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EDITORIAL

AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY

After the onslaught of King Hussein's army on the Palestinian resistance last September, all governments with interest at stake in the Middle East conflict have launched a propaganda campaign for the recognition of "Palestinian nationhood" -- calling for the creation of a Palestinian entity to be carved out of the Hashemite Kingdom.

This campaign represents a new phase within the wider strategy of forces led by the U.S. at quelling the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggle in the Middle East. It will be intensified in the coming months, in the hope that conclusive results will be achieved before the second cease-fire period expires.

Three months have elapsed since the abortive attempt to liquidate the Palestinian resistance by force of arms. It has become imperative for imperialism and its allies, Zionism and Arab reaction, to get rid "peacefully" of the Resistance, the only serious obstacle to a political settlement in the Middle East. The proposal for a Palestinian entity (although its territorial location is still a source of disagreement among its sponsors -- witness, for example, the denunciation by the Jordanian government of H. Kan'an's Palestinian project, N.Y. Times 12/13/70, Week in Review) must first be seen in the following light: Short of being able to physically eliminate the Palestinian mass movement, the proposal is an attempt to isolate it geographically and diffuse its revolutionary (Middle Eastern) potential. The "Palestinian entity" is being sold to the Palestinian masses as an alternative to the program of the Resistance. This alternative, a combination of induced economic "prosperity" in the West Bank and political "independence" for the Palestinian bourgeoisie, is being pushed precisely after the military setback suffered by the Resistance last September, and at a time when the Palestinians under Israeli rule -- because of their isolation from the events in the East -- are left in a state of political demoralization.

This atmosphere is contributing to the creation of a popular base for the "Palestinian entity"; thus helping the intent of its sponsors to undermine the Palestinian armed struggle and its present leadership. This today is the chief obstacle within the mass movement to the logic of confronting imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. [Notice that the Zionist government, as one of the sponsors of the "Palestinian entity" (even in case it is defeated as a result of popular pressure), is seeking to regain some of its faltering "democratic" image by proposing an alternative framework to the Democratic Palestinian State. In addition, while the former (Palestinian entity) secures a recognition of the Zionist state, the latter challenges its very foundations.]

A second objection to the proposal of a "Palestinian entity" should be made independently of its effect to contain and eventually reverse the Palestinian mass movement. It concerns the concept of self-determination for the Palestinians. It should be obvious to all democrats that the roots of the national oppression of the Palestinians lie in the denial of the territorial component of Palestinian nationhood. The right of the Palestinians to determine their existence away from their reservations and in their national homeland cannot be subjected to compromise. This is a more basic objection, made also independently of the shape the proposed Palestinian entity would have. Such an entity under the prevailing conditions would have to come under the oligarchic leadership of the pre-1967 period -- representing the only elements willing to cooperate with the Zionists while at the same time gaining for themselves a popular image by publically denouncing Hussein's regime. (Between the leadership of the Mufti--1936 to 1948--to the demagogy of Shukairy --1964 to 1967--and the present Kana'n's and Ja'bari's there are minor ideological differences). Such a Palestinian state, constituting one more Levantine mini-state could only be an economic extension of the Israeli market and further consolidate the rule of imperialism in the region.

A final word must be added for those on the "left" who are quick to point that the right of self-determination for the Palestinians--although acceptable in principle--is in fact a "tragic unrealistic" objective, since it must ultimately come in conflict with the national rights of the Hebraic community (the theory of two-irreconcilable-nationalisms). For socialists fighting for the self-determination of the Palestinian people, the struggle involves more than the creation of a "non-sectarian, democratic state". It must recognize in principle the national rights of both peoples in Palestine. The fact that the Jewish colonial settlers in the process of the last fifty years have, under the political hegemony of Zionism, formed an oppressive nation does not deny them the right to self-determination. But (and this is more important) neither the "misuse of that right" allows the Zionists to impose any rationalization for the present oppression and displacement of the Palestinian people, nor does it allow them to redefine the territorial limits within which the Palestinians can have their self-determination. Those limits can only be "imposed" by a democratic (i.e. in this case, internationalist) solution, establishing an arrangement for the existence of both national groups in Palestine.

The historical experience of oppressed peoples in the twentieth century has clearly shown that this democratic task can be accomplished only under the leadership of the working class armed with proletarian ideology. The failure of the Algerian revolution in our time points out the essential need for Marxist-Leninist leadership --not only to carry the war of national liberation to its socialist goal, but also to preserve the gains of the revolution in its national-democratic phase.

--The Editors, 12/16/70.

KING HUSSEIN: an egyptian delegate to washington



In his recent press conference in London King Hussein indicated that he will invite the Arab leaders to a summit meeting at the beginning of next year (1971) "to discuss the Palestine problem."

This initiative from the King must not be viewed in isolation. He can hardly announce by himself such an important matter without prior agreement with President Sadat of Egypt on the necessity for such a summit--as well as on its agenda.

Previously Hussein had declared that a coming Arab summit would discuss the question of the "Palestinian State". The fact that he replaced the expression of "Palestinian State" by that of the "Palestine problem" in this press conference can only be the result of a consensus with Cairo on the agenda of this summit.

Underlying this point was the King's statement that he will speak on behalf of Egypt and Jordan when he meets President Nixon in Washington to discuss the situation in the Middle East --"because our positions are the same."

This is not the first time King Hussein plays the role of the "Egyptian delegate" to Washington. In 1969 he spoke "on behalf of Egypt and Jordan" when he suggested his famous Eight Point Proposal for the implementation of the (1967) UN Security Council resolution. He was quick to point out, when faced with strong Arab reaction then (initiated primarily by the Palestinian resistance), that he did not speak only for himself, but also for President Nasser.

The Egyptian Government aims--by using King Hussein--to open a dialogue with the U.S. at a time when there are still no diplomatic relations between the two states (since the 1967 war). Because of its permanent interest in keeping strong ties with King Hussein since June 1967, the Cairo regime has prevented the King from reaching an independent settlement to his own advantage. This concern on the part of Cairo to keep Hussein as an intermediary with the US goes back to the first days following the June defeat. At that time, when diplomatic relations between Egypt and the US & Britain had been broken, King Hussein "consulted" President Nasser on what should be done.

Nasser stressed the importance of keeping good relations between Jordan and the U.S., because "that might bring us advantages which surpass by far the disadvantages that would be incurred by Washington if Amman had cut off diplomatic relations!"

The King's current mission to Washington fits within President Sadat's plan for political action on the Arab and international levels. "This plan aims at explaining Egypt's position on the temporary cease-fire agreement", as al-Ahram explains. To the Egyptian regime the U.S. holds "the key to the problem" as Muhammad H. Heikal is fond of saying.

