

People's China

人民中国

August 1, 1950

On Establishing Guerrilla Bases

— Mao Tse-tung

The PLA Policy for War Prisoners

— Chiu Kang

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— Kim Seng Yong

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Intellectuals and Land Reform—Ouyang Tsai-wei

Vol. II

PUBLISHED IN PEKING



People's China

This journal appears on the 1st and 16th of each month. All correspondence should be addressed to: 26, Kuo Hui Chieh, Peking, China. Entered as first-class printed matter at the General Post Office of North China, Dec. 20, 1949.

Editor: Chiao Kuan-hua

Vol. 2, No. 3

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SUBSCRIPTION RATES

(Postage Included)

| | One Year (24 issues) | Six Months (12 issues) |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| U.S.A. and Canada | US \$4.00 | US \$2.20 |
| British Commonwealth and Empire | £1, —s. | £ — 11s. |
| U.S.S.R. | 15 Rubles | 8 Rubles |
| India, Malaya, Hong Kong | HK \$16.00 | HK \$8.80 |

Published by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China.

TWENTY-THREE GLORIOUS YEARS

The people throughout China are celebrating the Anniversary of their own glorious People's Liberation Army, which is 23 years old today.

Brilliantly led by the Chinese Communist Party, the PLA has delivered the Chinese people from the shackles of feudalism and imperialism and their agent — the corrupt Chiang Kai-shek regime. It is celebrating its first birthday since the founding of the People's Republic. It is preparing to complete its mission of liberation.

The PLA has travelled far since its birth in the historic Nanchang Uprising of 1927. The crushing defeat which the American imperialists have received at the hands of the PLA in their attempts to enslave the Chinese people through the quisling KMT, testifies to its prowess. The valour and striking power of the PLA are now household words in Asia and beyond. Today, it stands second only to the mighty Soviet Army as a weapon of the people in the struggle against aggression and for a lasting peace. It is a major bulwark of the peace front headed by the Soviet Union.

Learning from the bitter lessons of the betrayal of the Great Revolution of 1925-27, the Communist Party saw the necessity of an armed force of the people to fight its revolutionary battles. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has frequently quoted Generalissimo Stalin's famous dictum that "the characteristic of the Chinese Revolution is that an armed people opposes armed counter-revolution." History has fully confirmed what Chairman Mao foresaw in the formative years of the PLA, that "in China, if we give up armed struggle, there will be no place for the proletariat, no place for the people, no place for the Communist Party and no victory for the Revolution."

Twenty-three years ago, when the PLA, then known as the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, first began its long struggle against the reactionary forces that dominated the country, it was composed only of a few thousand indomitable fighters, deficient in equipment and with little experience. But it had the leadership of the Communist Party; it had the support of the people.

Schooled in the theory of Marxism-Leninism as applied to the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution by the Communist Party, the People's Army has been steeled in the early struggles in the Ten Years' Civil War, in the Anti-Japanese War and the War of Liberation. It has become a highly efficient, disciplined, modern military force, with a high level of revolutionary political consciousness, inspired with unshakeable faith in the people's cause. Its members have learned not only how to fight, but how to produce and study and serve the people in many capacities. This character of a People's Army has given it potentialities extending far beyond a purely military domain. The PLA has thus

been able to administer the great cities that were freed in rapid succession from the KMT during the War of Liberation. Many of the finest sons of the Chinese people, generals and civil administrators, intellectuals and organizers, have graduated through the ranks of the PLA.

When the War of Liberation began in 1946, the bourgeois strategists wrote the PLA off as no match for the American-backed KMT war machine. The PLA entered the struggle with 1,200,000 regular troops against the KMT's 4,300,000. Its material equipment was far inferior. Yet the KMT and its American masters have been driven from the mainland to their last hide-out in Taiwan. What was the 'secret' of this success?

It is that the PLA is a People's Army, fighting a People's War. This has been, in essence, a peasants' war for land reform, led by the proletariat — a war against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. This is why the PLA could grow from strength to strength with the full support of the peasantry forming more than 80 per cent of the country's entire population. This great mass force has had the brilliant strategic and tactical guidance of Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the PLA.

The Communist Party of China, under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, has nurtured the People's Army from the early days of guerrilla fighting up to the present in the principles of revolutionary military strategy. The PLA, to take but one example, has never allowed the enemy to dictate the type of warfare in which it must fight. As Comrade Chu Teh has phrased it: "The type of warfare in which we must fight is to be decided by the type of arms we possess." If the PLA is only prepared to fight guerrilla warfare and not positional warfare, it will fight guerrilla warfare. When the time is ripe for positional warfare, as in the Huaihai Campaign, the PLA will switch flexibly to positional warfare to administer decisive defeats on the enemy. The revolutionary military strategy and tactics of the PLA are based on the same Marxist-Leninist principles which, developed by the genius of Stalin, confounded the mechanized hordes of Hitler.

With Taiwan and Tibet yet to be liberated, the PLA continues to improve its fighting efficiency. The conspiracy of the American imperialists to prevent the People's Army from returning these territories to China only strengthens its determination to achieve their liberation at an earlier date. With 5,000,000 men under arms today, the PLA is resolved to defeat all the aggressive designs of American imperialism against China. It knows that in defeating these imperialist plans, it is assuring the peace of Asia, and of the world; and for this reason, it will enjoy the support of all the peace forces of the world.

THE U.S. WARMONGERS' FIASCO

The National Campaign Week against U.S. Aggression in Taiwan and Korea rises to its climax in China; as we go to press. Through editorials and lectures, posters and cartoons, political commentators and artists have broadcast the truth about the fiendish atrocities of the U.S. Army, the perfidy and machinations of the U.S. State Department, and the menace of American imperialism to world peace. The arrogant and fleshy U.S. warmongers are personified by the loud-mouthed Douglas MacArthur.

During this campaign, the righteous indignation of the Chinese people against the brutal U.S. invasion of Taiwan and Korea has expressed itself in energetic action. Patriotic pledges are pouring in from every part of the country. Workers and peasants undertake to increase production; the men of the PLA vow to fight still more determinedly for the liberation of Taiwan. The Chinese people know full well that their struggle and that of the Korean people is one and the same. The entire nation has steeled itself to support democratic Korea in its sacred war of self-defence and national liberation.

History has shown again in Korea, as in China, that the just cause will be triumphant. Victory goes to the people. The moral bankruptcy of the American imperialists is reflected in their military fiasco. With half-hearted naval and air support from Britain, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, and farcically flying the flag of the United Nations, MacArthur has vented his hatred of the

Asian peoples by wantonly bombing non-combatant Korean people as his invading troops retreat southwards from their 'no retreat' line.

It is from the mouths of U.S. prisoners-of-war and U.S. eye-witness reporters that we learn of the demoralization of his troops and their apathy to this aggressive war. In America itself, the half a million signatures already collected for the Stockholm Peace Appeal and the demonstrators in front of the White House are representative of the rising

and indignant voice of the real America which condemns the murderous acts of the Truman gang. Demonstrating their determination to persist in this war against all just-minded people, the U.S. imperialists have even rejected the mediation proposals of the Indian Premier.

With all its arrogance, the U.S. paper tiger has been torn to shreds before the eyes of the Asian peoples. With all its much publicized A-Bombs and H-bombs, its networks of espionage and sabotage, the paper tiger is no match for the clenched fist of a united people. With the leadership of the Soviet Union, the strength of the peace-loving peoples has mounted to an unprecedented level.

Over 200 million people throughout the world have put their names beneath the Stockholm Peace Appeal. Let the imperialists take heed! Behind each signature is a will to defend, with the last drop of one's blood, the independence and peace of one's fatherland — a will to defend a lasting world peace.



Drawing by Jack Chen

ON ESTABLISHING GUERRILLA BASES

MAO TSE-TUNG

Editor's note: As is universally known, without the People's Liberation Army led by the Chinese Communist Party and without its heroic and protracted struggles supported by the people, China's revolution could not have attained its present great victory and the Chinese People's Republic, founded as a result of the victory, could not have been born. However, the existence and development of the PLA was inseparable from the existence and development of guerrilla warfare and its bases. In this sense, we can say that the Chinese People's Republic has grown out of the guerrilla bases of the early days of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, in commemoration of the 23rd anniversary of the PLA, we are reprinting here a chapter of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN, written in May, 1938, in which he presents his brilliant theories and rich experiences regarding the establishment of guerrilla bases.

The third of the strategic problems in the guerrilla war against Japan is that of establishing bases. The necessity and importance of establishing bases arises from the protracted and cruel nature of the war. Because we must wait for a nationwide strategic counter-offensive to recover the occupied areas, the enemy front may, before this occurs, penetrate deeply into our country and cut it through the middle. The smaller part or even the greater part of our national territory may come under the enemy's control and become his rear. Launching a general guerrilla war in such vast enemy-occupied areas will transform the enemy's rear into his front-line, making it impossible for him to stop fighting anywhere in the areas he occupies. The guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear should be resolutely carried on as long as our strategic counter-offensive cannot be launched and the occupied areas cannot be recovered. Although the duration of this phase cannot be accurately determined, it will undoubtedly be rather long. This is what gives the war its protracted character.

At the same time, in order to protect his interests in the occupied areas, the enemy will certainly steadily intensify his counter-measures against the guerrilla fighting. Especially after his strategic offensive has stopped, he will suppress the guerrilla units very cruelly. Without bases, guerrilla warfare of such a protracted and cruel character cannot be maintained in the enemy's rear.

What are bases in guerrilla warfare? They are the strategic bases upon which guerrilla warfare relies in executing its strategic tasks, in preserving and developing itself and in annihilating and driving out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, all strategic tasks and war aims will be deprived of the foundation on which they rely for fulfilment. Fighting without a rear was originally a characteristic of guerrilla warfare waged behind the enemy's lines, for it was separated from its country's rear areas. But guerrilla warfare cannot exist and develop over a long period without bases. These bases, therefore, form the rear for guerrilla warfare.

Many peasant wars patterned upon *banditism** have occurred in history, but none achieved success. It is completely visionary to try to achieve victory by adopting *banditism* under the present day conditions of communications and technical progress. *Banditism* does exist among the impoverished peasantry, but when these concepts find reflection among the leaders of a guerrilla war, they turn into the idea of not wanting bases or of giving no importance to them. Therefore, expelling *banditism* from the minds of guerrilla leaders must be the pre-requisite for a policy of establishing bases. In any guerrilla war there arises the problem of wanting bases or not, of giving importance to bases or not, in other words, the problem of the struggle between the theory of having bases and that of *banditism*. To a certain extent, this must also be the case in the guerrilla war against Japan. Therefore, the ideological struggle against *banditism* is a stage that is unavoidable. Only by thoroughly overcoming *banditism*, and by proposing and carrying out the policy of establishing bases can we conduct protracted and sustained guerrilla warfare.

After explaining 'the necessity and importance of bases,' the following problems which arise in establishing bases must be recognized and solved. These problems are: the different kinds of bases, the guerrilla areas and the bases, the conditions for establishing bases, the consolidation and expansion of bases and the several kinds of encirclement involving the enemy and ourselves.

(1) The Different Kinds of Bases

In general, there are only three kinds of anti-Japanese guerrilla bases: bases in mountains, on plains, and around rivers, lakes, harbours and inlets.

Everybody understands the advantages of establishing bases in mountainous areas. The bases that are already established, or are being established or are about to be established in the Changpei, Wutai,

* *Banditism* — a term embracing the military principles of the type of warfare waged by roving bandits, as well as the ideology arising from such warfare.

Taihang, Tai, Yen and Mao mountains, etc., are cases in point. These bases constitute the sectors where the anti-Japanese guerrilla war can be most protracted and most sustained; these are the major fortresses of the Anti-Japanese War. Guerrilla warfare must be full developed and bases must be established in all the mountainous areas in the enemy's rear.

The plains are, of course, somewhat inferior in this respect to mountainous areas. But it is certainly not impossible to develop guerrilla warfare there, nor is it impossible to establish bases in such regions. Extensive guerrilla warfare has already been developed on the Hopei plains and in the northern and north-western parts of Shantung. This proves that guerrilla warfare can be developed on the plains. At present nobody can prove whether it is possible or not to establish long-term bases on the plains. But in regard to temporary bases and bases for small army units and seasonal bases, it is already proven that the former — temporary bases — can be set up, while the latter are also feasible. This is because, on the one hand, the enemy does not have sufficient troops for adequate distribution and these forces are carrying out an unprecedentedly barbarous policy; on the other hand, China possesses vast areas of land and has tremendous numbers of people to resist Japan. These, taken together, are the objective conditions permitting the plains to develop guerrilla warfare and establish temporary bases. If one adds the condition of having a suitable command, then of course we can say that it is possible to establish long-term but mobile bases for small army units. As a rule, when the enemy concludes his strategic offensive and turns to the stage of preserving the occupied areas, brutal offensives will undoubtedly be launched against all guerrilla bases, but first of all against those on the plains. At that time it will be impossible for large guerrilla detachments active on the plains to fight for very long in their original localities. In accordance with circumstances, they must gradually withdraw into the mountainous areas, for instance, withdraw from the Hopei plains to the Wutai and Taihang mountains and withdraw from the Shantung plains to Tai Mountain and Chiaotung Peninsula. But under the conditions of a national war, one cannot say there is no possibility of maintaining many small guerrilla units scattered in all counties of the vast plains and of adopting mobile warfare, that is, of shifting the bases, sometimes here, sometimes there. And it is of course possible to adopt seasonal guerrilla warfare, utilizing the luxuriant vegetation as a natural 'green curtain' for concealment in summer and taking advantage of the frozen rivers and lakes in winter.

