



ARAB PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE

MONTHLY MAGAZINE

VOLUME IV-No. **3** MARCH 1972

PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY- PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FORCES

Arab Palestinian **RESISTANCE**

Vol. IV - No. 3

MARCH 1972

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Price per copy
Syrian piasters 100

4/-

\$ 0.50

Editor: **M. KHURI**

FROM THE RECORD

I had my ups and downs during four years as a prisoner of war in Germany, but the Germans never treated me as harshly as the Israelis are treating the Arabs of Gaza, the majority of whom are women and children.

Michael Adams
«The Guardian»,
26 January, 1968

EDITORIAL

A common feature of all West-inspired proposals for the solution of the Palestine question has been an absence of consultation with the Palestinian people and a complete disregard of their inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination. In fact ignoring the Arab people of Palestine when considering the future of their country has been at the root of the Palestine tragedy since its very inception.

When the Basle program of the first Zionist Congress was drawn up in 1897, it was based on a deliberate misconception of Palestine as being «a country without a people» to be colonized and developed by «a people without a country». And in 1917, when the Palestinian Arabs constituted more than 93 percent of the total population of Palestine, the Balfour Declaration referred to them as no more than «the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.»

In 1947 the United Nations disregarded the wishes of the people of Palestine when it approved

the partition of the country in preference to the more democratic Palestinian proposal in favour of making of Palestine a unitary state in which Arabs and Jews would have equal rights.

In Nixon's recent Report to Congress (February 1972), emphasis was placed on the global aspect of the Middle East situation, and the rights and views of the Palestinian people were completely ignored. The Palestine question was also misrepresented as almost boiling down to attaining an Israeli-Egyptian accord in which Israel would receive a full Arab recognition in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, permitting the reopening of the Suez canal.

U.S.-inspired projects, involving the setting up of some form of political entity in the «West Bank», which followed upon Nixon's message, were likewise characterized by the common denominator of the complete ignoring of the rights of the Palestinian people. These projects, which aim at liquidating the Palestine Revolution and the Palestinian people, cannot lead to a just or durable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. All attempts to reach such settlement, under the pressure of Israeli military occupation and with no due regard to the views and rights of the Palestinian people, will inevitably flounder and fail. ■

Resistance

Political Scene

A "HUNDRED YEARS" WAR ?

■

The features of the new American-Israeli plan in the Middle East are becoming so conspicuous that little effort is needed to trace the aims of this plan, the forces recruited to carry it out, and the means by which it is being designed and implemented.

■

The new plan was designed in order to bring about an eventual Arab surrender to the will of the imperialists and their Zionist protégé, Israel. After failing to destroy the solidity of the Arab persistent struggle, which has gained world-wide support, America and Israel are now seeking to implement a gradual process of «softening-up» this tough Arab attitude.

The first and foremost step in this process of long-term liquidation of the Arab cause is «to get rid of the Palestinians at any cost.» These Palestinians are making Israel nervous and edgy. They have resumed their resistance operations despite the diabolic blood-baths that were carried out against them over the past two years or more.

The Palestinian commandos are back on the conflict arena in full force. They have even escalated their activities to unprecedented levels. They have been striking in several places at once. Their operations at present run at the average of more than 20 or more every week.

Once more, the Palestinians are not only proving that they still exist, but they are also threatening Israel's feeling of «security» and «stability», and thus shattering the legend of Israel's «invincibility» or «invulnerability». Israel considers this state of affairs as «highly dangerous», since it may take away a considerable part of Israel's «attractiveness» to potential immigrants.

Moreover, commando activities hinder Israel's attempts to tighten her grip on the occupied Arab territories. Only a few months ago, Israeli propaganda was trying to convince everybody that the Palestinian commandos have ceased to exist, thanks to the efforts of the «brave» king of Amman. Now, the Israeli generals have discovered that these «nasty Palestinians» have not been annihilated yet,

and are still refusing to become defunct remains of the past.

Thus Israel chose to blame both Lebanon and Syria for the survival of the Palestinians. An Israeli military build-up in the north and the north-east has been going on for several months. The recent Israeli attacks on both fronts were deliberately prepared and premeditated even before the activity of the Palestinian freedom-fighters began to escalate. Even without these Palestinian operations, Israel would not have failed to find some other pretexts to justify her aggression.


But, someone may ask, why should Israel wage such large-scale military operations, if not provoked? The answer to this question brings us to the second item or step in the American-Israeli plot, which consists of the liquidation, or at least «neutralization», of the Arab fronts, one by one.

Israel, in fact, feels that a total showdown with the Arabs is imminent and inevitable. So, Tel Aviv's generals want to be ready when the decisive moment of confrontation comes. They want to forestall any possibility of fighting on more than one front. In other words, they want to isolate Egypt so that President Sadat will find himself alone in the battlefield when he decides to fight.

The very essence of the American-Israeli plan depends on this fragmentation of the Arab forces.

In this respect, the Americans and their Israeli lackeys have been moving in more than one direction. They have been trying to «Arabicize» the conflict, exactly as America is trying to «Vietnamize» the war in Indo-China.

They have been trying to create as many fights and feuds among the Arab countries as between each Arab country and the Palestinians living in it. They have been trying to create anti-Palestinian feelings everywhere, so as to convince other Arab countries to «crack down» on the Palestinian



freedom-fighters and to arrange more massacres, after the Jordanian model.

On the other hand, Israel feels a pressing need to gain recognition from the Jordanian authorities through concluding a separate peace-agreement. Some practical steps have already been taken in this direction. Negotiations have been going on in King David's Hotel in Jerusalem. The King is represented by his former Defence Minister Anwar Nuseiba, who has recently been shuttling to and fro between Amman and Jerusalem.

The Israelis do not bother to cover up these moves which have been reported by some Israeli newspapers such as «Ma'ariv» and «Ha'aretz». Bridges of the river Jordan have been almost unrestrictedly open for some time.

For the first time since the June war of 1967, Israel is permitting the circulation of Jordanian newspapers in the occupied West Bank. Moreover, the Jordanian King did not hesitate to grant an interview to a woman-correspondent of Ma'ariv.

But despite Jordan's cringing stance, the Israelis declare that they will not give the West Bank to Jordan. In fact, Israel has just received a fresh loan of \$ 50 million from «The American Agency of International Development» to help settle new Jewish immigrants in the occupied territories, particularly in the West Bank.

Meanwhile, the Arab citizens of this Bank are still being persecuted, detained arbitrarily, tortured brutally and then deported by force to the East

Bank of the River. New colonies are still being built in the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Israel, moreover, continues to obliterate more Arab lands in the Holy City. Hundreds of Arab families are now threatened with displacement because Israel wants to demolish their houses near the Western Wall of the Al-Aqsa Mosque which may give way because of what Israel terms as «archeological excavations». These measures are being carried out in defiance of the world community, the UN's resolutions, the protests of the Vatican and the indignation of the faithful all over the world.

That Israel is maneuvering to keep the occupied Arab territories is now generally recognized, even by neutral observers. In a recent statement, President Senghor of the Senegal frankly declared that Israel did not respect her word pledged in promises given by the Israeli officials to the delegation of the African Heads of State. In his statement to «Le Monde», President Senghor stressed the necessity that «Israel should unconditionally declare its commitment not to annex any Arab territories.»

As if in reply to this statement, Israeli Premier Golda Meir declared that «all Israel's borders should change in favour of Israel». Then General Dayan, in a less vague and more precise statement, said that Israel wanted to retain the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, Sharm el-Sheikh and the «right to settle Jewish colonizers in the Western Bank of Jordan.» One cannot but wonder, «what remains, then, for

any settlement? What are the things that Israel might consider negotiable?»

As for Israel's respect for the Jarring mission, it was shown in a very practical way through carrying out a four-day aggression against Lebanon while Jarring was still mediating in Jerusalem. The aggression, alleged to be an operation directed against the commandos, claimed a high toll of civilian victims, both Lebanese and Palestinians, including women and children. Yet, the commandos struck again in the Upper Galilee within less than 48 hours of this large-scale Israeli attack.


Meanwhile, Israel continues to suppress the news of the Palestinian blows dealt to its military installations in Haifa, Safad, the Negev, Acre and as deep as Tel-Aviv itself. Of course, Israel cannot blame any Arab country for these attacks, which are becoming more and more telling.

Another aspect of the new American-Israeli plan is manifested in Uncle Sam's suspicious moves in the Mediterranean. In addition to securing some permanent bases for the sixth fleet in Greece, President Nixon has decided to give Phantom jets to the Greek military regime, despite a previous congressional resolution to the contrary. The Greek Generals, with covert American instigation, are also trying to topple President Makarios in order to convert Cyprus into a springboard for NATO, to be used against the Arab liberation movement at anytime.

In view of the continuing U.S. imperialist



plots, should the Palestinians be blamed if they resorted to arms as the only alternative left for them to regain their rights and their homeland? No settlement is possible, and no stability is to be expected in this part of the world without recognizing and securing the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Tension is mounting while Israel's little Hitlers are preparing for their next military adventure. But the Arabs will never give up their just struggle for survival, even though this may mean a Hundred Years War, as Yasser Arafat has recently put it. ■



by: Joyce Kadi

On March 21, 1968, «Al-Karameh Battle» marked the first positive success for Arab resistance since June 1967.

At 5:30 a.m., the enemy, in an attempt to destroy commando bases once and for all, threw over 10,000 soldiers into the battle on the East Bank of River Jordan, but all went wrong right from the start. Palestinian commandoes lost many a brave man that day, but enemy losses were more than ten times their loss. By the end of that memorable day, what was left of enemy forces retreated to the West Bank in a state of panic. And Palestinian resistance became a major force in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Zionist propaganda spun a tale around «Karameh battle,» which is reconstructed and exposed in the following analysis of Zionist accounts of the alleged Israeli «victory».

Folk tales, while being passed down from generation to generation, often express the way people thought, behaved and felt at an earlier level of civilization. They frequently satisfy needs common to all people — the longing for security, love and a sense of competence in controlling their lives. Traditions of the country from which the tales originate are also common. Collections of «Israeli» folk tales brought to the Middle East from the former countries of the Jewish immigrants contain, naturally, no national Israeli characteristics such as portrayals of village life, customs and rituals, or accounts of past historic events, but they do present certain Jewish characteristics; cunning in business and personal life, frugality, morality and caution against people who may be against them.

