



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VOLUME IX NO. 5 MAY 1976
JUN 2 1976

FOCUS ON NAMIBIA



Headlines illustrate intensifying of struggle in Namibia. Here migrant workers are bomb police dorms.

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About the April Issue. . . .

We wish to assure readers of the April *Southern Africa* that the issue was not designed as an April Fool's trick, a sanity test or an exercise in political education. Pages 24 and 26, neither of which are numbered, are reversed. Page 24 is page 26, and vice versa.

Sorry. . . .

A Call to All New York and Vicinity Readers

We need to develop a list of supporters that we can call on for occasional assistance in getting out promotional mailings, renewal notices, etc. and in doing other types of work where a large number of hands can cut down tremendously on the number of hours required. Are you willing to put your name on such a list? If so, please drop us a card with your address, telephone number, and days or evenings you are most likely to be available.

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OVERVIEW

Namibia is being swept by an increasing number of insurgent actions, including several "abductions" which the Windhoek *Advertiser* describes as the work of "Swapo terrorists". A headman in the Owambo Bantustan on the northern border disappeared in late March. A construction foreman and German citizen employed at Oshandi 4 miles from the Angola border was kidnapped about the same time. A South African soldier was abducted near the border. On April 7 two people were captured during a raid on a shop in Owambo, and two days later Owambo chief minister Cornelius Ndjoba reports another fight involving SWAPO.

With increasing concern the Windhoek paper commented in early April that the South African Police have not yet handed in inquest documents on "five political murders of the past eight months", beginning with the assassination of former Owambo chief minister Filemon Elifas.

All these 'incidents' reflect the growing power of SWAPO, the increasing militancy of the Namibian people.

South Africa is trying hard to contain the situation by a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand increasing militarisation and repression—thousands of soldiers in northern Namibia and constant political arrests, trials and harassment. On the other hand the attempt at political co-option which is now in process at the so-called Constitutional Conference in Windhoek.

Yet even that conference now reflects the determination of the people of Namibia to win their freedom and independence. Composed of only those elements South Africa believed would be totally compliant, deliberately excluding all "political" groups such as SWAPO, the conference members are being pushed by the militancy of their "people back home" to take relatively strong posi-

tions . . . including an attack on all apartheid laws, calls for 'one man one vote' and other such heresies.

In this context of developing mass consciousness the United States is once again shaping up a policy on the side of the minimum change possible. Recognising that some change will have to come, that current realities will make it impossible to defend continuing direct South African control in the area, the US appears to be developing the argument that the Constitutional conference—is at least "a beginning" and should be given support. Behind the scenes the US is obviously hoping that the conference will produce enough, possibly even ultimately pulling in the most moderate of some former SWAPO supporters, to justify recognition as the future black leadership—to the exclusion of SWAPO.

Once again the US is refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of a liberation movement, is seeking alternative, more "moderate" forces to back. These are the first steps down the road to increasingly massive intervention against the popular struggle. It is not difficult to draw a scenario—the conference results in a constitution, elections are called, SWAPO refuses to participate in the fraud, the elections are held, now there is a new "legitimate authority", SWAPO continues its armed struggle—and is condemned as fighting not against the South Africans, but against the new Namibian Government. That Government calls for assistance, and no doubt the US, or a local friend, with US dollars and guns, will be happy to oblige.

US refusal to give unconditional support to SWAPO in the Namibian situation threatens the future of the Namibian people. It should be challenged and exposed before the supply lines are opened once again, this time to Windhoek instead of Kinshasa and Huambo as in the Angolan struggle.

FOCUS ON NAMIBIA

by Patrick Smith

With the triumph of the People's Republic of Angola to the north, the 600,000 people of Namibia now have some 1000 miles of border with a strong ally where once they were surrounded by closely cooperating racist and colonialist regimes—the Portuguese in Angola, and South Africa, which continues its illegal occupation of the Namibian nation.

"The independence of Angola, under the government led by the MPLA, has changed the whole situation," according to Ben Gurirab, the UN representative of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the liberation front waging armed struggle against South Africa. "Many of our supplies are going to come through Luanda and other ports all along the coast of Angola. That will mean that the struggle will expand; there will be more intensified guerrilla warfare. That is the strategy. How large the guerrilla warfare will expand will depend upon the response from South Africa."

That response so far has been to launch an immediate call for "peace and order at all costs" in Namibia. After

their humiliating defeat, the 7000 troops that had been committed to Angola have pulled back only into northern Namibia, boosting the total military force there to some 20,000 troops. From this alone, it is clear that the South Africans intend to prolong their occupation as long as it is possible to do so.

The history of that occupation is the history of what may be the most rampant and repressive exploitation of people and natural resources ever experienced by an African nation.

Colonized by Germany in 1884, Namibia was invaded by South African troops in World War I. By 1915, the territory was completely occupied in the name of the British commonwealth. At the war's end, the League of Nations named South Africa as the protectorate of Namibia, to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the territory."

Black workers' "canteen" outside a fish factory in Walvis Bay (UN)



REPRESSIVE REGULATIONS

But South Africa wasted no time in implementing what would soon become a network of strongly repressive regulations in Namibia. The speed with which these measures were effected has resulted in the extremely strong hold Pretoria has exercised over the territory; it also indicates that South Africa's intentions were no different from the first—to colonize the territory by then known as South West Africa and to integrate it fully into the South African settler state. Although the apartheid system of "separate development" did not come into being as an official government policy until the 1950s, 1922—two years after South Africa accepted its mandate—saw the institution of a rigid curfew whereby Namibians were not permitted in public from 9 pm until 5 am daily. The pass system that still controls the every move of the black African was also quickly imposed; an all-white legislature was created in the first five years of the occupation; and by 1929, the Caprivi Strip, the north-westernmost portion of the country, was declared a military region.

With the demise of the League of Nations in 1939, South Africa continued its claim on the territory, maintaining that "the spirit of the mandate" still applied, while the authority of the League did not carry over to the UN. Accordingly, South Africa discontinued the annual reports on the territory that had been required by the League. Years of increasingly sharp contention between South Africa and the UN ensued.

In 1966, the International Court of Justice—in a test case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa—failed to rule on the occupation. But this setback to the Namibian struggle was followed months later by the UN General Assembly's declaration that South Africa's rule was illegal.

To SWAPO and the Namibian people, the 1966 UN decision represented the achievement of one of their primary objectives of the period. Ever since the League of Nations permitted South Africa to occupy Namibia, a strong current of feeling among Namibians has held the League and its successor responsible for the ruthless colonization of their land. From 1962 until 1966, when SWAPO launched its armed struggle, one of SWAPO's aims was to draw attention to its cause and to galvanize international opinion in its favor.

'CONTRACT LABOR'

South Africa, of course, has ignored the UN ruling. During the past decade it has continued to impose its rigid social and economic system in the captive, mineral-rich territory. Under South African rule, Namibians have been faced with brutal living and working conditions, the backbone of which is the system known as "contract labor." Implemented by the South West African Labor Association (SWANLA), a body of white employers charged with the recruitment of Namibian labor, the contract system is the only means by which 50% of the Namibian work force can obtain employment.

Namibia's 90,000 workers are divided roughly in half, according to a 1974 survey conducted by the Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia, between contract and non-contract workers. It is an important distinction. Contract workers are those who have been forced to live in one of Namibia's eight "homelands"—poor tracts of land comprising 43% of

Namibia's area, on which 80% of its population lives. Additionally, four of every 10 contract workers in 1974 was an Angolan who had come to Namibia to find work. Non-contract workers are those who, by virtue of their birth, have been permitted to live in equally poor sectors of the "police zone"—that southern two-thirds of Namibia largely occupied by the 80,000 white settlers of German and Afrikaner descent.

For Namibian contract workers, there is little or no employment in the "bantustans," or homelands, where they and their families have been herded and forced to live. In Damaraland, a large portion of which occupies the arid Namib Desert in the north central coastal region, unemployment is 100%, the only mining operation present employing workers on contract from other "bantustans."

The Bantustan Investment Corporation, the government-controlled board that oversees the development of "bantustan" economies, has so far provided a total of nine loans for economic development for Ovamboland, Namibia's largest "bantustan." Developed concerns there have employed 587 people to date, while the area provides the police zone with some 23,000 contract workers. Unemployment runs to 75% in Ovamboland, with the result that over 10,000 workers daily have been reported to have waited in the SWANLA offices where they are screened for political reasons, designated "A," "B" or "C" grade workers, and—if fortunate—offered a contract.

"Taking up the contract" is a way of life for the Namibian worker. Signing a 12-month agreement (which can be extended to 18 months), the contract worker is assigned a job, an employer and a region in the police zone without choice. During the contract period, the worker must live in all-male housing compounds provided by the employer in the case of agricultural workers, and by the government in the case of urban and industrial workers. Forced to leave his family in the "homeland," there are no circumstances in which the worker may break the contract, although the employer may terminate it virtually at will. When the contract is up, the worker returns to his "homeland," where he remains until he finds another contract. Beginning this process in their teens or early 20s, workers have recounted 20 or more contract periods; others have told observers that they can no longer remember the number of contracts they have taken.

WORSE THAN SOUTH AFRICA

Working conditions and wages in Namibia, a 1974 university study has pointed out, are worse even than those in South Africa. And of the work available to the contract worker, farm labor has been designated as the worst of all. In 1971, the white-controlled agricultural industry (Namibians themselves are prohibited by law from selling their own farm products) employed some 30,000 contract and non-contract workers, each of whom earned an average wage of \$12 a month. Contract workers averaged \$7 to \$10 a month, in addition to weekly food rations that cost the employer approximately \$5 to \$8 per month. With the exception of karakul sheep farm workers, whose shepherding work is virtually a 24-hour-a-day job, farmworkers put in a 55 to 70 hour week. Since the Farmers' Employers' Association has effectively eliminated wage competition on even the most minimal level among white farmers, farm workers' wages represent the



Black workers' compound at Tsumeb Mines—no families allowed

lowest in the territory. Namibia's 12,800 contract mine-workers earn a minimum wage of \$30 a month; construction workers, whose numbers are not made available by the government, earn seven cents an hour; other urban workers average between \$25 and \$60 monthly, according to a 1968 government survey conducted in Windhoek, the capital.

For the contract worker's family, that portion of his wages he is able to save is the sole source of cash income. However, once it is noted that the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) established for Windhoek by the South African administration is approximately \$93 monthly for a family of five, it becomes clear that the contract system of labor is a cycle that few workers can escape. The vast majority of workers earn less than half the subsistence wage established by government planners.

'MY CHILDREN DON'T KNOW ME'

As a rule, the young worker must take his first contract within the first 12 months after his marriage, which means that the worker is often absent for the birth of his first child. It is not unusual for a friend or relative of the worker to stand-in for him at a young child's baptism. "Because of the contract, my children don't know me," a worker complained to a Finnish missionary active in Ovamboland. "When I return home, my children flee from me." Another worker confessed: "I have become a stranger to my own children."

These and thousands of other personal experiences of workers reveal how effectively the "bantustan" system and contract labor system work to break down the black Namibian's most fundamental social ties. The result is the creation of a vast reserve of rootless, underfed, diseased and alienated people which functions as a limitless supply of unorganized, virtually slave labor.

Crucial to the maintenance of these economic, social and political realities are the numerous foreign firms that have invested in South African industrial projects in Namibia. The majority of these firms, for example, pay their workers slightly more than half the PDL, while

creating an economy that is highly export-oriented. South Africa's Financial Mail has described this economy as being "operated in colonial style with South Africa the imperial power and with most of the spoils of fishing and mining sucked out by foreign firms."

"There are over 60 multinational corporations engaged in the depletion of our natural resources," Ben Gurirab explained in New York recently. "Through the apartheid system, South Africa has made it possible for these companies to invest and reap huge profits. They are participating with South Africa in a deliberate effort to deplete the natural resources of Namibia. We have said many times that after the liberation of Namibia, perhaps we will be left with a country without any natural resources, even though we are so well endowed with them. This is precisely the South African strategy—to deplete the country of its natural resources in order to make us dependent on South Africa after we achieve our independence."

The chief investors in the theft of Namibian raw materials—the UN has ruled that goods exported from the territory are considered to be stolen—are the U.S., Canada, Britain, West Germany and, to a lesser extent, France. In 1971, U.S. investment alone totaled some \$45 million, and according to visible trends, this figure has increased considerably since then. The bulk of this investment lies in fishing, where the American corporation Del Monte has significant interests, and mining, in which two of the largest corporations operating in Namibia are U.S.-owned: Newmont Mining and American Metal Climax (AMAX). At its vast operation in the north central region, the Tsumeb mine, AMAX mines copper, lead, zinc and other base metals. Further to the south, U.S. corporations have considerable holdings in diamond exploitation.

Another multinational, a joint venture controlled by U.S., British and French interests, is Rossing Uranium. Located on Namibia's Atlantic coast north of Swakopmund, the project will cost close to \$2 billion when it is completed. It will be the largest opencast mining project in Southern Africa when it begins production of 1000

tons of uranium per year in July 1976. By 1980, the project will employ over 1000 contract workers, for whom compound housing is now being erected 40 miles from the nearest town.

The background of the Rossing Uranium project reveals clearly how South Africa is attempting to integrate Namibia into its economy and how multinational corporations are assisting in this operation. Financed by the South African government agency, the Industrial Development Corporation, itself backed by a consortium of New York banks, production commitments at Rossing have already been made through the 1980s. Numerous American corporations have been awarded large contracts for the construction of water and electricity facilities for the mining operation and the town of Swakopmund. The source of the mine's power will be the Cunene River dam project, which is actually located in Angola. It was on the pretext of "protecting" this dam that South Africa first invaded Angola.

While the South African government continues to maintain that it will "gain nothing" from the Cunene dam's hydroelectric scheme, and that it is "exclusively for the benefit of the blacks of South West Africa and Angola," electrical power grids have already been constructed between the dam and Rossing plants. Constructed by an American firm under the auspices of SWAWEK, the South West African Water and Electricity Corporation, these grids will eventually extend into South Africa itself and contribute to the integration of the two economies.

One of the first manifestations of popular resistance to South Africa's complete control over every facet of Namibian life took place in 1959, around the forced removal of nearly 7000 Namibians from their dwellings in Windhoek. Henceforward, 1700 permanent residents would be housed in a crowded compound outside of Windhoek known as Katutura—a Herero word meaning "we have no permanent resting place." Additionally, 5000 Ovambo contract workers were housed in a single concrete shell just south of the Katutura township.

Built by the administration, houses in Katutura were rented to their tenants for the sum of \$4 a month—in

many cases, over half of the monthly wage. Additionally, the forced removal to a dry, barren tract some distance from town prevented the cultivation of vegetable gardens so essential to the Namibians' meager diet, and workers were forced to spend about 40% of their monthly wages on transportation to their workplaces. Facilities were completely inadequate in the houses, where there was no heat, electricity or water. But here is what the white mayor of Windhoek quoted in the *Windhoek Advertiser* stated on the subject: "In the Republic [of South Africa] the care of the destitute is financed on the profit on beer sales. Unfortunately, in Windhoek the same conditions do not prevail and there is no profit on beer sales, as a result of which the city did not have the funds to undertake welfare services on the scale it should."

Of the concrete housing for Ovambo contract workers, originally built for 3000 workers, a reporter for the *Manchester Guardian* wrote in May 1973: "Five thousand Ovambos are being housed in circumstances that would disgrace a nineteenth century prison. . . . A visitor can only be appalled by the compound's unrelieved bleakness; the barbed wire fences; the concrete bunks in dark, overcrowded rooms in which up to 20 men sleep; the food being prepared with spades and pitchforks; above all, the overwhelming stench of urine which hangs over the compound."


POPULAR RESISTANCE

Mass demonstrations resulted from the forced removals to these locations in 1959. In suppressing the uprising, police killed 13 Namibians and wounded another 60. The event was important as the first violent confrontation with South African police by a mass body of people. Twelve years later, Katutura would again be the site of mass demonstrations, when some 15,000 workers went on strike to protest the contract labor system. Lasting over a month, the strike spread quickly to all parts of Namibia, paralyzing the white economy. Finally, the administration agreed to eliminate SWANLA as the employer-controlled body that controlled the labor system, but it was replaced by an identical system with a different name.

In the long run, employers took advantage of the occasion to solidify their hold on the labor system; and political repression increased sharply. But the workers won for themselves a new sense of mass unity, while failing to achieve their immediate demands.

But the popular resistance that surfaced in Windhoek in 1959 had been preceded by several years of activity by those who would eventually found SWAPO. The predecessor of SWAPO, the Ovambo People's Organization (OPO), had been founded in 1955, essentially out of the need to abolish the contract labor system. The bulk of contract workers, even today, are of the Ovambo tribe in northern Namibia. Ovambos were sent on contract not only into southern Namibia's police zone, but also into South Africa itself.

"This was an era during which nationalism was very strong on the African continent," Ben Gurirab explained. "That fervor of nationalism was more pronounced in South Africa itself; one of the advantages of South Africa was that there was an old black liberation movement, the African National Congress [ANC], which was active as early as 1912. It was through ANC contacts that many of our early members were politicized. They were finding one another all over South Africa, particularly in Cape



SWAPO President Sam Nujoma

province, where SWAPO was finally formed. There they had discussions of Namibian history, but they still didn't know what they should do about the problems in Namibia.

The early concentration of the OPO on the contract labor system was soon broadened to take in the apartheid system as a whole and eventually the entire colonial system of the South African government. This progressed the OPO to see the need for a nationally based organization, and to the realization that OPO did not meet all the needs of the Namibian people's struggle. Even though OPO itself had by that time acquired members from numerous tribal groups, SWAPO was formed in early 1960. It was to become, in the words of one of its early cadres, the present minister of information, Andreas Shipanga, a "broad-based popular front leading the struggle for freedom and independence for the whole Namibian people."

"Even before we started fighting, we tried to establish a political infrastructure through which we could maintain contact with people inside Namibia," Gurirab has said. "We would go from region to region to organize people, setting up political structures, branches and the smallest units, which were cells. . . ."

