threshold" for the first time, thinks it underestimates the vastness of this base in the International Territory. "The transit camp," he says, "can accommodate 16 battalions at a time." That would be about 12,000 men, putting Grootfontein in a comparable category with one of the US army bases when all the supply, command and support units are considered. Anderson recounts also that troops were flown from South Africa to Windhoek in 707s and from the Namibian capital to Grootfontein in C-130s. Bill says that he did not encounter any Americans while on duty in Namibia.

His outfit was sent on to Ondongwa, the center of military operations for the Ovamboland region of northern Namibia. His battalion was then headquartered at the village of Inahna, 12 kilometres below the Angolan border, and with four other battalions—a total of some 4,000 men, joined in "Operation Cobra". This was a massive sweep of Ovamboland, covering not only the one kilometre no-man's-land strip the full length of the Angolan border but well below it.

Bill Anderson's first account, in the *Manchester Guardian* is very specific. "Torture began almost at once when the suspects were brought back. The first few were interrogated by a section of 10 South African police inside the tent of battalion HQ. I saw the troops beating the suspects with rifles and fists and kicks for two hours before they were taken into the tent. All the troops were welcome to join in the beating." Whenever torture was going on, either in battalion HQ or in the open space behind, a crowd would gather to watch."

Anderson explains that there was a tent set aside to serve drinks principally to officers and non-coms. "Torture would begin when the club closed. The screen



Along Namibian border with Angola—SA army patrols with Super Frelon helicopters, "hippo" trucks, landrovers and heavily armed soldiers

would go on until well after midnight. Officers boasted in front of me of using field telephones, for electric shock torture to the genitals, nipples, and ears. . . .

"I often saw young boys being roughly manhandled and kicked. They were blindfolded. Some were about 13 and some a little older. All suspects were blindfolded and beaten when brought in. . . . They were handcuffed to trees at night. Some were kept in pits. It was winter and very cold, approaching freezing point at night. Suspects were handcuffed to trees, dressed only in loincloths and drenched in cold water."

He tells of a joint five battalion operation early in June, 1976, his battalion sweeping 100 square kilometres. "Every male over the age of puberty was brought in. The orders were to kill those who ran and arrest those who did not run. All the arrested men were beaten, tortured, and interrogated without exception. . . .

"Our battalion captured between 200 and 300 men, and the other battalions captured a similar number, I believe. Of the 1,000 or so detained men, we were later told that 40 were to be charged with terrorism offences."

Torture was not a selective, intelligence-seeking effort: it was sport. "A good 90 per cent of the troops in my battalion cooperated. The bulk of my company took part in the beatings—it was spoken of as a pleasure."

Bill Anderson's testimony brought instant corroboration. A priest in Namibia told a Manchester Guardian correspondent of witnessing detention camps in the northern region of the Territory, "had spoken to victims of torture and seen maimed limbs and other similar injuries."

The British newspaper reporter writes: "He also told me of three young boys who were cycling from Angola to Namibia who were shot dead early in August for being in

the one-kilometre no-go zone along the border. The zone apparently has been cleared of all living creatures—people or cattle found there are shot on sight."

Another priest who had fled into Angola wrote of atrocities in the northern regions, with men and women being stripped and flogged by South African troops, some of whom took photographs of the naked women.

Another South African soldier related that he knew of "Operation Cobra" and that he had been a member of another South African force engaged in "Operation Eagle-Ops". This consisted of sudden helicopter swoops on communities in Ovamboland to check for identity cards. Local residents without these documents were sent to the military camp at Oshakati for detention and interrogation. This same serviceman also told of elite units, known as "recce" troops, which had taken part in an attack on a SWAPO base at Sialola in Zambia on July 11. A UN Security Council meeting condemned that attack.

This soldier said South African whites disguised themselves with black greasepaint in raids into Angola, fighting with and advising elements of UNITA and FNLA, the two organizations which opposed the People's Republic of Angola.

Bill Anderson's action in revealing South African deprivations is a milestone in the age-old struggle of a people to be free of oppression. His coming forward is a valuable contribution to that struggle, and it is an act of personal courage. The tall bearded young man, has set in motion events that will lead others to lift themselves from the squalid horror of South African society and follow their conscience to freedom. ■

South Africa

POLITICS

RESISTANCE SPREADS

Resistance and protest have continued throughout South Africa. Following upon the three day strike in Johannesburg on August 23, 24 and 25, a further three day strike was called commencing on September 13. The *Washington Post* (September 14, 1976) described the strike as "60% effective" among commuters from Soweto, and commented that Blacks in Alexandra, another segregated township of Johannesburg, were joining the strike as were Coloreds. South African sources admitted that in the Johannesburg area the strike was at least 75% effective. This massive action followed protests in Capetown, where police attacked thousands of colored demonstrators in the central (white) shopping areas, as well as in many towns and villages in the Cape Peninsula and the Western Cape. The *Johannesburg Star* (September 11, 1976) reported 16 deaths had occurred in the peninsula area in the previous 24 hours. Unrest was reported in widespread areas of the Cape province including Parow, Paarl, Huguenot, Mossel Bay, Oudtshoorn, Wellington, Worcester, Knysna, Kimberley, the major diamond producing city, and Stellenbosch and Uitenhage. Previously resistance in Port Elizabeth had been met by widespread police killings, reported in the *Star* (Johannesburg) of August 21 as numbering 33. In East London resistance was reported in the Mdanstane township (*Guardian*, London, August 28, 1976)

The involvement of the colored population was extremely significant for it expressed the unity of the non-whites in South Africa, despite the divisions and animosities cultivated by all white governments.

In addition to this evidence of unified resistance there has also been significant opposition in the "Bantustans"

The black students have attacked both Chief Gatsha Buthelezi whose official stance is to criticize the régime while remaining as head of the Kwazulu Bantustan, and Kaiser Mantanzima, head of the Transkei Bantustan and a long time spokesman for the Vorster regime policies. In Lady Frere, where there has long been militant opposition to Mantanzima and resistance to government imposed "chiefs," inferior Bantu Education, stock limitation schemes designed to speed the flow of migratory labor to white farms and industries, and general collaboration with government policies, a demonstration of five hundred students led to their being arrested and 265 sentenced to receive prison terms and whippings.

Police-inflicted corporal punishment is still a powerful weapon in the régime's armory of repressive weapons. The students condemned Mantanzima and his Bantustan state, which brought an "angry reaction" from Mantanzima, who was reported as saying that he would use "all means at my disposal to stamp out hooliganism and vandalism."

(*Star*, Johannesburg, August 28, 1976)

Chief Buthelezi was reported as having "deplored the arrogance of young people who think they know what is best for the people," after he had been mocked by young Blacks as a "stooge" for "playing the system" in the Kwazulu Bantustan. (*Guardian*, London, August 16, 1976)

The Capetown student militants at the "colored" University of the Western Cape have been strongly opposed to



R.E. van der Ross, the government appointed rector of the University. In one incident a student turned a fire hose on van der Ross, who had banned all meetings of students. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 4, 1976) Van der Ross has a long history of opposition to movements opposed to white rule in South Africa and of collaboration with various elements of the ruling white groups.

After wide-ranging protests at two black Universities, Fort Hare in the Transkei Bantustan and the University of Zululand at Ngoya in the Kwazulu Bantustan, both were closed for the rest of the academic year. At the University of Durban-Westville, a segregated institution for Indian students, lectures were boycotted as a protest against the detention of three fellow students by the security police. The students, are Lloyd Padayachi (whose mother is a political refugee in the United States), Rashid Meer, the son of sociologist Fatima Meer who is also in detention and Yanus Curram.

David Ottaway, writing in the *Washington Post* (Sept. 5, 1976) commented that "The student protest movement in South Africa appears to be moving toward a complete breakdown of the high school and university system for blacks and coloreds."

The government response to protest has been to continue arrest and detentions under various security laws including the latest law, the Internal Security Act passed earlier this year. The Johannesburg *Star* (Sept. 11, 1976) reported that the number of people detained in "the massive security police crackdown on the Black consciousness movement" was believed to be more than 260. In a single swoop during the three day September strike 800 people were reported as having been arrested in the black township of Alexandra in a systematic house-to-house search for "agitators and intimidators" (*Washington Post*, Sept. 15, 1976). Mass arrests had previously taken place as a reflex to the protests in Capetown.

One of the government's responses has been to make some minor concessions to colored and Indian businessmen extending their rights to trade in "white areas" easing the enforcement of laws on separate entrances, post office lines and waiting rooms (*Washington Post*, Sept. 11, 1976). No fundamental change has been even suggested in relation to the basic laws regimenting and controlling the Blacks as a cheap labor force. In fact, the pass laws have been used by police to round up Blacks in areas where protests have occurred.

Repression is again intensifying and political refugees who have recently escaped from South Africa say that the figures quoted in the press of the numbers killed or detained are no reflection of the real numbers involved. Jails and morgues have been filled to overflowing, but the mood of the people, their determination to resist, to begin the long fight for freedom, has not been shaken by government actions.

WHITE REACTIONS

The more sophisticated elements in the white business world have been shocked by the recent events, and many more business people are stressing the "desirability of increasing the stake of all races in the performance of the economy." The President of the Durban Chamber of Commerce elaborated, "What is at stake is the survival of the Western way of life, to which we are all committed and which, despite some bleak chapters in its evolution, has achieved most for the people sharing that commitment. Among its finest expression has been the private enterprise system. . . ." (*Star* Johannesburg, August 28,

Sept. 4, 1976) (*New York Times*, Sept. 14, 15, 16, 1976; *Star* Johannesburg, August 28, 29, Sept. 4, 11, 1976)

Other, less far-sighted employers announced that they would give empty pay packets to workers returning after the strike. The white controlled, liberal trade union confederation, TUCSA, warned companies that salary denial would create more "unrest" and appealed for deductions to be staggered. The head of the Garment Workers Union said members were willing to work on weekends to make up for lost time and production caused by the strikes. It is clear that many of the unions that relate to Blacks, but owe their origins to white initiative, have not as yet taken a strong stand in support of the strike actions.

ECONOMICS

HOME LEASING SCHEME BENEFITS THE FEW

It has been calculated that new plans to allow Blacks more permanent means to lease their homes will be so expensive for individuals, that only the few who work for affluent employers willing to aid them will in fact be able to take advantage of the scheme. The proposal does not actually allow for home ownership, but for lifetime leasing. The purchase of such a lease will cost initially around R400 (\$460) and require a monthly payment of R24.75 (\$28.46). Anton Rupert, an industrial magnate, the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and the City Council were willing to finance the new leasing system, but many Blacks remain skeptical. "Until free hold [defined as permanent tenure of real property] is introduced, which would be a dramatic change in policy, the urban Blacks will not be satisfied." (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 21, 1976)


ILLICIT CAPITAL EXPORT

Some businessmen in South Africa are afraid—afraid enough to skirt legislation preventing the export of capital abroad. One trick involves companies being "overinvoiced" and then paying a firm outside for more than they actually import. This builds up credit in foreign quarters. Buying overpriced art treasures and putting money into stamps or diamonds are other means for finding a more secure home than South Africa for one's money. (*Wall Street Journal*, New York, Sept. 13, 1976)

Another system applicable to non-residents in South Africa is to buy shares in a foreign company, such as Otis Elevator, which is paying out large dividends. The dividends are legally transferrable out of South Africa in so-called "free rands" as opposed to the "blocked rands" which must remain in the country. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 11, 1976)

NO LET UP IN GOLD PROBLEMS

Despite special appeals by Italy and South Africa to delay the third sale of gold by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the auction went off as scheduled on September 15 in Washington. The average price per ounce was \$109.40 (several dollars less than the London closing price), and there were more than enough bids to assure the sale of the scheduled 780,000 ounces. The IMF is using the revenues to provide credit for less developed nations and plans to auction off 25 million ounces in all. Many critics of the lower gold price blame the IMF sales for flooding the market. An examination of the last three sales reveals that the price of gold bullion has steadily dropped from \$126/ounce at the June 15th sale, to \$122



at the July and then to \$109.40. Buyers at the September sale were made public, unlike at the other sales, and U.S. purchasers included: Dresdner Bank of New York, Exchange National Bank and Trust of Atchison, Kansas; T.J. Holt and Co., New York; Mocatta Metals Corp., New York; Republic National Bank, New York; and Sharps, Pixley of New York.

