

GREATER ISRAEL

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GREATER ISRAEL

A Study in Zionist Expansionist Thought

by

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FOREWORD

The concept of "Greater Israel" has accompanied the Zionist Movement from its birth. In its earliest days, the Movement began striving (especially through the World Zionist Organization and its various agencies) to separate Palestine or a portion of it, or Palestine and parts of the neighbouring territories, from the Arab homeland. It did this by means of force, violence, intrigue, calculation, instigation, terrorism and conspiracy, transforming the area into a Jewish national home. Therefore, to speak of "Greater Israel," of "Israel," or of the "frontiers" which the Zionists claimed for their usurped entity in Palestine has come to amount to the same thing. "Greater Israel" as well as the plans, programmes and activities related to it, occupies an important place in the Zionist political literature. The libraries specializing in the Palestine question are rich in documents pertaining to this subject. The Research Center feels that one of its important tasks is to follow up Zionist ideas and schemes, to record and study them from their original sources in order to point out their dangers to Arab aspirations and rights. The Research Center also thought that it should undertake a detailed study of the concept of "Greater Israel" and its development throughout its historical periods, its ideological parties, its organization and thinkers. This was to be done from its emergence as an aggressive idea to the present time when it has achieved a great part of its aims as a result of the Zionist occupation of the whole of Palestine and parts of the two neighbouring Arab Republics, the U.A.R. and Syria. For now "Greater Israel" has become an openly proclaimed slogan, raised by the various Organizations and Movements in occupied Palestine, with no reservations or reluctance.

The Research Center entrusted Dr. Ass'ad Razzouk with the task of carrying out this long study. To do this he had to go over the hundreds of sources and documents related to the subject, from books to articles and files published by dozens of Zionist associations and prominent personalities in the Zionist Movement published over the last hundred years. The Center made available to the author all the means at its disposal, all its written records and sources, to provide him with all the data directly relevant to the subject. The Research Center does not confine its role to that of accepting ready-made research, publishing it and distributing it; rather it provides its authors and researchers with the sources and guidance necessary for their research. This book bears witness to the importance of the reciprocal relations between the researcher who devoted his time to this study, and the Center which made documentary records available for such work.

Anis Sayegh

Director General of the Research Center

INTRODUCTION

In its broad lines, this work is an attempt at carrying out a historical survey of the concept of "Greater Israel." It tries to examine the developments and changes which have been brought to it from its first appearance in written texts until the "Smaller Israeli State" undertook the occupation of the remaining part of Palestine, in addition to areas of the neighbouring Arab States after the June 1967 aggression. Thus, this study into the nature and implications of such an idea necessitates the examination of its origin and its formation before pursuing its development in its historical phases. It was also necessary to study the embryonic life of this concept until we reached the formation of the Organized Zionist Movement at an international level and the efforts exerted to put the idea into execution. Further, it required a close study of the movements, trends and ideas which originated from non-Jewish sources and proclaimed their Zionist aspect tens or even hundreds of years before the Jews started to look in the direction of the call for modern Zionism. We have chosen to use the term "Gentile Zionism"* to indicate such non-Jewish Zionists with a view to pointing out the part it played, directly or indirectly, in encouraging the emergence of Zionism and in crystallizing the idea of "Greater Israel" in particular. It is evident that the subject of Gentile Zionism and its linking to a great number of projects aimed at establishing a firm foothold for Jewish colonization in Palestine require a careful study. The religious roots and Jewish beliefs which nourished the idea of "Greater Israel" in addition to the Zionized Christian religious movements and their plans to send the Jews back to Palestine and reconstitute the country to them, necessitate an independent study, detailed and analytical. They are, therefore, mentioned from the viewpoint of the aspects which are relevant to this study. The Zionist and Zionized activities of the nineteenth century from the Napoleonic expedition (1798) to Ibrahim Pasha's conquest of Syria and Palestine and the various colonialist plans (1840) until the appearance of the call for modern Jewish nationalism, especially in Moses Hess's book, *Rome and Jerusalem*, (1862) were not dealt with. Also, the religious birth of the idea and the revival it witnessed in the sixteenth century at the hands of Gentile Zionism is not within the scope of this study in spite of the important role played by the "new crusade" in encouraging the Zionist Movement and awakening the Jews to their nationalism by exploiting the colonialist ambitions and aims and getting to the point of realizing some of the captious religious beliefs.

Although this study is in fact a collection of findings and data linked together by a common denominator—it is centered on Zionism as an idea, a call and an

*Christopher Sykes, *Two Studies in Virtue*, (London, 1953), p. 149.

expansionist movement—it endeavours to point out the share contributed by each of these numerous forms in nourishing the idea of “Greater Israel” and leading it to the level of implementation.

It is also essential to mention here the aspect from which the subject is dealt with and which can be considered to be one of the major bases of the Zionist Movement. In its general stamp it indicates the idea of the reconstruction of Palestine and the reoccupation of the land by the Jews of the world. Zionist policy and programmes are based on the principles of religious irredentism. This term originated in Italy and was first used in the year 1883, according to the shorter Oxford English Dictionary. It spread in Italian political life after 1878 to describe the members of the party which was calling for the restitution of all the Italian regions under foreign rule and annexing them to the Italian mother country under the slogan *Italia irredenta* or Italy which is still waiting for redemption, liberation and restitution. Looking into the Arab dictionary, *Al-Mawred*, we find the following: “Irredentism corresponds to the Arab expression ‘liberating and unifying’ which means: the political principle calling for the liberation of the regions historically or racially connected (now under another entity), and their unification to form a political entity as well as their joining in the scope of this natural entity. Whereas ‘*irredenta*,’ or ‘this dismantled portion,’ indicates such a region historically or racially linked to a political entity and under the control of another political entity.”

It is evident that the above-mentioned irredentist principle is like a two-edged sword, sharper when in the hands of the Arabs than in those of the Zionists. What makes it sharper in Arab hands is its nonreligious character in opposition to the religious one inherent in Zionism. In fact, Zionist irredentism is a perfect representation of the aggressive and expansionist characteristic of this principle. Zionism is in no way related to the liberating unification except when it distorts religious texts with the aim of pursuing temporal objectives and goals far from the spiritual contents of Judaism. The creation of the State of Israel is nothing but an aspect of the principle of Zionist conquest and occupation. And hiding behind the masks of a war for independence and liberation brings no change to the Zionist expansionist complex; it rather incites it to become more aggressive. This fact is, thus, the best witness of the religious nature of this irredentism which represents the most obvious motives acting as the motors of the idea of “Greater Israel.” However, this does not mean that it neglects the nonreligious objectives which are closely related to imperialism and to the aim of taking other people’s property. Even the resort to religious texts itself becomes a pretext to justify the materialist and real motives of the Zionist expansionist ambitions.

We will find many examples of this pattern of thinking which goes from the real and historic reality of Israel on the one hand, to the ideal or the utopian which Zionism wishes intensely to realize, using the pretext of the Covenant which Abraham made with the God of Israel according to the Book of Genesis. We will not stop to consider what were described as the five “concepts” of the

land of Israel in the biblical texts but will restrict ourselves to exposing the various concepts of the map and frontiers of Israel as defined by Zionism under the cover of the search for the historical land of Israel.

As to the method adopted in the following study, it can be summarized as follows:

First: The use of the original texts, religious or nonreligious, Jewish or non-Jewish, to derive the roots of the idea and present its framework.

Second: The reference to scientifically accepted historical facts and truths with a view to taking them as bases of the study in the clarification of the subsequent conditions surrounding the Zionist concept of the establishment of "Greater Israel."

Third: The utilization of general geographical facts, and of the historical geography of Palestine in particular, to show the extent of its connections—and the nature of those connections—with the political developments and moves throughout history in general, and more particularly since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Fourth: The persistent return to the "political map" and to the expansionist Zionist maps in order to derive the Zionist concept of Palestine as a geographical unity swinging between two extremes: the maximum and the minimum "Greater Israel."

Fifth: The exposition of the role of foreign influence and the policy of colonialist interests in the drawing up of the map of Palestine until it coincided with the Zionist plans, and the confirmation that "map-making in the Middle East had never been completely divorced from politics."

Sixth: The evaluation of the movement of "Gentile Zionism" and the delimitation of its contribution, directly or indirectly, in the shaping of the idea of "Greater Israel" and the crystallization of the concept of the "Land of Promise," as well as the distinction between its two parts: the Ecclesiastical and the Secular, with their strategic, imperialist and political motivations, in an attempt at showing the link existing between them.

Seventh: Following up the development which resulted from the idea of the "Greater Israel" during the period of fifty years which separated the issuance of the Balfour Declaration (1917) from the extension of the Zionist aggression after June 1967.

a. The study of the Zionist ambitions and the political positions of the Zionist Movement since the issuance of the Declaration (1917), the Zionist proposals submitted to the Peace Conference in Versailles (1919), and the stipulation of the Mandate in the League of Nations (1922) as well as the appearance of the Revisionist Movement (1925) and the New Zionist Movement under the leadership of Jabotinsky (1935) up until the establishment of the State of Israel.

b. The survey of the contingent developments and temporary amendments to the idea since the creation of Israel (1948) and the implementation of the expansionist plans on the military strategic level. These have taken place under

the cover of the "preventive war" and have been revealed by the tripartite aggression of 1956 followed by the June 1967 aggression which confirmed that the expansionist idea had entered a new phase aimed at imposing the accomplished fact on the pretext of its inability to reach a permanent peace and conclude a peace treaty with the Arabs.

Eighth: The analysis of the statements uttered by the Israeli leaders since the last aggression and the examination of the expansionist political biddings adopted by the new organization for the "Movement of the Land of Greater Israel." Then, the attempt at understanding the quick and "surprising" change and its influence which has been reflected on the pages of the Israeli papers and which has shown the following phases inside the Zionist regional expansionist mentality.

On the morning of Monday, June 5, 1967, the Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, declared that "we do not have any aggressive expansionist intention." The American magazine *Newsweek* reviewed in its issue of December 25, 1967, the process of the propaganda developments which led Levi Eshkol to depart from his manoeuvres and reservations related to the plan of "Greater Israel" according to the picture which can be summed up in the following manner: "The Israeli Press started, immediately after the first victory, to call the territorial gains, the conquered regions. It did not take long before this expression was changed into the occupied territories." The latter became in turn "the liberated territories" to end up with the last designation used recently by Levi Eshkol who had been preceded in this by Moshe Dayan, the great rabbis, the leaders of the Israeli parties and Yigal Allon, and who has started since the month of October speaking frankly about "Greater Israel," the security requirements and the new frontiers.

Ninth: The connection between the recent developments and their surrounding conditions on the one hand and the Zionist expansionist plan on the other; also, the confirmation of the existence of the idea of "Greater Israel" in the hidden constituting elements of the Zionist programme and then, the attempt at showing it as a higher aim from the innermost of the Zionist religious irredentist movement.

Tenth: The conclusion of the study and the testimony of the historical events and their outcome to throw light on the fate of the idea of the "Greater Israel." They also show the danger which its implementation and the materialization of the last forms of expansionist religious irredentism, the most extreme and based on racial considerations, represent to the Arab existence.

PART ONE

HERZL'S ERA

THE CHOSEN ONE

All the various elements which converged to form the Zionist movement, from the time of its conception to the beginning of the period of its political activity, are reflected in the personality of Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), the founder of modern Zionism. Zionism as an idea, a cause, and a movement, finds its roots in a number of sources, Jewish and non-Jewish, from the religious and salvatory motives springing out of both Messianism and utopianism on the one hand, to the expansionist territorial ambitions and the "disguised crusades" on the other. Zionism plans to bring these two trends together and does not refrain from using, to fulfil its aims, imperialism of all sorts and origins; it even tries to make its demands coincide with the interests of imperialism and in harmony with those countries within the Great Powers' spheres of influence. Besides, Zionism is one of the most "retrogressive" movements of the modern world; its contents reveal a scrupulous determination to ignore the evolution of history, as if it wished to make the latter go back to eras and environments already passed, instead of adjusting itself to historical evolution and looking forward into the new horizons of the future.

Six months before his death, Herzl met Reuben Brainin, an Hebraic writer, and revealed to him the origin of his Zionist thinking, telling him: "At about the age of twelve he read somewhere in a German book about the Messiah-King whom many Jews still awaited and who would come riding, like the poorest of the poor on an ass." In this connection, Alex Bein relates: "The history of the Exodus and the legend of the liberation by the King-Messiah ran together in the boy's mind . . . A little thereafter Herzl was visited by the following dream:

The King-Messiah came, a glorious and majestic old man, took me in his arms, and swept off with me on the wings of the wind. On one of the iridescent clouds we encountered the figure of Moses. The Messiah called to Moses: It is for this child that I have prayed. But to me he said: Go declare to the Jews that I shall come soon and perform great wonders and great deeds for my people and for the whole world."¹

What were these "great deeds" the Messiah told him to preach and how did this revelation affect both his contemplative and active life?

(1) Alex Bein, *Theodor Herzl* (Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1945), pp. 13-14.

It is beyond doubt that Zionism, as preached by Herzl, brought together an extreme religious mysticism and a sort of utopia or scientific vision, both aspects appearing clearly throughout his famous diaries. At this point we will mention an Austrian writer who had worked in the field of journalism as an economist and defended the theory of free trade, Theodor Hertzka (1845-1920); he had written a German play which he had called (*Freiland*) or the *Freeland*. The action of the play takes place in an imaginary country on the African continent; Hertzka described the economic system of this country as based on the collective possession of land while all other properties were privately owned. He had in fact collaborated with the *Neue Freie Presse* as a specialist in matters of economics between 1872 and 1879; later, he founded a daily newspaper (*Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*) in which he acted as chief editor until 1886; he, then, published a second play, *A Journey to Freeland (Eine Reise nach Freiland)* and endeavoured, in vain, to make of his "ideal country" a reality in the African continent.²

In the first part of his diaries, Herzl admits having on August 21, 1895 addressed to the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community in Vienna, Moritz Güdemann, a letter in which he stated that he had heard about Hertzka's first play but could not decide whether it centered on the Jews or not. When, in a library in Munich, he got hold of the second play, he found in it more elaboration on the subject and described it as the product of a resourceful imaginative mind. He said, "It is quite an ingenious fantasy, as remote from life as the equatorial mountain on which 'Freiland' is located"; then, wishing to do away with the accusation of utopia in relation to his own plan for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth or a Jewish state, he presented to the rabbi the following comparison:

"*Freiland* is a complicated piece of machinery with many cogs and wheels; but I find no proof that it can be set in motion.

"As against this, my plan calls for the utilization of a driving force that actually exists.

"What is this force? The distress of the Jews!

"Who dares deny that this force exists?

"But our force grows with the pressure that is exerted on us. I believe there are already enough sensible people to understand this simple truth."³

Herzl had addressed this letter to the Chief Rabbi after having communicated with Nordau on this matter for one and a half months; they had reached the conclusion that, "Semitic struggles alone have made of us Jews." In the first page of his diaries,⁴ Herzl, wishing to present a "written record" of his dream, speaks

(2) It seems that the plan presented by the British Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, to the Zionist leaders, and which consisted of the occupation of East Africa (Uganda) by Zionists, was not the product of the moment. It was rather felt that, before Herzl, Hertzka himself had referred to the same area.

(3) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, Vol. 1, (Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff, New York, 1960), pp. 237-238.

(4) Herzl's diaries were published in their complete form in 1960. A German edition had been previously published in Berlin in 1922; it was however incomplete since it was censored for political or personal reasons!

of his decision to write a novel, "The Promised Land," in which he would put his vision into words. He states:

"For some time past I have been occupied with a work of infinite grandeur. At the moment I do not know whether I shall carry it through. It looks like a mighty dream. But for days and weeks it has possessed me beyond the limits of consciousness; it accompanies me wherever I go, hovers behind my ordinary talk, looks over my shoulder at a comically trivial journalistic work, disturbs me and intoxicates me.

It is still too early to surmise what will come of it. But my experience tells me that even as a dream it is something remarkable, and that I ought to write it down—if not as a reminder to mankind, then at least for my own delight or reflection in later years. And perhaps as something between these two possibilities—that is, as literature. If my conception is not translated into reality, at least out of my activity can come a novel. Title: The Promised Land!

To tell the truth, I am no longer sure that it was not actually the novel that I first had in mind—although not as something 'literary' for its own sake, only as something that would serve a purpose."⁵

If by reading the diaries, one could immediately understand the overall idea presented by Herzl, it would consist of a set of principles which, once applied, would provide the solution to the Jewish question. Herzl's plan was to present his conclusions to the great Jewish capitalists such as Baron de Hirsh and the Rothschild Family Council; the idea was to create a Jewish association with the primary concern of organizing the immigration of the Jews into the "Promised Land." Two events were to give more substance to his programme, namely the publication in 1896 of a book entitled *The Jewish State (Der Judenstaat)*, and the Basle Program. The latter's object was "to create in Palestine a homeland for the Jewish nation (*Heimstätte*), guaranteed by international law." The following plan was adopted at the first Zionist Congress, in 1897:

1. The colonization of Palestine by way of Jewish agricultural workers and industrialists under convenient conditions.
2. The organization and coordination of world Jewry through the establishment of local and international associations in accordance with the laws of their respective countries.
3. The strengthening and development of the Jewish national consciousness.
4. The preparation of activity for the conclusion of the arguments necessary for the achievement of Zionist aims.

Thus, following the principles of the Basle Congress, the Zionist Movement started on concerted action based on organization, colonialism, and diplomacy.

Emphasizing the vital importance of the Congress he had called for, Herzl states:

"Were I to sum up the Basle Congress in a word—which I shall guard from pronouncing publicly—it would be this: At Basle I founded the Jewish State."⁶

Later, basing himself on Rousseau's philosophy, he writes that "the foundation of a state lies in the will of the people for a state." Remembering Louis XIV's

(5) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, p. 3.

(6) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 581.

famous statement, "*l'Etat, c'est moi*," he declares that a state could be founded by the will of even one powerful person alone. He, then, makes it clear that the territory is important only inasmuch as it provides a "material basis." "The states," he says, "even when it possesses territory, is always something abstract."⁷

Let us formulate a question on that land which "Herzl's nation" wishes to possess and bring into being. From there, we will proceed to analyze the expansionist character of the Zionist ideology as understood by Herzl while we will endeavour to examine the identity of the "Promised Land" mentioned in the first part of the diaries.

(7) *Ibid.*

THE VISION AND THE REALITY

In the first volume of his diaries, Herzl exposed the two ideas he had conceived in relation to the Jewish question before he adopted Zionism and published his pamphlet, "The Jewish State." The first one consisted of concluding, with the Catholic Church, an agreement by which all Jews would be converted to the religion of the majority, with the exception of the Jewish leaders who would preserve their faith. The second idea was to use anti-Semitism itself for the solution of the Jewish question. In this context, Herzl argued about the strength of this feeling among the European masses and the usefulness of the anti-Semitic movement to the Jewish character:

"It represents the education of a group by the masses, and will perhaps lead to its being absorbed. Education is accomplished only through hard knocks. A Darwinian mimicry will set in. The Jews will adapt themselves."¹

He, then, went on to compare the Jews to the seals "which an act of nature cast into the water." He explained that these animals "assume the appearance and habits of fish, which they certainly are not. Once they return to dry land again and are allowed to remain there for a few generations, they will turn their fins into feet again."²

In his third letter to Baron de Hirsch (June 3, 1895), Herzl addressed himself to the famous philanthropist in the following manner:

"What! You do not understand the imponderable? And what is religion? Consider, if you will, what the Jews have endured for the sake of this vision over a period of two thousand years. Yes, visions alone grip the souls of men ... nevertheless, a people's visions must have firm ground underneath...

The exodus to the Promised Land constitutes in practical terms an enormous job of transportation unprecedented in the modern world. Did I say 'transportation'? It is a complex of all kinds of human enterprise which will be geared one into the other like cog-wheels."³

What was this vision which "gripped" Herzl's mind and thoughts and what was Herzl's concept of the Promised Land?

In this same part of his diaries,⁴ Herzl centers his attention upon the nation of the Promised Land without indulging into specifications as to the location of that land. He simply gives a primary plan of the land as far as boundaries, main cities, military service and popular hymns are concerned. Then, he admits taking the leadership of the Jews without their mandate. Denying the existence of a "social contract," he affirms his belief in the delegation of authority (*Negotorium*

(1) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 10.

(2) *Ibid.*

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 28.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 29.

gestio) as practised by the Romans. He justifies his attitude on this basis and says: "Thus I conduct the affairs of the Jews without their mandate, but I become responsible to them for what I do."⁵

Herzl does not admit neutrality on the part of the Jews; they would have to be his "friends" or his "foes." Concerning his personal security, he explains that it will be "the concern of a well-run Secret Police." He then points out the importance of duelling which will enable him to have real officers ready to face the eventual dangerous missions required by the state. As for labour, it will be organized "along military lines."

Insisting upon the importance of the existence of a healthy economic situation, Herzl affirms that his vision will not become a second Panama but another Suez. It would be worthwhile to remind the reader, in this context, that Herzl was a fervent admirer of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the engineer who was responsible for the opening of the Suez Canal; in fact, he had always hoped to achieve as successful results with his plans as de Lesseps had with the canal.

Besides, Herzl does not forget to reassure the Jews about the conditions of emigration into the Promised Land; he makes it clear that no one will feel uprooted since the journey will be organized in such a way that parents, relatives and friends will be gathered on the same boat. He, then, writes prophetically: "The anti-Semites will become our most dependable friends, the anti-Semitic countries our allies."⁶

Referring to the Promised Land and to its location, Herzl avoids giving precise details on the subject once more; surrounding the matter with even more vagueness, he states: "No one ever thought of looking for the Promised Land where it actually is—and yet it lies so near. This is where it is: within ourselves! . . . The Promised Land is where we carry it!"⁷

In a letter to Bismarck, Herzl exposed his plan to the "greatest living empire builder"; trying to forestall his criticism, he argued that the further utopia is from reality the more interesting and amusing it is. In this context, he does not refrain from comparing himself with those utopian dreamers, from Thomas More to Edward Bellamy, author of the model socialist play, *Looking Backward*.

Towards the middle of June 1895, Herzl was busily engaged in preparing an "Address" to the Rothschild Family Council. The object of the "Address" was to present to the Rothschilds his plan for the solution of the Jewish question. In one of the letters, he raises the issue of the location of the Promised Land with the usual vagueness adopted in relation to this subject:

"As soon as the *Society of Jews* has constituted itself, we shall call a conference of a number of Jewish geographers to determine, with the help of these scholars, who as Jews are loyally devoted to us, where we are going to emigrate.

For I shall now tell you everything about the 'Promised Land' except its location. That is a purely scientific question. We must have regard for geological, climatic, in

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 41.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 84.

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 105.

short, natural factors of all kinds with full circumspection and with consideration of the latest research.”⁸

Herzl, then, emphasizes the importance of diplomacy once agreement is reached on which continent and country. He takes the example of Argentina to illustrate his plan, while confessing that he had first thought of Palestine as “this,” he says, “would have in its favor the facts that it is the unforgotten ancestral seat of our people, that its very name would constitute a program, that it would powerfully attract the lower masses.”⁹

However, clarifying his previous position *vis à vis* Palestine, he declares that the Jews are no longer Orientals and that they would consequently suffer from the climatic conditions prevailing in the country. He also argues that his system of transportation would be hard to implement in the case of Palestine and that its proximity to the European continent would constitute a handicap to his plan as “in the first quarter-century of our existence we shall have to have peace from Europe and its martial and social entanglements, if we are to prosper.”¹⁰ Herzl then points out that, in principle, he is “neither for Argentina nor against Palestine” but rather for the country which will provide the Jews with the proper climatic and geographical environment. For an easier understanding of his plan, he goes back to the example of Argentina and works out his scheme assuming it to be carried out there. Emphasizing the importance of the rabbis, he gives them the chairmanship of the “Local groups”: “After all,” he says, “our clergymen will be the first to understand us and go with us.”¹¹ He then uses one of his famous alluring statements to declare that, in his plan, every person will be given the right to choose his own way to salvation and, wishing to arouse more enthusiasm on the part of the Jews, he goes on to suggest slogans such as: “next year in the Promised Land”! Furthermore, he declares that this propaganda will be included in the religious service, “and properly so.” He says:

“We recognize our historic identity only by the faith of our father, because we have long since inextinguishably absorbed the languages of various nationalities.”¹²

For practical purposes, he decides on the German language to be first used in the Promised Land and, refuting both monarchical and democratic systems of government, he advocates the institution of an aristocratic republic as presented by Montesquieu. He points out that in this type of government “we shall permit no theocratic velleities on the part of our clergy to arise. We shall know how to restrict them to their temples just as we shall restrict our professional soldiers to their barracks.”¹³

Later on, he discusses the question with Nordau and they both agreed that the uniting force of the Jews was not religion but race; they only differed in

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 133.

(9) *Ibid.*

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 133.

(11) *Ibid.*, p. 155.

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 151.

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 171.

their conclusions about the effects of anti-Semitism, Nordau believing that "the Jews will be compelled by anti-Semitism to destroy among all peoples the idea of a fatherland," whereas Herzl thought to himself, "or to create a fatherland of their own."¹⁴

The diaries go on to discuss the necessity of raising all "modern aids" to explore and exploit the "new Jewish land." Herzl mentions again that the location of the land would be decided by the geographers who would have adopted his movement. He states:

"As soon as our geographers have decided on the location and the international and private purchase contracts have been concluded, a ship will sail to take possession of the land.

This ship will carry administrative officials, technicians of all kinds, and delegates of the Local Groups."¹⁵

As for these pioneers, they will have three tasks:

"First, the exact scientific investigation of all natural properties of the land; second, the establishment of a tightly centralized administration; third, the distribution of the land."¹⁶

He, then, points out once more that the only thing which has not been clarified yet is "the way in which the land will be occupied according to Local Groups." He knows, for instance, that the locations "will be auctioned off—not for money, but for achievements." When the new land comes in sight, they will raise their new flag on the staff. As for the flag which Herzl is thinking of, it will be white with seven golden stars." "The white field," he says, "signifies our new, clean life, and the seven stars, our desire to start this new life under the banner of labour."¹⁷ He does not forget to reassure his reader, declaring that the Jews have not ceased to long for the Promised Land. "And it is real," he states, "no fairy tale, no deception!"¹⁸

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 196.

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 174.

(16) *Ibid.*,

(17) *Ibid.*, p. 175.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 181.

A KING SEARCHING FOR A KINGDOM

"The people without a land to
the land without a people!"
(Zangwill)

Herzl left Paris on July 27, 1895, with the firm belief that "the Jewish state was a universal necessity." We can read in his diaries his expectation of a new phase in his life:

"And to-day I am leaving Paris.
One book of my life is ending.
A new one is beginning.
Of what kind?"¹

Now, to Herzl, his private life had ended while the "history of mankind" had begun. When, in the middle of August, he met the proponents of imperialism in Palestine, namely, the Berliner, Heinrich Meyer-Cohn and the Rabbi Moritz Güdemann, all three agreed upon publishing, in the form of a novel, the program Herzl had proposed himself to send to the Family Council of the Rothschilds. And Rabbi Güdemann, quite fascinated by Herzl, stared at him and said, "It is as if I saw Moses in the flesh. Perhaps you are the one who has been called by God."² And he kissed him.

After an exchange of views with his newspaper's staff and his friends in Vienna and Paris, Herzl decided that the first task was to establish a Study Commission in Paris or London. For this reason, he left for London on November 21, 1895, where he met Israel Zangwill, and revealed his programme at a dinner given at the Maccabeans' Club.³ Two months before his arrival in London, Herzl had heard about both Leo Pinsker (1821-1891), the author of a study titled *Auto-Emancipation* who had set himself up as the leader of a movement, called "The Lovers of Zion," at Odessa, and Colonel Goldsmid (1846-1904), the enthusiastic British Zionist who wished to lease a number of ships and invade Palestine once more. In this connection, Goldsmid was told that he would find a large number of supporters among the Russian Jews. It was during his stay in London that Herzl recorded, for the first time in his diaries, some of his ideas about Greater Palestine. He arranged for a meeting with Sir Samuel Montagu (November 24, 1895), a liberal member of the British House of Commons, and the Jewish financier told him in secret that he felt himself "more an Israelite than an English-

(1) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 219.

(2) Alex Bein, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

(3) Maccabeans: A Jewish Cultural Society founded in London in 1891

man.”⁴ He then added that he would settle in Palestine with his entire family, making it clear that he was referring to “Greater Palestine rather than the old one,” and thus refuting completely the idea of Argentina. Herzl’s diaries reveal that Sir Samuel Montagu also told him that he was ready to join the committee “as soon as one of the Great Powers take the matter seriously,” Herzl promised to send him his pamphlet before its publication.

On the next day, Herzl met with Colonel Goldsmid at Cardiff, and was happy to hear the following statement from him: “We shall work for the liberation of Palestine . . . That is the idea of my life.”⁵ However, the Colonel went on to tell him that “he cannot undertake the leadership in the project for it is something political, and as an officer he is not allowed to engage in active politics. But if the movement got started, he would leave the British and enter the Jewish service.”⁶ He then explained that he preferred the term “Israelites” to that of “Jews” because “Israel embraces all tribes.” He showed to Herzl the flag of the Hovevei Zion, with the symbols of the seven tribes while Herzl unfurled his white flag with its seven stars.

Later on, the Colonel started to relate the story of his life, pretending that he was Daniel Deronda! He then advised Herzl to consider only Palestine and assured him of the help of the pious Christians of England for, he said, “they expect the Messiah after the Jews have returned home.” In this connection, he explained that he wished to deliver the Holy Sepulchre to the Christians “stone by stone: part of it to Moscow, another part to Rome.” Here, Herzl recorded the identity of views between Goldsmid and Montagu; they were both thinking of “Greater Palestine.”

(4) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 280.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 281.

(6) *Ibid.*

LOVE OF ZION

In 1893, Samuel Montagu presented a petition to Sultan Abdul Hamid the Second, through the Earl of Roseberry. The document had been previously signed by all the responsible staff of the Executive Committee and by the Secretaries of every "Tent" of the "Lovers of Zion." This Movement had been created in 1882, in Russia; it was first known as "Love of Palestine" (*Palestino philstvo*) and its motto was: "To Palestine." Later on, it was designated by the name, "Love of Zion."

At the beginning of the 1880's, a group of fanatical young Russian Jews, moved by their "love of Zion" and their desire to protect it, started to advocate immigration to Palestine. A number of them used, in this connection, the sufferings and the persecutions of the Jews under the Tsarist regime, as a pretext for the fulfilment of their aims. They drew their inspiration from Pinsker's writings and considered his pamphlet as their secret book. Soon, organizations were formed, and money was collected to purchase land in Palestine. Branches were established in all parts of Russia, Poland, Rumania and England. However, the movement did not win the support of the religious leaders who preferred to wait for the coming events before taking any active part in it. It was opposed by a number of Orthodox Jews who considered it a political movement aiming at superseding the traditional thinking related to the coming of the Messiah. It was also opposed by assimilationist elements among the Jews of Russia and of Western Europe.

The Ottoman rulers soon understood the danger of the movement and, in April 1882, started to refuse all Jews the right to settle in Palestine. However, the members of the "Love of Zion" did not attach much importance to this decision; they were soon able to ignore that law and started their colonisation activity in Palestine.

At the Conference of Kattowicz (1884), the various branches of the "Love of Zion" organised themselves into a federal union which they called "Mazkeret Mosheh." It was not known as the "Lovers of Zion" (Hoveve Zion) until after the second general conference which was held at Droskiniki in 1887. By that time, it had succeeded in weakening the opposition of the religious group by winning over to its side a number of great rabbis such as Rabbi Samuel Mohilever. By 1888-1889, the issue of whether to plough Palestinian land during the Sabbath Sunah had widened the gap between the leaders of the secular movement and their religious opponents. In 1889, the Third Conference, held at Vilna, revealed the growing influence of the religious group inside the movement, and thus incited a number of secular leaders to look for another cultural and spiritual expression

of their Zionism. In the same year, under the leadership of Achad-Ha'am, they instituted the Bene Mosheh Order, after the Masonian model. It was dissolved in 1897.

The Movement witnessed a renewal of its activities and an extraordinary move forward with the abrogation, in 1890, by the Ottoman authorities, of the law prohibiting Jews from settling in Palestine, and with the licensing of the "Lovers of Zion" association by the Russian government. A Fourth Congress was held at Odessa in 1890 and a central committee, headed by Pinsker, was formed; at the same time, an office which was to supervise the purchasing operations, immigration and settlement, was established in Jaffa. Soon, prices competition operations in relation to the Palestinian land took place. As a result of a number of protests from Palestinians, the Ottoman authorities reintroduced the law prohibiting Jews from immigration to Palestine. The Jaffa executive office was closed in 1891 and the adventurers lost fortunes. The only activity which was carried out, for a time after that, consisted in granting donations to Hebraic colonies and schools.

Three tendencies dominated the Movement: the main one, represented by Lilienbloom, was to pursue practical activity in Palestine; it advocated the establishment of Jewish colonies in a number of ways; the second one, which was represented by the Bene Mosheh Order (The Sons of Moses), insisted on the primacy of cultural activity among the Jews of the world, while the third one, adopted by the religious Zionists, consisted of sticking to the "Love of Zion." It is interesting to note, in this context, that the text of the constitution of the movement for the colonisation of Palestine, as signed by the Russian authorities, gives the following name to the organisation: "Organisation for the granting of donations to the Jewish colonizers and industrials in Syria and Palestine."¹ This organisation established its headquarters in Odessa with Leon Pinsker as its first chairman. Pinsker was to hold this function until his death at the end of 1891.

As for the activity of the Lovers of Zion in western Europe, it was centralized in a committee founded in Paris by Halfkine and Meyerson in 1890; it was headed in 1894 by Elim Henry d'Avigdor, the engineer who had supervised the building of a railroad between Syria and Rumania. In Britain, Colonel Goldsmid gave the movement a military colouring. Goldsmid had visited Palestine in 1883 in the company of Laurence Oliphant, initiator of the project for the Jewish colonisation of East Jordan. From Belfast, he had previously sent, in 1882, a letter to the editor of the Jewish Chronicle in which he suggested the formation of an organization for the security of the colonies dominated by the western Jews, as well as the formation of the quasi-military association "which would strive for the security of the colonies." He also said, "It is a task I should not hesitate to undertake were it confided to me..."²

(1) The Odessa organisation was not the first one to include Syria and Palestine within the area of the Jewish colonising activity. In fact, around 1876, an organisation had been founded in London, Paris and Frankfurt under the name of "A Syrian and Palestinian Colonisation Society."

(2) Josef Fraenkel, "Colonel Albert E.W. Goldsmid and Theodor Herzl," *Herzl Year Book*, Vol. I, (Herzl Press, New York, 1958), pp. 146-149.

As soon as he returned from his exploratory trip in Palestine, Goldsmid undertook to unite all the organizations of the Lovers of Zion existing in Britain under one authority. Having been elected, in 1891, at the head of the united association, he started to issue laws and organise along military lines. The Executive Committee became the "Headquarters" while a "commander" replaced the chairman. Furthermore, the term "society" was replaced by that of "tent"; the organization was thus formed of "tents" under the authority of a military command. Goldsmid then started to work on a Hebraic map of Palestine. He imagined himself as George Elliot's hero, Daniel Deronda, and on the day of his departure to Argentina, he declared to the *Daily Graphic*, that he regarded the Jewish colonies in Argentina as "a nursery-ground for Palestine." He then added, "The Jewish question will never be solved until a Jewish State guaranteed by the Powers is established in the Land of Israel."³

His love of Zion was reflected in the programme he advocated for the Movement:

1. To foster the 'national idea' in Israel.
2. To promote the colonization of Palestine and neighboring territories by Jews by establishing new colonies or by assisting those already established.
3. To diffuse the knowledge of Hebrew as a living language.
4. To better the moral, intellectual, and material status of Israel.
5. The members of the Association pledge themselves to render cheerful obedience to the laws of the lands in which they live, and as good citizens, to promote their welfare as far as lies in their power."⁴

Goldsmid is thus referring to a Land of Israel which would include all of the tribes and to the colonization of a new Greater Palestine, other than the old one. He made it clear in adding "neighboring territories" to the word "Palestine." We will encounter this same terminology with a great number of Zionist intellectuals who appeared on the scene between Herzl's era and the establishment of the British mandate.

We have previously mentioned the Hebraic map of Greater Palestine which Goldsmid wished to circulate among his disciples and followers. It is this same map which we will find later on at the historical meeting which took place in March 1896, between Theodor Herzl and the Zionist priest, William Hechler. This meeting will be discussed at length later in this study as it represents the meeting point of Gentile Zionism with Herzlian expansionist Zionism.

(3) *Herzl Year Book, ibid.*, p. 146.

(4) *Jewish Encyclopedia*, Vol. IV, 1903, "Chovevei Zion," pp. 46-47.

THE EXPLORATION OF PALESTINE

Since its creation of 1865, the Palestine Exploration Fund had largely contributed to the development of the ever-growing interest of the British "Lovers of Zion" in Greater Palestine.

For centuries, the peoples of Europe, and especially the British,¹ had shown a keen interest in Palestine of the "Holy Land of the Middle Ages" (Terra Santa). However, for the purposes of this study, we will not enter into a discussion of this long period of history and will rather limit our research to the important steps which marked the history of the "Exploration of Palestine," trying to show the relationship which existed between the British political ambitions and the gains acquired by the Zionists. In this context, we will endeavour to point out the extraordinary coincidence of Zionists' intensions with those of British interests.

The explorations were carried out by military men, namely by members of the corps of the Royal Engineers. Most of them had thus travelled through Cyprus, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and the Sudan. However, their efforts were mainly confined to activities which are beyond the scope of the survey of the Holy Land. Captain Conder, for instance, who had arrived in Palestine in the autumn of 1873, was busy searching the battlefield where the Philistines had faced the Israelites. Later on, when the Arabi revolt broke out in Egypt, a British expedition was sent to that country to restore order, and Conder was selected by the Intelligence Service to accompany the expeditionary corps. Captain Kitchener (who later became Earl Kitchener of Khartoum) joined the exploration team in the autumn of 1874. In fact, he had already worked on the survey of Eastern Palestine while the western part was reserved to Conder. Kitchener is one of those who contributed most to the survey of the Arabian Valley between the southern part of the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba.²

Lawrence of Arabia was called back towards the end of 1913. In the meantime, he had succeeded in exploring the locality of Karkamish, the Hittite city built on the Euphrates. He had also contributed to the survey of the Negev and Sinai deserts as far as the borders set up by the Turco-Egyptian frontiers line commission, namely from Rafah to the Gulf of Aqaba. The area situated between the Suez Canal and the Turco-Egyptian borders had already been surveyed by Captain Newcomber.

In fact, the activities carried out by the "Palestine Exploration Fund" are wide enough to deserve a vast and meaningful study. In this context, we will

(1) Barbara W. Tuchman, *Bible and Sword: England and Palestine from the Bronze Age to Balfour* (Alvin Redman Ltd., London, 1957).

(2) In the spring of 1915, we find the Field Marshall Lord Kitchener as British Minister of war!

refer the reader to a book written by Dr. Abdul Lateef Al-Tibawi on the *British Interests in Palestine* during the nineteenth century, as well as to two other works which were published by the Fund itself and which correspond to the files and summary of its activities after 20 and 50 years of existence (1885 and 1915). We shall limit our study of the Palestine Exploration Fund to the discussion of the "services" rendered by this Fund to the Zionist Movement, be it incidental or not. We can safely say that all those who carried out the exploratory work were moved by the dual impulse for "Biblical nostalgia and imperialist thrust"; in other words, "Bible and sword" were unmistakably working together.³ This curious dualism is made clear through the work of Captain Warren (who later became General Sir Charles Warren), Captain Wilson (later to become General Sir Charles Wilson), and Captain Conder (Colonel Claude Conder). Accompanied by an officer from the corps of the Royal Engineers, Captain Warren arrived in Palestine in 1868. He had previously obtained the permission of the British War Office and a letter of introduction to the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem. In 1875, he published a book, *The Land of Promise*,⁴ in which he suggested that Palestine be developed by the East Indian Company, "with the avowed intention of gradually introducing the Jews pure and simple who would eventually occupy and govern the country." He maintained that the population could increase tenfold provided a good government took it in hand and increased its commerce, and that, with a land productiveness increasing proportionally to the labour attached to the soil, one could accommodate there a population of 15 million.

As for Sir Charles Wilson, he was among the first volunteers who, upon the request of the British War Office, enrolled to carry out the survey of Jerusalem and its surrounding area. His reports formed the first publications of the Palestine Exploration Fund in 1866. He went back to survey Beirut and Al-Khalil and, later on, joined the military expedition sent to the rescue of General Gordon in the Sudan. In 1899 and 1903, he was again in Palestine where he contributed to the designation of the disputed sites of both Golgotha and the Resurrection. Colonel Conder was asked to work on a detailed map covering the area of West Jordan (western Palestine), on which he would locate the names of places mentioned in the Bible and draw the boundaries of the twelve tribes of Israel. The British Ordinance Survey Office took upon itself the printing of the Palestine maps prepared by the Fund. These maps were most helpful to General Allenby when, in 1918, he led the expedition into Palestine. When in 1882, Prince George (King George V) went on a tour to Palestine he designated Conder as his guide. In the same way Dean Stanley had accompanied the Prince of Wales (the future Edward VII) in 1862. The Prince was "the first heir to the British throne to set foot in Palestine since the crusade of Edward I in 1270."⁵ Conder published a number of books on the history of the Jews in the Holy Land namely, *Heb and*

(3) Barbara Tuchman, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

(4) Cf. Nahum Sokolow, *History of Zionism*, Vol. II, Appendix LXXIII, pp. 269-272; Charles Warren, *The Land of Promise or Turkey's Guarantee* (George Bell & Sons, London, 1875).

(5) Barbara Tuchman, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

Moab in 1883, *Syrian Stone Lore* in 1886, *The Hittites and Their Language* in 1898, as well as various other works including his book on *The City of Jerusalem* which was published in 1909, one year before his death.

It is a matter of coincidence that his book on *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* was published in 1897, the year which saw the convening of the First Zionist Congress. It was at this Congress that the Zionists declared that they would seek to create a national home for the Jews in Palestine. Colonel Conder was, in fact, one of the first people to adopt Zionism and advocate its ideal. In 1892, he delivered a lecture on "Eastern Palestine" to a group belonging to the "Western Tent" of the "Lovers of Zion." It was soon published by the latter, and through it, we are able to examine the ideas of the man whom Sokolow described as "the greatest authority on Palestine." They can be summarized as follows:

- First*:— The future element for prosperous colonisation is to be found among the Jews of Eastern Europe.
- Second*:— The Jews, who have been able to live under Russian tyranny, will not find it difficult to prosper as subjects of the Ottoman Sultan.
- Third*:— The proposal to settle agriculturists, as freeholders tilling their own lands, is in accord with the general tendency of all enlightened statesmanship of the present age.
- Fourth*:— The exploitation of the whole of Palestine east of the Jordan River would simply mean a return of the old prosperity, which once covered this country with great Roman cities and prosperity would become greater because of the facilities offered by modern science.
- Fifth*:— Advice is given to the Lovers of Zion to buy all the land they can get at moderate prices in Bashan and in Northern Gilead, and to buy it soon, for the price will go up, and to promote as far as possible the making of a railway.
- Sixth*:— The Jewish Colonisation Movement is not artificial, not merely due to religious sentiment or visionary philanthropy. It is a natural and healthy movement, which ought to be encouraged by giving power and money to the organization which seeks to aid it, and to control its direction on a wise course.
- Seventh*:— The confident expectation of seeing, within a few more years, prosperity increasing in Palestine, and the empty lands filling up with an industrious population. And if this be so, credit is to be given to the generous benefactor, Baron de Hirsch, and to the Society of the Chovevei Zion.⁶

In view of the above-mentioned testimonies, we can safely say that the activities of the Fund, as well as the writings of the explorers, had, to a great extent, encouraged the Zionists to pursue their plan. They also contributed by giving a wider concept of Palestine. Had the surveys and the studies carried out

(6) Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Appendix LXXIII, No. 3, pp. 274-276.

by the Fund not been available, the Holy Land (*Terra Santa*) would have remained a sort of *Terra Incognita* to the "Lovers of Zion." Many Jews had refuted the idea of Palestine as inadequate for large scale colonisation and agricultural activity. They pictured Palestine as an almost desolated, abandoned land. They later learned how to exploit this question for their own benefit.

In 1890, the Palestine Exploration Fund put at the Zionists' disposal a new edition of the map of Palestine; it included all available information on the area situated between Baalbeck in the north and Kadesh Barnea in the south. Two editions were in fact published "of which one had the modern names of the Old and New Testaments together with the places mentioned in the Apocrypha and by the Jewish historian, Josephus, so far as these had been identified."⁷ It would be worthwhile to mention, in this respect, that the map included both Western Palestine, as understood by the explorers of the Fund, and Eastern Palestine. The maps of the western part were ready in 1881. In the following year, various publications were issued, some with the Old Testament names, others with the New Testament names, and still others indicating the sources of water and the water basins in Palestine. As for the map of Eastern Palestine, it was published in 1889. A contour map, showing in relief the physical features of the Holy Land, was constructed by Armstrong: "It was made of plaster and measured 7 feet 6 inches in length by 4 feet in breadth. In 1915, not less than 115 copies of this map were sold to university libraries and public institutions."⁸

When Barbara Tuchman undertook to demonstrate the historical relationship between "England and Palestine from the Bronze Age to Balfour," she expressed her appreciation of the Palestine Exploration Fund in these terms:

"Until the work of the Palestine Exploration Fund began to be published there were few practical people who thought the land could be revived at all. It was the great contribution of the Palestine Exploration Fund (apart from its historical findings) to show that Palestine had once been habitable by a much larger population and a more advanced civilization than was commonly supposed and therefore could be again."⁹

But, before her, the historian of Zionism, Nahum Sokolow, had recognized the valuable services rendered by the Fund to the "Lovers of Zion." In his book, the *History of Zionism*, he says:

"Still questions were naturally asked as to the condition of the soil of Palestine and the possibilities of expansion. It was also repeatedly asked, whether the Jews would be capable of hard pioneer work in the sphere of agriculture. These questions have been answered in a series of pamphlets and articles by such authorities as Colonel Claude Reignier Conder, General Sir Charles Warren, and others. They have shown that Palestine is capable of supporting a nation such as the Jews. Men who for many years had made the scientific exploration of Palestine their sole aim, whose judgement in the matter must be universally admitted to be decisive have given testimony to the fact that the land 'may be made one vast garden, not merely by rebuilding the aqueducts,

(7) Colonel Sir C.M. Watson, *Fifty Years' Work in the Holy Land*, A Record and a Summary: 1865-1915, (Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, London, 1915), p. 88.

(8) Watson, *ibid.*, p. 89.

(9) Barbara Tuchman, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

remains of which still exist, and by means of which the cities were watered, but by means of the Jordan River itself.' They also affirmed that 'the time has at last arrived to restore the desolations of Zion and to rebuild the wasted places of the land of Israel'...

