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**Economic Planning in the
Developing Countries of Africa**

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1. Colonial Planning: Past of National Plans of Social-Economic Development

The first attempts at planning the development of African economy date as far back as the colonial period. The colonial administration drew up and carried out plans of various complexity and range. The first appeared before the World War II. These were a kind of experiment on the part of European states in their pursuit of the most effective colonial policy. In the first place to the point here is the so-called Guggingberg's plan drawn up by Germany to be used in its Gold Coast colony between 1920-1930 as well as the English Law "On the Development of Colonies" of 1929. The latter envisaged that the parent state should invest 8 million pound sterling in the colonies in ten years. In 1940, the British government adopted a similar project for the next decade.

Large-scale colonial planning on the African continent began to be made already after the war. In 1945-1947, all of the major European colonial states drew up long-term, in the main ten-year plans of social-economic development for their colonies. For instance, in 1945 the British Parliament adopted a law "On the Development and Improvement of Well-being of the Colonies" in conformity with which the ten-year plan (1947-1956) of the development of all the British colonies was prepared. In the end of April 1946, a law "On the Elaboration, Financing and Fulfilment of Plans for Equipment and Development of Overseas Territories" was adopted in France in accordance with which a ten-year plan for the French colonies was established. Later on, the long-term colonial plans in Africa were broken up into shorter-range three to five-year periods. As a result Nigeria, for example, had a five-year plan (1951/52 to 1956/57) and a six-year investments programme (1955/56 to 1961/62); Kenya was provided with three plans for a three-year period, Tanganyika enacted a six-year plan for 1960-1956 and a five-year plan for 1956-1960, etc. The majority of the French colonies implemented four-year plans encompassing the same periods as the metropol state's plans of "modernization and equipment". Elsewhere the planned periods encompassed a certain number of fiscal years which did not coincide with calendar years in most of the colonies. Most of the European states made separate plans for each colony, while France (until 1958) did so for entire areas: (the French) North Africa, (the French) West Africa, (the French) Equatorial Africa. Only the trust territories of Togo and Cameroun as well as Algeria and Madagascar possessed their own development plans from the outset. However, in these countries after the 1958 Reform of the Constitution separate plans began to be drafted for "each member of the French Commonwealth".

Most of the colonial plans by the end of the 1950's were investments programmes of the colonial administration. Recently they also included a prognostication of the increase in the gross output of the colony as well as a rough draft of the rise in production of chief mainly export items.

The branch structure of investments planned by the colonial authorities distinctly betrayed the character and goals of the whole colonial planning. Elsewhere and especially at the initial stages a larger portion of the investments was earmarked for development of transport and communications, electric power base and other branches of economic infrastructure. The colonial plans envisaged the construction of roads, airfields, seaports and electric power stations which not only created conditions for intensifying the economic exploitation of the colonies, but also served to attain purely military and strategic goals. As the national-liberation movement was on the upsurge throughout the continent, these goals gradually took on importance in colonial planning. Only in the second half of the 50's did the plans foresee a certain increase in the allocations for social infrastructure: medical care, education, social maintenance. Apportionment of investments to this end was ground for publicity and pursued purely political goals of distracting the colonial peoples from their struggle for national independence. Besides, it was also aimed at definite economic tasks.

The industrial investments were almost exclusively planned by the colonial authorities to ensure an increase in the production of export items which were badly needed by the postwar West-European economies. In one of the first surveys of African planning published by the UN Economic Committee for Africa it was explicitly stated that "the productive investment in the development programmes /in the colonial period - S. E./ were oriented to production for export either to the metropolitan countries, or to countries where earnings would benefit their balance of payments".¹

The most characteristic example of colonial planning at the ultimate stage can be found in "Constantine's plan" which was elaborated for Algeria by France in 1959-1960 and encompassed the financial years of 1959/60 to 1963/64. What accounted for its singularity in African planning of those years was the high technical and economic level of its elaboration and the detailed enumeration of plan targets. This is the reason why Constantine's plan has even reckoned as a model for the plan-makers of the young African states. This plan was first and foremost an efficient publicity trap of the French Government to decoy the Algerian people off the track of national-liberation struggle, i.e. it pursued political and colonial purposes. Thus, it assigned large French, mainly public, investments for the Algerian economy with the alleged aim of raising the living standards of the local population up to the level of the metropol.

For the entire five-year period gross investments running into 29.9 billion old francs were contemplated, which accounted for 215% of Algeria's gross output in 1959.²

The gross domestic production of the country (i.e. the gross production with the deduction of state administration's output) was expected to increase from 11.1 billion francs in 1959 to 19.6 billion in 1964, i.e. by 76%, or by an annual 12%. An important social goal of the plan was to provide jobs for 60% of the unemployed in the cities, an army of 475 thousand men.

The French Government pursued also purely economic objectives by drafting this plan. To take an example, 5.5 billion of the French investments, private in the main, or 28% of the sum total was meant to be invested into the oil industry. A particularly sharp increase was contemplated in the development of the latter. The plan attached to priority to the manufacturing industry. The volume of its production should have increased by

88% in five years, i.e. by 19% per annum.³ The French Government's project included the construction of two big industrial units: a metallurgical works in Bon and a chemical plant in Arseu, as well as the completion of the gas-main from the Sahara.

To sum it up, the plans of the colonial administration on the African continent were virtually colonial plans, as they were aimed at broadening, intensifying and consolidating the exploitation of the African natural and manpower resources by the metropol. This was going to be done by economic means, police bludgeoning and political brainwashing. On different plans and in various colonies, however, heterogeneous methods were pushed to the forefront.

The complete disintegration of the colonial system that set in at the beginning of the 60's testifies, however, to the fact that the colonial plans did not succeed despite the police methods of bludgeoning and political propaganda. Neither did they carry through their economic objectives. Their investment programmes were accomplished only nominally, i.e. only by a traditional 60-80% of the aggregate investments. The chief reason that lay at the bottom of chronic failure in performance was lack of funds for the colonial authorities to invest. Another explanation may obviously be found in the insufficient number of skilled personnel to ensure a successful execution of the projects in accordance with the plans for which the colonial administration allots finances. It is also possible to refer here the inferior elaboration of the projects partly because of lack of specialists, funds and time, partly because the project-designers were unversed in the African background. All this caused very long procrastinations in the construction of many units and constituted one of the reasons of nonperformance in the investment programme.

Lastly, in many colonies a major role in the failure to realize the envisaged colonial investment programmes was played by the adverse political climate, specifically by the large-scale national-liberation movement. This fate befell the Constantine's plan in Algeria which was operated, and partially at that, only the first two years. In 1959-1960, the real investments amounted to 4.65 billion francs instead of the planned 6.0 billion francs.⁴

What is still more important, the branch structure of real investments was elsewhere far off the planned mark. The infrastructural branches absorbed, as a rule, relatively, and sometimes even absolutely, more investments than the amount planned in the investment programmes, while the social sphere and agriculture were given less than the indicators mapped out. It occurred for the reason that only an insignificant portion of the planned projects were actually accomplished, and belatedly at that, whereas the colonial authorities were setting up units that were not included in the investment programme, and at times even contradicted its objectives and branch structure. Thus, the colonial plans seem to have served as guidelines for the colonial authorities in their practical investment activities only in a very disparaging degree. The investment policy betrayed the genuine character and goals of the parent state's colonial economic policy far better than the plans, for in the plans they were disguised to some extent.

2. General Characteristics of National African Plans of Social-Economic Development

The young states that have arisen from the ashes of the perished colonial empires usually continued the practice of elaboration and execution of economic development plans. At the initial stages all these countries have had very much in common with the colonial programmes. In a number of countries, for instance, in Kenya, colonial plans continued being carried on in the pioneer years of independent development, in others they underwent minor changes. The first Ugandan five-year plan was mapped out before the country gained political independence, the national government adopted it with lesser amendments of the original variant. Still, from the very start national plans developed crucially specific features which testified to the fact that a qualitatively new stage of African planning set in after the collapse of colonial empires on the continent.

Actually from the start of the 60's planning was done extensively in the young African states where it became one of the vital trends in the economic policy pursued by their governments. In an economic survey of ECA it was even mentioned that "in these few years of independence ... planning has become the established mode".⁵ At present virtually all the countries have plans of various complexity and duration. Many African states have already accumulated considerable experience in the domain. Most of them have had two or three or even more short- and medium-range plans during the time of their independent development. For example, the United Arab Republic had 8 plans in the 50's and 60's, the Ivory Coast mapped out 5 plans in the 60's, Morocco, Congo (Kinshasa) and Nigeria - 4 plans each, etc.

African plans may be grouped according to their term, degree of encompassing and purpose. The latter is in our opinion the principal characteristics of any plan, therefore this category will be given special consideration below.

According to their duration plans may be long-term (for ten or more years), medium-range (for four to seven years) and short-range (for two-three years). The medium-range four- to five-year plans gained the widest circulation in Africa. According to the degree of encompassing one distinguishes between "partial" and general, or complex plans. Partial plans bear reference only to a part of the economy. For the most part they are programmes of public investments. Recently Africa has also given rise to development programmes of separate branches of economy and of separate regions. For instance, Libya adopted a five-year programme of tourist promotion in 1967/68, Nigeria after the end of the civil war embarked upon a five-year plan of communications development, Senegal is engaged in a specific plan for the Casamance province (south-east of the country).

The general, or complex, plans embrace, at least formally, the entire economy of the country.

According to the purpose of the plans, they fall into transitional plans, development plans, stabilization plans and long-term prognostic plans. It is necessary to note that this categorization is arbitrary in a way, as real plans may possess several functional goals, so one should judge by the prevailing objective.

In most of the African countries the first national plans were transitional, or intermediate economic programmes. As often as not, they encompassed a two- or three-year period. Formally their transitoriness had

a double sense: from colonial planning toward national planning, and from colonial development toward national development. That is why such plans included, on the one hand, completion of units that were commenced in the colonial period, on the other hand, they contemplated administrative and organizational-economic arrangements which, in the opinion of the plan-makers, were expected to create more favourable conditions for planning and economic development in future. Most of the transition plans of this kind were public investment programmes, as, for instance, the two-year plan in Morocco (1958-1959) and the first investment programme of the Algerian government (1963). Both were designed principally for the completion of units that were started before obtaining independence. In this project the Algerian government received assistance from France in conformity with the Evian agreements. That is why the branch structure of the investments in the first two Algerian state programmes (1963-1964) was similar to that of the Constantine plan. (Incidentally, many of the other pioneer national plans have had analogous features.) A number of the transition plans were general, i.e. they mapped out not only the public investment programme, but also indicators of private investments and the whole economic growth. Examples can be provided by the three-year plans in Tunisia (1962-1964) and Tanganyika (1961-1963).

Recently the continent developed a new variety of transitional plans which serve as a link between two development plans. Their chief purpose is to bring to a successful end the projects that were not accomplished in the period of the previous plan. That is why these transition plans consist principally in a programme of public investments, i.e. they are "partial". Thus, in Somalia, a three-year programme for 1968-1970 was elaborated so that the main targets of the first five-year plan (1962-1967) that were not realized during the period may be fulfilled. On Madagascar after the 1964-1968 five-year plan an "extraordinary" two-year programme for 1968-1969 was adopted with a similar orientation. One-year investment programme functioned in Libya after the 1963-1968 plan and in Zambia after the 1967-1970 four-year plan. In the United Arab Republic the 1965-1972 seven-year plan was broken up into two parts: three- and four-year periods. The three-year period had to see the completion of the principal units of the previous five-year plan.

The chief type of African plans are, nevertheless, the development plans. They usually embrace a four- to seven-year period. Their principal goal consists in stepping up the country's economic growth. It must be observed that this goal dominated also in the plans that were formally called "transition plans". At the start, that is in the end of the 50's at the start of 60's these were basically public investment programmes. Such development plans include, for instance, the five-year plans in Libya, Liberia and Somalia (1963-1967), the four-year in Gambia and a number of others. In the course of accumulating experience in plan-making and amplification of statistical data at the plan-makers' disposal, the complex development plans have gained the largest foothold on the continent. Only in Botswana, Swaziland, Gambia and Algeria national planning is confined principally to public investments. True enough, these plans contain supplements on the general development of the entire economy. The causes of "partial" planning preservation in the above-mentioned countries are very different. In Algeria they are connected with the process of gradual exclusion of the private sector from the leading branches of economy by the state, whereas in the other countries they seem to be accounted for by its immaturity and total lack of reliable data on its dimensions and development trends, that is in the first instance by state orientation toward construction of a socialist society, in the second - by an extraordinary economic backwardness.

Recently a number of African states made attempts to elaborate the so-called "rolling" development plans. The essence of these plans lies in the practice of annually revising the plans in operation and extending it for the next year. In Africa the first "rolling" plan was elaborated in Madagascar. In the course of the first five-year plan the government has annually been elaborating the four-year investment programme. In 1968 a similar three-year plan of public investments was adopted in the Ivory Coast.

Alongside the short- and medium-range development plans the majority of African states operated at various stages long-term (15 to 50 year) prognostic plans of economic development. These plans usually contain the task of doubling the absolute or average per capita gross product or the national income. Strictly speaking, they represent a calculation of time needed to achieve the doubling in case the country's economy increases by planned, or to be more exact, anticipated rates. Dahomey planned to double its national income in 20 years (1961-1980), Nigeria - in 10 years (1965-1974), the UAR - in 10 years (1961-1970), etc. Cameroon is expected to double its average per capita income in 20 years (1961-1980), Senegal - in 25 years (1961-1985), Tanzania and Uganda - in 15 years (1965-1980). In a number of countries long-term prognostic plans have additional purposes. Thus, the Congo (Kinshasa) government planned to raise the living standards of the population to the present-day level of the developed countries in the course of 10 five-year plans starting from 1965. Ethiopia's economy is expected to be changed from its backward and agrarian character into an up-to-date agrarian-industrial one within the period of 4 five-year plans (1963-1982), whereas the Ivory Coast planned to achieve a balanced economic development within 10 years (1961-1970).

The basic part of African long-term prognostic plans is the aggregate, or macroeconomic programme incorporating calculations of increase rates of the country's gross product and its constituents (usually in the cross-section of branches) as well as the amount of the necessary gross investments to achieve this. For instance, in Dahomey it is necessary to increase the growth rates of the gross product per annum by 6.25% and increase the sum total of investments from 4896 million African francs in 1959 to 28700 million in 1980 in order to double the average per capita income in the period of 1961-1980.⁶

In the Malagasy Republic the 1964-1973 ten-year plan envisaged an increase in the national income by 86% which required investment of 376 billion M. fr., i.e. 165 billion francs in the first, and 211 billion francs in the second five-year plan.⁷

Many long-term plans incorporate also a forecast of the changes in the branch structure of the national economy. These foretell an extensive decrease of agriculture as a portion of the gross domestic product and increase of the portion for manufacturing industry and social services.

Recently Africa gave rise to a new variety of economic plans, i.e. stabilization plans of development. Their content lies in the governmental enactments on the balance of the state budget, payments and trade, on curbing inflation and so on. In the second half of the 60's at least two countries - Ghana (1968-1970) and Morocco (1965-1967) had stabilization plans of development. The chief objective of the two-year plan in Ghana was to ensure an accelerated development of the economy by winding up "bottlenecks" and making a more extensive use of inner resources. Strictly speaking, it was a synthesis of development plans and stabilization plans.

Thus, the last decade on the African continent gave birth to a whole system of national economic plans. They are overwhelmingly development plans. We shall dwell in greater detail on their contents below.

Development plans were far from uniform in different countries and especially at the initial stages as far as their contents goes. The contents was basically determined by the statistical data at the disposal of the planners as well as the experience accumulated in planning. That is precisely because most of the first national plans were confined to programmes of public investments which in their turn was but a list of units planned to be built by various state organizations. Even the general plans in the beginning of the 60's encompassed the economy of the whole country only formally, the only difference from the "partial" state plans being the purely approximate sum of private investments which had to supplement the state programme with the view of ensuring the planned growth rates of the whole economy. In the ensuing general plans chapters related to economy as a whole and to its principal branches - agriculture, foreign trade, industry - were mapped out in greater detail.

A contemporary national development plan is a voluminous instrument of usually more than one book and laid down on several hundreds of pages. True enough, its greater part is a delineation of the country's economy in the incipient "basic" year as well as an assessment of the previous year's performance. The text of the plan proper occupies comparatively little space. In its turn, it consists of an introduction, which outlines the chief objectives and strategy of planned development, and a more or less detailed account of the particular chapters of the plan or the programme. By now a rather clear-cut structure of the general plan has become established in spite of the fact that the contents of its chapters differs considerably from country to country. Plans are elaborated in the greatest detail in the economically (and consequently statistically) developed countries: Tunisia, UAR, Morocco, and in lesser detail - in more backward countries.

Consequently, the development plans consist of several constituent parts-programmes. These are in the first place the aggregate, or macroeconomic programme, the general investment programme, the programme of public investments, the programme of private investments, the programme of production development in the principal kinds of national articles, the programme of employment and training of skilled national personnel and, finally, the programme of foreign trade promotion. Apart from these chapters, contemporary plans include specifications of governmental measures and trends which are qualified to contribute to the fulfilment of the plan targets. It should be pointed out that the above-mentioned chapters are not clear-cut enough or elaborated with equal penetration and detail in all the plans. Elsewhere the programme of public investments goes into particulars most of all, being the central link in the whole development plan.

National plans of development of African states are important political documents. They contain the main political principles and goals of the government. The three-year plan in Guinea (1961-1963) even served as the programme of the ruling party. In the countries which have rejected the capitalist road of development plans generally is the construction of socialist society. Such was, for example, the seven-year plan (1963-1969) in Ghana. "With this first Seven Year Plan text Ghana enters upon a period of economic reconstruction and development aimed at creating a socialist society ...".⁸ The second five-year plan in Tanzania was officially reported to be founded on the basic principles of the Arusha Declaration which proclaimed the chief goal of the government to be transition to

socialism. The construction of "African", "national" and other socialisms has been and is being aimed at in the plans of many countries: Tunisia, Kenya, Senegal and so on.

The majority of African plans specified as the principal economic target the attainment of higher rates of economic growth. Besides, a number of plans envisaged an increase in the living standards of the population (e.g. the 1963-1968 plan in Libya, the 1961-1964 plan in Senegal, the 1963-1968 plan in Ethiopia), a diversification of the economy (the first five-year plan of 1960-1964 in Morocco and Tanzania - 1963-1969 -, the 1967-1970 four-year plan in Zambia, the third 1969-1972 plan in Senegal). The chief economic target of some plans was to achieve economic independence (both plans in Mauritania, the last national programmes in Dahomey, Botswana and Morocco). True enough, this meant a reduction of external investment financing.

The first and most general part of the development plan is the macroeconomic programme. It contains the dynamics of all macroeconomic indices for the whole term of the plan: the gross domestic product and its constituents - funds of accumulation and consumption, sum total of gross and net investments and their share in the gross product, export-import of goods and services as well as the final product of the chief branches of economy (agriculture, industry, building industry, energetics, communication and post, commerce and finances, sphere of non-industrial services). In many countries of French-speaking Africa the gross domestic product is employed as the chief macroeconomic index.

The average annual rates of growth of the country's gross product constitute a major ingredient of the macroeconomic programme. Compared to the colonial plans the distinctive feature of African national plans lies in the fact that they comprise from the scratch much higher growth rates of the economy than those achieved in the previous years. Otherwise speaking, the African plans usually envisage a significant acceleration of economic growth in their countries. It was especially typical of the "first generation" of national plans which functioned in the beginning of the 60's. They usually planned 2 to 4 times higher rates of economic growth (in comparison with the indicators of the preceding years). The index of the three-year plan in Guinea equaled 16%, whereas in the end of the 50's the country's economic growth amounted only to an annual average of 4%.⁹ The ten-year plan in Tunisia (1961-1970) estimated this indicator at 6%, while the real indicator of the 50's equaled only 1.6%.

In subsequent plans the general rates of economic growth were mapped out with the view to the real development in the preceding plan. In consequence, they appeared more "moderate" than their predecessors, envisaging as they did a further acceleration of economic progress. In a number of countries, i.e. Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and so on, the second-stage national plans foresaw lower rates of increase in the gross product than their forerunners. For instance, the first five-year plan in Morocco (1960-1964) envisaged an average annual increase of economy by 6.2%, while the 1965-1967 three-year plan mapped out an increase by 3.7%. The second five-year plan in Tanzania (1969-1974) determined this indicator at 6.5%, whereas the first envisaged a 6.7% growth.

Table 1

Real and Planned Rates of Economic Growth
in African countries (in per cent)

Country	Planned period	Real (1955-1965)	Planned
Algeria	1970-1974	6.5 ^a	9.0
Kenya	1966-1970	3.4	6.3
Madagascar	1964-1968	2.0	4.9
Morocco	1965-1967	3.7	3.7
Tanzania	1969-1974	5.0 ^b	6.7
Togo	1966-1970	4.5	5.6
Uganda	1966-1970	3.2	6.3
Zambia	1967-1970	5.2	11.7

Note: a - 1965-1969; b - 1960-1969

Source: The Journal of Development Planning, No. 1, 1969, 159-160. p.

The macroeconomic programme contains also the growth rates indicators of the key branches of economy for the period of plan. The interrelation of these rates betrays the basic strategy of the plan: which branch of the economy should be developed to ensure a global economic progress. As demonstrated in the Table 2, most of the African plans of the 60's envisaged the highest growth rates for the manufacturing industry, and the lowest - for agriculture. The most significant gap in the growth rates of the two branches of African economy occurred in the "first generation" of the plans.

The five-year plan in Morocco determined an annual 6.1% increase for the manufacturing industry against an annual 3.5% for agriculture. The trebling (in comparison with the years preceding the plan) of the growth of the industrial development was mapped out by the ten-year plans in Sudan and Tunisia (1961-1970). Out of all African plans in the first half of the 60's only Ghana seems to have given priority to agriculture as a source of accumulation for the subsequent accelerated industrialization.

According to the estimates of the Federation of Agricultural Organizations (FAO), African planning has devoted more attention to the development of agriculture. Most of present-day plans envisaged higher growth rates than in the past. Thus, agriculture was chosen as the key branch in the 1966-1970 plan in Togo, in both five-year plans in Tanzania, in the three-year and five-year plans of Morocco. J. Nyerere, Tanzania's president, at the ruling party's (TANU) conference declared, that the industrialization was not a central element of the first plan, neither is it one in the second.¹⁰ True enough, as seen in the table 2, growth rates for industry were planned two times as high as those of agriculture in both five-year plans. A similar situation occurred in the last two plans in Morocco.

The new plans in Algeria, Kenya, Senegal and Zambia, for example, assigned even more space to industrial development than did their predecessors. In Algeria the industrial production between 1970-1973 should increase by 70%, while the agricultural production - only by 12.5%.¹¹

Table 2

Planned Growth Rates of African Economy and
Its Key Branches in Some Countries (in per cent)

Country	Period of plan	General rates	Agri-culture	Extract-ing industry	Manu-facturing industry	Trans-port, posts	Serv-ices
Gabon	1966-1970	7.2	3.7	11.5	10.5	— 6.2 —	—
Ivory Coast	1967-1970	7.5	4.1	7.4	20.9 ^a	7.7	7.9
Kenya	1966-1970	6.3	4.8	88.2	8.0	7.0	6.5
Madagascar	1964-1969	4.9	3.5	9.4 ^b	9.8	6.7	4.5 ^a
Senegal	1965-1968	6.1	5.6	— 10.5 ^b —	—	4.2	5.6
Tanzania	1964-1968	6.7	7.5 ^c	4.7	14.8	7.8	...
Tanzania	1969-1974	6.5	7.2 ^c	- 2.5	13.0	9.0	5.0
Togo	1966-1970	5.6	3.6	9.8	17.4 ^b	4.9	5.9
Uganda	1966-1970	6.3	4.3	6.6	10.1	8.3	7.8
Zambia	1967-1970	11.7	9.4	8.4	16.2	8.3	7.8

Note: a - including the building industry
b - including energetics
c - commodity production

Source: The Journal of Development Planning, No. 1, 1969, 159-160. p.

In most of the plans in the 60's the higher rates of industrial development compared with the rates of development in agriculture reflected a governmental strategy of growth with an emphasis on industry. This is the most characteristic feature of the majority of African national plans which makes them different from colonial planning.