Just in case those indirect channels to imperialism might prove a failure in "softening up America", the Egyptians are cautious not to put all their eggs in one basket. Vice-President al-Shafi's trip to Yugoslavia is intended to open another channel of "dialogue" with Washington, thus consolidating Hussein's mission in the United States. Tito's potential role is not a new one. He had worked before with the U.S. on many occasions, and was instrumental in securing Egypt's full support to the U.N. Security Council resolution. Tito also played an important role in arranging for the famous meeting between N. Goldman and King Hassan of Morocco...

The above was excerpted from an article in al-Hurriah (Beirut), # 544, Dec. 12, 1970 7.



Class Character of Israeli Society

Editor's note: The following article is part of a discussion, taking place within the Israeli Socialist Organization and the anti-Zionist left in Israel, on the nature of Israeli class structure and the tasks of revolutionary socialists in Israel today. This essay represents the views of a majority tendency within the I.S.O.; it is translated from its Hebrew periodical Matzpen.

In Israeli society, as in any class society, there are internal contradictions--class contradictions. In addition, Israel (and the Jewish settlement in Palestine before the establishment of the state) has been in a perpetual external conflict--that between Zionism and the Arab world.

The question is: Which of these two contradictions--the internal or the external--is dominant?

This question is not merely a theoretical problem: the future of revolutionary socialist activity in Israel depends on the answer.

Those who believe that the internal class contradiction is predominant and controls the political dynamics in Israel will concentrate most of their organizing and educational efforts towards the working class in Israel. The activity concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict, the information against Zionist ideology and the Zionist character of the Israeli State takes only second place.

Those holding this view see the crux of the external conflict as being a direct result of the internal class contradiction, and that the internal dynamics of the class struggle in Israel suffice to cause a social revolution without this being conditioned by revolutionary changes in the Arab world.

The well-known Marxist generalization states that class contradictions in a given society are dominant, and all external contradictions follow from them. This generalization is true in most cases, and especially in the classical capitalist societies. However, it does not hold in all cases. For example, in a colonial country under foreign rule, it is very doubtful that one can understand the dynamics of social development from the internal contradictions within the colony, without stressing the main external conflict between the colony and the metropolis.

Israel is not one of the classical capitalist countries, and it is not even a colony. Altogether, Israel is such an exceptional phenomenon from an economic, social and political point of view that it becomes impossible to make generalizations and comparisons concerning it. A comprehensive treatment of the special and exceptional characteristics of Israeli society and history is essential.

IMMIGRANT SOCIETY

The first demographic fact which must be pointed out is that the majority of Israeli Jews are immigrants or immediate descendants of immigrants. In 1968 the Jewish adult population (over 15 years) in Israel was 1,689,286; out of which a mere 24% were Israeli-born and only 4% native born whose parents were also born in Israel. (All figures are taken from the official 1969 Annual

Book of Statistics.)

Thus, the Jewish society in Israel is an immigrant society with all the characteristics usually found in such a society. Here classes are in a stage of formation, and class consciousness is still very vague. When immigrating, the newcomer (and especially in the case of Israel) changes his profession, his occupation and his class affiliation (the origin of the majority of Israeli workers is petty bourgeois). Moreover, privileged positions in society are occupied by immigrants from an earlier wave, thus strengthening feelings of social mobility among new immigrants. The immigrant worker sees his present social situation as a mere temporary stage: his father was not a worker, and he himself lives in the hope that he will become independent, or that at least his son will not be a worker. Class consciousness as it exists, for example, among the British or the French proletariat, does not exist in Israel. Here (as in other countries of immigration) people do not identify themselves by their class affiliation, but by their community and country of origin.

It is clear that such a lack of class consciousness becomes a barrier to the proletariat entering into a class that struggles for a change in the social order. The formation of a revolutionary proletariat is impossible while the worker hopes for the bettering of his condition by personal advancement in the framework of the existing society, and by breaking loose from the working class. All the while, the working class does not recognize itself as a stable social group with collective interests and a separate set of values which are in essential contradiction to those of the present society. The willingness and impulse for total change in the social order will not arise easily within a population of immigrants who have only just changed their class, social and political status and who are still undergoing a high rate of social mobility.

From the above we can conclude that the Israeli working class cannot become a revolutionary element in the future, but only that one cannot approach political work among the Israeli working class with the same expectations as among the working class of an average capitalist state.

SOCIETY OF SETTLERS

If it were only that the Israeli working class consisted mainly of immigrants or sons of immigrants, then one could still assume that the transformation of this class into a revolutionary one, in effect, would only be a matter of time and of patient work of education.

But the Israeli society is not just a society of immigrants, but also a society in formation by a process of settlement, at the expense of another people and by constant conflict with it; a conflict which has now lasted more than a half century.

While discussing the chances of a socialist revolution in Britain, Marx stated that as long as the British workers oppressed Ireland, they could not themselves be liberated; from this, he derived his famous statement: "A nation which oppresses another cannot be free." The exploited class of the oppressing country becomes, in spite of itself, a partner of exploitation; and even when in reality this class does not directly enjoy the fruits of oppression, it will always become a victim of the illusion that it has interest in the continuation of the oppression. Hence, this class does not tend to rebel against its oppressors, but rather to be drawn after them and to stand by their side against the oppressed people.

This is even more true when the national oppression does not occur in another country but "at home"--especially when the expulsion and the national discrimination become the source of creation of the given society and an inherent part of its way of life.

The great amount of experience of all the leftist revolutionary organizations that were active in the Jewish settlement from the Twenties until today provides a clear evidence that the slogan "A nation which oppresses another cannot be free" does not merely have a moral significance: it has a practical political meaning. As long as Zionism in Israeli society has political and ideological hegemony, there is no chance that the workers will become a revolutionary class. Those who believe that by approaching the material interest of the Jewish workers, in conflict with their employers, one can cause the Israeli working class to rebel against the present system cannot bring one piece of evidence in support of their view from the experience of the last 50 years. They are not able to explain the obvious difference which exists between the history of revolutionary activity and that of classical capitalist countries.

This view in effect leads the revolutionary movement in Israel into a road that has already been proved, both theoretically and practically, to be a dead end. It ignores this lesson and concentrates on the class struggle of the working class, while pushing the struggle against Zionism to the second place.

THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNITIES WITHIN ISRAEL

Another feature which must be taken into account is the fact that the Israeli proletariat is made up of different [ethnic] communities. The great majority of the most exploited people of the Israeli working class originally come from Asia and Africa.

On the surface it would seem that the parallel between the class division and the division along ethnic lines would sharpen the internal class conflicts. To a certain extent there is some truth in this. But in the present reality this element mainly works in the opposite direction.

First, an important section of the people originating in Asia and Africa improved their standard of living as a result of their immigration to Israel and by becoming workers in a modern capitalist society. Their bitterness is directed not against their condition as proletarians but against their relative discrimination in comparison to other

communities. The result, in reality is therefore that the ethnic factor does not increase the class contrast, but rather tends to minimize it. And on the contrary, the class contrast is translated in the consciousness of the worker into ethnic terms. He usually doesn't say to himself, "I am exploited because I am a worker," but rather "They exploit me because I am black."