In a summary article about gold, the *New York Times* (Sept. 12) revealed that political uncertainty in South Africa had not only created gold bullion headaches but had caused shareholders to abandon gold shares so that share prices had fallen sharply. A Wall Street broker cynically commented in reference to the days when the price of gold soared to \$200/ounce, "What the gold market is telling me is that there are no Blacks in Africa." (*New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1976) The world knows differently now. (*New York Times*, Sept. 12, 14, 16, 17, 21, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, August 28, Sept. 4, 1976)

BRIEFS

The *United States* will export 1 million tons of coking coal over the next two years to the South African state steel corporation, ISCOR. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 4, 1976) The U.S. will import 10 tons of onion seed from South Africa. (*Sauto Exporter*, May, 1976)

Wimpy's a *British* fast food chain, has its second largest subsidiary in South Africa and plans to pump R800,000 (\$920,000) into the 340 outlets there. The company is also planning to move into the market for Africans. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 21, 1976)

Taiwan is South Africa's second largest Far Eastern trading partner after Japan, taking more than R50 million (\$57.5 million) in South African goods in 1975. Presently, major exports to Taiwan include corn, apples, wool, and iron, but South Africa hopes to provide heavy industrial goods to Taiwan's huge transportation and energy projects. (*Safto Exporter*, May, 1976) Japan is again receiving most of its chrome ore from South Africa after India temporarily replaced it during 1975. (*Star*, Johannesburg,

Sept. 4, 1976)

The expansion of goods flowing into South Africa's ports at Durban, Port Elizabeth, and East London from Rhodesia, Zaire, and Zambia has caused tremendous congestion along the railways and at the docks themselves. Business and government officials are urging South African exporters to utilize the Mozambican port of Maputo. Tonnage through Maputo has dropped from 25,000 to 18,000 tons a day, but will no doubt resume its former flow as pressure is placed on businesses who have held because they were fearful of Mozambique's politics. The interdependency of the Southern Africa transport system makes it sensitive to political actions. Thus Mozambique's closure of its border with Rhodesia, has had economic repercussions on South African rail and harbor structures. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 21, 1976)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

SOUTH AFRICA HAS A FRIEND IN HENRY KISSINGER

South Africa's objective in the Kissinger-Vorster talks, which took place in Zurich and Pretoria, was to preserve the general conditions necessary for the maintenance of the apartheid system and the continued political and economic exploitation of the black majority. Thus the immediate aim was to end the regime's international isolation and to secure its borders against militarily trained South African freedom fighters.

Until now official US criticism of apartheid has, at least, prevented any American Secretary of State from visiting South Africa. Kissinger's agreement to hold the second stage of the talks in Pretoria was thus a morale booster to the apartheid regime. Vorster explicitly stated that the talks signaled the end of South Africa's international isolation from the West. In return for agreeing to assist in changing the faces of those who are in the "Rhodesian" and Namibian governments (but not actually changing the power relationships), the apartheid regime expects formal international recognition by the West of the "right" of white South Africans to politically oppress and economically exploit its own black majority. The negotiations have made South Africa's rulers confident that "Dr. Kissinger recognized South Africa as a country without an illegal or colonial government" and that he would persuade the "West . . . to [openly] accept it as an ally." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 4, 1976; *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1976; *Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Sept. 10, 1976) The apartheid regime considers its own internal security dependent upon its ability to pressure Western governments into committing themselves openly to the defense of the apartheid system. Hence the strategy is to create an automatic equation between the defense of the world capitalist system and the defense of the apartheid system, with the Western governments providing unlimited military and economic assistance against the South African freedom fighters.

As part of this strategy, Kissinger was encouraged to meet with black politicians who, although critical of specific aspects of the apartheid system, have refused to support the liberation movements and continue to press for change within the system. Thus Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has travelled extensively urging increased western corporate investment in South Africa arguing that the withdrawal of such investments would "harm" Africans. Others, such as Mr. Sonny Leon, the chairman of the (Coloured) Labor Party, Mr. J. N. Reddy, Chairman of the South African Indian Council, Mr. Leonard Mosala, the



In Pretoria, Kissinger talks with Lucy Mvubelo of the Garment Workers' Union, and William Kgware, Dean of the University of the North

"opposition leader" of the Soweto Urban Bantu Council, and Mr. Hudson Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister of the Gazankulu "Bantustan" all continue to identify their political fortunes with the segregated political institutions created by the apartheid regime. Also present were such leaders as trade unionist Ms. Lucy Mvubelo, another proponent of increased Western corporate investment, African "educators," who are rectors of the "tribal bush colleges" established specifically to deny quality university education to Africans, and the African editor of a white-owned newspaper for Africans, the *World*. Kissinger met none of the men and women who represent the struggle for liberation. (*Washington Post*, Sept. 19, 1975)

A second aspect of the South African strategy is an attempt to reconstruct the *cordon sanitaire* around its borders. Since the 1950s South Africa's rulers have sought to surround themselves with "friendly" neighbors. Traditionally the apartheid regime had tried to achieve this through providing military aid to the white-controlled colonial regimes thereby preventing the transfer of power to the African majority in those countries. South African freedom fighters who left South Africa for military training were prevented from returning to South Africa by this *cordon sanitaire*. Whenever neighboring white regimes seemed threatened by national liberation movements the apartheid regime responded by sending in white South African troops. In 1961 South African troops were sent to Mozambique. South African troops aided the Katanga successionist drive and fought to suppress Lumumba's nationalist movement in what is now Zaire. In 1967, when ZAPU and the ANC (S.A.) launched a joint military campaign in Zimbabwe, South African troops were sent immediately to bolster the Ian Smith regime. Last year the apartheid regime claimed to have "withdrawn" all those troops; yet some were obviously left behind. In September, as part of the Vorster agreement to exert pressure on Smith it was announced that 50 South

African helicopter pilots and technicians had been "withdrawn." They left all their equipment behind them. (*Washington Post*, Sept. 7, 1976)

After 1974, with the defeat of Portugal, this strategy of bolstering neighboring white colonial regimes was no longer workable. Mozambique became independent and the South African invasion of Angola in 1975 failed. The apartheid regime then adopted a new strategy. Now "friendly" African governments would be used to maintain the *cordon sanitaire*. Thus, the Vorster-Kissinger negotiations on Namibia and Zimbabwe. By sacrificing Smith's position in the "Rhodesian government" and South African formal control over Namibia, the apartheid regime hopes to reestablish the colonial nexus on a more stable basis. There are models in Africa for the South African regime's plan—namely, the relationship between France and African countries such as the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Central African Republic. South Africa is seeking to establish links with African politicians in Zimbabwe and Namibia whom it regards as "moderates", interested in personal or narrow elitist power and not in freedom for their people. Such politicians might cooperate with the apartheid regime in preventing the freedom fighters from having transit facilities in their territories. These politicians could easily "recognize" the "legitimacy" of the apartheid regime, and betray the cause of freedom in Africa.

The apartheid regime's tentacles are not grasping only at neighboring states but also stretch across the African continent. South Africa's rulers consider their ability to achieve their plans in Namibia and Zimbabwe as a first step in resurrecting their détente strategy in Africa. As the *Star* (Johannesburg, Aug. 21, 1976) wrote "South Africa needs a respite from international pressures and the removal of the two major 'colonial' stumbling-blocs to her African détente objectives." In other words, one of the objectives of the negotiations on Zimbabwe and Namibia

is to isolate the liberation movements and win "legitimacy" for the present status-quo in South Africa. When Kissinger left South Africa, the apartheid regime felt assured that its Africa strategy would rapidly achieve its goals. After September 26, 1976 when the five frontline African presidents announced their rejection of the Kissinger-Vorster-Smith plan, the apartheid regime was disturbed. Vorster stated that the Lusaka statement "was very difficult to understand," and called on the US and the UK to "clear up the confusion which now exists as quickly as possible." (*New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES

Despite the resolutions of the Non-Aligned nations conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, France will not be changing its policy of supplying arms to South Africa. The French Government has denied that it is actually aiding the South African military. The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Jean Sauvagnargues, stated that France had only supplied South Africa with weapons for external defense and that these had now been stopped. However, the South

African Ambassador to France, Mr. Louis Pienaar, remarked that he was unaware of any cessation of existing contracts between France and South Africa. There has been he said, "no indication from the French Government of any intention to stop supplies of arms to South Africa." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 21, 1976)

Meanwhile, the British Government opposes the imposition by the UN of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. On July 7, 1976 the British Minister of State, Mr. Roy Hattersley, said that "although the British Government regarded the South African Government's race policies as detestable and dangerous, it did not consider them to pose a threat to international peace." In addition the British Government opposes the withdrawal of British corporate investments in South Africa. Instead it favors an "amelioration of conditions by British companies." According to its logic, a boycott of South Africa "would strengthen" apartheid. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Sept., 1976; *Guardian*, London, Aug. 27, 1976.) ■

Namibia

U.S. PLANS TO CONTROL NAMIBIAN LIBERATION

A leading French journal reported that NATO Commander Alexander Haig spent two hours with Kissinger in Zurich on September 5, at the time the Secretary was in the Swiss city for his second meeting with South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster. (*Le Monde*, Sept. 7, 1976)

On September 19 an Irish newspaper disclosed that at the Zurich conference Kissinger had "fascinating proposals" to put to Vorster. Once the South African army had withdrawn from Namibia "A new Black Namibian armed force would then be created, trained by United States military personnel, equipped by the U.S. for at least a decade". Most of the Americans would be Black. "According to sources this particular proposal pleased Vorster and his advisors; among other things it could ensure the checkmating of the Cuban army in Angola." (*Dublin Sunday Express*, Sept. 19, 1976) Clearly such an army would be primarily designed as a counterforce to the SWAPO guerrillas.

Americans, however much they would put Vietnam behind them, cannot ignore the parallels this relation has with U.S. involvement in South East Asia.

SWAPO RESPONDS 'NO COMPROMISE' TO KISSINGER MANUEVERS

Speaking before the Security Council at the end of September, Sam Nujoma restated SWAPO's readiness to talk directly with the South African racist regime "with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the Namibian problem." He repeated SWAPO's conditions for such talks: that South Africa accept to talk with SWAPO regarding the modalities of transferring power to the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO; that any such talks be under the auspices of the United Nations; that before any talks all Namibian political prisoners be released; and that South Africa commit itself to withdraw its armed forces from Namibia.

Nujoma reiterated that, "in the absence of any peaceful solution", SWAPO will "continue to intensify armed

liberation struggle as the only effective way to achieve national liberation and genuine independence".

On September 29, the SWAPO leader met with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for the first time. After the encounter at Kissinger's suite at New York's Waldorf Towers, the Secretary said: "I think already there has been considerable progress and we are operating on the assumption that the meeting in Geneva will eventually emerge". UN representative Gurirab said the following day that Kissinger "had been unable to obtain any 'meaningful commitment' from South Africa regarding independence for Namibia". Mr. Gurirab said that African nations at the UN would press for some form of economic sanctions against the occupying power. (*New York Times*, Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 1976).

Secretary Kissinger in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 30 declared: "... the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerned speed up the process toward Namibian independence. The United States favors the following elements: the independence of Namibia with a fixed, short, time limit; the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under United Nations aegis; and the participation in that conference of all authentic national forces including specifically SWAPO." Thus Kissinger, while forced to recognize SWAPO, was leaving his escape hatches open as he talked about "all authentic forces" as parties to future negotiations.

