

D. F. L. P.  REPORT

**Issued by : THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT
FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
FOREIGN RELATIONS**

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Editorial

The April Events

...The Lebanese extreme right launches another attack against the Palestinian people in Lebanon.

...The resistance repulses the aggression and inflicts heavy material and political losses on the attackers.

...The militant solidarity between the Lebanese progressive forces and the Palestinian resistance prevents the fascist right-wing from achieving its aims.

On Sunday the 13 April, the extreme right-wing Phalangist Party (Kataeb) ambushed a civilian bus carrying Palestinians returning from a celebration of the first anniversary of the Al-Kalsa operation, an operation carried out inside Israel against Zionist targets by Palestinian fighters. The ambush resulted in the murder of 27 men, women, and children in the bus.

Not surprisingly, all factors indicate that this attack was the start of a new campaign against the resistance movement in Lebanon. Such right-wing campaigns began with the emergence of the resistance in Lebanon, with the beginning of its organizing and arming the Palestinian camps in the struggle against the Zionist state and for regaining usurped national rights.

Phalangist Party provocations against the resistance have a long history. In 1969, only two months after the Cairo Agreement (which officially acknowledged the legitimate presence of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon), the Phalangists aggracked and killed many Palestinian fighters in al-Kahala. Such provocations, the latest being the bus ambush in Ain al-Rummaneh, have continuously occurred at more or less regular intervals.

Armed ambushes and attacks on Palestinians and on their camps in Lebanon have been coupled with an intense propaganda campaign against the resistance and all progressive Lebanese forces. This right-wing propaganda includes calls for ending the open presence of the resistance in Lebanon, i.e. to forfeit all the political gains made and effectively to disarm itself. We hear the right-wing call for "Lebanese sovereignty," which for them means not strengthening national defense to counter the continuous Israeli aggression in Lebanon's southern area or on other Palestinian and Lebanese targets in the country. Rather, the continuous calls from the right-wing for "sovereignty" take the form of demands to disarm the Palestinian population, ban the P.L.O. in Lebanon, stop the resistance from operating in Lebanon, and so forth.

This right-wing interpretation of sovereignty of course stems from the ideology and class interests represented by Phalangist and other right-wing parties, and is related to the changes that have been taking place in Lebanon and other Arab countries during recent years.

The Phalangist Party, founded in 1936, has devoted itself exclusively to guarding Lebanese Christian (Maronite) interests and pitting them against the increasing tide of Arab nationalist sentiment which in the late 1930's and early 1940's has begun to strongly manifest itself. The Phalangist movement was influenced by its leader's (Pierre Gemayel) experiences in Nazi Germany while attending the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. This influence is manifested in the organization's para-military structure, its narrow confessional sectarian base, its anti-Arab ideology and by its motto: "God, Homeland, and Family."

It is well known that despite the Phalangists' demand for "independence" during French colonialism, they were in fact aided and encouraged by the colonialists - particularly in the Party's initial period of formation. Also known is the fact that certain right-wing Maronite leaders were, in the late 1930's and 40's, in contact with Zionist leaders. Hence, we had these Maronite leaders openly supporting the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine, and a Christian (Maronite) state in Lebanon.

The Phalangist Party came to represent the interests of financial, estate, and commercial capital in Lebanon, which are tied and subordinated to Western interests. The Party's social base, however, remained petit-bourgeois - about 80% of the membership. The remainder was of the middle and large bourgeoisie (of comprador character).

The interests of the latter have become more and more clearly differentiated from that of the petit-bourgeoisie who have formed the Party's base. This is due to the steady erosion of the petit-bourgeois standard of living caused by the various economic crises Lebanon has been suffering as a result of its deep integration in the international capitalist market. The continuously worsening economic situation with its steady rise in the cost of living, coupled with the growing strength of the progressive and left-wing movement in Lebanon, has naturally had its effect on wearing down the support from petit-bourgeois sectors for right-wing sectarian parties, particularly that of the Phalangists.

The resistance found a natural and eager ally in the Lebanese progressive and left-wing parties and movements. The presence of the Palestinian resistance has had its supportive effect on the democratic and progressive struggle in Lebanon - it is no accident that a number of left-wing parties (eg. the Lebanese Communist Party), which were banned before the resistance emerged in Lebanon, have since been legalized and have seen a real growth.

The Phalangists have seen the relation between the growth of the resistance and the left-wing progressive forces in Lebanon, and they are aware that the stronger one is, the stronger the other. Since a full and direct right-wing confrontation with Lebanon's left-wing and progressive forces would provoke a civil war, the tactic has been to try to weaken the resistance and if possible to do as the Hashemite regime has done in ending the open presence of the Palestinian resis-

tance, hoping thus to weaken the whole democratic and progressive movement in Lebanon. At the same time the right-wing tries to keep alive the ideology of confessionalism in an attempt to water down the petit-bourgeoisie's increasing dissatisfaction and the growing class consciousness among the working classes and lower petit-bourgeois sectors. Therefore, the right-wing portrays the Palestinian resistance as a "Moslem sect" opposing the Christian population.

The Phalangists failed in their latest attempts to turn the struggle between itself and the resistance into a confessional-sectarian struggle. Their failure is instructive and could have far-reaching consequences on Lebanon's political scene. The victory of the resistance in the events of this month is due to a number of reasons:

Basically the Phalangists made both military and political miscalculations. The balance of forces was not in their favor, and the resistance was quick in replying to the massacre of the bus passengers with attacks on Phalangist military positions and economic interests. The resistance showed it is able to go immediately into action and can inflict solid losses on the right-wing if and when it decides to do so. Politically, the demands of the resistance were clear - the arrest and punishment by the state of those responsible for the massacre. The Phalangists wrongly gambled that the resistance would not react to their attack, and gambled also on directly involving the Lebanese army in the fighting.