An attempt was made in 1968 to disseminate an Israeli victory tale based on an actual happening. It contained almost all of the elements characteristic of folk tales: predominant emphasis on theme, exaggeration, stereotyped characters — virtuous heroes and thoroughly wicked opposition, and an undisputed victory for the end. For three days after the Israeli Army's raid on the Jordan village of Karameh, elements of this tale were presented to the West in the **Jerusalem Post**, the major English newspaper published in Israel, and in other Jewish publications such as the **Jewish Chronicle** and the **Jewish Observer** and **Middle East Review**.

This story, potentially, could have become as

famous as the tale of Israel defending itself in the 1967 war, but it failed. Before we discuss why this tale did not become a masterpiece of propaganda and well-established Israeli folklore, let us examine the story itself from a literary point of view.

■ **THEME – A SELF-DEFENCE ATTACK**

The theme of the Tale of Karamah keeps in the tradition of most folk tales. It involves a conflict, a single episode, and a strong contrast between good and evil. The theme, in short, is that Israel, in self-defence, had to curtail an «Arab plague of senseless terrorism» by an act of war because there was «no other effective way of protecting Israeli civilians.» In support of the self-defence claim, the Israeli intelligence service, the fortune-telling mystics of this tale, predicted that a new wave of terror was being planned. Their «punitive action» of destroying the base and killing and capturing commandoes was described as a necessary «resounding rap over the knuckles» in contrast to the purposeless «butchering of the marauders.»

Hoping to attain international appeal, the Karamah tale-tellers prevailed on Westerners to believe that «Israel had done nothing against the United Nations charter in defending itself.» Foreign Minister Eban also contributed by saying that «no peace-loving state should regret a blow struck at murderous gangs who violate international law and the most fundamental codes of human behaviour

while deliberately undermining the chances of peace in the Middle East.» Conspicuously absent was mention of the great number of international laws broken by Israel since 1947.

A religious element often gives a story an everlasting appeal for many folk-tale lovers, so one was incorporated into the Karamah tale. The Army's rabbi asserted that the attack must have had divine sanction: «Chief Chaplain Aluf Shlomo Goren... cited biblical injunction to protect one's life, a commandment which takes precedence over all else.»




■ PLOT — A SWIFTLY-WON BATTLE

The plot of this lively tale of victory lacked many facts, although five separate articles in the **Post** the day following the raid dealt with the action of the battle on March 21, 1968. Some were furnished later by the **Jerusalem Post** and some by foreign correspondents based in Israel and Jordan. Several important contradictions also weakened the cohesion of the story. For example, the theme stressed the conflict between the Israelis and the commandoes, the Jordanians being involved only with respect to their lack of control over the fedayeen. The action account, however, the plot's conflict, was primarily between the Jordanian troops and the Israeli soldiers. The probable reason for this presentation will be explained under «Characters.»

The scene of the plot is scantily given as is traditional in folk tales — the Jordan valley near the Dead Sea. The time of the action — between 6:00 am and 6:00 pm. In an attack which was «a new character for defence force strategy», tank units crossed the River Jordan for three destinations at daybreak. The group entering Karameh was to destroy the base and kill and capture as many fedayeen as possible. Two units of tanks, one in the north and one in the south, had orders to block the escape from the area of attack and prevent reinforcements from entering. Although the opposition was often estimated at between 200 and 500, only a Western source, UPI, named the number of troops in the

Jerusalem Post, 250 entering Karameh and 170 entering the southern areas. Also missing was an account of the exact number of tanks, armored vehicles or aircraft in the attack, as if to avoid mentioning the magnitude of the raid.

The only detailed account of the attack on the village of Karameh was given by three correspondents of **Bemahane** and of **Galei Zohal**. Though the names are unknown to most non-Hebrew speakers, they are, in fact, the **Newspaper of Israeli Soldiers** and the **Military Broadcasting Service**. They reported that after helicopters dropped leaflets telling the villagers how to behave, tanks and half-tracks entered Karameh at 7:00 am, soldiers searched houses, exchanged fire with and killed Arab resistance men, collected all those who surrendered and then left after the «mopping up» was completed two hours later. The reports of their «success» was described as victorious to say the least. actions of



the Israeli soldiers were vigorous and efficient and the opposition fighters were weak, ineffective, and foolishly vain since they were so obviously outclassed by the skilled, yet humane, soldiers who were «following strict orders not to harm the civilian population.»

Another account admitted that some of the fedayeen veterans did put up a stiff fight «which ended only when all of them were killed or wounded.» This report also said Karameh was «honey-combed with bunkers and communication trenches and readied for a stand against the Israelis.» The following day, this fact was contradicted by Minister Israel Galili who said there were no special reinforcements at Karameh.

At the same time, Israeli troops were «cleaning up» the «nests of terrorists» in the south at Ghor Safi, Ghor Feifa and Dahal, where some resistance was encountered and 25 Jordanian soldiers and irregulars were killed.

The Israeli aircraft also took part, beginning at 6:15 am, by hitting ground targets and the Jordanian legion artillery positions. At 4:55 pm the movements for home began since «all units had attacked their allotted targets. Entire withdrawal was completed by dusk.»

The victorious ending, traditional in folk tale plots, was as follows: 150 commandoes were killed and an undisclosed number were taken prisoner. The first report of Israel losses were only 21 dead and



70 wounded, «most lightly.» Jordan lost 30 tanks (later raised to 45), 2 intact, but only six of Israel's armored vehicles were hit. «The action went according to plan and fighting had taken the number of hours estimated.» The generals closed the success chapter by proclaiming that the fedayeen had «suffered a serious blow to their strength» and that it was a «serious setback» for the Arab Resistance movement.

■ CHARACTERS — BLACK AND WHITE

The contrast between good and evil in the Karameh Tale is best exemplified in the characters. The Israeli citizens were simply a people plagued by

trouble, so their brave army had to come to the rescue. An action which could be carried out perfectly was planned and intelligence told the army «precisely what to expect.»

The army's military ability, too, was without fault. They hit targets directly, took over villages swiftly, combed houses thoroughly and ethically avoided the «neutral» Jordanian army until they begged for punishment. They also obediently carried out orders not to harm the civilians. Only «the terrorists» were killed. To circumvent the dilemma that one cannot differentiate between fedayeen and population in a resistance movement, the Israelis adopted the «uniform» formula, explaining that they could identify the fighters easily by their camouflage clothing. When men were found in a tunnel under the courtyard in civilian clothes, the astute army could identify them as fedayeen because suitcases «hastily packed» with camouflaged uniforms were found in the base. An amazing sixth sense told the Army which suitcases belonged to which men who had considerably aided the army by packing such obvious evidence of their affiliation with the movement.

The indubitable success in accomplishing their mission by «defending the security of the State with courage, effectiveness, and self sacrifice» completes the picture of the lively Israeli soldiers.

As good as the knights of Israel are, the enemy is as bad. In most examples of Israeli propaganda,

the «Arabs» are the enemy, a larger, more formidable sounding foe. But since in folk tales the story must be tighter with fewer elements, the enemy was limited to Palestinian commandoes in this tale. The marauders were again in the «Arab» mainstream two weeks after the raid at Karamah. Minister Menahem Begin brought them back by describing them as «armed squads recruited and trained by Arab states who were incapable of enemy aggression.»

Although their national identity is never mentioned, the Palestinian «terrorists» are presented as attackers of children and tractor drivers. Undoubtedly in the interest of brevity, essential in folk tales, no background for their acts of sabotage are revealed. The Israeli wars of aggression, occupation of Arab lands and villages, expulsion of Palestinians who resist occupation and especially the replacement of an Arab nation of millions of Palestinians for a state of Jewish immigrants were not mentioned. The only historical background given for the tale was that innocent people were being senselessly murdered. That those tractor drivers and children live in kibbutzim which are established in the border regions of occupied territory as military outposts and that a large number of kibbutzniks are specially trained army members, was also omitted.

«The terrorists» are also presented as anarchists who defy the king of the country from which they launch their attacks. The commandoes must operate

from Jordan to protect the Arab families in the occupied land from the Israeli government's policy, illegal in international law, of severe collective punishment. But this is interpreted as the gang's inability to win the popular support of the population in the West Bank. They also resort to extortion for financial support and bribery though the bribe taker is not mentioned.

The commandos were also shown to have trouble within their organization. Members had to be forcibly recruited; those who refused went to the Karama Jail which was filled with nonsupporters. Other more willing members were branded as mercenaries who were in it «for the money.» «An authoritative Israeli specialist», unnamed of course, told the **Jewish Observer** that «99% are mercenaries and opportunists, paid by results, at a rate of between 10 and 100 Jordan dinars an operation.» These activities came easily to ex-criminals who didn't regret being captured in Israel because the prisons there, «compared to the ones they have been to» were comfortable. Some very defamatory comments about the «terrorist leaders» were made by two of their own men. Commandoes who had surrendered to the Israelis in Karamah confessed that their leaders were making lots of money, that the commanders at Karamah, Abu Ammar and Abu Ali, fled before the troops arrived, and though they did not believe in the organization, they couldn't leave because they would be shot as spies.

The fedayeen were also shown to be inhumanly cruel even to their own people. A glaring example of this trait was detailed in this tale. A wounded commando was found along with other hiding «cowards», in a tunnel with his hands and feet bound, and his mouth stuffed with cloth to prevent the noise of his moaning from giving away the hiding place of his comrades. The tied hands and feet were presumably to keep him from deliriously running out in surrender.

These «mine layers» also lacked the skill of fighters. Those who tried to protect themselves from the heroic army's self defence attack were all killed.



Their operations against the settlements were criticized severely — they were described as having little technical know-how and training, throwing grenades with pins intact, laying bombs in the outskirts of settlements instead of important centers, etc.

■ STYLE — ANGRY LOCUSTS

The only aspect of the Tale of Karameh which did not conform to the folk tale was its style of presentation. Despite current flexibility of interpretative journalism, the highly conversational or rhyming style so familiar in folk tales is not yet suitable for newspapers. The tale was given a certain flair though, through such descriptions as Karameh was «plucked right out of the protective pincers of the Jordan army», «Gleaming jets were zooming eastward» and helicopters were crossing over the river «in swarms like angry locusts.»