MOVE TO ARMED STRUGGLE

The events around the 1959 Katutura shootings were important in SWAPO's evolution toward armed struggle, which began seven years later. As early as 1961 at SWAPO's national congress in Windhoek, the decision to prepare for eventual armed conflict in Namibia had been taken. In 1962, SWAPO's first cadres were sent abroad to train in friendly African nations—first in Egypt, the only independent African nation capable of offering such training at the time, and then in Algeria. In 1963, when the Organization of African Unity was formed, its Liberation Committee immediately declared its support for SWAPO's approaching armed struggle.

The intervening years were important to SWAPO's internal organization. Networks were created to receive and shelter returning guerrillas and provisions had to be made for the newly trained fighters to train others. In August 1966, when the armed struggle began with an attack at Nkurumbaje, Namibia's borders with Angola and Zambia were closed. But the contract labor system had forced the frequent rotation of SWAPO cadres and national branch leaders, who were constantly replaced by others in each region. This produced a strong leadership and organization, and SWAPO was able to rely on a highly developed internal network of support.

The decision to begin armed struggle was the result of a "new phase which the whole of southern Africa has undergone," Gurirab explained. "The liberation move-

ment in Angola had already started fighting—in 1961; the liberation movement in Mozambique, Frelimo, had started armed struggle in 1964; the people of Zimbabwe [Rhodesia] were organizing, although they had more difficulties, like us.

"We decided then that the situations that confronted us in the Portuguese colonies of southern Africa, in South Africa itself and in Namibia and Zimbabwe were qualitatively different from the situations that had existed in other liberated African countries," Gurirab continued. "Here we had to deal with entrenched white minority settler communities that also regarded themselves as indigenous. Their economic stakes were much higher than they had been in other African countries. We considered all these factors and then decided that nonviolence was not going to be the answer against colonial police and regular armies."

After the events of August 1966, the colonial administration replaced its special forces police units in northern Namibia with regular army troops, and introduced one repressive law after another aimed at destroying SWAPO. Hundreds of SWAPO cadres were arrested, and the administration, recognizing SWAPO's overwhelming popular support and the unity it was capable of achieving, excluded SWAPO from any of its "constitutional talks" with the "bantustan" chiefs who had been hand-picked by South African officials to "represent" the Namibian people. Yet SWAPO remains today a "legal" organization in Namibia.

"In theory, SWAPO is a legal organization," Gurirab said, "but practically, it is a banned organization, because for any political meeting that we organize, we must obtain a permit. Under any pretext, the permit can be denied. If any of our officials want to go from one region to another, he has to obtain a permit and then he will be bombarded with all kinds of questions, even though it is known that he is a political leader of SWAPO. Whatever we try to do by way of openly organizing people is circumscribed by the apartheid laws. This is again strengthened by the 'bantustan' system, which physically fragments a country along tribal lines."

"But as far as we are concerned now," Gurirab concluded, "armed struggle is the primary activity of SWAPO. We are going to get more military supplies now. We are going to get support and facilities from the MPLA government in Angola. The armed struggle can only intensify and increase. We have that long border with Angola now, and there is no way South Africa can barricade itself fully against our efforts. . . ."

This is a slightly edited version of an article that first appeared in the Guardian, March 31, 1976. We thank the Guardian, for permission to reprint it.

SWAPO guerilla fighters in training (Hsinhua News Agency)



South Africa

Politics

THOUSANDS DEMONSTRATE IN JOHANNESBURG

Police clashed with workers in Johannesburg following a demonstration outside the Rand Supreme Court where six men and a woman are standing trial under the Terrorism Act. The seven are charged with conspiring to bring about revolutionary change in South Africa.

In the afternoon when the seven defendants were taken away from the court in a police van a crowd of about 500 blocked the street, gave clenched fist salutes and shouted black power slogans. Leaflets appeared signed by the African National Congress, a South African liberation movement. The demonstrators then moved toward the railway station where their numbers were increased to several thousand by workers on their way home. For the next several hours the demonstrators clashed with police who drew their guns. A number of people were arrested and injured but no one was killed.

Among those arrested was Jarius Kgokong of Soweto, the black township, allegedly for distributing leaflets. Mr. Kgokong, a former official of the South African Students Organization, had testified in the trial that when he was recently detained he had been tortured and forced to sign a false statement under threat of death from the Security Police. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 20, 1976; *Africa News*, Durham, March 29, 1976.)

On March 21, several thousand people in Soweto held ceremonies marking the 16th anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre when police opened fire into a crowd of people peacefully demonstrating against passbooks. Seventy people were killed and many injured. The demonstration this March 21st is part of a rising militancy among Blacks in South Africa since the defeat of Portuguese colonialism. (*Africa News*, Durham, March 29, 1976.)



A Johannesburg policeman arrests demonstrators outside Rand Supreme Court

NEW BUS BOYCOTT

The African population of Springs (a town about 20 miles from Johannesburg) have reacted to a 50% bus fare increase by launching a bus boycott. Rather than pay the new fare for the ride from their "township" the black population has been walking to work some six miles each day and home again at night. A few car-owners have been trying to drive people to work but the police have been stopping them, demanding proof that they were not collecting fares.

Bus boycotts are a traditional means of resistance in South Africa. Last October a similar boycott in Newcastle was successful in turning back a fare increase. As of the latest reports the boycott was continuing.

BOPHUTHATSWANA "INDEPENDENCE"

The South African government is moving ahead with plans to give the Bophuthatswana "homeland" independence. While no date as yet has been set "independence" will take place "as soon as possible" according to a joint statement issued in Cape Town by Prime Minister B.J. Vorster and Bophuthatswana Chief Minister Lucas Mangope. Mangope will probably be the first "Prime Minister" of the Bantustan.

The policy of granting "independence" to the Bantustans is part of South Africa's apartheid system. Bophuthatswana will be the second of the ten Bantustans to become "independent" with the Transkei set to become independent in October of this year. A bill enabling Bophuthatswanan independence will be passed in early 1977.

Bophuthatswana, like most other Bantustans, consists of many non-contiguous land fragments. The total Bantustan land area is currently made up of over 100 separate land fragments. Plans have been drawn up to consolidate these into 36 areas, but Bophuthatswana will still consist of six disconnected fragments. Presently Bophuthatswana covers 37,540 square km.

Bantustan "independence" has been rejected as a fraud by the majority of the African population. The South African liberation movements, the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations have already stated that they do not recognize such independence.

The fact that South Africa is a single economic unit shows clearly that such independence is a fraud. Of the \$90 million spent on investment in the Bantustans by the Bantu Investment Corporation since 1959, only 18 per cent was in African owned enterprises. This reflects the white ownership of the major enterprises in the "homelands." And according to a survey published in late 1975, more than 90 per cent of the income of the "citizens" of Bophuthatswana is earned outside the homeland, including some R230 million (\$264.5 million by current exchange value) earned by citizens "permanently absent" from the homeland. Less than 1/3 of the Tswana population live in the homeland. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975, Feb. 28, 1976; *South African Digest*, March 5, 1976; *Comment & Opinion* March 5, 1976; "The South African Bantustan Program: Its Domestic and International

al Implications" by British Anti-Apartheid Movement, *Notes and Documents* No. 36/75 Unit on Apartheid, United Nations; *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, Oct. 10, 1975.)

BUTHELEZI-NAUDE STATEMENT

"A radical redistribution of wealth, land and political power is essential for the establishment of a stable and moral society in South Africa," declared Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Beyers Naude in a joint statement on March 10th. In the statement they rejected "capitalist paternalism" which is doomed "because the needy millions of South Africa require for themselves the liberation they witness amongst their brothers in neighbouring states." Thus they concluded, "Foreign investment in the central economy is devoid of all morality," and called for "a National Convention in which Blacks in South Africa can speak for themselves on the matter of foreign investment." Buthelezi is Chief Minister of the Kwazulu Bantustan and Beyers Naude is associated with the Christian Institute.

This appears to represent a shift in position for both men. Buthelezi declared in 1973, "Those who advocate trade sanctions and economic withdrawal to help my people and punish whites in South Africa may be killing us with kindness. What we need in South Africa is not disengagement, but full participation in South Africa's overall economic development to create more jobs. . . . I am no apologist for apartheid, but a realist who knows that a job may make the difference between living or starving for many black families."

The South African liberation movements, the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, have long called for the withdrawal of all foreign investment. In 1972 the Black People's Convention passed a resolution "to reject the involvement of foreign investors in this exploitative system," and the black South Africa Students' Organization (SASO) issued a statement saying, "SASO sees foreign investments as giving stability to South Africa's exploitative regime and committing South

Africa's trading partners to supporting this regime. For this reason SASO rejects foreign investments."

However, it is not clear from the Buthelezi-Naude statement whether they oppose all foreign investment in the whole of South Africa. They are clearly opposed to "foreign investment in the central economy." This leaves open the implication that South Africa actually has two economies: the central economy (i.e. white areas) and a peripheral economy (i.e. the Bantustans). In actuality, South Africa has one integrated economy. But accepting a dual economy thesis could lead to the argument that the "redistribution of wealth" means more investments in Bantustan areas.

The Terrorism Act makes advocacy of economic sanctions a crime punishable by five years in prison as a minimum sentence and death as the maximum. While the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress are illegal organizations in South Africa and the leaders of the Black People's Convention and the South African Students Organization are constantly harrassed, arrested, detained, and banned, the Government has so far taken no action against Buthelezi.

For a long time the South African Government has allowed Buthelezi to make loud anti-Government statements. The South African Government has, in fact, slowly been allowing a small black elite to develop. This group includes "homeland" leaders, who make speeches against apartheid but none the less participate in apartheid institutions. Buthelezi is the most vocal of these, but he continues to hold his position as Chief Minister of Kwazulu. Another is Hudson Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister of Gazankulu, who recently declared that he will not ask for "independence" for his Bantustan. Kaiser Matanzima, the Chief Minister of the Transkei, also makes anti-apartheid statements claiming that the Transkei will not have apartheid when it gets its "independence."

In reality this is double-talk. Transkeian "independence" is apartheid. Apartheid is basically an economic system under which the black population of South Africa provides cheap labor for those who have the capital—the white population. In reality the South African government is trying to create safety-valves for the frustrations of the exploited black population, channeling their political activities into homeland politics. The state hopes that giving leaders like Buthelezi the freedom to criticize will catch and curb the militancy of the population, preventing them from throwing their energy into threatening activities such as those of the Black People's Convention, SASO, the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. Further, the regime finds it useful to be able to point to Buthelezi as proof that criticism is allowed.

The Buthelezi-Naude statement may represent a change in position, but not in role. The recent successes in the liberation struggles in Mozambique and Angola—with both countries strongly committed to liberation—have sparked an increase in militancy inside South Africa. It is now more important than ever for the South African government to divert the struggle for national liberation in South Africa.

MATANZIMA BACKS CAPITALISM

The following are excerpts from a speech made by Kaiser Matanzima on the economic policy the Transkei will follow after "independence" in October. The speech was made at the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg.

Gatsha Buthelezi—responding to popular militancy





Chief Kaiser Matanzima—head of Transkei Bantustan

"Firstly, the Government and people of the Transkei are natural capitalists who attach great store by their personal belongings. Not that we are materialists, to the exclusion of all other factors, but that we, who are increasingly part of a western consumer society, value the fruits of labor.

"My Government's policy is one of capitalism with a conscience (the so-called mixed economy of the West). In the new Transkei there will be no equal division of profits. People are not equal and deserve different compensations. Rather, there will be a just division.

"It is obvious that agricultural development can and must form a cornerstone of my Government's policy, and also that of any other Transkeian Government which might replace us. Notwithstanding those already at Umtata [the Transkei capital-ed], it is the industrialists who hold the key to the future, and they can rest assured they will be efficiently cared for." (BANTU, South Africa, Nov. 1975.)

TRADE UNIONISTS FIRED

Five black bus drivers have been fired for their activities in the 800 member Transport and Allied Workers Union. They were attempting to get the Union recognized by Greyhound Buslines, African Bus Service, and Vall Transport. Under South African law African trade unions are not recognized, but companies can negotiate with them if they wish. Strikes by African workers are illegal.

The excuses for the firings range from "causing damage to a tyre on a boulder" to dishonesty. These companies are largely owned by the British firm United Transport Overseas. (Guardian, London, Feb. 24, 1976.)

INTERVIEW WITH ANC

The following are excerpts from an interview with M. P. Naicker, a member of the African National Congress on the victories in Angola and Mozambique. The interview was done by Wilfred Burchett, staff correspondent of the Guardian (New York) in Luanda, Angola.

"It has changed the whole balance of forces in southern Africa. . . . The progressive forces are now on the offensive and they will rapidly gather force. For us, this is of particular importance. For the first time we have a genuinely friendly border—denied us ever since the imperialists came to southern Africa.

"It is no secret—certainly not for the South Africa authorities—that our underground structures have been developed, and that the numbers recently recruited are more than they have been at any time since the ANC national leadership was arrested in 1963. As a result of the victories in Mozambique and Angola—and the defeat of South African elite troops here in Angola—militants, subdued as a result of tremendous repression in recent years, are beginning to surface again.

"Depending on concrete conditions, we are ready at any moment to launch armed struggle. . . . The ANC has been committed to armed struggle for a long time. It would be wrong to think that we just want to be 'fashionable'—to go over to armed struggle because it is the revolutionary thing to do now. Since the ANC was born on Jan. 8, 1912, its policies have gone through many changes. In the beginning, we tried through memoranda and deputations to the authorities to change our status. Afterwards, we led mass disobedience campaigns and general political strikes. . . .

"Our movement, the ANC, has been nonracial from the beginning. . . . The cornerstone of our policy, based on our 'Freedom Charter,' which stands for freedom for South Africans and a national democratic revolution, is that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white." (Guardian, New York, March 24, 1976.)

DAWOOD SEEDAT—A LEADER IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST GROUP AREAS

Dawood Seedat died on January 27th. He was a leader of the Natal Indian Congress and the liberation struggle. In 1956 he was indicted with 155 other members of the Congress movement and the South African Communist Party. He remained in jail until the indictment was quashed in 1958. He was detained in 1960 following the massacre at Sharpeville. He continued to struggle for the liberation of South Africa until the day he died, refusing to move from his two rooms which had been declared a "white area" under the Group Areas Act.

The Group Areas Act was passed in 1950. Under this act the Government has the power to dictate where Indians and Coloureds (people of mixed descent) can live. There are no "homelands" for Indians and Coloureds, and the government plans none. Rather, they live in townships set aside for them in white areas. They are not allowed to live outside these areas.

In the past 25 years 600,000 people have been forced to move under the terms of this act; only one per cent of these have been White. Three hundred and five thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine (305,739) Coloureds have been forced to move. According to the 1970 census the total Coloured population was 2,018,453, thus over 15 per cent of the population have been affected. Of the 620,436 Indian population almost 25 per cent 153,230 have been forced to move in the last 25 years.

Dawood Seedat is not the only person who has refused to move. Resistance among the Black population is growing in South Africa and the Indian and Coloured communities are no exception. (Star, Johannesburg, March 13, 1976; Anti-Apartheid News, London, March 1976.)

HEINEMANN TRIES TO BUST UNION

The workers of a US corporate subsidiary, the Heinemann plant in Germiston, struck on Monday March 29th, after the company fired several employees who were attempting to organise African workers into the Metal and Allied Workers Union. Although African unions have no legal status in SA, employers can choose to bargain collectively with African union representatives, but Heinemann has refused to do so.

Heinemann is a wholly owned subsidiary of the US firm Heinemann Electric Company of Trenton, New Jersey. The Germiston plant produces circuit breakers which are exported to Hong Kong, the UK and Australia. Production costs in South Africa are low because of cheap labor and cheap steel.

Heinemann responded to a demonstration in support of the dismissed workers by calling in the police, who brutally dispersed the workers outside the factory gates, injuring 14 so badly that they had to be admitted to hospital. At least 4 people were arrested.

Officials of the non-racial Metal and Allied Workers Union have appealed to South African Unions affiliated with the International Metalworkers Federation for support in their struggle.

Economics

MASSIVE US LOANS TO SOUTH AFRICA

An international banking group dominated by American interests (Citicorp International [First National City Bank of New York]; Manufacturers Hanover and Morgan Guaranty Trust) and British Barclays has raised R174 million (\$200 million) for the South African Government agency ESCOM (Electrical Supply Commission). (For more information on Manufacturers Hanover, see *Southern Africa*, March, 1976.) This is the largest loan obtained by ESCOM, which is directing a number of projects including the building of South Africa's first nuclear power plant. (*South African Digest*, Feb. 6, 1976)

In related news Chase Manhattan Bank has announced it will open an office of its overseas corporation in Johannesburg. The status of Chase Manhattan in South Africa has altered over the years, since in the mid-1960's it closed down its branches, leaving First National City as the only US bank with direct local banking facilities in South Africa. At that time Chase purchased a 15 per cent interest in British Standard Bank's empire. Apparently that relationship was recently forced to change because of US Federal banking laws. The new Chase role was clearly stated by the bank's Johannesburg director: "We aim to assist multi-national companies in obtaining the best possible local and off-shore financing and provide them with introductions to the commercial and banking sectors; provide customers with comprehensive intelligence on SA; and counsel overseas customers on SA legislation." (*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, Dec. 12, 1975).

Another banker explained the role of his company, in this case referring to Midland Bank, a British firm which has been under church pressure: "One of our jobs is to help British exporters to find markets, and sometimes in the process we find it also our job to help those exporters in the financing of the deals, so that the foreign buyer can pay for the goods over a period. So in the process we find

ourselves lenders to private individuals, companies in the private sector, to government agencies, and to governments abroad themselves." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 28, 1976) International finance capital couldn't have been explained better.