The timing and heinous character of the bus ambush made such army involvement unlikely. It would have meant an internal crisis for the government, a crisis of a scope which could be easily turned into a civil war. Furthermore, if such a situation broke out, none of the right-wing Arab regimes could have dared to openly support action against the resistance because of the general political atmosphere in the area following the failure of the Kissinger mission and the hardening of the Israeli position. At the same time, the support apparently expected by the Phalangists from other right-wing parties in Lebanon (i.e. Chamoun of the Liberal Party and Edde of the National Bloc) did not materialize. Both refrained from direct involvement because this was not in their interests at this point in time - Chamoun because he wants to emerge as the more stable representative of Lebanese right in contrast to an impulsive-adventurist Gemayel, thus being able to strengthen his relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran; Edde, because he wants to strengthen his relations with the Sunnite bourgeoisie.

In addition to these factors in the failure of the Phalangists is the role played by the progressive and left-wing forces in Lebanon. They immediately mobilized in support of the resistance - calling for the government not only to punish those responsible for the massacre, but also to ban the Phalangist Party, disarm it and dismiss its ministers from the government. The Phalangists were effectively put on the defensive by the progressive forces, who were strong enough to demand against the Phalangists measures which the right-wing had been calling for against the progressive and left-wing forces in Lebanon. We have also seen in some Beirut newspapers open accusations that the Phalangist Party is in collusion with the national enemy, Israel. These reports stated that, before the massacre, Western sources had reported Rabin's answer to the Israeli parliament as to why the Israeli forces had not replied to the Tel Aviv operation saying, "We have chosen not

to reply to this operation because we are planning on and waiting for a confessional war to occur in Lebanon which would have the same result." (Al-Sha'ab, 12/4/75) Similar reports have indicated American encouragement of and connivance with the Phalangist Party.

In short, the Phalangists failed to achieve any of their aims: ...In the last years they have focused activity on preventing the Palestinian resistance from organizing and leading Palestinians in Lebanon, on cancelling the Cairo Agreement, and on carrying out continuous anti-resistance agitation. The Phalangists were now forced to objectively acknowledge the resistance and sign a cease-fire with them. ...The Phalangists have now seen the demands they have always put forward against the progressive and left-wing parties become, instead, the measures demanded against the Phalangist Party. ...The Phalangists failed to drag the resistance into a long costly secondary struggle, and thus the resistance emerged stronger and has more firmly established its rightful presence in Lebanon. Furthermore, the resistance insisted that it would stop the fighting only in reply to an appeal made to it by the Lebanese progressive parties and forces; and this had the effect of strengthening these forces. That the Phalangists agreed to hand over some of those responsible for the massacre (a demand of the resistance) and to give the names of seven other men, is clear admission for all by the Phalangists of their responsibility in the events.

What is now required is for the Lebanese progressive forces to make use of the isolation now faced by the Lebanese extreme right. From the progressives' strengthened position, the battle must be carried further against Lebanese reaction and they must prepare themselves for the coming battles which will in the future be launched by the Phalangist and other right-wing forces.

The Failure of the Kissinger Mission

...We must prevent a repetition of the step-by-step policy in a new guise.

Following the failure of the Kissinger mission, the Arab and Egyptian right-wing circles were quick to blame Israel, and Israel alone, for the failure of the mission and for the setback in reaching a new partial solution on the Sinai front. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmi, did not hesitate (in both his announcements and in his declarations to the Arab Foreign Ministers) to point out that "the rigidity of the Israeli position is the main reason for the failure of the Kissinger mission." It did not skip his mind to affirm "the continuation of trust in the United States and its policy." (However Fahmi was quick to "rectify" the situation when he indicated that the commitment of the Egyptian leadership to Syrian and Palestinian rights made it refuse to accept the inflexible and unyielding Israeli conditions.)

The danger that lies in this lopsided evaluation of the failure of the Kissinger mission is to be found basically in the fact that it assumes the existence of a "serious contradiction" between the American and Israeli positions, and in maintaining and strengthening the illusion

that the U.S. has played and continues to play the role of the "neutral mediator" in the conflict.

Israel and American Guarantees

If American guarantees were not sufficient to secure an agreement, this is not because of any disequilibrium in its relations with Israel. It represents more the collapse of its "guarantees" on a world scale, because of the defeats the U.S. has been subjected to in more than one area of the world. In short, given the worsening position of American imperialism in the world, an American "guarantee" to any limited agreement in Sinai can no longer be sufficient even to its most dependent ally.

Kissinger himself had to acknowledge this when he pointed out in his assessment of the situation that the events in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Indo-China had a clear effect on the course of the negotiations - for these have raised "in so far as our friends are concerned, the question of the continuity of the guarantees we give." In other words, the disintegration of the imperialist camp is a general phenomenon at this stage. This leads even the most dependent and intimate allies of American imperialism to doubt the usefulness of its guarantees to and agreements with it.

In such a situation, the Arab reactionary and right-wing forces have not grasped the lesson implied in a world situation of this kind - a lesson that has been grasped by the revolutionaries of Vietnam and Cambodia, who have taken the initiative in utilizing the situation of disintegration that the network of imperialist relations (under the hegemony of the U.S.) is undergoing. Such a lesson, for the Arab forces, means the continuation of political attack and the cancellation of all the concessions given away during the last one-and-a-half years (since the October War) together with serious military preparedness. The only course that the Arab reactionary and right-wing forces have begun to advocate is to emphasize "friendship toward and trust in the role of the U.S. and that Israel alone shoulders the responsibility for the failure!"