THE TURNHALLE CONFERENCE

Further elucidation of the way the year-old South African-sponsored "constitutional conference" at the Turnhalle building in Windhoek is developing came on September 16. The constitutional committee (which issued a statement on August 18 outlining with considerable vagueness its concept of a future South West Africa) came up with a dead give away. The committee, headed by white National Party politician Dirk Mudge, announced acceptance "in principle" of a three-level government:

—a first level in which "all the population groups" would



Chief Clemens Kapuuu—the Western candidate

be represented on national matters;

—a second level "elected by members of the various population groups and which will be responsible for matters which are regarded as own affairs";

—a third level "or local authorities for the different towns".

This apartheid kind of set-up runs in diametric opposition to the demands of the United Nations, Namibia's lawful authority, and that of SWAPO and smaller political groupings of the country. The fine hand of Pretoria and its overseas allies shows through such a scheme. Concern over trying to see Turnhalle to the world brought the ever peripatetic Chief Clemens Kapuuu, slated by South Africa and the U.S. to become the figurehead chief of state of an "independent South West Africa—or even Namibia" (Dirk Mudge would be the prime minister with the real power), to New York in mid-September. Both he and another Turnhalle bigwig, Mr. A.J.F. Kloppers, who had been brought to the USA under the State Department's International Visitors program, after fruitless efforts to get to address the UN Security Council, returned to Windhoek. While in the U.S. Kapuuu hired a New York public relations firm to work on building his American support. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, Sept. 30; Oct. 1, 1976)

DEBATE ON NAMIBIA CONTINUES IN SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council resumed consideration of Namibia on September 28, amidst growing demands for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa in order to compel it to withdraw from the territory. Under a resolution adopted in January, the Council had given South Africa until August 31 to comply with United Nations resolutions, after which the Council would consider applying sanctions under the Charter. An eleventh-hour move by South Africa to avert action by the Council by declaring its willingness to grant independence by the end of 1978 had already been rejected by several United Nations organs as inadequate to meet the terms set by the United Nations. However, a Security Council meeting called on August 31 was adjourned until late in September, ostensibly to allow for participation by African Foreign Ministers coming to New York for the General Assembly session, but more likely in order to wait for the results of Kissinger's meetings with Vorster.

Resolutions calling for sanctions against South Africa if it did not comply with United Nations resolutions on Namibia were adopted in June by the Organization of African Unity, and in August by the non-aligned group. At the August 31 meeting of the Security Council, the only speaker was the representative of Madagascar, Chairman of the African Group at the United Nations, who in a

strong speech called for the imposition of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. As the meetings resumed on September 28, in the wake of the failure of Kissinger's diplomatic maneuvers, the pressure for the imposition of sanctions mounted. Calls for effective measures against South Africa as provided in the Charter were made by speaker after speaker, in particular the President of the Council for Namibia, the OAU representative, and Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO.

The meetings also reflected growing suspicions among the African countries concerning Kissinger's purposes in Namibia. Speaking for the OAU, the Mauritian Ambassador demanded to know whether it was true that a) Gen. Alexander Haig, chief representative of NATO, had attended the Vorster-Kissinger meetings in Zurich; b) Kissinger had proposed to Vorster the creation of an army in Namibia to be trained, equipped and financed by the United States for ten years following South Africa's withdrawal from the territory; c) the United States Government was paying the fees for Burns and Schwarz, the New York lawyers representing Chief Clemens Kapuuu; d) Kissinger had proposed large-scale United States assistance to Namibia after the installation of a puppet regime headed by Chief Kapuuu; e) Kissinger had promised to guarantee South Africa's borders in return for a manipulated solution in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

The accusations were promptly denied by United States representative William Scranton, who, however, was forced to admit that Haig had indeed been in Zurich at the time of the Kissinger-Vorster meetings, although he claimed that this was due purely to Haig's "close friendship" with the Secretary of State.

In the past, the Western permanent members of the Council (France, United Kingdom, United States) have used their veto power to block the imposition of sanctions on South Africa. As debate in the Council dragged on into the second week of October, it was by no means clear whether the attempt to bring the Council to adopt effective measures would succeed this time. (UN documents S/PV.1954, 1956-1960).

THE WAR FRONT

South African military forces are still engaged in Angola. Despite a formal and well-publicized withdrawal at the end of March, Pretoria's troops mount incursions across the long border from the occupied Territory of Namibia into the unsettled region in the southern part of the People's Republic of Angola.

An 18-year-old South African soldier, said by Angolan officials to have been captured 25 miles inside their country, was presented at a press conference in Luanda in mid-September. Eugene de Lange had been reported as missing in August by South African Defense Force headquarters while "picking up refugees" inside Namibia. Authorities of the People's Republic of Angola have charged Pretorian forces with constant border violations.

In addition, the PRA officials say that South Africa is training and assisting fragments of FNLA and UNITA forces which the PRA fought against during the only recently ended war. These units are being trained at a base in the Caprivi Strip section of Namibia by South African and Portuguese advisors, who sometimes act as field commanders as well. Pretoria denied it was training UNITA units. Confirmation, however, has come from several sources, one a South African soldier who recalled that fellow troopers had fought since the official withdrawal inside Angola alongside FNLA groups (*Africa News*, Sept. 20, 1976; *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1976).



People's Liberation Army of Namibia guerrillas—ready to intensify the struggle (SWAPO)

Further confirmation of South African incursions into Angola and of FNLA and UNITA groups receiving training and supplies from Pretorian forces in northern Namibia comes from Namibians of that region who have recently fled into exile.

South African occupation officials are ferrying foreign newspeople, including those from the South African press, into northern Namibia to meet what they describe as Angolan refugees who say their villages are being looted and burned by "Cuban-led Angolan troops" aided by SWAPO guerrillas as part of Luanda's campaign to wipe out opposition to the Angola government. The *Windhoek Advertiser* headlines "alleged machinegunning of dozens of people". The South Africans produced a renegade SWAPO supporter who claimed that a joint SWAPO-Russian-Cuban invasion of Namibia is imminent. This has been a persistent theme in the South African and Namibian press since the beginning of the Angolan war last year. The "red menace" is in constant use by the Pretoria regime, both to stir up whites and to reach out to putative allies in the West. And, doubtless, Pretoria needs atrocity tales to counter the eye-witness revelations of former South African conscript Bill Anderson (see *Southern Africa Magazine*, Oct., 1976). Finally such stories provide a useful cover for Pretoria's military activities in Angola. (*New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1976; *Washington Post*, Oct. 3, 1976; *London Sunday Times*, Oct. 3, 1976; *Windhoek Advertiser*, Sept. 29, 1976). Readers may recognize the technique Portuguese troops used to don FRELIMO uniforms when they terrorized the people's villages and recently the Rhodesian troops who slaughtered over 600 Zimbabwean refugees when they attacked a refugee camp

in Mozambique arrived singing FRELIMO songs.

SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, in a New York press conference on September 21, put the matter of extra-continental troops straight. "We have enough forces to carry out our struggle in Namibia. What we need is the diplomatic and material support of the Cuban government."

Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO's representative at the United Nations and in the Americas, said, according to the *New York Times*, that "no attempt is being made to get the aid of Cuban troops now in Angola. . . . He said that both anti-aircraft artillery and planes were needed by his organization to combat what he described as an accelerated military involvement by South Africa in the territory". (*New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1976)

South African Defense Force headquarters issued a communique, saying that firing across the border into Namibia had occurred, coincident with the visit of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to South Africa. Another South African government agency also announced the "total suspension" of work at the Calueque power station under construction in Angola some 40 kilometres above the border. Calueque is a vital part of the huge Ruacana electric power and water complex on the Cunene River, a South African-financed scheme aimed to transform a large part of Namibia by supplying irrigation and electricity as far south as Windhoek and below. The South African spokesman denied the Luanda government had confiscated the station, but admitted that Angola had requested the halt. The Cunene complex is said to be scheduled for full operation by 1977. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, Sept. 27, 1976) ■

Zimbabwe

THE ZIMBABWE PEOPLE'S ARMY-ZIPA SPEAKS FOR ITSELF

The armed liberation struggle in Zimbabwe has taken on new dimensions through the important advances made by the freedom fighters over the last eight months. The

nature of these advances and the policies of the freedom fighters responsible for them are among the topics discussed in this interview with DZINASHE MACHINGURA.

Deputy Political Commissar of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). These are the first public comments made by a member of the leadership of ZIPA. The questions were put by the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM).

Mozambique Information Agency: What is the Zimbabwe People's Army and how was it formed?

Machingura: The Zimbabwe People's Army is a product of the voluntary merger of the military wing of the former ZANU (ZANLA) and the military wing of the former ZAPU (ZIPRA). It was formed for the purpose of rescuing the Zimbabwe liberation struggle from the chaotic situation that had been created by the ANC leadership. It is an armed body of men, which was formed for the purpose of resuming the armed struggle, intensifying this armed struggle and carrying it to its logical conclusion and finally establishing a just and popular socio-political order serving the interests of the people of Zimbabwe.

After the Lusaka agreement in December 1974 the four nationalist organizations fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe came together under one umbrella, the ANC. But in the course of time, the leadership which was formed at that time through the Lusaka agreement failed to organise itself in negotiating with the Smith regime and failed to set in motion machinery that would prosecute and realise the liberation of Zimbabwe through armed struggle.

After the fighters had realised the incompetence of the ANC leadership they took it upon themselves to organise themselves, to reconstitute themselves into an army that would fight for the independence of the Zimbabwe people. The combatants from both former ZANU and former ZAPU agreed to form a joint military command that would lead the armed struggle. After this agreement they approached the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity and the front-line Heads of State, who appreciated and actively supported this joint military command.

The joint military command was formed on the understanding that the liberation of Zimbabwe could only be realised through an arduous armed struggle; secondly, on the understanding that the traditional political leadership of Zimbabwe had divided the people of Zimbabwe. And it became quite clear to us that if we were ever going to be able to prosecute a successful armed struggle we could not be a party to either of the two rival ANC factions, the Muzorewa faction or the Nkomo faction. We realised that the time for personality politics had long passed. It was this approach to politics which had divided the Zimbabwe people.

Mozambique Information Agency: Is ZIPA only an army, or does it have a political structure and leadership?

Machingura: ZIPA is an army in the traditional sense of the word. But ZIPA is a unique and revolutionary army in the sense that it has a strategic role of transforming itself into a political movement. The ZIPA structure accommodates the shouldering of both the military and the political tasks of the revolution. We have, within the ZIPA structure, a political department exclusively charged with the responsibility of shouldering the political tasks that are normally shouldered by a revolutionary political organisation.

In the history of revolutionary struggles we find examples that closely approximate our own situation. For example, in the course of their struggles, at one time or another, depending on the stage of their revolution, the



Dzinashwe Machingura, Deputy Political Commissar of ZIPA

political leadership was identical to the military leadership of the organisations fighting for freedom in China, in Cuba, in Korea, in Vietnam and in many other countries.

But we have to establish a formal political structure in order to give better political direction to the armed body that is now fighting inside Zimbabwe. And moves to do this are already well underway, moves to transform this organisation into a revolutionary vanguard for the people's struggle.

Mozambique Information Agency: What are the political goals of the struggle? For example, ZIPA is fighting for freedom but how do you define this freedom?

Machingura: We are not mercenaries. We are not simply soldiers. We are political soldiers. We are fighting for clearly defined political objectives. Our political goal is to overthrow national oppression in Zimbabwe, to put an end to the system of exploitation of man by man within Zimbabwe and to create a system that will serve the people of Zimbabwe. When we say that ZIPA is fighting for freedom we mean that ZIPA is fighting for political freedom. By political freedom we mean that ZIPA is fighting for the political rights, the economic rights and the cultural rights of the Zimbabwean people; to put the Zimbabwean people in a position of authority and in a position of dominance in these spheres. Through realising the people's democratic freedoms we release and set in motion the innovative and creative potential of the masses of Zimbabwe.

Mozambique Information Agency: Does ZIPA today have any relationship to the traditional nationalist organisations of Zimbabwe?

Machingura: ZIPA is not in negation to the former

traditional organizations in Zimbabwe. What ZIPA aims at is assimilating, synthesizing and espousing the progressive revolutionary content of these former organisations.

