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MOZAMBIQUE

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OUR COLLECTIVE

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
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE - ONE YEAR

by Ruth Minter



Independence Day celebrated in Mozambique, June 25, 1975

On June 25, 1975, Mozambique became independent. At midnight, as the day began, the Portuguese flag was lowered and the new flag of the People's Republic of Mozambique was raised. Now a year has passed and it seems fitting to try to see what content has been put into

the name "People's Republic." What has this first year meant for the people of Mozambique?

The intent of a People's Republic is that the determining factor for all decisions and choices should be the inter-

ests of the masses of the people—the workers and the peasants. In a People's Republic the economy and the social services, the police and the political structures, all authorities, should be in constant contact with the people, hear them, learn from them the problems which are urgent and work out solutions. In a People's Republic there is no room for those who wish to ignore the masses and just make a good living for themselves. There is no room for big profits by individuals or by small groups. The "people" are to assume responsibility and provide the guidelines and the thrust for building the future of their country. The "leaders" are given legitimacy by the people and can expect to remain in positions of responsibility only as long as they remain conscious of, respectful of and servants to the people and their needs.

Mozambique, at Independence, was not able to fulfill all of these conditions. The masses of the people can really only assume power when they are politically conscious. They have to understand and internalize the fact that they have a right, a duty—and capacity—to make suggestions and criticisms. They have to learn to collectively analyse their objective situation and suggest what could be done. They have to understand that the deprived and exploited situation they endured under Portuguese colonialism was unnatural and wrong, that they should not cower before people in power, and that they should not accept perpetual poverty, illiteracy, ill health, etc.

Organizing the People

FRELIMO, the governing party in Mozambique, had developed these conditions over a ten year period in the "liberated areas" of Mozambique, in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Tete provinces. In some other areas such as Zambezia, Manica and Sofala there were zones where the people began much later to have experiences which would build this new and necessary consciousness but they had few opportunities to really put it into practice before 1974. In the rest of the country, FRELIMO was underground until 1974 and the masses of the people lived in the midst of the colonial system without an alternative experience of how things might be. Thus with about three fourths of the population FRELIMO faced and faces a tremendous task of organizing and teaching. Old patterns have to be unlearned and replaced. The people must see in practice the good that comes by transforming the nation from a colonialist capitalist society into a People's Republic. The best learning comes from living the new patterns. The experience of the liberated areas during the war years serves as a lesson and a model for the rest of the country.

This task of educating, organizing and mobilizing the people was taken as one of the major thrusts of the Party during the period from September, 1974, to June, 1975, the period of the government of transition when the Portuguese still participated in government alongside FRELIMO leadership. Throughout the country, both in living areas and in the workplaces, dynamizing groups ("grupos dinamizadores") were organized. They were to engage in political education of the people throughout their jurisdiction as well as serving as catalysts in helping the people organize themselves to begin solving local problems. The dynamizing groups were urged by the Party to take initiatives in various local projects related to education, health, housing, women, working conditions, or whatever seemed urgent. Although the programs were similar in many places because all were working within FRELIMO priorities and orientations, different groups had different strengths.




In some areas students aid agricultural programs by working a few hours a week in garden.

For instance in the district of Ribaué in Nampula Province, the dynamizing group responded enthusiastically to the party's call to help the people begin schools for themselves. They urged the building of schools throughout the district, not just for the children, but even more for the illiterate adults. In independent Mozambique, they told the people, everybody had a right—and a duty—to study. Whoever knew even a little bit should be recruited to teach his/her neighbors. In the immediate area of the district center, an area that included some 35,000 people, about 140 new schools were organized and functioning even before Independence. Most were literacy centers, but where the people found someone able to teach they tried to have primary school classes as well—both for children and for adults who were ready for them. In the schools which served both adults and children the standard pattern was for the children to have classes in the morning and adults in the afternoon and/or evening. Evening classes depended on the people being able to afford a storm lantern for lighting.

Previous to the efforts of the dynamizing group there had been about ten primary schools in the same area—for children—only two of them reaching as high as 4th grade. What is amazing and very important is that schools now exist for everyone—virtually the whole population is in them, having built them themselves and found their own teachers.

Adult enthusiasm for the classes runs high. In July, right after Independence, I had various occasions to visit these schools unexpectedly while they were in session. They were invariably full, sometimes with many more people than could fit comfortably in their small buildings. One school for adults which we dropped in on twice was full of men and women both times. Yet they were without a teacher, their own having found a paying job about a month before. Yet they still came daily and tried to continue, with a young boy of 11-12 years helping them.



Education for all is a major priority of the new Mozambique.

In other areas, dynamizing groups had other priorities. In a sawmill in Nampula which serves a large area, the workers had the task of keeping the mill going when the management left the country, deserting them and the mill. They did not have all the skills necessary but they have kept the mill in operation and are learning as they go. In Quelimane housing was a priority since some 60% of the population lived in substandard housing. There the people have been organized to collectively build themselves permanent and adequate housing. In other areas vaccination campaigns, health education, the establishment of consumer cooperatives or people's stores have been a priority. In many areas organizing has focused on the formation of collective fields and planning for communal villages.

In all of these areas the crippling legacies of colonial patterns have emerged to be combatted again and again. One example comes from looking more closely at the people's schools mentioned in the Ribaué District. In the months after Independence most of these schools were visited by students from the FRELIMO Secondary School, which had just moved to Ribaué from Tanzania. The students worked with literacy teachers and primary school teachers. They found their biggest task though was general political education. In some locations they were the first people who had ever come who could explain what FRELIMO was about and what difference it made that the government was now headed by FRELIMO instead of the Portuguese. The people were happy with Independence but they hardly knew what it was.

The people of Ribaué had little close contact with FRELIMO during the war years. It was the location of a Portuguese military base and a large number of settler farmers. One of the consequences the students found difficult to overcome, which was very different from the patterns they knew within FRELIMO, was the deference or even fear with which they were treated in some zones. The peasants knew FRELIMO was now in power and identified them with FRELIMO, but their only previous

experience of relationships with people in power was of oppression. People in power were best avoided. They greeted the students not with an ordinary greeting but with "Viva FRELIMO" and a raised fist and then sometimes scurried away. In meetings, even with the teachers, the FRELIMO students were always asked to give their opinions and suggestions but the local people were very reluctant to volunteer any opinions or even ask questions. Never before had it been expected of them. When the Portuguese or the Portuguese-appointed "regulos" issued orders the people had had to obey quickly and without question or be punished.

Furthermore the FRELIMO students found that in a few locations people were attending literacy classes out of fear. They had heard it was an order and they had no experience of FRELIMO to know what happened to the disobedient. Hence, at least while the FRELIMO students were present, even the senile and sick came to literacy classes. They were afraid not to in the presence of a "FRELIMO" person.

The student presence helped to teach the people that they themselves were expected to think and decide what was best, that FRELIMO was not giving orders to be followed unthinkingly but guidelines to be understood and adopted critically. In almost every location the students had occasion to help the people analyze one or another local problem and try to see how FRELIMO orientations would apply in reaching a reasonable solution.

The focus and quality of results of the various dynamizing groups have varied as have the particular problems they have faced. But as structures designed to educate and organize around the people's needs, they have stimulated many projects this first year. In the liberated areas the structures of people's power already established by FRELIMO during the war years have continued to function, often sharing their experiences with other areas. There have been innumerable meetings throughout the year to help local leadership share ideas and experiences. These

have been at both provincial and national levels on a wide variety of topics. There have been meetings on literacy, health, primary and secondary education, women, child-care, information, political organizing, etc. all trying to stimulate creative thinking, evolve common solutions for problems, and contribute to national planning. Local areas were expected to send representatives, who would participate wholeheartedly and share with the rest of their community on their return.

Thus although in September of 1974 only the "liberated areas" were really ready and able to assume the responsibilities of people's power, the rest of the country has been working hard this year at moving in that direction. FRELIMO is concerned that more adequate structures be created as rapidly as possible. In March 1976 the FRELIMO Central Committee announced that People's Assemblies are to be created at every level of State administration. These will have authority over the administrative structures. Within the administrative structures themselves leadership will be organized collectively. The intent is to radically change the objectives and style of work of the State machinery, which was inherited from colonialism. The details of how and when the People's Assemblies will be formed has not yet been announced.

FRELIMO leadership in the People's Republic of Mozambique government has moved ahead on various fronts to turn the country around and make it begin to function in the interests of the majority rather than in the interests of a privileged minority. Many of the positive developments have come in the areas of education, health, and social services.

Education for the Masses

I have already mentioned the mushrooming of schools built by the people themselves. This has happened not only in rural areas such as Ribaué but in urban areas as well. In the urban areas, classes are often organized at the workplace, although others are also available in the bairros where people live. In these new schools, everything is still at an initial stage. Many of the teachers chosen by the people, especially in the rural areas where there is little choice, are really inadequate. But they do know more than the other peasants around them and are willing to teach what they know. They themselves need opportunities to study more, however, if they are to keep ahead of their students. Classes are in whatever location is available. In Ribaué the buildings are all in the style of local houses: mud walls supported on a sturdy skeleton of lashed saplings or bamboo with grass thatch roof. In some cases in the poorer communities there are only logs for benches—in others rough tables or desks have also been built. In some a local carpenter has constructed a blackboard, in others a smoothed place on the inside of the mud wall has to serve. In the cities equipment is usually a bit less rudimentary as there are more carpenters among the people and more possibilities of costs being met from the workers' pockets. These schools so far receive no subsidy from anybody and in most cases the teachers have received no pay this first year, although in Ribaué some of them taught mornings, afternoons and evenings. Everything in these schools has come from local organization and initiative in response to FRELIMO insistence that education is basic to national development and a top priority.

In line with this determination to raise the educational level of the whole people (rather than just educating an elite) another major emphasis has been on expanding pos-

sibilities for primary education. A complementary priority is on expanding the number of primary teachers and upgrading and retraining those who already are teaching.

Every province now has a location and staff for the retraining and training of primary school teachers. The first big retraining effort came during the three-month vacation period at the end of the 1975 school year. During this period each province held two six-week retraining courses. Teachers were selected from every district within the province to try to spread the benefits everywhere rather than concentrating on the larger centers as had been the norm for education under the colonial system. Each province enrolled 300 teachers. With ten provinces, the number retrained by the end of January 1976 was 3000 nationwide. Those who taught the courses are now preparing themselves to teach six-month courses for new teacher recruits in 1976. This continuing education of teachers is especially necessary since candidates to teach are considered who have two or more years schooling beyond the year they wish to teach, and in many cases really need and want to study more themselves.

Secondary schools and the university have also been going through transformations in structure, orientation, curriculum and staffing, but only a tiny minority of the people are currently involved at these levels of education. The larger thrust is to improve the lower levels which serve and are needed by a vastly larger portion of the population at this time. The students and staff of the higher levels of education are learning to work with each other in jointly running the schools and making decisions of a wide variety that used to be the prerogative of people in administrative posts. They are also being engaged in work related to the problems of the communities in which they find themselves. For instance, students in the electricity course of the industrial school in Maputo (formerly Lorenzo Marques) have been spending part of their time working with people in the poorer sections of town installing electricity in the houses. And students were organized to work in the fields, in literacy work, in city jobs or in a wide variety of other tasks related to nationbuilding during their school vacation November through January. Not everybody participated. There were parents who wouldn't permit their children to participate. But considering the elitist nature of the vast majority who had entered these higher levels of education under the colonial system, a very respectable number did participate in these vacation programs.

Probably the most widely talked about effort in education in Mozambique in the western media was the July 25 nationalization of all private schools. It has to be understood that under the Portuguese there were many kinds of schools and the system was far from unified. There were official schools run by the government—for whites and assimilados. There were missionary schools run by churches, mostly the Roman Catholic Church, and mostly for blacks, and often requiring baptism for admission. There were also a wide variety of private schools, again serving primarily the white community. For the People's Republic of Mozambique to begin to put all these institutions at the service of the whole people, it was essential that the system be unified, restrictions on admission eliminated, and high tuition modified. Hence the decision to nationalize the schools. Although there have been some problems from private or mission administrators who tried to hide or abscond with school resources, the transition has by now been made and the schools entered the 1976 school year on a very different basis from that existing at



Doctors are badly needed in independent Mozambique. Dr. Joseph Paz, the Ministry of Health's flying doctor, treats patients at local clinic.

the beginning of 1975. During this year it is hoped to begin to integrate the new schools begun during the last 18 months into the national system so that they can begin to pay their teachers, improve the level of teaching, etc. There are however national shortages of funds and of personnel so it will be some years yet before it is possible to ensure good universal education.

Decentralizing Health Services

In the area of health there have also been a number of new directions and measures taken to begin to put medicine at the service of the masses of the people instead of serving only an urban elite. Again a major step was the nationalization on July 25 of all hospitals and clinics and the closing down of all private practice. All doctors, nurses and other hospital workers were invited to participate in the national health system, and to accept assignment wherever they were needed. FRELIMO wanted to end the possibility of getting rich off people's sicknesses. It also wanted to begin to distribute available personnel more widely throughout the countryside and reduce the concentration in the cities, particularly Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). Transfers have begun during this first year and health services are beginning to be available away from the cities in places where they hardly existed under the colonial system.

In this initial phase there are two severe problems. One is lack of medicines, the other is lack of personnel. No medications are produced inside Mozambique so every prescription implies an import and the use of scarce foreign exchange. Doctors fled in large numbers before Independence, and diminished further in number with the end of private consultations, so that now there are scarcely a tenth the number there were before April 25, 1974. Those who stayed have been distributed, more are being trained, and some foreign medical help is being accepted. But it will be a long time before personnel is available in adequate numbers. This means that existing medical staff

work very long hours, and even so, the patients endure a very long wait in order to receive treatment.

Apart from these problems there are problems of educating the masses of the people, who previously had little access to health care. They have to become accustomed to seeking medical help when needed. They also need to learn about the prevention of disease. For instance, a maternity ward in Ribaué is staffed with a midwife and has good facilities but the woman in charge laments the fact that the local population still comes largely when it is too late, when they have problems with home deliveries. Therefore she has to deal with far too many deaths—often ones which could have been prevented had she been in touch with the mothers earlier.

Another rural area in Gaza province has already overcome that problem, however. The nurse/midwife there in Mapai had an infirmary and waiting room brimming with women and children when she was visited in March and had delivered three babies in the previous 24 hours. She said the women usually came to her for delivery. Her problem was facilities. Her infirmary had taken over what used to be a private home but she had only two small rooms into which beds were crowded—one had three beds and two cribs for ordinary patients—the other had two delivery tables, two beds, and three cribs and served as a maternity/nursery. An old woman wounded in an air attack by Rhodesian troops at the border occupied a mat in a small hallway outside those two rooms.

Many of Mozambique's diseases and deaths come from diarrhea, water-borne diseases and malnutrition. The people themselves can do a lot of preventive work if they begin to understand what is needed. If they do they can be healthier yet require less medical care or medicines to cure them, a bonus in a country where these are in short supply. Therefore an important priority of the Ministry of Health in Mozambique is preventive medicine, health education and campaigns on improving sanitation. During this first year of independence there have been campaigns to vaccinate against smallpox and cholera, and clinics throughout the country are being organized to distribute regularly prophylactic doses of anti-malarial medicine.

Most of the health education and sanitation drives have been by local initiative but one campaign was nationwide and met with enthusiastic participation. That was a campaign to build latrines. The goal was that every family would have access to a latrine. This was as important in the city slums as in the countryside. Both locations had been essentially without any such facilities. Posters and the radio and organizers reached out virtually everywhere to teach a simple way to construct a latrine and to try to mobilize people to help each other. "If you have a latrine, help your neighbor build one." The campaign was quite successful, probably not quite achieving its goal, but certainly improving tremendously what was a very poor situation.

CHILD CARE AND OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES

New priorities have also emerged in the area of child-care since Independence. Nursery schools and kindergartens were nationalized along with other schools. Almost all had been expensive private facilities used only by the urban elite and expatriate populations. Poor children simply had no access.

Now there is an attempt to expand facilities. Factories and other workplaces are urged to set up childcare facilities for their employees. In one clothing factory in Maputo, now worker controlled since its owners deserted

it, the workers selected from among themselves a woman to take charge of a nursery school for her own and fellow-workers' children. Space was allocated on the factory grounds and a man from the warehouse was temporarily reassigned to construct cribs from the wood of the packing crates in which the factory received its raw materials. The nursery now regularly takes care of about a dozen children and is preparing to expand.

Probably the biggest change to date is in the priorities for admittance to the few places available. Admission is no longer by virtue of being able to pay. Priorities go to children of FRELIMO cadre whose responsibilities mean their children need care away from home. Priorities also go to children from families where both parents work. As facilities expand there will be more and more places for workers' children.

Clearly expanding facilities means training more personnel and people are now being recruited for just such training, the first course to be during 1976.

Other social services such as the training of those with birth defects, the disabled, the mentally retarded, or the care of the aged, the recuperation of alcoholics and drug addicts are also in the process of development. In all these areas, minimal shelters existed in the bigger cities but rarely with adequate program or appropriate goals.

It is hoped eventually to have adequate facilities for all of these people in each of the ten provinces but initial work is for the blind, the retarded, and the disabled. Training centers are to be established for them where it is hoped they will stay for short times or even only as day students, learning skills that enable them to be reintegrated into their communities as participating citizens. By the end of this first year work in this field is largely still in the planning stages though some provinces have moved ahead. In Quelimane, for instance, the people have been mobilized this year to collectively cultivate several extra fields. These will help support the population of a training center when it opens later this year.

Another area of activity which could perhaps be called a social service has been the effort throughout the last 18 months to take off the city streets the prostitutes, idlers, and homeless children. The goal is to move them into new situations, often involving collective work, communal living and study in the countryside together with the peasant populations. It is hoped they will discover new and better ways to live, reject their previous life-styles, and become productive contributing citizens. One such group of children taken off the streets of Quelimane is now in a FRELIMO primary school together with other children who had studied in FRELIMO schools during the war.

Communal Production and Communal Villages

All such problems as education, health, social services have been tied to the goals of organizing the people into communal villages. These will be more concentrated living and working units, where such services will reach everybody, and where collective decisionmaking can make people's power real. Large areas of rural Mozambique have traditionally been populated not by villages but by scattered homesteads or family groupings, often unlinked by road with any major population center. Rural isolation has been intense. In the cities, the colonialist capitalist system promoted a dog-eat-dog individualism that inhibited efforts to work together for the general welfare. FRELIMO has in its first year successfully promoted a wide variety of cooperative and communal efforts, with a focus on collective production, especially agricultural pro-

duction. This program affects not only peasants but also organized groups of city dwellers. For instance the public service workers from the capitol city work weekends on a collective garden outside the city. These efforts at collective production are seen as a first stage in the development of communal villages of some 500 families. Some locations have already mapped out where the villages will be and have begun to construct the first houses, but by and large the stage of communal villages is yet to come.

Housing

A correlative of the campaign to form communal villages is the campaign to get the people into permanent housing rather than the common mud and thatch or scrapmetal huts which have to be rebuilt regularly. Most of this will become a reality only as the communal villages grow, but in some zones such as Quelimane and Maputo there are self-help building schemes already under way. In these particular schemes the dynamizing group and local government have helped by providing a simple house plan which can be built in stages for smaller or larger families. Concrete blocks, the basic building material, have been made collectively by bairro members, then the families have formed groups so that 6-8 families will work together on each others houses until all are ready. Building materials have been made available with some of the money to cover costs raised collectively and the rest to be paid off over a twenty year period by the residents of each new house. In Quelimane the program started in September of 1975 and a visitor six months later saw stacks of concrete blocks in bairro after bairro, and small houses going up all over, many of them right in front of thatch huts that will later be torn down. In that city the city council has tried to organize the layout of the houses so there will be room for streets, water and electricity.