Moreover these right-wing circles used Ford's announcement regarding "the American re-assessment of its relations with the countries of the area" to prove the correctness of the continuation of its trust in American policy. However, Kissinger himself clarified this "misunderstanding" when he announced that "this re-assessment is not directed against Israel and does not aim to lower aid to any of the states in the area, but is aimed at achieving peace." In other words, the U.S. which has attempted to freeze the conflict in the area through its policy of a partial solution in Sinai, does not intend to put any serious pressure on Israel nor to implement any change in the general line of its policy in the area. What it searches for at the present moment are new avenues to achieve the same aim, i.e. to freeze the situation. Kissinger uncovered the features of this "new road" when he pointed out that the U.S. will support "the carrying out of separate negotiations in Geneva instead of negotiations attended by all the parties at the same time." Thus Kissinger is attempting once again,

under the umbrella of Geneva, to continue the policy of fragmenting the solution, implementing separate negotiations - that is the step-by-step solution in its new guise!

The Israeli position with its increasing demands during the negotiations was the product also of the local situation. The most important factor here is the policy followed by the Egyptian right during the last year and a half since the October War of continuous concessions. This includes internal retreats in the political, social, and economic spheres, openly dropping relations with Syria and the P.L.O., and sabotaging its relations with the Soviet Union. The Egyptian right gave up in advance all its weapons before entering the struggle for the partial withdrawal in Sinai. Perhaps the only weapon it had was American guarantees to complete this step. Such guarantees can evaporate easily, since they are not accompanied by a political, economic and military pressure capable of forcing the U.S. to accept Arab demands.

Other Reasons for the Kissinger Failure

1. The Egyptian leadership was not capable of officially declaring an end to the state of war with Israel, the establishment of open relations with Israel, a minimization of the Arab boycott, and a refusal to help Syria even when the latter is subject to Israeli aggression, etc.

Despite the fact that Israel considers that it has provided Egypt with a tempting prize by offering to withdraw from the oil wells and the straits, the ending of the state of war which Israel demanded in return would be the gambling away by the Egyptian leadership of the rest of Egyptian territory occupied in Sinai. Such a situation represents open national treason. Given the explosive internal situation in Egypt and the situation of the Egyptian army, whose composition and morale has changed, no national-patriotic leadership can accept such demands by Israel.

2. An acceptance by the Egyptian leadership of the Israeli demands would have led immediately to an Arab upheaval. This would have isolated the Egyptian leadership and embarrassed its friends and allies in the Arab area. Here the Palestinian and Syrian position, which has attacked the partial and separate solution has had an important effect in narrowing the margin of Egyptian concessions, and in indicating the Arab upheaval that would follow. For as long as the Egyptian leadership was unable to elicit the tacit agreement of Arab countries involved by their silence (especially that of Syria and the P.L.O.), it would be wrong to assume that it was prepared to sacrifice its Arab relations completely, (especially with Syria and the P.L.O.). Its need for such relations and for a minimum of Arab solidarity remain as long as any Egyptian territory is occupied, and as long as other stages of struggle remain after the partial solution in Sinai. Moreover, the Egyptian leadership would have risked destroying its relations with the Soviet Union if it had accepted the conditions of the enemy. It is also a mistake to assume that the Egyptian leadership can completely cut off its connections with the socialist camp at a time when the myth of finding alternative sources of arms or depending on Arab and Western capital has only aggravated the internal crisis of the Egyptian regime.

3. Israeli "greed" was not satisfied with the fact that the Egyptian leadership was offering all the new concessions it could at this stage, i.e. the promise - with an American guarantee - to terminate the state of war for two years, which means agreeing to freeze the struggle during this whole period. Here it is sufficient to remind ourselves that a number of Israeli declarations were indicating that it was not necessary to offer any territory to Egypt in return for freezing the situation for two years. For, without offering any part of Sinai back to Egypt, Israel can continue to use delaying and stalling tactics for two years, being fully aware there will be no threat from Egypt, because the Egyptian leadership's policy of concessions since the October War has deprived it of almost all political and military weapons.

These considerations led Israel to harden its position more and more and to consider that the preferred "two years prize" is not worth much since it can have it in any case, even if no agreement is reached. Such Israeli calculations were an important factor in the Israeli position. This position counts on Egyptian policy following the same course that it has taken since the October War, i.e. opening the doors to the U.S. and becoming a satellite for its policy.

4. Lastly, the Egyptian leadership was hoping to "expose" Israel and to plant the seeds of "contradiction" between it and the United States! This it hoped to do through being amenable to the conditions that were put forward by Kissinger during the negotiations. In this way the Egyptian leadership hoped to expose Israel as being solely responsible for the failure to reach agreement, thus bringing it into conflict with the United States.

Such feeble calculations mean that the Egyptian leadership has not learned one lesson from the history of U.S. relations in the area, not to mention from the lessons to be drawn from its relations with the international struggle. Disagreements between the U.S. and its allies cannot turn into major contradictions, nor can those allies be pressured into giving strategic concessions, without subjecting the U.S. to continuous political, economic and military pressures and without calling forth action to liquidate its influence and interests.

This illusion of the Egyptian leadership explains its right-wing deviation and its recent practice. In addition there is the political influence of the Zionist movement inside the U.S. which can be utilized every time disagreements between Israel and the U.S. appear. Moreover, Israel, like all other forces tied to imperialism, sometimes attempts to use the U.S.'s crisis to further its own individual interests- this at a time when Arab patriots should be deploying this crisis in order to weaken America's role and influence and to force it to acknowledge their rights. Despite the fact that some assessments indicated that Israel was not able to reach a compromise over Sinai without this having serious repercussions on the internal situation (especially between the various Zionist wings), it is clear that the attempt to avoid such an upheaval was not the reason behind its inflexible position. The other factors are more relevant here, especially the Egyptian concessions.