■ A RING OF TRUTH

This story, with all its folksy charm, failed to become famous in the West because of two major factors; the large scale attack aroused much negative public opinion internationally and the events following the attack proved the victorious ending to be false.

Foreign governments complained that the Israeli raid at Karameh was too grandiose for the provocation. The attack had created international public opinion against Israel which was exemplified

by a United Nations Security Council condemnation two days later. Even the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, called the action «greatly out of proportion» and «greatly to be deplored.» This condemnation naturally threw the Israeli folk tellers on the defensive. Beside the articles covering the UN discussions, in the Jerusalem Post, were excerpts from the world press, all except one condemning the Arabs more than the Israelis. All excerpts from the Israeli press in Hebrew also justified and supported the raid.

Israeli counterarguments led them into murky, confused propaganda: First came an attack on the Security Council, saying five members «always support the Arabs and vote out of hatred for Israel,» and like the Jewish merchant in many a folk tale, Israel «stands alone with nothing but his wit» against all others.

The Israelis also claimed they were legally justified in making the raid because Jordan had broken the cease-fire first. As contradictory as it may sound, the newspaper stressed the Jordanians' responsibility to enforce the cease-fire, whether they were supporting the commandoes or were unable to control them.

If the jumbled presentation of the justification for the raid, of Jordan's role and the fedayeen's has not destroyed its possibilities for wide acceptance by the West, the events following the raid, the reality of the situation, would have sent the Karameh Tale to the folklore graveyard. Sabotage operations by

fedayeen continued three days after the raid, and were strong enough to provoke another attack into Jordan by Israel on April 8. The obvious failure to quell the sabotage operations, the loss of 25 Israeli lives, equipment including six armoured vehicles and one airplane, in addition to international criticism, brought strong criticism at home, a normal occurrence in «a democratic country where everything is bound to be criticized» according to Abba Eban in Amsterdam the following week. A strong Knesset debate on March 25 reported lightly in an article in the Jerusalem Post which focused on agreement, but more critical in the Jewish Observer and the Jewish Chronicle, shows that many Knesset members were very disappointed with the operational planning and execution.

The most conclusive proof of the falsity of the Israeli «victory» in Karameh, the clincher in destroying the folk tale, was the impetus the attack has on the resistance movement. As the story of Karameh spread throughout the Arab world, more and more Palestinians joined the resistance group. Instead of breaking the back of Fatah as Israel had claimed, the raid had the reverse effect by enhancing the spirit of the entire resistance movement. Karameh is now regarded as the turning point for the fedayeen because international as well as Arab recognition began then. From that time on, the fedayeen were considered a popular nationalistic organization which was fighting for the liberation of its land, Palestine. ■



ISRAEL'S RESPONSIBILITY

by: Igor Blishchenko

The following discussion of Israel's responsibility before the world for violations of international law, and of the possibility of imposing appropriate sanctions on it as an aggressor state, is by Professor I. Bleschenko, Secretary of the International Association of Democratic lawyers.

Most of the speakers in the U.N. General Assembly debate on the Middle East in the Assembly's 26th session, unequivocally condemned Israel for her unwillingness to return the occupied Arab territories to their rightful owners and the contempt she has shown for the U.N. Charter and generally recognized principles of international law.

The six-day war in June 1967, the seizure of Arab territories and their plunder, the policy of genocide with regard to the Arab population of the occupied areas, and the practical steps taken by Tel-Aviv towards their annexation add up to an indictment of Israel and its ruling quarters as responsible for aggression and other international crimes.

That Israel is guilty of aggression clearly follows from a succession of United Nations decisions which unambiguously call for the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the June 5, 1967, line and the annulment of all actions aimed at the annexation of Jerusalem, and declare all territorial changes forcibly effected by Israel invalid.

Israel has not only grossly violated the United Nations Charter, under Article 25 of which she is obliged, as a U.N. member, to abide by Security Council decisions. She has in effect also scrapped her own declaration, made at the time of her admission into the United Nations, that the State of Israel «unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a member of the United Nations.»

More, Prime Minister Golda Meir has questioned the authority of the Security Council and declared that U.N. decisions and resolutions need not worry Israel.

By her aggressive actions and unwillingness to accept the decisions of the world organization responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, Israel has increasingly placed herself beyond the pale of international law. Persistence in this policy makes it essential to raise the question of her responsibility before the world and of imposing the appropriate sanctions on her as an aggressor state.

Many lawyers rightly maintain that the responsibility of states for aggression and aggressive actions, for the violation of international law, was written into the law of the nations with the adoption of the statutes of the Nuremberg International Tribunal after the defeat of Nazi Germany.

International law distinguishes between political, material and moral responsibility.

Sanctions following from political responsibility range from official apology to temporary limitation of sovereignty. An example of such limitation is the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany of June 5, 1945, in which the Soviet Union, U.S., Britain and France proclaimed that they were assuming «supreme authority with respect to Germany.» The dismantling of the state machine of the Nazi Reich was the result of its total defiance of international law.

Material responsibility involves compensation

through reparations and restitutions for damage done.

The question of compensation by Israel for the damage she had inflicted on Egypt, Jordan and Syria and their citizens, and also of the return of all the property and other material values seized, was raised already at the special session of the U.N. General Assembly held in the summer of 1967.

Since then the sum total of the damage caused the Arab countries has grown considerably. Scores of villages and thousands of Arab homes have been bulldozed or dynamited in the occupied territories. For instance, the report on Palestinian refugees



Dayan: «We must develop all the territories...»

heard in late November in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee shows that in July and August this year alone the Israeli occupation forces razed more than 6,000 homes in the Gaza area and deported some 15,000 of its inhabitants. Then there are the material losses incurred by Egypt as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal. The losses suffered by the Arab peoples owing to the Israeli aggression are being totalled up and sooner or later the Israeli rulers will surely have to foot the bill.

Israel also bears a moral responsibility. Tel Aviv's persistent refusal to carry out the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and withdraw its forces from all the occupied territories is leading to its growing isolation in the world arena.

International law holds states responsible for the international crimes they have committed as well as for all criminal actions by members of their armed forces (Article 4 of The Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land). At the same time, the individuals guilty of grave war crimes against peace and humanity are liable to punishment (Article 6 of the Statutes of the Nuremberg Tribunal). Besides, international law does not recognize any statute of limitations when it comes to crimes of this order, as was confirmed in the convention adopted by the General Assembly on November 26, 1968.

Under the Geneva conventions for the protection of war victims concluded in 1949, criminal

responsibility is borne also by Israeli officers and soldiers directly involved in the killing of Arab prisoners of war, the destruction of the homes of and collective repressions against the civilian population.

International law does not recognize the offence, however high, held by offenders as grounds for exemption from punishment or as an extenuating circumstance.

Existing legal norms make it possible not only to indict Israel for the crimes committed, but to compel her to abide by international law and respect the United Nations. The U.N. Charter provides for applying measures of compulsion to states and governments violating peace and security. In view of this a number of countries are increasingly pressing for the application of such measures to Israel.

One of the measures that could be taken is an economic boycott of Israel. Another is the dispatch of a U.N. force to the Middle East to restore peace. However, to apply sanctions a Security Council decision unanimously supported by all of its five permanent members is needed. It is common knowledge, however, that the United States is in effect encouraging and supporting Israel's aggressive actions against the Arab countries. With Washington taking this stand, it is impossible to achieve the necessary unanimity and hence to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East ensuring the security of all the peoples of this area. ■

ZION BRIGANDS

■

The following outburst of anger against Zionist crimes in Palestine is specially significant in view of the fact that the writer is a Canadian Jew, who feels doubly indignant at these crimes because they are vile in themselves and because they have been committed by «brigands» who claim to represent world Jewry.

■

Listen Zion Brigands! —

Yes — I am a Jew.

But I am also an Arab — a Syrian,

An Egyptian — or may be a Lybian.

Afro-Asian — is my Semitic blend,

Zion — is not wherefrom I descend.

For with Rome you've shared in loot

And with blood — disgraced my book

From Ur — my roots were torn

From Mesopotamia my span dispersed.

Listen Zion Brigands! —
Yes — I am a Jew.
But I am also an Arab — an Algerian,
An Iraqi — or may be a Palestinian,
Afro-Asian — is my Semitic blend
Zion — is not wherefrom I descend.
For with my Semite brethren,
I have shared centuries of peace.
But now — their land you have invaded,
Their cultivation labour — destroyed,
Their shelters — savagely demolished,
And my brethren exiled to starvation.
And on their sacred fields
Enthroned yourself under Zion-shields.

Listen Zion Brigands! —
Yes — I am a Jew,
But I am also an Arab — an Iraqi,
A Sudanese — or may be a Lebanese.
Afro-Asian — is my Semitic blend.
Zion — is not wherefrom I descend.
So — do not forget my six million flames,
Whose ashes you traded for Nazi-gold
And desecrated Sacredness with shame,
With your bartered, Zion — Yankee swords.
Do not forget nineteen forty-eight,
Your Zion-massacres — Deir Yassins,
Your bloody-hands still witness bear,
For not forgiven are your sins.
I still hear cries of a brethren child
Torn from a mother's trembling hands



And pierced with spears «Zion»-inscribed
And then — thrust to the abyss of death.

Listen Zion Brigands! —
Yes — I am a Jew.
But I can also love my human brethren,
Who equally with me — despise your crimes.
For I remember Qibya and Kafr Kassem,
When on open fields — in mid-day light,
You Zion-guns stilled my brethren hearts,
And then spoke of 'Zion might'.
But when you plow their sacred fields,
And when crops of thorn-weeds you reap,
Then let eternity condemn your deeds.

Listen Zion Brigands! —
And You! — «Silent Jehovahs» of Zion! —

Yes — I am a Jew.
Come to my brethren's Jordan valleys —
Hear the echoes of a thousand exiles —
Feel the hunger — of a thousand orphans.
Come to the Gaza torturing chambers —
Hear Zion's demand of ransom price!
And feel the wounds of mutilated life!...
Come to my brethren olive groves —
Face their silent looks of anger,
And hear their whispering hush in sorrow...
Hear their deafening sounds of rage
From morning star — till midnight depth.