ANOTHER US FIRM IN ON NUCLEAR BID

As was reported in the March issue of *Southern Africa*, General Electric is part of a Dutch/Swiss/US consortium which has tendered a bid to build a \$630 million nuclear reactor plant in South Africa. Another US participant appears to be Westinghouse, which is part of a French led group called Framatome (which includes the Creusot-Loire group). The World Council of Churches has condemned this international support for apartheid and its expansion, calling upon its member churches to research, publicize and oppose the involvement. There have already been some international reactions to the nuclear project including a vote in the Dutch Parliament (regrettably narrow and unbinding) against Dutch company participation, and pressure in the United States to hold off Export-Import Bank guarantees for US corporations. The West German Government, despite the turmoil over its collaboration with South Africa's nuclear development, is willing to allow German cooperation in the plant construction. (WCC Statement; *Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 28, 1976; *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, Nov. 29, 1974 as quoted in UN Unit on Apartheid, *Notes and Documents*, No. 35/75; Nov., 1975)

JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE HIT

Shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are "in the doldrums ... depressed by political uncertainty in southern Africa" reported Ray Vicker, conservative Africa reporter for the *Wall Street Journal* (March 5, 1976). The effect of South Africa's embroilment in the Angolan war, the specter of Russian and Cuban permanent presence in the area, the enormous growth in the South African military budget and other economic factors have joined hands to depress the Johannesburg market since February.

The large and formerly pro-South African Union Bank of Switzerland has sold its South African gold, industrial and financial shares. Vicker cites the fall in the value of DeBeers shares, primarily because of uncertainty over the future of Namibia where one-third of DeBeer's profit is derived from its subsidiary, Consolidated Diamond Mines. A leading white Namibian politician has called the pull out of South African controlled businesses from South West Africa (Namibia) cowardly. South African gold share prices fell dramatically, along with platinum, and South African Eurobonds suffered a 9 per cent loss. Nosedives of South African stock on the London exchange began in October. Naturally other factors have played on the downward trend in some areas, for example gold shares have been affected by International Monetary Fund decisions, the lowered price of gold and rumors of massive gold sales by the Russians. But in addition to the direct financial causes it seems clear that there is a wariness in the European business community about holding South African stocks. As one local paper expressed it, South African stock brokers lack business and are "bored." It is unlikely the boredom will be permanent but it may be the beginning of fundamental changes in the southern African economic and political climate. (*Wall Street Journal*, March 5, 1976; *Financial Times*, London, March 2, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 3, 6, 1976; *Sunday Times*, London, Feb. 22, 29, 1976)



Black workers build 860 km long railway line linking new Saldanha Bay harbor to rich iron ore deposits at Sishen.

NEW PORTS—SOUTH AFRICA'S SAVIORS?

In trying to decrease its traditional dependence on gold sales, South African planners are looking towards the export of other minerals as a basic alternative. Two new deep water ports, at Saldanha Bay, 70 miles northwest of Cape Town, and Richards Bay, 120 miles north of Durban, have been built to make such export feasible.

By 1980 it is estimated that as a result of new projects and exports connected with the two ports South Africa will earn R1,600 million (\$1,840 million) in new foreign exchange a year. The Saldanha Bay Project is connected with the expansion of the Sishen iron mine complex and the development of a whole new industrial complex in the western Cape, particularly the manufacture of semi-processed steel. Also planned are a dry dock, and other heavy and light industries. Japan will be the major importer of the Sishen iron ore, while other foreign construction, technical and supply interests have made possible the huge scheme. (For more details see UN Unit on Apartheid, *Notes and Documents*, No. 35/75, November, 1975.)

The Richards Bay project involves greater diversification of exports including coal, phosphoric acid, phosphate rock, titanium slag (US Kennecott is involved here), zircon and rutile ores, and in the future chrome, steel, sugar, alumina, vanadium slag, and granite. Other U.S. corporations connected with the scheme include Southern Company which plans to import 2.5 million tons of coal, while other American mining companies are exploring and developing minerals for export through Saldanha. It is projected that Richards Bay will develop into a city of 750,000—it started as a fishing village in the KwaZulu Bantustan but was carved out of the Bantustan when development began. (*New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 6, 1976; Unit on Apartheid, *Notes and Documents*, No. 35/75, November, 1975)

BLACKS STILL LIVING BELOW BREAD LINE

The University of Port Elizabeth's Institute for Planning Research has revealed new figures for what was formerly called the Poverty Datum Line, and is now termed the Household Subsistence Level (HSL)—calculations for what it would cost a family of six (Africans) or five (Coloureds) to live at a bare minimum in various towns in South Africa. The figures run for Africans from R97.15 (\$111.72) a month in Umtata (the

Transkei) to R135.34 (\$155.64) in Windhoek (Namibia). For Coloureds they range from R115.96 (\$133.35) in King William's Town to R159.81 (\$183.78) in Windhoek. But the average wage for workers in both categories is below the HSL, for Africans at R80 (\$92) per month, for Coloureds, R100 (\$115) per month. This would place families with only one breadwinner below the bread line. (*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, Dec. 5, 1975)

MANUFACTURING WAGE GAP

The chart prepared by the *Financial Mail* (Jan. 16, 1976) indicates average monthly gross wages and salaries for Whites and Africans in various sectors of the manufacturing industry.

	Total number of employees	Rands per month		Gap	Ratio: White/African
		Whites	Africans		
Printing	37 200	442	130	312	3.4
Tobacco	3 900	436	117	319	3.7
Electrical machinery	52 600	462	128	334	3.6
Beverages	26 500	445	110	335	4.0
Furniture	38 800	441	93	348	4.7
Rubber products ..	23 800	474	116	358	4.1
Footwear	34 500	455	96	359	4.7
Transport equipment	90 400	478	119	359	4.0
Leather & products ..	8 400	453	92	361	4.9
Food	151 200	460	96	364	4.8
Machinery	73 800	504	123	381	4.1
Miscellaneous	50 900	489	103	386	4.7
Metal products	155 500	495	109	386	4.5
Wood & cork	66 700	460	71	389	6.5
Paper & products ..	32 600	513	123	390	4.2
Clothing	131 000	473	79	394	6.0
Non-metallic mineral products ..	107 200	491	96	395	5.1
Textiles	98 700	489	84	405	5.8
Chemicals & products	71 300	515	104	411	5.0
Basic metal	95 100	551	118	433	4.7

ANTI-INFLATION PACT CONTINUED

The Anti-inflation Manifesto co-signed by government, industry and union representatives (see *Southern Africa*, December, 1975; January, February, 1976) will be extended again until September 30 with some modifications. Union officials pushed to raise the wage level for those affected by measures to keep salary increases down, and certain industries (engineering in particular) will be dealt with separately because of long-term contract problems. The government is again proclaiming optimistically that the inflation problem is on the way to being beat—the rate of inflation dropped from 18.2 per cent in 1974 to 10.4 per cent at the end of 1975. (Some predict it will rise again to 15 per cent in 1976).

Huge Leap in Defense Costs

Parliamentary and journalistic critics of government policy have decried the recent announced rise in rail and transport tariffs as counter productive to the anti-inflation drive, and although the new budget is trimmed by some R800 million (\$920 million), defense costs will leap dramatically by some 40 per cent to \$1.6 billion. This kind of expenditure may throw havoc into other government attempts to curb the outflow of foreign exchange through tight credit and exchange controls. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 14, 21, March 6, 13, 1976; *New York Times*, April 1, 1976)

KENNECOTT'S INVESTMENT PLANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Kennecott Copper Corporation, the largest domestic producer of copper, recently announced participation in a new \$300 million venture in the development of iron and titanium bearing beaches on the north east coast of South Africa. The project will have 30% ownership by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and 30% by the Union Corporation. Kennecott will control 40%. IDC is a government controlled development corporation and Union Corporation is a large, privately owned white conservative mining corporation. Kennecott will have operational control only in the smelting operation, while the South African corporations will control the mining operation.

Kennecott has indicated that the venture is intended to provide its European markets with titanium pigment—used extensively in the textile, art and paper industries. The South African government however may be enthusiastic about developing this source of titanium for other reasons. One of the metal's primary values lies in its use in military and commercial aircraft. Because of its light weight, great resistance to corrosion and high melting temperature, it has been extensively used in making compressor blades for jet engines, leading edges of the wings, fire walls, and the skin of aircraft designed to travel at or near supersonic speeds. In 1971, the United States used 84% of the titanium produced domestically for these purposes.


The form of investment involved here is highly beneficial to South Africa. Kennecott brings its technological knowledge and its developed overseas markets to the deal. It will also aid in the expansion of Richard Bay, the largest harbour in South Africa, and facilitate the government's plans to use the harbour as a major outlet for the coal fields of the Transvaal.

This investment may result in significant increases in the strength of the South African economy and its military capabilities.

CALTEX'S EXPANSION IN SOUTH AFRICA

In 1975 Caltex announced a \$134 million expansion of its Milnerton refinery outside Capetown. Scheduled for completion in July 1978, the new facilities will increase the refinery's capacity to 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day, double the present capacity, and also increase the production of motor and other light fuels from a given volume of crude. The major units involved will be a new crude distillation plant, catalytic cracking facilities for making gasoline and a sulphur removal and recovery facilities. Caltex's proposed investment represents a massive increase in U.S. petroleum investments in South Africa, giving Caltex over two-thirds of the U.S. petroleum stake there.

As in every industrialized country, the oil industry is of crucial importance to the South African economy. Although oil comprised only 26% of South Africa's energy resources at the end of 1973, its importance has been increasing, concentrated in the vital transportation sector. In addition, oil is an essential raw material for a variety of important industries. Recognizing the importance of this industry, the South African government has established a high degree of control over the oil industry in the Republic. Since 1967, foreign oil companies have been required to: 1) make their refineries available for process-



Caltex oil refinery at Milnerton, Cape Town

ing crude products from any source, when excess capacity is available; 2) ensure that the major proportion of their earnings remained in South Africa to finance the future expansion of the industry; and 3) be prepared to produce specialized petroleum and oil products required for strategic and other logistical reasons irrespective of the commercial potential.

Caltex has assisted the South African government by breaking the 1973 oil embargo against South Africa called by the Organization of African Unity and by executing a complicated series of swaps to allocate more Iranian crude oil to South Africa.

The new investment serves the interests of South Africa in three ways: 1) it provides a major source of capital inflow; 2) it will provide a significant savings in South Africa importation of crude oil, since more of the required refined fuels can be produced from a given volume of crude; 3) it strengthens the identification of the company with the interests of South Africa.

The Social Impact on Blacks. Caltex did not build a refinery in South Africa until 1966 and its investments have grown significantly since that time. However, between 1962 and 1972, its total number of employees fell considerably from 2400 to 1830. The number of Africans in the Caltex work force also fell as a proportion of the total labor force, from 32% to 22%, while white employees increased their predominance from 56.2% to 66%. The total number of jobs for blacks in 1972 was only 607, an insignificant number when compared to the \$100 million investment at the time.

Petty Apartheid On the Lamb

South Africa is facing another one of those "changes" which apologists for apartheid often point to as a sign of "liberalization" in South Africa. A white host may now serve a black guest liquor in his home, if he wants. See, foreign investment works! (Star, Johannesburg, March 13, 1976.)

Foreign Relations

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES

The growing strength of the anti-Apartheid opposition movement within Western countries is making the South African rulers anxious. They are worried about whether they can depend upon the military and political support of the Western Governments. Ken Owen, the Johannesburg *Star's* Washington correspondent, wrote that among Western political leaders there are "doubts about the viability of the Whites of Southern Africa." He noted that one unnamed Western diplomat informed him that "Vorster's détente [strategy] must show results and quickly. There's no point in talking about solutions in the future. If no solutions are found [immediately], there will be no future." (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 13, 1976)

The apartheid regime is using a two-pronged strategy to undermine this growing opposition movement, first by increasing the propaganda outflow directed at conservative corporate interests, and second by interfering in the domestic politics of Western countries. In February the "Club of Ten"—a "private" propaganda agency connected with the South African Government—spent \$15,318 on a full-page ad in the *New York Times* which aimed at mobilizing American public opinion behind the apartheid regime. Later this year the South Africa Foundation—another apartheid propaganda agency—plans to publish a pamphlet entitled *South Africa—an Investor's Guide* in order to increase corporate investments in the apartheid system. There are plans to arrange a meeting between black South Africans who support foreign investment in the apartheid system—that is, black puppets of the apartheid regime—and black Americans. The projected meeting place will be in South Africa. Additionally the Bantustan "Information" Officers from the Transkei have been dispatched to their diplomatic posts: New York (T. Letlake, and L.D. Sawula), London (D.S. Koyana and A.L. Socikwa—a BOSS agent), Paris (K.M. Mdleleni and C. Mankotywa), Bonn (F. Qaba and V.D. Lila—another BOSS agent) and Pretoria (M. Njisane). BOSS—the Bureau of State Security, South Africa's combined version of the American FBI and CIA—has currently made Great Britain the focus of its interference in Western politics. It is responsible for a number of burglaries involving the homes of members of the African National Congress, the representative of SWAPO, and members of British anti-apartheid organizations. Additionally BOSS has been implicated in a smear campaign against Mr. Jeremy Thorpe, the leader of the Liberal Party, who has been a consistent opponent of apartheid. (*Guardian*, London, Feb. 20, Mar. 10, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 14, Mar. 13, 1976; *Anti-Apartheid News*, London, March, 1976; *Sechaba*, First Quarter, 1976)

Although the apartheid regime is concerned about the reliability of its Western allies, the regime still has powerful friends among Western politicians. The British Government has refused to issue an unambiguous policy statement committing itself to denying future diplomatic recognition to the Transkei Bantustan Government, slated for "independence" in October. Last February Chief Mopeli, Chief Minister of the Basotho-QwaQwa Bantustan, went to West Germany to sell Apartheid politics to German politicians after visiting Great Britain as a guest of

the British Government. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, March, 1976)

Meanwhile Western corporate interests are competing to increase their trade with and investments in the apartheid system. The UK—replaced last year by West Germany as the apartheid regime's number one trading partner—plans to expand its trade during 1976 in order to recapture its former position. French and Italian businesses are actively involved in South African trade fairs. Mr. K. Nakajima, the official representative in South Africa for the Japan External Trade Organization—which is subsidized by the Japanese Government—expects that Japanese-South African trade will double in the next five years. The area most likely to experience this expansion is the field of export of Japanese technology to South Africa. Currently Japanese-South African trade amounts to \$350 million per year. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 21, 1976) Thus Western businessmen continue to ignore public opinion on the Apartheid regime and to follow their policy of profits as usual.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND RHODESIAN ALLIANCE

Now that the Western puppet organizations have been defeated in Angola, the major focal point of the liberation struggle has shifted to Zimbabwe. One of the factors determining the eventual longevity of the Ian Smith regime is the actions of South Africa's rulers. The apartheid regime is faced with a quandary. It does not want another black nationalist regime coming to power but it cannot afford to send too many troops to defend the Ian Smith regime, since it is faced with a growing black resistance movement at home.

Initially South Africa's rulers pinned their hopes on the British and Zambian sponsored negotiations aimed at installing a puppet government. The *Friend* wrote that "there are extremely strong reasons why neither Britain, Zambia nor South Africa can afford to have negotiations go awry this time. . . . Dr. Kaunda, who has had to declare a state of emergency in Zambia, is faced with [domestic] unrest. . . . At present Britain appears on the brink of being drawn back into direct responsibility for developments in Rhodesia. . . . South Africa . . . has an interest in resuscitating some of her détente image, which lost its gloss in the Angolan adventure. It is important that this country can demonstrate that it still has a *role to play in settling the destiny of the subcontinent*. It is also important that *Rhodesia should not . . . become an additional front for the launching of an all-out offensive against this country*" (italics added). The *Oggenblad* remarked that "time is no longer on Rhodesia's side. A settlement must be speedily attained, so that the excuse for outside intervention which now exists can disappear. Rhodesia's only hope is that its whites and moderate [meaning reactionary] blacks should unite against the threat from outside." The SABC stated that "*Rhodesia, by the virtue of its geographical position was a critical link in the formation of a Pretoria-Lusaka axis, an axis with the power and stability both to defend the sub-continent and to introduce a new era in harmonious relationships and economic progress*" (italics added). (*Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Feb. 27, Mar. 5, 1976)

Mozambique's imposition of economic sanctions against the Rhodesian regime has increased the apartheid regime's dilemma. South Africa is now the economic lifeline of the Ian Smith regime. South Africa's railroads

and port facilities are not equipped to handle the extra traffic, but any refusal to handle the extra traffic would mean undermining the Smith regime. The *Sunday Times* noted that "the siege of Rhodesia is virtually complete. South Africa provides the last lifeline and this ... can handle no more than 'normal traffic'.... Mr. Smith must be made to realise that the UDI game is up and to recognise the real risk of a bloodbath." *Die Burger* remarked that "this [Mozambique's closure of its border with Rhodesia] is aggravating Rhodesia's economic problems and places extra burdens on the South African Railways.... South Africa ... will have to plan ... diligently for gloomier prospects looming ahead.... There are forces ... which ... want to extend South Africa's battle fronts.... We will have to try to prevent this with every means, without excluding the possibility that our enemies might succeed in doing so. The far reaching implications of this for our [South Africa's] economy and entire way of life will have to be faced sooner rather than later." (*Comment and Opinion*, Mar. 12, 1976)



Bayonet practice to defend white supremacy

MILITARY

APARTHEID DEFENSE SPENDING RAISED TO \$1.6 BILLION

On March 31, South African Finance Minister Owen Horwood presented the 1976-77 defense budget of \$1.6 billion to Parliament, explaining that the increase of 42 per cent over last year was required to meet increased threats on South Africa's borders. With last year's increase of 36 per cent, defense expenditure has almost doubled in two years, and now accounts for about 17 per cent of South Africa's total budget of \$9.1 billion. In addition to holding down expenditures in other areas, the South African Government will pay for its ever expanding military establishment through sharp increases in gasoline, liquor, cigarette and general sales taxes, through a five per cent surcharge on company and individual income taxes, through a ten per cent "loan levy" on basic taxes, and through new defense bonds, which it is assumed South Africans will "gladly" invest in.

