

Party Line on Current Tactics

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THE *strategy* of the Indian revolution outlined in our Party Programme is People's Democratic Revolution. Opposed to it is the CPI's strategy—National Democracy. Corresponding to these are the two tactical lines—class struggle and class-collaboration respectively.

The tactical line of class-collaboration adopted by the CPI became clear within less than three years of the adoption of National Democracy as the strategic line. The CPI joined, in 1967, coalition Governments in three States, though the parties which headed these coalitions had been denounced as “communal” in the CPI programme. Within still another two years, the CPI opted for a coalition with the Congress—a line which continued for a decade. It was given up only when the collaboration with the Congress was completely exposed during the Emergency. Even today, the CPI leaders try to gang up with any bourgeois Opposition party against the Left, as was seen in their betrayal of the minorities in Assam and their electoral monoeuvres at the time of the December 1984 elections to the Lok Sabha and the March 1985 elections to several State Assemblies.

We do not propose here to deal with the CPI's tactical line. We confine ourselves to the CPI(M)'s tactical line as it has been developing from stage to stage.

TACTICAL LINE OF THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE CPI(M)

The basis for the CPI(M)'s tactical line of class struggle was

Party Line on Current Tactics

laid in the resolution on Current Situation and Tasks adopted at the Seventh Congress of the CPI(M) in 1964. The crux of that tactical line was “to give organised leadership to mass actions of resistance to the anti-people policies of the Government”. It was pointed out that “this task cannot successfully be discharged unless the serious dangers arising from the weakness in the mass organisations are fully grasped and the weakness rapidly overcome”. The resolution went on:

“The Party must mobilise all democratic sections of the people against every attack on civil liberties and democratic rights and against repressive measures. It must campaign against the anti-people policies of the Government and for alternative policies. It must carry on a relentless campaign for world peace, for banning of all nuclear weapons and for general disarmament. The slogan of People's Democratic Front and particularly the slogan of land to the tiller in view of its importance to the democratic revolution must be constantly popularised”.

The Seventh Party Congress which adopted the Programme and the above-quoted resolution on Current Situation and Tasks also adopted a report on The Fight Against Revisionism. It said :

“While the Party should firmly fight against the revisionist ideas, slogans and tactics of tailing behind the bourgeoisie and the ruling party, an essential condition for building the unity of the democratic front is that the Communist Party should continue its struggle against all manifestations of sectarianism”. Sectarianism, it was pointed out, manifests itself in two main forms: (a) “sectarianism towards the masses owing allegiance to the ruling Congress party”; (b) “sectarianism towards the masses rallied behind the parties of Opposition which are Right-reactionary, or Leftist with rabid anti-Communism, as their basic outlook”. Both arise “from the failure to realise that the bulk of the masses who are to be won over to democratic policies and into the democratic front are more or less equally divided into those who follow the Congress and those rallied round the non-Communist Opposition parties.”

An important directive contained in the report Fight Against Revisionism was that the Party should “intervene in all cases where

ministerial or other crisis develops in a State or at the Centre. Removal of a particular Minister, wholesale reorganisation of the Ministry, charges and counter-charges made by the rival groups in the ruling party—all these occasions should be made use of and so handled as to strengthen the forces of radicalism in the country as a whole and in the ruling party. The attitude of contempt for such ‘petty quarrels’ among the ruling classes and sections within the ruling classes, refusal to intervene in and transform such situations (to whatever slight extent it may be possible) will make the Party a totally ineffective force in a rapidly changing political situation”.

However, caution was given that “all such political interventions as well as all united struggles and campaigns should be such as strengthen the mass movement and the struggle of the working people, strengthen the unity of trade unions, etc. Negligence of this task will lead to the opportunist tactics of manoeuvring from the top as the main form of political action.”

The conclusion was drawn: “If the Party adopts the correct tactics of combining the extensive activities among the working people in developing their united struggles and building their united organisations with political intervention at the top, the Party can play an effective role in rallying far bigger sections of the people against the anti-people policies of the Government and in the, struggle against reaction”.

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THE NEW SITUATION

This tactical line worked out at the Seventh Congress helped the Party in defeating the revisionist tactics of the CPI first in the 1965 mid-term elections in Kerala, and then in the 1967 general elections in the entire country. Assessing the results of the 1967 general elections, the Central Committee adopted its report, *New Situation and Party’s Tasks*. Making a realistic assessment of what happened in the general elections, the report pointed out:

“The coming into existence of non-Congress Governments comprising different parties and groups in a number of States

denotes a big break on the chariot-wheels of the Congress monolith. The struggle the non-Congress Governments will have to carry on in defence of States’ autonomy and the rights of the people belonging to different nationalities is essentially democratic and progressive in content and will go a long way in influencing and strengthening the wider democratic movement with its ultimate objective of replacing the big bourgeois-landlord set-up by a People’s Democratic order. It will be a grievous mistake to under-rate it.”