Mozambique Information Agency: *What is the basis of disunity among the former leaders of the nationalist organizations? Is it tribal, political or what?*

Machingura: As far as we are concerned, the basis of disunity among the former leaders of the nationalist organisations is political ambition and power struggle, though this might manifest itself as tribal differences or political differences. Tribal, in the sense that in creating a power base they seek to place people belonging to their own ethnic group in key positions, in strategic positions, so as to prepare a secure power base which serves as a springboard to gain political ascendance. This disunity also manifests itself politically, inasmuch as they put forward political slogans to try to win the support of the broad masses of the people. But we should emphasize that their differences are essentially not ideological at all. Ideologically they belong to the same camp.

OPERATIONS INSIDE ZIMBABWE

Mozambique Information Agency: *Has it been possible to establish liberated or semi-liberated zones in Zimbabwe?*

Machingura: We can say that at this stage we have managed to establish semi-liberated zones in the sense that, although the political and administrative infrastructure is not yet fully organised, the enemy has no control whatsoever in these areas. The masses are fully mobilised and organised, and are fully behind the armed struggle that is now being waged by the freedom fighters. We also feel that establishing liberated areas at this stage would be presenting the enemy with many targets vulnerable to air strikes.

Mozambique Information Agency: *How far has ZIPA gone in organising a political infrastructure inside Zimbabwe to mobilise the people?*

Machingura: The masses are organised in units and they are democratically conducting their day-to-day business under the leadership of ZIPA. In each unit we have a

section of dedicated people and we have also managed to establish mass organizations—for students, for children, for women, peasants and workers.

Mozambique Information Agency: *Does this political structure extend into the cities?*

Machingura: Our strategy has been that of fighting from the countryside, encircling the cities. As far as the rural areas are concerned, this structure is quite organised. But because of the existing conditions it has not been possible for these organisations to come out into the open in the cities. They are still clandestine. But they are there.

Mozambique Information Agency: *What about the possibilities for urban guerrilla struggle?*

Machingura: We do not conceive of urban guerrilla warfare as being divorced from the guerrilla war we are carrying out in the countryside. Urban guerrilla warfare can only play a supplementary role to the guerrilla operations organised in the countryside.

Mozambique Information Agency: *But are you considering the possibility of that kind of action?*

Machingura: We do not rule it out.

Mozambique Information Agency: *What does ZIPA see as the objective of the recent Rhodesian massacre of more than 670 Zimbabwean refugees at Nyazonia in Mozambique?*

Machingura: Principally, to internationalize the conflict. They hoped that the People's Republic of Mozambique would react rashly and invade Rhodesia, which would have created a pretext for Smith to call for support from his Western allies.

At the same time the attack was also aimed at creating a rift between Frelimo and the Zimbabwean freedom fighters. It was meant to show that by supporting the Zimbabwean freedom fighters and accommodating Zimbabwean refugees the Mozambican Government is actually inviting attacks by the Smith regime. The idea was to force the Mozambican Government to oppose the guerrillas by creating the idea that in an all-out war between Mozambique and Rhodesia, the young People's Republic would stand to lose.

Zimbabwean guerrillas in training (LNS)



Mozambique Information Agency: *The regime regularly claims that the freedom fighters have committed atrocities against the African population. What do you have to say about this?*

Machingura: The Smith regime brands us as terrorists, therefore they have to find something to justify this definition. But we are a people's army. We are not terrorists. Civilians are not the targets of our attacks.

However, the Smith regime itself has organised the Selous Scouts to carry out atrocities against the people while masquerading as freedom fighters. This is widespread, but not so much in the semi-liberated zone, because we are in control there and the masses can clearly distinguish the true freedom fighters from the sham freedom fighters of the regime.

ZIMBABWEANS IN SMITH'S ARMY

Mozambique Information Agency: *Many Zimbabweans are fighting in the Smith regime's army. Why, and what is ZIPA's attitude to them? And are any of them deserting to join the Guerrillas?*

Machingura: It is true that thousands of Zimbabweans are fighting in the racist regime's army. This is because of blackmail and conscription. The people are blackmailed into serving the Smith regime in search of social security. They want to guarantee the security of their families. They want to earn a livelihood and have no alternative, with all other employment opportunities denied them, but to serve within the racist army. It has also become clear of late that the Smith regime is actually conscripting Africans into its army by force.

ZIPA's attitude is that those who join Smith's army are misguided Zimbabweans. They need to be doubly liberated. First they need to be liberated from the national oppression. They are oppressed just like any other Zimbabwean. Secondly, they need to be liberated from the oppression they suffer within the racist army. They occupy an inferior position in the racist army. So we sympathize with them. Our struggle is to liberate all oppressed Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe today.

Recently the number of deserters from the racist army joining the ZIPA ranks has risen to astronomical proportions. Hundreds and hundreds of them come to our ranks. Some of them with their weapons.

Mozambique Information Agency: *You said the black soldiers in the Rhodesian racist army are discriminated against. In what way?*

Machingura: About a couple of months ago the Smith regime published the report of a commission of inquiry into racial discrimination. This revealed quite candidly that the African soldiers in Smith's army occupy a very inferior position in the sense that up to now none of them has risen to the position of an officer, all of them are either non-commissioned officers or simply privates. So this in itself is tantamount to exploitation.

In addition, there is racial discrimination within the army itself. Some facilities that are available to whites are not available to African soldiers. And also European private soldiers do not show respect to their seniors who are Africans.

In the Rhodesian racist army today, the most dangerous tasks are assigned to the Africans and, in most cases, the African soldiers are used as minesweepers and as reconnaissance personnel for the racist army. But, of course, the racist army also mistrusts the African soldiers very much. They doubt their loyalty. As such they cannot give them freedom of action to organise action against the

guerrillas. They can only work under the supervision of their white superiors.

Mozambique Information Agency: *There have been some reports about Israeli military co-operation with the Smith regime. Have you any concrete information about this?*

Machingura: It is not only the Israelis who are co-operating with the Smith racist regime in oppressing the Zimbabwean people. There are a large number of mercenaries from a variety of Western countries who are actively assisting the Smith regime in oppressing the Zimbabwean people. So we don't see this in isolation. We know, we have evidence that there are mercenaries from Israel and many other countries operating with Smith against us.

ZIPA DEFINES THE ENEMY

Mozambique Information Agency: *How does ZIPA define the enemy? What is the target of the freedom fighters' bullets?*

Machingura: A clear understanding of the character of our society, the nature of our revolution and the fundamental contradiction in our society is essential to the definition of the enemy. Our society is essentially a colonial society and as such we have to wage a national democratic revolution to overthrow national oppression. This national democratic revolution will serve to reconcile the principal contradiction in Zimbabwe which is characterised by the domination and oppression of the vast majority of the Zimbabwean people by a small, minority, racist, reactionary clique of whites.

From this we can say that all those who are opposed to the liberation and the independence of the Zimbabwean people are our enemies. These comprise the Smith racist regime, and the imperialist powers that back it, puppet Africans serving the Smith regime, and all those who are opposed to the independence of the Zimbabwean people. The target of the freedom fighters' bullets is the system of exploitation and the capitalist enterprises and armed personnel which serve to perpetuate it.

INTENSIFICATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE

Mozambique Information Agency: *It is clear that since the beginning of this year the ZIPA forces have stepped up the armed struggle. Has this been done only in terms of the geographical area affected by the war, that is to say, is it only a matter of extending the war to a wider area, or has the war been intensified in the sense of achieving higher combat effectiveness?*

Machingura: It is true that there has been considerable expansion of the geographical area covered by our guerrilla struggle. But the quantitative growth of the war has also given rise to the qualitative development and transformation of this same war. This has become necessary in accordance with the changes in the enemy's situation. The enemy is now generally on the defensive. The enemy has now employed the strategy of not dispersing its forces, so as to minimise the danger of ambushes on patrols and to minimise the dangers of surprise attacks on small encamped units without permanent fortification. This has forced the enemy to concentrate its forces in large fortified camps and to deploy its forces in big convoys. To continue the war we have to develop it to a stage of attacking the garrisoned enemy, and to raise the level of tactics to ambushing large enemy convoys. Therefore there was an imperative need for a qualitative change in our struggle. This we have realised and carried out through operating in bigger military units, which has been possible because of the qualitative development of the conscious-

ness of the masses, who are serving as our camouflage, as our intelligence system and as our quartermasters.

Mozambique Information Agency: *The Smith regime's war communiques announce their casualties in terms of one or two deaths in an action. They have never admitted losing more than five soldiers in a single day. Does this bear any relation to the real situation?*

Machingura: Not at all. It is merely a camouflage to disguise their losses. If they were to admit the truth it would demoralise their supporters and their fighters. So they try as much as possible to minimise their losses and at the same time to exaggerate those of the guerrillas.

SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE

Mozambique Information Agency: *But hundreds of thousands of people have been moved into concentration camps in Zimbabwe. This must create problems when the people want to help the guerrillas. How do the fighters and the people deal with this problem?*

Machingura: Mass participation and mass support in guerrilla warfare is an indispensable condition for victory. It is the strategic aim of the Smith regime, like its predecessors in Vietnam, Mozambique, Angola and other countries, to try to isolate the guerrillas from the masses by establishing concentration camps, the so-called "protected villages". However, the Smith regime has now overtaxed its manpower to such an extent that it doesn't have adequate manpower to police the concentration camps. So there are always loopholes.

Our struggle is a popular struggle, and it enjoys abundant support from the broad masses of the Zimbabwean people. We have a fairly large army, which runs into thousands. Without the support of the masses it would be very difficult to maintain such a big army. We get food, clothing and whatever kind of assistance we need from the masses. Some governments find it a burden to maintain an army only half the size of ours. But we are capable of maintaining this army because of the support we get from the broad masses of the people.

THE KISSINGER-SMITH PLAN

Mozambique Information Agency: *An economic plan has been drawn up with the collaboration of the United States government concerning economic guarantees for settlers after the formation of an African government in Zimbabwe. What are your views on this plan?*

Machingura: First of all, this so-called economic plan is a direct result of the intensification of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe. The United States and other imperialist powers see their interests threatened and they are determined to stamp out the revolutionary flame before it is too late. The so-called economic plan aims at creating a socio-economic climate conducive to the continued exploitation of the Zimbabwean people under "majority" rule.

We are totally opposed to the so-called economic plan. It falls far short of our objectives. We are not fighting for economic or political reforms. We are fighting for the total transformation of the Zimbabwean society.

To us the economic plan is doubly ridiculous. First, the United States wishes to pay compensation to the racists for the termination of their exploitation. Secondly, the United States purports to be supporting the struggle for majority rule, while the US government itself is oppressing millions and millions of people in its own country. They would do better to make use of the money in alleviating the economic burden of the broad masses in their own

country, who live a life far worse than that of Rhodesian whites.

Mozambique Information Agency: *Do you think anything will come out of Kissinger's and Vorster's "shuttle diplomacy" in Africa?*

Machingura: They are definitely "shuttling" with a purpose, working out a plan to sabotage our struggle. We think they will produce some formula aimed at containing the struggle. But we are prepared for them and we are quite sure that whatever they do will fail. All their schemes will be stillborn.

Mozambique Information Agency: *What is ZIPA's attitude toward elements in the traditional leadership of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement who compromise themselves by supporting imperialist plans to continue the system of exploitation after majority rule?*

Machingura: We are not racialists. We are not fighting against the Smith regime simply because they are white. We are fighting against the system that they are perpetrating and defending. If any Zimbabweans collude with them in oppressing the Zimbabwean people we shall bundle them all together, we shall make no distinction on the basis of colour.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Mozambique Information Agency: *There is a great deal of international support for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. What form would you like to see this solidarity taking? What material support do the Freedom Fighters need and how should it be channelled?*

Machingura: We would like to see this support encompassing primarily political and moral support, material support, financial support and diplomatic support. The material support we receive from the international community should serve to create a material base for self-reliance within our own army. We would like to receive more arms, training facilities as long as they help us to be more self-reliant. As far as support for our struggle is concerned, because of the geographic and strategic location of Mozambique, we would appreciate it if all aid was channelled through Mozambique to the fighters. Among our material needs is medical aid. The need for medicines has been compounded by the development of the war inside Zimbabwe. We need medicine not only for the fighters, but also for the masses who are in our operational area. The Smith regime is no longer servicing them with any medicine. We are catering for their medical needs. What we would like to receive in this field is medicines to cure the common diseases suffered by our masses in the operational areas; diseases like malaria, diarrhoea, cholera and many others.