The Question of the Geneva Conference

Soon after the failure of Kissinger, the Egyptian leadership called for the convening of the Geneva Conference quickly as a framework for finding a solution instead of the method used by Kissinger. The Egyptian call concerning the Geneva Conference can be seen as follows:

1. It suggests the convening of such a conference as an end itself at this stage, and not as one arena of the struggle. The Egyptian leadership is satisfied that by threatening to hold this conference, it will scare the U.S. and Israel with the participation of the Soviet Union and with the "danger" of the presence of all the Arabs as a collective unity! The Egyptian leadership hopes that such "dangers" will scare the enemy into accepting its demands concerning a partial solution in Sinai.
2. The Egyptian leadership is calling for the Geneva Conference without taking the necessary preliminary steps for such a call. These include attempting to regain the unity of the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian position on the basis of the Rabat decisions and through rejecting all partial and separate solutions.
3. The Egyptian leadership used to look at the Geneva Conference as the step following the "defusing" of the situation; that is, the dampening of the struggle through the achievement of a partial solution in Sinai. It ignored the fact that any conference of this kind cannot achieve any result without "fusing" the situation, without careful military preparations and even the use of military force. Therefore, without maximum military and political preparedness, such a conference can only be the kind desired by Israel and the U.S. - a place for the delivery of speeches and a framework for delays and postponement. At best, it can only lead once again to partial separate solutions. At any rate, in such conditions it is unlikely that the conference will be held because of the Palestinian problem on the one hand and the American-Israeli determination to avoid an effective Soviet presence and a unified Arab position on the other hand.

The utter failure of the Kissinger mission, together with the determination of some Arab forces (especially the resistance and Syria) to intensify the struggle against individual solutions - all this has contributed toward containing and constraining any tendencies by the Egyptian leadership toward further retreat. It has also opened the way toward further intensification of pressure constraining the new right-wing concessions. Moreover it allows the reunification of the Arab position on solid patriotic bases to confront the American-Zionist solution.

The crisis of the Arab right-wing does not lie simply in the collapse of the political theory it has adopted since the October, nor simply in the bankruptcy of its propaganda that concessions to the U.S. will lead the latter to put pressure on Israel. The crisis is more acute now because this right-wing policy cannot give any further concessions for it has nothing left to give. Any new concession will mean national treason on its part.

On the other hand, the freezing of the situation and the surrender once again to a state of "no war, no peace" can only serve Israeli aims and deepen the political, military and economic crisis of the right-wing leadership.

American imperialism is aware that a brink-of-war situation and armed conflict are real possibilities, since its attempts to freeze the situation in the area have reached an impasse. Thus, in addition to the active Arab national-patriotic forces (especially Syria and the resistance), the Egyptian right itself is incapable of surrendering to a state of "no war, no peace" which would threaten the regime with serious and acute internal upheavals and dangers. Such a situation can weaken its political position immeasurably.

Arab patriotic forces are required to adopt a position of initiative and political attack without delay. This will enable them to face the brink-of-war situation, to avoid all possibility of freezing the situation once again in the area, and to prevent the Geneva Conference from being turned into an instrument of pacification and further delay by the enemy. Further wide military preparations are required, together with mobilization and deployment of all economic and oil capabilities for the benefit of the war fronts. This must be accompanied by attacks on American monopoly interests in the Arab world on the one hand, and the correction of Egyptian-Soviet relations to secure advanced armaments for the Egyptian army on the other hand. Putting pressure on the Egyptian position does not mean adopting a position of "gloating" toward the failure of the partial solution, as the Egyptian propaganda organs were quick to infer. It means attempting to obstruct and prevent any new tendencies toward compromise and bargaining, and it means using the new situation that has emerged since the Kissinger failure to effect a political change in the Egyptian position. Such a policy aims at this stage to achieve the following urgent patriotic tasks:

1. Unification of the Arab national patriotic stand, especially between the main forces in direct confrontation with the enemy (Egypt, Syria and the P.L.O.). This should be based on the Rabat decisions and tie the future of the Occupied Territories with the rights of the Palestinian people in one cause - together with the rejection of all forms of partial and separate solutions. Within this framework, the plan for unifying the Syrian-Palestinian command should be developed into a concrete plan on the basis of clear and stable political premises oriented against the American solution, against partial and separate solutions, and aimed at strengthening the resistance's military, political and mass capabilities. This step cannot be separated from the unification of the positions of the three parties nor from the task of building Arab solidarity on fixed patriotic bases.
2. The brink-of-war situation requires a high degree of military coordination and preparation between the three main parties on the confrontation line. Such a matter is also the responsibility (apart from Syria and Egypt) of other Arab countries, especially Algeria, Libya and Iraq, among other.

3. The Geneva Conference, like any international conference, is not an end in itself. Thus, without the presence of conditions that make it an arena of struggle, it becomes an arena for delays and waste of time. The unity of the political position, military preparedness and the strengthening of Soviet-Arab relations are the necessary and preliminary conditions for going to the Geneva Conference from a position of effective strength. Such a position can force the enemy front to acknowledge Arab and Palestinian rights and can turn the Geneva Conference into an effective arena of struggle. Without this, the conference can only become an American-Israeli forum to be used for partial and separate solutions and delays.

4. The Arab patriotic forces do not only shoulder the responsibility for strengthening the unity of the Arab position according to the strategy of the present stage of the struggle as formulated at the Rabat conference, but they must also make preparations for a hot military and political confrontation which requires the renewal of mobilization, using all the financial and oil capabilities as weapons in the battle.