At present the enemy has not the power to take care of everything, nor will his power be sufficient for this in the future. Therefore, it is absolutely essential to decide on a policy of developing widespread guerrilla warfare and establishing temporary

bases in the plains for the present, and of preparing to carry on guerrilla warfare with small armed units in the future. At least the policy must be adopted of waging seasonal guerrilla warfare and establishing mobile bases.

Objectively speaking, there are greater possibilities of developing guerrilla warfare around rivers, lakes, harbours and inlets and of establishing bases in such areas than of developing it on the plains; these possibilities are second only to those offered by the mountainous areas. 'Sea pirates' and 'river bandits' have enacted countless living dramas in past history. In Red Army times, the guerrilla war around Hung Lake lasted for several years. This proves that it is possible to develop guerrilla warfare and establish bases around rivers, lakes, harbours and inlets.

Even though the various anti-Japanese parties and anti-Japanese people have as yet taken little notice of this aspect and although the subjective conditions are not yet ripe, nevertheless, there is no question that such action should be given attention and must be carried out. We must organize guerrilla warfare around Hung Tse Lake, which lies north of the Yangtze River, around Tai Lake to the south of the Yangtze River, around all enemy-occupied harbours and inlets, and along the coast and rivers. We must build up long-term bases in all such places and their neighbouring areas. This is one feature of developing guerrilla warfare on a national scale. To lack this feature is equivalent to supplying the enemy with the convenience of waterway communications. It is a flaw in the strategic plan in the war against Japan. We must promptly remedy this.

(2) Guerrilla Areas and Bases

In waging guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, there is a difference between guerrilla areas and bases. There are bases ready for use in those areas where the surrounding regions are occupied by the enemy but where the centre has not been occupied or has already been recovered as, for instance, in certain counties in the Wutai, Taihang and Tai mountains. This makes it very convenient for the guerrillas to rely on such places in developing guerrilla warfare.

But the situation is different in other localities within these bases, for instance, in the eastern and northern sectors of Wutai Mountain (in other words, in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region); that is, in certain parts of western Hopei and southern Chahar and in many places lying east of Paoting and west of Tsangchow. In such places, guerrilla warfare cannot, in the initial phase, gain control of the region completely. It is only possible to make frequent guerrilla attacks. When the guerrillas arrive, these areas belong to the guerrillas; when the guerrillas leave, they again belong to the puppet regime.* Such areas are not yet bases for guerrilla

* The Japanese-sponsored regime headed by Wang Ching-wei.

warfare, but may be called guerrilla areas. After passing through the necessary stages of guerrilla warfare—after annihilating or defeating large numbers of the enemy, crushing the puppet regime, arousing the masses, creating mass anti-Japanese organizations, developing the masses' armed forces, founding an anti-Japanese administration—these guerrilla areas will be turned into bases, and be added to the area of the original base. This is known as developing the bases.

In the guerrilla warfare of certain places, the whole of the area that is active is a guerrilla area at the start, as, for instance, in eastern Hopei. This region contains the puppet regime which has been in existence for a long time; it also contains the armed forces of the local masses who are rising up, as well as the guerrilla detachments sent from Wutai Mountain. In this case, the whole of the region that becomes active is a guerrilla area from the start. In the preliminary period, the guerrillas can only select some good localities in this area as a temporary rear, which may be called a temporary base. Only after the work of annihilating the enemy and arousing the masses has been carried to a more advanced stage, can the area eliminate its guerrilla area features and change into a relatively stable base.

From this, one can realize that it is a difficult and painstaking process to turn guerrilla areas into bases. The degree to which the enemy has been annihilated and the masses awakened determines whether or not the stage has been reached for transforming a guerrilla area into a base.

Many regions will remain guerrilla areas for a long time. In these places, the enemy tries his best to establish control but cannot set up a stable puppet regime. The guerrillas also try hard to expand their operations, but they cannot achieve their aim of creating an anti-Japanese administration. This is the case, for instance, along enemy-occupied railway lines in the suburbs of big cities and on some plains.

In the case of big cities, railway stations and certain plains which are firmly under enemy control, the guerrillas can only approach their vicinity but cannot penetrate inside these areas, which have comparatively stable puppet regimes. This is one type of situation.

As a result of errors in our leadership or of powerful pressure by the enemy, the situation in the

above-mentioned cases may develop in the opposite direction—that is, the bases may turn into guerrilla areas, and guerrilla areas may turn into relatively stable areas under enemy occupation. Such cases



Crossing the Grassland during the Long March

by Li Hwa

may occur, and it is well for guerrilla leaders to be especially vigilant in this respect.

Therefore, in enemy-occupied areas as a whole, three different kinds of areas will evolve from the twin struggles of the guerrillas and the enemy. The first are anti-Japanese bases, under the control of the guerrillas and the Chinese authority. The second are occupied areas, controlled by the Japanese imperialists and the puppet regime. The third are intermediate areas where both sides struggle for control, and these are called guerrilla areas. It is the responsibility of guerrilla commanders to exert every effort to enlarge the first and third type of area and to reduce the second type of area. This is the strategic task of guerrilla warfare.

(3) The Conditions for Establishing Bases

The basic condition for establishing guerrilla bases lies in having an anti-Japanese armed force and in using this force for defeating the enemy and for awakening the masses. So the problem of establishing bases is primarily the problem of armed forces. Therefore, the leaders of guerrilla warfare must direct their entire energies toward creating one or more guerrilla detachments, and then, in the course of struggle, gradually expand them into guerrilla columns and finally into regular units and regular army groups. The establishment of armed units is the most fundamental link in the establishment of bases. Without such units or with units

(Continued on page 30)

THE PLA POLICY FOR WAR PRISONERS

Chiu Kang

In the course of the four years of China's Liberation War, from July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1950, the People's Liberation Army wiped out a total of over 8,070,000 Kuomintang troops, of which 5,220,000 were taken prisoner or surrendered. Another 1,140,000 laid down their American-supplied arms and crossed over to our side.

During the Liaoyang-Mukden campaign in the winter of 1948, more than 370,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers were annihilated, of which 320,000 were captured or surrendered. Of the 500,000 KMT troops in the Peiping-Tientsin Area, almost half were taken prisoner while most of the remainder, led by General Fu Tso-yi, accepted our surrender terms. After the PLA's great victory in the Huai-hai campaign near Hsuechow, the great majority of Chiang's remaining crack forces (nearly 600,000) joined the already numerically superior PLA, bringing an abundance of American equipment with them. The revolutionary army's subsequent sweep through South, Southwest and Northwest China was accompanied by many similar episodes.

These spectacular successes in winning the enemy to our side can be largely attributed to two factors: to the PLA's policy of treating its war prisoners with leniency and consideration, and to its effective policy for undermining enemy morale.

The policy of winning enemy troops over to the side of the revolution was formulated and put into effect as far back as 1927, when the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was first organized. According to this policy, war prisoners, far from being discriminated against, received preferential treatment. After seeing the free and happy life in the Soviet Area, many wished to remain. Those who wished to join the revolutionary ranks were welcomed. However, prisoners who chose to return to the KMT areas were given the funds to reach their homes.

Many of these returned prisoners found their way back into the KMT army, usually unwillingly. There they proved themselves a strong element in undermining the fighting spirit of the reactionary army. In trying to instil their troops with a desire to fight, KMT officers have always relied heavily on atrocity stories about the Communist forces. But these returned prisoners were living proof that the KMT officers lied when they claimed that the Communist-led armies tortured and killed their prisoners. Moreover, in battle these returned prisoners were always eager to lay down their weapons at the first opportunity, and they usually persuaded large groups of their fellow-soldiers to surrender with them.

During the Anti-Japanese War, our main enemy was the alien invaders who had been indoctrinated with the medieval *bushido* spirit and modern fascism. At the beginning of hostilities, the Japanese soldiers preferred suicide to surrender. But we never relaxed our propaganda efforts among them. We trained a great number of Japanese-speaking cadres for this work. We prepared and distributed tons of leaflets and booklets in the Japanese language. When we captured Japanese prisoners, we treated even the arrogant ones with consideration.

After a period of re-education, some of the Japanese prisoners were released. We helped the more politically advanced among them to form a Japanese People's Anti-War League, with headquarters in Yen-an. This association assisted us with our propaganda work, and its efforts were especially effective after the collapse of Nazi Germany. Japanese desertions to our side became more and more frequent. As soon as they reached our lines, these men usually asked how to contact the League. During our counter-offensive, and especially after the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan, many Japanese garrison units made preparations to surrender to us. However, most of these plans were frustrated by Chiang Kai-shek, in collaboration with Okamura, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China.

It was an easy task to win over the rank and file of the puppet troops, who were forced into battle by the Japanese aggressors. The reason is obvious. They were Chinese, and it simply went against their conscience to shoot their fellow-countrymen at the order of a foreign invader.

Soon after the conclusion of the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek, at the instigation of the American imperialists, unleashed his full-scale attack against the Liberated Areas. Though numerically inferior, the PLA was able to inflict a series of heavy losses on the enemy right from the outset. The KMT troops quickly began to lose their will to fight. They dreaded entering the Liberated Areas as if they were going to their graves. Under such circumstances, our policy of magnanimity towards war prisoners offered a way out for Chiang's reluctant troops. This was one of the many reasons for the mass surrender of KMT forces that soon became a characteristic of all large battles.

It should be noted that our political work was invariably synchronized with military operations. Never for a moment did we entertain the illusion that we could overcome the enemy by political work alone. Experience had taught us that the greater our military strength, the more effective our political work became. Similarly, the more effective our poli-

* CHIU KANG is a member of the Political Department of the People's Revolutionary Military Council.

tical work, the swifter and larger were our military successes.

It should also be noted that our policy of leniency did not apply to all of our foes alike. Our policy of discriminating between officers and men in our treatment of prisoners was announced in 1947. According to a manifesto issued by the PLA on Oct. 10, severe punishment would be meted out to the people's No. 1 enemy, Chiang Kai-shek. His top accomplices were also declared national war criminals. However, we announced that those who had committed crimes against the people would be given a last chance to lighten or commute their eventual sentences by severing their relations with the reactionary regime and rendering meritorious service to the revolutionary cause. Those who worked openly or secretly for us would be appropriately rewarded. KMT officers who came over to our side would be offered the same choice as their men to remain with the people's army or return to their homes.

Subsequent events have amply proved the correctness of this policy. Chiang Kai-shek's die-hard clique was isolated, defeated and finally driven to its island hide-out on Taiwan. The overwhelming majority of the KMT troops crossed over to our side, and many of them have since earned high honours as revolutionary soldiers. Thus the KMT army, which numbered more than 4,000,000 men at the beginning of hostilities and which received several billion U.S. dollars worth of modern military equipment, was completely disintegrated.

Treatment of War Prisoners

How do we treat our prisoners of war? Our fundamental policy is to win them over, re-educate them, and gradually remould their ideology and behaviour so as to transform them into new persons who may be of service to the people.

When a group of new prisoners is taken, we first allay their fears by our considerate treatment. They are neither searched nor forced to give up their personal belongings. Those with injuries receive medical care alongside our own men.

The officers are quickly separated from the enlisted men. Although officers frequently try to conceal themselves as ordinary soldiers, their own men invariably point them out to us sooner or later. The junior officers are also segregated from their superiors and receive different forms of political re-education, since they respond to re-education more readily than the generals. During the latter part of the war, junior officers were sent back to the KMT areas after two to three months of training if they wished to leave then. While these officers, who come largely from the upper classes, could not become revolutionaries in such a brief time, this period was sufficient to make them politically neutral. Such persons were no longer willing to risk their lives for a lost cause, and they usually surrendered promptly at their next contact with our forces.

We have never had prisoner-of-war camps for ordinary soldiers. At most, if their numbers are great, they are sent to a rear area assembly centre. After a few lectures on the nature of China's revolution, followed by small-group discussions, they are encouraged to hold Accusation Meetings at which they relate their past sufferings under the KMT rule, both in the army and before conscription. After several of such Accusation Meetings, about four-fifths of these soldiers will demand to be taken into the PLA so that they can help overthrow the reactionary forces that have oppressed them all their lives.