Second, in the reality of Israeli settler society, the oriental workers constitute a parallel stratum to what is called in the American South "poor whites" and in Algeria, before its liberation, "Pieds Noirs". These strata fear that they will be identified with the "inferior race", and their psychological reaction is to support the chauvinist and most reactionary wing of the ruling class. It is typical that most of Herut's public support is from among the people of this stratum.

This does not indicate that these exploited people of the Israeli proletariat are reactionary "by nature". Their reactionary stand is a direct result of the rule of Zionism.

A PRIVILEGED SOCIETY

The Israeli society is not only a society of settlers, but is also a society which enjoys material good sent from abroad in unprecedented quantities. Israel is a special case in the Middle East: a country which is not economically exploited by imperialism. Imperialism exploits Israel politically and pays in return economic support. The American economist Oscar Gass (who was formerly economic advisor to the Israeli government) writes: "For the 21 years, 1948-68, the import surplus has been in excess of \$7.5 billion. This means an import excess of some \$2,650 per person, during 21 years, for every person who lived in Israel (within pre-June 1967 borders) at the end of 1968." And of this supply from abroad, as the author shows, only about 30% came to Israel under conditions which call for a return outflow of dividends, interest or capital. This is a circumstance without parallel elsewhere. (Journal of Economic Literature, Dec. 1969, p. 1177)

One must stress that this enormous flow of money must be added to the large amount of property (houses, land, fields and cultivated vineyards) which was left by the Arabs or was confiscated from them after the creation of the state.

Is it possible that such a large amount of capital coming from abroad (the majority of which was not invested for profit to be taken out of the country) will not have a great influence on the dynamics of the Israeli society?

Is it possible to ignore that even the Israeli working class enjoys both indirectly and directly the flow of this capital?

Can one assume that the working class does not realize that it too is among the privileged?

Israel is definitely not among the countries in which the foreign financial support goes only into the pockets of the ruling minority. The sums of money which Israel receives are an economic subsidy.

The Jewish worker in Israel does not, obviously, receive this subsidy in cash, but he does get it in the form of houses (which could not be erected in such quantities using only local capital),

employment in industries (which would have been closed long ago were it not for both open and hidden subsidies) and a high standard of living which does not correspond to the product of his labor.

It is clear that the profits of Israeli capitalists are also a result of their share in the foreign subsidy.

The struggle between Israeli workers and their employers involves not only the division of surplus values produced by the worker, but also the share of the different classes in the foreign subsidy.

Why does Israel deserve an enormous flow of capital from outside under such exceptional conditions?

This question was answered in the early Fifties by the editor of Ha'aretz, G. Shoken, in his essay, "The Prostitute from the Sea City: Thoughts on the Eve of Rosh Hashana, 1951" (Ha'aretz, 9/30/51). He stated that one of the motives of the West "to support us financially" is because

Israel's job is to be a kind of watch-dog.

One must not fear that Israel will use a violent policy against the Arab countries if this would be clearly against the interests of America and Britain. However, if the Western Powers should prefer, for some reason or another, to shut their eyes, then Israel can be trusted to be able to punish one or a number of its neighboring countries whose lack of politeness towards the West became too much.

This evaluation of Israel's role in the Middle East was accurately verified in the years that followed.

When one mentions the special case of Israel, to which "there is none similar in the world"--according to the economist Gass--it becomes clear that the policy is not an expression of inner economic processes, but on the contrary the economic structure itself is built and based on the political and military role of Zionism in the Middle East. In this, there is no contradiction with the Marxist point of view. It is only that one must regard the whole Middle East as one unit, and that is exactly what those who see everything in terms of the class contradictions within Israel refuse to do.

How can one explain the fact that 70% of the capital which is brought into Israel from the imperialist countries is not used to gain economic profits and is not at all conditioned by profit considerations? If one regards Israel separately from the rest of the Middle East then this fact has no explanation. However, in the context of the Middle East there is an immediate economic-political explanation: it is the price for a foreign policy which is in agreement with the economic and political interests of imperialism in the whole area.

The fact that a great part of the subsidy which Israel receives is in the form of donations from Western World Jewry does not change its character as a subsidy from imperialism. The imperialist states agree to define these contributions as "gifts of charity" and they are exempt from income tax. In this fashion these donations become to a great extent a disguised contribution from the imperialist governments.

The Israeli working class can become revolutionary and the internal contradictions in Israeli

society will achieve revolutionary significance in the general context of the Middle East, in such a way that the privileged standing of Israel will cease to be guaranteed.

And what is this analogous to? The society of Cossack tribes at the end of the Tsarist regime was a class society. In it were also to be found internal contradictions and struggles. But since all the Cossacks were used as "gendarmes" of the Tsar against the oppressed strata in Russia, and because they received special privileges in return for this service, no revolution could possibly have arisen from among the Cossacks without being caused by a revolution from outside. The dynamics of this revolutionary process in Cossack society was not decided from within, but from without, by the dynamics of the revolution in the whole of Russian society; and that revolution did not start with the Cossacks and could not have started there while their job was to be "gendarmes" and while special privileges that were given them were more or less guaranteed.

From this one must not conclude that revolutionaries in Israel should sit with folded arms and wait for the ripening of exterior processes that do not depend on them. Political activity must be carried out among those circles and strata in Israeli society which are paying the highest price for Zionism's political role (and this is especially true of the youth). This activity in itself is the most important contribution to the revolutionary struggle in the area. Anyone who follows what is going on in the Arab world knows that there is a dialectical connection between the political struggle against Zionism in Israel, and between the struggle for a social revolution in the Arab world. The action among the Israeli working class must not, of course, be neglected, but this action must be dependent on the general strategy of the struggle against Zionism.

THE CHARACTER OF THE RULING CLASS

The dependence of the economic structure on political considerations is not at all a new phenomenon, but is a characteristic of the Zionist colonization from its very beginning.

This fact is the main key to the understanding of the special nature of the ruling class in Israel.

The authors of the book, The Economic Development of Israel (Bank of Israel, 1968) correctly state that "the economic policy in Palestine was dependent on political aims."

The Zionist enterprise has not developed as an ordinary capitalist colonization, guided by considerations of profitability.

The Jewish bourgeoisie in Israel [sic] was always inclined to hire Arab workers, who could be most exploited. But the workers' Zionism, which was represented and led by the bureaucracy of the Histadruth and the Zionist Left parties, struggled against the bourgeoisie, demanding employment of Hebrew labor only. This struggle was a bitter one--actually it was the main one in the Hebrew settlement--and lasted for the whole period between the two World Wars. In the end the struggle was settled in favor of the Zionist Left, not only by the real power-relation in the Yishuv [Palestine] but by the involvement of the world Zionist movement

and by pure political considerations.