These testimonies of English authorities concerning Palestine encouraged the 'Lovers of Zion' in England to carry on their philanthropic work and also to take certain steps."¹⁰

With this we get to the historical meeting of Gentile Zionism, in the person of William Hechler, with Herzlian or political Zionism. We will, then, devote a whole chapter to Zionist activities in Eastern Europe before the convening of the First Zionist Congress and the creation of the World Zionist Organization.

(10) Nahum Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 230-231

THE AWAITED MEETING

One month after the publication of *The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question*, Herzl received a visit from the Reverend William H. Hechler, Chaplain to the British Embassy in Vienna. He had come to express his enthusiasm for the Herzlian solution, assuring Herzl that he had foretold the movement two years ago; he had calculated "in accordance with a prophecy dating from Omar's reign (637-638), that after 42 prophetic months, that is, 1260 years, Palestine would be restored to the Jews."¹ This would bring us to 1897-1898. Upon reading Herzl's book, Reverend Hechler, who had been impressed by the Prophecy of Ezekiel, hurried to the British Ambassador, Edward Monson, and told him that "the fore-ordained movement is here!" He then declared that he owed his discovery of Herzl to the journalist, Dr. Saul Raphael Landau (1870-1943) who had striven to unite the Lovers of Zion with the advocates of socialistic views. Besides, Landau had pretended that he was the first to teach Herzl the fundamental principles of the Zionist idea. As for Hechler, he had spent much of his life studying the Millennium and the various "Signs of the Times" related to it. He was expecting the fulfilment of the prophecy when he heard the name of Theodor Herzl. He remembered that the Messiah was to appear soon. When, in a window of a bookshop, he saw Herzl's pamphlet, he bought it quickly and immediately felt enthusiastic about it. He then hastened to arrange a meeting with Herzl and, as soon as he had stepped into his library, he said with a shaking voice, "Here I am." Herzl could not hide his surprise at the appearance of this "unusual" guest, and his surprise was no less dissipated when his visitor started to speak, accompanying his words with strange gestures. The Reverend reassured him and said that he wished to introduce him to the Grand Duke of Baden who would in turn secure him an audience with the Kaiser. Herzl understood the meaning of the words with which the priest had hailed him when he said, "You are the one I was waiting for. You are the Awaited Messiah." On the Sunday afternoon of the same week, Herzl visited Hechler in his apartment on the fourth floor of a building overlooking Schillerplatz. As soon as he returned, he noted in his diaries, "Next to Colonel Goldsmid, Hechler is the most unusual person."²

* * * *

(1) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 310.

(2) Marvin Lowenthal, *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl* (Dial Press, New York, 1956), p. 105.

We must make the acquaintance of this "unusual person" whom we consider as the symbol of the historical meeting of Gentile Zionism with Herzlian Jewish Zionism.

We will also deal with Reverend Hechler's Zionist expansionism when, sitting in a compartment of the "Orient Express," he gave Herzl a lesson on the boundaries of Palestine. He had unfolded his extraordinary map of "Greater Israel" which, in his opinion, should be realized according to calculations based on the prophecies of Ezekiel.

But who is the Reverend William Hechler?

Born in South Africa, his parents were both German, which made him declare, "I am a mixture of the Black Forest and Great Britain."³ He had completed his study of the 42 prophetic months before he entered the clergy, and since ordination, "he had spent a great part of his life studying the Millennium and the signs and wonders connected therewith."⁴ It is only from this date on that information on his life and activities is available. However, we know that he was a member of the "London Preaching Society" which was founded in 1795 and later became known as the "London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews." We also know that his father was a protestant preacher and that Hechler himself was ordained at an early age. Later, on the recommendation of the British Royal Family, he was appointed private teacher of the eight year-old Prince Ludwig, son of the Grand Duke of Baden. His stay at Frederick I's Palace gave him the opportunity of meeting the Duke's younger cousins, including the future German Kaiser, Guillaume II (1859-1941), who was crowned in 1888. After the premature death of Prince Ludwig, Hechler returned to London where he occupied his position as a preacher.

In the eighties, we find him deeply interested in East European Jewry, raising funds to help their settlement in Palestine under the protection of the British Consulate. Later he visited Odessa and Kishinev as well as other Russian Jewish towns, distributing the donations sent by philanthropic societies to facilitate the emigration of the Jews to Palestine. No wonder, then, that the Jewish publications described him as "the Christian Lover of Zion." Had he not, indeed, preached that, according to his understanding of certain Biblical texts, Israel would be founded in Palestine before the second advent of its glorious Messiah, "our Saviour," who will reign over Jerusalem and govern from there, king of all kings, for one thousand years?

In 1882, he was entrusted with the mission of carrying a personal letter from Queen Victoria to the Sultan Abdul Hamid II. In the following year, he published a book, entitled *The Jewish Bishopric*, in which he reproduced a number of documents related to the foundation of an Anglican Bishopric in Jerusalem (1841-1842). The book referred also to the nomination of Michael Solomon Alexander, a preacher member of the "London Society," as the first Evangelical

(3) *Herzl Year Book*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 207-270.

(4) Christopher Sykes, *Two Studies in Virtue*, (Collins, London, 1953), p. 153.

Bishop in Jerusalem, at a time when no evangelical community existed in Palestine! During his stay in London, he published a manifesto, "The Restoration of the Jews to Palestine according to the Prophets," in which he presented his studies on the Millenium as well as his interpretation of a great number of prophecies. He explained that these prophecies foretold that the second coming of Christ was imminent, thus inviting the Jews to build the new Temple of Ezekiel. Later he was appointed Chaplain to the British Embassy in Vienna (1885-1910). It was then that he drew a map of Greater Israel and offered his services to "King Herzl" and to the Zionist movement.

Soon after he made the acquaintance of Herzl, Hechler addressed, to Frederick I, a letter in which he drew the Grand Duke's attention "to a very remarkable book, which has lately appeared in Vienna, and treats of a subject on which I have repeatedly had the honour of speaking to you. I mean the Return of the Jews to Palestine, foretold by the Hebrew Prophets."⁵ It appears from this letter that Duke Frederick had been influenced by the theory of the Millenium as adopted by a group of Zionised protestants. Speaking of Herzl, Hechler assured the Grand Duke that the author of *The Jewish State* ignored the prophecies connected with the Millenium and, consequently, was not trying to fulfil them, "for God will in His own good time and in His own way bring about His wonderful purposes." He then uses Herzl's own statement and sums up the "Manifesto" in these terms: "The Jewish State is a world necessity," thus confirming his belief in Jewish rights to Palestine. He adds: "it seems that the last Return of the Jews to Palestine has already begun"; Hechler pursues his letter to the Grand Duke, reproducing the verses of the New Testament of St. Luke (21:24) in which Jesus said to His Disciples: "...And (the Jews) shall be led away captive into all nations: and Jerusalem shall be trodden down by the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled." He then explains that the first part of the prophecy has been fulfilled long ago, since Jews are scattered over the world. Considering the second part, he bases himself on the following verse (Revelation 11:2): "The Holy City shall they (the Gentiles) tread under foot forty and two months," to conclude that the date of Return is near. But how does he reach this conclusion? He suggests the date 637 to 638 A.D. To him, "the year when the Caliph Omar, the father-in-law of Mohammed, took possession of Jerusalem," may be considered as the starting point of the times of the Gentiles. He then states that the 42 prophetic months will come to an end in 1897 to 1898, basing his argument on the following:

"It is acknowledged," he says, "that a biblical prophetic month has 30 prophetic days and that one prophetic day is equal to one of our secular years of 12 months. Now, if we multiply 42 by 30, we have 1260 prophetic days or secular years, and 1260 added to 637 and 638, brings us to 1897 and 1898."⁶

(5) *Herzl Year Book*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 210-213.

(6) *Ibid.*, pp. 211-212.

Hechler's letter is dated March 1896, and thus, according to his calculations, the following year or the one after, was due to witness the fulfilment of the Prophecy. In his correspondence with the Grand Duke, he does not hide his wish to see Germany and Britain encourage the Zionist Movement and protect the future Zionist state. He goes on to express his humility, saying: "... for I am not a prophet, nor the son of a prophet, but only a humble student of prophecy, watching the signs of the times which we are certainly told to do in the Bible."⁷

In 1891, in Vienna, Hechler delivered a lecture on "Ancient Egypt" which he published in English under the title, "The Oldest History of Man in the Light of Recent Researches." In one striking passage of this lecture he says: "I have been asked the question: Did the Patriarchs really live such a length of time? I can now answer this question in the affirmative and, in order to give it a thoroughly scientific investigation, I have attempted the construction of a calendar for the year of the Deluge."⁸ When Herzl called on him, he could not resist showing him certain bricks he was keeping carefully, declaring that they were Babylonian bricks dating back to Abraham's days. However, what is important for our purposes, in addition to Hechler's studies of the Millenium, is the extraordinary map of Palestine which he had in his possession. Herzl described it as a huge "military map," made up of four parts. He recorded that Hechler had told him about the secret pocket in which he would hide the map when he and Herzl went to Palestine. On April 25, 1896, Hechler accompanied Herzl on his way from Munich to Vienna. While they were sitting in a compartment of the "Orient Express," Hechler unfolded his maps of Palestine and instructed Herzl, "for hours," on the geography of expansionist Zionism. He said:

"The northern frontier ought to be the mountains facing Cappadocia; the southern, the Suez Canal. The slogan to be circulated: The Palestine of David and Solomon."⁹

There is no doubt that Herzl understood the lesson in his own way. In the letter he addressed to the Grand Duke on April 26, we find him speaking of "God's will that we return to our historic fatherland." He explained that the Jews wished to return there as "representatives of western civilization, bringing cleanliness, order and the well-distilled customs of the Occident to this plague-ridden, blighted corner of the Orient." Having assured His Highness that he was not thinking of the emigration of all Jews, he found it appropriate to point out that the Movement would have two effects, namely, "the weakening of revolutionary parties and the breaking of international financial power."

Here we leave the historical meeting of Herzl and Hechler to focus our attention on Zionist activities, especially in Germany and Austria, during the years which preceded the First Zionist Congress. We will thus be able to reach a better

(7) *Herzl Year Book, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 211.

(8) *Ibid.*

(9) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 342.

understanding of the important aspects of the Zionist expansionist idea and examine closely the carried-out activities of the organised Zionist Movement under the cover of political Zionism which was never dissociated from Herzl and his followers.

But before we proceed to the discussion of the expansionist character of German Zionism and its colonialist implications, we shall look at a group of "Zionist adventurers" who appeared on the scene during the last decade of the nineteenth century. When these adventures had failed in their endeavours, the organized Zionist Movement took their failure as a pretext for a new and wider scale of action which was to include the Jews of all the world. It is only after we discuss these that we will deal with Zionism in Germany.

TO THE LAND OF GILEAD

Historians of Zionism consider the year 1882 as the turning point of the Movement. It was indeed during that year that a succession of events took place which had far-reaching effects on the development of Zionism.¹ In Russia, where the majority of Jews were settled, the economic situation had greatly improved as a result of the liberalism which characterized the reign of Tsar Alexander II and the efforts made towards the abolition of serfdom. This led to the reinforcement of the movement of awakening and speeded up the movement of liberation among the Jews. The abolition of serfdom resulted in a massive migration of peasants to the cities and consequently an increase in the number of unemployed, as the country lacked industry at that time. The unemployed masses turned to fields which had for a long time been monopolized by the Jews, e.g. handicrafts. The rivalry between the long-settled Jews and the incoming Russian peasants developed into violent hatred. The economy of the country was largely in the hands of the Jewish elite.

The Jewish tradesmen and bankers who were members of that elite handicapped the young Russian generation. In the towns and cities where the majority of tradesmen and usurers were Jews, antagonism reached such a degree that the population started to accuse Jews of "enslaving and exploiting the people." Panslavism, with its nationalistic implications, reinforced the feeling of belonging to the Orthodox Church, and the Jews were thus looked upon as a foreign body among the peoples of Holy Russia. Moreover, the extensive Jewish participation in the revolutionary movement made it easier for Russian reactionaries to rouse the mass of believers and followers of the Tsar against the Jews.

When, in March 1881, a group of Jews participated in the Nihilists' attempt to assassinate the Tsar, the first massacres took place. They started around the middle of April 1881, and continued sporadically until 1883. The settlement of the Jews was limited to specific areas; they were forbidden to buy land and real estate, and their proportionate membership in universities was limited.

Advocates of Jewish liberation used this situation as an argument against assimilation and as an incentive for emigration. They insisted on the necessity of finding a new solution to the Jewish question, as assimilation and fusion had failed. A number of them started to look at Palestine for future emigration and settlement. M. L. Lilienbloom (1843-1910) undertook to spread the Zionist idea among the Jews. In 1883, he published a pamphlet which he entitled *Mission of the Jewish*

(1) Adolf Böhm, *Die Zionistische Bewegung*, I. Teil: Die Bewegung bis zum Tode Theodor Herzls (Welt-Verlag, Berlin, 1920), p. 64.

People in the Holy Land of its Ancestors. Before him, in 1882, Pinsker had already called for auto-emancipation without insisting, at the beginning, on Palestine. The societies of "Lovers of Zion" soon aroused enthusiasm with their slogan: "To Palestine"; Jewish university students decided to put their academic work aside and found the "Bilu" Movement which aimed at colonising Palestine with the help of volunteer workers. This Movement grouped approximately 25 students from Krakov University who devoted themselves to spreading the idea among their fellow Russian-Jewish students. Then they started organizing the Movement and gathering emigrants on the frontiers.

The year 1882 is no less important in relation to what was called "the Eastern Question." In November 1875, the British Cabinet, headed by Disraeli, had bought the Khedive Ismail's shares in the Company of the Suez Canal and, since 1876, had delegated three members to represent it at the Board of Directors of the said company. Disraeli suggested that Cyprus would be a convenient base from which the British would be able to protect their interest in Asia Minor and Armenia against any future Russian invasion. British forces were, thus, sent in 1878 to occupy Cyprus. They submitted to the Sublime Porte the text of a treaty legalizing such an occupation, while Sultan Abdul Hamid II was given an ultimatum of 48 hours to sign it.

In the middle of the year 1882, Britain sent forces to crush the national revolt led by Arabi and, with the defeat of the Egyptian Army at Tal Al-Kabir, on September 13, stabilized its domination over the area in spite of the reiterated promises to evacuate "at the nearest possible time." The Sultan became suspicious of Britain's intentions. He turned to Germany and, in 1883, the Sublime Porte received a military delegation from Berlin. Istanbul consolidated its relationships with Germany and the Baghdad-Berlin railway project became the symbol of the growing German influence in the Ottoman Empire. The British took it as a pretext to carry out manoeuvres in the so-called Persian Gulf area and tried to put an end to the penetration of German activity into "the land between the rivers" and the Arabian Gulf.

* * * *

Since the Napoleonic wars and all through the rule of Ibrahim Pasha over Syria, Britain had endeavoured to maintain its influence in the Middle East. With the pretext of protecting the "Sick Man of Europe," it prepared the ground for the erection of British pillars of authority thus trying to put an end to French and Russian ambitions in the area. Insofar as the Jews were concerned, British interests in Syria and Palestine expressed themselves, since the invasion of Ibrahim Pasha in 1831, in the reiterated demands for the establishment of a British Consulate in Jerusalem. In July 1838, the British Ambassador at Constantinople succeeded in obtaining from the Sultan, a firman authorizing the establishment of such a Consulate. However, the instructions received by William

Young, the first holder of the office of Vice-Consul in Jerusalem, were soon radically enlarged "clearly through the powerful intervention of the sympathizers of the London Jewish Society" with Palmerston and Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury.² In fact, Young had been first instructed merely "to cultivate a friendly feeling towards Great Britain amongst the inhabitants of the country and to use his best endeavours to introduce desire for British commodities and to extend the commercial relations between the two countries."³ Four months later, namely in January 1839, he received additional instructions extending the scope of his authority "to afford protection to the Jews generally." In addition, he was asked by John Bidwell, Superintendent of the Consular Service in the Foreign Affairs, to "take an early opportunity of reporting to His Lordship upon the present state of the Jewish population of Palestine."⁴

One could say that with this began Britain's official concern for the Jewish question in relation to Palestine, and that Shaftesbury was among the first people to promote it. An ardent supporter of the "Lovers of Zion," the Earl of Shaftesbury was, however, mainly interested in "the testimony of the authenticity of the Bible" and hoped that Palestine "when dug and harrowed" would supply the required evidence.⁵ Thirty years later, Shaftesbury's dream was realized with the creation of the Palestine Exploration Fund.

We do not intend to discuss, in the context of this study, the Jewish colonisation activities from 1831 to 1882; we shall only mention, in this respect, the plan carried out in 1878, by Lawrence Oliphant at the time of the Congress of Berlin. In 1878, Lawrence Oliphant called for the colonisation of "Southern Syria" and the cultivation of this "rich land," assuring that "it had an easy access to the Mediterranean Sea." Besides, he insisted that this area was "nearly uninhabited." After having toured the country he recorded the results of his exploratory journey in the book, *The Land of Gilead—with Excursions in the Lebanon* which he published in 1880. He did not forget to mention, in his concluding chapters, the political aspect of his colonisation programme.

Lawrence Oliphant was a most astonishing person. According to Barbara Tuchman, Oliphant was born in 1829 of "fervent evangelical parents." He entered the diplomatic service and served in posts ranging from Canada to Japan. He visited India, the Turkish Empire and the United States and covered the Crimean war as correspondent of *The Times*. In Italy, he sided with Garibaldi and Cavour and, in 1865, became a member of the British Parliament. Suddenly, he resigned his seat in Parliament and disappeared from the political scene. Actually, in Barbara Tuchman's words, "Oliphant had embarked on a recurring endeavour of the disillusioned, to attempt to forsake the world and live the humble life of the first Christians." Tuchman continues: "It did not suit him, and he was allowed

(2) A.L. Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901*; A study of Religious and Educational Enterprise, (Oxford University Press, London, 1961).

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 32.

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 35.

to return to the world as a proselyte.”⁶ Turning to the description of the second Mrs. Oliphant, she presents her as “subject to visions and voices.” She says that Mrs. Oliphant had, in fact, “described a vision of a Jew on a White Horse; the horse, she explained, symbolized power, the color white stood for righteous power. This she took to mean that Israel, ‘redeemed’ by Christ, would be restored to power in Palestine.”⁷

One year after the Congress of Berlin, Oliphant arrived in Romania to attend a lecture of the “Lovers of Zion” at Jassy. There, he tried to arouse the interest of the Jews in his plan in order to secure the participation of the capitalists and ally the Jewish masses to it. He then went to Constantinople, and asked the Sultan to grant these Jews the right to settle in and colonize Transjordan (Palestine). He proceeded from there to Palestine where he carried out the exploration and the survey of the land he intended to claim. Declaring officially that he was seeking to modernize Turkey under the auspices of Great Britain and with the help of the Jews, he pointed out the advantages which a country could find in espousing the cause of the Jews and their restoration in Palestine. Speaking of such a country, he said: “It would be able to rely upon their support in financial operations on the largest scale, upon the powerful influence which they wield in the press of many countries, and on their political cooperation in those countries—which would of necessity tend to paralyse the diplomatic and even hostile action of Powers antagonistic to the one with which they were allied.”⁸ As for his attitude towards the Arab inhabitants of the land of Gilead, it is reflected in the following statement. He said:

“... In point of fact, the Arabs have very little claim to our sympathy. They have laid waste this country, ruined its villages, and plundered its inhabitants until it has been reduced to its present condition.”⁹

Besides, he expresses his wish to see them “driven back to the Arabian deserts from which they came” where they would find “abundant pasture in its oases for their camels and goats”!

After repeated efforts, Oliphant succeeded in winning over to his programme the support of the British financier, Victor Cazalit. Together they submitted to the Sultan a project aiming at granting the Jews a stretch of land two miles wide at both sides of the railway which was to be constructed. The plan was, however, doomed to failure. In England the Liberals had succeeded Disraeli, while in Constantinople, the Sultan did not hide his fears of seeing Palestine becoming another Mount Lebanon. On the other hand, the death of General Gordon in the Sudan was not helpful to the British either.

The Sublime Porte soon realized the far-reaching aims of such plans. Sultan Abdul Hamid separated the Sandjak of Jerusalem from the Vilayet of Syria and

(6) Tuchman, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

(7) *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

(8) Lawrence Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead—With Excursions in the Lebanon*, (William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, London, 1880), p. 503.

(9) *Ibid.*

placed it under the direct control of the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman Government had previously expressed its opposition to the creation of a Jewish Zionist Colony and its irrevocable decision to enforce the laws related to the foreigners who had acquired land illegally. The latter had entered the country under the cover of tourism and pilgrimage and, having settled there, had started to acquire land.

Oliphant died in 1888 in Haifa where he had settled after he had written his book on *Haifa, or Life in Modern Palestine*.

During the eighties, the "Lovers of Zion" succeeded in infiltrating into Palestine through various means and expedients, especially bribery. The representatives of the Ottoman Government constituted "The Party of the Baksheesh," and in his diaries, Herzl constantly referred to Baksheesh as the miraculous "Open Sesame" of the Empire.

* * * *

It is worthwhile to mention, in this context, that Oliphant's plan was not the only one of its kind. Similar plans were adopted by people like Paul Friedmann, the Jewish financier of German origin, who however replaced the Land of Gilead by that of Midian.

Accompanied by a Prussian, Lieutenant Lothar von Seebach, Friedmann succeeded in gathering an army of 50 soldiers, recruited mainly from among the members of the "Lovers of Zion" society. At the end of 1891, he bought a steam yacht which he named Israel and sailed with his "pioneer" army to the "Promised Land." As soon as they reached the "Land of Midian," they began to encounter difficulties of all kinds and were forced to abandon their colonisation scheme.

We do not intend to discuss, in this study, the adventure of Friedmann in the land of Midian. We will rather refer the reader to *Herzl Year Book*, Vol. IV, pp. 67-117, where the details of the expedition are reproduced at length.

It would be appropriate to mention here that the Jewish press violently criticized Friedmann's scheme and accused the financier of being a "baptised assimilated Jew."

Moreover, when in 1902, Lord Cromer was asked by the British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, to examine Herzl's colonisation plan in El-Arish, he indicated that "Friedmann's episode had created ill-feeling at Istanbul." As recorded by Joseph Fraenkel, the Zionists pointed out "the entirely different character of the [Herzl's] enterprise, which was not to be compared with the inadequate, ill-planned, ill-executed fancy of an ambitious assimilated Jew; the memory of Friedmann's failure was one of the reasons, besides many others, for refusal to permit the El-Arish project."¹⁰

Thus, the Zionists refused to associate Friedmann's scheme with that of Herzl's, in spite of the close relationship between the two. One should not forget,

(10) *Herzl Year Book*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 88.

in this connection, that Herzl started to write his manifesto on *The Jewish State* at a time when Friedmann, already returned from his expedition, was suing the big Jewish leaders who had caused him prejudice. We believe that we would not be departing from the truth in stressing the similitude between both enterprises in spite of the disparity in the circumstances and the nature of the Zionist organization which resulted from the subsequent Herzlian call.

"ZIONISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!"

The "Lovers of Zion" did not limit their activities in the eighties to East Europe alone, and Lawrence Oliphant was not the only Britisher to "love Zion" and to devote himself of the colonisation of the land of Gilead. Similar calls manifested themselves on various levels in Germany and Austria while certain big universities became the scenes of Jewish students' activities. University students, namely those of East Europe and more particularly those of Russia, undertook to realize and develop Jewish nationalist action. It did not take long before they formed a political foundation, its starting point at the heart of the Zionist World Organization.

The first Jewish Students' Nationalist Society occupies an important place in the history of the Zionist Movement. In 1882, both Nathan Birnbaum (1864-1937), and Peretz Smolenskin (1842-1885), called for the foundation of a Jewish Students' Society at the University of Vienna. Their guiding principle was the Jewish Nationalist ideology while Pinsker's "auto-emancipation" was their gospel. The society was named, after Smolenskin's suggestion, the "Kadimah" Society in view of the dual implication of this term, namely "onward" (*vorwärts*) and "eastward" (*ostwärts*).

The basic aims of the "Kadimah" Society was to fight assimilation and work for the colonization of Palestine. It was first joined by a group of Russian Jews who were soon followed by a number of students from Galilia and Romania; at the same time, German students were trying to discover means to enrol themselves in it.

Historians of Zionism consider that the "Kadimah" Society was the first organization to extend its support to Herzl and welcome his call. Among the members who distinguished themselves on the Zionist scene of action during the Herzlian phase, we can cite: the first chairman of the society, Moshe Shnirer (1860-1940), a student of medicine at the University of Vienna, Ruben Bierer (1845-1931), and Oser Kokesch (1885-1905).

But, the member who devoted himself most of the association is undoubtedly Nathan Birnbaum, known also by his *nom de plume* of "Mathias Acher." He was the first to introduce the term "Zionism" in its modern connotation, in replacement of "Jewish Nationalism" (*National-Judisch*). He used it for the first time in a pamphlet published in 1893 under the title of *The National Awakening of the Jewish People in its Land, as a Means to Solve the Jewish Question (Die National Wiedergeburt des Jüdischen Volkes in Seinem Lande, als Mittel Zur Lösung der Judentrage)*. Previously, at the age of 21, Birnbaum had founded a newspaper which he had called *Auto-Emancipation (Selbst-Emanzipation)*.

While in 1888, the Jewish U.S. Ambassador in Constantinople, Oscar Strauss, was declaring to the Grand Vizier that the Jews of the world were not moved by the desire of founding a Jewish state in Palestine, the "Kadimah" Society, from a "peaceful union," changed to become a "brotherhood society" aiming at fighting with the sword in defense of Jewish honour. By so doing, it was following the pattern of the German Students' Societies which had declared themselves responsible for the defence of German honour and which, even today, devote themselves to the preservation of the old Germanic traditions. This change in the "Kadimah" Society obviously influenced Paul Friedmann, as well as a number of persons we will encounter later in our study.

The Kadimah call spread rapidly from the University of Vienna to that of Berlin mainly through Martin Buber, the well-known Jewish philosopher, and Berthold Feiwel (1875-1937) who later became the chief editor of *Die Welt* in Vienna, and who participated in the foundation of the Democratic Faction inside the World Jewish Organization in 1901.

Thanks to the Russian Jewish students, Berlin soon became a true centre of Zionist activity. In 1889, Leo Motzkin established, together with Joseph Lorey, "The Russian Jewish Students' Scientific Organization" (*Russisch-Judischer Wissenschaftlicher Verein*). The latter was soon joined by a group of leaders of the Zionist Movement among whom we find Victor Jacobson, Shmarya Levin and Chaim Weizmann. In spite of the fact that it was considered to be equivalent to its sister organization "Kadimah," its own trend of thinking was, nevertheless, deeply influenced by a Jewish Chief Rabbi known as "The Jewish Socrates." On the other hand, in relation to Davis Trietsch, we could not gather enough information as to whether the advocate of the Cyprus colonization plan had been in this organization or not. We simply know from Sokolow that Trietsch, who was born in Dresden in 1870, was "not a University Student" but "worked in close cooperation with the Berlin group."¹

At the time of the publication of Birnbaum's pamphlet, Doctor Heinrich Lowe, who then held the chairmanship of a new society, "Young Israel," was founding a magazine, *Zion*, which was to act as the mouthpiece of that society. Three years later in 1896, Birnbaum was appointed chief editor of *Zion*. He held this position until the cessation of his Zionist activities in 1898 which came as a result of his controversies with Herzl.

In the summer of 1893, another Zionist, Isidore Bodenheimer (1865-1940), had proceeded from Cologne to Berlin to pass his official examination as a student of law. He had previously published, in 1891, a pamphlet which he had entitled, *Whither the Russian Jews?* (*Wohin mit den Russischen Juden?*). Answering the question, he said: "To Palestine and Syria." He developed his idea of a Jewish settlement, connecting it with the building of railways and harbours in Syria and Palestine. "This object," he wrote, "was to be served by a limited cor-

(1) Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 284.

poration, to be supported by the formation of relief committees, which would raise the funds for purchasing land by means of voluntary donations."² In addition, he thought of establishing settlements of Jewish immigrants, "capable of engaging in agriculture," along the railway line.

During the same year, we find Bodenheimer addressing his "appeal" to the "Lovers of Zion," which he published in the *Menorah Journal* on September 4, 1891, under the title, "Zionists of All Countries, Unite!" He wrote: "The powerful hand is still missing to combine all these endeavours of the 'Friends of Zion' into one large whole. Why cannot open propaganda take the place of quiet action? . . . But the means to attain this goal lies in the union of all existing Zionist societies into a league comprising the nations of the entire globe. That is why we call to all those who have a voice in the Zion societies: 'Zionists of All Countries, Unite!'"³

He does not give us more details on his plan except after he makes the acquaintance of the lawyer, Plotke, in Frankfurt. Speaking of Plotke, he says: ". . . He showed great interest in my plans. As he had close contact with Baron de Hirsch, he persuaded me to work out a practical proposal for a colony in Syria."⁴ Soon, Bodenheimer devotes himself to this task with two regions in view. The first one is the plain of Bekaa, lying between the mountain ranges of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, while the second one is the Valley of Jezreel. Pursuing the description of his plan, he writes: "The basis of both settlements was to be a railway line. In the Bekaa I visualized a connection with the already existing line between Beirut and Damascus. In the event that the Valley of Jezreel were chosen, Haifa would be connected with Tiberias by a railway line, and a harbour built at Haifa."⁵ Yet, Bodenheimer's plan does not differ much from that of Lawrence Oliphant in *The Land of Gilead*. The importance which they both gave to the railway line and to an easy access to the Mediterranean Sea is nothing but the reflection of imperialists' domination plans in the Ottoman Empire. Britain showed a deep interest in the various projects aimed at reducing the distance between the Mediterranean Sea and India. Faced with the growth of French influence and the plan to open the Suez Canal which would assure the junction of the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, Britain hastened in 1857, to prepare studies in connection with the land road from Iskenderon to Basrah; and a plan for joining both points soon emerged. Nevertheless, Britain's opposition to Ferdinand de Lesseps' plan was maintained until the Sublime Porte gave the French engineer its official approval in 1866. As soon as the Canal was inaugurated, the British renewed their efforts in the area and in 1872, Sir William Andrew succeeded in making the House of Commons appoint a Parliamentary

(2) Isidore Bodenheimer, *Prelude to Israel*, edited by Henriette Hannah Bodenheimer, translated by Israel Cohen, (Thomas Yoseloff, New York, 1963), p. 73.

(3) *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 76.

(5) *Ibid.*

Commission to study what was called "the railway line project in the Euphrates Valley."

As for the Germans, early in the eighties they had shown a great interest in the railway projects within the Ottoman territories and during the last decade of the century, the Berlin-Baghdad railway project became the symbol of German influence in the Turkish Empire.

As to German Zionists, one cannot look at them except in the context of the German sphere of influence inside the Ottoman Empire. A "State of Alliance" between the German Zionists and the Turks was established and reached its peak at the beginning of this century during the period which separated the Young Turks' Revolution from the outbreak of the First World War. It deeply influenced the thinking of German Zionists and, consequently, the colonisation plans which they formed. We even find Davis Trietsch declaring for the sake of Zionist propaganda in Germany in his pamphlet entitled *The Jews of Turkey*: "In a certain sense, the Jews form a Near Eastern element in Germany, and a German element in Turkey."⁶ He then went on to suggest that "there are possibilities in a German protectorate over the Jews as well as over Islam."

Going back to Bodenheimer, we find him in 1893, participating with David Wolffsohn, who was later on to succeed Herzl as Chairman of the Zionist Organization, in the creation of a "Lovers of Zion" Society in Cologne. One year after his visit to Berlin, he was at the head of the "Jewish National 'Zion' Club," which had emanated from "the Society of Jewish History and Literature." Its principles, which were mentioned in the appendices to Bodenheimer's memoirs, were enunciated as follows:

"The Club fosters the consciousness of the solidarity of all Jews on the basis of common descent, history, culture, and common social and economic interests.

"For this purpose, the club promotes:

- (a) the knowledge of Jewish history and literature,
- (b) the use of the Hebrew language,
- (c) the improvement of the legal, social, and economic position of fellow Jews in the countries in which they are oppressed in any of these respects,
- (d) the establishment of Jewish agricultural colonies.

"As means to this furtherance the Club envisions first of all the enlightenment of fellow Jews, at regular meetings, concerning all vital questions of the day as well as the support of all organizations active in any of these spheres."⁷

We find it rather strange that these principles do not precisely name the nationality of the land in which the Jews wished to establish their agricultural colonies. However, the combined efforts of the Birnbaum group and of the members of the "Young Israel" Society had, by 1893, been directed towards the call to a general Zionist Congress. In the pamphlet which was to give its name to Zionism, Birnbaum states:

(6) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

(7) Bodenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

"If the Jewish individual has a homeland, the Jewish nation has no homeland . . . Our aim is not to gather Jews into one homeland but to find one homeland for the Jewish people."⁸

The unified programme for a preliminary meeting of the various factions in Berlin (1893) not only stressed the necessity of addressing an appeal for a Zionist General Meeting; it rather offered the pretext for another objective, "Panjudaism," in addition to the establishment of a unified organization, a fund for the Movement (*Parteifonds*), the revival of the Hebraic language, and the renovation of the Jewish colonization plan in Palestine. Political Zionism, described in this context as "comprising all Jews" (Panjudaism), constitutes a clear reflection of the German understanding of nationalism. We know that German theory considers "that people of common descent or speaking a common language should form a common state." As defined by the historian of modern nationalism, Hans Kohn, Pan-Germanism is "based on the idea that all persons who were of German race, blood, or descent, wherever they lived or to whatever state they belonged, owed their primary loyalty to Germany and should become citizens of the German state, their true homeland. They, and even their fathers and forefathers, might have grown up under 'foreign' skies or in 'alien' environments, but their fundamental inner 'reality' remained German."⁹

There is no doubt that Theodor Herzl, who was the product of an Austro-German environment, had been guided in his nationalist thinking by those principles which had inspired, to a great extent, the Pan-Germanic Movement. As stated by Hannah Arendt, "Herzl thought in terms of nationalism inspired from German sources."¹⁰ The above-mentioned principles enunciated by Bodenheimer obviously support this statement, although the two situations were not similar!

Moreover, the trend represented by Bodenheimer within the organized Zionist Movement is nothing but an extension of the ideas which we have already encountered in the programme of the "Jewish National 'Zion' Club" or "the Jewish National Society" under the heading of "principles." As soon as the establishment of the "Jewish National Fund" was completed in 1901, in Basle, the following principles were adopted:

"The Jewish National Fund should belong to the Jewish people as permanent property. It should be used only for the purchase of land in Palestine and Syria."¹¹

When Bodenheimer started communicating with Herzl—after he had been disappointed by Colonel Goldsmid and his "Lovers of Zion" group in Britain and had been referred by them to Herzl at the end of 1895—the latter had informed him that "the Society of Jews" was to be founded in London by the end of June 1896. The German Zionists decided to set up a "new" version of their old program.

(8) Böhm, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

(9) Hans Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea," *Palestine Collected Papers* (The Arab Cultural Club, Beirut, May 15, 1963), p. 32.

(10) *Ibid.*, quoted from Hannah Arendt, "Zionism Reconsidered," *The Menorah Journal* (Autumn 1945, Vol. 33, No. 2), p. 188.

(11) Bodenheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202.

They decided to formulate their efforts in a "platform" and to declare publicly what they wished to be understood by political Zionism. They drew up a statement containing three theses which Bodenheimer later designated as the "Cologne Theses" to distinguish it from the subsequent "Basle Program." The three theses do not really differ from the principle of the "Jewish National 'Zion' Club" in as far as the Pan-Germanic influence is concerned. However, the second thesis reads that "the granting of civil equality to the Jews (who, united by common descent and history, form a National Community) has not sufficed to ensure the social and cultural future of the Jewish people."¹² It also rules out liberation and assimilation by concluding that: "A definitive solution to the Jewish question can take place only by the formation of a state, which is in a position to represent the Jews on the bases of international law and to receive the Jews who cannot or do not wish to remain in the country of their birth."¹³ The third thesis gives the means to achieve this purpose, namely:

- "(a) Colonization in Syria and Palestine.
- (b) Cultivation of Jewish studies and Jewish customs.
- (c) Improvement of the social and cultural position of the Jews."¹⁴

At the beginning of June 1897, a few weeks before the convening of the First Zionist Congress, the German Zionists decided, at the suggestion of Hermann Schapira, to replace the term "Jewish nation" by that of "Zionist" and started to call themselves "The Zionist Federation for Germany" (*Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland*). A vignette was prepared by Bodenheimer as the symbolic expression and the emblem of the Union. He described it in his memoirs as follows:

"I had prepared a vignette in red, gold, and blue, in the middle of which appeared the Star of David with the lion of Judah, surrounded by twelve small stars symbolizing the twelve tribes of Israel. The shield bore the inscription: 'The founding of a Jewish State is the only possible solution of the Jewish question.'"¹⁵

When Herzl saw the shield, he "approved of the Star of David and the lion of Judah, but rejected the twelve small stars." Then, he drew a sketch of his own. The final sketch which was adopted at all Congresses until Herzl's death consisted of "The Star of David enclosing the lion on a white field with two blue stripes." Meanwhile, Bodenheimer had used his shield as a "watermark in the prospectus of the Jewish Colonial Trust."¹⁶

Through this survey of the Zionist activities in Germany and Austria, from the foundation of the "Kadimah" Society in Vienna (1882) to the establishment of the "Zionist Union of Germany" (1897), we were able to see how Zionism was based on expansionist thinking and how its principles were inspired by German sources. During these fifteen years, we also met a group of the "Lovers of Zion"

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 85.

(13) *Ibid.*

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 86.

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 97.

(16) *Ibid.*, p. 97.

who, not being the disciples of Colonel Goldsmid, had explained the question of the sword duel in defence of the Jewish honour in their own way.

The various influences exerted on these societies and organizations reflected themselves on the ideas and calls which were adopted and put into practice by people like Paul Friedmann who, in his small scale military expedition, aimed at occupying and colonizing the "Land of Midian" so he could then "leap" from it to Palestine and its surrounding area.

Here are some details about some of the characters and ideas which abound in the writings and history of the Zionist Movement:

1. Dr. Wilhelm Boehendorf—a farmer landowner and chemist in Berlin. In the summer of 1893, he makes the acquaintance of Bodenheimer who finds him very enthusiastic about the idea of colonization by force. Speaking of him, he says: "He had formed a plan of gathering around himself a number of comrades, who were to establish themselves in Transjordan, and begin a jolly guerilla war with the Bedouins, if they should hinder his idea of the founding of a Jewish State."¹⁷

2. Aaron Marcus (1843-1916)—born in Hamburg, Germany. He gets interested in the Hassidic teachings and goes to Poland where he lives among a community of Hassidim. He starts corresponding with Herzl in 1895 and offers him an army of three million Hassidim. An extreme mystic, he compares the First Zionist Congress to "a towering building with Herzl on its terrace watching from there the future of our people." He then declares that the awaited Christ alone possesses the power to open the doors of the land of Israel. After a whole night spent in the company of Herzl at the time of the First Zionist Congress, he says prophetically: "The issue of how Philistines would pay their outstanding debts, and how they would transport their women and cows across the sea is of no interest to us."

3. Joseph Marcou Baruch (1872-1899)—born in Istanbul—an agitator who, during his studies in Vienna, joins the "Kadimah" Society. Then he tours Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Izmir, and the Balkans. He also joins Garibaldi's troops in their military expedition to liberate Crete from Turkish rule and is promoted to sergeant. He devises a programme to be implemented in the following manner: "The Jews would purchase a small island in the Mediterranean Sea and declare it an independent Jewish State. They would, then, organize from there a military expedition and occupy Palestine by force." Later on, he attends the Second Zionist Congress and threatens Herzl that he will organize an army and get Palestine by force. In his diaries, Herzl expressed his fears of being assassinated by such an agitator. However, Baruch committed suicide in Florence after an unhappy love affair.

4. Menachem Scheinkin (1871-1924)—a trader and an economist who later becomes a school teacher. He participates in the foundation of Herzl's Secondary School in Tel Aviv (Herzlia Gymnasium) and helps the development of immigra-

(17) *Ibid.*, p. 87.

tion into Palestine. He attends the First Zionist Congress and declares, in Yiddish, on the Congress platform: "One does not buy a land, one takes a land for oneself." Then, speaking of the importance of military action in achieving Zionist purposes he says that it is to be shown "with the participation of the Jewish Legion in the conquest of Palestine." In his memoirs, Bodenheimer refers to the military aspect of Zionist expansionist thinking. He says: "Although I rejected the idea of launching a military enterprise in the absence of any situation calling for it, I nevertheless could not but hope that the involvement of Turkey in war might pave the way to securing possession of the land. That this idea had taken root in the heads of some enthusiasts was clear later from the attitude of a co-founder of Tel Aviv, Scheinkin."¹⁸

In his diaries, Herzl refers to a proposal made to him by two young members of the Kadimah Society, before he left for Constantinople to meet the Sultan and the High Officials of the Sublime Porte. The Kadimah members wished to "recruit a volunteer battalion of one or two thousand troops and attempt a landing at Jaffa." Herzl hastened to state in his diaries that he "advised them against this beautiful Garibaldian idea ... for they would not find a nationally prepared population awaiting them."¹⁹

(18) *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

(19) *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, edited and translated by Marvin Lowenthal (The Dial Press, New York, 1956), p. 134.

"WE WILL ASK FOR WHAT WE NEED"

In the notes he recorded on the night of the First Zionist Congress and throughout his diaries in general, Herzl gave us an insight into his attempts at camouflage and misinforming which we have encountered in the preceding chapters. We saw him leaving the issue of the claim to Greater Palestine to be raised by Sir Samuel Montagu and Colonel Goldsmid. We also saw him listening carefully to Reverend Hechler's explanations about the map of the Promised Palestine and its large frontiers, with the motto, "Palestine of David and Solomon," although we know, from historical facts, that the Kingdom of David as well as Solomon's Empire never reached such frontiers as the ones prophesied by Hechler!

Interestingly enough, Herzl made use, in his diaries and correspondence, of code names which were later compiled by Oskar K. Rabinowicz at the end of the fifth volume of the diaries. In the context of this book, we will limit our study of these symbols to "Palestine," what is called "The Land of Israel." They read as follows:

Eretz Israel: "Fly," "Isaland," "Druckerei," "Kohlmarkt," "Persien," "Number 16."

In addition, the charter which Herzl was trying to obtain from the Ottoman Sultan was designated as "Business," "Feuilleton," "Jam," "Sache," "Teppiche" and "Tuch." The Ambassador was given the code name of "Filiale" while the name of England was "God" and East Africa was "Samson" and the Island of Cyprus was referred to as "Number 12."

When, once in Istanbul, Herzl met the Grand Vizier (Khalil Rif'at Pasha) and his first secretary (Khairuddin Bey), he was asked the following question: "Palestine is large; what part of the country did you have in mind?"

Herzl asked then that it be answered in this way: "It would have to be weighed against the benefits we offer. For more land we would make greater sacrifices."¹ When the Grand Vizier inquired as to the terms of the proposal, Herzl apologized for not being able to enter into details saying that he "could indicate their precise nature to no one but His Majesty the Sultan." The diaries do not conceal the fact that the Sultan distrusted Herzl's project which he considered to be "a disguised crusade against Turkey."

Later on, Herzl went to London where he met the Baron de Rothschild to whom he gave a lesson in play on words and camouflage. He said:

"A 'Colony' is a little state, a state is a big 'Colony.' You desire a little state, I propose to set up a big 'Colony.'"²

(1) *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, Marvin Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 187.

In Rothschild's answer—which Herzl recorded ironically as the Baron's "philosophising"—we see the true reflection of certain outstanding aspects of Zionist expansionist thinking. The Baron said in French: *Il ne faut pas avoir les yeux plus gros que le ventre* (one mustn't have eyes bigger than one's stomach). Herzl refused to indulge in analogies of this sort. In fact, he remained silent and cautious until after the creation of the World Zionist Organization and the convening of the Zionist Congresses.

August 1897 saw the convening of the First Zionist Congress. Agreement was reached among the important participants in it, especially the jurists among them, to the effect that the Basle Program would be conducted in the well-known diplomatic language and that the members would abstain from evoking the Jewish State as one of the aims of Zionism. They decided to use a vague terminology in relation to the non-Zionists, and Max Nordau convinced the commission, which was putting up the final draft of the program, to use the term "Homeland" in Palestine (*Heimstätte*) "which does not account for state and does not press on the question of the frontiers."

Herzl arrived at the Congress in the company of Hechler who, considering himself as the secretary of the "Awaited Messiah," acclaimed the founder of modern Zionism with words: "Long live the King." Hechler later published an article in *Die Welt* which he ended with the following statement:

"Ye children of Abraham, awake! God Himself, the Heavenly Father, calls you back to your ancient fatherland and wants to be your God, as He promised of old through his prophets."³

However, the classical expression of the Zionist expansionist thinking is best reflected in the meeting, arranged by Hechler, with the German Kaiser in the autumn of 1898, a little more than one year after the convening of the First Zionist Congress. Herzl was thinking then of a German Protectorate. In fact, Germany was becoming more and more influential with the Sublime Porte. Although the meeting with the Kaiser did not take place at such a time, Herzl was able to meet his counselor, Von Hohenlohe, in the presence of the Second Reich's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Bülow.

Hohenlohe asked Herzl whether he thought "that the Jews are going to desert their stock exchange and follow you?" Then he inquired about the territory Herzl wished to acquire "whether as far north as Beirut, or even beyond that." Herzl's answer to this question is the first sincere confession disclosing the expansionist thinking of the Zionist Movement and which has remained the same for seventy years in spite of changes in the cadres, formulae, motives, and justifications. He said, "We will ask for what we need—the more immigrants, the more land."⁴ Wishing to set his audience's mind at ease, he immediately pursued:

(3) Barnet Livitnoff, *To the House of Their Fathers—A History of Zionism* (Praeger, New York, 1965), p. 69.

(4) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 701.

"It will, of course, be purchased from its present owners in accordance with civil law.

Hohenlohe: 'Who are these?'

[Herzl]: 'Arabs, Greeks, the whole mixed multitude of the Orient'!"

Hohenlohe then inquired about Herzl's intentions to found a Jewish state and the attitude of Turkey towards this project. But Herzl started to use a number of devices and ruses in order to evade giving a sincere answer on this subject.

On October 15, Herzl and Bodenheimer were on their way to Constantinople discussing the demands they were to formulate to the Sultan of the Sublime Porte. Herzl recorded in his diaries the following:

"Area: from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates. Stipulate a transitional period with our own institutions. A Jewish governor for this period. Afterwards, a relationship like that between Egypt and the Sultan. As soon as the Jewish inhabitants of a district amount to 2/3 of the population, Jewish administration goes in force politically, while local government (communal autonomy) always depends on the number of voters in the community."⁵

Then, following the tactics which we have become familiar with by now, Herzl attributes these ideas to Bodenheimer, qualifying them as being "in part excellent." He then adds, "A transitional stage is a good idea."