The government of the People's Republic of Mozambique has taken one other important step in bringing its national housing resources within reach of the general population. That was the decision announced on February 3, 1976 to nationalize all non-owner-occupied rental housing. This was seen as necessary to end speculation in housing and to begin to redistribute housing more equitably within the cities. Adequate housing in the central city has in the past been mainly white-occupied while the slum suburbs outside have been occupied by the blacks of the city. The nationalization should enable this barrier to begin to crumble and the city to become more integrated. It should also enable more people to be moved into adequate housing. The measure was of course unpopular with those who were real estate speculators. Many of them decided to leave the country.

Economy—A Survival Operation

The leaders of the People's Republic of Mozambique have put a high priority on agricultural production. The decision on July 25 to nationalize the land meant that land which was not being used by its "owners" was no longer available to them. Others, interested in putting the land to productive use could ask for it. This meant that plantations which had been deserted and other unused agricultural land were taken over in many areas by peasants and agricultural workers. For instance in Zambezia Province the largest tea plantation in Mozambique was deserted and the workers have been organized to maintain production, and assume its management. The vast majority of Mozambican peasants however were subsistence farmers and they have been urged to work

collectively in developing newly available lands. They have enthusiastically taken up the offer throughout the country. They are encouraged by the experiences of the war years in the liberated areas, where the people produced collectively. They found that collective production meant not only more food and better distribution but also that they were able to improve their diets through collective production of new foods, usually fruits and vegetables, but in some cases also animals.

The goal is to improve the diet of the general population, reduce malnutrition, while at the same time reducing food imports. But food production, important as it is, cannot be done at the expense of the already established commercial farming which has an important place in the national economy. Many of the commercial farms have suffered drops in production during this first year because of loss of management or technicians, and various forms of sabotage. Also it has taken much of the year to organize the workers to take on additional and cooperative responsibilities. It is expected that production will be better again in 1976.

In industry there is also an urgency about maintaining previous levels of production. Mozambique is one of the more industrialized states in Africa but its industry is not oriented toward meeting the needs of the masses. Most of it is light industry producing for the urban consumer. Eventually there will be a plan for reorganizing and reorienting industry but this is not yet ready. Right now, for the sake of the national economy what exists must simply be maintained. Again workers are being organized to assume management when necessary. Various owners, managers, and middle level technical personnel have left the country. Frequently they deliberately sabotaged the industries they left behind by leaving them nearly bereft of funds, by failing to pay bills before leaving, by destruction of machinery or removal of crucial parts etc. This has made maintenance of industry harder but gradually factory production is creeping back to a normal level.

Zimbabwe Solidarity

When Mozambique announced in early March of 1976 that it was closing the border with Rhodesia, it took a step which will have very serious effects on Mozambique's economy as well as on that of Rhodesia. Large numbers of dock workers will be out of work because of the reduced traffic in the ports, and a lot of foreign exchange usually gained by handling the Rhodesian export-import traffic must simply be discounted from the economy. The international community has indicated that it will help Mozambique meet its losses and Mozambicans themselves have been mobilized to yet again increase production as part of their support for the decision. Mozambique hopes to mobilize those unemployed to participate in some of the rural production units where there is ample room for them. 1976 will be a difficult year economically but it should not be a disaster.

The Zimbabwe decisions are thoroughly supported by the people, who have shown their support in rallies throughout the country and in the opening of more fields of production. Mozambique has been attacked all along its border by Rhodesian forces. Nobody doubts the need for defense. But there is also a real sense of solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle against the racist Smith regime. Mozambique knows what it means to fight for independence. It understands the importance of having supportive neighbors. And it is confident that the people of Zimbabwe will win.

In its first year of independence then, the People's Republic of Mozambique has moved steadily and rather rapidly in directions intended to turn the structures of the state and the resources of the nation to the advantage of the masses of the people. Despite the loss of significant numbers of technicians and middle level cadre who chose to return to Portugal rather than remain in Mozambique, the economy has remained afloat. Foreign currency reserves at the time of the Rhodesian border closing were significantly more than at the time of Independence though still not large. The people are increasingly mobilized throughout the country to do for themselves as much as possible and to contribute to the larger economy through collective production.

There is no aspect of the development and transformation of the country that does not face problems. Personnel, financial and organizational problems often dominate. But the national ethic is one of work, discipline and sacrifice. The feeling one gets from the people as well as from FRELIMO leadership is positive. The directions have been set, major first steps taken, and people are learning that the fruits of their dreams, the next years must be ones of hard dedicated work and willing sacrifice.

Struggle Against New Elites

This general picture which is hopeful must be seen however in the context of a very real political struggle that permeates all of the organization and mobilization within Mozambique. The struggle to prevent the emergence of new elites and keep the people's interests primary is basic and difficult.

So far FRELIMO has been very stern with its members, especially those in the People's Army and in other positions of power. In August, December, and March, FRELIMO announced cases of persons removed from responsibility because of corruption, disrespect for the people, or promotion of personal interests at the expense of the people. Those thus removed included a governor and various commanders as well as a variety of others.

At local levels, dynamizing groups have also been purifying themselves. They often began with whoever was willing to work. As they worked together, gradually people have been found who were primarily concerned

Woman shopping for material at a People's Market.



with personal power or prestige, or have shown their inability to live in their own lives what they were teaching as the FRELIMO model for the "new man." Such people have been removed from the dynamizing groups and their replacements have been more carefully scrutinized, both politically and in terms of improving the representivity of the group.

The combat by FRELIMO against the emergence of a new elite will continue in the coming years. There must yet be a great deal of maturing and internalizing of what it means to serve the people and put their interests first.

Many FRELIMO veterans, faced with big responsibilities, good pay, possibilities of personal power because of their jobs, access to privileges, plus for many of them the novelty of city life with its sophistication and vices, have not been able to keep their priorities clear. They have slipped into life-styles alien to FRELIMO. They have copied the bourgeois, the colonial without seeing how it estranged them from the people or adversely affected their work. They have been removed. But in each group of new assignments, there will be those who prove to have similar weaknesses. External and internal reactionary forces continue to try to discover and promote these weaknesses in attempts to slow or destroy the revolution in Mozambique.

The lack of cadre has contributed to this problem. FRELIMO had to take people who previously had responsibilities for work in liberated areas in three provinces and spread them nationwide in 10 provinces. This put many in positions where they were isolated from the supportive communities they were used to. In the liberated areas a style of work and life had been built up based on collective decisions and conscious self-discipline. The whole people was conscious of what leaders should be doing and called them to task or even removed them if they wavered. In zones which the Portuguese controlled to the end, this is not yet the case and on the contrary, there are usually elements who try to lead the new leaders into corruption and bad habits.

The necessity to spread the proven FRELIMO cadre

around has also created problems in the liberated areas. They have felt a decline in leadership just at a time when they were asked to absorb into their midst thousands of returning refugees. These refugees had not experienced the same struggles and transformations that molded the new collective participatory lifestyles of the liberated areas. Their re-integration has not been easy.

FRELIMO therefore has chosen the liberated areas as priority areas for all aspects of action. They are the areas of the country where the revolution is most advanced and Independence must not mean for them a backsliding in their progress.

In the struggle against the formation of new elites, as well as in the removal of privileges of the remnants of the colonial elites, FRELIMO has so far been strong. But the struggle is far from over. The eventual triumph of the revolution in Mozambique depends heavily on FRELIMO's ability to maintain this strength and develop sufficient committed and able cadre to guide the country into the future.

In order to analyze more deeply the next stage of the Mozambican revolution, and to involve the whole country in the discussion, the Central Committee of FRELIMO will be convoking the Third Party Congress for December of this year. This Congress will define the tasks of FRELIMO "in the phase of the building of the new society and in the stage of People's Democracy." ■

Ruth Minter, a member of the Southern Africa collective has just returned from Africa, where she and her husband Bill, spent several years teaching in FRELIMO schools, first in Tanzania, and then, for almost a year inside Mozambique.

special

EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH BY SALIM A. SALIM Tanzanian Ambassador to the U.N.

This month's feature article appeared in the *Tanzania Daily News*, March 8, 1976. It is an excerpt of a public lecture by Tanzania's Ambassador to the U.N., Salim A. Salim, delivered at the University of Maryland on February 16, 1976. Mr. Salim is also Chairman of the United Nations Decolonization Committee.

I do not believe that there is any responsible person either in this country or in other world capitals who now doubts the seriousness and explosive nature of the (South Africa) problem. I should only point out, as a matter of record, that long before the issues of that part of our continent began to attract prominent headlines in this country and elsewhere in the Western world—thanks to

the struggle in Angola—many eminent African Heads of States and particularly those bordering the areas like Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda had repeatedly warned that the situation in Southern Africa poses a real threat to the peace and security of the African continent and that it has all the makings of a racial conflagration with unforeseen international repercussions.

For the confrontation between the forces of freedom and those of oppression were nowhere more sharply drawn. Yet, there were those who considered these warnings as alarmist and in some cases treated them with cynicism, confident as they were in the invincibility of the so-called "white redoubt!" To them, it was simply inconceivable that the unholy trinity of Portuguese fascism,

apartheid South Africa and the minority Smith regime would be seriously challenged.

Unholy Alliance

The stability of Southern Africa was conceived in terms of the so-called stability of the impregnable forces of this unholy alliance. But the liberation movements of the former Portuguese colonies—PAIGC of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, FRELIMO of Mozambique and the MPLA of Angola, through their resilience and sacrifice, supported by Free Africa, the Third World nations, the Socialist and Scandinavian countries, as well as many people outside the governments in the Western World, among whom are many Americans—shattered this myth.

The defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and the collapse of Portuguese fascism brought a new era in Southern Africa. The Balance of Power has changed radically in favour of the forces of freedom and against the forces of racism and colonialism. In the words of the Dar es Salaam Declaration adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity held in Tanzania in April 1975, the frontiers of freedom have been extended in that part of our continent. Yet, one must recognize that the victories won had been at great sacrifice, both human and material! Africa lost some of its finest sons in that struggle. Most certainly we would all have preferred a less violent path. Historical evidence fully supports Africa's desire to effect peaceful changes.

In 1969, the countries of East and Central Africa evolved the famous Lusaka Manifesto. That historical document which was endorsed by the OAU and the United Nations clearly stipulated Africa's option to attain freedom and racial equality through peaceful means. "We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than to kill. We do not advocate violence: we advocate an end to violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa," so declared free Africa's leaders.

The Lusaka Manifesto went further, "if emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change." This was a call to reason; a call for negotiations.

Regrettably, the Lusaka Manifesto was rejected by the regimes of Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon. But even more lamentable was the fact that the foreign allies and supporters of these regimes while paying lip-service tribute to the Manifesto, did nothing to promote meaningful negotiations. On the contrary, five years later—after thousands of casualties—fatal and otherwise—the ideals espoused by the Lusaka Manifesto triumphed, thanks to the perseverance and resistance of the Liberation Movements.

The Liberation of Mozambique and Angola—which is currently successfully waging a struggle for the consolidation of its independence—has ushered new hopes and expectations for the freedom of Namibia and Rhodesia and finally, for the triumph of equality and justice within South Africa itself.

Clear Testimony

But whether Zimbabwe and Namibia attain this freedom through the ballot or the bullet is really not up to the Africans. The ball is in the court of their oppressors and those who collaborate with them. Africa's desire to seek peaceful changes has never diminished. The Dar es



UN Ambassador Salim A Salim (United Nations)

Salaam Declaration is a clear testimony to this end. But Africa's enemies show no such peaceful desires. This brings me to the Angolan question.

The People's Republic of Angola is of vital and strategic importance to the Southern African struggle. But the concept of strategic value of that country should not be confused or deliberately distorted. Attempts to consider Angola in pure cold war calculations is not only to do disservice to the Angolan struggle but also to underestimate the passionate nationalist yearnings of the Angolans. It is above all to demonstrate sheer ignorance on the history of nationalist resistance in Africa—the MPLA no exception.

From our point of view, the strategic importance of Angola lies in that country's monumental potential in the contribution to the liberation of Africa. Free Angola will certainly greatly enhance the prospects of early liberation for Namibia and also Zimbabwe. South Africa knows this. We know it too. All the noise of Angola going communist or being a satellite of the Soviet Union is utter nonsense. South Africa knows that and we know it too! And we are not in the least surprised that the Pretoria regime resorts to the spectre of communism to justify its invasion in Angola. They thought they could bamboozle world public opinion and thus, buy more time. Fortunately, they have failed miserably. They have certainly failed in Africa.

What then are the issues concerning Angola? The South Africans . . . invaded that country with one single objective: attempting to thwart the establishment of a government in Luanda which would be genuinely serving African interests and thus, diametrically opposed to the grand design of Pretoria's expansionism. In brief, South Africa aimed at establishing in Angola a client regime. This attests to its support of those factions in Angola which were prepared to lend themselves to be used by Africa's arch enemy, and its outright incursions into Angola.



Africa's enemies show no desire for peaceful change—South African troops invade Angola

moving hundreds of miles in the interior. Fortunately, South Africa's invasion boomeranged. It made more and more African states vigilant and come out in support of the MPLA-led Government of the People's Republic of Angola. . . .

The Apartheid regime is the main enemy of the Africans in our continent. That regime oppresses non-whites in South Africa proper; it is a colonial power in Namibia and an illegal one at that; it is the main bulwark of resistance against international action against the illegal white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. Thus, whether one refers to Namibia or Rhodesia, in the final analysis, we must reckon with South Africa. It should therefore not be difficult to comprehend the concerns and fears of countries like mine to South Africa's aggression in Angola. Nor should our reaction surprise anyone.

National Unity

Tanzania was one of those countries, which though it had ardently supported the MPLA throughout its liberation war DID NOT immediately recognize the MPLA-led government after independence. At one time, we also advocated a government of national unity. We worked tirelessly in collaboration with many other African states to avoid a civil war. But with the advent of South Africa's intervention, the struggle in Angola ceased to be a simple civil strife. It was a struggle to resist foreign aggression and racism. The alternative before us was clear. We felt it as our responsibility to fully and unequivocally support the MPLA government as only that government could ensure the freedom and independence of Angola and thus ensure the onward march of the African revolution. Through its heroic resistance, the MPLA had more than justified our confidence.

Today, the Peoples Republic of Angola is being recognized and supported by no less than 42 African states. It is already a member of the Organization of African Unity. I have no doubt that in days and weeks to come, more and more African states will recognize and support it. For it should be emphasized that those African states which have yet to recognize the MPLA government—have not

done so not due to lack of commitment to the struggle for Africa's freedom and against South Africa's aggression but rather out of genuine differences of approach.

Dynamic Leadership

I remain confident that as the Peoples Republic consolidates its independence and eliminates foreign aggression, it will, true to the historical traditions in the process, win even broader support to its cause both within the MPLA and its leaders, who know of their non-racial, non-tribal and non-sectarian appeals, are confident of Angola's future under their dynamic leadership.

. . . I must express our satisfaction at the increasing understanding shown by many sectors of the American public and its legislators on the nature of the struggle in Angola. This is of vital importance. For it would be most unfortunate and indeed tragic to fail to evaluate properly Angola's struggle for meaningful independence and be swayed by cliches and highly over-simplistic propaganda.

The struggle in Angola as indeed in the rest of Southern Africa is not a struggle for or against communism. The MPLA government is a nationalist, non-aligned and yes, admittedly, staunchly anti-colonialist one. The MPLA is no more communist than for example is TANU of Tanzania, PDG of Guinea, FRELIMO of Mozambique and UNIP of Zambia.

Angola will be nobody's satellite. It will certainly be a strategic rear base for the liberation struggle in Namibia as was Tanzania in the case of Mozambique and as are Zambia and Mozambique in the case of Zimbabwe. No amount of pseudo-strategic cold war conceptions should be used to distort the true nature of Angola's quest for real freedom and the reasons for the support that the MPLA government enjoys from the ever-increasing majority of African states. Those who really understand Africa's aspirations realize this.

The Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Olof Palme, one of the outstanding Western statesmen with a clear sensitivity to Africa's legitimate struggle for freedom, recently made very pertinent remarks concerning the Angolan situation and the propagandistic onslaught against the MPLA. Writ-

ing in the Stockholm Newspaper "Dagens Nyheter", the Swedish Prime Minister explained that the MPLA had asked for weapons from most countries in the West before turning to the Soviet Union. He rightly pointed out that hardly a state in Africa had turned into a Soviet satellite after receiving such assistance, adding:

"I see in the press the MPLA practically, always is depicted as 'Marxist', pro-Soviet or even communist. This is propagandistic simplification."

Mr. Palme, whose country's links with the MPLA—like that Movement's relations with other Nordic countries and the Netherlands—have been quite extensive (a fact conveniently not publicized by the mass media here), further asserted that MPLA differed little from other liberation movements long accepted in the west. The Swedish leader then declared:

"There is, of course, a reason for these labels, it is more legitimate to attack "communists" and "terrorists" and to support their opponents."

These are wise and pertinent remarks indeed.

New Horizons

The liberation of Angola and Mozambique, changing the geo-political situation in Southern Africa, has opened new horizons in the tide for Africa's freedom and human dignity in southern Africa. But the war is far from being won. Indeed the obstacles are many and no less formidable. And once again, the old question of whether there would be violent or peaceful—or to be more accurate, less violent—means of struggle comes into the fore. And again, the choice is neither that of the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, Namibia nor that of free Africa. For Africa's objective of liberation cannot be compromised.

President Nyerere, addressing the commemorative session marking the Silver Jubilee of the United Nations in October 15, 1970 explained Free Africa's alternatives on Southern Africa in the following items:

"For Africa there is no choice. We have to support the freedom fighters. Theirs is merely a continuation of the freedom struggle which has already resulted in 41 African nations being represented in this General Assembly. For the national freedom and human equality for which these people are fighting are not only the same rights which the rest of Africa claimed and won; they are also the only basis on which free states of Africa exist."

Yet as was aptly put in 1969, Africa does not advocate violence. Rather, we advocate an end to violence. Thus, in spite of the victories won, the OAU Council of Ministers in their extraordinary meeting in Dar es Salaam in April, 1975, went on record as follows:

"Africa's objective in Zimbabwe is independence on the basis of majority rule. This can be achieved either peacefully or by violent means. Either way, Africa will lend its unqualified support to the freedom fighters led by their nationalist movement—the African National Council. As long as the objective of majority rule before independence is not compromised, Africa would support all efforts by the Zimbabwe nationalists to win independence by peaceful means."

This declaration by the Organisation of African Unity was made amidst a background of the efforts made by the African National Council of Zimbabwe to attempt a negotiated settlement. These efforts began in December, 1974, with the encouragement and support of Presidents Seretse Khama of Botswana, Samora Machel of Mozambique, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of

Tanzania. Regrettably, these efforts have been frustrated by the intransigency and recalcitrancy of the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. And thus making an intensification of armed struggle in Zimbabwe inevitable. For the alternative to a negotiated settlement is not a impasse or status quo. Rather, an intensification of armed resistance. Africa's role is clear. It was in fact already enunciated as an alternative strategy of the Lusaka Manifesto:

"But while peaceful progress is blocked by action of those at present in power in the states of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the people of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors."

Characteristic Contempt

The situation in Namibia is no less disconcerted. In 1966, the United Nations terminated South Africa's mandate over that territory. This decision has been endorsed by the Security Council. In June, 1971, the International Court of Justice delivered an advisory opinion confirming the illegality of South Africa's presence in the territory. In December 1973, the Security Council unanimously and I emphasize the unanimity of the decision—called upon South Africa to withdraw from the territory; to respect its unity and territorial integrity and affirmed the right of Namibians to self-determination and independence. South Africa has treated all these decisions with characteristic contempt. . . .

I have already pointed out that South Africa as the colonial power in Namibia and a de facto authority in Rhodesia holds the key to the solution of the two problems. The freedom fighters have made their decision. Faced by South Africa's obduracy and the arrogance of the minority regime in Rhodesia, they will intensify their armed struggle so as to facilitate eventual serious negotiations. But what of the world community?

