

Why the Ultra-‘Left’ Deviation?*

**An Examination of the Basic Causes of
Left Defections in Special Reference to Andhra
(Adopted by the Central Committee of the CPI(M)
in its meeting held in Calcutta, October 5-9, 1968)**

It was in April 1967 that our Central Committee reviewed the results of the fourth general elections in the country and worked out the resolution “New Situation and Party’s Tasks” to guide our activities in the present phase of our democratic movement. It is exactly during this period that a dangerous Left-adventurist line has emerged, challenging the entire political line of the party, and causing considerable damage to the party and the democratic movement in the country. In short the period under discussion was a most trying and testing one when the party had to stand up and fight back a three-pronged attack on it by the ruling Congress party and the revisionists from outside and the Left-adventurists from within.

There was not a day when one conspiracy or another was not hatched by the ruling Congress party and the central Government it controls to topple the U.F. governments in West Bengal and Kerala, to disrupt the U.F.s, and to slander, defame, disrupt and to even outlaw our Party, if possible.

There was not a single opportunity missed by the Right Communist Party to direct its venomous attack on our Party, to disrupt the united kisan and trade union organizations in the country, to discredit and isolate our Party and to undermine the U.F.s and their governments in West Bengal and Kerala. A careful scrutiny of their entire activity during the last fourteen months reveals the real face of the revisionists

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as the avowed agency of the bourgeoisie in the working class movement.

Is it then any wonder that some of the other bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties in the U.F.s were frequently found to join the anti-CPI(M) chorus and thus introduce in the functioning of the U.F.s and U.F. governments constant friction and conflict?

It is exactly under these circumstances that the Left-adventurists from within our Party opened a third front against the party, its political line and its organizational cohesion. These pseudo-revolutionaries by their irresponsible words and deeds provided ample grist to the mill of Congress reaction in its nefarious game of disrupting the unity of democratic forces; these "ultras", contrary to their boastful bragging of fighting revisionism and neo-revisionism, was in reality sidetracking the party's struggle against revisionism by their diversionary attacks on the party; and they did only assist reaction from their Left-opportunist end while the revisionists were doing the same from their Right-opportunist end. In short, in the crucial battle that was on in the country between the Congress party and its allies on one side of the barricade and the anti-Congress democratic forces on the other, the "ultras" did not range against the former and join with the latter in which the CPI(M) played the key role, but objectively abetted the Congress government and harmed the anti-Congress democratic front.

The strange and monstrous combination of Congress reaction and ultra-Leftism against the CPI(M) was glaringly revealed in the first half of the year 1967 itself, when the central Congress Government started attacking the CPI(M) to isolate it with a view to disrupting the U.F. and toppling the U.F. government in West Bengal and the Naxalites were exactly engaged in the same game of toppling the U.F. government since, according to them, it was more reactionary than the Congress government.

Thanks to the determined fight put up by the Central Committee and the loyalty and political vigilance of the

overwhelming majority of our Party members, the Left-adventurist challenge was met and defeated, as revealed in several states and finally at the Central Plenum at Burdwan. The Naxalites' conspiracy of subverting the party from within was scotched in time, despite initial damages suffered by the party. The party, on the whole, emerged from this struggle more united, ideologically, politically and organizationally, notwithstanding the serious dislocation and disruption caused by the Left defection in states like Andhra, U.P. and some other areas.

However, this phenomenon of Left-adventurist defection, coming as it did hardly within three years after our break-away from the revisionists, has, no doubt, sprung a sort of surprise on several amongst our Party and its following. Seriously concerned as they are about the unity of the Communist Party and the future of the revolutionary democratic movement, they are keenly interested in critically analysing this whole phenomenon, in examining the causes and sources that are at the root of this development and in drawing the correct lessons from our past history for proper guidance for the future.

The bourgeois press does not conceal its glee over this development and is busy mounting the propaganda that the communist movement in India is disintegrating under the impact of its internal splits and disruption and hence it has no future as far as India, let alone the world, is concerned. This, of course, is its deliberate class line and aims at discrediting and destroying the image of communism in the minds of the Indian toiling masses. While carrying out this general class task of anti-communism, it does not for a moment miss its job of making our Party the main target of attack and to tell the public, "after all, the leaders of the CPI(M) had sown the wind of split in 1963-64 and are now reaping the whirlwind".

The Right Communists, true to their class masters, join the chorus, shed crocodile tears over the 1963-64 split, denounce it as a "Peking-dictated affair", and curse the

Communist Party of China and its leader, Mao Tse-tung, to their heart's content, holding them responsible for all the ills in the world communist movement and the Indian communist movement in particular. They fondly hope, thereby, to bolster up the sagging morale of their ranks and destroy the CPI(M), branch and root, by exploiting the present Left defection from it. Finally, they address the Naxalites: "You have done well in revolting against the leaders who revolted against us"!

Thus, if the avowed anti-communist and reactionary forces in the country, in their utter stupidity, seek to draw comfort for themselves from the 'differences and divisions' in the communist movement, hoping that they would work for disintegration and destruction of communism, the Indian revisionists, too, from a different end of their own, are gloating over these differences and defection in our Party, while cursing us, all the time, for having broken away from them in 1964. These revisionist leaders under the signboard of the CPI, who parade as communists and even boast of being "creative Marxists" have totally abandoned the Marxist-Leninist method of analysing the phenomenon of differences and divisions inside the working class movement, in the same way as they have abandoned several fundamental concepts and precepts of Marxism and are indulging in all sorts of philistine banalities.

It is necessary that the Central Committee should go into the whole question deeply and thoroughly, review the entire course of our struggle against right-reformism since 1955, and also against Left-opportunism during the last one year, analyse the causes, in concrete, that gave birth to these two monsters in succession and draw correct lessons so that the party is armed well in facing the exacting tasks ahead.

But it is necessary, at the very outset, to make it absolutely clear that such a review of our entire past is a stupendous task which cannot be undertaken in such a short time and in haste, as it would be highly hazardous. For the present, the review is confined to examining the developments in

Andhra, since several comrades throughout the country are extremely anxious to know as to why such large-scale defections took place in Andhra which happens to be one of the oldest and strongest units of the party.

The Left defections that have taken place during the last one year and in particular, the large-scale defections in Andhra, and the necessity of continued struggle against this menace, both from within and outside the party, compel the party to probe into this phenomenon of Left-adventurism and petty-bourgeois revolutionism, analyse the causes, assess the entire struggle against it, and draw correct conclusions for our Party and the working class movement in the country. It is obvious that any such attempt at analysing the phenomenon of Left deviation in our Party in isolation from our struggle against the Right-revisionist disruption and its legacies would be highly defective and extremely shallow. Since both these Right and Left monsters, as Lenin puts it, are manifestations of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influence over the working class movement and the two often complement each other, our examination of one in isolation from the other becomes faulty and the corrections are in danger of acquiring a superficial and stop-gap character. Confining this review to the present phase and immediate past, without going deep into the entire past, and confining it to Andhra would certainly impose serious limitations on the discussion and would not bring out the complete picture. And yet, placed as the party is, there is no escape from this, and comrades must appreciate the real difficulties at present and the limitations they impose on this effort.

Origin and Sources of Differences in the Communist Movement

Before proceeding to analyse the causes and reasons of defections in Andhra, and making some general observations on the conditions obtaining in our Party and the revolutionary movement in the country, it is necessary to reiterate the Marxist-Leninist methodology for analysing and

assessing the phenomenon of differences, deviations and splits in the modern working class movement. A tendency, often expressed in this connection, is to trace these differences and divisions to one or another leader's mistaken positions in the working class movement or one or another group of leaders' erroneous views, which may lead to either Right-reformism and revisionism, or Left-sectarianism and adventurism. But such a view in the first place is superficial and does not explain the essence of the phenomenon; and secondly, it does not arm the working class movement to understand the depth of this phenomenon, nor does it enable it to carry on a principled fight against this menace and guard the unity of the movement. Hence it is necessary that we are guided by the accepted Marxist-Leninist methodology in analysing this phenomenon of differences in the working class movement, as our differences are no exception to the general laws in operation.

All Marxist-Leninists admit that internal influence of the bourgeoisie and external pressure of the imperialists are at the root of this phenomenon of revisionism, whether it is Right-revisionism or revisionism from the Left. This truth is concretised by Lenin and his observations on the subject provide us with infallible guidelines.

The first important observation of Lenin on the subject, which we should note is that "Revisionism", or 'revision' of Marxism, is today one of the chief, if not the chief, manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat and bourgeois corruption of the workers". Further he states, "Anarchism was not infrequently a kind of penalty for the opportunist sins of the working class movement. The two monsters complement each other". To put it in other words, both Right-revisionism and Left-opportunism are the reflection of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influence on the working class movement and they are often twins, born of the same common origin, rather than antipodes.

The second pertinent observation of Lenin clearly points out that opportunism of both the Right and Left variety is

the social product of a whole historical epoch, and it is an international phenomenon. "That opportunism is not an accidental thing, not a sin, not a slip, not a treachery of individual, but the social product of a whole historical epoch. But not everybody ponders over the significance of this truth." "The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon." Commenting on the struggle of Marxists "against the two big trends that are departing from Marxism", Lenin asserts that "these two trends are revisionism (opportunism, reformism) and anarchism (anarcho-syndicalism). Both these departures from the Marxist theory that is dominant in the labour movement, and from Marxist tactics, have been observable in various forms and in various shades in all civilised countries throughout the more than half a century history of the mass labour movement".