We will stop here, remembering the Baron de Rothschild's remark about the eyes which try to be bigger than the stomach. In this context, we cannot but refer to what Herzl said seventy years ago, in the light of the present circumstances and on the level of the recent events. Look at Palestine 1948 (after half a century), and Palestine 1968 (after the June 5 aggression). What will be the next step? We may well ask what is behind the claim to Greater Israel, knowing that propaganda has not stopped but has indeed kept on, following the method of the founder of the Zionist Movement and adopting the style which he introduced. We do not find it strange that Zionism should use terms such as "The Return of the Exiled" and "the Liberation of Palestine as a whole" when we know it is trying to invent the "need" in a number of ways: within itself on the one hand and publicly on the other as far as the claim for secure frontiers and guarantees for peace and security are concerned. It is well to recall Herzl's words:

"We will ask for what we need— the more immigrants, the more land."

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 711.

CASA DI ALTRI

A. *The Friend and the Enemy*

Herzl's Zionist activities filled the ten years which preceded his death. In November 1894, he published a play which he entitled *The New Ghetto*. His biographers consider that with this play, the founder of modern Zionism completed his "inner return" to the Jewish people. The play carried a message to the Jews: it asked them to get out of the ghetto where they had, for decades, constituted a poor and wretched class, indifferent to the changes and liberation of the surrounding world. A few months later, Herzl started to think of the "Promised Land," and this idea soon found its expression in the manifesto, *The Jewish State*. It might very well be that Herzl was, in this connection, deeply influenced by the character drawn by Benjamin Disraeli in his novel, *Tancred*, published in 1847, some fifty years before the convening of the First Zionist Congress. Josef Fraenkel tells us that Herzl's nickname as a student and a member of "Albia" was "Tancred," this "heroic figure who had taken a prominent part in the conquest of Jerusalem during the Crusades . . . Prince of Galilee, Prince of Antiochia."¹

In 1902, Herzl published a play *Old-New Land (Altneuland)* in which he drew a picture of the future Jewish state, "envisaging it as a New Society." His characters were drawn from among his colleagues in the Zionist Movement and members of his family. Josef Fraenkel relates that, "when [Herzl] came to describing the colonisation of Palestine on a large scale and the creation of the Jewish State, his first step was to send 'Alladino' to Palestine to buy as much land as he could get." Herzl described Alladino as "a Spanish Jew with a knowledge of Arabic and Greek, a trustworthy and clever man, descended from one of those proud families who could trace their ancestry back to the time of the expulsion from Spain..."²

As to the immediate aim behind the presentation of such a model of Jewish Palestine, it was to try to turn the world's attention to the new utopia and to win over non-Jewish public opinion to Zionist interests. While Herzl was busily engaged in writing the play at the end of the winter of 1901, he was at the same time occupied in the Zionist Working Commission with the subject of "exploring Palestine" and the study of its natural resources in relation to its industrial exploitation. He then tried to avoid the opposition of the Ottoman government towards colonization of and immigration into Palestine, and resorted to carrying out his activity under

(1) Josef Fraenkel, *Theodor Herzl—A Biography*, (Ararat Publishing Society Ltd., London, 1946), p. 31.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 14.

the cover of foreign joint-stock corporations, provided these were largely owned by the "Bank of Jewish Credit for Colonization" and worked under the facade of German, Austrian, and French protectorates. He also felt enthusiastic about the idea formulated by Kokesch, of purchasing the shares of the Jaffa Jerusalem Railway Company and all which pertained to it. Towards the middle of May 1901, after he had reached the age of 41, Herzl, inspired by Schopenhauer's philosophy, recorded in his diaries: "For me the world is no longer Representation (*Vorstellung*), but Will (*Wille*)."³ In the meantime, he was trying to obtain from the Ottoman Sultan, a license for the exercise of the rights, obligations, and privileges related to "The Jewish-Ottoman Land Company for Colonization and Settlement in Palestine and Syria" (*Jüdisch-Ottomanische Land-Compagnie zur Besiedlung von Palestina und Syrien*). The draft of the license stipulated, in Article 3, the evacuation of the indigenous population from the country. However, the failure of Herzl to obtain the approval of the Ottoman Government prompted the Jewish National Fund—which was founded the year the Fifth Congress of Basle was held—to incorporate in its basic rules and regulations those articles which considered the purchased land as permanent Jewish property and the allocation of money only for the purchase of land in Palestine and Syria.

Although Herzl endeavoured, in his above-mentioned play, to picture the Jewish State as a New Society different from the "New Ghetto" and in harmony with the liberal trends which were dominating the beginnings of this century ("It is founded on the ideas which are a common product of all civilized nations"), the utopian theme of this play is, however, in contradiction to the nations outlined in *The Jewish State* and *The Diaries*, as well as with his subsequent activities as leader of the Zionist Movement. He viewed the New Society in Old-New Land as follows:

"It would be immoral if we could exclude anyone, whatever his origin, his descent, or his religion, from participating in our achievements. For we stand on the shoulders of other civilized peoples . . . What we own, we owe to the preparatory work of other peoples. Therefore, we have to repay our debt. There is only one way to do it, the highest tolerance. Our motto must therefore be, now and ever: Man, you are my brother."⁴

However, these feelings of brotherhood, which should lead to the "highest tolerance" disappear completely from the picture when one comes to the Zionist sacred book, *The Jewish State*, and to the activities, statements, and conversations of the founder of Zionism, as recorded in his diaries. His motto there is not to bring civilization to the people of Palestine in spite of the strong link existing between colonialism and the instrument of the "mission civilisatrice." The picture which he gives of the happy Arabs in the future state is the complete opposite of what we find in *The Diaries* in terms of concealed intentions to encourage the poor peoples to cross the frontiers once possibilities of work and employment are blocked. He called this operation "voluntary expropriation."

(3) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 1105.

(4) Hans Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

He pointed out that the natives could be used for the extermination of the wild animals "big snakes, etc...!" If Herzl considered the equipment of a Zionist army, which would be responsible for security and peace (*Schutztruppen*), as one of the concessions he would expect from the states supporting him, he did not hide his intentions at all. He declared that, once the Zionist Movement had established itself firmly, it would rely upon itself and would not refrain from taking whatever it needed and getting whatever it found suitable for its purposes, at any cost.

In the concluding chapter of *The Jewish State*, Herzl tries to meet all the possible objections to his plan. He states: "We ought not to raise fresh barriers, we should rather make the old disappear."⁵ He then explains his understanding of brotherhood, relating it to his idea of the nature of human relationships. The point of view which he adopts, in this connection, is reminiscent of the statement which we encountered in a previous chapter about the role of anti-Semitism in making Jews aware of their Jewry: "Semitic struggles alone have made of us Jews." He says: "Universal brotherhood is not even a beautiful dream. Antagonism is essential to man's greatest efforts."⁶

We simply have to project the summing up of this philosophy to the practical level in order to understand some of the outstanding and deep-rooted characteristics of Zionist expansionist thinking and the policy of the state the foundation of which had been laid by Herzl at the Congress at Basle. The organized World Zionist Movement started to undertake its activities as "the Jewish state in the making." At the end of the year which Herzl had chosen as the last limit for the realization of his utopian vision in Palestine, Zionism was more in harmony with Herzl's philosophy of universal brotherhood. It persisted, through various ways, in assuring that the "beautiful dream" had no basis whatsoever but had been replaced by an "unpleasant nightmare."

In fact, the Zionist Movement had adopted the Herzlian utopia as a pretext to hide its real objectives and considered it as justifying various colonialist expansionist activities.

Both Herzl and the Zionist Movement as a whole had understood the significance of their claim to other peoples' homeland. In the 1890's, Ahad Ha-am had already sounded the alarm signal by revealing the truth about Palestine. After his first stay in Palestine in 1891, he wrote his famous essay, "The Truth from Palestine," which was later published in his collected essays, *Al-Parashat Drachim* in 1895. This article did not, however, appear in the second German edition of 1902 which, on the other hand, included all his other essays, namely, "This Is Not the Way" (1889), "Dr. Pinsker and His Pamphlet" (Odessa, 1892), and "The External Freedom and the Internal Servitude (1891). The following passage, from his article "The Truth," reflects the consequences of the activities of the "Lovers of Zion" in Palestine, after ten years of efforts for settlement and colonial expansion, in terms of human relationships. He wrote:

(5) Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State* (4th edition, London, 1946), p. 76.

(6) *Ibid.*

"Yet what do our brethren do in Palestine? Just the very opposite! Serfs they were in the lands of the diaspora and suddenly they find themselves in freedom, and this change has awakened in them an inclination to despotism. They treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, deprive them of their rights, offend them without cause, and even boast of these deeds; and nobody among us opposes this despicable and dangerous inclination."⁷

In doing this, Ahad Ha-am was warning the Jews about what was happening in Palestine while attempting to give a correct insight into the distorted picture of the Palestinian Arabs in the minds of the "Lovers of Zion." He insisted on the fact that Zionists were committing a great error in thinking that "the Arabs are all savages who live like animals and do not understand what is happening around . . ." Besides, he considered that the basic principles of Zionist activity were "not how much we do but how we do it."

Herzl's writings and activities, in addition to his intentions which he revealed in *The Jewish State* and *The Diaries*, illustrate his understanding of how action should be carried out on various levels. When he lost hope in the Ottomans' willingness to accede to his wishes, he started thinking of "giving the Movement a closer territorial goal, preserving Zion as the final goal." "Thus," he thought, "we must organize ourselves maintaining all of our historic claims."⁸ He then planned to "demand Cyprus from England, and even keep an eye on South Africa or America—until Turkey is dissolved."⁹ We shall deal with the issue of Zionist expansion into the island of Cyprus by studying the concept of Greater Israel which was officially adopted by Davis Trietsch since the First Zionist Congress, and which was recorded at length in *The Diaries* between 1898 and 1902.

During the two years which preceded Herzl's death, 1902-1904, the Zionist plans of colonialist expansionism kept growing steadily. On 25 February 1902, Herzl mentioned the proposal made to him by the Sultan to colonize (on gratis territory) in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, with the exception of Palestine. He wrote down in his diaries that he had to refuse, "because," he said, "I can make an agreement only on the basis of our program, as long as the Greater A.C. [Action Committee] does not authorize me to make such impromptu policy."¹⁰ However, six months later, he came back to the question of the colonization of Iraq. On July 25, 1902, we see him in Constantinople, trying to conclude the deal in exchange for "a charter or concession for Jewish colonization in Mesopotamia adding the territory of Haifa and its environs in Palestine."¹¹ Although the deal was to be worked out in exchange for the consolidation of the Ottoman debts, Herzl insisted on assuring the Sultan that the Jewish colonization would, in addition, present many advantages to the Ottoman Empire. One year later, after he had heard about the Kishinev atrocities in Tsarist Russia, he felt

(7) Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

(8) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 644.

(9) *Ibid.*

(10) *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 1244.

(11) *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 1315.

that time was passing and that "events are pressing." He addressed a letter to Izzet Pasha Al Abed, reminding him of the projects related to the "arrangement for colonization in Mesopotamia as well as in the Sanjak of Acre,"¹² and declaring that this was his last "hope of concluding an arrangement with His Imperial Majesty." If not "we shall be obliged to find some other territory. There will be no lack of opportunities."

At the beginning of July 1902, Herzl gathered with Lord James de Rothschild and explained to him that he wanted to ask the British government for a colonization charter which would enable him to found a Jewish Colony in a British possession. Rothschild said: "Take Uganda!" Herzl refused the offer and, taking a slip of paper, he wrote: "Sinai Peninsula, Egyptian Palestine," Cyprus." (He noted down later in his diaries that he had done so because there were other people in the room.) Then he informed Rothschild that the Sultan had offered him Mesopotamia and that he had refused it!¹³

Soon after, Herzl presented his plan connected with "The Jewish Company for Sinai, Egyptian Palestine, and Cyprus." He changed its name, in the financial draft which he sent to Rothschild (while he had prepared a political draft for Chamberlain).¹⁴ It read: "The Jewish (Eastern) Company, Limited," thus reminding him of the history of the "East-India Company" (1601) which had emanated from the "British Levant Company" (11 September 1581) and continued its operations until it was dissolved in 1825 by a Parliamentary decree. As for the political aspect of the plan, it was made clear in the letter Herzl addressed on July 12, 1902, to the Baron explaining his "political motivation" together with his "human interest." He wrote:

"A great Jewish settlement east of the Mediterranean will strengthen our prospects for Palestine. The Jews in the English Colony of the Jewish Eastern Company will be as loyal Zionists as Hirsch's remote colonists in Argentina."¹⁵

In this same letter, Herzl spoke about his second plan, which he qualified as "secret," and which he said, "could be carried out simultaneously with the first one, *but also separately*." He was referring there to Mesopotamia. The letter went on to explain that Herzl prepared the first plan "because in Mesopotamia there are fewer political assurances for the future" than in a British possession.

Towards the end of October, Herzl met with Chamberlain and explained to him that he wanted the territories of Cyprus, El Arish and the Sinai Peninsula. Chamberlain answered him saying that "he could speak only about Cyprus," the rest being the concern of the Foreign Office. He then pointed out to him that Cyprus was the homeland of Greeks and Moslems and that he could not "crowd them out for the sake of new immigrants." On the contrary, his duty was to stand by them. He added that matters could be solved if Herzl could indicate to him

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 1503.

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 1294.

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 1301.

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 1302.

a British possession, not inhabited by white people as yet. When Chamberlain expressed to him his fears of opposition from the indigenous population saying, "In our country everything is out in the open," Herzl answered him saying, "Not everything in politics is really disclosed to the public—only results, or whatever may happen to be needed in a discussion." And when Chamberlain took an atlas and pointed to Egypt declaring that Jews would encounter the same obstacles there, Herzl took this opportunity to make him understand that his "desire was to obtain a rallying point for the Jewish people in the vicinity of Palestine"!¹⁶

When, later on, Herzl realized that important political changes were to take place east and west of the Mediterranean Sea, namely the opening up of the Macedonian question, the imminence of the partition of Morocco and the Italian annexation of Tripoli, he understood that he had to speak immediately with Lansdowne and Rothschild.

Thus, the Commission of Jewish Experts was formed in January 1903, under the leadership of Leopold Kessler. The latter had arrived from South Africa where he had worked in the field of mineralogy. He had then acted as the chairman of the Jewish Society in Transvaal and had been later named vice-president of the Zionist Union in South Africa. The expedition for the study of El Arish and the Sinai Peninsula counted, among its members, Colonel Goldsmid. He had been asked by Herzl to win over the Egyptian Jews to their plan. Kessler was to investigate the territory extending from the Suez Canal to the Turkish borders on the Mediterranean Sea, as well as its hinterland while Goldsmid was to provide the expedition with the appropriate maps from the British War Office. Finally, Greenberg and Kessler were to go in their expedition south "as far as the Gulf of Aqaba."

One is entitled to wonder, then, if a sort of earlier harmony did not exist between British imperialist plans and Zionist ambitions, which reached its climax with the Balfour Declaration in 1917. What is the nature of this "harmony," and how was it reflected in the thinking and activities of the Zionists during the last years of Herzl's life, in the last decades of the nineteenth century?

B. *The Earlier Harmony*

It is beyond any doubt that British policy, from long before the occupation of Egypt until after the stabilization of its colonial rule and its control over the Suez Canal, had tried to use every possible device to extend its domination over the area situated east of Suez, on the pretext of protecting the route to India. In addition to their old established competition with France and their new fear of Russia, the British had to cope with a new type of threat, namely that of the "German rush Eastwards," after the German economic influence had penetrated into the Ottoman Empire during the last decade of the nineteenth century. British

(16) *Ibid.*, p. 1362.

fears increased as a result of a possible extension of the German influence into the areas of Iraq and the Arabian Gulf. Britain was determined to consider such an extension as a threat to its interests in India and its policy became based on an eventual German move to cut the Indian route, thus putting an end to British influence in the area.

The British colonialist policy started to carry out various operations of encirclement in order to keep German influence away from what it considered to be its own sphere of interests, and the competition for the zones of influence in the area took the form of competition over the railway lines. In addition to those plans which we have encountered in the previous chapters, a Haifa-Baghdad railway was envisaged by the British since the 1880's. It was known as the Willcoks plan, named for its author, the engineer Sir William Willcoks, who had carried out vast irrigation projects in Iraq and had met Theodor Herzl in Cairo in 1903, to discuss the Zionist development plans for the Sinai Peninsula.

In January 1899, Britain succeeded in concluding with the Sheikh of Kuwait, a pact by which the Sheikh agreed not to relinquish any part of his land or to receive any representative of a foreign power before the previous consent of the British High-Commissioner in Kuwait. When the Sublime Porte undertook in March 1903, to grant a new railway concession extending as far as the Arabian Gulf, and the Concessionaire Company tried to associate British capital with the execution of the project, the idea was welcomed by Balfour, who was then Prime Minister, and by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, while the secretary of state for the colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, proclaimed his opposition to any British participation in the construction of the said railway, thus confirming his hostility to Germany.

As to the frontier question between Egypt and Palestine, it can be summarised as follows:

Zionist sources refer to the area situated between the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba and Suez, as "Egyptian Palestine," known in books of history and geography as the Sinai Peninsula. The frontier question goes back to the time of Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim Pasha's conquests in the territories independent of the Ottoman Sultanate. The frontier lines of Muhammad Ali's kingdom were defined in the Convention of London (1841). The Sinai Peninsula, the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as a number of Red Sea garrison towns, remained under the authority of Khedivial Egypt, thus allowing for the protection of the Egyptian pilgrims' route to Mecca. The two maps defining the exact boundary had disappeared during the Aqaba incident. In fact, according to Frischwasser-Ra'anan, "one was lost in an Egyptian fire. The Turks still claimed to be in possession of the other map in 1906 but no one on the Anglo-Egyptian side had ever seen it and its existence was considered doubtful."¹⁷

(17) H.F. Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *The Frontiers of A Nation* (The Batchworth Press, London, 1955), p. 35.

However, the London Convention for the Pacification of the Levant which was ratified by Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire on the other, stipulated under a separate act:

"His Highness [the Sultan] promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt; and His Highness promises, moreover, to grant to Mehemet Ali, for his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of the fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, the limits of which shall be determined by the following line of demarkation:—

"This line, beginning at Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the coast of the Mediterranean, shall extend direct from thence as far as the mouth of the River Seisaban, at the northern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias; it shall pass along the western shore of that Lake, it shall follow the right bank of the river Jordan, and the western shore of the Dead Sea; from thence it shall extend straight to the Red Sea, which it shall strike at the northern point of the Gulf of Akaba, and from thence it shall follow the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba, and the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez."¹⁸

Mehemet Ali was given ten days to concur to the said proposal. In the Sultan's Firman to Mehemet Ali stipulating the conditions of hereditary governorship of Egypt (June 1, 1841), we note the following clause: "I grant unto thee the Government of Egypt within its ancient boundaries, such as they are to be found in the map which is sent unto thee by my Grand Vizier now in office, with a seal affixed to it . . ."¹⁹ We, however, ignore the exact boundaries found in the said map. The dispute, which broke out in 1892 between the British occupying forces in Egypt and the Sublime Porte, concerned the issue of whether the frontier lines between the Turkish Provinces in Palestine and the Egyptian territory in the Sinai, extended from Aqaba to Rafah or from Aqaba to El Arish (see the map in the appendix of this book); it later included the issue of the future southwestern Palestine. What exactly had happened and how did this "reduction of the territory of Turkish Palestine by several thousand square miles as compared with the area of 1892 and of Biblical days"²⁰ take place?

In relation to its geographic situation, Sinai can be considered as the connecting link between the Asian and the African continents.²¹ Its strategic importance, recognized all through the course of history, was such as to make it a sort of a buffer state between Egypt and Palestine. For 2500 years of Near Eastern history, invading armies from both Egyptian and Palestinian sides, had marched across the Peninsula. It was also crossed by the crusaders in their expedition against Cairo. Jarvis explains that "from the earliest days of the Frankish Kingdom, the Crusaders had realized the importance of the Gulf of Aqaba, and the immensely strong castles of Kerak and Shobuk were constructed partly with a view to controlling the trade between Egypt and Syria." When Saladin tried to drive them out of the country, he occupied the Faraoun Island and the Gulf of

(18) J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1535-1914*, Vol. I (Princeton, New York, 1956), p. 117.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 121.

(20) Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

(21) Major C.S. Jarvis, *Yesterday and Today in Sinai*, (Edinburgh and London, 1931, revised 1941, reprinted 1943), pp. 90-130.

Aqaba in 1170. In 1182, he chose to "march across Sinai via the central road and entered Transjordan by the Aqaba road." Thus began his war against the Frankites which ended only after the fall of Jerusalem (1187) and Acre (1191), and the ratification of a peace treaty with the King of England (1192).

When the Ottoman Turks invaded Egypt in 1517, under the leadership of Sultan Salim, they marched across the Sinai coast road. In 1799, the Napoleonic invasions followed the same route. However, Napoleon did not succeed in invading Acre because of the help extended to the Turks by the British Fleet.

Thirty years later, in 1831, Ibrahim Pasha took the lead of the Egyptian Army and crossed the Sinai; he defeated the Turkish armies stationed at Acre, Homs, and Aleppo, and threatened to occupy Istanbul, but the European Powers interfered. The weakness of the Ottoman Empire aroused the ambitions of more than one country. Britain succeeded in enforcing its policy of pacification in the Ottoman Provinces and decided to delay the partition of the Ottoman Empire (The Sick Man of Europe) until such time when this partition would coincide more with its interests in this part of the world and with its ability to protect the Indian route.

Since the Napoleonic expedition, a close relationship was established between the religious interests on the one hand and the cultural, economic and political interests on the other. Of all the countries, Britain was most eager to establish its predominance over this part of the world. Its interest was reflected in the close relationship which was established between the British Colonialist policy of expansion and the activities which were later carried out by the Palestine Exploration Fund. As a matter of fact, the activities of the Palestine and Biblical associations go back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, right after the Napoleonic expedition. In 1804, the Palestine Association was founded in London with the aim of gathering and publishing information regarding the geography, people, climate, and history of the Holy Land. In 1810, it published a volume which included "a translation of Seetzen's description of the countries adjacent to the Sea of Galilee, the Jordan, and the Dead Sea."²² It appears, however, that as a result of prevailing unfavourable conditions, that Association had to relinquish its funds, papers and books in favour of the Royal Geographical Society which was established in 1830; but, as the latter's sphere of interest embraced the whole world, it could not achieve much in the field of Palestine exploration.

In the winter of 1852 and spring of 1853, Arthur Stanley (Dean of Westminster), in the company of three of his friends, visited the scenes of sacred history in Egypt, Syria, and Arabia. In 1856, he published his book *Sinai and Palestine* which later appeared in more than one edition. He visited Palestine again in 1862 as guide and clergyman of Prince Edward. He considered Egypt as the "necessary introduction to Sinai and Palestine" and agreed with Chevalier

(22) Watson, *Fifty Years' Work in the Holy Land (P.E.F.)—A Record and a Summary 1865-1915* (London, 1915), pp. 11-12.

Bunsen when the latter remarked that "Egypt has, properly speaking, no history. History was born on that night when Moses led forth his people from Goshen" or the land of Egypt. The map of Palestine and the Sinai, which he included in his book, extends from Sidon to Damascus on the north to Ras Muhammad and the Gulf of Suez on the South; however, no frontier lines were drawn between Palestine and the Sinai Peninsula.²³

Thus, the organized exploration of southern and eastern Palestine was carried out only after the establishment of the Fund. Between 1871 and 1877, explorers undertook a survey of the land situated between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, "from Tyre and Banias on the north, to a line, running from near Gaza on the south, through Beersheba to the Dead Sea," considering this area as corresponding to the one usually known as the Holy Land. According to the Palestine Exploration Fund's records, "it was not possible to extend the survey south of Beersheba into the country known as the Negeb, which lies between Beersheba and the line of the Egyptian frontier, from Rafah on the Mediterranean to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba."²⁴

However, Captain Wilson had previously carried out the survey of the Sinai Peninsula, under the auspices of a private fund, "the Sinai Survey Fund," which pursued the same objectives. He had left Suez in October 1868, at the head of an expedition composed of Captain Palmer of the Corps of Royal Engineers (R.E.), four non-commissioned officers of the R.E., Rev. F.W. Holland (then Honorary Secretary of the Palestine Exploration Fund), Professor E.M. Palmer, the well-known oriental scholar, and a naturalist, Mr. Wyatt. The work was completed by April 1869, a few months before the opening of the Suez Canal! (November 1869). However, the survey had been confined to the vicinity of Jebel Musa, and did not include the northeastern areas known as the desert of the "Tih." The members of the expedition encountered a number of difficulties with the bedouins who felt suspicious about these European travellers who had come to intrude into their private lives. In order to avoid these difficulties, Palmer decided that the next expedition would not include servants or interpreters. The expeditionary group left Suez in December 1869, for Mount Sinai via the Wady Gharandel. Having crossed Mount Sinai, the group proceeded to Ain Hudherah, then to Nakhl on the pilgrim road; then they reached Wady el Arish, Jebel Araif and Ain Kadeis which they considered to be the Kadesh Barnea of the Holy Bible. From Ain Kadeis, they proceeded to El-Aujeh in the Wady Hanein or Valley of Gardens until they reached Jerusalem where Palmer carried out a "study of the history of the Dome of the Rock, as related by the Arab historians."²⁵ Palmer returned to England and published the results of his exploration in a two volume work entitled *The Desert of the Exodus* (1871). Later, he returned to

(23) Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., *Sinai and Palestine, In Connection with their History* (John Murray, London, 1910), p. 1.

(24) Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 61.

the desert, but according to Watson, under different circumstances. In 1882, the British decided to send a military expedition to Egypt to suppress the Egyptian nationalist revolt led by Arabi. The military experts decided to "advance into the Delta from the Suez Canal" and "considered a matter of great importance to ascertain the dispositions of the Bedouin tribes in the desert, and either to induce them to remain tranquil or to assist the English, for, in case of their hostility, the safety of the Canal might have been endangered."²⁶ Consequently, the British Government asked Professor Palmer to approach the sheikhs and make the necessary arrangements with them, "a very unusual task for a university professor,"²⁷ according to the records of the P.E.F.

This time, Palmer found it more convenient to enter the Sinai from Palestine. He went from Port Said to Jaffa, along the sea coast, and proceeded to Gaza where he met his former friends of the Terabin and Teyahan tribes. In August, he reported to the Admiral Sir William Hewitt, that his mission had been accomplished successfully. As soon as Suez was occupied by the British troops, Palmer was appointed interpreter-in-chief. A few days later, he was sent on a mission to the desert; he left for the Sinai accompanied by two British officers, and all three disappeared after they crossed the Wells of Moses on August 8, 1882.

In August, 1881, the expedition for the survey of Palestine led by Colonel Conder had been strongly opposed by the Arabs, and the local Ottoman authorities forced them to stop their work and return to Jerusalem. In the meantime, they had been able to survey an area of 400 square miles! All attempts at getting a favourable firman from the Sublime Porte failed, and Conder, as already mentioned in a previous chapter, joined the Intelligence Service of the British army during the military expedition sent to crush Arabi's revolt and occupy Egypt.

In 1883-84, Captain Kitchener, together with Professor Hull and a group of soldiers, botanists and meteorologists, carried out the survey of the Wady Arabah, east of Jordan. They decided to divide the area into three parts and study the area extending from the Dead Sea on the south to the Gulf of Aqaba on the north; then they added their results to the previous studies made in Palestine.

But, according to the records of the P.E.F., all these explorations and expeditions did not succeed in providing the Fund with the reliable information it required. In 1913, the British War Office authorized Captain Newcombe of the Royal Engineers to pursue the work which had been executed by Conder and Kitchener. Previously, in 1906, Captain Newcombe had surveyed the area situated between the Suez Canal and the Turco-Egyptian frontiers and had developed friendly relations with certain bedouin tribesmen. He was joined by the later famous T.E. Lawrence and the work was carried out from December 1913 till May 1914, shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. The survey covered an area of 2500 square miles. A small portion near the head of the Gulf of

(26) *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

(27) *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Aqaba was left unsurveyed as a result of the intervention of the Ottoman authorities. The surveyors took the missing information from the maps that Major Kitchener had drawn for this area during his expedition in 1883.

* * * *

The issue of the Turco-Egyptian frontiers, which took place between 1892 and 1906, has kept until now its controversial character. According to certain sources, the dispute had been directly provoked by the accession of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi to the throne by way of a firman from the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II; in this connection, Frischwasser-Ra'anan explains that this firman "was so worded as to give Abbas Hilmi legal authority only over Egypt, the implication being that Sinai and the Red Sea forts would revert to direct Turkish rule."²⁸ In the person of Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer), the British immediately took steps "to prevent the loss of what they regarded as a strategically vital area."²⁹ A telegram was dispatched to Cairo by the Grand Vizier, Djevad Pasha, expressing the Turkish will to leave "Tor-Sinai" under Egyptian rule on condition that the garrison towns along the Hejaz route reverted to Turkey. Cromer then declared that the British occupying authorities considered the new frontier as extending from east of El Arish on the Mediterranean Sea to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. As for the Ottoman authorities, they "neither assented nor objected" to it.

On the other hand, Cromer said that he considered Friedmann's project of Jewish colonization in the land of Midian as the immediate cause of the frontier dispute. When the Zionist colonization plan of El Arish, the Sinai Peninsula (and Cyprus), was submitted to him in his capacity of final authority in Near Eastern Affairs, Cromer "repeatedly referred" to the earlier failure of Friedmann claiming that Friedmann's project had caused the frontier dispute with Turkey in 1892.

Besides, Cromer considered the frontier question between Egypt and the Turkish Vilayets in Palestine as unsettled. Not wishing to draw the attention of the Turks in this direction, he suggested at first "that any Zionist settlement should be outside the area claimed by Turkey in 1892, i.e. north-west of the line El Arish-Suez." Then, for strategic considerations, he opposed the colonization scheme of El Arish. It might very well be that the British plans, at that time, were trying to maintain the *status quo* in the Sinai Peninsula and closing it to Zionist colonization and settlement schemes, thus providing a better protection for British interests in the Suez and Egypt.

The moment the British authorities felt that the Ottoman government wished to build a branch to the Hejaz Railway line linking Ma'an to Aqaba, they realized that their interests would be threatened in case "the Ma'an-Aqaba link

(28) Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

(29) *Ibid.*, p. 36.

raised the Hejaz Railway to the status of an overland line, linking the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.”³⁰ They provoked an incident similar to the one which led to the conclusion of an agreement with the Sheikh of Kuwait in 1899. To them, the extension of the Berlin-Baghdad railway had begun to resemble the project for a branch line of the Hejaz Railway from Ma’an to Aqaba. If Britain had, in 1899, promptly sent some of its warships to the port of Kuwait and refused its access to the Ottoman army, it had reached the said agreement without caring about either the protestations of the Sublime Porte or the terms of the Berlin Treaty which stipulated the respect of the Ottoman regional supremacy.

In 1906, British soldiers were sent to construct military barracks near Aqaba. Led by Bramly Bey, they attempted to occupy Nakbel Aqaba and El Gattar near the actual location of the port of Eilat, and to march in the direction of the Wadi ‘Araba. British troops advanced into the disputed area and occupied it. Negotiations for a peaceful settlement started to take place in Cairo. Mukhtar Pasha suggested that “Sinai be bisected by a line running south from El Arish to Ras Mohammed.” However, Lord Cromer objected to this proposition as, in his opinion, the Gulf of Aqaba would become a “*mare clausum* in the possession of Turkey, and a standing menace to the security of the trade route to the east.”³¹

The British authorities sent an ultimatum to Constantinople demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops to a line “running from Rafah on the Mediterranean to a point west of Aqaba, at Taba.” In his book, *Frontiers of a Nation*, Frischwasser-Ra’anan explains that most of the maps published before 1882 “showed the frontier at El Arish” while, he says, Lord Cromer claimed that “the boundary pillars had been at Rafah for many years” and not near El Arish. By virtue of an agreement concluded on October 1, 1906, between the Egyptian Khedivial authorities and the Ottoman government, the official frontiers between Palestine and Egypt were defined as follows: They extended from Tal Kharaeb at Rafah on the Mediterranean coast to Ras Taba on the Gulf of Aqaba, and the frontiers which the Ottoman authorities considered as purely “administrative,” separated the nominally Ottoman dominated Khedivial Egypt from the province of Syria and the Jerusalem Mutasarrifiyah until 1948 when the State of Israel was founded on part of the Arab land in Palestine.

C. *Someone Else’s House (Casa di Altri)*

Herzl asked Greenberg not to leave Cairo before getting hold of a settlement and colonization charter, duly signed by the Egyptian government. Greenberg then addressed him a cable containing what he described as “private information” from Cromer, namely that the “Sultan’s man” in Egypt was doing his best to oppose the project. Herzl relates that after a conversation with Dr. Abdullah Djevdet Bey, “a Young Turk and a friend of the Jews,”³² he got the idea

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 38.

(31) *Ibid.*, p. 39.

(32) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 14-19.

of breaking the Turkish commissar's resistance by means of *baksheesh*. But when he received Greenberg's report on March 2, he could not hide his deception. Greenberg had not succeeded in obtaining the required charter. What he had managed to get instead, was a document in the form of a letter addressed to him by the Egyptian Prime Minister, Boutros Ghali, about the establishment of a "Jewish National Settlement Company," with no reference at all to either the Jewish Colonial Trust or to Herzl himself. In his diaries, Herzl pictured the situation as follows:

"... I must differentiate: Possession, power and right. The Egyptian government has possession, the English government has the power, the Turkish government has the right."³³

He decided to go to Cairo and meet Boutros Ghali and Lord Cromer whom he described as the "most disagreeable Englishman I have ever faced." Referring to Boutros' letter to Greenberg, Cromer explained that they "couldn't manage anything more than that," for "within this framework, however, the Turkish government could have no objections."³⁴ In Cairo, Herzl attended a lecture given by Sir William Willcocks, on the "canalization of Chaldea." It reminded him of the land of Iraq which the Sultan had proposed to him the year before. The next day, while waiting for the arrival of the Commission, he asked Goldsmid to read the report for him and decided to omit the following statement: "Under the present circumstances, cannot be settled—but if water is made available, it can be settled,"³⁵ declaring that in so doing, he was obeying the same motives which made him conceal the reason why he wanted to have land up to the 29th parallel. If we cast a glance at the map of the Sinai Peninsula, we will find that the 29th parallel crosses its lower part; it divides the Gulf of Suez roughly into two sections and passes near the spot known as Ain Hadira to include all of the Gulf of Aqaba and intersect with Hejaz Railway. Throughout the diaries, we can depict the various devices the Zionists used to mislead Lord Cromer and the Egyptian authorities about the area they had ambitions for. On the official level, we see them keeping up with their readiness not to divulge their true intentions so as not to encounter difficulties in relation to their water requirements. Speaking of the colonization Charter, Herzl referred to what Talleyrand had said when Napoleon was conferring with him and Sieyès about a constitution: "'A Constitution must be brief and . . .'" said Sieyès; 'and obscure,' Talleyrand completed the sentence."³⁶

On the verge of leaving Cairo, Herzl confessed that the main difficulty turned around the question of "the size of the territory" they were claiming then. The local authorities were willing to give them a "*suite de terrain*" but no "continuous area." In view of Chamberlain's ignorance of the value of the requested land, Herzl had put his confidence in him once more. On April 24, in London, Cham-

(33) *Ibid.*, p. 1432.

(34) *Ibid.*, p. 1446.

(35) *Ibid.*, p. 1450.

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 1454.

berlain told him that he had "seen a land for you on my travels and that's Uganda." "But," he pursued, "of course he wants to go only to Palestine or its vicinity," Herzl nodded and explained:

"Our base must be in or near Palestine. Later on we could also settle in Uganda, for we have masses of people ready to emigrate. But we have to build on a national foundation, and this is why we must have the political attraction offered by El Arish. But they don't understand that in Egypt. It is true that I wasn't able to make myself as plain there as I was here."³⁷

A discussion on Asia Minor, where the British had "fewer and fewer interests," followed. Then Chamberlain confessed that, on the other hand, the British "will not leave Egypt" as they had many interests there; reassuring Herzl, he said: "... Thus you and your settlement will share the fortunes of that British possession." But he wondered what would happen, for instance, in case Herzl having succeeded in establishing a Jewish colony there, a confrontation were to take place in that region between France, Germany and Russia. Herzl answered him, saying:

"I believe that then our chances would be even better. For we shall be used as a small buffer state. We shall get it not from the goodwill, but from the jealousy of the powers. And once we are at El Arish under the Union Jack, then Palestine too will fall into the British sphere of influence."³⁸

In the middle of May 1903, a cable sent from Cairo, informed him that Lord Cromer had advised Goldsmid about the refusal of the Egyptian government. The use of code names in the diaries diminishes considerably in this context. Starting out from Chamberlain's suggestion about Uganda, Herzl came to think of colonizing Mozambique. His scheme consisted of obtaining the land for a chartered company from the Portuguese government, in return for his promise "to meet the deficit [of the Portuguese government] and to pay a tribute later." He then made it clear that he considered the acquisition of Mozambique "only as an object of barter in order to get for it from the English government the entire Sinai Peninsula ... and possibly Cyprus as well—and for nothing!"³⁹ He decided to approach the Portuguese Ambassador in Vienna instead of asking Nordau to pursue the Mozambique project in Lisbon. He had decided to do so because he feared Nordau's opposition and scepticism about the project and hoped to negotiate the matter with some "clerical nobleman," relying on his old friend Hechler to obtain an appointment with the Portuguese Ambassador!

Towards the middle of July 1903, Herzl addressed to the Jewish banker, the Belgian Franz Philippson (1851-1929), a "strictly confidential" letter in which he exposed to him a new scheme explaining that, "with full maintenance of our Palestine program, which, to be sure, we cannot immediately put into practice, and on a national basis in any case, we must create a place of refuge secured by

(37) *Ibid.*, p. 1473.

(38) *Ibid.*, p. 1474.

(39) *Ibid.*, p. 1487.

public law." By that he meant the Congo State, where the Belgian banker might be "able and willing to participate," declaring that the Congo had "land enough which we can use for our settlement." He then asked Philippson to "sound out" King Leopold in relation to this project. A few days later, Philippson informed him that he would not participate in the scheme, in view of the fact that he considered the Congo as "absolutely unsuitable."⁴⁰

* * * *

The last events in the life of the founder of modern Zionism, after the failure of the El Arish project, started with his trip to Vienna (May 25, 1903) to meet Count Paraty, the Portuguese Ambassador. Throughout this meeting, Herzl showed a keen interest on certain specific questions about Mozambique, such as: Is it autonomous? Did it have protected troops? Again, the idea of bartering the Mozambique against the Nile waters and Cyprus occurred to him.

At the beginning of August 1903, he left for St. Petersburg where he tried to convince the Russian government to intervene actively with the Ottoman authorities for a Charter for the Colonization of Palestine, with the exception of the Holy Places. He also asked the Russian authorities to provide a "financial subsidy" for the emigration of the Jews, and to facilitate the organization of the Russian Zionist societies along the lines of the Basle Programme. Meanwhile, the Russian state as an actuality. We want to assimilate them, and to this end this matter differed from his: "The Russian state," they said, "is bound to desire homogeneity of its population . . . what we must demand of all the peoples in our Empire, and therefore also of the Jews, is that they take a patriotic view of the Russian state as an actuality. We want to assimilate them, and to this end we have two methods: higher education and economic betterment."⁴¹ Herzl then remembered that the Russians were very sensitive about the Holy Places. He reassured the Minister Witte in this respect declaring that the Jews wished to settle "farther to the north of the country. Far from Jerusalem."⁴²

Upon his return from Russia, Herzl received from Sir Clement Hill, a letter containing the new official proposal made by Chamberlain. At the Sixth Zionist Congress which was held in Basle (August 1903), Greenberg made this letter public, and the disagreement within the World Zionist Organization between the "Ugandists" or the "political Zionists" and the "Palestinians" or the "practical Zionists" spread dangerously. The opposition of the "practicalists" and the Russian Zionists to Herzl's policy and method grew stronger. In 1905, the Seventh World Zionist Congress, which was held after Herzl's death, decided to refuse the Uganda proposal and to stick to Palestine at any cost.

(40) *Ibid.*, p. 1514.

(41) *Ibid.*, p. 1523.

(42) *Ibid.*, p. 1532.

In January 1904, Herzl went to Rome to meet the Pope and the King of Italy. At the Vatican, Cardinal Merry del Val promised to ask the Pope to grant him an audience and Herzl explained what he would expect from the Pope in relation to the Jewish question. He said:

"I don't intend to ask for anything that might embarrass him. I shall only request what is possible. Let him state in an encyclical that he has no objection to Zionism, provided the Holy Places are extraterritorialized."⁴³

On January 25, Herzl was received by the Pope. He tried to explain to him that, in his plan, the Holy Places would be extraterritorialized. After having listened calmly to Herzl's exposé, His Holiness, the Pope said:

"There are two possibilities. Either the Jews will cling to their faith and continue to await the Messiah who, for us, has already appeared. In that case they will be denying the divinity of Jesus and we cannot help them. Or else they will go there without any religion, and then we can be even less favourable to them."⁴⁴

But if His Holiness, the Pope made it clear to Herzl that the Vatican could neither approve of the Zionist Movement nor prevent the Jews from going to Jerusalem, he, at the same time, insisted that it could "never sanction it." During the meeting which later took place between him and the King of Italy, Herzl mentioned "how in Palestine I had avoided mounting a white donkey or a white horse, so no one would embarrass me by thinking I was the Messiah"! He then listened to the King's opinion about Napoleon Bonaparte and the Sanhedrin's Congress of 1806, by which he explained that Napoleon did not wish to restore the Jewish nation; he rather wished "to make Jews, who were scattered all over the world, his agents"; which made Herzl think that the King's views were identical to those of Chamberlain in this respect. After he exposed his original projects of settlement in the Sinai and Uganda, Herzl broached his Tripoli scheme which was "to channel the surplus Jewish immigration into Tripolitania, under the liberal laws and institutions of Italy." The King interrupted him saying: "But that again [Tripolitania] is someone else's house" (*Ma è ancora casa di altri*).⁴⁵ Herzl ignored this remark and pointed out to the King that "the partition of Turkey is bound to come." The King asked, "When?" The audience was over after Herzl had repeated the argument, "Italy can do a lot for us, for the Sultan is afraid of Italy."

During the last months of his life, Herzl heard about an Arab movement aiming at the establishment of a Moslem Caliphate from among the prophet's descendants, "a sort of Papacy with Mecca as Rome." He probably meant the movement of "The Islamic Union" or the appeal to the restoration of the Caliphate from the Turks. It occurred to him that he should unite this movement with that of the Arab Awakening which had found its expression in Negib Azoury's writings.

Herzl kept trying to get promises from the Great Powers, and in May 1904,

(43) *Ibid.*, p. 1591.

(44) *Ibid.*, p. 1603.

(45) *Ibid.*, p. 1600.

he noted a promise made to him by Count Goluchowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to assist him "if the matter were great enough to warrant concerted action on the part of the Powers." Turkey would have to be asked for a settlement area in Palestine and the vicinity large enough for five to six million Jews. Meanwhile, Herzl had, in the draft which he had prepared, referred once more to the Sanjak of Acre pointing out that the latter's location, in the middle of the Ottoman Empire, was like "a staging area for the settlement" and would later constitute the starting point for expansionism and conquest. In this connection, the founder of Modern Zionism did not stop to think that the land he was coveting was "someone else's house." He, in fact, ignored it for the sake of the "Israeli homeland" which was to be based on usurpation and expansionism. In that, he was imitated, though with certain modifications as to the means and methods, by the Zionist Movement as a whole.

PART TWO

FROM HERZL TO BALFOUR

NORDAU AND THE JEWISH DISTRESS

A member of the Jewish intelligentsia, Max Nordau, adopted Zionism in its early Herzlian stage. The moment he met Herzl in Paris, they both realized that they could unite successfully. Herzl's genius was indeed in need of Nordau's experience in the political arena and skill in dealing with people. Besides, Nordau was not an unknown figure in the European intellectual circles which he had frequented during the ten years which preceded his meeting with Herzl. In the eyes of his contemporaries, he appeared as one of the leading writers and a critic of society. He was born in Budapest in 1849 and brought up in the Jewish tradition. Like Herzl, he soon received a German education and started writing at an early age. He went to Vienna to cover the world exhibition as correspondent of the famous "Pester Lloyd Press" of Budapest. He then travelled for two years to various European capitals, and recorded his impressions in a book which he published in 1879, *From the Kremlin to Alhambra*. He returned to Vienna to terminate his medical studies and proceeded from there to Budapest, then to Paris where he was to live thereafter with his family. In Paris, he practised as a physician and at the same time started writing articles for German papers (Herzl was to do the same ten years later). In 1883, he published a philosophical book, *Conventional Lies of our Civilization*, in which he made a sharp and critical analysis of the conventional religious and ethical concepts of his time. This was the beginning of his career as a philosophical writer and novelist which, though very brilliant, will not enter into the scope of this study. What we will rather examine at length is Nordau's leading role in the history of the Zionist Movement from the day of his meeting with Herzl until his death in 1923. His biographers¹ mention that his Zionist feelings had, in fact, existed long before the Dreyfus case and the discovery of his affinities with Theodor Herzl. In the summer of 1893, he had experienced during his vacation at Borkum, an incident which was to influence him all his life. At the first dinner there, he had found an anonymous letter asking him to leave the place immediately. Nordau felt the insult and left Borkum ten days later. With this incident, his "confidence in the persistence of the ideas of humanitarianism and tolerance was shattered."²

(1) Anna and Maxa Nordau, *Max Nordau, A Biography*, translated from French (Nordau Committee, New York, 1943).

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 118.

It also seems that in the 1880's, he had made the acquaintance of Doctor Loewenthal, a Galician, who had later presented to the Baron de Hirsch a large and detailed Jewish colonization plan which the latter had accepted. It consisted of mass immigration into Argentina. Loewenthal's immediate plan was "to acquire a territory of 2,500,000 square kilometers and to settle 500,000 Russian Jews upon it." He was sent by the Baron at the head of an exploratory mission to Argentina and returned from there "full of enthusiasm and with the promise of the full support of the Argentinian government." He asked Nordau to help him carry out his scheme and even asked him to join him in Argentina. But Nordau could not make up his mind and follow him there; he simply extended to the doctor his moral cooperation and "wrote in support of the project . . . against all kinds of detractors."³ The Argentina colonization scheme having failed, Loewenthal had to face de Hirsch's criticism and, as a result of "a campaign of slander" on the part of his detractors, he was "stricken by a malady of the heart . . . [and] died shortly."⁴ Anna and Maxa Nordau relate that Nordau had "witnessed this entire drama . . . the wound in his heart remained open from that time on."⁵ Three years later, Nordau experienced as previously mentioned at Borkum "the direct moral shock which," according to his biographers, "was to hasten [his] awakening."