We would also like to have support for educational facilities. We have young people who need to be educated since they had no opportunity for this in our country.

THE KISSINGER PACKAGE FOR ZIMBABWE BLOWS UP

The British and Americans have a tendency to talk about majority rule in two years or so. We are talking about majority rule in four to six weeks, when, with the formation of an interim government, the powers of the government of Rhodesia will be passed to the majority. Independence will then follow.

President Julius Nyerere, September 28, 1976.

An intimate of Kissinger's recently described for the *New York Times* the method he likes to use for his shuttle diplomacy: "He does it alone. He makes his moves, keeps them secret, and springs a completed package when everything has been assembled." (*New York Times*, September 8, 1976.)

The completed package on Rhodesia has just finished exploding in Kissinger's face. "Everything" had clearly not been assembled, at least not yet.

On September 5th and 6th Kissinger and Prime Minister Vorster met for the second time this year in several rounds of intense discussions in Zurich. Neither side would say more than that "progress had been made in setting up a framework for negotiations" on the Rhodesian and Namibian questions. (*Washington Post*, September 7, 1976) General Alexander Haig, NATO Commander in Chief, flew into Zurich for two hours' talk with Kissinger, but insisted that their meeting was "routine" and only concerned matters of mutual interest. (*Le Monde*, Sept. 7, 1976) But the Dublin *Sunday Press* claimed that Kissinger had put forward proposals which would secure South Africa's border safety. To check-mate the Cuban army in Angola, a new Black Namibian Armed Force would be created, trained by US military personnel, equipped and financed by the US for at least ten years. The US military advisers would include a large proportion of blacks. All of this proposal would be contingent on a South African military withdrawal from the territory. In addition, the United States was said to be prepared to guarantee South Africa's own frontiers under certain circumstances. On the economic side, the United States was prepared to transform Namibia into a modern state by rapid and effective financial aid. Vorster was said to be pleased with the plan. (*Sunday Press*, Dublin, September 19, 1976.)

On the Rhodesian question, Vorster was said to have ruled out arms embargo "pressure" on Smith but agreed to point out "realities". (*Washington Post*, September 9, 1976.) Vorster was also said to have argued with Kissinger that Smith could and should play an important role in the power transfer and that he would "eventually accept majority rule." (*New York Times*, September 9, 1976.) Earlier, David Martin, a British journalist close to Nyerere's thinking, had reported that Kissinger was urging Britain to send in troops to oust the Smith regime by force and to install a caretaker government to deal with black nationalists, a proposal that Nyerere feared would mean the installation of a pro-western neo-colonial regime which would be confronted by the guerrilla army. (*Observer*, London, July 18, 1976. See also, *Ibid*, September 12, 1976)

Kissinger got Vorster to agree to a complicated international fund scheme to provide financial guarantees and/or compensation to induce whites to stay on in Rhodesia once it was under majority rule. The ultimate cost of this scheme was said to be 1.5 to 2 billion dollars. (*New York Times*, September 9, 1976.) While Kissinger had spoken in his April 27th Lusaka speech about protecting white "rights", it was becoming more evident that it was white privilege, obtained by 85 years of exploitation of blacks, that was going to be guaranteed. An international bank, underwritten by Britain, US, South Africa and other western powers would buy land from farmers at "fair" prices, perhaps lease it back to the whites who wanted to stay and provide compensation if the land were nationalized or "eventually" turned over to blacks. Whites would be guaranteed the right to resettle in Europe or the United

States, their pensions and dividend shares would be safeguarded even if they left the country and their ability to withdraw capital from the country would be limited but grow as time went on. New investments in Rhodesia would exploit the mineral wealth and rich agricultural land of the capital-squeezed Rhodesian economy and black Rhodesians would be given "practical skills" through intensified training. (*New York Times*, July 20, 1976. September 26, 1976. *Washington Post*, September 25th, 1976.)

To determine just what a majority-ruled Zimbabwe or Namibia might need, Kissinger ordered a crash \$340,000 AID study contracted to the African-American Scholars Council, an organization primarily of black American scholars designed to "promote the social, economic and human resource development of the African continent." The Principal Investigator for the project was Dr. Samuel Adams, Jr., former AID deputy administrator for the Bureau for Africa, reputed to be a "decent" man but with no detailed knowledge of southern Africa. Although Adams is black, his chief under-lieutenants initially were almost entirely white. Dr. Robert Rotberg, Political Science professor from MIT, is to do four major papers on the political/social aspects of transition to majority rule including "ideological orientation of new leadership," "possible internal political structures assuming a wide range of scenarios" and the politics of South Africa, the region and the international political, economic and financial community during transition. Previously Rotberg has attempted to conduct a study of African liberation movements in Zambia over a five year period beginning in 1971 using the University of Zambia as a base and MIT and Ford money. Members of the university's Political Science department believed that the project would compromise research activities of students, would be politically embarrassing and probably hostile to liberation, and in fact turned Rotberg down. (Robert Moltano, *The Role of Certain North American Academics in the Struggle against the Liberation of Southern Africa*, paper at United Nations Africa Institute for Economic Development and Planning Conference, Dar es Salaam, 1-8 December, 1975.) Dr. Elliot Berg of the University of Michigan will do seven papers on the economics of Rhodesia and Namibia while Dr. Stewart North of the University of Houston has been commissioned to do three papers on human resources. Goler Butcher, longtime associate and staff advisor to Congressman Diggs, was brought into the project by Adams to study "policy choices" with regard to Zimbabwe and Namibia. Sources close to the staff feel that the study is being fed into Kissinger's own policy to buy a "moderate" black government quickly to safeguard US strategic interests in South Africa and the region.

While Kissinger's sense of Vorster after Zurich was favorable ("blunt", "honest", "forthright" and "a lot more realistic than any one gives him credit for"), Vorster was even more delighted with Kissinger's courtship. He told a Nationalist Party rally that talks with Kissinger ended the period in which the West "ignored us totally." (*New York Times*, September 20, 1976)

Meanwhile President Nyerere surprised Kissinger by calling a summit of the five front-line Presidents (Angola's Neto was brought into what had been a group of four) and the liberation movements and political leadership of Zimbabwe and Namibia to form a united strategy. Assistant Secretary of State Schaufele was dispatched to brief Nyerere and Kaunda and to be sure that the Africans wanted to see Kissinger. Robert Mugabe of ZANU mean-



President Nyerere—Nothing encouraging from Kissinger

while called Kissinger's involvement "unfortunate", and said it created "all kinds of false impressions. Nkomo, who alone among all the Zimbabwe leaders had seen Kissinger previously, was more circumspect, and said he would wait and see. (*Washington Post*, September 9, 1976.) Kaunda was likewise "grateful" to Kissinger, wished him "best of luck" but warned that time was running out. (*Observer*, London, September 7, 1976. *Washington Post*, September 14, 17 and 18, 1976.) Nyerere argued that the time was not ripe for negotiations, was skeptical of the results of any new round of "talks". (*Observer*, London, September 12, 1976)

Kissinger meanwhile was at pains to paint himself as having been invited by the Africans, stressed that there was no "American plan". "We will do what we are asked to do, we will take no initiatives that are not invited." (State Department Press Releases 429, 435. September 11, 14, 1976.) Nyerere responded that Kissinger would be welcome if he wanted to come, but that any such visit was not at his invitation. When Kissinger arrived in Dar es Salaam on September 15, he was greeted by a demonstration with placards that read "GO HOME" and a lengthy Tanzanian analysis of the positive and negative aspects of Kissinger's diplomacy. While Tanzania welcomed Kissinger's support for majority rule, his condemnation of apartheid and pressure for freedom and equality in Southern Africa, it condemned Kissinger's linkage of support for majority rule with anti-communism and his explanations of the US interest in preventing a takeover by "the man with the gun." The Ministry of Information bulletin, displayed prominently in the newspapers the day of Kissinger's visit, went on to ask, "Why cannot the American government also say that if a peaceful transfer of power is impossible because of the intransigence of the racists, then it will be on the side of those who fight for freedom?" (*Tanzania Daily News*, September 15, 1976).

But Kissinger refused to be drawn into any commitment to armed struggle. Denying he was on an anti-Communist crusade, he avoided saying that the liberation movements were communist, or that he feared them, "either in their own right or because they are communist" but stressed that he was concerned about "outside intervention" and saving African lives. After several hours of talking to Kissinger, Nyerere said he had heard nothing to encourage the possibility of a negotiated solution. (State

Department Press Release 437. September 15, 1976. *New York Times*, September 16, 1976). If Nyerere was disappointed, Kaunda was tearful. Speeding Kissinger on his way to meet Vorster and Smith in Pretoria he bade him God speed. "You have only a few days." If Kissinger failed, said Kaunda, quoting the man responsible for the butchery at Soweto, J.B. Vorster, "the alternative would be too ghastly to contemplate". (State Department Press Release 443. September 16, 1976.) After a stop in Lusaka to "clarify principles" with Kaunda, Kissinger went into a marathon negotiation session with Smith under Vorster's auspices.

Kissinger used as his "base" the four principles outlined by Prime Minister Callaghan of Great Britain on March 22d after the failure of the Nkomo-Smith talks on March 19th:

- acceptance of the principle of majority rule
- elections in 18 months to 2 years for a majority rule government
- no drawn out government negotiations
- transition to majority rule not to be thwarted and to be orderly

(see *Washington Post*, September 22, 1976)

Smith had said ten days earlier that it would be political suicide to accept the British plan; the Rhodesian Front had rejected black majority rule and the Kissinger compensation scheme at the party congress only a few days before. But it was clear that South Africa and the western powers for whom Kissinger spoke were determined to make Smith see reason. Their intelligence estimates were that Smith's regime was doomed without major outside intervention. "War between the races, if it once started" in open-ended form, "would have the profoundest implications for international stability on a global scale." Kissinger declared to US embassy personnel. "South Africa either holds the key or can make a decisive contribution." (*Washington Post*, September 19, 1976) Without US and South African breaking of the UN sanctions by permitting mineral exports and more importantly, imports of oil from South Africa, (which is also the principal arms supplier to Rhodesia), Rhodesia would have to shut down its war and its economy.

Smith obviously held out for certain key modifications in the Callaghan proposals. He wanted to retain control over the Ministry of Law and Order and the Armed Forces in any interim transition to majority rule. On September 24th when he announced his "acceptance" of the British American proposals it became evident that he wanted sanctions lifted and the guerrillas disarmed as soon as the interim government was set up. (*New York Times*, September 25, 1976. *Washington Post*, September 25, 1976.) Kissinger had explained the plan on the way home to Washington to Kaunda, Nkomo and Nyerere but he seems not to have made Nyerere aware of the "details". Nyerere's optimism when he heard from Kissinger that Smith would probably accept the Callaghan scheme turned to gloom when he heard there had been "slight" modifications. (*Washington Post*, September 22, 23, 1976.) Despite African doubts President Ford welcomed Kissinger back as a hero of peace. "The road is now open for an African solution." Kissinger, more cautious, was satisfied and weary but worried that the plan should be implemented quickly before the "Russians and the African radicals" they back could interfere. (*New York Times*, September 25, 1976). The next day he got the bad news



Ian Smith, Secretary Kissinger (ringed by security guards), arrive for talks in Pretoria

The initiative of the people of Zimbabwe, and Namibia, and South Africa will always be maintained and will be victorious in its issue. . . . The front line states will never be guided by anyone but the people of Zimbabwe. No one gave us independence, no one in this world is given independence. People will fight for it. They win it. They conquer it. The people of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa will not be given a solution, they will find it.