I would like in this connection to refer to the role of the Western countries and more particularly the major powers in the coming confrontation in Southern Africa.

Zimbabweans persevere in armed struggle—a guerrilla fighter undergoes ambush training



They are the main supporters of the Pretoria regime. They supply it with economic and other types of support. Above all, they give that regime political respectability and protect it from universal ostracism and isolation. They do have then a great responsibility. They ought to search their conscience and consider ways and means at least to reduce the level and intensity of the inevitable confrontation. We hope that as the leader of the Western world, the United States will assume a responsible position in that direction. Nothing could be more fitting in a bicentennial year.

Their responsibility is grave indeed. For us in Tanzania, as indeed the whole of free Africa, our choice is clear. We shall reinforce our support for the liberation struggle. We expect no less from the traditional allies and supporters of the liberation movements.

I should like to end with one sombre observation. Since the Angolan events, we have heard a lot of moralising. Africa has never had so many advocates of "good advice". We have been warned of the danger of recolonization. Some of these remarks have come from well-meaning even if misguided advisers. Others from cynics. And yet others from apologists of apartheid and colonialism in

Southern Africa. To the cynics and apologists, we need not waste our breath. But to those well-meaning people, we can only say that it is important to examine one's role if one's advice is to be taken seriously.

Legitimate Struggle

In the days of the armed resistance against Portuguese colonialism Africa—through its highest authorities, pleaded in vain to many western governments for support. Not only were the freedom fighters refused military assistance but in some cases, not even an aspirin was spared. To compound the rebuff, some of the governments from whom Africa expected understanding and sympathy, chose instead to fill the coffers and provide equipment, military or otherwise, to the very oppressors.

The collusion with Portuguese colonialism is still fresh in our memories. It is to be hoped that the rich experience accumulated, would solicit more understanding of the legitimate struggle for national liberation. Only then can those nations have any moral right to expect to be taken seriously by the freedom fighters and the supporters in free Africa.

South Africa

politics

ANC MEMBERS ARRESTED-ABDUCTED

South African police have broken an underground network of the banned African National Congress (ANC) involved in sending Blacks to Tanzania for guerrilla training, according to a report in the *Rand Daily Mail*. According to the report the recruits were smuggled out of South Africa into Swaziland and then on to training camps. Once trained, the route was reversed.

The Chief of the South Africa Security Police, Major-General M. Geldenhuys refused to comment beyond acknowledging that a "criminal case" was pending. Among those who may end up on trial are two ANC members who recently disappeared in Southern Swaziland and are thought to be held by the Security Police.

SEVEN ARRESTED

Seven black students en route to neighboring Botswana have been arrested at the border by South African police. The students, 6 of them still in high school in Soweto, Johannesburg, were reported being held incommunicado at the Johannesburg police station.

The father of one of the students told journalists that a 3 a.m. visit by South African security police, who searched his home and removed some of his son's letters, was the first indication he received of the students' detention. Friends and relatives claim that the travel documents of the students were all in order, and that police have so far refused to disclose the charges under which they have been jailed.

Attempts by parents to visit their children in jail have been thwarted by police, who claim that they are still under investigation. Meanwhile, security measures all along South Africa's border with Botswana have noticeably increased, as heavily armed security forces erected road blocks and began searching all vehicles crossing the

border in either direction. (Report in *Africa News*, April 26, 1976.)

BUTHELEZI SETS UP "LIBERATION MOVEMENT"

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has called for all Blacks to join Inkatha ye Sizwe and build it as a "national liberation movement." Inkatha ye Sizwe, originally a Zulu cultural organization, is now open for all Blacks. Buthelezi is the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan.

Buthelezi issued his call at a meeting in Soweto, the black township outside Johannesburg. He told his audience that South Africa must move towards majority rule. "We cannot wait until Parliament in Capetown falls before we achieve that dignity which comes from self-help," Buthelezi said. "We build a better South Africa in what we do now. But before we can begin, we need to organize ourselves into a disciplined body—to come together and plan with each other and act with each other."

He made it clear that he was not proposing armed struggle. "I am offering a black hand of friendship to the whites of South Africa, probably for the last time."

While extreme right wing National Party MP, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, attacked Buthelezi's speech as "not in the interests of good relations between black and white or between different black peoples," United Party MP Dr. Gideon Jacobs said "we dare not ignore the underlying message in his utterances."

Inkatha ye Sizwe was revived by Buthelezi last year when he addressed its general conference. One of the reasons such an organization is necessary, according to Buthelezi, is to deal with such questions as whether to co-operate with "separate development" i.e. apartheid. The question of foreign investment is also an issue that would be dealt with by Inkatha ye Sizwe. Buthelezi has consistently refused to come out against all foreign inves-



Chief Gatsha Buthelezi—the dilemma of legal opposition

ment in South Africa. [See *Southern Africa*, May, 1976.] "We need a body like this national movement where we can come face to face with these questions and think them through as a group," said Buthelezi last year when he addressed the general conference of Inkatha.

Other black "leaders" in South Africa have expressed willingness to go along with the idea. Sonny Leon, who was deposed by the Government last year from his position as Chairman of the Coloured People's Representative Council (CRC), has said that his Labor Party will no longer meet the Government as representatives of an individual Coloured group because "the name of the game now in South Africa is a national convention of all people."

But whether Inkatha ye Sizwe will provide "the people as a whole" with a process for democratic decision making is doubtful. More likely Inkatha ye Sizwe will be controlled by Buthelezi and will be the voice of the small black middle class that the South African Government is building up mainly in the Bantustans.

The South African Government would not allow any movement to exist that posed a threat to white privileges. Yet Buthelezi continues to be Chief Minister of the KwaZulu bantustan and Leon, although no longer Chairman, is still a member of the CRC and head of the Labor Party. Both Bantustans and the CRC are apartheid institutions. The real black opposition movements, the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and the Unity Movement, remain illegal organizations as a result of their activities in the 1960s and their commitment to overthrowing white minority rule.

The fact that the South African Government is allowing Buthelezi to develop some kind of movement reflects the new political situation in southern Africa. Not only were South African troops defeated in an attempt to subvert Angolan independence, but the Namibian and Zimbabwean national liberation movements have recently shown that their military strength is growing. (See Namibia and Zimbabwe sections.)

These victories are having an important impact inside South Africa. It is important for the South African Government to try and direct the rising nationalism of the black population. It must offer alternatives to the liberation movements. It remains to be seen how far the South

African Government can go in allowing criticism, or how much Buthelezi can direct the efforts of the black population of South Africa. However, a militant sounding KwaZulu Chief leading a "national liberation movement" may be useful to the South African Government. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 27, 1976; *The Times*, London, March 19, 1976; *Anti-Apartheid News*, London, April 1976.)

AMNESTY DENIED MANDELA

Nelson Mandela, imprisoned leader of the African National Congress, will remain in his cell on Robben Island. The South African Government had announced it was "considering" his release after Transkei Bantustan Chief Kaiser Matanzima announced he would try and negotiate the release of Transkei 'nationals'. The Transkei Bantustan is being given "independence" in October.

Presumably one of the considerations concerning Mandela's release was his acceptance of Transkeian 'nationality'. For the purposes of apartheid ideology South Africa is not one nation; the Africans are divided up by "tribal" origin into many nations, all Whites are another nation. (Thus if Blacks took part in the "white" parliament they would be interfering in the affairs of another nation.) The Transkei Bantustan is allocated to South Africans of Xhosa descent to exercise their "separate freedom." Nelson Mandela is of Xhosa background.

Commenting on the offer of release, an ANC spokesman said "Nelson Mandela and his comrades have been imprisoned because they fought for majority rule in a nonracial South Africa. To torment the political prisoners with an offer of Tribal amnesty is a cruel mockery of everything for which they have stood in the past." Winnie Mandela, Nelson Mandela's wife, commented, "Nelson is a national leader, not a tribal leader." (*The Guardian*, New York, April 21, 1976; *The Economist*, London, April 17, 1976.)



Nelson Mandela—no amnesty

EXPOSURE OF MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES BRINGS NEW PRESS CENSORSHIP

South Africa has passed a sweeping new act restricting the press from covering one of its growing industries: mental institutions. The Mental Health Amendment Act was passed in response to a special supplement of *Peace and Freedom*, the newspaper of the Church of Scientology, which exposed conditions relating to mentally disturbed South Africans.

According to *Peace and Freedom*, evacuated mine compounds have been turned into privately owned mental institutions for over 12,000 black and 700 white inmates. The compounds "are guarded, have high fences, and wire mesh windows welded open a few inches." Inmates sleep on thin mats on concrete floors in crowded drab dormi-

ories. The asylums "are maintained by the patients who perform most of the labor." None of the asylums has a full time psychiatrist and at times as few as one nurse per 300 patients is on duty.

While inmates are seldom released, many work in local factories. The money earned by the inmates is paid to the asylums, while inmates are given "incentives" of tobacco, matches and candy.

The institutions are owned by Smith Mitchel and Company. The South African government pays Smith Mitchel R1 (\$1.15) per black "patient" per day.

Dr. Gilliland, acting Secretary for Health, has denied that "these people are not properly cared for, and that profits are being made of their plight." But David Tabat-znik, speaking for Smith Mitchel said "We know we're far from perfect, but we provide a reasonable service at no capital expenditure to the State. And of course we make a profit or we wouldn't be doing it."

The Mental Health Amendment Act of 1976 was passed just two days after the *Peace and Freedom* article appeared. Under the Act it is illegal to publish anything about mental institutions "knowing the same to be false, or without taking reasonable steps to verify such information." Since the onus of proving "reasonable steps" is on the accused, publishing any information that might prove to be wrong would be illegal. (*Peace and Freedom*, Johannesburg, Jan., 1976; *Sunday Tribune*, Durban, Feb 15, 1976.)

IS SOUTH AFRICA DESTABILIZING BRITAIN?

Is South Africa trying to effect the internal politics of Britain? And if so, why?

These questions arise out of two recent cases of slander against members of Britain's Liberal Party. Jeremy Thorpe, the leader of the Liberal Party recently saved his political career following allegations he was a homosexual. The allegation was made by an unemployed male model on trial for welfare fraud. The alleged affair took place 15 years ago.

The second case is that of Peter Hain, 26, president of the Young Liberals, the party youth organization. Hain was accused of robbing a bank. However neither his fingerprints nor any other material evidence tying him to the crime were ever found. Hain was recently acquitted.

Both cases have been linked to BOSS, the South African Bureau of State Security. Reporting to Parliament on the Thorpe case former Prime Minister Harold Wilson said, "I have no doubt that there is strong South African participation in recent activities relating to the leader of the Liberal Party based on massive resources of business monies and private agents of various kinds and various qualities." But he would go no further saying, "I have no evidence that the South African government or its agencies or agents have any connection with these unsavory activities."

BOSS is very active in London. [See *Southern Africa*, May 1976.] And both Thorpe and Hain are understandable targets. Thorpe has long been a vocal opponent of apartheid. Hain was a major organizer of SART, Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour, which organized a nation-wide campaign against a tour by the British Lions rugby team to South Africa. The tour was cancelled as a result.

Further, South Africa may hope that by disrupting the Liberal Party the Conservative Party will capture their votes and win the next election. The Conservative Party could be expected to be far more openly sympathetic to

continued white minority rule. (*Washington Post*, March 10, April 24, 1976; *Guardian*, London, April 10, 1976.)

economics

SEAGRAM BANTUSTAN INVESTMENT—MODEL FOR THE FUTURE?

Although United States and other foreign investment is flowing into crucial sectors of the South African economy (see below), recent events surrounding the potential involvement of a Canadian/US liquor company in a South African Bantustan, have far more political significance. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, a Canadian concern which is the major distiller in the US, is planning a \$10 million joint venture in KwaZulu, which includes the construction of a distillery, with a local South African company, SA Breweries. But Seagram is going about this investment in a different way. To ward off criticism and feel out the situation, the company hired a team of consultants from the black firm of Clark, Phipps, Clark and Harris, to examine the issues. Led by the noted black psychologist and educator, Kenneth Clark, the team visited South Africa and KwaZulu. The team's goal is to develop criteria for Seagram's investment, and it has stated that the company will participate in "an affirmative action which is being developed in ways consistent with the positive future of South Africa and all its people. In no way should it be seen or interpreted as an acceptance or reinforcement of apartheid or present forms of racial inequities." (from American Committee on Africa memorandum, "Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Investigating Bantustan Investment," April, 1976)

The American Committee on Africa and the Canadian Task Forces on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility have condemned the planned investment, with ACOA saying that "such efforts, designed to find 'clean' ways of investment in South Africa today, ignore reality by pretending that it will be possible to run a non-apartheid operation in an apartheid system; or, more seriously, that such an operation will serve to advance the cause of freedom by undermining apartheid." The Canadian Task Force position is that "this investment favors the white minority regime. It legitimizes the South African Bantustan system and it assists South Africa's balance of payments. This assessment appears to us to be valid despite the obvious efforts to create a link between black South African and black American businessmen. This link is no substitute for bringing fundamental civil and political freedoms to disenfranchised black South Africans. . . ."

Investment in the Bantustans, even if sanctioned and encouraged by African Bantustan leaders, is geared to ultimately benefit the central (non-Bantustan) economy. Statistics about KwaZulu itself reveal its pitiful dependence on white areas for jobs for Zulu men and women (only 22 per cent of "national income" in 1973 was earned by people inside KwaZulu). Almost half the Zulu population live outside the "homeland" where there are obviously not enough jobs, and by the late 1970's 55,000 Zulu workers will come into the job market each year. "The South Africans will be happy to allow some jobs to be created in the Bantustan to soak up some of this labor to avoid massive unemployment and social unrest—but they will not allow a level of development which would in any way threaten the constant flow of cheap labor to



Jack Yogman, President of Joseph E Seagram—moving into the Bantustans?

their areas of economic investment." (ACOA memo, *op. cit.*)

The Bantustans are integral to continued white control in South Africa. They are both a reality, as sources of cheap labor and outlets for tribally orienting the black political and economic middle-class, and a myth, when propagated by the South African Government as "independent" nations for its Blacks. As the Transkei moves towards that false "independence" South Africa is increasingly trying to gain international support for the Bantustan system. Seagrams investment in KwaZulu would help put South Africa on the road toward such legitimization of apartheid. (ACOA Memorandum on Seagrams, April, 1976; *New York Times*, April 27, 1976)

HUGE INVESTMENTS BY TWO US FIRMS

American investment in South Africa has tripled in the last decade from \$500 million to \$1.5 billion. Two companies which will be the focus of this year's church-initiated stockholder actions are Caltex and Kennecott, whose planned projects in South Africa will increase US investment by another 20 per cent. (ACOA letter, April, 1976; also see *Southern Africa*, April, 1976, on corporate campaigns for 1976) In brief, Kennecott Copper Corporation plans together with the South African Government Industrial Development Corporation and a private concern, to invest \$300 million in the development of iron and titanium mines and smelters in an area formerly of the KwaZulu Bantustan near the near harbor/industrial complex at Richards Bay. (See *Southern Africa*, May, 1976) Titanium is used for aircraft as well as in the paper, textile and art industries. (Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, April, 1976)

Caltex plans a \$134 million expansion of its Cape Town refinery increasing the plant's capacity to 100,000 barrels per day. The expansion will more than double Caltex's investment and will result in the company holding more than two-thirds of US petroleum interests in South Africa. Despite the growth in the company's investment, the number of African employees has decreased. The ICCR has done a 26page comprehensive paper on oil

companies expansion in South Africa. Send \$1 plus postage to ICCR, 475 Riverside Drive, Rm. 566, New York, NY 10027 for a copy of the report.

OTHER SOUTH AFRICA-US NOTES

The US Environmental Protection Agency's decision to postpone controls on sulphur emissions resulting from cars which use catalytic converters on exhausts will benefit South Africa. South Africa is the major supplier of platinum to GM and Ford for the manufacture of converters. The former decision to alter the exhaust system to cut back on the sulphur emissions in 1979 cars was postponed. (*Africa News, Digest*, April 19, 1976)

United States imports of South African sugar have increased despite the end of South Africa's assured quota under the old sugar quota system. Imports rose from 63,094 metric tons in 1974 to 121,881 metric tons in 1975. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 3, 1976)

EXPORT PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS

With decreasing demand for certain raw materials, South Africa is finding a new lucrative area of exports in the manufacturing sector, particularly in selling custom-built and engineering goods. The whole export area of South Africa's economy is growing. The South African Foreign Trade Organization (SAFTO) has increased its affiliates by 20 per cent during the first three months of 1976 alone. Now switchgear components, pots and pans, exhaust systems, pianos all go to industrial nations.

The patterns of exports have changed with South Africa's attempt to diversify not only its products but its markets. Exports to Asia are up from 11.3 per cent of the total in 1964 to 16 per cent in 1974 and to Latin America from .5 per cent to 2 per cent of the total in the same ten years. A major new focus is Central America where South Africa has consular relations with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama—countries all interested in using South African industrial-capital equipment. Puerto Rico is viewed as a test market before entry to the United States, and already fruits and fish are exported there. Shipping has also been made less expensive to the Caribbean and Central America by facilities in Puerto Rico as opposed to the former utilization of New Orleans.

Another key target area is the so called "second eleven" high-growth countries, including Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan (SA is also one of these). Political events of course have affected the trade patterns, for example strikes and anti-apartheid activities in Australia have resulted in less imports from South Africa, but other Australian economic problems have opened up new Far Eastern markets to South African goods.

South Africa is encouraged by the growth of exports to industrial nations, and "particularly pleasing is SA's breakthrough into the US." "For years," states the *Financial Mail* (Nov. 14, 1975), "apprehensive exporters wouldn't touch America. It was too big, too intimidating. But there have been several notable successes recently—from office furniture to oil rigs." Exports have risen to West Germany, France, Japan, and oil rich countries such as Dubai. South Africa also hopes to develop more links with international capital projects through consortia working in developing countries. The goal of all this activity is to offset the worsening balance of payments problem in South Africa and to find economic alternatives to the country's dependence on gold exports.

A final and most politically acute area is South Africa's links with the rest of Africa. Although trade has decreased in percentage terms in the last decade from 19 per cent to 14 per cent, some analysts say that trade is actually higher but goes through third countries. South Africa still hopes to develop and control a Southern African common market area, but political wariness on the part of some African states, fear of South Africa's economic colonialism, and problems of parallel production and trade patterns have prevented any formal developments along these lines. Nevertheless, observers can readily see that the South African Customs Union with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland basically serves South Africa's interests. The other major move towards an integrated economic system in southern Africa is the power grid which is projected to include Cabora Bassa and Cunene, both now fraught with political uncertainties in terms of continuing South African domination.