The special importance of the electoral victories won in Kerala and West Bengal (where our Party was the leader of the new ruling coalitions) was duly noted, but it was pointed out, “In both the States, despite the electoral majorities the respective united fronts won, a good section of the people ranging from 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the voters are still under the influence of the bourgeois-landlord parties, mainly the Congress. The vote secured by the united front, by and large, reflected the deep mass discontent against Congress rule more than the endorsement of a radical programme with all the deeper implications such a programme entails. The governmental programmes adopted and endorsed by parties in the front cannot be taken for granted, as far as the masses are concerned. . . . ,

“Above all, governmental power in the States has got to be understood in clear class terms and with all its limitations.

A good and essential part of the States’ power resides in the Union Centre and the Congress Central Government, and whatever small share of power the State Governments possess under the provisions of the country’s constitution will have to be exercised within the confines of this overall central power.”

On the basis of such a realistic assessment of the post-election situation, the report gave two warnings to the comrades who were working as Ministers in the two united front Governments: (a) they should not “entertain undue illusions about giving relief in a big way”; (b) nor “court despair that nothing can be done under the present set-up”. Our Ministers, on the other hand, “should always bear in mind that they, as the Party’s representatives, should strive

to tender our bona fides to the people. Any failure on this score compromises the Party's political line in the eyes of the people; adversely affects the independent mobilisation of the people and their activities; and all these in turn will not help us to resist and overcome the vacillations, wobbles and sometimes even possible backsliding of some democratic parties in the united fronts and their Governments. In a word, the united front Governments that we have now are to be treated and understood as instruments of struggle in the hands of our people, more than as Governments that actually possess adequate power, that can materially and substantially give relief to the people. In clear class terms, our Party's participation in such Governments is some specific form of struggle to win more and more people and more and more allies for the proletariat and its allies in the struggle for the cause of People's Democracy and at a later stage for Socialism." (Emphasis added)

With the adoption of this report, one phase of the struggle for the correct Marxist-Leninist tactical line was over—the phase in which the revisionist line for which the CPI stood was successfully fought without slipping into sectarian errors. This however was the beginning of a new phase in which sectarianism launched an attack on the Marxist-Leninist line adopted by the Party.

RISE OF NAXALISM

The reference here is to the rise of Naxalism in the wake of the 1967 elections following which the Central Committee report on New Situation and Party's Tasks was adopted. It fully confirmed the correctness of the warning given in the Fight Against Revisionism report of the Seventh Congress on the danger of sectarianism and the need for struggle against it.

The rise of Naxalism however is not a purely Indian phenomenon. It was integrally connected with the struggle in the international Communist movement.

It will be recalled that the Seventh Congress which adopted the Programme and the current tactical line of the Party did not discuss the problems of ideological debate in the international movement,

deferring it for an in-depth discussion on a more convenient occasion. However, since the Seventh Congress marked a break with revisionism in the undivided Party and since the Communist Party of China was at that time the standard-bearer of the anti-revisionist struggle in the international movement, there was a good deal of pro-China sentiment in the newly-formed CPI (M). The Chinese Party's open attack in 1967 against the line adopted by the CPI (M) derailed sections of Party members and followers into "Left" positions. The Central Committee had to demarcate itself clearly and openly from the CPC, adopting a document, *Our Differences With The CPC*. A furious inner-party struggle culminated in the formation of a clearly Left-sectarian group calling itself the Naxalites and openly declaring that they faithfully followed the leadership given by the Chinese Party.

It is not within the province of this study, to deal with the ideological positions adopted by the Naxalite group. We are confining ourselves here to the tactical positions which may, by and large, be characterised as "an infantile disorder" as Lenin called "Left"-wing Communism. Opposed to the painstaking mass work through trade unions and other organisations of the working people, opposed to the tactics of united front, opposed to participation in elections to bourgeois parliamentary institutions and being committed to the path of armed struggle everywhere and under all circumstances, the Naxalites claimed to be "real revolutionaries", while the CPI (M) was a "neo-revisionist" group. They could carry with them a large number of immature youth inside and outside the Party.