The achievement of such urgent tasks will be built on the realistic capabilities of the Arab patriotic forces and regimes. It is these forces that foiled the Alexandria declaration, formulated the P.L.O. national programme for the current stage, produced the Rabat decisions and actively contributed toward the failure of the Kissinger mission. These are the tasks for continuing the political and military attack toward completing the aims of the October War and paralyzing any new retreatist intentions. Perhaps, in the aftermath of the Kissinger failure, the call for holding an Arab summit conference soon provides a real opportunity to reactivate the Rabat decisions together with narrowing the margin of right-wing and reactionary retreats after the collapse of its political illusions and "theories."

Immediate concrete action in the new race with the American solution is the method called for by the new situation.

Memorandum from the P.F.L.O. to the Arab League

Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (P.F.L.O.) Memorandum to the Arab League on the Subject of Jordanian Interference in the Affairs of the Omani People

July 23, 1970 represents the opening of a new stage of imperialist aggression against the Omani people, with a new wave of terrorism and repression never before known in Oman.

The British dethronement of Said Bin Taimour and his replacement by his British-schooled son, Qabous, marked the beginning of a new era of repression whose principal consequences have been:

1) The escalation of the war in Oman which began in June 9, 1965 and since took wider dimensions with the participation of several imperialist and reactionary countries attempting to maintain the collaborating regime in Muscat and their financial profits. The British were joined in their war against the Omani people by Iran, Jordan, the U.S., and other imperialist and reactionary forces.

2) The opening of Oman to all monopolies, no longer being reserved for just British business.

3) The further perfection of the repressive apparatus by putting to use hundreds of experts, officers and mercenaries of various nationalities. In this way, Qabous' army was increased from 3,000 men in 1970 to 14,000 in 1974 - and this does not include the number of forces in the different tribes. The army itself consumes 60% of the GNP, which is a major factor in overall economic deprivation in the otherwise-rich Sultanate.

In this memorandum, we shall explain the March 1 declaration of the Muscat Government.

The Sultanate of Oman has ordered 31 Hawkhunters from Jordan, 15 of which have already arrived. In addition to this, a Jordanian infantry battalion has been sent to take part in the war against "the communists" of Dhofar organized within the P.F.L.O..

This Jordanian role in Oman has been entrusted to it by British and U.S. imperialism, whose plan here is to let local reaction play the major role in the repression of national liberation movements outside the imperialist countries proper. In this we see the activity of the Jordanian regime.

The Jordanian regime has excellent experience in such work through its repression of the Palestinian resistance and also of the Jordanian and Arab national movement. The role Jordan played in destroying the Egyptian-Syrian Union; its role as guardian to Zionist interests since 1947; its role in repressing all attempts of the Palestinian people to regain their rights; and its role since the beginning of the Palestinian armed struggle in January 1965, with the first martyr of Fateh falling from Jordanian bullets - all this is well known. This regime also succeeded in liquidating the resistance based in Jordan, committing massacres that even Israel had not carried out. The reactionary Jordanian regime again proved its traitorous character by not participating in the October War.

All these factors put Jordan at the head of the repression of the Arab liberation movement, thus being well trusted by the imperialists for use in the execution of their despicable plots.

Following the liquidation of the resistance in Jordan, sights were reset toward taking care of the revolution in Oman. Since King Hussein's crimes against the Palestinian people, he has begun working on massacres of the Omani people. The Jordanian regime was the first to offer its services to the British and Americans in Oman, this even before the Jordanian forces had finished their work against the resistance in Jarash and Ajloun in 1970-71. The King was early preparing a maximum fulfillment of its repressive role. The Jordanian army's experience, acquired through massacres of thousands of Arab militants, makes it ready to commit the most heinous crimes no matter where it is assigned to do so.

In the beginning of 1972, following the failure of the October-November offensive against the liberated areas, Jordanian forces began to land in Oman. The Jordanian presence was then no longer limited to experts and officers, as even reported on 24 March 1974 by Reuter's New Agency, "...the role of the Jordanian officers is not as before limited to the training of Omani soldiers, but now includes Jordanian forces directly engaged in battle in Dhofar, which was requested by Qabous."

Jordan and Oman have tried to make a complete information blackout concerning the intervention of the former in Oman. This blackout is particularly necessary due to the isolation of the Hashemite throne because of its crimes against the Palestinian people and their courageous resistance forces. But the obvious could not be hidden for long and the King had to admit on 4 June 1972 to members of the French press that he had sent troops to Oman - "King Hussein stated that in the near future he was going to send various types of armed forces to the Sultanate of Oman in order to lend a strong hand to the soldiers of Qabous in their fight against revolutionaries, and that the preparations for this are in the making."

On 12 June 1972, Hussein received an Omani delegation led by Abdallah Tay, Minister of Culture, who was given Jordan's confirmation of its unconditional support. Concerning this support Colonel Hue Eldman, British Secretary for Omani Defense, went to Jordan to work out the details of agreements for training Omani officers in Jordan and the sending of Jordanian experts to Oman. In June of 1972, Omani-Jordanian relations reached their high peak with Qabous visiting Jordanian military installations, attending military maneuvers, and actually inspecting the soldiers that were later to arrive in Dhofar.

Jordanian interference is not just of a military nature, but includes much diplomatic and political activity. Hussein has sent tens of information officers specialized in defamatory propaganda campaigns against the Palestinian resistance. They have infiltrated cultural and educational spheres in Oman in order to inject their poison into the young people and the masses in general. The Jordanian diplomatic body in Oman is equally infested with tools of reaction, not to mention the role played by Bedouins in the police repression in which the best sons of our people died.