The aim of Zionism from the beginning was to create a pure Jewish state and to drive out the Arab population. On June 12, 1895 Herzl wrote in his diary: "The private land in the areas given to us must be slowly taken from its owners. We are trying to transfer the poor population quietly to outside the borders by placing them in other countries, but in our own country we are denying them all jobs." (Herzl, Selected Works, ed. M. Neuman, VII, i, p. 86) This intention resolved the conflict in favor of the bureaucracy of the Zionist Left and against the bourgeoisie in the Jewish settlement. After the determination of the conflict there was a common rule of the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, in which the former assumed the main rule and the latter a minor role. This combination of power forms the ruling class in Israel up to the present, and this is one of the special characteristics of this society. Even the dominant ideology in Israel was never typically bourgeois, but was rather a special mixture of bourgeois elements with dominant components of the ideology which is typical of the workers' bureaucracy of the Zionist Left.

It is true that the weight of the bourgeois partner in the ruling class has increased in time. Dayan's moving from the bureaucratic camp to the bourgeois one is one of the political indications of this. (It is typical that Dayan opposes Golda and Ben Gurion in supporting the employment of Arab workers from the occupied territories in the Israeli economy. In this, as in many other subjects, he is supported by the bourgeois newspaper, Ha'aretz.)

But still the weight of the labor bureaucracy is greater. Through the huge apparatus of the state and the Histadruth it has control over the society and a big portion of the economy.

The recent data we have is taken from research done by Professor H. Barkai which is included in a report by the Falk Institute for the years 1961 to 1963. According to this data the private sector produced only about 58.5% of the general net production of the Israeli economy in 1960. The remaining 41.5% was divided equally between the Histadruth and the government. There is no basis to assume that a change has occurred in the division among these two sectors during the last ten years.

The economic power of the labor bureaucracy is actually bigger than what the above-mentioned data express. The tight bureaucratic supervision of the private sector joins the direct rule over the Histadruth and the government sectors. This supervision is more than governmental intervention in the economic life, which is accepted in most

capitalist states. One should remember that the Israeli economy as a whole--and also the profits of the private capitalists--depend to a great extent on foreign subsidy which is given to the economy mainly through the government which is subordinated to the bureaucracy of Zionist life. There are many ways which can be used by the labor bureaucracy in order to balance the flow of the foreign subsidy to the different enterprises of the private sector and to enjoy authority over the bourgeoisie.

This is capitalism--but a peculiar kind, controlled by a special class contract. The supervision of the bureaucratic stratum of the Zionist Left of the way foreign money is channelled enables them to control the masses to a greater extent, not only on the political level but on the level of everyday life as well. The majority of Israel's population and especially the workers depend on the good will of this bureaucracy in giving them jobs, housing, social security and health, etc.

It has happened more than once that workers revolted against the ruling bureaucracy and refused to surrender to it, but eventually they had to leave the country.

All these facts, about the peculiarity of Israeli society and the special components of the ruling class cannot be explained by the internal dynamics of Israel, but only by the political and economic nature of the Zionist experience.

From daily experience of political work in Israel and from the above-mentioned theoretical considerations, one can draw the most important conclusion about the strategy of revolutionary action in Israel.

In the short run, the political struggle should be directed against the Zionist nature of the state of Israel. This struggle should be primary in all revolutionary action in Israel, among workers as well as among the rest. Furthermore, this activity should be stressed among circles in the Israeli society which are directly and badly hurt by the Zionist character of the state (the youth and the Arab population), and it should be directed at rallying them against the existing establishment.

This principle for the short run strategy is the most important, and according to it one must judge the contribution of every political action in Israel to advance the interests of the revolution in the Middle East.

(Translated from Matzpen, no. 55, Aug.-Sept. 1970--official organ of the Israeli Socialist Organization.)

PALESTINE WILL BE LIBERATED BY REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE -
THROUGH THE WAR OF THE ORGANIZED AND ARMED MASSES--NOT
BY DEFEATIST SETTLEMENTS.

" from a wall poster distributed by
the Democratic Popular Front."

WHAT DOES THE D. P. F. STAND FOR ?

[Editor's Note: The following was recently distributed by supporters of the DPFLP in the West Coast. PRB, with some reservations explained in the "postscript", feels that this concise statement will help readers who inquired about the general perspective of the Front. Readers and DPF supporters are invited to send their views on the statement.]

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war lifted the mask off the face of the Arab governments; and the people of the Middle East, Palestinians in particular, began to see more and more that the liberation of Palestine can only come through the struggle of the masses themselves. The Palestinian guerrilla movement, began in 1965, took a leap forward after the 1967 war and has been growing stronger ever since. Out of the struggle of this mass movement against Zionism, imperialism and the Arab reactionaries, there emerged in February of 1969 the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is now one of the main forces in the Palestinian movement.

The DPF sees the Palestinian revolution as a national-democratic revolution, aimed at abolishing Zionist occupation with its institutions and its ideology and at achieving self-determination for the Palestinian people in their own land. The enemies which this movement confronts in accomplishing its revolution are Zionism, imperialism, and Arab reaction. The DPF sees the struggle as a class struggle in which the working class must have the leadership, and it makes the following class analysis of the Jordanian-Palestinian situation to determine the class allies and the class enemies of the revolution.

1. The feudalists, high army officers, big merchants and the landed aristocracy. These people form a class that opposes any movement which militantly organizes the masses because such a movement challenges their control and their class interests. This class is always reactionary and the DPF considers it an enemy of the Palestinian revolution.

2. The national bourgeoisie. On the West Bank of the Jordan (i.e. occupied territory), the national bourgeois class consists basically of two sectors: the commercial and financial bourgeoisie, and the industrial bourgeoisie. The first group is increasingly playing the intermediary in the economic interaction between the Israeli occupied West Bank and East Jordan. As such, it makes the middleman's profit off both sides and would like to see the status quo (ie, Israeli occupation) preserved. The second group, the industrial bourgeoisie, is engaged in processing and marketing agricultural products. This sector has been hurt by Israeli competition and would welcome the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan. On the East Bank, the national bourgeoisie, mainly financial and commercial, would also welcome reunification. But the sectors which want reunification want it to serve their own interests;

namely to regain their economic hegemony over the larger Jordan which they exploited before 1967. Therefore, their interest is fundamentally opposed to the interests of the mass movement, and their position from the Palestinian movement ranges from out-and-out opposition to very temporary and opportunist support which is withdrawn as soon as their interests are threatened. Furthermore, in seeking a return to the pre-1967 conditions, this class's interests do not require the abolition of Zionism from the rest of Palestine, but only for the West Bank, nor do these interests require an end to imperialism in Palestine and the rest of the Middle East. The DPF sees this class as one which might at the present give some hypocritical and limited support to the Palestinian movement as a means of pressuring the Israelis and the U.S. for a speedier and more favorable deal on the occupied West Bank, but in the final analysis they must be seen as enemies who will in the near future join the ranks of counter-revolution with their full force.