It appears that South African Government and business interests will pursue the goal through smaller, low key projects; bilateral agreements; and the offer of technical, agricultural or health assistance to nearby countries. The area's existing linkages are numerous—rail lines, roads, labor migration, South African investment in minerals and agriculture, but the concrete future of a totally integrated economic unit, in South Africa's projection controlled by itself, is far from a surety. South Africa alone of the 10 Southern African countries has less than half the population but 70 per cent of the GNP. The new nations of Mozambique and Angola will be working towards an alteration in this ratio, and a different kind of regional development than that envisaged by South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 11, 18, 1975; Jan. 10, 1976; Feb. 14, 1976, March 13, 1976; *Financial Mail*, Oct. 17, Nov. 14, 1976; *Times*, London, Oct. 12, 1975)

BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT

From October, 1974 to October, 1975 the number of Africans holding jobs in the manufacturing sector increased by only 16,900, or less than half the increase from 1973-74. And 'Coloured' jobs did not increase at all. In the building industry there was a decrease in the number of African workers from 296,500 to 295,200 in contrast to an annual average increase of 9,675 jobs per year from 1970-1974. Even in mining the employment record has not kept pace with the Government's Economic Development Program (EDP—1974-79) for employment growth. In all three sectors there are 11,400 fewer jobs for Blacks than in the EDP target plans. (*Financial Mail*, Jan. 30, 1976)

But it is not only inflation and the general economic recession in South Africa which is putting people out of work. The government is more actively implementing laws to regulate the ratio of black and white workers in particular industries and to decentralize industrial patterns in order to decrease the numbers of Blacks in urban areas. The Environment Planning Act (and its predecessor The Physical Planning Act) determine employment patterns by race in so-called "controlled areas" of the economy (basically industrial, white areas). Formerly the ratio was 2.5 Blacks: 1 White, for new businesses established; but after June, 1973 there is a lower ratio of 2 Blacks: 1 White. There are laws to punish businesses which expand or change without government permission, and various forms of prosecution if a company's Blacks exceed the ratio. In areas of greater Coloured population, Africans can be employed only when there is a lack of Coloured

workers. The formerly more mild application of the law is changing as the Dept. of Planning investigates more cases and initiates more prosecutions. The clothing industry which, in controlled areas, employs 24,600 mainly African workers, 80 per cent of whom are women, will be hardest hit by the laws, together with small businesses who cannot afford the heavy fines or the relocation costs. (*Financial Mail*, Jan. 23, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 27, 1976)

\$23 MILLION ON POST OFFICE APARTHEID

United Party Senator Poorter has said that the Post Office system could save R20 million (\$23 million) a year in wages alone if apartheid (separate entrances and facilities) were eliminated. The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, Sen. van Der Spuy asserted that the PO would not "blindly stick to apartheid." Another Senator pointed out that more than 16,000 out of the total of 23,410 who work for the Post Office earn below the Poverty Datum Line (less than \$115.00 per month) while even 3,000 Whites earn less than \$172.00 a month. It will be interesting to see how fast the Government moves to alter traditional "petty apartheid" given economic pressures on the budget (see below). Black employment in the public sector has expanded, but with tight controls on wages. New forms of control, through the Bantustans for one, going beyond simply race separation are being developed so that in the future Post Offices without separate entrances may be the reality. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 27, 1976)

WAGE GAPS—TEACHERS TO TOURIST AIDES


Teachers who are employed by the Dept. of Bantu Education in equivalent jobs with Whites earn at most 60 per cent of the white salary. The Minister of Education said that the closing of the gap is "receiving attention." (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 27, 1976)

In the tourist industry 80 per cent of the workers are Blacks with the replacement of whites by cheaper black labor. At Johannesburg's Tollman Towers hotel black cleaners are paid R60 (\$69) a month while white untrained waitresses are paid R230 (\$264) a month. At the Holiday Inn chains black cleaners get even less at R42 (\$48) a month while a white waitress receives R180 (\$207) per month. At the Swaziland Holiday Inn the black receptionist is paid the same as the white receptionist in a South African Inn. Black unions are organizing in the tourist area. One can see why. (*Financial Mail*, Nov. 21, 1975)

MINING DEVELOPMENTS

130,000 miners from Malawi who formerly worked in South Africa are no longer there. Withdrawn over time after the death of 74 men in an air crash in 1974, their absence caused a major manpower shortage in the mining industry. At that point, 75 per cent of the black labor force on the mines came from outside South Africa. Now, two years later, the foreign African input is down to 60 per cent, as South African workers are lured into jobs at the mines. One major factor attracting the workers is the rise in wages to more competitive salaries. The beginning minimum wage has increased to R57 (\$65) a month with an average salary of R90 (\$103) a month.

As a response to the mining crisis due to the lack of workers, strikes, inflation and the drop in gold price, the industry has developed certain techniques to attract and keep workers more akin to Detroit than Johannesburg.



On the mines, migratory workers still live in sub-human conditions, parted from their families

There is now a biweekly newspaper for black miners, films which are distributed, and TV planned for some hostels. The Anglo American Company has reported that it has new housing plans for senior married Blacks to enable them to live in black areas near the mines rather than in the all male hostels. It is also experimenting with men living together in work groups rather than ethnically, and in setting up "briefing groups" and "consultative committees" to facilitate communication between workers and management. (for other developments see *Southern Africa*, October, 1975)

Obviously life for the individual gold miner has improved slightly. "Briefing groups" and TV are no substitute for worker political and economic freedom, and these new conditions for miners are by no means universal. Witness the recent case of a 58 room hostel owned by a coal company where 1,000 men were found to be living with only 400 beds. Twenty-five to forty workers squeezed on and between eight beds in a room, no ventilation, no privacy, dim if any lighting, no security for personal things, unsanitary open toilets. The company claimed it only allowed 200 men to live in the hostel, but interviews showed that many workers employed by the company were unregistered, or under age. Some hostel residents charged rent to others, and all lived in inhuman degrading conditions. No TV there. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 3, 10, 1976)

THOUGHTS ON THE ECONOMY—PAY POWER CONFERENCE ETC.

"Hate for South Africa" is the attitude of many black youth, reported Grey Mbau, an African consultant speaking at the Institute of Personnel Management's "Paypower Conference" in Johannesburg. This hatred is derived from their objective conditions. "Deprived, depressed and disadvantaged as he is, the Black man is dominated by a sense of powerlessness and pessimism. This generates a personality of poverty . . . it is 'excruciatingly painful' to be kept at the lowest standard of living . . . he does not possess the means to influence his lot for the better."

(*Star*, Johannesburg, April 3, 1976) Mbau called for increased manpower education, more pay equity, increased cooperation and consultation with white unions. Although his speech described a core reality the emphasis was on white South Africa preventing radical change in the future. Mbau said "there is a tendency of the Black youth to look beyond the South African borders for something—anything—that comes to his aid."

Other discussion at the conference included the raising of minimum wages by law to match Minimum Living Level (MLL) or Household Subsistence Level (HSL) figures—calculations which cover only food, health, hygiene and clothing needs. It was claimed that this raise to between R112 (\$128) and R120 (\$138) a month would increase morale and productivity. There were also calls for equal pay for equal work, narrowing the gap between black and white living standards, and compulsory schooling and technical training for Blacks. Speakers forecast the continuing bad effects of South Africa's racially distorted economic system on real economic development. One businessman expressed the tenor of the meeting when he called for "getting more out of Black workers" and better use of the country's "biggest natural resource."

This same kind of pragmatic thinking has led to a government-proposed "think tank" meeting on the economy composed of representatives of government and the private sector including black business people and Bantustan representatives. The recommendations of the meeting would then be passed on to a joint action committee of government and business and to the Prime Minister's Economic Advisors.

Because of the enduring problems in the economy and society as a whole, members of South Africa's ruling class are continually proposing their own solutions. Progressive Reform Party leader Colin Eglin has appealed for an end to all racial restrictions on labor, abolition of the Pass Laws, the phasing out of migrant labor, and trade unions for Blacks. In contrast to the few who want to reform the system there are those who believe that only Christian western white capitalism will preserve the economy

against socialism. "The reason I regard free enterprise as the most important issue is because the Black man basically is a communalist and a socialist. If our society and the individual in society is going to survive then we must involve the Black man totally in the free enterprise society for his personal advantage and the advantage of the group as a whole. This will provide the strongest support of the Western system," stated United Party MP Bill Sutton, condemning the Nationalist Party for "left wing" thinking in its economics, and more liberal white groups for trying to make Whites accept the turnover of power to Blacks and to socialist ideals. Sutton believes that the greater generation of wealth itself along with some federal political arrangement between Black and White will maintain the western capitalist stability of the country. (*Star*, Johannesburg, March 27, April 3, April 10, 1976)

OPPOSITION TO NEW BUDGET MINIMAL

The new South African budget for 1976-77 (see *Southern Africa*, May, 1976) is up 10.5 per cent over the previous one. It has been called a tough and austere budget despite the fact that expenditures for defense are up 42 per cent to 17 per cent of the total (R1350 [\$1552] million out of R7832 [\$9006] million). It rose only 6 per cent in non-defense areas with cut backs in certain areas including health care. The new monies are to be raised from the sale of special defense bonds (R120 million [\$138 million]); income tax (five per cent surcharge on individuals and companies) and sales taxes (on petrol, liquor, cold drinks and cigarettes) (\$721 million [\$828 million]); and tax loans and special funding (R1525 million [\$1753 million]). Minister of Finance Sen. Horwood explained the new budget when presented on March 31 saying that it would safeguard the balance of payments as well as provide the key defense monies. Tight monetary policies will continue, taxes will lead to less consumer spending, and hopefully exports will grow with prospects better in the industrialized world.

Opposition to the budget has including phrases like "bleeding the citizen" and more "lowering of living standards" but in general opponents have not challenged the very core of the budget—defense expenditures. Critics have said that increased taxes will create more cost-push inflation, that the budget does not contain any stimulants


for real economic growth, that the rise in oil taxes is inflationary, that the private sector is hit too hard with taxes, and so forth. There was praise for the increases in pensions and funds for the aged, and wide support for more defense spending. One Afrikaans paper calculated that even with the new budget the cost for defense per person in South Africa was less than many European countries. If only white heads had been counted it would be a different story. All seemed justified because "behind this budget looms our crisis for survival" because "the . . . enemies we have are pursuing a total strategy of which economic exhaustion forms an important element." (*Die Burger*, April 1, 1976) The rise in the budget was rationalized as keeping up with the double digit inflation and there was praise that it had not increased as much as in previous years and that the government was finally recognizing the dangers of its former over-spending. Even labor seemed willing to "shrug" off the real questions in the budget complaining only about tax burdens on the consumers. Only the *Rand Daily Mail*, among papers surveyed, zeroed in on the contradiction in a budget which because of cutbacks, increased tax burdens on the already poor Blacks, the effect on companies who will no doubt reduce wages, and renewed inflation will increase internal instability more fundamentally than the external political developments in Angola, Rhodesia and environs. "This [economic effect on the Black population] is a threat to the security of South Africa that simply cannot be met by spending more on tanks and guns. . . . Does anyone doubt for instance that if it were not for apartheid, our defence spending could be considerably reduced—It becomes an appallingly extravagant luxury when its other costs are added: separate amenities, poor use of labour, duplicated services, etc. etc. . . . As never before, we need to examine the doctrine that it is better to be poor but White." (*Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, April 1, 1976)

foreign relations

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES

An interview with Mr. M.P. Naicker, Director of Publicity and Information of the African National Congress of South Africa (*WBAI*, New York, Apr. 14, 1976) discussed, among other topics, the close ties between the Apartheid regime and the major Western powers. The following is an excerpt from that interview:

"The entire system of South African Government—ever since 1910, when the British Government handed power over to the White minority in South Africa—[is based on the] . . . denial of every single basic right to the Black population . . . while at the same time ensuring that the Black population could be exploited as cheap labor in White owned establishments. . . . The [Governments of] the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany . . . work closely with the racist regime in South Africa. [US] investments in South Africa bring a return of roughly 20 per cent and . . . [it] is this kind of business, western investors would not like to loose. At the present moment the United States is the second largest investor in South Africa. . . . UN resolutions . . . [have called] for the total economic disengagement of all investors in South Africa, but Britain, France, West Germany, the United States,



White South Africa hates to pay for its privileges!

"THE FREE WORLD
MUST WAKE UP!"

"I TAKE IT WE'RE
PART OF THE
FREE WORLD"



and others have refused to disengage from the South African scene. In other words, they are underwriting Apartheid for profit."

"NATO is [working] much closer with South Africa than ever before. A multi-million Pound tracking station has been established in the Cape . . . [which] when completed . . . can track anything that moves from Bangladesh to Latin America. We [A.N.C.] have evidence to show that West Germany, United States, France, and other countries of the western world have participated in the establishment of nuclear reactors in South Africa. . . . There is . . . military equipment being produced in South Africa on license from western countries. . . . We have no doubt that the [pro-Apartheid] forces at work within the United States administration and . . . other . . . Western [Governments] . . . are very powerful. Their investments are high; their returns are very high, and [the possibility that] such investments [could] . . . be lost, would perhaps, lead to direct invention—maybe even by the United States and, perhaps, by other western countries—in any [future] military confrontation."

APARTHEID-ZIONIST ALLIANCE

For a number of years now, there has been a steady growth of political, economic, and military cooperation between the South African and Israeli Governments. Israel has been an excellent market for South African exports. The polished diamonds which are Israel's major export, are primarily supplied, in their rough form, by South Africa. Also, Israel assists in subverting the African boycott of South African goods. Semi-finished South African goods are finished in Israel and then marketed in Black Africa under a "made in Israel" label. An arms agreement permits the Apartheid regime to build the Reshef naval patrol boat in Durban shipyards. Each boat is equipped with seven Israeli-made Gabriel sea-to-sea missiles, four anti-submarine depth charges, two 72 millimeter cannons, and light machine guns. Diplomatically, the relations between the two governments were raised from the consulate general (1971) to embassy level at the beginning of 1976. Since the 1973 "Yom Kippur War"—besides Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland—South Africa has remained the only regime on the African continent to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. (*New York*

Times, Apr. 18, 1976; *Washington Post*, Apr. 18, 1976; *Sunday Times*, London, Apr. 11, 1976)

This alliance became more formalized when Prime Minister Vorster, accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brand Fourie, visited Israel from Apr. 10 to 14, 1976 as a personal guest of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. Vorster's itinerary included—in addition to stops at religious shrines—tours of the Lydda plant of Israeli Aircraft Industries which produces the Kfir jet fighter and the Gabriel missiles, the Reshef patrol boats in the Haifa harbor, Israeli warships at Sharm-el-Sheikh, the electronic security fence along the Golan Heights and Israeli-Lebanese border, and talks with both Prime Minister Rabin and Israeli military officers. Fearing an assassination attempt by either Palestinian nationalists or South African exiles, the security surrounding the Vorster visit was extremely tight; in fact it matched that used to guard US Secretary of State Kissinger during his visits to Israel. At the conclusion of the visit, the Israeli and South African governments signed an economic, scientific, and industrial pact which provides for Israeli technological assistance to the Apartheid system in exchange for the export of South African materials—such as iron ore, cement, coal, semi-processed steel, and enriched uranium—to Israel. Once a year Cabinet Ministers from the two countries will meet to review the progress of the Agreement. Additionally there is speculation that a secret arms agreement has been signed. The Apartheid regime has openly expressed interest in obtaining the Kfir jet fighters, an Israeli-built tank specifically designed for desert conditions, and an anti-tank helicopter which Israel is developing. (*Guardian*, London, April 10, 13, 14, 1976; *Economist*, London, April 11, 1976; *Sunday Times*, London, April 11, 1976; *WBAI*, New York, April 12, 1976)

The visit produced jubilation for both the South African and Israeli rulers. Mr. Japie Basson, the United Party's chief spokesperson on foreign affairs, stated that "we have a special interest in the *development of Israel*, which has many parallels with our own situation. . . . We are both outcasts together. Israel is under constant threats

Mr Vorster with Israeli "hawk", former Minister of Defense General Moshe Dayan



and on the defensive. We seem to be at the beginning of facing the same sort of thing." (Italics added) Israeli Prime Minister Rabin toasted Vorster with the remark that "Israel was sympathetic to South Africa's détente policy." The *Jerusalem Post* wrote that "there is no reason to make common cause with the hypocrites of the world who have sought to turn South Africa into a pariah state." However, Israeli public opinion is not unanimous about the Vorster visit. The Israeli left is in opposition to the growing alliance between South Africa and Israel. Twenty Israeli students staged a demonstration against Vorster. Mr. Meir Wilner, Member of the Knesset (Israel's parliament) of the Israeli Communist Party (MAKI) said that "it was a shame for a Jewish Government to roll out the red carpet to an apostle of racism." (*Guardian*, London, April 17, 1976; *Observer*, London, April 11, 1976; *WBAI*, New York, April 12, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 10, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICA—RHODESIA

The Apartheid regime is still hoping for a quick negotiated settlement which would allow conservative African politicians in Zimbabwe to gradually assume political office. Under the cover of "negotiations" efforts are being made to prevent the actual liberation of Zimbabwe—to prevent a redistribution of the economic wealth to the African majority and to prevent an African government being established which would be committed to the liberation struggle. The objective is to change the

status of the Rhodesian regime from a colonial to a neo-colonial one.

South Africa's rulers are anxious that Ian Smith and his supporters will be a permanent obstacle to the fulfillment of this strategy. The anxiety is reflected in the South African press. The *Cape Times* writes that "with every month that passes, the bargaining position of the Black nationalists is likely to improve. Few White Rhodesians see this essential point. . . . Sooner or later a settlement will have to be reached—if Rhodesia and possibly the whole of Southern Africa are not to be engulfed in violence. It would be better for Mr. Smith to start negotiating on the basis of the Callaghan plan now than sit it out till confronted with terms of an even more radical nature later." Similarly the *Oggenblad* notes that "what is especially necessary, is that in South Africa there should not be panicky reaction and automatic reaching for rifles to save Whites in Rhodesia. Calm consideration of self-interest and not merely sentiment should prevail throughout. . . ."

Vorster has informed Ian Smith that he should expect neither troops nor additional military equipment from South Africa. However the developing guerrilla conflict, uncomfortably close to the South Africa-Rhodesian border, may produce changes in this policy. In Parliament Vorster threatened that "incalculable consequences" will follow if guerrilla attacks on South African tourists in Rhodesia continue. (*New York Times*, April 25, 1976; *WBAI*, New York, April 23, 1976)

Namibia

WAR IN NAMIBIA

The boundary between the new independent nation of Angola and the emerging though still occupied nation of Namibia is one of the front lines in the continuing struggle for the liberation of southern Africa. The war is well underway in northern Namibia—indeed deep into the country as well—since the withdrawal of all South African Defence Forces from Angola on March 27.

Four white South African soldiers were killed and seven more wounded by machine gun fire in an ambush by soldiers of the South West Africa People's Organization's People's Liberation Army of Namibia about 19 miles below the Angola border on April 22. There are confirmed reports of another South African soldier being killed and one wounded recently while searching for guerrillas who attacked a farmhouse farther to the south. On April 13, a white South African soldier and two African "trackers" were slain either by grenade launcher or rocket launcher fire from across the border as they were patrolling the frontier road in a convoy of vehicles. The *Washington Post* reports from Johannesburg that "More than 20 of Pretoria's troops have been killed this year by Namibian rebels". (*Washington Post*, April 24, 26, 1976; *Windhoek Advertiser*, April 14, 1976).

The Advertiser reports that the rocket launcher attack "is the first time that this type of firearm has been used in an attack inside South West Africa"—the armament being a portable launcher which shoots a projectile up to distances of almost 6,000 yards.

A series of abductions have spread across northern Namibia. On March 14 a headman was kidnapped from his

home 48 miles east of Oshikango along the Angolan border, purportedly by SWAPO guerrillas armed with automatic weapons. A German construction foreman was taken on March 29. Two people were abducted by "insurgents" on April 7. Owambo Chief Minister Cornelius Ndjoba announced that "Swapo insurgents" had been involved in a local incident in which a 16-year-old boy was killed and an unsuccessful attempt made to capture a tribal policeman. A South African soldier was kidnapped near the Angolan border, a fact not officially commented upon but confirmed to the press. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, March 16, April 5, 7, 9, 21, 1976).

South African occupation officials have been attempting to both calm and prepare the whites in Namibia and those blacks beholden to Pretoria. Police and military authorities have held meetings with farmers, construction workers and others. One brigadier quipped "I have to depanic some of the panic". There is a standing \$57,000 reward for information leading to the detection and conviction of "terrorists". A "specialist" on terrorism from the South African Council of Industrial and Scientific Research has toured Namibia lecturing on the problem. The South West Africa Agricultural Union has asked the country's widely scattered white farmers to contact the Department of Defence for information on protection against attacks. South Africa's proconsul in Namibia, Administrator B.J. van der Walt, appealed to farmers to join the Defence Force commandos, adding that women too could become members of these militia units. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, March 4, 5, 8, 10, 16, 1976).