Different Aspects of the Interference

A. The Jordanian forces that participate in the war.

1) The same infantry battalion which committed the horrors of Jarash and Ajloun against the Palestinian resistance is in Oman. This battalion is infamous for its bloody atrocities in the liberated areas; and its well-known statement, "You will see how we took care of the fedayin in Jarash," speaks for itself. Our people have suffered untold repression from this battalion - by its devastation of houses and agricultural crops and slaughtering of livestock. The presence of this particular battalion was not public knowledge until after the offensive of our national liberation army on Marbeth, 135 klm. east of Sallalah. In this offensive we captured enemy arms, destroyed positions, and among the enemy officers killed was Commander Ali Damour. The announcement of this death made the battalion's presence known.

2) An engineering battalion stationed on the central area's passage. The task of this battalion is to fence off the area with barbed and electric wires, thereby obstructing nomadic movement, and mining the caravan and flock passes.

3) A Royal Guard battalion specialized in urban guerilla warfare. This is the force we confronted during the Restak incident (8 November 1974) in which Comrade Ahmad Ali, Executive Committee member, was killed.

4) A special infantry battalion which arrived in Oman on 1 March, 1975. This is a force specially trained by instruction of Hussein for the purpose of reinforcing the Iranian troops which had suffered such losses in their December 1974 campaign against the liberated areas.

5) Jordanian air force personnel. The Sultanate has no pilots of its own, having in fact air squadrons made up of British, Iranian and Jordanian personnel. This fact, along with the first aircraft delivery from Jordan of 15 planes, is flagrant proof of the major Jordanian aid in the war against our people.

B. Intelligence - Second Bureau

In addition to British intelligence agents, Oman and the Arabian Gulf are infested with Jordanian ones infamous for extreme measures of torture against our people, exceeding even the atrocities carried out under the rule of Bin Taimour.

C. Jordanian Training of Omani Instructors, Army Officers and Police

This has been officially confirmed by Qabous's statement in March 1973 to journalists of the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahar, in which he said, "Jordanian officers have arrived to instruct our forces." The work of these officers (who appear at all official ceremonies) is not limited to training Omani troops, but extends to forming troops of mercenaries of all nationalities. All of this has even been published in several newspapers in Australia, the U.S., and South Africa.

D. The Political Presence of Jordan in Oman.

Oman's taking a position with the Hashemite Kingdom against the P.L.O. is indicative of and important to its policy. Jordan's military presence gives it influence on decisions taken by the Sultanate. It is also important to note the \$6 million given to Jordan by Qabous. Marshal Mohammed Abd-Dayam, Jordanian Ambassador to Muscat, and one of those responsible for the massacre in Amman, holds great power in Oman as does Marshal Amir Khamash, a political advisor to Qabous. They both, of course, are in the complete service of Jordanian-American plans.

There are numerous Jordanian functionaries in Omani ministries who influence government policy - such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs who, while using an Omani name, is in fact of Jordanian-Tunisian origin. The radio, television, and press are also all infiltrated with Jordanian agents.

We intended by this memorandum to expose to our Arab national brothers the reality of the dangerous role being played by Jordan in the plan to cover up the colonization of our country by the British, Americans and Iranians.

Executive Committee of the P.F.L.O.
5 March 1975

Interview with a Representative of the Soviet Union

The past week has been one of much Soviet diplomatic activity, with the Soviet representative, Comrade Vinogradif, holding meetings with P.L.O. leaders while delegates of the Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity visited bases of the Palestinian revolution, including those of the D.F.L.P. in Syria and Lebanon at the fighting lines with the Zionist enemy.

Being politically an important Soviet visit in this period, Al-Hourriah carried out the following interview with Comrade Vladimir Gudryaftasif, who is the Chief Deputy of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, a member of the Supreme Council of Soviets and on the Council's Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of the Steering Committee of the Soviet Union Parliament, and the political commentator of the Izvestia.

Q.: How does the Soviet Union view the situation regarding the American imperialist-Arab reactionary and rightist attempts to put through surrenderist "partial solutions?"

A.: This situation is complicated and critical to the Arab peoples' struggle, particularly to the Palestinian people's struggle. The method of partial and bilateral agreements is an imperialist and reactionary attempt to regain influence in the Middle East, and to suppress the movement of Arab progressive and national forces. The American imperialists hope to destroy the relations between the Arab states and the Soviet Union, and isolate the Palestinian people. Of course, such a policy does not lead to a just solution, rather it keeps tension high endangering peace in the area and the world.

The Soviet Union sees the following two conditions essential to establishing peace and stability in the area:

- 1) Israeli forces must withdraw from all occupied Arab territories including occupied Palestinian territory.
- 2) The Palestinian people's national rights, including their right to self-determination and establishing an independent national authority on their land, must be assured.

These are the necessary conditions to a real and lasting peace in the Middle East. The Arab peoples and all progressive forces in the world are struggling to achieve this goal, and the imperialists will not be able to turn the wheel of history backwards.

Q.: What is the Soviet position on the Palestinian right to self-determination and to establishing their independent national state? And what is the real democratic solution to the Palestinian question.

A.: The Soviet Union believes that the Middle East crisis cannot be solved unless the just national rights of the Palestinian people are guaranteed. We support the Palestinian right to self-determination and the establishment of a national authority on their land. The Soviet Union supports the courageous struggle of the Arab-Palestinian people and will continue to support their struggle to achieve their goals after the establishing of the independent national authority, in regaining all their rights.

Q.: America, along with its old and new alliances in the area, hopes to turn the Geneva Conference into a smokescreen for putting through its partial solutions. How does the Soviet Union view this conference, and what are the practical ways to avoid its becoming an American smokescreen?

A.: The Soviet Union believes that the Geneva Conference can resume its work when all concerned Arab states are participating in the conference along with the attendance and equal participation of the P.L.O. the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

In our view the Geneva Conference is not an end, but is one of the means in the Palestinian people's struggle to gain their rights. Also we do not believe that the imperialists will be able to succeed in their trying to control the conference.