Joaquim Chissano, Foreign Minister, Mozambique, September 25, 1976

In an unexpected display of unanimity, on September 26th the five front-line Presidents issued a statement declaring that the proposals would be "tantamount of legalizing the colonialist and racist structures of power." (*New York Times*, September 27, 1976) Refusing to detail their objections to the package that Kissinger had unveiled through Smith's good offices, they called on Britain to convene a conference to set up the transitional government under African majority rule and to set up a later constitutional conference. (*Ibid.*) Nyerere said the next day that the provisional government structure had been decided unilaterally, that Kissinger had inserted the white law and order ministry to satisfy Smith and that Kissinger should have known the proposal was unacceptable. (*Washington Post*, September 28, 29, 1976.) Congressman Diggs agreed with him. (*Washington Post*, September 29, 1976.) But William Rogers, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, insisted that things were "on track" altho the Presidents wanted still to talk over some major "details". Black Presidents "have their own domestic interests in terms of their rhetoric" but also a "legitimate concern" that the old government not re-emerge.

Meanwhile the British and American Secretaries of State for Africa were dispatched to Botswana where several of the frontline Presidents and Zimbabwe politicians were gathered to celebrate Botswana's Tenth An-

niversary on September 27th. Nkomo and Muzorewa were there seeing if they could patch things up. Nkomo and Mugabe were also conferring. But nobody could speak for the guerrillas, who insisted in a statement from Maputo: "We are determined to fight Kissinger's proposals to the bitter end. We are determined to wage a resolute armed struggle until final victory." (*Washington Post, New York Times*, October 2, 1976).

Our situation parallels that of the struggle in China, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam and other countries. We are political soldiers aimed to overthrow the system of exploitation in Zimbabwe.

Dinas Mashingura, member of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) High Command

At the UN General Assembly Kissinger attacked the Soviet Union bitterly for intervening in African affairs and backed a British call for a conference to form a transitional government and then a constitutional conference. But the question of parties was, who would come and how could the question of parties to it be solved in two weeks' time? (*Ibid*, October 2, 1976) Nyerere has said that the parties were authentic representatives of the Zimbabwe people. Meanwhile, London refused to believe that Mozambique would not stop the guerrillas fighting; Mozambique was said to be too impoverished to do without Western economic help. (*Washington Post*, September 28, 1976).

It seems probable that negotiations and counter-negotiations will go on now for some months, probably openly in Geneva, less openly in other capitals, African and Western. But whatever the other interests involved the Zimbabwean people seem likely to reject any settlement that comprises their chances of building a true independence.

As Tennyson A. Nyagumbo of the black Restaurant

and Hotel Workers Union put it, "We would like it [the Kissinger initiative] to fail. We will win this war and ensure our economic and political independence. If settle-

ment is imposed by the Americans and South Africans, we will not have true independence." ■

A Luta Continua

Angola

EFFORTS TO SABOTAGE ANGOLA CONTINUE

Reports of sporadic fighting in southern Angola and in the north between MPLA forces and the remnants of UNITA and FNLA continue. The Angolan Minister of Defense, Iko Carreira, has reported that the southern border with Namibia is constantly being violated by the South African regular army and by Portuguese mercenaries who are training and equipping FNLA and UNITA troops. The report indicated that the South Africans have a training base about 50 miles southeast of Mucusso in the Caprivi Strip from which operations aimed at southern Angola are being conducted. During one of these incursions a South African soldier was captured by FAPLA (Armed Forces of the MPLA) troops near the Namibian border. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Sept. 6, 1976) FAPLA forces now control the entire southern frontier and the province of Cuando-Cubango, which had been subject to attacks by South African and mercenary troops: (Radio Luanda, Sept. 5, 1976)

In the north the virtually defunct FNLA of Holden Roberto has been involved in last, desperate acts of sabotage against the Angolan population in Zaire province. Water, electricity and telephone communications were interrupted for a time at Mbanza Congo (formerly Sao Salvador) as a result of an FNLA attack. The FNLA also raided the hospital at Mbanza Congo, even stealing the mattresses, so that basic health care could not be provided to the region. (Radio Luanda, Sept. 2, 1976) It is clear that anti-Angolan forces in South Africa and the West have not abandoned the hope of destabilizing or weakening the MPLA government in Luanda.

President Agostinho Neto paid a week long visit to the south central town of Huambo, former capital of the FNLA-UNITA coalition government. He reiterated Angola's support for the Namibian people's national liberation struggle under the leadership of SWAPO. He said, "Following the example set by the socialist countries which rendered and are continuing to render unselfish aid to us, we must help the peoples who are fighting for their liberation in the south of Africa, especially SWAPO which is the sole legitimate representative of the people of Namibia". (*Daily World*, New York, Sept. 17, 1976)

SOCIALIST SOLIDARITY GROWS

The socialist countries are increasing their support of Angola. The German Democratic Republic has responded to the critical need for ground transport by supplying 200 trucks and 15 ambulances as a gift. The trucks will be used to transport coffee from Northern Angola to Luanda, and four GDR technicians also arrived to serve as the maintenance crew while they train Angolans for the job. (Radio Luanda, Aug. 27, 1976)

A Cuban forestry delegation has arrived in Cabinda to study the possibility of developing forestry industry in Angola. Cooperation between Cuba and Angola is expanding in the areas of cadre education, youth organization,

and union organization. The Cuban Union of Young Communists (UJC) and the MPLA Youth organization (JMPLA) have agreed to work together on the 11th World Youth and Student Festival to be held in Havana in 1978 and for the Second Pan-African Festival to be held in Cuba and Angola respectively. (Radio Havana, Aug. 19, 1976; Aug. 27, 1976)

In an important political speech Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento recently indicated that the MPLA will ultimately move to form a political party based on Marxism-Leninism. (*No Pintcha*, Guinea Bissau, Aug. 27, 1976)

PORTUGUESE SOCIALIST PARTY DELEGATION VISITS ANGOLA

A high ranking delegation from the Portuguese Socialist Party visited Angola in September and held talks with President Neto, Prime Minister do Nascimento, and other members of the Political Bureau and Central Committee. During the talks the Portuguese delegation indicated a great interest in the normalization of diplomatic and consular relations between Portugal and the PRA. While Angolan representatives reiterated their own wish for the restoration of relations, they indicated that certain Portuguese political parties and a section of the press had clearly been hostile to the MPLA government. Angola broke off relations with Portugal earlier this year when the Lisbon regime launched a campaign against the PRA after the nationalization of former Portuguese property in Angola.

Guinea-Bissau

EDUCATING FOR A NEW SOCIETY

This is the third report that Stephanie Urdang has written for Southern Africa since her return trip to Guinea-Bissau this past summer.

The Kwame Nkrumah Secondary School is a large two-story building adjacent to the Commission of Education in Bissau. As you enter, you cannot help but be struck by the alive atmosphere, where students mingle easily with teachers, many of whom are hardly older than the pupils themselves. Wall newspapers are taped to the walls commemorating the first year of Mozambique independence, or denouncing apartheid and the Soweto massacres and calling for the solidarity with the people of South Africa or explaining aspects of preventive medicine. A plaque in the small grass square in front of the school is dedicated to Titina Silla, one of the national heroes of Guinea-Bissau. She was a member of the Central Committee of PAIGC and a political worker for the North front before she was killed by Portuguese soldiers on her way to Amilcar Cabral's funeral in Conakry in 1973. Although the school buildings are old and rambling, the freshness of the atmosphere speaks to the excitement that I found in all aspects of education in Guinea-Bissau, as the government challenges the old colonial structures and

continues the transformation into a truly liberated society.

During the colonial period, the school had been the only secondary school in the country. It was a school that catered to the sons and daughters of the African "assimilated" (those considered sufficiently 'civilized' to be Portuguese) and the children of the small Portuguese community that had settled in Bissau. The Africans were educated to become part of the privileged elite to fill the civil service, an elite reflecting the colonial mentality that had been imposed upon them for decades. The students were taught by wives of Portuguese officers and studied in an environment that was alien to Guinea-Bissau. They learnt nothing about the history of their own country or continent and instead, struggled with the dates and events of the history of fascist Portugal. They absorbed values that entrenched their feelings of superiority and disdain for the majority of their country men and women. They were told, and generally believed, that PAIGC was not a liberation movement trying to free their people, but a band of terrorists who were trying to bring communism to Guinea-Bissau which would cause great suffering for the people in general and for themselves in particular.

When the new PAIGC government took over, it had to resist the temptation to abolish schools such as this and replace them with the system of education they had developed in the liberated zones. Without money, teachers and other cadres, without equipment and textbooks, this was impossible. As a result, there is a dual system of education operating in the country. There is on the one hand, the system inherited from the Portuguese administration, of which the Kwame Nkrumah school is part. On the other, existing side by side, are the PAIGC boarding schools, or *internatos*, which were developed in the liberated zone and reflect PAIGC ideology and the goal to produce a new generation of men and women.

The adoption of the old Portuguese system was a practical decision and certainly not an ideological one. A few months ago they launched an impressive six-year program to totally transform this system, year by year, until it reflects the ideology of PAIGC and can continue the education for a revolutionary society. Many more schools will be established in the process and the number of pupils attending intermediate and secondary schools will be vastly increased. By the end of six years they will have new textbooks—which will be introduced yearly—and a totally revised syllabus. For example, production, which is already encouraged on a voluntary basis, will be a regular school activity. Pupils throughout the school system will go out into the countryside for extended periods each year to work the land. This is to ensure that all the youth in the country, whether living in the towns or the countryside, understand the importance of agriculture for the country.

These are some of the extensive plans for the future. The present, just two years after independence, is a different picture. There is a great shortage of teachers, and many of the teachers have had no training at all. The primary school teachers in Bissau are almost all students at the Kwame Nkrumah school. A large number of students have been sent abroad to study teaching. One group of students went to Portugal to train there. For the last three months of their two year course they will go to Cuba in order to learn from their achievements in education. There is a chronic lack of textbooks and other teaching materials. Most of the texts that were used by the colonialists are unsuitable now and had to be thrown

out, particularly those for history and geography. The teachers at the Kwame Nkrumah school for instance, write all their own lessons, a task that is discussed collectively between them. These lessons will form the basis for the new textbooks still to be written. Often I would walk into the teachers' room to find a teacher pounding away on an old manual typewriter, preparing stencils for mimeoing for his or her lessons. Regularly, however, the school would run out of paper, and the teachers would then have to read out the text for the pupils to take down in their books before they could begin the lesson.

For much of my stay in Bissau, when I was not travelling in the countryside, my interpreter was a young PAIGC militant and an English teacher at the school, Lucette Tavares. Her pupils had been thoroughly imbued with the colonial mentality which was uncritical and resistant to thinking in a political way. She talked to me about her efforts to change this. For her English classes, she chose texts of African writers and of progressive writers from other continents as a basis for discussion. She chose not to use overtly political texts as some of the other teachers were doing. (One class I attended was reading a speech by Samora Machel.)

"What I would do", Lucette told me, "was to take a sentence from the text and begin a discussion around that. For instance, one African story had the sentence 'and the woman stood outside the door.' 'Why did the woman stand outside the door, away from the company of men?', I asked my class and we got into a discussion of the oppression of women. On another occasion we were discussing the well. I had a picture of women collecting water from the well which I showed to the class. This is a method we use—bringing a picture to class to get a discussion going and so practice English. 'Why are only women collecting water from the well?', I asked and again we began to talk about the role of women in our society. Sometimes these discussions could get very heated, but the most heated one I had was when we were reading a text about American Indians. A boy in the class made the comment, 'but Indians are lazy'. I said, 'OK, class, close your books. We'll stop the formal lesson right there.' For over an hour we had an intense discussion about these attitudes. I began by pointing out that this was exactly what the Portuguese had said about us. By the end of the discussion all the pupils agreed, and the boy tried to make out that this was not what he meant".

Although she felt her pace was slow, in the criticism session at the end of the term when pupils evaluate the teachers, she was criticized for being "too political". "They told me that they had come to class to learn English, not for political education!" From what I could see for myself and from what both teachers and other connected to the education system told me, the political consciousness of the pupils had improved considerably since independence.