"Industrialization, - it was pointed out in one of ECA documents - is a major objective in the development plans of most developing countries, since it is felt that development based on agriculture is uncertain and rather slow."¹²

Plans of some countries oriented their strategy on the development of extracting industry. In the opinions of the designers, it should have become the locomotive of the whole economic progress: it should have provided the necessary accumulations to other branches of economy and drawn them into a swifter development. Such were both four-year plans in Mauritania which gave priority to the development of iron ore and copper output, the five-year plan in Gabon which mapped out a higher growth rate for extracting than manufacturing industry (see Table 2). A similar strategy with an emphasis on oil and gas output can be found in Algerian planning as well as the current five-year plan in Botswana (1968-1973) which concentrated on the exploration of copper and nickel fields and diamond extraction. In an interview to *Le Monde* given on the 4th of April, 1968, H. Boumediene, president of Algeria's Revolutionary Council said, "The government had the alternative of developing the sectors that would create large employment opportunities, or, conversely, the branches of industry that create resources. We have chosen the latter road and given preference to oil, as it brings immediate incomes and procures accumulations for the country to invest, which protects us from external dependence."

It should be mentioned that this strategy did not bring the anticipated results in Mauritania. It was admitted by the Second Congress of the ruling party in 1968. The current (third) four-year plan (1970-1973) shifted the emphasis over to agriculture which, as was pointed out in its text, remains extremely backward in spite of one-sided progress in the extracting industry. The latter, being kept in the hands of foreign monopolies, obviously exerts a negligible stimulative influence on the rest of the economy. Nationalization of oil production in Algeria in the beginning of 1971 pursued the purpose of increasing the role of this branch in financing the development of other branches of the national economy.

One of the characteristic indicators for the macroeconomic programme of African plans is the ratio between the growth rates of the commodity and natural portions of the gross product. In this respect all the plans were unanimous in determining a swifter growth of the commodity production. Thus, the first five-year plan in Kenya fixed it at an average of 7.1% per annum against 3.2% of increase in natural production, the indicators in Tanzania were 8.5% against 2.1% respectively, in Uganda - 7.2% against 3.2% and so on.

An important part of the development plans under consideration is the ratio between the increase of exports and the entire national economy, for it characterizes the general strategy of planned development. The majority of African plans in the 60's determined higher growth rates for exports than for the entire gross product. For instance, such a situation occurs in 9 contemporary plans out of 14, information on which was released in FAO yearbook for 1970.¹³ The second five-year plan in Cameroon determined 5.8% of annual growth for the gross national product and 7.0% - for exports, the five-year plan in Dahomey fixed the indicators at 4.0% and 7.8% respectively, in Gabon - at 7.5% and 11.1%, in Ruanda - at 5.0% and 14.0% and so on (all of the four plans encompassed the years of 1966-1970). On the other hand, the current plans in Uganda and Senegal, the recent plans in Togo and Mauritania determined slower development rates for exports.

Taking into consideration the proportions of rate dynamics in different branches, one can infer the planned structural changes in the economy of the country. But the magnitude of these changes is influenced not only by the difference in rates, but also by the difference in the final proportion of the branches compared. That is why the planned changes in industry and agriculture are, as a rule, far less significant than one might have expected judging from the difference in the planned rates. Most of the plans in the 60's determined a comparatively small - within the limits of 2 to 5 per cent - decrease in the share of agriculture, and an even smaller increase of the share of manufacturing industry. The current five-year plan in Morocco even reduces the latter from 15.7% in 1968 to 15.6% in 1972. Only the plans of the UAR and Algeria seem to introduce considerable changes in the proportions between separate branches of national economy: increase in the share of industry, electroenergetics and transport at the expense of a decrease in the share of agriculture. Thus, in the current four-year plan of Algeria the share of industry should increase from 48.8% to 57.5%, of which the share of the manufacturing industry - from 24.7% to 26.5%, and of the oil and gas industries - from 24.1% to 31%.¹⁴

Elsewhere the plans incorporate a gradual increase in the share of the commodity part of the country's gross national product. The Kenyan five-year plan determined the increase from 75.6% in 1964 to 79.5% in 1970.¹⁵ Finally, the majority of the plans determined an increase in the share of exports. Thus, the five-year plan in Gabon envisaged that the

proportionate share of exports in the gross domestic product should increase from 38% in 1963 to 47% in 1970.¹⁶ Such a leap was connected chiefly with the planned growth of manganic ore production which is almost wholly exported from the country.

To ensure the growth rates according to the macroeconomic programme and the changes in the structure of the economy it is necessary to find investments. That is why the investment programmes - the general, governmental and private - are the central chapters of the whole complex development plan. The general investment programme is simply the sum of the two others. It comprises the sum total of gross and in some plans of the net investments, their apportionment according to branches between the state-owned and private sectors, as well as their sources (internal accumulation and external revenues). Many African plans of the 60's were characterized by the fact that alongside the regular, or financial investments they planned also the so-called labour investments which meant free and compulsory labour of the population in the construction of all sorts of local units: roads, wells, primary schools, etc.

A considerable increase in the rates of economic growth requires a corresponding increase in investments. The investment programmes of all African plans were characterized by a considerable increase in the planned sum total of investments in comparison with the real investments in the years preceding the plan. An especially large increase - by two or three times - was determined by the first national plans. The five-year plan in Morocco (1960-1964) determined that already in its first year the gross investments should increase 2.2 times - from 74 billion fr. to 160 billion fr. The amounts of planned investments kept growing from plan to plan. The first four-year plan in Senegal determined them at the amount of 23 billion Afr. fr. per annum, the second - at 30 billion, and the third - at 35.2 billion.¹⁷

Apportionment of aggregate investments according to the key branches of economy accounts for an important part of the entire development plan, as it represents the development of the planning strategy formulated in general outline in the macro-economic programme. True in an array of plans of the 60's this apportionment was missing, because their private investment programme comprised only an approximate general sum. In the second five-year plan of Tanzania, however, the branch apportionment of aggregate investments is missing in the default of such an apportionment for public investments.

The largest share of investments in the absolute majority of plans in the 60's accounted for the development of economic infrastructure: transports and communications, electroenergetics, water supply. From 25 to 50 per cent of planned investments were allotted for this sphere. For instance, in Guinea this share equalled 54.4% in a three-year plan, in the five-year plan of Madagascar - 37%, in the recent plans of Upper Volta and Togo - 30%, respectively, etc.¹⁸

Nevertheless, in many plans investment programmes gave top priority to industry. First and foremost one should mention here the five-year plan in Ghana which was expected to lay the foundations of the country's industrial development in future, all the Moroccan plans, both five-year plans in Tanzania, the last plans in Gabon and Nigeria. All these plans allotted from 20 to 40% of the investment programme. The five-year plan in Gabon (1966-1970) determined this share at 42.5%, but 29.7% of it was earmarked for the extracting industry.¹⁹

Only a few plans put agriculture in the lead in the investment programmes. Among them are the five-year plan in Upper Volta (1963-1967),

Dahomey and Ruanda (1966-1970), Uganda (1961-1966), Congo (Brazzaville) (1964-1968) and the third four-year plan in Senegal. The share of this branch in the aggregate investments varied from 55% in Congo to 29% in Senegal.²⁰

It should be mentioned that there exists a certain contradiction between the branch structure of many plans and the general development strategy as formulated in macroeconomic programmes. To take a particular instance, many plans declared "top priority" for agriculture. But only a few of them directed larger investments into agriculture than other branches. A point in case is first of all the Kenyan five-year plan which allotted 19.5% for agriculture and 28% - for economic infrastructure, the recent plan in Togo (1966-1970) - 20% and 30% respectively and a number of others. All the Moroccan plans (with the exception of the first five-year plan) pointed out as the chief objective the development and modernization of agriculture, but the principal place in investments was earmarked for industry: in the first five-year plan - 33%, in the three-year plan - 34% and in the second five-year plan - 28.8%. Such a contradiction in our opinion, occurs as a result of the propaganda loading that the most general chapters of African plans convey including the macroeconomic programme.

An important part of the aggregate investment programme is the apportionment of investments between state-owned and private sectors. In the absolute majority of African plans the share of the state-owned sector accounts for more than a half of aggregate investments. In the socialism-oriented countries, e.g. UAR, Tanzania, this reflects the general strategy of the state aimed at restricting and gradual ousting the private sector from the key branches of the national economy. Among the capitalist-oriented countries the largest share of the state in planned investments is manifest in all the backward countries of Tropical Africa. For instance, according to the first five-year plan in Sierra Leone it equalled 80%, in Togo (1966-1970) - 70%, in Uganda (1961-1966) - 77%, in Centran African Republic (1967-1970) - 73%. The four-year plan in Nigeria (1967-1970) allotted more than 90% of aggregate investments.²¹ In our opinion, this situation is a result of weakness of private sector in these countries.

In very few plans of the 60's private investments accounted for more than half of the aggregate investment programme. Among them one can mention the ten-year plan, the three-year plan and the first four-year plan in Tunisia, the first five-year plan in Morocco and the 1966-1970 plan in Gabon. In the latter the share of the private sector accounted for 61% of aggregate investments.²² It should be mentioned that in all countries the share of private investments in the recent plans was noticeably reduced in comparison with the beginning of the 60's. Thus, in the first five-year plan of Morocco it accounted for 52%, in the three-year plan - for 14%, and in the second five-year plan - for 33%.

Lastly, it is of interest to note the apportionment of the planned sum total of investments between external and internal sources of financing, because it clarifies the planned strategy. In the majority of the countries the plans envisaged ensuring the prevailing part of investments at the expense of external sources: official loans and subsidies, as well as imports of private capital. Their share, for example, accounted for 80% of aggregate investments in the five-year plan of Upper Volta (1963-1967), for 87% - in Gabon and for 65% in Chad (1966-1970).

Only in more advanced countries of the continent the prevailing part of the capital programme was expected to be ensured at the expense of internal accumulations. Here one can mention the UAR, Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya, Uganda and an array of other countries. One of the vital targets in some plans registered the necessity to reduce the country's de-

pendence on external sources of financing the investments. An example is the ten-year plan of Ivory Coast (1961-1970), which envisaged to attain full self-sufficiency in resources for investments. Increase in the role of internal accumulation lies at the roots of the five-year plan strategy in Tanzania.

Increase in the share of accumulated part of the gross domestic product at the expense of consumption is a characteristic feature of African plans. Thus, in the ten-year plan of Tunisia it was planned to increase it from 11.5% in the end-50's to 26.0% in the beginning of the 70's; in the first five-year plan of Morocco - from 13% to 20%, in the ten-year plan of the UAR - from 11% to 21%, etc. It should be pointed out that the subsequent plans everywhere determined more modest targets in this field, obviously taking into account the results of their predecessors' fulfilment.

In certain plans the total investment programme was not ensured even nominally by financing sources. Thus, in the four-year plan of the Central African Republic (1967-1970) they are indicated only for 43% of the aggregated investments, in the five-year plan of Somalia - for 48%, etc. In such cases it was implied that the missing means would be sought for already in the process of putting the investment programmes into reality.

The programme of public investments is one of the central and most elaborated chapters of general development plans. In some countries its elaboration remains the principal form of national planning. In many African plans this programme, besides investments, contained also pertaining current public expenditures. Thus, in the Kenyan first five-year plan the transferable and current payments accounted for some 20% of the capital programme of the government.

The governmental programmes of investments in all African plans of the 60's were characterized by a steady growth of their amounts both in comparison with the pre-plan index numbers and from plan to plan. In 1961/62 in Libya, for example, the governmental investments into development amounted to 8.1 million pound sterling, whereas the first five-year plan determined 169 million pounds for the 1963/64-1967/68 fiscal years, i.e. on the average almost 34 million annually.²³ This trend in the African plans was connected, on the one hand, with a general increase in the sum totals of capital expenditures, on the other - with the endeavour of national states to increase their role in the economic development of their countries, an endeavour which took shape everywhere in Africa irrespectively of the political persuasion of the governments.

Structurally the programme of public investments is a sum total of investment programmes of the central government, local authorities and autonomous state-owned enterprises (corporations, companies, banks, purchase and sales department, etc.). The key investor in every country is the central government, although the share of state-owned enterprises in some of them accounts for 30-40%. This share depends on the volume of state-owned sector and with its growth increases from plan to plan. Thus, in the first five-year plan in Morocco it accounted only for 5% of the entire public investment programme, in the three-year plan - for 13%, while in the current plan it is determined at 29%. Similar proportions can be observed in the Tanzanian five-year plans: in the first - 38%, in the second - 50%.

The government programme has at its roots a set of projects which are planned to be fulfilled by various public organizations in the course of the plan-period. The number of these projects and the degree of their elaboration and validity are very variegated in the plans of different countries. For instance, the industrialization plan of the UAR (1957-1962) consisted of 502 projects worth 330.5 million Egyptian pounds, while

the first five-year plan (1960-1964) - of 1400 projects. Yet the Guinean three-year plan incorporated 170 projects of various branches of the economy and administrative structure. Far from all of African plans of the past decade distribute the entire public investments envisaged in the plan between the concrete projects. Many of them incorporate from the scratch only a part of new units which accounts for 30-50% of the entire sum total of planned investments. The rest of the projects were supposed to be elaborated and carried out already in the process of execution of the plan. In most of the cases this situation occurs because the plan-makers are pressed for time, because the planning offices are weak or absent in the country and in the default of reliable sources of financing. In the five-year plan of Somalia, it was pointed out to this effect that concrete public projects would be elaborated only after spotting real sources to finance them. A similar approach was chosen also by the plan-designers of the Guinean five-year plan (1964-1968). In the current plan of Tanzania, however, the public programme was not loaded with projects with the view of rendering it flexible and adaptable to possible changes in the economic and financial standing of the country.

Yet virtually all African plans include an apportionment of public investments according to branches. Under the circumstances of only partial "filling out" of the latter by concrete projects this distribution may but pinpoint the trend of development and remain artificial. Still, it reflects the role in the planned development of the country's economy which the planners afford to public investments, i.e. its orientation and the class character of the country's whole economic policy.

In the absolute majority of African plans of the 60's the greatest share - from 30 to 60% - of the public investments was allotted for the economic infrastructure, mainly for transport and posts. Thus, in the Kenyan five-year plan it accounted for 36%, in Madagascar - for 58%, in Togo - for 48%, in Gabon - for 44%, etc.²⁴ All this is a reflection of the fact that the state's investment policy in countries of capitalist orientation is actually subjected to the interests of the development of private sector. This, for instance, was openly stated in a number of their plans: in Kenya, Nigeria (1962-1968) and others. Prevalence of infrastructural investments occurred also in some plans of the socialist-oriented countries, for example, in Tanzania. But it was accounted for the first place by the underdevelopment and backwardness of energetics, transport and posts, which hindered the development of the rest of economic branches.

On the whole, the planning policy of the states that have embarked upon a non-capitalist road of development is characterized by an emphasis on the development of branches of material production, i.e. industry and agriculture. In plans of the UAR and Algeria the greatest share of public investments is directed into industry. In the Algerian four-year plan (1970-1973) it accounted for 44%.²⁵ Among the countries of capitalist orientation only the current Moroccan five-year plan placed industrial production in the lead on the public investment programme where it accounts for 27% of aggregate investments.

Only in three or four plans - in the five-year plans of Dahomey (46%), in Congo (Erazzaville) (37%), in the four-year plan of Ivory Coast (1967-1970) (30%) and in the three-year plan of Morocco (35%) was the emphasis laid in the public investment programmes on agriculture.²⁶ But an analysis of agricultural planned expenditures brings to light the fact that the greatest portion was aimed at developing the agricultural infrastructure.

An analysis of investments programmes in the development plans of the countries with a capitalist orientation reveals that the state bears

the responsibility of improving the sphere of social services, i.e. the spheres that require large capital investments and bring little income, whereas the spheres of production, trade and non-productive services are reserved for private capital. In other words, quantitative prevalence notwithstanding, public investments are regarded here as auxiliary and complementary to the private investments into production. Thus, electroenergetics, transport and posts as well as irrigation should develop, as planned, by 80-100% at the expense of public investments, the agriculture - by 50-90% (but the main sphere of public investments' allocation is not production here either, but rendering services to private production), whereas in the sphere of trade, services and industry this share almost everywhere does not surpass 20-30%.

Plans of the countries with a socialist orientation are characterized by the fact that here the state possesses a preferential (or exclusive as is the case in Algeria and the UAR) right to develop industry, trade (chiefly wholesale) and, though in a smaller degree, agricultural production. In this aspect the evolution of Tanzanian plans was typical, the first two did not differ in any way from the plans of the neighbouring Kenya with regard to distribution and the role of public investments. The second five-year plan expelled the private capital in the planned development of economy from the forefront. According to this, only 16% of industrial investments will be accomplished by private investors during the five years. These will be in the main small and medium-size enterprises.

Financing the public investment programme in African plans consists of domestic and external sources. Domestic sources include home (chiefly budget) means and loans, external sources comprise loans and subsidies of more advanced countries. True, in many African plans of the 60's not all public investments were distributed between these sources, i.e. means were not ensured even formally. For instance, in the first five-year plan of Uganda about 40% of economic expenditures of the government were not provided by financial means: their exploration was delayed till the term of the plan.

In the majority of plans about 60-80% of public capital investment programme was expected to be procured from external financial incomings, and only the remainder - from domestic funds. For example, according to the plan of Gambia (1967/68-1970/71), the domestic funds were expected to provide only 10.4% of total capital funds, according to the plan of Somalia (1966-1970) - 5.3%.²⁷ Very few plans gave priority in financing to domestic accumulation: in the four-year plan of Ivory Coast it accounted for 61.5%, in the second five-year plan of Uganda - for 64.3% (in the first case it had to provide only 1/3), in Tanzania - for 60-65% (the first five-year plan here also gave priority to external financing which accounted for 73% of the aggregate public investments (in the Algerian four-year plan - about 35%).²⁸

External sources are in part loans and subsidies received by the start of the term of the plan, and agreements already concluded with respective donor-countries. The share of such real sources in the Kenyan five-year plan, for example, accounted for 36.7 million pounds sterling, i.e. for 34.5% of all planned external incomings and 23.2% of the whole public programme.²⁹ In the first Moroccan five-year plan they accounted for 32.9% of public investments, in the second - for 68.5%.³⁰ Thus, in most of the plans the dominating part of external assistance had to be sought during the term of their execution, and the national governments had no guarantees that they would be in a position to do it. Domestic sources of incomings were equally unreliable, both the budgetary and the loans.

The programme of private investments in the majority of general

development plans of African countries is complementary to the public programme. At the start of the 60's, it was simply a sum total of resources which had to be mobilized in the private sector as a complement to the public sources in order that the planned growth rates in the economy may be ensured. Contemporary plans incorporate a more elaborated private programme. It is designed independently on the basis of analysis of the tendencies in actual private investments in general and according to the key branches of the economy. True, in these cases most of the plans take into account only the so-called contemporary investments, i.e. investments of capitalist enterprises.

The majority of contemporary plans incorporate not only the aggregate sum of private investments, but also recommendations as to its apportionment according to branches. The prevalent portion is allotted to industry (an average of 35-70%), in some plans this sum is even greater. For instance, in the Moroccan three-year plan it accounted for 83.6%, in the five-year plan of Gabon 49% of the aggregate private investments were poured into the extracting industry and 33% - into the timber industry.³¹ Some of the plans steered the prevalent portion of private investments for building industry and for purchasing of transport means. The 1966-1970 plan of Togo allotted 57% for this purpose, whereas that of Morocco (1968-1972) allotted 40% only for housing construction.³²

Contemporary plans incorporate also an apportionment of private investments between domestic and external sources of financing. They all plan to ensure the prevalent portion - 55-70 per cent - at the expense of domestic accumulation; in some of the cases this share is even higher. Thus, the first plan of Tanzania determined it at 79%, while the second plan of Uganda - at 83%.³³ This points to one of the differences between private and public investment programmes - the latter always lays greater emphasis on the external sources of financing.

The programme of production increase in the key national items is one of the most important kinds in the African development plans. Properly speaking, it comprises several branch programmes, the chief of which are the agricultural and industrial programmes. In each of these sub-programmes, one can eventually point out firstly targets of production increase in the key items, and secondly, a system of measure with the help of which the state sets out to ensure this growth. They differ from the above chapters of African plans in that these programmes are itemized not only in value, but also by designation of articles. The latter holds good for separate articles produced.

African plans differ very much according to the degree of this chapter's elaboration. Thus, the Libyan 1963-1967 five-year plan did not contain itemized indicators as to the nature of goods, the first plan of Uganda foresaw the growth in production of only cotton and cotton goods. On the other hand, many contemporary plans elaborated with a view for the interbranch balance, e.g. Morocco, Tunisia, the UAR, Algeria, contain targets of production growth in many kinds of industrial, agricultural and other articles.

The agricultural sub-programme is the most important in the part of African plans under consideration. In the majority of them it contained first of all "targets" of production increase in the new kinds of export products (its diversification), and on the other hand - foodstuff production increase on the home market. Diversification of export goods in many contemporary plans implies not only harvest growth of new and perspective kinds of products, but also a restriction of outdated and traditional crops that have become less perspective because of unfavourable conjuncture on the world market. The second Tanzanian five-year plan, for example,

envisaged an acceleration of production rates of tea, tobacco, raw cotton, oil-bearing crops, cashew nuts as well as a decrease in the production of sisal, coffee, piretrum. Curtailing the coffee plantations was envisaged also in many other African plans of the 60's, for instance, in the ten-year plan of the Ivory Coast.

The first place among the agricultural products is occupied by cattle fodder, cereals and vegetables. In Eastern Africa special attention is being paid to increasing the sowing areas of maize and wheat, while in the Western Africa - of rice. A great many plans concentrate especially on the development of fishing.

The majority of plans point out as a basic means of increasing agricultural production the improvement of various public services for agricultural producers. These are the dissemination of improved seeds and seedlings, veterinary and medical aid, distribution of fertilizers and the more productive agricultural implements and methods of production, irrigation and amelioration, etc. In the current Mauritanian plan (1970-1973), the main emphasis is placed on the development of veterinary service, because cattle-breeding is the key branch in this country. Many plans, the Moroccan three-year plan and the Kenyan five-year plan included, contained targets of granting credits by public and semi-public financial establishments to agricultural producers. Lastly, a number of plans envisaged to carry out agrarian reforms of various degree: the ten-year plan in Sudan, the second Ethiopian plan and others.

In some countries important social and economic changes were planned as the primary goal of the agrarian programmes. In the two neighbouring countries - Kenya and Tanzania - they were of opposite character and political orientation. The Kenyan five-year plan concentrated in the sphere of agriculture on the "Kenyazation" of the White Plateau which was the most fertile region of the country where the plantations of European settlers prevailed. It was planned to purchase 1 million acres of land from these settlers and sell them to Africans into private property. Intensive stimulation of the growth of private African farmsteads was one of the principal goals of this plan. Both of the Tanzanian five-year plans on the contrary, accentuated the development of state-owned forms of production in agriculture: state-owned farms and cooperatives. It was especially characteristic of the second five-year plan which mapped out as one of the principal goals the extensive organization of "socialist villages".

The industrial programme in the majority of African plans of the 60's was considerably less detailed than the agricultural one. But the basic traits of its strategy were similar to those mentioned above. Most of the plans put forward the necessity to develop home production of the basic kinds of consumer goods with the view of decreasing their imports. A second major trend in the industrial programmes was the increase in the primary manufacturing of exported mineral and agricultural raw materials. For instance, in the 1966-1970 plan of the Central African Republic, the average growth of production in the manufacturing industry is by 87%, whereas the production of textiles is increased by 3.3 times, and the production of various chemical household goods - by 2 times. This plan envisaged the increase in the output of diamonds by 18.5% and in their production - by 5.2 times.³⁴

Consequently, two diverging strategies of growth were characteristic of the branch programmes in the African plans of the 60's: "substitution" of imports by domestic production and diversification (by way of introduction of new export crops and improvement in the degree of manufacturing the traditional kinds of raw materials) of exports. In our opinion, "import substitution" prevailed in the majority of the countries.

Of all the other chapters of the general development plans we should like to dwell on the external economic programme as it will permit to go still deeper down to the roots of planning strategy in the development of African states. This programme usually includes the plan of foreign trade and a draft of the country's payments balance in the first and second year of the plan's term. The plan of foreign trade is central, and it consists of export-import development programmes.

The export programme of all plans is marked by higher growth rates in the exports of the basic kinds of national products as compared with the pre-plan years. An intensive rise in exports is one of the chief trends in the planning strategy of African states. Most of them plan to achieve it at the expense of various new kinds of agricultural and mineral raw materials, and only in the countries most advanced economically an important role in the rise of exports is attributed to the products of manufacturing industry.