We see the tasks of the Geneva Conference to be the reversal of the result of the 1967 war, and the guaranteeing of the Arab Palestinian people's fundamental rights. Therefore, it is necessary to reject all American imperialist control, and to increase Arab solidarity and the unity of all Arab progressive national forces. At the same time, it is important to expose the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary plots, and to further influence international opinion in understanding that the Middle East will not have peace unless there is a just solution to the Palestinian question.

On the official level, the governments concerned with the situation are considering new ways to confront the imperialist schemes, and such steps are very important in facing the crisis in the area.

Q.: Following the visit of the last Soviet delegation to Amman, some Jordanian newspapers carried an article reporting that there was a change in the Soviet position on the P.L.O.. Would you please comment on this matter?

A.: This was an attempt to create distrust between the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, and the Soviet Union - and hoped to instill doubt in the Palestinians regarding the Soviet Union's policy. The Jordanian government has since stated that its own official newspapers had lied on this issue. We see here another example of the continuous attempts by this reactionary government, which is tied to American imperialism, to undermine Palestinian-Soviet relations. The Jordanian government's stand is the same now as it was before the Rabat Summit. As the Rabat decisions are in the interest of the Palestinian revolution, the reactionaries and the imperialists have been trying to undermine them. Once again, it is very important to expose the reactionary and imperialist policy.

Q.: What is your position on a Palestinian provisional revolutionary government?

A.: We consider this to be an internal matter concerning the Arab Palestinian people and their revolution. If it is decided to form such a government, and it is done at a politically suitable time, this would strengthen the Palestinian revolution.

Q.: What were the main results of your talks with Brother Yassir Arafat and Comrade Nayef Hawatmeh?

A.: In our meetings with Brother Yassir Arafat, Chairman of the P.L.O. Executive Committee, and with Comrade Nayef Hawatmeh, Secretary-General of the D.F.L.P., we were in complete agreement on the fundamental points discussed regarding the present situation in the Middle East, and Soviet-Palestinian relations.

Q.: What were your impressions of the fighters after visiting the revolution's military bases, particularly those of the D.F.L.P.?

A.: We had a very good impression of the fighters and we praise their courage and readiness for sacrifice in the struggle for their people's freedom. At the D.F.L.P. bases we were also impressed by the morale and the political situation. These fighters truly deserve the Palestinian people and the people deserve them. We have the grounds to make such an assessment because of our people's experience in their long struggle against invasions and imperialist enemies.

Report on the Sixth Congress of the National Front of Democratic Yemen

...A new turn in the revolutionary movement

...The masses welcome the unity declaration of the Democratic National Working Organization

At the opening of the ninth plenary session of the National Front's Sixth General Congress on 23 March, Salim Rubiya Ali, President of the Congress's Steering Committee, spoke on the results of the first meeting of the newly-elected Central Committee including re-elected Comrades Abdul Fateh Ismail and Salim Rubiya Ali in the posts of Secretary-General and Vice-Secretary-General respectively.

The Political Bureau, which according to the Fifth Congress in 1972 had been made up of seven members and two candidates, has now been enlarged to nine members and three candidates. The newly-elected members are:

1. Abdul Fateh Ismail
2. Salim Rubiya Ali
3. Ali Nasser Muhammed
4. Ali Salah Abaad
5. Muhammed Salah Mutiya
6. Ali Salem Rubiyd
7. Salah Muslah
8. Jaim Salah
9. Abdul Aziz Abdul Waly

The candidates are:

1. Abdulla Salah Albar
2. Hassan Ahmed Baun
3. Muhammed Saide Abdullah (Mohsen)

At the seventh closed session of the General Congress, the election results for the Central Committee were announced. It is now made up of 41 members and 13 candidates, while according to the Fifth General Congress it had contained 31 members and 14 candidates.

The newly-enlarged Political Bureau and Central Committee will carry out their responsibilities for the next five years according to the internal constitution approved by the Congress.

The Masses Call for Increasing the Work Day to Eight Hours

During the period of the Congress which was held under the slogan of "Struggle to Consolidate the Yemeni Revolution and to Execute the Five-Year Plan," the enthusiastic support of the masses was manifested by large demonstrations covering the whole of the capital, Aden. In the last two days of the Congress, mass demonstrations marched to the site of the Congress with cheering and singing in support of the conference and with calls for putting into effect an eight-hour work day. All the Congress members greeted the masses, with Comrade Abdul Fateh Ismail and Comrade Salim Rubiya Ali addressing them. The two comrades praised the masses' resolute efforts to consolidate the Yemeni Revolution through their increased labor time and determination to realize the Five-Year Plan. They assured the masses of protecting the rights of the working people and of raising their standard of living.

Preparatory Work for the Sixth Congress

In preparation for the Congress, the whole Republic took an active role in more than two months of planning. The many planning committees reviewed and studied all points dealt with at the Fifth Congress, including the internal constitution. Opportunistic elements in the Party were criticized and expelled. Decisions were made to develop organizational standards and to improve the organizational bases in all sectors of production. All activities that had taken place since the Fifth Congress were evaluated, as was the work of the organization's branches in the six governates.

The central information committee for the Congress's preparations raised slogans of "The Revolution Serves Us and We Must Serve the Revolution," and "Eight Real Working Hours, Not Just Eight Hours at the Workplace." Under such slogans, the month of February was designated as "Productivity Month." The masses rallied around the increased pro-

ductivity call, raising output in all productive units. Of the figures so far calculated, the First Governate produced an increase of 37,000 dinars, and the Third Governate of 15,000 dinars.