3. The petty-bourgeoisie. This class, including the bureaucrats, teachers, lawyers, doctors, small shopowners, etc., is at the present time actively confronting the Israeli occupation, imperialism and Arab reactionaries. Though sectors of the petty-bourgeoisie can and do reject their class ideology for revolutionary ideology, nevertheless as an intermediary class, the petty-bourgeoisie vacillates and often takes either timid positions in leading the masses or else it is given to irresponsible adventurism which could cripple the mass movement. Furthermore, while the petty-bourgeoisie leads the movement, it opposes the independent organization of workers and peasants, and thus aborts the conscious participation of the masses in their own revolution. The DPF considers that the petty-bourgeoisie, as a class, is an ally of the mass movement, that it is included in the revolutionary forces; but that it cannot and should not be leading them.

4. The proletariat. The DPF sees the working-class as the only class capable of leading the Palestinian masses to achieve self-determination and an end to national and class oppression in the new Palestinian state. Because of its relationship to the means of production, it is in its class interests to abolish exploitation, nationalism, and chauvinism. Though the Jordanian Palestinian proletariat is small in relation to the rest of the people, the DPF considers that when it is organized into a party and guided by Marxism-Leninism, the working class will play a role hundreds of times larger than its size.

5. The peasants and poor refugees. Those two classes make up by far the majority of the Jordanian-Palestinian population. Because of their extreme oppression, they constitute the strongest allies of the working class and the main force in the Palestinian movement. The DPF considers

that the peasants and poor refugees, organized and led by Marxist-Leninist ideology, will join and fight the revolution to its conclusion.

The DPF is a mass organization composed of workers, peasants, refugees and revolutionary elements of the petty-bourgeoisie. The leadership of the Front adheres to Marxism-Leninism and applies its principles to the Jordanian-Palestinian struggle. The DPF is currently engaged in building a Marxist-Leninist party.

The DPF considers the Rogers so-called Peace Plan as a US-USSR conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian movement. In Jordan the DPF calls for the overthrow of Hussein's regime and for the transfer of all power to the People's Councils. Instead of a 'democratic non-sectarian Palestine', the DPF considers that a solution can only come through the formation of a socialist Palestinian state within a larger socialist Arab union.

POSTSCRIPT:

Without disagreeing with the general outline of DPF positions above, the Bulletin feels that the comrades from the West Coast have made a wrong evaluation of the role of the 'industrial bourgeoisie' in the West Bank. Presumably, according to the article, this sector of the upper bourgeoisie which is engaged "in processing and marketing agricultural products ... has been hurt by Israeli competition and would welcome the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan." This assessment would otherwise be insignificant had it not to do with the consideration of potential allies (among elements of the national bourgeoisie) in the transitional phase of the antiimperialist/anti-Zionist struggle, who in the final analysis are our class enemies.

It must be asserted here that although there are role differentiations in the economic activity of the Palestinian upper bourgeoisie such a differentiation takes the form of division of labor within the functions of the same class, (e.g. the big export-import merchants also employ their capital in industrial projects involving food production). This is especially true of big merchants in the Khalil (Hebron) and Nablus regions where agricultural industries--soap and other olive oil products, food packaging, etc.--are most prominent. In contrast one can seek such relative distinctions within the Lebanese bourgeoisie where the interests of the commercial-financial (comprador) bourgeoisie occasionally come into conflict with those of the industrial (national-capitalist) stratum.

Now it has been a consistent policy of

the Zionist occupation forces to subsidize middle and rich farmers as well as entrepreneurs in order to create an atmosphere of economic prosperity in the West Bank to facilitate an attitude of resignation to Israeli political rule among the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. Such a policy has been more successful than is usually acknowledged in Arab and Palestinian circles.

The Israelis, aware of the dangerous implications of a situation of economic stagnation which might create revolutionary consciousness in the West Bank "hastened to grant economic subsidies since the beginning of occupation while maintaining the existing economic relationships between the two banks...this was a conscious attempt on the part of the enemy to consolidate the leadership of the big bourgeoisie and the political feudalists on top of the Palestinian class structure to form the class and political intermediary agents between the occupation authorities and the Palestinian masses (e.g. Kan'an, Ja'bari, Taji, al-Shawwa, etc.)" (N. Hawatmeh, On the Crises of the Palestinian Resistance Movement--Beirut, 1969--pp. 120-123). This paragraph and the subsequent analysis points out a clear trend: that the Israelis have succeeded in winning the Palestinian big bourgeoisie as a whole as the future heirs to the proposed Palestinian "state" in the West Bank. Hamdi Kan'an's public sponsorship of this project recently bears out this point only too clearly.

Secondly: the DPF, as far as we know, does not consider the formation of a 'socialist Palestinian state within a larger socialist Arab Union' as an alternative to the democratic Palestinian state. Rather the Front sees as the immediate aim of the Palestine national liberation movement "the establishment of a popular democratic Palestinian state where Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights without discrimination and where all forms of national and class oppression will be abolished" (DPF draft resolution to the Palestine National Congress, Sept. 1969). This process, the DPF further asserts, can only be realized under workingclass leadership in alliance with the peasantry and poor refugees. In addition only a socialist program can maintain the victory of the national democratic revolution in Palestine. But having posed socialism as the aim of DPF's perspective for the Palestinian revolution, the Front does not substitute that aim for the transitional program of establishing "the popular democratic state" especially with the significant presence of the petty-bourgeoisie (and that includes the peasantry) in the national democratic stage of the revolution.

The Conflict Between The Resistance And The Jordanian Regime On The Cairo Agreement

There is no doubt that any agreement reached in a struggle such as the one between the Jordanian regime and the resistance, is no more than an expression of a certain balance of forces and of the internal and external political circumstances which surround and affect the situation.

The main reason on the part of the Jordanian regime for the acceptance of the ceasefire was the fierce resistance it countered for ten days, from the Fedayeen in Amman. This marked the failure of the regimes plan to crush the resistance in the capital within 48 hours, this failure made it politically and militarily impossible to continue fighting.

The primary motive of the resistance movement in accepting the ceasefire was to put an end to the butchery that was being conducted by the Jordanian Army on the civilian population, and to lift the siege around those Fedayeen who were fighting with very limited amounts of supplies and ammunition.

The Arab States concerned saw to their benefit that the battle should end with three specific results:-

- (1) The preservation of the Hashimite Monarchy.
- (2) Keeping the Palestinian resistance movement weak so that it would not be capable of opposing the "peace" plans. This also means that it will become easy for Arab governments to extend an "official protection" of the movement and by doing so interfere in its internal affairs with the purpose of limiting the political framework of the movement. This would in turn force it toward accepting a Palestinian state tied to the notion of "Peaceful Coexistence" with Israel.
- (3) To avoid at all costs an American military intervention, so that the Arab governments would not be put in an embarrassing situation on a mass level and to insure that the prospects of the "peace" plan are not complicated.