In his speech before Parliament, Horwood indicated that South African involvement in Angola had cost the country an extra \$133 million—the reference being to "unforeseen military expenditures." (*Washington Post*, April 1, 1976; *New York Times*, April 1, 1976)

Namibia

TERRORISM TRIAL

The trial of six members of the South West Africa People's Organization charged under the South African Terrorism Act continues in the small Namibian town of Swakopmund. The three women and three men are accused of activities aimed at overthrowing "the lawful administration of South West Africa" and "undermining law and order". One man is alleged to have assisted the assassins of a Bantustan chief. Witnesses brought by the

WOMEN'S AIR FORCE COMMANDO SQUADRON FORMED

Chief of the Air Force, Lieutenant-General R.H. Rogers, has announced the establishment of a new commando squadron for women only. At present, the Air Force knows of 15 women with the requisite 150 hours' solo flying time needed to qualify for the 114 Squadron, which will be concerned primarily with communication flights and casualty evacuation. Another prerequisite is ownership of an aircraft, or guaranteed access to one when required. According to Ms. Freda Flanagan, who owns a Cessna 172, the formation of the squadron is bound to give a boost to female pilots. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 14, 1976)

The World (*Johannesburg*), a newspaper for blacks, conducted a survey asking its readers "Would you fight for South Africa if we are invaded from Angola?" Of the 244 responses, 203 were negative.

Some of the responses showed a sense of humor. One person wrote, "I'm a Bantu homeland citizen, so I'd be indulging myself in foreign politics—South Africa's."

Another man wrote, "How can a Black man be expected to fight with the 'dompass' [passbook] in his pocket, because if he leaves it at home he will be arrested." (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 13, 1976.)

State included nurses and other residents of the northern region who had been held in detention for months. One witness testified about his training as a SWAPO guerrilla. Another refused to give evidence and was sentenced to 12 months in jail for contempt of court. Others have told of police cruelty while in detention.

South African police gave evidence about the aims and methods of SWAPO and the military operations of its People's Liberation Army of Namibia, on SWAPO's ex-



SWAPO supporters demonstrate outside trial (Sanapic)

ternal and internal organization, on its support from the World Council of Churches and exiled Bishop Colin Winter. Security Police Lt. Col. Willem Schoon and Lt. G. Dippenhaar testified on SWAPO plans and literature and on their investigation of the accused. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, Feb. 26, 27, March 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, 1976).

her 85-year-old husband testified at the trial, which has been adjourned until late April. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, March 3, 4, 1976).

THE "CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE"

The South African promoted conference which is attempting to work out a scheme acceptable to South Africa and its adherents in Namibia opened its third plenary session in Windhoek on March 2. The 156 delegates from 11 "national groups" convened in the Turnhalle Building in what is being called the "Turnhalle Summit," the events of which are regarded as spectacular among some circles in the Territory and in South Africa.

Four committees have been working during the recess period: the first is studying race and color discrimination, equal wages and job opportunities; a second is concerned with economic advancement, urban property rights and finance; the third is concentrating on social advancement, housing, public amenities and services, elimination of discrimination in the police force, and the setting up of a national pension and welfare system for all; and the fourth committee is charged with surveying education and educational facilities.

The assembly approved a non-compulsory plan establishing a minimum wage for unskilled workers and aimed at closing salary and wage gaps for skilled and professional people of all races over a period of three years. Within two weeks the South West Africa Agricultural Union dissociated white farmers from the conference call for a \$62.00 a month minimum wage (plus food, housing and medical care). The farmers' chairman declared that his group would appoint an investigative committee to report back next year about wages and other agricultural matters. It was revealed that currently unskilled black farm and ranch workers get \$14.00 per month (plus rations, housing and medical care), a figure which rises to \$17.00 if the laborer remains on the job for 18 months.

A proposal for integrated schools was rejected but there was agreement on equal educational standards. Compulsory education was accepted "where circumstances justify compulsory action." The principle of a university for all inhabitants of the Territory was accepted; an "expert investigation would be launched in this respect."

Herero Chief Clemens Kapuu, back in Namibia from



Police use dogs to attack demonstrators (Sanapic)

ANOTHER TRIAL

Last August 27, two white soldiers in the South African Defence Force assaulted and raped Ms. Rachel Nailenge at Ongenga in the northern region of Namibia. Her husband, the Rev. Paulus Nailenge, pastor of the local Lutheran congregation, was beaten to the ground and kicked when he tried to intervene. The two soldiers are on trial in Windhoek Supreme Court charged with house-breaking with intent to rape, assault with intent to rape and to seriously injure, and with malicious damage to property. Ms. Nailenge—75-years-old and virtually blind—spent five weeks in a hospital after the incident. She and



Chief Clemens Kapuuo and his American legal adviser Mr. Schwartz

yet another trip to the United States, submitted a constitutional proposal on behalf of the National Convention (not to be confused with the Namibia National Convention, which is composed of SWAPO and four other non-participants in Turnhalle) which was prepared by "a number of constitutional lawyers," chief among whom is

Mr. Stuart Schwartz, a New York attorney once prominent in Democratic Party politics. The scheme would allow for one man, one vote for all Namibians over 18, with a national legislature divided into two houses, one for the three northern Bantustans of Owambo, Kavango and Caprivi, the other for the remainder of the country. A constitutional committee was set up to study the matter.

SWAPO leader Daniel Tjongarero, Publicity Secretary of the Namibia National Convention, stated that his organization rejected Chief Kapuuo's proposal "but we would fight an election and win under its terms".

The conference called on South Africa to maintain "law and order" and to protect the northern borders, a move proposed by Owambo Chief Minister Cornelius Njoba. The Turnhalle plenary ended on March 19, setting a reassembly date of June 2.

(*Windhoek Advertiser*, March 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 25, 1976).

ECONOMIC NEWS

Tsumeb Corporation has announced the closing of its Kombat and Asis Ost mines and plants, throwing over 800 workers out of jobs. The giant American-controlled copper and lead producer stated that the main center at Tsumeb and the Matchless mine near Windhoek would remain open. Tsumeb cited the fall in metal prices worldwide as the reason for the closures. AMAX, Inc. and Newmont Mining Corporation, the US corporations which dominate Tsumeb, both indicated plummeting dividends in their 1975 annual reports. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, March 12, 15, 1976).


Zimbabwe

TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR WHITE-RULED RHODESIA

Talks between Ian Smith, leader of the illegal white government of Rhodesia, and Joshua Nkomo, head of the dissident faction of the Zimbabwe ANC, were broken off on March 19, 1976. Shortly before the break, Nkomo had given reporters the impression that he expected to reach agreement with Smith, and Smith's Defense Minister, Pieter K. Van der Byl, said "some progress" was being made. (*New York Times*, March 12, 1976)

According to a report in the London *Observer* (March 21, 1976), Nkomo broke off the talks after the four African Presidents—Machel, Kaunda, Nyerere, and Seretse Khama—told him the talks were "futile and increasingly dangerous." The reasons given were that Smith was only playing for time; that there was a danger of "a contrived settlement, possibly acceptable to Britain, but not to most Rhodesian Africans"; and that "continued talks leading nowhere were causing confusion."

In announcing the breakdown, Nkomo issued an 18 point statement (in the name of the ANC) justifying his position. This included the offer to "meet European fears" by accepting separate blocks of white and black seats, with a third of "mixed composition," and also an



Defending "their" Rhodesia—a volunteer in women's service corps trains with 9mm automatic pistol.

interim sharing of power with the Smith regime for at least a year. The interim government would have had equal numbers of black and white ministers. (*Washington Post*, March 20, 1976; *Times*, London, March 20, 1976) The statement emphasized the Nkomo faction's "spirit of compromise," and in the British Parliament, Foreign Minister James Callaghan characterized Nkomo's demands as "reasonable and moderate." (*Washington Post*, March 20, 23, 1976) Callaghan said Britain was prepared to give aid to Rhodesia if Smith would agree to holding elections for a majority ruled legislature in 18 to 24 months, give up U.D.I., and negotiate promptly on a new constitution.

LIBERATION FORCES UNITE

Meanwhile, reports of regrouping of Zimbabwean forces inside the country and in neighboring Mozambique are increasing. The London *Observer* (March 21, 1976) reported some 35,000 Zimbabweans in camps alongside the border and inside Mozambique. In contrast with other refugee camps in Africa, reported the *Observer*, inhabitants were preponderantly young—17 to 35 years—"potential recruits for the growing guerilla army." Political instructors were teaching people to think of themselves as Zimbabweans, "and not to identify with various factions," according to *Observer* correspondent David Martin. Previously the *Guardian* (London, March 9, 1976), quoted Tanzanian Government sources as stating that "all the former African National Council leaders had now been excluded from the guerilla struggle" and that a military committee, "the third force," had been formed to lead the liberation struggle.

Pressure on the Smith forces continued to mount as a result of guerilla attacks. Pieter Van der Byl, Smith's Minister of Defence, said on March 5 that there were 1000 guerillas operating inside Zimbabwe backed by a force of 5,000 in neighboring countries. To deal with the "substantial guerilla build-up" the Smith government was planning to recruit far greater numbers of Blacks, giving some of these officer status for the first time. Correspondent James MacManus commented from Salisbury: "The Government is aware of the dangers of equipping and training African soldiers in what is essentially a white cause." He also observed: "Black participation in a war for the retention of white superiority is a sensitive subject in Salisbury involving conflicting ideas about the required black-white ratio in the army." (*Guardian*, London, March 6, 1976)

WHITE REACTIONS: FORCE AND DECEPTION

The Smith regime, in further response to pressures from liberation forces, stepped up its process of uprooting Africans in border areas, forcing huge numbers into "protected" villages modelled on the "strategic hamlets" imposed by the U.S. during its war against the people of Vietnam. A Smith Minister said in mid-March that 175,000 to 200,000 Blacks had been moved "and the program was continuing." (*New York Time*, March 14, 1976)

Economic pressures on the regime were also increasing, particularly as a result of Mozambique's closing of the border and implementing of the sanctions resolution of the U.N. Fuel allocations were cut by 20 per cent and even tighter restrictions on the repatriation of capital were imposed under exchange control regulations. (*Guardian*, London, March 5, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 13, 1976)

Under the headline "There is more to Rhodesian 'flying accidents' than meets the eye" the *Sunday Times of Zambia* (February 22, 1976) reports the successive destruction of two of the rebel regime's aircraft, each of which carried high ranking defence personnel. The first occurred on Christmas eve, 1975, when five officers, including the Army Chief of Staff Major-General John Shaw and Infantry Commander Colonel David Parker were killed in a helicopter crash during what was described as a "Christmas visit to troops stationed on the border with Mozambique." On February 17, 1976, Air Force Squadron Leader G.A. Routledge was killed in another "flying accident" at Umtali on the Eastern border with Mozambique. Commented the *Sunday Times* reporter: "Why is it that the Umtali area has become a graveyard of the rebels' top soldiers? Does the world and in particular the pundits of the Rhodesian situation ever wonder about these coincidental 'flying accidents'? For anybody who has been closely following the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, it is easy to notice that these 'accidents' are actually happening in the war zone."

Meanwhile, white Rhodesians are blaming foreign reporters in Salisbury for the fact that world opinion is generally negative toward their racist goals. According to WBAI radio (New York, April 2, 1976) a propaganda campaign is being launched to counter "hostile" press reportage. The focus of this campaign is to be western companies and representatives of economic interests. That whites in Rhodesia stand for capitalism and christendom rather than racism and repression will no doubt be the thrust of this propaganda.

Zimbabwean freedom fighter takes aim (Hsinjua News Agency)





Zimbabweans in "protected villages" work under watchful eye of Rhodesian soldier

The struggle continues

Angola

SOUTH AFRICA WITHDRAWS ITS TROOPS FROM ANGOLAN TERRITORY

On March 27, the South African regime pulled out the last of its 5,000-20,000 troops from Angola back into occupied Namibia.

"The South African Defense Minister, Pieter W. Botha, took the salute as the last convoy of armored cars rolled across the Cunene River border bridge. 'This is the end of a chapter,' he said, 'but I hope the beginning of a better chapter.' Mr. Botha added: 'We want peace but until peace exists properly we shall be on the alert and shall remain on our side of the border to protect the interests for which we are responsible.' " (*New York Times*, March 28, 1976)

The withdrawal was highly publicized, with newsmen from many countries brought there for the occasion, which followed by a day the opening to the UN Security Council debate on South Africa's aggression against Angola. Pretoria claimed it had received assurances about the security of the key Ruacana hydro-electric complex from Angola through both the British Government and UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. The Ruacana complex straddles the Namibia-Angola border near the falls of the Cunene River, with the bulk of its facilities situated in Angola. (*Washington Post*, March 26, 28, 1976; *New York Times*, March 28, 1976)

On April 3, in a meeting in New York with representatives from various MPLA support groups in the U.S., Pascal Luvualu, a member of the MPLA Central Commit-

tee, said that there had *never* been an agreement with South Africa concerning the dam, either at the time of withdrawal or afterwards. "Protect the dam from whom?" Luvualu asked. "The dam is on our soil. It is ours. There was no trade-off. The South Africans are distorting the facts. We do guarantee that the dam won't be destroyed, because it is economically important—for us and [eventually] for the people of Namibia."

Some weeks before the withdrawal the South Africans had demanded assurances of three issues. The first was protection of Ruacana, which already is providing water for irrigation of farmlands in the Ovambo Bantustan in northern Namibia. It is expected that by next year electric power will be generated for use throughout Namibia, mainly in the south and central regions. Pretoria has been emphasizing the former which benefits mainly the rural African population and downplaying its real concern—its energy requirements to maintain and expand municipalities, mines, and industries in the lower, or white-settled, two-thirds of the country. Particularly important is the need for power to operate the Rossing uranium mine and plant due to begin production shortly.

A second issue which had been raised by the South Africans was guerilla incursions by SWAPO from bases in Angola. There have been a continuing series of armed attacks inside Namibia, one only 40 miles from the capital city of Windhoek in the center of the country. None of the insurgents has been apprehended despite the fact that Namibia is full of heavily armed and mobile soldiers and



SA Minister of Defense Botha and Chief Minister of Owambo, Pastor C. Ndjoba watch as last convoy of South African armored cars roll back across Kunene border bridge.

paramilitary police. South Africa seems to have dropped this issue, as press reports of about the last five weeks have not mentioned it as a continuing demand.

The third point had been the matter of Angolan refugees who remain in camps along the southern border. Some 1600 of them were reported to have fled into Namibia as the South African forces withdrew, but about 5,000, mostly black, were said to have remained in Angola. South Africa had helped 8,000 Portuguese to be repatriated to Portugal and allowed officials and soldiers of FNLA and UNITA to enter Namibia, claiming that they faced reprisals by the victorious MPLA. The South African army, it was claimed, was caring for these while efforts were being made to engage the UN High Commission for Refugees in the problem. Many of these refugees have asked for political asylum in the northern border Bantustan of Kavango. The International Red Cross has been helping to care for many in the Angolan camps. (*Washington Post*, March 26, 28.)

ANGOLA VICTORY AIDS SWAPO STRUGGLE

Wilfred Burchett writes in the March 10 *Guardian* of New York, after having interviewed SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and other leaders of the Namibian liberation movement at the newly-opened SWAPO office in Luanda. The Namibian representative to Angola, Homateni Kalu-enja, said: "The MPLA victory opens up perspectives for us to drive the South Africans—despite their considerable strength—out of our country by our own force of arms. We feel that for the first time we have a strong rear base for our revolution . . . we have a long common border with a friendly, independent and progressive people." He added that SWAPO's People's Liberation Army of Nami-

bia (PLAN) had seen rapid development, with further big spurts in recruitment after the promise of Angolan independence.

RECOGNITION CONTINUES

In Africa the number of OAU countries which have recognized the People's Republic of Angola has risen to 43 out of 47 nations with only Kenya, Zambia, the Central African Republic and Senegal yet to recognize. South Africa and Rhodesia have not recognized the Government, but with South African's withdrawal of its troops at the end of March, there is the possibility that diplomatic relations between the two countries might be normalized.

Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, indicated that his Government was seriously considering recognizing the MPLA-led Government of Angola but, he said, "Zambia is not going to be stampeded into making decisions which are against its principles". Kaunda continues to call for a unity government of MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. Normally conservative President William Tolbert of Liberia recognized the Angola Government and appealed to FNLA and UNITA to "lay down their arms and join the MPLA government in the reconstruction of a united Angola". (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Feb. 16, 19, 1976)

All nine European Economic Community countries and the European socialist countries have now recognized the Government, which leaves the United States and China as the only remaining major world powers to withhold diplomatic recognition. It is interesting to note that almost all of the countries that are close to China have granted recognition, including North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

INTERVIEW WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

"We are going to build socialism", Angola's Prime Minister, Lopo do Nascimento told Wilfred Burchett when he was interviewed in Luanda in March. "In fact we have no choice but to build socialism."

The following is an extract from that interview.

"Over 90% of the Portuguese fled the country, abandoning their plantations and enterprises; they forced our hand. Some sectors—foreign trade, for instance—we had not intended to nationalize, but the Portuguese who ran it pulled out. If the state does not handle it, who will? Foreign trade must go on. So, we find ourselves taking it over along with many other sectors that were not in our original plans. . . ."

In this, as in so many other problems in Angola, it sounded like a replay of what happened in South Vietnam, where the White House predicted "bloodbaths" and scared South Vietnam's capitalists and bourgeoisie into wholesale flight, obliging the newly established state in Saigon into either taking over their enterprises or facing a total collapse of their economy.

I asked Nascimento whether important sections of Angolan society would oppose the building of socialism. "No," he replied, "those who would have opposed it have already fled."

"There are two sectors among Angolans which could have been expected to oppose us. The small landowning class—from which my own family comes. But they were almost entirely liquidated physically, or eliminated, as a class by the terrible Portuguese massacres of 1961-1962 [during which over 350,000 Angolans fled across the



Angolan Prime Minister, Lopo do Nascimento

border into Zaire in 1962 alone]. The other element is what could best be described as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which enjoyed special privileges under the Portuguese. This is an element—not a force—which opposes socialism, the prime minister said. "They could be open to corruption. To build socialism, we have to reinforce the MPLA cadres, carry on ideological work, and avoid an element of the petty bourgeoisie which could become transformed into a bourgeoisie and a natural ally of imperialism. But for the masses of people there will be no problem.