Concern over reduction of foreign trade deficit lies at the bottom of import programmes in most of the plans. That is why the planned growth rates of import are usually lower than those of export (see Table 3) and lower than those of pre-plan years. For instance, the seven-year plan of Ghana reduced the average growth rates of imports from 8.5% of pre-plan years to 4.8% in 1964 - 70, whereas exports were expected to increase by an annual 5.3% instead of 4.2 before the plan. Thus, the plan determined a reduction of foreign trade deficit. The first five-year plan in the UAR envisaged even an absolute reduction of the worth volume of the imported goods by an annual 1.2%, whereas in the end-50's it increased by an annual 7.2%. With the view of curbing imports, this plan - as many others - envisaged to introduce their quantitative restrictions chiefly on the imports of consumer goods. Only some of the plans determined outstripping growth rates for imports. These were the first plan of Kenya, the first and second plans of Uganda, the four-year plan of Zambia and the second five-year plans of Morocco and Tanzania.

Table 3

Planned Import-Export Growth Rates
in Some African Countries (%)

Country	Term of plan	Export	Import
Chad	1966-1970	5.3	2.1
Gabon	1966-1970	10.5	2.2
Ivory Coast	1967-1970	7.7	7.1
Kenya	1966-1970	3.9	7.0
Madagascar	1964-1968	6.4	4.2
Uganda	1966-1970	4.3	5.7
Zambia	1967-1970	6.7	13.3

Lastly, in designing the balance of payments all the African plans of the 60's envisaged an increase in the deficit of its current items both in comparison with the pre-plan years and during the term of the plan. The main source of discharging this deficit is derived from foreign loans and subsidies as well as direct private investments.

All the chapters of African plans in the 60's, with the exception

of the chapter on finance, contained essentially "targets" for the closing year of the planned term. Only the financial plans included an approximate apportionment of the sum total according to separate years, transitional included. So on the whole these plans did not elaborate an apportionment according to years which was indispensable for its execution, as it was made evident later.

Further on, most of the plans were elaborated for the country as a whole. In the federal states (Cameroon, Nigeria) they summed up the plans of separate provinces. In the recent times the African planners arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary to regionalize the national plan in order to better realize it, i.e. it is necessary to base the separate plans for regions and provinces on it. One of the first attempts at disintegrating a national plan in Africa was made in the second five-year plan of Tanzania which incorporates industrial development programmes for all major cities. The chief goal of these programmes is to disperse the new enterprises all over the country.

But a few countries have as yet made attempts at elaborating yearly plans. In Tunisia, for example, such a plan was elaborated only for 1966. The current five-year plans of Morocco and Tanzania were expected to start yearly planning, but by now only Tanzania prepared such a plan for 1970/71. The obstacle in the elaboration of yearly plans is obviously a famine for planners and financial resources.

Such is the essence and orientation of the development plans in Africa. They appear to represent rather intricate economic-statistical structures which reflect in a varying degree the peculiarities of the state's economic policy. In particular, an obvious distinction between the plans of socialist- and capitalist-oriented countries is revealed on the question of the position and role of the national state. Nevertheless, the great similarity between the plans of both groups of African countries is striking. Almost all of them are economic development plans, i.e. they all put the main emphasis on the increase in production of the key branches of the economy and on the acceleration of growth rates of the economy as a whole. The social reforms and enactments of the state's economic policy incorporated in the plans render means for attaining the planned rates of economic growth, while the planned structural progress in the economy (such as an accelerated development of import-replacing branches, diversification of exports, etc.) are consequences of this growth. Only in some plans (the seven-year plan of Ghana, both five-year plans of Tanzania, the plans of the UAR and Algeria, the Kenyan five-year plan of 1966-1970) the social reforms and structural progress in the economy were determined as the chief objective alongside with the accelerated economic development.

The great similarity of plans in countries of various political orientation can be accounted for by more reasons than one. The main reason, in our view, is the similarity of basic economic problems that all the states on the continent have to face. Another important reason is the common methodology and methods of planning which are to be discussed hereafter.

In conclusion of the general delineation of African plans let us point out another peculiarity. This is their frequent cancellation before the term of the plan expires. This fate befell every third national plan. Among the reason one can enumerate as the most widely-spread the crop failures in agriculture and sharp slumps in prices of the key goods of national export which reduced to nothing the calculations for the whole term of the plan. This fate befell, for instance, the first Moroccan five-year plan. In a great many countries plans were cancelled as a result of military putches and replacement of governments. Such were the seven-year plan in Ghana, the six-year plan in Nigeria and the ten-year plan in Sudan.

Moreover, practically all the plans that lived to see the end of their term underwent various changes and revisions because of serious changes in the economic and political conjuncture within the country and abroad. Should the economic conditions deteriorate, the plans were revised so that the chief indicators were decreased; in case of improvement the "targets" of the plan were increased. The Kenyan five-year plan of 1966-1970 was put forward as a result of revising the 1964-1970 seven-year plan. However, it was also revised, increased and decreased alternately, and ultimately cancelled before the five-year period expired. The Israeli aggression resulted in the revision of the five-year plan in the UAR and the adoption of the 1967-1970 three-year plan instead.

All this reveals the great peculiarity of the conditions in which the African plans are executed as well as the specific understanding of the nature of planning, the place and role of the plans themselves which the African planners and politicians live by.

By now a certain system of national planning bodies was established in Africa. In the majority of countries it consists of a central body which is incorporated in the government. Only recently were planning sections and departments established at the ministries in the regions and provinces as well. The central planning body is usually an independent ministry of planning or a department at the ministry of economic development. In some countries, for instance, in Tunisia, it falls into directive and executive organs. The directive organ is a planning committee which consists of managers of leading ministries and is headed by the President of state. The executive organ is the ministry or department of planning proper. It elaborates the development plans on the basis of political and economic directives formulated by the Planning Committee. The planning organs in Africa deal primarily with drawing up plans. It is beyond their authority to supervise the activities of other public (let alone private) organizations.

In the framework of executive national planning organs of the majority of African states the bulk of work in planning is done by specialists from the developed capitalist countries. The majority of African plans were elaborated by groups of experts from these countries visiting the African state for a short period of time (2-6 months). Apart from that, a considerable number of bourgeois economists and planners come to Africa and conclude working contracts with the national governments for employment in their planning organs. Only recently did these organs employ local specialists, but these are few in number all over Africa, and especially in Tropical Africa. The majority of them received training in the West. Only in the UAR, and recently also in Algeria, Tanzania and some other states a significant role in planning is played by specialists from socialist countries and by local specialists who obtained higher education in the socialist countries.

The elaboration of national development plans is a major form of economic assistance rendered by the capitalist countries to the states of the "third world". The organizational forms of this assistance were shaped in the end-50's. On the international level the leading role is played by the Institute of Economic Development at the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development which was founded in 1955. The majority of African plans of the 60's was drafted by the experts of this Institute. One should refer here, for instance, both plans of Kenya and Uganda, the three-year plan of Tanganyika, the ten-year plan of Sudan and one of the variants of the Algerian seven-year plan.

Besides, the governments of major imperialist states have established national organizations of experts-planners. An important channel of the American aid in this domain is the College of Administration at the

Harvard University. This college has helped to design the Nigerian six-year plan, the Liberian plans and an array of other African economic programmes.

The majority of the former French colonies has had the plans elaborated by special French state and semi-state design organisations. About ten organisations of the kind were functioning in the 60's. The greatest was the General Society of Research and Planning (SEGEP), the Society of Research in the Economic and Social Development (SEDES), the Society of Research and Social-Economic Reconstruction in Agriculture (SERESA) and the Society of Industrial Research and Area Management (SINAM). For example, the twenty-year plan-prognosis was prepared by SEGEP which has also elaborated the four-year plan of Dahomey, SINAM and SERES elaborated the first four-year plan of Senegal; the second five-year plan of Congo (Brazzaville) was prepared by SEDES, etc.

3. Guidelines of Methodology and Methods of African Planning

Thus, the bulk of work in African planning was up till now done by bourgeois specialists who, naturally, made use of the bourgeois methodology and methods of planning. This methodology and methods of planning under the circumstances of developing countries emerged after the World War II on the basis of a more general theory of bourgeois planning which is related to the state monopolistic regulation of economy in the advanced countries themselves. At the outset the experts from the advanced capitalist countries tried to apply the principles and methods of this programming to the elaboration of national plans in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but eventually specific principles and methods of planning were elaborated with regard to these countries which were but a further development of the methodology and methods of bourgeois planning.

As shown above, the bourgeois methodology lies at the roots of African programming from the very start. In our opinion, this is accounted for in the first place by the sustained economic dependence of African states on the developed capitalist countries in general and on their former parent states in particular, and in the second place, by an almost total lack of national staff of economists and planners. So, in order to better understand the whole African experience in planning, it is necessary to consider the basic traits of this methodology. This methodology has emerged only in the 50's as an independent trend in the bourgeois economic science. That is why in the 60's it was in the making and did not constitute a consummate and comprehensive theory. Up till now, the bourgeois methodology of planning in the developing countries has been made up of an aggregate of principles and approaches which are more or less shared by the majority of Western theoreticians and executives in this domain. Moreover, there exist divergent and even conflicting points of view on a great many of these principles.

All the bourgeois specialists fall in line on the point of view that the subject of national planning in the former colonies and semi-colonies is the national state. Planning itself is considered to be a variety of administrative and organizational-economic activity of the government. This activity is considered to be possible in any social-economic conditions in case of existence of planning and other economic state organs. Socialist planning is reckoned by bourgeois theoreticians as a variety of national planning in general and is put on the same level with economic programming in the advanced capitalist countries.

Summing it up, the general and conspicuous feature of bourgeois

theory of planning is the repudiation of the necessity of certain socio-economic prerequisites for a successful execution of plans. It is also worthy of mention that at the first stages any prerequisites and conditions were denied. It was precisely because of this that the "first generation" of African plans was designed with an assumption of its almost automatic fulfilment. Failures of the first national plans in Africa and other developing countries compelled the bourgeois theoreticians and practical planners to more thoroughly investigate the causes of these failures. In consequence it was universally recognized that certain auspicious conditions and prerequisites might be imperative to put the plans into reality. However, these conditions and prerequisites were referred in their entirety to the improvement of administrative and organizational-economic activity of the state, including an improvement in the methods of planning.

The object of national planning was also universally recognized to be the economic development of the country. Such an understanding of planning emerged in the bourgeois economic science under the direct influence of the theory and practice of socialist national economic planning. The assumption by bourgeois theoreticians of planning as a politically and socially neutral activity of the state of which mention was made above has contributed a great deal to the "borrowing".

It must be admitted that divergent points of view emerged from the very start on the subject-matter of plans. The most widely held view is represented by the school of "programmers" which considers the key element of the national development plan to be the concrete programmes of economic growth on the whole and of the separate sectors and branches of the economy. At the initial stages (the 50's and beginning of the 60's) the "programmers" constrained the essence of the national plans to the programmes of the kind. An expressly divergent approach was represented by the school of "politicians" which accentuated in the course of plan elaboration the definition of means and procedure of the state economic policy rendering assistance in the realization of economic growth programmes. Consequently, the state economic activity is considered here to be an important, but not the principal object of planning. To put it more precisely, it is considered to be the main means of implementing the economic programmes, so it should also be planned. In the recent years a certain rapprochement has come to pass between the two main bourgeois schools of planners on this point. Specifically, the "programmers" admitted the necessity to supplement the economic programmes by working out the instruments of the state economic activity, whereas the "politicians" began to attach more significance to the programmes of economic growth.

The wording of the objectives of national planning is an important methodological problem. The most widely spread point of view consists in the fact that the plans should define the most streamlined optimum road of economic development. Another point of view attracts the attention to the accelerated rates of this development. Many authors maintain that the acceleration of development should be linked with an optimization of its trends and means of supply. Finally, the most reactionary part of the bourgeois specialists consider that in the conditions of Africa the plans should pursue the goals of accelerating the private capitalist commodity production. As was made manifest in the previous chapter, the majority of African plans set out to achieve an accelerated economic development in the 60's as the main objective in terms of absolute and average per capita volumes of the gross product of the country as well as the production of the key branches of economy.

The proportion between the plan, i.e. the state economic activity, and the market is one of the major problems of the theory and practice of

national planning. The bourgeois science infers the necessity of planning from the fact that the mechanism of the market possesses certain deficiencies (proclivity to the irregular and unbalanced growth, disproportionate distribution of incomes, increase in unemployment, the ineffective utilization of resources, etc.) and fails to fulfil the functions of the general regulator of development. However, it does not mean that the plan is considered here as a substitute of the market, on the contrary, it is assigned for the amendment of the principal defects of the latter as a complement and assistance to it.

But all this does not imply that the plan here is considered to be a substitute of the market, on the contrary, its assignment is to correct the basic deficiencies of the latter, to complement and assist it. Certain bourgeois authors derive the necessity of planning in Africa and in other economically backward countries from the underdeveloped and backward market relations.³⁵ However, here as elsewhere plans must stimulate the growth of the market and serve as its regulator. François Perroux, one of the outstanding theoreticians of French planning, wrote that "the plan is an assistant of the market when the latter cannot cope with its functions".³⁶ It is precisely in the capacity of an assistant of the market and of the private sector that national plans are elaborated in the majority of African countries.

Proceeding from this understanding of the place and role of national plans in the economic development the bourgeois economic science designates its planning "indicative", i.e. advisory and non-compulsory for fulfilment contrasting it in this way to socialist planning which is compulsory in the majority of socialist states. Not only programmes concerning the private sector, but also public investment programmes are essentially called indicative. The indicative nature of the latter ensues logically from the auxiliary role which the bourgeois science assigns to the economic activity of the state as well as from the key role of the market mechanism in regulating the economic growth. Most of the African plans make every possible declaration of their indicative nature. Even in the framework of the state-owned sector no African country possessed any system of administrative or economic stimulation for the implementation of development programmes.

The logical consequence of the feature of bourgeois planning considered above is the basic methodological characteristic of elasticity, mobility, changeability, adaptability to the changing socio-economic and political conditions. The principle of elasticity presupposes periodical amendments and corrections in the short-term, medium-term and long-term plans-prognosis. The "rolling" plans whose essence consists in annual revisions, corrections and amendments of plan targets as well as in the extension of the plan term by a year with the addition of a new yearly programme represented a great discovery of bourgeois theoreticians who are called upon to implement the principle of elasticity. The rolling plans of the kind have not, however, taken root in Africa as yet.

The necessity of elastic development plans is usually accounted for by the impossibility to quite precisely forecast and foresee the future development, which in its turn is connected either with the functioning of some accidental factors that are beyond the state's control, or with the insufficient level of the prognostic science, or else with the ultimate inability for man to foresee his future.

The methodological principles of bourgeois planning considered above pertain equally to the plans of advanced capitalist and developing countries. Apart from these, there are some principles which are especially formulated for the sake of planning in the conditions of economic backwardness. The most important one pertains to the definition of the dimen-

sions of planned programmes. What is the way to determine the plan targets: proceeding from the demands or from the possibilities of the country? The bourgeois theory has no unanimous answer to this question. The most conservative part of theoreticians and practical planners in the countries of the "third world" support planning "by possibilities". A. Waterston writes, "Since the needs of less developed nations are almost limitless, the requirements approach hardly presents a practical solution to the problems. The resources approach is both more feasible and more realistic".³⁷ On the other hand, a large group of progressive bourgeois economists, especially the representatives of the developing countries proper, support planning with the view to "demands". Their basic argument is the necessity to liquidate the economic backwardness of former colonies and semi-colonies in the shortest time possible.

African planning of the 60's provides examples of plans elaborated on the basis of either approach. But on the whole, and especially in the beginning of the previous decade, planning with the view to demands prevailed. Besides, these demands in many countries were considered at their utmost and were mechanically severed from the real possibilities of their implementation. Recently African plans have become more "moderate", but this does not mean, however, that their planners have repudiated the principle of "demands". The matter merely is that the demands have come to be formulated in a more moderate manner.

One of the basic methodological problems of planning in the developing countries is the selection of the degree in which the plan should encompass the economy of the country. What kind of plans are to be made up: partial or general? The bourgeois economic science asserts that the general plans encompassing the entire economy are more adequate for the "third world" than the partial ones. "In the mixed-economy countries also, a basic credo took root early, writes A. Waterston. It holds that comprehensive development planning based on econometric techniques, is so superior to any other type that all countries, at all stages of development would be well advised to use it in preference to any other."³⁸ The extensive utilization of general plans in Africa was supported by ECA from the very beginning of its existence, or to be more precise, by the bourgeois specialists working there.³⁹ Such an approach to the selection of the type of the plans follows directly from the social-economic neutrality of bourgeois planning, from the repudiation of the necessity of peculiar, specific conditions and prerequisites for each type of planning.

The general plans of development prevailed in the practice of African planning from the very outset. The majority of national governments consider it a matter of prestige to work by this very type of plan. Only the extreme scarcity of national statistics depriving some governments of the possibility to make up a general development plan compels them to limit themselves to partial plans, i.e. public investment programmes.

These are the principal postulates of the bourgeois theory of planning which constituted the methodological basis of African planning in the 60's. This theory, much the same as the whole bourgeois economic planning, is a newborn trend in the bourgeois economic science. It has seen intensive development during the 60's. A number of its postulates have acquired profundity and were thoroughly elaborated as a result of this development, others have undergone noticeable changes. The principal changes were connected with the agency of three factors. Firstly, the bourgeois theory of planning has rapidly become an instrument of imperialist countries' neocolonial policy. It is precisely because of this that its evolution in this direction has brought forward a manifest vindication of capitalism and neocolonialism. Secondly, a number of changes emerged

here under the influence of accumulated experience in the elaboration and - what is still more important - implementation of national plans. Thirdly, a certain role was played by the emergence of the national staff of economists and planners who share as they do the main tenets of the bourgeois economic science, but reflect more thoroughly and correctly than most of the Western experts the pressing needs in the development of their countries. In the evolution of bourgeois theory of planning under consideration a significant role was also played in the developing countries by the intensification of interest in theory and practice of economic development in the socialist countries in general and in the theory and practice of socialist planning in particular. Two circumstances contributed to this: a decisive orientation of a number of young states toward the non-capitalist road of development and the constant failures in the entire "third world" to successfully implement the national plans mapped out with the help of Western methodology and Western specialists.

Notwithstanding the significance of the above-mentioned factors, the changes that the bourgeois methodology of planning has undergone are not qualitative. In most of the cases they were but some modifications of approaches and views which did not affect the foundations of bourgeois economic science. Still, they merit a few brief glimpses as they exert an ever greater influence on the practice of African planning.

The essential change consisted in the shifting of the centre of gravity from the elaboration of plans to the problems and principles of their implementation. It stands to reason, for these problems have been at the start the most vulnerable place in the bourgeois methodology of planning.

Certain changes have recently taken place also as regards the principal goals of development plans. At the outset the simple acceleration of economic growth rates prevailed among them. At present the bourgeois methodology suggests approaching this problem in a more differentiated manner, taking into consideration the concrete economic peculiarities of the country. Specifically, it is recommended to pay attention to the "bottlenecks" of economy hindering its development.⁴⁰ At this juncture certain social reforms aimed at stepping up the transformation of pre-capitalist social-economic forms into capitalist ones are recommended as the goals of plans. This transformation is now considered to be one of the crucial tasks of national planning.⁴¹ But here as elsewhere all the structural reforms are supposed to be a means of stepping up the economic growth which continues to be the principal goal of bourgeois plans.

Failures in the implementation of the first plans have directed the attention of bourgeois investigators to the examination of pre-requisites and favourable conditions of planning in Africa and other less developed countries. This attention, however, was concentrated on factors that are purely technical, administrative or external as regards the developing countries. The basic prerequisites of successful planning are now considered to be an all-embracing and efficient state administration, including the planning organs, highly qualified and conscientious public servants, an elaborated system of means and methods of state economic policy which is capable of directing the economy along the lines outlined in the plans, as well as the stability of world markets of raw materials. But it is not clear as yet what is the way to ensure all these conditions. That is why many authors express their belief in the fatal inevitability of failures in the implementation of national plans in the developing countries.

There exists also a viewpoint on planning as a continuous process. The conception of continuity was elaborated in general outline by J. Tinbergen. This characteristic feature, in his opinion, should come to

pass in a system of plans that exist simultaneously. The foundation of such a system should be long-range plans-prognoses encompassing 15-20 years. "The main purpose of a perspective plan, writes the author, is to provide a background to the shorter term plans, so that the problems that have to be solved over a very long period can be taken into account in planning over a shorter term".⁴² The next link consists in the medium-range plans embracing from 4 to 6 years. Their principal objective, in Tinbergen's opinion, is to specify the problems set out by the long-range forecasts and to elaborate the fundamental means and methods of their solution. The foundation of the whole pyramid of plans should be considered the yearly plans elaborated within the framework of medium-range programmes. Their basic purpose consists in drafting concrete targets of economic growth for one year and in elaborating the state's economic policy whose arsenal may be sufficient for the implementation of annual economic programmes. Thus, a yearly plan is assigned to be an instrument of practical execution of medium-range development plans. Another - equally important - function of yearly plans lies in introducing the necessary amendments and corrections into the medium-term plans in accordance with the changes in the political and economic climate in the country and abroad. They should be a means of rendering the medium-term plans flexible and elastic.

As shown in the above paragraph, the African planning did not shape such a system of plans. The long-term plans - programmes that have been elaborated at the beginning of the 60's have already lost all importance. Only some governments made attempts at elaborating yearly plans. The medium-range plans are the prevalent form. They are also the only plans in the majority of the countries.

The countries that have embarked on a non-capitalist road of development worked out a specific methodology of national planning. Its main peculiarity lies in the attempt to make a synthesis of the bourgeois and socialist approach to plan-making, as the purely bourgeois methodology was admitted to be unable to ensure the elaboration of the necessary plans. Specifically, in the socialist-oriented countries one of the most important features of socialist planning has gained recognition, i.e. the necessity to create adequate social-economic prerequisites in order to successfully fulfil the plans, namely the development of state-owned sector and cooperatives by all possible means as well as the ousting of the private sector from the key branches of national economy. Liquidation of external economic dependence is also considered to be one of the most important conditions of successful national planning in these countries. The contemporary plans are supposed to serve the purpose of creating such prerequisites. Moreover, the progressive social reforms that will ultimately result in the construction of a socialist society should be one of the main goals of these plans. Thus, national plans are considered here not only as plans for liquidation of economic backwardness, but also plans of building socialism.

In some countries of socialist orientation a comprehension of their limitations began to evolve in the conditions of indicative planning. H. Boumediene, President of Algeria's Revolutionary Council, for instance, declared in one of his speeches, "Our planning has not been compulsory. This is its weakness".⁴³

Nevertheless, many of the above-mentioned principles of bourgeois methodology are made use of in the course of planning in all these countries. Specifically, the movement towards the implementation of compulsory plans is linked with statements of the necessity to preserve their elasticity. This is characteristic for example, of the second five-year plan in Tanzania.

The bourgeois economic science has also worked out the methods, i.e. a set of accounting modes and patterns to be used in the elaboration

of national plans in the developing countries. In their entity these methods are assigned for the general plans. It is recommended to elaborate the partial plans making use of the separate departments of the general methods that are consonant with their character and subject-matter. All the bourgeois theoreticians and practical planners do not hold good every means of the general methods. Many are a disputed issue up till now. Further on, we shall dwell on the methodological recommendations which are shared by the majority of practical planners and are the most popular in African planning.

For a long time, the general approach to the elaboration of a plan was a matter of dispute. The problem was how to go about it: work out all its principal chapters at a time, simultaneously or piecemeal, step by step. At the outset, many bourgeois theoreticians of planning gave countenance to the former approach which, to the best of their knowledge, ensured a harmony of all parts of the plan and its optimum nature in general. It was expected to make full use of either a complete and complex mathematical model or an interrelated system of simpler models to determine simultaneously all the basic parameters and programmes of the general plan.

However, the practice of planning in the developing countries have soon made manifest that the "integrated" method of elaborating plans is unworkable. It turned out to be too intricate and required too much reliable statistical information. Consequently, the method of elaborating the plan piecemeal and step by step has become the most popular among the theoreticians and practical planners. The essence of this method lies in elaborating the various departments of the plan independently by means of a particular method and eventually coalescing them into a uniform plan. However, the champions of this approach have also split into two trends from the start: the first suggested that the process of plan calculations should start from "the bottom up", i.e. from the elaboration of separate projects and wind up with a macroeconomic programme. Yet the majority of bourgeois theoreticians and practical planners thought it proper to begin working out the plan "from the top", embarking from its macroeconomic part and closing with individual projects and partial programmes. This "programme" approach is now the most popular in the practice of planning. J. Tinbergen is considered to be its author; he has broken up planning into three basic stages: "macrophase", "middle phase" and "microphase".

The macroeconomic programme is worked out at the first stage. At the second stage it is disintegrated into separate programmes of sectors and branches, whereas at the third stage the separate programmes are "filled up" with concrete projects.⁴⁴

The most widespread approach to the elaboration of various programmes in the bourgeois economic science is the application of econometric methods and models of different proportions and complexity. At present each key programme of the general plan has a whole set of models and methods whose application is entirely dependent on the availability of statistical data, the number and qualifications of the planners and the computational technique that is at their disposal, i.e. on organizational and technical-economic factors.