It was clear, however, that after the first direct Arab intervention (the first visit to Amman of the official Arab delegation formed at the summit meeting) that King Hussein was operating on his own terms. He wanted the complete destruction of the Palestine resistance movement and the continuation of the butchery which he had begun on the Palestinian people until that goal was accomplished.

When the Summit meeting realized that King Hussein was not going to follow the official Arab position, only then did it become necessary to try to stop him by politically attacking him and publicly accusing him of trying to liquidate the resistance movement and massacring the Palestinian people !!! (This is what the purpose of the press conference held by Al-Numeiry at the request of the Summit meeting and after his second return from Amman, was for.)

This political reproach did not last very

long because shortly after the summit meeting succeeded in stopping the fighting and negotiating a meeting between the two parties.

This is what brought about the Cairo agreement. An agreement which represents an internal military balance on one side (in Jordan), and the colluding attitudes of the Arab regimes vis-a-vis the struggle in Jordan, on the other.

Using this as our background we shall now look at the Cairo agreement itself to see how it ties itself up to the three aims it set out with which we mentioned earlier.

On one hand King Hussein wants to use the agreement to his own benefit, i.e. to weaken and divide the resistance movement as much as possible.

The Palestine resistance on the other hand must specify its position on executing the agreement in such a way as to avoid falling into the trap that has been set up for it, and in a way that can gain it temporary military and political goals towards continuing its struggle against the Hashemite regime.

The agreement is being carried out today under the supervision of the (Arab committee), headed by Al-Baghi Al-Adgham (prime minister of Tunisia).

THE CONTENT OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT :

1. The Jordanian Army will withdraw 5 kilometers away from the capital. The Fedayeen in Amman will withdraw to Ajloun mountains next to Jarash. (This part of the agreement has already been accomplished.)
2. The Jordanian Army should withdraw to the same bases they used to occupy prior to the fighting.
3. The Fedayeen should return to those bases which had been occupied by the Jordanian Army.

In summary : The Fedayeen will have full freedom of movement in all their previous bases in the main routes leading to them. However all internal bases will be training and supply centers but not staging areas for guerrilla activity.

This agreement necessarily remains in a very general framework since there are several important points over which a great deal of controversy. It is these issues that will determine the way the agreement will be executed on the political and military level.

The three main points involved are :-

1. The form in which the presence of the movement in Amman will take. i.e. the different political offices (of the different organizations) and the question of the militia.
2. The situation in the Northern areas.
3. Return to "civilian rule".

FIRST, THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE RESISTANCE AND THE QUESTION OF THE MILITIA :

After the withdrawal of the Army and the Fedayeen forces from Amman the question arises as to what form should the different political organizations within the resistance take? It is clear that the Jordanian regime under the pretense of working with only one organization (PLO), is trying to shut down all the political bureaus of the different organizations. It is doing this in an attempt to split and weaken the movement.

The resistance movement considers that the agreement must hold for all the different organizations within the movement, because it is clear that the Jordanian government has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Palestinian organizations forcing them all into one group.

The other important issue involved is the presence of a people's militia in Amman. King Hussein is trying to disband and disarm the militia because as he put it (in the Paris newspaper "Figaro"): "No one is threatening the population, so why carry guns?" (one of the suggestions presented by the Jordanian government to the Arab committee) was that all the arms of the militia should be stored in special warehouses in Amman and these will be delivered to the population in the event of an Israeli attack only!!!)

The position of the Palestinian resistance on this question is absolutely clear. The continued presence of the militia in Amman is a political question upon which there will be no compromise whatsoever. Yasir Arafat clearly stated in the Cairo conference: "on this point there will be no compromise whatsoever. We are not prepared to take away from a people the arms which they fight with, thereby repeating the 1948 catastrophe".

SECOND : THE NORTHERN AREAS : on this question the agreement stated the following :

1. The Palestinian Liberation Army should withdraw its forces to their previous bases between Irbid and Jarash.

2. There should be full freedom of movement to and from bases, on the main routes and the side routes.

3. The route between Ramtha and Dara'a should be opened with full freedom of entering and leaving for both the Fedayeen and the Palestine Liberation Army, from Syria to Jordan and vice versa. This should be done on the condition that every individual will carry a personal identification card with his picture and this card will become

an acceptable form of crossing the borders.

The struggle over the liberated zones has already caused a breach in the ceasefire on the part of the regime which understands the importance of the positions presently occupied by the Fedayeen in the North. On 5/10/1970 the regime carried out military operations against a base of the Fedayeen in Haryma, an area north of Irbid. Haryma is considered a crossroads of several important routes and it is also on the border with Syria.

THIRD : THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE: The Cairo agreement states that a return to civilian rule is absolutely crucial to any success of the talks. The resistance movement made a request to the Arab committee to discuss this issue with the popular movement in Jordan. However it should be made clear that any return to civilian rule of this sort does not make a qualitative change in the situation so long as King Hussein continues to use a "National Government" as a curtain behind which he plots the liquidation of the resistance.

The struggle over executing the Cairo agreement is taking place within a very limited framework through which the Jordanian regime together with the Arab governments and the Big Powers are trying to push the resistance movement into, namely: that of bringing to life the project for a Palestinian state as a part of the "peaceful settlement" with Israel.

It is possible to arrive at this goal by play the different Palestinian organizations against each other thereby encouraging those elements within the movement that may be prepared to accept the project of a Palestinian State.

From this we can understand the goals of the political attack delivered by the Jordanian minister of information in which he stressed that the Jordanian government will only deal with one organization (i.e. Fateh) and that all "left-wing organizations" would be considered as no more than Armed political parties which should be banned.

The purpose of the attacks is to generate false assumptions inside the resistance movement; i.e. that it would be possible to coexist with the Jordanian regime were it not for the presence of the left-wing organizations. This argument hides the historical truth that the Jordanian regime has continuously aimed undermining and liquidating the Palestine revolution as a whole quite apart from the identity of the different organizations.

This is what was stated by Ibrahim Bakr in the name of the Central Committee of the Palestinian resistance in reply to the minister of information when he said : " The Jordanian minister of information has interfered in the internal affairs of the Palestinian revolution and this is something which the Central Committee will not tolerate. The Palestine revolution refuses to subject itself to any form of administration or "protection" or interference not only from the Jordanian Government but from any Arab Government."

WHAT IS THE TRUTH??

Just a brief review of the year before 1967 shows us that the Jordanian government had already come into conflict with the Palestine Liberation Organization and Fateh, at a time when there were no "armed bands".

When Israel attacked the village of Samou' in October 1966, on the pretext of retaliation against Fedai activities the Jordanian government was actively fighting against the Fedayeen, especially Fateh, because at that time there were no

organizations except Fateh. As a result of this attack the country witnessed tremendous mass support for the Fedayeen. Immediately after the 1967 war the Jordanian regime once again tried to undermine Fateh activities.