"Our real problems are that when the Portuguese left, this meant the departure of nearly all the technical and administrative cadres. We are very rich in typists," he said with a smile. "Otherwise, the Portuguese never trained any Angolans in fields of technique or administration. We have already decreed free and compulsory five-year terms in education. But where are the teachers? We have decreed free medical services, but apart from the teaching and medical staff at Luanda University hospital, there are only 68 doctors for a population of about six million."

"How are you going to train them?" I asked.

"That is why our friendship with the Cubans is so valuable," replied the prime minister. "They are building 17 fully equipped hospitals in the provinces. In general their aid is a model of internationalism." From Cuban and other sources, I learned that there will be between 150 and 200 Cuban doctors, including specialists in all modern branches of medicine and surgery as well as nurses and other medical workers within a very short time in Angola.

"Our greatest contradiction," Nascimento continued, "is between what we want to do to solve the immediate needs of the masses—who had nothing—and the means at our disposal to do it. In every field, we have to start with nothing and we have to guard against trying to solve exclusively urban problems—those of Luanda, for example—and neglecting to solve the urgent problems in the rural areas.

"There has to be, for instance, a rational distribution of teachers and public health workers so that the majority

of people all over the country can benefit from these measures. Above all, we're starting intensive training programs for the formation of cadres.

"Here again, we are hampered by the heritage of Portuguese colonialism. Illiteracy covers almost 100% of the countryside, for instance. And the university was almost exclusively reserved for either mainland Portuguese or Angolans of Portuguese origin."

(Reprinted from a longer article published in the *Guardian*, New York, March 24, 1976)

ON THE POLITICAL FRONT

Now that military victory has been secured, the political bureau of the MPLA has announced that UNITA, FNLA and FLEC (the Cabindan "liberation" front supported by Gulf Oil) have been banned as political organizations inside Angola. (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Feb. 20, 1976) The threat by Jonas Savimbi of UNITA to continue operations against MPLA has not materialized and the southern region is secure now that South African troops have withdrawn into Namibia.

The People's Defense Organization (ODP), reported on in last month's *Southern Africa*, has now expanded to over 2500 members with plans to set up ODP's all over the country. The ODP describes its members as 'worker-soldiers'; this organization forms the base of the Government's people's militia. The ODP are similar to popular defense committees set up in Cuba, Vietnam and South Yemen after liberation. Work on the ideological and political fronts as well as the military front is stressed. Defense Minister, Iko Carriera, said that "just as we have liberated the zones occupied by armed invaders, we must be ready to fight saboteurs, divisionist elements which attack our movement. The Government has also stepped up campaigns against racism and sexism thus continuing the work begun during the war years when the MPLA struggled for equality among all people." (*Daily News*, Dar Es Salaam, Feb. 26, 1976).

Since the victory, anti-MPLA forces have tried to weaken the Government by launching an attack on the MPLA, labelling it "pro-white and pro-mullatto". MPLA officials claim that the CIA is trying to undermine their effectiveness during the reconstruction phase by promoting racial unrest which they hope might oust the present leadership for more conservative, pro-Western leaders. The wave of racial violence predicted in the American press once independence was certain, did not happen.

Seminars are being conducted by MPLA leaders in factories and public meeting places to explain how racism was used by the colonialists and now by the imperialists, in an effort to divide MPLA unity. The MPLA's political orientation has always been non-racial with a view toward a progressive, multi-ethnic and multi-racial Angola.

All Angolans between the ages of 18 and 35 must now serve in the army, regardless of ethnic origin, race or sex.

ORGANIZATION OF ANGOLAN WOMEN

The Organization of Angolan Women (OMA) has organized a campaign to develop the consciousness of Angolan women as to their responsibilities for contributions to the new nation. OMA has traditionally emphasized the education of women in practical skills, such as medicine, hygiene and teaching, and is continuing its work



"The liberation of women is a guarantee for the continuation of the revolution"—armed MPLA militant

in these areas. The consciousness program is also being extended to the male population through educational campaigns which urge a greater consideration of the rights of women. (*Bilalian News*, Mar. 19, 1976)

The following statement is excerpted from a speech delivered at an OMA conference just prior to independence last November 11.

How is it possible to have a revolution without mobilizing women? If more than half of the exploited and oppressed people are women, how can they be left on the edges of the struggle? The Revolution is *obliged* to free the woman.

The struggle of the Angolan Woman is for women from all regions and ethnic groups of the country. It is the struggle of mothers and grandmothers side by side with the young. It is the struggle of women workers, peasants, farmers, fisherwomen, professors, health workers, etc.

Angolan workers are harshly exploited. Their political rights were always denied them. Education and culture are a privilege of the exploiters. However, in our society, it is the woman who suffers the most. Who receives the lowest salaries? The Woman! Who works in the house, who takes care of the children and the washing? The Woman! It is still the woman who suffers in the house the difficulties and despair of the companion who, tired from work, worn out with starvation wages that he receives, humiliated by the injustices to which he is victim, mistreats and subjugates her.

But the struggle of Women is not a struggle that divides men and women. No! It is a struggle of men and women, both exploited, against the colonialist society, against the exploiting society. True equality between men and women can only be achieved by women themselves struggling with a truly revolutionary consciousness in the process of the liberation of the exploited classes.

Our children are a very important force in the fight.

Thus how can we build in our children a love for the popular revolution? How can we educate our children in the revolutionary spirit which will make grow in them the love for the Popular Revolution if the mother, the first educator, is not integrated into the revolutionary work?

The liberation of women is a guarantee for the continuation of the revolution!

ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

The new economic plan for Angola is contained with the *Law on State Intervention in the National Economy*. All natural resources will be the property of the state, but the Government will recognize private interests which are useful to the Angola economy and the interests of the people—including those of foreigners. There will be three major sectors to the economy: state economic enterprises, cooperative enterprises and private enterprises. These three areas should be stimulated to produce those commodities necessary to raise the standard of living of the Angolan people while maintaining a strong enough economy to withstand imperialist blockades. (*Guardian*, New York, Mar. 24, 1976)

The Benguela Railroad has reopened after an interruption of seven months. Goods are now reaching Nova Lisboa from the port of Benguela and are bringing in food and supplies to the interior. By late February the full extent of the railroad was in use, from the coast to Teixeira de Sousa at the Zaire border.

Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento announced salary cuts for the highest grade civil servants and employees of state owned bodies as an austerity measure which will begin to equalize the wages of Angolan workers. Do Nascimento said that in order to establish "people's democracy ... the living standards of some must be lowered so that the income of others will be raised". (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Feb. 27, 1976)

Gulf Oil shows signs of normalizing economic relations with Angola. In March Gulf paid \$102 million from oil tax and royalty funds previously held in escrow. After announcing the payment, Gulf said it is also discussing the resumption of operations in Cabinda "under new arrangements" (*Wall Street Journal*, Mar. 10, 1976)

Meanwhile Texaco Inc. disclosed in its annual report that it had set aside \$23 million for possible losses in its investments in explorations in Angola. Texaco said its reduced level of spending was because of "restrictions on the company's profitability by governments" which Texaco left unnamed.

Diamang, which controlled Angola's diamond interests under colonialism, is also considering negotiating with the Angolan Government. It is proposing that its concessions revert to the Angolan government with Diamang running the mines on a contract basis in return for a share of profits." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 28, 1976)

As yet no satisfactory agreements have been reached between the major foreign corporations and the Government. The Angolan point of view was expressed by Prime Minister do Nascimento: "What they would like—Gulf and Diamang—is that we put up the money and they take the profit. With or without Gulf Oil we will exploit our oilfields in the interest of the Angolan people".

Mozambique

FRELIMO EXPLAINS DECEMBER UPRISING

Last December an armed uprising took place in Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques) Mozambique. While order was quickly restored by the FRELIMO government, at least a dozen people were killed and many more were injured.

According to FRELIMO sources, the violent outbreak was not an attempted coup against the FRELIMO government as had been reported in the Western press, but was primarily the work of new FRELIMO recruits and others in the Party. Most of the participants in this abortive uprising had not experienced the years of intensive political training and discipline that FRELIMO members actively engaged in the national independence struggle had received.

The behavior of these new FRELIMO members, such as abuse of civilians, drunkenness, disregard for authority, drug abuse, etc., which was beginning to give FRELIMO a bad name among the people, led Party cadre and soldiers of the People's Forces to take action against them. Shortly before the December outbreak, many of these same people had been individually reprimanded or expelled from the Party for corrupt behavior deemed potentially threatening to the revolution itself. As a result the December violence must be seen as a last ditch bid for power by counter-revolutionary elements who had already been discredited as individuals.

Investigations by FRELIMO after the incident have made clear that the source of the trouble was not solely internal. Outside counter-revolutionary forces also provided assistance for this attack on the revolutionary aspirations of the Mozambican people.

INTERVIEW WITH SAMORA MACHEL

Following is an interview with President Samora Machel of Mozambique published in the March 28 London Observer. The interview was conducted following the recent meeting in Zambia between Machel, the presidents of three other black African nations and leaders of the Zimbabwe liberation movement.

What new strategy evolved from the Lusaka summit with your colleagues from Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and Rhodesia [Zimbabwe]?

We decided to intensify the armed struggle, because Smith's arrogance shows that it is impossible to negotiate. And we decided to consolidate unity in the midst of the armed struggle; to re-define the enemy, and that is very clearly Ian Smith; and, finally, to decide what targets to aim for.

The breakdown of the Smith-Nkomo talks showed everyone, especially the British, that Smith is incapable of understanding. So the only thing for Britain now is to support the armed struggle.

The armed struggle is not against whites as such. Our strategy has a lot of respect for life, a lot of respect for human beings. No children will be killed because they are whites, no women will be killed because they are whites, no farmers will be killed because they are whites, no

civilians will be killed because they are whites.

In Zimbabwe, it will be a people's struggle and it will be protracted. It will allow Zimbabweans to transform the present nationalist struggle into a revolutionary struggle that implies profound changes in the society. This will allow the people of Zimbabwe a complete divorce from the system of capitalism. So we would like the struggle to be a long one in order to liberate the mentality of Zimbabweans.

The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Callaghan, has said that Mr. Smith must accept elections leading to majority rule within two years. Would that be an acceptable time scale?

I do not know if Britain is the administrative power which can fix time limits to Ian Smith. Nor do I know if the foreign secretary's proposals followed consultations with Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo about a time scale. But my answer is this: Time is a two-edged sword. Give time to the reactionary forces in Rhodesia and you give time to Ian Smith to be better prepared. And this would imply negotiations with Mozambique to reopen her border. Who would this help? Mr. Smith or the majority?

And what does Britain think of the third force, the guerrillas who are waging the armed struggle? It is the main force in Zimbabwe.

When Ian Smith's regime declared UDI, they did not need a transitional period. Here once again is this paternalistic attitude towards blacks: that they need time to qualify. If Britain wants to make Rhodesia her responsibility, it should be eight months, at most 12, for transition, because time is very dangerous and there is a war situation in Rhodesia.

Can you explain the timing of your decision to close Mozambique's border with Rhodesia on March 3 and apply United Nations sanctions?

Essentially this move is to destroy Ian Smith's economy. We have closed the roads and railways which support Rhodesia's economy. But for those who are for freedom, Rhodesia's borders are not closed.

President Samora Machel





A soldier in Mozambique trains his binoculars on Rhodesia, across the border

We did it at this precise moment because the freedom fighters and the people of Zimbabwe are organized to fight against the Smith regime, so the conditions were ripe for the application of sanctions. We do admit there is an economic crisis in Mozambique but we have applied sanctions nine months after independence after studying Mozambique's economy and because this action will not divert attention from the Angolan struggle.

When we closed the border, we were well aware of the economic consequences. But for Mozambique it is a temporary setback, even if it lasts five years. What we imported from Rhodesia we can import from elsewhere. But Rhodesia cannot replace these routes. In the final analysis, they will suffer most.

Since the Angolan war, Dr. Kissinger and others in the West have expressed fears that Cuban troops may fight in Rhodesia and South West Africa. Would you allow foreign troops to travel through Mozambique to fight in Rhodesia?

These fears are essentially the myth that exists among the whites that the blacks are not capable. But who brought down Portuguese colonialism which was the representative of Western civilization in Africa? Was it the Cubans, the Russians, or any other foreigners? For 10 years we fought in Mozambique and we defeated Portuguese colonialism. We were able to transform the armed struggle into a revolution and we took power by force. We are leading our state in a revolutionary way and making profound changes in our society.

When I was a child and went to church, white priests used to say that God was white and that blacks did not go to heaven when they died. So now they say that blacks cannot beat the whites without the help of other countries, without the active participation of whites. They must not ignore our capacity. The Zimbabweans will defeat Ian Smith without Cuban participation. [Machel] and others in the region have noted, however, that armed

South African intervention in Zimbabwe could change the nature of the struggle.]

We would like Dr. Kissinger and the American government to worry first about getting rid of the illegal Smith regime. Then they would have the support of the whole world. But I believe they are trying to find a new zone of tension. We believe that Dr. Kissinger's main motive is to try to transfer the tension from the Middle East to southern Africa and, having established that tension here, to find an excuse for bases in the Indian Ocean.

Is it the task of the west to perpetuate crimes and wars of aggression? This is what they should answer. They must not ask about the Cubans and the Russians. They must not try to divert attention from what is happening in Rhodesia. This is a case of an illegal, minority, racist regime and the choice is between supporting those who oppress and those who want freedom.

What happens if an outside force like South Africa intervenes militarily to support Mr. Smith?

South Africa will be defeated. The people are very strong. And in Zimbabwe it is a people's struggle.

Because Smith defines his struggle as racial, he will lose and is already losing. This is a situation of agony and desperation on the part of Smith. But it is not too late: there is still time for him to correct his policies, dissolve his government and transfer power to the majority.

You have said that Mozambique's government will 'destroy the basis of poverty' by the end of the decade. Yet in more than a decade of African independence no country has achieved that. How do you define the basis of poverty and how will you destroy it?

We will destroy poverty by a correct economic strategy based on the needs of the people. We know what the people want and our central problem is to destroy the colonial structure which is so deeply rooted. So we have to liberate the minds of the people, liberate their creative initiative.

So we have defined the communal villages as places where people will be organized, carry out defined tasks, be programmed and where they will correctly utilize their own forces. Development will begin in the countryside and be supported by industry. We know that you in the West never wanted to industrialize Africa because that is the secret of eliminating poverty.

Reports on the BBC and elsewhere talk of massive forced labor, political repression and concentration camps in Mozambique. Will you comment on this?

Since we created the new republic we have closed prisons, not opened new ones. In addition we have destroyed the concentration camps, the so-called strategic hamlets, and liberated 1,500,000 Mozambicans. They lived in concentration camps and were brutalized. So now who do we have in prison: the tramps created by colonialism—drug addicts, thieves, prostitutes, criminal elements, con men, smugglers and so on. We have to reintegrate them back into society.

Before, these arrests only affected blacks. But now the world reacts because we also arrest whites who have never been arrested before and who are being arrested by blacks. Once again you come to this white complex.

We serve our people and our interests are antagonistic to the capitalist interests. People ask us if we are communists. Our answer is that we are Mozambicans and we are revolutionaries and consequently we are against capitalism, discrimination and humiliation:



Jose Carlos Lobo, first Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations, presented his credentials to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim on the 16th of March 1976. (UN/T. Chen)

Guinea-Bissau

NETO VISITS BISSAU

In early March, following a meeting in Conakry between Fidel Castro, Agostinho Neto, President of Angola and Luis Cabral, President of Guinea-Bissau, Neto visited Bissau. He was accompanied by 50 Angolans representing the Angolan people and mass organizations such as women and workers. Cultural presentations were made by the Angolans and solidarity between the two countries was emphasized. Huge crowds of people carrying banners and placards came out into the street to greet the arrival of Angola's president and the Angolans.

RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL

As Portugal turns away from a progressive alternative toward the right, its relations with Guinea-Bissau have soured. Comodore Jose Gomes Mota, acting Secretary of State for Portugal, led a delegation to Bissau which criticized various aspects of the transition to national independence. When Guinea-Bissau nationalized the Portuguese Overseas Bank of Issue, the Portuguese authorities claimed that they had been improperly compensated. Lisbon retaliated by freezing Guinea-Bissau's overseas foreign currency reserves. (*New York Times*, Mar. 18, 1976)

NEIGHBORS

THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE

The shelving of the Tenke-Fungurume mining project (see *Southern Africa*, March 1976) was caused by several factors: capital costs have escalated; the combined effect of the sharp decline in the world price for copper and the inability of Zaire to export its production via the Benguela railway, has caused the government to lose a great deal of anticipated revenue and to default on some international loan obligations; and a more conservative loan policy is being followed by European and especially American banks. Tenke-Fungurume is one of the richest unexploited ore deposits in the world, with proved reserves of 51 million tons, averaging 5.7 per cent copper

and 0.45 per cent cobalt. The partners—Charter Consolidated, the State of Zaire, Amoco Minerals (a Standard Oil subsidiary), Mitsui of Japan, Leon Tempelman of the US, and BRGM and Omnomines of France—hoped to start production in 1978 and to reach a level of 130,000 tons of copper and 6,500 tons of cobalt a year. Zaire had built revenues from the project into its development plans. In June 1975, Charter estimated that \$660 million would be necessary to complete the installations; this January the figure was raised to \$850 million. The partners suspended the project indefinitely because lenders were not ready to put forth the additional funds. US finance and Government are worried about major loan losses in 1975 and are



Agostinho Neto, President of The People's Republic of Angola returns to Luanda after meeting with President Mobutu of Zaire.

generally cautious about loans to the developing countries. About \$200 million has already been spent and the 'winding-down' process could cost up to \$60 million more. The suspension could affect Zaire's other major copper expansion project, the State-owned Gaca plan, designed to produce 150,000 tons of copper per year by 1978. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Jan. 21, 24 and 31, 1976; *New York Times*, Jan. 27, 1976)

Zaire has not, however, been quite so isolated as the closing of the Benguela Railway might suggest. Its alternative export route from mineral-rich Shaba province—the railroad through Zambia and Rhodesia—has continued to function despite Lusaka's application of sanctions against the Ian Smith regime. Zaire was probably exporting copper through Mozambique until the recent closure of the border and perhaps through South Africa. South Africa's Minister of Transport acknowledged that oil was shipped to Zaire by rail from his country. The Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation has taken the unusual step of covering for Zaire's unpaid bills to Southern African creditors. This information emerged amid rumors of increasing contact between Kinshasa and Pretoria. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975; BBC Broadcast, Jan. 29, 1976; *New York Times*, Jan. 29 and March 5, 1976; *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg,

In February and March Zaire moved substantially towards a normalization of relations with Luanda, principally because of its economic and political vulnerability. Zaire depends on Angola in the south, where the Benguela Railway used to export 35 per cent of Zaire's copper, and in the north, since Angola controls the estuary of the Zaire River between Zaire's principal port (Matadi) and the sea. Angola could refuse to dredge the river mouth or

threaten to attack shipping, thus discouraging vessels from supplying Zaire. Politically, President Mobutu is concerned about the activities of Katangese soldiers, variously estimated at 3,000 or 6,000, who have been fighting for MPLA since 1974. Trained by white mercenaries to fight for Tshombe in the early 1960s, the Katangese fled to Angola after Mobutu came to power in 1965 and subsequently enlisted with the Portuguese in the struggle against the Angolan nationalists. In addition, Mobutu may worry about the threats of Antoine Gizenga, an ally of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 who recently vowed to return to eastern Zaire to lead a movement against Kinshasa.