Listen Zion Brigands! —
And You! — 'Silent Jehovahs' of Zion! --
Yes — I am a Jew.

But I am also an Arab — a Syrian,
An Egyptian — or may be a Lybian,
Afro-Asian — is my Semitic blend
Zion — is not wherefrom I descend.
So — lay down your Zion-spears,
Wash your bloody hands —
Cape in mourning black!...
And come to my brethren's eternal torch —
At his grave you shall mourn in shame —
His sacred olive-branch, dare not touch
But in your heart, must carve his name...

So Listen Zion Brigands! — And You! —
'Silent Jehovahs' of Zion! —
You may now record my name,
Whose tears have long been dried,
Whose tenderness — a rock of ashes —
Whose heart fears no death,
But whose destined task is to move,
Away from the realm of Zion-beasts,
To the realm of a Palestine Brotherhood and Peace!..

THE ARABS AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM

■

The following analysis of the Arab view of the Jewish problem and the attitude of Arab Resistance to anti-Semitism and Zionist ideology, includes arguments establishing the ideological necessity of a continuing and operational Palestinian Arab resistance.

Dr. Clovis Maksoud is a leading Arab writer and Senior Editor of *Al-Ahram*.

■

There is no question that there is a Jewish problem before the Arabs which is different from the Jewish problem as defined and determined by the non-Arabs. To the Arabs, the Jewish problem is a by-product of the Zionist colonization of Palestine.

The Jewish problem for the Arabs is that the goal of the Zionist colonists was the establishment



of a Jewish state in Palestine at the cost of evicting the people of Palestine. Therefore, Israel is a Jewish state and as such a Jewish problem. It is not a problem for the Jews as much it is problematic to the Arabs. What does this mean? It means, first of all, that Zionism was capable of convincing world Jewry as well as a large part of the world that there is a Jewish Problem and that Zionism was a viable solution to it. And inasmuch as Zionism decided to establish a Zionist state in Palestine, then the Jewish Problem, or so-called Jewish Problem, became an Arab problem; and as such, we had to go beyond reacting to the Zionist colonisation

into discerning the causes and dimensions of this so-called Jewish problem.

The Jewish Problem, as we conceive of it, is the problem that anti-Semitism has created in many Western societies and many European societies, including the Soviet Union. It is the problem of the crisis of the liberal, democratic, socialist forces throughout the world, which are incapable of building institutions and a climate of opinion that is sufficiently accommodating to permit people of diverse religions and races to co-exist and live successfully together. If this is a problem (generally speaking), it was also a problem to many people of the Jewish faith (specifically). As such, there is a Jewish Problem; but it is not separate from the problem of discrimination and from the problems that emanate from multi-religious, multi-racial, multi-national societies.

The Zionists, of course, sought to affirm that the Jewish Problem is not only an aspect of pluralistic societies but that it is peculiar to the Jews. Therefore, the Jewish Problem has been given an added exclusiveness, an added peculiarity and an intellectual dimension, whereby the world deals with the Jewish Problem, not simply as a problem of pluralistic societies but also as a problem that is peculiar to the Jews themselves. In this the Zionists have succeeded.

It has become imperative for the Arabs to study the Jewish Problem because it has affected them although they did not contribute to this problem.

The Arabs were the recipients of a Zionist solution to the Jewish Problem, they were the victims and they were not contributors to the problems of the Jews. It is paradoxical that Arab resistance to Israel and to Zionism has become a problem to the Zionists and a solution to the Jewish problem. Amid the confusion created by Zionist propaganda, this certainly appears to be a paradoxical view but, I am convinced, that as we become more of a problem to the Zionists, we become a contributing factor to the solution of the Jewish Problem. Now how do we proceed from this position?


First, we have discovered in the process of resisting Zionism and Zionist structures on all levels, at times successfully and at times not successfully, that Zionism and anti-Semitism are predicated on an identical philosophical, political and intellectual assumption: that the Jew is incapable of assimilation and of integration, and that it is undesirable for him to integrate and assimilate. It is not only that the non-Jews reject the Jews, which the anti-Semites do, but also in the Zionist philosophic outlook it is desirable for the Jew to stimulate his alienation from the non-Jew and in that respect Zionism and anti-Semitism can be said to be predicated on the same belief and made of the same fibre, i.e. the ultimate necessity of the alienation of the Jew.

The Zionist believes in the necessity of the alienation of the Jews in order to facilitate the

association of the Jews with a Zionist structure. The anti-Semite reacts to the outward aspects (indications) of alienation and sees them as an unwillingness or incapacity to adjust, integrate or assimilate, and as a result builds up a logical basis for his own prejudices which are Christian or non-Jewish exclusiveness, not Christian or non-Jewish alienation. Thus Zionism and anti-Semitism feed each other. Zionism and anti-Semitism thus converge and are the principal allies against the struggle of the Arabs against Zionist colonisation.

Therefore it cannot be assumed that the Arab is not in confrontation with the Jew. This is so elementary that it has become axiomatic in Arab, and particularly Palestinian, thinking. But it is erroneous, and indeed fatal, for any Arab, at any moment, to slip into the facile notion that all Jews are Zionists or, at any moment, to accept the converse notion that non-Jewish rejection of Jews can serve the Arab cause of the struggle against Zionism.

On the one hand, it is fatal ethically because our rejection of Zionism not only emanates from a reaction to Zionism but also, through the dialectics of struggle, from a firm belief in, and commitment to, the ultimate resilience of human integration which includes the integration of the Jews in their national societies. Therefore, the Arab resistance is committed to the struggle against all forms of anti-Semitism, against all forms of discrimination, and the Arab resistance must create an alliance with the



integrated Jews because as Zionism claims to have a solution of the Jewish problem, the Arabs must show that Zionism only exacerbates this problem.

Why? Because Zionism instils in the Jew a permanent pessimism about the capacities of human beings for accommodation with each other. It instils in the Jew a belief in a permanent polarity between the Jew and the rest of mankind, and that this polarity is perennial, actual and perpetual. And, if this is so such polarity has a historical, contemporary and futuristic dimension.

Therefore, as the Zionists see it, the polarity between the Jew and mankind is an inevitable, historical concept and not an aberrational accident as the humanist, integrationist, liberal, democratic and progressive forces throughout the world believe. So,

it is this concept of the polarity between the Jew and the rest of mankind which the Zionists seek to elevate to the level of a mystique and an ideology. And, the Zionists encourage all the forms of Jewish alienation (and rejection) and formulations promoting continued belief in this polarity. Such activity makes Zionism continue to have an appeal to a large segment of the Jewish constituency.

It is because of this that the armed struggle of the Arabs against the structure of Zionism, against the State of Israel, is a necessity if we are to break through the notion of the permanency and viability of this philosophical polarity which the Zionists have successfully promoted among the Jews throughout the world. The armed struggle erodes the viability of the structure, is an indication of the seriousness of the Palestinian and Arab resistance to the Zionist structure, stimulates within the Jewish constituency questioning processes about the validity of the concept of Jewish-Man polarity.

Arab resistance to Zionism is necessary for two reasons: One, it is a legitimate struggle on the part of the Arabs to restore their rights; and two, it should enable the Jews who live, or are conscious of, a Jewish Problem to find a solution other than the Zionist solution of the Jewish Problem.

That there has been a Jewish Problem is not to be denied. On the contrary, it is a historical reality and in certain cases one of the embarrassing, shameful aberrations of contemporary history. But the

Zionist answer is not only a product of the Jewish problem, and not only an answer to the Jewish problem; the Zionist solution is in itself a positive intellectual structure deliberately conceived to establish not only a Jewish state but also a state for the Jews.

Now, of course in the semantic acrobatics of Zionism, it was certain that these two aspects (facets) should be linked into an organic unity. In uniting these two aspects the Zionists made it difficult for those who genuinely sought answers to the problems of the Jews to escape the intellectual, ideological and psychological thrust of Zionism, particularly as Zionism sought to provide the sole answer to the Jewish Problem.

The Arabs share in the humanistic rejection of anti-Semitism in all its forms and discrimination against the Jews in all its dimensions. And if it was deemed by the international community that the Jewish Problem is an international responsibility that should be resolved by international participation, namely that all nations should open their doors to make homes for Jews who cannot feel at home in societies which have practiced discrimination against and persecution of the Jews, then the Arabs would be morally bound to open their doors to Jewish immigration as their part in an international effort to accommodate Jews who feel restless, and who are living in a state of agony in societies which have not yet reached the optimum of humanism and equality.

This international, humanist solution to the Jewish Problem admits that there is a Jewish problem; and we admit that there has been, and still remains, a Jewish problem. Not only that, discrimination against the Jew can be as intolerable as persecution of the Jew, because to be discriminated against is to live with inequality and to be persecuted is to bring inequality to its brutal conclusion.

Therefore, if the Arabs were asked to join in an international endeavour to solve the problems of Jews who do not feel at home, the question is no longer how many Jews should be let in, the question of numbers becomes almost irrelevant if they are to be co-opted as citizens in the Arab community. But to have Jews, however small their number, as a matter of a destined right, establish in and carve out of Arab territory a state, then the numerical problem becomes ideological and totally rejected by the Arabs.


It is in this respect that we must distinguish between the empirical consideration of Jewish demographic presence in the Arab context and the Arabs' ideological rejection of the attempt by the Zionists to establish the Jewish right to carve out a state from Arab territory at the cost of evicting an Arab population.

This distinction testifies to the fact that the Arabs are not indifferent to the Jewish Problem in whatever dimensions it exists, but it is concerned

about the fact that the Zionist solution to the Jewish Problem is basically unethical for the Jew himself inasmuch as it solves his problem by creating a problem for the people of Palestine. It is this attempt at rendering the Zionist thesis as an answer to the Jewish problem that has created for the Arabs a problem whereby they have to accept the Zionist thesis as the sole answer to the problems of the Jews.

So if we recognise Israel, if we acknowledge the right of Israel to exist on whatever level, then we are accepting in one form or another the Zionist answer to the Jewish problem, the claim that Palestine is the land for Jewish self-expression, and we are setting in motion further Zionist objectives of creating problems for the Jews in order to accommodate further demographic expansion of the present state of Israel. It means that we have abdicated our belief that the Jewish Problem has to be solved by the enhancement of the processes of integration, of humanist values, of secular notions and of democratic institutions and of socialist transformation.