The South African Commissioner General for Indige-



South African troops on constant patrol in Namibia

nous Peoples, Jannie de Wet, has been hard put to answer the rising cries for "law and order". He "could not reply on whether a number of terrorists and guerrillas had succeeded to infiltrate the homeland from Angola" when confronted by the press. "He could, however, officially state that there was a 'traffic' of terrorists between Angola and Ovamboland". When questioned about a meeting of officials of the People's Republic of Angola and of South Africa "He said that in Monday's discussions with the Political Commissar from Luanda and an MPLA military commander, the question of terrorist and guerrilla infiltration from Angola into South West Africa was never raised. The entire discussions were confined to the security of the Ruacana hydro-electric project, the workers and the crossing of the border into Angola from South West Africa by the workers. 'We have to tackle one issue at a time. The meeting was not aimed at discussing Swapo's presence either in Angola or by infiltration into South West Africa', he said." (*Windhoek Advertiser*, April 7, 1976).

Whites in South Africa are becoming increasingly agitated by events in Namibia as well as Zimbabwe. A *Washington Post* dispatch from Johannesburg says "South Africans have reacted angrily to what they call the SWAPO 'intrusion'. . . . 'This attack has really hit home', said one young Johannesburg resident, referring to the recent ambush. 'First Angola, then Rhodesia, now South-west. Then what.'" The *Post* story continues: "Some even feel a need for a new military involvement in Namibia to insure a peaceful transition. . . . Perhaps the most telling reaction came from a South African army reservist: 'All around us people are giving way to Communism. We must make a stand. We won't do it in Rhodesia, it's not our territory, but we can in Southwest Africa.'"

White eyes are being cast nervously over the northern border of the occupied United Nations territory of Namibia. The *Windhoek Advertiser* carries a front page story calculated to heighten anxiety. Quoting an Associated Press report from Dar es Salaam, it says: "African diplomatic sources here believe that South West Africa will be the next combat area for 15,000 Cuban troops now stationed in neighbouring Angola. . . . The sources said the Cuban Prime Minister, Dr. Fidel Castro and the Angolan President, Dr. Agostino Neto, agreed last month that the

troops should be sent into South West Africa to help Swapo wrest it from South Africa." The report goes on to say that SWAPO is rumoured to be moving its headquarters from Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, to the Angolan capital of Luanda. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, April 22, 1976).

SHOOTOUT IN WINDHOEK

A shoot out between two men termed by authorities of the South African occupation as wanted "terrorists" and South African police brought Namibia's mounting warfare to the capital city of Windhoek on April 19. A policeman was shot to death, a second wounded and one of the "wanted" Africans was wounded while the other escaped. The shoot out occurred when a midnight police detachment stormed a house in Katutura, Windhoek's large African location outside the white city. Police officials said they believed the two men belonged to SWAPO and identified them as Nduvuu Nangola, under guard in a hospital, and Kanisius Heleleshi, for whom a massive search was launched. A special police colonel was flown to Windhoek from Johannesburg to take charge of the manhunt. The police allege that the two men were responsible for killing a white couple near Okahandja on February 16 and a white woman and her son on a farm near Grootfontein last December 21. Detective Sergeant Cedekias Ogamb was buried on April 23 with a full display of local dignitaries, the police brass band of Pretoria and a contingent of black policemen brought up from South Africa. Windhoek's police brigadier said "that White people intending to attend the funeral were welcome to do so. There were no restrictions and it was not necessary to obtain permits to enter Katutura". (*Windhoek Advertiser*, April 20, 21, 22, 1976).

REFUGEES

A South African government spokesman stated that about 1200 Angolan refugees were being accommodated in the Rundu district of northern Namibia, that the army was feeding them and that the refugees themselves were erecting homes with equipment supplied by the Bantu Administration and Development Department. (Johannesburg International Radio Service, April 6, 1976).

TERRORISM TRIAL

The state prosecutor in the trial of six SWAPO members under the South African Terrorism Act charged that there had been a conspiracy by SWAPO to abduct black political leaders in Namibia and to force them to broadcast "subversive propaganda over Radio Zambia". He made this statement while cross-examining Mr. Hendrik Shikongo who is charged with having aided the assassins of Owambo Chief Minister Filemon Elifas in August, 1975. The five other defendants, two men and three women, continue testifying in a trial which is viewed by many observers as a prelude to the banning of SWAPO as an organization within Namibia. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, April 15, 21, 1976).

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

New York attorney Stuart Schwartz was in Windhoek in late April to discuss the draft constitution which he prepared for Chief Clemens Kapuuo and which now rests with a special committee of the South African-sponsored conclave. He said he hoped his visit would "assist the process towards reaching consensus". The Turnhalle gathering, the Namibia Constitutional Conference, is due to resume plenary sessions on June 2. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, April 20, 1976).

BUSINESS INTERESTS

British

Mr. Peter Katjivivi, British and European representative of SWAPO, issued an ultimatum to British firms in Namibia. "Either they should recognize the UN status of the area and register with the UN Council for Namibia, or face the consequences, including armed guerrilla attack". A half dozen UK firms operate in the Territory, the most important of which is Rio Tinto-Zinc, which has a contract with the British Government to supply up to fifty per cent of Britain's uranium needs, with the initial output commencing this July. (*Johannesburg Sunday Times*, March 21, 1976).

American

"A South West African mining company crashed yes-

terday with a debt of almost R1,000,000 (US \$1,146,000)—most of the money indebted to American businessmen". (*Windhoek Advertiser*, April 2, 1976). The company, Gemstone Miners (Pty) Ltd, surfaced during hearings before Congressman Charles Digg's subcommittee on Africa in April, 1974. A Securities and Exchange Commission official brought up Gemstone (not to be confused with the Watergate operation of the same name) in connection with a proposal to sell securities in the US to raise for Gemstone to mine amethysts in Namibia. Documents presented by the SEC showed that the State Department in 1972 had notified Gemstone's President of the US Government's concern that hiring policies for Namibian workers should be in concord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The SEC had been informed of the three elements of US policy: "to officially discourage investments by US nationals in South West Africa"; that "Export-Import Bank credit guarantees and other facilities will not be made available for trade with South West Africa"; and that US investments in "South West Africa" after October 27, 1966, will not receive "US Government assistance against claims of a future lawful Government of South West Africa".

According to the *Advertiser* Gemstone's liabilities were unsecured "with the exception of a claim in favour of the Small Business Administration of the United States Government . . . secured by a notarial bond". The *Advertiser* further notes that one James Endicott holds a claim of \$45,000 against Gemstone. Endicott—described as a "mystery man"—is a close associate of Chief Clemens Kapuuo, a leading figure in the Turnhalle constitutional conference.

SAIL-IN

A ship carrying a cargo of books either banned by the South African occupation authorities or not available in Namibia is due to set sail from Portsmouth, England, in May. Operation Namibia has initiated the sail-in, which is expected to have an international crew and to make a six-week journey stopping at various West African ports. Whatever the reaction of the South Africans at or near a Namibian port, the crew, which is committed to non-violence, is prepared to make continued efforts to deliver the books to the Namibian people.

Zimbabwe

GUERRILLA ATTACKS ESCALATE


The escalation of guerrilla attacks on the Smith regime was highlighted in April by the blasting of the railroad link to South Africa near Rutenga. On April 18, two trains carrying goods that violated sanctions against Rhodesia were blown up by guerrillas. The *Washington Post* (April 20, 1976) noted that previously, an explosive device had been discovered by the Rhodesian forces on the line, but had been defused. Evidently, awareness of the mining of the track did not enable the Smith forces to prevent the successful detonation on April 18.

On that date also, three South African motor cyclists were shot near Nuanetsi, on the road between Fort Victoria and Beitbridge (the South African border). The cyclists apparently drove up while guerrilla forces were

searching three motor cars, and could have been regarded as plain clothes security officers.

The proximity of the attacks to the South African border and the identity of the cyclists as South Africans has brought the conflict ever closer to South Africa itself. These were the first South African civilians to be killed in the Zimbabwe clashes.

Losses by Rhodesian forces continue to mount. One of Ian Smith's Deputy Ministers told reporters on April 9 that 19 members of the Security Forces had been killed since the beginning of 1976, and claimed that 128 guerrillas had been killed during the same period. But a communique issued while he was speaking said two black policemen "were shot accidentally today and another was seriously wounded." (*Guardian*, London, April 10, 1976)



Major road link between Rhodesia and South Africa comes under attack

Gavin Alcock, Mining Editor of right-wing South African *Financial Gazette* killed in guerrilla attack near Nuuanetsi

On April 28, the *New York Times* reported five Rhodesian Security Force members killed "in the last nine days."

RHODESIAN RESPONSE: TORTURE, REPRESSION, MILITARY BUILD-UP

Within Rhodesia repression increases. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace stated that 70,000 inhabitants of tribal trust lands were being held in so-called "protected villages." More than 900 people are held in detention under the Emergency Act for Law and Order Maintenance. (*Washington Post*, April 19, 1976) Conditions in the "protected villages" were vividly described in a report by Michael Helman of the London *Observer*, quoting Mr. Mathias Chitauru, Chairman of the Chiweshe Residents Association, an organization formed by workers living in Salisbury to aid their relatives in these villages: "A typical protected village covers 100 acres and holds up to 2000 people. Each family is allocated 15 square yards. The village is surrounded by seven foot barbed wire fence, and the perimeter is floodlit and patrolled by armed guards at night. . . . People live under a dusk to dawn curfew, leaving the villages to work in their fields during the day."

Deaths caused by insanitary conditions are widespread. The report states, ". . . people have died in much greater numbers than before . . . most of the dying people suffer stomach troubles and diarrhoea, and dysentery is very common." The Chiweshe villages were described as part of a "massive regrouping of 175,000 to 200,000 African civilians in Rhodesia's North-East war zone, from scattered kraals into confined settlements." (*Observer*, London, April 4, 1976)

Previously, Amnesty International in London had issued a report describing how torture is "routinely employed" by Rhodesian police seeking to extract information from Blacks suspected of aiding the liberation forces. Techniques include "beating on the body with fists and sticks, and the application of electric shocks by means of electrodes or cattle goads. In addition torture victims have been threatened with castration or immersed head first in barrels of water until unconscious." Amnesty International estimates that the total number of people confined

in "protected villages" may be as high as 300,000 (*Washington Post*, March 30, 1976)

The Smith regime is making new efforts to deal with the stepped-up guerrilla attacks. The *Los Angeles Times* (March 29, 1976) quoting Lt. Col. Ramsey Peart, head of the newly established "guard force," reported that "the Rhodesian armed forces are being expanded at an unprecedented rate." David Ottaway of the *Washington Post* reported that white women were being mobilized to serve in office jobs so as to free more men for combat duty. He also reported that the Smith government was "busy recruiting British and American war veterans." War supplies, he added, continue to reach Rhodesia from South Africa—" . . . trains from the south loaded with ammunition and war supplies still roll into Salisbury station three or four nights a week." (*Washington Post*, March 29, 1976)

In its mobilization drive, the Smith regime is being forced to recruit more Blacks into its army. In a *Christian Science Monitor* article entitled "How loyal are Rhodesia's black soldiers?" Robin Wright concludes that there is "serious doubt" that "Rhodesia's African soldiers would back up the minority white officers in the long run—especially if the Rhodesian Army started to lose." (*Christian Science Monitor*, March 17, 1976) On the other hand, some 80 Vietnam veterans have reportedly joined the regular Rhodesian army in response to the Smith government's recruiting drive. (*Washington Post*, April 28, 1976)



Minister of Defense van der Byl inspects white troopers at passing out parade—"To you will fall the honor of exacting the most terrible vengeance for our comrades and compatriots maimed, mutilated and murdered by the terrorist beasts."

"DEAR _____, NO DOUBT YOU ARE WORRIED. . ."

Thus begins the printed air letter forms that the Rhodesian regime now sells for use by the white minority. The air letter goes on to attribute all news of war and trouble to distorted press coverage. Outside observers therefore have a choice: They can accept as truth a form

letter devised by the Smith government, or they can accept the first hand observation of journalists such as David Ottaway, who reports a "deepening malaise among white Rhodesians over their future following the breakdown of the constitutional talks" between Smith and Nkomo, and observes that "signs of jitters are increasingly visible." In contrast, Ottaway notes that "in the African townships here [Salisbury] there is open jubilation at the collapse of the negotiations." (*Washington Post*, April 4, 1976)

LAST-DITCH PLOYS: BLACKOUT AND BLACKS IN

Two moves undertaken by the Smith regime in the last week of April underscore the total bankruptcy of white minority rule in Rhodesia. On April 26, the Rhodesian Government announced the establishment of a national security committee with the power to censor and control news reaching the Rhodesian public. In particular, the committee is to regulate and censor information relating to "defense, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the state, or information that could cause alarm and despondency, and other allied matters." It has the power to prohibit publication "of any information that it believes should not be published," to authorize police searches and to serve bans on local publications, the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation and Rhodesia television. At the time of writing, it was not clear what effect these censorship regulations would have on foreign correspondents in Salisbury. (*New York Times*, April 27, 1976)



Prime Minister Smith with four new Cabinet appointees—Chiefs Mangwende, Charumbira, Chirau and Ndieweni (left to right)

In what may be an even more pathetic attempt to buy time for racism, turn back the pages of history, and shield the white minority from the reality of its position, rebel Prime Minister Ian Smith responded to Secretary of State Kissinger's Lusaka speech of April 27 by announcing his intention to add four government-supported tribal chiefs to his Cabinet. Smith also said he would appoint six black businessmen as deputy ministers, and promised improved job opportunities for Africans and the removal of some forms of racial discrimination. (*Washington Post*, April 28, 1976) On April 28, the four tribal chiefs, T.C. Mangwende, Zefania Charumbira, J.S. Chirau and Kayisa Ndieweni, were sworn in, with Smith apologizing for the haste of the whole operation and "assuring them that they

would be told their duties in due course..." The four chiefs are already Senate members on government salaries. (*New York Times*, April 29, 1976)

FOUR AFRICAN PRESIDENTS MEET ON ZIMBABWE

In Lusaka, Zambia, talks on the need for intensification of armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe took place on March 25 between Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, Seretse Khama of Botswana, Samora Machel of Mozambique and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Leaders of both factions of the African National Council of Zimbabwe were called into the talks. According to the *Tanzania Daily News* (March 26, 1976), informed sources appeared to indicate "that the four Heads of State also discussed the re-unification of the A.N.C." On his return to Maputo, President Machel was quoted as saying that the armed struggle in Zimbabwe would unite and consolidate the nationalist forces and help the people acquire a revolutionary conscience. It will also be the unifying agent of all the forces and "permit the nationalist forces to rapidly overcome the differences which existed in the movement." (*Daily News*, Tanzania, March 27, 1976)

According to the *Guardian* (London, March 28, 1976), President Machel also said that the war would allow the creation of liberated zones which would give Zimbabweans experience in government. "They will learn to live collectively and establish a complete breakdown of the rotten decadent system of Rhodesia," Machel was quoted as saying.

ANC LEADERS MEET WITH UN DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE

ANC leaders Rev. Ndabinyi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa met with a special mission sent by the UN Committee of 24 on Decolonization, which was in southern Africa in April to discuss developments in Namibia and Rhodesia. The meeting was closed, but was summarized in a UN press release which will be quoted at length here.

Rev. Sithole concentrated on two aspects of the liberation struggle—internal and external. The struggle depended on an interplay of both aspects, he said. Internally, the political atmosphere was one where the people were highly politicized and well-organized despite "strong-arm" methods of the illegal regime. Thousands had been sent out of the country for military training since the people realized that "they will not win by the ballot box, but on the battle field." In the meantime, he said, "the enemy is importing mercenaries" from the United Kingdom, United States, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Australia and South Africa.

Concerning Nkomo's talks with Ian Smith, Sithole said that it was clear that "there were no results and the only alternative is armed struggle." He said "the ANC has left the door open for Mr. Nkomo to return if he so desires." The ANC wanted a "united front against the common enemy." He added that the "core of unity" remained, since only Nkomo, of four signatories creating the ANC, had left it. The other three organizations forming the ANC in 1974 remained united. This was important "since the unfortunate impression has been created that there is no longer unity in the ANC," he said. "The ANC remains 75 per cent intact."

Sithole went on to say that the press had falsely stated that Nkomo led the people internally while Bishop Muzorewa led the ANC externally. That was not correct. Bishop Muzorewa led the vast majority of people internal-

ly and externally.

Dealing with the external aspects of the situation, he said that without the help of Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia, the military struggle would have been virtually impossible. It would not help, however, he added, to ignore the sensitive fact that the "military high command" of the Zimbabweans in the struggle "has been created without the knowledge of the recognized leaders of Zimbabwe." They had not been consulted in any way, he added. The political leaders of the ANC "have been kept in the dark . . . and cannot visit the military camps," he said. The result had been a "so-called third force." The

reasoning was that the leadership "should emerge from military cadres, as occurred in Mozambique." However, the experience of Mozambique could not be taken over *in toto* regarding Zimbabwe, he said. The situation had caused confusion among those wishing to assist the Zimbabwean struggle. However, efforts were now under way to resolve the situation "with the ANC remaining the only organization having legality in representing the people of Zimbabwe." He said the "third force does not have a separate legal existence." The confusion regarding "the third force" interfered with the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, "especially in regard to supplies to the front."

The struggle continues

Angola

INSIDE ANGOLA:

Two American friends of the *Southern African Committee* have recently reported on their firsthand observations of conditions inside Angola (Ruth and Bill Minter, reporting in *Angola Weekly News Summary*, Apr. 22, 1976). They report that agricultural cooperatives, worker commissions, consumer cooperatives, state agencies and multi-purpose "emergency commissions" have formed all over Angola to get the economy on its feet again, after the severe disruptions to production and transport created by the war. Cooperatives are being organized in the extreme north and in southern Angola, where some of the fiercest fighting with FNLA and UNITA occurred. The attitude of the MPLA toward citizens who may have supported either FNLA or UNITA is non-vindictive: everyone, even soldiers from either of the two movements, has been asked to participate in national reconstruction. The Minters report, "Of course those responsible for massacres will be judged, but the average man or woman in the former territories held by FNLA or UNITA has nothing to fear."

In the province of Luanda, the first elections to the People's Commissions, part of the "People's Power" program, will be held in May. MPLA leaders stress that those elected should be MPLA militants and that the majority should be workers or peasants. According to the Minters the main priorities of the PRA at this time are getting production underway, organizing People's Power and establishing national unity.

In another report (*Sevendays*, March 15, 1976) a Western journalist spent several days observing reconstruction in the town of Novo Redondo in central Angola. Reconstruction began only a few short weeks after the town was liberated from South African occupation. There is no electricity or water because the South Africans blew up the generator and wrecked the water purification system. The population is slowly returning; by early March nearly 5000 of 20,000 who fled from the South African invaders had returned. Production is getting underway and goods are sold at moderate prices in an MPLA "People's Store." As in all Angolan cities, a managing committee composed of representatives of health, education, mass organizations and other MPLA departments is supervising the reconstruction effort in Novo Redondo.

The Cubans are participating in national reconstruction and have even brought their own supplies so as not to

burden the new Republic. More than 1000 Cuban technicians are now in Angola, helping to develop fisheries, agricultural industries, railways and transport. (*Sunday Telegraph*, London, Apr. 4, 1976) Crowds often gather around the Cubans to talk in a mixture of Portuguese and Spanish and almost every rally in Angola ends with chants of "Viva los Cubanos." The Angolans think Kissinger's characterization of the Cubans as the "policement of Angola" is ridiculous. They are very grateful that one small Third World country has provided massive aid to another during a time of great need. (*Sevendays*, Mar. 15, 1976)

On the economic front, Angola has denied that it has nationalized Gulf Oil operations in Cabinda, as reported in South Africa. A Gulf spokesman in Pittsburgh has corroborated the fact that nationalization has not occurred and said that talks with the Angolan government are expected to begin soon. (*International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 19, 1976) A team of Algerian oil experts has been in Angola to advise the PRA on its negotiations with Gulf Oil. The Algerian delegation is headed by Sidahmed Ghazali, the Director of the Algerian National Oil Co. In 1963 Algeria had formed a national oil company which was nationalized in 1971. During the intervening eight years cadres, technicians, and engineers were trained to carry out the operation of the oil company. (*Financial Times*, London, Mar. 23, 1976) Meanwhile the press in Rio de Janeiro has reported that Brazil has acquired authorization for the prospecting and production of oil in Angola. (*O Século*, Lisbon, Mar. 25, 1976)

In Cabinda there are reports of attacks on troops and civilians by FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) which has been driven out of Zaire, its former base for operations, through an agreement between Angola and Zaire. The remaining FLEC forces are now attacking civilians to obtain food; in April a village was attacked leaving 20 people dead. There are also reports of ambushes against MPLA troops, but the FLEC movement, divided internally and ever dependent on outside support which it no longer has, is not expected to last long in its stand for control of Cabinda.