These attempts to divide the Palestinian organizations and attack their most radical elements are closely connected to the present attempts to bring about a Palestinian state. This project cannot be brought about unless the Palestinian movement is fragmented. Such splits would strengthen the position of those elements within the movement that will cooperate with such a plan.

The notion of a Palestinian state is definitely developing momentum in international and Israeli circles, as can be easily observed by following the Western press. In Israel the government is now working on a project to grant to the Arabs of the West Bank "self government". The objective of the plan is to "grant" to 600,000 Arabs in the West Bank "the right to control their affairs" in "all areas" except those connected with defense and foreign affairs, which will remain in the hands of the Israeli government.

All these signs come as a prelude to the concept of a West-Bank Palestinian state.

The Palestinian people must realize that the execution of the Cairo agreement is not a question of separate military or political clauses isolated from the much larger political framework that holds real dangers to the Palestine resistance movement.

-- Al-Hurriah, # 536, 10/19/70.



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THE EGYPTIAN REGIME AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

[Ed. Note: The following analysis appeared in October 26, and Nov. 9 (#s 538, 540) issues of al-Hurriah, that is, before the proclamation of the proposed confederation between the UAR, Libya, Sudan, and later, Syria.]



The appointment of Dr. Mahmud Fawzi as the new Prime Minister (of the UAR) and the retention of most cabinet members in their posts stresses clearly the affinity of the present Egyptian leadership with the policies set by Nasser before his death in the efforts of finding a political solution for the Middle Eastern crises.

The choice of Fawzi under the prevailing conditions was dictated by two main considerations in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict: First is the restriction of the regime's maneuverability within the boundaries of the UN Security Council Resolution (of 1967). The second consideration is the acceptance of the American (Rogers) proposals and what they entail: cease-fire along the Suez Canal and negotiation of a settlement with Israel.

This perspective was facing major obstacles just before the death of Nasser which the late President was able to control only in their internal (i.e. popular) manifestations. Those obstacles to the "peaceful solution" of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be summed up in the following: Israel's military superiority (with US backing), the defensive nature of Soviet aid to Egypt, the US-Israeli accusations of cease-fire violations against the UAR, the failure of the Jarring "Peace Talks", the effects of the three-month cease-fire on the morale of the Egyptian army, and (perhaps most important) the consequences of Egypt's acceptance of the US proposals internally and among the Arab masses--especially after the massacres in Jordan (September).

New Problems

As soon as the new leadership was able to handle the effect of Nasser's death on the Egyptian masses, and the redistribution of responsibilities was accomplished, it had to face a combination of new pressing tasks:

1. The alleged intransigence of Israel after its withdrawal from the Jarring talks.
2. The termination of the cease-fire agreement (Nov. 5) and the consequences of a new 90-day extension on the military and the masses.
3. Increased U.S. backing of Israel with the conclusion of the Phantom deal and the new military-economic aid program.
4. Withdrawal of the U.S. from the four-Powers talks on the ambassadorial level.
5. The absence in Egypt of a leadership capable of winning and maintaining mass support for its political moves.

The political content of the slogan raised by the new leadership--"Following the Road of Nasser"--is connected with two central questions: continuing the alliance with the Soviet Union, and continuing their moves on the basis of the UN Resolution and the Rogers Plan.

It is clear that the current obstacles facing them are connected with the second question. Under the present conditions it is unexpected that the Egyptian rulers will raise objections to their relations with the Soviet Union, given the stability of this bond by virtue of the solid place occupied by the USSR in Egypt's military and economic plans. Hence the focus of this continuity "on Nasser's path" is connected with the UN and American 'peace plans'...not only in the methods of overcoming the above obstacles, but also--and this is more important--in securing a balance between the objective requirements of those policies and the popular pressures demanding the liberation (of Sinai) and victory.

Nasser's leadership was capable of maintaining an acceptable balance--from the view of maintaining the regime's interests-- while exposing the incapability of his regime to initiate a total war of liberation against Israel. It is clear that the present leadership cannot use Nasser's methods with the same effectiveness.

The Attempt to "Win" America

Two seemingly contradictory trends emerge within the new Egyptian leadership: One is directed internally; emphasizing the inevitability of liberation and victory by Egypt's own forces, rejecting American-Israeli pressures for the withdrawal of (Soviet) missiles from the Suez, and proclaiming that "the battle goes on even when the cease-fire will be extended" [Sadat's add-

ress to army officers, al-Ahram, September 20, 1970 7.

The other trend is directed at the West and can be summarized by Sadat's words "Our hearts and minds are open"--said while referring to the U.S. role as the "key" to the crises, and that Jarring's task will succeed in 24 hours "if the U.S. was not behind Israel's expansionist schemes". Sulzburger's interview with Sadat in the New York Times 7.

This second position becomes less subtle when Egyptian pronouncements are not subjected to the scrutiny of Arab audiences. Thus in another effort to "win America to the Arab side" Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal (in charge of Egyptian concerns in Washington) informed the (US) National Press Club that "we want to win America as a friend and supporter of our rights. We believe that our relations with the U.S. must improve..." and "There is no conflict of interests...the Arab world constitutes a large and widening market for American products..." (!!!). As for U.S. arms to Israel: "they encourage the Zionist state to challenge American and international principles." (?:)



The so-called "intransigence of the Arabs and Israelis" in their positions never really went beyond disagreements over questions of detail of the implementation of the Security Council Resolution and the Rogers Proposals. Both plans have the collective agreement of the groups involved.

Israel's Position

The extension of the cease-fire agreement provides an ample opportunity for Israel to consolidate its foothold over the lands occupied since 1967 (establishment of new colonies, fortifications, etc...). Israel will be in a position of power which will enable her in the future to impose new demarcations of her borders in case of an incomplete withdrawal (e.g. annexation of Jerusalem, "special status" for the Gaza Strip, a "Palestine Entity" in the West Bank attached to the Israeli state, final annexation of the Golan Heights).

Thus Israel is seeking objectives from the first cease-fire agreement and its extension which it could not accomplish after its military victory in 1967--partially due to the Soviet military aid to Egypt. The military pressure on the UAR (in-depth bombardments) aimed at gaining such concessions which the American proposals finally achieved. Israeli initial ob-

jections to the US plan should not lead us to the ridiculous conclusion that those proposals did not meet Israel's needs. At worst they accomplished two such needs: They forced Arab recognition of Israel through the U.N. resolution, and they allow for strategic rearrangement of Israeli borders in occupied Arab territories--now imposed from a position of strength.



The official Arab position on the cease-fire extension has been led by Egyptian propaganda which proclaimed it as a "last chance for testing the peaceful intentions" of the United States. This line must be exposed for what it is: a determined attempt on the part of Arab governments to implement the UN Security Council Resolution with all what it entails; the recognition of the Zionist entity in Palestine, dealing with Israel in several forms (use of the Aqaba Gulf and the Suez Canal), and the actual liquidation of the cause of the Palestinian people through the proposed "Entity".