This development of political consciousness does not present the same problem in the *internatos*. Over eighty per cent of the pupils in these schools were either in the *internatos* before independence or lived in the old liberated zones. They were part of the war and part of the political mobilization that was an ongoing process throughout the armed struggle. They are not resistant to the ideas of PAIGC because they are part of PAIGC.

There are presently ten *internatos* in the country—one secondary school, one nursery school, one primary school and the rest intermediary schools. The Friendship Insti-

tute, which, during the war, had been the umbrella organization for the two PAIGC secondary schools in Conakry and Senegal, expanded its work to develop and oversee the *interratos*. It operates as an autonomous unit within the Commission for Education.

I visited five of these schools and was very impressed by the students' spirit and their enthusiasm for their school and their country. The questions they asked me about South Africa and about the United States showed their high level of political consciousness and perspective on the world. The pupils themselves take care of all the organization, maintenance and discipline of the school. Teachers have no special authority outside of deciding on subject matter for their lessons. A six-member committee, elected by the students each year to have overall responsibility for running the school, is divided equally between the sexes, despite the fact that the percentage of girls still hovers between 25 and 30 per cent. This is a reality in a society which traditionally has not favored education for girls. The equal representation reflects their goal to bring the enrollment of girls up to 50 per cent. Two "political commissars", one boy and one girl, are chosen from the committee. Meetings of the student assembly are held once a week to discuss any problems that might have arisen during the week, to report on the Committee's work and to discuss any future changes or plans.

These two systems of education presently coexisting with each other and the two levels of political consciousness found among the pupils demonstrate the kind of contradictions confronting PAIGC and the government of Guinea-Bissau in their efforts to develop the country along a socialist path. For over ten years they worked at building a new society in the liberated zones to the point that they had established a rudimentary state. Suddenly at independence they inherited the state developed under Portuguese colonialism which was entirely at odds with the ideology of PAIGC. They have now embarked upon the task of developing a new integrated nation, based on the principles established in the liberated zones, and



Plaque to commemorate Titina Silla, one of Guinea's heroes, stands in front of the Kwame Nkrumah Secondary School in Bissau (Urdang)

continuing the political mobilization of the people to ensure their mass participation in order to reach their goal of a new society without exploitation of any kind. ■

THE BODY OF AMILCAR CABRAL IS RETURNED TO BISSAU


On September 2, 1976 at 4:30 PM the body of the PAIGC Secretary General Amilcar Cabral was brought home to Bissau from Canakry. Cabral was assassinated in Guinea (Conakry) on January 20, 1973 in a plot engineered by General Spínola of the Portuguese colonial government. Huge crowds were assembled at the Bissalanca airport some miles from Bissau to greet the body of this great patriot and leading revolutionary theoretician which has been placed in a special mausoleum in Bissau.

PAIGC CELEBRATES ITS 20th ANNIVERSARY

On September 19, 1976 the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) celebrated its founding, twenty years ago, at a secret meeting of six patriots in Bissau on September 19, 1956. Following the brutal Portuguese repression of any political opposition, culminating with the shooting of many striking dockworkers at Pijiguiti in 1959, the PAIGC was forced to undertake a rural guerrilla war which lasted more than a decade and ended in victory for the people. For the ceremonies, the leadership of both Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde assembled in the Guinean capitol of Bissau from August 27 to 31 while the Supreme Committee for the Struggle (CSL) met on various aspects of furthering the unity between the sister republics. Plans were also set for organizing the Third PAIGC Party Congress to be held July 26-31, 1977.

MORE REFUGEES RETURN

Operating in close coordination with the government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees moved into the second phase of its two-year returning refugee program. Last year approximately 65,000 Guinea-Bissau refugees went back to their home villages from camps in southern Senegal and northern Guinea (Conakry). The heavy rains of June 1975 forced many of the roads to be closed off in the first phase causing a halt in the program. Those who were able to resettle in Guinea-Bissau in 1975 were given basic agricultural equipment, seeds, and some building materials to facilitate their reintegration into the rural areas and to help forestall a mass drift from the farms into congested Bissau, the capitol. The 1976 operation was on a considerably smaller scale involving only about 15,000 additional refugees. Five trucks were donated to the UNHCR by the



A village, newly rebuilt by returning refugees (UNHCR)

United Kingdom while 40 other trucks were supplied by the Government of Guinea (Conakry). The program was funded by a \$4 million appeal launched by the UN High Commissioner in early 1975. Equipment for hospitals, schools, road-construction, dispensaries, and well-drilling is also included in the overall scheme. In an interview, Guinea-Bissau's President, Luis Cabral, stressed that "we are prepared to receive all our compatriots who are outside the country and who express a desire to return now that we are independent", but he added, "we are opposed to parasitism; people must be responsible and receive only what is absolutely indispensable so that they may start in normal conditions, with dignity and in a spirit of participation". (*Newsletter of the UN High Commission for Refugees*, New York, July 1976)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Expanded accords between Guinea and the Soviet Union have been signed in Bissau. These accords deal with the *Estrela do Mar* fishing boats which are jointly operated between the two nations with a program of gradual phase-out for Soviet ownership once Guinean fishermen are fully trained with the modern fishing equipment. The Soviet destroyer, *Bravo* arrived in Bissau for a friendship visit and the ship's officers placed a wreath on the Monument of the Martyrs of Colonialism. In the following days the Soviet sailors played in a football match with Guinean soldiers. Later a musical concert was held in their honor as a token of appreciation for the long-standing support given by the Soviet Union during the war years.

The Cuban Ambassador, Alfonso Perez Morales, submitted his credentials to the government of Cape Verde and stressed a relationship of friendship and solidarity. Representatives of the Cape Verde government thanked the Cuban Ambassador for their great and prolonged assistance during the armed struggle. A representative from the Peoples Republic of Angola visited Cape Verde and carried out talks on economic cooperation in a variety

of areas. (*No Pintcha*, Bissau, Aug. 24; Sept. 7, 1976)

The Republic of Guinea Bissau attended the conference of non-aligned countries held in Colombo, Sri Lanka in August. Long, feature-length articles were written for the mass circulation newspapers which gave great prominence to both the conference and the Republic's international policy. The governments of Cape Verde and Guinea continue to feature news items about Polisario which is fighting for the liberation of Western Sahara from neo-colonial forces under Morocco. International working class solidarity is also an important part of the foreign affairs policy.

IN BRIEF

In Bissau the taxi service has now been collectivized in view of the shortage of vehicles and the number of people who need urban transport. The new program appears to be gaining rapid support through a publicity campaign in the press.

INSIDE CAPE VERDE

Inside Cape Verde agricultural and political reconstruction continues at a steady pace. Special emphasis has focused on the islands of Sao Tiago, Santo Antao, and Brava for agricultural improvement, while the Cape Verdean Institute of Solidarity will begin construction of nursery schools on Sao Vicente, Sao Nicolau, Sal, and Fogo. Each school will serve 80-100 children. (*No Pintcha*, Bissau, Aug. 17, 19, 1976). A PAIGC party school will soon be in operation in Sao Tiago and a general meeting of JAAC (Amilcar Cabral African Youth) took place in the city at Sao Vicente. (*No Pintcha*, Bissau, Aug. 31, Sept. 7, 1976).

The best news for the islands was the report of some (approximately 50 mm) rainfall. However, much more is needed to put an end to the eight-year drought. The Supreme Council for the Struggle met in Bissau to discuss various proposals for drought relief. (*No Pintcha*, Bissau, Aug. 31, 1976; *Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Aug. 30, 1976) ■

U.S. and Southern Africa

MAJORITY OF HOUSE SUPPORTS NON-RECOGNITION OF TRANSKEI

On September 21 the House of Representatives voted 245 to 156 to urge the President not to grant diplomatic or other recognition to the Transkei. Although a substantial majority voted for the resolution, it failed to pass because it came to the floor under a rule allowing quick action but requiring a two-thirds majority vote. The measure was initiated by Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) who had recently returned from southern Africa. It received strong support from the Black Caucus and a lone Republican, Edward Biester, who is retiring at the end of the session. The South African Government lobbied against the measure, making particular use of members of Congress who had visited South Africa in the last 18 months, supposedly financed by the South African Foreign Affairs Association but organized largely by the SA government. These Representatives included Reps. Phil Crane, John Dent, Clair Burgener and William Ketchum.

DEBATE ON WITHDRAWAL REACHES THE SENATE

The debate over the role of US companies in South Africa was aired for the first time in the Senate during an eight-part set of hearings before Senator Dick Clark's African Affairs Subcommittee in September. Coincident with the uprisings in South Africa, the Congressional Black Caucus and Presidential contender Jimmy Carter have also raised this issue, and it could well be the subject of legislation in the next session of Congress.

Clark called the hearings to "examine the relationship between the conduct of US companies in South Africa and US national policy objectives." Witnesses ranged from advocates of withdrawal to supporters of increased investment. The first category included Jennifer Davis of the American Committee on Africa's Africa Fund, Horst Klainschmidt of the South African Christian Institute, and Tim Smith from the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility in Investment. The latter group included John McGoff, a conservative newspaper publisher and friend of South African Minister of Information Cornelius Mulder, and John Chettle of the South Africa Foundation. Eight representatives of US businesses and banks involved in South Africa also appeared, and all made the well-worn argument that US investment in South Africa strengthens the economy, provides jobs for blacks, and will eventually lead to social and political improvements.

Clark stated throughout the hearings that he had no "preconceived opinions" about whether US companies should withdraw or expand their involvement in South Africa. But the organization and content of the hearings demonstrated that he did have certain assumptions about the South African economy and the role of US companies in it. Clark accepted the corporate premises that foreign investment creates jobs, and that an expanded South African economy necessarily means improvements in living standards for blacks. He said that the question that remained was whether this positive contribution was outweighed by the political and social support foreign investment might give the apartheid regime. He also referred to the fact that US corporations in SA employ less than 100,000 workers in all. Although Clark said he

had not reached a conclusion on which aspect of corporate involvement was primary, the hearings gave much attention to the "positive" economic role that US companies play in providing an example of "enlightened" employment practices. Clark's follow-up will also focus on this aspect; he plans to send a questionnaire to US companies investing in South Africa (as Congressman Diggs did in 1973 after his extensive hearings on the topic) and to hold hearings on corporate involvement, annually to see whether business practices are improving. Clark also gave his strong support to the proposal for a Corporate Alliance for Black Progress made by Urban League President Vernon Jordan in August, which would encourage US companies to take a joint approach to "working within the system" of apartheid to change it.

Another objective of the Clark hearings was to provide Clark with data on which to decide what future directions US-South Africa policy should take. Clark used the hearings forum to give support to Kissinger's current shuttle diplomacy, but also laid out several options for increasing pressure on South Africa "to help us find a solution" which he would be prepared to advocate if the current negotiations fail. These options included mandatory economic sanctions, ending diplomatic relations with South Africa and giving assistance to SWAPO, Mozambique and "a radical regime in Zimbabwe." The main policy issue he seemed to be exploring was denying corporations tax credits for taxes paid to the South African government. In response, IBM stated that tax credits were not a "carrot" or "stick" but simply prevented double taxation, and the South African Foundation representative stressed how difficult it would be for companies to withdraw their capital if the end of tax credits forced them to withdraw. Senator Percy, who attended the early sessions of the hearing, came out in support of increased investment in South Africa.

The hearing did bring out some new information on economic relations with South Africa, principally on loans and Export-Import Bank facilities. Clark cited figures that showed that current US lending to South Africa amounts to nearly \$2 billion: \$672 million in short-term loans and \$181 million in medium-term loans from banks operating in the US (which had more than doubled since the end of 1974), and \$1.108 billion in loans from foreign branches of US banks. US banks have also managed \$150 million in South African bond offerings since the beginning of 1975. Citibank Executive Vice President George Vojta also acknowledged that Citibank is negotiating a \$300-million-plus loan to South Africa along with several other US banks.