Nordau contributed very greatly to the theoretical aspect of Zionist thinking. His speeches as permanent speaker of the Zionist Congresses can be considered as the records of the thoughts and themes which dominated the Movement during its first 25 years of existence. Moreover, Nordau's adherence to Zionism constituted one of the main elements which helped to give the Movement its progressive character and its stamp of approval as "advanced thought." It was, in fact, these characteristics of progressiveness and tolerance which made it appeal to a group of young Jewish intellectuals, like Bernard Lazare, Israel Zangwill, and others, who might not have been attracted to it otherwise.⁶ On the other hand, Nordau's speeches, together with the articles which he wrote during the first decade of the history of the Zionist Movement (1897-1907), contain a significant number of the basic concepts and ideas which later became part of the Zionist active struggle and the foundation of the expansionist colonization policy to the detriment of others.⁷ Also, one should not forget to mention Nordau's leading role at the negotiations and discussions which surrounded the First Zionist Congress in relation to the official programme of the Zionist Movement (i.e. the Basle Program). A Committee was formed then, of Nordau, Nathan Birnbaum, Sigmund Rosenberg, Dr. Minz, Saul Rafael Landau, Max Bodenheimer and Professor Schapira, with the task of drafting the principles of the program. In

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 116.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 117.

(5) *Ibid.*

(6) Arthur Hertzberg (ed.), *The Zionist Idea. A Historical Analysis and Reader* (Doubleday and Herzl Press, New York, 1959), p. 234.

(7) *Max Nordau's Zionistische Schriften*, Hrsg. Von Zionistischen Aktionskomitee (Jüdischer Verlag, G.M.B.H., Köln und Leipzig, 1909).

his memoirs, Bodenheimer gives us the account of the discussions at the preliminary conference about the final phrasing of the Zionist platform.⁸ He relates that Professor Schapira presented a quite "neutral" draft "setting forth only the idea of the colonization of Palestine and then the Theses of the Cologne Zionist Society," while Nordau suggested that the following text be adopted: "The aim of Zionism is the creation of a homeland, recognized by international law, for the Jewish people in Palestine." Schapira objected to Nordau's statement arguing that he would reject "any formulation that would arouse suspicion of an intent to create a Jewish State in Palestine." The final phrasing proposed by the lawyers in the Commission, namely that "the aim is a legally secured homeland," was adopted. The lawyers had in fact suggested it "in order to obtain an unanimous vote" and also because they considered that "this phrasing admitted of the possibility of constitutional law as well as international law."

When the program was submitted to the Congress, Fabius Schach opposed it and insisted upon the word "*Völkerrechtlich*" (through international law), declaring that "no one had ever yet called a national movement into life." However, one should not overlook that all the participants in the Congress were, in fact, fully aware of the question of the homeland (*Heimstätte*), its location, and the creation of a "State" in a territory which was revealed to us earlier in Herzl's diaries.

In an article published in 1920, before the official establishment of the British Mandate over Palestine, Nordau had declared that he was the one who invented the term "homeland" (*Heimstätte*).⁹ There is no doubt that the purpose behind the adoption of such a vague and mild terminology was the dissimulation of the real aims of the Zionists and not the relinquishment of their claim to a state on Palestinian land. The following excerpts from Nordau's article show clearly what he and the leaders of the Movement had in mind from the beginning. It is probably taken from the series of ten articles which Nordau published between September 17

(8) Bodenheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

(9) The German word (*Heimstätte*) means the home (*Heim*) or the dwelling place and habitation (*Wohnplatz*) in the (Brockhaus) dictionary, while the (Wehrle-Eggers) gives it the following synonyms: "home" (*Heimat*) and "homeland," "fatherland" (*Vaterland*), "native place" (*Heimatort*), "birth place" (*Heimatsstadt*) or town and "city of the fathers" (*Vaterstadt*). None of these synonyms contains a political connotation. It might be closer to "settler" in the sense of (*Seidlung*), corresponding to the French word *Foyer* while the nearer English term is "home-croft" which indicates a habitation in the middle of a small enclosed field or a small farm. In its American use, it is (Homestead) which means the "habitation together with the land surrounding it" or "an ancestral home." It was used around 1700 to signify the home and the constructions and offices included in it or the farm. From 1862 onwards, it meant in the U.S.: the farm cultivated by the owner which has approximately a surface of 640,000 sq. meters (160 acres) and which was granted to the settler pursuant to a Congress Act (Homestead Act of Congress 1862); its owner was thus known as the settling farmer (Homesteader) (See: Shorter Oxford Dictionary). One cannot argue that any of these words and synonyms could mean "national home" which Nordau considered as the real objective of the programme of the Zionist Movement since its creation in the past, to the present and future. This linguistic survey helps us to have a clear understanding of the style adopted by official Zionism in using symbols which are far from its far-reaching aims. Nordau could not but confess that he had made use of these circumlocutions on purpose to dissimulate their real aims; when faced with the text of the Balfour Declaration, he had to explain the real Zionist aims.

and November 20 in the weekly paper *The Jewish People (Le Peuple Juif)*, organ of the French Zionist Union. The aim behind these articles which constitute Nordau's political testimony was to evaluate the Zionist plan and teachings from the beginning until the publication of the Balfour Declaration and three years thereafter (1897-1917-1920). Speaking of the Basle Program, he wrote: "I did my best to persuade the claimants of the Jewish state in Palestine that we might find a circumlocution that would express all we meant, but would say it in a way so as to avoid provoking the Turkish rulers of the coveted land. I suggested 'Heimstaette' as a synonym for 'State' This is the history of the much commented expression. It was equivocal, but we all understood what it meant. To us it signified 'Judenstaat' then and it signifies the same now . . . Now there is no reason to dissimulate our real aim."¹⁰

We also see Herzl standing on the platform of the Congress Hall declaring, "In this Congress we are creating for the Jewish people a tool which it did not possess before, but which it urgently and persistently needs in life." Then, wishing to win the support of the religious minded Jews, he explains that Zionism is the return to the bosom of Judaism before the return to the land of the Jews (The First Zionist Congress, Basle, 1897).¹¹

As to Max Nordau, he confined his speech to picturing the condition of the Jews and blaming the movements of assimilation and emancipation for the Jewish social distress (*Judennot*). He analysed "*Judennot*" as obstructing the Jewish adoption of Zionism. In the manner of Shakespeare, in the tragedy of Hamlet, he faced the Jewish people with the following alternative. "Judaism," he said, "will be Zionist or cease to be" (Das Judentum wird zionistisch sein, oder es wird nicht sein).¹² To him, the Jewish distress took two aspects: (1) The material one (*sachlich*) in relation to the Jews of Eastern Europe, North Africa and Western Asia, where most of the World Jewry (approximately nine-tenths) was struggling for "the maintenance of a bare existence, and (2) the moral one (*sittlich*) experienced by the Jews of Western Europe in the form of the repeated daily insults to their personal pride as human beings and to their honour. He then went on to give certain Freudian explanations to the harsh repression which the Jews were suffering from and which was hindering the realization of their psychological self-contentment and sufficiency. Speaking of the nature of the Jew, he said that the Jew was more industrious and more capable than the ordinary European and not to be compared with the Asian or the African who was burdened with sleeping lethargy. But, he pursued, the Jew was not given any chance to demonstrate freely his abilities and put his efforts into practice, as he was deprived of a national environment and doomed to his tragic isolation. Whenever he succeeded, it was because of his deprivation of equality! Finally, ending his speech, Nordau said emphatically, "That Jewish distress cries for help. To find that help

(10) Sykes, *op. cit.*, fn. 1, p. 160.

(11) Theodor Herzl, *Zionistische Schriften*: "Eröffnungsrede zum erste Kongress"; Hrsg. von Leo Kellner (Jüdischer Verlag, Berlin, 1920), pp. 140-143.

(12) Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften*, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

will be the work of this Congress.”¹³

Let us now come to the presentation of the major expansionist aspects in Nordau's thinking as expressed in his Zionist writings.

Zionism, to Nordau, “has awakened Jewry to new life, morally through the National ideal, materially through physical rearing,”¹⁴ and the latter is the means to the development of “muscular Judaism” (*Muskeljudentum*) which was lost during the eighteen centuries of exile and vagabondage! This youth is inspired from the old glories and chivalries of the times of Bar-Kochba and the Ashmonites. It seeks departure from bodily constraint and flabby muscles, and the realization of bodily skill and health. Nordau, thus, in his speeches (1898 to 1900), encouraged the sporting Zionist groups to choose their names from among old Jewish glories and to work for the development of their muscles like the hero “who refused to familiarize himself with the defeat, and when the victory deserted him, he knew how to die.” This was Bar-Kochba, the last incarnation in world history of such a Judaism engaged in fighting and attracted to the clatter of arms.¹⁵ Also, he insisted on the importance of gymnastic training and fighting games, thus reminding us of certain similar Herzlian ideas.

As previously mentioned, Nordau was famous for finding stimulative names and slogans. He made violent campaigns against those Jews who opposed Zionism and accused a number of them of outward abandonment of Judaism, while he considered that the majority of Jews were only Jews from habit and for convenience sake,” not by inner strength or self-confidence. Zionism, as he conceived it, invites those lazy and lethargic Jews to break the chains of inherited traditions and to abandon the Judaism of appearance (*Scheinjuden*). Nordau designated the masses of Jews who, having stuck to Judaism “from habit,” protested that they were “also Jews” (*Auch-Juden*), as being merely “belly-Jews” (*Bauch-Juden*),¹⁶ and gave them the choice of Zionism which, in fact, was not giving them any choice at all. He refused, for instance, to speak of a “Zionist party” in Jewry. He said:

“... We hurl back with contempt this distinction. The Zionists are no party, they are the Jewish body itself — their number be it great or small does not matter ... and they may exclaim: ‘In our camp is Israel, in the other dead limbs.’”¹⁷

In a lecture delivered on April 26, 1898, at Berlin, which he called “Zionism and its Opponents,” Nordau undertook to examine a number of objections which were facing the Zionist idea then. He opened his lecture with the following remark: “Hitherto Zionism has found no single enemy in the Christian world ...” Indicating that opposition came from among the Jewish ranks alone, he divided these into two groups: those who wished to remain Jews and those who did not.

(13) Anna and Maxa Nordau, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 146.

(15) Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften*, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

(16) Anna and Maxa Nordau, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

(17) See Nordau's Speech to the Second Zionist Congress, *Zionistische Schriften*, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

Addressing himself to the second group, he said: "You have no right to speak about Zionist affairs. The Zionist call is not addressed to you who do not wish to remain Jews but to those who wish to remain Jews."¹⁸ Then, he classified the latter's objections into three categories:

- a. Zionism is a foolish idea which cannot be realized.
- b. Zionism represents a danger to Jewry.
- c. Zionism is not essential; Jewry will survive without it as it did for eighteen centuries.

He further added two other objections which he classified as mystical (*Die Mystische*):

- d. Zionism interferes with God's Providence while the Jews must wait for the Redeeming Messiah.
- e. Zionism hinders Jews from fulfilling their mission which is to be the light of other peoples and their teacher.¹⁹

It is, however, worth nothing, in this connection, that Nordau refrained from answering these last two objections, arguing that they were in a language he could not understand or speak. Previously, the Jewish Russian historian, Simon Dubnow, had analyzed Nordau's ideas in his *Essays on Old and New Judaism* (1897-1907).²⁰ He had stressed the importance of clarifying the origins of Zionism stating that it was necessary "to differentiate between the temporary and the permanent factors in order to establish, from the beginning, which foundations of Zionism are solid and which are flimsy and ephemeral . . .". He then pointed out the wide gap between Nordau's analysis of the Jewish distress and his suggested course of action for curing it. Finally, he considered political Zionism as a web of fantasies: The dream to create a Jewish state guaranteed by international law, to colonize a large number of Jews and finally the dream to solve the Jewish question in this manner. To him, what remains from the Basle Program in practice are its second and third paragraphs: the "organization of the Jews" and the "strengthening of the national consciousness." Describing political Zionism, he said, it "is merely a renewed form of messianism that was transmitted from the enthusiastic minds of the religious kabbalists to the minds of the political communal leaders. In it the ecstasy bound up in the great idea of rebirth blurs the lines between reality and fantasy."²¹

Yet Nordau attached no importance to objections of this sort. He was more interested in the objections related to the capacity of absorption of Palestine. He insisted on the idea that Palestine and its adjacent provinces (*Palästina mit den angrenzenden Provinzen*) could absorb 12 to 15 million inhabitants, without clearly determining what he meant by these adjacent provinces. Also, he did not

(18) Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften*, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

(19) *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

(20) Simon Dubnow, "Reality and Fantasy in Zionism," *Nationalism and History, Essays on Old and New Judaism*, ed. Koppel S. Pinson (The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1958), pp. 155-166.

(21) *Ibid.*, p. 157.

neglect to recall and remind that Palestine was not uninhabited and that its inhabitants would not agree to evacuate it. Thus, reassuring the people of Palestine he explained that the Zionists did not want to chase people out of Palestine and that he could prove that the six hundred thousand actual Arab inhabitants (*Hansen*) of the Holy Land would keep good neighbourly relationships with the Jewish immigrants.

There is no doubt that Nordau was perfectly aware of the position of the people of Palestine in this respect. At the beginning of March, 1899, Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi, President of the Municipal Council in Jerusalem, addressed a long letter to Zadoc Kahn, Chief Rabbi of France and personal friend of both Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau. The letter emanated from Constantinople. It was very carefully and properly written and presented sound logical arguments. Its author had felt that, in so doing, he was fulfilling a sacred duty towards his conscience.²² He wondered about the historical right of Jews to Palestine, while Mandel states that he admitted that historically, Palestine was "Your country" (*Votre pays*). However, Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi's first objective was to warn the Jews that reality was stronger than any expansionist dream which could grip them. He reminded them that Palestine was an inseparable part of the Ottoman Empire and that it was inhabited by non-Jews. Predicting the rise of a popular movement against the Zionists if the situation was to remain unchanged, he affirmed his belief that the Ottoman government, even if well-intentioned, would not be able to overcome such a movement or calm it down. Consequently, he advised Zionists to abandon "geographic Zionism" and look out for another land. He expressed his wish to see them leaving Palestine alone and refraining from interfering in its fate.

The Chief Rabbi immediately communicated the letter to Theodor Herzl who, in his answer, referred to the permanent friendship which existed between the Jews and Turkey and affirmed that it was about to become active in supporting Moslems. In addition, he denied the existence of unfriendly intentions on the part of the Zionists *vis à vis* the Turkish government, enumerating the advantages which the country would enjoy as a result of the Jewish settlement. He tried to reassure Al-Khalidi, explaining that Zionism was not planning to displace the non-Jewish population; on the contrary it would work for their benefit. Jewish immigration would bring about an artificial increase in the prices of real estates and lands. This, he said, should be made clear to the people, that they were to gain excellent brotherhood in the area which, historically, constituted their homeland. Herzl's argument, in this connection, was based on the idea that the friends of the Turks would undoubtedly become friends of Zionism. He went on to comment on Al-Khalidi's advice to look for a place other than Palestine, confessing that this would occur if Turkey refused to take the immense advantages offered by Zionism. Only then would Zionists look for another place. However, Herzl

(22) See the article by Neville Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine: 1882-1914," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, ed. Albert Hourani, "St. Anthony's Papers," No. 17 (Oxford University Press, London, 1965), pp. 77-108.

insisted on the advantages which Turkey would enjoy in terms of financial organization and economic development if only it were willing to meet the Zionists' demands. If it would not, it would lose all hope of getting these advantages. Turkey, he explained, would have to seize this opportunity before it was too late.

In 1900, we see Max Nordau speaking about the financial interest which Turkey would enjoy as a result of the Jewish immigration. He declared that four-fifths of the Holy Land was then desert and that two-thirds of its inhabitants, who counted 600,000, was composed of unsettled bedouins and paupers who did not provide the Sublime Porte with any significant income. When the settlements reached a hundred thousand, then millions of Jews, agriculture and industry, on small and large scale, would develop, and Zionism would guarantee to the Ottoman government an annual income increasing proportionately to the number of Jewish settlers in Palestine. Here we notice the early agreement between Herzl's thinking and Nordau's. The Jewish Bank had already been established in 1899 under the name of the Jewish Colonial Trust with a registered capital of two million sterling guineas. It was followed by the Jewish National Fund in 1901 while in 1903, the Anglo-Palestine Company was established as a branch of the "Trust."

There is no doubt that the efforts made by the English Zionist Federation in the 1900 Parliamentary elections in Britain reflect best the Zionists' desire to spread their activities on all levels and in all realms. In his *History of Zionism*, Sokolow relates that "during the Parliamentary Elections of 1900, the English Zionist Federation addressed to all candidates a letter, asking for an expression of sympathy with Zionism, and between ninety and a hundred replies were received, the great majority of an exceedingly favourable nature."²³ At the Fifth Zionist Congress (December 1901), we see Nordau going back to his discussion on the Jewish distress, to describe the Jewish people as a whole as the "people of air" (*Luftmenschen*) or the "nation of air" (*Luftvolk*) because, he said, "it has not a square foot of its own land, and is completely hanging in the air, figuratively, because it has no solid economic ground beneath its feet, and lives as the individual "man of air," from day to day, on wonders and miraculous chances, not by a regular sure livelihood."²⁴ An event related by Bodenheimer in his memoirs might reflect some of the main aspects of Zionist thinking in general and that of Max Nordau in particular. After the Fifth Zionist Congress was over (1901), Nordau, Mandelstamm, Zangwill, the Marmorek brothers, Tschlenow, Bodenheimer, and Wolffsohn gathered with Herzl in the latter's hotel room. At dinner Bodenheimer proposed that the next Congress be held in the U.S.A. and Marmorek added that "the voyage could be made cheaper if a ship were chartered for the delegation." Marmorek's suggestion met with approval and, relates Bodenheimer, "somebody remarked then the whole Congress would be at sea."²⁵

(23) Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 299.

(24) Anna and Maxa Nordau, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-74.

(25) Bodenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

Zangwill said, "If the ship sank, that would be the end of Zionism"; while Nordau remarked that "this enormous disaster would arouse such a sensation that new leaders and thousands of followers would rally around the Zionist flag."²⁶ Alexander Marmorek then directed the discussion to another similar plan and said, "There was still another means for our opponents to give Zionism its death blow. Somebody had only to cut off Herzl's handsome beard," and Wolffsohn exclaimed that "in half a year the beard would grow again, and Zionism would once more be alive."

No doubt, the stories and jokes which the Zionist leaders were exchanging in this private discussion, reveal best the various means they had imagined to fulfil the aim of Zionism and win over supporters from among the Jews of the world.

(26) *Ibid.*

AFTER HERZL'S DEATH

The Russian Zionists united their ranks at the Minsk Congress which was held in September 1902. Around five hundred delegates attended the Congress. They represented all the various Zionist factions and blocks: the Orthodox religious party, the Center Party or the Democratic Fraction to which people like Chaim Weizmann belonged, and the Socialist Union of the Jewish Workers in Russia and Poland, known as the Bund Party. The leaders of the Congress expressed their desire to cooperate closely with the non-Zionist Colonization Societies for the immediate purchase of land in Palestine on a large scale, thus making the first break in the rigidity of the Basle Platform.

The Congress passed decisions for the use of the money collected by the Jewish National Fund for a unique objective, namely the purchase of land in Palestine.¹ While Tsarist Russia was starting to show its fear "that Jewish Socialists might make use of the Zionist platform for the propagation of their theories," the Minister of Interior, Von Plehve, on June 24, 1903, issued secret circulars to all the local governors and authorities to forbid Zionist meetings and prohibit the collection of donations for Zionist purposes. He also ordered that the money collected by both the Jewish Colonial Trust and the National Fund, be turned over to the Odessa society which had been formed to assist the Jewish agricultural and industrial workers in Palestine and Syria. August 1903 saw Herzl's visit to Russia where he met representatives of the Tsarist regime. He succeeded in securing the promise that Russia would extend its support to the Zionist Movement, provided the latter confined its activities to the creation of an independent state in Palestine and to the "organized emigration from Russia of a certain number of Jewish inhabitants."²

One should not fail to mention, in this connection, the formation of the Mizrahi group as ally to the Orthodox Jews within the Zionist Organization. It was formed at the time of the Fifth Congress in 1901, as a counterpart to the Radical Fraction which was represented by the Zionist Left and the Zionist workingmen movement (Po'ale Zion), and headed by Rabbi Jacob Reines. The latter called the annual meeting on February 23, 1903, when the group counted, according to its leaders, around eleven thousand members. What is important to note here, is that since its formation, the Mizrahi Party voted with the Government Party or "the group composed of the immediate followers of Theodor Herzl and of those that stood by him during his seven years of work." Under "Zionism,"

(1) *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, "Zionism," Vol. XII, 1905, p. 678.

(2) *Ibid.*

the *Jewish Encyclopedia* confirms that the Herzlian wing, called the Government Party—and those that voted with it like the Mizrahi group—“desired a legally assured home for the Jewish people in Palestine and *neighbouring countries*.”³

After the death of Herzl, the Seventh Zionist Congress was convened in August 1905, when rivalry broke out between the “Palestinian Zionists” and the “Territorialists.” The Jewish Colonial Trust clause, related to the preference of Palestine and Syria as fields of action for the Jewish colonization, was amended to read:

“In Palestine, Syria, any part of Asiatic Turkey, the Sinai Peninsula and the Island of Cyprus.”⁴

This was all clearly reflected in Max Nordau’s speeches and writings. He emphasized in his speech to the Seventh Congress, that Zionism was not planning to detach Palestine from the Ottoman Empire or call for an independent Jewish kingdom or republic. Moreover, Nordau did not hesitate to put the Zionist Organization and all of the Jewish potentialities and capabilities at the service of the Ottoman government, in order to prevent the spread of the Arab Awakening Movement into Palestine. He said:

“The Movement which overwhelmed a great part of the Arab people could easily spread to Palestine, thus making the land of our fathers what it had been before, the center of interest of world politics. The Turkish Government will find itself forced to defend its sovereignty and domination over Palestine and Syria against its own subjects and with the force of arms.”⁵

Under such circumstances, Nordau hoped to make the Turkish government understand the following: that the Ottomans would acquire an extraordinary force if they enjoyed the support of largely organized and active elements from within Palestine and Syria. The Jews, notwithstanding their respect of the rights of the indigenous population, would not allow any attack on the Sublime Porte or the disruption of the Empire and would mobilize all their forces to defend the Sultan.

Nordau had probably been acquainted with the ideas of Nagib Azoury as expressed in his book, *The Awakening of the Arab Nation*. The book was published in February 1905, while Nordau delivered his speech to the Seventh Zionist Congress in August of the same year. Azoury had stated, “Two events of the same nature but opposing each other are taking place: the awakening of the Arab nation and the Jewish secret activity for the reestablishment of the old kingdom of Israel on a larger scale. These two movements are doomed to struggle continuously until one of them defeats the other. The future of the world depends on the final outcome of this struggle between two peoples representing two opposing doctrines.”⁶

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 684. *(Italics mine).

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 682.

(5) Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften*, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

(6) Nagib Azoury, *Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe* (Paris, 1905), p. v.

Nagib Azoury was an official of the Ottoman government in the Mutasarrifiyah of Jerusalem between 1895 and 1904. He left his post the year Ahmad Rashid Bey, who overtly supported the Jewish immigration while attaching no importance to the execution of the laws issued by the Sublime Porte, was appointed Mutasarrif. However the latter had to resign his seat in 1906, as a result of Arab pressure. He was replaced by Ali Akram Bey who carried out the execution of the orders to the letter and remained in his post until the advent of the Young Turk's Revolution in July 1908, when he was transferred to Beirut. At the end of 1904, Nagib Azoury published his historical pamphlet, *The Arab Countries for the Arabs (Les Pays Arabes aux Arabes)*. Mandel relates that the Arabic translation of the said pamphlet was dated January 3, 1905, and that Arabic and French copies were circulated in Palestine and spread to the extent that the Ottoman authorities arrested a number of Arabs in Jaffa and other towns, and searched their houses and papers.⁷

We cannot examine Nordau's ideas in his previously mentioned speech except within the framework of the Arab Awakening Movement which gathered around the slogan, "the Arab Countries for the Arabs." Nordau did not only point out the important role which Zionism would play in relation to the alleged interests of the Ottoman Empire. He also found it essential to clarify the advantages Europe would get from the "services of the Jewish people." He explained that the European countries, which found themselves in a difficult position each time they tried to threaten the Ottoman Empire with destruction, could not but look out for the following with approval:

"The Jewish people will colonize Palestine peacefully but firmly without bringing about any change to the elements of sovereignty which are prevailing there. The intervention of the Great Powers, which represents a danger familiar to the diplomatic circles will thus become unnecessary."⁸

This would result in winning over the confidence of the Ottomans and that of the European countries and reassuring the inhabitants of the good intentions of the Zionists. At an unexpected moment, the history of the world provided an opportunity which could not but be grasped at once. Thus, the Actions Committee proposed the following programme to the Seventh Zionist Congress, considering it as a compromise between the rival fronts after the election of Nordau as chairman of the "Ziyyone Zionists" party which had held its preliminary meeting in Freiburg (Germany) not far from the Swiss town, Basle:

"The Seventh Congress declares: The Zionist organization stands firmly by the fundamental principle of the Basel Program . . . and it rejects, either as an end or as a means of colonizing, activity outside *Palestine and its adjacent lands*.* The Congress resolves to thank the British government for its offer of a territory in British East Africa . . . The Congress records with satisfaction the recognition accorded by the British government to the Zionist Organization in its desire to bring about a solution of the Jewish problem, and expresses a sincere hope that it may be accorded

(7) Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

(8) Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften, op. cit.*, pp. 172-173.

the further good offices of the British government where available in any matter it may undertake in accordance with the Basel Program."⁹

This consecrated the split within the Zionist Organization after the dispute over the Uganda project had resulted in the withdrawal of those who wished to see the Seventh Congress accept the offer of the British government. Soon after, this group formed, under the leadership of Israel Zangwill, the "International Territorial Organization" (I.T.O.), and insisted, through its leader, that the majority of the Sixth Congress had voted with the Territorialists, while the Zionists of the Organization kept arguing that the said vote, which showed 295 affirmative, 178 negative and 90 abstentions, did not represent the view of the Congress as to the "advisability of accepting the offer of the British government, but merely as to the proper spirit in which so generous an offer might be received and upon the political necessities of the moment."¹⁰

After the death of Herzl, the question of his successor as chairman of the Actions Committee and president of the Congress became a matter of first concern. An additional commission to the smaller Actions Committee was elected. It consisted of Nordau, Wolffsohn, Katzenelson, Warburg, Tschlenow, Ussishkin, Alexander Marmorek, Bodenheimer, and Greenberg—although the formation of such a committee was not provided for by the constitution. Some of the members of the Actions Committee suggested the formation of a triumvirate with Nordau, Wolffsohn and Warburg as successors to Herzl and in place of the Executive Committee of five members. But Nordau refused to participate in the leadership for "personal reasons." The name of Rabbi Moses Gaster was ruled out because of his previous adoption of the Jewish settlement in Rhodesia as proposed to him by Cecil Rhodes. The Russian Zionists had Professor Otto Warburg as the candidate of the opposition which they were leading.¹¹ The German Zionists and their supporters succeeded in bringing David Wolffsohn to the presidential chair. Wolffsohn had accepted the chairmanship of the Congress only after all parties had given him their "undivided support." He occupied the chair from 1905 until 1911, when the practicalists succeeded in electing their candidate, Warburg, who remained at the head of the Organization until the coming of Weizmann in 1920.

During Wolffsohn's chairmanship, the practicalists kept strengthening themselves, and the demand for an organized colonization and settlement action in Palestine became dominant regardless of the various objections and obstacles. In addition, the Zionist Organization saw promising signs in the advent of the Young Turks to power in 1908 and set great hopes on their support.

The Eighth Zionist Congress held in The Hague in 1907, passed decisions to the effect that a large scale colonization activity would take place immediately in Palestine. Max Nordau's speech expressed the atmosphere which was then

(9) *Jewish Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 680-681 *(Italics mine).

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 679.

(11) Bodenheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-174.

prevailing inside the Zionist Movement. Upon reading the said speech, no doubt is left as to Nordau's leading position in the realm of Zionist philosophical and doctrinal thinking.

Nordau opened his speech at The Hague (August 14, 1907), with the exposition of the activities and struggles of the movement for the past ten years. He then proceeded, as usual, to answer the objections of the critics of Zionism, declaring that misinterpretation and lack of understanding had led the critics to distort the Zionist image and present it as:

- a. A return to religious fanaticism,
- b. A rejection of the progress, civilization, and science of modern times, and even that of Europe and what it represents in terms of civilization,
- c. A strong desire for orientalism—and the ghetto way of life.¹²

Nordau answered these attacks declaring that Zionism was free from blind religious fanaticism and capable of uniting within its ranks the representatives of the Jewish Conservative trend as well as those of the liberal trends. He also declared that the accusation of orientalism did not frighten them at all since they had learned from the Japanese people that one could successfully join orientalism with the most sophisticated progress. Zionism, in his opinion, was confident and sure that it belonged to Europe where it grew up and flourished for thousand of years. Ridiculing those who were trying to alarm the Zionists by telling them that they would become Asians in Palestine, he reassured the critics and sceptics stating that the Zionists would not change into Asians in the anthropological sense, in the same manner as Anglo-Saxons did not become red Indians in North America and Hottentot in South Africa or Papuas in Australia. He reached the peak of excitement when he declared:

"We will try our best to achieve in the Near East what the English have done in India—I mean by that cultural development and not domination (*Herrschaft*). We intend to go to Palestine to bring civilization there. Our mission is to extend the moral frontiers of Europe to the *Euphrates*."^{13*}

In the following year, 1908, the "practicalists" of the Organization had started to find their way towards an organized colonization of Palestine under the motto put down by Professor Otto Warburg, "The policy of economic penetration" or "an extension of the general foreign policy of Europe abroad, to the sphere of Jewish interests."¹⁴ The commission, whose formation had been decided at the Sixth Congress (1905), was created and known thereafter as "the Commission for the study of the Palestinian Conditions" (*Kommission Zur Erforschung Palästinas*). It counted among its members, Franz Oppenheimer, promoter of the idea of the cooperative settlements.

(12) Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften*, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 175. *(Italics mine).

(14) Horace Meyer Kallen, *Zionism and World Politics*, A Study in History and Social Psychology (William Heinemann, London, 1911), p. 108.

Warburg soon suggested that Arthur Ruppin be in charge of the Palestinian office which was established in Jaffa as a branch of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization. Also, a "Society for the Development of the Palestinian Land" was founded, while a branch of the Jewish Colonial Trust was opened under the name of "The Anglo-Levantine Banking Company." All this was taking place at a time when Turkey was celebrating the inauguration of the Constitution!

Professor Otto Warburg, who held the chairmanship of the Organization between 1911 and 1920, gave a true picture of the policy of Zionism in relation to Palestine when he gave his famous declaration against political Zionism which, according to him, was about to make of the Zionist call a mere philanthropic movement based on donations and charity. He said, "The historical right, which is based on our ownership of Palestine 2000 years ago, is not sufficient by itself, in the eyes of the Great Powers. We have to find, in addition, a modern expression to this right and this expression is based on our demonstrating *de facto* if not *de jure* that Palestine is economically subject to our domination and that all the progress registered in that country is due to the efficiency of our economic enterprises and means and of them alone."¹⁵

This clarifies for us the basis of the policy of economic penetration which became the official and public policy of the Zionist Organization after 1908. One must remember the intentions expressed by Max Nordau when he pictured Zionism as wishing to penetrate into Palestine as the bearer of European civilization striving to extend the moral frontiers of Europe to the Euphrates. The Palestine office was established to put such a policy into practice and realize what was described by Warburg as the true modern expression of their right. The relationship between the Young Turks and the Zionists became closer and the German influence in the Ottoman Empire grew stronger. At the outbreak of the First World War it reached its peak through the German Zionists and culminated in a German Balfour Declaration giving assurances to both parties and guaranteeing the German dominance in the Empire. In the advertising pamphlet, *The Jews of Turkey*, which he published in 1915, David Trietsch gave the possibilities of an extension of the German protection to both Jews and Moslems. Among his reasons, he stated that the Jews constituted in a way "a Near Eastern element in Germany and a German element in Turkey."¹⁶

We will proceed in the next chapter to the exposition of Trietsch's ideas known in the Zionist circles since the beginning of the Movement as the call to "Greater Palestine" (*Das Grossere Palästina*). We shall see Trietsch taking the lead in the call to the colonization of Palestine and its adjacent countries: Syria, Asia Minor, the Island of Cyprus, and El Arish since his participation in the First Zionist Congress in 1897.

(15) Arno Ullmann, Hrsq. *Israels Weg zum Staat: Von Zion Zur Parlamentarischen Demokratie* (dtv dokumente, München, 1964), S. 220.

(16) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

TRietsch AND GREATER PALESTINE

The name of Davis Trietsch is associated, in most Zionist sources, with the call to colonize Cyprus and the Sinai Peninsula. His Zionist activities, which started at the First Zionist Congress, had aimed since then at making the Zionist Organization adopt his concept of Greater Palestine and at having the Basle Program expanded and amended accordingly. Having failed to achieve this at the early Congresses, he continued to pursue his policy independently. Later he was to declare more than once that he had gone to Basle with the hope of realizing the colonization of Cyprus which he had had in mind since 1895, moved by the "natural and beautiful idea of a return to the Old Land." The moment he heard of the publication of *The Jewish State*, he immediately hoped "to combine his project with those expressed in the *Judenstaat*."¹ But, was there any similarity in the ideas between Trietsch and Herzl? We know that Herzl himself had seriously thought of making Cyprus a center of Jewish colonization activity, and then of exchanging it, with additional payment to the Ottoman Sultan, for Palestine. In his diaries, he related his first visit to Constantinople (June 20, 1896), when Izzat Bey, the Sultan's Chamberlain, advised him to "acquire some other territory for Jewish colonization, and afterwards offer it to Turkey in exchange for Palestine, with additional payments." In this connection, Herzl recorded that he had "immediately thought of Cyprus."² However, in spite of the historians of Zionism efforts to associate the Cyprus project with Herzl, the latter himself recognized that it was Trietsch's idea.

It has been proved historically that the idea of the Jewish colonization of Cyprus goes back a number of years before, and it should be understood in the context of the British expansionist policy of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In the spring of 1191, Richard The Lion-Hearted led a Crusade—some 700 years before Trietsch and Herzl—and "stopped off to take Cyprus on the way to the Holy Land,"³ which he had to leave in the autumn of the next year (1192). Later on, Disraeli followed in Richard's footsteps according to the strategic logistics of British imperialism. He occupied Cyprus immediately after the Russian Turkish war of 1877-1878. Cyprus was thus subjected to the British administration while the Sultan kept a nominal sovereignty over the island.

On August 9 of the same year, the *Jewish Chronicle* newspaper in London gave expression to the Jewish voices asking for the colonization of Cyprus, by publishing an article presenting the historical connections between the Jews

(1) *Herzl Year Book*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 122.

(2) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 383

(3) Tuchman, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

and Cyprus. The following is an excerpt of the said article:

"Cyprus was once the sea of a flourishing colony of the Jews. Why may it not be so again? To the Jews of Syria [which then included Palestine] it offers the same tempting attractions as it did to the Jews of old, nay, greater. It is within a day's sail of the mainland. And for the first time in the world's history the Jews of Palestine have the opportunity of living under the beneficent institutions of the most enlightened and the most liberal of rule, without submitting to the pain of migrating to distant climes, and renouncing their oriental mode of life."⁴

In spite of Rabinowicz's efforts to demonstrate that the objective of this article was to call for Jewish emigration from Palestine to Cyprus, it is obvious that Cyprus was taken as a platform for the future immigration of East European Jews into Palestine, thus allowing for the realization of "Greater Palestine" under the protection of Britain. The Hassid Aaron Marcus, chief editor of the Polish newspaper *Krakauer Jüdische Zeitung*, started to propagandize the idea of the colonization of Cyprus after he had proposed to Herzl the membership of three million Hassidim in the Zionist Organization (May 8, 1896). He had declared that the island of Cyprus "according to the Talmud" was once part of Palestine. Herzl answered him by saying, "If you as a Hassid say so, I do not object. I too would see therein an important acquisition."⁵ As to Trietsch, he declared that he conceived of his Cyprus scheme when, in the United States, he read in the English papers about the controversy that was going on in Britain in 1895, as to whether it would remain in the island or abandon it completely.

It seems that Trietsch's plan was not met favourably at the First Zionist Congress and thus, he could not get it included in the Basle Program. He returned to the U.S. and addressed from there a letter to Herzl in which he enclosed a memorandum on his scheme. Herzl answered him on December 29, 1897 and asked him to be patient for "... at the moment the time is not right to discuss it, we have better prospects." But it is worth noting that Herzl himself recorded in the middle of the following year (July, 1898) that he was thinking of "giving the movement a closer territorial goal, preserving Zion as the final goal."⁶

At the Second Zionist Congress, a number of delegates advised Trietsch to discuss his scheme with the leaders of the "Jewish Colonization Association" which had been founded by the Baron de Hirsch in Paris. However, after he had submitted his memorandum, to the JCA head office, he found no response from its leaders. Later, he expressed his scheme in the official Zionist organ, *Die Welt*, (1899) and made contact with Zionists in Vienna. At the Third Congress, Trietsch spoke on the resolution regarding the Jewish Colonial Trust and included a passage, "to the effect that the bank would be active in 'Syria and Palestine,'" as these were the countries where this Fund functioned. He tried to deliver his speech but was interrupted a number of times until he was forced to end, as "the majority

(4) Oskar K. Rabinowicz, *A Jewish Cyprus Project*, (Herzl Press, New York, 1962), p. 7.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 14.

(6) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 644.

decided against Mr. Trietsch continuing his speech." He had said, "The term 'Syria and Palestine' proves that we have instinctively recognized: We need a larger Palestine. However, we have looked for that expansion in the wrong direction. Lands divide, seas unite. You know already that I have Cyprus in mind."⁷

But Trietsch did not completely give up hope and kept counting on Herzl's positive feelings towards the project. He decided to pursue his scheme on the basis of personal contacts. He won the support of David Wolffsohn—who, as Trietsch recollected, considered it as the first sensible idea in Zionism—together with those of Professor Max Mandelstamm and Dr. Ph. Awinowitzky. Later he went to Berlin where he formed a committee consisting of prominent Zionist personalities, to take the matter in hand. Among its members we find Prof. Otto Warburg, Dr. Heinrich Meyer-Cohn, Prof. L. Levin, Prof. Leopold Landau and Prof. Martin Philippson. It was decided that Warburg would travel to Cyprus. He arrived there in October 1899, and David Trietsch joined him after he had visited Rumania "to select suitable colonists." He then wrote to Herzl asking him to replace the Basle Program by that of Greater Palestine before it gets too late; for, in his view, it would be difficult to win over the Jews of Rumania to the idea of "Smaller Palestine" unless Zionists already had it. He also suggested the inclusion of the following words into the Basle Program: "*Great-Palestine or Palestine and its neighbouring lands*" saying that otherwise the program would be a "nonsense" for can one "get the ten million Jews into a land of 25,000 km²"?⁸

It seems that Herzl did not dare to express publicly his sympathies for the project for fear of irritating the societies of the "Lovers of Zion." He showed an ambivalent attitude towards the scheme, rejecting it officially at the Congress while recording his sympathies for it in his diaries. Trietsch attached no importance to this and kept emphasizing the correctness of his concept of "Greater Palestine." He declared that what he was calling for was an earthly Zionism which was capable of being achieved, and that "everything else is only a modern form of prayer." In a letter to Herzl he stated, "The Cyprus matter does not need Zionism, but Zionism depends on Cyprus."⁹

In the same letter, he answered Herzl, insisting on the idea that "Zionism without action" was a "dangerous experiment," not his colonization scheme in Cyprus.

Before Trietsch's arrival in Cyprus, Warburg had already left for Palestine. The opposition of the leaders of the Jewish Colonization Association became more and more violent against any interference in their affairs. Trietsch had come to Cyprus to investigate conditions "personally." He recorded his findings in a memorandum which he addressed to the British High Commissioner of Cyprus. The memorandum contained Trietsch's ideas and projects and reflected his wide

(7) Rabinowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 17.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

knowledge of the conditions of life in the island and of the Annual Reports of the Government. He proposed to the High Commissioner certain industrial schemes including railway connections while he emphasized the advantages of tobacco planting and the construction of a sanatorium "that would tend to bring strangers and consequently money into the island."

In the middle of December 1899, after he had final conversations with the Commissioners of Famagusta and Larnaca, Trietsch left Cyprus for Berlin where he reported to his committee on the results of his negotiations and the steps to be taken in this respect. But Warburg was able to convince the committee to adopt a cautious approach in view of a possible failure and as a result of the negative attitude of the members of the Jewish Colonization Association. The committee agreed to reduce the number of workers whom Trietsch had wished to engage from 50 to 15. Trietsch left once more for Rumania, but the government authorities showed hostility towards the Americans who were promoting Jewish emigration from there, and Trietsch just managed to leave the country before he received the expulsion order.

He went to London and sent a second letter to the High Commissioner (February 1900) while the governors of the Jewish Colonial Trust were holding a meeting in Vienna. Trietsch went over to Vienna but again failed to win over the Zionist leaders to his views.

The official Zionist organ, *Die Welt*, did not refer to those events except on the eve of the departure of the first group of Rumanian Jews to Cyprus. A "Berlin Committee for the Boryslaw Workers" was formed at the time when Trietsch, having organized the departure of the workers, accompanied them to Port Said and then to Jaffa.

Here we see the similarity between Friedmann's expedition in the land of Midian one decade earlier and Trietsch's scheme for the settlement of Rumanian Jews in Cyprus, as a first step for the realization of Greater Palestine, beginning at the peripheries. A group of Rumanian Jews belonging to another association arrived in Cyprus without Trietsch's knowledge and thus without any planning. He managed to arrange employment for them as well as for the two Boryslaw workers. Difficulties started on Friday morning thus "shattering all the dreams of Davis Trietsch." In fact, the group refused to work on Friday afternoon arguing that they used to work on Friday morning only in Rumania, "devoting the afternoon to preparations for the Shabbath." The group started to complain about the climate, then the food and the environment while "the Boryslaw workers, regarding themselves superior, refused to work under the same conditions as, and under the same roof with, the Rumanians," and the experience ended in the same day as that of Paul Friedmann in the land of Midian. Herzl recorded in his diaries after the Fourth Zionist Congress was over in London (1900):

"We would rally on Cyprus and one day go over to Eretz Israel and take it by force, as it was taken from us long ago. . . .

Should Germany get Cyprus, I shall afterwards still have the opportunity to attempt the matter via Eulenburg and the Grand Duke . . . I would present a Cyprus

project to the next Congress for which I could obtain the support of the big millionaires beforehand . . . I would further declare to the Fifth Congress that Cyprus was only a step on the way to Palestine. That Turkey would then take us more seriously."¹⁰

Herzl had written these lines after he had read an article regarding an Anglo-German exchange of territory. England was to exchange the island of Cyprus for German East Africa "in order to safeguard for England the strategic and commercial value of the Cape-Cairo railroad," while "Cyprus would be an excellent acquisition" for Germany, much more valuable than its East African possessions. The island would serve as a base for its aspirations in the Near East as well as a station on the long road to its possessions in the Far East. It would also serve as an important base of operations for an armed defense of German interests in Asia Minor. Herzl recorded that in the first excitement, he thought of writing to Count August Eulenburg as he believed that the German Empire of William II would undoubtedly welcome a Jewish settlement in Cyprus.

As for Davis Trietsch, he found himself living in "political seclusion" after the failure of his first experience. A change in *Die Welt* brought his friend, Martin Buber, to the editorship of the paper and Trietsch was thus given the opportunity to air his views and plans.

The insistence of the German Zionists on "the neighbouring countries" appeared clearly by then and Syrkin's socialist program adopted the view that "Palestine and the neighboring countries" came within the Zionist program. The Austrian Zionists also joined in the call for the extension of the area of Zionist activity to include the countries situated outside Palestine. At that time, the call for the colonization of the El Arish valley, which was controlled by the Egyptian authorities, made its appearance. In addition, Trietsch attended the Fifth Congress as a delegate from Berlin and, when the statutes of the Zionist Organization were submitted for approval, he took this opportunity to suggest "an expansion of the program beyond the limits set by the official interpretation of the Basle Program" and concluded:

"Zionism strives to create for the majority of Jews a Home in Palestine and in its neighboring lands secured in every respect."¹¹

We will also mention, in this connection, that Trietsch quoted from Nordau's speech that Palestine "can absorb 12 to 15 million souls, be it well understood: including the neighboring lands." In spite of the Cyprus tragedy which "still hung over his head," Trietsch succeeded in advancing his ideas in the discussions which centered around the activities of the Jewish Colonial Trust. As previously mentioned, these were of an expansionist nature. Rabinowicz states in this respect:

"Although Trietsch did not achieve concrete results at the Fifth Congress, he could nevertheless depart from Basle with a sense of satisfaction: his ideas were beginning to strike roots and win recognition . . ."¹²

(10) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 1023-1024.

(11) Rabinowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 53.

In the next phase of his Zionist activities, Trietsch dedicated himself to the periodical, *Palästina*, which he had founded with Dr. Alfred Nossig in January 1902. The first articles of the periodical were clearly directed against the Herzlian trend of thinking which considered obtaining a colonization charter as the first step towards the realization of the Zionist political program. These articles reflected a tendency towards practical Zionism in all its forms and aimed at a:

"Break with charter-messianism which prohibited all positive work in Palestine and paralysed Zionist forces of Zionism;

Commencement of *Gegenwartsarbeit*: preparatory work, particularly the exploration of Palestine, the purchase of land, and colonization;

Extension of colonization efforts to Palestine's neighboring lands, particularly those under British rule such as El Arish and Cyprus."¹³

Trietsch not only called for Greater Palestine, he also took upon himself to suggest the formation of an "emigration office" which would gather and supply information about the Jewish emigration and the areas suitable for colonization, in cooperation with the world Zionist associations and societies. As he could not realize this project, he decided "on a last attempt at independent action" and initiated the creation of the "Jewish Oriental Colonisation Society" (*Die Juedische Orient-Kolonisations Gesellschaft*) which was registered in Berlin on March 30, 1903, and which included Dr. Franz Oppenheimer among its leaders.

The news of the colonization plan of El Arish and the Sinai spread, and Trietsch advocated fervently his old dream claiming that he was the originator of the project. He pursued his negotiations with the officials in the British government, trying to get assurances that the authorities could open Cyprus to Jewish emigration, for "Cyprus is not a country to which British settlers are likely even to go." As soon as the Sixth Congress had authorized Herzl to negotiate with the British authorities about sending an expedition to East Africa and Trietsch had made known his opposition to the Uganda offer, the administration for African affairs at the British Colonial Office decided to look into Trietsch's Cyprus scheme. What had happened was that Herzl's East African scheme and Trietsch's Cyprus plan had become intermingled in the huge bundles of paper of the office and the title of the file "Proposed Settlement of Jews in Cyprus and Uganda" made both schemes seem as if they emanated from Trietsch. However, the British authorities declined Trietsch's proposition, in view of the situation prevailing in Cyprus which did not permit the "Government of the Island to grant any exceptional terms to Jewish settlers." Later, Trietsch managed to get an offer for the purchase of a few hundred acres at thirty dollars an acre. But, the Sixth Congress put an end to Trietsch and to his plan. He was unable to raise the funds or even find suitable settlers to carry out his plan. The third attempt at Jewish colonization had thus come to an end.