It is these rational prerequisites that will be abandoned by the fact of any form of Arab consent to the State of Israel, and to the Zionist conquest. Indeed, Arab consent to the State of Israel, whatever form it takes, gives legitimacy to the State of Israel. It means that it gives legitimacy to the eviction of the Palestinian people from Palestine.



Such consent might be granted in the name of realism, in the name of practical considerations, in an attempt to comply with international consensus, yet legitimising Israel is not only an abdication of our right to reinstate the Palestinians in their country and restore Arab territory, it means also that Israel becomes legitimately the focus of Jewish loyalty and the ultimate locus of Jewish settlement.

It means that the Zionist and Israeli attempt to

make the Jewish sense of belonging in various countries transitional and temporary will not only be successful but legitimate. It will mean that the polarity between the Jew and mankind will become a part of the ideological structure of the rational and humanist forces. It means that democratic liberal humanism must make an exception of the Jews in dealing with the problems of pluralistic, multi-racial, multi-religious societies.

It means that the cumulative heritage of rational, positive revolutionary thinking must in applying its yardstick of integration make a definite exception to the Jews. It means that the Jews have opted out of their involvement with mankind and it means that mankind has accepted voluntarily this abandonment.

So Zionism is a threat to the universality of humanism because Zionism, if legitimised by Arab consent, means that there is no longer an Arab problem and a Palestinian problem. It means that all these humanist values which we cherish and seek to enrich have made out of the Jews an exception.

Mankind is impoverished when it excludes the Jews from its problematic concerns. The Jews are dehumanised when they opt out of dynamic, resilient, continuous involvement with mankind irrespective of the suffering they have undergone

and mankind cannot numb its conscience by accepting the Zionist option for the Jews.

What Israel is trying to do today is to lead mankind to a position whereby mankind will be convinced of the final peculiarity of the Jew. If the Arabs fall into this Zionist trap by giving consent to the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, then the Arabs will be denying mankind the opportunity to reexamine the validity of the Zionist thesis and will be contributing to the activation (the setting in motion) of subsequent racial, religious or tribalistic groups which will also claim peculiarity and particularity.

If we allow the Zionists to get away with Jewish peculiarity, then what is mankind's claim or sanction against any distinctive group in any society which claim institutional permanence for its peculiarity and particularism? Not only would this mean fragmentation of existing national societies, it would also mean possibilities of the emergence of territorial claims by peculiar elements, the establishment of their own states in different territories.

If we concede to the Zionists their legitimacy, there is no moral ground for our refusing others similar legitimacy or denying others similar objectives. This will lead to fragmentation amidst a clamour for internationalism. This will mean that nationalism will collapse into chauvinist

postures. This will mean that we have reintroduced medieval notions whereby man seeks to affirm and assert what distinguishes him from others rather than what unites him with others.

It is in this context that the struggle for Palestine is between two notions of nationalism, a nationalism that is the end of human commitment, namely Zionism, which conceives of nationalism as a final ideological commitment, and an Arab nationalism which conceives of nationalism as a movement which seeks to remove all barriers which separate the Arabs from mankind.

Arab nationalism is an enabling act to involve the Arab with mankind, while Zionism has a concept of nationalism which enables the Jew to rupture with mankind. Zionism, on the other hand, is in this respect an attempt to close the Jew in a ghetto garrison state. It is an ideology that instils in the Jew a sense that he cannot belong except to a Jewish state and therefore Israel and Zionism constitute a problem to the Jews integrated into many communities where they feel totally at home.

Zionism inasmuch as it attempts to make the Jewish state co-terminus with the Jewish people introduces a state of tension (among Jews integrated in outside communities). And where the Jews does not feel that there is a problem, Zionism introduces a problem for him. Therefore, Zionism, as we said

earlier, exacerbates the Jewish problem. It prevents the Jew from feeling at home anywhere and it has introduced a new aspect, namely that if the Jew feels at home anywhere but Israel, he has planted within him the seeds of Jewish betrayal.

Therefore, Zionism is not only exacerbating a Jewish problem, it is deliberately, consciously and systematically and brutally creating a Jewish dilemma, and the dilemma is not only a dilemma of belonging but a dilemma of conscience. Hence, the beginning of a Jewish rejection of Zionism is a precursor to resolving the Jewish dilemma and the Jewish Problem.

It is necessary to assert that Arab resistance to Zionism is not the only solution to the Jewish problem, but Arab resistance is definitely a principal leverage to the ultimate solution of the Jewish problem. It is so because the Arab rejection of Israel must not only be rhetorical because this lends credibility to Israel's claim that there is no serious resistance to it. Arab resistance must become performance-oriented in order that it communicates to the Jewish constituency throughout the world the Arab determination to make Israel as a Zionist state live in a serious problematic condition. ■

PALESTINE QUESTION IN WORLD PRESS



Our «world press» extracts for this month include (1) an editorial from the January 1972 issue of «Middle East International» entitled «Lame Excuses», on the unconvincing arguments put forward by Zionists and their supporters in justification of the decision of the U.S. Government to supply Israel with more Phantom planes. (2) A letter by John P. Richardson, Executive Vice President of the American Near East Refugee Aid on the damaging effect of Israeli occupation to the lives and future of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories. The letter was published in the Washington Post issue of January 28, 1972. (3) a comment entitled «Zionism Self-Exposed» on results of the World Zionist Congress, which was held in Jerusalem in the latter part of last January. The comment is taken from New Times Issue No. 5, of February 1972.

■ **Lame Excuses**

Middle East International (January - 1972)

Whenever Israel feels the need to make a major new acquisition of arms its propagandists have to exert all their efforts to put over two contradictory propositions: first, in order to get the arms, that the Middle East balance of power (i.e. an overwhelming Israeli military superiority) has been upset by the latest foreign arms deliveries to the Arabs; and secondly, in order to reassure the feelings of racial superiority which are essential to the survival of the Zionist state, that Israel could still defeat all the Arab armies combined with one arm tied behind its back. Hitherto they have generally been able to get away with this obvious fallacy in the United States, because of the American public's lack of critical discrimination towards Zionist propaganda; but today they are having some difficulty, both because the Americans are becoming slightly more critical and because they are dealing with a Republican administration which is marginally less sympathetic towards Israel than its predecessor. It has been amusing to observe their convolutions over recent weeks.

The irony is that those reporters who are most sympathetic to Israel usually do the most damage to its campaign to acquire the new arms supplies. For example, the other day a peculiarly sneering despatch from a C.B.S. correspondent in Cairo, describing the somewhat easy-going and haphazard civil defence measures in the Egyptian capital, ended

with the observation that if Egypt's military defences were comparable, the Israelis had nothing to worry about because they would win the next war in even less than six days. Many people must have wondered in that case why Israel should need any more Phantoms.

A few days before this, the campaign to extract the Phantoms from a hesitant President Nixon had reached a crescendo, with Mrs. Meir declaring that the US action in withholding the planes was the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East, when a report mysteriously ascribed to Western and Israeli intelligence sources appeared in all US newspapers saying that, contrary to the general impression, the Soviets had been rather restrained in their arms supplies to Egypt and the other Arab states since the summer. This was so obviously contrary to Israel's interests that it is hard to believe that Israeli military intelligence wanted to be quoted as an authority unless it was another example of the military being out of step with the civilian authorities. General Dayan has been known on several occasions to make bluntly honest statements which must have enraged the smoothly plausible Mr. Eban. The pro-Zionists rallied a few days later with a new report that after all the Soviets had supplied Egypt with some new TU-16 bombers and they managed to make them sound like a fearful threat to Israel's cities—until a State Department spokesman pointed out that less than ten of these planes had been supplied to Egypt and Time magazine quoted an



Parcel bombs create panic in Israel: 'I won't even answer that...'

American military expert as saying that they were so slow and antique that you could shoot them down with a bow and arrow. Zionists were then reduced to saying rather lamely that it was the political significance of the TU-16s (whatever that means) which counted.

■ **The Arabs and the Israeli Occupation**

Washington Post (January 28, 1972)

Most analyses of the Middle East situation overlook one significant aspect of Israeli occupation of Arab lands: it is a military occupation, against the will of the people under occupation, and their

rights are at the sufferance of the occupiers. (All of the Occupied Territories are administered by military governors who have absolute authority over their respective areas.) Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's recent remarks at the United Nations stressing more benevolent features of occupation in no way mitigate or remove this central reality of occupation for the one million-plus Arabs (Palestinians, Syrians, and Egyptians) who are no longer masters in their own homes.

Arabs under occupation (and those in pre-1967 Israel) find their problems compounded by an additional factor stemming from Israel's Zionist philosophy: the belief that Israel must be a Jewish state. Amos Elon, the Israeli author of «Israelis: Founders and Sons,» has eloquently documented the subtle racism in Zionist attitudes toward Arabs since the origin of the Zionist movement in the late nineteenth century. To Zionists, Arabs have rarely appeared as potential neighbors and co-sharers of the land; rather, they have been viewed as embarrassing obstacles standing astride the path leading to achievement of Zionist national goals in Palestine. These attitudes were reinforced through obvious economic and cultural differences between the Zionist settler community and the traditional, often feudal Arab society of Palestine before 1948.

Thus the cumulative effect of the Israeli occupation on the Arabs directly experiencing it is devastating even when it may be invisible to outside

observers. At the most blatant level occupation can mean swift death from a nervous Israeli soldier in Gaza; or destruction of one's house because of alleged guerrilla connections; or deportation to East Jordan for provocative views or actions.

At another level occupation means that farm produce from the West Bank entering Jerusalem is taxed as a «foreign» import while Israeli products going in the opposite direction are free from such taxes; or a Gaza merchant finally realizes that crucial export permits will come only when he agrees to work through an Israeli middleman- or



when permits are required for meetings of whatever kind.

At a third level occupation is more subtle, such as when Arab Jerusalemites see the steady encirclement of their city by buildings being built for Jewish inhabitants in order to guarantee a permanent Jewish majority; or when all Arabs under occupation are required to have distinctive license plate, telephone, and post-office box numbers; or when increasing numbers of signs are printed in Hebrew only. Occupation means facing a future filled with uncertainty and the fear that the Israelis will not withdraw but will continue the process of entrenchment and development in the Occupied Territories in order to «justify» retention later on.