The third point that cannot but interest us while discussing the deviations from Marxist theory and practice is Lenin's elucidation of some of the important factors that constitute the causes and sources of the differences in the proletarian movement, which he had dealt with in a short article captioned "Differences in the European Labour Movement". He mentions there six causes and reasons which are as follows: the growth of the labour movement and the attraction to it of ever new sections of the working class; the uneven growth of capitalism, its development in different countries and spheres of national economy; the tactics that the bourgeois class adopts towards the working class movement; the bourgeois world outlook and its influence; the dialectical nature of social development which misleads some people to constantly exaggerate one-sided theory and tactics, now one and now another feature of capitalist development; and the passing of certain individuals, groups and sections of the petty-bourgeoisie into the ranks of the proletariat, which in turn gives rise to vacillation in theory and practice.

The fourth statement of Lenin that is particularly instructive to us, communists in India, concerns the concrete study

of the phenomenon in each country where the Right and Left opportunist monsters raise their head. He directs all Marxists that "it is now essential that communists of every country should quite consciously take into account both the fundamental objectives of the struggle against opportunism and Left-doctrinairism, and the *concrete features* which this struggle assumes and must inevitably assume in each country, in conformity with the specific character of its economics, politics, culture, national composition, its colonies, religious divisions, and so on and so forth".

Lastly, besides these above-narrated sources for the differences and divisions in the world working class and communist movement, there has arisen an additional source in the present-day international situation. The coming into existence of big socialist states and powerful ruling Communist Parties in them such as the Soviet Union and the CPSU and the People's Republic of China and the Communist Party of China has its big impact and influence on the rest of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the entire world, their policies and their theoretical-ideological standpoints, from time to time. If correct internal and external policies pursued by these big socialist states and their ruling parties have a salutary effect on the rest of the Communist Parties, and if correct Marxist-Leninist theoretical-ideological stands by them have a beneficial role in moulding the theoretical-ideological view of other fraternal parties, the differences and deviations in each of these big parties and between these parties cannot but reverberate in other fraternal parties. The intensity of these reverberations and the consequent results, of course, vary from party to party, depending upon a number of circumstances. As far as the Indian communist movement is concerned, it is no exaggeration to state that the serious Right-revisionist split in the year 1964, and the Left-adventurist defections in the year 1967-68 are in a big way influenced by the policies of the CPSU and the CPC respectively. To under-rate this truth in any manner is obviously wrong, and the struggle of each party against the adverse

impact of this factor and in defence of its correct and independent positions acquires added importance. The importance of this struggle is all the more underlined when these big parties not merely exercise their influence through their correct or incorrect policies but even crudely interfere in the internal affairs of brother parties—all in the name of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and their infallibility in understanding them and practising them. Otherwise, the unity of the communist movement is in danger of reducing itself to either an unrealizable concept or to the position of succumbing to the pressure of one or the other big party and blindly rallying behind them.

Some Basic Defects and their Impact on Differences inside the Communist Movement

Keeping the guidelines mentioned above, brief observations can be made regarding some of the basic defects, and their persistence since long, in the Indian communist movement.

The first important truth, however unpleasant it may be, is that the communist movement in our country, despite its forty years and more of existence and selfless struggle for the building of a democratic and socialist mass movement, is not yet firmly rooted either in the working class of the advanced industries or the multi-million rural proletariat and semi-proletariat in the countryside. Up to this day the majority of the industrial working class, even in the trade unions, is under the influence and domination of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, and the section under the Right Communist Party is, in no way, politically different from them. It is true that our movement in states like West Bengal and Madras differs somewhat with a comparatively large proletarian base. But taking the party's mass base as a whole in the country, the proletarian and semi-proletarian mass base of our Party was weak even when there was a united Communist Party, and this position has not changed for the better after the split.

Objective and subjective reasons for this state of affairs

apart, the weakness of the mass proletarian base of the communist movement has its immediate and direct effect on the Communist Party and its development. The proletarian aspirations, sentiments, urges, immediate and long-range interests and their class mood and temper do not get adequately reflected and influence the decisions of the party. Consequently, class and mass corrections to the deviations arising in the party are not there, either altogether or with enough impact. Thus, one of the important sources for the prevention of the growth of Right and Left-opportunist trends, and for assisting their speedy remedial when they crop up, remains extremely weak, with all the consequences that such a weakness implies. One of the aspects to be examined while analysing and assessing the latest Left defections is whether the presence or absence of an organised mass workers' and peasants' movement has any direct influence on the phenomenon, and whether it is a fact or not that wherever such a mass proletarian base is there, the Left disruption is either absent or insignificant.

The second point that deserves careful examination is the new growth of capitalism under the three five-year plans in post-independence India, and the influx of new entrants into the working class, i.e. the uprooted peasants and petty-bourgeois white collar workers, and its impact. It cannot be denied that the still-dominant bourgeois influence on the general working class movement of our country is further reinforced by these new entrants into the class, and it, in its turn, in no small way has contributed to the growth of Right-reformist and revisionist illusions in the trade union movement under the leadership of the once-united Communist Party. The fact that the bulk of cadre working on the trade union front opted out to the side of the revisionist leadership when the 1963-64 split took place, should not be dismissed as either accidental or simply because of their theoretical-ideological ill-equipment. The spurt in the industrial development, however limited or small compared to the possibilities and needs, and the big influx of new entrants to the ranks of the industrial

working class, certainly, had provided fertile soil for breeding reformist illusions, which were reflected in the communist movement during the 1955-62 period. The slowing down of the industrial development, the falling employment opportunities, the crisis that set in, the abandonment of the fourth plan, the growing disparity in real incomes, etc., accentuated since 1962, are causing disillusionment, particularly in the middle class employees, and this section is expressing its disillusionment in the form of petty-bourgeois revolutionism and Left-radicalism. Is it conceivable that this will not have its own share in influencing the rise of Leftism in the party?

The third important source that has its direct bearing on the differences and deviations inside the communist movement in our country is the character and weakness in our peasant movement. The growth of the revolutionary working class movement and the Communist Party in our country, a country in which eighty per cent of population is rural and mainly agricultural, is very much dependent upon, not merely how the industrial working class organises itself and fights in defence of its day-to-day interests, but the development of the revolutionary peasant movement and the political, ideological and organisational leadership it provides to the agrarian revolutionary movement. In this regard, apart from the achievements and shortcomings prior to the years 1954-55 in the building up of the agrarian movement, the signal failure on the part of the communists since 1954-55 is undeniable. The first serious attempt made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India in the year 1954 to get the kisan movement out of the old rut and reorientate it to the developing new conditions and class relations on the agrarian front, was virtually sabotaged and abandoned in practice, on one pretext or the other. The sum total of this failure was the stagnation of the mass peasant movement, and whatever kisan movement was organised and led was mainly oriented to the middle and well-to-do peasant sector, instead of to the growing numbers of agricultural labour and

poor peasant sections. The relative new opportunities for well-being that presented themselves to the middle and rich peasant sections, in no small way, influenced the Communist Party in the rural areas, and in particular, a good chunk of the cadre of middle and rich peasant origin occupying leading positions in the rural party committees. In fact, the main contingents that came as a big prop to the Right Communist Party and its opportunist line from states like Andhra in its struggle against our Party, represent the above-mentioned sections. The weakness of the movement of agricultural labour and the poor peasantry, the devastating effects of government policies and economic crisis on the rural poor, their intensified class oppression and utilisation of government's repressive police machinery for the same—all this in turn is breeding extreme Leftism and petty-bourgeois revolutionism in certain cadres of the party as a way out of the predicament into which the agrarian movement is thrown. They fail to understand the importance of implementing the new agrarian policy enunciated by the party, show reluctance for patient and sustained work, and are becoming victims of some adventurist slogans and actions.

The fourth important aspect that should draw our utmost attention is the nature and character of the party, its class composition, its Marxist-Leninist education, its steeling and tempering in class and mass struggles, the degree of its class consciousness and political maturity and the manner it was functioned, built, disciplined, etc. Leaving the task of a fuller and comprehensive review to the future, it may be of use to highlight certain marked features that will enable us to have a realistic picture of the present.

The class composition of the once-united Communist Party as well as of our Party after its breaking away from the revisionists, is predominantly petty-bourgeois in character. Ninety per cent of the leading bodies and cadres comprise of middle and rich peasant sections. The fact that both in the general membership of the party and its committees from the village level to every higher committee up to the Central

Committee, elements of proletarian and semi-proletarian origin do not constitute a considerable force, let alone the majority, even after four decades in our country speaks volumes for the failure of the communist movement in our country. True, this state of affairs continues not because the leadership is either unaware of it or has not adopted some good resolutions from time to time stressing the need for increasing proletarianization of the party, but it is mainly and solely due to the serious defects in building the mass workers' and peasants' revolutionary movements, as already pointed out above. Unless a radical turn and reorientation is made in building the trade union and kisan movements, as indicated in our trade union and kisan documents, no amount of self-criticism regarding the defective class composition of our Party will improve matters and no pious resolutions and arbitrary steps can remedy this situation. Is it any wonder that such a party is extremely vulnerable to the frequent rise of Right and Left deviations, when no Communist Party in the world, even if it is sought to be built on the firm foundations of Marxism-Leninism, can escape facing Right and Left deviations and inner-party struggles?

Now examine the question of Marxist-Leninist education and schooling in the Indian communist movement. Almost all of our leaders and functionaries are quite conversant with the statements of Lenin on the importance of theoretical knowledge for the communists. Statements such as "without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary practice"; "the role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory"; "there can be no strong Socialist Party without a revolutionary theory, theory which unites all socialists, from which they draw all their convictions, and which they apply in their methods of struggle and means of action"; "to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn away from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen the bourgeois ideology;" etc., are remembered by many and even recited frequently. But, as the saying goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, we

will have to judge our past performances in this regard from the struggle that has been waged and the results that have accrued on the theoretical-ideological front. It is an undeniable fact that the party, in its long past, had very much neglected the task of theoretical-ideological education of the party. Consequently what had happened was not simply a matter of 'belittling the socialist ideology in any way, to turn away from it in the slightest degree' against which Lenin had sternly warned, but we had belittled the socialist ideology in a big way and turned away from it to a dangerous degree.