Zaire's first major step towards improving relations with Luanda came in mid-February when white mercenaries were no longer allowed transit from Kinshasa to Angola. The offices of the FNLA and UNITA in Kinshasa were subsequently closed. In late February Presidents Mobutu and Neto met in Brazzaville under the auspices of President Nguabi of Congo. According to Azap, the official Zaire news agency, the two countries agreed to "assure mutual confidence and security of each country . . . and the exchange of refugees;" Angola declared that it "will cooperate with its neighbors in all fields and guarantee common communications." Communications presumably refers particularly to the reopening of the Benguela Railway to Zaire traffic. Although Western diplomats in Kinshasa claim that there has been an agreement to exchange Angolan refugees in Zaire (estimated at about one million) for the Katangese soldiers, the agreement actually calls for voluntary repatriation under the UN High Commission for Refugees. In March, President Mobutu met with the Ambassadors of the USSR, Cuba and Eastern European countries and lifted restrictions on the movement of their diplomats in Kinshasa. (*New York Times*, Jan. 27, Feb. 13, 15, 17 and 29, March 7 and 23, 1976; *El Moudjahid*, Algiers, Jan. 17, 1976)

There is no indication that Presidents Mobutu and Neto resolved the issue of Mr. James Martin, a British businessman detained in Kinshasa since September 1975, and two Zaire Air Force officers held by the MPLA. Martin, the commercial director of the London-based division of a cargo airline called Alaska International Air, had been negotiating a contract for moving mining equipment with Diamang, the diamond mining company, carrying him and three Portuguese colleagues strayed into Zaire. (*Star*, Jan. 10, 1976)

Outside of the ruling circles of Kinshasa, the plight of Zairean citizens remains grave, often desperate. In some sketches of the capital Henry Kamm described the squalor of the Angolan refugees' camps, the poverty of the native Zairois, and the rampant inflation and bribery. (*New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1976) President Mobutu was forced to devalue the Zaire currency by 42 per cent in mid-March while adding a new and "more loyal" 2,500-man brigade, trained in 1975 by North Korean advisors, to his personal bodyguard. (*New York Times*, March 23, 1976; *Newsweek*, March 8, 1976)

UPDATING THE ZAMBIAN SITUATION


More information is now available on the events of January and February at the University of Zambia. The University opened in 1966 with 312 students and has grown to almost 3,000. 83 per cent of the faculty are non-Zambian. Dr. Lionel Cliffe was arrested on Jan. 31 and much of the subsequent protest was an effort to secure his release. George Siemensa, a Dutch assistant

lecturer in the School of Engineering and a freelance journalist, was taken in the first week of February, while Robert Molteno and Dario Longhi were seized Feb. 9 with the closing of the University. Molteno is a white South African (see *Southern Africa*, April 1976), son of the late professor and Progressive Party lawyer Donald Molteno. He has been teaching in Zambia for the last eight years and no longer has a valid South African passport. He gave a paper on alleged CIA activities at Dar es Salaam in December, but the paper apparently did not figure in his arrest. Longhi is variously described as an Italian or American lecturer in sociology. He and Molteno urged the Nigerian professor Eyo Ndem, Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, to take some action in favor of Cliffe, particularly to call a meeting of the school's board. Ndem and Pro-Vice-Chancellor Moses Musonda considered that such a meeting might be "misinterpreted" under the state of emergency. Matters came to a head on Feb. 6th: seventy-two lecturers, including 18 Zambians, signed a petition calling for Cliffe's release, while more than half the student body boycotted classes in support of the same position and in an effort to obtain the dismissal of Dean Ndem and Kasuka Mutukwa, a Zambian lecturer. On Feb. 9 the police arrested Longhi, Molteno, and the student leaders; closed the university; and sent the other students home with \$15 in their pockets. As of the end of February, there was no word of the release of the lecturers or students. The four faculty members had been taken to a maximum security prison at Kabwe, 85 miles north of Lusaka, held in solitary confinement and interrogated at length about their relations with

students and alleged contacts with the Soviet Embassy. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Feb. 10, 1976; *Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Feb. 10, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 14, 1976; *Guardian*, London, Feb. 20, 25 and 28, 1976)

Internal criticism of the government is increasing, particularly over the doubling of the price of corn meal. Mr. Newstead Zimba, the General Secretary of the Zambian Council of Trade Unions and leader of the 68,000 Copperbelt miners, has spoken out sharply against the emergency powers and the suspension of the basic freedoms set forth in the constitution. These powers have enabled the regime to deal with opposition from the left, but UNIP backbenchers and Zambian businessmen continue to press for a reopening of the Rhodesian border. Zambia apparently intends to de-emphasize its role as a base for liberation movement activity, with the departure of the Zimbabwe liberation groups for Mozambique and the transference of SWAPO headquarters to Luanda. As for the unrest in the Northern and Western Provinces, most sources identify the cause as the remnants of the Daniel Chipenda wing of the FNLA. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 14 and 21, March 13, 1976)

Zambia has apparently made no move to normalize relations with Luanda and maintains that the MPLA has held up 12,000 tons of its copper in Lobito. An increasing amount of Zambian exports and imports are transiting through Malawi and the Salima railhead, passing ultimately through Beira or Nacala. President Kaunda praised Mozambique's decision to close its border with Rhodesia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Feb. 14 and March 6, 1976; *Times of Zambia*, Feb. 24, 1976)



SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS SOUTH AFRICA ON ANGOLA

The much-delayed debate on Angola took place in the Security Council at the end of March. The meeting was called at the request of the Africa Group at the United Nations "to consider the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola." This reflected the total shift in the OAU in favor of the MPLA Government following the MPLA's victory and the admission of the People's Republic to the OAU in February.

Last fall, at the height of the South African invasion of Angola, deep divisions within the OAU had resulted in a decision to keep the issue out of the United Nations. A move to add a clause condemning South Africa's intervention to a resolution on apartheid had failed because of the combined opposition of the Western powers, China and some African countries. In January, a meeting of the OAU heads of state had likewise failed to reach agreement on condemning South Africa because several pro-Western countries demanded that any resolution also condemn Cuba and the Soviet Union. In February, however, the OAU Council of Ministers (at the first OAU meeting attended by the People's Republic of Angola representatives) decided to seek an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider South African aggression.

The fact that the Security Council agreed to meet exclusively on the issue of South Africa's aggression also shows the extent to which the MPLA Government had gained in international support: of the fifteen members of the Council, only the United States and China had refused to recognize the People's Republic and insisted on trying to inject the extraneous issue of Cuban and Soviet aid to the MPLA into the debate.

The meeting began as scheduled on March 26 despite some eleventh-hour maneuvers by South Africa and its

Western allies to have it called off. In a statement circulated to the Security Council a few days before the meeting, Prime Minister Vorster claimed that South Africa's occupation of the Calueque Dam site in August 1975 had been approved by the Portuguese Government, which had requested them to continue such occupation. The statement said no word of the fact that South African troops had penetrated deep into Angolan territory in a determined push on Luanda, and that they had been pushed back to the southern part of Angola by the victorious MPLA and Cuban forces. Instead, Vorster sought to portray South African intervention as limited to the dam site "for the protection of the workers and the works . . . (South Africa) would withdraw from the area as soon as assurances were received that no harm would come to the workers, that the work would continue and that the flow of water to Owambo would be assured." In another statement also circulated to the Council, the South African Minister of Defense had the arrogance to portray again South Africa as concerned about the future of the refugees which it was "protecting" in southern Angola, and to state that even after complete withdrawal from Angola, the South African Defense Force would "obviously" be "still positioned for the protection of the South West Africa border."

In the following days, South Africa made much of "contacts" which it was seeking to establish with the MPLA through "a third party" (the British Government) in order to obtain "acceptable assurances" that the Angolan Government "will not damage the hydro-electric project concerned or endanger the workers and that it will respect the international boundary." Finally, the day just before the Security Council meeting was scheduled to start, South Africa announced that the desired assurances had been received and that therefore all troops had been withdrawn.

South Africa's maneuvers, however, failed. Portugal immediately denied Vorster's claims, stating that the Portuguese Government, far from authorizing the invasion, had protested against the territorial violation of Angola. It was for Pascal Luvualu, the Angola representative, and for several other African countries to set the record straight. In a forceful statement, Luvualu rejected the notion that the Peoples' Republic of Angola had given any guarantees to the South African Government. He said:

"The People's Republic of Angola has no common frontier with South Africa and does not recognize South Africa's right of sovereignty over Namibia. . . ."

"We stress that we have no common boundary with South Africa, but we have with the people of Namibia, and when that people gains its independence, the People's Republic of Angola will in due course discuss with it the problem of the use of electricity and water from Cunene . . . we demand the unconditional withdrawal of the forces of the South African army."

Luvualu depicted the tremendous loss of life and wanton destruction inflicted on the Angolan people by



People's Republic of Angola representative Pascal Luvualu addresses Security Council (UN)

the South African troops. Villagers had been massacred, and homes and crops burned. The South Africans had carried off with them, or destroyed, goods and equipment essential to the country's economy. Large amounts of money had been taken from banks; trucks, prime cattle, light aircraft stolen; roads, bridges, airports, factories and radio stations destroyed or damaged. Thousands of people had been literally kidnapped and herded into "refugee camps" along the border with Namibia.

Other African countries pointed out that South Africa had been soundly defeated in Angola but that it was now massing its forces in the international territory of Namibia, claiming its right not only to "defend" Namibia but also to intervene anywhere in Africa to protect its interests. By presenting itself as moderate and accomodating, South Africa was actually trying to obtain legitimation of its presence in Namibia—a game supported by the Western countries on the Council. The Western European countries on the Council, while praising South Africa for having withdrawn from Angola and complaining that the Council meeting had been made obsolete by events, said nothing of South Africa's continued aggression and military expansion in Namibia. The United States' new ambassador William Scranton treated South Africa's withdrawal as the end of the problem and devoted most of his speech to an attack on Cuba's support for the MPLA. The Chinese representative—to the dismay and regret of many African countries who have links of friendship with China—went even further than the United States in denouncing Cuban and Soviet help for the Angolan struggle. China's attempt to establish a third position opposed to both Western imperialism and Soviet "social-imperialism", however, failed, as its stand came to be inevitably associated with covert support for South Africa and the West. The bitter debate between China on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Cuba on the other, at times overshadowed the actual issues under discussion, and at one point prompted a highly unusual intervention by the Ambassador of Tanzania, Salim Salim, rejecting any attempt "to hijack the debate from the consideration of the real problem and to divert it to other problems. . . ." The African members of the Council had a particular responsibility to defend Africa's interests, he stated, and the Chinese contention that South Africa's intervention had somehow been justified by Cuban and Soviet aid to the MPLA was totally unacceptable to Africans. Others remarked that Africa now knew who were its friends and who its enemies. For his part, Luvualu stated:

"My country, which has lived through a long colonial night, holds its independence dear. The help from friendly socialist countries, and more particularly from Cuba, was supplied at our request so that we could face the aggression of which my country was a victim. That request therefore was made by my country in full sovereignty. The people of Angola know the extent of this aid and the time when it can bring it to an end."

Despite rumors that the draft resolution proposed by a number of Third World and Socialist countries would be vetoed by either the United States or China, the veto did not materialize. The United States apparently did not exercise its veto power because of a mistaken calculation that the resolution would not obtain a majority; it

abstained together with all the other Western countries (except Sweden who voted in favor) and Japan. China did not participate in the vote.

The resolution, which meets the wishes expressed by the Angolan representative at the beginning of the debate, condemns South Africa's aggression against the People's Republic of Angola; demands that South Africa "scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the People's Republic of Angola; that South Africa "desist from the utilization of the international territory of Namibia to mount provocative or aggressive acts against the People's Republic of Angola or any other neighbouring African State"; and calls upon the South African Government "to meet the just claims of the People's Republic of Angola for a full compensation for the damage and destruction inflicted on its State and for the restoration of the equipment and materials which its invading forces seized." (UN documents S/RES/387; S/PV.1900-1906)

MOZAMBIQUE BRINGS RHODESIA QUESTION TO SECURITY COUNCIL

Immediately following his historic message to the nation on March 3, Mozambican President Samora Machel addressed a telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing him that "in order to support the just struggle for national liberation of the people of Zimbabwe against the racist minority régime, in keeping with the relevant decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, the People's Republic of Mozambique, as of 3 March 1976, has imposed sanctions against the British colony of Southern Rhodesia." The telegram ended with an appeal to the Secretary-General to "make the necessary approaches to Member States to support our country, which is the victim of racist aggression."

Expressions of support for the measures taken by Mozambique and calls for international assistance to Mozambique were sent to the United Nations by organiza-



Tanzanian Ambassador Salim introducing draft resolution on aid for Mozambique.

tions representing most Third World countries, in particular, the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Group, and the Commonwealth. The Government of Nigeria declared in a message to the Secretary-General that "Africa will not be cowed by the threatening stick of multinational monopolies and big Powers" and that Nigeria was sending an envoy to Mozambique to ascertain in what areas they could be of help to the peoples of Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

On March 10, Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano formally requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious economic situation faced by Mozambique as a result of its decision to impose sanctions against Rhodesia. Chissano appealed to the Council "to take the necessary steps to help the people of Mozambique defend itself by every means against the aggression to which it has been subjected by the rebel Ian Smith."

The Council, which adopted sanctions against Rhodesia in 1968 and later compensated Zambia for economic damage suffered because of the sanctions, was bound to be sympathetic to Mozambique's request for help, at least as far as economic assistance was concerned. (The Council, of course, has always refused to take concrete measures to enforce the sanctions.) Britain's acclaim for Mozambique's decision to close the border with Rhodesia, while it may have been hypocritical, further ensured that the Council would take a positive decision.

The Council held three meetings on March and 17. In a forceful speech at the opening meeting, Chissano declared that Mozambique saw the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe as part and parcel of its own struggle, and was ready to do its utmost to support it. "We in Mozambique believe that our liberation will not be complete while other brother peoples in Africa and in other parts of the world continue to be dominated, humiliated and exploited. We shall therefore not fail to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle until victory is won," said Chissano. He then described the severe economic difficulties faced by Mozambique as a result of colonial rule and the transformation of its economy into a service economy for the racist minority régimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. He pointed out that sanctions involved shaking the country's entire structure, and that Mozambique needed help not only to overcome the immediate effects of sanctions, but also to convert its economy within the general plan of national reconstruction.

Chissano requested that a study be carried out by the United Nations together with the Mozambican Government to devise "the most adequate technical and financial ways and means of implementing projects that may allow us to create new structures and new employment." For the immediate term, however, Chissano stressed the urgency for the Council to guarantee to Mozambique an annual compensation of at least \$57 million to cover losses sustained following the closing of the border with Rhodesia. Of this amount, \$42 million would be to cover the annual volume of revenues from the ports and railways services which came from Rhodesia; \$2 million to compensate for the purchase of maize previously imported from Rhodesia at higher world market prices; \$5 million to cover the equivalent of all revenues from the usual exports from Mozambique to Rhodesia; and \$8 million to compensate for the debts owed Mozambique by Rhodesia for services rendered by Mozambican ports and



Mozambique Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano waits to address Security Council.

railways. Additional amounts would be needed to compensate Mozambique for having to acquire on the international market a range of products previously supplied by Rhodesia, and for the loss of jobs by workers engaged in servicing the various aspects of trade with Rhodesia and by those workers presently employed in Rhodesia.

On March 17, the Security Council adopted unanimously a resolution requesting the Secretary-General "to organize, with immediate effect, all forms of financial, technical and material assistance to Mozambique to enable it to overcome the economic difficulties arising from its application of economic sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia." The resolution also appealed to all states to provide immediate financial, technical and material assistance to Mozambique, and requested the United Nations programmes, organizations and specialized agencies to assist Mozambique in the present economic situation and to maintain the country's needs for economic assistance under review.

Following the adoption of the resolution, a four-man mission was dispatched to Mozambique to examine the country's needs for financial, economic and technical assistance. The team, which is due to arrive in Maputo on 2 April, includes Assistant Secretary-General Abdulrahim Abby Farah; Sir Robert Jackson, Adviser on Special Economic Operations; Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa; and Kurt Jansson, Resident Representative of the UN Development Programme. (UN documents S/PV.1890, S/RES/386; press release WS/755)

RUBEN HAUWANGA DESCRIBES HORRORS IN NAMIBIA

Ruben Hauwanga, 25 year old Secretary for Information and Publicity and regional organizer in the north of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO),

recently managed to escape from Namibia after five months of detention. In a hair-raising speech before the Council for Namibia on March 8, Hauwanga described the "unspeakable agonies" suffered by himself and his comrades at the hands of the South African security police.