This brief period is also enough to show the prisoners how entirely different a people's army is from a reactionary army. They are first impressed by the democratic unity existing between our commanders and fighters, who live like members of one large family, sharing the same food and living conditions. They are also impressed by the harmonious relations between the army and the civilians, an astonishing thing for KMT soldiers who have previously received only curses from the peasantry whom they robbed and oppressed.

These are some of the reasons why such tremendous numbers of KMT soldiers joined the PLA so enthusiastically. This is also why cowardly fighters turned so rapidly into brave warriors. Many of them even made so much political progress that they have been accepted into the Chinese Communist Party or the Democratic Youth League. Quite a few attained the rank of junior officers. Many others sacrificed their lives for the revolutionary cause.

These liberated soldiers, as these captives are customarily called, constituted a steady supply of reinforcements for our PLA ranks. And, I should like to emphasize, we have found no difference between the revolutionary potentialities of such liberated soldiers and of the volunteers who joined our army in the Liberated Areas.

Why is this so? The war we are fighting is a righteous struggle against armed reaction. The rank and file of the enemy's army have been recruited largely from the exploited classes. They have nothing to fight for but the chains that already weigh heavily on their necks. Once inside the KMT army, the maltreatment they receive teaches them new depths of misery. Under such circumstances, it is very easy for them to come over to the people's side and many even turn their guns against their commanders on the battlefield.

Our policy towards prisoners is an inherent part of a revolutionary people's army, one of the many features which distinguishes a peasants' and workers' army from the armies of the exploiting classes. The correctness of this policy has been confirmed by more than twenty years of combat experience. Without such a policy, the PLA could not have so swiftly achieved its great revolutionary victories of today.

THE PLA IN PRODUCTION

Cheng Lien-tuan

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) today is not only an army of national defence. It is also an army of production. This is a development of its great tradition of working to cover part of its own expenses while training and standing ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Even during the most difficult periods of the Anti-Japanese War, the people's armed forces continued their production efforts whenever possible, for these helped in no small measure to alleviate the burden on the tax-payers and improve the soldiers' own livelihood. At the same time, this training in labour also enhanced the army's political consciousness and improved the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people.

The story of Nanniwan is typical of the PLA's early achievements on the production front. This stretch of barren, abandoned land in the suburbs of Yen-an was allotted for reclamation in 1940 to the 359th Brigade of the Eighth Route Army (the PLA's predecessor). Five years later, Nanniwan had become a prosperous farming community with 14,000 hectares of cultivated land.

With this unique tradition of the PLA in mind, the Chinese People's PCC stipulated in its *Common Programme* that: "The armed forces of the People's Republic of China shall, in peace time, systematically take part in agricultural and industrial production in order to assist in national construction work, provided that their military duties are not thereby hampered."

Last winter, with the war drawing to a close on the mainland, a great number of the five-million strong PLA were ready to turn to the production front. On Dec. 5, Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the People's Revolutionary Military Council issued a directive, calling on the PLA to help the people surmount the difficulties left behind by the protracted warfare and thus speed up the New Democratic economic construction. The scope of army production, as prescribed by the directive, is confined to agriculture, stock raising, fishing, irrigation works, handicrafts, construction works and certain industrial and transportation enterprises. Commercial transactions are strictly prohibited. The directive provides that 40 per cent of the proceeds from production should be distributed to the men who have engaged in the work, and the remaining 60 per cent should be divided into three equal parts—one for reinvestment, one for the army's daily expenses and the third for payment of taxes.

In response to Chairman Mao's call, all the rear area units of the PLA immediately drew up detailed production plans and made the necessary preparations. Millions of battle-steeled fighters plunged into a gigantic production drive. Beginning last spring, from the North Manchurian plains to the

hilly Southwest, from the densely-populated East Coast to the under-developed Northwest, they worked on a wide variety of projects with military precision and front-line spirit.

The PLA's production campaign is now no longer simply an effort to alleviate pressing financial problems, but a positive and long-term measure unprecedented in scope and character, aimed at increasing the wealth of the nation. Such a vast undertaking, as can be easily seen, involves many difficulties. It is possible only because the PLA has a high degree of political consciousness, and millions of its soldiers, most of whom come from the labouring masses, have retained and collectively developed the diligence and resourcefulness of their class.

Encouraging Reports

Encouraging reports of initial successes are pouring in everyday from the PLA's various production fronts.

In the remote northwestern province of Sinkiang, on the fringe of the Gobi Desert, PLA men have reclaimed and cultivated 53,000 hectares of wasteland, surpassing their original target by 33 per cent. They have excavated or repaired irrigation canals which are watering over 133,000 hectares of land. Other army enterprises in Sinkiang include 37 coal pits, 15 big and small oil presses, 85 flour mills, eight soap factories, three weaving mills, three paper mills and two gold mines. The soldiers are raising 5,000 cows, 70,000 sheep, 14,000 hogs and 50,000 poultry. They have planted 200,000 trees.

In the other provinces of the Northwest, a total of 42,000 hectares of arid land has been turned into cultivated fields and an even larger area of both army and peasants' land has been irrigated by a vast number of newly-dug or repaired canals. Another important undertaking in Northwest China is the construction of the 540-kilometre Tientsin-Lanchow Railway in Kansu Province and the maintenance work on a 153-kilometre section of the Lunghai Railway from Paoki (Shensi) to Lanchow. So far, over one million cubic metres of earthworks and masonry have been completed. In Chinghai the PLA are building highways through unexplored mountains and deserts to Southwest China.

Manchuria, with its vast expanse of fertile virgin soil, is well suited for army reclamation work. In addition to the troops which were originally stationed in Manchuria, a part of General Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army was called back from Central-South China last spring for production. Arriving in Manchuria after over one month's journey, the deployed units launched an all-out assault against Nature in the sparsely-populated areas along the Sungari and Liao rivers. So far, they have opened up about 35,000 hectares, bring-

ing the total area of army farms in Manchuria to 59,000 hectares. Meanwhile, the PLA men are also engaging in timber felling and transportation, railway maintenance, highway construction, hunting, dyke-building, canal excavation, the operation of charcoal kilns and construction projects in cities and mining centres.

North China is also the scene of many colossal army production projects. Here the PLA units have brought about 30,000 hectares under cultivation. The greater part of the army farms are on abandoned alkali lands which have had to be thoroughly washed with fresh water led in by a complicated network of canals and ditches. The PLA has in addition contributed 4,650,000 man-days to the various water conservancy projects. It also runs 70 small-scale industrial establishments ranging from leather-making to coal mining, and 357 handicraft shops, most of which are beancurd mills supplying the army mess.

In Central-South China, the PLA units have reclaimed 29,000 hectares of land and built long sections of river embankments. The troops in East China are making intensive preparations for the liberation of Taiwan. Nevertheless, they have ploughed and are cultivating 10,000 hectares of land. Even the garrison troops in Shanghai have managed to plant vegetables on 540-odd hectares of scattered, tiny lots in the suburban areas. Figures for the newly-liberated Southwest China, where the PLA is running a number of small farms and working on some irrigation projects, are not yet available. On June 16, the PLA men started construction of the 530-kilometer Chengtu-Chungking Railway, of which a 125-kilometre section will be open to traffic by the end of this year.

A Typical Project

Working in most places under extremely difficult circumstances, the PLA has been fighting on the production front with as much élan and ingenuity as it did against the enemy forces. The heroic exploits of the fighter-farmers are daily making headlines. The experience of a certain regiment of the Fourth Field Army is typical of the PLA's victorious battle against Nature.

This regiment had fought its way from Manchuria down to Central-South China. There, in February, having completed its mission, it received an order to return to the Northeast to Tungtien-pien — "Eastern Horizon" — 250 kilometres north of Harbin. When the regiment finally reached its destination, it found itself on an expanse of snow-bound plain melting away into the dark-grey horizon. Undaunted, the soldiers first cleared a stretch of ground of the deep snow and set up their tents. They ate their ration after defreezing it on fires.

The next morning they started surveying and felling trees in the unexplored forests nearby. Clusters of mud-thatched barracks sprang up and big farms were roughly laid out.

Since farm tools were in short supply, the regiment set up its own blacksmith and carpenter shops. Later on, as the actual ploughing began, it received a number of horse-traction implements. But it took many weeks of patient training to turn spirited army mounts into plough horses. As the drivers also learned to handle ploughs skilfully, a team of three men with one plough could break up four-fifths of a hectare each day while at the beginning a team of eight could do only one-fifth of a hectare.

During all phases of the work, members of the Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth League invariably took the lead. The ranking officers, too, shared all the hardships of their men.

When the spring sowing season came, things at 'Eastern Horizon' were already in good order. The regimental headquarters decided to start work competitions. These had not been advocated before, because the soldiers might do harm to their health by working too hard before they got acclimatized. But as soon as the order was given, team after team challenged each other to overfulfil their quotas. On the other hand, many soldiers signed 'mutual aid contracts' in which, for instance, one would promise to teach the other party reading and the other would in return help him in hoeing.

Although stationed in this quiet and remote place, the men are always ready to answer the call for action at a moment's notice. In the barracks, their well-polished arms look spick-and-span. Even the beddings and miscellaneous belongings are kept in perfect order so that they can be promptly packed. The regimental headquarters have already begun to plan for an intensive training programme in the slack season when a number of cadres will return from military academies with newer techniques of modern warfare.

'Eastern Horizon' has assumed an entirely new appearance. Down to the horizon stretches the refreshing green of plants. Cottages nestle in the fields. But, as the Regimental Commander told his men one day, the horizon is still far away, and next year they would get tractors and expand their farms to that faraway horizon.



A PLA Farm

Woodcut by Ku Yuan

The War Situation in Korea

Kim Seng Yong

For 25 days the Korean people have been fighting to wipe out the assaulting puppet forces and American aggressors.

Backed by their compatriots and in coordination with the southern guerrillas, the gallant People's Army has put out of action the so-called five 'crack' divisions of Syngman Rhee — the Seoul, 2nd, 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions — and the major part of his 1st and 5th Divisions.

On June 27, the U.S. declared that its naval and air forces would aid the Syngman Rhee brigands in the fighting. Soon afterwards it threw in land forces and, in its efforts to turn the tide, added more and more forces.

By July 17, two-fifths of South Korea had been liberated. This included two provinces — Kyungki and Kangwun — entirely freed; the main part of South and North Chwungchung Provinces; three provincial capitals, Seoul, Chwunchun and Chungchwu; industrial centres such as Yungdyngpo, Bwupyung, and Inchun; and Kaisung, Swuwun, Pyungtaik, Ronsan and about 50 other counties.

On the morning of June 25, Syngman Rhee, invading our territory north of the 38th parallel, met with hard blows from the North Korean garrison forces. The People's Army, after routing the invading enemy, took the counter-offensive and carried the liberation war south of the 38th parallel.

One column of the Korean People's Army, starting from Kyungki and Hwanghai Provinces, liberated the capital, Seoul, on June 28. Another column pushed down from Kangwun Province to the southeast part of Kyungki Province, raced through North Kyungsang Province, and continued the southward drive. Meanwhile, a third column swiftly pushed down to the east coast, joining forces with other units landed from the sea and with the people's partisans: Wulchin, Nyungwul and Kyungchwu in that area were then liberated.

The units that had freed Seoul mowed down U.S. and puppet forces in their drive on to Swuwun and liberated this strategic town on July 4. U.S. troops were defeated in their first engagements with the People's Army.

The main puppet forces were all but spent before the liberation of Swuwun. The 2nd and 7th puppet Divisions were destroyed in the battle at Ichungbu, the Seoul Division was knocked out in the capital and the 6th and 8th Divisions were routed along the east coast. In operations on Ongchin

Peninsula, 3,000 enemy troops were killed or wounded. The main force of the 1st and 5th puppet Divisions, 12,000 strong, were crushed in the campaign north of Inchun, on the right bank of the Han River. A force of about one division was put out of action in the campaign between Seoul and Swuwun. The enemy sustained 8,000 casualties during Inchun's liberation. At the same time, puppet troops revolted in large numbers to join the people and now there is only a negligible fraction of them left with Rhee.

After the Swuwun campaign, U.S. troops replaced the puppets in the major operations. In encounters south of Swuwun, the Korean People's Army killed or captured over 200 American mercenaries. On July 6, another 300 of them were killed or wounded during the liberation of Pyungtaik. In areas south of Chunan, an American battalion was surrounded and wiped out. On July 11, in an area south of Chochiwon and north of Taichun, the People's Army stamped out almost all the U.S. troops who were equipped with tanks; killing, wounding or taking prisoner 1,200 men. Northwest of Taichun, 2,500 U.S. troops were killed and another 100 taken prisoner. Thus, the losses of the U.S. ground troops alone amount to one regiment and one battalion, apart from 4,300 killed, wounded or captured.