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 54.

In his discussions about practical and political Zionism, Herzl kept referring to Trietsch's scheme commenting on it as follows: "Mr. Trietsch is a Baron Hirsch without money . . . For these people intend to do without money what Baron Hirsch could not do with money."

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

The importance of Davis Trietsch to Zionist expansionist thinking is not limited to the Cyprus colonization scheme alone. It is mainly in his active contribution to the knowledge of the Greater Palestine he was dreaming of, through publishing information and research on the colonization scheme of the neighboring countries. Soon after Herzl's death and the resulting growth of discussions inside the Organization, Trietsch published in *Altneuland* a series of articles in which he put forward his ideas once more, hoping to influence the Seventh Zionist Congress which was to be held in 1905, and to win over additional supporters to his scheme.¹ In order to make his "Greater Palestine" known to the public, he published in 1906, in Jerusalem, a *Tourist Guide* in Hebraic. It was to appear later on in German (Berlin, 1907), and English (London, 1907).

At that time, Trietsch was working in very close cooperation with the various official Zionist associations. He participated very actively in gathering information about Greater Palestine and its neighboring Middle Eastern countries. He mentioned, for instance, in the introduction to his *Tourist Guide* of Palestine that most of the information found in the Guide had been supplied to him by the following organizations:

- The Palestine General Information Office (Jaffa).
- The Azrah Colonization Association (Berlin).
- The German Office of the Anglo-Palestine Company (London).
- The Tamzarah Colonization Association (Berlin).
- The Russian Zionists' Central Committee (Filna).
- The German Zionist Federation.

He drew a comparison between both German and Jewish Colonization in Syria and Palestine, based on other people's writings on the conditions in Syria regarding its land and agricultural economy. Referring to their conclusions about the importance of greater colonization in relation to the development of Syria, he went on to discuss the role of the human element in the field of economic development. In this respect, he drew a connection between the execution of most of the plans for economic improvement and the availability of the human element who undertakes to realize it and introduce progress. The Germans had contributed greatly to modern development in the country and had shown the means of achieving it. However, the issue of large scale colonization "as the one required by the situation in Syria" was of no concern to them at

(1) See what Trietsch himself has said in this context when he published these articles in *The Palestine Handbook: David Trietsch, Palaestina Handbuch*, 2. Aufl. revised and enlarged (Orient-Verlag, Berlin Schmargendorf, 1910), p. 282.

all. Here lies the importance of the Zionist Movement to this deserted country (*menschenleere*) where thousands and thousands of Russian and Rumanian peasants, possessing a power of production beyond imagination, wished to settle.

What calls for our attention in this *Palaestina Handbuch* is the introductory chapter which Trietsch entitled, "Definition of Palestine" (*Definition von Palaestina*).² He pointed out that the word "Palestine" indicates an area which had been determined at different times by numerous sources in various ways. Then, he mentioned the Land of Canaan with its frontiers which had been cited in the Book of Numbers (34:1-12) and in the Book of Genesis (15:18-20) when the Lord made a Covenant with Abraham, "from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates." And Trietsch pointed out that, "until our times," the Palestinian Jews considered that someone had left the country only when he had passed Aleppo in the North or Alexandria in the South.³

He also found it necessary to warn that the term "Land of Israel" (*Eretz Israel*), which is often applied to Palestine, does not indicate Palestine but the "Land of Captivity" (*Das Land der Gefangenschaft*) which meant those specific areas which were destined for the Jewish inhabitants in Babel. People used to say in this respect, "he went from the Land of Israel to Palestine."⁴ Besides, Trietsch confessed that, at the time of the Israeli self-government, the frontiers were always subject to various modifications and readjustments. Basing himself on historical facts, he confirmed that the frontiers of the Land of Canaan, mentioned in the Books of the Old Testament, did not correspond to the real existing frontiers. Thus, he undertook to inquire into what he described as a rational definition (*ein vernunfthige definition*) of what we should consider as Palestine today. In spite of his recognition that the picture "which we are drawing for the administrative distribution of the Palestinian land shows that the concept of Palestine does not play any role in the distribution of the Ottoman Provinces,"⁵ he found himself compelled to take the following questions into consideration in order to establish the frontiers of Palestine (*ein Grenze zu Kombinieren*). He, thus, relied on the four following sources:

1. Ancient history,
2. The actual administrative distribution of the Ottoman Provinces,
3. The cultural conditions and relationships, and
4. A number of inherited traditions.⁶

In spite of his belief that Palestine does not constitute a modern geographical entity but is a part of Syria, Trietsch proceeded to complete his definition of its frontiers in the following manner. Ottoman Palestine was formed, according to him, of:

(2) *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 14.

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) *Ibid.*

(6) *Ibid.*

1. That part of the Beirut Vilayet which is situated to the South of Mutasarrifiyah of independent Mount Lebanon,
2. That part of the Damascus Vilayet which is situated on the South of Mount Hermon,
3. The Mutasarrifiyah of Jerusalem which is under the direct rule of Constantinople, and in addition to this and within the narrow traditional frontiers,
4. That part of the land which is subject to Egyptian administrative control and considered by modern geographers as part of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula: It consists of a triangle, the base of which extends on the north from Tal Rafah on the seacoast to the El Arish Valley (*Bach Aegyptens*). Two lines start from these points and meet in the area situated on the western side of the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red Sea.⁷ In its narrow meaning, this area constitutes, according to Trietsch, "Egyptian Palestine."

However, Trietsch indicated another approach which included the whole of the Sinai Peninsula within the scope of Palestine, basing himself on the Zionist explanation, namely that the frontiers mentioned in the Old Testament of the Holy Bible are not the brook of Egypt but the river of Egypt—the Nile—which constitutes the southern frontiers of the Promised Land!

It seems that Trietsch was eager to wash his hands of this last form of expansionism when he stressed that "the Zionists have lately adopted this last version." This aroused his interest and led him to admit that numerous difficulties would derive from the fact that the desired area was under British Egyptian administration, which fact would have a tangible effect on the Jewish settlement and colonization activities inside the lands constitutionally subjected to the Ottoman Empire. However, the fact that he attributed this concept of expansionism to other Zionists did not mean that he opposed it in principle. He might have adopted this attitude in order not to compromise the good relationships which existed between the Jews and the Ottoman government. It might also very well be that he saw moderation and malleability in this respect as the kind of adjustment essential for the principle of the neighboring countries (*Nachbarlaenderprinzip*) which he was advocating. One should not fail to remind the reader of the tactics which Trietsch later adopted in his approach to Turkey with the motto: "The Jews constitute a Near-Eastern element in Germany and a German element in Turkey."

The Theory of the Three Circles

We will complete our study of Davis Trietsch's concept of Greater Palestine by examining a great part of his article entitled "the neighbouring countries" (*Die Nachbarlaender*) which was published in the June-July 1905 issue of *Altmeuland*.

(7) It is obvious that Trietsch has written this after the frontiers between Egypt and Turkey had been defined in 1906.

He later published it again in the *Palestine Handbook* where he indicated in the footnotes that he had decided on the publication date on the eve of the convening of the Seventh Zionist Congress in Basle. He went on to state: "... However the Palestinian Zionists' (*Tziyyone Zionists*) Congress had been resumed in Freiburg in Germany before the Seventh Congress and had proclaimed its acceptance of the principle of the "neighbouring countries," which made the adoption of other plans by the World Zionist Congress unnecessary.

In that article Trietsch seemed to be handling the question of the neighbouring countries from the point of view of a division based on the principle of the three interdependent circles: First, the periphery which determines the extremities and includes Asia Minor, Armenia, Kurdistan, the Land between the Rivers, the Arabian Peninsula, Tripolitania, and Egypt; then, the mid-circle which consists of the two islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, the vilayets of Adana, Aleppo, and Syria (with West Jordan), Beirut (with Galilee), the Mutasarrifiyah of Jerusalem, the El Arish area, and the Mutasarrifiyah of Mount Lebanon; finally, the smaller circle which includes what Trietsch had described as part of his own concept of Greater Palestine, namely Palestine as such and as he himself pictured it with the vilayets of Beirut, Jerusalem, and Syria, in addition to El Arish (Egyptian Palestine), and the eastern half of the island of Cyprus.

Let us read his own comments on the subjects:

"The object of the following details and explanations is to give a more precise meaning to the neighbouring countries, as the actual understanding of the term lacks clarity. That is why we will try here to determine the neighbouring countries as a whole (*überhaupt*) and those countries which are connected, in the first place, with our efforts. It is essential to put all arbitrary definitions aside before we start this endeavour. We also have, within the scope of the wide frontiers which we will define in this first phase of our activity, to determine the field of action (*Arbeitsfeld*) of the first activity we will undertake, and set its limits with care and clarity."

The next question was the following: What could be considered, even in the broader sense, from the angle of the concentration of Jewish efforts, as the neighbouring area and what could not be considered as such.

The different viewpoints *vis à vis* the inclusion of the neighbouring countries within the Jewish sphere of activity in Palestine, are the following:

1. The said area must be as much as possible adjacent to Palestine because, once the Jewish settlement has been completed there, all colonization, rapid or not, of the lands adjacent to it must be prepared so as to form a tight and harmonious unity with Palestine.
2. The countries which are separated from the center of Palestine by other inhabited areas, cannot fit in the context of our planned study except once all the possibilities of those areas which are better situated, in our viewpoint, have been exhausted.
3. The countries or territories in which the Jewish immigrants will form the majority in the near future, or even those in which the Jews form an important proportion of the total population, will precede the

countries in which the Judaisation operation will take a longer time. As to those countries in which the Jews will remain a fading minority, they cannot be taken into consideration in the near future.

4. The countries which are not situated very far from those into which the Jews will immigrate (i.e. those countries in which the transfer and settlement expenses will be low and which do not involve a long distance trip) should be handled before the more distant territories as the latter would be more difficult to reach.

5. Regarding the distribution of the colonization activity in Palestine itself and the neighbouring countries, it would be more appropriate not to look in the direction of the latter except in relation with what our action would have resulted in Palestine or in relation with what hinders or prevents the realization of our action and opposes it in terms of difficulties and obstacles. (Which means that once we are capable, for instance, of carrying out the activity itself or what relates to it in Palestine and Syria, there will be no need to transfer simultaneously this activity outside Palestine for we would then be losing our main center.)

Consequently, the following territories will be excluded from the above-mentioned list as they do not belong to the plans we have formed for the near future:

The Periphery

1. *Asia Minor* — It is approximately the same size as Germany and has 9½ million inhabitants. The Jews cannot participate, except relatively, in the expected development of a country as big as this. Also, compared to the actual population, the Jews form a small minority which is bound to disappear some day or else remain as such. That is why we must renounce for the near future, inclusion of this large territory in the core of the Jewish settlement plan. However, we cannot but consider certain specific areas in Asia Minor which enjoy a very suitable situation, namely the province of Adana and the island of Rhodes.

2. *Armenia and Kurdistan* — It is slightly larger than a third of Germany. It is situated very far from Palestine and so remote that the formation of a harmoniously united Jewish majority would be difficult to achieve.

3. *The Land between the Rivers* (Iraq) — This territory is situated between the Syrian Arab desert on the southwest, Kurdistan on the North and Persia on the East. It does not fall within the scope of our immediate plans because of its remoteness and the low proportion of Jewish participation in its expected future revival. Another shortcoming of this area is that it has not been linked with Palestine and the immigration countries by a modern communication network. A traveller needs four weeks to go, for instance, from Beirut to Baghdad and no one can

predict the date the Berlin-Baghdad railway will reach the center of the land between the two rivers. What we can best achieve now is to found a small or large colony in areas which do not require a penetration into remote places, and leave out regions which are preferable but more remote, as such colonization will serve no specific purpose now nor in the near future. Once we reach the huge number of five million Jews, which is the number of those who will settle in the East throughout the long period of our activity, it will be more appropriate to settle them in Palestine and its adjacent countries within a surface of approximately 400 kms., which allows no justification whatsoever for our considering a country situated at a distance of over 1,000 to 1,200 kms.

4. *The Arabian Peninsula* — Most of the interior part of this large country consists of an uninhabited desert land; its interior does not belong to the Ottoman Empire while its coastal area in the west, where the Moslem Holy Places are situated, as well as the Turkish Coast on the Persian Gulf, constitute an entirely different set up. We cannot think of establishing a Jewish colony in this area and, consequently, it is not possible to discuss it at all. However, the part situated on the extreme north of this coastal area and which meets the boundaries of Palestine at Aqaba (*das alte Ezion-Gaber*)—and we mean by that the old land of Midian—is worth considering. It is a neighbouring country of Palestine and is situated near it. It is probably uninhabited at the present time and its soil is not arid; on the contrary, it is most certainly fertile.

5. *Tripolitania* — This territory is ruled out because of its distant situation from Palestine and of its wide surface. However, we can look into the question of creating a colony there, as happened in old Jewish history in relation to the old Tripolitanian province, Benghazi, or old Cyrenaica. There exists a small coastal area from which we could profit relatively as it is situated on the seacoast. In the old times, apparently 1,000 years ago, it had a Jewish majority. What we notice in this context was the big Jewish revolt against the Romans which took place simultaneously with the revolts in the mother country and other regions situated on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. These were inhabited by Jews, which confirms the existence of strong ties between these colonies and the mother country, at an age when the system of communications was still almost primitive.

6. *Egypt* — This great and flourishing African country, the population of which amounts to twelve million, does not offer any possibility for the establishment of a Jewish majority capable of keeping in touch with the Palestinian center, except for its Asian front, i.e. the Sinai Peninsula, which forms with the northern extremity the administrative area of El Arish. We will deal with it later on.

The Mid-Circle

After these eliminations, we are left with a complex of land (*laender-Komplex*) and countries including the following area (with the exception of Palestine which is considered as the center of the mid-circle:

	<i>Surface</i> (in Sq. Kms)	<i>Population</i>	<i>Number</i> <i>of Jews</i>
The Mutasarrifiyah of Jerusalem	9,100	375,000	75,000
The Beirut vilayet (with Galilee)	16,000	533,500	25,000
The vilayet of Syria (with Transjordan)	95,900	719,500	10,000
El Arish (under Egyptian rule)	59,000	30,000	—
Cyprus (under British Colonial Administration)	9,301	262,000	200
Lebanon (independent vilayet)	3,100	200,000	200
The vilayet of Aleppo	86,600	995,800	18,000
The vilayet of Adana	39,900	422,400	200
Rhode Island (under British Colonial Administration)	1,424	30,000	5,000
TOTAL	320,325	3,568,200	133,600

We do not need to consider in this context these areas as a whole within their administrative boundaries. However, it is possible to look at these areas after having limited them to a determined sphere and based ourselves on specific parts or concentrated on certain areas of our choice.

We do not need to include the whole of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula in our sphere of interest. In fact, we can exclude the southern and central parts which are of no importance to the sphere of our activity. If we succeed in not restricting ourselves to the Palestinian area itself, which is situated within the boundaries of Nakl-Mezraim, and to the plain known as the El Arish plain (*Pelusinische*), we would be able to exploit the potentialities of this province which is double the size of Greater Palestine excluding the east bank of the Suez Canal together with a coastal area of around 25 kms. on the north. Thus, it will be possible for us to add to that sphere of interest (*interessensphäre*), an eastern part which is adjacent to Palestine from the southern side and which includes ancient Petra and the coastal area on the south of the Arabian Peninsula—Midian—situated on the Gulf of Aqaba. (The latter two areas are under Turkish control.) To the east of the Sinai region, the El Arish Valley belongs to our sphere of interest because of the possibility of building dams and artesian wells in the valley and in the area adjacent to it.

El Arish, or the narrow coastal strip on the Mediterranean Sea, located in the country adjacent to Palestine from the southeast, is the most important area for us. Thus, we can limit our efforts to it in the first place and for many years

to come. As for the island of Cyprus, it is not necessary to think of colonizing it as a whole; on the contrary, we should be practical in the coming years. We will thus concentrate our efforts on the eastern part of the island (considering Famagusta Bay as the starting point of our activity). The eastern part of Cyprus, especially the Famagusta area, offers Jewish colonialism opportunities which cannot be found in any other area of the East. It is one of the most fertile and most neglected areas at the present time. Recently, water, port and railway companies affiliated to the British government were established. Besides, Britain's attitude towards our colonial activities would be one of satisfaction if we carried it out in Cyprus.

As for Syria in addition to Palestine, our interest will be centered in the near future on a coastal strip the width of which is around 1,000 kms. It enjoys a good communications system as well as a certain cultural level. It, thus, obviously forms the most important area in the region. On the "wide" coastal plain, in addition to the wide spread sea ports, cities such as Damascus, Hama, Aleppo, Antioch and Aintab are located.

We do not need to include the vilayet of Adana in Asia Minor except the coastal strip, adjacent to the Syrian shore, the length of which is around two hundred kms., and the width is fifty kms. This area, like the coastal Syrian strip, suits our aims better than the hinterland. It includes the cities of Mersin, Tarsus and Adana, in addition to the fertile mouth-rivers of Jijan and Sayhoun.

If we were to consider the island of Rhodes, we would find that it is very small for our purposes; its area is around 1,400 sq. kms. and its population is 30,000 (whereas in the old and Middle Ages, the population totalled 200,000). Its strategic position between Eastern Europe and the "circle of the Palestinian countries," makes it possible for Rhodes to become an important step (*Etappe*) for us. It is very possible that Turkey would express its readiness to come to an understanding with us concerning the island for very specific reasons. Moreover, there are around four to five thousand Jews living now in Rhodes.

The Small Circle: "Greater Palestine"

The area known as "Greater Palestine" which has well-defined boundaries, is situated within the regions the total area of which is 320,000 sq. kms. and its population is more than 3½ million inhabitants; however, we recommend a region whose area equals 120,000 sq. kms. for emphasis in the near future. It is necessary to point out that this "smaller area" is four times the size of Palestine itself (the area of which is 30,000 sq. kms.). In addition, it only forms one-fifteenth of the total area of Asiatic Turkey, the area of which equals approximately 1,760,000 sq. kms.

In order to have a real vision of this huge area and because of the difficulty in thinking of an explanation of Greater Palestine which would include the totality of Asiatic Turkey, we can only point out that the first million Jewish immigrants would secure for us an absolute majority in the region which includes Palestine

and Lebanon to the north in addition to El Arish and the island of Cyprus, while it would only constitute one-fifth of the total number of the population of the territory. If the million Jews were scattered throughout Asiatic Turkey, it would constitute one-seventeenth of the total population, i.e. one-half Jew for every sq. km.

* * * *

Since it is meaningless, from a practical point of view, to discuss questions which are beyond the scope of our time, means and capabilities, and since settlement would require huge efforts, we shall have to limit the above-mentioned area. Finally, we will concentrate our activities, in the coming ten years and within the scope of the first million Jewish settlers, on short-range and immediate aims. Moreover, it is evident that the "Palestinian point of view alone" (*Nur-Palästina Standpunkt*) has previously proved to be true since it has pointed out that the successful colonial activity only materialized when there was the highest degree of centralization and in-gathering. Since limiting the smaller circle to Palestine threatens the larger activities with indefinite postponement, the author has decided to combine a "Greater Palestine" which is no longer than the "other narrow Palestine" except to the degree required for the fulfilment of the activities and projects which smaller Palestine would be unable to include.

To this effect—and especially with regard to the recent improvement in the situation—it would be better to limit our activities to Turkey, and under the auspices of the Turkish rule to Palestine itself as far as possible, while the other parts of Turkey will be considered later on, if it be understood that we will take every opportunity to include the above-mentioned area.

Thus, in the narrowest sense of the program of the neighboring countries (*Nachbarländerprogram*), we will concentrate our efforts on Palestine itself out of the Turkish regions (and on the west bank of the Jordan river in Palestine, where it is possible, in order to preserve the cohesiveness of the settlers and their greater unity) while we will concentrate at the same time on the better-suited regions in El Arish and the island of Cyprus (the non-Turkish territories). As a result, we get an area which includes the following:

	<i>Area in Sq. Kms.</i>	<i>Actual Population</i>
Palestine proper inside the vilayets of Jerusalem, Beirut, and Syria	27,000	700,000
The northeastern part of El Arish (appr.)	5,000 (appr.)	15,000 (appr.)
The eastern part of Cyprus	4,500 (appr.)	110,000 (appr.)
TOTAL	36,500 (appr.)	825,000 (appr.)

We can expect a total number of three million Jewish immigrants which would make the density of population around 100 persons per sq. km.

In this way only can we best profit by linking all possible forms of activity with the greatest amount of concentration. We can secure for ourselves the best possible success only when we prefer a smaller number of the countries which require less knowledge and study. Consequently, we will be faced with less difficulties than if we were to consider a larger number of different countries.

Finally, there would be the possibility of our including the non-Turkish regions adjacent to Palestine. By so doing, we might succeed in winning the support of those people belonging to the important surrounding areas who, even today and under the present circumstances, are not in favour of colonial activity in the Turkish territory.

ZIONISM MINUS ZION

Before analyzing the British School of Zionism and the role it played in introducing its own geographical concept of Palestine, it is necessary to devote some time to the study of the activities and efforts which were undertaken by the Jewish Territorial Organization under the leadership of Israel Zangwill.

In 1908, on its third birthday, this organization sent a special commission of experts to carry out studies on Cyrenaica. The aim behind it was to make Cyrenaica the territorial scene of Jewish colonization activity and the "temporary" center of large-scale colonization operations. The commission was requested to report on the possibilities offered by Cyrenaica in terms of Jewish expansionism and mutual advantages to Zionism and the Ottoman Empire. According to Israel Zangwill's biographer, Joseph Leftwich,¹ the report was not favourable. It indicated that the territory was not suitable for Jewish colonization as it lacked sufficient water supply and thus could not absorb a large number of Jewish immigrants. However, some of the members of the expedition who later joined the Zionist Executive in Palestine declared that a system of water conservation might be carried out if the Territorialists were only able to dispose of several millions.²

The draft of the document, which is found in the historical archives of Tripolitania (Libya) in the form of a letter carrying no signature and no addressee, reveals best the hidden side of the Zionist colonization plan in Cyrenaica. Besides, it constitutes a reliable guide to the degree of penetration of Zionist influence into the Ottoman Government and to the way this influence was reflected in the organization of the Ottoman rule over the vilayet of Tripolitania. It was published recently in the Libyan daily newspaper, *Al-Rayid*,³ following the translation of the Turkish draft, handwritten by the translator of the vilayet during the Ottoman era. The Libyan Archeological Affairs Superintendent declared that the original document could not be found in the Archives section. According to him, the document might have been sent to the Sublime Porte or lost at the time of the Fascist Conquest. Besides, Abdel Aziz Jubriel declared to the newspaper's correspondent that, "The subject matter of the document centered around a Jew who had participated in a great Zionist meeting and Congress in London in 1908. As soon as the Congress was over, he sent this letter to one of the leaders of the Jewish sect in Tripoli, informing him of the existence of a Zionist idea purporting to make of Libya a national home for the Jews. He also requested him, in view of his influence in the Jewish community in Libya, to prepare the

(1) Joseph Leftwich, *Israel Zangwill* (James Clarke and Co. Limited, London, 1957).

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 229.

(3) See the issue of August 3, 1967.

ground for future Jewish immigration, and use his influence, without delay, for the establishment of Jewish banks and societies which would purchase land, dominate commercially, and infiltrate into the actual governmental apparatus in order to fulfil the Zionist aim by converting Libya into a place where the Jews would gather and form a state.”⁴

Upon reading this letter, it becomes clear that it is connected with the attempt made by the Jewish Territorial Organization to get the region of the green mountain which includes the city of Benghazi in the Barka vilayet (Cyrenaica). We have already mentioned the commission for “study” and exploration which was sent by the organization in 1908 to Barka. The fact that the letter, which is in our possession, refers twice to the chairman, Mr. Zangwill (meaning the chairman of the Organization, Israel Zangwill), supports and confirms this view. It is difficult to assess the connection which existed between the World Zionist Organization and the subject discussed in this letter. However, Herzl himself had previously put forward to the king of Italy on January 23, 1904, his scheme “to channel the surplus Jewish immigration into Tripolitania, under the liberal laws and institutions of Italy.”⁵ The king had said then, “But that again is someone else’s house” (*ma è ancora casa di altri*). Did the Zionists combine their efforts with those of the Territorialists in an attempt to acquire a foothold in Libya and consider it as a stepping stone to Palestine, or did each organization carry out its activities with the Sublime Porte independently?

It is evident that the negative attitude adopted by the Zionist Movement *vis à vis* the Territorial Organization allowed for a certain amount of cooperation with them. Less than one year after the convening of the Seventh Congress and the split over the Uganda colonization plan, the Zionist Organization joined with the Territorialists in an appeal to the fortunate Jews of England and America. This appeal was signed by Sir Francis Montefiore, then chairman of the English Zionist Federation (June 1906), Leopold Greenberg, its Honorary Secretary, Israel Zangwill, chairman of the Territorial Organization, and Clement Salaman, its Honorary Secretary. The chairman of the World Zionist Organization, David Wolffsohn, joined in 1906, with Zangwill, Greenberg, Joseph Cowen, Lucien Wolf, and others in their search for a unified plan to help Russian Jews settle in a new place other than Palestine.⁶

It may very well be that the prominent position Zangwill held in Jewish circles had contributed most to making the Zionists adapt themselves to his Territorial solutions. In his book, *Zionism*, Richard Gottheil stated the object of the organization as follows:

- “1. To procure a territory upon an autonomous basis for the Jews who cannot or who will not remain in the lands in which they already live.
2. To achieve this end, the organization proposes:

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 1600.

(6) Leftwich, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192.

- (a) to unite all Jews who are in agreement with this object;
- (b) to enter into relations with governments and public and private institutions; and
- (c) to create financial institutions, labour bureaus, and other instruments that may be found necessary."⁷

In spite of Gottheil's inclination in his book to compare the Territorial doctrine (Itoism) to a play which had been deprived of its principal character and consider it as: "Zionism minus Zion,"⁸ a large number of distinguished Zionists did not hesitate to cooperate with Zangwill's organization. In 1906, Max Nordau addressed a letter to Israel Zangwill discussing the relationship of Territorialism to Zionism. He wrote:

"...One can be a Territorialist and a Zionist at the same time. Territorialism aiming only at immediate relief, while Zionism strives for the final solution of the Jewish problem which, in my opinion, can only be found in Palestine."⁹

A number of Zionists followed Nordau's line and cooperated with the Territorialists. Among them, we will cite Eliezer Ben Yehuda, who declared that he would be ready to go to Uganda, Nachman Syrkin, chairman of the Workers of Zion Movement, and the Rabbi Reines, founder of the Mizrahi group. Zangwill's call won over support which was not overlooked by the political Zionists of Britain, who in turn insisted on their faithfulness to Herzl's memory and persisted in following the methods which the founder of modern Zionism had adopted. Besides, it is evident that the ten years following Herzl's death were characterized by an intensified struggle between the political Zionists on the one hand and the practicalists on the other, despite Warburg taking up the chairmanship of the organization in 1911, under the slogan of "Synthetic Zionism."

As to the letter, it was in fact closely connected with the Barka colonization plan which had been studied in 1908, by Zangwill's organization, Sykes points out that the Territorialists "had already come very near to success in 1909 in an effort to obtain a colonization concession from the Turkish Empire."¹⁰ Towards the middle of 1912, the Territorialists decided to revive Herzl's project of negotiating with the Portuguese Empire. Wishing to increase their colonial population by any means, the Portuguese accepted the settlement of Russian and East European Jews in Angola. The Portuguese Cortes passed unanimously a bill authorizing the Jews to colonize Angola. The Portuguese government put, however, two restrictions in the bill:

- (1) Mass colonization was prohibited; Jews were to be allowed in "as individuals not as a people"; and
- (2) The Portuguese government would maintain its control over the administration of Angola.

(7) Richard Gottheil, *Zionism* (The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1914), p. 137.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 141.

(9) Leftwich, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-196.

(10) Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

Negotiations began between both parties. In 1913, the Organization sent a Commission led by Prof. Gregory to study the situation in Angola. However, the outbreak of the First World War complicated the issue. The competition between Germany and Britain in Africa alarmed Zangwill a great deal, and the matter was closed before any final action was taken.

Let us return to the document related to the colonization of Libya. The following is the translated text as it appeared in the above-mentioned issue of the newspaper, *Al-Rayid*:

"I returned yesterday from London. The activities and measures which I was able to carry out there surpass all imagination. In fact, I obtained results which I could not have possibly secured by correspondence. I explained to the chairman and to the members of the Council that the Prime Minister Moushir Pasha, the Wali and Commander-in-Chief of the Tripoli Vilayet, was favourably disposed towards the Jews. I also pointed out to the Council that the Maktoubaji of the Vilayet, the secretary general, Bakir Bey is a man who God has sent to help the Jews out of the degrading life which they are suffering today and that he is a highly educated and cultured person, capable of evaluating the advantages of both parties. Thus, I added, he will not hesitate to help us to obtain the agreement of the Sublime Porte for the fulfilment of our plan.

"I took this opportunity to speak about you and described you as a man of knowledge like your father working for the benefit of the Jews while taking into account the interests of the Ottoman government. These words impressed the chairman and the members to such an extent that they asked me to convey to you their thanks and high esteem. I leave it to you to inform the gentlemen of your party about the contents of this letter. I went over the letters which you had addressed to them. They were all very pleased about their contents, and after immediately studying the conditions they included, they made the following decisions:

First: The establishment of a Jewish bank for the purchasing of remote lands.

Second: In accordance with your wish, persecuted Jews accept to be considered as Ottoman refugees until they obtain Ottoman nationality; they will be allowed to form a religious association. The fees and taxes due to the Ottoman government will not be payable individually, but collectively at a fixed sum which will be determined later.

Third: The Organization will establish at a point on these coasts, a harbour, a railroad line, and a navigation company. The Ottoman flag will be hoisted over all the departments, establishments, societies, and institutions, so as to enhance the prestige of the Ottoman government and increase its national wealth.

Fourth: The confirmation or recission of decisions taken by the organization in this respect will be kept secret, and four members of the Council together with the chairman, Mr. Zangwill, will begin carrying out

their exploratory work under the cover of a tourist trip in the Mediterranean Sea to inquire into certain affairs of the European government.

Fifth: Once we settle in Sicily, namely in Catania or in Syracuse, we will inform you of our arrival in Malta so that you may immediately join us there and give us more of the necessary information and details because we will be unable to carry out any activity, in this respect, before we discuss the matter with you.

Sixth: After we come to an understanding with you, four members of the expedition, among whom there will be an expert in agriculture, will proceed to Benghazi and carry out a tour in Darfamat pretending to found Jewish schools there. In case you are apprehensive of this meeting with us, we will go down in secret to an isolated place dressed in the national costume. In order to avoid certain difficulties, we will inform the government and the Qaimacam about this meeting, and with the help of God, we will succeed in accomplishing our mission in ten days. We will first ask for an agricultural licence; in case we are not granted it, the Committee will carry out negotiations with Canada and Australia to this effect.

“That is why I am asking you to explain this matter to the Prime Minister Al-Moushir Pasha and to Bakir Bey. Point out to them what I have done during the last six months to bring about this plan, moved by the desire of bringing happiness and blessing to the place. My aim is to attract Jewish capital and to allow its exploitation by the Ottoman Empire. We are confident of our success. In case the local government does not refuse our agricultural plan, advise me immediately by cable. We are ready to start our activity upon receipt of your telegram.

Seventh: As soon as the previously mentioned group returns to Sicily from Benghazi, Mr. Zangwill will, upon your recommendation, proceed immediately to Istanbul to negotiate the concessions and establish a bank, as well as other enterprises, in all peace of mind.

Eighth: Explain to the Pasha that the members of the Committee have, as far as this matter is concerned, unanimously expressed their wishes for the welfare and happiness of the Ottoman government and that I beg him to study the sacred plan which will relieve the distress of the unfortunate Jews.

Ninth: We ask for your cooperation in the fulfilment of the hope I have expressed in my letter and ask you to send us the awaited cable as soon as possible.”

THE OTTOMAN GERMANS

We have previously mentioned that practical Zionism started to concentrate its efforts on controlling the potentialities of the Movement and of the World Organization representing it. The period extending from the Young Turk's Revolution to the outbreak of the First World War (1908-1914) was characterized by the intensification of Zionist activities in the capital and Arabic vilayets of the Ottoman Empire. Concerning the economic and financial penetration, a branch of the Zionist bank known as the Jewish Colonial Trust was opened in 1903, under the name of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, which in turn became the central bank of the Jews of Palestine. The bank soon became a financial instrument in the hands of the Zionist Organization. The main office was established in Jaffa while branch offices were opened in Jerusalem, Haifa, Al-Khalil, Safad, and Beirut. Victor Jacobson (1869-1934), a native of Crimea with a German education, became the manager of the Beirut branch in 1906, and held this position for two years (1906-1908). When the Young Turks' Revolution took place, he was transferred to Constantinople as the political representative of the Zionist Organization (1908-1914). In his memoirs,¹ Chaim Weizmann relates his first visit to Palestine in 1907, and his meeting with the manager of the Anglo-Palestine Bank in Beirut. He said, "It was from him (Jacobson) that I first heard something of the nascent Arab national movement."² Summing up the results of the Zionist activities between 1906 and 1914, he wrote, "We have gathered a stock of experience; we anticipated the problems which we will have to face in the future and laid the foundations of our action."

Victor Jacobson played an important role during the ten years which he spent in Beirut and Constantinople. Those who knew him intimately³ confirm that he was the model of the cultured Russian Jew looking in the direction of the West. They point out that the cultural influences which shaped his personality were a combination of French and Russian. He was fascinated by the romantic trend and the laxity of the French literature and moved by the strength of the Russian language and the music of its words. He also delved deeply into the realm of German logic and thought and acquainted himself with the characteristics of the Ottoman East. In Beirut, he first devoted his attention to the tendencies for independence and liberation of the Ottoman subjects. He helped Weizmann not only by giving information on the Arab inhabitants of Palestine

(1) Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*. The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (Harper & Bros., New York, 1949).

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 125.

(3) Arthur Ruppin, *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine*. Trans. from German by R.J. Feiwel (London, 1926), p. 8.

in 1907, but also by taking it upon himself to meet their leaders and thinkers.⁴ During the years which followed the rejection of the Uganda plan by the Seventh Congress (1905), the Zionist Organization decided to implement its practical activity in Palestine on a larger scale (1907). The reign of Abdul Hamid II came to an end with the Young Turks in government; a wider scope of action was opened for organized Zionist activity at a number of levels. In the meantime, Warburg became the leader of the practicalists' wing within the Zionist Organization. At the Eighth Congress (1907), he achieved the first successes of the practicalists while the Executive Actions Committee of the Organization consisted of the three representatives of the "practicalists" and three of the "political Zionists." At the end of 1907, he succeeded in getting the Actions Committee to nominate the statistical expert and Zionist sociologist, Arthur Ruppin, as representative of the Zionist Organization in Palestine and manager of the Palestine office. Ruppin made the condition for taking up his post the foundation of a company which would enjoy legal rights and act in conjunction with the administrative authorities represented in the Palestine office, while also carrying out all the legal affairs related to Zionist activity in the country.⁵ The Palestine Land Development Company thus came into being.

After the Zionist Organization decided to widen the scope of its activities in Constantinople, Victor Jacobson was made responsible for all the Zionist activities in Turkey. Plans were made to launch a political campaign in Constantinople with the aim of awakening political consciousness, and thus "Zionizing" the Ottoman Jews who had not yet been influenced by the Zionist idea and hesitated to adopt its call. The Executive Committee of the Russian Zionist Organization took the lead in the movement demanding the foundation of a number of newspapers and means of propaganda to carry out a large-scale publicity campaign for Zionism. This program was achieved at the time of Wolffsohn's chairmanship of the Smaller Actions Committee. The Zionist Organization thus started financing a daily French paper, *The Young Turk (Le Jeune Turc)*, after having changed its first name *Courier d'Orient*. They appointed Djelal Nouri Bey, son of a Turkish Minister, as its nominal editor and publisher.

When, in the middle of 1909, Jabotinsky joined the Constantinople office, upon the recommendation of Jacobson, the Zionist-controlled press network consisted of the following in addition to the above-mentioned French daily paper:

- a. A French weekly, *The Dawn (L'Aurore)* edited by Lucien Sciuutto;
- b. A weekly in Judeo Spanish, *El Judeo Ha-Hebudi* edited by David El-Kanon; and
- c. A weekly in Hebrew, *Ha-Mevasser*.⁶

(4) Blumenfeld, *op. cit.*

(5) *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. I, April 1965, No. 3, pp. 238-267.

(6) Joseph B. Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman. The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story: The Early Years* (Thomas Yoseloff Inc., New York, 1956), p. 155.

As a result of the development of German influence in the Ottoman Empire, the prestige of the German Zionists was enhanced a great deal in Constantinople. As to the crypto-Jews known to belong to the Doenmeh Sect—since Shabbetai Tzevi outwardly adopted Islam in the seventeenth century for fear of the penalty of death, they had apparently played an important role in the revolution of the Young Turks which had been planned in Salonica. A number of them had joined the Secret Society of Union and Progress and provided the Committee with several of its ablest members. They directed their efforts towards prompting the Turks to be suspicious of Russia and as a corollary, encouraged a pro-German trend.⁷ The Zionists realized their importance and tried to exploit it in favour of their movement. Under the leadership of Victor Jacobson, the Zionist-controlled press started to exhibit a sort of fanaticism for Germany devoting itself to German propaganda. It even went further by publishing articles unfavourable to Britain which the Actions Committee considered as dangerous for the Zionist Movement. Wolffsohn addressed in February 1911, a letter to Jacobson asking him to justify such an attitude and reminding him that "Great Britain had done more for the Jews, and especially for the Zionists, than all the other Powers put together." British political circles began to worry that Zionism was becoming a movement working for the interests of Germany. They tried to remove this interest before it was too late; the outbreak of the First World War offered them the desired pretext. They issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and established later the British Mandate in Palestine.

While in 1909, Max Nordau had declared, in this respect, to the Zionist Ninth Congress: "We respectfully deposit the Charter idea in the archives of modern political Zionism and speak of it no more," Wolffsohn explained at length that "the Zionists unreservedly accepted the obligations of loyalty to the Ottoman State and its institutions and implicit obedience to its laws."⁸ The statements made by the Zionist leaders during the period between the Young Turks' Revolution and the outbreak of the Great War, gave similar assurances of loyalty to Turkey. Through them, the Zionists were trying to convince the Ottoman Empire that, in colonizing Palestine, they were making "a valuable contribution to the progress of the Turkish Empire."⁹ Wolffsohn himself declared in 1911, to the Tenth Congress that the Zionists did not want a "Jewish State but a homeland." According to Stein, "the idea of 'loyalty' to Turkey . . . became in the minds of many Zionists something like an article of faith, and, coupled with the principle of 'neutrality.'"¹⁰

In the spring of 1907, the Dutch Jewish banker, Jacobus Kann (1872-1945), visited Palestine. In 1901, he published a "political travelogue" in German which he entitled *The Land of Israel (Eretz Israel)* in which he clearly expressed his Zionist political credo and program. He asked the Turkish government to "transfer

(7) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 64.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 65.

(10) *Ibid.*

its authority to the Jewish administration which for the duration of the agreement takes over all rights and obligations in respect to the population already settled in the country from the present Turkish administration, so that Turkish taxes will be replaced by Jewish taxes.”¹¹ To him, the frontiers of Palestine were: Lebanon on the north, the Damascus-Aqaba railway to the east, Egypt to the south, and the Mediterranean to the west. He demanded that the Ottoman state lease to the Jews all of this area for at least one hundred years. Although these demands were in conformity with the Herzlian concept of Zionism, they were in obvious contradiction with the “policy officially proclaimed and pursued by the Zionist Organization.” The tactics followed by the Zionists in this respect were aimed at removing the suspicions of the Turks and convincing them that “Zionism did not aspire to a Jewish state in Palestine and was striving merely for free Jewish immigration to Palestine and purely cultural autonomy.”¹² Schechtman points out that Jabotinsky had been officially asked by the Zionists to clarify the matter with the Turkish authorities and calm down public opinion. He also makes it clear that these tactics formed “the foundation of the entire Zionist propaganda and enlightenment work among Jews and non-Jews alike.”¹³ Jabotinsky succeeded in securing the cooperation of outstanding Turkish-Jewish personalities in the Zionist work, two of whom were members of the Ottoman Parliament, Nissim Russo and Nissim Matzaliach Effendi, who had previously participated in the foundation of the Young Turks’ Movement.

When the French edition of his book was published shortly after the Hamburg Ninth Zionist Congress, Kann started sending copies to Turkish statesmen and politicians as well as to the press. The Press Committee of the Zionist Organization feared that the “extremist demands” included in the book might be identified with the official position of the Zionist Organization. Jacobson asked Wolffsohn to eliminate the chapter on “Zionist aspirations” from the French edition. But Wolffsohn refused this demand and, by so doing, opposed the position of the Central Committee of the Zionist Organization in Russia which had endorsed the action of the Press Committee. The matter ended with Jabotinsky’s resignation.

We will also mention, in this context, the work carried out by Dr. Alfred Nossig who had collaborated in Trietsch’s press activities. Immediately after the Turkish revolution, this “practicalist” arrived in Constantinople with “ambitious plans for the settlement of Jews both in Palestine and elsewhere in Asiatic Turkey, notably in Mesopotamia, under the auspices of a German-Jewish organisation founded by himself and having its seat in Berlin (*Allgemeine Jüdische Kolonisation Organisation*).”¹⁴ His frank statements and courageous attitude alarmed the Zionist leaders. They decided to publicly disown him at the Ninth Congress and to warn

(11) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

(12) *Ibid.*

(13) *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

(14) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 37

Zionists "to have nothing to do with his unauthorized activities." The British Embassy at Constantinople started to show a growing interest in Nossig's projects and "bombastic hints" to "influential alliances" which the British assumed to consist of alliances between Germany and Central Europe. Leonard Stein sees in this concern an expression of the fears and doubts which were prevailing in British circles in Constantinople "that the Zionists were somehow linked with Germany and working in German interests."¹⁵ Again in 1912, *The Times* advised the British "to take more than a platonic interest in the Movement" without neglecting British prestige in the Arab world. The charge that the Zionists were working for Germany was answered by Wolffsohn in *The Times* itself while Max Nordau undertook to "brush disdainfully aside" the charges that "the Zionists are the advance-posts of Germany, whose power in Turkey they seek to establish in strength at England's expense."¹⁶

However, at Basle in 1911, vigorous controversies broke out within the Zionist Organization between the political Zionists and the practicalists. Wolffsohn resigned his chairmanship of the Organization and kept the management of the Zionist bank, while Otto Warburg headed the Inner Actions Committee which consisted of Jacobson, Hantke, Shmarya Levin and Nahum Sokolow. In 1911, Jacobson had become a member of the Zionist Executive Committee. He was to keep this post until he was appointed in 1916, manager of the Zionist office at Copenhagen. During the period of his activity in Constantinople, he expressed his leaning and support to the German policy in the Ottoman Empire. He kept getting closer to the German diplomats of the Ottoman capital until the Zionist office which he was managing was allowed to make use of the German diplomatic bag and code to communicate with the Berlin Executive Committee and with Palestine (from December 1, 1914). Jacobson was provided with a diplomatic passport before he left Constantinople for Berlin on June 5, 1915. Besides, the German Zionist leaders hurried to contact the German foreign office asking for German help and thus were able to save a number of Jews from prison or exile.

We have already encountered, with reference to Trietsch, the propaganda method adopted by the German Zionists in the first years of the great war. The outstanding characteristics of the link between the Zionists and the German politicians were related to the following:

First: The efforts undertaken by people like Bodenheimer, Adolf Friedmann and Franz Oppenheimer in order to make the German authorities grant the Zionists a German Balfour Declaration at the beginning of the war.

Second: The opinion expressed by Kurt Blumenfeld in an article which he published in the 1915 August-September issue of *Preussische Jahrbücher* under the title, "Zionism as a Question of German Policy in the East."

(15) *Ibid.*

(16) *Ibid.*, p. 40.

(1) In the chapter of his memoirs related to his Zionist activities during the First World War, Bodenheimer mentioned his policy of "rapprochement" with the German foreign policy. In 1898, he had presented to the Foreign Office a memorandum in which he emphasized the importance of the Yiddish language which, he wrote, was nothing more than a "German folk dialect," together with the part which it could play in the Ottoman Empire. But this question was not met with interest at that time. At the outbreak of the First World War, it became clear that what Germany was looking for was the destruction of Russia. Bodenheimer made his memorandum the basis of a comprehensive plan which he submitted to the Foreign Office. He summarized it as follows:

"In the event of a German victory a League of East European States should be created, which would run approximately along the edge of the Pale Jewish of settlement. In this League the Poles would be the strongest nation, but Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Letts would maintain a balance. The Jews together with the Germans would turn the scales. For the constitution of this new State I set up the principle of the national autonomy of the alien peoples within the Russian Empire. From the Jewish angle propaganda for it should be undertaken among the Polish-Russian Jews. If the invading German troops could be regarded by the Jews as deliverers from the Russian knout, this propaganda would have a certain prospect of success. For the German Empire the creation of this state would be of the greatest interest since it would be freed thereby from the constant threat of a Russian attack. So far as the Jews of Russia were concerned I expected a mighty national upsurge, which could also facilitate the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine."¹⁷

This memorandum aroused the interest of the Foreign Office and its author was immediately invited to discuss it with the General Staff's political experts. Soon after, the Zionist leaders of Berlin created a "Committee for the Liberation of the Russian Jews" and gave its leadership to Franz Oppenheimer. This Committee was vested with the power of signing the document with the Foreign Office. It also collaborated in the publication of an illustrated war journal, *Kol Mevasser*, full of anti-Russian propaganda. Sokolow wrote the first editorial. When the Committee was informed that the Imperial admiralty was planning to send a "confidential man" to America in order to win over the support of the American Jews to the Central Powers, it realized that this was in harmony with its own intentions and succeeded in sending Dr. Isaac Straus,¹⁸ at the beginning of the war, to cooperate with the German Ambassador as his counselor in Jewish Affairs, after a budget of 20,000 gold marks had been put at their disposal.

Bodenheimer confirms that Wolffsohn had been informed about this plan, that he shared the Committee's desire to see the German victory and the fall of the Czarist regime and that he supported the view of the "compatibility of German and Jewish interests in the conduct of the war."¹⁹ In order to avoid the appearance of complicity between the Zionist Organization and the Greater Action Committee, Bodenheimer did not participate in the Copenhagen meeting of the Committee which the German Zionists had formed. He simply sent a detailed memorandum on the subject. However, the Action Committee opposed the activities of

(17) Bodenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 239.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 240.

the Germans and demanded the withdrawal of the Zionists in order to avoid confusion of the activities of Bodenheimer's Committee with the policy of neutrality of the Zionist Executive. Bodenheimer was not ready to dissolve his Committee and cease his activities in relation to Palestine. He did, however, give up his position as chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jewish National Fund. In order to strengthen his position, he gave the invitation which he had received to meet General Ludendorff, as a pretext for his attitude.