In the duration of the three-month standstill on the Suez Arab counter-revolution adopted a two-pronged strategy:

* The most brutal attack on the Palestinian resistance movement was launched by the Comradour regime in Jordan.

* Organized and systematic deceit by the Egyptian regime was directed at the Arab masses.

All those factors continue to ripen the fruits of the "peaceful solution". The recent extension of the cease-fire agreement brings this process to a higher stage: Further neutralization of the popular movement and encirclement of the Resistance--thus making the conditions for returning to the battlefield virtually impossible.



SUDANESE COMMUNIST PARTY UNDER REPRESSION

The military regime of General Ga'far Muhammad al-Nimeiry in the Sudan has begun a witch-hunt against the Sudanese Communist Party, ousting its representatives from the government and arresting its leaders.

The government radio in Omdurman announced Nov. 16 that three cabinet ministers, members of the Communist party, were relieved of their functions. Thirty officers in the Sudanese army, thought to be sympathetic to the CP, were removed from command. The CP's general secretary, Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub, was arrested.

Mahjoub was exiled by Nimeiry last April but he was allowed to return to the country in June. He had been under close government surveillance until the purge began.

The Communist Party was instrumental in bringing the Nasserite Nimeiry regime to power in the coup of May 25, 1969. Nimeiry's Revolutionary Command Council depended on the Communist-led unions in the initial period of its rule. The junta adopted a "left" stance, calling for "Sudanese socialism" and aligning itself with the more radical of the Arab bourgeois states.

Earlier this year, on the first anniversary of the coup, Nimeiry announced a series of sweeping nationalizations, including all foreign-owned banks and four British companies that control the bulk of Sudan's foreign trade.

Like Libya, the new regime moved toward a close alliance with the United Arab Republic, with a concomitant shift toward opposition to the aims of the Palestinian resistance movement after the Middle East cease-fire began this summer.

The Sudanese Party had been subject to a deep factional dispute within its ranks on the question of the party's relation to the present regime. The faction which contain the communist ministers who participated in the government--a minority tendency--had been advocating the "assimilation" of the party within the National Progressive Front, which is sponsored by the regime. The majority faction, led by Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub, favored the party's participation in the Front but insisted on the party's independent existence.

The Sudanese Communist Party is one of the largest and most powerful among the Arab CPs. Although it has been previously looked upon as belonging to the revisionist bloc, the Party--under strong pressure from its working class base--became the first Arab CP to reverse its revisionist stance on the Palestine question (i.e. acceptance of the UN partition plan in 1948) and come toward open support for the Palestinian resistance movement.

/From--al-Hurriah, Nov. 23, 1970
542 (Beirut).

&--Intercontinental Press
Nov. 30, 1970, vol 8, #40/

Somerville, Mass.
December 15, 1970

Letter from the Editors of the Palestine Resistance Bulletin:

Responses to the first three issues of the Bulletin went far beyond our expectations. The majority of requests and comments we received have confirmed the outlook to which the editors dedicated themselves to in PRB #1: to give priority to Marxist-Leninist analysis of events in the Middle East. Beginning with the January 1971 issue (PRB #6) the Bulletin will publish those letters from the readers that the editors feel will contribute to the clarification of our understanding of revolutionary movements in the Middle East--as well as those articles that raise serious questions about the line taken by the editors in support of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Increasingly the Bulletin will depend less on direct translations from the Arabic socialist press and more on original articles written in dialogue with the American left. Future issues will still contain one major document from the Arabic--and occasionally from Persian, Hebrew, and Turkish. Readers are reminded of the following:

1. Despite tripling the circulation of the Bulletin since PRB #1 came out in August, the demand is still much higher than the small volunteer staff can handle. So far we managed to send PRB free of charge to a considerable number of friends and interested readers. Unfortunately our financial situation does not allow us to continue this practice; if you fall in this category and would like to still receive the Bulletin please subscribe by filling the form below. Those readers who would still like to receive the Bulletin but cannot afford to subscribe, please write and tell us so.

2. Subscription rate is still \$1.50 for 12 issues. This covers the minimal costs of printing and mailing the Bulletin. Contributions to help in the expansion of the quality of layout and content will be greatly appreciated. Readers who send \$5.00 and above will automatically receive all the pamphlets, buttons and posters described in our literature list in this issue. Cheques may now be made to the "Palestine Resistance Bulletin".

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a communique of the DPF



Two military operations were carried out in occupied Palestine by the Democratic Popular Front during the first half of November. The operation involved the ambush of an Israeli patrol in upper Galilee (Huneen region) on the evening of November 4, 1970. After fierce fighting lasted for three hours all enemy soldiers were wiped out. Three partisans of the Front were killed: Comrade M.I. Mahfuz, Comrade A.M. Ramadan, and comrade G.Zuhur.

The second operation consisted of an attack on Israeli forces outside the colony of Avavim, also in Upper Galilee on November 12, 1970 and forced the enemy to call for aerial bombardments from the Israeli Air Force. The operation resulted in the following: 1. Total destruction of an army encampment. 2. Death and injury to an unidentified number of enemy soldiers. 3. Demolition of several colony constructions. An Israeli news broadcast acknowledged four casualties.

The Democratic Popular Front issued the following communique:

The national cause of our people is passing through its most crucial stage while the reactionary forces in Amman are attempting to harvest the fruits of their barbaric onslaught in September. Their aim is to bring the Palestinian resistance to its knees and impose on it its liquidationist schemes in the form of the proposed "Palestine Entity" project.

Following the cease-fire agreement between the Resistance and the Fascist regime in Amman, the government began a political campaign of encirclement to crush the Resistance and clear it out completely from the Jordanian towns and countryside. This became evident from its dealings with one section of the Central Committee (Fateh)

while neglecting the others. The government thus is aiming at splitting the movement through a series of instigated clashes and arbitrary arrests. Similarly, the formation of the "civil" government headed by Wasfi al-Tal--foremost leader of the September counter-revolutionary onslaught--clearly marks this trend.

Our Militant Masses:

The Palestine Resistance Movement must fight for the total liberation of Palestinian territory from Zionism and imperialism and for the establishment of a democratic state where all forms of national and class oppression will be eliminated, and not for a deformed Palestinian Entity 'granted' on a territory to be relinquished by Israel only so that our people will be subjected again to Jordanian police rule. Nor is the Resistance fighting for a state whose international links with imperialism will provide a security belt for the state of Israel.

The counter-revolutionary forces in Amman have shown their true nature and made it clear for us who are our enemies and friends. We shall not lay down our arms! We shall never submit to living in our camps and to the mass repression of the authorities. We are not frightened by the weapons of imperialism and reaction and their liquidationist schemes!

Long Live the Palestine Resistance Movement!
Eternal Glory to Our Martyrs!
Let Us Bury Forever All the Conspiracies of Counter-revolution!

---The Democratic Popular Front For
The Liberation of Palestine.

P.R.Bulletin

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