Despite anguish and bitterness, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Jerusalem have not yet taken the desperate, ultimate route of violent opposition to occupation that typifies Gaza. Thus Jerusalem and the West Bank, where tourists usually go, appear to be a model for occupation, while in isolated Gaza systematic and harsh Israeli tactics against suspected guerrillas and the population generally are conducted free from world outcry. The only «crime» of these people is opposition to military occupation. Destruction of the homes of 15,000 Palestinian refugees and dispersal of their inhabitants elsewhere has greatly increased human suffering in Gaza.

Perhaps the least excusable aspect of world

reaction to the military occupation by Israel of Arab lands is the apparent ease with which busy citizens elsewhere explain away the realities of occupation through sympathy for Jewish Israeli memories of World War II and before. The ultimate irony for Westerners, particularly Western Christians, is that such complacency permits rationalization of a situation not unlike many of the tragic memories themselves.

■ **Zionism Self-Exposed**

New Times (February - 1972)

The organizers of the World Zionist Congress, held in Jerusalem in the latter half of January, were in for a bitter disappointment.

They and their masters had pinned great hopes on this assemblage. Preparations for it were started long in advance. For several months Zionist emissaries had been rushing about the world, recruiting delegates. The biggest of the 26 delegations was from the United States, and many observers considered this highly symbolic. The choice of Jerusalem, illegally occupied by the Israeli aggressors, as the venue of the congress was not accidental either. It was meant to give weight to the Israeli claims to the Arab territories seized in June 1967.


There were other aims too. First, the congress was to demonstrate the unity of «world Jewry,» a Zionist-invented concept. Secondly, it was to whip up anti-Sovietism, which has now become the main

ideological and political doctrine of the Zionist movement. One of the documents drawn up by the sponsors of the congress stated that all Zionist efforts should centre on anti-Soviet activity.

But acute differences between the Zionists arose even before the congress got down to work. As prominent a figure as Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, did not attend. His colleagues felt he was not displaying sufficient anti-Soviet zeal. One delegate who timidly expressed apprehension about Tel Aviv's expansionist policy was actually placed in custody. The opening of the congress brought further disgrace to its sponsors. Witness this from the Associated Press (January 18): «Helmeted police with shields and batons opened fire with a water cannon on hundreds of skirmishing Israeli protesters and drove them back from barricades outside the congress hall. The demonstrators were trying to shout out grievances about housing and social conditions... Some of the delegates were wet from the water-cannon blasts.»

In short, the organizers of the congress, particularly the Israeli rulers, wanted to show that there was «unity between Israel and world Jewry,» and all they succeeded in doing was to show that they are completely indifferent to the needs of the Israeli people, to say nothing of the interests of international security. They wanted to capitalize on anti-Sovietism, and this «trump card» proved to be a losing one. By their anti-Sovieting, their obvious

attempts to aggravate world tensions, and their threats to Arab countries, they merely emphasized the fact that Zionism is a devoted servitor of the imperialist monopolies and an opponent of peace and international détente. It looks very much as if the millions allocated by the monopoly bourgeoisie of different countries for the provocative propaganda assemblage in Jerusalem have been spent in vain. ■



Resistance Operations

(February 1972)

On February 2, an Israeli military spokesman admitted that two Israeli officers were killed and an Israeli soldier was wounded when a mine planted by Palestinian commandos, went off under their car in Sinai.

Also on February 2, Palestinian freedom fighters placed explosive charges and incendiary bombs at three places used and run by the Israeli Intelligence service along the Jaffa road in Jerusalem. The three

places were completely destroyed and set on fire, which spread to neighbouring buildings, killing or wounding a number of agents present at the time in the said premises.

On February 4, Palestinian commandos, pounded with rockets an enemy vehicle concentration at El Khushniya in the occupied Syrian Heights, scoring direct hits on enemy targets.

On February 5, a Palestinian commando hurled a hand-grenade at an enemy restaurant in the Holon settlement, near Tel Aviv, which is frequented by Israeli military personnel. The restaurant was damaged and a number of Israelis were killed or wounded.

Also on February 5, a Palestinian commando unit launched an attack against an enemy camp in the Ferdhawi region in the Golan Heights. The attack resulted in killing a number of Israeli soldiers.

On the same day, a Palestinian commando placed highly explosive charges at the Ein-Gedi Hotel on the Dead Sea shore. The charges went off destroying a large part of the hotel, and killing or wounding a number of enemy personnel.

On February 6, a commando unit placed highly explosive and incendiary charges in the building used as the Israeli Prime Minister's Offices in Haifa. The charges exploded, setting the offices on fire and destroying a large part of the building.

Also on February 6, a Palestinian commando unit planted explosive charges in building No. 38, in Herzl Street in Tel Aviv. The charges exploded, resulting in large fires lasting for several hours. The flames spread to other adjacent buildings.

On the same day, Palestinian commandos placed explosive charges in an enemy restaurant frequented by enemy soldiers at the Sokogoff street in Tel Aviv. The charges went off in time, killing or wounding a number of enemy soldiers.

On February 8, a Palestinian commando unit placed highly explosive and incendiary charges in the Zionist Youth Club at Mount Carmel in Haifa. The charges exploded setting the building on fire and destroying and killing, or wounding, a number of Israelis. The enemy admitted the incident.

On February 9, a Palestinian freedom fighter hurled a hand grenade at an enemy military Power Vehicle at the entrance to Beit Hanoun, north of

the Gaza Strip, where it was patrolling the area. The attack resulted in damaging the vehicle and inflicting three casualties among enemy personnel.

On February 10, a Palestinian commando placed highly explosive charges in enemy stores at the David camp on the outskirts of Haifa. The charges exploded setting the stores ablaze. Enemy losses were estimated at many millions of Israeli pounds.

Also on February 10, Palestinian freedom fighters clashed with an enemy patrol operating in an area to the north of Beit Lahiya, in the Northern part of the Gaza Strip. The patrol was engaged in a search operation. A fierce battle ensued, in which our fighters used machine-guns and hand grenades. The enemy sustained five casualties.

On February 11, a special commando unit placed incendiary charges in a post office store, at Herzl Street in Haifa. The charges went off destroying all contents of the store.

On February 12, Palestinian commandos placed highly explosive charges in a building in Hashalom Street in Tel Aviv. The charges went off, destroying a large part of the building. On the same day, charges placed by another Palestinian commando

unit in building No. 82 in Jaffa exploded, damaging the building.

Also on February 12, Palestinian freedom fighters placed a large quantity of explosive charges in the first floor of Government House building, composed of five storeys, in Tel Aviv. The charges exploded causing great damage to the building and setting it on fire. The enemy admitted the incident.

On February 13, Palestinian freedom fighters clashed with an enemy patrol in the occupied Syrian Heights, using bazookas and machine-guns. The enemy claimed that one Israeli soldier was wounded, but it is believed that enemy losses were higher.

On February 14, a Palestinian commando unit clashed with an Israeli patrol in an orange grove to the east of Beit Hanoun, in the Gaza Strip, using machine-guns and hand grenades. The enemy sustained several casualties.

On the same day, a Palestinian commando hurled a hand-grenade at an enemy military patrol at the Shati Refugee camp, in Gaza, killing or wounding a number of enemy soldiers.

On February 15, a Palestinian commando

launched an attack, with rockets and machine-guns, at an advanced enemy position in the Nahal Golan region in the occupied Syrian Heights, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.

On the same day, a Palestinian commando unit forced its way to the Raggad station near Kuneitra, in the occupied Syrian Heights, using machine-guns and rockets. The attack resulted in the destruction of a number of enemy installations and fortifications, setting enemy barracks on fire and killing or wounding a number of enemy soldiers.

On February 16, Palestinian freedom fighters placed explosive and incendiary timed charges in an enemy timber warehouse. The charges exploded, setting the warehouse on fire. Losses are estimated at millions of Israeli pounds. The enemy admitted the incident and reported that several fire-brigades were rushed to the scene to fight the blazing fires.

On the same day, a Palestinian commando unit placed highly explosive charges in the principal Emba Co. stores for electric apparatus and equipment, in Tel Aviv. The charges exploded setting the Company garages, stores and offices on fire.

On February 17, a Palestinian commando pla-

ced highly explosive charges in an enemy carpentry at Shimon Street in Haifa. The charges exploded, setting the carpentry on fire, which spread to other places. Fire-brigades were rushed to the scene to put out the blazing fires.

On February 23, a special commando unit placed explosive incendiary charges at an enemy plant comprising three smaller plants for the manufacture of paper, plastic and cotton at the Khairiyya settlement, northeast of Tel Aviv, near Ramat Gan. The charges went off setting the plants on fire. Enemy material losses were high.

On the same day, a commando unit clashed with an enemy patrol on the main «Safad-Nahariya» road using various weapons. The unit destroyed an enemy vehicle, killing or wounding its occupants.

On February 24, a Palestinian commando hurled a hand-grenade at an enemy military vehicle patrolling the Omar El Mukhtar Street in Gaza, killing or wounding a number of enemy soldiers.

On February 24, an enemy military vehicle was destroyed and its occupants were wounded when it struck a mine planted by a commando unit on the road to Brechta, on the western slopes of Mont

Hermon. The enemy admitted that four of his soldiers were wounded.

On February 25, a Palestinian commando unit laid an ambush to enemy vehicles on the road to Sasa, near Safad, in Upper Galilee. Two enemy vehicles that came to the scene were attacked by the commandos with rockets and other weapons. They were completely destroyed and all their occupants were either killed or wounded. The enemy admitted the incident, claiming that an officer was killed and six soldiers were wounded.

On February 27, a commando unit shelled with rockets El-Al settlement in the occupied Syrian Heights. The rockets scored direct hits on enemy targets and caused heavy damage to enemy installations. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ARAB RESISTANCE THROUGH ISRAELI EYES

The following review of two Israeli books on the Palestinian Resistance is by Abdullah Schleifer, Middle East correspondent of «Jeune Afrique.»