The People's Navy and Air Force are fighting with great daring. Though assisted by their British, Australian and New Zealand accomplices, the American air and naval forces have failed to halt the advance of the People's Army. In fierce air combats, the people's airmen have brought down over 60 U.S. bombers and fighters including much publicized B-29 superfortresses. Again and again they have beaten back U.S. planes which savagely bombed the peaceful inhabitants and have provided the people's ground forces with effective cover.

The People's Navy has overwhelmed the far larger foe on both the eastern and western coasts. They struck at the invading U.S. and British naval forces and sank a U.S. cruiser together with a good many other enemy vessels.

All these facts show that, as the American invaders fight an unjust cause, their morale is low; their strength is that of a paper tiger. But the Korean people's armed forces take the initiative on every sector of the front, because they are fighting for truth and justice. Even reports of American correspondents from the Korean front cannot conceal the fact that American troops are finding it difficult to deal with the skilful tactics and powerful strength of the People's Army.

KIM SENG YONG is Director of the China Bureau of the Korean Central Telegraph Agency. Here is an abridged version of his article published in the Peking *People's Daily* on July 20.


The retreating American troops intended using the Kum River as their 'no retreat' line, in the hope of gaining a respite behind that 'natural obstacle.' But the Korean People's Army swiftly advanced in three columns toward the Kum River. The central column crossed the river after liberating Chochiwon, the east column took Chungchow city on July 13 and pressed near the river and the west column rushed the water barrier in the vicinity of Kongchwu the following day and its spearhead thrust to the southwest of Taichun (Taejon), liberating Bwuyu and Ronsan on July 17. In the past week the Americans had pinned their hopes was crossed. The U.S. army field headquarters and remnant Rhee troops, who had only just taken breath at Taichun, immediately took to their heels again. Now the Korean People's Army is tightening the ring on Taichun.

The swift crossing of the Kum River by the People's Army reveals the fact that neither American air, naval and ground forces, nor their tank brigades; neither their Generals Dean and Walker, nor the Han and Kum Rivers could hinder the onward march of the Korean People's Army. The American aggressors wish to win the war with tons of bombs and ammunition. But they neglect the most decisive factor of war—the people. The reason the Korean people's forces are crushing their enemy is that they have the whole-hearted support of the people and the sympathy of the democratic camp all the world over.

People's guerrilla forces behind the enemy lines fight in close co-ordination with the regular people's troops. They operate actively in cutting communication lines, intercepting retreating enemy troops and organizing the people to expand the liberated areas. The Americans are unable to maintain their foothold because 'snipers are everywhere.'

Other armed forces of the Korean people are the former puppet troops who revolted against the Syngman Rhee clique. Troops under the command of Pyo Mwu-won and Kang Tai-mwu, who severed relations with Syngman Rhee last year, have set out for the front. Song Ho-sung, former Commander-in-Chief of Rhee's reserve army, also severed relations with the puppet regime. In newly-liberated Seoul and Kaisung, people's volunteers have been organized and numerous captured puppet troops are enthusiastically applying to join the People's Army to fight against the American invaders.

In response to the call of General Kim Ir-sen, 740,000 youth in the northern part of Korea have handed in their applications to enlist in the army.



The Korean Liberation War Fronts on July 22

Over 100,000 young people in Seoul and other newly-liberated areas have joined the Self-Defence Corps, pledging to wipe out the traitorous Syngman Rhee gang and the American interventionists.

In the northern half of the Korean People's Democratic Republic as well as in newly-liberated regions, people are busy repairing the damage caused by wanton bombing of U.S. planes. Workers are pledging themselves to overfulfil their production plans and women are voluntarily filling the vacancies in the factories left by men who have gone to the front. Patriotic national bourgeoisie, merchants and citizens are doing their part by collecting funds for more airplanes and tanks.

With strong backing from the world democratic camp, the people throughout Korea are closely united around General Kim Ir-sen and victoriously carrying on the liberation war in the southern part of the country under the flag of the Korean People's Republic. It is the people of Korea, and not the American invaders sheltering under the banner of the UN, who will undoubtedly win complete victory.

REDUCTION OF RENT AND INTEREST

P. C. Yu

The reduction of rent and usurious rates of interest is now established in the New Democratic China as one of the most important preliminary steps to the implementation of full land reform.

At the present time, land reform has been completed already in an area, mainly in North and Northeast China, with a rural population of 145,000,000. Here the feudal system of land ownership has been uprooted. The landlords' land has been confiscated and distributed to the landless and land-poor peasants and a system of peasant land ownership has been established. As a direct result, there has been a big increase in agricultural production and the peasants' standards of living have risen sharply. This reform, carried out on a nation-wide scale, is the pre-requisite for the further economic development of the country. It is 'a decisive condition permitting a fundamental turn for the better' in the national economy as a prelude to its industrialization.

It is not of course feasible to carry out this radical reform, effecting the greater part of the country's population, immediately in all areas. It must be carried forward stage by stage and in a planned, orderly manner, with the minimum disruption to production. It will in fact be completed throughout the country within the next three to five years. It has been carried out in the old liberated areas where conditions were ripe for this step. But in the newly-liberated areas, the way is being prepared by reduction of rent and interest rates, a measure which gives urgent relief and aid to the mass of the peasants in the key task of rural rehabilitation.

Furthermore, past experience in the old liberated areas has shown that before the full land reform can be carried out successfully, the peasants must be awake to their interests and be fully active in the movement. It is mainly through the reduction of rent and interest that this latter condition is fulfilled. It is a popular measure that immediately alleviates the condition of the bulk of the peasants. It enables them to tide over their immediate difficulties with the aid of the excess rent taken back from the landlords. It settles at one stroke indebtedness which may have plagued a family for generations. This measure immediately brings to the peasants the benefits of liberation and stimulates the peasants' productive enthusiasm.

RENT REDUCTION

The People's Government and the Work Teams led by the Chinese Communist Party initiate and lead the mass movement for the reduction of rent, but it is the peasants themselves who carry

it out. Peasant associations are first organized jointly by poor peasants, hired labourers and middle peasants. When these associations have consolidated the unity of the mass of peasantry, the struggle against the landlords is launched. The peasants advance their claim, authorized by the People's Government, not only for reduction of rent but also for the return of the excess rent paid to the landlords since the liberation. This struggle between landlords and tenants takes many forms, but almost invariably the landlords, even if they cannot deny the justice of reduction of rent, attempt to avoid repayments by pleas of poverty. The common experience is that they have in fact hidden or moved their wealth to other places. In the course of this struggle, Accusation Meetings are organized in which the hostile landlords are arraigned for their extortions. These meetings effectively demonstrate the class alignments in village. The peasants become conscious of their interests and their common class enemies. As shown in recent experiences of land reform in Honan, the peasants have found it easy to understand and expose the criminal acts committed by the landlords such as murder or blackmail or the grosser forms of exploitation, but they have not been easily convinced that the very basis of the landlords' wealth has been the continuous exploitation of the peasants by means of excessive rent. They found it hard to understand that it is the peasants who 'feed the landlord.' It was often only gradually that through participation in the process of rent reduction they became aware of this exploitation and developed their demand for its liquidation. It is for this reason that, as experience has shown, land reform can only be effectively completed in those areas where the movement for rent and interest reduction has been successfully carried out.

The burden of excessive rent is not by any means the total burden borne by the peasant under feudal landlord exploitation. The tenant has had to contribute festival 'gifts,' birthday 'gifts' and render various labour services to the landlords, but rent and its invariable corollary—usurious loans and interests—have been the major economic burdens of the mass of China's peasantry. Under the old order, the peasants on an average have had to hand over half of their produce in rent. In some places this extortionate rent has risen to 70 per cent of the harvest. And in the course of the Resistance War against Japan it has actually risen to 80 or 90 per cent in some places. It can thus be imagined what has been the actual state of China's peasantry as a result of paying the old extortionate rents.

(Continued on page 32)

THE PREDECESSORS OF THE PLA



Mao Tse-tung (third from left) and some of his comrades who staged the 1927 "Autumn Harvest Uprising" against KMT rule in Hunan. On August 1, in the same year, a Communist-led army, 30,000 strong, under the command of Chu Teh, had revolted against the KMT in Nanchang. These two columns of people's fighters later joined forces at Chingkangshan on the Hunan-Kiangsi border to form the backbone of China's early revolutionary armed forces



A guerrilla unit attached to the Eighth Route Army in Hopei on its way to engage the Japanese invaders in 1937



A part of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army during the Long March from Kiangsi to Shensi in 1934-5



The PLA attacking Szepingkai, KMT stronghold in Manchuria during the Liberation War



The remnants of the KMT American-equipped forces



In the battle for Tsinan, capital of Shantung




The forced march into Szechuan Province

Battle-Steeled PLA Is Now



Chungking, one of the last "capitals" of Chiang Kai-shek



Force routed in the Huaihai Battle

Now A Mighty Force



Beijing on the mainland, welcomes the PLA



The PLA has grown into a huge, well-equipped force




Sailors of the young People's Navy on review



THE PLA TODAY

Guarding the nation's frontiers



Literacy classes are held in each unit



A choir — one of many cultural activities



Rear area units engage in production and construction



On manoeuvres in preparation for the liberation of Taiwan

The Huaihai Battle

A Military Correspondent Describes the PLA in Action

The great Huaihai battle began on November 7, 1948. It was a decisive engagement between the last remaining major force of the Kuomintang (KMT) reactionaries on the north bank of the Yangtze River and the powerfully reinforced People's Liberation Army (PLA) determined to clear the road to the Yangtze River and liberate the rest of China.

It was a brilliant campaign that showed the full power of the people's forces in morale, generalship and armaments — mainly U.S.-made and captured from the enemy. It was a gigantic battle of manoeuvre involving over 1,000,000 men with prolonged intervals of heavy positional warfare. It lasted for more than two months, putting enormous strain on every branch of the forces. It demanded close co-ordination of arms — infantry, artillery, engineers and armoured units. It ended in the utter defeat of the enemy's picked troops. In the annals of Chinese military history it has become a classic of the art of encirclement and annihilation.

The battle opened in the third year of the War of Liberation. Only five days before, the KMT armies had been smashed and driven pell-mell out of Manchuria. Qualitative superiority was always with the PLA. Now it had numerical superiority as well. Three million people's fighters were advancing on the demoralized KMT troops which had been reduced from 4,000,000 to some 2,900,000 men. After suffering severe defeats in North and East China and the loss of Chengchow and Kai-feng, Chiang Kai-shek withdrew and concentrated his armies at Hsuehchow. This was a strong position at the junction of the Tientsin-Pukow and Lunghai Railways. It was held initially by 55 KMT divisions numbering over half a million

men armed with tanks, heavy artillery, well equipped with light arms, sheltered by powerful fortifications and supported by a sizable airforce, unopposed in the skies. Yet, in a matter of weeks, these forces were decimated.

The PLA's offensive was a skilful combined operation. The decisive blow was launched only when preparations for victory were complete. Troops were mustered, supplies and munitions stocked. Guerrilla forces were in operation against enemy posts over a wide area. Telling diversionary blows were struck deep in the enemy rear and on his flanks. When the main forces moved into battle, peasant militia combed the roads and fields for enemy deserters and stragglers. The wounded were rescued from the field and taken for treatment by heroic members of the people's auxiliary services. In the rear, millions of civilian aides ground grain and cooked for army, brought up supplies, constructed defence works. The East Kiangsu peasants sent 40,000,000 catties of grain to the fronts at a speed of 100 *li* a day. Old women sewed shoes for the People's Army, extra strong shoes with the slogan 'For Victory' embroidered on their toes. In the intervals of fighting, the enemy was subjected to a propaganda barrage that caused the revolt or desertion of whole armies.

The Offensive Begins

On November 7, the *Hsinhwa News Agency* announced that the PLA's Second and Third Field Armies under Generals Liu Pocheng and Chen Yi had opened an offensive on the Hsuehchow front. The KMT defences, built up over several years, were immediately pierced. The defending forces, spread around the city, were segmented. Chiang Kai-shek's 7th Army Group with five armies under

Huang Po-tao was cornered east of the city and was being cut up and smashed. From then on, the battle developed into a series of desperate attempts by Chiang's troops to break out of their encirclements to rejoin their main forces, and equally futile efforts by these latter forces to come to their rescue. One after another of Chiang's armies met with encirclement, defeat and annihilation.

The battle in the Huaihai area fell into three main stages. In the first, the fighting centred around the Huang Po-tao 7th Army Group. These ten divisions were guarding the eastern approaches to Hsuehchow based on the Lunghai Railway and Grand Canal line. Their left flank and rear, however, collapsed when, northeast of Hsuehchow, two KMT generals, leading 23,000 men of the old Northwest Army (who were sharply discriminated against by Chiang's "own" troops), revolted and joined the PLA. Huang Po-tao, in a panic, began to withdraw on Hsuehchow. Part of his troops were wiped out before they could cross the Canal. Then he found that PLA units, occupying the positions vacated by the revolted troops, barred his way westwards. The encirclement was completed 33 miles west of Hsuehchow near Nien-chuang, when main forces of the PLA, advancing on Haichow, wheeled westwards.