Thus, it is usually recommended to make use of the macroeconomic production functions of Harold-Domar and Cobb-Douglas for the macrophase as well as the variegated macroeconomic linear models elaborated on their basis.⁴⁵ The disintegration of the macroprogramme and the elaboration of particular programmes may be performed with the help of an entire system of procedures and methods of various complexity. The simplest one which is recommended to be used in case of dire scarcity of statistical data is the mere linear-regressional extrapolation of temporal trends.

4. Some Results Attained in the Implementation of African Plans

Before entering into the details of an analysis concerning the basic results attained in the implementation of the economic development plans in the African states, it is necessary to dwell on the contents of the notion "implementation of the plan" itself. When and under which circumstances is it possible to affirm that the plan is implemented, respectively not implemented. Keeping in view the triviality of this question, the answer might be totally different. In the bourgeois economic literature there are on this points of view which principally differ from the approach to the plans in the socialist countries. Moreover, in the West, as well as in the East there are discussions between the planning theoreticians and practitioners on the basic criteria and indices concerning the implementation of plans.

The central point of these discussions is the role of comparison of the plans' indices and the actual totals of development during the general evaluation of the place and role of plans in the economic development. In the bourgeois economic literature, as a rule, the importance and necessity of such comparisons are rejected. The basic argument usually mentioned in such cases is that in the conditions of the developing countries they are unreal, considering the unsteadiness of the economic development in these countries and a multitude of factors which influence it, these being beyond the effective control and regulation of the state.⁵⁵ Thus, into the formulation of the criteria concerning the assessment of the plans' implementation willy-nilly the results of the implementation itself are included. More exactly, these results influence the formulation of the criteria.

A more prevailing point of view among the Western scientists has it that the basic criterion at the assessment of the results attained by the development plan is the comparison of actual rates of the economic growth during the plan's period and during the pre-plan years. Are these rates higher than in the past and if the actual investments etc. present themselves as larger than during an analogic number of pre-plan years, so this is considered as sufficient for a positive assessment of the plan in its totality.⁵⁶ On the other hand, the point of view is widely spread in accordance to which such a criterion is the efficiency of the regulation and stimulation of the growth in the whole economy of the country and, in particular, in its private sector.⁵⁷ Thus, if the first approach effectively takes the assessment of the plan's efficiency and its role in the economic development to the assessment of the development itself, the second one will lead to the assessment of the state's economic activity in course. Both approaches could be legitimate if in the first case the plan of economic development would be the single factor of this development, in the second case, if the plan would be related only to the state's economic policy. In fact, however, both proposals seem to be incorrect. An enormous number of political and economic, internal and external factors, among which the plan itself could be at the very best one of them, influence the course of economic growth in Africa and in the other developing countries. On the other hand, as it was demonstrated in the Chapter 2, the African plans concern first of all the economic growth, they are not connected to the state's economic policy. Thus, both points of view on the basic criterion of assessment concerning the implementation of plans spread in the bourgeois economic literature, do not take account of the specific features of the social-economic planning of a given type which is expanded in Africa.

We are of the opinion that the central point of this assessment is precisely the comparison of the planning indices with the actually attain-

preceded by a two-year-long investigation of the economic position in Senegal. The result of the investigation was a survey consisting of two volumes on the general characteristics of the country's economy in 1959, of ten volumes on the regional analysis and of three volumes of various supplements (an analysis of the position of industry, health services, education as well as charts and maps). At the preparatory stage of working out the Tunisian ten-year plan (1960-1970) special attention was concentrated on the collection and processing of the more specific statistical information. To give an example, the most important tables of national economic accounts for 1957 were elaborated, they composed the temporal rows (1950-1959) of the global economic indicators, the current inter-branch balance comprising 122 sectors was worked out, etc.

This vast and long work on the preparation of statistical material notwithstanding, many basic parameters of the national economy remained unknown at the outset of the work on the composition of the first plans. In Tropical Africa, for example, no information was available even on the number and structure of population (Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mauritania, Ethiopia), on the volume of the national income (Nigeria, Mauritania), on the structure of making use of the gross domestic product (Eastern Africa). The agricultural statistics in the African countries was especially fragmentary and poor. One of the first surveys of African planning read, "National accounts are mostly in an embryonic stage in Africa and rarely go beyond estimates of national income and (at times) capital formation. The reliability of these estimates is another problem again. The weight of the problem may vary from country to country; in one country there may be no population census or a reliable estimate while in another the difficulty may be the relatively more sophisticated one of inadequate data on the savings and consumption pattern."⁴⁷ The text of Sierra Leone's ten-year plan also spelled out that a certain amount of vitally important information, specifically, on the number and structure of the population, the proportion of its active members, the number of school-age children, etc., the territory of cultivated land, the number and structure of farms, the general geological map of the country, the volume of the gross national product, etc. was absent at the preparation of the present plan.⁴⁸

Under the circumstances, the planners had to make a choice of either restricting themselves to the present statistical data and elaborating a plan of utmost simplicity or search for, make calculations, borrow and even invent the missing indices in the process of planning. The experts were urged to take the second choice by the ambitious striving of the national government to have a general plan of national development at all costs. The procedure of elaborating the plan under the circumstances of utmost scantiness and disjunction of the statistical data was ridiculed in A. Lewis' monograph. As he states, in the poor countries an econometric is compelled to invent many important indices. He contemplates, 'the elasticity of the demand for food-stuffs is impossible to measure. Let us consider it to be equal to 0.8'. Or, 'we do not know the proportion of iron in ore. Let us suggest that it be 48%'. Or, 'it is probable that the maximum rate of accumulation should be equal 0.2'.⁴⁹ The majority of the general plans in Africa in the first half of the 60's was based on exactly this kind of statistical data.

Partial plans-programmes were elaborated everywhere, and especially at the outset, by resorting to the "project" method, i.e. by a simple summary of the projects proposed by different state institutions. In one of the surveys on planning issued by the ECA it was pointed out that plans are often an assemblage of the projects of the public sector, especially in

the sphere of infrastructure, for which quantitative and qualitative information was available at that time.⁵⁰ The first three-year plan of Tanganyika was a plan of exactly this kind. The development plan of Tanganyika was not a general plan, but an assemblage of projects. It is related to the state-owned sector and will be carried out by state organs. The plan is only tangentially related to the private sector. In Tanganyika no attempts were made to follow the programme procedure which proceeds from the elaboration of the general indices of the gross domestic product, consumption, imports and exports, investments, etc.⁵¹ A similar approach was used in the composition of the first plans in many other countries of Tropical Africa, including the five-year plan of Somalia (1963-1967).

The procedure of the elaboration of the first general plans was also very simple and was essentially reduced to two operations (outside the bounds of the public programme): an arbitrary - by enactments of the national government - establishment of the volume and tendencies of growth of the gross product and other key macroeconomic indices as well as a simple extrapolation of the dynamics of other indices. Harmonization of the different indices and programmes was carried out iteratively, by the method of "trials and errors". According to the estimation of J. Tinbergen the majority of the national plans in the "third world" in the first half of the 60's was elaborated in this way.⁵²

The "programming" approach was implemented at the outset only in the countries with the richest statistical data at the disposal and possessing at that time a staff of national economists, namely in Morocco and Tunisia. In the UAR the first five-year plan was elaborated by way of combining "project" and "programming" procedures. It consisted in collecting the propositions of the ministries and autonomous state organizations in the central planning organ. There they were subjected to critical analysis from the aspect of the general tendencies and perspectives of the country's economic development determined with the help of a macroeconomic model, the "expenditure-output" balance and national economic accounts. The redacted and corrected propositions of the ministries and companies were returned to them to be further elaborated and transformed into branch programmes as well as to give definitions of the means and methods of putting these programmes into reality.⁵³

However, the "programming" method has gradually gained the central place in the planning of the majority of African states. But this method is very different from the procedure delineated in the bourgeois books on planning first of all because of the use of very simple and primitive methods and procedures of calculations. Further on, the general framework of the plan is based in many cases on the decrees of national governments which formulate not only the strategic goals and targets of planned development, but also define the basic quantitative parameters introduced exogenously into the text of the plan in the capacity of management parameters for other calculatory indicators. The high proportion of such parameters defined exogenously is the basic methodological feature of the whole African planning.

Let us dwell on some other peculiarities of implementing the "programming" method of plan calculations in Africa in the 60's.

The macroeconomic programme is calculated in most of the cases on the basis of Harrod-Domar function. The planned rates of economic growth were usually considered to be the exogenous quantity, whereas the volume of the necessary investments was considered to be the unknown quantity. Only in the first plans which proceeded "from the possibilities" (the Ugandan first five-year plan, the Nigerian six-year plan) was the opposite target kept in mind: on the basis of the already defined resources

they calculated the growth rates of the gross national product. Very few national plans made use up to now of linear macroeconomic models. They are in the first place the plans of the UAR, Tunisia and both five-year plans of Morocco.

The disintegration of the macroprogramme, or to put it more precisely, the elaboration of independent partial programmes (they are brought in touch with the macroprogramme by the method of "trials and errors" only later on) was carried out in the majority of plans by means of relatively simple and approximate procedures: simple extrapolation, expert estimations and political decrees. The inter-branch balance and the system of national economic accounts was used only in some of them. Only in the UAR, Tunisia and Morocco were both procedures used for plan calculations.

The proportions and structure of inter-branch balances used up till now in African planning have been very different. Thus, in case of the three- and ten-year plans in Tunisia a table with 22 columns was used, in case of the Moroccan first five-year plan - with 30 columns, in Mali - with 8. In the Zambian four-year plan a matrix of inter-branch relations was used with 42 columns, in the five-year plan of Uganda - with 10. The distinctive feature of employing the inter-branch balance in Africa is the fact that it is done piecemeal, i.e. the size of each component of the gross production in every sector is situated independently, while the table of "expenditure-output" is used as a form of putting in order all the partial calculations and reducing them to a general balanced sum total. The partial calculations are carried out by the same approximate methods described above. Even the intermediary industrial consumption is far from everywhere a solution of the whole matrix of technical coefficients for the simple reason that in the majority of the cells in the matrix they are absent, and in their stead figure the independently calculated proportions of production in their value expression.

Much greater popularity in the African planning is enjoyed by the system of national economic accounts (in general of the French type). However, the number of accounts employed in the elaboration of different plans varies very much. In most of the cases the planners confined themselves to the account of branch distribution of the gross domestic product (or the production of the French variant) and to two accounts of the state. In the countries of more advanced national statistics, the system of national accounts was naturally employed in a greater extent. For instance, at the elaboration of the Tunisian ten-year plan three accounts of enterprises were elaborated for the starting and final years of the plan period (of production, distribution and investments), two accounts for both the state and households (of distribution and investments), and one - for external economic operations. Besides, the general chart of the financial streams in the economy of the country was composed.⁵⁴

These are the basic peculiarities of the implementation of the bourgeois methods in the elaboration of national plans of development in the African countries in the 60's.

In the recent years the interest of the African planners is increasingly attracted by the methods of elaborating socialist plans of national economy. In the countries which have embarked on the non-capitalist road of development some of them have become popular. These are mostly the value and material balances of production and consumption of some key products of the national economy.

The countries which have accumulated a certain amount of experience in working out plans and possessing a richer storehouse of statistical data may make use of "expenditure-output" charts of different complexity, of the system of national accounts, special partial models (of foreign trade, formation and training of personnel, etc.) and even of the simple models of linear programming. The latter are suggested for streamlining the particular programmes or the plan in general.

The contemporary bourgeois methodology of planning devotes much attention to the elaboration of the public investment programme. This is usually recommended to achieve by means of the iterative method of "trials and errors". The first stage of this process amounts to the definition of the general dimensions of the future public revenues, the second to a forecast of the dynamics of the current expenditure. At the second stage it is recommended to determine the possible influence of the investment programme on their total proportions. The investment programme proper, or, to put it more precisely, the sum total of planned investments is determined by means of this method exonerously, either on the basis of the previous distribution of the sum total of investments between the private and state-owned sectors or by way of summarizing the projects put forward by different ministries and other state economic organizations. The main goal of calculatory iterations is to secure the necessary means for investments either by cuts in the current expenditures or by a corresponding increase in the calculated public revenues, or else by definition of new domestic and external sources of financing.

The principal accounting procedure recommended by the bourgeois economic science for the elaboration of national plans in the developing countries is a certain form of extrapolation of the previous tendencies in the economic development. The simplest one is performed by means of mathematical-statistical calculations, the more complex ones are carried out by means of various econometric models, linear programming excluded. An important place is also assigned to expert estimations and political decisions. Both of these methods of planning calculations are recommended to be employed at the initial stages of planning when the conditions for the formal procedures to be used are absent or when such procedures are not elaborated as yet.

However, the practice of African planning does not exhaust the procedures and methods of plan calculations elaborated by the bourgeois economic science. This rift was especially conspicuous at the beginning of the 60's when "the first generation" of African plans were in the making. The practical character of economic planning, as points out one of the governmental documents in Tanganyika,⁴⁶ has very little in common or is not at all linked with the theoretical work on the elegant models in the statistical laboratories of the more advanced countries. The basic cause of this lies in the scarcity of the necessary statistical information in the young African states and of the experience in practical planning activity of the foreign and national economists. A great role in the deviation of practical methods of planning from the recommendations of the bourgeois economic science was also played and continues to be played by the direct influence of the governmental policy on the practice of planning.

The whole process of planning in Africa falls into two independent stages: collection and preparation of the necessary economic and statistical information and the wording of the instrument of the plan. The first stage was especially important at the initial stages of planning. The majority of young states did not possess national statistics; the composition of the first national plan began, as a rule, by assembling one.

For instance, the first four-year plan of Senegal (1961-1964) was

ed results. This follows from the nature itself of a given plan, respectively programme, during the assessment of their role and place in the implementation of the planned processes. Another question is what would be the character and the size of such comparisons. By the way let us say that among the practitioners of the African planning apparently those are prevailing who consider such a comparison as the principal index of the results attained in the implementation of the plans. This is also testified by the fact that in the majority of the official publications, as well as in the surveys concerning the African planning, published in the Western periodicals, practically the whole analysis concerning the implementation of the plans leads precisely to this comparison.

The general assessment concerning the implementation of the national plan and of its role in the social-economic development of the country must not, however, in our opinion, be drafted from the simple arithmetic comparison of the plans' indices with the actual results, as their coincidence and not-coincidence could in effect be the result of a multitude of chances. It seems to be far more important to observe the coincidence of the general direction (trend) of the economy's development in its whole and of its most important branches and sectors, as well as of the stages of re-production with the trends formulated in the plan. Such a quality assessment is possible, however, only on the basis of simple qualitative comparisons mentioned here above. Moreover, only a determined "percentage of the plan's implementation" and even more precisely the total amount of these percentages (qualitative determination) enable us to judge whether the given plan played a certain positive role in the development of the country's economy (i.e. on its qualitative determination).

Further on we dwell on the results of the implementation of the African plans which existed - however only formally - till the end of the originally planned delays, on the basis of the data being at our disposal. We have to stipulate that this represents only the half of the national development plans existing in the sixties on the continent. Considering even its incompleteness, however, this analysis could offer a material enabling an assessment of the African planning as a whole.

An even more penetrating attention is paid during the assessment of the results attained in the implementation of the plan by the African designers to the investment programmes and in particular, to the state's programme of investments. As to the implementation results of the sections within the general development plans, there are above all data in the official African and other publications.⁵⁸

Let us dwell first of all on the basic regularities in the implementation of the state's investment programme. Even the most general knowledge of the data shows that in the majority of countries the actual public investments prove to be every time at the assembling of results less than the envisaged ones in the plans. In Tunisia, Morocco, the UAR, Senegal, Tanzania and many other countries all the plans implemented there were not completely realized in this field. The percentage of the general nominal implementation of the state's investment programme (i.e. the relation of the actual investments to the planned ones) varied from less than 50 per cent in the five-year plan of Somalia (1963-1967) to 97% in the first five-year plan of the UAR (1960-1964). In the majority of cases it proved to be 70 to 80 per cent.

In some countries, among others, in the period of certain plans the actual public investments surpassed as to their general amount the planned ones. Here belong the three-year plans in Guinea (1961-1963), the five-year plan in Libya (1963-1967), the first plan in Uganda (1961-

1966), the two first plans in Ethiopia and the four-year plan in Zambia (1967-1970). The degree of over-implementation was also very diverse - from 15 per cent in the plans of Guinea to nearly 100 per cent in the plans of Libya.

The purely qualitative comparison, however, shows serious differences between the plan and reality, if we begin to compare the planned and the actual branch-structure of the public capital expenditures. Disregarding the enough mixed picture given here by the African plans and the official statistics, it is rather easy to reveal the almost everywhere existing regularity: the degree of implementation of the plan as to the investments is considerably higher in the field of the administrative and economic infrastructure and lower for the agricultural and industrial investments. In consequence, the share of the first two spheres of allocations in the public investments in actuality constantly surpass the planned ones, however, in industry and agriculture - they are lower. For instance, in the three-year plan of Guinea, besides a general implementation of the investment programmes of 115 per cent, in the field of transport and telecommunication it proved to be implemented to 185 per cent, but in agriculture only to 50.5 per cent. As a result, the share of the latter ones within the general sum of the public investments proved to be equal to 57% instead of 36% in accordance with the plan, whereas in agriculture and industry it was 26% instead of 32%. In the first five-year plan of Morocco the general percentage of implementation of the state programme was equal to 68%, however, as to the administrative construction it was 84%, in agriculture 59% etc.

And so, considering their overall size and their branch structure, the actual state investments differ in a considerable way from the planned ones. The differences are even larger at the level of the diverse branches of industry, agriculture and other large sectors of the economy. In some of these the planned forecasts very frequently are over-implemented up to 1.5 to 2 times, whereas in others the results attain 20 to 30% or sometimes even less. On such a basis the coincidence of the actual investments with the planned amounts looks like a simple hazard.

On the basis of the above surveyed differences between the planned and the actual public investments it can be affirmed that their real contents, i.e. the list of the concrete units and measures, have as a rule few in common with each other. The facts prove that, firstly, generally only a small part of the planned projects and measures are really implemented. Moreover, this implementation is strongly delayed and far surpasses the term of the plan. It is precisely for this reason that many governments in the second half of the 60's got accustomed to prolong this term by one to two years. Let us mention the example of the second five-year plan of the UAR which was later on transformed into a seven-year plan, the transformation of the five-year plan of Libya into a six-year plan etc. An other issue was the appearance on the continent of a multitude of special short-term transitional plans whose main task was to execute and to bring to an end the previous medium-term plan what was already mentioned in the Chapter 2.

Secondly, a characteristic feature of the public investment activity in all the African countries is the high share of the non-plan projects. At a time when the planned measures are not implemented, others, which not only miss in the plan, but partly contradict its basic objective forecasts, are carried out. Apparently a great part of the non-plan units is linked to the aims of many circumstances. First of all the public programmes in the majority of the plans are not "filled out" entirely at the very beginning

by concrete contents, i.e. by a complete list of projects to be implemented. During the compilation of this list, already in the period of the plan, the ministries and autonomous public organizations feel themselves only a little responsible for the general forecasts of the plan. On the other hand, the medium-term African plan elaborated only in its most general form really cannot serve as a guideline for the practical investment activity.

The plan projects themselves, furtheron, only rarely represent, if included into the plan, more than the most general trend of their characteristic features including only an orientation sum for the investments. Therefore, during their further elaboration, already in the period of the plan, a lot of difficulties appear up to the rejection of the practical implementation. Finally, in the case of many planned measures the necessary financial, manpower and other resources are simply not at disposal, so that they are included into the plan, as a rule, without being guaranteed by these resources, in the simple hope that lateron they will be found in the country or beyond its frontiers. However, such a possibility, as it will be proved lateron, is far not always realized in practice, and the projects remain so on paper. In the meanwhile for numerous non-plan projects, especially in the field of the infrastructure, the resources often are found and this is connected with the particularities of the practical investment activity of the ministries and autonomous organizations, but also with a determined policy of the imperialist powers in offering to the African states an economic "assistance".

The quantitative (according to the general sum) and the qualitative (according to the branch structure of this sum and to the selection of executed measures) diversity between the public investment programmes and the actual investments of the ministries and the autonomous state organizations is also enhanced by the fact that the implementation of plan and non-plan projects is ensured in general at higher expenses than envisaged. This is first of all connected to their bad-quality technical-economic elaboration, as well as to the steady increase of prices being in course at a certain degree in all African states. The constant underestimation of the expenses related to the units included into the plans, on the one hand, is a result of the shortage and miscalculations of the project organizations, and on the other hand, it is linked to the general lack of the necessary and authentic statistic data because of the general economic backwardness of the continent, therefore in these conditions any project calculations will be inexact. Besides the broad share of the non-plan units this explains also why, in certain cases, the public investment programmes are nominally implemented, respectively even overimplemented, but in their real contents they remain not implemented. It is exactly for these two reasons that the five-year programme of Libya, which was, as to its general sum of public investments, over-implemented in 1967/68 two times, had to be delayed for another year in order to finish all primary and started units included in it. An analogic situation occurred in Zambia: disregarding the formal over-implementation of the four-year plan in the field of the public investments, the plan had to be delayed for the further budget year of 1969/70.

The most important reason of the non-implementation of the public investment programmes in the majority of African countries, as facts prove it, is the incapability of the national governments to mobilize in a necessary degree the planned sums for the investments.

A distinctive feature of the African plans in the sixties was the considerable increase of the public investment expenditures in comparison to the pre-plan years. Nevertheless, this increase was not ensured every-

where, even not formally, by corresponding resources of financing. So, in the plan of the Central African Republic in 1967 to 1970 the covering means were allotted only to 43% of the general sum of public investments, in the five-year plan of Somalia to 48.4%, etc. The rest, i.e. the non-ensured sums, as it was tacitly supposed in the plans' documents, had to be found already in the process of implementation of the plan. This, as a matter of course, could not but influence the results in the implementation of the public investment programmes.

The situation concerning the financing of these programmes was strongly complicated by the fact that the larger part of the formally determined external resources, and as to the part of these resources the majority of plans referred to more than the half of the planned public investments, represented the so-called probable assistance -, i.e. it was necessary to look for it already in the period of the plan's implementation. Very frequently such a "probable assistance" remained at the end of the plan's period on paper. Therefore, as it is testified by the official statistics, the external official assistance proved to be, while summing up the results on the implementation of all - without exception - plans in the sixties, lower than the previously mapped out one. During the first five-year plans of Uganda and Tanzania it corresponded to 36 to 75%, in the four-year plan of Senegal (1961-1964) to 60%, and in the five years of the Sudanese ten-year plan to 25 Million Pounds Sterlings less than the planned sums.

All this marks the character of imperialist "assistance" given to the young African states whose share accounts for more than 90% of all the incoming external official funds. In the background of this policy stays the neo-colonial policy of the governments of the developed capitalist countries. In the past ten years there were rather frequently cases when these governments refused already promised loans to a country what immediately frustrated the implementation of the public investment programme in the different branches, even sometimes the whole programme was brought this way to nought. More than a dozen of different industrial and other state-owned enterprises included into the first five-year plan of Tanzania remained on paper after the refusal of England to transfer the already promised loan of 7.5 million Pound Sterling. An analogic sort was reserved for the hydro-electric station in Kafué - the largest construction of the four-year plan in Zambia. It was included into the plan in the hope of a loan of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. In 1967 the Bank promised this loan, but lateron it was refused. A similar enumeration could be continued.

We have to observe that even the offering procedure of the imperialist "assistance" hinders the successful implementation of the African public investment programmes. As a matter of fact this aid is rendered in accordance with the different financial years and its concrete size for the current year is revealed only after that the parliaments of the developed capitalist states confirmed the governments' budgets. However, long-term planning requires long-term estimates, calculated in advance and therefore steady, as to the financing of investments.

In the conditions of such an unsteadiness in obtaining the financial means from abroad, the African states often are obliged to accept the imperialist "assistance" in the amounts and forms in which the developed capitalist countries agree to render them, and not under circumstances meeting the interests of implementation of the development plan. It is also therefore that the practical investment activity of the national governments differs partly from that mapped out in the plans. One of its important principles is "for what purpose" it is rendered by the donor-countries and not

"what is necessary for the national economy". The national interests here often yield the first place to the interests of the developed capitalist countries. From this aspect the economic assistance of the socialist countries has a decisive advantage. It is rendered on the basis of long-term agreements and in accordance with the national development plans. It is not by chance that in the UAR, Algeria and in some other countries where its share in all the official external financial incomes is large enough that the public investment programmes could be implemented with a far higher succession and more completely than in the countries orientated exclusively to the West.