How is the fact to be explained that for a greater part of the time during the last forty years the party got manoeuvred into the position of building a Communist Party and the revolutionary movement without a clear-cut party programme? Why was it shy of working out a new programme from 1955 to 1964, after the programme adopted in 1951-52 was found to be defective in some vital respects? What valid reasons were there to dodge, bypass and evade a serious inner-party discussion from 1955 to 1964, when a series of fundamental theoretical-ideological issues came up such as the precise class character of the state, the stage of our revolution, the principal contradiction in the stage, the class assessment of the internal and external policies of the Congress government, and the possibility or otherwise of conducting the industrial revolution along the bourgeois reformist path, etc.? And what was at the root of the phenomenon that an overwhelming majority in the leading committees of the united party at different levels opted out to the camp of Right-reformism and revisionism? Is it not a fact that the majority of the party membership responded to the call of the 32 National Council members in 1964 not so much because of the complete theoretical-ideological clarity they had over the issues under dispute, but because of their own practical experience of the increasing mass discontent and disillusionment with Congress policies on the one hand, and revulsion with the patently revisionist policy and class-

collaborationist practice of Dange's party and the revisionist policies of the Soviet Communist Party leadership and its government in international affairs, on the other?

The mere fact that our Party broke away from the revisionists should not obliterate the harsh reality that our Party was an integral part of the once-united party and has inherited all the legacies, good and bad, that its Marxist-Leninist theoretical-ideological level is extremely poor, that its rejection of Right-revisionism is no positive proof of its Marxism, that a good chunk of it rallied behind our Party due to its militant sentiments and petty-bourgeois radicalism and that a prolonged and arduous struggle is ahead of us to liquidate the evil legacies and to forge ahead in building a really revolutionary and genuine Marxist-Leninist party.

During the last three years, only preliminary steps could be taken in that direction, and even these, for the most part, remained on paper and are yet to be translated into action. It is in this process that the Party has met with the Left-adventurist challenge and defections.

Hence any analysis and self-critical examination of the Left-infantile phenomenon the party is facing cannot be correct if it is not assessed in relation to the nature of the working class and peasant movements, to the socio-economic conditions that prevail, to the party and its class composition we have inherited, to the growth or stagnation of the democratic movement that our Party is heading in different states, to the correctness or otherwise of the ideological-political struggle we have been waging for the last three years, and to the international factors that are influencing the phenomenon.

The Defections and the Special Features Behind Them

A general look at the Left defections and the relative scale of their disruption in different states and areas would reveal some specific common features that have to be noted, besides the general features on an all-India scale and the

particular features in each state. Stagnation in the mass movement, reverse in the electoral struggles and the pressure of the enemy on our Party and the movements under its leadership and the consequent frustration, all have their impact on this phenomenon.

There are serious defections in states and areas where the mass movement of workers and peasants is either stagnant or at a low ebb, when compared to the states and areas where the democratic movement, under the leadership of our Party, is registering some progress, and the party is in live touch with the masses. Andhra, U.P., Kashmir in the former category and Bengal, Kerala, Tamilnad, etc., in the latter, corroborate this.

In states and areas where our Party's estimation of the correlation of forces and its own strength went completely wrong, where it suffered severe electoral defeats in the fourth general elections, and where it failed to draw correct lessons from the election defeats and reorganise its work to forge ahead, there Leftism got a spurt, and the defections, too, have been serious.

In the states and regions where the struggle against the revisionists was fought more on the abstract ideological-political plane than in the concrete and on mass issues, where revisionist isolation was overestimated and where the dire necessity of forging united front and united mass struggles was underplayed or neglected, there Left infantilism erupted in bigger dimensions and caused greater disruption.

It is noticeable that whichever state unit implemented the party line, as elaborated by the Central Committee and P.B. from time to time, registered progress in the measure it was successful in implementing it, and this truth is more clearly seen during the post-election period, following the Central Committee's resolution "New Situation and Party's Tasks". Not only is there advance in these states—this advance itself differing from state to state, but it is also found that the Left disruption is either less or could be effectively checked when the monster raised its ugly head. Conversely, in the

states where the central party line and directives received either scant regard or could not be implemented for one reason or other, and where the C.C. and P.B. did not and could not intervene in time to get its line implemented, there greater stagnation has set in, providing fertile soil for Left-opportunism and revolutionary phrase-mongering.

Another thing that is strikingly revealed with almost all these groups and individuals that have defected is that none of them, during the last three years, raised any basic objection to any political or programmatic issue or expressed any differences with the party's political line. All of them, without exception, had welcomed the unanimously accepted C.C. resolution "New Situation and Party's Tasks", in the middle of April 1967. It was with the Naxalite infantilism in May-June 1967, which began receiving support as the beginning of an "armed revolution", "national liberation war", etc., from the Peking Radio and the Chinese press on the one hand, and, on the other, was used for systematic scare propaganda with highly exaggerated reports by the monopolist press in the country depicting the Naxalbari struggle as the beginning of an armed insurrection, etc., that the whole programme and political line began to be challenged. If Radio Peking and the press had wrongly seen rising flames of revolution in Naxalbari, the central Congress Government and reaction saw in Naxalbari a golden opportunity to slander the CPI(M), to disrupt the united front and topple the state Government in Bengal. In the confusion thus created, the Left-adventurist trend lost its bearings and steadily and rapidly drifted into a position of total opposition to the party and its political line. Their loyalty to the party, its programme and political line proved skin-deep and their blind faith in Radio Peking and the Chinese press, in the name of anti-revisionism and proletarian internationalism, swept them off their feet into a Left-infantile revolt against the party.

These people who supported the party programme and the political line of the party at the Seventh Congress and who pledged loyalty to the party organisation and its

constitution staged a revolt against it in the second half of 1967.

They demanded that the party accept the thought of Mao Tse-tung as the Marxism-Leninism of the present epoch, and when the demand was rejected by the party's Central Plenum, they decided to go out of the party denouncing it as neo-revisionist.

Thus, a section of comrades in different states who were in no way conspicuous in their zeal and enthusiasm in fighting Right-reformism and revisionist inroads into party policy since 1955 and were even frequently lending support to the then wrong official line of the party and its dominant leadership, surprisingly enough are claiming now to be the sole repositories of Marxism-Leninism and its real revolutionary content. In the name of their adherence to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, they have come to uphold every pronouncement and statement from the Chinese communist press and radio as creative Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao as the last word on all matters connected with the entire present epoch—a stand that our Party does not and cannot accept as correct.

Andhra Defections and Underlying Causes

Several comrades from all over India, even those who quite well understand the meaning of the dangerous political-ideological line of the Left-adventurist trend and who are convinced that the documents put forth in the Central Plenum by the Andhra 'Lefts' are advocating a systematised Left-adventurist line, express doubts and seek answers as to why such large-scale defections took place and how several leading cadres of long standing, from taluk level to state level, fell victim to Left-infantilism. It is natural that such questions crop up because the Andhra state unit of our Party and the democratic revolutionary movement it was leading had come to occupy a proud and prominent place in the Indian communist movement for nearly a decade during 1946-55, and the party's organisational strength there was on par with

that in the West Bengal and Kerala states, till the Left split and disruption took place. Hence it may prove beneficial to attempt a review of the Andhra developments leading to the large-scale defections.

At the outset it should be made absolutely clear that the phenomenon of Right-reformism or Left-opportunism, as Lenin aptly pointed out, is a phenomenon of an entire historical epoch and of an international character. There is no, nor can there be, any Andhra exceptionalism in this regard. The Left-adventurist deviation in Andhra is an inseparable part of this phenomenon which is expressing itself on a national and international scale at present, as is the case with modern revisionism which stands as the main danger before the world communist movement.

Similarly, the common features of this phenomenon as narrated in this document earlier are fully applicable to and valid in the case of Andhra. In fact, it is in Andhra that they express themselves in a concentrated and concerted form.

In reviewing and analysing the phenomenon of extreme Leftism and large-scale defections in the state unit of Andhra, it is not possible to avoid going, even briefly, into the history of the Communist Party in Andhra, its origin and growth, the major struggles that it had led, the class movement and organizations it had built, the class composition of the party unit, the strong and weak points of the party and the mass movement under its leadership and the particular socio-economic background in which the communist movement in Andhra is being built.

In this connection, we recall how several foreign 'research scholars', particularly those employed by the U.S. and other imperialist agencies in anti-communist research institutions, were repeatedly raising the question, during the 1950-55 period, what the special, social peculiarities are that enabled the growth of the communist movement in Andhra, which is neither conspicuous in any way for its industrial growth nor marked for its feudal oppression and extreme poverty—keeping in mind, of course, the coastal districts of

Andhra where the party organisation was always stronger. These anti-communists had their own purpose for this enquiry and had their own answers. But it should also interest us so that the proper answers to them may help us to appreciate the strong and weak points of our Party and movement in Andhra.

The present Andhra Pradesh comprises three broad regions, which are popularly called the Circar districts, Rayalaseema and Telangana. These three regions, leaving aside how they came to be named so, are distinctly different from each other in their socio-economic development, in their level of education, in the average standard of life, in their relative contribution to the social, cultural and political movements during the last fifty years and more, and, in a way even in the growth and development of the Communist Party in the state.