Hauwanga, who was picked up on August 17 in the raids following the assassination of Chief Fillemon Elifas, was repeatedly assaulted and beaten unconscious during interrogation. He was suspended from the ceiling with his feet barely touching the floor, and sometimes upside down, for hours on end, and prevented from sleeping. Finally, he was subjected to electric shock torture several times. When he and his fellow prisoners had been sick, they had not been allowed to visit a hospital or to see a doctor; for most of the time, his family did not know where he was and the police even denied that he had been arrested. Nevertheless, Hauwanga said, very little had happened to him in comparison to what was happening to many of his comrades still in South African hands, and it was important that South Africa's Western allies learn the truth about the criminal behaviour of the South African occupation forces in Namibia.

Hauwanga described how Elifas's assassination, which had been welcomed by most people in Namibia as the end of a traitor, had been used by South Africa as a pretext to carry out a brutal campaign of repression against SWAPO. The occupation forces in Ovamboland and Kavango had been greatly strengthened, and the security police had engaged in acts of arbitrary terror against anybody they deemed to be "subversive to the security of the state", with SWAPO members and sympathizers as the main target. A new tactic used by South Africa in the so-called police zone was to use the supporters and tribal police of puppet chiefs, such as Chief Clemens Kapuuu, to curb SWAPO's increasing popularity with the Namibian people. Kapuuu had sent his people to harass and threaten SWAPO officials, and recently some SWAPO militants had been brutally assaulted and then arrested and handed over to the South African forces by Kapuuu's thugs, he said. The Hereros, however, had refused to heed Kapuuu's call to join the South African army to fight SWAPO guerrillas along the border.

Hauwanga described the creation of a strip of "no-man's land" in southern Angola by South African forces through the rounding up and killing of villagers and the burning of homes and crops. The real purpose for South Africa's intervention in southern Angola had been to destroy SWAPO and deny it any form of support, rather than to protect the Cunene dam as claimed by South Africa, said Hauwanga.

Finally, Hauwanga told the people that the people of Namibia had totally rejected the so-called "constitutional conference" imposed upon them by the South African regime; they knew full well that this was "a circus performed by stooges and their masters on the stage of history," he said. On the other hand, popular support for SWAPO was growing constantly, and the freedom fighters "were highly admired and respected by the Namibian people." (UN document A/AC.131/SR.230)

Hauwanga has come to the States to take up a Lutheran scholarship for training to become a doctor.

OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA PLANNED

It has long been recognized that South Africa's dependence on outside sources for its oil supplies makes the

apartheid regime particularly vulnerable to an oil embargo as a boycott measure. As early as 1963, the General Assembly recommended an oil embargo against South Africa in order to force it out of Namibia; a Security Council expert conference considered the possibility in 1964. During the October 1973 war against Israel, the Arab countries did in fact decide to stop oil supplies to South Africa and Portugal for their support for Israel. The embargo, however, never did get off the ground in such a way as to seriously challenge South Africa's economic power. The main reasons for this lie in Iran's continued refusal to interrupt its oil supplies to South Africa (Iran even owns a refinery in South Africa in partnership with public capital), as well as in the practical impossibility to monitor and control the activities of the big oil companies.

The question of an oil embargo was revived again last year by the General Assembly in a resolution appealing "to all States concerned to take the necessary measures to impose an effective embargo on the supply of petroleum, petroleum products and strategic raw materials to South Africa." In March 1976, the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, Mme Cissé of Guinea, was reported to have held talks with Arab League officials in Cairo on the possibility of an effective embargo. Mme Cissé also disclosed recently that she would lead a delegation of the Committee to the Netherlands and Austria, and possibly other European countries, in April to discuss with OPEC "the means to implement an effective oil embargo against South Africa." (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, March 1976; *Washington Post*, March 20, 1976)

UNITED NATIONS WARNING TO THOMAS COOK

Thomas Cook, the international travel agency, has offices in South Africa and organizes tours to that country. Thomas Cook also happens to have the exclusive right to arrange all official travel by United Nations personnel and delegations. The contradiction between the monopoly enjoyed by the agency within the United Nations system and its neglect of United Nations resolutions on a boycott of South Africa already caused a stir two years ago, and Cook issued a statement to the effect that it would no longer publicize its tours to South Africa.

Recently, the inclusion of several pages on South Africa in the agency's glossy 1976 brochure prompted a protest by the Special Committee against Apartheid to the Secretary-General. Mr. Waldheim (though rumoured to be unwilling to tackle the issue) issued a warning to the agency that its United Nations franchise would be withdrawn unless it stopped promoting tourism to South Africa. Caught red-handed, the agency is likely to comply, at least for a while. The issue, however, is clearly not whether the agency would stop advertising its tours to South Africa, but whether it would stop all relations with South Africa altogether, and that has not even been proposed although United Nations resolutions on the subject are very clear. (*The Guardian*, London, February 28, 1976; UN document A/AC.115/SR.318).

WEEK OF SOLIDARITY CELEBRATIONS PLANNED

The annual Week of Solidarity with the Colonial Peoples Fighting for Freedom, Independence and Equal Rights usually held in connection with Africa Liberation Day (25 May) will be held earlier this year so as not to conflict with a conference of the Special Committee

against Apartheid scheduled to take place in Havana from May 24 to 28.

The Week of Solidarity has been observed since 1973 as a means of promoting assistance and support to the peoples and national liberation movements of Southern Africa.

Plans for the week, which is to begin on May 18 with a press conference by Ambassador Salim of Tanzania (Chairman of the Special Committee of Twenty-four),

include a photographic exhibit on Southern Africa and the daily showing of films on the liberation struggle at United Nations headquarters, as well as various activities by the specialized agencies. The films, which will be screened during the lunch break, will be open to the public. Efforts will also be made to arrange for showings through the main television networks in North America and Western Europe. (UN press release GA/COL/1681)

UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA



Charles Diggs, Chairman of House Subcommittee on Food, Energy and Resources held hearings on Angola.

US POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA SLOW TO CHANGE

A delegation of Americans returned from a seminar in Havana, where they met with representatives of the People's Republic of Angola, convinced that prompt US recognition of the MPLA-led government was in the best interests of both countries. But there were few signs in Washington that the Ford Administration was in any hurry to recognize the Angolan Government.

At a hearing before the Subcommittee on Food, Energy and Resources of the House International Relations Committee on March 10th, Assistant Secretary of State William Schaefele testified that while the People's Republic appeared to satisfy the legal requirements of control over most of the territory of Angola, the United States would not recognize it as long as there was a continued presence of Cuban troops in the territory. Schaefele gave more weight to the nonrecognition of the PRA by Zambia and Zaire than to the fact that the European Economic Community and over forty African nations had recognized the new government—a fact which he dismissed. In his view, Zaire's agreement with the Angolan Government did not amount to recognition, but was simply an agreement in principles without specific details of implementation.

In spite of its denial of recognition, the United States is apparently prepared to co-operate with certain kinds of international relief and refugee programs—its participation in programs such as these often being aimed more at enhancing US interests than at providing real aid. Stanley Scott, head of the Africa division of AID, told the subcommittee that the International Committee of the Red Cross had requested a US contribution of \$6.4 million for Angolan relief. Of the \$30 million authorized for AID funding for the former Portuguese colonies, AID is prepared to spend approximately \$7 million to meet the Red Cross request and contribute to other international relief efforts in Angola. AID officials said that AID had provided funding through the African American Institute (AAI) for educational training of 45 Angolans, 15 from each "faction." Thirteen UNITA trainees are in the United States now and two more are coming. FNLA has five trainees here and two coming. All fifteen MPLA trainees were to go to Tanzania for short-term technical training, but they will not start the program until April, allegedly because of shortage of dormitory space in Dar es Salaam. When queried as to whether future grants will be split up among the "three factions"—a procedure incompatible with the new political situation—Scott said the matter was under discussion with AAI, which is proposing that all funding go through the People's Republic Government as the legitimate government for all Angolans. Since this would involve some recognition of Angola, Scott responded lamely: "I'll be frank with you. We will have to come to a policy decision."

Meanwhile, at the United Nations, the United States must face the question of whether it will veto the admission of Angola when the matter is considered, which is likely to be in a few weeks. As the United States did not vote against extending a seat to the Angolan government for the purpose of the Security Council debate on South African aggression against Angola, it seems unlikely it will vote against admission.

The delay in recognition of the Angolan Government, however, is likely to last until the November elections are over, in order to show US disapproval of Cuban and Soviet assistance to Angola for the benefit of the Republican and independent right wing. Another sign of disapproval was the cancellation of three cabinet-level meetings of Soviet-American joint commissions in trade, housing and energy. When told about the decision, Senator Cranston, the author of a Senate resolution favoring detente

said he thought it was "sort of silly." He said it was foolish to expect the Russians not to support "anti-colonialism" in Angola. Since the joint commissions have never been regarded in Washington as very productive or important, it seems doubtful that the Soviet Union will take the cancellation seriously. It seems more likely that Kissinger is trying with these gestures and with his threats against Cuban intervention in Rhodesia to save American prestige without threatening any important relationships.

WHITE HOUSE RETAINS EX-IM RESTRICTIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

A March 13 *New York Times* article by David Binder reported that the White House has at least temporarily decided to retain the restriction on direct Export-Import Bank financing to the South African government. The article quoted State Department and White House officials as saying that a review of the policy by the National Security Council had been cancelled March 10, but that the issue "remained under review."


Twenty-one conservative Senators had urged the President to end the restriction in January (see *Southern Africa*, April, 1976). In response, liberals in both Houses organized letters to the President in early March supporting the current policy. In the House, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm drafted a letter which was co-signed by 40 other members, including most members of the Congressional Black Caucus, a dozen freshmen, and eight members of the International Relations Committee. Presidential candidate Morris Udall also signed the letter, in one of his few visible actions on southern Africa policy. In the Senate, Republican Senator Jacob Javits of New York took the initiative in drafting a letter, co-signed by seven other Senators, including some Foreign Relations Committee members and Senators Kennedy and Brooke.

It appears that the liberal victory may be only a temporary one, however. The no-change decision was leaked to the press informally by State Department personnel. But no written statement or even press comment has been forthcoming from authorized officials. The Export-Import Bank has not received any written directive on the decision, so the request from Fluor Corporation for a \$225 million loan and an equal guarantee to SASOL II, the South African coal gasification project, is still pending. South African embassy officials say informally that they are not too worried about the current decision. They expect that favorable action has simply been postponed while there is too much attention on the aftermath of Angola and on this specific issue. They may well be correct, particularly since Ford is continuing to move to the right while Ronald Reagan gains support in the Republican primaries. Furthermore, according to one Washington correspondent, Ford personally favors ending the restrictions toward South Africa.

KISSINGER WARNS CUBA ON ZIMBABWE

Following its failure in Angola, the Administration appears to be pulling another Mayaguez, this time over Zimbabwe. Throughout March, Kissinger carried on what amounted to psychological warfare against Cuba, threatening unspecified actions if Cuba supports the national liberation forces in Zimbabwe.

Kissinger's warnings about Zimbabwe are clearly a continuation of US policy during the Angolan war. As soon as the MPLA regained the offensive in the war in November, the Administration began threatening the Soviet Union, saying that "the United States cannot remain indifferent" to Soviet and Cuban "military intervention" in Angola. On February 12, when it became clear that the MPLA would be victorious, Kissinger said that Angola would not be allowed to set a precedent for



southern Africa. The next testing ground appears to be Zimbabwe.

Kissinger has directed his threats about Zimbabwe almost exclusively against Cuba, although they apply by implication to the Soviet Union also. On March 4, Kissinger told the House International Relations Committee that Cuba "should act with great circumspection" with regard to Rhodesia and Mozambique "because our actions cannot be deduced from what we did in Angola." In a major speech in Dallas on March 23, Kissinger was even more explicit: "The United States will not accept further Cuban military intervention abroad," even against white minority regimes such as Rhodesia.

Kissinger has conspicuously failed to identify what action the U.S. would take if the Cubans did respond to a request for aid from the Zimbabwe Liberation Army. But a March 23 *Washington Star* article by diplomatic correspondent Jeremiah O'Leary reported that the US was considering a naval blockade of Cuba along the lines of the 1962 missile crisis action. Other options being considered include reinforcement of the Guantanamo Bay base, expansion of the base's perimeter into Oriente Province, and an invasion or aerial attacks. On March 25, Defense Department spokesman William Greener said publicly that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council were reviewing "possible actions" against Cuba. A group of Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee who met with Kissinger on March 17 felt that Kissinger was "so hung up on the Cubans it wasn't even funny," and that he was personally considering a Cuban blockade.

All the options for action against Cuba are in the western hemisphere, one reason for this being the wish to avoid the implication that U.S. opposition to "military intervention" by the Soviet Union and Cuba actually amounts to support for continued minority rule in Rhodesia. As Kissinger said on March 23, "We are certain that

the American people understand and support these two equal principles of our policy—our support for majority rule in Africa and our firm opposition to military intervention."

Whether or not the American people believe Kissinger's formulation of these "two equal principles", the Rhodesian Front regime does not. Kissinger's March 4 statement drew a thank-you from Rhodesian Defense Minister van der Byl in a press conference with western journalists. The following week, Prime Minister Smith told Rhodesians that they could hope for aid from the US if the Cubans got involved on the side of the nationalists.

Kissinger's threats to the Cubans appear to be intended for consumption by the American public during the election year. Kissinger's detente policy has become a major issue in the Republican primaries, as it promises to be also in the November election. Changing the target of his attacks about southern Africa from the Soviet Union to Cuba allows the Administration to take a hard line "against the Communists" without really threatening detente with the Soviet Union. Apparently Ford and Kissinger think that the American public is more likely to stand for a military blockade of Cuba over Rhodesia than a threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

Liberal Congressional critics have begun responding to Kissinger's bellicose threats over southern Africa. For example, Senator Clark does not challenge the Administration's concern about the Soviet and Cuban presence, but said on March 19 that the US "should take the initiative away from the communist powers in southern Africa ... [by] encouraging peaceful change." His approach is purely a pragmatic one:

"... the worst southern Africa policy the United States could adopt would be one based on the old formula: back the side the communists are opposing. That would put the United States on the side of racial domination. It would be disastrous for our





Senator Dick Clark—urging the administration to hasten Smith's overthrow, relations with Africa, our international prestige, and our view of what this country stands for in the world. It would also put us on the losing side, which is hardly a good way to counter communist intervention."

Clark, and other liberals such as Senator Kennedy (who

gave a major policy speech on southern Africa on March 23), are urging the Administration to stop its threats and to take every measure possible to press Smith to accept majority rule without armed conflict. Both recommend U.S. support for possible British participation in Rhodesian negotiations. They also support repeal of the Byrd Amendment allowing US non-compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia, although clearly the Congress is not going to try for a third time to repeal the measure unless it can be sure of the Administration's support. Clark has also pressed for US assistance to Mozambique to compensate them for the closure of the border with Rhodesia.

The Administration is in fact following the moderate path recommended by liberals at the same time as it is loudly threatening the Cubans. The State Department has been consulting with Great Britain about the Rhodesian negotiations. With regard to aid to Mozambique, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele told the Senate Subcommittee on Africa on March 19 that the US was prepared to "consider favorably" how the US could participate in the UN program to compensate for the border closure. But the US aid will almost certainly be non-financial. Furthermore, Kissinger hinted on March 23 that aid in any form might not be forthcoming if Mozambique allowed Cubans on its soil to train Mozambican or Zimbabwean forces, saying that the US would not support "those who rely on Cuban troops."


(*New York Times*, March 6, 23, 24. *Congressional Record*, March 23.)

US ACTIONS NEWS & NOTES

LOS ANGELES CAMPAIGN TO STOP FLUOR CORPORATION

The African Activists Association (AAA) of students related to the African Studies Center at UCLA, is mounting a campaign against the Fluor corporation's proposed billion dollar investment in South Africa's new coal-to-oil plant, SASOL II. AAA picketed the company's Los Angeles headquarters March 9, and planned leafletting company employees in the company's Los Angeles headquarters March 9, and planned leafletting company employees in the parking lot April 1. AAA plans film presentations and panel discussions in 5 area churches April 19-25. The activists are encouraging a flood of letters of protest to the company, area congressional representatives and President Ford, to oppose the company's application for Ex-Im credit facilities for the South African investment. AAA's leaflet emphasizes the critical importance of new investment to South Africa, following South Africa's defeat in Angola, and reports that capital is fleeing the country. The group's address: c/o African Studies Center, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024 tel. (213)825-3686 (information sheet).

South Africa's first oil from coal—SASOL 1—project. Now Fluor seeks Ex-Im dollars to help South Africa again.



SAN FRANCISCO CAMPAIGN FOR SWAPO PRINTSHOP

The Bay Area Namibia Action Group (BA-NAG) and the Liberation Support Movement Bay Area Unit (LSM-BAU) have joined forces to raise funds to buy SWAPO a printshop and provide a trained worker to teach printing skills. The groups sponsored a benefit film premiere of two U.N. films in March "The Liberation of Namibia" and "Colonialism Case Study: Namibia". BA-NAG also reports they held an open house, March 21, met with Anglican Bishop-in-exile from Namibia Colin Winter, and are active in publishing a monthly newsletter, updating a packet on Namibia and researching a possible boycott of Del Monte sardines imported from Namibia (newsletter). Their address: 611 Frederick Street, San Francisco, CA 94117

ANTI-TRANSKEI CAMPAIGN BEGUN IN WASHINGTON, DC AREA

The Task Force on Southern Africa of the Potomac Association, United Church of Christ (representing 25 D.C.-area churches) has begun a campaign to oppose recognition of the Transkei bantustan scheduled for "independence" next October. The group plans to obtain statements from Africa academics in the U.S., to develop a report and flyers, and a possible workshop. They also report participating in a symposium on "Zimbabwe/Rhodesia--Today/Tomorrow" held April 7 and sponsored by the Friends of Zimbabwe at Wesley Seminary and American University in Washington. (minutes).