Questioning of the Export-Import Bank centered on its relationship with the Private Export Funding Corporations (PEFCO), an association of 54 private institutions established by the Ex-Im Bank in 1971. PEFCO has made \$108 million in Ex-Im guaranteed loans to South African purchasers since its inception, more than 10% of its world-wide lending. Clark suggested that Ex-Im guarantees for these PEFCO transactions violated the spirit of the decade-old prohibition on Ex-Im direct loans involving South Africa. Clark also suggested that, partly because of the PEFCO lending, exports to South Africa had not suffered substantially because of the direct loan prohibi-

tion. To prove the point, Clark made public figures from a 1975 National Security Council study which indicated that the prohibition had resulted in an annual loss of only \$50 million in exports. (The NSC study recommended continued restrictions of Ex-Im financing despite opposition from one-quarter of the Senate, several corporations, and the Defense Department and Energy Research Development Agency, which is interested in South Africa's coal gasification technology.) Export-Import Bank financing involving South Africa currently stands at \$222 million, a more than fivefold increase since 1971. The recent increase is largely in short-term insurance of normal commercial transactions which private lenders are becoming less willing to cover because of the uprisings in South Africa, according to Ex-Im Senior Vice President Stephan Minikes.

US TO GIVE MOZAMBIQUE \$10 MILLION IN AID

Secretary Kissinger's April 17 pledge to give \$12.5 million to Mozambique to help compensate for its closing the border with Rhodesia created a five-month storm in Congress. Senator Allen of Alabama, the most skilled user of the filibuster technique to hold up business in the history of the Senate, lead the objections of arch conservatives to giving aid to a "Communist government". Their entire fight over the fiscal 1977 foreign aid bills was really bogus, however, since the Administration's original intent was to get the money out of already-appropriated 1976 funds. In September, Kissinger engineered a "compromise" by declaring that the aid would not come from the 1977 bill, even though he had never intended that it should. Thus the conservatives could say they succeeded in keeping the money out of the 1977 bill; the liberals could claim that Mozambique will get the funds and Kissinger's credibility won't be too badly damaged. Senator Allen's performance suggests that we can expect him to filibuster most controversial southern Africa bills in the near future, although Kissinger's politicking has temporarily won him backing from both camps.

POST-ANGOLA—KISSINGER SEEKS NEW ALLIES

Kissinger has learned at least one lesson from Angola: the necessity of consulting with Congress if he hopes to get their support for his southern Africa strategy. Throughout the recent negotiations surrounding Zimbabwe and Namibia he has met with several members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and various members of the Black Caucus. Immediately before his late-September trip to southern Africa, Kissinger met with 47 uniformly supportive Senators in a group organized by both liberals and conservatives.

Kissinger's strongest advocate has been Senator Percy (R-Ill.), who traveled to southern Africa in April. As a member of the African Affairs Subcommittee, he used the recent hearings on U.S. corporations in South Africa as a forum for rallying public support for Kissinger's "mission". Percy orated about the threat of an escalated war in Rhodesia during the rainy season which made the Kissinger trip so urgent. He tried to press Representative Andrew Young, the most influential black person in the Carter campaign, to get Carter to come out for a "bi-partisan", "American" solution (which Carter subsequently did).

Kissinger has also won support from Senator Clark, the strongest Senatorial critic of U.S. intervention in Angola. Clark said that the U.S. began a new Africa policy with Kissinger's April Lusaka speech which was a positive

attempt to abandon the 1970 "tar baby" option of National Security Council Memorandum (NSSM) 39. In this context he gave his blessing to the Kissinger trip, "although reluctantly", with one reservation: that the U.S. "initiative" "in no way inhibit our efforts and interest" in dealing with "the real heart of problems in southern Africa—the racial policies of South Africa itself". Clark has also suggested that he would support U.S. participation in a program of financial guarantees for white Rhodesian property and investment incentives (which could amount to half a billion dollars) as part of a negotiating plan. Clark said on September 26: Congress will "look very, very strong and very long at that kind of proposal. But . . . if I thought this would bring the two races together, it would be a very, very small amount indeed. You know, we spent a half a billion dollars a week in Vietnam, . . . that's less than the price of one-third of one Trident submarine, so we can afford peace." If Kissinger agrees to a guaranteed package, Congress will not be in session to authorize the money for it until it reconvenes in January. One liberal Senator told the Washington office on Africa that Congress would probably grant the money, just as it approved the \$2 billion Sinai Agreement two years ago.

Meanwhile Kissinger is also courting the black bourgeoisie. In early August he got the Rev. Jesse Jackson of Chicago, head of PUSH, to agree to meet with him in "dialogue" and to help him organize a constituency for his Africa policy. Jackson declared that Kissinger was "concerned" but "insensitive", suffering from "lack of dialogue." (*Washington Post*, August 4, 1976) On August 23rd, Jackson met Kissinger with a delegation of 8 prominent black Americans: Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton, Judge William Booth, President of the American Committee on Africa, Thelma Dailey, President of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, D.C. Councilman the Rev. Jerry Moore, Atlanta Attorney David Franklin and Dr. Thurman Evans of the D.C. School Board. Jackson's group told Kissinger they thought negotiations were not viable, that if they did not succeed, US should put pressure on Southern African governments by reducing trade and investment. They said that a delegation of American blacks should go to South Africa to talk to the detainees after Soweto under American sponsorship, that the US should admit refugees on parole status from Southern Africa, that travel by Americans to Southern Africa and travel to the USA from Southern Africa ought to be cut down. They were impressed by Kissinger's concern to avoid a "holocaust".

Later Jackson and a group of black Americans, including Franklin, Evans and black journalist Ethel Payne, and Samuel Jackson, former assistant secretary of HUD, met with a South African embassy official, Jeremy Shearer, to request visas and arrangements for a delegation of 25 American blacks, including labor leaders, businessmen, and congressional staff people to make a "complete assessment." They said they wanted to have complete access to government officials, students, detainees jailed after the recent fighting in South Africa, tribal leaders, and others. (*Washington Post*, Sept. 23, 1976)

In August Kissinger had also addressed two groups of black Americans who receive major contributions from US businesses: Urban League and Opportunities Industrial Corporation. (OIC gets AID money for vocational training in Africa.) Kissinger told his OIC audience in Philadelphia on August 31: "American trade and investment are crucial for Africa's development." He called for a substantial



Secretary of State Kissinger greets Chicago based leader Jesse Jackson in Washington to talk about Africa

increase in US aid, flow of technology and investments. He called South Africa an "African country", not an "illegitimate government" or "an outside colonial intrusion." He said the US should use all its influence to bring about "peaceful change, equality of opportunity, and basic human rights." (State Department Press Release No. 403.)

Vernon Jordan of the Urban League warned his cor-

porate donors that multi-nationals must use their "leverage" for economic and political justice in South Africa so as to change labor laws, to disobey petty apartheid and to institute affirmative action (*Amsterdam News* August 28th, 1976). This, of course, had been State Department doctrine for several years. (*Employment Practices of US Firms in South Africa*, 1973) ■

International Organizations

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY COLLABORATES WITH SOUTH AFRICA

In September, the Special Committee against Apartheid sought unsuccessfully to terminate collaboration with South Africa by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a United Nations specialized agency. The Committee, informed that the nuclear reactors recently sold by France to South Africa were to be placed under IAEA safeguards, appealed to the Agency to take action to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment or fissionable material to South Africa. However, at its annual meeting, the Governing Board of IAEA (of which South Africa is a member) proceeded to ignore the request and approved the safeguards agreements despite condemnation of nuclear collaboration with South Africa by a number of countries. In the subsequent meeting of the General Conference of IAEA, the Nigerian representative attacked the presence of South Africa as a permanent

member of the Board and as a participant in the Conference. He proposed that the Conference refuse to recognize the representatives of the racist regime, and that it direct the Board to desist from further designating South Africa to the Board and to reconsider South Africa's membership in the Agency. The Board was requested to report back to the Conference at its next session in 1977. Meanwhile, however, South Africa remains both a member of the Agency and a member of the Board. (UN document A/AC.115/SR.329; press release IAEA/895)

ANGOLA BECOMES UNESCO MEMBER

The People's Republic of Angola was admitted to membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on September 28. Angola's application, which was presented by a group of African, Asian and Socialist countries, was approved by a vote of 34 in favour to none against, with one abstention.

(the United States). (UN press release UNESCO/2210)

APARTHEID COMMITTEE REJECTS KISSINGER MANEUVERS

In a recent meeting of the Special Committee against Apartheid, the Chairman, Ambassador Leslie Harriman of Nigeria, recapitulated the position of the Committee on the situation in South Africa, with special reference to the meetings between Kissinger and Vorster. He summarized this position, which has been embodied in a number of United Nations resolutions and confirmed by the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries, as follows:

Firstly, in order to assist the struggle of the people of South Africa, it is necessary to isolate the apartheid regime, to end all collaboration with it and to provide the necessary assistance to the liberation movements. Secondly, the apartheid regime is immune to persuasion, as proved by the painful experience of the last 28 years. Thirdly, the only meaningful dialogue has to be between the South African regime and the liberation movements, on the basis of the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations. Fourthly, the Special Committee cannot countenance any deals under which apartheid is consolidated in South Africa in return for some progress on Namibia and Zimbabwe. Fifthly, the order of priorities is of fundamental importance. For the United States, the

danger of Soviet or Cuban involvement in Southern Africa is a more important determinant of policy than a commitment to freedom in South Africa. Any attempt to divide the ranks of the opponents of apartheid and to deprive the liberation movements of support is a grave disservice to the cause of liberation. Southern Africa is a part of Africa and consequently of the non-aligned world. Any attempt to inject "cold war" considerations into the situation must be energetically opposed. Sixthly, it is obvious that apartheid cannot be reformed, but must be totally eradicated. The so-called reforms of the regime are in fact Machiavellian maneuvers to consolidate racism. Vorster has made it sufficiently clear that his idea of how to end discrimination is not to abolish apartheid but to apply it more speedily. No form of compromise will be accepted either by the people of South Africa or by the rest of the world. Lastly, there is a great difference between the civil rights movement in the United States and the struggle in South Africa, the latter being a struggle for national liberation by the great majority of the South African people, whose legitimate representatives are the national liberation movements. Only in consultation with them, in the context of the relevant United Nations resolutions, should governments and organizations take measures with regard to South Africa. (UN document A/AC.115/SR.328) ■'

resources

"U.S. Policy Toward Africa", hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs in March and May, 1976. Topics covered include "Major powers in southern Africa after Angola," Kissinger's report on his April southern Africa trip, and sale of nuclear reactors to South Africa. Available from Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4229 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., 20510.

"Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance Committee Report on Southern Africa", by Frank Balance and Constance Freeman. Available from Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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Books and Pamphlets Received:

International Commission of Jurists, *Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1976. Paperback, £ 1.

Thoko Mbanjwa (ed.), *Black Review 1974/5*. Black Community Programmes, 1975.

Bjorn Beckman, *Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana*. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976. Paperback.

Martin Igbozurike, *Problem-Generating Structures in Nigeria's Rural Development*. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976. Paperback.

Anthony Clayton, *The 1948 Zanzibar General Strike* (research report no. 32). Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976. Paperback.

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Jorgen Lissner (ed.), *Namibia 1975: Hope, Fear and Ambiguity*, Geneva: Lutheran World Federation Department of Studies, 1976. Paperback; \$5.00.

The Church in the Third World, Third World Reader Service, May-June Double Issue. (1500 Farragut St. N.W., Washington D.C. 20011.)

Susan Hurlich, "Up Against the Bay: Resource Imperialism and Native Resistance," TCLSAC Paper No. nine. (Available from TCLSAC, 121 Ave. Rd., Toronto, Ontario, Canada.)

FILMS

A listing of 43 selected socio-political films on southern Africa has been prepared by the African Studies Program of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. A project to write a review article of the best socio-political films currently available on Southern Africa is in process. Requests for the film listing and enquiries concerning the review pro-

ject and all Southern Africa films are welcome and should be directed to the African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1450 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.

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