It is an undeniable fact of history that it was the Circar districts, from the once united Vizag district to Nellore, specially the four delta districts of Guntur, Krishna, West and East Godavaries, that had been the hub of social and political activities. Whether it was the so-called non-brahmin movement in the early 20th century, or the language renaissance movement of *grandhic bhasha* versus *gramya bhasha*, or the movement for a separate Andhra province or for Visalaandhra, or the successive national movements of the 1920s, 30s and 40s, or the progressive student, youth and women's movement or in the spreading of the socialist and communist movement—it is from this central region that the major contingents came forth, the solitary exception being the Telangana peasant armed revolt during 1946-51, which, again, enjoyed solid sympathy and mass support from our Party and the people in the Circar districts. Telangana came into the picture later and is dealt with separately.

A few glaring facts go to corroborate the truth of this statement. During the national movement led by the Congress, in the twenties and thirties, of the three to four thousand persons who participated in the civil disobedience

movement and courted imprisonment in entire Andhra, the three districts of Guntur, West Godavary and Krishna alone contributed three-fourths of this contingent; more than three quarters of the strength of the Communist Party which has functioned in Andhra during the last thirtyfive years or so, comes from the central Circar districts, the region of Rayalseema remaining far behind with only some small and scattered pockets in different districts whose total strength never exceeded two thousand; the three hundred comrades who laid down their lives during the fascist repression of the Congress in 1948-51, except for six or seven, came from these central districts; of the fortyeight Legislative Assembly and 11 Parliament members, either party or party-supported, elected in the 1952 elections, 40 of the former and 10 of the latter were from these central districts; and the same holds good, even to this day, regarding development of class and mass movements as well as the Communist Party.

It is equally striking that out of the total voting strength in the eleven districts of the old Andhra province, as big a percentage as 55 of the average of votes are registered in the four districts of Guntur, Krishna, West Godavary and East Godavary. In the three successive elections held in 1946, 1952 and 1955, it is found that the percentage of the total votes secured for the Communist Party from these four districts alone are 95 in 1946, 85.5 in 1952 and 73 in 1955. Out of the total communist candidates contesting the three successive elections, as big a percentage as 89 in 1946, 72 in 1952 and 58 in 1955, came from these four delta districts alone.

This speciality of the area cannot be explained by anything other than its socio-economic basis and the consequent class pattern which is relatively advanced from the rest. The first point is that for long all these central districts have had the ryotwari system of land tenure, barring a few zamindari or inamdari pockets. The second important point is that big projects like the Godavari, Krishna and Pennar have been providing irrigation facilities for the last hundred

years and more to sizable tracts in these districts. Thirdly, the land is also more fertile in these districts. As a result of all this, and several other factors, capitalist relations in agriculture are far more developed here than in the rest of the regions, and the emergence of a good chunk of middle and rich peasants and sizable sections of the urban petty-bourgeoisie are a pronounced character of this region.

This region, even today, after twenty years of national political independence, remains an industrially backward region, with hardly one urban centre which can be called the centre of the modern working class, though towns and the urban population constitute 15 to 20 per cent of the people in the area. In the agrarian sector, neither the time-old feudal and semi-feudal forms of exploitation and oppression prevails nor have fully developed capitalist relations and capitalist landlordism taken its place. Between the bulk of the agricultural labour and poor peasant on the one hand and five per cent of the different kinds of landlords on the other, there has emerged a sizable stratum of middle and rich peasants, which is not inspired by the slogan of land distribution, because they, as realists, well understand that there will be practically no land for them after the demand of the agricultural labour and poor peasants for land is satisfied. And more than that, this stratum, in general, is opposed to the wage demands of agricultural labour, as they, too, employ considerable numbers of agricultural labourers and indulge in different forms of exploitation of the rural proletarians and poor peasants. The Congress Government's agrarian policies are principally aimed at benefiting the big landlords and rich peasant sections. But these policies, in the long run, as the crisis deepens, will certainly hit even the rich peasants. Yet it is totally unrealistic to state that the rich peasants and the middle peasants in this deltaic region of Andhra are already affected seriously. It is also unreal to say that even sections of the middle peasants have not gained anything at all from the agrarian policies. Though this observation is surely not applicable to all parts of the country,

and for that matter even to all the regions of the state equally, and may appear even somewhat strange, it seems to be completely correct as far as this region is concerned, with its considerable tracts of land, moderate rainfall, extensive irrigation facilities, long-standing ryotwari system of land tenure, availability of cheap agricultural labour, and good marketing facilities. The worst hit under the Congress policies are the agricultural labourers, poor peasants, artisans and the urban consumers and middle classes, while the most benefited are the big landlords, rich peasants, big traders, the Congress-patronised contractors, etc.

Such in brief is the socio-economic background of the region in Andhra on which the first nucleus of the Communist Party in the state was formed, and to this day, after 35 years of its existence, the bulk of the party membership is recruited from this region, and the major class and mass movements under the party's leadership are more or less confined to this area, with the exception of the three districts of Telangana. Out of the 20 districts in the present Andhra Pradesh, the Communist Party stands as a mass force only in 6 districts, while in the rest it is either weak and nominal or non-existent. Neither a mass working class movement nor a widespread agrarian revolutionary movement constitutes the base and principal centre of party activity.

The question that remains to be explained now is how the Communist Party grew in strength and secured its wide democratic mass base in Andhra? First of all, it is necessary to state that it could attract to its fold a good chunk of the anti-imperialist youth in these central districts who were disillusioned with the Congress and its methods of struggle during the 1930-32 movement and were roused by radical and revolutionary ideas of socialism and communism. Secondly, it was this communist youth who had the fortune of doing pioneering work in trade unions in the working class, as well as organising agricultural labour associations and kisan sabhas of the peasantry, which conducted a number of working class economic struggles and a series of agricultural

labour struggles as well as local kisan struggles on their pressing day-to-day demands, over a period of a decade from 1935-36 to 1945-46. Thirdly, it was the commun-ists in Andhra who were the first to organise youth and student sections on a big scale, and attracted the most militant and advanced among them into the Communist Party. Fourthly, it was the communist unit in Andhra that extended its party organization and work to the Telangana region in the then state of Hyderabad, and this work in course of time provided real flesh and blood to the movement for the formation of the Visalaandhra state, the first of its kind in the history of the Telugu people. Fifthly, our Party in Andhra stood in the van during 1939-46, initiating and championing causes such as cultural and literary revival, women's uplift, end to social oppression of the scheduled castes, and all other progressive and democratic currents like the demand for separate Andhra state and Visalaandhra. It also led militant agricultural and urban labour struggles in the central districts of Andhra during 1946-48. Finally, the historic Telangana peasant armed revolt of 1946-51, boldly led by our Party, had helped the Andhra communist movement to gain new heights by 1951-52. The massive electoral victories scored in the first general elections, when as big a number as 85 MLAs and 19 MPs got elected on the party ticket or mainly on the party's support, prove this truth.

Telangana Peasant Struggles and the State Communist Party Unit

The Telangana region, as is well known, was a part of the Nizam's state of Hyderabad, which comprises 8 districts, with a population of around ten million. The state Communist Party unit, which was formed and was functioning in the Andhra area of the former Madras state since 1933-34, was able to set up its illegal communist nucleus in Hyderabad only in 1940 with a group of Left petty-bourgeois intellectuals and some radicals of liberal landlord origin who were connected with the states people's movement under the Andhra

Mahasabha and were inspired by the national liberation movement led by the Congress in British India. From 1940 to 1945, the party unit there was guided by organisers appointed by the Andhra state unit, and its activities, besides forming study groups and some stray contacts with the working class, were confined, in the main, to activities in the Andhra Mahasabha, an organization which began as a literary-cultural organisation and comprised of elements in its leadership from newly recruited communists to liberal landlords and enlightened gentry from the Telugu part of the state. The agrarian demands that the communist elements raised and succeeded in incorporating in the programme of the Andhra Mahasabha, the demand for no eviction of tenants, for no illegal exactions and forced labour and for no imposition of grain levy on the poor peasantry, secured a wide peasant mass base for it in the peasantry which was subjected to mediaeval exploitation and the most barbarous social oppression for centuries under the Muslim feudal rulers and their jagirdar and deshmukh landlord satraps. It must be admitted here that neither the agrarian programme that our Party advocated on the platform of the Andhra Mahasabha nor the political slogans raised from it were conspicuously radical and revolutionary in their nature, they were only general democratic and moderate in their nature. And yet, the sabha platform, being the sole mass platform of its kind, which came to exist in the region after centuries of denial of any civil liberties worth the name, secured spontaneous mass peasant support, and our Party's work among the peasantry, however modest and limited, paid big dividends.

The big mass peasant upheaval in Telangana, it should be realised, started in 1945-46 as an inseparable part of the post-second war upsurge in the country. The resolution of the party's Central Committee of August 1946, and the Andhra state unit's serious efforts to implement the same, both in the Andhra area and the Telangana region, found ready and spontaneous response in the Telangana peasantry, particularly in the districts adjoining the Circar districts of Guntur,

Krishna, West Godavary, where the general national movement as well as the Communist Party were strong and widespread.

The Telangana peasant struggle which was started as a movement against large-scale evictions, burdensome and oppressive grain levies and atrocious slave labour in 1946 gained rapid momentum. The peasantry with its long-accumulated revolutionary energy was in no mood to be cowed down by the combined oppression and violence let loose by the Nizam's police and military and the hired goonda gangs of the deshmukhs and big landlords. Not only did this mass peasant resistance to the armed attacks of the feudal ruling classes steadily acquire the character of armed resistance of the peasantry, however poorly equipped and ill-prepared it was, it also marched forward with radical agrarian demands, combined with the political demand for the overthrow of the Nizam's state power.