On the political front, trials of captured mercenaries, including two Americans, may be seen in Luanda. PRA Justice Minister Boavida said that "severe but serene"

Justice would be meted out to the men who were captured while fighting with the FNLA and UNITA. One of the defendants, known as 'Callan', is the one who ordered the execution of 14 other mercenaries in February and was thought to be dead. The American defendants were identified as Daniel Gearhart and Gary Acker, but no other information concerning the two is available. (*Washington Post*, Apr. 2, 1976)

Meanwhile, UNITA officials, speaking from various parts of the world, have asked South Africa to grant asylum to themselves and to their followers remaining in southern Angola. (*Washington Post*, March 27) Although South Africa had previously stated that it would assume no responsibility for refugees after its pullout, it is considered likely that it will permit the UNITA refugees to enter.

ANGOLAN UN MEMBERSHIP TO BE DISCUSSED SOON—RECOGNITION CONTINUES

Kenya and Zambia, have both changed their position on recognition of the MPLA-led government of Angola. In mid-March the MPLA sent a delegation to Zambia to discuss the normalization of relations. About a month later Zambia formally recognized Angola. Like Zaire before it, Zambia is motivated by the need to secure a safe route to export its copper, rather than by its zeal for the MPLA-led government of Angola. Recognition signals the end of Zambian support for UNITA whose forces have been firmly and finally defeated in southern Angola. UNITA supplies had been flown into southern Angola from Zambia.

Meanwhile, Kenya, one of the few OAU nations which has not recognized Angola, may be preparing to do so according to Kenya's Foreign Minister, Munyua Waiyaki. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 3, 1976) Waiyaki told newsmen that he hoped the matter would be discussed at the Cabinet level soon. Kenya acknowledged the independence of Angola on November 11, 1975, but failed to recognize the leadership of the MPLA. Apart from Kenya,

of the OAU states only Senegal and the Central African Republic have failed to recognize Angola.

The question of Angolan membership in the U.N. will come up soon. (*Angola Weekly News Summary*, Apr. 8, 1976) Of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council France, Britain and the Soviet Union have recognized Angola. It is unclear at this time what the U.S. and China will decide. It has been reported in Luanda that the PRA is considering postponing its bid for U.N. membership until later this year. (*Providence Bulletin*, Apr. 10, 1976)

Up to the present time, the U.S. and China remain the only major world powers not to recognize Angola. Nations outside of Africa which have recently recognized include the Philippines and Cambodia. The former is in the U.S. camp and the latter is generally conceded to be in the Chinese camp. Perhaps this is some early indication of a move towards normal relations by the U.S. and China.

MORE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY:

The heads of the governments of Cuba, Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry met with President Agostinho Neto to assure him that the three countries would provide all of the aid necessary to achieve and maintain the total independence of Angola. All three countries had sent troops to assist the MPLA forces during the war to expel reactionary and foreign-backed forces from Angola. (*Granma*, Havana, Mar. 28, 1976) The historic meeting of President Luis Cabral of Guinea Bissau, Prime Minister Fidel Castro, and President Neto took place at the invitation of President Ahmed Sekou Touré of Guinea Conakry and was held in Conakry on March 15. The leaders acknowledged the historic significance of the victory of the MPLA not only for the Angolan people but also for the destiny of the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Africa as a whole.

In Tanzania, Roy Innis, Director of the Congress of Racial Equality, has come under attack by Radio Tanzania for trying to recruit black Americans to fight in

From left: Presidents Luis Cabral, Sekou Toure, Agostinho Neto and Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Conakry



Angola. The official government radio said Innis should be "condemned without qualification" and that Innis is a man "free Africa must watch out for." The editorial went on to say that Innis is "the biggest contradiction our brothers of America have to live with." (*Providence Bulletin*, Apr. 2, 1976)

Guinea-Bissau

PROGRESSIVE LEADERS MEET: CABRAL SPEAKS

On March 14, the leaders of Angola, Guinea Bissau, Guinea (Conakry), and Cuba met in Conakry in a concrete demonstration of the close friendship and solidarity between the peoples of the four nations. The four leaders also heralded the great victory of the MPLA in its war against South African racism, Western imperialism, and local reaction. As each of the distinguished guests arrived they were welcomed by a 21-gun salute and full military honors. The following are excerpts from President Luis Cabral's speech which were also echoed in the words of Presidents Touré and Neto, and in the comments of Prime Minister Castro.

"We have won a great victory in Africa. The enemy of our peoples, of the liberation of our peoples believed, was in fact sure, that even after being defeated in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Cape Verde, it could continue to dominate the people of Angola. The enemy discovered some African traitors, puppets who were willing to serve its interests, and believed that it would be able to dominate that heroic people, a people who had for 12 years waged an armed struggle for liberation. But the fighters of the MPLA have stood firm and the Angolan people have been determined, more and more so as time went on, having discovered the deadly criminal nature of those serving imperialism and colonialism in the FNLA and UNITA."

"We in Africa must be ready for action as long as there are colonialist and racist regimes. We must be on the alert to shoulder our responsibilities toward Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The victory of the Angolan people is a tremendous contribution to the cause of liberation and independence and an important base for the continuation of the struggle until all Africa is free."

"We know that our enemies are not at all happy over the fraternal aid which the revolutionary people of Cuba gave Angola and the fraternal aid which the sister people of Angola received from Mozambique. But I would ask those who were able to wage their own struggles, how would it have been possible for you, in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and other areas, to struggle victoriously against Portuguese colonialism from our soil, without the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries?"

Of course we want all the fraternal aid of the socialist countries, and we say: "Glory to the Cuban revolutionary fighters who were ready to make every sacrifice in order to aid the Angolan people". (*Gamma*, Havana, March 21, 28, 1976)

PROMISES OF AID FULFILLED

Guinea Bissau gave consistent support to Angola in the recent conflict, sending some 600 volunteer troops from Bissau and Cape Verde to Luanda. When the first Cuban

soldiers arrived they used Bissau as a stopping off place on the long flight from Havana to Luanda. (*Pourquoi Pas?*, Brussels, Feb. 5, 1976)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

New Economic Agreements

Relations between Cuba and Guinea Bissau have been further cemented with the signing of an air transport protocol between the Cuban Ambassador to Guinea, Alfonso Perez Morales and Bissau's Transport Minister Otto Schacht. (*Havana Radio*, April 8, 1976, 1200 gm) Similar accords were signed between Guinea Bissau and the Soviet Union which has introduced daily flights to Bissau and Luanda on Aeroflot TU-154 jetliners. (*Daily World*, New York, April 2, 1976)

There have also been technical and commercial discussions with Brazil. While the military dictatorship in Brazil has major political differences with the Republic of Guinea Bissau it comes from a common cultural heritage and is interested in establishing foreign markets for its products. When Bissau's delegation returned from Brazil, it indicated that "the groundwork has been laid for bilateral cooperation" and that Brazil has shown a "willingness and readiness to cooperate".

Cooperation with the socialist nations is being steadily strengthened. President Cabral paid a state visit to Roumania on April 8, 1976. (*AFP*, Paris, April, 1976)



Otto Schacht, Minister of Transport—building new links for Guinea Bissau

Support for East Timor

The struggle for the liberation of East Timor was given support by Guinea's Ambassador to the United Nations, Gil Fernandes, who called for an unconditional withdrawal of Indonesian troops seeking to annex the former Portuguese territory. (*Daily World*, New York, April 23, 1976)

THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE

PRESIDENT NETO PAYS STATE VISIT

After President Neto of the Peoples' Republic of Angola visited Conakry he spent two days in Bissau and then flew on to the Republic of Cape Verde for a three day visit to the archipelago. He was widely acclaimed throughout the islands and large crowds gave him a heroic welcome. Discussions took place with President Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde on cooperation between the sister nations. Plans for the April meeting of CONCP (the Conference of Nationalist Movements in the Portuguese Colonies) to be held in Luanda were also discussed. Neto

and Pereira also issued a joint condemnation of white minority rule in Zimbabwe before Neto's departure on March 20, 1976.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED

In the islands, economic progress is slow but steady as the people gradually lift the heavy yoke of centuries of colonialism. The development program is taking a number of directions including reorganization of agriculture, political education, and social organization of slum dwellers, particularly near Sao Tiago the capital city. Popular support for the PAIGC grows constantly as the people see that it is the only way to move forward. A great deal of hard work lies ahead but the first firm steps have been taken.

CAPE VERDEANS IN NEW ENGLAND

On April 24 and 25, 1976 the Cape Verdean-American Federation held its Third Annual Convention in North Dartmouth Massachusetts. Three workshops were organized around the issues of "Education and the Cape Verdean Child", "Political Awareness and the Cape Verdean", and "Social Programs and the Cape Verdean".

The right-wing Cape Verdean movement known as the Juridical Congress sought to propagate its anti-PAIGC campaign stressing fears of unity with Guinea Bissau despite the common cultural traditions of Guinea and Cape Verde. Talk of annexation by the PAIGC was a major preoccupation although the Congress had never criticized Portuguese colonial rule. The paranoia about "communism" in Cape Verde has proven to be the group's chief weakness in developing any mass support. While the convention failed to take a stand in support of the Republic of Cape Verde it also refused to take a stand in favor of the Juridical Congress. Thus the Cape Verdean community continues to stand divided at a time when serious support is needed in the Islands by those who sincerely care about their countrymen.

Mozambique

MOZAMBIQUE: BORDER ARREST INCIDENT

Four Rhodesian consular staff members in Maputo have been released from detention in Mozambique in exchange for 17 Mozambicans arrested in the Kruger National Park, South Africa in March.

The Rhodesians had been under house arrest since making an unsuccessful attempt to leave Mozambique after President Machel closed the border on March 3.

The Mozambicans included the Frelimo soldiers, policemen and civilians who were arrested while pursuing some Portuguese illegally leaving Mozambique. The Portuguese cut an opening in the fence which separates Mozambique from the Kruger National Park in the Eastern Transvaal, and drove their cars through it thereby avoiding the Mozambican border check. The Mozambicans who followed them—eight on one day and nine on the next—were being held by the police in Nelspruit. All the Portuguese had air tickets to Lisbon. Eight of the Portuguese were also detained for entering South Africa illegally. It is reported that three Frelimo soldiers fired on the South African police who shot back. However, no one was wounded.

The South African Minister of Police, Jimmy Kruger,

said Mozambique offered South Africa the four Rhodesians voluntarily. "There had not been negotiations as such." (*Guardian*, Britain, March 25, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, March 27, April 10, '76)

American press reports on Mozambique sometimes differ markedly from Mozambican statements or the reports of other journalists. Some examples—compiled by Africa News.

"In a recent statement the government warned: "The people must be made to understand that to attend church services or to obey the preachings of the missionaries will mean to work against Mozambique and to serve the imperialist powers.'"

— Robin Wright, *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1976

"The Labour Ministry in a communique has informed people of the Christian faith working in state offices and private firms that they are free not to report for work this afternoon in view of the Good Friday religious celebration."

— Maputo Radio (in Portuguese), April 16, 1976

"President Samora Machel of Mozambique today announced the immediate nationalization of private homes. . . . As well as nationalizing all privately-owned houses, he ordered troops and policemen to move into unoccupied houses and take them over in the name of the state."

— *New York Times*, February 4, 1976

"In February all non-owner-occupied rental housing was nationalized. People are still allowed to own two houses, one in the city, and one in the country for relaxation, but they cannot be absentee landlords. Some of these ex-landlords are leaving in the current wave of exits. The housing they used to control can be redistributed, proving more people with adequate housing and breaking down the racial patterns that have characterized housing districts up to this point."

— report from Ruth Minter, Maputo, April, 1976

"The breadlines are long and meat is available only sporadically. . . . This is Mozambique ten months after independence, a country so crippled by birth pangs that many observers wonder whether the new militantly-Socialist government will survive. . . ."

— Robin Wright, *The Washington Post*, April 14, 1976

"I think the point about the journalists who are writing all of this is that they're not traveling around the country, and some of them have simply been in the country for a few hours or at the airport and they're making these charges. . . . It is absolutely true that there are queues [lines] here in Maputo, but up-country there are no queues. . . . the situation is nowhere as bad as people are trying to portray. Shortages vary from day to day. . . . but I have seen no evidence of hunger whatsoever, and I've not heard anybody claim [that there is any]."

— David Martin, British Broadcasting Company, March 24, 1976

Neighbors

ZAMBIA AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

At an exclusive press breakfast President Kenneth Kaunda declared that negotiations on Zimbabwe had failed and blamed South Africa for not putting sufficient pressure on the rebel regime. He warned South Africa against the "Bantustanization" of Namibia and called for the liberation of Nelson Mandela and other African nationalist leaders and the convening of a conference of Black and White South Africans to map out the future. By implication, he praised the independence and freedom of Angola. Two weeks later, on April 15, Zambia recognized the People's Republic of Angola. (*1Star*, Johannesburg, April 3, 1976; *Sunday Telegraph*, London, April 3, 1976; *Angola News Summary*, New York, April 22, 1976)

Within Zambia, however, the prospects for support of the military struggle in Zimbabwe are bleak. The recent summit of Presidents Machel, Nyerere, Khama and Kaunda concluded on March 25 without any official statement. No progress towards unity of the Zimbabweans was achieved; Joshua Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa were left to sort out their differences while the new high command of the guerilla fighters did not accept the invitation to attend. (*Africa News*, Durham, N.C., March 29, 1976) The only Zimbabwean leader still operating in Zambia is Jason Moyo of ZAPU. ZAPU has traditionally received Soviet backing and training and would have difficulty working with the Chinese military instructors who train the Zambian national service. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 3, 1976)

As for ZANU, Zambia has now released a report indicating the complicity of much of the leadership in the murder of Herbert Chitepo, chairman of ZANU, his bodyguard Silas Shamiso, and a young Zambian boy Sambwa Chaya, by a bomb explosion on March 18, 1975, in Lusaka. President Kaunda appointed a Special International Commission on March 31, 1975, consisting of representatives from Botswana, Libya, Malagasy, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, the OAU Liberation Committee, Sierra Leone, Somali, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia. The Commission reported to Kaunda on March 8, 1976, and the report was released April 9. The findings go back to a rebellion within ZANU in November and December 1974, led by Thomas Nhari. Nhari and other members of the "Rebel Group" were executed, apparently by the "Karanga" elements in the Executive Committee (called "Dare") and the Military High Command of ZANU. Some of these same persons became concerned that "Manyika leaders" in ZANU, such as Chitepo and Edgar Madekorozwa (killed in February 1976; see *Southern African Magazine*, April 1976), might have played a role in the initial rebellion (an erroneous assumption according to the report) and might divulge information about the executions. They grew especially anxious with the pressure on ZANU to move into the larger, less controllable framework of the ANC, and after Chitepo met with Zimbabwean leaders in Malawi and Zambian officials in Lusaka in early 1975. The Commission singled out Josiah Tongogara, the ZANU Minister of Defense and a member of "Dare", as the mastermind of the assassination, but also implicated William Ndangana, Mayor Hurimbo, Cletos Chogwe, Robson Manyika, Joseph Chimurenga, Sheba Gava and Justin Chauke, all of the ZANU leadership. The report ruled out



Josiah Tongogara, ZANU Minister of Defense—accused of complicity in Chitepo assassination

the possibility that "racists, imperialists or their agents" were involved, criticized the latitude given by Zambia to ZANU and reproached the ZANU political leadership for its isolation from the military camps. (Zambian Mission to the UN, Press Release from Lusaka of April 9, 1976; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 10, 1976; *New York Times*, April 11, 1976)

About 50 ZANU members are still detained by Zambia, many without formal charges. Lionel Cliffe, the British lecturer recently freed by the Zambian Government, told BBC that he met many of them while under detention. All five of the detained expatriate faculty from the University of Zambia were released in mid-March and have left the country on the orders of the government. In addition to the four mentioned previously (see *Southern Africa Magazine*, April and May, 1976), they include Klaus van der Berg, a Dutchman who headed the engineering department. A Zambian Education Fellow, Younis Lulat, together with 15 students and the Zambian features editor of the *Times* of Zambia, are still in jail.

Robert Molteno, a White South African who lost his citizenship because of his 8-year residence in Zambia, has appealed his deportation from that country. On his arrival in London on April 1, he said that he had been stripped naked and threatened with torture. The authorities also threatened to detain his wife and two children and pressed him to name Socialists inside and outside the university. Cliffe, in speaking of his own arrest, declared that he had not been "politically active" in Zambia: "We were not directly involved in student activities, and we certainly were not involved in any Soviet efforts. We think that this is an over-reaction by the Zambian Government, and are worried about its effects on the academic freedom of the university. We were used as scapegoats to fill the conspiracy theory." (*Guardian*, London, April 2, 1976; *Africa News*, Durham, N.C., April 5, 1976)

COPPER AND FINANCE


Copper producing countries (members of the Copper Exporting Countries or CIPEC) and consumer countries met in Geneva in late March, but did not agree on any arrangements to stabilize prices. They predicted that the price of copper—now up to about \$.62 per pound after a

low of \$.52 last year and a high in April 1974 of \$1.52—would return to healthy levels. Zambia depends on copper for 90 per cent of its export earnings, Zaire for 70 per cent. The International Monetary Fund will soon extend financial aid of about one billion dollars in the form of oil loans to about 50 countries, with \$22 million going to Zambia and \$37.7 million to Zaire. IMF has also approved an export earning aid package for Zaire worth \$112.5 million, partly from a semiautomatic compensatory fund to help nations whose export earnings decline for reasons beyond their control, partly from normal stand-by credit. This brings total current IMF assistance to Zaire to \$230.8 million. In return, Zaire has agreed to stringency measures, including a 42 per cent devaluation of its currency (*Southern Africa Magazine*, May 1976), and this may open the way for additional US aid; \$68.5 million of loans and guarantees from the Export-Import Bank for the Inga-Shaba power project and \$20 million of general credit that has been held up in Congress. (*Africa News*, Durham, N.C., March 29, 1976; *New York Times*, April 5, 1976)

The European Common Market countries have decided to give over \$200 million in aid to the majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa. About \$36 million will go immediately through the Lome Convention arrangements, chiefly to Zaire and Zambia in almost equal shares (with a small portion also for Malawi). The rest will come in bilateral form from West Germany (\$72 million), Great Britain (\$37 million, with \$25 million more to follow later), Belgium (\$28 million), the Netherlands (over \$8 million) and Denmark (over \$5 million). The recipients are as follows: at least \$90 million for Zaire (principally from West Germany, Belgium and the Lome Convention funds), at least \$61 million for Zambia (from West Germany, Britain and the Lome funds), at least \$18 million for Mozambique (from Britain and the Netherlands), and at least \$12 million for Angola (from Britain and the Netherlands). Mozambique is expected to receive additional assistance from West Germany and Britain, particularly in light of the costs of its enforcement of sanctions against the Smith regime. Both Mozambique and Angola have applied for membership in the Lome Convention. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 10, 1976)

BOTSWANA'S DILEMMAS

In a series of articles date-lined Gaborone (*Guardian*, London, April 1, 3 and 7, 1976), James MacManus discusses Botswana's short-term reluctance to join in sanctions against Rhodesia and its long-term efforts to extricate itself from the embrace of South Africa. While President Seretse Khama is one of the "four presidents" who have been working for majority rule in Zimbabwe and, while he would like to implement sanctions, he recently reiterated that closing the Rhodesian border would hurt his country more than Ian Smith. The 394 miles of railway in Botswana are owned and run by Rhodesia and carry 40 per cent of the volume of Rhodesia's external rail traffic. Botswana estimates that it would cost about \$55 million to take over the line and that nationalization at present is unthinkable. The country does provide refuge and safe passage for Zimbabwe guerrillas and deserters from the Rhodesian army but will not consider providing local bases for freedom fighters. South African intelligence forces, principally from the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), gather information in



Botswana, although the local government monitors their activities.