The Party however was able to survive the attacks launched by them ; the two united front Governments headed by our Party (in Kerala and West Bengal) functioned by and large along the lines laid down by the Central Committee in its report *New Situation and Party's Tasks*.

AFTER THE TOPPLING OF UNITED FRONT GOVERNMENTS

Having successfully defeated this assault and kept the Party united around the tactical line of the Seventh Congress and of

the Central Committee, however, the Party faced a critical situation towards the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970. The campaign against the two united front Governments launched by the Congress and its Central Government in which, along with other bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, the CPI also joined, culminated in the overthrow of the two united front Governments (Kerala in October 1969 and West Bengal in March 1970). This was followed by the participation of the CPI in the anti-CPI (M) Government in Kerala. In West Bengal, too, the CPI moved steadily towards unity with the Congress against the CPI (M), culminating in the 1972 rigging of elections in which the CPI was an active associate of the Congress.

This change in the position of the CPI occurred against the general background of a split in the Congress party which gave the ostensible ground for the CPI to move towards a pro-Congress stand all over the country. Actively assisted by this entire process, the Congress clamped what was rightly called semi-fascist terror in West Bengal, together with cruel repression in Kerala and in the rest of the country.

How to assess and face the new situation—the Congress split and the CPI betrayal—this question was posed before the CPI (M). Vacillations were visible in the beginning in assessing the Congress split, in laying down the tactical line to be pursued towards the two Congress parties that emerged out of the split. These, however, were overcome, although after some delay. This enabled the Party to take an independent line in the 1971 elections, of supporting neither the Indira Congress and its allies, (including the CPI) nor the Syndicate Congress and its allies (who formed themselves into what was called the “Grand Alliance”). The position adopted by the Party paid rich dividends in that, while the Grand Alliance was defeated all over the country, the Party and its Left allies did well in West Bengal. But the nakedly terroristic rigged election in West Bengal in 1972 and the semi-fascist terror that followed created an entirely new situation.

How to meet this new danger? The leadership of the Party—the Central Committee and the Polit Bureau—came to be sharply

divided on this question. The Ninth Congress of the Party held in June 1972, therefore, was not so unified as the Seventh and Eighth. After the Party Congress, too, differences continued right up to the end of the Emergency.

TACTICAL LINE OF THE NINTH CONGRESS

Despite these differences, however, the leadership succeeded in correctly assessing the semi-fascist terror which followed the rigged election in West Bengal. It warned the country against what was happening in West Bengal which, it said, was the “shape of things For the future” in the whole country. The ruling Congress party, it was pointed out, was rapidly and systematically moving towards authoritarianism and one-person rule. Against this threat to democracy, the Congress called for ‘Unity, particularly the unity of Left and democratic forces’.

Making a realistic assessment of the circumstances in which the Left unity that had been forged in the 1967 elections came to be disrupted, the Ninth Congress expressed complete optimism that those Left parties which had abandoned their positions and joined the Congress would come back. Winning the Left “forces back for the Left and democratic movement, forging unity with other democratic forces against authoritarianism and personal rule—these became the key tasks outlined by the Congress.

The tactical line that was thus evolved, however, was inadequate to take full advantage of the growing resistance to the authoritarian moves of the Congress Government, as was seen in the series of political struggles culminating in the J.P. movement. Though the Central Committee was groping towards the line of independently supporting the J.P. movement (without merging itself into it, as the Socialists and some other Leftists did), the Party could not take full advantage of the conflict between the bourgeois Opposition parties and the ruling party.

Sectarianism manifested itself also on questions of trade union unity, the approach to agrarian struggles, developing unity of action with bourgeois Opposition parties such as the Kerala Congress in that State, etc. (These manifestations of Left-sectarianism

were subjected to self-criticism at the Tenth Congress in 1978.) Vacillations were clear also when the Emergency was clamped on the country in 1975. These, however, were overcome during the latter half of the Emergency period. That was why it became possible for the Party to play an active role in the anti-Emergency struggle and, following it, in the general elections of 1977.

PRE-TENTH CONGRESS TACTICAL LINE X-RAYED

Making a "self-critical examination of our work and activities, during the years 1975 and 1976, both during the Emergency and pre-Emergency periods", the Tenth Congress pointed out: "There was a big gap between the formal resolutions calling for forging a broader front and putting forth corresponding programmes on the one hand and the actual practice on the other. This hiatus between the formal resolutions and statements and the practice came to exist, surely not because the P.B., C.C. and the entire Party were not loyal and faithful to the decisions of the Ninth Congress, but it was because of the defective assessment of the class and political forces in the prevailing conditions and the estimation of the then political situation being lopsided and not clear enough".