A similar unsteadiness and unreliability of the external resources in financing the investments, the lack of incomes from them in comparison to the planned targets forced the African governments to make complementary efforts to mobilize the means out of the domestic accumulations in the country, in order that the deficit in financing the planned investments may somehow be compensated. Many of them achieved in this field considerable successes. The plan of internal financing within the public investment programme was over-fulfilled in several national development plans. For instance, in the first plan in Senegal this over-fulfilment was of 22%, in the three-year plan of Tanzania of 8%, in the first five-year plan of Tanzania of 106% and in the plan between 1961-1966 of Uganda of 105%, etc. It is necessary, however, to note that such successes were characteristic fundamentally for the first half of the sixties. As to the "second" generation of the African plans the non-fulfilment was more characteristic in this field. So, in the course of the first two years of the Senegal plan from 1965 to 1969 the two-year plan concerning the mobilization of internal means for the public investments was fulfilled to 49%, and during the three years of the five-year plan in Tchad - only to 24%.

However, the national domestic savings, in the majority of cases cannot compensate the deficiencies of domestic currency incomes. In general, their growth could even not nominally cover the deficit in the obtained foreign loans and subsidies. Exactly therefore the financing plan of public investments proved to be in the majority of the African countries not fulfilled and this fact played a decisive role in the non-fulfilment of the investment programme itself. The (nominal) over-fulfilment of this programme in a few countries could take place fundamentally on the account of the unforeseen increase of state currency incomes which occurred in consequence of the increase of the world prices of the exported products (for instance, of copper - Zambia, Congo-Kinshasa), or on the account of a quick increase of its production (Libya - petroleum).

Thus, the experiences of the sixties showed that the majority of the African governments was not in a position to ensure the financial resources contemplated in the investment plans. One of its reasons was the unsteadiness of the foreign incomes on which the majority was based, and in particular - the unsteadiness of the imperialist "assistance". Even the domestic financial basis proved to be very weak and not very reliable. In particular, the incomes from domestic loans were very unreliable, disregarding the fact that in the majority of the cases they had a compulsory character. The possibilities of a deficit financing to which the national governments resorted on a large scale during the decade, were cut down everywhere towards the end of it. And, finally, the increase of the current incomes into the budget was "eaten up" in a considerable degree, if not entirely, by the unforeseen, "non-planned" increase of the current budget expenditures. For instance, already in the first year of the second five-year plan of Tanzania they increased by 21% instead of the 7.5% envisaged by the plan.

The organizational-economic weakness of the ministries and autonomous organizations was, apparently, the second important reason of the non-fulfilment of the African public investment programmes. Numerous facts testify that exactly because of these reasons (lack of experience, shortage of qualified cadres, bureaucratism and conflicts between the different state organs etc.) the already appointed means were not coped with in due time and in the foreseen degree. In countries, which are relatively rich in financial resources (Libya, Algeria, Zambia, Congo-Kinshasa and several others) this low investment capacity of the national state was during the past ten years the most important reason of the fact that the public investment programmes remained really, and in some cases nominally not fulfilled.

Summing up the results of an analysis concerning the regularity in the implementation of the public investment programmes in the African national plans during the sixties, we could make the following two conclusions: firstly, the financial and organizational-economic basis of the effective state investment activity was weak and unsteady; secondly, and this is even more important, everywhere there was an essential difference between the sphere and the contents of this activity, on the one hand, and the envisaged investment programme, on the other hand. The facts testify that overall only a small part of the planned projects and measures could be really, in due time and in the envisaged degree, implemented, and in the meantime the non-planned projects were partly in contradiction with the general aims and tasks of the programme. In other words, this programme was only in an insignificant measure a guideline for the practical activity of the ministries and autonomous state organizations. A similar conclusion, *inter alia*, is rather less valid for the countries which progress on the non-capitalist road of development where the national governments, in particular in the recent years, made serious efforts in order to make about the plan a law of economic activity for the ministries and autonomous organizations. However, this conclusion is entirely confirmed by all experiences of the African states which in all respects - in the economic as well as political fields - follow the developed capitalist countries.

Both conclusions cannot be applied wholly to the part of the public investment programmes which from the very beginning was ensured by agreements on foreign financial and technical assistance. These agreements were concluded for special purposes, i.e. they included a completely fixed list of units to be supplied by the country, respectively the donor-organization promising to do it by its own forces. The including of such projects into the plan was a determined guarantee that sooner or later these projects will be realized. This part of the state programme, ensured by agreements, was its most real section. Nevertheless, as it was already noted in Chapter 2, the share of this part was everywhere small, exception made perhaps for the countries where the share is large due to the aid of the socialist countries (the UAR and Algeria).

Let us survey briefly, how and in which degree were realized in the sixties the programmes of the private investments in the African development plans. A simple comparison of the effective private investments with their planned amounts give a more intricate picture than in the case of the public programmes. In some countries they proved to be at the end of the plan's period considerably lower than the envisaged ones, in other countries - so much higher. In Mauritania, for instance, from 1963 to 1967 the private investments reached 18.6 billions African francs, i.e. 133% of the planned sum. According to the first plan of Uganda they had to reach during the five-year period 18 to 20 millions of Pounds Sterling, in reality they reached 40 millions of Pounds Sterling. A similar considerable nominal over-fulfilment of the private programme took place in the five-year

plans of Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon and in some other plans of Tropical Africa.

On the other hand, in Madagascar, during the first five-year plan (1964-1968), the private investments were equal to 27.5 millions of Mal-gash Francs instead of the awaited 82 millions. Such a situation occurred at the end of the first five-year plan of Morocco, somewhat better - in the period of both four-year plans of Senegal, in the first half of the Sudanese ten-year plan etc.

The comparison of the effective and planned branch structure of the private investments shows, however, that they are only a very little similar to each other. In other words, it is clear from this comparison, that the national plan was not everywhere the guideline for the private investors. These latter were orientated in their decisions to the maximum benefit and this, as a rule, did not coincide with the principal objectives of the plans. Thus, the main part of their investments went to the complementary industry and the processing branches which work for exports; in the meantime in the rest of the economy the effective private investments proved to be, in general, less than the planned ones. During the three first years of the five-year plan in Togo (1966 to 1968) 1.2 billions of African Francs were invested by private means in the extracting industry, in spite of the fact that the plan did absolutely not contemplate such investments. In Madagascar such a branch was the export-import trade. The first plan of Morocco mapped out the creation in Port-Etienne of a company for the processing of fishes in a capacity of 50 thousand tons, in reality due to the efforts of the private investors, this capacity reached at the end of the four-year plan 300 thousand tons.

In certain countries the plans and the official statistics enable us to compare the private programmes to the effective private investments at the level of different large projects. Such projects are included into the national plans by the investment programmes of the firms themselves. However, we could enumerate a multitude of examples when the firms, already in the period of the plan's realization renounce of their original projects and in the meantime other build enterprises and factories missing from the national plan. For instance, the four-year plan of Mauritania envisaged in the private sector not only a development in the iron-ore extraction, but in the exploitation of copper-beds, too. However, the latter remained in that period on paper. In a survey concerning the implementation of the last five-year plan of Togo, it was stated that in several cases the industrial development is not carried out as it was envisaged in the plan. For instance, the Bata firm built up a shoe-factory, a metallic furniture factory was constructed, some food-producing enterprises were enlarged, all this did not figure in the plan. On the other hand, not a single of the six most important industrial projects of the plan, exception made for the factory of plastic materials, was realized.⁶⁰

The effective financment of private investments also differed from the mapped out one. In the majority of the countries the investments were mainly implemented on the account of the private resources what determined their branch allotment. With some exceptions (for instance the first five-year plans of the UAR and Tanzania) the share of the foreign private investments proved to be at the end of the plan periods higher than mapped out, whereas that of the domestic ones was accordingly lower. Thus, the hopes of many national governments of an accelerated growth in the local class of private owners were abortive.

We could not affirm that the national governments did not try to influence by means of their economic policy the selection of investment decisions in the private sector, in particular in the recent years. However,

in its totality, during the last ten years in this policy overall reigned (with the exception of the countries of socialist orientation) a general stimulation to the investments of private firms, disregarding the plans. Under different favourable circumstances (political and economic stability in the country, presence of rich beds of important minerals etc.) this stimulation effectively contributed to the growth of the private enterprise, but could not influence the branch structure of new investments. Such a situation arose, for instance, in Kenya. In non-favourable economic and political conditions the state stimuli (taxation privileges, protectionism, loans and subsidies, accelerated amortization etc.) proved to be very weak in order to determine the volume and structure of the private investments. The state's economic policy was much more efficient in its indirect and negative effect on the private sector: the proclamation of nationalization of certain given companies led as a rule to the cancellation of new private investments - this not being envisaged by the plans - or even to the abatement of old foreign capitals, in spite of the fact that, as a matter of course, not a single plan envisaged the nationalization and, consequently, did not take into account all the possible consequences. It is exactly for this reason, for instance, that the programmes of private investments were not "fulfilled" during the first five-year plans in the UAR and Tanzania. An analogic situation arose now in Uganda and Zambia.

The analysis of the realization of the aggregate investment programme in the African plans appears to be purely formal in the light of the above-mentioned facts, as there does not exist any real causal relationship between the actual tendencies and plan calculations. However, such an analysis is of some interest for the determination of the size and character of the deviation between the planned and real tendencies of national economic development because the investments represent one of its basic parameters.

In the majority of countries the real aggregate investments in the last decade have constantly been below the planned level. In some of the cases it occurred because of the failure to fulfill the public programme, in others - the private ones, in still others - because of the failure to fulfill both. The degree of "execution" of the general programme varied very much in these cases fluctuating from 60 per cent in the five-year plan of Madagascar to 95 per cent in the five-year plan of the UAR and 98% in the first four-year plan of Senegal. Some plan targets were "overfulfilled". For example, the five-year plan of Congo (Brazzaville) set out the aggregate investments at 50.3 billion francs. In reality, it amounted during the five years to 62.2 billion francs. It occurred as a result of a considerable exceeding of the real private investments over the planned level (27.1 billion instead of 19.8 billion) as well as the "overfulfilment" of public investment programme (35.1 billion instead of 30.5 billion).⁶¹ The real gross investments exceeded the planned ones during the first five-year plan of Uganda (at the expense of private investments), the first half of the ten-year plan in Sudan (because of the public programme). The real investments are always mentioned while drawing up the balance of the national plan in current prices. Taking into consideration the rise in prices, the degree of nominal "fulfilment" of the aggregate investment programme is usually much lower than the above indices.

A comparison of the branch structure of real and planned investments testifies to the fact that in most of the cases the development was swifter than expected in infrastructure (owing to the public investments) and extracting industry (owing to the investments of foreign monopolies). At the same time the manufacturing industry and the agriculture were assigned less means than planned in the relative and absolute expression.

For example, the four-year plan of Niger was fulfilled as regards investments by 75%, whereas the plan for the extracting industry - by 128%, and for the energetics - by 100% (the latter coincidence of the planned and the real indices is purely nominal, as in reality all the planned capacities of electric power stations were not put into operation, and one may only speak of an overdraft of the public funds). In some countries more than planned investments were allotted also to those industries which produce for exports (owing to foreign private investments). The 1963-1967 plan of Mauritania was, generally speaking, "overfulfilled" as to the aggregate investments by 70%, as to the energetics - by 3.4 times, as to canned fish industry - by 2.6 times.

The comparison of the real and planned share of the state-owned and private sectors as to the aggregate investments almost everywhere reveals the following regularity: the state's share is actually lower, whereas that of the private sector (mostly of foreign monopolies) is higher than planned. Only in the UAR, Tanzania, Morocco and Madagascar did the situation testify to the contrary. The share of the external sources of financing in the aggregate investment programme (public and private) was, as a rule, lower than planned. During the four years of the Nigerian six-year plan it accounted for 21% instead of 50% as planned, during the five years of the ten-year plan in Sudan - for 28% instead of 47%, during the Tunisian three-year plan (1962-1964) - for 39% instead of 46% etc. Only in two-three plans was the proportion the contrary: in the first five-year plan of Uganda - for 33% instead of 30% and in the second three-year plan in Tunisia (1965-1967) - for 50% instead of 38%.

Similar reservations to those mentioned in case of the aggregate investment programme may be mentioned as regards the rest of the general (i.e. comprising separate spheres and branches of the economy) programmes of African plans. That is why we shall dwell on them only briefly and only on the issues that will permit us to trace more fully the plan strategy of national governments and the real development of African countries' economies.

Despite the variegated proportions between the "targets" of the branch programmes and the real development of separate branches there emerges the following regularity: in the overwhelming majority of cases the plan targets of the aggregate investments are not reached; the cases of overfulfilment are even fewer than in the event of investment programmes; agriculture lags behind the plan "targets" most of all, especially, the production of foodstuffs for domestic consumption. Among all the plans in the first half of the 60's, only in Sudan did the agricultural production grow more rapidly during 5 years than planned: by 5.2% per annum instead of 4.0%. In the plan period of the Kenyan five-year plan it is increased by an average 3.5% per annum whereas the plan stipulated a 6.2% increase, in the Tanzanian five-year plan - by 5% instead of 12%, in the first Moroccan plan - by 1.5% instead of the planned 3.5%, etc.

The growth rates of industrial production in the majority of African countries have generally been closer to the plan targets. However, it has often taken place owing to the extracting industry, or to the energetics which is included in the general index of industrial production in the majority of the countries. Thus, in Kenya this index stipulated in the second half of the 60's an annual increase by 11.8% instead of the planned 8%. In Tanzania the manufacturing industry has been increasing by an annual 10% during the first five-year plan (the planned rate accounted for 7.5%). The overfulfilment of the plan in the manufacturing industry in the Ivory Coast has been even greater. Nonetheless, most of the plans, especially in the first half of the 60's, have not been fulfilled as to the industrial

production growth. Thus, during the first Moroccan five-year plan its real rates accounted for 3.5% instead of 10%, in Madagascar (1964-1968) - for 10% instead of 28%, in the UAR (1960-1965) - 8.5% instead of 11%, during the same period in Sudan - for 7.6% instead of 11.1% and so on.

As far as the separate articles and commodity groups are concerned, the range of deviation of the real growth rates from the planned targets was here much broader than in the branches in general. Given the general prevalence of "non-fulfilment" of plan targets, there often occur cases of their "overfulfilment" by several times. In the agriculture of the majority of the countries, the exporting branches have undergone the most rapid development in the 60's. These were just the cases that usually accounted for the "overfulfilment" of the plan, as the latter generally determined a swifter growth in production of industrial goods for home market.

In the industrial sphere, the majority of cases of "overfulfilment" occurred in the extracting industry and less - in the manufacturing industry, although there were very great fluctuations in the real output of separate goods around the plan targets. For example, in Tanzania the indices of the first five-year plan in 1968 have been exceeded almost 5 times in the production of plywood, almost 2 times - of beer, but were 1.5 times below the planned level in the production of cement and 3 times in the output of oil products. In Gabon the oil production by 1968 have exceeded the 1970 plan target by 17%, whereas the production of manganese and uranic ores has lagged behind the plan a great deal.

The analysis of implementation of African plans in the output of separate kinds of goods reveals the fact that in the majority of cases any causal relationship between the plan targets and real industrial development is absent. Much more powerful forces than those of plans and the governments' economic policy seem to exert influence on the real development of African economy - forces determining its general road of development which more often than not contradicts to that outlined in the plans.

The most important forces appears to be the dependance of the continent's economy on the economy of the advanced capitalist countries and of its development on the conjuncture on the world capitalist market. It is precisely this conjuncture that directly influences the development trends of export-oriented branches in industry and agriculture, and indirectly - the other branches. In Tanzania the slump in the world prices of sisal resulted in a curtailment of its production from 230 thousand tons in 1964 to 194 thousand tons in 1968, whereas the first five-year plan determined to raise it to 270 thousand tons. On the other hand, the auspicious conditions on the world market lead to an overfulfilment of the targets on coffee already by 1966 and on pyrethrum and cashew nuts - by 1967. In Gabon the stagnation in the output of manganese and uranic ores was accounted for by a drop in the demands on the part of world monopolies.

Another factor determining the development of African economies was the instability of natural climatic conditions. The latter exerts direct influence on the development of agriculture, and through it - on the total rates of economic activity. It is precisely because of crop failures and loss of cattle in consequence of draughts and destructive floods that the absolute drops in the agricultural production occur, whereas the plans outline elsewhere its steady growth.

Furtheron, the realization of the African countries' production for exports and in many cases even its production (extraction of the mineral ores, many kinds of plantation crops in agriculture) have been in the hands of foreign monopolies up to now. That is why the national states, no matter how strongly they endeavour to, cannot influence the production level in any considerable degree. In the recent years, many of them take

measures to constrain the domination of monopolies in the production of export goods, but these measures do not affect their domination in the sphere of world trade. The experience of Latin American states shows that these measures are obviously ineffective in order to achieve actual control of the national economy.

These are the crucial factors that are, in our opinion, in the way of realizing the branch programmes of national development plans. These very factors similarly affect the development of foreign trade relations of African countries neutralizing any positive influence of the external economic programmes of the development plans and the state's economic policy in this sphere. Moreover, here the national governments can exert even less influence on the actual flow of events than anywhere else.

The comparison of planned and real index figures in the sphere of foreign trade shows that the plans of exports are chronically "not fulfilled" in the majority of countries, whereas the plans of imports are "overfulfilled". The conjuncture on the world markets, however, is very unstable for the most export goods of the continent, so it is very diverse of separate countries in different periods of time. It was especially favourable for the majority of African mineral resources in the first half of the 60's. At that time, a considerable portion of export programmes were "overfulfilled", for example in Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia. In the second half of the decade the situation has generally changed, and the real growth of exports has elsewhere become lower than the planned level.

Exceeding the plan targets of imports can hardly be regarded a favourable condition, as it results, in the event of exports lagging behind, in the exhaustion of currency funds and in an upshot of external debts. It is not by chance that many plans determined to slow up the export growth rates which were, as a rule, improbable. For example, the five-year plan of the UAR determined to out import by an annual 1%. In actuality, it rose by an annual 8%. The ten-year plan of Sudan set out the yearly import growth at 2%, while in fact during the first five-year plan it rose by 10%. The import growth rates were slower than planned in Morocco (1960-1964), Nigeria (1962-1965), Tanzania (1965-1968) and in some other countries. However, this was accounted for by different factors. In Tanzania, it seems to be the governmental restrictions on the imports of various goods, in Morocco - the slower than planned rates of economic development.

As a result of the above-mentioned export and import tendencies, the trade balance deficit was almost everywhere heavier than planned. Only perhaps, in the case of Tanzania was it set out for 1962-1969 at 100 million Shillings, and amounted to a mere 15 million Shillings. The proportions between the real and planned balance of current external payments were similar in the majority of countries: almost everywhere the external economic programmes determined to remedy them, whereas the result was usually worse than expected. For instance, during the first half of the ten-year plan in Sudan the average yearly deficit of the current items in the balance of payments had to account for 43 million dollars, while in fact it was as much as 67 million dollars. During the same period in Tunisia it equalled on the average 128 million dollars instead of the planned 89 million. The first five-year plan of the UAR proposed that the country's balance of payments that has revealed a deficit of Egyptian £13 million in 1959/60, should possess a positive balance of Egyptian £ 57 million in the period of 1964/65. As a matter of fact, the deficit was on the upgrade year by year and amounted to Egyptian £ 130 million in 1964.

There are two ways of making up the deficit of external payments: currency reserves and foreign loans. In the first half of the 60's the basic means of accounts as to the payments above the planned ones, has ob-

viously been the national currency fund, while in the subsequent years the role of the foreign loans increased, including the loans of the International Monetary Fund.

To sum up, just a few words on the execution of the most general, i.e., macroeconomic programme of African development plans. In the first half of the 60's, the general rates of economic growth have almost everywhere been lower than planned. During the second half they have on the whole increased in many countries, which even resulted in nominally exceeding the plan targets in some of the countries. One of the reasons of such an "overfulfilment" should be regarded the fact that "the second generation" of African plans has been more moderate than its predecessors having apparently taken into consideration the experience of the past. For example, the second four-year plan of Senegal set out the average annual increase of the country's gross product at 3.6%, whereas the first - at 8%. In fact, during all these years it equalled 5.5% at the current prices and 4.0% at the comparative prices.

Besides, in many countries with an increased inflationary growth of the economy, a nominal overfulfilment of plan targets have taken place, because the national statistics of the 60's included the calculations of macro-targets only at current prices.

The macroeconomic programmes set out elsewhere a considerable increase of the share of investments in the gross product of the country. These targets were "un-accomplished" everywhere but in Sudan. In Morocco, for example, the first five-year plan envisaged to increase the rates of investments up to 20%, while in fact they attained a 13% rise only by 1964/65. In Madagascar the share of investments in the gross product accounted for 15% in 1968 instead of 20-25% according to the five-year plan, etc.

As far as the changes in the branch structure of the economy are concerned, they have taken about the same trend as was mapped out by the national plans: the share of agriculture diminished, whereas the share of industry was on the rise. But it was everywhere taking place much slower than planned. The share of social services sphere, on the contrary, usually showed a steeper rise than planned.

These are the brief summaries of the research aimed at throwing light on the results of implementation of African development plans in the last decade. It permits, in our opinion, to make a general conclusion on the place and role of these plans in the economic development of the countries on the continent in general and on the economic strategy and tactics of governments in particular.

In general, plans have exerted little influence on the social-economic development of Africa. They were founded on factors that remained external and beyond the authority of national governments, i.e. the regularities of the world capitalist economic reproduction by which most of the countries under consideration continue to function.

Apart from a purely quantitative non-performance of the majority of chapters in the development plans, a grave quantitative gap between them and the real path of economic progress could be observed. In the first place, the process of industrialization of the entire economy took place at a much slower pace than expected (with the possible exception of the Ivory Coast and Kenya where this process took place at a quicker than expected rate), and therefore the planned structural shifts of the economy were not carried out. The policy of replacing imports by domestic production in the sphere of manufacturing industry and agriculture have also failed to bring the expected results. At the same time a rapid and mostly unplanned development in the extracting industry have taken

place. As a result, instead of eliminating the dependence of the countries on the external markets (both in the sphere of imports and exports) envisaged by the majority of the plans, a reverse process process was underway almost everywhere (with the exception of only the most advanced countries of the continent).

In the second place, the countries that have set out to eliminate their dependence on the external sources of financing have usually failed to achieve it. A characteristic example can be observed in Tanzania. In 1969/70, i.e. the first year of the second five-year plan which declared the guideline of the plan strategy to be self-sufficiency, the share of external sources of financing of the public programme turned out to be higher than in the last year of the first five-year plan, the incoming sum accounting only for 40-45% of the level expected according to the state balance.⁶² The unplanned steep rise of international private capital's share was especially conspicuous in the majority of African countries.

Thirdly, the national governments of the majority of African countries have failed to step up the general rates of economic development with the help of the plans. The main task remained unfulfilled. Moreover, on the whole, the economy of the developing countries on the continent made similar progress in 1960-1967 (an annual 4%) as in the 50's, according to an estimate of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Calculated per head of population, this growth has even slowed down and accounted for an annual 1.6% instead of 1.7% of the past years.⁶³ Despite their arbitrariness, these indices on the whole render a true reflection of the general tendencies in the economic development on the continent.

Even the public investment programmes, as was already shown above, have not provided a basis for an increase of the state-owned sector but for the part which was financed and implemented in accordance with the long-term agreements of economic assistance with the advances, mainly socialist, countries. The share of extra-plan projects in the actual evolution of the state-owned sector has been too great, including the nationalization of private property. In one of the survey of plan implementation in Tanzania, it was explicitly mentioned: "The rapid development of the /parastatal/ sector in recent years had not followed any comprehensive plan but a series of ad hoc sectoral plans pursuant to the 1967 Arusha Declaration."⁶⁴

The place and role of the national government proper in the execution of development plans in the 60's is an intricate problem that has not been completely resolved. We are not in a position to get down to it in detail, so we should like to point out only the core of the problem, that is: the plans in general and their separate programmes in particular did not serve as basis of everyday practical work of the ministries and autonomous state economic organizations.

Moreover, the practical economic activity of the state in the Africa of the 60's often contradicted not only to the separate programmes, but also to the whole planned strategy of development. Firstly, the political instability of many governments, their replacement, civil wars are naturally not taken into account; and this resulted in the fact that the problems of economic development were driven out of the limelight by the purely political issues in the state's activity. This was revealed in the distribution of the budget expenditure: ventures of military and political-administrative character were often carried out at the expense of economic programmes.