In the long haul, Botswana is moving on three principal fronts to decrease dependency on South Africa and Rhodesia: the construction of a 700-mile all-weather route from Gaborone to the Zambezi ferry link with Zambia (to be completed in 1979 at a cost of \$100 million), the building of two oil storage depots outside Gaborone to give the country a 4-month instead of a 10-day fuel reserve, and the institution of a new national currency scheduled for August of this year. The new currency will be called the "pula", from a greeting meaning rain. The economy remains highly dependent on beef and diamond exports, and the returns from the copper and nickel mines of Selebi-Pikwe continue to be disappointing. 50,000 persons still suffer the harsh labor conditions of the South African mines each year, although this does not seem to have embittered Black-White relations in Botswana.

Of more immediate concern is the health of President Khama—only 54 but afflicted by acute diabetes and pancreatitis—and Vice President Quett Masari, who suffers the after effects of skin absorption of a weedkiller. President Khama is widely respected and could probably succeed in designating a successor. Until he does, Botswanans will continue to worry over what they call "the leadership gap." ■

at the United Nations

RHODESIA SANCTIONS EXPANDED

On April 6, the Security Council adopted a resolution expanding the existing mandatory sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia to cover:

- a) insurance of goods imported from, or exported to, Rhodesia, and of any commercial or industrial property in Rhodesia;
- b) trademark or franchising agreements with any Rhodesian company.

The resolution, which was co-sponsored by all fifteen members of the Council, was adopted unanimously. It is clear, however, that the main reason for the Council's vote was the non-controversial character of the resolution which only covers a marginal aspect of economic relations with Rhodesia.

Several delegations pointed out how the resolution was to be seen only as an interim measure, pending adoption by the Council of really effective measures. Ambassador Salim of Tanzania, Chairman of the Committee of 24 on Decolonization and Chairman of the Sanctions Committee, aptly summarized this view when he stated: "Sanctions cannot be effective unless they are comprehensive and effectively supervised and fully implemented by the whole international community. We are still very far from achieving that goal." He pointed out that sanctions were not being implemented by a number of Western countries (most blatantly by the United States under the Byrd Amendment which allows for the importation of chrome from Rhodesia); that the Council ought to extend sanctions to South Africa so long as South Africa supported the Smith regime and provided it with a channel to the outside world; and that the Council should apply the full force of the United Nations Charter to secure implementation of the sanctions.

In spite of United States and United Kingdom support for the resolution and declarations in favor of majority rule in Rhodesia, it is unlikely that they will ever let effective measures pass through the Security Council: more comprehensive proposals were vetoed by the United Kingdom nine times, and by the United States twice since the adoption of sanctions in 1968. (UN documents S/RES/388(1976); S/PV.1907)

DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE MEETS WITH

NYERERE, KAUNDA, ANC and SWAPO LEADERS

The Committee of 24 on Decolonization sent a special mission to Southern Africa in April to discuss recent developments in Rhodesia and Namibia, and to explore ways in which the United Nations could assist in the liberation struggle. The group, headed by Ambassador Salim of Tanzania, met with Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, and travelled to border areas of Zambia with Rhodesia. Both Presidents told the group that armed struggle was now the only viable alternative for the liberation of Zimbabwe, and affirmed their full commitment to supporting the struggle. On the question of the ANC, they both emphasized that it was essential to ensure a united ANC for the struggle. Referring to the problem of the emerging new leadership among the military cadres, President Kaunda stated that the four "front line" states had agreed on training liberation fighters, but that did not mean an attempt to create a new political leadership. The choice of leadership, he said, was "the sacred trust" of the people of Zimbabwe themselves.

The struggle in Zimbabwe was discussed at length in an enlightening meeting with Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Although the meeting was closed, the United Nations prepared a press release which is quoted at some length in the *Zimbabwe* section of this issue of *Southern Africa*.

In a meeting with a SWAPO representative, the group was informed that South Africa now had about 40,000 troops in Namibia, and that reinforcements had been sent after the war in Angola. He said that South African troops remained in Angola, despite official announcements to the contrary. They remained to assist the UNITA and FNLA remnants in the south of Angola. Those who were termed "refugees" were mostly UNITA troops, he stated. They were being trained militarily in Namibia by South Africa. He appealed to the United Nations to stop any aid to these so-called "refugees" who were being trained to fight the Angolan government. In addition, he said, South African troops withdrawn from Angola were now moving villagers so that a 30-mile cleared area was created in Namibia to serve as a buffer strip with Angola, with the aim to prevent SWAPO from sending fighters into Namibia. (UN press release GA/COL/1693)

U.S. and Southern Africa

CONGRESSIONAL LIBERALS MAY TRY AGAIN ON SANCTIONS

Following the US debacle in Angola, several liberal members of Congress are worried about the United States image on other southern Africa issues, especially Rhodesia. The most flagrant negative signal comes from the continued existence of the Byrd Amendment, which has allowed US violation of sanctions against Rhodesia to import "strategic and critical materials" since 1972.

In early April, Atlanta Congressman Andrew Young tried to attach a Byrd Amendment repealer onto the Defense Department Authorization bill as it came through

the Rules Committee, of which he is a newly-appointed member. Young's move came as somewhat of a surprise to groups which had worked to restore sanctions in the past and also to the previous main Congressional sponsors of the sanctions legislation. It appeared that his original strategy was to try to add the amendment at the last minute, so as not to give the steel companies a chance to lobby against it before it reached the floor.

Besides the intensive opposition to sanctions from steel companies and their corporate consumers, the main stumbling block to passage of a sanctions bill in the House has always been lack of active support from the Administra-

tion. In the last repeal effort in 1975 the White House didn't lift a finger to back up its public posture of support for the bill, and the result was a defeat by 197-209, with only 22 Republicans supporting repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Since this second unsuccessful attempt to repeal the amendment, House sponsors have maintained that they would not again go to the floor without a guarantee of active White House support.

When White House support was again lacking this year, Young decided to postpone his repeal effort. The Administration was holding off for at least two reasons. First, Kissinger wanted to be able to use a promise to work for repeal as a bargaining chip during his Africa trip. It would not have served this purpose as well to go with sanctions already restored. Before the trip, the Administration was preoccupied with a campaign to warn Cuba to stay out of Rhodesia, in which the pragmatic step of the Byrd Amendment repeal didn't fit. Second, the Administration was not willing to speak out against the interests of the steel industry before the April 27 Pennsylvania primary. Even after the primary, Republican Presidential politics may determine whether the Administration will actually follow up on any promises Kissinger may make in Africa.

The current liberal strategy in Congress has been to prepare for a repeal effort when it looks like the Administration will support it, but not before. Congressman Fraser, the main sponsor of the 1975 repeal effort, has suggested that a sanctions provision might be amended to the foreign assistance authorization bill which Congress is planning to consider in mid-May. The Senate is waiting for successful House action, since the Senate demonstrated in 1974 that the votes were there to defeat the Byrd Amendment.

DIGGS GRILLS ADMINISTRATION WITNESSES ON RHODESIA POLICY

On April 13, Congressman Diggs chaired a hearing of the House Subcommittee on Resources, Food, and Energy, of the Committee on International Relations, devoted to a review of the US policy toward Rhodesia.

The Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, James B. Blake, ranged over familiar ground. He claimed to see no contradiction between administration support for majority rule and warnings to foreign powers not to intervene to help in achieving it. The Administration, he argued, was for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, co-sponsored the extension of sanctions by the UN on April 6, and was vigorously enforcing the sanctions program, except for the loophole created by the Byrd Amendment. But the exception clearly was lucrative for the Rhodesians. An official of the Commerce Department estimated that the Byrd Amendment loophole had earned the Rhodesians \$60-70 million last year.

According to Samuel B. Sherwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic Commerce, 86% of all metallurgical chrome is in Rhodesia. Closure of the Mozambique frontier would mean a 6-10 month "adjustment," while South Africa absorbs the new traffic. "We believe that they can manage and we hope so," he said in a typically forthright statement, at variance with the official State Department line on sanctions.

Sherwin claimed that the chrome mines could flood in the event of a war, and said that if flooding took place, it might be as much as four years before production could be restored. Clearly, there are good economic reasons for the US position of seeking a peaceful solution to Rhodesia's mounting crisis.

INCREASED MILITARY TRAFFIC AT AZORES BASE IN MARCH REPORTED

According to two American journalists who have recently returned from a year in Portugal via the Azores, U. S. C-141 Globe-master planes were landing at Lajes base in greatly increased numbers during the last week of March. The local correspondent of the Agence France Presse told them that all of the inhabitants were aware of the increase, especially at night. The local base commander, however, told the journalists that the increase was not all that great, and that the reason for it was a structural defect in the C-141's which was causing lighter loading.

Conceivably, the increased number of flights might be related to developments in Southern Africa. A friend of the Agence France Presse stringer overheard a cockpit conversation with the tower in which the tower directed the plane not to land because an American plane was taking off for Rhodesia.

American airlift capacity could play an important role as the Rhodesian scenario unrolls. Airlifts could be used to evacuate white Rhodesians who wish to leave as the effectiveness of the guerilla war hits home. Airlifts could also assist African countries such as Botswana and Zambia to overcome difficulties imposed by cutting off rail lines to Rhodesia. Or arms supplies and aircraft could be brought in for the white regimes themselves. But the first two possibilities seemed much stronger than the last.

KISSINGER PROMISES NEW SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY ON AFRICA TRIP

At the end of April Kissinger made his first much-publicized trip to Africa, where he made what was billed as a major policy speech on southern Africa policy in Lusaka.

One central purpose of Kissinger's trip to Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Liberia and Senegal was to demonstrate a genuine US interest in Africa and to counter reports that the US is trying to manipulate and divide Africa to achieve its own policy interests. Kissinger

'On Safari' in Africa—the hat was new but the politics sounded the same





In Lusaka, with President Kenneth Kaunda

seemed to concede that the United States has had no Africa policy, saying "there is nothing to be gained in a debate about whether in the past America has neglected Africa. . . ." The Africa trip was primarily a public relations show to underscore an alleged dramatic shift from ignorance and neglect to care about Africa, and real support for majority rule, particularly in Rhodesia.

However, the real question is not whether the US has or has not had an Africa policy, but what that policy is and has been. In answer to that question, the Kissinger trip appears as a concerted drive to counter a perceived growing Communist influence in southern Africa after the US failure in Angola, and to make sure that US interests will not be ignored. As the *Washington Post* diplomatic correspondent Murrey Marder reported on April 28, "Above all, the unexpectedly detailed Ford administration program is intended to checkmate and even roll back the Communist penetration of Africa. The objective is to block a repetition of the Soviet-backed use of Cuban troops last February [in Angola]". Even State Department officials privately admit that Kissinger finally got to Africa after many promises to do so because of the US Angola debacle.

Kissinger publicly stressed in his Lusaka speech and at almost every stop on his trip that the US "does not seek any pro-American African bloc confronting a bloc supporting any other power. Nor do we wish to support one faction of a liberation movement against another." But after US intervention on the side of UNITA and FNLA in Angola, many observers expect that the US is looking to see if it can find nationalist elements to support who will guarantee the protection of US interests.

Furthermore, Kissinger went on in Lusaka to tie US official support for African unity to similar action by the Soviet Union. Although Kissinger made no direct threats to the Soviet Union and Cuba, he did say: ". . . neither should any other country pursue hegemonial aspirations or bloc policies. An attempt by one will inevitably be countered by the other." This action-reaction explanation harkens back to the Administration's rationale for intervening in Angola to counter "external aggression" by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Administration officials also used a cold war rationale to explain Kissinger's uneven reception in Africa. Before the trip started, visits to Nigeria and Mozambique had already been rejected by the leaders of those countries. While Kissinger was in Zambia, he was informed that the trip to Ghana (which had been added to replace Nigeria) had also been cancelled, the official reason being the poor health of General Acheampong. There had been student protests against the Kissinger trip which was called "an avenue to propogate American foreign policy, which is anti-African." But officials on Kissinger's plane told reporters that Soviet diplomats had agitated among the students, and said that "the Soviet Union is actively working to undercut the secretary of state's Africa tour." According to the April 28 *Washington Post*, Washington was on the verge of protesting to Moscow against agitation in Ghana by Soviet diplomats against the Kissinger visit. The next day Reuters reported that Kissinger "voiced regret" that "certain foreign countries" had applied pressure on Ghana to cancel the visit.

Kissinger's major policy speech in Lusaka "[ushering in] a new era in American policy" toward southern Africa focused almost entirely on the crisis situation in Rhodesia. Kissinger outlined a ten-point policy for a "just and durable Rhodesian solution." The proposals were a combination of the old and the new. Kissinger repeated several US policy statements: complete US support for the British proposal for majority rule before independence; no US diplomatic or material help for the Smith regime; Administration support for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment; readiness to aid any country neighboring Rhodesia which decides to enforce sanctions (perhaps referring now to Botswana). Kissinger also emphasized some new policy points: direct communication through unnamed channels of US "unrelenting opposition" to the Salisbury regime "until a negotiated settlement is achieved"; encouraging "other industrial nations" to comply with sanctions; discouraging American tourists from going to Rhodesia and urging American residents in Rhodesia to leave; humanitarian assistance to refugees from Rhodesia; a promise of \$12.5 million to compensate Mozambique for closing the Rhodesian border; a program of economic, technical and educational assistance "as [Rhodesia makes] the peaceful transition to majority rule" and to a "newly independent Zimbabwe"; and, finally, protection of "minority rights" in Rhodesia, including devoting "some assistance programs to this objective."

Much of the emphasis in the generally favorable reporting on the speech in the establishment American press has been on Kissinger's promise to press for Congressional repeal of the Byrd Amendment. It is probably somewhat more likely now than it was in the past that Kissinger is prepared to lobby seriously for repeal since he has said so publicly in Africa. However, it remains to be seen how Reagan's challenge to Ford could affect White House action on sanctions and whether, in this context, Kissinger will be willing to carry out his commitment by throwing

his real weight behind a repeal effort on Capitol Hill.

Probably the most important aspect of the Rhodesia proposals is the extent to which the United States now appears to be taking the leadership role in determining Western strategy there, a role formerly taken by Britain. In fact, the day after Kissinger's Lusaka speech he said in Zaire that the United States would willingly participate in Rhodesian negotiations "to bring about the results mentioned in my Lusaka Speech . . . if the parties asked us to be helpful." The promised aid programs to white Rhodesians (perhaps in the form of an airlift if and when they decide to leave in large numbers) and to a transition government in Rhodesia could also place the United States in an influential position. One major question raised by the speech is at what point and to whom such aid would be given. With regard to aid to the majority Zimbabwean population, in late March, Josiah Chinamano, an associate of Joshua Nkomo, met with Africa Bureau officials at the State Department to ask for help. The Department is rumoured to be considering a \$2 million aid package, mostly for training programs. Kissinger's emphasis on aid during a "peaceful transition" suggests that the aid would be forthcoming only to nationalist figures who might still be convinced to negotiate with Smith. Aid to the Zimbabwe People's Army, which is convinced of the necessity of guerrilla war, has apparently been ruled out.

There have been few reports on the private talks between Kissinger and African leaders. One BBC report said that Kissinger told Nyerere that the US wanted no African request for Soviet or Cuban aid for the Zimbabwean struggle unless South Africa intervened first to back up Smith. This actually amounts to US acceptance of the decision reached sometime ago by the four presidents of the "front-line countries" (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana) and the Zimbabwean liberation forces.

On Namibia, Kissinger reiterated the Administration's view that South Africa must allow "all political groupings" to take part in determining the constitutional structure of Namibia and must set an acceptable timetable for self-determination. He also said that restrictions on

trade and investment in Namibia would be eased "once concrete movement toward self-determination is underway." Actually "restrictions" was a misnomer—US "discouragement" of investment in Namibia has been a flabby and ineffective lever, and trade restrictions have been applied only to baby sealskins. On South Africa, Kissinger was notably vague. He said that there is still time "to bring about a reconciliation of South Africa's people for the benefit of all", but that it would have to be done more quickly "that was generally perceived even a few years ago." He also said South Africa could "show its dedication to Africa" by influencing Smith to come to a settlement in Rhodesia. Some observers read Kissinger's silence on the critical issue of recognition of Transkei as a wait-and-see attitude which smacks of acceptance of the separate development strategy of apartheid. Before he left, Kissinger had indicated to the South Africans through their Washington embassy what he would say on his trip.

Kissinger did not announce a specific aid package for Zambia on the trip, as some observers had expected he would. However, he did say that there would be some bilateral assistance to countries which had suffered from the drop in copper prices (Zaire and Zambia) and that "we expect to triple our support for development programs in southern and central Africa over the next three years."

The response to the southern Africa proposals from those African leaders who agreed to meet with Kissinger was not hostile. President Kaunda of Zambia described Kissinger's speech as the American response he had been appealing for during the past decade. Tanzanian President Nyerere's response was reportedly friendlier than the Americans had expected, but he chose his comments carefully. Without opposing Kissinger's call for further negotiations on Rhodesia, he said "the war [in Rhodesia] has started. It is therefore too late to talk about negotiations to prevent it. But, it can be ended. The only thing that can stop the war is majority rule."

(The text of the Kissinger speech is reprinted in *The New York Times*, April 28, 1976.)



U.S. PRAISE FOR SOUTH AFRICA

The Angolan situation is not regarded as an impediment to the investment of capital and the development of industry in South Africa, said Mr. Robert B. Anderson, a former Secretary of the US Treasury after visiting South Africa last month. "I am deeply

impressed with the stability and economic growth of the country', stated Mr. Anderson who is now an international financier with US and Middle Eastern interests, and he looked forward to joint ventures between South African industry and US companies.

THE STAR 2.2.76

u.s. action news and notes



May Day, 1976 saw more than 1000 people in New York demonstrate under rainy skies against racism, colonialism and imperialism in Southern Africa. Initiated by the Pan African Students' Organization in the Americas (PASOA), the demonstration brought to-

gether many organizations in a strong display of solidarity with the people of Southern Africa in their struggle for freedom and an end to exploitation.

BLACK OFFICIALS OPPOSE CALTEX, KENNECOTT INVESTMENTS

A statement signed by Black elected officials and other black community representatives opposing new investment in South Africa by Kennecott Copper and CALTEX (see *Southern Africa*, May 1976) was released by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility at the annual meetings of these companies in April. The statement charges that new investments by these two companies "constitute a substantial increase of 20% of total U.S. investment in South Africa, increase the identification of American interests with apartheid." Among the signatories were state legislators Carl McCall and Herman Farrell of New York; Willie Brown and Leon Ralph of California; Sidney Barthelemy of Louisiana, Bob Holmes of Georgia; Norman Justice and Clarence Love of Kansas

and Joy Johnston of North Carolina; Congressional representatives Parren Mitchell and Charles Rangel and Washington DC City Council members Julius Hobson and Marion Barry. (ICCR letter, April 26, 1976)

SOUTHERN AFRICA CONFERENCES IN NEW ENGLAND

The Yale-New Haven Southern Africa Solidarity Coalition launched its activities at a conference held on campus the weekend of April 10-11. Four hundred persons packed a hall to hear Ambassador Elisio de Figueiredo of the People's Republic of Angola speak and to see the film "The Second War of Liberation." The next day's presentation was by Prof. Sean Gervasi of Brooklyn College and a panel including Mme. Jeanne Cisee, Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea to the U.N., who chairs the U.N. Special Committee Against *Apartheid*. Workshops fol-

lowed on community education, corporate actions, liberation support work.