* * *

- **Y. Harkabi. Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy: Adelphi Papers No. 53. The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968. 43 pages. 25 pence.**
- **Ehud Yaari. Strike Terror - The Story of Fateh. New York: Sabra Books, 1970. 387 pages. \$ 7.95.**

* * *

In the years preceding the June 1967 war Israeli spokesmen and writers invariably described Palestinian guerrillas as anything but Palestinian. They were «Arab terrorists,» «Syrian,» «Lebanese,»

or «Jordanian» mercenaries or, at best, «Egyptian agents.» The same assumptions were shown in other Israeli statements describing Palestinian realities (e.g. the use of «Arab» rather than «Palestinian» for the refugees or the use of the name «Israel» when speaking of events that occurred in Palestine prior to the creation of Israel).

The rapid intensification of guerrilla activity after the June War, the subsequent emergence of the resistance as a public as well as popular force in the politics of the Arab East and the resulting focus of world press attention on this movement dramatically altered almost everyone's terms of reference. Even if Mrs. Meir could still deny in a London Sunday Times interview that the Palestinians did exist, the point was generally acknowledged (and in some Israeli quarters even intensively embellished) over the subsequent years.

Harkabi's monograph and Yaari's book, the major Israeli works devoted exclusively to the Palestine resistance movement and made available in English to a non-Israeli audience, diverge significantly both in their style of writing and in the manner in which they have responded to the re-emergence of the Palestinians on the world scene.

Harkabi, a former Israeli Military Intelligence chief turned Hebrew University professor, has authored a tightly-organized, well-written monograph that reflects a disciplined mind at work, moving consistently and consciously towards its

conclusion. Yaari, the Arab affairs journalist for Davar, is short on evaluation, and long on the use of raw, often petty, data of uneven and sometimes contradictory quality; his sources include courtroom testimony, intelligence reports and personal interviews as well as resistance literature. Harkabi's study dates back to 1968, and the thrust of his work is to contest the significance of the rising Palestinian movement at the very moment of acknowledging it. In contrast, Yaari's book, while based on an earlier Hebrew edition but updated to the summer of 1970, faces up to the new phenomenon as an established fact of political life. Thus Harkabi on his opening page speaks of «Arab fedayeen guerrilla warfare, » discusses his extensive use of «Arab internal publications» (which, according to his combined reference-bibliography, consisted of 19 specifically Palestinian publications out of 26 cited), and their value as a «guide to the thinking of Arabs,» without ever mentioning the Palestinians. Yaari, however, gets quickly to the point. In the opening sentence of his foreword he describes his book as an attempt «to provide the reader with a detailed, informative account of the Palestinian armed movement...» and he goes on to refer to his own use of the «publications of the Palestinian organizations.»

These seemingly technical divergences are reflections of the different preoccupations and concerns of their authors. Harkabi, seeking to challenge the authenticity of Palestinian nationalism, twice



refers to modern Palestinian «rewriting» of the «history of events in Palestine» (pp. 3, 13), and the implicit theme that Palestinian self-consciousness, literature and folklore are only willed creations of contemporary political imagination pervades the entire monograph. And since Harkabi assumes from the beginning the stance of a scholar (which includes for tone the assumption of a shared pool of historical reference between writer and reader), his subtle phrasing sometimes obscures distortions, cf. his comment on the rewriting of Palestinian history which contains the implication that Palestinians

under the Mandate were, somehow, indifferent to Zionism and the British occupation.

To preserve the Palestinian entity was not considered simply an organizational task. It was accompanied by efforts to rewrite the Palestinians' history, presenting it as an epic of continuous struggle against the British Mandate and the Jews in Israel...

The goals of the Palestinian resistance movement meet scanty treatment from the author. The insistence by the guerrillas that they are struggling to destroy the Zionist state and the Zionist-structured society that generates such a state is turned by Harkabi into a concept of «politicide» (an impressive-sounding concept applicable to the aims of any valid liberation movement, e.g. against Rhodesia and South Africa). Another sweeping allegation — «Since the existence of Israel is founded on the existence of a concentration of Jews, so their dispersion [in guerrilla eyes] should precede the demise of the state...» — allows the author to claim that the Arab Resistance goal of a «democratic Arab Palestine» can lead only to «genocide» (p. 11), obscuring the history of Palestinian theoretical development away from such concepts.

At the same time Harkabi squeezes Arab state post-war goals into a mould of his own making in order to sustain his view of the fedayeen as an extension of, rather than a potential break with, conventional Arab strategy. This means that Harkabi ignores the implications of the Khartoum

Summit and the subsequent acceptance of the November 1967 UN Security Council resolution — that a significant number of Arab states had renounced even their conditional and largely rhetorical pre-war commitment to the goal of liberating all of Palestine. But as Yaari, unlike Harkabi, observes in his discussion of the Khartoum Summit, the three famous «Nos» only placed restrictions on the extent to which the Arab states could go in their search for a political settlement and the UN resolution, even if interpreted in the strictest of Arab views, still means recognition of the existence of Israel.

Harkabi sidesteps all of this by quoting al-Ahram editor Mohammed Hassanein Heykal's comments in the early and middle part of 1968 to the effect that fedayeen action could only play a limited role in the struggle against Israel, and that the present conventional Arab armies were the decisive force. But Heykal was referring to fedayeen action within the limited theoretical framework of recovering the 1967-occupied territories and not, as the guerrillas interpreted it, as a stage in a popular liberation war to recover Palestine based on a strategy that would dare, if necessary, to contemplate and provoke the Israeli occupation of still vaster and more heavily populated Arab territories. Harkabi also ignores the obvious political context of that running controversy over military tactics. The real issue for Heykal and his opponents in 1968 was whether the Arab masses would continue to look to



Cairo or to the Palestinian resistance for political leadership, and what the strategic goals of Egypt's eventual «war of attrition» would be.

Again it is Yaari, not Harkabi, who recognizes a significant evolution in Palestinian thought after the failure of the underground West Bank networks in the autumn of 1967, both events being blurred by Harkabi as part of his own underestimation of fedayeen activity.

Since Harkabi proceeds from the assumption that the collapse or destruction of the Zionist state is inconceivable, «the 'Palestinization' of the Arab side» will, he argues, at most simply make «a solution» to the Arab-Israeli conflict more difficult (page 36). Israel may have to learn to live for a long time under the shadow of «sporadic subversion,» and Israeli optimism must be directed away from the immediate post-war vision of a rapidly achieved peace settlement to acceptance of a prolonged struggle with the Arabs (pp. 36-37).

The real challenge, he concludes, does not come from the guerrilla movement but from the prospect of still more conventional wars to be fought on occasion with the Arab states (p. 37). He does add, however, that Israelis must «accustom themselves» to the idea «that the adversary too may have dreams and grievances for which he may be ready to fight and offer sacrifices...» (p. 36).

Except on the most empirical level of geo-

graphic comparison to the settings for other guerrilla struggles, Harkabi has considered «fedayeen action» in a vacuum, choosing to ignore the historical background and theory of social revolutionary warfare that stimulate it. Settler colonialism, imperialism, shifting power relationships and popular consciousness in the Third World simply do not exist as his terms of reference. Instead of analytical historical background he offers his reader an apparently clinical detachment, like a disinterested but compassionate biologist leaning over his microscope. But empirical observations alone do not compensate for lack of analysis of the full context.

Harkabi and Yaari offer up the usual formulas to discount guerrilla effectiveness but these formulas and the official statistics they rest on have been challenged by Professor Hisham Sharabi in his book «Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness» (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970), who has not only gathered together those flashes of frankness that do appear in the Israeli Hebrew-language press but has also compared private memorial notices for fallen soldiers to official statistics. Equally revealing is a study of official and semi-official Israeli manipulation of their own casualty figures by a member of the Jerusalem Committee in England, published in Beirut in the English-language edition of *Fateh* under the title: «Do They Rise from the Dead?» (By the first quarter of 1970 Israeli «road casualties» had risen by 80 percent and in a death-per-vehicle comparison

Israeli traffic fatalities were then running 387 per cent higher than in England.)

The apparent eclipse of the guerrilla movement over the past year and a half dulls our memory. But in the month (May 1970) that preceded the US initiative and the opening phase of intense Royalist-guerrilla confrontation in Jordan that was to culminate in the September civil war, Israeli casualties by their own admission were 61 killed and 136 wounded. In proportion to population this alone would have been equivalent to a monthly toll in Vietnam of 15,000 American casualties and, given Israeli statistical practices, it is more likely that the losses were at least double the figures released.

May 1970 was the month that American news-magazines and British newspapers reported a «crisis of confidence» in Israel and the openly voiced disenchantment of Israeli youth with the heavy toll they were paying for the border war and counter-insurgency effort (particularly in Gaza, the one portion of the occupied territories where armed struggle was sustained on a local basis.)

Harkabi's study is a systematic effort to prove in 1968 that what was beginning to happen by the spring of 1970 was impossible.

Most of Harkabi's themes appear in Yaari's book, but, with the passage of time, there is now a tentative quality to the ideas that Harkabi had baldly asserted, producing a very different effect. Confused, not lacking in contradictions, it is Yaari who labours under some sort of obligation to come

to grips with reality even though Harkabi's smooth generalizations and polished distortions cannot fail to have a more attractive scholarly glitter.

Yaari's fascination with the Palestinian solution is most apparent in the way he devotes almost an entire chapter to the relatively obscure case of Mustapha al-Khamis, a Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) commander captured on the West Bank in the early autumn of 1967. Two documents, reportedly written by al-Khamis in prison and which reflect his sudden conversion to the idea of a Palestinian state at peace with and assisted by Israel, take up much



of the chapter (pp. 156-67.) Al-Khamis apparently offered his services as an envoy to be sent by the Israelis to discuss the question with his PLF superiors. Equally interesting is that in his typically detailed account of al-Khamis' personal history prior to his arrest Yaari is exceptionally accurate until he claims that part of al-Khamis' mission included orders from the PLF to penetrate and participate as



«a minister» in the West Bank Palestine state that was then considered imminent by everyone east of the Jordan. In fact al-Khamis had been ordered to gather intelligence as to possible participants in such a state.