Secondly, the analysis shows that the economic policy of African states conducted in the 60's was on the whole out of concert with the main tasks set out by the development plans. The plans, as was indicated

in Chapter 2, formulated basically the strategical and tactical tasks of economic growth, whereas the practice of carrying out the plans confronted the national governments at the very outset with specific economic problems and difficulties which emerged as a result of the disintegration on the continent of the colonial system of imperialism and which were not taken into account in the plans.

Specifically, the majority of young states have emerged on the territory of the former vaster colonial possessions or by way of merging the territories that have belonged to different colonial states. Therefore the main trends of the state's economic activity during the first years of independence have become: 1. to take measures so as to establish legal and organizational-economic foundations for controlling and regulating the economic development; 2. to reorganize the assets of the colonial administration into the national state-owned sector; 3. to carry out measures aimed at integrating the economy of the former colony into a unified system of national economy. These processes, however, were carried on during the 60's with varying rates and on different scale in all the developing countries of the continent, and have not been accomplished so far. As to their character, they belong to the specific policy of reconstruction, and not development, so the plans did not, especially at the outset, include all these measures. But what is the most important thing, they did not further economic growth, but even hindered it to a certain degree, i.e. they contradicted to the principal strategic task of the development plans.

The plans of the second half of the 60's, having obviously taken into account the experience of their predecessors, paid a great deal of attention to formulating the means of economic policy which, in the opinions of the planners, should have contributed to the implementation of plan targets. But at the same time, the tendencies for inflation have intensified in the majority of the countries. Therefore the governments had to resort to measures of stabilization, while their plans continued to be those of economic growth. That is why it becomes clear why the practical policy of the national governments at this stage of African planning not only failed to correspond to the interests of implementing the development plans, but also hindered the process to a great extent.

Thus, in the past decade a manifest contradiction between the main tasks of development as formulated in the plans (we brush aside the few short-term transitional plans which have set out the problems of reconstruction as well as the two-year programme of stabilization in Ghana (1968-1969) which were, on the whole, not characteristic of African planning) and the practical political and economic issues and difficulties that have emerged from the start can be observed. This contradiction was naturally resolved in favour of practice and at the expense of plan execution. (We do not make mention here of the effectiveness with which the economic policy of the state can at present exert influence on the development of African economy, as it was dealt with above.) In other words, one of the basic weaknesses of African general development plans lies in the fact that they did not reflect the practical tasks of development which the governments had to face every day, but outlined only a very general strategy of economic growth formulated on the basis of bourgeois methodology of planning without due regard to the specific nature and difficulties of the political and economic situation of African countries. This shortcoming, let us note in passing, is common to the whole planning in the developing countries. R. Mallon in his article devoted to the problems of Latin American planning wrote, "One of the main reasons for growing skepticism about the usefulness of comprehensive planning in developing countries is the lack of relation between development objectives and programs, and current policy

problems".⁶⁵ This, however, fully applies to African plans as well. At present the bourgeois economic science is not in a position to establish and work this link which is, in our opinion, one of the most important prerequisites of a successful implementation of the plans.

Finally, in many African countries - as a great many facts testify - the governments did not intend in earnest to implement the development plans adopted by them. The latter were important from the point of view of maintaining the prestige and for political ends. Naturally, more often than not, the plans were adopted with the good intentions of carrying them out, but the everyday political and economic problems and difficulties made the government change their minds in no time. Under the circumstances, the plan was formally considered functioning up to the end of the plan period, but it was in fact cancelled. Sometimes mention was even made of them, and attempts were underway to redact it in conformity with the changed circumstances, but all this did not remedy the actual standing of the plan. Actually cancelled from the very start of its existence was the seven-year plan of Ghana. Nkrumah's government was swerved off the road of its implementation by the curve of inflation that started to rise in 1964 as well as by the economic difficulties of a general nature.

Consequently, every other national plan of the 60's was cancelled ahead of time for some political or economic reasons. The plans that have functioned formally during the period expected did not exert a noticeable influence on the social and economic development of African countries. The governments either couldn't or even wouldn't live by these plans in their everyday political and economic activity. By so doing, they actually cancelled the plans that continued to formally function during the plan period, with the exception of the part of the public investment programme which was accomplished with the help of more advanced countries. Therefore one cannot but admit that in general the African planning of the 50's and 60's was formal.

True enough, the plans have played a certain positive role in many countries. First and foremost, the elaboration and proliferation of plans contributed to a preciser wording of the general economic tasks which the national governments endeavoured to solve. Furtheron, they made it easier to understand that the economic development was an intricate objective process consisting of many links, every element of which is closely interconnected in a definite succession. Yet it remains to be seen which approach to the economic planning prevails in the practical policy of African governments. The failures of the first plans attracted the attention to the problems of their implementation and in particular - to the improvement of the public administrative and economic service as well as to the elaboration of the means and methods of state regulation and stimulation of economic development.

The failure of the attempts to step up the nationalization of the private sector resulted in an accelerated development of the state-owned sector by the majority of national governments, including those which discarded the socialist road of development. The elaboration of the programmes of this development and the attempts to implement them contributed to putting into good order the practical investment activity of ministries and autonomous organizations and pushed the problem of the efficiency of state enterprises and service centres into the limelight. Finally, the elaboration of plans exerted a favourable influence on the development of national statistics and various applied social and economic investigations.

Thus, the African planning in its present shape contributed to a certain degree to put into order and develop the state's administrative eco-

nomical activity as well as increase the state-owned property in the country's economy. But this is not the basic but the by-effect of the plans. As far as their principal task is concerned, they fail to accomplish it.

5. The "Crisis" of African Planning and a Quest of the Ways Out by the Bourgeois Economic Science

In the recent years in the Western economic literature a lively discussion is underway on the subject of the so-called crisis of planning in the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Institute of Development Studies at the Sussex University (England) organized a special conference on this subject in the summer of 1969.⁶⁶ In the course of the same year, independently of this conference a paper by R. Mallon and a study by W. Stolper were published.⁶⁷

In the background of this crisis lies, in accordance with a general opinion, the generally known and here-above mentioned fact concerning African planning that the plans of economic development, as a rule, are not executed, and even the development differs in an essential manner from that envisaged in the plans. In one of the world economic surveys of the UN it was stated: "While a great many developing countries have drawn up development plans in recent years, comparatively few have experienced much success in achieving their targets. /In Africa practically not a single plan of the 60's reached its aims - S.E./ The fact that plans have often not accomplished what they set out to do is commonly equated with a failure in plan implementation."⁶⁸

A direct consequence of such a situation is disillusionment in planning itself, or at least scepticism in its utility, making its appearance in the ranks of the politicians and large layers of the population of Africa, as well as among the planners-economists themselves. "After about two decades during which planning gained virtually world-wide acceptance, questions are being raised about its usefulness for accelerating the rate of development" - this was the remark of A. Waterston in his report at the Conference of Sussex.⁶⁹ R. Mallon considers, not without any reason, that the "crisis" of planning appears also in the fact that "Many of the economies which are being 'planned' are themselves in crisis, both economically (inflation, balance-of-payments disequilibrium, chronic budget deficits) and institutionally (weak administration, ineffective policy instruments, political instability)".⁷⁰ However, it would be scarcely correct to count all these intricate political and social-economic difficulties encountered by the majority of the developing countries among the consequences of the non-implementation of the plans, as it is done by R. Mallon, despite the liquidation of a part of them being the basic objective of numerous national plans, in particular in Latin America.

What are the reasons of the "crisis" of planning in Africa and in other developing countries? In the bourgeois economic literature a serious attention is paid to this problem in the recent years. It is possible to this problem in the recent years. It is possible to pick out a few basic principles which, in the opinion of the majority of the Western scientists and economists-planners, are at the roots of the failures encountered during the execution of the plans.

First of all, let us distinguish the group of reasons which are reputed to be accidental and do not depend on the governments of the de-

veloping countries or lie beyond their effective control. Here belong the lack of political stability in the majority of them (inter-tribal discords, struggle of the different political groups for power, frequent military coups and, finally, civil wars) and the unsteadiness and unstability of economic development (the uncertainty of currency incomes from exports, economic assistance, a strong dependence on the natural-climatic conditions). In one of the last surveys concerning the African planning it was noted: "In all too many cases when sudden contingencies, especially those produced by foreign trade and external financial assistance, have arisen the first victim to be sacrificed has been the plan."⁷¹ The factors which hinder the policy of economic development in Africa to be executed in accordance with the plans are accidental fluctuations in the real resources among which the most important are the changes in the harvests and in the export incomes.

Little mention is usually made of these reasons, however, they are just mentioned and considered as being self-explanatory and above all inevitable and natural. It is just for this reason that the UN World Economic Survey of 1966 stressed the view that the plans which have not been executed for similar reasons and circumstances of the mentioned type, should not be considered as a failure.⁷² The main attention is paid to reasons which are considered dependent on the national government and which could be eliminated. This is first of all the super-ambitionism of the plans, the lack of financing and qualified personnel, administrative and organizational-economic weakness of the state, meagreness of national statistics, as well as methodologic and method failures of the plans themselves.

Under super-ambitionism of the plans we understand their exaggerated tasks which surpass the capacities and possibilities of the country during their implementation. In the opinion of numerous bourgeois authors this is one of the most important reasons of the non-execution of the majority of the national plans in the countries of the "third world". "In many developing countries, ambitious national plans have been drawn up but these have outreached the power of Governments to implement them."⁷³ The plans frequently remained on paper, "the fault surely lies not in the failure to implement but in the lack of realism of the plans".⁷⁴

In one of the first surveys on the African plans compiled by the Economic Committee for Africa it was stated that concerning the rate of increase of gross domestic product fixed to 9 per cent per year to be found in several plans, even the compilers themselves often stressed that such an achievement would be impossible in the course of a few years.⁷⁵ A. Waterston remarked in his monography that such plans are purely prestige plans and nobody counts on their realistic execution.⁷⁶

One of the most important reasons of failures in the majority of the African plans is the insufficiency of financial resources for the planned investments. This refers in particular to the public investment programmes. In the recent times the lack of qualified personnel in all the fields of social life and especially in the state apparatus began to be mentioned among such reasons. "The lack of qualified cadres is a bottleneck in the implementation of the development programmes" - was declared at the African Symposium on industrial development.⁷⁷ Numerous authors pay a particular attention to the shortage or low qualification of the national personnel, economists and planners which in their turn, in their opinion, lead to miscalculations in the elaboration of the plans and to failures in their execution. "Shortages of manpower, including personnel needed to design development programmes and projects, to implement these, and to manage productive enterprises, have turned out to be among the most important constraints on planning and the implementation in the African region."⁷⁸

The shortage of numerous important statistical indices and the small trustworthiness of the data at disposal represent also one of the important reasons of the failures in African planning. They do not only lead to the incorrect elaboration of plans, but they hinder their successful execution, as it is impossible, under such circumstances, to control with efficiency and regularity the economic development. "In some cases plans were faulty to begin with, owing to a lack . . . of statistical data" - was noted already at the Paris Conference on the administrative problems of national planning in 1964.⁷⁹ In another UN document of the same date it was stated: the data concerning the economic activity are unreliable or they are received very belatedly and only few things are known about the intentions of the private sector. In addition, in numerous countries even the current and planned activity of the state sector is generally only a little known to a small circle of persons. The budget previsions often do not give a full information as they do not include data on the financial activity of the autonomous institutions and state enterprises, whereas the traditional system of budget classification restricts extremely the value of the economic analyses. Further, in only a very small number of countries are elaborated rational methods of control and evaluation as the results achieved in the implementation of the public development programmes.⁸⁰

In the recent years the conditions of statistics improved in a considerable way in the majority of the African countries and the above-mentioned could not be applied unreservedly to countries like the UAR, Tunisia and Morocco, however, it is still entirely valid for the majority of the states of Tropical Africa.

However, the bourgeois authors pay a particular attention to the analysis of the deficiencies in the administrative and organizational-economic activities of the national state which, in their opinion, hamper or even block the implementation of the development plans. An impression is created as if these deficiencies were the main obstacles on the way of the successful planning what concerns the social-economic development in Africa and in other under-developed regions of the world. In principle, this corresponds to the bourgeois views on national planning as to the variety of the administrative and organizational-economic activities of the state.

Admittedly, the proper administrative system of the young states, which remained in its basic features the same as during the colonial times, does not correspond to the tasks and needs of the plans' implementation. "Administrative systems were generally established to fulfil functions much more limited than those demanded of present-day governments, - was stated at the Santiago Conference on planning in the developing countries, organized under the sponsorship of the UNO -, and administrations have not possessed the flexibility needed to carry out new and larger responsibilities efficiently. . . . Some observers have, in fact, singled out administrative inefficiency or limited administrative capacity as principal obstacles to the introduction of an effective process in many developing countries."⁸¹

F. Clairmonte wrote in his work on African planning, that the radical weakness in the majority of the plans is a result of the fact that they are commanded by an administration which remained from the metropolitan country and was never orientated to development.⁸² A. Waterston in his report held at the Conference of Sussex stressed that "it must be recognized that conventional planning assumes the availability of an administrative structure and a pool of trained manpower which do not in fact exist in most low-income countries".⁸³ And finally, in one of the documents of the second session of the Conference of African Planners, it was plainly stated, that until there exists an incompetent administration, both on the

superior and regional levels, the development plans will inevitably become a formal document which contains the sum of hopes not inter-connected with each other.⁸⁴ We have to observe that in such a criticism numerous bourgeois authors confuse the incompetence or inability of the national states in the majority of the developing countries to contribute to the acceleration of economic development with their incompetence or inability to implement the national plans. In our opinions, these are different quantitative and qualitative notions.

What are the defects in the administrative structure of the African states which hinders them, in the opinion of the Western authors, in the successful implementation of the development plans?

Firstly, the absence of numerous state organs is noted; they have to contribute directly or indirectly to the economic development. Similarly we have to point out the lack of an intricate system encompassing planning organs of the central institutions and of the provinces and districts. This leads to numerous mistakes in the elaboration of plans and hinders the efficient control of their implementation. A great deal of attention is paid to the analysis of the legal and actual state of the central planning organization within the governmental system. In a good number of countries, admittedly, this organization occupies the place of the younger partner as compared to the other economic ministries, therefore it is deprived of the possibility to control in an efficient way their activities, in accordance with the plan targets. In one of the surveys on the situation of planning in the French-speaking countries of Africa it was stated: "An ill-informed, slightly respected planning organ does not play the role of the development's indicator, of the catalyst and coordinator during the plan's implementation. In particular, such a situation appears in this respect with the autonomous organizations as only few means are at disposal in order to influence them in conformity with the plan."⁸⁵

Moreover, it is often noted that certain special public organs are absent which could directly be engaged in the implementation of economic programmes in the public sector or in the execution of the economic policy concerning the stimulation and regulation of development in the private sector. The system of such organs was especially underdeveloped in the majority of the African countries in the beginning of the 60's.

Secondly, there is a lot of talk about the reluctance of numerous old, traditional ministries to follow in their activities the plan which is established by the central planning organ and even about their hostility in their attitude to the latter being a novice in the system of the state organs which tries to give advice and instructions to more honoured institutions. At the same time, a formal and even casual attitude is observed towards the plans from the side of the higher state executives in numerous developing countries. A large number of them consider the plans as political slogans, others "forget" about them during their practical activities, still other simply do not know what to do with the plans, how to implement them. A. Waterston, who has repeatedly visited the developing countries as an expert of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and who knows well how the national planning is concocted, has the following to say: "The largely formalistic acceptance of development plans by political leaders in some low-income countries is still another impediment to the implementation of ... plans." The political leaders are not ready to adopt the discipline which is necessary for the implementation of the medium-term development plans. In several countries the political leaders prefer to have the control on the investments in their own hands and prefer to improvise more than to follow a previously fixed programme.⁸⁶

A certain number of political leaders are simply not convinced of the necessity to plan in their countries and they are inclined to consider the composition of plans as a contribution to fashion. A. Meguid, the representative of the UAR on the Conference of Sussex observed the following in his report: "It is not true that government in under-developed countries are fully aware of this. In the age when laissez faire is 'generally' regarded to have been considerably diluted, and when government intervention is unanimously recommended, governments in a large number of under-developed countries will remain aloof from the problem of planned development."⁸⁷

Thirdly, the majority of the bourgeois authors consider that in the system of the state organs in the African countries there is a lack of co-ordination necessary for the successful implementation of the plans in connection with the activities and discipline of the officials. The relations between the local and central state organs are in particular very weak. This, on the other hand, creates the tendency to concentrate all public economic activities in the centre and leads to the establishing of a great number of new services in the central government, to the duplication of their activities, to the increase of bureaucratism, confusion and delays in their work.

Fourthly, a lot is written in the bourgeois economic literature about the incompetence, the bribery and nepotism of the African officials, who are frequently ruled by their own considerations, and not at all by the interests of the state. "Corruption becomes serious from the development point of view - writes B. Higgins - when it determines the actual composition of the programme, with projects selected in terms of personal or political gain rather than priority for development; or when it results in patterns of actual expenditure different from that proposed in a 'good' programme."⁸⁸

Fifthly and finally, a great number of Western economists consider as the main vice of the state's economic activity in the developing countries the fact that there is a shortage, or even a lack in the practice concerning the system of concrete measures introduced by the state's economic policy aiming at the implementation of the plans. At the initial stages, in accordance with their opinion, in numerous developing countries there was a general view as if the plans were auto-operational and could be implemented without supplementary and particular efforts of the state. "This illusion did not disappear in Africa up to now. Essentially, the role of the plan is not always understood in a correct way - was stated in one of the surveys on the African planning -, the plan is often considered as a useful amulet, its implementation being carried out without any efforts."⁸⁹

In 1963, at one of the first meetings of the African planners it was noted that in some African countries the political and economic accent concerning the implementation of plans is missing. This way planning is limited to the compilation of tasks and only few efforts are made in order to implement the plans. The preparation of a plan is changed into a "l'art pour l'art" with only very insignificant practical results.⁹⁰

A particularly grave failure in the whole state economic activity of the developing countries is the absence of sufficient control, of the regulation and stimulation of the development in the private sector in accordance with the plan. In the World Economic Survey for 1966 it was expressly stated, that there is "the absence of any assured means by which a Government can instigate in the private sector action that is necessary for the fulfilment of its plans." Recent experience showed that the Government's control of the private sector is at the best very weak.⁹¹

Numerous Western authors and African economists point also to the deviations and even the contradictions between the virtual state economic policy and the plans which they consider as one of the most impor-

tant reasons of the non-implementation of plans. O.E. Forrest stated that the majority of the plans in Western Africa are only vague hopes in the sense that the decisions concerning the investments and other political questions are often adopted by the governments without any priorities as to the objectives of the plans.⁹² From recent experience it is clear that the absence of harmony between the development plans and the economic policy is one of the fundamental weaknesses during the implementation of the African plans.⁹³ A lot is also written nowadays on the erroneous state policy and the concrete measures which lead to failures in the course of the implementation of given programmes related to the national plans - especially in the field of agriculture.⁹⁴

The bourgeois economists pay special attention to the elucidation of the defects and deficiencies in the financial activity of the governments in the developing countries, considering them one of the most important reasons of the non-implementation of the public investments programmes. The whole activity of the Ministry of Finances, in particular, is unanimously considered as not corresponding to the needs of development and of the implementation of plans. "The budget is not an adequate tool for development policy" - was affirmed by W. Stolper.⁹⁵ A. Waterston adds: "In many less developed countries, budgetary classification systems make it difficult to relate projects and programs in plans with budgetary allocations."⁹⁶

A basic view of the activity of the ministry of finances is to be found, according to the views of the bourgeois economists, in their organization and procedure, not in the principles themselves laying in the background of this activity. Already at the World Economic Survey for 1964 it was stated, that "inadequancies in existing budgetary procedures are another problem that has often adversely affected progress in plan implementation".⁹⁷ In a paper prepared to the Conference of African Planners in Addis Ababa, 1967, it is stated: "Government budgeting in many African countries, whilst it is still the key factor in converting development plans into realities, suffers from a number of defects, perhaps the most important of which is that it is still tied to the budgeting techniques formulated for the financial administration of a colonial régime."⁹⁸

Frequently, conservatism, and even the hostility showed by the ministry of finances is mentioned as to its attitude to planning and planning organs which make efforts to undermine its monopoly in the field of state finances. There are frequent allusions to the weakness of the budget statistics, to the lack in them of numerous data necessary for the control on the implementation of the public investment programmes, to the weakness and shortage of statistics concerning the public sector in general. "The budgetary authorities - writes A. Waterston - often makes annual allocations for projects without knowing how much has already been spent on each or how much will be required to complete it. The government is likely to know even less about the investment activities of public enterprises which use government funds to carry out projects outside the government budget."⁹⁹

These are the basic administrative, organizational-economic and political defects in the activity of the national states which, in the opinion of the majority of bourgeois economists, are the main reasons of failures in the national planning of the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is not difficult to see that in the bourgeois economic literature mention is made virtually and even in an enough convincing way, not only of the organizational, political and psychologic unpreparedness of the state apparatus in the developing countries to manage the economic development of their countries, in general, and the implementation of the national plans, in particular, but also of their unwillingness in many cases

to implement these plans and, may be, even of their incompetence to do it.

One of the most important reasons of failures in national planning in the developing countries mentioned by the bourgeois economic literature is also represented by the group of deficiencies and defects in the methodology and methods of the plans themselves. During the recent years, a particularly great attention is paid to this problem. It is true that the positions of the different authors are extremely divergent, discussions are going on numerous elements of the methodology and methods.

A more general point of view, however, is the recognition of the illegality of the stress on the macroeconomic programmes which up to now took place in the theory and practice of the bourgeois planning. This stress lead to the under-evaluation of the elaboration of concrete means and methods concerning the implementation of macro-programmes: yearly plans, specific projects and measures tending to the regulation and stimulation of the development in the private sector in accordance with the plans' outlines. Among the planners during a long period the opinion was spread that their task is to compile the programmes aiming to the economy's development, the determination of the concrete means and methods serving the implementation - being the task of the government itself. In the text of the second five-year plan of Morocco it was stated that the neglect expressed towards the elaboration of means required for the implementation of the economic programmes - represent a serious defect of the whole indicative planning.¹⁰⁰

The incorrect elaboration of the concrete projects in the state's investment programme and of the measures related to the state's economic policy as to the private sector is considered, however, by numerous authors as the result of the shortage, respectively low qualification of the national cadres and planners. This, as a matter of course, plays an important role in the appearance of the indicated defects concerning the plans. Nevertheless, those authors are rather right who consider it as a result - first of all - of a general methodologic approach to planning, to the striving above all and at any price to the compilation of a general development plan and its macro-economic frame.

In the World Economic Survey for 1966 the majority of the methodologic and methods' defects concerning the development plans comes to the excessive and premature passion for the compilation of such general, i.e. over-all plans covering the whole economy.¹⁰¹ The view is wide spread according to which the lack of success of numerous plans are linked with the incompetence of the governments to survey them in due time at the light of the circumstances undergoing changes, i.e. with an insufficient elasticity of these plans.¹⁰²

G. Hayden in his critical survey on the contemporary plans of Eastern Africa expressed a deep idea - as to its content -, an idea being new for the Western economic literature. In his opinion, the development plans in whole Africa suppose that the increase of the income depends mainly on the investments. This is an over-simplification - he said. In spite of the fact that the accumulation of capital could be an instrument of material progress, this is not the single condition for growth. The idea, as if the investments would be themselves efficient, is potentially dangerous, as it leads to the ignorance of other methods concerning the utilization of money.¹⁰³ Here, in our opinion, in a latent form though it takes place, a negation of the right to have recourse to the bourgeois theory of the economic dynamics as a theoretical basis of development plans, emerges.

Numerous authors submit to criticism some strategic bases of the national plans which are erroneous under the circumstances of the developing countries and lead to failures in the course of their implementation.

In the well-known Pearson Report, for instance, the African plans are criticized for the excessive accent on industrialization and the neglect of the requirements concerning the development in agriculture.¹⁰⁴ Some radically minded Western economists criticize the majority of the African plans for their excessive accent on the private sector which, in their opinion, is an unreliable partner in the course of the plans' implementation. For instance, A. Ewing sees here the main reason of the failure during the first five-year plan in Morocco.¹⁰⁵ In the report submitted by Senegal at the Second Conference of African Planners, it was also stated that the private enterprises' owners are rather willing to invest in the branches which dispose of more advantageous economic conditions than in those which are covered by the plan as primary branches, but which are considered as non-profitable ones in the eyes of the private investors, and this is one of the main reasons of failures in the course of the implementation of numerous African plans.¹⁰⁶

During the last years in the bourgeois economic literature there appeared statements which in general express doubts on the legitimacy of using the planning methodology in the quality of a basis serving to the elaboration of national plans in the developing countries. In one of the UN documents, in particular, it was stated that the primary methodology on which planning is based was used for the analysis of problems concerning the process of development, but not for the planning activity. There are failures in planning - as the document follows - which are linked to the fact that the theory of development is not a satisfactory basis for planning.¹⁰⁷

From a somewhat different position the up-to-date methodology of planning is criticized by G. Bereniste. He considers that the whole process of compiling a national plan is carried out as if it were not compiled for the entire economy, but only for a single firm or enterprise where a single centre of management has in its hands enough means to regulate the whole activity of the firm in accordance with the outlined programme.¹⁰⁸ In the up-to-date economy, in his opinion, there exist a multitude of autonomous organizations, which "take their decisions independently from the directives of the country's president".¹⁰⁹ In conformity with the view of the author, in order to ensure that the up-to-date formal planning should be changed in the developing countries into a real one, it is necessary to have different principles and methods in the course of the elaboration of the plans.