The New England chapter of the Muzorewa wing of the African National Council, African Students for Liberation at Harvard, and the Southern Africa Solidarity Coalition in Boston co-sponsored an all day teach-in on Zimbabwe at Harvard, April 17. The program featured Zimbabwean academics, with an unexpected guest appearance by Walter Rodney, author "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa."

CHARGE U.S. FRELIMO SUPPORT GROUP IS "FOREIGN AGENT"

In its April 1976 "News & Notes", the Committee for a Free Mozambique reports harassment by the Federal Government. CFM joins the African Liberation Support Committee in receiving orders from the Justice Department to register as a "foreign agent" in a case probably linked to the continuing FBI investigation of the Southern Africa Committee, publishers of this magazine, and untold other groups supporting African liberation.

The newsletter reports:

"Early in March, CFM received a letter from the Internal Security Section of the Justice Department asserting that CFM "has been acting as an agent of a foreign principal," and requiring that we register as a foreign agent.

We in the New York working group feel that CFM, as a committee of independent U.S. citizens which has provided support to FRELIMO in its struggle for independence, has never acted as a "foreign agent." FRELIMO, which throughout its history has strongly believed that groups such as CFM should develop their own program of activities consistent with their beliefs, has never dictated and would never dictate or control any of our activities.

CFM is contesting the registration order, and will be legally represented by Michael Davis and Peter Weiss of the Center for Constitutional Rights."

The issue also features Comrade President Samora Machel's speech to the Frelimo Central Committee in February and an appeal for material aid to agricultural development in Mozambique. Contact CFM, 825 West End Ave, Apt. 14F, New York, N.Y. 10025.

RECOGNIZE ANGOLA!

On the eve of Secretary Kissinger's trip to Africa, Judge William Booth, president of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) released a statement signed by 75 prominent Americans calling for U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA). The statement states that "a stable government, under the leadership of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, firmly administers the affairs of state" and that most countries in the world except the U.S. have already recognized Angola.

George Houser, ACOA executive director, noted that "Our government's continuing refusal to recognize the Angolan government connotes hostility toward the Angolan people and their government. It is high time we drop the shibboleth of a Soviet 'take-over' and accept the hand of friendship the Angolan government has offered us."

Among the signatories to the statement were Georgia State Senator Julian Bond, Dr. Gwendolyn Carter of Indiana University, Methodist Bishop Ralph Dodge, James Farmer, Moe Foner, secretary of the Hospital Workers Union, Dr. Carlton Goodlett, president of the National

Black Press Association; U.S. Senate candidate Tom Hayden, Dr. John Holloman, president of the NYC Health & Hospitals Corp, Episcopal Bishop Paul Moore, Jr, Gil Noble of WABC-TV, investment counselor William X. Scheinman, Rev. Eugene Stockwell, associate general secretary of the National Council of Churches, Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton, UAW President Leonard Woodcock and former Ambassador Franklin H. Williams, president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund. (release).

SUPPORT PROJECTS IN AFRICA

The Africa Fund (tax exempt associate of the American Committee on Africa) has released a new brochure describing projects in Africa it is raising monies for in 1976. The Fund seeks \$10,000 for agricultural implements for a farm in Zambia and educational supplies requested by the Africa National Council of Zimbabwe, and an equal amount for assistance to political prisoners inside Rhodesia. The Fund seeks to raise \$90,000 for a medical clinic and agricultural tools in Mozambique, medical services in Angola, training of health workers in Guinea Bissau, and school equipment in Cape Verde. The Fund also seeks \$30,000 for legal defense and scholarship for SASO students in South Africa, \$20,000 for textbooks for a SWAPO school in Zambia, and \$8,000 for emergency assistance to southern Africa refugees. Contact The Africa Fund, 305 East 46 St, NY, NY 10017.

OTHER ACTIONS

The All-African People's Revolutionary Party and organizer Stokely Carmichael are calling an Africa Liberation Day March on Washington, May 22 at 11:00 a.m. at Malcolm S. Shabazz Park. The theme of the gathering is "Take African Liberation Day Back to Africa." AARPP calls for "Pan-Africanism . . . the total liberation and unification of Africa under scientific socialism; . . . unconditional support for MPLA in Angola;" support for the liberation movements in southern Africa, Eritrea, Palestine and the Arab Gulf, Puerto Rico, the Caribbean, and the American Indian and Chicano movements. (leaflet) Contact: AARP, P.O. Box 3307 Washington DC 20009.

Anti-Apartheid Movement USA sponsored a panel discussion on "Liberation in Southern Africa" at Columbia University in New York City April 23, featuring Callistus Ndlovu, representative of the African National Council of Zimbabwe (Nkomo); Theo Ben Gurirab, representative of SWAPO; and Ben Magubane, member of the African National Congress of South Africa. The movement also participated with PASOA in a program to "Oppose Apartheid in Southern Africa" held April 26 by the People's Democratic Association in Manhattan. (leaflets)

On the West coast, the Angola Solidarity Coalition and the African Liberation Support Coalition jointly sponsored a program on "Angola and Southern Africa" in Oakland, CA, April 11. The program consisted of a talk by Belmi Roots of the Zimbabwe support group, an update on conditions in Angola by Steve Talbot of Internews, slides on Angola by Robert Kramer, recently returned from Luanda, poetry readings from Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, and a presentation by T. Kangai of the Zimbabwe African National Union. (leaflet). ■

book reviews

Richard L. Sklar, *Corporate Power in an African State. The Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, pp. 245, \$12.00.

UCLA political scientist Richard Sklar, who published *Nigerian Political Parties* in 1963, has now made one of the first political analyses of the relations between multinational companies and an independent African country based on research conducted between 1966 and 1972. The great strength of the book lies in the concise summaries of various aspects of Zambia's predicament: lack of control over the processing and consumption of copper, dependence on transport facilities controlled by Western capital, and the disproportionate development of the Copperbelt and the "railroad belt" in relation to the rest of the country. Its main weaknesses are two: the "class analysis" which Sklar claims to apply to the situation does not produce any particularly original findings or fresh insight, and the time of final composition (1974) caused the author to underestimate Zambia's dilemma and the urgency of change. Since that time the price of copper has plummeted, normal export routes have been blocked and President Kaunda has moved to ban freehold land tenure (*Southern Africa Magazine*, October 1975 and April 1976).

The principal themes and findings of the book can be summarized as follows: First, the multinational companies (the Anglo-American group and the Roan Selection Trust group) have adapted to the conditions imposed by an independent Zambia, including the 1969 arrangement which involved 51 per cent nationalization and the effort to reorient the economy away from the south. Sklar calls this adaptability the "doctrine of domicile"; it is, of course, also used by the companies to justify their quite different practices within South Africa. Second, the last decade has done little to alter the disproportion between white and black workers on the mines and between black mineworkers and peasants (1968 figures show the average European employee at the copper mines earning about \$10,640, the Zambian mineworker getting about \$1,820, and the peasant farmer about \$200). Third, the same period has seen tremendous growth in the national bourgeoisie of civil servants, entrepreneurs and parastatal staffs, with wage scales and opportunities in even greater disparity with the rural sector than those of the miners. Fourth, this national bourgeoisie is simply the local wing of a managerial bourgeoisie which includes the expatriate employees of the multinationals. This combined group should be seen as the main beneficiaries of the changes of the last decade, rather than either the companies or the Zambian Government. Finally, Kenneth Kaunda must be praised for his courage and commitment, especially during the push for independence and in his attacks on the aggrandizement of the national bourgeoisie. His principles of "humanism" and "participatory democracy" though confusing may yet push the economy away from elitist to popular control.

This work is, then, a useful description of the place occupied by Zambia in the Southern Africa economy and the limited modifications of that place which have been made since 1964. Sklar treats the Anglo-American and

RST groups rather gently, quoting extensively from published sources and interviews with their leading spokesmen, Harry Oppenheimer and Ronald Prain, respectively. He has not seriously sought information from those Zambians or others who have proposed alternative courses of action to those of Kaunda and the companies. A more comprehensive view of the Zambian situation, at a much cheaper price, can be found in Dennis Dresang's article, "The Political Economy of Zambia," in Richard Harris, ed., *The Political Economy of Africa* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1975, \$6.95).

Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, Sam Sarkesian, (Ed.), Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975, 623 pp. Hardcover, \$13.95.

As the war in Indochina escalated in the sixties, so did the involvement of the American social science community. Anthropologists studied tribal society in northeast Thailand, economists examined the dynamics of pacification in the Mekong Delta, and political scientists delved into the underpinnings of religious sects in southern Vietnam.

One of the most striking illustrations of social science's prostitution for the war effort is RAND's involvement with the "Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project". Begun in 1964, the Project sought to find out who the NLF were and what motivated them. Given access to NLF defectors and prisoners, the initial project study was quite honest in its conclusions. It depicted the NLF as an authentic national liberation movement. RAND's informants revealed they were fighting for social justice, peace and to expel the American imperialists. After one briefing on the findings, a senior American official remarked, "If what you say is correct, then we have joined the wrong side."

At a time when Johnson was planning to escalate the war, such conclusions about his adversaries' resiliency were ignored. Instead, airpower advocates took over the Project. These men were convinced that U.S. airpower could destroy the NLF. This closely resembled the British view during the twenties that the RAF could single-handedly destroy anti-colonial resistance. In their reports from 1965 to 1967, the Project reported that ground and air action were cracking NLF morale. Any doubts of creating new NLF recruits by free-fire zones were erased when the project erroneously reported that the villagers blamed the NLF for air/ground attacks. Fear of these attacks was a major reason why the countryside was emptied of farmers; yet anyone acquainted with the interviews could have easily proved that the villagers blamed the allied forces for their bombing and "search and destroy operations." Nevertheless, these findings lent support to Johnson's war strategy and provide an excellent example of the perverted use of "value-free" social science in our latest war.

Sam Sarkesian's anthology *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare* provides the reader with a good sample of social science application to the perplexing problems of counter-insurgency. His selection of articles in the chapter on revolution are valuable in showing the reader how contemporary American social scientists misperceived the

causes of revolution. They provide an insight into the mentality of those who would condone B-52 strikes because they create resentment against the revolution. The choice of readings in his chapter on guerrilla doctrine are quite good. Selections from Sun Tzu, Lenin, Mao and an essay on Clausewitz make this a valuable section. These writings have stood the test of time and are always worth reading again.

His sections on micro and macro-views of modern guerrilla warfare are of mixed quality. Particularly bad is his selection of articles on peasantry. One article, by James Scott, on patron-client politics in Southeast Asia is a good example of the kind of social-science usage that aids counter-revolution. A possible policy application of such knowledge is to help CIA and Special Forces personnel to better understand how to manipulate tribal groups and warlords in "insurgent" situations. Such findings as "local/patron leaders tended to be strengthened by colonial backing" and "the sanction of colonial authority permitted many such leaders to broaden the resource base of their authority" take on ominous implications when we see how these insights were applied to Indo-China to strengthen the status-quo. The blatant manipulation by the French and Americans of local rivalries placed the Meos of Laos, L'Armee Clandestine, in the hands of foreign powers for several decades against the Pathet Lao.

Sections on Cuba, Malaya, Africa and Urban Guerrilla Warfare are good. Sarkesian's own piece on Malaya provides the reader with many insights into the failure of the Malayan Communist Party against the British. Given the fact that most counter-insurgents have touted the Malayan insurgency as a model of effective pacification it is worth examining. But his last chapter, "The Problems of the Defenders," should be read in the same spirit as his chapter on revolution. An article by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf is an amusing example of applying Samuelson economics to merely state the obvious. Articles by George Tanham, Dennis Duncanson and Amron Katz are revealing examples of how the "liberal" wing of the counter-insurgency establishment viewed Vietnam.

Although Sarkesian makes a noteworthy attempt to piece together an anthology on revolutionary warfare, the scope is too large and each of his chapters of articles could have easily been expanded into a book. At the same time, the paucity of articles on southern Africa (there are only two: one consisting of excerpts from Mondlane's *Struggle for Mozambique*; the other, Lars Rudebeck on Guinea-Bissau) means that readers must draw their own comparisons and conclusions in terms of Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African counter-insurgency doctrine and practice.

Many of the selections in this book reflect the poverty of bourgeois social thought in attempting to deal with genuine social revolutions. But here is precisely the book's value: It provides useful if sometimes boring insights into how conventional social science perceives revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

In conclusions, this reviewer is reminded by this book of the prophetic words of I.F. Stone in 1961: "In reading the military literature on guerrilla warfare so fashionable at the Pentagon, one feels that these writers are like men watching a dance from outside through heavy plate glass windows. They put the mechanical gestures down on paper with pedantic fidelity. But what rarely comes through to them are the injured feelings, the misery, the rankling slights, the hatred, the devotion, the inspiration

and the desperation. So they do not really understand what leads men to abandon wife, children, home, career, friends; to take to the bush and live gun in hand like a hunted animal; to challenge overwhelming military odds rather than acquiesce any longer in humiliation, injustice or poverty."

RESOURCES

"Congressional Voting Record on Southern African Issues", including votes on Angolan intervention, Rhodesian sanctions, South African sugar quota and NASA tracking station. Available from the Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave., N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002, 1-10 copies for 25¢ each; 11-50 for 20¢ each, and 50 and over for 15¢ each. 8 pages.

Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January and February entitled "Angola" are now available from the Committee, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510. Witnesses include Secretary Kissinger, Defense Department witnesses, Congressman Andrew Young, and academics and non-governmental figures.

update

TWO OF SIX NAMIBIAN TERRORISM TRIALISTS SENTENCED TO DEATH

Civil liberties and Africa groups in the United States and abroad are organizing to fight death sentences imposed on two African men in Namibia, where a court ruled that the two provided a vehicle for terrorists who are suspected of killing a South African-appointed tribal chief, Filemon Elifas.

Groups protesting the sentences point out that neither of the accused was charged with actually committing murder, but only with *association* with those who might have committed such a crime. Critics also say that since South African rule in Namibia is illegal the South African court ruling is not valid.

GENERAL ELECTRIC SEEKS SOUTH AFRICA NUCLEAR DEAL

The General Electric Company has applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for permission to export certain nuclear materials to South Africa. The move poses yet another policy problem for the Ford Administration, already concerned that any Africa policy decision it makes will either anger black Africa on the one hand, or alienate conservative Republicans on the other (see item on Kissinger trip below).

The plum GE is pursuing is a contract worth over \$750 million to build two nuclear reactors for the South African government—a deal that could become a highly charged issue in the U.S.

South Africa, which is among the nations that have refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is capable of building the reactors itself. But it has chosen to buy them from abroad, in order to concentrate its own resources on a nuclear enrichment plant to process South African uranium.

U.S. MERCENARIES AWAIT TRIAL

Three American mercenaries—Daniel Francis Gearhart, Gary Martin Acker, and Gustavo Marcelo Grillo—are scheduled to go on trial in Angola on June 8.

Angolan Minister of Justice, Diogenes Boavida, says the men, who are part of an international group of thirteen, will be judged by a "Peoples Revolutionary Tribunal." He says they are to be tried for specific crimes, and not simply for being mercenaries.

KISSINGER AFRICA POLICY FACES TEST

Secretary of State Kissinger is having some success on consolidating Administration and Congressional backing for his new Africa policy.

Despite the points scored off the Administration by Presidential contender Ronald Reagan on the Kissinger stand for "majority rule" in Rhodesia, President Ford has endorsed Kissinger's southern Africa policy, and concurs with the proposal to repeal the Byrd Amendment (which permits the U.S. to import strategic minerals from Rhodesia).

The Secretary of State also received a warm welcome following his two week African tour from the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, with whom Kissinger's relationship is much more congenial than it was during the Angolan conflict.

SMITH LAUNCHES OFFENSIVE

With the arrival of the dry season in Rhodesia, government forces have launched a counter-insurgency offensive that has further intensified guerrilla war along the eastern border. In the second week of May, more than 50 civilians and soldiers were killed or wounded in the operational area. Reportedly, some of the civilian casualties were villagers shot for breaking the curfew; others were allegedly victims in land mine explosions.

Rhodesian military strategists called up several thousand reservists for their dry season offensive, and predicted quick success in mopping up guerrilla forces already inside the country. One tactic they are expected to use is to defoliate large areas covered with tall grass that could give cover to guerrillas.

SOUTH AFRICA CRACKS DOWN ON DISSENT

The South African government has introduced in Parliament an extension of the Suppression of Communism Act that will give police and the courts broader powers of detention and censorship.

Proposed amendments to the Act allow the banning of any publication that endangers State security or "maintenance of public order," and also extend the length of time that suspects can be held without trial from 180 days to one year.

The new bill, which is virtually assured of passage, reflects both the government's concern with rising pressure from radical groups and more moderate critics like the Progressive-Reform Party as well as the need to re-assure the strong right-wing among its own following.

VORSTER COURTS FORD MEETING

The South African government has made overtures to President Gerald Ford concerning a possible meeting on the southern African situation between Prime Minister Vorster, Ford, and Rhodesian leader Ian Smith. Following an interview with Michigan publisher John McGoff, in which Ford said he would consider meeting with the two

white leaders, the South African government announced that such a meeting was under consideration, and that it welcomed Ford's openness to such a possibility.

The White House denies that a meeting is being planned right now, but it is likely that such a meeting could be justified by the Administration in terms of its desire to achieve peaceful change in Southern Africa.

FLARE-UP IN ZIMBABWE GUERRILLA CAMP

The Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee is investigating a shooting incident that took place in a Zimbabwe Liberation Army training camp in western Tanzania. BBC reporter David Martin says that as many as 30 people may have been killed in a gunfight between supporters of ZANU (the Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union). Many of the guerrillas reportedly fled to the training camps in Mozambique in the wake of the fighting.

ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE STRENGTHEN TIES

Zambia and Mozambique—brought closer together by the guerrilla war in Rhodesia—have signed a cooperation pact covering commerce, communications and finance, and have agreed to establish a direct rail link between the two countries at the border town of Zumbo.

PORTUGAL-ANGOLA TIES STRAINED

The Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of Angola has asked Portugal to withdraw its diplomatic mission from Luanda, in view of the deteriorating relationship between the two countries. The move follows a protest note delivered to the Lisbon government by Angola in late April, which accused Portugal of "going back on its word" and sympathizing with forces that "desperately try to oppose the Angolan revolution." The note cited the bombing of the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon, and similar violence against the MPLA's Oporto offices.

CURFEW IMPOSED IN OVAMBOLAND

South African authorities have imposed a dusk to dawn curfew in Ovamboland, in order to curtail the stepped-up infiltration of guerrilla forces.

southern africa

"Greetings in the infinitely great event of Mozambique and Angola's liberation'. My heart leaps of joy every time my African brothers and sisters attain victories'. I know and I rejoice and take pride in the participation of our independence struggles...I thank you deeply for sending me your fine periodical."


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As you, our readers, know, SOUTHERN AFRICA provides free subscriptions to prisoners. The excerpts above are from prisoners' letters to us; they are powerful proof of the impact SOUTHERN AFRICA has had upon the men and women in prison in this country. These are men and women who feel a strong sense of solidarity with the African people and their struggles; men and women, who, previously uneducated, are now trying to educate themselves. We are committed to aiding their struggle.

As the costs of printing and mailing continue to rise along with the number of free subscribers, we are finding it harder to maintain our prison list. We feel sure that all of our paying subscribers agree with us on the necessity of continuing prison subscriptions. So we're asking you to send a donation -- whatever you can afford -- towards prisoners subscriptions. Send a check or a money order - today!

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