Fifteen KMT divisions were despatched from Hsuehchow under Generals Li Mi and Chiu Chingchuan in an attempt to rescue the Huang Po-tao Army Group. Spearheaded by tanks and artillery, they were confident of battering their way forward. They advanced only 10 miles in 11 days and lost half of their tanks. After suffering heavy losses they were fought to a halt 15 miles from their objective. PLA tanks went into action and captured Nienchuan. By November 22, the entire Huang Po-tao group had been accounted for. Including losses in other sectors, the KMT lost 178,000 men in this stage of the battle. One thousand artillery pieces and huge amounts of other equipment were captured.

Powerful people's columns closed in on Hsuehchow from every side. The Tientsin-Hsuehchow line was in the PLA's hands, and south of Hsuehchow the railway — main feed-line of the KMT — was cut.

The second stage of the battle opened on November 23. It found the remaining KMT troops divided into three parts: 22 divisions under Tu Yu-ming, KMT Deputy Commander in East China, were gathered in besieged Hsuehchow. There were a further 26 divisions concentrated at Pengpu. To the west, there was the 12th Army Group with 11 divisions under Huang Wei which had been ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to advance from Honan. This strong force of 125,000 men with one mechanized column had been trying to break through to help the Hsuehchow garrison, but it had itself been intercepted at Junan on Nov. 12 and then trapped southwest of Suhsien.

The KMT's moves were now either desperate attempts at rescue or escape. The Huang Wei Group's difficulties increased. Supplies ran out. The men fed on sweet potatoes or potato leaves stolen from the peasants. The small amount of air-lifted supplies only caused quarrels among the recipients. Troops who seized rice parachuted down 'for officers of

battalion grade and above only' had three of their number shot. There were daily food riots. Morale broke. Daily radio talks, broadcast to the KMT over loudspeakers, increased their confusion. On November 30, the 110th Division, a 'favoured' division of Chiang Kai-shek's own personal troops, revolted and joined the people.

Finally the PLA moved in for the kill. The assault was preceded by an intensive half-hour barrage. Howitzers, field guns, mountain guns and mortars roared in unison. The enemy defence works were ploughed up by rows of shells. Machine guns and their crews were blown sky high. With precision timing, before the enemy could recover his wits, the assault detachments went into action. Much of their work was already done. One KMT officer admitted that gunfire had already accounted for half of his entire regiment.

In 19 days of fighting up to Dec. 15, the entire Army Group had been annihilated. Huang Wei was captured hiding in a ditch.

Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek had been giving his usual fatal orders for the rescue of his beaten troops. The 6th Army Group under Li Yen-nien, based on Pengpu, despatched 14 divisions with orders to cover the intervening 37 miles to Suhsien


and establish contact with Huang Wei within a week. After 14 days they had covered only 18 miles. The PLA forces, often outnumbered on separate sectors, put up a tenacious all-round defence in village after village until the enemy was worn down and brought to a halt on November 30. One PLA company held up a whole KMT regiment for hours. Fighting with the same tenacity that had won them victories in the days when they had been equipped only with

rifles, a small PLA patrol delayed the KMT crossing of a river for three whole days. Li Yen-nien gave up his attempt to break through.

The fate of Tu Yu-ming in Hsuehchow was even more disastrous. To remain in Hsuehchow meant certain annihilation. On December 1, the enemy abandoned the city — the 'gateway to Nanking' — and with all forces attempted to make a break through southwestwards and link up with Huang Wei. The three KMT Army Groups of Chiu Ching-chuan, Li Mi and Sun Yuan-liang, numbering 200,000 men in 25 divisions under Tu Yu-ming fled with their U.S. tanks, artillery and planes. . . . and ran straight into a wall of PLA troops deployed on a 60-mile front. They failed to break through, suffered heavy losses in a six-day battle, and then fled westwards in panic. This enormous mass of troops was completely encircled 15 miles northeast of Yungcheng and, by December 4, had been pressed into a 40-mile square area.

Chiang Kai-shek's most vaunted units had suffered a crushing defeat. The Chiu Ching-chuan 5th Army was Chiang's personal force, the oldest mechanized unit in China, U.S. trained and equipped for the past six years, a veteran of the Burma campaign. By December 17, when the final stage of the campaign began, half of Tu Yu-ming's forces had been killed, wounded or captured.

The Huaihai battle approached its climax. The road southwest of Hsuehchow was littered with U.S.-made equipment. In their panic flight, KMT tanks crushed KMT soldiers. The KMT command was further dispirited by the news that at this decisive stage, fresh tens of thousands of people's forces were entering the battle. Young peasant fighters of Shantung, fresh from the successful carrying out of the land reform, battle-hardened already after years of service as People's Militia, demanded to be sent to the Hsuehchow front and arrived full of fighting spirit to get a blow in at the enemy. Over a wide area, diversionary attacks were launched against the scatter-



ed KMT forces. Local people's forces dealt telling blows between Nanking and Shanghai on the north bank of the Yangtze.

The demoralization of the enemy took on a farcical aspect. When an armoured regiment commanded by Chiang Wei-kuo, Chiang's son, was intercepted by a platoon of people's fighters, it left seven tanks and armoured cars abandoned on the road while their crews took to their heels! In a village near Hsiaohsien, southwest of Hsueh, the PLA found scores of KMT officers' wives abandoned with their luggage by their husbands.

Within the close encirclement there were constant conflicts between the various commanders under Tu Yu-ming, leading on occasion to regular 'civil war.' Tu Yu-ming ordered Sun Yuan-liang to fight the rear-guard action intended to cover their retreat from Hsueh. Sun's men suffered heavily. Then, although his forces were the weakest, he was ordered to lead an attempt at a break through on the night of December 6. PLA forces, however, closely barred the way and Sun's men promptly retreated, only to be met with a hail of lead from the other KMT troops in the rear. They turned again and surrendered in droves to the PLA.

Chaos increased among the beleaguered armies. Desertions multiplied. They were subjected to a continual barrage of propaganda. Hunger sapped their strength. At length, after 20 days of rest and reorganization, the PLA launched the final mopping-up operation. In four days the entire grouping was wiped out. Tu Yu-ming himself was captured trying to escape in disguise, dressed as a KMT prisoner of war among his bodyguard masquerading as PLA men.

In this 65 days, ending on January 10, the KMT lost nearly 600,000 men and masses of equipment; 327,070 prisoners were taken. The whole area from the Huai River to the Yellow River was liberated. Preparations were immediately advanced for the historic crossing of the Yangtze River and the liberation of South and Southwest China.

An Episode of the Early Red Army

Agnes Smedley

... Mingling with these throngs were peasants from the bandit region around Ching kangshan, men and women who remembered only that the Red Army was the defender of the poor. The Red Army was showing the peasant masses who was the leader of the Revolution.

Then came the battle of the Seven Bridges, the Red Army against twelve thousand White troops seasoned in battle and armed with guns such as the Red Army could only dream of.

It was the first time the peasants had experienced a real battle. Never had they dreamed there could be a roar so terrific that you could not hear a rifle shot. Could not hear your own voice shouting. Never had they known shells could tear up tons of earth, burying men. In terror many of them fell to the earth or ran away. But when some saw that the Red Army continued fighting with the coolness of a money-lender counting his coppers, they crept back. They watched units of peasant spears of the Army attacking without fear of death, and barefoot peasant couriers dashing with the fleetness of the leopard over the hills until it seemed no bullets could overtake them. They crept back to see Red Army men wounded, still fighting, others pounding powder down the mouths of wooden cannons, then hammering in broken iron, glass, and stones before igniting the powder. The wooden cannons kicked up the earth and sometimes turned over, roaring so fiercely that the hearts of the enemy surely trembled.

When they saw all this many of the peasants returned to the fight. Some of them . . . harried the rear of the enemy, drawing them off from the Red Army positions, cutting them to pieces. . . .

* * *

The night came and the battle continued spasmodically. The Whites longed for rest, but the Red Army had not come to the Seven Bridges to give them rest. All through the night, while small units of Red Army men lay stretched in heavy sleep, their comrades made sallies on White positions, descending suddenly, shouting, fighting in hand-to-hand battles. To the Whites every shrub became a spectre.

From the Red positions came singing.

"Do you hear?" the White soldiers asked one another.

"What do they sing?"

"Listen! They sing that the poor are prisoners of starvation and the most wretched on the earth!"

"*Ai-yo!* Who can say that is not the truth?"

Over the hillsides came the cries: "Brothers of the White troops, why do you fight us poor peasants and workers? . . . Brothers, why should poor men fight poor men? . . . Brothers, you are running dogs of the landlords and militarists! . . . Land to the peasants and soldiers! . . . The eight hour day for the workers!"

White soldiers sighed heavily. "*Ai-yo!* I never asked to come here!"

"Whip up your spirits! . . . Attention! . . ." yelled a White officer to his men.

A soldier muttered: "Now I ask — why should poor men fight poor men?"

An extract from *China's Red Army Marches*

INTELLECTUALS AND LAND REFORM

Ouyang Tsai-wei

It was only a few months before the liberation of Peking that History Professor Lei Hai-tsung of Tsinghua University branded the whole great revolutionary movement of the Chinese people as an 'adventurist act of hunger-stricken peasants.' In the same article in the *Weekly Review* of September, 1948, he described the Chinese Communist Party 'stripped of some of its foreign terms and slogans,' as 'little more than a semi-secret, fanatic sect!' And the advance of the People's Armies left him, somewhat apprehensive, in the midst of a city led by these very 'fanatics.'

Professor Lei watched the early transformations in Peking with an attitude of detached cynicism. It was only gradually that his distrust was shaken and replaced by a feeling of amazement at what he saw of the new regime of the people's democracy. It was then that in January, 1950, he took the opportunity to go out with a Work Team to help in the carrying out of land reform in the suburban villages. "This," he writes, "was the turning point in my life. It was only then that I understood the bitter class conflict and cruel oppression that poisoned the life of these seemingly peaceful and harmonious villages." From close contact with the veteran cadres of Party members and direct observation of their resolute class stand on the side of the people, he continues: "I began to understand how the revolution had achieved its successes under the leadership of the Communist Party. My confidence in the future under that leadership grew." Lei Hai-tsung was himself transformed by participation in the great and historic movement of agrarian reform.

Professor Lei was but one of the hundreds of intellectuals, teachers and students, writers, artists and poets who participated actively in the land reform movement in North

and Northeast China. Eight hundred went out to the countryside from Peking alone.

This was no country jaunt. These teachers and students of the National Peking University, the Tsinghua and Yenching Universities, the Colleges of Fine Arts and of Dramatic Arts spent six to eight weeks in the villages, taking their example in living from veteran Party members, living with the peasants, learning from them, assisting them each in his own way in the difficult and complicated tasks of land reform.

To Aid the Peasants

Professor Fung Yu-lan the philosopher, Hsu Peon the painter, Yeh Chien-yu the cartoonist, Tsao Yu the playwright, Li Hwa the woodcut artist, were among those who, before going to the countryside on their exacting task, assembled for a week's courses in the policies of land reform.

As soon as they arrived in the villages in 65 Work Teams, under the guidance of experienced Party cadres, they were given a practical initiation into the social structure and class alignments of the areas. They met and talked as comrade to comrade with the active revolutionary elements among the peasants. They studied at first hand the problems of how to differentiate between the various classes of peasants; how to deal with crafty landlords; how to divide up equitably the lands, houses, cattle and other means of production. When the time came for the reform to be implemented, they lent all their talents to the people. Artists drew posters, made up wall newspapers, actors and singers propagandized the policies of the People's Government in song, dance and drama, students drew up accounts and helped to make surveys and calculations, writers reported on progress for the press.

It is characteristic of the high level of political consciousness

achieved by China's artists that the first to go to the land from Peking were the students and professors of the National College of Fine Arts. On reading reports that land reform was to be started in the villages around Peking, they asked to be allowed to join in the work. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs enthusiastically supported their request.

Many started the venture in a holiday and romantic mood. The first day out was a country trip with all its beauties. The departure from Peking; the yellow sands of the highway in the West-suburbs; the glistening snow on the Western Hills; the gaunt willows beside the icy streams. The sun shone as on a spring morn. Professor Ai Chung-hsin, a painter, revelled in the scene, but he did little painting, however, in the following weeks. Days of urgent activity left his mind in a turmoil of thought. But on the road back, the confusion became ordered and he found his artistic vision transformed. What he saw: the hills, the willows, the city, was no longer 'scenery,' but the scene of immense historic changes. Formerly he had admired Monet and the Impressionists and their fresh vision of the world in the open air, a bourgeois world of care-free light and colour, a world of leisure, not of work. Now, how well he understood the social significance of such delightful painting!