A large discussion is going on as to the problem of the legitimacy concerning the use of the methods related to the planning estimates (calculations). An always increasing number of bourgeois economists working in the practice of planning come to the conclusion of its unfitnes to compile national development plans in the ex-colonies and semi-colonies. The main argument in this respect is that the basic estimate methods do not correspond to the conditions and needs of the economic development of the "third world", as these methods were originally created for the purpose of an economic analysis in the developed capitalist countries.

"It must be realized - writes A. Waterston - that in preparing plans in low-income countries, planners make use of a kit of tools largely devised in and for the more advanced countries. Experience raises some doubts about the relevance of this 'transfer of technology'."¹¹⁰ In his opinion, the application of such a selection of planning estimates under the conditions of the developing countries is disturbed by the following circumstances: firstly, the high proportion in their economy of natural production which leads to a situation where the use of conceptions, categories and instruments of the commodity economy might give inexact, or even incorrect conclusions; secondly, these methods (mainly econometric models) excessively simplify

the economic reality due to the fact that they include constant coefficients, lineary dependencies and only one parametre of management - for the investments.¹¹¹

At the fourth international seminar for development planning (Accra, December 1968) it was stated: "It was felt that the kind of macroeconomic models and economic analyses currently used to draw up development plans were not adequate to illuminate the problems of development; consequently, the kind of policy implications drawn from such analyses were not relevant to the crucial problems of developing countries."¹¹²

Especially many criticism is directed against the macro-economic models. W. Stolper detaches two basic features of these models which render them, in his opinion, unfit to the objectives of planning in the economically backward countries. Firstly, it is their political neutrality, secondly - their excessive dependence on unauthentic statistics.¹¹³ The second, among others, is the defect of statistics in the developing countries, not of the models themselves, the first is an effective - methodologic defect of the models.

In a more systematic and detailed way appears the criticism of the econometric models and of their application in the planning of the developing states in the well-known work of G. Myrdal Asian Drama. He points out the following defects of models: 1. the use of constant coefficients; 2. the possibility of introducing into them only one strategic variable (parametre of development); 3. a too high aggregateness; 4. a too great isolation from social structure.¹¹⁴

It seems necessary to observe that Myrdal criticizes first of all models which are practically used in planning, he does not concern their up-to-date versions which are to be found still on the pages of the theoretical publications on econometrics. Therefore the objections of Tinbergen against the criticism of Myrdal which were made by him in his lecture held at the Asiatic Institute of Economic Development and Planning (Bangkok) seem to us not wholly legitime.¹¹⁵

Above all objections against the models are provoked by the constancy of the coefficients: investment, technical etc. ones. In the opinion of numerous authors (A. Waterston, V. Louis, G. Myrdal) this leads to a situation where the models on the substance extrapole the past tendencies of the economic development in the ex-colonies and semi-colonies, at a time when actually in their economy serious structural displacements occurred which could not be caught by up-to-date models, neither could they be embodied into the economic plan.

On the other hand, the supporters of the application in the planning of models ("econometry") criticize the practical method for its coarseness and the primitiveness of the planning estimates. This latest one, very likely, is linked first of all to the African plans. At the end, the different plans' programmes show themselves as not being coordinated among each other, respectively not being guaranteed by the necessary means, materials, manpower etc., the different projects included into the state's investment programme are in contradiction with the rest of the plan's sections. In the opinion of numerous Western experts, all this leads to a situation where in order to realize certain projects, respectively programmes it is necessary to renounce others etc.¹¹⁶

Thus, we have surveyed the basic reasons of the failures in the course of the plans' implementation in Africa and in other developing countries, as they are formulated and treated in the bourgeois economic literature. The bourgeois economists pay the basic attention to the deficiencies in the political, administrative and organizational-technical activities of the

state in the developing countries, if the planning process itself is included here, too.

They formulate their recommendations in the same directions as to the liquidation of the reasons hindering the successful implementation of the development plans and the creation of more favourable conditions contributing to their implementation. Deeper factors - as the political instability in the "third world" and the economic unsteadiness of its development - stay as a rule in these recommendations as a certain type of data and many of them are never discussed. The bourgeois economic science and practice of planning in the developing countries try now to find an approach to the planning process which could better help to implement the plans even under such political and economic circumstances. It was not by chance that in the World Economic Survey for 1966, as it was mentioned here above, there was a proposal concerning a conception for the evaluation of the plans' sums (totals, results), which excludes the effect of any kind of unexpected fluctuations in the economic development occurring as a result of political or economic "explosions" similar to military coups, the cut in prices etc.

Let us note that the positive part of the analysis concerning the failures of national planning in the bourgeois economic literature is incomparably poorer than its critical part. One can feel that only the first steps are made towards the discovery of an issue from the critical situation in the methodology and methods of planning. Further on only the basic recommendations concerning the improvement of the whole planning process will be analysed.

Two main directions of these recommendations can be pointed out: the establishment of more favourable conditions for the implementation of national plans and the improvement of the planning process itself: its methodology, methods, procedure and the contents of the development plans.

The establishment of more favourable conditions for the implementation of plans, on the one hand, amounts to reforms and the improvement of the state apparatus, on the other hand, to the elaboration of a state economic policy which could directly contribute to the implementation of certain given programmes and sections of the plan. Discussion is on about these two directions and it concerns a high number of points of view.

One has the impression that the administrative reforms, the modification of the state apparatus and its better applicability to the requirements and needs of the economic development are considered nowadays as the main direction of improvement concerning the whole process of national planning in the developing countries. The basic contents of these reforms are: the liquidation of the deficiencies in the state apparatus which were mentioned here-above; the development of the system of planning organs in the ministries, autonomous public organizations and in the provinces, the procuring of qualified cadres in sufficient number, the conferring to them of control functions on the activities of all other public organs; the reform of the state budget in order to adapt it in a higher degree to the requirements and needs attached to the implementation of the state investment programmes; the development of the system of public organs for the regulation and stimulation of the development of the private sector etc. "Conscious, and often far-reaching reforms of the machinery of government are needed in order to assure that the people and the various institutions on whose efficient performance successful plan implementation depends will understand what they are supposed to be contributing and will have the means within the day-to-day organization of their work, to carry out the tasks expected of them."¹¹⁷

In the recent years, in the publications of the ECA devoted to the problems of planning, certain ideas were developed on the necessity

of the reorganization of the system of international economic assistance to Africa in order to approach it to the financing of the national development plans.¹¹⁸ The ECA also intervenes for the widening of the practice of international agreements on goods in order to stabilize the prices of goods in the African exports.¹¹⁹ These two measures must liquidate or at least decrease in a considerable degree the unsteadiness of foreign assistance and the export entries, as well as the sharp fluctuations in their volume which, in the past, so often lead to the wrecking in the implementation of African plans.

A serious attention is paid nowadays in the bourgeois economic literature to the problems related to the elaboration, in the developing countries, of an economic policy which could be directly aimed at the implementation of development plans. The basic problem in this respect is the following: how is it possible to overcome the "imperfection" of the market in these countries and to elaborate a supplementary system of stimuli for the private sector, how to render the private owners interested in the implementation of plans. At this point, it is true, the majority of researchers are limited to the analysis of different combinations of the traditional means found in the bourgeois public economic policy - taxes, protectionism, loans and subsidies, export stimulation, licences, quotes and tariffs etc. In their opinion, a more consequent and complete application of these instruments could give the national state the possibility to influence in an effective way the whole process of social-economic development in the country.

In the recent years, in Africa the problem of sub-regional economic integration became a number one question. Integration is considered as a wholly realistic and effective means to overcome the narrowness of the markets in the small countries and to accelerate the rate of their economic growth which appears as the main task for the majority of plans on the continent.

Finally, as the principal condition of a more successful planning in the future, the majority of authors mentions the development and the improvement of national statistics.¹²⁰

In the present time the problems related to the improvement of the whole planning process in the developing countries are discussed about in an even more vivid way: the discussion concerns the methodology and methods, the procedure and the contents of the plans. In this field, however, even more than during the discussion of the conditions necessary for the successful implementation of the plans, a critical approach reigns as to the system of positive recommendations. The bourgeois methodology and methods of planning in the developing countries, as a matter of fact, find themselves only on the threshold of great changes, but the character of these changes is not wholly clear to them. Only the general principles made the subject of the discussion up to now.

Apparently, the central methodologic problem is the transfer of the most important point in planning from economics to economic policy. Now already it is almost generally recognized that besides the economic programmes of political and organizational-economic means and methods concerning implementation, a detailed elaboration seems to be necessary, too. And in this respect first of all the means and methods of a more efficient stimulation and regulation of the private sector are understood. The necessary condition of a successful implementation of the state investment programme includes a more thorough and complete elaboration of the projects. The participants of the international seminar on planning problems (Accra, 1968) came to the conclusion that "in the next decade more emphasis should be placed on the identification of the projects".¹²¹

A great criticism is exerted on the newly formed order of elaborating in Africa the plans with the help of a narrow group of experts and designers, these being mainly foreigners. Such a plan, in accordance with a generally spread view, remains strange for the state apparatus and almost unknown to the private sector. Therefore it is recommended to draw into the elaboration in participation all the basic organizations and social strata of the population: the political figures, the owners of enterprises, the trade unions etc. - as the effective economic development of the country depends on them. Consequently, in the opinion of numerous bourgeois economists, the reality of the plan and the possibilities of its implementation will become in a considerable way more enhanced.¹²² At this point a particular attention is given to the means and methods enabling the political figures to participate in the planning process. For this purpose, the designers, in the opinion of numerous Western experts in planning (W. Stolper, A. Waterston, E. Haggins) must map out not a ready plan, but they have to draft a selection of alternative projects, enclosing to them the substantiation and evaluation of results in the simplest form, from which the politicians could select the variant corresponding the best to their points of view.¹²³ This, supposedly, could help them to understand the necessity of planning, to accept the plan as their own proper cause and to put on them a serious responsibility for the implementation of the plan.

In an analogic way, one of the most important pre-requisites of a successful implementation of the particular investment and branch programmes resides in the broad participation of the private owners in the leading branches of economy and their organization in the process of the plan's design. Already in the World Economic Survey for 1966 it was stated: "In order to maximize and spread the benefits of a soundly based development plan, it is most desirable to involve the private sector - and especially the key productive elements - in the planning process ... The more closely the private sector identifies itself with the general objectives and specific targets of the plan, the best are the prospects for successful implementation."¹²⁴

Finally, a great attention is paid in the bourgeois economic literature to the improvement of the planning system and of the plans' contents. There is an unanimous opinion according to which annual plans are necessary for the implementation of the development plans. These plans are, in concordance with the bourgeois planning theory, an instrument for transforming the abstract concentrated plans into concrete programmes which already can be implemented; with their help it is possible to carry out the necessary changes in the development plans at the light of the changing conditions and finally, the annual plans help to adapt the budget and the entire activity of the ministry of finances to the tasks concerning the implementation of the concentrated plans.¹²⁵

A considerable importance is also paid now to the problem of the regionalization of the national plan. This latter should include the regional plans which could be drafted on the spot taking into account to a maximum the specific features and the interests of the different regions in the country. The regional plans are presented together with the annual plans as the two most important means serving the concretization of the development plans, their approaching to the real economic reality, their transformation into a form in which they already can be implemented.

These are the basic recommendations of the bourgeois economic science as to the improvement of the whole process of planning in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. They fundamentally amount to the elaboration of means and methods for a more efficient intervention of the state into the course of the social-economic development

in these countries without changing the social-economic structure existing there and based on the domination of private property and the prevalence of the private (small-commodity and capitalist) sector. In the opinion of the bourgeois economists this is possible to obtain by means of the improvement of the administrative and organizational-economic (including planning) activities of the national governments. However, some authors recognize that this process is not so simple, as the deficiencies are linked in these activities to the social structure of the society. A. Waterston, in particular, wrote already in 1964 that the reasons of the incompetence and the non-efficiency of the administration are internally connected to the social, political and cultural phenomena in every country.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, not one among the bourgeois planners did propose in a clear form certain given modifications concerning the social-economic structure existing in the majority of the developing countries in order to increase the efficiency of the national planning.

6. On the "Crisis" of African Planning. Assessment from the Standpoint of the Marxist Economic Science

Our opinion is that the bourgeois economists selected the not quite successful term of "crisis" in order to characterize the situation related to planification at least in Africa. That is to say, the crisis of a given process supposes that the process runned in the past with success, gave a certain satisfaction etc. From the above-mentioned chapters it is obvious that the African planification did not know any better periods in the whole course of its history, including the colonial period, too. It is clear that there is no question of a crisis, but of lingering and permanent failures of the national governments in their efforts made to influence essentially with the help of the plans the course of the social-economic development of their countries and to lead this development in the desired direction. Under such circumstances there is no question of the crisis of planification, if we could understand under this term not only the elaboration of plans, but also their realization, it is rather a crisis of confidence in planification what concerns the forms in which it has been realized up to now in Africa and in other regions of the "third world", i.e. a crisis of the bourgeois methodology and of methods of planification in the developing countries. Therefore W. Stolper is right when he affirms that there is a "crisis" of planners. And the bourgeois economic science tries to find an issue from this crisis.

The main task of the researcher of problems related to planification in Africa and in other economically backward regions of the world is of course not to discuss on terms, but to clear the reasons of failures in the national plans and to find the means enabling to remove this reasons. However, terminology can play a rather important role in this field, as it characterizes the methodologic approach to the problem and can largely influence the following assessment of conclusions and recommendations.

Marxism-Leninism approaches the social-economic planification in the developing countries by means of entirely different methodologic positions than those of the bourgeois economic science. This planification, as it has already been mentioned above, expands in the majority of states of the "third world" or at least tries to embrace their whole economy and numerous sides of social life. The national plans of development pretend to form all main national economic proportions and rates of economic development. For such a planification definite conditions, respectively circum-

stances are required, first of all in the economy i.e. in the object of planning.

The objective basis of planning at the level of the whole economy is the entire, i.e. national-economic planned development which represents a permanent, consciously established proportionality sustained by the whole economy, i.e. a proportionality which is determined previously in the form of a national economic plan and thereafter realized in the economic development as a result of a conscious and productive activity directed at the realization of the plan by the entire society.

K. Marx stated that production can be realized in any social structure only in conformity with determined correlations specific for every structure and existing between the different branches and stages of it. At the different phases of development of the society, nevertheless, this proportionality can be realized by different ways. At the early stages of historical development, when social production is divided by private property to different isolated groups linked to each other through the market, i.e. by means of purchase and sale of goods, the proportionality is established in an instinctive and anarchic way, which means - independently of the will and the consciousness of the producers - behind their backs, with the help of the market mechanism. An important element of such a proportionality of social development are the periodical crises of over-production - the complete ones embracing the whole economy of the country, as well as the particular ones, covering certain branches of the economy.

Thus, in a society where the private forms (simple and capitalist-ic) of property dominate the means of production, the economic development can be realized entirely only instinctively, and not in a planned way, the main regulator of such a development can be only the market, not at all the national plan. All attempts to plan the development of such an economy in its entirety, and not at the level of its different branches and groups, are therefore condemned, as a matter of course, to failure. This is testified by the long-year experiences of the developed capitalist and developing countries.

At a given stage of development of the forces of production in the society, however, the instinctive market mechanism forming the general economic proportions proves to be insufficient, not satisfying the requirements of a steady economic and social development. This is not revealed in all branches at once, but only step-by-step, in accordance with the increase in it of the social character of the forces of production. We understand under the social character of the forces of production an organic interdependence (economic and technological) between the different groups and stages of production. At early stages this interdependence is limited by the different enterprises, but later on it overgrows them and covers whole groups of companies, even whole branches, beginning at the national, and later on continuing till the international scale. In the economic plan the increase of the social character of the forces of production is accompanied by the amalgamation and a modification of the forms of property: from small working properties into small capitalist, thereafter into large capitalist corporations (share-capital), which in their turn grow into monopolies - private and state properties.

In the framework of a certain property the main regulator of production is no more the market mechanism, but the plan, and the instinctive development has changed into a planned one. Thus, already during capitalism, in the framework of the different monopolies - state and private ones, national or international ones - appears a definite objective pre-condition for planning: the partial planning (when it covers only certain groups of the economy). What concerns the whole economy, the rates and proportions

continue to form themselves in an instinctive way. The necessity of regularity within the economy, as it was stated by V. I. Lenin, appears at a high standard of development of the forces of production, namely at its mechanical stage.¹²⁷ This means that under the circumstances of small handicraft and semi-handicraft production realized in small private enterprises, which work for the same local market, the regularity of production was constrained only within these enterprises and was absent beyond their bounds: at the level of branches and even more at the level of the entire economy.

The whole regularity of plans, i.e. the regularity at the level of the entire economy of the country, appears only then and there when and where the up-to-date forces of production, being already by their character social, change into social forces of production and really - with other terms -, when they join in the social form of property which covers all crucial branches of the economy and begin to be the dominant and determining course of development within the whole economy. The planned development of the economy, becomes, consequently, possible and necessary only in socialism where all basic forces of production are in the hands of the state which intervenes in the name of the society and in its interests, as its principal governing agent, or in the hands of the cooperative associations of producers whose activity is also regulated and directed by the national state.

In the bourgeois economic science there is no notion for the regulated economic development. And this is also logic as it considers the national planning only as a variety of the economic activities of the state which does not need specific conditions, and pre-requisites in the economy itself and which is possible everywhere where the competent state organs exist - corresponding to the required levels and quality.

Beside the entire regularity, i.e. the objective pre-requisite of a successful planning at the level of the whole economy, the Marxist economic science considers it necessary to dispose of certain subjective pre-requisites or conditions, too, i.e. of pre-requisites which are already found in the conscious acting of people and depend directly on them. To the category of such pre-requisites belong first of all the existence of a special social organ or system of organs responsible for the establishing of plans and exercising a supervision on their realization. Further on, it is important that these organs could not only compose successfully the plans, but also really and efficiently regulate and manage in accordance with them the whole course of the social development.

An important subjective pre-requisite of planning is the consciousness of the people who realize the production process, the necessity and usefulness of planning and their real wish to carry out the plans. This, however, is possible only when the plans reflect in a real, and not only formal way the interests of all the participants of the social production. First of all let us mention the managers of the production, as, in order to ensure the success of the plans it is extremely important that the ordinary participants would at least not be against the plans and planning itself.

The regularity supposes the substitution of the instinctively functioning mechanism concerning the regulation of the productive proportions and rates of the economic growth by the conscious activity of man. (During the first times the market can be maintained and play a definite role in the regulation of the production, but only as an aid to the plan and as a supplement to it.) This activity, and consequently the plans themselves must reflect in a correct way the objective conditions of production: its aims and, accordingly, the basic production proportions. The scientific character of planning and plans, their objective character are considered in the Marxist economic science as one of the most important subjective pre-

requisites of planning. The last in our enumeration, but not the last to its importance, of the most important subjective pre-requisites is the political stability in the country, this being an indispensable condition of any normal economic development.

As it is obvious from the previous chapters, the bourgeois economists are now occupied with the elaboration of the subjective pre-requisites of the national planning in the developing countries. Nevertheless, only these pre-requisites, without regularity and planning, can represent just the roof of planning, without walls and foundation.

The whole previous analysis of the African planning testifies that on this continent the objective and - in a sufficient degree - the subjective conditions are missing what concerns a successful realization of national plans of development.

In an economic plan first of all one must take into account the low level of the development of the forces of production on the continent. In all branches working for the domestic market, up to now the small and smallest enterprises of handicraft type, satisfying in the majority of cases only the local demands, and even those not completely, are prevailing in Africa. In agriculture a high share is occupied by natural and semi-natural peasant cultures - up to 40 to 50 per cents of the gross output of the branch. It is known that only in certain branches of the African industry, and first of all in the output of minerals, exist large and up-to-date companies. Apparently, only in the industries which have a national and even international importance does exist on the continent a certain necessity of a planned and regular development.

Further, the prevailing social-economic forms of development in the African economy include different varieties of the small group and individual private (working and capitalist) property. The national state sector is in the majority of countries extremely insignificant. Only there where progressive anti-capitalist transformations are carried out, can its role and importance grow progressively, as required by the development of the economy of the countries. In the framework of the state sector there exists in a certain degree a socialization (collectivization) of the production, and consequently, certain possibilities of a regular planned development are given.

An overwhelming part of the African economy is up to now in the hands of the large international monopolies, respectively it is controlled by them, i.e. it is also socialized in a certain degree, but in the interests of these monopolies and not for the sake of the African countries.

Accordingly, certain possibilities of a balanced development in the African economy exist only in the framework of the state sector, on the one hand, and in the companies of the international monopolies, on the other. These two kinds of possibilities are qualitatively and quantitatively incommensurable and incomparable, as the state sector is limited by the state boundaries, whereas the foreign companies are international, however, their planned development is limited by the frames of control of the different monopolies. The most important is that the interests of the national states and those of the international monopolies are contrary, therefore the unification in a single national plan of the state sector and the foreign companies could not lead to the success of a plan.

Therefore, in its entirety, the African economy and the majority of its industries cannot develop in an other way than instinctively and anarchically thus, the constant failures of the national plans with the help of which the governments try to outline and realize rates and basic proportions of the economic growth of their countries.

The instinctive character of the African economies is deepened due to their strong dependence on the international capitalist market. In

the majority of the countries about a half to two-thirds of the production is exported. A similar share is composed on the domestic market by the imported goods. If the state is capable of regulating in a certain measure the local production on the domestic market, the international capitalist market - exception made for a few cases - is beyond its influence. The commerce carried out with the socialist countries, which could in principle be realized in accordance with the national plans, does not play a relatively significant role for the majority of the continent's countries.

Thus, it is possible to stress three basic reasons for the failures of the African planning. Firstly, let us mention the low level of development of the forces of production and the general social-economic backwardness. Secondly, the low level of development in the state sector in the economy of the majority of countries. Thirdly, the economic dependence of the continent on the imperialist countries which appears as the direct domination of the international monopolies in one part and as the financial and commercial control on the other part, as well as in the foreign trade attachments of the economy in its entirety to the economy of the developed capitalist states.

Quite all the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph - by which the bourgeois economists try to clear up the failures concerning the African planning - are indeed only the particular manifestations of these three radical (fundamental) reasons. For instance, the low level in the development of the forces of production and the small share of the state sector in the economy determine the majority of failures and weaknesses in the latter's activity, as well as the unsatisfactory situation of the national economy. Other failures in the activity of the state sector and of the state apparatus are directly linked to the social backwardness of the African countries.

The extremely strong dependence of agriculture on the natural and climatic conditions represents also a striking illustration of its technical backwardness, and its high proportion in the whole economy - the under-development of all other branches and first of all of the industry.

The political instability on the continent can be explained first of all by the generally low level of the social development in the African countries, as well as by their economic and political dependence on the imperialist states.

Even the high-reaching ambition of the majority of the African plans, besides purely political and subjective reasons, has completely defined objective economic reasons. This is first of all the proper economic backwardness of the continent and the objective necessity of its liquidation within a possibly short delay.

Thus, in Africa nowadays only in the framework of the state sector exist determined objective and subjective pre-requisites for the national planning (i.e. being in the national interests of these countries). What concerns the private sector and the economy in its entirety, at the present time there can be only the question of making prognostics on the possible directions and rates of development which could be a common basis for the elaboration and realization of the particular programme concerning the development of the state sector.

Nevertheless, it would not be correct to exaggerate at the present time the real possibilities of planning in the development of the state sector in the greatest part of the African countries. First of all, even the state sector represents, as a rule, only a small part of the entire economy developing in an instinctive way. And this sector is submitted inevitably to this instinctiveness. Moreover, the state and semi-state companies in the majority of the African countries do not represent a united economic

complex. These companies appeared as a supplement and appendage to the private sector. Therefore their independent development, and consequently the planning of this development is practically impossible.