Operation Namibia Seeking Sailors

Operation Namibia reports from Philadelphia (Bulletin #4) that its British Organizing Center has arranged the purchase of a boat for its project to gain media publicity by sailing with banned books to Namibians. O.N. reports being in touch with a group of Namibians inside the country who have requested books such as Kwame Nkrumah's *Class Struggle in Africa* and Julius Nyerere's *Freedom and Development*. The group is advertising for an "international, multi-ethnic crew of four or five women and men, who can begin nonviolence training" to man the ship. Operation Namibia seeks loans of \$500 or more, to be returned after the project is completed, weekly or monthly pledges if the boat is lost or damaged, contributions of over \$5 for a book with the contributor's name on a book plate or general contributions sent to O.N., 4811 Springfield Ave, Philadelphia, PA 19143, or to the "Books for a Free Namibia Project--A.J. Muste Memorial Institute" 339 Lafayette Street, New York N.Y. 10012 (which are tax-deductible).

ALSC New Hampshire-Vermont Formed

Nineteen Vermont-New Hampshire area students, teachers and residents from the greater Dartmouth College area, formed a regional African Liberation Support Committee February 20. The group's charter statement recognizes that Africa is a principle area in the struggle against imperialism, the most recent example being the struggle in Angola under the leadership of the MPLA. The group has formed an internal study group, is discussing the collection and dissemination of literature, has begun an educational program, plans a clothing drive and sees its long-term goal as raising material support for the liberation movements. (news sheet). Its address: ALSC of N.H.-Vt, P O. Box 172, Hanover, N.H. 03755.

MAY 1 "ANTI-APARTHEID DAY" IN NEW YORK

The Pan African Students Organization is stepping up activities in support of the SASO 9, the SWAPO 6 and the NUSAS 2, all on trial in South Africa and Namibia. They sponsored a Sharpeville commemoration addressed by Prof. Ben Bagubane of the African National Congress SA and others at Columbia University March 21. Together with Youth Against War and Fascism they have issued a call for a rally and protest march which will begin in Herald Square, and march past South African Airways, on May 1. Endorsers of the rally include numerous church, trade union and liberation movement representatives and support groups. (leaflet).

CHALLENGING SOUTH AFRICAN RACISM IN MISSISSIPPI

An activist at the University of Mississippi has challenged a prominent professor there who participated in a government-sponsored junket to South Africa. Michael McMurray challenged an article written in Mississippi papers, by Dr. Ronald Farrar opposing the MPLA, based upon his travel to South Africa, on the white government's expense. Local papers would not carry McMurray's response, so he distributed it as a leaflet on campus, debunking such claims by the head of the Journalism department as "the whites were in South Africa first", "South Africa has the freest press in Africa", "Blacks no longer carry passes" and Angola was "a peaceful, European dominated colony until recently." Dr. Farrar responded to McMurray's letter by threatening him with "promot and appropriate legal action" for "any malicious and defamatory remarks". Dr. Farrar is working on an exchange program between the "Ole Miss" campus and a coloured university in South Africa. The Northern Mississippi Rural Legal Service project responded to this by threatening a suit against the exchange, noting that the program would involve a segregated university in South Africa. (letters).

COALITION FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

19 national and local organizations focusing work on southern Africa formally joined a coalition, which emerged from a working conference of the groups held in Madison, Wisconsin in the fall. The steering committee composed of representatives of 11 of the groups held its first meeting in Philadelphia, the end of February, naming the group the Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa.

The steering committee took action to: establish procedures for expanding the coalition's membership; to evaluate work on Angola done among member groups; to disseminate a bibliography of resources on the current situation in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle; to implement a "hotline" telephone tree among the groups and to designate an interim executive secretary to help carry forward these proposals. Groups participating in the coalition include: American Committee on Africa; Anti-Apartheid Movement USA; Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique & Guinea; Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa; Freedom Information Service; Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa; Philadelphia Coalition to Stop Rhodesian & South African Imports; Southern Africa Liberation Committee; Syracuse

Committee on Southern African Liberation; Washington Office on Africa; Women's Division, Board of Global Ministries, United Methodist Church; African Liberation Support Committee—Atlanta; Bay Area Namibia Action Group; Lutheran Committee on Namibia; Lutheran Global Justice Task Force; Southern Africa Action Coalition; Southern Africa Committee; Southern Africa Task Force, Massachusetts Conference, United Church of Christ (UCC); Southern Africa Task Force, Potomac Association, UCC.

RHODESIA TOUR STOPPED IN WISCONSIN

Quick action by a member of the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa (MACSA) stopped an airline tour to Rhodesia from Wisconsin. David Wiley,

who chairs the African Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, protested a tour including Rhodesia sponsored by Wisconsin AAA. A vice president of Northwest Airlines, the tour carrier, responded: "We have directed Wisconsin AAA World Wide Travel to remove all of the brochures from circulation and either delete Northwest, or the Rhodesia stop, from the itinerary. We are advised that Southern Rhodesia will be deleted and a visit to Victoria Falls via Zambia will be included instead." Dr Wiley charged that the Rhodesia stop was in violation of U.S. law implementing U.N. sanctions against the white minority regime. (Letters). MACSA reports holding programs at several area churches in observance of Sharpeville Day, March 21. (MACSA News).



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RESOURCES

A Revolution within a Revolution: Women in Guinea-Bissau, by Stephanie Urdang. A twenty-page booklet with photos on the role of women in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Guinea-Bissau and their own fight for liberation within the context of the total revolution. Published by New England Free Press, 60 Union Square, Somerville, MA 02143. Price: 50¢. Available too, through the American Committee on Africa, 305 E. 46th Street, NY, NY 10017.

From Slavery to Freedom—A comic book from Angola, written by the MPLA for use in their mass work during the struggle for independence. It is a simple, dramatic story of a young Angolan freedom fighter. Peoples Press, which has reprinted and is distributing the booklet, has written a forward and epilogue adding background and current information on Angola. Available from Peoples Press (2680 21 Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94110). Price: 60¢, 33% discount for organizations.

OMA Button—Black silhouette of a woman fighter on a red background, with the words "Organizacao da Mulher de Angola" ("Organization of Angolan Women") in yellow print. Produced and distributed by Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea (see address above). Price: 25¢, 20¢ for bulk orders.

The Committee for a Free Mozambique has available translations of President Samora Machel's opening and closing speeches to the FRELIMO Central Committee Meeting held in February 1976. Write CFM, 825 West End Ave. #14F, NYC 10025. 50 cents a copy. 40% discount 10 or more.

The Liberation of Southern Africa: The Organization of Angolan Women—Sixteen-page booklet with photos, about the struggle for liberation in Angola under the MPLA and the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA). Contains an interview with an OMA militant and an article by OMA entitled, "Why is the Angolan Woman Fighting?". Produced and distributed by the Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (1476 W. Irving Park Road, Chicago, Illinois 60613). Price: 50¢, 40% trade discount on 10 or more.

Angola Information Packet produced by and available from the Africa Fund, (305 E. 46th Street, New York, New York, 10017). Price: \$1.50 each, plus 25¢ postage. The packet consists of the following articles:

"Luanda is Madrid" by Immanuel Wallerstein, reprinted from *The Nation*, January 1976.

"African Economies" by Basil Davidson, reprinted from *The Nation*, January, 1976.

"Communism and the War in Angola" by George M. Houser, *New York Times*, December 14, 1975.

"Continuing Escalation in Angola" by Sean Gervasi.

"Angola in Perspective" by George M. Houser, reprinted from *Christianity and Crisis*, October 27, 1975.

"Allies in Empire: The U.S. & Portugal in Africa," 1970 issue of *Africa Today*, with update.

"Constitutional Law of the People's Republic of Angola," *Tricontinental Magazine*.

"Who Tried to Oust Whom, Secretary Kissinger?" by the Washington Office on Africa.

"Angola: The Vietnam Analogy," Center for National Security Studies.

Map of Angola, the United Nations.

Angola Chronology from 1956 to February 12th, 1976, the date of the OAU recognition.

New Film on Angola: "Angola: The Second War of Liberation" (color, 40 min., 16 mm.) This film depicts the background of the struggle between MPLA and neo-colonialist forces represented by FNLA and UNITA just prior to independence. Also shown is the day-to-day reality of "poder popular" (people's power) in Luanda and elsewhere. It was filmed by Herbert Risz, an independent Austrian film-maker. Narrated by Robert Van Lierop. (Available from Third World Newsreel, 26 W. 20th Street, New York, New York 10011 for \$75, or from DEC, 121 Avenue Road, Toronto, Canada.)

The following materials are available from the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) for 25¢ each (address: 121 Avenue Road, Toronto, Canada):

Angola: A pamphlet prepared in July 1975 outlining the major events in the decolonization process in Angola since the coup in Portugal, a brief history of MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA, and the nature of foreign intervention in Angola. Prepared by the Angola Solidarity Committee, London, England.

MPLA for Angola: Text of a speech by Paulo Jorge, responsible for External Affairs, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) given in Toronto, October 22, 1975. Outlines the situation in Angola since the Alvor Agreement of January 1975 and MPLA's readiness to assume the responsibilities of governing an independent Angola on November 11.

BOOKS RECEIVED

If You Want to Know Me: Reflections of Life in Southern Africa, a collection of original poetry compiled by P. Halsey, G. Morlan, and M. Smith. New York: Friendship Press, 1976. Paperback, 48 pp. \$2.25.

Naboth Mokgatle, *The Autobiography of an Unknown South African*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Paperback \$3.95. 360 pp.

Richard L. Sklar, *Corporate Power in an African State: The Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Hardcover \$12.00. 257 pp.

Leonard Thompson & Jeffrey Butler (eds.), *Change in Contemporary South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Paperback \$5.95. 447 pp.

Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Hardcover \$10.50. 284 pp.

Richard Thompson, *Retreat From Apartheid: New Zealand's Sporting Contacts with South Africa*. London: Oxford University Press, 1976. Paperback, \$4.50. 102 pp.

Derek Wilson, *A History of South And Central Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Paperback, \$4.75. 342 pp.

Angola: Some Questions and Answers—takes up some of the frequently asked questions about Angola, including those of foreign involvement, and attempts to show how some of the public information available through the media is misleading in its presentation of the situation. Prepared by TCLSAC, Nov. 1975.

Liberals and Liberation—an article outlining Canada's policies in relation to decolonization in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola, focusing on recognition of Guinea Bissau and aid to the liberation movements. Prepared by TCLSAC, June 1975.

TCLSAC also produces a monthly newsletter on Southern Africa as well as other papers. These are available to members. A membership in TCLSAC costs \$10.00, \$5.00 for students and unemployed. A "sustaining membership" costs \$50.00

Hearings on Southern Africa

Two sets of hearings on southern Africa conducted by the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are now available in print. The first, "U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa," was held in June and July, 1975. It included testimony from Administration and public witnesses (mostly professors) on each country in southern Africa. The second hearing was on "Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire," and was conducted in October, 1975 when the dramatic increase in aid to Zaire became known. It included some information about the connection between this aid request and U.S. involvement in Angola.

Both hearing transcripts are available from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4229 Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510, or the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas, *Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War*. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976. Paperback, 157 pp. \$2.45.

Frederick S. Arkhurst (ed.), *U.S. Policy Toward Africa*. New York: Praeger, 1975. Hardcover, \$16.50. Paperback, \$6.95. 259 pp.

Roger E. Kanet & Donna Bahry (eds.), *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World*. Praeger, 1975. Hardcover, \$17.50. 242 pp.

George T. Yu, *China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania*. New York: Praeger, 1975. Hardcover, \$16.50.

South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 4

Critique of the Black Nation Thesis. Racism Research Project, P.O. Box 3026, South Berkeley Station, Berkeley, Ca. 94703. Pamphlet, .50 per copy. 32 pp.

Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*. New York: Academic Press Inc., 1974. Hardcover, \$16.50

Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Francis A. Kornegay (eds.), *American-Southern African Relations: Bibliographic Essays*. African Bibliographic Center (Special Bibliographic Series, New Series, #1) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. Hardcover, \$11.95. 188 pp.

UPDATE

ZAMBIA RECOGNIZES PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

The government of Zambia last month recognized the People's Republic of Angola, becoming one of the last African nations to do so. During the Angolan fighting that followed independence from Portugal, Zambia supported one of the pro-Western factions—UNITA—and later called for a government of national unity.

The Zambian move may clear the way for US recognition of Angola, since American officials have argued that their hesitance to recognize the MPLA-led government was based largely on the attitudes of Angola's neighbors, Zambia and Zaire. Zaire recognized the MPLA in February.

VORSTER VISITS ISRAEL

Prime Minister Johannes Vorster of South Africa made a 4-day visit last month to Israel, where he received a warm welcome despite his record of Nazi sympathies during World War II.

Though the trip was played down as a "private visit", Vorster arrived in Jerusalem with a planeload of South African officials, and before leaving he signed a cooperation agreement with Israel that will involve industrial and scientific exchanges.

SMITH LOOKS TO CHIEFS

Rhodesian authorities have indicated they will take steps to give state-appointed tribal chiefs a larger role in government, and will relax the "color bar", in order to improve their image internationally.

Pressure on the Smith government from the guerrilla war, meanwhile, continues to mount. One attack in late April took place 60 miles inside Rhodesia, on a major highway to South Africa through the border town of Beitbridge. Three South African tourists were killed in the incident.

In addition, the UN has widened its boycott against the white regime, in a unanimous Security Council action, which calls on member states to ban their citizens from providing insurance for Rhodesian goods, and to end franchising arrangements with Rhodesian firms.

LIBERATION MOVEMENT SPLITS

A group of expelled members of the African National Council (ANC) of South Africa have formed a new organization to fight the white regime in Pretoria. The group, which charges that the ANC leadership is dominated by the South African Communist Party and is preoccupied with ideological debate, include the following prominent members: Tennyson Makaywanie, Mzimikula Makaywanie, George Mbele, O.K. Setlhapelo, A.K. Mqota (Kgo-kong), Thami Bonga, J.D. Matlou, and P. Ngakane.

The new organization is calling itself the ANC (African Nationalist), and says it's prepared to unite with the Pan Africanist Congress and the Unity Movement.

ANGOLA'S CUNENE PACT CLOUDED

Normal operations have resumed at the Cunene Hydroelectric Project near Angola's border with Namibia, but there is some confusion about the nature of MPLA's posi-

tion on the project.

South Africa says that Cunene's security has been guaranteed by Angola, but officials in Luanda stress that they have not and will not make any agreement concerning Namibia with the South African government. Angola says its guarantee not to interfere with the Cunene dam system is not a pledge to South Africa, but a promise to the people of Namibia that they will not be denied the water they need.

In other Angolan developments, the Gulf Oil Company has announced that it will resume oil production in the enclave of Cabinda. In addition, an Angolan official has been quoted as saying that Gulf will also begin exploration activities as soon as possible.

ZAMBIA FREES DETAINEES

Zambia has released five foreign-born lecturers detained in connection with pro-MPLA activities at the University of Zambia earlier this year.

Latest released include Lionel Cliffe, a British political scientist, George Siemansma and Klaus van der Berg, both Dutch engineering teachers, and Robert Molteno, a white South African who lost his citizenship during his 8-year residence in Zambia.

Still in jail is a Zambian Education Fellow, A. Lulat, and roughly 15 students whose names are not known.

NAMIBIA—TERRORISM TRIAL

The Swakopmund terrorism trial of the SWAPO Six got underway again on April 5 after a two weeks recess. Informed observers are convinced that the South African occupation regime is striving hard for convictions in order to be able to come up with a plausible excuse to ban the internal organization of SWAPO inside Namibia.

Two men held incommunicado in detention by the security police were sentenced to 12 months for contempt of court. SWAPO secretary-general for Namibia Axel Jackson Johannes said that he had been detained for 200 days and that he should be among the accused and not appear as a state witness. Victor Uutoni Nkandi also would not give testimony, stating he had been detained since September 1975 and that at one point he was made to stand for four days and nights without sleep and forced to make false statements.

Ms. Kaino Malwa, a nurse at the Engela Lutheran hospital (as are the three women among the SWAPO Six) testified on cross examination that she had been tortured, held suspended by a chain attached to her wrist so that only her toes could touch a wooden block. Sam Shivute, SWAPO secretary for the northern region, who has been in detention since August of last year, was put on the stand and said during cross examination, "you know how it is when the police question you," a phrase not included in translation, so it was not pursued by the defense counsel. Later, the lawyer attempted to have Mr. Shivute recalled on the basis of the incomplete translation of his testimony. The judge denied the motion.

Amnesty International has instructed a Windhoek attorney to investigate the case of Axel Johannes' detention.

THE CURTAIN FALLS

The poem "I'M A PROSTITUTE"

*I cry for the past I possess
A past which marked me brutally
That created in me a hate which I didn't know
— I was a prostitute!
I'll yell it louder: I was a prostitute!
And I'll blame you
I'll point at you colonialists, one by one
Without passion. . .
You forced me to become a prostitute
I was a prostitute for subsistence
I was a prostitute to save the life I wanted to live
Not knowing that this way I would lose it
I accuse you colonialists of the tears I cry
I accuse you colonialists of my downfall
I accuse you colonialists of the life I lost
I'll accuse you colonialists eternally
I'll accuse you always!
I'll accuse you always!
I wanted to live and you killed me
You destroyed me
You despised me
How I hate all of you!
I was a prostitute because I wanted to eat
I was a prostitute so that I could have a minimum to live
on
I thought of life when small
And knew that it wasn't all happy times
But you forced me into one of the worst ways of life
— Prostitution
The degrading sell out of the human body
The destruction of the mind
The total ruin of an abyss without end of a human being
I accuse you for the food I didn't have
I accuse you for the water I didn't have to wash myself
I accuse you for the small hut, without living conditions
which you made me pay for
I accuse you for the honest job I had of begging from
door to door
And for which I shall never find
I accuse you for the life I led
Oh! I hate you colonialists!
I hate you!
I'll accuse you in each movement I make
In each look
In each place I may be at
I repented . . . I changed my life but remained marked
And that mark will never disappear because it taught me
to hate
For all this I'll accuse you wherever I go
For all this I'll tell everyone wherever I go
— Look at me and see
Here's what colonialism does
What it is
— Oppression
Exploitation
Humiliation
Injustice
Look at me and see
And you'll find an easy answer of what has to be done
Of who can save you
And give you a reason for living
— A REVOLUTION*

Amelia Neves, C.P.P.M., 4/7/75

This poem was recited during a performance at Mozambique's Independence Celebrations, June, 1975.



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