The Review Report went on: "A closer study of our inner P.B. discussions, the resolutions and the statements of the P.B. and C.C. on the subject and our actual practice would show that there was stiff resistance on the part of the Party's leadership to reassess the role of the bourgeois Opposition parties* when most of these parties, in practice, were slowly giving up their earlier programmatic and policy positions, and moving towards the programme of Jaya Prakash Narayan and his resistance movement.

"The P.B. and the CC instead of noting the changing moves of these bourgeois Opposition parties, continued emphasising the fundamental class character of these parties and their Right-reactionary and counter-revolutionary nature as was described in our Party Programme and further explained and elaborated during the 1967-72 period when these parties were holding the banner of the so-called 'Grand Alliance'.

"The P.B. and C.C., resolutions were grossly underestimating the conflict and contradiction between the ruling Congress party on the one hand and the bourgeois Opposition parties on the other, while tending to exaggerate the basic contradiction between the great masses of the people and the ruling bourgeois landlord classes and parties as a whole."

Positively assessing "the efforts made by our Party, particularly in the latter part of the year 1976, in making the civil liberties convention and the second convention opposing the utterly anti-democratic 42nd Constitution Amendment Act a big success, and the mass campaign conducted by our Party against the 42nd Constitution Amendment in Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Andhra and Maharashtra", the Review Report pointed out that it "enabled the Party to play the proper role during the March 1977 general elections in facilitating the defeat of the Emergency regime of the Congress Party. It was this political leverage that helped our Party to emerge in the post-election political stage as the only hope for forging the unity of Left and democratic forces, as a real alternative against the reactionary concept of stabilising the so-called two-party system of the Janata and the Congress—the two bourgeois-landlord formations—to rule the country merrily and alternatively."

TACTICAL LINE OF THE TENTH CONGRESS

The political resolution of the Tenth Congress (1978) therefore was a follow-up of the tactical line that came to be evolved since the Seventh Congress. Basing itself on the understanding given in the Seventh Congress resolution on the Current Situation and Tasks, followed by the Central Committee report on New Situation and Party's Tasks (1967) and removing the confusion and vacillations that cropped up since 1969, the Tenth Congress enriched the slogan of Left and democratic front for which a 20-point programme was formulated. It pointed out the necessity also to have a "broad platform" to fight the forces representing dictatorship* It was pointed out that "the sharp conflicts among the bourgeois-landlord parties themselves reveal the possibilities of developing it. This

broad platform should have the immediate objective of completely dismantling the frame-work created by the authoritarian dictatorship, expanding democracy and introducing new clauses in the Constitution putting the fundamental rights of the people beyond the mischief of any ruling party or Government.”

The difference between the Left and democratic programme and the broad platform of struggle against dictatorship is one of the major contributions made by the Party at the Tenth Congress. An equally important feature is the clear and careful manner in which the various Left and democratic forces were defined. These forces come in the following order each with its distinct characteristics—positive as well as negative :

1. First come “our Party and the mass organisations led by us”.
2. Then come “our allies of the Left parties in West Bengal, Kerala and their mass organisations ; Left parties in other States, Maharashtra, etc.”

(It will be noticed that these two categories are the most consistent, though category two is less consistent than one.)

3. The Right CPI, its followers and mass organisations headed by it. The negative feature of this party is that its leaders “are not yet prepared to give up their policies of collaboration with the Congress which objectively disrupts Left and democratic unity”. As against this negative feature, however, is “a strong urge among its ranks to leave these policies behind and join the mainstream of anti-authoritarian struggle. Besides, in the present situation the former inhibitions against mass actions do not operate for them”.

4. “Large numbers in all parties who take a critical attitude towards the policies of their leadership and take a radical stand on several issues. This potential force has to be harnessed by nurturing it and developing a proper approach to it from issue to issue.”

5. Specific mention is made of “the Left and democratic forces in the Janata Party which consist of the former Young Turks, radicals from the Congress, members of the Socialist Party, independent individuals, who take a firm stand against the authoritarian forces and press for democratic changes, the radical individuals and groups in all constituents of the Janata Party which are keen on

defending the gains and fighting for the demands of the people.”

6. Also mentioned is “the split in the Congress (which) took place on the question of reassertion of authoritarianism by Indira Gandhi There are elements and groups in the Congress who not only are against the authoritarianism of Indira Gandhi but also tend to take radical positions on many socio-economic issues. These elements should be cultivated with a view to winning them over to the Left and democratic programme.”