That is how Franz Oppenheimer went to visit, together with Bodenheimer, the Russo-Polish front. There, on Ludendorff's intervention, they received the following letter from Von Hindenburg before they left the front.²⁰

"I gladly testify to Herr Justizrat Dr. Bodenheimer and Privatdozent Dr. Oppenheimer, authorized representatives of the Committee for the Liberation of the Russian Jews, that I have a benevolent interest in the endeavours of their Committee and am prepared to further its aims.

S. H. O.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Army von Hindenburg."

Radom, October 15, 1914.

Commenting on this letter, Bodenheimer pointed out that, with the end of the war and the establishment of the Polish State, it had lost its political value. Nevertheless, he did not underestimate it although the Balfour Declaration, published three years later, made it useless! He compared it to the statements of McMahon to the Sherif Husain pointing out that they had a similar character! There is no doubt that the aim behind such a disproportionate comparison was to minimize the McMahon-Husain correspondence, the terms of which had not been respected by the Balfour Declaration, and consequently to reduce its importance in relation to this Declaration.

(2) When Blumenfeld undertook to go over the 25 years of German Zionism which he had experienced,²¹ he avoided mentioning the contents of the article in which he had attempted to analyze the Jewish question within the framework of German policy in the East. He admitted, for instance, that German Zionism presented then a pro-German tendency and had set its hopes on the victory of the Central Powers. He also mentioned that the editor-in-chief and the publisher of the *Preussische Jahrbucher* had asked him to write an article in answer to those who believed that Zionism was no more than a political meteor which shines for a time and then dies down. Besides, Blumenfeld's interest had been aroused by what the chief editor had told him, namely: "You want to get Palestine from those who will occupy it after the end of the war. You should always take into account that Germany will come out of this war victorious."²² However, he did not mention the contents of this article and referred the reader, in the concluding chapter, to Richard Lichtheim's book, the two volumes which relate to the history of the Zionist activity within the Turkish-German camp during the Great War.

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 251.

(21) Kurt Blumenfeld, *Erlebte Judenfrage* — Ein Vierteljahrhundert Deutscher Zionismus (Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart, 1962), p. 112.

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 117.

In his chapter on "Zionist Moves in Berlin and Constantinople,"²³ Stein reproduced part of Blumenfeld's article and the thesis he had defended in the following manner: "... Germany would be well-advised, in her own interests, to co-operate with the Zionists. Zionism had no political aims of a separatist nature; in other words, there was no question of any attempt to detach Palestine from the Turkish Empire. On the contrary, the Turks would have in the Jews a completely reliable element and one which could do much to raise the level of their economic and cultural life." Predicting, then, the British attitude in this respect, Blumenfeld had said: "The English press might be professing a friendly interest in Jewish nationalism, but British control of Palestine would from a Zionist point of view be unattractive, since Great Britain's policy in the Middle East hinged on Egypt. The Jews could not, therefore, rely on her to put her weight behind their aspirations in Palestine, the implications being," according to Stein, that "Great Britain would lean towards the Arabs." Blumenfeld went on to argue that "a revival of Jewish life in Palestine would not only benefit Germany by strengthening her friend and ally, Turkey, but would be of direct advantage to Germany itself."

At this point, Blumenfeld came to think of the question of the Yiddish language, as Bodenheimer had done previously, and pointed out that most of the Jews "spoke as their mother-tongue a language closely akin to German." Here he joined Trietsch's propaganda mentioned in the preceding chapter of this study, and insisted that the Jews "were the natural intermediaries between Germany and the East" and that those Jews "who settled in Palestine would thus form a bastion of German influence in that part of the world. Given their chance, they could be relied upon to spread German culture, and promote German economic penetration, throughout the Turkish Empire."²⁴

Let us remember what Herzl had said two decades earlier in his discussions with the Grand Duke of Baden and in the letters which he sent to Bismarck and to the German Kaiser Wilhelm II. Lichtheim hastened to send a copy of the above-mentioned article, before its publication, to the Attaché to the German Embassy in Constantinople, Von Neurath. The aim behind it was to incite the German Foreign Office to issue official orders to its consulates in Palestine and in the Arab countries reflecting the deep interest of the German government in Zionism. In November 1915, the Zionist Executive Committee in Berlin was informed of the contents of the document issued by the Foreign Office. The latter had been very careful not to mention clearly the name of Palestine. The consuls were asked to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Zionist activities which aimed at raising the economic and cultural standard of the Jews of Turkey and preparing for the immigration settlement of the Jews of the other countries. Besides, the Consuls were warned not to hurt Turkish feelings. It seems that the Germans found it beneficial to ally themselves with Zionism. They submitted this docu-

(23) Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213.

(24) *Ibid.*

ment to the German Attaché Bethmann-Hollweg for ratification. Towards the end of 1915, Jacobson and Warburg kept calling on the German Foreign Office expressing their Zionist hopes and requesting permission to announce to the Jews of the world the friendly German initiative. The Germans reiterated their demand for more caution while Warburg thought of the effect this decision would have over the Jews of the United States at the eve of their organizing the "American Jewish Congress."

The Berlin Zionist Executive success in interesting the German Foreign Office played an important part in making the Foreign Office press the British War Cabinet for prompt approval of the Balfour Declaration before the Germans came out with a pro-Zionist declaration of their own.

In the following chapter, we will encounter another form of so-called Zionist neutrality. At the Eleventh Zionist Congress held in Vienna in 1913, Arthur Ruppin declared: "We have adopted the opinion that we should realize our aim, not by way of our innocence but through practical activity in Palestine," while in London, Rabbi Moses Gaster affirmed that Zionism was not a German Movement and, answering the British press accusation that Zionists are the "advance-posts" of Germany, he said: "...We are fighting everywhere to make it clear that we feel neither German nor English nor French nor Russian, but that our feelings and our thoughts are solely and exclusively Jewish."²⁵

(25) *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

THE ZIONIST TRADITION OF ENGLAND

After the Balfour Declaration, Nahum Sokolow devoted himself to the writing of the history of Zionism from 1600 to 1918. He found himself writing one chapter after the other to trace the influence of the Zionist tradition over British policy, thinking and literature. If we were to present the main phases of this tradition, we would mention Cromwell in the middle of the seventeenth century and Palmerston and Shaftesbury from the forties onward in the last century, as well as people like Lord Lansdowne and Joseph Chamberlain during the last years of Theodor Herzl's activities and the Zionist efforts to obtain a colonization charter under the auspices of the British Empire.

It is not strange that we should find Herzl saying in his address to the founding Conference of the English Zionist Federation, "from the first moment, my eyes were directed towards England."¹ He also described the convening of the Fourth Zionist Congress in London as an expression of "political Zionism goes to London to introduce itself, so-to-say, officially to the English world and to ask for its support . . . only . . . moral and political."² There is no doubt that Herzl had realized, from the very beginning, the "clear-cut parallelism" if not the concurrence of interest between the Zionists and Britain. He expressed it most clearly when he declared in one of his London speeches (1899): "The English were the first to recognize the necessity of colonial expansion in the modern world. Therefore the flag of Great Britain is flying across the seas. And therefore, I believe, the Zionist idea, which is a colonial idea, must be understood in England easily and quickly."³ He developed the same idea once more when, at the Fourth Zionist Congress, he discussed what he called the Asiatic problem and its growing seriousness which was of increasing importance to the civilized nations. The latter would have "to set up a station for civilization," and, he argued, Palestine would become such a station or advance-post while Zionism would present a valuable opportunity for providing "an easy approach to Asia . . ." Herzl reached the peak of his enthusiasm while expressing the hopes which he set on England. He said:

"England, great England, free England, England commanding the seas, will understand our aims. We may be certain that from here the Zionist idea will take its flight to higher and more distant regions."⁴

When the Uganda offer seemed to be an indication of tangible results from his glorification of England, Herzl found himself confronted by a dangerous split within the ranks of the Zionist Organization. In June 1904, Herzl died before the

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- (1) Oskar K. Rabinowicz, "Herzl and England," *Herzl Year Book*, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 38.
 - (2) *Ibid.*
 - (3) *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.
 - (4) *Ibid.*, p. 43.

convening of the Congress which elected his successor and rejected the Uganda scheme.

A few weeks after Herzl's death, Weizmann decided to leave Geneva and settle in England which appeared to him as "the one country which seemed likely to show a genuine sympathy for a movement like [Zionism]."⁵ He described this new start in Manchester as "drawing back in order to make a spring forward" (*Reculer pour mieux sauter*).^{*} Five months after his arrival in Britain, he was delegated to the Congress of the British Zionist Federation. Through a friend, Joseph Massel, Weizmann made the acquaintance of Charles Dreyfus who was famous for his opposition to the Uganda project but who, nevertheless, surrendered to the pressure exerted on him by his colleagues and abstained from voting during the Sixth Congress discussions over that project.

Dreyfus was an influential member of the Manchester society. He was the chairman of the Zionist Society of the town and a member of the City Council. In addition, he was manager in the Clayton Aniline Works and the chairman of the Conservative Party in Manchester. Through him, Weizmann succeeded later on in getting part-time employment as research worker for that firm. In January 1905, he started giving lectures in chemistry at the Manchester University. However, the most significant event, in the context of this study and in the relationship between England and Zionism, was Weizmann's meeting with Balfour which was arranged by Charles Dreyfus early in 1906, while Balfour was conducting his electoral campaign in Manchester as the candidate of the Conservative Party for the Clayton District.

One should remember that Balfour was at the head of the British Cabinet when the Uganda colonization offer was made to the Zionists. He had occupied this post after the resignation of Salisbury in July 1902, and was forced by internal political events and changes to resign, in his turn, in 1905. During the general elections in which the Liberals gained complete success, Balfour was the candidate of the Conservative Party in the Clayton division of North Manchester where the firms managed by Dreyfus were. Dreyfus served as Balfour's political agent during this election.

Balfour's relationship with Zionism can only be understood in the light of the following facets of his intellectual make-up.

1. The religious-ideological aspect: This aspect puts him in the framework of popular or international Zionism—mentioned in the first two parts of this study—and which is reflected in his being "strongly infused . . . with the Hebraism of the Bible."⁶ Barbara Tuchman states in this respect, "Long before he ever heard of Zionism Balfour . . . had felt a particular interest in the 'people of the Book.'"⁷ He admired certain aspects of Jewish philosophy and was interested in the prob-

(5) Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (New York, 1949), p. 93.

(*) In French in the text.

(6) Tuchman, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

(7) *Ibid.*

lem of the Jews in the modern world. Besides, he considered that the "Christian religion and civilization owes to Judaism an immeasurable debt." Speaking of his keen interest in the Jews, his niece Blanche Dugdale wrote: "Balfour's interest in the Jews and their history was lifelong. It originated in the Old Testament training of his mother and his Scottish upbringing."⁸ Barbara Tuchman relates that Balfour was one of the undergraduates at Trinity College who met George Eliot on her visit to Cambridge in search of material for her studies of *Deronda* and his friends, and that Eliot "developed the idea, that was to play a role in Balfour's thinking, of the necessity of requiting a moral debt owed to the Jews."⁹ Finally, Balfour used to read the chapters from the Book of Isaiah chanting the Jews' everlasting longing for Palestine.

2. The political-national aspect: If Balfour did not consider the Jews merely as the tools of the Christian millenium, neither did he see them as the "agents of a business imperialism." He emphasized, instead, that they were simply exiles "who should be given back, in payment of Christianity's 'immensurable debt,' their homeland."¹⁰

The Zionist rejection of the Uganda colonization offer made by the Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, awakened Balfour's feelings towards the Jews and aroused his curiosity. Moreover, according to a number of sources, it was this same rejection that led him to meet Weizmann. In point of fact, Balfour had then asked to meet one of those Zionists who had fought against the acceptance of the Uganda offer. He explained to Dreyfus that he was eager to understand the reasons for the Zionist attitude to this offer. Although Dreyfus was not among the supporters of the Uganda project, he did not hesitate to tell Balfour about one of the leaders of the Zionist Movement "a Russian Jew Chaim Weizmann."¹¹ Weizmann recorded in his diaries in this connection, "that I was anxious to meet Balfour goes without saying."¹² As to Weizmann's argument that, in arranging this meeting, Dreyfus wished that Balfour would convince him that his attitude towards the Uganda offer had been wrong, it pales considerably in the light of the reality we know. It is appropriate to remember now the Seventh Congress Report (27-30 August, 1905) which submitted its thanks to the Balfour cabinet and which recorded its satisfaction at the recognition by the British government of the Zionist Organization's attempt to find a solution to the Jewish problem. In that same report, the Zionists went on to express their hopes that the Balfour cabinet would carry on its efforts within the terms of the Basle Program.

It is not strange, then, that Zionism tried, in the person of Weizmann, to meet Balfour during this decisive phase of his electoral campaign; nor is it surprising that Balfour should welcome Weizmann at the time of their meeting, a

(8) Blanche E.C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, Vol. I, 1848-1906 (Hutchinson, London, 1936), p. 433.

(9) Tuchman, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 199.

(11) Dugdale, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

(12) Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

meeting which lasted five times longer than had been agreed upon. What is hard to believe, though, is that Balfour was merely concerned with convincing Weizmann that he had been wrong in his attitude towards the Uganda offer. It is obvious that the British Zionists were putting their hopes in the success of Balfour's candidature and that of his party at the election, as they thought this success might be beneficial to them. The liberal Manchester paper, *The Guardian*, had on its staff the Zionist lawyer, Harry Sacher, a friend of Weizmann from the time of the Sixth Congress (1903) and one of the members of the triad (Sacher-Marks-Sieff) who gravitated around Weizmann. Did this coincidence of interest which Herzl had dreamt of take place once more? Probably yes. However, the Conservative Party defeat in the elections proved to the Zionists that they had bet on a losing horse.

The strange conversation which took place at this meeting has been recorded by Weizmann as follows: (after he had pointed out to Balfour that the Zionists were trying to liquidate the legacy of Uganda which Herzl had left them with)¹³

"Then suddenly I said: 'Mr. Balfour, supposing I were to offer you Paris instead of London, would you take it?'

"He sat up, looked at me, and answered: 'But Dr. Weizmann, we have London.'

" 'That is true,' I said. 'But we had Jerusalem when London was marsh.'

"He leaned back, continued to stare at me, and said two things which I remember vividly. The first was: 'Are there many Jews who think like you?'

"I answered: 'I believe I speak the mind of millions of Jews whom you will never see and who cannot speak for themselves, but with whom I could pave the streets of the country I come from.'

"To this he said: 'If that is so, you will one day be a force.'

"Shortly before I withdrew, Balfour said: 'It is curious. The Jews I meet are quite different.'

"I answered: 'Mr. Balfour, you meet the wrong kind of Jews.'"

At this point, the meeting was over, and the two men did not meet again until eight years later at the end of 1914. Blanche Dugdale relates that Balfour "told her often about the impression the conversation made on him. He used to say: 'It was from that talk with Weizmann that I saw that the Jewish form of patriotism was unique. Their love for their country refused to be satisfied by the Uganda scheme. It was Weizmann's absolute refusal even to look at it which impressed me.'"¹⁴

* * * *

During the following year, the Zionists succeeded in purchasing a London weekly newspaper, *The Jewish Chronicle*. Through Wolffsohn, Leopold Kessler, Jacobus Kann, Joseph Cowen and Leopold Greenburg, the Jewish Colonial Trust played an important part in this acquisition, and Greenburg became the chairman of the new administration in his official Zionist capacity. He was granted a contract for life and wrote the editorials from an official Zionist standpoint, answering the objections against Zionism which the paper had previously published.

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 110.

(14) Dugdale, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

From 1907-1917, British Zionism developed through a series of events and changes in favor of the practicalist trend in the Movement. The practicalists took advantage of the withdrawal of the Territorialists led by Israel Zangwill and succeeded in the elections for office in bringing back to the chairmanship of the English Zionist Federation in 1909, Rabbi Gaster, while the Herzlian Zionist, Greenburg, was elected vice-chairman but he only defeated his practicalist opponent, Herbert Bentwich, by a majority of one vote.¹⁵

At the Ninth Zionist Congress (Hamburg 1909) the Zionists were divided into two distinctive groups. There was a group that was represented by the English Zionist Federation which declared its support for the chairmanship of Wolffsohn. The other group was represented by the Order of Ancient Maccabeans, and it joined the Russian, German and Austrian practicalists in their opposition to Wolffsohn's candidature. However, the old Executive Committee consisting of Wolffsohn, Kann and Warburg, was able to reaffirm its mandate. The control remained within the hands of the Ottoman Jews in the manner we have encountered in the previous chapter.

Autumn 1910 saw the newspaper, *Die Welt*, publishing a special issue on "Palestine." Later on, a number of the articles of this issue were collected in a volume which was published in July of the following year and translated into English in 1912 with a foreword by David Wolffsohn. It was entitled: *Zionist Work in Palestine* and written by a number of Zionist authorities. Israel Cohen wrote the introduction to the American Edition.¹⁶ In it he put forward the necessity of concentrating the activities of the Zionist Movement inside Palestine, thus forecasting the future work to the English speaking countries. He expressed his hopes that this work would help "to dispel the ignorance and to correct the misrepresentations of those who wish to frustrate its appeal." He pointed out that the "fantastic legends" which had been circulated by enemies about "Zionism planning to establish an independent state in Palestine and to settle all the Jews in the world there" had no roots in reality. He concluded by saying that Zionism was a peaceful movement of an ancient people to revive its national life and culture in the land of its forefathers . . . it is denied the wealth and influence of the magnates of the Jewish community in every land!"

In the article entitled "Palestine and Other Countries," Ussischkin undertook the survey of the seven years which had passed since Herzl had submitted the Uganda scheme to the Sixth Congress, and proposed himself to examine its effects. He criticized the new champion of this project, Israel Zangwill, as well as the offers which "poured on" the organization from Uganda to Congo, South Morocco, Cyrenaica, Mesopotamia, Mexico and Galveston (Australia). He wrote: "A Reform Judaism in place of tradition, any spot on earth instead of the Promised Land . . . that would be national death," and concluded by stating that as the Christian

(15) Israel Cohen, *A Jewish Pilgrimage*. Autobiography (London, 1956), pp. 76-77.

(16) Israel Cohen (ed.), *Zionist Work in Palestine* (Judaean Publishing Company, New York, 1912).

world had its holy Trinity, the Jewish people "lives by its own *trinitas*: Torah, Erez Israel, and the Hebrew language."¹⁷

The last part of the book consists of an article written by Elias Auerbach (Haifa) on "The Jewish Outlook in Palestine." Auerbach urged the Jews to accept the two following truisms about Palestine, the first being that "Palestine is not an empty land" and the second that "the land takes its character from the predominant elements in its population" which population includes 600,000 non-Jewish souls. He indicated the necessity of abandoning the view that the population of Palestine formed a "negligible quantity (*quantité négligeable*)* and pointed out that "through the revolution which has taken place in the political conditions of Turkey, it is no longer the European Powers which can forestall us in the occupation of Palestine, but rather the native Arabic element, which is growing steadily stronger, and which is . . . beginning to work according to European methods."¹⁸ He then added, "If we do not make haste, Palestine will be taken by others." And these others which Auerbach is talking about are no less than those Arabs who formed the majority of the population in Palestine!

In order that Palestine might become a Jewish land, he went on to argue that the Jews must become "the principal element in the population." According to him, this could only be achieved in the two following ways:

1. Massive Jewish immigration.
2. The purchasing of land by Jews on a larger scale.

When Auerbach discussed the danger of Ottomanizing the Jews, he did not admit that the possibility could exist in Palestine. Rather, he stressed that the real danger for the Jews was that of an "Arabic assimilation." "However," he added, "the Government will take care to avoid anything that might contribute to the extension of Arabic influence. The national spirit which is just awakening in the Arabs naturally gravitates to Arabia, which is in perpetual revolt. Hence, in its own interest, Turkey is likely in the future rather to support than to hinder the creation of a Jewish culture which can serve as a counterpoise to Arabic nationalism."¹⁹

Auerbach repeated the same argument in a pamphlet which was published in German by the Actions Committee of the Zionist Organization, under the title of *Palestine, the Land of the Jew* (1912). He pointed out that the Ottoman government's attitude towards Jewish colonialism was neither friendly nor hostile and that, in fact, it knew very little about it. He proved it in relating the discussions which took place in the Ottoman Parliament about Zionism and in revealing the Minister of Interior's ignorance about the situation in Palestine but at the same time expressing his wish that both Ministers of Interior and Finance would go to Palestine and find out for themselves.²⁰ Clearly, he expressed his wish

(17) *Ibid.*, pp. 21-24.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 172.

(*) In French in the text.

(19) *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

(20) Elias Auerbach, *Palästina als Judenland*, Hrsg. Von A.C. der Zionistischen Organisation (Berlin und Leipzig, 1916), pp. 48-49.

because of the strong opposition which was facing the government from the Arab delegates between 1908 and 1914. In 1911, the Minister of Finance was Jawid Bey. He was of Jewish origin and belonged to the Doenmeh sect. The Arab deputies had opposed him in Parliament because he had gathered around himself in the Ministry a group of Jewish exploiters and land brokers, among them the chief of his staff. In addition, the Arabs had opposed the government because it had opened the doors to Jewish immigration, the purchasing of land and doubtful financial operations. For example, in 1911, the Ottoman Ministry of Finance included around 111 Turks, 13 Jews, 14 Armenians and Greeks, but not one Arab.²¹ When the Arab Deputy Rauhy al-Khalidy stood up to uncover the aims of the Zionist Organization, the Jewish Minister, Nissim Mazeliah Effendi, proceeded to reply immediately. In 1913, Mazeliah occupied a ministerial seat in the government which replaced the coalition Cabinet which did not have any Arab members.

Auerbach continued his discussion of the advantages of Jewish colonization having no doubt that the Ottoman Prime Minister, who knew the situation well, would become a friend to the Jewish settler. Since the Jews had no political interest except to devote their force to the support of the central government in Constantinople: "We are not stupid to the point of wishing to establish a Jewish kingdom . . . All we want is to find for every Jew, who is suffering because of his Judaism, a place in Palestine, in the land of Israel, our true homeland."²²

Between September 2 and 9, 1913, the Eleventh Zionist Congress was convened in Vienna. It was attended by over five hundred delegates. Wolffsohn kept his position as president of the Zionist Bank and of the Jewish National Fund, while Chaim Weizmann was elected for the first time chairman of the Permanent Committee; at the same time, Warburg was elected chairman of the Inner Actions Committee with the Russian Tschlenow as Vice-chairman. In the report submitted to the Congress, the Actions Committee surveyed the political activities of the Zionist Movement. It affirmed that the political issue which the organization was handling continuously had gained additional importance during the phases of political turmoil. Furthermore, it showed its interest in the political events that would influence the future of the East. The report stated the following:

"War broke out in Tripolitania and was followed by bloody incidents in the Balkans, which in turn brought about a change in the core of political alignments. Turkey lost Tripolitania and most of its European possessions which brought the question of the future of Asiatic Turkey within the scope of European diplomacy."²³

The report went on to state that the realization of the Zionist program did not depend on a specific political success but on "us in the first place." It also indicated that the Zionist settlement policy could not be carried out if it ignored

(21) *Al Abram*: 10033, March 15, 1911; 10079, May 10, 1911; 10083, May 15, 1911.

(22) Auerbach, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

(23) Berient des Actions — Comites der Zionistischen Organization anden XI. Zionisten-Kongress, Wien (Berlin, 1913), p. 7.

the prevailing situation of the population in Palestine. Admitting that the inhabitants of Palestine had acquired in the last years an important role in the solution of the independent political problems of the East, the report went on to record the success encountered by Zionism in winning over and influencing the Ottoman Jewish leaders while securing the silence of the enemies of the Movement in some of the spheres of the Jewish press in Istanbul.

The Balkan wars (1912-1913) certainly did contribute in supporting and strengthening the German influence over the Sublime Porte. Also, most of the Young Turks who came to power after the revolution of January 1913, were ardent supporters of Germany; among them were, Anwar Pasha and Izzat Pasha, the War Minister. In May 1913, the Turkish government asked Germany to send a military delegation to help reorganize the Ottoman army. An agreement was signed to this effect in November of the same year, and it was decided that the delegation would consist of forty officers under the leadership of General Leman Von Sanders. Russia soon showed her fear of German domination over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and started getting closer to Britain and France.

At the end of 1913, Lord Kitchener, the British High-Commissioner in Egypt since the summer of 1911, issued orders for the continuation and completion of the exploratory work in Palestine which he had initiated with Colonel Conder in the seventies. British interest demanded now that the survey be extended to Aqaba to include the area situated south of Beersheba and extending to the Egyptian-Turkish frontiers (from Rafah to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba)—that is Al-Naqab. The British War Office charged officers from the Royal Engineers with this mission under the cover of the Palestine Exploration Fund. Two archaeologists, Sir Leonard Woolley and T.E. Lawrence, were chosen to join them.²⁴ When Turkey entered the war, both of them were "transferred" to the British Intelligence Service in Cairo.

The First World War broke out in the summer of 1914, and the Zionist Movement was asked to implement the principle of neutrality which the Eleventh Congress had "so emphatically proclaimed and so warmly approved," one year before Turkey's entry into the war. Although the Central Office of the Organization and the seat of its directorate, the Zionist Executive, was located in Berlin, Britain was chosen from the beginning as the financial center for the associations, which were laying the foundations of and carrying out colonization in Palestine, such as the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Anglo-Palestine Company, and the Jewish National Fund, all of which were officially registered in London.

Pro-Turkish and pro-British tendencies started to manifest themselves. After the outbreak of the war, Weizmann demanded the removal of the headquarters of the organization from Germany and the cessation of the activities of the Executive Committee which consisted of two Germans, Otto Warburg and Arthur Hantke, three Russians, Yechiel Tschlenow, Nahum Sokolow and Victor Jacobson, and an

(24) Lawrence Evans, *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924* (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1965), pp. 24-25, cf. note 7.

Austro-Hungarian of Russian origin, Shmarya Levin. After the formation in the United States of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs under the chairmanship of Lewis Brandeis, Weizmann suggested that the conduct of Zionist affairs during the war be entrusted to this committee. He also argued that, for the sake of the future of the Jewish cause, "the Provisional Committee should be given full power to deal with all Zionist matters until better times come."²⁵ He said:

"...It is in the interest of peoples now fighting for the small nationalities to secure for the Jewish nation the right of existence. Now is the time when the peoples of Great Britain, France and America will understand us ... The moral force of our claims will prove irresistible; the political conditions will be favourable to the realisation of our ideal ... We must unite the great body of conscious Jews in Great Britain, America, Italy and France. The German and Austrian Jews will also understand us better later ..." (excerpt from Weizmann's letter to Shmarya Levin who, in the summer of 1914, was sent to the United States on a Zionist mission and spent the rest of the war years there).

When Turkey entered the war in November 1914, on the side of the Central Powers, the Zionist General Council rejected Weizmann's suggestions at a meeting held in The Hague, at the beginning of December. The headquarters remained in Berlin under the control of Warburg and Hantke and a Zionist bureau "which was to work in close conjunction with the Berlin Executive" was opened in Copenhagen on February 15, 1915, under the direction of Leo Motzkin while it was decided that Tschlenow and Sokolow would go to the United States on a special mission. However, Sokolow arrived in Britain on December 31 and remained there until the end of the war, while Tschlenow left London for Russia where he remained until the autumn of 1917 when he returned to England and died there a few months later. Besides, it seems that the General Council had, at a meeting in March 1916, passed a decision prohibiting the Inner Actions Committee from "negotiating with the government of any country at war with Turkey."²⁶ But Weizmann, pursuing his own idea, kept looking for friends in another direction. Great Britain, with its deep-rooted Zionist tradition, became the pivot of his activity in which he aimed at betting on the winning horse in the war race. He ignored the decision passed by the majority of the members of the organization and sided with the Allies. The Zionism of Manchester took a trend of its own and became known as "The Manchester Zionist School."

In the Manchester School, new dimensions were revealed as far as the British-Zionist tradition was concerned. The new trend called for an alliance of interest between Zionist and the British Empire on the one hand and Gentile Zionism on the other. However, the roots of this trend stemmed from the interpretation of specific biblical verses and it was always latent there; in fact, it came to the surface from time to time and further confirmed the idea that the creation of Israel was the fulfilment of the prophecies and the proof of the truth of the Biblical message.

In the summer of 1913, Reverend Hechler had prophesied that "next year

(25) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

(26) *Ibid.*, p. 102.

a war would break out, and the House of Hohenzollern would be at the height of its power. It would then break up and the Kaiser would be forced to flee for refuge.”²⁷ In the same prophetic vein, Frank Jannaway of the Thomassians (a group in the religious sect known as the “Christadelphians” had considered the Zionist Movement as “an Evidence that the Messiah will soon appear in Jerusalem to rule the whole world therefrom.”²⁸ Frank Jannaway had visited Jerusalem four times, in 1901, 1902, 1912 and 1914 in the company of the editor in chief of *The Christadelphian*. He published his second book, *Palestine and the Powers*, immediately after the outbreak of the war. Then, on the establishment of the British Mandate, he published a third book, *Palestine and the World* with the picture of the first High-Commissioner of Palestine under the British Mandate, Herbert Samuel. The following motto appeared on the cover of the book: “The land of Israel for the people of Israel”!

Already, in his first book, he had expressed his article of faith. He wrote:

...“We do contend—and that most emphatically and earnestly—that the migration of the Jews to Canaan, which has been for some years, and is still going on, is an absolute fulfilment of those prophecies concerning the Jew and his land just prior to the return to the earth of his Messiah ...”²⁹

While these prophetic trends might not have influenced the minds of the British politicians at that time, nonetheless they constitute an indivisible part of the British Zionist tradition. It left traces in the heart of a number of politicians and government officials, be it consciously or unconsciously and had been influential on British tradition for the last three centuries. In considering the part played by the leading Gentile Zionists from the outbreak of the war until the Balfour Declaration, one should distinguish between two kinds of motives, the first stemming from the belief in the Millenium, the second based on practical and temporal considerations. In the study of the Manchester Zionist School, we will encounter the second category of motives, namely interest and imperialism tinted with romanticism and a tendency to imitate the classical Greek tradition.

That is how the Balfour Declaration came into being to crown the British Zionist tradition and give body to the efforts initiated by Theodor Herzl. The founder of modern Zionism had set the guiding lines which the organization was to follow after his death. Zionism allied itself with imperialism in order to carry out the colonization of Palestine and to lay down the basis of a “Jewish National Home” in a country whose great majority had rejected all the things such an alliance represented.

This majority insisted on its right to self-determination and never endowed any third party with the responsibility of granting its land and country to other groups—under the cover of what it called the “historical rights and links” the homeland of others.

(27) Bodenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

(28) Frank Jannaway, *Palestine and the Jews or: The Zionist Movement an Evidence That the Messiah Will Soon Appear in Jerusalem to Rule the Whole World Therefrom* (Birmingham, 1914).

(29) *Ibid.*, p. 70.

THE MANCHESTER ZIONIST SCHOOL

Early in November 1914, Turkey entered the war after three months of neutrality. On November 5, Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire, and Prime Minister Asquith proclaimed his country's abandonment of its traditional Eastern policy, thus making Turkey's dismemberment among the war aims of Great Britain. The opportunity, which a group of Zionist leaders had impatiently waited for, was thus offered to them, and Weizmann began, with the help of his friends and followers among the British Zionists and their supporters, to play the role he had been looking for. Yet, the Zionist Organization did not elect him to its chairmanship; its members thought instead of making Max Nordau the successor of the German Zionist Warburg, while the leaders of the English Zionist Federation thought of Israel Zangwill in view of his prominent social position, even though he had withdrawn from the Organization.

However, Weizmann did not pay much attention to the criticism which certain Zionist circles were directing against his activities and connections. Later on, he described the little group which he had gathered round him as "a small bank of workers, not official, not recognized, out of contact with Jewry at large." His independent activities were considered as "a breach of discipline," since he had not been given authority to speak in the name of the Organization. They were further considered as a breach of the principle of neutrality, which the Movement had adopted, as well as a danger to the Palestinian Jews who were at the mercy of the Turks while Turkey was at war with England.¹ That is why Sokolow's arrival in England at the end of the war represented official support to Weizmann's activities since Sokolow had the "status and authority" of a member of the Zionist Executive.

On September 16—before Turkey's entry into the war—Chaim Weizmann had met the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, Charles Prestwich Scott. While Max Nordau was being accompanied by French soldiers to the Spanish frontiers to become a political exile in Madrid, Weizmann succeeded in arousing Mr. Scott's interest in the Zionist ideas which he explained to him. The influential journalist declared that he was quite prepared to "help us in any endeavour in favour of the Jews" and expressed his willingness to meet the Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, as soon as the Zionists had a practical proposal to submit to the Government.²

It might very well be that the meeting of Weizmann and Scott had not been prearranged and that the introduction was a pure accident. However, Stein's state-

(1) Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 131.

ment that "Zionism, as Weizmann expounded it, was new to Scott,"³ does not correspond to reality since Scott had probably known Zionism before that, through Harry Sacher. The latter had in fact been on the staff of Scott's paper between 1905 and 1909, and had known Weizmann since the convening of the Sixth Congress in 1903. Furthermore, it was Sacher himself who had won over Mr. Scott to the Jewish cause in 1913. This is indicated in Israel Cohen's autobiography which mentioned the author's connection with Mr. Scott and his attending as the *Guardian's* special correspondent, the Zionist Congresses between 1905 and 1946, with the exception of one in 1907. In his autobiography then, Israel Cohen recorded his visit to Scott's house in 1910, where the two had a chat about the Zionist situation. He wrote:

"He [Scott] evinced a warm sympathy with Jewish national aspirations and was particularly anxious to learn about the currents of feeling in Constantinople. I also went to see Weizmann in his chemical laboratory at the University . . ."⁴ Did Mr. Scott wait until this accidental meeting with Weizmann in the middle of September 1914, to be indoctrinated with the principles of Zionism as expounded by the founder of the Manchester Zionist School? Or is Jeffries' opinion more correct that 'when Weizmann indoctrinated Scott, it was like the sowing of grass-seed upon a lawn'?"⁵

It is certain that Scott's inclination for Zionism came before his meeting with Weizmann. Sykes relates that Scott "came of a Unitarian family and would have entered the ministry of that sect as a young man if he had not been appalled by what he described as the weight of 'external authority' opposed to its doctrine."⁶ As a result of his doubts about the validity of Unitarianism, "his piety in after life" was somewhat vague. Christ was revered by him as a "moral idealist" and "the passionate religion of Zionism with its ancient continuity and visible sacraments of race and soil was much better suited to the mind of his Bible-reading man than the diluted Christianity and perplexed idealism of the Age of Diffusion."⁷ That is why we see him, after his meeting with Weizmann, unconsciously following in Reverend William Hechler's footsteps. He prepared the way for the introduction of Chaim Weizmann to the British personalities he was in contact with in his capacity as editor of the *Manchester Guardian*. Through him also, Weizmann was to meet Lloyd George. Like George, Scott had joined the Radical Wing of the Liberal Party and had been on the unpopular side in the Boer War. His paper vehemently criticized Edward Grey's diplomacy before 1914. It adopted the view that "if war broke out in Europe, Great Britain could and should keep out of it,"⁸ and abandoned it only after the invasion of Belgium.

In *Trial and Error*, Weizmann relates that once he realized that the war would spread to the Middle East, he expected that "events of great significance" would

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) Cohen, *A Jewish Pilgrimage—Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

(5) J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality* (London, 1939), p. 91.

(6) Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

happen to the Jews. He had been waiting for this chance and it had come sooner than he had expected, "by accident." Since, he writes, "... I made the acquaintance of a man who was to be of incalculable value to the Zionist Movement ... If we had not met thus, I might have gone to see him, for his sympathy with Jewish ideals was widely known, and his personal and public influence was enormous."⁹ After he had promised to introduce him to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, and to "a Jew in the government," Mr. Herbert Samuel, Scott started studying the Jewish problem thoroughly. Weizmann records in this respect: "Scott began to read literature on Palestine and I provided him with a map of the country, showing our settlements."¹⁰ Soon after Turkey's entry into the war, Mr. Scott started to link the Jewish question to the future of Palestine and connect it with the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

One week after Britain declared war on Turkey, Weizmann addressed a letter to Balfour with the idea of making use of their common friendship with the philosopher, Samuel Alexander, who was a professor at the Manchester University and his colleague since his appointment in 1913, as Reader in Biochemistry in the same university. Weizmann decided on Samuel Alexander's intervention with Balfour in view of the close relationship between the two. The answer reached him through Alexander on November 17, 1914, that Balfour still remembered their conversation in 1906 and would be glad to hear from him again. Thus, on December 12, Weizmann met Balfour and they went back to the discussion which they had started eight years ago. Balfour assured him of his sympathy towards the Jewish cause and that "the Jews might get their things done much more quickly after the war." He remembered everything they had previously discussed and Weizmann thought "it would be superfluous to repeat his exposition of the Jewish problem in its national aspect."¹¹ They separated after Weizmann had expressed his wish to see Balfour again "when the thunder of the guns had ceased," while Balfour "moved to the point of tears," said, "I am deeply moved and interested. It is not a dream. It is a great cause, and I understand it."¹² It is probable that Weizmann and Scott expected that the British coalition Cabinet would be reconstructed on a broader basis and would include a number of Conservatives. Their wish was fulfilled a few months later when Balfour joined the Asquith coalition Cabinet in May 1915, replacing Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, while Lloyd George became Minister of Munitions. In the middle of September 1915, one year after he had met Mr. Scott, Weizmann entered the service of the Ministry of Munitions as Chemical Adviser on acetone supplies.

But the most important meeting was that which took place, on Scott's advice, on December 10, 1915, between Weizmann and Herbert Samuel in the presence of Rabbi Moses Gaster. Immediately after Mr. Asquith's speech to the British Cabinet in which he clearly explained that "Great Britain had finally abandoned her trad-

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 149.

(10) *Ibid.*

(11) *Ibid.*, p. 154.

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 155.

ditional Eastern policy and now included among her war aims the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire," Herbert Samuel broached the subject of Zionism with his colleagues in the Cabinet. Lloyd George declared to him that "he was very keen to see a Jewish state established in Palestine," while the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, suggested that "perhaps the opportunity might arise for the fulfilment of the ancient aspiration of the Jewish people, and the restoration there of a Jewish state."¹³ It seems certain that Samuel's ideas about Zionism had been formed before 1914, and that he had not wished to reveal them to anyone except Rabbi Moses Gaster. He had studied at Oxford between 1889 and 1893, and in 1902 had become a member of the House of Commons. He was probably influenced by the Zionist ideas of his uncle, his father's youngest brother, Samuel Montagu (1832-1911), who had played a very active part in the Movement of the "Lovers of Zion" all through the Seventies and helped in submitting a petition to Sultan Abdul Hamid II for the colonization of East Jordan in 1893. He had "stood successfully for the White Chapel Division at the general election and sat for that constituency from 1885 till 1900." We have already mentioned him in this study in relation to Herzl's first visit in London where they both met on November 23-24, 1895.

In spite of his uncle being a Liberal, Herbert Samuel's ideas had been more influenced by Disraeli than by anyone else.¹⁴ He was one of the British leaders who immediately realized that "the war had put Zionism on the map." They immediately looked into the question of the "ultimate destiny" of Palestine after the war ended. Samuel took the lead in this trend at the highest levels, and in 1915, he sent Asquith a draft Cabinet memorandum which proposed "annexation and a Protectorate within the British Empire":

"The course of events," he began, 'opens a prospect of a change, at the end of the war, in the states of Palestine. Already there is a stirring among the twelve million Jews scattered throughout the countries of the world. A feeling is spreading with great rapidity that now, at last, some advance may be made, in some way, towards the fulfilment of the hope and desire, held with unshakeable tenacity for 1,800 years, for the restoration of the Jews to the land to which they are attached by ties almost as ancient as history itself.'¹⁵

He then proceeded to sketch the possibilities, "not of a Jewish State" but of a centre of Jewish culture in Palestine, "the home of a brilliant civilization." He further argued that a Protectorate "would enable England to fulfil in yet another sphere her historic part of the civilizer of the backward countries." In addition, he did not omit mentioning political and strategic arguments, and concluded:

"The Jewish brain is a psychological product not to be despised. For fifteen centuries the race produced in Palestine a constant succession of great men—statesmen and prophets, judges and soldiers. If a body be again given in which its soul

(13) *Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.

(14) Viscount Samuel, *Memoirs* (The Cresset Press, London, 1945), p. 3.

(15) John Bowle, *Viscount Samuel—A Biography* (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1957), p. 170.

can lodge, it may again enrich the world. Till full scope is granted as Macauley said in the House of Commons, 'let us not presume to say that there is no genius among the countrymen of Isaiah, no heroism among the descendants of the Macabees.'"¹⁶

Asquith described the first draft of the memorandum as "a new edition of 'Tancred' brought up to date" and "a curious illustration of Dizzi's (Disraeli's) favourite maxim that race is everything." Regarding the relationship between Asquith and Herbert Samuel, Stein explained that Herbert's cousin, Montagu, was "one of Asquith's closest political and personal friends among the young liberals."¹⁷

Weizmann met Samuel who explained to him his plans and ambitions for Palestine. He also suggested that the Temple might be rebuilt "as a symbol of Jewish unity and in a modernized form." Then he told Weizmann about the memorandum he had prepared on the future of the Jewish state in Palestine. Furthermore, he considered that Weizmann's demands were "too modern." Not wishing to expose the details of his plans, he simply advised the Zionist leader to "work quickly . . . and prepare for the hour to come."

We have found it appropriate to reproduce Samuel's memorandum on the future of Palestine in its complete and final version, as it was circulated to the Members of the British Cabinet in March 1915.¹⁸ In this revised text, Samuel insisted on the importance of the purely strategic considerations included in his suggestions related to the annexation of Palestine to the Empire as a British Protectorate. John Bowle stated that Samuel "attuned the eloquence of his plea for Jews to the hard-headed business sense of most of his colleagues." The memorandum did not define clearly the area which Herbert Samuel was interested in. However, it is almost certain that Samuel was thinking of a frontier line which would start where the frontiers of the independent Mutasarrifiyah of Mount Lebanon ended; and extend south as far as the Turco-Egyptian frontiers, while it would include East Jordan until the Hedjaz railway line!

(16) *Ibid.*, p. 171.

(17) *Ibid.*

(18) *Ibid.*, pp. 172-177.

"PALESTINE"

If the war results in the break up of the Turkish Empire in Asia, what is to be the future of Palestine?

(a) Of the possible alternatives, the one most frequently discussed is annexation by France.

But the establishment of a great European Power so close to the Suez Canal would be a continual and a formidable menace to the essential lines of communication of the British Empire. The belt of desert to the east of the Canal has proved an admirable strategic frontier against the Turks. But it would be an inadequate defence against a military expedition organized by a powerful Western State, and supported by the laying of a railway from El Arish. We cannot proceed on the supposition that our present happy relations with France will continue always.

France has considerable interests in Northern Syria, but few in Palestine. A French company owns the railway of 54 miles from Jaffa to Jerusalem, but the sum invested is small. Beyond that there is little. There are French monastic establishments, but few other French residents.

The ancient protectorate of France over Catholic interests in the East could be continued in Palestine, if her present Government attached importance to it, even if the control of the country were in other hands. A recent report of the Egyptian Intelligence Department (quoted in a telegram from the British Agent in Egypt of the 7th January) stated that a French annexation would be unwelcome to the inhabitants of the country. The vast African possessions of France, recently immensely increased by the annexation of Morocco; the acquisition, after this war, of the greater part of Syria, including Beirout and Damascus; the re-absorption also of Alsace and Lorraine—all this should be ample to absorb the energies of the population of France, stationary in numbers as it is, for many years to come.

(b) A second alternative would be to leave the country to Turkey.

Under the Turk, Palestine has been blighted. For hundreds of years she has produced neither men nor things useful to the world. Her native population is sunk in squalor. Roads, harbours, irrigation, sanitation, are neglected. Almost the only signs

of agricultural or industrial vitality are to be found in the Jewish and, on a smaller scale, in the German colonies. The Turkish officials are foreigners in the country. Of Turkish population there is none. The Governors, who follow one another in rapid succession, are concerned only with the amount of money they can squeeze out of the country to send to Constantinople. If it is possible for the Western nations to rescue Palestine from the Turk, it is as much their duty to do it as it has been to rescue the European provinces of Turkey. Besides, if Northern Syria goes to France and Mesopotamia to England, there seems to be no reason for leaving Palestine, detached and isolated, as a Turkish possession.

(c) A third alternative would be internationalization.

An international régime has invariably been a transition stage to something else. While it lasts it is a theatre of intrigues among the agents of the governing States, each seeking to establish for his country a claim to ultimate control. In this case internationalisation might prove to be a stepping-stone to a German protectorate. Already Germany has been very active in Palestine. She has spent considerable sums of money there with a view to increasing her influence. She has founded a bank, agricultural colonies, schools, hospitals. After the war, shut out, to a great extent, from the Far East and other parts of the globe, she may well concentrate a part of her energies on Palestine. In twenty years' time Egypt's neighbour, ostensibly internationalised, may have become so permeated by German influence as to furnish a strong case for German control, whenever the cumbrous form of government established shall have patently broken down, and whenever another revision of the map of Western Asia takes place. Such an eventuality would be as dangerous to France in Northern Syria as to England in Egypt. Meanwhile, to govern the country through a Commission composed of representatives of several Powers would be to lay it under a dead hand. Continuous disagreements would be inevitable, and would result in nothing being done for the development of the land and the progress of the people.

(d) Another alternative often suggested is the establishment in Palestine of an autonomous Jewish State.

Whatever be the merits or the demerits of that proposal, it is certain that the time is not ripe for it. Such increase of

population as there has been in Palestine in recent years has been composed, indeed, mostly of Jewish immigrants; the new Jewish agricultural colonies already number about 15,000 souls; in Jerusalem itself two-thirds of the inhabitants are Jews; but in the country, as a whole, they still probably do not number more than about one-sixth of the population.

If the attempt were made to place the 500,000 or 600,000 Mahommedans of Arab race under a Government which rested upon the support of 90,000 or 100,000 Jewish inhabitants, there can be no assurance that such a Government, even if established by the authority of the Powers, would be able to command obedience. The dream of a Jewish State, prosperous, progressive, and the home of a brilliant civilisation, might vanish in a series of squalid conflicts with the Arab population. And even if a State so constituted did succeed in avoiding or repressing internal disorder, it is doubtful whether it would be strong enough to protect itself from external aggression on the part of the turbulent elements around it. To attempt to realise the aspiration of a Jewish State one century too soon might throw back its actual realisation for many centuries more. These considerations are fully recognised by the leaders of the Zionist movement.

(e) The last alternative is a British protectorate.