Their days in the midst of the great agrarian struggle were milestones in the development of the art students, too. Most of them had been swaddled for years in the reactionary atmosphere of KMT dominated schools. Their professors had derided the Chinese folk tradition as vulgar and lauded the doctrines of the bourgeois 'non-political' artists, the painters of fruit and flowers and attenuated nudes. But after land reform they

saw how far removed was this cosmopolitanism from the life of the great masses of the people. A student wrote in his journal: "Love of the masses must be the source for our artistic creation."

The pictures at the next exhibition of students' work showed a complete change. Portraits of peasants and labour heroes had a new quality of realism; there were many drawings in the clear line technique popular among the peasants. The young artists took an enthusiastic interest in designing New Year pictures of a new type for the peasants. In the old days, country and town houses were invariably decorated on New Year's day with pictures of the ancient gods. This year there was a ready sale for new New Year pictures showing the days of plenty after land reform, the visit of Soviet agricultural specialists to a Chinese farm, the decorating of a Labour Hero, and such like themes of the new China.

Many students had never before had so close and intimate a contact with the peasants. Now they realized with greater clarity the way the economy of the country rested on the mighty and painstaking labours of the peasants. This realization expressed itself in many positive ways. A professor who had been complaining that his salary was inadequate now stated publicly that he felt he must work even harder to deserve it fully! Students from rich landlord families

called on their parents to take a positive part in the land reform movement, voluntarily offer their lands and houses to the poor peasants and assist the work in every possible way.

Peasants Teach Intellectuals

This participation of intellectuals in the land reform had a special significance in Peking—the main cultural centre of old China. Here a large proportion of the intellectuals, particularly in the case of the professorial staffs, were returned students from England, America or other capitalist countries and they passed on their fundamentally bourgeois education and outlook to their students. Many were 'non-political'—if not reactionary. The progressive intellectuals of Peking, however, played and are playing a valiant role in the revolutionary movement, but in many this was essentially inspired by petty bourgeois motives. In fighting for freedom of speech and thought, of organization and meeting, for instance, they had an incomplete understanding of the revolutionary significance of these 'bourgeois' rights in relation to the masses. If they hated the landlord system, it was in many cases from a vague sense of equalitarianism. They had had no direct contact with the brutalities of the feudal system as it embittered the day-to-day life of the poor peasant or hired labourer. Now, in the countryside around their own

familiar Peking, they found that, all unknown to them, landlords had been literally squeezing the peasants to death.

Attendance at meetings where the landlords were accused, or where the peasants related their grievances, were unforgettable experiences to all. At one Accusa-

tion Meeting, three thousand people denounced a brutal landlord, witness after witness related poignant and tragic stories of his crimes—the beating and killing of peasants, the violation of women, an endless record of extortion and cruelty. The accusers wept tears of grief and anger.

In their journals and reports of their experiences published later in the press, the intellectuals of Peking describe not only how they awakened to the bitter fate of the peasants under the old regime, but how they gained a fresh realization of the strength of the peasants, their capacity for endurance, of heroic action and of deep feeling. They were amazed at the quickness and justice with which peasant meetings solved complex problems in the process of the reform, problems which baffled even experienced cadres. It was the masses who time and again discovered and exposed some new trick of the crafty class enemies. "Then, indeed, we understood," writes a student, "that the eyes of the masses are clear-sighted; the strength of the masses is great."

The intellectuals returned to the city with a new feeling of comradeship with the peasants. In their turn, the peasants showed a real affection for these writers and artists, teachers and students whom they had previously lumped together with somewhat mixed feelings of respect and strangeness as the *nien shu ti jen*—"those who read books." Both were enriched by their comradely co-operation in a work of supreme national importance.

The intellectuals had helped to reform the age-old feudal land system of China. This in turn had helped them to reform themselves. It had given them a clearer insight into the historic tasks of the revolution, in wiping out the terrible exploitation to which the majority of the Chinese people, the peasants, were subjected; a clearer understanding of their own role in the transformations taking place in China. It had helped to make them better citizens of the People's China.



A Landlord Is Accused

by Li Hwa

tion Meeting,

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY — ITS BIRTH AND GROWTH —

History has proved that the formation and growth of the Chinese people's own armed forces has been a decisive factor in achieving national liberation.

When the Northern Expedition of the Great Revolution was advancing towards victory in the spring and summer of 1927, the KMT reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek suddenly betrayed the revolution, joined up with the imperialists and the feudal forces and started a bloody massacre of the people on April 12, 1927. The Great Revolution of 1925-27 suffered a serious setback.

In this crucial situation, the Communist Party of China, led by Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, raised aloft the banner of revolution. On August 1, 1927, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Ho Lung and Yeh Ting led the first revolutionary armed uprising in Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province. They seized the city from the counter-revolutionaries and held it for five days. Then, outnumbered by the enemy, the revolutionary forces withdrew from Nanchang and advanced toward Kwangtung. But again they encountered overwhelmingly strong opposition. The revolutionary forces therefore broke up and scattered in different directions for the sake of mobility.

One unit led by Ho Lung and Yeh Ting organized the peasants along the Kwangtung coast for armed resistance. In October, this group captured Hoifung and Lukfung and established a Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of over 10,000 men.

Another unit led by Chu Teh retreated through Kiangsi Province to Hunan, where it supported the armed uprisings of the peasants there.

In September, under Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership, the peasants of Hunan had organized the famous Autumn Harvest Insurrection and occupied Pingkiang, Liling and several other important towns in East Hunan. Comrade Mao's forces were organized into the 1st Division of the 1st Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army.

The two units led by Comrades Mao and Chu finally met at Ching kangshan, a mountain on the Kiangsi-Hunan border. Following this historic meeting, the two groups united to form the 4th Red Army.

Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, this people's army very quickly developed its own

flexible strategy and tactics and developed a body of theory, principles and methods for building up the army under the leadership of the working class.

In 1931, the first congress of representatives from the Chinese Soviet Areas formally established August 1st as the Anniversary Day of the People's Army, the day on which was begun the independent creation of the armed people's forces led by the Communist Party, that opened a new stage in the history of the Chinese people.

During the Ten Years' Civil War that followed the Nanchang Uprising, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army established more than ten big revolutionary bases. It grew into a 300,000 strong force which repeatedly shattered the 'annihilation' campaigns launched against it by the million strong army of the KMT reactionaries aided by the imperialists. In October, 1934 — October, 1935, the main forces of the Red Army successfully completed the 25,000 *li* (8,300 miles) Long March to north Shensi, the advance base for resistance against the Japanese invasion of China.

Following the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War in 1937, the Red Army was reorganized into the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army. It was China's mainstay through eight years of resistance. Though subjected to attack both by the Japanese and puppet troops and blockaded by the KMT, it engaged 64 per cent of the total Japanese forces invading China and 95 per cent of all the puppet armies. It killed, wounded or captured 1,700,000 Japanese and puppet troops. It built up a regular army of 930,000 men with a People's Militia of 2,200,000. It created Liberated Areas with a population of 99,500,000 in 19 provinces and ensured final victory in the Anti-Japanese War.

When Chiang Kai-shek launched his nation-wide American-instigated civil war against the Liberated Areas in July, 1946, the 8th Route and New 4th Armies were re-named the Chinese People's Liberation Army. In the course of the Liberation War, the PLA has already driven from China's mainland the KMT reactionaries assisted by American imperialism. In the four years up to June 30, 1950, it has wiped out over 8,070,000 enemy troops and itself grown into a powerful force of 5,000,000 men.



ARMY ON THE CULTURAL FRONT

The PLA has launched a new offensive on the cultural front. The People's Army has become a huge school. With the great campaigns over on China's mainland, it has embarked on widescale attacks on illiteracy. It is storming the heights of knowledge.

The Northeast Command was first to announce its plan of study and cultural advancement engaging every soldier. The campaign begins in September. The first stage ends in the winter of 1951.

Preparatory surveys, made last December, show that a considerable number of the troops and commanding personnel in the Northeast have not, or have only just reached an elementary school standard of education. PLA fighters are mostly poor peasants or hired farm labourers who have never before had the opportunity of getting a formal education. Despite the attention the PLA has always paid to raising its fighters' cultural level, it has been impossible in recent years, because of the incessant fighting, to carry through general educational work on a large enough scale. Now, however, the movement to 'master characters' has surged through the barrack rooms. From July, 1949, several divisions were able to devote five hours a week to reading and writing. By November, they were doing 12 hours a week. In examinations held this spring, four divisions showed that in five months every soldier could master an average of 370 characters. One artillery regiment reached an average of 600.

The project now calls for 31 hours general education a week—70.2 per cent of the weekly study period. The rest of the time goes for military training and political courses. By the autumn of 1952, every PLA soldier will have received a full elementary education. All commanding personnel will receive a secondary education in the next four to five years.

IN THE SOUTHWEST military zone, the PLA is also preparing to launch a cultural offensive at the beginning of 1951. Illiterate army men are being coached this year so that they will know a few hundred characters before the three-year plan actually gets under way. Then a million troops will devote a few hours every day to cultural studies. The project will give full elementary education to those who were illiterate or semi-literate, a secondary education to those with an elementary school education and more advanced training in military and political academies to those who now have a secondary education.

THE URGE TO LEARN and interest in cultural activities have now become a mass movement in the People's Army. Soldiers are saving their money now to buy books and stationery. One division in North China has recently bought over 7,000 fountain pens. However far away from Peking they may be, PLA men subscribe to the Peking *People's Daily* and the *Fighters' Companion*, the Army magazine. A radio set is now a much prized possession, opening the doors to the latest news, talks on literature, the theatre, Peking opera, the world of music. . . . Cultural activities of various kinds are being expanded in every army.

EIGHTEEN HEROES advancing hand over hand across the naked iron links of the Tatu River Bridge in the face of enemy gunfire, have become legendary figures in the PLA. By seizing this bridge in Sikang Province in 1936, the 18 assured the crossing of the river during the epic Long March and saved a People's Red Army from destruction. After 14 years, Li Teh-tsai, one of the 18, is now a vice-commander of an army division stationed in North China. Since those days he has been wounded 14 times. A born fighter,

he revelled in the excitement of campaigns. He last saw action in the liberation of Taiyuan. Then he realized that the fighting labours of the PLA had brought peace and new tasks for soldiers. Formerly only semi-literate, he began to learn his characters from his orderly, using the army newspaper as text book. Within three months he was able to write letters and correspondence for the papers. Now he has written a ballad of the Long March which will shortly be published.

* * *

A MODEL ARMY STUDENT is Chen Shih-pin. Seized in Szechuan by the KMT pressgangs, he was liberated by the PLA in Peking.

He joined the people's forces and received an award for bravery. After last year's Army Day, he got his first chance for regular study. His rapid progress gained him another award and the title of 'Model Student.' In seven months he mastered 2,000 characters.

Chen Shih-pin has his special recipe for character study. He says: "Learn from the book and from your own life. What you learn from the book cannot keep pace with what you do. Either the characters learned in the book find no immediate application, or what you need to know that day is not included in the day's text. Learning without doing, results in the newly-learned characters being quickly forgotten." So, for instance, when he was learning to count, he wrote down in one of his exercise books the number of buckets that he carried that day. He learned his basic numbers unforgettably in one day.

In his letter to the press, describing his method, he concludes: "I have decided to study both cultural subjects and military science, so that I shall be a good revolutionary soldier till the day comes when the world will see no more war."

He voiced the ideal of a People's Army—fighting for culture, for peace.

AMERICAN P.O.W.'S SAY "QUIT KOREA!"

It has not taken the average American G.I. in Korea very long to find out for himself what kind of a war he is fighting on behalf of the American imperialists. When the Korean war was only three weeks old, 114 American prisoners-of-war signed a joint statement which one of them read over the Phyongyang radio. After noting that "the majority of the South Koreans indicated a strong desire to unite themselves with the North Koreans in order to create a unified and independent nation," the statement concluded:

"It is the belief of this group of prisoners that all foreign elements be immediately removed from Korea and the Korean people be permitted to resolve their own internal problems."

Typical of other statements was one by First Lieutenant Herbert E. Marlatt, of the 34th Regiment, 24th Division, who said:

"... Upon our arrival in Korea, it became quite apparent that the majority of the South Korean people had made little effort toward the defence of the South Korean government. South Korean troops ran away by the thousand. . . . If there were no American intervention, they would have brought the civil war to an end already. American intervention has resulted in mass destruction of life and property in this undeclared war. . . .

"Fellow Americans, stop shooting and bombing the Koreans who never have done any injustice to the U.S., and leave Korea immediately!"

A group of foreign correspondents who visited one of the prisoners' camps in Phyongyang heard many similar statements from the Americans they interviewed. Captain Ambrose H. Nugent, of the 52nd Regiment, 24th Division, told the reporters:

"I can see no reason for any U.S. soldier being here. . . . None of these men want to be here or ever wanted to come. U.S. troops ought to pull out of Korea at once."