In this connection, it is instructive to note that our Party's attempt to organise and lead a wide mass movement as part of the general anti-imperialist national liberation struggle in the Andhra part of the former Madras state did not succeed as desired, but in the Telangana region it grew beyond expectation, and in a way, took the party unawares. Is it not also important to note that while in the Andhra area, where the organised peasant movement was far older with its organisation of Kisan Sabha and Agricultural Labour Association, where the anti-imperialist national liberation movement was deep and widespread and where the Communist Party and its organizational strength was far superior, the revolutionary upsurge did not break out, whereas in the Telangana region, with a young and weak Communist Party, with no other class or mass organization in existence since time immemorial except the amorphous mass movement organised in the form of the Andhra Mahasabha, with no experience of any class and mass struggles with the exception of the State Congress satyagraha movement during 1938-40, and with comparatively less mass political awakening, it grew into the historic peasant armed struggle and continued

for more than five years, people displaying marvels of heroism and sacrifice, laying down their lives in thousands, facing mass-scale arrests, beatings and torture?

There are a number of socio-economic factors that alone can correctly explain this. The first and foremost factor was that the contradiction between the mass of the peasantry and feudal landlordism in Telangana had assumed the acutest and sharpest form reaching its bursting point, whereas in the agrarian class set-up in the Andhra area, that was not so, since the development of capitalism and capitalist relations, the class differentiation among the peasantry, were far advanced, mitigating some contradictions, while also introducing some new contradictions which had not yet matured.

The second important political point was that in the part of Andhra under direct British rule, the national liberation movement continued to be under the hegemony of the Congress party, as in the rest of British India, while the hegemony of the liberation struggle against the feudal autocracy of Hyderabad, in the Telangana region, was virtually snatched away from the liberal leadership of the Andhra Mahasabha by the democratic forces headed by the Communist Party, which secured the additional advantage of merging the agrarian revolutionary current with the national liberation current. Why our Party failed to secure such a leading position in the anti-imperialist national liberation movement in the Andhra part, what the shortcomings and errors were during the 1939-46 period of the second war in the struggle for such a hegemony, etc., of course are not the subject matter of the present document since these questions are connected with the policies of the CPI as a whole in that period and cover questions of party history, though it is very necessary to draw correct lessons from our past experiences.

The third significant factor was that the contradiction between the state ruler of Hyderabad and the new Indian state that had come into existence with the transfer of power in 1947, could not be resolved by a peaceful compromise, as in the case of the rest of the Indian native states, but con-

tinued and intensified till the 'police action' in September 1948. Thus the period between the establishment of the Interim government at the Centre in August 1946 and the so-called police action of 1948, had provided our Party with elbow room to manoeuvre, develop and expand the struggle in Telangana utilising this contradiction.

The fourth factor that worked in the party's favour was the complete social isolation of the Muslim autocratic ruler of Hyderabad state and the general moral sympathy for the struggle against this regime, coming not only from genuinely democratic and nationalist forces but also several Hindu-minded sections, who identified their Hinduism with Indian nationalism. This factor working in our favour in a more pronounced manner could be seen in the Andhra area where considerable sections of the local national bourgeoisie and even liberal-minded gentry were either sympathetic to the struggle or benevolently neutral despite their anti-communism, and this lasted till "the liberation of Hyderabad" by the big bourgeois-landlord government.

The last significant factor that, in no inconsiderable way, assisted the development of the Telangana struggle was the existence of a well-knit Communist Party in the adjoining Andhra area which had in its fold the revolutionary youth, inspired with revolutionary idealism and militancy and was able to supply political-ideological leadership and tender moral, material and organizational assistance to it, despite the leadership's theoretical-ideological limitations in the science of Marxism-Leninism, and the lack of adequate knowledge and experience to lead such a big peasant revolt.

The historic Telangana peasant struggle, which wrote a golden chapter in modern Indian revolutionary movement, not only gave the communist movement in Andhra a great moral and political boost, but it also immensely enhanced the political prestige of the Communist Party of India as a whole, put the party on the political map of India as a serious political force in the national arena. The great sacrifices made in the struggle, chiefly by the peasant masses

and their militant leadership in Telangana and also partly by the people and the Communist Party in Andhra, the big impetus it gave to the urges of the Andhra people for separate statehood and the fillip it gave to the movement for linguistic states in the Indian Union, the contribution it made in thrusting to the forefront the agrarian question as the foremost national question in India, the practical achievement it scored and the proud record of revolutionary traditions it created, and the big lessons that this heroic peasant armed struggle taught our Party are matters of recorded history which none can erase.

It is true that our Party, unfortunately, has not so far succeeded in methodically and systematically reviewing the whole struggle so that the rich and correct lessons from it are drawn and made the common consciousness of our entire Party members and all the democratic, revolutionary fighting people in the country. One of the principal reasons for this failure is to be directly traced to the rise of a big Right-opportunist trend which, cashing on some of the sectarian and adventurist mistakes of the party during 1949-51, had slowly and steadily gained ascendancy in the party leadership at the all-India level and in particular at the Andhra-Visalaandhra level of our Party. The lessons this Right-opportunist trend drew and was trying to impart from time to time, particularly in Andhra, when pieced together properly, bear similarity to the lessons the Mensheviks drew from the 1905 Russian Revolution. The comparison may look far-fetched and exaggerated, and yet the fact remains that horribly defeatist and thoroughly opportunist lessons were drawn by this trend.

To cite a few examples of the treacherous lessons, the attention of comrades may be drawn to some of the controversies raised by the Right-reformist trend during the 1951-52 period. The thesis that the continuation of the peasant armed resistance after 'police action' was adventurist and terroristic, and that the party should have welcomed the 'action' as liberation of the people of Hyderabad state from feudal

princely yoke; the open denunciation of the struggle through pamphlets and statements; the hideous propaganda let loose against the leadership of the struggling peasantry as people perpetrating arson, loot, murder and responsible for the deaths of thousands of Communist partisans; the splitting activities indulged in breaking the common communist organization of the Visalaandhra Committee into separate Telangana and Andhra Committees; the demand raised for the readmission of those who were expelled from the party for cowardice, giving undertakings to the enemy, betrayal of partisan leaders, and running away from underground shelters, on the specious plea that all these anti-party crimes took place because of the sectarian and terroristic policies of the party; the dogged and determined opposition to the inclusion of prominent partisan leaders in party committees on the bogus plea that it would create difficulties in the legal functioning of the party and that the partisan leaders are not politically mature; the reluctance and even resistance to assist in fighting the hundreds of cases foisted on the partisan leaders; the dogged attempt to function the People's Democratic Front as a sort of party while relegating the Communist Party to the background; the local and parochial feelings freely roused to drive a wedge between the people of the Telangana and Andhra regions, etc., all did immense damage both to the orderly withdrawal of the partisan struggle and to the defence and consolidation of the gains of the peasantry in the post-withdrawal period. The united party organization and the movement was split into separate Andhra and Telangana parts, and this continued for nearly five years from 1951 to 1956, and paralysed the strength of the party and the entire movement—a movement that had become what it was mainly due to this united strength and its striking force.

This separation of the two, i.e., Andhra with a more developed and organised Communist Party but without a solid mass working class and peasant revolutionary movement as its base, and Telangana with a powerful agrarian movement but with a weak Communist Party which lacked

the minimum required organizational experience, minimum necessary theoretical-ideological equipment and political maturity of the leading committees, harmed both, and opened the floodgates to the widespread growth of parliamentary illusions, and undue admiration of bourgeois democratic reforms and achievements. A marked growth of legalist illusions and conspicuous neglect of mass work on class lines in the workers and peasants on the one hand and, on the other, introduction of such alien concepts and ideas in the building up of the Communist Party as lowered its discipline, theoretical-ideological cohesion, membership standard, proletarian outlook, etc., became a pronounced feature. The launching of the second five-year plan with great fanfare, the new good friendly relations established by the Nehru government with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and the government's new stances against war and colonialism, the defeat in the mid-term elections of Andhra, and the Right-opportunist contributions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU—all this was taken advantage of in a big way by the Right-reformist trend in the leadership to mount its offensive and strengthen its position. The Andhra communist movement which had come to occupy the foremost place in the Indian communist movement and contributed in a considerable way to assist its growth, now became the major centre of all these differences and deviations, with all the consequences such disputes entail.

However, our analysis of these Andhra developments and assessment of our movement in the state should not blur our vision to one important aspect. Since these differences and deviations arose in the course of building and leading a powerful democratic revolutionary movement, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the prolonged inner-party struggle to settle these differences in terms of Marxism-Leninism and its outcome has a positive and beneficial effect on our Party as a whole. It was this strong movement, which reached the height of armed struggle and local agrarian insurrection against the feudal regime of Hyderabad and

its accomplices, that forced into the forefront several theoretical, ideological, and programmatic questions as questions arising out of the dire needs of the movement. One such important point was the discussion of the so-called Chinese path and Russian path and the concluding of that discussion by arriving at a broad, essentially correct understanding as incorporated in the Policy Statement of 1951. Similarly, the basic controversies raised by the then Andhra Secretariat of the party regarding the stage, strategy and programme of our Party, however defectively and imperfectly they were formulated, and correct solutions to which could not be found till 1964 were clear reflections of the movement in Andhra. And they had their positive contribution which cannot be ignored.

Not only did we fail to carry on a systematic struggle against these opportunist trends and the defeatist lessons drawn by them from the Telangana struggles carried on in the Andhra part during the 1947-51 period, thanks to the dominant all-India leadership and its Right-reformist political-organisational line, the erroneous lessons again drawn from the electoral defeat of 1955 in Andhra further assisted the growth of Right opportunism in the state unit of Andhra Pradesh.

Why Disunity, Disorganisation and Decline?

The question that arises is, why was the communist movement in Andhra which had reached such heights by 1951-52—and the process, in a way, seemed to be continuing till 1954-55—thrown on the defensive since then, and is now in 1967-68, in a sort of disunity, disorganisation and 'decline'? What are the objective conditions that had negative influence and what were the subjective errors of the communists for this course of development? These are questions that require a correct answer.