Its establishment would be a safeguard to Egypt. It is true that Palestine in British hands would itself be open to attack, and the acquisition would bring with it extended military responsibilities. But the mountainous character of the country would make its occupation by an enemy difficult, and, while this outpost was being contested time would be given to allow the garrison of Egypt to be increased and the defences to be strengthened. A common frontier with a European neighbour in the Lebanon is a far smaller risk to the vital interests of the British Empire than a common frontier at El Arish.

The harbours at Jaffa and Haifa are poor, but they are both capable of improvement by the expenditure of no very large sums, and one or other would have to be improved for commercial purposes. Haifa, on the Bay of Acre, has been in the past an important strategic point. It is a question for experts whether it could be made, under modern conditions, a good naval base. Haifa is further away from the Dardanelles than Alexandretta, but Alexandretta itself is considerably further from them than

Alexandria, and almost as far as Malta. If on general grounds a base on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean is desired, and if political difficulties prevent the acquisition of Alexandretta, it may be worth considering whether Haifa would not serve.

In order to conciliate the susceptibilities of the Catholic and Greek Churches, it would, no doubt, be necessary to accompany British control by the establishment of an extra-territorial régime for the Christian sacred sites, and to vest their possession in an international commission, in which France (and perhaps the Vatican), on behalf of the Catholic Church, and Russia, on behalf of the Greek Church, would have leading voices. It would doubtless be desirable also that the Mahommedan sacred sites should be declared inviolable, and probably that the local government should include one or more Mahommedans, whose presence would be a guarantee that Mahommedan interests would be safeguarded.

A British protectorate, according to the Egyptian Intelligence Department report already quoted, would be welcomed by a large proportion of the present population. There have been many previous indications of the same feeling. I am assured, both by Zionists and non-Zionists, that it is the solution of the question of Palestine which would be by far the most welcome to the Jews throughout the world.

It is hoped that under British rule facilities would be given to Jewish organisations to purchase land, to found colonies, to establish educational and religious institutions, and to cooperate in the economic development of the country, and that Jewish immigration, carefully regulated, would be given preference, so that in course of time the Jewish inhabitants grown into a majority and settled in the land, may be conceded such degree of self-government as the conditions of that day might justify.

The gradual growth of a considerable Jewish community, under British suzerainty, in Palestine will not, indeed, solve the Jewish question in Europe.

A country the size of Wales, much of it barren mountain and part of it waterless, cannot hold 9,000,000 people. But it could probably hold in time 3,000,000, and some relief would be given to the pressure in Russia and elsewhere. Far more important would be the effect upon the character of the larger part of the Jewish race who must still remain intermingled with

other peoples, to be a strength or to be a weakness to the countries in which they live. Let a Jewish centre be established in Palestine, let it achieve, as it may well achieve, some measure of spiritual and intellectual greatness, and insensibly the character of the individual Jew, wherever he might be, would be raised. The sordid associations which have attached to the Jewish name would be, to some degree at least, sloughed off, and the value of the Jews as an element in the civilisation of the European peoples would be enhanced.

The course which is advocated would win for England the gratitude of the Jews throughout the world. In the United States, where they number about 2,000,000, and in all the other lands where they are scattered, they would form a body of opinion whose bias, where the interest of the country of which they were citizens was not involved, would be favourable to the British Empire. Just as the wise policy of England towards Greece in the early part of the nineteenth century, and towards Italy in the middle of the nineteenth century, has secured for this country the goodwill of Greeks and Italians, wherever they may be, ever since, so help given now towards the attainment of the ideal which great numbers of Jews have never ceased to cherish through so many centuries of suffering cannot fail to secure, into a far-distant future, the gratitude of a whole race, whose goodwill, in time to come, may not be without its value.

The British Empire, with its present vastness and prosperity, has little addition to its greatness left to win. But Palestine, small as it is in area, bulks so large in the world's imagination, that no Empire is so great but its prestige would be raised by its possession. The inclusion of Palestine within the British Empire would add a lustre even to the British Crown. It would make a most powerful appeal to the people of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, particularly if it were avowedly a means of aiding the Jews to reoccupy the country. Widespread and deep-rooted in the Protestant world is a sympathy with the idea of restoring the Hebrew people to the land which was to be their inheritance, and intense interest in the fulfilment of the prophecies which have foretold it. The redemption also of the Christian Holy Places from the vulgarisation to which they are now subject and the opening of the Holy Land, more easily than hitherto, to the visits of Christian travellers, would add to

the appeal which this policy would make to the British peoples. There is probably no outcome to the war which would give greater satisfaction to powerful sections of British opinion.

The importance that would be attached by British opinion to this annexation would help to facilitate a wise settlement of another of the problems which will result from the war. Although Great Britain did not enter the conflict with any purpose of territorial expansion, being in it and having made immense sacrifices, there would be profound disappointment in the country if the outcome were to be the securing of great advantages by our Allies and none by ourselves. But to strip Germany of her colonies for the benefit of England would leave a permanent feeling of such intense bitterness among the German people as to render such a course impolitic. We have to live in the same world with 70,000,000 Germans, and we should take care to give as little justification as we can for the hatching, ten, twenty, or thirty years hence, of a German war of revenge. Certain of the German colonies must no doubt be retained for strategic reasons or on account of the interests of our Dominions. But if Great Britain can obtain the compensations, which public opinion will demand, in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and not in German East Africa and West Africa, there is more likelihood of a lasting peace.

H. S.

March 1915.

SIDEBOTHAM AND PALESTINE

In Manchester the Zionist circle of people which gathered around Weizmann included a group of his young students who had imbibed his thinking. Among them we find, Leon Simon (later Sir Simon Marks) who occupied a high rank as a member of the civil service and was a distinguished Hebraist and translator of Ahad Ha'am; Harry Sacher who carried out studies in the field of history, law and journalism and later joined the staff of the *Manchester Guardian* (1905-1909). He had succeeded in introducing Simon Marks and Israel Sieff to the Zionist Movement and to the Manchester School in particular. Marks, Sacher and Sieff were all three related to Weizmann by marriage. They also controlled a commercial empire which later became "Marks and Spencer Ltd." Moreover, they profited a great deal from Ahad Ha'am's teachings and "were given the advantage of his valuable service and his full moral support." Still other members joined Weizmann's inner circle; one of these was Albert Hyamson (1875-1945), a civil servant and Anglo-Jewish historian who was the Director of the Jewish section at the Ministry of Information between 1917 and 1918. Later on, he held an office at the Emigration Section of the British Mandate in Palestine and published a large number of historical studies. In addition to Hyamson, we will mention Norman Bentwich, a lawyer who had been appointed inspector of courts in Egypt and who served in the British army as major during the British expedition in Palestine [he was to be appointed attorney-general in Palestine under the Mandate (1920-1931)], and Samuel Landman who later became secretary of the World Zionist Organization.

There is no doubt that the cooperation between the members of this circle and the *Manchester Guardian* took its most brilliant form with the acquisition of Herbert Sidebotham (1872-1940), the prominent journalist and correspondent on military strategy for this paper. In fact, Sidebotham offers the best example of the Zionist School's reliance on strategic considerations. Weizmann described Sidebotham's interest in Zionist ideas as being "from the British strategic point of view." He mentioned the important part played by Sidebotham in the molding of British public opinion in favour of the Zionists and argued further that Sidebotham was "one of the first prominent English publicists to perceive the coincidence of the interests between Great Britain and a Jewish Palestine."

In spite of Sidebotham's allegations that Scott never sought to communicate his Zionist faith to any member of his staff, it would be difficult to ignore the actual existence of some sort of "earlier harmony" between the thinking of the editor and that of his military correspondent. Furthermore, Sidebotham's articles,

(1) Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

which we will discuss later in this chapter, could not have appeared without Scott's approval. We cannot exactly define the part played by Harry Sacher except to say that he brought Sidebotham into contact with Weizmann. It is not unlikely, then, that Mr. Scott was the one who inspired, in a way, the *Guardian* military correspondent, the "Student of War" (the *nom de plume* of Herbert Sidebotham), in order to "establish this community of ideals and interests between Zionism and British policy,"² at the time of the extension of the war to the Near East. His paper opened its doors to a number of British Jewish writers who had sided with the Liberals and became, during the war, the organ of the policy aiming at the identity of interests between Zionism and Great Britain. Its articles were, to a large extent, the organ of the Zionist Manchester School, and Sidebotham transposed the doctrine of that school to the level of British strategy.

Christopher Sykes points out that Sidebotham was, in 1916, in close relationship with Sir Edward Grey and that he visited him often in London. He also suggested that Balfour's Zionism might have been due to the influence of the memorandum presented in the spring of 1916 by Sidebotham to the British Foreign Office "since," he wrote, "one of the arguments in this document, that the small gifted Jewish people needed but their ancestral hearth to give the world such treasures as the Ancient Greeks had given from Hellas, was often used by Balfour when discussing Zionism in private."³ Besides, Sidebotham was considered by Lloyd George as the best military correspondent of the British Press.⁴

What were the ideas which Sidebotham expressed at the end of 1915 in his leading article "The Defence of Egypt," and how did his thinking "take possession" of the minds of the politicians and strategists which made him declare, "We were all strategists in those days"?⁵ We should also examine Sidebotham's analysis of the revival of what he called "Old Palestine" in his argument for the creation of "a new nation of Old Palestine."⁶ In addition, we must consider how these things relate to the recognition of a geographic entity which would become "New Palestine"? We are well acquainted with the enthusiasm of people like Lloyd George and Balfour for the resurgence of the Old Testament into modern politics. In this respect Lloyd George had stated: "When Dr. Weizmann was talking of Palestine, he kept bringing up places and names which were more familiar to me than those of the Western front," as well as Barbara Tuchmann's remark: "Indeed, there was hardly an Englishman to whom Dan and Beersheba did not mean more than Ypres or Passchendaele."⁷ In his memoirs, Weizmann declared, for instance, that "the eastern boundary of Palestine went as far as the Hedjaz Railway and included Transjordan,"⁸ while Barbara Tuchmann pointed out that

(2) Herbert Sidebotham, *England and Palestine. Essays Towards the Restoration of the Jewish State* (London, 1918), p. x.

(3) Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

(4) Stein, *op. cit.*, fn. no. 32, p. 145.

(5) Herbert Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine* (Macmillan, London, 1937), p. 23.

(6) *Ibid.*

(7) Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 206; Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

(8) Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

"Palestine" was a word "that the experts could not use, because it always suffered from an unfortunate geographical inexactitude."⁹ How did Sidebotham come to the notion of his geographic Palestine through his analysis of the strategic conditions?

Sidebotham published his article on "The Defence of Egypt" in answer to an article which had appeared in *Le Temps* in Paris which discussed "how the forces gathering in Egypt could best be used in the service of Allied victory in the War." The article was published before Turkey's second attack on the Suez Canal area in the summer of 1916. The British were not able to pierce the Turkish lines between Gaza and Beersheba before the autumn of 1917, when the following idea "took possession" of the minds of the British politicians and strategists:

"You cannot have your main artery of communications with India and the East as a battle front. You must have a protective bastion, and that commits you to the possession of Gaza on the coast road and to the hills of Judaea that command it. The same logic and geography that involved the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah in every war between the Nile and the Mesopotamia Empires were now working in the defence of Egypt against Turkey. But if Judaea is necessary, or at least highly desirable, for the satisfactory defence of Egypt, why rest content with the possession of the hills of Judaea? What Judaea could do, Israel and Judah together might do still better. Why not therefore revive the old Palestine? The hills of Judaea, it has been said, are as barren as the floor of a chapel, and if they were to become a mere military place of arms, they would be without profit in peace and at all times a financial burden. But if you can join to Judaea the fertile plains of Samaria and the beauty of Galilee, you have the bones of a new country which only needs the right people to clothe it with flesh to make a new nation of the old Palestine. And a new Palestine, especially in alliance with the power that had command of the sea, which was never at the service of Old Testament Palestine, might not only be the ideal bastion of Egypt, but a self-supporting nation, stronger than the old Palestine and even more prosperous."¹⁰

This is the summary of Sidebotham's argument in his articles in the *Manchester Guardian* from November 1915 onwards. Referring to them later in 1937, he said: "This journal for the first time yoked the international ideal of the Zionists in harness with an Allied victory in the war. The leader is worth quoting *in extenso*, for not only is it the first essay in the reconstruction of our Eastern policy that was destined to take a permanent shape, but it is of interest as shewing how incidentally and casually an idea can establish itself in politics."¹¹ Twenty years after the Balfour Declaration, he called his reader's attention to the fact that what was contemplated then (1915-1976) was the formation "not of a National Home" but an "actual Jewish State."¹² On what data did Sidebotham base the outlines of his new Palestine?

In order to answer this question, we should refer to the first chapter in his book, *England and Palestine* (1918), which he entitled "The Military Geography of the Ancient Jewish State."¹³ In a footnote of this chapter, he pointed out that he had relied on Sir George A. Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*

(9) Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

(10) Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine, op. cit.*, p. 23.

(11) *Ibid.*, p. 24.

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 37.

(13) Sidebotham, *England and Palestine, op. cit.*, pp. 1-27.

for most of his information. However, he expressed his uneasiness at this noted writer's statement: "Palestine, formed as it is and surrounded as it is, is emphatically a land of tribes. The idea that it ever belonged to one nation even though this were the Jews is contrary both to Nature and to Scripture."¹⁴ Sidebotham commented that "if it were true, it would condemn the Jews to inevitable political failure in their own country in the future as in the past." He considered the geographical lack of unity in Palestine "like nothing to be found anywhere else in the world" and went on to argue that "the strange cutting up of the country, nowhere wide, into longitudinal sections, give a greater variety of climate and physical character than is to be found in the same distance anywhere." Palestine enjoys the best natural frontiers: The sea to the west, the desert (which is a sea of land) to the east and south, and the mountains to the north, this was at least how Sidebotham wanted it to be! However, the ancient history of the people of Israel failed him in this respect. He discovered that the Jewish State, in reality, had never been "strong enough to touch and maintain itself on all these natural frontiers at once."

Our author went then to survey what he called "the History of the Foreign Policy of Israel under the Kings" which to him, was the history of the three following failures:

- a. The failure to reach the sea frontier,
- b. The failure to find a satisfactory frontier on the north, and
- c. The failure to establish itself firmly on the edge of the desert, east of Jordan.

The first failure, he explained, "not only deprived her of the wealth and influence that comes of sea power, but uncovered the western entries into the plateau of Judaea and opened a broad highway of invasion north and south," while the second one deprived her of the northern tribes and "invited her enemy to decapitate the country by occupying Esdraelon," and the third "opened up the crossings of the Jordan, which in spite of the great depth of the valley in which it flows is in no sense a defensible frontier line."¹⁵

Consequently, Sidebotham decided in the next chapters to find "some clues to the history of Palestine through the centuries." While keeping these geographical peculiarities constantly in mind, he went on to argue that the position of Palestine in Asia is similar to that of Belgium in Europe. He then divided the military geography of Palestine into three parts: Judaea, Samaria, and Galilee, pointing out that Galilee had played but "a small part in the classic period of secular Jewish history, because Esdraelon in the hands of an enemy cut it off from the rest of the country."¹⁶ However, Galilee's importance lay in the fact that "it is the centre of the roads between the coast and Mesopotamia." The way to sea is usually believed to have been "the road which came down from Damascus

(14) George Adam Smith, *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, Especially in Relation to the History of Israel and of the Early Church. (London, 1897, 4th ed.).

(15) Sidebotham, *England and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

(16) *Ibid.*, p. 14.

round the flank of Mount Hermon and crossed the Jordan into Galilee at the Jisr Benat Y'akub, between Huleh and the Sea of Galilee."¹⁷ When he came to discuss the Jordan valley, he pointed out that "the Jews wasted no sentiment on this river, and with good reason." It is a "swift, black, sullen current," he pursued, "flowing between ugly mud-banks of refuse or an occasional bed of stones foul with ooze and slime and sweeps to the Dead Sea through unhealthy jungle relieved only by poisonous soil."¹⁸ East of the Jordan, Sidebotham's interest is aroused by that "belt of high land, for the most part fertile, between it and the desert" where its width varies from "thirty to as much as eighty miles." He considered it as the most important region of all Palestine from the military and economic points of view and declared that "the great aim of Jewish foreign policy under the kings was to secure control over this territory east of Jordan, without which Palestine had no secure frontier on the side of the desert."¹⁹

In his discussion of the political geography of "this exceedingly valuable country east of Jordan," he pointed out that it had been very unstable throughout the history of the Old Testament. However, he explained, its physical boundaries "are clear and well marked," by which he obviously meant the land of Gilead, the plateau of the Hauran and Beisan while considering that they extend "from the foothills of Hermon on the north to the Yarmok on the south, and from the Jordan to the edge of the desert."²⁰ Moreover, he called the reader's attention to the importance of the plateau of the Hauran which is covered with "a red fertile soil of disintegrated lava" and is considered as the richest ground for cereals in all Palestine. He then discussed the commercial treaties between Israel and Tyre under David's reign in terms of the rivalry over the "produce of the Hauran" and explained that "one of the motives of David's campaigns in the Hauran and of the alliance with Tyre was the desire of these commercial and industrial towns of the coast for the produce of the Hauran." He concluded the chapter by stating that "the secular greatness of Palestine usually depended on the possession of these lands."

In 1937, twenty years after the publication of *England and Palestine*, Sidebotham published his second book, *Great Britain and Palestine*, in which he discussed Solomon's treaties with the Phoenicians. He explained that Solomon attached such great importance to the commercial treaties he had concluded with Tyre that "he surrendered part of Galilee for the sake of them." In his opinion, it was this preference for his interest in the south to those in the north that brought about the division of Palestine into the Kingdoms of "Judah" and "Israel."

He proceeded to state that Beirut is the modern successor of Tyre and praised the Commission which "in assigning Galilee to the Jewish state, has made it a neighbour of the new Lebanon state, which will ... possibly be some day a

(17) *Ibid.*, p. 23.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 25.

(19) *Ibid.*

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 26.

field of Jewish expansion."²¹

The following chapters of *England and Palestine* discussed among other topics "Napoleon's Campaign in Syria," "The Old British Policy of Turkey," and "German Ambitions in the East." He then proceeded to analyze the Zionist colonial plans which were carried out by British leaders such as Shaftesbury, Colonel George Gawlor, Hollingworth, Colonel Conder and Laurence Oliphant, and undertook to enumerate the bases of "our Eastern policy" in the last decade of the nineteenth century, at the time of the appearance of the Zionist Movement. Among those bases, he mentioned:

- "(1) An entente with France, because without that our position in Egypt was insecure and a source of constant diplomatic embarrassment;
- (2) an understanding either with Russia or with Germany, because without that our military position in Egypt and in the East could not be safe;
- (3) an agreement with regard to the future of Turkey between England, France and either Germany or Russia . . . ;
- (4) the revival of the Semitic nationalities in the East to take the place of Turkey;
- (5) a union of the Balkan States to prevent Germany from establishing connection by land with Turkey."²²

These bases were laid by Britain's Entente Treaties with France and Russia. The third and the fourth ones "were not attempted until after the war broke out," while the fifth one was achieved by M. Venizelos, then broken up by the Second Balkan War. Had the expedition to the Dardanelles been successful, it would have been achieved once more.

In the last chapters of his book, Sidebotham devoted himself to the task of studying the British interests in Palestine. He discussed the objections which were being made—and they were—against the policy of the establishment of a Zionist Jewish state in Palestine. He then explained the principles on which the return of the Jews, within the context of political equality, were based and expressed his hopes for the creation of a Jewish state within the independent dominions of the British Empire and guaranteed by international law. In the appendix to his book, he gave the account of the agreements between the Powers, relating to Turkey, as it appeared in the Soviet *Isvestia* on November 24, 1917, and after its translation in the *Manchester Guardian* (March 6, 1917).

In his discussion of British interests in Palestine, he called the reader's attention to the fact that this chapter was written before the publication of the Balfour Declaration and the official adoption of the principle of Zionism. He went on to mention the commercial and military interests of the British Empire in the Turkish provinces explaining that its military interests were "dictated mainly by the defence of Egypt and India," while its political ones included "such a settlement of the provinces adjacent to Egypt and India as will secure their future and make our military burdens as light as possible."²³

(21) Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 293 (Italics mine).

(22) Sidebotham, *England and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 173.

By adjacent provinces he meant Palestine and Iraq. He then brought up the ancient connection between Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia and said it would be revived on the following basis:

"Mesopotamia was the cradle of the Jewish people and the place of its exile in the captivity. From Egypt came Moses, the founder of the Jewish State. The wheel of destiny will have come full circle round if at the end of this war the extinction of the Turkish Empire in Mesopotamia and the need of securing a more defensible frontier in Egypt were to lead to the re-establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine."²⁴

For Sidebotham the matter was one of determining "how far is the ideal of a Jewish State in Palestine consistent with the interests of the British Empire" or "what these British interests are . . . and . . . if they are . . . consistent with the creation of a Jewish State [in Palestine]." "This procedure," he explained, "will ensure us against the undue influence of considerations that may be under the suspicion of being sentimental." He declared that "the most uncompromising *Real-Politik* will not leave out of account the emotions and ideals which are the most potent springs of human action" and went on to state that the latter must have their place in any calculations of British policy. He divided his subject into the three following categories:

- (1) The defence of Egypt,
- (2) the settlement and defence of the district east of the River Jordan, and
- (3) the military and commercial frontiers of Palestine towards the north."²⁵

Speaking of Egypt, he said:

"Egypt is our master interest in the East. And to say that, is to say that Palestine is our master interest; for Palestine, now as always, is the key to Egypt."²⁶

To defend Egypt, the "Student of War" rejects the German doctrine that the best "defence is in offense" and suggests instead the Indian solution, referring to the application of the British military system in Indian to the Near East. His argument went as follows:

"Two advantages have prevented the Indian Empire from being a military burden proportionate to its size. The one is its incomparable natural frontier. The other is the system of buffer-states on the one frontier of India, the North West, which is exposed to attack. Of these buffers the more important is, of course, Afghanistan . . . Clearly, then, on the Indian analogy what we would seem to require for the better and less burdensome defence of Egypt is a State to do for this frontier what Afghanistan has done for India."²⁷

Later in the chapter, Sidebotham examined whether "the geography and the history of Palestine throw any fresh light on the policy that would be best in the interests of Great Britain." He explained that if his argument for the creation of a buffer-state in Palestine holds, it would be important that he ascertain "what general principles should govern the drawing of the new frontier." Basing his

(24) *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174.

(25) *Ibid.*, pp. 174-175.

(26) *Ibid.*, p. 175.

(27) *Ibid.*, pp. 182-183.

ideas on George Adam Smith's information, he pointed out that Palestine, on the side of Egypt, had three strongly marked natural divisions: The Maritime Plain, the Shephelah or Downs overlooking this plain from the east, and the Plateau of Judaea. He then mentioned the "one principal fault of the present frontier of Egypt" which, "in assigning Gaza to Palestine, gives to the Turks the most famous bridge-head in history."²⁸ On the north side of the Vale of Ajalon where Samaria begins, Sidebotham discovered the other end of the bridge and argued that if the Jews never gained access to the sea, it was because the Philistines possessed the Maritime Plain.

He further argued that a new Jewish state in Palestine "would begin with two immense advantages which history denied to the old order. It would have access to the sea and the firm friendship of Egypt." Although he declared that the interest of Egypt in Palestine, from the point of view of strategic defence, ends in Judaea, he saw no future for the colony as long as it remained restricted to the Maritime Plain, the Shephelah and Judaea. He felt compelled to go beyond the idea of Egyptian defence "in order to raise a vigorous self-supporting colony capable of rendering real help to Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean."²⁹ Concluding this part of the argument, he pointed out that "to rest content with securing the military safety of Egypt would, so far as the Jews are concerned, be to perpetuate the tragedy of the separation of Israel and Judah. It would be to use the Jewish national spirit selfishly for our own ends, and to make the Jews no adequate return for their services to Egyptian defence."

To him, the problem was how to form a state worthy of the Jewish people. He devoted, in this respect, special attention to the issue of the frontiers, pointing to what he called "the tragedy of the history of the Kingdom of Israel" which is "the gradual contraction of her frontiers on the north under the growing pressure of Syria." Not only did he justify the inclusion of Galilee in the Jewish state and the British Colony, but he went even further by saying that it was an "indispensable" part of it. As to the natural frontier of Galilee, it consisted of the Lebanon range. Sidebotham explained that "its delimitation towards the sea and the question of how much of the Phoenician plain should be assigned to it is a question of detail rather than of political or military principle."³⁰ On the other hand, he argued that "extension, commercial if not political, in the direction of Damascus is most important . . . A Galilee in possession of Damascus would soon be the main channel of trade between the Persian Gulf provinces and the Mediterranean." In addition, he considered the railway project between Haifa and the Arabian Gulf as a British substitute for the German Berlin-Baghdad railway project. That is why, he explained, Palestine is so deeply concerned about Damascus. Speaking of the delimitation of the eastern frontier of Palestine, he argued that it was no less important than that of the north. The Hebrews themselves, he went

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 187.

(29) *Ibid.*, p. 188.

(30) *Ibid.*, pp. 191-192.

on, entered the land of Canaan from the southeast "after their long journey in the wilderness of Sinai." But the new Palestine cannot be satisfied with the land of Gilead alone; it wishes to possess as much as possible of the country situated between the Jordan River and the desert of Eastern Syria. It is possible that the future Jewish State might find consolation for Damascus, "should this city be beyond its attainment," by possessing Hauran and its surrounding area. Speaking of the country east of Jordan, Sidebotham said, "It is impossible to exaggerate its importance to the future Jewish State" since "through it runs the railway from Damascus to the Gulf of Akabah used for the pilgrimage to Mecca." Whatever changes should take place in this area, one should "preserve complete freedom of commercial access between Palestine across the desert towards Mesopotamia."⁸¹ Consequently, he argued, it is impossible to leave it under foreign domination!

Sidebotham has thus presented his argument for the creation of a Jewish State in the light of the conditions which, in his opinion, would guarantee the success of the plan. In sketching the frontiers of that state, he pointed out to us, as he had done to the British leaders then, how the old Jewish State encountered political and military failure. The solution which the military correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* called for, was the establishment of a Jewish State under the auspices of the British Crown.

(31) *Ibid.*, p. 198.

PALESTINE AND THE JEWISH FUTURE

In the previous chapters we have examined Sidebotham's argument for the establishment of a Jewish state under the British Crown. As soon as the news of the article reached Weizmann through Sacher, the former asked Sidebotham, by way of Simon Marks and Israel Sieff, to expand the argument of his article in the form of a Memorandum which would be presented to the Foreign Office.¹ Sidebotham wrote the Memorandum which ran to some 8000 words and thus became one of the most important contributors to the Manchester Zionist projects for Palestine. He considered himself as well as the triad Marks-Sieff-Sacher to be "eighteen months ahead of the march of events."² Their enthusiasm for the question reached such a degree that they formed a Committee—modelled upon the Balkan Committee which could always "command attention for its views." They called it the "British Palestine Committee" and established its headquarters in Manchester, while Sidebotham was asked to draft the circular inviting famous men to subscribe to their principles and join them in their action.

After several hundred circulars had been sent out to men famous in politics, letters, and learning, Sidebotham admitted that no more than ten replies were received by the Committee of which half were "purely formal acknowledgements" while two were opposed to them. Then came Sir George Adam Smith's reply which, to the great disappointment of the members, condemned the idea of making a nation of Palestine arguing that "Palestine never had been and never would be a nation."³

Yet, the British Palestine Committee refused to acknowledge its defeat and resorted to the adoption of a different method, rather than the direct frontal attack. It decided to publish a weekly journal of its own, *Palestine*.⁴ The first issue appeared on January 26, 1917. During its early period, the journal was edited by Harry Sacher while Sidebotham was in charge of keeping "our propaganda in due relation to the events of the war" and of strengthening "the liaison between British interests, both military and political, and the new Zionist movement."⁵ The slogan adopted by the Committee and published in every issue of *Palestine* summarized its policy and ran as follows:

"Seeks to reset the ancient glories of the Jewish nation in the freedom of a new British Dominion in Palestine."⁶

(1) Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 40.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 42.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 43.

(5) *Ibid.*

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 50.

The Committee sent some 400 to 500 copies to politicians, civil servants, leading journalists, known friends, and prominent enemies. In spite of its members being all Zionists with the exception of Sidebotham, the latter confessed that he was "the most copious and regular contributor to the paper" during the war. There is no doubt that Weizmann and his circle realized that the Committee was approaching the question from a purely British point of view. In fact, the Committee was trying to influence the government officials and convince them that Great Britain "ought to back the Zionists in her own interests." The Committee was unable, though, to realize its aim of being merely "the nucleus of a larger organization, most of whose members would not be Jews." Stein wants us to believe that the paper, *Palestine*, was not under direct control of the Zionist leaders and that "the freedom which its writers allowed themselves caused Weizmann and Sokolow some embarrassment," since the British officials had warned the two leaders at the beginning of 1917 to the effect that "over-zealous advocacy of a British protectorate in Palestine might defeat its own purpose by hardening French opposition." In addition, Sir Mark Sykes could not but express his objections to the "indiscretions in an article discussing the future boundaries of Palestine."⁷

Despite the fact that the articles published in the paper were unsigned, the initiated knew that among its regular contributors were Sidebotham, Sacher, Hyamson and others. Those responsible for the paper soon realized that it had aroused the interest of the people who directed or influenced policy. The publication never aimed at a popular circulation; instead it was being read by the right people in the government.⁸ Stein confirms, in this respect, Sidebotham's statement that the British War Office took the paper seriously, that it was regularly read there as well as in newspaper offices and in other influential quarters.⁹ The Committee later included such personalities as Lord Robert Cecil and the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore and, according to reliable sources, paid the closest attention to the boundary problem throughout the period from 1917 to 1921. It was also joined by important members of the British House of Commons while the main contributor in the *Palestine* articles, Herbert Sidebotham, "enjoyed the status of *persona grata* with Lloyd George."¹⁰

Although Zionism succeeded in reaching the circles which it had chosen to reach, this does not mean that British public opinion remained unaffected. It simply means that Zionism was primarily interested in winning over the support of specific personalities selected among those who directed and influenced British policy. Great importance was attached to the part played by those friends in their endeavours to obtain a clear British attitude in favour of the demands of the Movement and readiness to adopt the aims which it propounded.

(7) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

(8) Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

(9) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

(10) Frischwasser-Ra'anana, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

If we adopt the view that the British Palestine Committee and its organ did not represent the official Zionist position and were not entitled to speak in its name, then it would be possible, or rather necessary to look for the official position and examine it with regard to the future which the Zionist Movement was preparing for Palestine. First, however, we must mention the secret agreements and treaties which the Allies made among themselves on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. We have chosen to follow the chronological order of events while dealing with these negotiations and agreements which were exposed by the Bolsheviks after the outbreak of the socialist October revolution and the downfall of the Czarist regime in Russia.

* * * *

We will start with the document which was sent by Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to both the British and French Ambassadors in St. Petersburg on March 4, 1915. In it, he expressed his government's desire to annex the following territories to its possession: "The city of Constantinople—with the west bank of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, the Dardanelles, Southern Turkey up to the Imoz-Media line, and the Plains of Asia Minor—situated between the Bosphorus until the Saciaria River with some centres on the Gulf of Izmir, and the islands of the Sea of Marmara as well as the Amiris and Tandrus Islands both situated near the entry of the Dardanelles, provided this does not prevent France and England from having rights over these territories."¹¹

Then came the answers of the British and French governments approving the terms of the memorandum on condition that a "successful rapid end of the war" takes place and provided Russia recognizes both countries' rights over and interests in the Dardanelles. It should be recalled, in this respect, that Herbert Samuel had circulated his memorandum among his colleagues in the British Cabinet while negotiations were being carried out among the Allies. Asquith's comments on this memorandum were recorded in his memoirs on March 13, 1915. It appears from it that the memorandum had been circulated a few days earlier when discussions had taken place about it in the Cabinet.¹² Two weeks after the presentation of Sazonov's memorandum, the Russians were informed about the Allies' views regarding the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Then, when Italy joined the Allies in the war, it took part in the current negotiations and expressed its demands over the areas which it wished to control. The secret London Treaty was thus signed on April 26, 1915, between Britain, France and Russia on the one hand, and Italy on the other. It guaranteed territorial compensations for Italy, provided the latter would enter the war on the side of the Allies within one month. Italy was promised, that when peace was signed, the way would be opened for the realisation of its irredentist policy which aimed at uniting all the

(11) Wajih Alamuddin, *The Treaties Related to the Arab Homeland, 1908-1922*, (Dar Al-Kitab Al-Jadid, Beirut, 1965), p. 13.

(12) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

Italian speaking areas as parts of the greater Italian homeland under the motto "unredeemed Italy" (*Italia irredenta*). It was also given assurances that it would be treated on a reciprocal basis in the division of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. The Allies immediately agreed to the Italian demands, with the certainty that Italy's entry into the war would bring about the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and would thus open the rear door of Germany for them.

As for Palestine, it had been openly and persistently claimed by France since the beginning of the war. Towards the end of November 1914, the Czar agreed, in principle, to the French demands at a meeting with the French Ambassador in Petersburg.¹³ However, the Russians expressed again their fears of a French domination over the Holy Places; these fears soon developed into an allied objection to French ambitions, while the French counted on Russian opposition to making of Palestine a "Protestant protectorate" under British domination. They declared that the maximum they would be prepared to agree on was the internationalization of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. It appears that Weizmann himself had suggested the internationalization of this specific area in January 1915, on the assumption that a Jewish State would be formed in the rest of Palestine.¹⁴ In the meantime, Kitchener succeeded in convincing the British government to reach an agreement guaranteeing the neutralization of Palestine and of the area situated south and west of the Haifa-Aqaba line. In *The Arab Awakening*, George Antonius relates that Kitchener "made frequent representations to Whitehall about the geographical importance of Southern Syria both as a bulwark to the Suez Canal and as an overland highway to the East."¹⁵ We have already mentioned the part played by Kitchener in the survey of the Sinai Peninsula which he carried out with Colonel Newcombe and members of the Royal Engineers. After the outbreak of the war he entered the Cabinet, and was thus given the opportunity to "press [his views] home with greater force." His views did, in fact, gain ground and in the spring of 1915, the Prime Minister appointed a Committee which was to "consider France's and Russia's claims to portions of the Ottoman Empire in the light of British interests."

In June 1915, the Committee reported that the French claim might be conceded "only in respect of Northern Syria, and that the southern part, roughly corresponding to Palestine, should be excluded from the area of French influence and reserved for special treatment."¹⁶ In Antonius' opinion, it is probable that it was "in pursuance of that recommendation, that Sir Henry McMahon was instructed, in his negotiations with the Sharif Husain, to reserve only the northern regions of Syria in favour of France, and not Palestine as well."¹⁷ Besides, in his chapter on "Diplomatic Partition 1914-16" of the Ottoman Empire, Frischwasser-Ra'anan mentions certain British documents relating to the contacts which Abdul-

(13) Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 63.

(15) George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, (Khayats, Beirut, 1938), pp. 246-247.

(16) *Ibid.*

(17) *Ibid.*

lah, son of the Sharif Husain, made in February 1914, six months before the outbreak of the war with Kitchener and his suggestions for an Anglo-Arab *entente* against the Turks.¹⁸ When Kitchener became War Minister, he issued orders to the effect of continuing such negotiations during the last week of September and approximately six months before Britain declared war on Turkey, in order to secure Arab support to Britain against Turkey, should the Turks join the German camp and the war against the Allies.

There is no need to discuss here the controversial views adopted by the two brothers, Abdullah and Faisal, and the attitude taken by each one of them on the eve of Turkey's decision to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. We will simply mention Faisal Bin Husain's conviction then about the danger of French and British ambitions in the Arab vilayets and the absence in Kitchener's offer of any guarantee against these dangers. We will record how Prince Abdullah linked, on his father's advice, in December 1914, the Hedjaz question and the liberation of the other Arab provinces to a secret straight forward alliance with Britain. George Antonius described Kitchener's message from a linguistic point of view and as it was understood by the Sharif Husain. He wrote:

"The terms of the message were studiously general, it is true; but in the form in which it reached 'Abdullah'¹⁹ it spoke of 'the Arab nation' and of the 'emancipation of the Arabs.' Whatever these phrases may have meant to the pre-occupied Kitchener when he used them, to the Sharif they conveyed an unmistakable invitation to foment a revolt of all the Arabs. In that sense did he read the letter addressed to his son in the name of Kitchener . . . and to that end, henceforth, did he direct his activities."²⁰

What is more important in the context of this study, is undoubtedly the attitude adopted by the independent Arabs *vis à vis* the members of "The Young Arabs"—with its headquarters in Damascus then—and the "Al-Ahd" society which was formed by Aziz Ali Al-Masri and which included the elite of Arab officers in the Ottoman army.

The members of these two associations had drawn up a plan of action in Damascus, while Faisal was in Constantinople. They drew up a protocol defining the conditions on which the Arab leaders would be prepared to enter the war to the side of Great Britain. It was known as the Damascus protocol and demanded the recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Arab countries lying within the following frontiers:

- North:* The line of Mersin-Adana to parallel 37°N. and thence along the line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (Ibn-'Umar)-Armadia to the Persian frontier;
- East:* The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;
- South:* The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was to be maintained);
- West:* The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin."²¹

(18) Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

(19) i.e. in an Arabic translation made at the British Agency in Cairo.

(20) Antonius, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-134.

(21) *Ibid.*, p. 157.

The protocol also provided for:

"The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to foreigners under the Capitulations.

"The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the future independent Arab state.

"The grant of economic preference to Great Britain."²²

In July 1915, the Sharif Husain resumed negotiations with Great Britain based on the text of the Damascus protocol, a copy of which had been given to him by Faisal to present to the British government, the conditions which, if accepted by the latter, would serve as the basis for a work in common. He inserted in it the document which the British High-Commissioner in Egypt had addressed to McMahon on July 14, 1915. In his answering note, dated August 30, 1915, McMahon wrote, "... as for the question of frontiers and boundaries, negotiations would appear to be premature and a waste of time on details at this stage, with the War in progress and the Turks in effective occupation of the greater part of those regions."²³

In his Second Note dated September 9, 1915, the Sharif Husain explained that he considered the frontiers question as "our essential clause" while he pointed out that he felt the note showed "obscurity ... lukewarmth and hesitancy." In addition, he declared that in drawing up their proposed delimitation, the Arabs "have not outstepped the bounds of the regions inhabited by their race."²⁴ In McMahon's Second Note dated October 24, 1915, we notice that the author of the note had clearly understood that the frontiers question was "important, vital and urgent." He immediately communicated to the British Government the purpose of Husain's note and conveyed to Husain on its behalf declarations about specific zones of influence in the required frontiers "which," he pursued, "I have no doubt, you will receive with satisfaction and acceptance."²⁵

However, the Sharif Husain was not prepared to accept the British offer. In his Third Note dated November 5, 1915, he declared his readiness "in order to facilitate agreement and serve the cause of Islam by the removal of possible sources of hardship and tribulation" to "no longer insist on the inclusion of the districts of Mersin and Adana in the Arab Kingdom" while insisting that "the vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut and their western maritime coasts, these are purely Arab provinces in which the Moslem is indistinguishable from the Christian, for they are both the descendants of one forefather."²⁶

McMahon answered him with his Third Note (December 13, 1915) saying, "I was glad to find that you consent to the exclusion of the vilayets of Mersin and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab countries. I have also received with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction your assurances that the Arabs are resolved on

(22) *Ibid.*, pp. 157-158.

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 416.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 417.

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 419.

(26) *Ibid.*, p. 421.

following the precepts of the Caliph . . . which guarantee equal rights and privilege to all creeds alike."²⁷

However, as Faisal had always feared, McMahon pursued, "As for the two vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut, the Government of Great Britain have fully understood your statement in that respect and noted it with the greatest care. But as the interests of their ally France are involved in those two provinces, the question calls for careful consideration. We shall communicate again with you on this subject, at the appropriate time."²⁸

On the first of January 1916, the Sharif explained in his Fourth Note to Sir Henry McMahon that "any concession designed to give France or any other Power possession of a single square foot of territory in those parts is quite out of the question," and reminded him that he would adhere to what they had resolved two years before and had communicated to Storrs.

What is worth mentioning in this respect is that this note referred to the Sharif's readiness to feel "bound to steer clear of that which might have impaired the alliance between Great Britain and France and their concord during the calamities of the present war" while the Sharif would, on the other hand, claim from Great Britain "Bairut and its coastal regions" at the earliest opportunity after the conclusion of the war.²⁹

One month later, Husain received McMahon's Fourth Note in reply to his note of January 1, expressing "his great pleasure and satisfaction" at the receipt of the note.

Later on, the Sharif Husain and McMahon exchanged two notes, the last of which was written by McMahon on March 10, 1916. They did not mention either the frontiers or the areas. In spite of McMahon's groundless excuses—which he used as a pretext to avoid entering into details and clarifying the nature of the agreements previously concluded with Kitchener, in relation to the independence of the Arabs and the recognition by Britain of the Arab Caliphate—the cunning, hesitancy and postponement, in his notes to Sharif Husain, together with the determination not to give a clear-cut answer in the midst of the exaggerated praise and glorifying titles, could not obliterate the landmarks of the "reality and truth" with respect to the frontiers of the area of Arab independence. What concerns us, in the first place, is that the texts of the correspondence which the two men exchanged mention neither Palestine nor that part of Syria which was known "in Ottoman administrative parlance," as the Sanjaz of Jerusalem, and which later became part of Palestine as defined by the British Mandate. Also, as pointed out by Antonius, McMahon was "at pains throughout his correspondence to enumerate by name each of the provinces affected by his reservations,"³⁰ i.e. those parts of Syria which are adjacent to the coastal areas of the northern side of the country alone, while he excluded Palestine from the area of Arab indepen-

(27) *Ibid.*, p. 423.

(28) *Ibid.*

(29) *Ibid.*, p. 425.

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 177.

dence. And the argument which Churchill developed in 1922 using the excuse of the "tacit exclusion," is untenable in spite of the linguistic acrobatics and the play on words *vis à vis* the irrefutable truth which the texts of the correspondence reveal to us. It would be sufficient to recall what George Antonius has recorded in this respect, namely that "although they were repeatedly pressed to issue an authoritative English version, successive British governments have refused to publish the full text, on the plea that it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose it."³¹ In fact, the terms of the correspondence were known all over the Arab world. The Sharif himself had officially published extracts from it in Mecca while "several of the notes have appeared *verbatim* and in full in Arabic books and newspapers." The Arab historian, George Antonius, was able to collate the available versions of the McMahon Notes and draw up the full and final text. By the time he had done so, it became apparent to him that the "British Government's interpretation of the meaning and scope of their own pledges was inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the texts."³²

* * * *

Following the negotiations which had been going on among them for one year, the three Allies, Russia, France and Britain, succeeded in signing a new secret treaty on March 4, 1916, in St. Petersburg. The three states pledged to work hand in hand for the recovery and protection of the Arab countries and the formation of an independent Islamic government under the administration and control of the British. They also agreed to partition the Ottoman country into their respective spheres of influence. The French sphere included the following:

1. The Syrian coasts starting at the frontiers of Nakourah and passing through Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli and Latakia, to end in Isken-deron.
2. The whole of the coastal areas with Mount Lebanon the frontiers of which had been defined in an international agreement.
3. The Island of Erwad and its neighbouring areas, as well as the little islands situated on the sea coast.
4. The vilayet of Cilicia.³³

As for the British sphere of influence, it included the provinces of Iraq, the littoral extending from the Egyptian frontiers to Haifa and Acre where it joins the French zone of influence, together with the area extending from the Persian Gulf to the end of the Red Sea.

This treaty referred to the formation of Arab governments enjoying sovereignty and independence in those areas which were inhabited by Arabs so that an Arab state or a confederation of states would be formed between the British and French zones of influence in conformity with a private agreement between France

(31) *Ibid.*, p. 180.

(32) *Ibid.*

(33) Alamuddin, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

and England, provided the frontiers of such a state would be fixed at the conclusion of the treaty.³⁴ It also proclaimed the internationalization of Alexandretta while considering Palestine and its Holy Places outside the Turkish land with the aim of putting it under a specific administration to be determined later by the Allies.

It would be interesting to go back to McMahon's Fifth Note to the Sharif Husain (March 10, 1916) to find out how the promises ensued, while secret agreements were carefully carried out to divide the country into zones of influence. The "essential clause" mentioned in the Sharif's Second Note (September 9, 1915) in which he openly declared that "the people of all those countries (i.e. the Arab countries) . . . are awaiting the result of the present negotiations, which depend solely upon whether you reject or admit the proposed frontiers"³⁵ while McMahon kept delaying this issue considering it, at times, as premature, and at others, giving the war situation as an excuse. Yet Britain was able amid the hardships of the war, a few weeks before the outbreak of the Hedjaz Revolt, to make the secret agreement which came to be known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement; it was concluded in the form of diplomatic notes exchanged between the British and the French governments on May 9 and 16, 1916, roughly one month before the Sharif Husain's revolt. It defined the shares of each of the two states and the distribution of their zones of influence. The future of the Arab provinces became subject to the text of the famous agreement which was concluded in London on May 16, 1916. It indicated the "blue, red, and brown" zones corresponding to the various spheres of influence. What is important for our purposes in this agreement, is the text of the third article:

"In the Brown area [Palestine] there shall be established an international administration of which the form will be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and after subsequent agreement with the other Allies and the representatives of the Sharif of Mecca."³⁶

According to this agreement, the brown area would extend from Al-Nakura to Gaza on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and from Gaza to the northern end of the Dead Sea where its frontiers would follow the banks of the Jordan River to meet the line extending from Al-Nakura eastwards to a point near the source of the Jordan. The fourth article stated that there shall be accorded to Great Britain the ports of Haifa and Acre while "Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her colonies and protectorates."³⁷ Britain was given the right to build and administer the railway which connected Haifa with Iraq provided she is the "sole owner." As for Article 11, it stated that "the negotiations with the Arabs concerning the frontiers of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be pursued through the same channel as heretofore in the name of the two Powers."³⁸

(34) *Ibid.*, p. 20.

(35) Antonius, *op. cit.*, p. 418.

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 429.

(37) *Ibid.*

(38) *Ibid.*, p. 430.

(Refer to Map No. 2 illustrating the Sykes-Picot Agreement at the end of this study).

A. *The Modest Demands*

Let us go back now to the official Zionist position, while seeking to examine the characteristics of the picture drawn by the Zionist circles for the future of what the Sykes-Picot Agreement designated as "the brown area" or the area colored in brown, raising once more the question: How was the Zionist case presented to the British public opinion and politicians during the months which preceded the issuance of the Balfour Declaration?