Secondly, besides the branches of the economic infrastructure and the few up-to-date industrial enterprises, built up in the recent years, the state sector in all its parts includes a multitude of small handicraft enterprises of local size which cannot be successfully managed from a unique national centre because of their character.

Thirdly, the organizational-economic structure of the state sector itself which reflects the above mentioned economic particularities has a character which does not favour the execution of unified long-term programmes of development. The majority of enterprises are amalgamated into economically and legally autonomous companies and corporations which carry out their investment and production activities independently of the governments and are guided in their functioning - similarly to the private companies - first of all by the conjuncture.

And finally, fourthly, in numerous state-owned companies the national private and foreign state and private capital participates in a large degree. (We do not include into the state sector the enterprises where the state is the minor share-holder, whilst private capital is its effective owner). This fact limits even more the possibilities of an efficient government control and regulation of their activities, in accordance with the plans.

Under such circumstances in the state sector of the majority of the African countries there are determined objective features which block the successful execution of the development plans. Strictly speaking, at present in Africa there exist certain possibilities concerning the planning of state investments, however, not of the whole development of the state sector, and above all possibilities in the field of the state investment programme which is financed on the account of the foreign economic and technical assistance of the more developed states.

Only in the countries which progress on the non-capitalist way of development - the UAR, Algeria, Tanzania etc. - could the wide national-democratic transformations eliminate in a considerable measure the above enumerated defects of the state sector, which however were wholly maintained in the countries of capitalist orientation. Thereafter, at our opinion, there are here more advantageous possibilities for the planning of the development in the whole state sector.

Nevertheless, the question arises: why did appear on the African continent and in other regions of the "third world" and why did relatively quickly expand the practice of composing general development plans for which there were no favourable objective and subjective pre-requisites? The common reason of such a phenomenon is, in our view, concealed by the ability of politics to tear off from economy, for the plans established by the state are always and first of all political documents. There must be obviously a lot of concrete reasons for a similar isolation of politics from the economy in this form in Africa. The most important are beyond all question the general economic, political and ideological dependence of the majority of African states on the developed capitalist countries. It is exactly the result of such a dependence which contributed to the expansion in Africa of the bourgeois methodology and methods of planning. The illegitimate efforts to forward the practice of the socialist planning into the African soil played also a certain role. The possibilities of such a transference were concluded, however, in the bourgeois methodology of planning which considered it as a politically, socially and economically neutral phenomenon.

The national plans of development, further, began to play the role of political programmes and slogans of the social groups coming to power

which, especially in the first times, need the support of the population. This role is apparently more important for numerous national governments than their direct appointment - to serve as a compass for the economic development of the country. This is the reason why on the continent in the past years a quantity of prestige plans made their appearance, counting on a certain "propaganda" effect, and not at all on the real execution. Finally, it is not without reason that many bourgeois economists, well acquainted with the practice of planning in Africa and in other developing countries, consider that many plans came to light only with the calculation that the developed countries would offer an economic assistance. And we have to note that from this aspect the plans of a whole series of African states worked out up to now not so badly.

Thus, the national development plans in Africa appeared first of all as political "propaganda" documents, as well as means enabling to attract into the country the foreign economic aid and they were not real stimulators and regulators of the economic development, in spite of the fact that certain illusions were enough largely spread on the continent, in particular in the first half of the 60's in broad strata of the African intellectuals. We do not think that such illusions were spread all over the African politicians and planning economists from the very beginning, as they were indirectly linked to the planning process itself.

The director of the Research Institute of Development Problems in Sussex (England), D. Seers affirms in his lecture held at the above-mentioned conference on "Planning Crisis" that nowadays in the developing countries a "pseudoplanning" is reigning.¹²⁸ And we could agree at this point, as the development plans appeared up to now in effect not in order to carry out their natural role, but in order to serve the two above-mentioned political and economic aims which occupy within a normal planning only a subordinated role as compared to the main situation. However, we do not agree with the prescriptions of transforming this pseudo-planning into a real planning which are included in the lecture of D. Seers and which were explained in the previous paragraph in their main features. According to our views, their realization cannot modify in any essential measure the situation concerning planning in the developing countries, as they are based on incorrect methodologic principles of the bourgeois political economy.

Which are the longest-range and realistic ways of transforming the pseudo-planning in Africa into a real planning of the national economy; we have not the possibilities to dwell at length on this intricate problem not yet elaborated by the Marxist economic science, therefore we outline only the principal directions of the process.

The real planning of the development in the whole economy, i.e. the formulation in the plans and the realization by means of the state's economic policy of the basic proportions and rates of its development, represent a characteristic feature of the more developed social-economic systems, as those existing at the present time in Africa. Its appearance on the continent could be only the result of a whole complex of social-economic and technical transformations. In other words, such a planning is the cause of a very distant future.

However, partial planning is already possible now, from the point of view of theory and practice, in the framework of the state sector and in particular of the state's investments activity in the majority of the African states; at our opinion, its development and improvement are necessary and merit the main attention of the African governments and planners.

The principal direction of this development and improvement is first of all the elimination of the defects and weaknesses in the state sec-

tor and in the entire state economic activity of the government which were mentioned here above and which lead to the appearance of instinctiveness in the given spheres of economic relations in the African countries.

Firstly, the state sector should gradually cover all leading branches of the economy having a national, respectively international importance. It is not only a question of nationalization, but of the development of different type cooperatives controlled and managed in their activities by the state. Such a cooperative could, due to its nature, affiliate the state sector being its organic part. Such a process, incidentally, is already in course in numerous countries of the continent.

Secondly, a certain centralization must be carried out in the administration of the state sector enabling the central state organ to define the strategy of its development, leaving to the enterprises and their associations only an operative autonomy. Such a centralization has been observed during the recent years in some countries (the ARE, Algeria, Tanzania).

Thirdly, the central planning organ must be at the same time the controlling organ as to the realization of the national plans. In the first times when the economic levers and stimuli are weak - those being used by the national state in the direction of the state sector's development, as it is done nowadays in the majority of the African countries -, the programmes of the state sector must be chiefly of a directive character. In conformity with the increase of the size and the effectiveness of the economic and other stimuli, the role and the size of the directives in the state's economic policy could change in the field of the state sector. However, at the given moment the directive programme have considerable advantages under the circumstances of the African economy as compared to the purely indicative ones. The widening of their directive character is also in course in some countries which follow the non-capitalist way of development.

Fourthly, it is necessary to deepen permanently the scientific basis of the state programmes and to consider in them all fundamental tendencies of the economic and political development in the given country and beyond its frontiers.

Fifthly, the whole financial activity of the state organs must be re-orientated in order to ensure that in its centre would be the realization of the development plan. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the proper contents of these plans would be modified, they cease to have an investment character and the current, in particular the production expenses become an object of planning and of investments as well. We consider that it is incorrect from the theoretical and economic points of view to make such a sharp distinction between these two types of economic expenditures, as it is done at the present time in the African countries.

Sixthly, certain changes are necessary at the international scale, too, as they could contribute to the weakening of the uncertainty and unsteadiness in financment (in the first times, furtheron in the whole activity) of the state sector. First of all it is a question of the development practice of the long-term economic agreements with the developed capitalist countries, similarly to those already concluded with the socialist countries on the basis of which the financing and realization of entire development programmes concerning the state sector might be founded, however, not separate specific drafts and projects. The stabilization of the world raw-material prices, furtheron, might also create more favourable conditions for the realization of the state programmes in the developing countries. However, stabilization represents a part of the general intensification of the national states' control on the foreign trade of their own countries. We think that

at present there are sufficiently favourable conditions for the realization of similar actions at the international scale.

What concerns the private sector where the development planning seems to be at the given moment impossible, the strategy of the national state could cover the development and improvement of the mechanism of its current regulation and stimulation. Principally the aim of such a mechanism should be the limitation of the spontaneity in the development of the private enterprise and its submission to the national interests.

At the light of the above-mentioned arises the question of the sort reserved to the up-to-date general plans of development. There is no sense to refuse their elaboration, this is obvious, however, the character and the role of the different programmes require changes. At the methodological level it is important to divide them into two categories: programme-plans and programme-prognostics. The first ones are linked to the field of the economy where the state is in a position to regulate them with efficiency, the second ones join the entire economy and all the other spheres of the economic activity. At the present time only the programmes of the state investments can become programme-plans. By the way, all the other chapters of the African plans are - considering their character - at the very moment simple prognostics, therefore the question is only to bring their formal status in harmony to their effective situation. Such programme-prognostics might play a threefold role: they contribute to the development of the general strategy within the economic development which requires the covering of the whole economy; they develop the theory and the practice of the economic forecasting itself, as well as contribute to the intensification of the efficiency of the state regulation concerning the development of the private economy's sector and the external economic relations.

The overgrowing of such prognostics into real programme-plans begins on the ways of the following strictly interdependent social-economic processes: the growth of the state sector and its transformation into the leading sector of the economy covering all its key branches; the establishing and developing of a mechanism of state regulation in the private sector which might be in a position enabling to form all basic directions and parametres of its activity; the general acceleration of the economic growth and the liquidation of the economic backwardness (incidentally, this last mentioned process will in its turn stimulate both firstly mentioned processes); the progressive decrease of the external economic dependence whose most important elements are exploitation which submits the developing countries to the international monopolies, and the unsteadiness of their external economic relations. Nevertheless, all these processes will be possible, as it is shown by practice, only in the conditions of progressive anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist political and social-economic transformations as well in the countries themselves, as beyond their boundaries, on the international scene.

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STUDIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

REVIEWS

V. G. Solodovnikov: Afrika vybiraet put'. (Africa Chooses Its Road)
Moscow, 1970. Izd. Nauka, 237 p.

Ever since the young states of the Black Continent took off on the historic road to independent national existence, the direction, tempo and the detours of their progress, in fact their entire search for direction have become the themes of international specialized and political literature. Works analyzing the first era of autonomous national existence and searching for the perspectives of tomorrow have drawn a broad scale of conclusions. This wide variety of judgement on changes taken place under identical historical circumstances stem from sharp differences in the development of the peoples of Africa, despite the identical nature of the colonial past, and from differences of opinion and method on the part of the researchers themselves.

The literature analyzing the possibilities for development in Africa has recently become enriched by the work of Professor V. G. Solodovnikov, director of the Africa Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, a volume appearing, unfortunately, in Russian only.

This work by Solodovnikov is more than simply one of the series of books on this subject, for in his approximation of the subject, his analysis of it, in the sources of his conclusions and with respect to publication of his conclusions he has completed an outstanding study of modern Africanism, and this is particularly true for the field studying the economic problems of this scientific branch.

This work has merited this outstanding position principally for its method, and the consistently applied historical perspective. Professor Solodovnikov seeks the pillars of support in order to understand contemporary problems by examining the past; he seeks those historical roots from which "special African development" has grown, a jungle of problems often opaque and impenetrable.

This largest single land unit of the "third world", within or despite the great geographical unity, is a mass of questions in a multitude of graded shades, differing from one another in many features, sometimes openly contradictory, and requires new forms and methods in research, analysis and drawing scientific conclusion. The contemporary economic and social problems of present day Africa are not newly born. Their roots reach back into the long-gone 16th century, and densely entwine the land which Europe, through its slave trade, deprived of hundreds of millions of creative, intelligent and working hands. The land was divided, redivided and its resources gave an impetus to the development of foreign powers, while the conquered land was influenced in a determining manner along with its

native societies, and underwent a development distorted and forced upon it by the Europeans.

Africa's present day problems must be viewed as cause complexes developed historically, and therefore it is obvious that it is impossible to understand them without viewing them in historical perspective.

In his examination of the tomorrow of Africa Professor Solodovnikov consistently takes into consideration the processes operating since the 16th century, problems which either in existing or in vestige form, have decisive importance in the present day life of society and the economy.

The first catastrophe, the effects of which can be felt to this very day, was slave trade. Professor Solodovnikov reinforces the opinion of the sphere of Africa scholars who have marked the long-over slave trade as one of the factors decisive in forming the present situation in Africa. He used new data and new ideas to do this.

Slave trade deprived the Black Continent of one of the most important elements of the forces of production, of human manpower, to a degree limiting the possibilities of development to the minimum. And while the withdrawal of manpower forced Africa into centuries of stagnation, in America the black manpower robbed from Africa became one of the driving forces of the development of capitalism, and one of the means of the accumulation of capital.

Solodovnikov marked the permanently operating affects of the slave trade in the following: "It is more than a matter of an enormous loss of people, running to about 100 million. The slave trade changed the historical development of the peoples of the continent. It caused internal wars and created possibilities for the formation of slave-holding states, etc.; it destroyed the family and production. The slave trade weakened the resistance of the peoples of Africa against the colonialists ..." (10. p.).

The mention of colonial wars indicated another turning point in the history of the African peoples, a point which also had decisive affect on further development. However, before reviewing the analysis of the results of colonialization given by Professor Solodovnikov, which receives a separate part of the book, we would like to make several observations on the relationship between the heritage of African backwardness and the slave trade.

Although Professor Solodovnikov gives a broad scale summary the phenomena caused by slave trade, which held back and distorted economic and social development, he does not analyze several historical trends which we have recognized as having had very strong effects.

The author views only one side of the stagnation and retrograde development of the forces of production and that is the situation caused by the removal of manpower from the continent, despite the fact that in addition to the removal of manpower the majority of the population remaining in Africa were forced among natural and living conditions which paralyzed the forces of production, and limited the native population to ancient cultivation and to giving up the achievements of civilization.

The most advanced cultivation, as in the ancient civilizations, developed in river valleys, and on the seaside, in areas which easily ensured the maintenance of life, for they were both fertile and suitable for transportation. It was precisely because of suitability for transportation and the easy approximation that the peoples long settled and having attained a comparatively high level of production were most exposed to the danger of slaving expeditions. It was natural that this uncertainty forced many tribes and peoples to leave the ancient "civilized" areas, opening a new stage in the history of the migrations of the peoples of Africa. It appears that in this forced migration the springs driving historical migrations operat-

ed to only a slight extent, and the directions it took, and the settlement sites were determined principally by security considerations. The new settlement, assumed to be secure was objectively far from roads and rivers, and forest area, where land cultivation, and, due to a lack of basic raw materials, most of the handicrafts known until that time had to be given up, for continuation was impossible under the natural conditions. This circumstance caused a catastrophic fall in the forces of production, which became rigidified at the deep point for a long period of time, and changed the essence of the African economy. Taken together, all these factors should be viewed as a complex of determining causes for the economic and social development of the peoples of Africa.

Another effect operating on the long range was the trend taken by the lives of the peoples establishing business relations with the Europeans through the slave trade. In the lives of the peoples procuring slaves productive work lost its primary role of maintaining existence, and providing incentives to social development. Generally the tribes hunting "live goods" for the European traders maintained themselves in part through the payment received for the slaves and in part from the bounty gained as by-products of their slave hunting campaigns. In this way they attained a state of comparative welfare without productive work. This state also had an unfavourable influence on the development of the forces of production in the areas inhabited by these peoples.

The points reviewed above, in our opinion, would have made the analysis completed by the author on historical basis, more complete.

According to Solodovnikov's data, modern imperialist colonialization was no smaller catastrophe than the slave trade with respect to the loss of human lives, and to cutting down the human creative elements in the forces of production. In fact with colonialization the cumulative era of genocide struck the peoples of Africa. In 1900 the population of the French Congo was estimated as 12 to 15 million. By 1921 only 2.8 million people lived in this area. The population of the Belgian Congo dropped from 30 million in 1884 to 15 million in 1915. This enormous loss of human life did not fully stem from direct brutality, but from the barbarianism of colonial administration striving for profits which reduced the output of foods, and drove the populations to extreme physical effort through forced labour while at the same time they took no measures to protect their health. The colonial wars of robbery also took enormous sacrifice. The European powers made war on the peoples of Africa with intentions of territorial conquest on a total of 121 occasions, and these campaign cost 5.3 million native lives.

The liberation battles of the peoples of Africa and the first stage of this struggle took place on the battlefields of the wars of conquest. The masses defending themselves instinctively, or military organization on as high a level as e.g. was the army of Imaun Samori, carried out military actions which introduced the era of the national liberation fights in the form of defensive war. The outcome of these battles was predetermined by the technical difference between the opposing sides and the circumstance emphasized by Professor Solodovnikov, that the Africans had no allies in this battle.

The first "ally" of the struggling peoples of Africa was the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat, Marxism-Leninism, which disclosed the world historic importance of the anti-imperialist fight taking place in Africa, from the points of the oppressed, fighting people and from that of the international revolutionary working class movement as well.

The ideological aid of the proletariat become concrete and strengthened following the victory of the Russian Socialist Revolution. With the liberation of the peoples under the oppression of Tzarist Russia the

October Revolution became an example to the world on how to solve the colonial question. The forces of the victorious revolution which caused a global crisis of imperialism and imperialist colonial policy, became historical allies to the peoples struggling for their freedom.

The peoples of Africa understood the message of the October Revolution, they recognized the importance and perspectives of ideological allies. Hardly a few months following the victory of the October Revolution, in 1917 and 1918 communist groups were organized in Egypt, and at the other end of the continent, in the Union of South Africa. The October spark set off the fire of anti-imperialist battle in Africa: in 1919 and 1921 there was armed uprising in Egypt against the colonialists. In these battles the Communist Party of Egypt declared its anti-imperialist platform; in 1921 the people of Morocco rose against the French and Spanish oppressors; in 1918 and 1922 there were many anti-imperialist uprisings organized in Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra-Leone, Dahomey, and demonstrations in the Cameroon and Togo. October awoke them. And it not only woke up the people but showed them a direction. The October Revolution has become an organic part in the political history of Africa and in the process of its national liberation battles.

The author leads the reader through the continuation of the national liberation struggles, through the economic crisis of the 1920's.

All that took place on the Black Continent between the two world wars, that is the changes in the internal structure of society, the economy and political schooling, had a decisive role on the further course of the liberation struggles, in this final stage of the fight begun simultaneously against the colonialists. The author views this period as an historical era in which Leninist ideology became a historical reality in creating the unified anti-imperialist front. The world political basis for this reality was socialism, formed into a world system following World War II.

The battle for independence fought on different fronts, in different forms and with a differing ratio of participation of social classes led to the year of Africa, to the historical date which marks the independence of Africa. But the many decade long struggle for national independence, as the author indicates in the opening sentence of his first chapter, was not ended with the winning of political independence, but only changed in form. All those problems accumulated in the centuries of contact with Europe, condensed into the colonial era, were still unsolved when political independence was won. As the consequence of colonial economic policy the young independent states were vulnerable from many sides. In the majority of the former African colonies modern industrial production did not exist. Agriculture was paralyzed by the limits stemming from monocultural output, mixed with the contradictions of feudal conditions existing to differing degrees. The colonial era formed the colonial type of society, which hindered economic and social progress. With methodical eradication of national culture and tradition, and rejection of education and skilled training on the part of colonial administration, the cultural situation which stood throughout the continent was one which could and can only be eliminated by enormous effort on the part of the national governments and the peoples of the politically independent countries.

Realization of those economic tasks which are essential in the interests of the development of Africa, in the opinion of the author, can only be ensured by a deep-reaching social reorganization. In order to attain an efficient rise in the forces of production the industrialization programme which must be elaborated and executed step by step, is one which is capable of ensuring the continuous rise in the industrial forces of pro-

duction. Industrialization cannot be exhausted with construction of one or two, or ten or twenty new factories. Much more is needed in Africa; the basis for industrialization must be created. This includes, e.g. the expansion and modernization of technical training and the training of experts for the programme of industrialization. And as to just how much they must start from scratch, this is illustrated by the author by a statement made by the President of Zambia: "I do not know if everyone knows", said President Kaunda, "that in 1964, when our country became independent we had only 1200 young men and women with secondary educations and 100 persons with university diplomas in all the land ..."

The requirement of economic development is no less in agriculture despite the fact that almost all of the African countries were "agricultural" in nature throughout all of their colonial pasts. Today the majority must begin on the road to modern agricultural output from the conditions of natural economies.

Development requires an enormous concentration of forces, and there is a commanding force in the endeavour which would move Africa to rise above the role of "village of the world" in which it was placed by the capitalist division of labour, holding it responsible for supplies of agricultural products and raw materials.

In addition to the problems emphasized in this review the author completes an analysis of the present economic and social difficulties on a broad scale, as well as of those circumstances which limit the stronger growth of the African proletariat and solution to the national question on a social basis. The obstacles in the road of the independent African countries were constructed by the colonial era. This heritage ensured the colonialists of yesterday and the United States of America the maintenance of economic dependency even under the changed political conditions.

Today the colonialists of yesterday approach the independent countries with new forms and methods of colonialism. This policy of the capitalist powers caused the second stage of the liberation struggle, the battle against economic dependency.

What phenomena ensure the existence and intensive activities of colonialism in Africa?

First of all, and most noticeably there is the capitalist control of the rich raw material resources of the continent. The raw materials produced at a deficit in Africa, which are also highly important strategically, go almost exclusively to the capitalist world market. In 1967 e.g. over 80 per cent of the exports of the African countries were to the developed capitalist countries. The data published by the author on the withdrawal ratio of certain raw materials from Africa show a shocking annihilation of the basis of industrialization and the conservation of poverty regulated by the "price scissors". Under the external control of the economies of the developing African countries, as great as the one being completed by the imperialist powers political independence can become no more than an illusion.

The willingness and endeavours on the part of the capitalist countries of today to invest capital also express the strivings of neo-colonialism. The capitalist enterprises operating in the developing countries, and in particularly the new ones founded for conscious reasons, operate to maintain economic dependency, and to spread and reinforce it, in all of their activity. This is why full nationalization of capitalist interests and enterprises is particularly important for the developing countries in order to win and hold their economic and political independence.

In the next part of the chapter the author gives a detailed analysis of the scope of the withdrawal of capital, its trends and consequences; of the role of the monetary zones deepening the political division of the con-

continent in the new methods of colonialism; of the role of the ideological, anti-communist campaign in the system of neo-colonialism which would force development to take the capitalist road under historical conditions when other roads to development are also possible.

In the fifth chapter the author views the possibilities and perspectives of this "other" road. He bases himself on the historical determining fact that capitalism did not develop in Africa through the laws of its own internal development, but instead, these production relations were forced on the conquered populations by the colonialists. Capitalism was of an "imported" nature in African society and was wedged into the historical process of the development of African society as a foreign body. Reinforcement of capitalist conditions in the presence of the external medium of imperialism resulted in a new "special" form of development on the part of the independent African countries, the formation of the comprador type of capitalist neo-colonialism, which instead of national tasks, serves the interests of the foreigners managing it, and this causes a newer contradiction in the development of society since in the present era the factors determining the normal capitalist development of society no longer exist.

However, there is another possible and realistic road open to the independent countries of Africa: the non-capitalist road to development. The non-capitalist road to development has been filled with many definitions of content, and many variations of the interpretation of this term can be found in professional literature. For this reason the author considers it necessary to give a concrete definition of the meaning of the term. This is that: "The non-capitalist road to socialism is the road of continuous transformation and the establishment of the prerequisites of socialism, for the complete victory of socialism".

The possibility of a non-capitalist road to development has been proven by history decades ago, and today the Leninist theory of revolution on the transformation of pre-capitalist societies has become practice and the reality of our era.

This development of course requires concentrated social effort and in accordance with the size and importance of the tasks to be solved, it contains many problems and difficulties, but this is the only road on which the people of Africa can advance towards political and economic independence, and this is the only road through which they can solve their internal, and among these their national problems, and become parts of the international anti-imperialist revolutionary movement.

The peoples of Africa can count on the unselfish and far-reaching aid of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in the enormous efforts which they must make for their tomorrow. The final chapter of Professor Solodovnikov's book analyzes the relationship between the Soviet Union and the independent countries of Africa.

Just as the homeland of the victorious revolution of the proletariat gave the people of Africa their first support in the struggles against the colonialists, the African countries which became independent following World War II also received their first aid which truly served their own development from the Soviet Union, in both material and moral form. The technical and scientific aid, the political work in the interests of the developing countries, completed at the forums of world organizations and in the establishment of an entire series of institutions completing research into the problems of the developing countries, in both volume and ideals show the efforts and the aid given by the Soviet Union for the future of an independent and free Africa.

In this brief review, we were unfortunately unable to go into a

detailed description of the data and arguments of Professor Solodovnikov, and had to satisfy ourselves with simply emphasizing his methods and point of view, which we hope to be able to welcome as an undertaking which will create a school of its own.

We would particularly like to call the attention of our readers to the appendix to the volume. It provides thorough information on the history of Africa from the late 19th century to the present, using illustrative tables and data. The manner in which the appendix is constructed, and the grouping of the data gives a clear picture of not only the historical turning points of the past, but of the African popular, national, and working class movements' perspectives as well.

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