These American prisoners are also indignant at the lies emanating from MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo regarding alleged maltreatment of prisoners by the Korean People's Army. All the prisoners' statements have emphasized what good treatment they have received with 'three meals a day of meat, vegetables and bread, plus a cigarette ration.' Doctors visit the prisoners' camp daily and the seriously injured have been hospitalized.

Sergeant Merlin J. Hamilton, of the same unit as Lieutenant Marlatt, voiced the general feeling when he remarked: "If MacArthur says we are dead, he's got some lousy reason for it."

The reason, of course, is obvious.

Since few, if any, of the American troops are willing to sacrifice their lives for the great cause of additional Wall Street profits, what can MacArthur do to instil in his men any desire to kill the Korean people? Only one thing — artificially stir up animosity through the use of trumped-up atrocity stories.

The American G.I.'s are also convinced already that "Truman is bungling things up" and that Wall Street can never defeat the Korean people. Even First Lieutenant Donald S. Sirman, a jet fighter pilot from Philadelphia, whom the foreign correspondents found to be the most cynical and heartless of those they interviewed, said flatly:

"I believe the Korean people are going to win."

The Invincible Koreans

By a Special War Correspondent

Phyongyang, July 20 — As you cross the frontier into Korea, the spirit of the people comes to meet you. At this time of the year, the weather can be terrible. Rain, rain, rain, filling the air-raid trenches and swamping the treasured crops. But through the mist and heat and sweat you see a people who have stood up and cannot be beaten down again. Everyone knows this is a life-and-death fight and everyone is in it.

One million and three hundred thousand young men have volunteered for the People's Army since Syngman Rhee began his attack not a month ago. Trains, trucks and roads running south are full of singing youngsters on their way to defend government by the people and all the improvements in their lives that it has brought.

When a train is due at some tiny station, the whole town gathers to welcome it, waiting in the rain until it leaves and then running after it along the track until, in the end, only a few children, young men and women, are left waving, smiling and sometimes weeping.

Children carry garlands to the fighters. Peasant men and women

— now owners of their land — come running out of their corn and paddy fields to give little presents to the men going south.

All towns are heavily blacked out against the constant threat of American terror bombing — and blackout in this weather is something to be endured. But the citizens and workers go about their work in absolute calm, serenely confident that the people will defeat the mercenaries of the foreigner.

An overwhelming atmosphere of unity and determination pervades Korea. A People's Army soldier at the frontier said to me, "If you have come here to tell the world about us, you will find that every Korean thinks the same: that we have been too long under foreign rule, and now we would rather die than go back to the past."

America cannot defeat Korea, for the people will take their hammers, spanners, axes, pitchforks and cooking knives and make life untenable for the invader if it becomes necessary. Behind that million and three hundred thousand lie millions more waiting for the call. (From the *Daily News Release*)

ON THE PEACE FRONT

The Peace Signature Campaign in China was greatly intensified in the middle of this month and, according to incomplete statistics, by July 24, the total number of signatories had exceeded 44,000,000. Following the National Peace Week from July 1 to 7, a National Campaign Week against U.S. Aggression in Taiwan and Korea started on July 17. The two Campaign Weeks have been closely linked. The people of the whole country are voicing their support for the defence of world peace and opposition to the U.S. warmongers. Democratic organizations have issued fresh calls to the people to sign the Stockholm Peace Appeal.

Up to the present, 14,500,000 or more than one third of the whole population of the Northeast have signed their names to the Stockholm Peace Appeal. This figure includes 596,800 signatures from the Dairen-Port Arthur area; 1,200,000 from Mukden and 203,000 from among Northeast railway workers.



More than 4,000,000 people in Southwest and Northwest China have signed the peace appeal, including 2,529,000 people in the Chungking and Chengtu area, 180,000 in Kunming, 155,000 in Kweiyang, 14,000 in the Southwest Military Area, and 1,283,952 people of the national minorities and other groups in Northwest China.

By the afternoon of July 13, over 3,311,514 Shanghai residents, or over 60 per cent of the total population of that metropolis, had solemnly affixed their names to the peace appeal, states an interim report of the Shanghai Branch of the China Committee for Defence of World Peace.

Many Chinese people in Hongkong have signed the peace appeal in a campaign that began there at the end of last month.

The leaders of the 54 trade unions in the Federation of Trade Unions in Hongkong and Kowloon signed at one meeting. They also called on the 100,000 workers in Hongkong to sign.

The whole 1,415 people of the tiny Honan village of Yenliu by the Sha River have all added their names to the Stockholm Peace Appeal.

At a peace signature meeting held there, the village presented an animated scene as peasants poured into the square where a platform carrying Chairman Mao Tse-tung's portrait had been erected. A former poor peasant, Chao Shih-lu, was the first to sign and he coined the slogan "Defend world peace with the plough!" This immediately caught the popular imagination—and farm work is being pushed forward with a will.

The remarks of the people as they lined up—mothers with children, parents who had lost sons to the KMT, former PLA fighters and people's militiamen—boded no good for any aggressors against China!

Over 13 million people have signed their names to the Stockholm Peace Appeal in North and East China and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. This does not include the signatures gathered in Peking and Shanghai.

The Peace Signature Campaign is being keenly supported by the rank and file of the Chinese People's Infantry, Navy and Air Force in Central-South China. Many units throughout this vast area report that every single member has signed.


Steeled cadres who had served in the old Red Army and newly-liberated fighters who come from Hainan Island, airmen, frontier fighters who are on guard at the mouth of the Pearl River, army medical workers and their patients in the army hospitals, all are unanimous in firm opposition to the warmongers and ready to defend peace.

Many units held solemn ceremonies before signing and made pledges to defend the fatherland and lasting world peace.

Fighters of the company that won renown as the 'Steel Company' in the fighting on the mainland declared: "We wish to tell Truman and his gang to take note of how Hitler and Chiang Kai-shek met their end."

People's army men are carrying publicity about the Stockholm Peace Appeal to remote, thinly-populated mountainous districts and villages of this area, as they carry out the tasks of rooting out bandits and developing farm production.

CURRENT CHINA July 11—25, 1950



MILITARY FRONT

The mounting anger of the Chinese people at the U.S. imperialists' predatory acts against Taiwan was given expression in General Chen Yi's pledge that "the Chinese people will surely liberate Taiwan and annihilate the Chiang Kai-shek brigands." The famous general, who commands the troops which will carry out the Taiwan operations, made this statement in Shanghai on July 20 after the American 7th Fleet commenced its illegal patrol of the Taiwan coast.

Mopping-up operations are continuing against the remaining KMT outposts on China's coastal islands. Between July 8 and 16, the PLA liberated the Chengssu group of 80 small islands off the Chekiang coast, as well as the Peichishan and Pishan Isles. (These amphibious operations resulted in the capture of 1,200 KMT troops.)

Bandits Wiped Out

The newly-liberated areas on China's mainland have been virtually cleared of KMT bandits. Between March and June, the number of bandits in Sinkiang was reduced from some 20,000 to less than 100. Bandit chief Janimkhan, who had collaborated with the U.S. authorities as well as the KMT, was captured on July 2. Another 58,000 bandits were rounded up in southern Szechuan province during June. In southern Honan province,

Jobs for Graduates

All of the 17,539 university students who graduated this summer have been offered jobs by the Government. A unified plan has been drawn up for placing these graduates in positions where their special training can be of greatest value to the nation's reconstruction. About one-third of them will be sent to Northeast China.

Eleven colleges and universities in North China are participating in a government-sponsored summer vacation training programme, under which students are signing up to spend their holidays working in factories and mines.

68,000 of the 70,000 bandits at large were wiped out between January and May this year.

PLANS OVER-FULFILLED

Reports on the over-fulfilment of the first half-year's production plans are pouring into the nation's capital. Here are a few of the records achieved:

Irrigation Works: The entire year's irrigation programme has already been overfulfilled by 17%. Over 670,000 hectares of farmland

have been brought under irrigation already this year.

Railway Freightage: China's railway exceeded their freight targets for the second quarter of 1950 by 3%, although this is normally a dull season for freight transport.

Paper Industry: State-owned paper mills in North China and Shantung Province overfulfilled their production quotas for the first half of 1950 by 5%. These represent one-third of the total output of state paper mills in China.

LAWS ADOPTED

Two important laws have been adopted, concerning the following aspects of China's national life:

Peasant Associations

Regulations governing the organization of Peasant Associations, which have been named the executive organs for carrying out agrarian reform, were passed by the Government Administration Council on July 14. According to these regulations, the Peasant Associations have the tasks of eliminating the feudal economic forces in the countryside and of helping to raise the cultural and political level of the peasant masses. Membership in the associations is open to 'farm labourers, poor peasants, middle peasants, rural handicraft workers and impoverished intellectuals.' Landlords are barred from membership, and rich peasants may not join before the completion of agrarian reform.

People's Courts

At the same session, the Government Administration Council also adopted laws governing the organization of the People's Courts, whose functions are limited to handling problems arising from the agrarian reform programme. These People's Courts will arbitrate any disputes which may arise and will also pass judgement on landlords and other persons who sabotage the reforms.



It Won't Be Long Now!

Hung Huang, in *The Cartoon Magazine*

N.E. WORKERS' WELFARE

Workers' conditions in Northeast China have recently registered a number of important improvements.

Wages: An 8% increase in real wages went into effect on June 19 for all employees of all state-run or local public enterprises in Northeast China. This follows a 27% pay increase which these workers received during the latter half of 1949. In June alone, Manchurian workers deposited \$10,000,000,000 (N.E. People's Currency) in their bank accounts.

Housing: Modern workers' quarters totalling 1,404,000 square metres of floor-space are now under construction in Northeast China and will be ready for occupancy by Jan. 1. This, added to the 1,000,000 square metres of housing completed last year, will provide quarters for 70% of the workers in state enterprises.

Health: To date, 52 workers' hospitals and 454 clinics, staffed by more than 6,600 medical workers, have been established to care for the workers' health in Manchuria. More hospitals as well as large numbers of canteens, co-operatives, clubs and nurseries are now under construction.

INTERNATIONAL

Diplomatic Activities: Chinese Ambassador to Mongolia, Chi Yantai, arrived at Ulan-Bator on July 9. Chinese Ambassador to Poland, Peng Ming-chih, presented his credentials to President Bierut on July 20.

Japan: All leading Shanghai newspapers published a joint statement on July 16, condemning the persecution of the Japanese Communist organ, *Akahata*, by the American and Japanese authorities.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent its hearty greetings to the Communist Party of Japan on July 14, the latter's 28th anniversary. The message declared that "the people of Japan and China know that justice is on your side and final victory will belong to you."

Against U.S. Aggression!

A nation-wide campaign to oppose U.S. aggression in Taiwan and Korea, which began July 17 and will continue until August 1, is now in full swing. The campaign was launched in response to the general call by the World Federation of Trade Unions for a Week of Support for the Korean People.

A committee was set up to conduct the campaign, with headquarters in Peking. Eleven people's organizations are represented on this committee, including the All-China Federation of Labour and the China Peace Committee.

The campaign is designed to awaken all of China's 475,000,000 people to American aggression in the Far East. It aims at further strengthening popular support for the campaign to liberate Taiwan as well as for the liberation war which the Korean people are conducting. This campaign will also show the Chinese people more clearly than ever that the struggle for peace is identical to the struggle against American encroachments in Asia, particularly in Taiwan and Korea. All media of information have been mobilized.

The All-China Democratic Women's Federation is playing a leading role in the campaign. Its members are carrying out door-to-door publicity campaigns and organizing neighbourhood group discussions.

Workers everywhere are pledging increased production to support the PLA, and peasants are similarly pledging bumper autumn harvests. Army men are vowing to give their lives, if necessary, to liberate the last inch of China's territory and to repulse any further American encroachments.

Labour Hero Chao Kuo-yu spoke for the Chinese working class when he declared in Mukden: "My answer to Truman's challenge is to step up production to supply the PLA for the liberation of Taiwan."

* * *

Wang Lin, a former landless peasant in Hopei Province, declared: "Now after land reform, I own 15.7 *mow* of cropland. If the American devils try to take this away from me, I will fight them to the end."

* * *

Chiu Sheng-pao, a Shanghai dock worker, stated: "The Americans' defeat in Korea has shown the whole world that American im-

perialism is inwardly weak despite all its apparent strength; it is only a paper tiger."

Huang Sung-ling, Chairman of the Tientsin Peace Campaign Committee, told a rally of 30,000 people: "In carrying out armed aggression against Taiwan and Korea, American imperialism has thrown off its mask and revealed itself as a fascist robber."

* * *

Chen Chang-sun, of the PLA's 3rd Field Army, said: "Whoever dares to try to prevent us from liberating Taiwan will be crushed like an ant without mercy."