7. Finally, “the democratic forces like the AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu, the Akali Party in Punjab and Republican Parties.” (It should be mentioned right now that one of the parties mentioned here, the AIADMK, has become an ally of the Congress, while the Akalis have become one of the divisive forces which can no more be considered an ally of the “Left and democratic front.”)

ASSESSING THE JANATA PARTY

It will be noted that, through the process of a painstaking study of the class and political essence of various parties, distinctions are made among them, pointing out which, of them and the extent to which they can be rallied and which of them have to be fought against. A more detailed characterisation of the Janata Party is relevant in this context. The main constituents, it is pointed out, are “the same parties that represented the Grand Alliance in 1971 and those whom our Party characterised as extreme reaction, Right reaction. Our Party especially attacked the reactionary ideology of the Jana Sangh and the RSS. We described the Congress (O) as the avowed and outspoken representative of the monopolist-landlord combine. These people at one time stood by the sacred right of property, opposed abolition of princes’ privy purses, nationalisation of banks, etc. Above all, they openly took a violent anti-Communist posture and were in the forefront of slandering our Party and the West Bengal Ministry led by us. They refused to condemn the semi-fascist terror directed against us in West Bengal.”

How then did these parties become our allies in the struggle against authoritarianism ? Because, “victims of one-party rule, denuded of all freedom, they had to take up the fight against dictatorship,

champion norms of parliamentary democracy and ifight for them. Their election manifesto put the question squarely as one between dictatorship and democracy and committed the leaders, party ranks and their followers to restoration of fundamental rights.”

Nevertheless, the warning was given that “all will not be faithful to these commitments ; vacillations, hesitations may occur and even treachery may be attempted. The urge for democracy, for fulfilling the promises, will be repeatedly obstructed by the class interests which dominate the party, by its class outlook and ideology.” Still, “the promises of the Janata Party are valuable assets which must be fully utilised in the political struggle. And they can be utilised because the-radicalised sections behind the Janata—which suffered during. Emergency—are not going to lend blind support to compromising policies.”

The political resolution noted “the growing combination of the Jana Sangh and the BLD (which) threatens to overwhelm the party with reactionary-conservative leadership.These forces are being resisted from inside the Janata Party by the-democratic and Left elements.”

The conflicts between the various constituents of the Janata, Party were thus of great importance in determining the tactical line worked out at the Tenth Congress. This, it can be seen, is precisely what led in 1979 to the break-up of the Janata Party and its Government.

JANATA BREAK-UP EVALUATED

The developments that led to the break-up of the Janata Government, however, created once again confusion in the-ranks which continued for quite some time. It was resolved only at the Eleventh Congress held in January 1982. The organisational report presented to the Congress by the Central Committee explained the circumstances in which the Janata Government came to be broken up and the reason why the CPI(M)-helped the process. The West Bengal State delegation expressed its opposition on some points but, after detailed discussion, the C.C. view was endorsed by the Congress.

Rebutting the criticism that the C.C. was “involving itself in the unprincipled squabbles of the groups inside the Janata Party” and that what was happening in the Janata Party was “factional strife and not guided by any principles”, the C.C. pointed out:

“Most of the conflicts and quarrels among the bourgeois-landlord parties relate to the issue of sharing political power, .and that is the ‘over-riding principle’. The adoption of ‘principles’ and ‘platforms’ by different bourgeois-landlord parties and .groups is aimed at subserving this ‘over-riding principle’. When .sections fell out with the then ruling Congress party and formed the Bangla Congress, Utkal Congress, Jana Congress, Jana Kranti Dal, Kerala Congress and the like in 1966-67, we did not think some lofty ‘principles’ were involved in it. The CPI (M) had supported or allied with some of them with the only one over-riding consideration of breaking the monopoly of one-party rule in the country.

“Then, again, during the second half of the year 1969, the ruling Congress party announced a political platform of “nationalisation of major banks’, ‘the abolition of privy, purses of princes’, ‘garibi hatao’ and the like, while some other bourgeois Opposition parties such as the Congress(O), Swatantra., Jana Sangh, RSS and certain other groups formed into a ‘Grand. Alliance’ with a political platform of extreme Right reaction. Again, the same parties took up the banner of defence of democracy against the authoritarian ruling Congress. It is difficult to judge these bourgeois-landlord parties and their inner-conflicts and feuds and factional strife through the yardstick of some ‘principles’. The CPI(M), while uniting with some of them on certain issues or in forging electoral alliances and even forming State Governments with them, never tried to judge them and their ‘principles’, though their announced pledges and principles were taken into account. No doubt, the CPI(M) was guided by some principles, such as breaking the monopoly of power of the ruling Congress, fighting against the authoritarian Congress(I), etc. If the CPI(M) could not dismiss the slogans of bank nationalisation and abolition of privy purses, and had to oppose the ‘Grand Alliance’ candidate and support V.V. Giri, it had no reason to dismiss the anti-RSS slogans of some

sections of the Janata Party as pure bluff and bluster.”