The communist movement in Andhra Pradesh, after initially securing its minimum independent mass base through its work in the urban working class and the rural poor, was

quick in correctly espousing and boldly giving leadership to a series of pressing bourgeois-democratic demands, such as the demand for separate Andhra, the demand for Visalaandhra and the breaking up of the feudal Hyderabad state, and the big electoral battle of 1951-52 both in the Andhra and the Telangana regions, the mass campaigns and huge mobilization for irrigation projects and other general political democratic issues. All these struggles, no doubt, paid big dividends to the Communist Party, and most of these bourgeois-democratic demands were won by the popular movements led by the party. But in course of leading these general democratic struggles, particularly during the period following 1951-52, a serious mistake crept in—the mistake of neglecting the independent mobilisation and consolidation of the working class base in the urban areas and the agricultural labour and poor peasant base in the rural areas, and also in building the Communist Party on correct theoretical, ideological and political lines. As a result of this grievous mistake, the big democratic victories scored by the breaking up of the former Madras state and the setting up of a separate Andhra state, and the breaking up of the feudal Nizam's state paving the way for the formation of Visalaandhra state could be more effectively utilised by the rural and urban bourgeois classes in the state for their class aggrandisement, while the working class and its Communist Party found themselves organisationally weak, politically backward and ideologically unprepared to meet the turn of events and go forward.

To put it sharply, when the party of the working class participates in the multi-class struggles for national independence and other general democratic demands, it has always to bear in mind that as a working class party it will have to frontally confront on a number of crucial issues its bourgeois and petty-bourgeois allies in such struggles on the morrow of partial or complete victory in these struggles, since common interests either completely recede into the background or get relegated to a secondary place while con-

flicting interests are thrust to the forefront. Our failure to correctly and concretely assess in class terms, in time, the real significance of the transfer of power to the hands of the bourgeois-landlord classes in 1947, and our failure to assess the class meaning of achieving Andhra and Visalaandhra states for the working class vis-a-vis its bourgeois-landlord opponents, and the consequent unpreparedness, politically, ideologically and organisationally, to face the new tasks in the new situation deprived us of the initiative, and threw us on the defensive from which we have not recovered and regained the initiative.

A glance into the history of inner-party controversies in Andhra since 1952, into several of the reports of extended meetings of the State Committee and State Conferences, into the self-critical reviews of elections of 1955, 1957, and 1967 would bring before us one salient truth, i.e., the open and frank admission that our party's links with the agricultural labourers and rural poor were getting weaker and weaker, that intensive work among them was neglected, and that there was persistent reluctance and hesitation in a greater part of the village level party leadership to go to the agricultural labourers poor peasants and take up their demands. This 'disease' could not be cured for years either when the party was united or to any appreciable degree even after the break from the revisionists. How does one explain this horrifying failure in a state party unit, whose pioneers in the 1930s and 40s were in the habit of going to the rural labourers and urban workers with missionary zeal, a state unit which during 1947-51 headed the Telangana peasant armed resistance and faced brutal violence and repression with death-defying courage and abandon?

A careful analysis reveals some of the grave defects that had crept in. The sweeping electoral victories both in the Andhra and the Telangana regions in 1952, in no small way, influenced the party leadership at different levels in their thinking and activity—thinking and activity permeated with parliamentary illusions, subordinating sustained work in the

basic classes and masses to different types of elections from village panchayats to the Assembly and Parliament. The issues that were chosen and on which attention was concentrated used to be such that they would not disturb the electoral alliances and fronts, or class peace in the village, in any serious manner. With the exception of the demand and struggle for the distribution of wastelands among the agricultural labourers and poor peasants, which of course, does not frontally and directly conflict with the landlords in a big way, other issues that took priority were separate Andhra state, projects, location of capital, formation of Visalaandhra and the no-confidence motion in the Andhra Assembly—not so much class and mass issues but issues round which all sorts of odd interests rally. This continued till the 1955 mid-term elections, which again revealed all the basic weaknesses in the movement, particularly among the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat.

The lessons drawn from the Telangana struggle and the struggle against cruel repression unleashed in the Andhra region during the 1948-52 period, as well as the lessons drawn from the electoral victories of 1952 by the dominant section of the party leadership at different levels were extremely defective and even right-opportunist in character. Fear of alienating allies in the electoral and legislative fronts that had been forged if the class demands of the rural poor were taken seriously, the right-opportunist attitude to forming and building united fronts, the exaggerated and lopsided importance given to the work of petitions, representations and legislative measures to the point of neglecting independent class and mass mobilisation on issues and the tendency to take up “all-class” and non-controversial issues and problems which neither rouse the enthusiasm of the basic classes nor evoke serious antagonism from the landlord classes were some of the manifestations of the wrong lessons mentioned above besides the highly exaggerated and bloated opinion that had come to be held that our party had become a big party in the country and the second party, next only to the Congress.

The mid-term election battle, fought by the state unit in 1955, was really a big political struggle from the point of view of general bourgeois-democratic parliamentary forms of struggle waged under the leadership of the Communist Party. The votes secured, the huge mass mobilisation and the strenuous efforts made by the party were, certainly, praiseworthy, though the actual seats won and the consequent fiasco to the slogan of the formation of an alternative government came as a big defeat. This electoral battle, no doubt, revealed all the strong and weak points of our movement and party organisation in Andhra, and had many lessons for our party, which if correctly drawn could be utilised for the advancement of our party and democratic movement. But what were the main lessons drawn by the Central Committee as well as the state party leadership and to what purpose were they used subsequently?

The first lesson was that we failed to build a united front with non-Congress political parties and groups. Seizing upon the serious error of overestimating our independent strength and consequent slackening of concrete efforts to win as many allies as possible and neutralise all those who could be neutralised, a non-class united front concept was emphasised. The dominant group in the state leadership of our party, as was clearly seen in the subsequent two years of practice, was trying to put into practice its own totally erroneous lessons, the lessons of forging united front with one or the other factional groups in the Congress party. The bogus thesis that Sri Sanjiva Reddy's faction was the representative of small capitalist landlords and the rising bourgeoisie while Sri Gopala Reddy's group was the mouthpiece of big feudal landlords and the big bourgeoisie and advocating a united front with the former, the equally bankrupt thesis that the Rao group in Telangana represented the progressive liberal bourgeoisie and the Reddy group championed the worst feudal and semi-feudal landlord reaction and advocating electoral front and unity with the former in the period preceding the 1957 general elections, etc., stand as glaring examples of

the right-opportunist and class-collaborationist lessons that were drawn on united front. The total fiasco of this line, during the 1957 elections in Andhra, and the serious setbacks in Telangana, were such that the Secretary of the State Committee who was its main propounder went home to look after his farm and did not return to his Secretary's duties for nearly one year!

The second important lesson drawn was that our party did not appreciate the great progressive aspect of Nehru's foreign policy, and its attitude was negative instead of positively acclaiming it, and hence it lost the support of considerable sections of middle class voters in the mid-term elections! This, in other words, was accusing the party in Andhra for not circulating the Soviet government's good conduct certificate of Nehru's progressivism, which the Congress party was widely circulating during the Andhra elections in lakhs of printed copies! Not satisfied with that, a special directive was given to concentrate our work in the middle classes whereas the real malady was neglect of work among our basic classes and masses.

What was the practice resorted to following these lessons, particularly by the Secretary of the State Committee and his followers? Exploiting the sentiments of depression and demoralisation caused by the electoral defeats in the minds of the party cadre, which itself was a reflection of low political calibre, a systematic drive was unleashed for the so-called "rehabilitation" of party wholetimers by which a good number of wholetime functionaries in different mass fronts and party organisations were sent out to find different occupations in life and eke out their livelihood.

In the midst of drawing these and similar other totally defeatist and disruptive lessons, the single biggest, crucial and correct lesson, either half drawn or virtually not drawn, was the grievous loss of live links and touch of the village level party leadership with the agricultural labour and village poor, fatal weakness in our movement which came to be revealed in a good number of cases where our Party

candidates not merely got defeated but the defeat itself came as a surprise. In hundreds of villages, where our Party was supposed to be strong and even the leading political force, our local Party units were banking on the support of the agricultural labour sections, en masse, and their solidly voting for our candidates was taken for granted. But the results disclosed that sizable numbers among them did not vote for us, and were lured into voting for the Congress under the manipulations and machinations of local landlords, about which our village level Party leadership was not even aware of till the counting of votes took place! The absence of any planned and intensive work among them during the years 1952, 1953, 1954 and even during the election year of 1955, the deplorable lack of living day-to-day touch with these oppressed and down trodden sections, and the failure to consolidate their precious support which alone was responsible for the big electoral victories of 1952 and the voting strength in all the subsequent elections, were nakedly revealed. Neither was this costly lesson learnt nor a single effective step to remedy the malady taken, following the 1955 experience.

The election reviews of 1957, 1962 and 1967 formally drew this lesson, but without making any change in the actual practice. This grave defect in the movement, particularly in a region where fifty per cent of the agrarian population comprises of agricultural labour which has practically no other means of livelihood than selling its labour power, in a region where neither the old form of feudal set-up exists intact nor the building of an agrarian revolutionary movement of all-in kisan unity against feudal and semi-feudal land relations is anymore easy and feasible, has had devastating effects.