ON ESTABLISHING GUERRILLA BASES

(Continued from page 7)

having no strength, it would be useless to discuss any problem at all. This is the first condition.

The second condition which is inseparable from establishing bases is the use of armed forces in co-ordination with the masses to defeat the enemy. All areas controlled by the enemy are the enemy's bases and are not the bases of guerrilla warfare. It is self-evident that, without overcoming the enemy, enemy bases cannot be transformed into guerrilla bases. Even in guerrilla-held areas, if the enemy attacks (anyway, we must suppose that the enemy will attack) and if we do not overcome him, the areas we control will become enemy-controlled areas, and it will then be impossible to build up guerrilla bases.

Similarly, the third condition which is inseparable from establishing bases is the use of all our strength, including that of our armed forces, to arouse the masses to struggle against Japan. During this struggle, arm the people, organize self-defence corps and guerrilla units. During this struggle, set up mass organizations of workers, peasants, youths, women, children, businessmen and free professionals. In keeping with the degree to which the masses' political consciousness and spirit of struggle has been heightened, organize them into all the essential anti-Japanese organizations and then gradually enlarge these organizations. If the masses have no organizational spirit, they cannot display their anti-Japanese strength. During this struggle, liquidate the open or secret influence of traitors; to do this, one can only rely on the strength of the masses.

It is especially important during this struggle to set the masses in motion and consolidate or establish local anti-Japanese administrations. Where the original Chinese authority has not been destroyed by the enemy, consolidate it on the basis of broad popular support. But where the original Chinese authority has been destroyed by the enemy, restore it on the basis of broad popular efforts. This administration is necessary to carry out the policies of the anti-Japanese national united front. It must unite all forces and fight the one enemy — Japanese imperialism.

Guerrilla bases can only be actually built up after gradually achieving these three basic conditions — after creating anti-Japanese armed forces, overcoming the enemy and setting the masses in motion.

In addition, geographical and economic conditions should be noted. On the question of geographical conditions, three different circumstances were pointed out in discussing 'the different kinds of bases.' Here we shall only remark that the major requirement is vastness of area. When encircled on

three or four sides, mountains naturally provide the best condition for establishing long-term bases. But the most important thing is that there must be space for the guerrillas to turn about in, i.e., a large area. Having this condition of a vast area, it is even possible to develop and maintain guerrilla warfare on the plains, not to mention around rivers, lakes, harbours and inlets. Under the contradictory phenomenon of China's territorial size and the enemy's inadequate number of troops, this condition is generally available to China's guerrillas. In speaking of the possibility of guerrilla warfare, this is an important, even primary, condition.

In small countries such as Belgium, etc., there is little or no possibility of guerrilla warfare because they do not have this condition. But in China, this condition is provided by nature. It is not a condition that needs to be attained or a problem that needs to be solved. It is a thing, provided by nature, that man only needs to make use of.

The nature of economic conditions, regarded in terms of natural characteristics, is the same as that of geographical conditions. This is because we are not now discussing the establishment of bases in a desert, where there is no enemy. We are talking about building bases in the enemy's rear — in all places that can be reached by the enemy, where there have long been Chinese people and where the economic basis for obtaining food supplies has long existed. Therefore, the problem of establishing bases does not give rise to a problem of selecting economic conditions. All places, where there are Chinese people and our enemies, can, regardless of the economic conditions, be used for developing guerrilla warfare and establishing permanent or temporary bases.

But the case is different when viewing the question in terms of its political characteristics. There a problem exists, the problem of economic policy. This point has a very significant bearing upon the establishment of bases.

The economic policy in guerrilla bases must carry out the principles of the anti-Japanese national united front — that is, place reasonable burdens upon the people and protect commerce. The local administration and guerrilla units absolutely must not undermine these principles, for otherwise it will affect the establishment of bases and the maintenance of guerrilla warfare. Reasonable burdens means implementing the slogan "Those with money give money." But the peasants should also supply a certain limited amount of foodstuffs for the guerrillas. The protection of commerce should be expressed in the strict discipline of the guerrilla units. With the exception of proven traitors, absolutely no person's shop should be permitted to be indiscriminately confiscated. This is a difficult matter, but it is a definite policy that must be carried out.

(4) The Consolidation and Expansion of Bases

In order to confine the enemy invading China within a few strongholds—that is, within the big cities and along the main lines of communication—the guerrillas in all bases must do their utmost to expand out in all directions from their base, to bring heavy pressure against all enemy strong-points and threaten their existence, to shake the morale of enemy troops and, at the same time, to extend the guerrilla bases. This is absolutely imperative. Here we should oppose *conservatism* in guerrilla warfare. Regardless of whether it arises from a craving for comfort or from an over-estimation of the enemy's strength, *conservatism* will bring harm to the anti-Japanese war, and it will not benefit guerrilla warfare and its bases.

On the other hand, we cannot forget the consolidation of the bases. The major task is to arouse and organize the masses. This includes the training of guerrilla units and local armed forces. Such consolidation is essential in maintaining a long-term war and also essential to its further development. Without consolidation, one will have no strength for further expansion. In guerrilla warfare, if one only thinks about expansion but forgets about consolidation, he will not be able to stand up under the enemy's attack. As a result, not only will the prospect of expansion be forfeited but the very existence of the base itself will be endangered.

The correct policy is "expand on the basis of consolidation." This is the good method of "gaining a position from which one can either advance and attack or retreat and defend."

Whenever a long-term war is involved, the problem of consolidation and expansion of bases constantly arises in every guerrilla unit. When the time comes to solve this problem concretely, the decision should be based on the circumstances. At certain periods, emphasis should be placed on expansion; this means extending the guerrilla areas and enlarging the guerrilla forces. At other periods, emphasis is placed on consolidation; this means organizing the masses and training the armies. Because of the difference in character between these two activities, military staff work and the execution of plans will differ accordingly, and emphasis must be based on estimates of the situation at the time of analysis. Then this problem will be solved correctly.

(5) Several Types of Encirclement Involving the Enemy and Ourselves

Viewing the Anti-Japanese War as a whole, since the enemy is on the strategic offensive and is fighting on exterior lines, and since we are on the strategic defensive and are fighting on interior lines, there is no doubt that we are inside the enemy's strategic encirclement. This is the enemy's first type of encirclement around us.

But since we have numerical superiority of forces, when the enemy advances toward us along separate routes from his exterior lines, we adopt a policy of taking the offensive in our battles and campaigns and of operating on exterior lines. We thus encircle each separate enemy unit which advances on us. This is our first type of encirclement around the enemy.

Looking at guerrilla bases in the enemy's area, each isolated base is encircled by the enemy on three or four sides. The former is the case in northwest Shansi, and the latter is the case in the Wutai Mountain. This is the enemy's second type of encirclement around us.

But if we look at the various bases in their inter-relations as well as at the various guerrilla bases in their inter-relations with the regular army's front lines, then we are again encircling many of the enemy. For instance, in Shansi we have encircled the Tungpu Railway* on three sides along the east and west sides of the railway and around its southern terminus, and we have encircled the city of Taiyuan on four sides. In the provinces of Hopei, Shantung, etc., there are also many encirclements of this kind. This is our second type of encirclement around the enemy.

Since we and the enemy confront each other with two types of encirclement, it is in general very much like a game of *wei chi*** The enemy's battle or campaign against us, and ours against him is like encircling and capturing the opponent's pieces. The inter-relations of the enemy's strategic bases and our guerrilla bases are like making 'strategic spaces.'*** This problem of 'making spaces' illustrates the importance of the strategic function of guerrilla bases in the enemy's rear. This problem, raised in the light of the anti-Japanese war, confronts the national military authorities on the one hand and the guerrilla leaders in various places on the other hand with the task of developing guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear and of establishing bases in all possible places. This they should put down on their agenda and carry out as their strategic task.

If, internationally, we can build an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific, making China a strategic unit and also making the Soviet Union and other possible countries into other strategic units, we shall have one more encirclement than the enemy. We shall then be fighting along exterior lines in the Pacific, and we can encircle and crush fascist Japan. Today, of course, this point has no practical significance yet, but one cannot say there is no such prospect. The world is changing and the Japanese people are in the process of preparing themselves for a struggle!

* Tatung-Fenglingtu Railway.

** A kind of chess based on principles of encirclement and counter-encirclement.

*** In *wei chi*, the pieces of one side must form at least two spaces in the territory they occupy, or else they can be captured by the opponent's counter-encirclement.

REDUCTION OF RENT AND INTEREST

(Continued from page 14)

In a constant state of need, because of these excessive feudal rents the peasants in the past have had constant recourse to the money-lenders. This has placed them still more in the power of the landlords, for the rural usurers have in most cases been the landlords themselves. The rates charged for loans to the peasants have been notoriously high.

In the rural areas, in order to avoid the losses caused by the galloping inflation, the usurers insisted on payment of interest in grain, no matter whether the original loan was contracted in paper money, silver dollars or in commodities. Nevertheless, the interest rates were fantastically high. In one Kiangsu district, a loan equivalent to the value of a picul of rice was advanced in May, 1946. In September, five months later, the loan was repaid with interest equivalent to double the original loan. Under such conditions it was inevitable that once a peasant fell into debt he was like a man in a quagmire . . . sucked in further and further to his utter ruin.

The People's Government has now directed that the landlord's share should be reduced by 25 per cent from the average of 50 per cent of the harvest as rent. This reduces the landlord's rent to 37.5 per cent of the harvest, and he is under obligation to repay 12.5 per cent of the harvest for that year to the tenant. In the case of a higher rent, say 60 or 70 per cent of the harvest, this, too, will be reduced to 37.5 per cent and the difference repaid to the tenant. In certain areas, in accordance with local conditions, slightly different rates of reduction are authorized by the government.

INTEREST REDUCTION

The people's governments in the various administrative areas have decided in regard to usurious loans that, in order to clear away the morass of debt in which the peasants are bogged, all loans contracted before the liberation will be settled at one and the same time. It is stipulated that usually the principal should be paid back with interest equal to the sum of the principal. That is, no matter how long ago the loan was contracted, it will be considered settled on payment of double the amount borrowed. In view of the inflation which prevailed in the past, this is a great gain to the peasants. The local authorities and peasant associations, however, have considerable discretionary powers in dealing with such usurers' debts.

In consideration of the fact that the peasants are badly in need of loans to rehabilitate or expand production and that it is not yet possible for the government to supply all the loans needed, loans can still be made by private interests provided they are lent at a reasonable interest. At present, 15 per cent is the prevailing monthly rate of interest, but this has not yet been officially fixed.

This, in short, is the policy now reducing the excessive rent and usurious rates of interest that have shackled the productive forces of the Chinese countryside for so many centuries. Just recently, by the end of May, the peasants of Central-South China, including the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi and part of Honan (half of Honan has already completed land reform) had completed this policy of rent and interest reduction in over 80 per cent of their villages. More than 18,567,000 peasants, out of a total rural population of 74,895,518, had been organized into peasant associations. In the course of the campaign, a total of 886,000,000 catties of grain had been returned by the landlords to the tenants in repayment of excess rent. This had enabled the peasants to overcome their difficulties in the spring months before the first harvests and stimulated their enthusiasm in production and in support of the People's Government's agrarian policy. They had reclaimed vast tracts of wastelands and finally they had voiced their demand for the completion of agrarian reform with the expropriation of the landlords' lands. This has formed a typical example of rent reduction policy in action.

Present plans indicate that by the autumn of this year, rent and interest reduction will have been carried out in various areas north and south of the Yangtze River, covering 300 counties and involving a rural population of 100,000,000 people. The gathering of the harvest in these areas will be followed immediately by the carrying out of full agrarian reform.

The policy of rent reduction is no new idea. It has been advanced as a basic policy by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It was talked about by the reactionary KMT government as early as the days of the Great Revolution of 1925-27. In 1946, the high-sounding slogan of a 25 per cent reduction in rent was officially proclaimed by Chiang Kai-shek as a sop intended to quieten the peasants' revolutionary demands. The reactionaries, however, had no intention of implementing their promises, and the slogan remained a slogan.

It was under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party that the policy of rent reduction was for the first time carried out in Hunan during the Great Revolution. After the interval of the Ten Years' Civil War (1927-1937) the movement was resumed in the old liberated areas during the Resistance War against Japan (1937-45). At that time it satisfied the peasants' demands for alleviation of their burdens; it served to maintain the United Front with the landlord class against the Japanese invader.

Now with state power in the hands of the people and practically the whole of continental China liberated, the movement has been extended on a scale never before witnessed. The leadership of the People's Government and the Chinese Communist Party and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the peasants will ensure that it will be consistently carried out, paving the way to complete emancipation of millions of China's peasants.

北京市軍事管制委員會登記證新字第七七號
 中華北郵政總局登記證第一類新聞紙類登記證第一〇一號