This, it can be seen, is the further development and enrichment of the idea put out at the Seventh Congress on the need for intervention in the various manifestations of the political crisis that erupts in bourgeois politics and how the intervention should be so planned and executed as to strengthen the position of the proletariat and its allies. Inner-party differences, conflicts, and struggles repeatedly broke out after the Seventh Congress* and created temporary difficulties for the Party. They were however resolved through the well-tested method of criticism and self-criticism, showing the essentially correct nature of the line laid down at the Seventh Congress and the complexities revealed in applying that general line to the changing political situation in the country.

BASIC ELEMENTS OF TACTICAL LINE

This brief survey of the tactical line as it evolved from the Seventh Congress to the Eleventh Congress enables us to differentiate our Party from the bourgeois, petty-bourgeois parties as well as the revisionist CPI. We may therefore now sum up the differences between them on the one hand and our Party on the other.

1. Unlike the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, our Party has a clear perception of the objective towards which revolutionary politics should go—People’s Democracy which is the first stage in India’s transition to Socialism. Unlike the CPI which places before itself the objective of National Democracy in which the proletariat shares the leadership of the State with the bourgeoisie—from which followed its tactical line of collaboration with the bourgeoisie—we work towards developing the proletariat as an independent revolutionary political force working towards class hegemony in the democratic movement. The Left and democratic front, the broader platform against authoritarianism, etc., are calculated to realise this strategic objective.

2. Unlike the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties for whom winning elections, forming Governments, etc., are the be-all

and end-all of politics, electoral politics (including the formation of Governments) is subordinated by our Party to the main job of preparing the people for the People’s Democratic Revolution. The CPI/ too, like other bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties has been subordinating their independent mass political work to electoral politics with corresponding tactical manoeuvres.

3. Unlike the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties which absolutise certain concepts like parliamentary democracy, nationalism, secularism and so on, but sacrifice them when such sacrificing becomes convenient for parliamentary politics, we subordinate them all to the need for uniting the working people under the leadership of the working class. This enables us to build the unity of the common people in determined struggles for democracy against authoritarianism, for national unity and secularism against casteism, communalism and other divisive forces. While we mobilise the common people belonging to all castes, communities, tribes and ethnic groups in the struggle for the protection of the oppressed and downtrodden, we fight the separatist and disruptive elements in all these groups with a view to forging the unity of the common people cutting across all such barriers.

4. Unlike the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties which consider the struggle for democracy inside the country in isolation from the struggles in the rest of the world, we integrate the two. Our struggle in India is intimately connected with the worldwide struggle to prevent the nuclear war being prepared by imperialist Powers headed by the United States. In thus integrating the national with the international struggle, we are broadly in agreement with the Soviet Union and the CPSU, but we make our own humble contribution to the unity of the world Communist movement in which China once again occupies its legitimate role. In this respect we differ not only from the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties but from the CPI as well.

5. Unlike the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois Opposition parties which by and large fail to distinguish between the anti-people internal policies pursued by the Congress Government and certain aspects of its foreign policy which have an anti-imperialist thrust,

Party Line on Current Tactics

we base our foreign and internal policies on this difference. Support to those elements of foreign policy which have an anti-imperialist thrust does not prevent us either from opposing the weaknesses and vacillations in foreign policy or the anti-people essence of internal policy.

6. Unlike the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, we look upon the class character of the Congress Government in the economic sector as the key to its anti-people internal policy. Struggle against the economic policies of the Government therefore becomes the basis on which broad unity of the Opposition can be built. Hence the crucial importance of trade union unity, the unity of the Kisan Sabhas and of the fighting organisations of other sections of the working people. The unity of these mass organisations to which revolutionary political leadership is given by the Party is therefore the key element in the struggle for Left and democratic unity which will develop into People's Democratic unity. From this arises the need for consistent ideological struggle—struggle against all ideological and political positions from which the ruling classes try to divide the people.

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