Then, coming to the working class movement its character, etc., in Andhra. As was mentioned already, Andhra is not an industrialised state, even by Indian standards. The communists worked hard among whatever working class was there in the state, and had acquired the leading position in

the trade union movement of the state. But the movement was mainly confined to economic activity and its level of political consciousness remained at a low level, and no serious party building activity among the workers was undertaken. At no stage of the development of the democratic revolutionary movement in Andhra under the leadership of our Party, including the days of the armed peasant struggle of Telangana, could the working class, as a class, be mobilised as a political vanguard to participate in these struggles. Economism, the low level of political consciousness, the neglect of party building among the working class, etc., provided ample opportunities for the revisionists to run away with the major organised trade union movement when the break with them came in 1963-64 and our Party found itself very weak in the trade union movement in the state. Another weakness is that the trade union or political work carried on in the working class is not concentrated in key industries such as railways, transport and other big industries, but is left to spontaneity, taking on hand whatever that comes easy. As a result of all this, the working class movement, as an organised mass movement, remained as one of the several currents of the democratic movement in the state, rather than playing a vanguard role in it. This serious defect, in its turn, reflects in the Communist Party its development and the policies it evolves and practises, from time to time. The healthy, revolutionary class instincts of the working class as a class did not and could not come into play in practice, either during the stage when Right-revisionist disruption was threatening the Communist Party in 1963-64 or Left-adventurist defection in 1967-68. These costly lessons should teach our Party to correct the mistakes and guide its activities in future, not only in Andhra, but in all the states in the country, wherever the grave defects, pointed out in our analysis, are discernible in one degree or another.

The third serious defect that could be clearly seen was that the party leadership at village and taluk level, which comprised mainly of personnel of middle and rich peasant

origin, and which also was the easy victim of the above line of thinking, systematically displayed its unwillingness to orient its work on correct class lines, with the result that several resolutions of the State and District Committees to this effect remained on paper, unimplemented. A common complaint from conscious elements among agricultural labour, that was repeatedly brought to the notice of the state party leadership, had been their critical remark, "you communists came to us during 1948-51 seeking shelter when the police was hunting you, and also come to us whenever there are elections, either to the village panchayat or the Legislative Assembly, and for the rest of the time you are not to be found". This single remark, heard repeatedly, speaks more eloquently of our malady than volumes of our self-critical reports. On looking back, we find that while a type of reformist work was carried on between 1942 and 1946 with the slogan of agricultural labour and peasant unity (*cooly-ryoty samarasyam*) and it was sought to be corrected during the 1947-51 period, despite some serious Leftist errors in executing it, in the long period since 1952, it is not the political line corrected by both these experiences that is implemented, but what has come to prevail is total neglect of the work on this front, and that, too, at a stage of socio-economic development when this front assumes added importance for the building up of the revolutionary movement. The predominance of the petty bourgeois element in the party and the leadership at local levels, in particular, and the theoretical ideological ill-equipment and the consequent rise of deviations, both Right-opportunistic in the past and Left-sectarian at present, cannot be dismissed as small factors in the present sad developments in the Andhra communist movement.

To put it sharply, the communist movement in Andhra still retains strong characteristics of a petty-bourgeois revolutionary democratic movement, and has not yet succeeded in acquiring a real proletarian character and content. The objective socio-economic reasons for this development apart, the absence of any other Left political party, worth the name,

in the state, several petty-bourgeois democratic elements rallying behind our Party as the only effective opposition party to the Congress in Andhra, the failure to put the movement on correct proletarian class lines and above all, the wrong lessons drawn from time to time of the struggles led by the party and the extremely inadequate attention paid to Marxist-Leninist theoretical ideological equipping of the Party are some of the factors to be taken into serious account, besides the developments on an all-India plane, the policies of the all-India party and their direct and indirect impact on the Andhra movement.

The mere fact that not only the biggest contingent championing Right-reformism and revisionism during the 1963-64 inner-party struggle came from the Andhra state unit of the Communist Party, but during the Left adventurist disruption of 1967-68 also, the Andhra state unit contributed the biggest quota of defections, highlights the weak ideological base of our Party, its predominant petty-bourgeois class composition and the weakness of its independent class base in the urban and rural proletariat. It can be easily seen that except Andhra, from no other traditional strongholds of the communist movement, such as Kerala, Bengal, Tamilnad and Punjab, such big chunks of the Party opted out to revisionism in 1963-64 and again to Left-opportunism and adventurism during 1967-68. This phenomenon cannot be brushed aside as either accidental or connected only with the behaviour of some individual leaders and groups.

Some leaders from Andhra, as the typical class representatives of the petty-bourgeoisie, were the first, since 1955, to come forth as the biggest eulogists and apologists of Congress five-year plans, the progress achieved under them, the benefits of community development schemes, the relative prosperity that people including agricultural labourers were supposed to be enjoying, etc. Thus, they were the first to be swept off their feet by the limited bourgeois-democratic achievements under the Congress regime, and to work out all sorts of Right-opportunist theories.

Then, again, when Congress policies have gone bankrupt and its path of capitalist development is caught in a crisis, causing disillusionment and disenchantment with the ruling Congress party, the same Andhra unit throws up another set of leaders who discover all-round disintegration of the Congress party and its bourgeois-landlord rule, discover that a revolutionary crisis is on and demand highest revolutionary forms of struggle, here and now.

These are, thus, two sides of the same medal—the petty-bourgeoisie which goes into ecstasies, at some bourgeois democratic progress, and runs into frenzied denunciation the moment they find some reverses in the same. A steadfast and sustained revolutionary stand is quite alien to this class.

Impact of the Differences in the International Communist Movement

However, tracing the Right-opportunist and Left-adventurist deviations and the disruption caused by them in the communist movement in Andhra to the socio-economic factors, the defects in the building of the worker's and peasants' revolutionary movement and the party organisation, its class composition and Marxist-Leninist education, etc., cannot be taken as a complete and exhaustive analysis of the reasons for either the large scale defections in Andhra or the spurt of this Left-adventurist trend inside our Party on a countrywide scale. There are other equally important reasons for the emergence of this phenomenon, and the magnitude in which it has emerged now.

One of the principal reasons is the undue, though unavoidable delay caused, in clinching the ideological questions that are under debate in the world communist movement. Since our Tenali Convention of July 1964 when our Programme draft was broadly endorsed, for full three years up to August 1967, our C.C.'s official stand on these ideological questions, more or less, stood in suspense, with the result that *the entire struggle against revisionism, as far as the ideological issues under debate in the world communist*

movement are concerned, was carried on solely relying on the contributions made by the Chinese Communist Party and reproducing them in our papers and pamphlets in different languages. In no other state party unit, probably except that of West Bengal, was this work carried on with such zeal, persistence and faith as in Andhra during the last three years and more. In the name of fighting modern revisionism and defending Marxism-Leninism, every syllable coming from the Chinese communist press has come to be swallowed as an infallible piece of Marxism-Leninism, as used to be the case with most of us in regard to the CPSU for a long time in the past. In a party unit like Andhra, which comprises of members and leaders mostly coming from the peasant strata and where the movement, during the 1947-52 period, reached the heights of the Telangana armed resistance, this has left its particularly strong and powerful impact. The broad acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party's General Line, propounded in the June 14 Letter, as the correct Marxist-Leninist line by the majority in the Central Committee, led to a stage where a good chunk of the cadres as well as ranks in Andhra came to be taken in by the Chinese thesis that the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung is the Marxism-Leninism of the present epoch". The non-committal stand of the Central Committee on the ideological issues in the international dispute, until they were discussed and decided by the party, was in reality utilised by this section of comrades, more and more, to commit themselves to each and every Chinese position, leaving no open mind whatsoever on any issue that was yet to be discussed and decided through organised inner-party discussions and debate. Positions were taken, convictions were formed and confirmed—and what remained was to carry on the inner-party struggle for the victory of these positions!

The clear demarcation we made with Chinese communist positions in drafting our Programme, while breaking with the revisionists, was accepted formally or acquiesced in by many in our Party, but they neither understood its deeper

theoretical implications nor did the C.C. leadership realise the urgency or necessity of elaborating them and educating the entire party on them. The facile apprehension that any special emphasis on these Left errors in the Chinese communist understanding, as regards problems of our country, might divert our main fight against the menace of revisionism, and satisfying ourselves with positively correcting them and incorporating them in our Programme, has been proved by life and events to be totally wrong.

Some of the international developments and the Chinese communist stand on them, during the process of struggle against the modern revisionist theories of the CPSU leaders had begun causing concern and worry to several PBMs even while they were in jail in 1965. They were prompt in making known their sharp reactions to some of the Chinese communist political positions and practical steps to the Central Committee outside. Further, immediately after the release of our detenus in May 1966, the P.B. discussed these differences of ours with the CPC, and also initiated discussion on those issues in the C.C. meeting of June 1966 with a view to alerting our party against the Left errors from the side of the Chinese Communist Party, both in regard to some international issues as well as questions connected directly with the Indian situation. But after a round of discussions it was found that several amongst the C.C. were not inclined to clinch the issues and were even critical of the draft note submitted for discussion. The P.B., in the light of the C.C. discussions and in view of the impending countrywide electoral struggle, had to reconsider the issue and come forth with the proposal of deferring the issue until after the fourth general elections were over and the discussion on ideological questions was initiated as promised at the Seventh Congress.

But two points need special mention in this connection. One is that the volume of opposition that was being encountered until then on the concept of united action and electoral fronts with the revisionists on the ground that they were, in

principle, wrong and opportunist, was rejected by the C.C. and the resolution on electoral strategy and tactics was unanimously adopted.

The second point is that a special resolution was adopted which contained some definite directions to the party regarding certain key issues of political-ideological controversy. To quote the pertinent passages:

“Now, though the party leaders have been released, the party is faced with serious and pressing problems of the people like food, famine, high prices, etc. and the fourth general elections. A serious ideological discussion like the one proposed cannot be undertaken now.