Yaari is at his weakest when straining for sensation. His story of Yasser Arafat's supposed Cairo birth and childhood is so shaky that he hedges on his own claim and he has badly scrambled the rest of Arafat's family history. He says, too, that Algeria's President Boumedienne reduced Algeria's support for the Palestinians; on the contrary he restored it.

But Yaari is at least aware of the importance of Algeria as a source of inspiration and then active support for the Palestinians, whereas Harkabi barely touches the question and then goes on to insist that the Algerian Revolution failed to produce a literature or manual of revolutionary method that could be used by the Palestinians (Harkabi considers Fanon's contribution within the context of ideology.) He has missed the profound influence that al-Jihad al-Afdal by the FLN militant Umar Ozegen — with its description of the formation of the FLN and its methods of urban guerrilla struggle — had on all of the leaders of the pre-1967 Palestinian guerrilla groups.

When discussing the limits of some of the fedayeen operations, Yaari overlooks the fact that the political impact of a particular military action on mass consciousness is an integral and self-conscious aspect of revolutionary warfare relative to the historic circumstances at the time of the military action, and not some accidental by-product.

As the movement enters into the complicated mainstream of political life and class and communal struggle in Jordan and Lebanon, Yaari loses the thread. His discussion of government-guerrilla relations in Jordan on the eve of the battle of Karameh to the summer of 1970, and the Lebanese Army-guerrilla crisis in the Fall of 1969, are the least valuable parts of a book whose interest lies in its presentation of individual episodes rather than its analytical perspective. ■

DOCUMENTS

REPORT OF THE UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



On October 5, 1971, the three-member UN «Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories» submitted to the UN Secretary-General its second report. The Report condemns Israel for serious violations of the rights of the inhabitants of the Occupied Arab territories and makes recommendations to deal with these violations.

For considerations of space we give below the full text of the «findings» of the Report, leaving the «Recommendations» for our April issue.

Findings of the Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Occupied Territories.



1. The evidence that the Special Committee has received reflects a policy on the part of the Government of Israel designed to effect radical changes in the physical character and demographic composition of several areas of the territory under

occupation by the progressive and systematic elimination of every vestige of Palestinian presence in these areas. It would have the effect of obliterating Arab culture and the Arab way of life in the area, and, contrary to international law, of transforming it into a Jewish State. Measures taken under this policy include the establishment of settlements for Israeli Jews in, for example, occupied Jerusalem, Hebron, certain parts of the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, Gaza, Northern Sinai and Sharm El-Sheikh. Such a policy will render more difficult any eventual restoration of the Palestinian people's property and other rights. Besides denying the right of Palestinians who have fled the occupied territories to return to those territories, it also threatens the right of Palestinians who have remained in the occupied territories to continue to live there. In the Special Committee's view the right of the inhabitants of the occupied territories to remain in their homeland is unqualified and inalienable.

2. The Special Committee is of the opinion that the practice of deportation of persons from occupied territories, as carried out by Israel, is not only contrary to article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention but is also part of a total policy of depriving the people of the occupied territory of their right to remain in their homeland. The Special Committee has made the same finding with regard to the practice whereby Israeli nationals are transferred to the occupied territories, as is the case in East Jerusalem, Hebron, the Golan Heights, certain

parts of the Jordan Valley, Gaza, Northern Sinai and Sharm El-Sheikh.

3. In the debate on the Special Committee's report in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the delegate of Israel, referring to his Government's policy in the occupied territories, stated that several thousands of Arab visitors had been allowed into the territories during the summer of 1970 (A/SPC/SR. 744-751; A/C. 3/SR. 1782). According to reports in the Israeli press, several more thousand visitors have been permitted this year. Although this may be considered as a positive aspect of Israeli policy towards the territories it occupies, it is no remedy in the circumstances. The summer visitors' programme is no substitute for recognition of the right of the refugees to return to their home — a right that is continued to be denied to them by the Government of Israel — nor does it have any bearing whatsoever on the declared policy of the Government of Israel to settle occupied territories and on the fact that several hundred persons had been deported from their home in the occupied territories on official deportation orders purporting to be issued by the Israeli authorities under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. No statistics are available of the number of persons who have been forcibly expelled without any such formality. These facts remain true, irrespective of what the Israeli authorities claim to be a liberal policy of granting visiting permits or of lifting travel restrictions. The same

observation would apply to the statement frequently made that Israeli policy in the occupied territories is to keep the Israeli presence as unobtrusive as possible, not interfering with the conduct of local affairs and keeping intervention by the occupation government to a minimum. It is difficult to reconcile the latter statement with the recurring curfews imposed for periods ranging from dawn-to-dusk over a stretch of 22 hours and the habitual intervention of Israeli troops to deal with acts of resistance to the occupation. The fact remains that (a) the Government of Israel still refuses the population of the occupied territories the right to return to their home; (b) the declared policy of the Government of Israel is to settle occupied territories with Israeli citizens; (c) the Government of Israel regularly deports civilians from the occupied territories.

4. The Special Committee has shown in paragraphs 52 and 58 above that the Government of Israel's declared policy is to destroy the houses of persons suspected of helping members of the resistance. This policy is in violation of articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It also violates the fundamental right of the protected persons to a home. The evidence before the Special Committee shows, moreover, that the destruction of houses takes place arbitrarily and that it has not ceased. The Special Committee notes the efforts of the ICRC to aid victims, whose houses have been demolished, by providing relief supplies and temporary shelter. The Special Committee notes that many persons

whose houses have been demolished have left the occupied territories. The Special Committee is of the view that the policy of demolition of houses in this manner and a demonstrated policy of deportation, as parts of a general policy of annexation and settlement, can have but one result: the elimination of any possibility of the fulfilment of the Palestinian people's right of self-determination within the confines of their own homeland.

5. It is clear that the right of the Palestinian people to their own homeland was sanctioned by the United Nations in all resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council, including resolution 181 (II) by virtue of which the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended the Plan of Partition with Economic Union as spelled out in the resolution. The Plan of Partition, in the same manner as other United Nations resolutions and declarations on the question, has acknowledged the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The concern of the international community for this basic right was further manifested when the General Assembly adopted the International Covenants on Human Rights, article 1 of each of which proclaims the right to self-determination. The Israeli policy would have the effect of extinguishing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The Special Committee considers any act in furtherance of that policy to be a violation of a fundamental human right to which all peoples are equally entitled.

6. Numerous allegations of ill-treatment while under detention have been made before the Special Committee. In the absence of sufficient corroborative evidence, the Special Committee is unable to reach a conclusive finding in regard to these cases. The Special Committee is convinced however that, apart from general prison conditions which, despite reported efforts at improvement, are stated to be bad, mainly due to overcrowding, interrogation procedures very frequently involve physical violence (see **International Review of the Red Cross**, September 1970, No. 114, pages 504-505; and **The Red Cross in Action**, news bulletin No. 164, 14 July 1971).

7. The evidence shows that the practice of imposing harsh curfews continues. In regard to the four weeks' long curfew imposed on the Shati Refugee Camp following the grenade incident in January 1971, the conditions of curfew make it appear to have been more of a form of reprisal than a necessary means of either preventing similar incidences or bringing the offenders to book.

8. In regard to allegations of mass arrests, the Special Committee has reached the conclusion that whatever their avowed purpose, the arrests were clearly calculated in part to be a means of destroying the morale of the people of the occupied territories.

9. For lack of evidence, the Special Committee is unable to arrive at a finding on the allegation that

radical changes have been made in the education curricula of Arab children of the occupied territories. The Special Committee understands that UNESCO has interested itself in securing for the children of the occupied territories the quality and type of education to which they are entitled.


10. On the basis of the testimony placed before it or obtained by it in the course of its investigations, the Special Committee had been led to conclude that the Government of Israel is deliberately carrying out policies aimed at preventing the population of the occupied territories from returning to their homes and forcing those who are in their homes in the occupied territories to leave, either by direct means such as deportation or indirectly by attempts at undermining their morale or through the offer of special inducements, all with the ultimate object of annexing and settling the occupied territories. The Special Committee considers the acts of the Government of Israel in furtherance of these policies to be the most serious violation of human rights that has come to its attention. The evidence shows that this situation has deteriorated since the last mission of the Special Committee in 1970.

11. The Special Committee must emphasize once again the importance of having an arrangement for implementing the provisions of the Geneva Conventions which would be acceptable to all parties and which would thereby better ensure the safe-

guarding of the human right of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee regards its task as essentially a humanitarian and not a political one, despite the fact that there are certain political and juridical problems that necessarily arise from the nature of the Middle East question as a whole. It is, however, clear to the Committee that the arrangement it recommended in its report to the Secretary-General (A/8089, para. 155) should be implemented if any progress is to be achieved in safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The Special Committee would like to draw particular attention to the recommendation which provides for the representation under this arrangement of the large population within the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination. The Special Committee in no way intends to enter into the question of the status of any of the States vis-à-vis one another nor is the arrangement it proposed in any way meant to prejudice whatever political attitudes these States have taken in relation to one another until now. The arrangement envisaged by the Special Committee is designed to ensure that the persons in the occupied territory are guaranteed the protection of their rights, namely, the primary right to remain in or return to their home and other rights consistent with their status as the civilian population of an occupied territory.

12. The Special Committee has already stated

in its first report (A/8089, para. 146) that it considers that in this case the fundamental violation of human rights lies in the very fact of occupation. The most effective way of safeguarding the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, therefore, is to end the occupation of these territories. Occupation constitutes an infringement of the principle of territorial integrity which has been accepted and repeatedly endorsed by the family of nations and has been enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The same principle has been further recognized and elaborated by the United Nations in the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session (resolution 2625 (XXV)) on 24 October 1970. The principle that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible has been expressly reaffirmed by the General Assembly in paragraph 1 of resolution 2628 (XXV) relating to the situation in the Middle East. The evidence received by the Special Committee since its mission to the Middle East in 1970 strengthens its conviction that, failing an end to the occupation itself and if the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are to be enforced, the States concerned will have to agree to an arrangement that would remove any suspicion regarding violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories. ■



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
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For all people, March 21 is the beginning of spring.
But we Palestinians live one unchanging, unending colourless
season, the season of exodus which started with the
establishment of «Israel» in 1948, the season of exile whose
only hue is that of blood, our blood, the season which
haunts us with one cry only: WE SHALL RETURN.



See Inside cover