The militias held meetings to discuss ways to improve their work, with decisions to be more vigilant and better their protective measures. The General National Yemeni Students Union called for the students to give their studies more serious attention and to improve the appearance of the schools through such things as cleaning campaigns and tree planting. The Union of Yemeni Democratic Youth held its second conference during the latter part of January to organize preparations for the Sixth Congress of the National Front. The youth referred to themselves as the National Front's reserve force and expressed their complete support of the Front's political organization. The young people organized programs which included art exhibits, musical performances, and sports events.

In response to the people's revolutionary spirit, the Political Bureau put forth to the government a law to raise the workers' salaries and for social security. This law will raise salaries by 10% and of this raise half will go into a social security fund.

The Political Report is an Analytical and Critical Document

In the first day of the Congress, the Secretary-General read the political report forwarded to the Congress by the Central Committee. The report analyzes and criticizes all aspects of the revolution - political, economic, cultural, military, and organizations. It contains adjustments and improvements to the revolution's work in its present national democratic phase.

Concerning the foreign policy of the National Front, the political report notes that the Republic's guide is scientific socialism in determining its foreign political line. There is the principle of peaceful coexistence in regard to all states which respect the independence of the Yemeni people and land.

The report praised the struggle of the Palestinian people represented by the P.L.O., and spoke of the Algerian and Rabat Summit's positive decisions. The report viewed the decisions as aiding Arab solidarity which in turn serves the Arab national struggle against imperialism and Zionism, and also noted that the decisions are obstacles in the way of imperialist partial solutions.

On the Conference for Unity

The Political Report briefly spoke on the democratic discussions for unity that took place between the parties of the National Working Organization:

1. the Political Organization of the National Front
2. the Democratic Popular Union Party
3. the Popular Vanguard Party

It analyzed the class, political, and ideological basis for unity, pointing to the three organizations all being committed to scientific socialism, having common class stands, and sharing the same views on the questions of the national democratic revolution in internal and external matters. The Report concluded that the National Front's Political Organization is the suitable political framework in this

transitional phase to building one vanguard party.

Following the unity discussions, the three organizations signed an agreement on 5 February. The agreement calls for the establishment of one united political organization, details of which will be worked on in a unity conference of the three organizations to be held on 15 September.

The political report went on to speak of the unity agreement as having greatly served in the preparations for the Sixth General Congress, and it being of great importance to the national liberation movement in Yemen, besides being the first such experience in the Arab region.

In the last day of the unity discussions, Comrade Abdullah Batheeb, Secretary-General of the Democratic Union, delivered a speech in which he said the people welcome the news of the organizations' unity, and that with such unity the revolutionary movement, the country, and the people will achieve new gains. Following this speech, Comrade Anise Hassan Yahya spoke for the Political Bureau of the Popular Vanguard Party. In his speech he welcomed the unity saying, "The unity of the National Working Organization in our country and particularly at this time is a living example of understanding the objective and subjective conditions. It shows the responsible awareness of our national democratic movement." He went on to say that uniting the forces into one organization is dealing consciously with the subjective conditions in that part of the Arab world.

At the end of the Sixth Congress, Comrade Abdul Fateh Ismail read the decisions and recommendations of the Congress. He noted the achievements of the National Front in the period between the Fifth and the Sixth Congress, and affirmed the determination to advance the struggle and to learn from mistakes. He praised the work of the Central Committee in its Political Report, and the work of the various committees in the Congress. In addition, Comrade Abdul Fateh Ismail praised the

Congress's recommendations and decisions, saying of them that they were in line with the internal, Arab, and international policies of the Central Committee in its Political Report.

A Call to the Patriotic Palestinian People from the Sixth Congress of the National Front

The Sixth Congress saluted the Palestinian, Omani, and Indo-Chinese peoples, and the socialist countries. Regarding the Palestinian people the Congress sent its greetings to the Arab masses and their leadership, calling for them to support the P.L.O. according to the Algerian and Rabat decisions. The Congress said the Palestinian revolution is passing through a critical phase, facing the most dangerous conspiracies from the imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary forces. These forces are trying to exterminate the revolution by isolating it from the Arab governments, and by using the secondary contradictions that exist among the organizations of the Palestinian revolution. By this they can strike at one after another of the organizations, finally doing away with the national stand of the Palestinian revolution and giving the reactionary Jordanian regime the authority to represent the Palestinian people.

The P.L.O., which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, must recognize these dangerous and complicated conspiracies. The Arab governments and the national democratic forces must intensify efforts against the plots to crush the P.L.O. and its people's right to their national authority. The Palestinian people will be victorious.

Following the close of the Sixth General Congress of the National Front, the Secretary-General, Comrade Abdul Fateh Ismail, held a press conference in which among the questions asked was the following from the Al-Hourriah reporter:

Q.: You stated the unity conference for the National Working Organization will be held on 15 September. What are the preparations for and the importance of this conference for uniting the three organizations and creating one vanguard party?

A.: In the Political Report, we concretely pointed to the importance of the united national democratic struggle in one party. Here we spoke specifically of the Democratic Popular Union Party and the Popular Vanguard Party. We have taken a principled stand on the question of unity, and have in our position made use of the experience of the Arab national movement. You can see ineffective party work in some countries due to the existence of multiple organizations - a breaking down into separate organizations although many share the same political, ideological and class stand. But, they wrongly emphasize their secondary contradictions putting aside their common struggle. Our view is that the unity of the democratic, progressive forces in each Arab country must always be put forth, as long as there is a common ideological, political and class understanding.

This being what we propose on the national level, it is necessary to begin such unity here in Democratic Yemen. The agreement reached with

the Democratic Popular Union and the Popular Vanguard Party for unity within the National Front's framework sets an example not only to the Yemeni national movement, but to all revolutionary and progressive movements in the Arab world.

Concerning preparations for the unity conference, there is a committee made up from the three organizations, whose duty it is to prepare the work of the conference. The results reached by this committee will be reported at the conference on 15 September.