“The Central Committee, therefore, resolves to defer the discussion. But while doing so, the Central Committee takes into consideration that in the eighteen months since our Party Congress adopted the Programme, divergent views have been expressed by some fraternal Communist Parties of various countries on the Indian situation and reiterates that what has been said in the Programme about the Indian situation has been amply proved to be correct and sound. The committee, therefore, directs that the party should be guided by the Programme as the only correct application of Marxism-Leninism to the Indian situation while rejecting all views expressed either divergent to or deviating from it”.

Further, the resolution directing the State Committees to ‘publish the authoritative pronouncements of fraternal parties’, instructed them that, “in making such material available to comrades it should be made clear that our Party is not committed to any of them. Care should be also taken to avoid as much as possible the publication of such material as undermine faith in the socialist system”.

From these, the C.C. drew the conclusion that a correction to the Left-sectarian thinking on the issue of united action had been made, and that the reiteration of the correct Marxist-Leninist position of the party programme had upheld it against the attacks of “some fraternal Communist Parties of various countries”. However, life and developments during

the subsequent period, particularly the Left-sectarian revolt and the large-scale defections in Andhra, showed that the Central Committee's assessment of the inner-party ideological-political situation suffered from a sort of complacency, and the C.C. was underestimating the danger of the Left-opportunist trend of thinking which had come to grip considerable sections of the cadre at different levels of our Party. The apologetic manner in which several of our cadres reacted to the infantile slogans and actions of the Naxalites after the May-June 1967 events in Bengal; the volume of opposition that emerged to the principle of united action against imperialism between the Soviet socialist state and the People's Republic of China; finally, this Left-adventurist trend pitting itself in total opposition to the Party programme and its political line, while welcoming the denunciations and attacks on them by Radio Peking and the Chinese press, etc., go to clearly demonstrate how our C.C. and leading cadres at different levels were totally underestimating the danger of Left deviation in our Party, and how in our struggle against Right-revisionism, we gave concessions to Left-opportunism for which history has forced us to pay the penalty.

In our Party, constituted with the class composition analysed earlier, if the powerful impact and influence of the revisionist C.P.S.U. leadership, leading the great Soviet Union, had resulted in a good chunk of leading cadres in the united C.P.I. deserting to the Dangeite revisionist camp in the past, we find today that an equally powerful influence and impact of the C.P.C. leading the strong People's Republic of China, whose prestige got further reinforced by its bold fight led against Soviet revisionism, has resulted in the present Left defections from our Party. The fact that our party is striving to independently apply Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions obtaining in our country, while steering clear of the modern revisionist theories of the C.P.S.U. leaders and also some of the grave Left errors of the Chinese communist leadership, and in the process is encountering enormous

difficulties, should not be lost sight of when analysing and reviewing our shortcomings in our struggle against revisionism as well as Left-sectarianism—the latter expressing itself in Andhra in large-scale defections.

However, it is now a proved fact that our Party leadership at the centre and states' level could neither assess in time the dangers of this Left deviation nor was it able to take necessary measures to fight it out before it assumed the disrupting proportions it did by the year 1967-68. It is a widely known phenomenon in the international communist movement that while combating one deviation, whether Right or Left, the irresistible tendency would be to slip into the deviation against which the party stops fighting. Hence, the correct concept of 'fight on two fronts' in defence of correct Marxist-Leninist positions should, in no case, be forgotten or ignored, a concept which we failed to keep constantly in view and practice.

The question naturally arises, why this failure on the part of the C.C. and particularly of the P.B. First of all, as is already made clear in the present note, there was not the necessary political awareness of this Left danger and its magnitude on the part of our C.C. and P.B. Entire attention was centred on the struggle against modern revisionism of the Dangeites in the country and the Soviet leaders in the international communist movement, with practically no serious attention being paid to the Left-opportunist trend inside our Party as well as in the world communist movement.

The second important reason, which cannot be brushed aside as of less or no significance, is the harsh reality that our P.B. which is expected to carry on the day-to-day work of our C.C., is virtually reduced to three or four members who have to carry on that work, while as many as five to six out of the nine members have had to sink themselves mainly in the work of the two states of West Bengal and Kerala, and the work of our central parliamentary fraction in Delhi. It was precisely under these circumstances that the utmost attention of the P.B. had to be given to the serious problems

of the West Bengal and Kerala state units, which happened to be the leading partners of the two U.F. state governments, as Right or Left mistakes in these states were sure to cause immense damage to our entire Party. In West Bengal, the Naxalite disruption and the Chinese backing of their political line started as early as May-June of 1967, apart from the other policy disputes on food and other issues with allies in the U.F. Government. In Kerala, two deviations came up—the Right-reformist trend in the work of the state leadership at the party and government levels and a Left-adventurist trend in several state, district and local cadres, which threatened to disrupt our Party and movement there. The P.B., i.e., three to four members, were left to grapple with these two states' problems, besides other routine work, and could not tackle Andhra, which too was in need of effective intervention and guidance immediately following the fourth general elections.

But, in this connection, it should be pointed out that the P.B. was quick in reacting sharply to the serious Left challenge that was growing inside our Party. The critical observations on some Chinese positions sent for the C.C. from jail, the note it submitted for discussion in the June 1966 C.C. meeting, the prompt dealing with the Naxalites, politically and organisationally, the open exposure of these elements and defence of the party line in our central organ, the resolutions on "Left Deviation" and "Divergent Views with C.P.C." and the firm stand it took on the ideological questions—against organised Left pressure—all these go to confirm the point. It needs also to be noted that all this had to be done in face of considerable resistance from a section of our leadership at different levels, which did not awaken in time to the Left danger.

Some Conclusions

The subject matter covered so far in the present report, it should be made clear, is neither exhaustive nor is it an attempt to analyse the phenomenon and its roots in our whole

party and in different states, it is mainly confined to Andhra. The analysis and assessment made regarding developments in the Andhra communist movement, if they are construed as some sort of a verdict on past happenings and the party rests content with that, would in no way help us in the struggle ahead to overcome the shortcomings and march forward. The State Committee leadership of Andhra, with the active assistance and guidance of the C.C. and P.B., should take upon itself as its foremost task to concretely study the specific socio-economic factors prevailing in Andhra, the state of different classes and the degree and maturity of different contradictions, and the level of political consciousness of the working class and its unity with the peasantry, particularly the toiling strata, since this alone will enable it to concretely apply Marxism-Leninism, and then work out corresponding concrete political organisational and tactical measures. This is not in the least to suggest that such a concrete study and working out of concrete tactics for Andhra is something completely separate and unrelated to the all-India economic-political situation and the party's strategy and tactics worked out on its basis, it should be done as an inseparable part of it and strictly subject to it. This alone would help us in learning from our past mistakes and achievements, and put the political-ideological discussions on a realistic basis, the basis of actual class realities, the concrete problems the movement is facing and the correct solutions for the same in terms of the science of Marxism-Leninism. No shortcuts are there nor can there be to overcome all the difficulties in the situation and a sober and realistic revolutionary approach is what is urgently demanded of us.

It is wrong in theory and harmful in practice to give any quarter to the utter defeatist lesson from the happenings in Andhra that due to the divisions and splits in the Communist Party and the consequent momentary disunity and disruption of the democratic revolutionary movement, the entire work of communists during the last three decades is

lost, and its future is bleak. Nothing is more erroneous and farther from the truth than such a disastrous lesson. It will not take long to recover lost ground, regroup the forces and regain the proud place it has held so far in the Indian communist movement. However, the hard reality remains that the democratic gains won by the revolutionary movement in Andhra, in which our Party played a worthy and proud part, are garnered more by the landlord-bourgeois classes in Andhra, and these exploiting classes, it is true, have been pressing hard against the working class party. The landlord-bourgeois classes, which, a decade ago, had neither a national state of their own nor political power over it were able to secure a big united Andhra state and governmental authority over it to utilise that state apparatus to their economic and political aggrandisement. A new united revolutionary movement, on a new class basis and with a correct class outlook, is required to meet this challenge and defeat it. The economic-political crisis of the Indian ruling classes that is deepening and its consequences cannot but offer our Party increasing opportunities to give a rebuff to the state government's offensive and regroup the revolutionary forces on a much wider and intense scale. Such confidence based on living and growing realities should guide our activities.

The second important conclusion that will have to be drawn is that it would be grievously wrong to think that the phenomenon of Right and Left deviations and consequent harmful effects is a special Andhra phenomenon, and other states are free from these dangers and their movements are placed on sound class and mass basis, and their party organisations comprise of correct class composition, etc. The truth seems to be otherwise, and the same grave defects and shortcomings pointed out in the case of Andhra, are found in almost all the states, though in varying degrees. The greater or lesser extent of the Right desertions in 1963-64 and the Left defections in 1967-68 should lead no one amongst our Party comrades to the facile conclusion that they provide the clue for the correct assessment and estimation of their

movements and party units. Every State Committee leadership, drawing on the lessons of Andhra, should review its work, assess its strong and weak points realistically and devise ways and means to overcome the shortcomings. Otherwise, similar sad experiences will have to be faced, now by one state unit now another at a later date. We should avoid this at all costs.

Thirdly, it would be totally erroneous on our part to entertain any illusion that the dangers for our Party from both Right-reformism and Left-opportunism are, in the main, overcome, and that our Party is now firmly placed on correct Marxist-Leninist foundations. The truth is far from it, and we have to go a long way to achieve that stage, and much hard and sustained work and trying times are ahead of us. With confidence in the gains so far secured and the lessons we have learnt, we should continue our struggle without any complacency whatsoever to build a Communist Party which will be able to lead the Indian revolution. Such a struggle demands of us, first and foremost, the genuine implementation of the three key C.C. resolutions, i.e., Tasks on the Kisan Front, Tasks on the Trade Union Front, and Tasks on Party Organisation. Either the party struggles and stakes its all to implement them and win successes in the measure they are implemented, or it drifts in this regard and damages the whole cause. The party should pledge to fight for the former and never allow the latter.