In February 1916, the West London Zionist Association published a collection of articles in a book entitled: *Zionism: Problems and Views*.³⁹ The introduction, written by Max Nordau, consisted of a brief exposé of the Zionist case "this is the case for Zionism," in which he declared that "there is nothing vague or hazy about the tenets of Zionism." Stating them clearly, he wrote, "The Jews form not merely a religious community but also a nation . . . the large majority of Jews, chiefly in Eastern Europe, desire ardently to preserve their Jewish national identity. Zionism has no meaning for Jews who favour the melting-pot theory. It is the ideal of those who feel themselves to belong to a Jewish nation." In his well-known style, Nordau drew the picture of the Zionist hope for the development of Jewish characteristics and the realisation of their hereditary notions of morals, justice and brotherhood. He explained, "To escape the blighting influence of hatred and persecution, they must be redeemed from their Dispersion, be gathered together, and settle in a country of their own, where they may live a natural life as tillers of the soil." He considered Palestine as the only country "answering this purpose." It is, he wrote, "the historic home of their forefathers, which for nearly two thousand years has never ceased to be the object of their yearning."⁴⁰ He also warned that Zionism "does not pretend to lead back to the Holy Land of their ancestors all the Jews of the globe," but "only those will set out for the East who feel that there and nowhere else has life moral and material satisfaction and happiness in store for them." It seems that Max Nordau during his Spanish exile, had continuously repeated the ideas which we have already encountered throughout his writing between 1898 and 1908. He took the opportunity in the introduction to this book to reassure the reader with the statement: "Zionism has not the ambition of founding an independent Jewish State, be it a kingdom or a republic." He indicated that "all it [i.e. Zionism] desires is that its adherents should be allowed to immigrate without any restraint into Palestine, to buy there as much land as they can obtain for their money, to enjoy autonomy of local administration, and not to be hampered in their earnest efforts to create culture and prosperity."⁴¹

(39) Paul Goodman and Arthur D. Lewis (ed.), *Zionism: Problems and Views*, (T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., London, 1916).

(40) *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

(41) *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Finally, he concluded his introduction with the following remark: "Whoever wishes for a future for Judaism and believes in it must realize that nothing can ensure it but Zionism."

Then comes the editors' preface in which Goodman and Lewis admitted that the articles included in the book appealed to the realisation of the idea of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. History, they explained, will give a chance, either by political action or by the growth of Jewish interests, for the idea to become "an accomplished fact."⁴² What is worth noting is the paragraph in which the editors speak of the appeal of Zionism as not being made to Jews only, arguing that Zionism had "found a welcome among non-Jewish statesmen and publicists." He then pursued: "England particularly has been sympathetic towards the Zionist idea and in 1903, when there was no possibility of English assistance in Palestine, an eminently practical empire-builder, the late Mr. Chamberlain, offered to the Zionist organisation a part of British East Africa for an autonomous Jewish settlement." Among the contributors to this book we find Nahum Sokolow who dedicated his article to Herzl's activities and services to the Zionist Movement. Sokolow considered Herzl as the father of modern Zionism. He wrote, "Herzl did everything. He created a Jewish platform, the Congress . . . and founded financial instruments . . . The whole world became the theatre of his activity, leading him to create a centre in the future."⁴³ Then, Sokolow went to the discovery of the elements of Herzl's enthusiasm and explained:

"There is the springing forth of a noble self-consciousness . . . which flows from the remembrance of a great past . . . the power of the protest against thousands of years of injustice. Such is the intoxication of liberty . . . occupied with these tasks, the energies rise so much that, once cowardice and mental subservience are overcome, all that seemed insurmountable to the soul is as nothing. That is the intoxication of heroism . . . Then one becomes a part of a whole, united by the feeling of a people, bound together through an organization, together in pain and joy; egoism flees, the man is lost in the many, the many are as one."⁴⁴

The book also includes a memorial address on David Wolffsohn by the Chief Rabbi Joseph Herman Hertz, and a poem from Bialik entitled "Surely the People is Grass," as well as Ahad-Ha-am's "A Spiritual Centre" in which the author insisted on demonstrating that in Palestine the Jews were to create "a spiritual center of our nationality." Herbert Bentwich undertook to examine the connection between England and the Jewish National Movement, declaring that England is "the appropriate home" of Zionism, if not its birthplace. Louis D. Brandeis' article on "Zionism and the American Jews" was taken from "The Jewish Problem: How to Solve It," by the same author. Dr. Harry Friedenwald, President of the Federation of American Zionists, wrote an article on "The Unity of Israel," while Joseph Cowen, President of the English Zionist Federation and Governor of the Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd., wrote "Theodor Herzl: Reminiscences." Albert Hyamson, the Treasurer of the Palestine Society of London gave his impressions

(42) *Ibid.*, p. 9.

(43) *Ibid.*, p. 24.

(44) *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

and feelings about his visit in "The New Palestine." He pointed out that "in Palestine to be Jewish is to conform to the general rule; not to be Jewish is to be an exception [although] only one seventh of the population of Palestine is as yet Jewish, but," he further explained, "because the general atmosphere, the general feeling, is Jewish . . . the Jews settled there are alive with the consciousness that they are the people of the land."⁴⁵

Rabbi Morris Joseph, Senior Minister of the West London Synagogue of British Jews analysed in his article, "Israel a Nation," the contents of the word "Israel." He indicated that the word "implies not a race only, not a spiritual ideal only, but the two combined—a race animated by a spiritual ideal."⁴⁶ He further argued that "nationality does not necessarily postulate a political consciousness." "A nation," he wrote, "can exist even though it has lost its independence and all desire for it." He then referred to an article published in *The Times* five years before, in which the author admitted that "a nation is indefinable; but," he had said, "you can see it. Some instinct makes you recognise it." The author of the article who was none other than Arthur James Balfour, was inspired to write it by a meeting of an influential society which aimed at fostering among the Welsh an enthusiasm for their ancient culture. It seems that Balfour expressed then his approval of the romantic movement which "gives to those who take part in it, 'a deep and passionate interest in the past, and to which they owe their interest in folk-songs, in folklore, in the old literature, in the old laws.'"⁴⁷ Speaking of him, Morris Joseph said: "With the clearness of vision which marks the true statesman, he could see, not only the *possibility* of a double nationality, but *the advantage that may rebound from it for the State.*" The Jewish culture, he pursued, and its revival enrich England while "to give ourselves more earnestly to Jewish culture . . . is . . . *to show ourselves capable of the very highest patriotism.*"

Samuel Landman, joint editor of *The Zionist*, wrote on "The Jewish Colonies in Palestine." He explained that the "Land of Promise" began to be the land of fulfilment. On the other hand, Rabbi S. Levy undertook to show the interplay between Zionism and liberal Judaism. He considered that there are two tendencies in human nature: Conservatism and Liberalism. After analyzing these two tendencies from the point of view of the Jewish religion, he concluded his article by stating: "Liberal Judaism must therefore seek its sanction or justification and find its basis in the pursuit of a national Judaism . . . the international movement towards Liberal Judaism should in its own interest, and to advance its own cause, ally itself with the international movement towards Zionism, and so endeavour to provide a *milieu* for the free play of the forces of Conservative Judaism and Liberal Judaism, acting and reacting upon each other, without any peril to the preservation of the wider Judaism which embraces them both."⁴⁸

(45) *Ibid.*, p. 145.

(46) *Ibid.*, p. 152.

(47) *Ibid.*, p. 154.

(48) *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

Cyril M. Picciotto, barrister-at-law, examined the "Conceptions of the State and the Jewish Question" from the angle of the trend of political philosophy in recent years. He spoke about the organic collectivist theory of the state and compared it to that of the utilitarians. Considering that the organic doctrine is the marked tendency in modern states while "the growing force of nationality is its political expression," he went on to determine the Jewish stand in the future. He wrote: "Political thinkers of weight have before now dwelt upon the anomaly and the undesirability of an *imperium in imperio* . . . The Jew who is a Zionist has a definite political ideal, and must conceive himself as a member potentially of a State that has a latent existence."⁴⁹ He then tried to picture the situation of the Jewish people in the future state as a choice between "absorption and exclusion." To him, there will not be any such conscious choice or any conscious invitation to choose, but the process will be "long-drawn-out and the result of the subtle and impalpable influences of a conception of nationality apparent now for some time past," of which the Jewish National Movement is in itself an expression.

The book also includes an article on "Zionism and Orthodoxy in America" written by the Rev. Rabbi Dr. D. de Sola Pool and one on "Zionism and the Future of Judaism" by the Rev. Rabbi M.H. Segal. In addition, the President of London University, Leon Simon, treated the subject of "Modern Hebrew Literature" while Maurice Solomons presented a study on "Zionism and Jewish Students in England" from a student's view. He was followed by a number of his colleagues in his endeavour to synthesize "Zionism and Judaism." The author of the book, *The Balfour Declaration*, Leonard Stein, wrote on "The Future of Zionism" from the point of view of its present situation, blaming the Zionist for not securing powerful support in influential quarters. "If the Jews need Palestine..." , he argued, "Palestine may be found to need the Jews" !

Among the articles which treated Zionism as "a practical object," we will mention that of the agricultural engineer, S. Tolkowsky, who apparently sent it from Jaffa. He examined in the article the number of people which Palestine can absorb, thus answering those who pretended that Palestine could not support the twelve to thirteen million Jews existing in the world. He insisted on demonstrating that "nobody has ever dreamt of a return of *all* the Jews of the whole world to Palestine" and pursued his argument stating: "Do all Britishers live in Great Britain? Or all Greeks and Italians in Greece and Italy? . . . Do we not see millions of Germans living in foreign countries and . . . maintaining the closest relationship with the Mother Country?" He then drew a connection between the exile of the Jews from Palestine and the poverty of the country. This argument was not strange to the minds of those who had taken part in the work of the "Palestine Exploration Fund." If today, he explained, Palestine has only about 700,000 inhabitants, the great geographer, Reclus, estimates that "in ancient times the population was six to seven times [greater]" while Conder went farther to estimate it to ten times greater. Tolkowsky went on to discuss the mineral wealth

(49) *Ibid.*, pp. 185-186.

of the Palestinian soil in asphalt, phosphates, coal, and petroleum, as well as that of the waters of the Dead Sea in terms of valuable chemicals: salts of potassium and bromine, and of the numerous rivers that keep in store enormous quantities of energy which might profitably be utilized for the production of electricity. Commercially speaking, he argued, Palestine owes its importance "as a link between the three continents (Europe, Asia, and Africa) [to] its situation between the Baghdad Railway and the Suez Canal, between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean."⁵⁰ He further indicated that "in the light of concrete facts" taken from Zionist experience in the country, "the principal arguments against the practical feasibility of the Zionist plans are theoretical book arguments," which are effectively contradicted by practical experience in Palestine." He denied that the Zionists, as believed by "ill-informed people" ask for the creation of an independent Jewish state and affirmed, "What we ask is the establishment, in Palestine, of an honest administration whose only object must be the development and progress of the country." The best example of the Zionists' "very modest demands" lies, he argued, in that "we do not ask for a Jewish but for a pro-Jewish administration, not for a Jewish but a pro-Jewish policy."⁵¹

If one is to go deeper into what Tolkowsky considered as "very modest demands," we would find that, on the practical level, these include the right of free immigration into the country in order that the number of Zionists becomes superior to that of the indigeneous population and thus, might in turn control the country. The relationship between Zionism and imperialism is obvious to Tolkowsky's reader, and his qualifying the Zionist demands as "very modest" as well as his denial of the real aims under the cover of terms like "pro-Jewish administration" and "pro-Jewish policy," are nothing but the reflection of an intelligent device used to remove suspicion from the Zionist real aims. They are almost meant to prepare the way for a British Protectorate and the realisation of "the modest demands" under its rule and support.

The next article is written by Weiner, lecturer in history at the University of London, on "Zionism and the Revival of Nationality in Europe." He explained that nationality and democracy are the two dominating factors of the world's history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Jewish nationalism, he argued, has never died in fact "in the long-drawn tragedy of the history of the Jews." He pursued, "For what is nationalism other than racial self-consciousness, than the pursuit of racial ideals? And what people has displayed this self-consciousness, this social idealism, in a more constant, insistent, and persistent form than the Jews?"⁵² In Weiner's opinion, what Jew from the dawn of his history and the first call of Abraham, has ever forgotten that "the fulfilment of the special functions entrusted to his people by Divine ordinance depends upon his retaining his distinct and peculiar racial qualities."⁵³

(50) *Ibid.*, p. 242.

(51) *Ibid.*, p. 243.

(52) *Ibid.*, pp. 249-250.

(53) *Ibid.*, p. 250.

In his article on "Two Dreamers of the Ghetto," Israel Zangwill undertook to compare Theodor Herzl, author of *The Jewish State*, with Theodor Hertzka, author of the utopian play *Freiland*. He pointed out that Herzl had narrowed "to Judaea what Hertzka meant for mankind," and concluded his article by stating, "There is no longer among Zionists a question of emigration *en masse* to Palestine—or anywhere else. But if the Jewish Will-to-Live now bids fair to surmount the most dangerous crisis in all the long Jewish story, it is largely because of the life and death of Theodor Herzl."

If we were to consider the book as a whole, we would find that the articles of the two editors offer that best example of the problems and views of Zionism. In his article "The Jew A Nation," Arthur Lewis, Hon. Secretary of the West London Zionist Association, treated the subject from the angle of the race element itself. He considered that Zionism belonged to the collectivist religions: "Common racial descent," he wrote, "instinct due to heredity, will necessarily lead to a specifically Jewish attitude towards the world whether we will or not." He agreed to the need for change and life in Judaism. Yet he argued that "reform must not be reasonable and negative, but positive and creative." That is why, he explained, the Zionist idea is "the one creative idea, capable of uniting Jews." To him, the essence of the Jewish religion is the idea "that God chose Israel for a great purpose, and that God will yet in the future send the Great King whose help will enable us to carry out our work for the world." On the other hand, and from the angle of the Jewish mission with regard to peace, he declared, "we believe in violence as a source of good and shock and danger as a source of fellowship . . . Force must be allied with faith in the right."⁵⁴

Paul Goodman's article on "The Spirit of Zionism" is a sort of repetition of the ideas which we have already encountered in our study of Herzl and Max Nordau. He spoke of the "demands for emancipation" and explained that political equality has not been for the Jewish community as such, but for Jews as individuals, while Zionism insists on the Jewish race and Herzl, in his declaration at the opening of the first Congress had said, "Zionism was to be a return of the Jews to the Jewish people, even before their return to the Jewish land."

When Goodman proceeded to discuss the Zionist colonization in Palestine, he expressed that the colonists obeyed feelings of justice and morals alone. They never asked for the aid of the Ottoman authorities in their internal discussions and did not call the Turkish police to keep order. "There are no Jewish criminals" he added, "this is no ordinary work of colonization . . . for Judaism comprises . . . a view of life, a *Weltanschauung*."⁵⁵

The book *Zionism: Problems and Views* thus consists of a series of articles giving a complete picture of the Zionist leaders themselves at the beginning of 1916. It appears from the arguments and theories which were developed in the articles of this book, that the problem of winning over the support of the British

(54) *Ibid.*, pp. 264-265.

(55) *Ibid.*, pp. 277-279.

and American Jews and their rallying to Zionism was of prime importance. Also, the repeated discussion on the Jewish nation, from the point of view of the Jewish race and the presentation of Liberal Judaism as external to the group and working for the destruction of Zionism, has in it Zionist political considerations. One should not forget that an eminent British Jewish scholar like Lucien Wolf was an extreme opponent of Zionism. In the early part of 1916, he presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Foreign Office "pointing out the dangers of Jewish nationalism."⁵⁶ One should not overlook either the strong opposition to Zionism by the Assimilationists among the British Jews. According to Sykes, these "were never organised into a coherent group and so they never realised their strength."⁵⁷ Since the middle of 1915, the Zionists succeeded, through Weizmann and Sokolow, in entering into negotiations and discussions with the British leaders via the "Con-joint Foreign Committee" which formed since 1878, the representative body of the main organizations of British Jews, namely: the Anglo-Jewish Association, and the Board of Deputies of British Jews. However, the negotiations achieved no results then. From this angle, we can look into the efforts which the articles of the book displayed in order to convince the British Jews to rally themselves to the Jewish race and face them with the alternative of either adopting Zionism or else appearing as working for the destruction of Judaism from within and shaking its collective and racial base, that is its nationality. This is no less than accusing those who refute the Zionist view of Judaism of being heretics and of conspiring against the safety of the Jewish religion. Also, some of the articles which we have gone through, tried to present the Zionist idea as broadminded, open to both the Orthodox and atheist Jews. In conclusion, this book is no more than an attempt at attracting the Jews to Zionism and intimidating its opponents by threatening them with the consequences of their attitude which distinguishes between Zionism as a political movement and Judaism as a uniting universal religion.

B. *The Frontiers of the Future*

The official Zionist position as presented by Weizmann to the British politicians then was also expressed in a book entitled *Zionism and the Jewish Future* which, according to Stein, was primarily meant for "the enlightenment of the general reader" while it was at the same time a challenge to the anti-Zionist Jews.⁵⁸ It was considered by him as "skillfully planned as a serious and authoritative statement of the Zionist case." Sacher prefaced it with the following statement: "The publication of this volume was suggested by the heads of the Zionist movement, although the responsibility for it rests entirely with the editor and those who have collaborated with him in the production of the book. The project of a volume to set before English-speaking readers the meaning and achievements of Zionism

(56) Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

(57) *Ibid.*, pp. 211-212.

(58) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

could not have been realized but for Dr Weizmann ..."⁵⁹ In *Trial and Error*, Weizmann described the circumstances which surrounded the publication of the book. He wrote:

"Early in the spring of 1916 I called together the Manchester Zionists in a little room on Cheetham Hill and put the situation before them. I told them of my talks with Edmond de Rothschild, with Achad Ha-am, with Robert Samuel and, above all, with the British statesmen. With the support of the Manchester Zionists I went to London, and there talked with Joseph Cowen, the chairman of the English Zionist Federation. We decided, as a first step, to publish a little book on Zionism. For, apart from a few pamphlets, mostly out of date, and some reports of the Congresses, there was nothing that could be put into the hands of British statesmen."⁶⁰

In his discussion of *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, Stein finds that Weizmann and Gaster have, in their articles, "Zionism and the Jewish Problem" and "Judaism as a National Religion," successively expressed themselves "in language not calculated to narrow the gulf between the Zionists and their opponents in the Anglo-Jewish community." The anti-Zionists were in fact deeply offended by Weizmann's assertion that "the position of the emancipated Jew, though he does not realise it himself, is even more tragic than that of his oppressed brother,"⁶¹ and by Rabbi Gaster's remark that "the claim to be Englishmen of the Jewish persuasion—that is, English by nationality and Jewish by faith—is an absolute self-delusion."⁶²

Among the other contributors to this book, we will mention Harry Sacher and Albert Hyamson who distinguished anti-Semitism, the prejudice against the Jewish race, from anti-Judaism considering the first one as an essentially modern phenomenon whereas anti-Judaism is "as old as the Diaspora."

However, what is most closely connected with our study is undoubtedly the chapter entitled "A Note on the Boundaries of Palestine" which was added to the articles of the volume before Sokolow's decision to draw a sketch of the new Jew. The editors of the book supplemented it with a map of Palestine extending from Beirut to the Gulf of Aqaba (see Map No. 3 at the end of this study). One may notice that the discussion of the boundaries of Palestine is unsigned. Is it the work of Herbert Sidebotham or that of Tolkowsky? Perhaps it is the result of a general discussion at the Manchester Zionist School conducted by Weizmann, Sacher, Sidebotham, Hyamson and others. However, the anonymous character of the article and the aim behind the book, in addition to the official pronouncement of the project, might support the argument that the issue of the future boundaries aroused the interest of the Zionists there and that they persistently endeavoured to attract the attention of the British statesman and public opinion towards this same issue.

What is worth mentioning in this respect is that the author of "A Note on the Boundaries" opened his discussion with an examination of the various definitions of the boundaries of ancient Palestine. He indicated that he wished to speak

(59) Harry Sacher (ed.), *Zionism and the Jewish Future* (John Murray, London, 1916).

(60) Weizmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183.

(61) Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300.

(62) *Ibid.*, p. 300.

of the boundaries of a "Palestine of the future" or Palestine "as it would be should those who hold its immediate destinies in their hands give their consent to the re-establishment of Jewish national life in the country"! It is interesting to note that the author kept repeating his argument that "the territory needed for this purpose is of modest extent," that it includes certain points which are "indispensable for the economic development of the country," which reminds us of Tol-kowsky's article in the book previously discussed, *Zionism: Problems and Views*. In defining the boundaries, the author took into consideration the important part which Palestine could play as a "land-bridge" between Asia, Africa and Europe. Those who insisted on the inclusion of areas outside the Dan-Beersheba limit were unable to explain the reasons which led them to do so. They simply declared: "This is not the place to explain in detail the reasons for the conclusion" because, it was argued, many factors are too technical for the general reader's understanding. But, had they forgotten that their book was destined to the British statesman and mainly meant for the enlightenment of the general reader? Or did they prefer not to enter into the details for fear of being exposed and falling into the trap leading to an open struggle with the British officials? The second alternative is more likely since we know a lot about the warning addressed to the British officials then and at the beginning of the following year (1917) about the possible short-coming of their exaggerated enthusiasm over the question of the British Protectorate in Palestine which might lead to a hardening of the French position. We also know that Mark Sykes informed Weizmann and Sokolow of his disapproval of their foolishness in looking into the boundaries of a future Palestine. It is obvious that these factors played their part in making the Zionists decide to use caution in their discussion of the question of the frontiers, which they did also for fear of throwing Britain into a critical situation *vis à vis* its Allies. That is why they tried to refrain from referring to what could create serious problems, in spite of the fact that the newspaper *Palestine* went to extremes when it published unsigned articles on the subject.

Before reproducing the text of "A Note on the Boundaries of Palestine" we will mention the following appraisal of the part played by the two books under discussion. It was written by Paul Goodman in 1942 in a book entitled *The Jewish National Home*, which was published to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. He stated:

"If there was any doubt as to the extent of pro-Zionist feeling that had been developing in the Anglo-Jewish community under the impact of events, this was manifested by two separate but simultaneous publications in the crucial period of 1916, when public opinion was being formed."⁶³ By the two publications, Goodman meant *Zionism and the Jewish Future* which was edited by Harry Sacher with the cooperation of Leon Simon and Albert Hyamson, and *Zionism: Problems and Views* with an introduction by Max Nordau which was edited by Arthur Lewis and

(63) Paul Goodman, *The Jewish National Home* (London, 1943), pp. 18-19.

himself. He further indicated that the two books "rallied to the Zionist standpoint the spiritual and a considerable number of the intellectual leaders of Anglo-Jewry."⁶⁴

A NOTE ON THE BOUNDARIES OF PALESTINE

Every work on Palestine has its own definition of the boundaries of the country. The reason lies in the diverse tendencies and special points of view of the authors, who reach very different conclusions according as the object of their works is religious, scientific or political, and according as they base themselves on biblical texts or on data furnished by tradition, history, or geography.

The discrepancies between the different definitions are considerable. The first Book of Kings (iv. 21) and the second Book of Chronicles (ix. 26) tell us explicitly that in the period when the Jewish kingdom was at the height of its power Solomon "reigned over all the kings from the river [the Euphrates] even unto the land of the Philistines, and to the border of Egypt." These kings paid him tribute, and they were subject to him so long as he lived. 1 Kings ix. 26 and 2 Chronicles viii. 17-18 relate how King Solomon, having finished building the Temple at Jerusalem, betook him to Ezion-Geber (Akaba), on the Red Sea, and there equipped a fleet which went to Ophir and returned laden with gold. But the twelve tribes of Israel, reunited under his sceptre, were only one people among a great number of others; and if the sovereignty of David and Solomon extended northwards as far as the Euphrates and southwards as far as Egypt and the Red Sea, it is none the less true that the Israelites themselves were in effective occupation only of the territory described in the first Book of Kings (iv. 25) as extending "from Dan to Beersheba."

The object of this note is not to take up the cudgels for one or other of the definitions of the limits of ancient Palestine which have been put forward. The boundaries of which we wish to speak are those of a Palestine of the future—of Palestine as it would be should those who hold its immediate destinies

(64) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

in their hands give their consent to the re-establishment of Jewish national life in the country.

The territory needed for this purpose is of modest extent. It includes roughly what was in biblical times the heritage of the twelve tribes of Israel, extended by a certain tract of territory, which is inconsiderable in area, but contains some points that are indispensable for the economic development of the country and for the fulfilment of the important rôle which Palestine could play as a "land-bridge." For Palestine ought to serve from the economic point of view as a link between Asia and Africa.

So far as the western boundary is concerned, there is no room for discussion: the Mediterranean coast is the frontier. In what follows, therefore, we shall deal only with the boundaries on the north, the east, and the south.

The northern border of the ancient territory of the twelve tribes runs from the coast, a little north of Saida (Sidon), almost in a straight line to the point where the *Wadi-Luwa* falls into the lake or morass of *Matkh Burak*, south-south-east of Damascus. The eastern border runs from this spot first along the *Wadi-Luwa*; then it describes a wide curve, skirting on the east the mountainous region of *El-Leja* (the ancient *Trachonitis*) to a point 32°30'N. Thence it turns south-westward as far as the most easterly reach of the river Jabbok, from there due south as far as the river Arnon, then westward along this river to the Dead Sea, which itself forms the boundary as far as its southern extremity.

The southern border runs due south from this end of the Dead Sea, up the valley of *Arabab* to about 30°30'N; thence it turns westward as far as the *Wadi-el-Arish* and then follows this *wadi* to the sea.

Such were approximately the boundaries of the ancient inheritance of the twelve tribes of Israel. In considering what are the important points which are indispensable for the economic development of the country in modern times, we have to remember that from the economic point of view the rôle of Palestine is that of a double bridge: on the one hand a bridge between the combined continents of Europe and Asia and the continent of Africa, on the other hand a bridge between the maritime basin of the Mediterranean and that of the Indian Ocean. As a bridge between two continents, Palestine ought to have railway and caravan routes; as a bridge between two maritime basins, it ought

to have outlets on both basins. With modern appliances it would be possible without great difficulty to construct excellent harbours at Jaffa and Haifa on the Mediterranean; while Akaba on the Red Sea where once King Solomon equipped his eastern fleet, is the natural outlet towards the Indian Ocean, and an outlet which belongs historically to Palestine. Akaba is, in fact, absolutely useless for anybody else, whereas for Palestine it is a vital necessity.

This is not the place to explain in detail the reasons for the conclusion, but a close investigation of all the factors, many of which are too technical for the general reader, suggests the following delimitation of the frontiers of Palestine:

On the north, the first five miles of the lower course of the *Nabr-el-Auwali*; thence a straight line to the south-east, skirting the southern extremity of the Lebanon and of Mount Hermon and running to a point situated at 36° E by 33°15'N; thence another straight line running south-south-east to Bosra (32°30'N); from this town the frontier would go southward, parallel with the railway and at a distance of ten to twenty miles to the east of it, as far as the depression of *El-Jafar*, which is twenty miles east of Ma'an; from this depression the frontier would turn to the south-west almost as far as Akaba. Finally, on the south the natural boundary is indicated by the existing Egyptian frontier, running north-westward, from a point on the Gulf of Akaba some miles south-west of the port of that name, to Rafah.

C. *The Capacity of Absorption*

Weizmann and his circle were not the only ones to inculcate, during the years which preceded the Balfour Declaration, British statesmen and officials with Zionist views about the future of Palestine and its "modest frontiers." Soon after the transfer of the official headquarters of the Organization to Copenhagen, capital of a neutral country, the main office of the Jewish National Fund was transferred from Cologne to The Hague. In September 1916, the Fund contributed to the knowledge of Palestine, its desired boundaries, settling possibilities and its capacity of absorption. It published, to this end, a magazine, *The Land of Israel (Eretz Israel)*, in German which contained information on its main office and on the activities it sponsored and financed.⁶⁵ It also included a short index of the books

(65) *Eretz Israel*, Mitteilungen des Haupthüros des jüdischen Nationalfonds, Heft 1. Den Haag, September 1916.

on Palestine and the Zionist colonization activities there. A map of the land of Israel was presented in the first issue, with all rights reserved to the Jewish National Fund. Looking into the contents of the first issue of this publication, we find an article on the actual colonization activity in Palestine (*Palästinaarbeit*) written by De Lieme, the Dutch economist and Zionist leader who was chairman of the National Fund between 1919 and 1921. We will first examine De Lieme's views before proceeding to present Kaplansky's theories and his estimation of Palestine's settling capacity.

De Lieme opened his article by indicating that the Jewish problem was unique in nature, (*sui generis*), and that it would thus be impossible to clarify it by comparing it with other national issues. The aim behind his article was to distinguish between the Zionist means on the one hand and the general colonization activity on the other. He took up the question of "emigration" to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Zionist character which, contrary to other colonists who seek to exploit the resources and the labor capacity in the interest of the mother country, has adopted the "agricultural colonization" trend. Here the author resorts to a comparison which he had acquired from his study of Buchenberger's *Agriculture and Agrarian Policy*.⁶⁶ He drew a distinction between the latter and the following colonization trends:

1. Colonization as commonly understood: It begins with the appropriation and occupation of a country, followed by the distribution of its land to the occupiers and the reclamation of its legacy. In addition, there is the establishment of permanent settlements, the issuance of a law, and the organization of local and general institutions.

2. Internal colonization in the modern sense of the term: It does not seek to conquer a land with no owner or to distribute it and exploit its economic wealth, but endeavours to establish independent centers for the peasants and the agriculturalists on inhabited and cultivated land and seeks through this to redistribute the land in order to utilize it in a better and more complete manner. The guiding principle would consist of the interest related to the social policy more than to production. Its aim is a better distribution of property.

However, these two trends do not completely fit in the case of the activities carried out by Zionists in Palestine. Zionist activity differs from imperialistic colonial policy in its effort to establish a homeland guaranteed by international law and under the Ottoman law, in conformity with the situation existing with the national and religious groups of that country.⁶⁷ The author took away from the colonial movements the shortcomings which he did not wish to attribute to Zionist colonization, knowing that emigration is the basic issue of the Jewish question. He sees the unique character he is looking for, first in saying that the Jewish people do not know emigration because they do not know immigration.

(62) A. Buchenberger, *Agrarwesen und Agrarpolitik*, 2. Aufla. 1. Bd. 1914.

(67) *Ibid.*, p. 10.

And their ignorance of emigration goes back to the fact that "they have always been wandering around the world for 2,000 years." That is why Zionism comes to put an end to this aspect, and one of the main objectives of the actual Zionist activity in Palestine becomes "giving the Jewish people a foothold."⁶⁸ He further argues that the waves of invading Jewish emigrants differ from the emigration of other people for it does not spring out of its unequal combination and does not base itself on the unnatural economic relations.

To speak of inequality requires the existence of a similar combination. However, "equality," in the author's opinion, does not apply to the situation of the Jews. The aim behind these comparisons and distinctions was to emphasize the exceptional condition of the Jewish people in exile and to reach the improper generalization that the radical solution to the Jewish question cannot be found in the liquidation of exile. Jewish society in Palestine was the logical means, protected by the history of the Jewish people, as the practical Zionist activity was one of the important means to achieve the desired end.

De Lieme went on to distinguish between the "Palestinian activity" and colonization in general. Zionist action in Palestine was not connected with the imperialist colonial policy in its old and modern sense, the policy which worked mainly to subdue other people to foreign domination; it rather took upon itself the mission of confirming that the essential distinctive factor was limited to the fact that Zionism was not trying to subdue and enslave another people and did not intend to exploit Palestine and its people for the benefit of a group external to Palestine. It coincided with the colonization aspect from the angle of its "establishing permanent settlements of a national character." However, it was not possible to speak here of "distributing land to the occupiers" as it would be possible in a situation where purchasing occurred for instance. This was nothing but an attempt at justifying the activities carried out by the Jewish National Fund in relation to the purchase of land, and then declaring it the real estate of the Jewish people.

With regard to the second trend of internal colonization, De Lieme drew a comparison between it and Zionist action in Palestine. However, he soon emphasized the difference in the positions of each one of them with regard to what was considered as a "consequence" or a "marginal issue." Internal colonization was mainly concerned with primary questions such as the cultivation of waste land or abandoned land and the doubling of production while it considered the distribution of land and property as a marginal or secondary issue. This did not appear to be in the interest of Zionist colonialism. However, this colonialism included elements common to all the previous colonization organizations.⁶⁹ But De Lieme did not wish to compare it because the Jewish people in exile and the dispersion in the various inhabited parts, as he states it, did not allow for a comparison between its colonizing miracle and its national one which was unique.

(68) *Ibid.*, p. 5.

(69) *Ibid.*, p. 11.

In spite of the foregoing, we find De Lieme asking every Jew to organize his way of life so that he will be ready to move to Palestine at the appropriate time. The actual occupation of Palestine could only take place through a process of slow and gradual penetration. De Lieme also examined the views expressed by Kautsky in his studies on agricultural relationships in ancient Palestine. It is known that Kautsky considered the ownership of large land properties and the existence of important fiefs and farms among the major reasons which led to the downfall and destruction of the Jewish state.⁷⁰ There are many common points between Kautsky's view in this respect and the opinions expressed in Franz Buhl's study on *The Social Relationships of the Israelites* in which the author undertook to consider the socio-economic condition in ancient Palestine. He indicated that the Hebrew prophets had raised the bedouin way of life to the highest level. De Lieme has attempted in this discussion to demonstrate that the Jews were not, by nature, incapable of implementing an agricultural economy, and that Palestine would give them the possibility of synthesizing agriculture, commerce and industry. Jewish colonization in Palestine must be based on agriculture, knowing that agricultural colonization allows for commercial development and industrial change. To him these three sectors are not necessarily exclusive. He then took as his basis, Karl Marx's description quoted in the first volume of *Das Kapital* concerning the evolution of agricultural colonization in the United States as well as the relationship between this colonization and industry. He ended by mentioning that Palestine would be the scene of both commercial and industrial evolution and that the foreign industries as well as the evolution of imperialist capitalism in Asia Minor would enable Palestine to occupy the same position as Holland when the industrial and commercial capital reached its peak.

The role to be played by the Jewish National Fund in the framework of agricultural colonization can be summed up in the three following steps:

1. Purchase of land
2. Cultivation and possession
3. Settlement

In his study, De Lieme considered another important question—that of the absentee landlord. This phenomenon greatly contributed to the impoverishment of the peasants and gave birth, in Northern Holland for instance, to a revolutionary workers movement. But the lack of sufficient Jewish agricultural workers in Palestine would delay the formation of the working class. The absence of the landlord as well as his domination over the great farms would lead to the following:

1. The consumption of the revenue of these Palestinian lands abroad.
2. A tendency to reduce the wage of the workers which made the utilization of the Arab workers indispensable and led to a decrease in the invested capitals.

(70) Kautsky, *Der Ursprung des Christentums*, p. 220.

3. In spite of the advantages derived from the employment of Arab workers, by the mere fact of counting on them they became a powerful economic factor forming an insurmountable obstacle which would delay the national evolution of Jewish colonization.

Thus, he chose to share Ussishkin's opinion in this respect and insisted on the importance of limiting oneself to employing Jewish labor and preventing the Arabs from working on land on which they had worked before. To him, the absence of Jewish labor would mean the absence of the foundation on which Jewish colonialist activity should rest. Then, in an attempt to justify the salaries and rewards granted to the Jewish workers, he praised the competence and the value of the latter's work arguing that he was more intelligent, more skilled and more active than the Arab workers and concluded by rebutting the opinion that the employment of Arab labour was more economical than and preferable to that of the new immigrants.

Turning to Kaplansky, we will look at his views in his article, "The Absorption Revolution in Palestine" to see the close link between the capacity of absorption and the frontiers of the future. From there, we will get to know the deep-rooted expansionist tendency which Zionism conceals and seeks to realize through every means. What increases the importance of Kaplansky's ideas is his adherence to the Zionist labor movement and his claim to reconcile socialism with Jewish colonialism.

Kaplansky began his argument by saying that the question of the capacity of absorption of Palestine was raised in Zionist circles at the time of the internal splitting between Territorialists and Palestinians. He then briefly examined the scientific opinions related to this question. He admitted that the well-known geographer, Professor Alfred Philippson, had evaluated the economic capacity of Palestine to roughly one and one quarter million inhabitants. He related that before the war, Levin had published a series of articles in the *Judische Welt* in which he had expressed his doubts about the possibilities of progress in Palestine. He pointed out that a thorough examination of the question of the capacity of absorption of the country should precede any organized large-scale colonization. He confessed that the socialist circles which advocated assimilation in the United States were keenly interested in the problem of the Arabs in Palestine. And these same assimilationists attacked the "Poale Zion" on the grounds that the resettlement of Jews in Palestine would lead to depriving the Arab peasants of their territories, chasing them away from their land and making Zionism a movement of conquest and invasion.

Kaplansky confirmed that the mere fact of discussing this issue makes the question "one of the preferred oppressive weapons" for the socialist assimilationist circles. He attributed their call to prohibiting Jewish emigration to Palestine or submitting to strict regulations in an attempt to appear to have "great and extreme jealousy for the sake of the Arabs." He claimed, on the other hand, that their concern about interests of the Arabs and the expression of their friendship was

out of place, because he did not approve of what they were doing.

He concluded that the minimum capacity of absorption is five to six million inhabitants and that "Palestine is not an isolated country but forms a part of greater Syria . . . The problem which confronts us is not that of the smallness of the area of Palestine; it is rather related to technology and agricultural industry and, more important than that, it is a social problem which should secure for us a large self dependent agrarian section of the population and enable the immigrants and the non-possessing classes to deepen their roots in the land of Palestine." Thus, the close connection between Jewish immigration and Zionist expansionism becomes clear. However, Kaplansky did not give the question of borders the attention it deserved, but rather he seemed to have supposed that these borders would inevitably be extended. Thus, his first and last concern was to convince those who were hesitant, of Palestine's capacity to absorb millions of Jews who possessed nothing. He was concerned with the question of dispossessing the Arab inhabitants of their land only to enable the Jewish masses to infiltrate into the economic life of Palestine.

RABBI ISAACS AND GREATER ISRAEL

In the previous chapters, we have encountered the Zionists' territorial and expansionist ambitions in Palestine which were expressed in their publications of the war period, before the Balfour Declaration was issued. We have also come across Herbert Sidebotham's insistence on the military and strategic considerations while we considered in addition, De Lieme and Solomon Kaplansky's studies. It is now appropriate to examine Rabbi Samuel Isaacs' book, *The True Boundaries of the Holy Land*,¹ as the official expression of the historical and religious aspects of the orthodox wing in the Zionist Movement. This will complete the picture which Zionism drew of Greater Israel and its boundaries at this time, in the light of what it designated as the strategic, economic, and historical factors and criteria based on specific religious texts.

The boundaries which Isaacs chose for the Holy Land are the ones defined in the Old Testament of the Holy Bible (Numbers 34: 1-12). The aim behind his book was to distinguish between the various contradictory theories related to these boundaries and determine what he considered to be the true historical boundaries of Israel.

The "Biographical Sketch of the Author" informs us that Rabbi Isaacs was persuaded by friends, after the first Hague Peace Convention, "to prepare for English Biblical scholars his discoveries concerning the true boundaries of the Holy Land."² The author's preface preceding the introduction was written in 1906, one year before the convening of the second Hague Convention (1907). In this preface, the author referred to the prophecy of Jeremiah which, he explained, "it would be well for Israel's persecutors to heed." He then indicated that this prophecy is but one of the countless prophecies assuring Israel of a glorious future, its restoration to the Holy Land and the establishment of universal peace and happiness. He admitted that these prophecies had not been fulfilled as yet, but explained that "the extraordinary signs of the times, of a universal character, may justify the conjecture of a possible partial restoration in a near future."³ The indications that the time was near, were, in his opinion, the following:

"(1) The International Peace Conventions, which though yet but experimental, may in time become practical and achieve their purpose;

(2) The prevailing spirit actuating the changes from autocratic and despotic government to constitutional authority—when these two movements for international peace and constitutional government become fairly well established, justice, liberality and toleration may be expected to dominate;

(1) Samuel Hillel Isaacs, *The True Boundaries of the Holy Land* (Chicago, 1917).

(2) *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 16.

(3) The awakened interest in the Holy Land, evidenced by the late explorations therein, which have opened the country to our view and have made it possible to trace its boundaries . . . after they lay hidden for nearly two thousand years."⁴

However, Rabbi Isaacs did not confine himself to the three indications mentioned above to justify the fulfilment of the expected prophecy. He added to them a fourth one, the "Jewish question," which had assumed grave proportions, and the "Zionistic movement" which had developed a great deal. "The contemporaneous origin of them all," he argued, "makes it appear as if they were intended to coalesce and produce great and good results." He expressed the Zionists hope which had been discussed earlier by Max Nordau (see above) for their recognition as the representative body of world Jewry to be allowed to present the Jewish question and their claims before some future peace conference which might find a favourable solution. It is interesting to note that Rabbi Isaacs expected such a convention to gather "the master minds" of the world, commissioned to consider the grievances occurring between nations and settle them "by justice and right"—not "by arms and right." He concluded his preface by stating:

"Whether this salvation shall come to pass in the manner above described or by additional momentous events which may yet arise,—whether it be sooner or later, in either case it is important to know the boundaries of the territories which Israel would claim."⁵

The Zionists' concern to determine the boundaries of the territory they intended to claim had been evident since the outbreak of the First World War. Once they had assured themselves of the favourable intentions of the British, they turned their attention to the Jews of America with the aim of prompting the Zionist organizations there to double their efforts and organize their activities in order to win over the American Jewish public opinion to their cause and make it side with the Allies against the "hostile" forces of the Central Powers. On August 30, 1914, "The Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs" was formed under the chairmanship of the Zionist judge, Louis Brandeis. This committee succeeded in arousing the interest of the U.S. government in Zionism and in securing its assistance for the Palestinian Jew. It also succeeded in "kindling the imagination of the Jewish masses" and attracting prominent supporters such as Felix Frankfurter and Julian W. Mack.⁶ Brandeis was soon joined by Richard Gottheil and Jacob de Haas (both British-born) and Rabbi Stephen Wise. His quarrel with Dr. Judah Magnes, who apparently held British imperialism in deep distrust, led to the latter's resignation from the Provisional Executive Committee in September 1915. Towards the end of the same year, the American Zionist leaders began preparing for the organization of a representative American Jewish Congress, and Brandeis, in spite of his personal sympathy for the Allies and his hatred of the Prussian military spirit, declared

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 17.

(6) Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192.

that the preparatory committee "maintains a strict neutrality towards the nations now at war."⁷

The supporters of the Allies had to face the pro-German American Jews in the committee. In fact, the majority of American Jews were concerned with the eastern front alone. In 1916, for instance, the "American Jewish Committee" published in New York, a book containing information on the Jews in the eastern war zone⁸ pointing at, in its introductory part, the following: "Thus the present war has again demonstrated the great truth that, in times of struggle as in times of peace, the Jews constitute a most valuable asset to those nations that accept them as an integral part of their population and permit them to develop freely."⁹ This book also devoted six of its 120 pages to the Jews of Palestine, examining the report submitted on October 21, 1914, by Maurice Wertheim after he had been entrusted by the American Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, with the distribution of a fund of \$50,000 contributed by American Jews. It indicated that the American Jewish Relief Committee and the Provisional Zionist Committee had succeeded, in March 1915, through the United States Government in sending a food ship to the Jews of Palestine.¹⁰

Kaplansky, Schmarya Levin, and Aaronson were not the only ones to look in the direction of the American Jews and encourage Brandeis and his collaborators among the American Jews. They were soon imitated, in the first half of 1915, by two other members of the "Poalei Zion." David Ben Gurion and Isaac Ben Zvi, who had been expelled by the Ottoman authorities from Palestine after the latter had been informed by the German secret services that the two men were working against Turkey, and like all Zionists were siding with the Allies. In spite of the statement he made in his first essay in America, namely, "we shall gain our land (Eretz Israel) with labour, with capital, with culture and with science,"¹¹ Ben Gurion, together with his friend Ben Zvi, approved the formation of a Jewish legion which had been advocated, since the end of 1914, by Jabotinsky. The latter had agreed, with Joseph Trumpeldor and J. Ettinger, upon the need to convince the Commander of the British force in Egypt, General Maxwell, to open the door for the enrollment of the Jews who had fled from Turkey and taken refuge in Alexandria.¹² The formation of the Jewish military unit will be dealt with later in this study in the context of the role played by Jabotinsky.

In spite of the opposition of the Copenhagen Zionist Bureau to the "Jewish Unit" project, Ben Gurion and Ben Zvi were among the first to enroll. Furthermore, they did their best to convince the reluctant Jews and the advocates of the peaceful approach among the Zionist workers to join the Zionist army which

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 199.

(8) *The Jews in the Eastern War Zone*, (The American Jewish Committee, New York, 1916).

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 15.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 95.

(11) Maurice Edelman, *Ben Gurion — A Political Biography*, (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1964), p. 61.

(12) Joseph Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman: The Early Years*, (Thomas Yoseloff, New York, 1956), p. 204.

intended to occupy Palestine by force in case the Allied armies decided to march on it.

We should notice in the essay by Ben Gurion on the "gaining of our land" (September 1915) which has already been mentioned, that it was the peace conference "which will lead our just plea and fulfill our entreaty." However, Ben Gurion was not sure that this would be sufficient to secure the possession of the land. He wrote:

"We do not ask for the Land of Israel for the sake of ruling over its Arabs, nor seek a market to sell Jewish goods produced in the Diaspora. It is a Homeland that we seek . . . A Homeland is not given or got as a gift; it is not acquired by privilege or political contracts; it is not bought with gold or held by force. No, it is made with the sweat of the brow."¹³

In 1917, Ben Gurion published, with the collaboration of Ben Zvi, a book on *The Land of Israel (Eretz Israel)* with the aim of winning more American Jews to the Zionist plans.

In Frischwasser-Ra'anan's opinion, the book was "one of the pioneer works on the geography and history of modern Palestine."¹⁴ Also, it seems that the newspaper *Palestine*, which was issued by the British Palestine Committee, published later on (June 1918), an article in which the two authors, Ben Gurion and Ben Zvi, put forward their views on the subject of the territorial needs of Jewish Palestine and defined its boundaries as follows:

Lebanon on the north,
The Syrian Desert on the east,
The Sinai Peninsula on the south, and
The Mediterranean Sea on the west.

Basing himself on the above-mentioned paper, Frischwasser-Ra'anan presented some of the major considerations which Sidebotham and his friends in the committee put forward in relation to the desired boundaries of Greater Israel, which supported his previous statement on the keen interest of the paper *Palestine* in the frontier question between 1917 and 1921. He tried, however, to distinguish between the demands of the orthodox religious wing inside the Zionist Movement and those of the secular leaders. He declared that the orthodox section claimed the territory mentioned by the Bible, "from the Egyptian River to the Euphrates" while the secular one claimed the smaller historical area, "from Dan to Beer-sheba." The latter did not, however, content themselves with this area, for they supplemented it "with such regions as would give the country the bases for a sound modern economy and for military defence."¹⁵ They tried to include the desert areas to the south and the east in order to prevent nomadic invasions. Also, for security considerations, they looked for a control over the Beka'a valley, as it constitutes an entry gate between the slope of the Lebanon and Mount Hermon. As to the Hauran and the Yarmuk valley, military needs dictated their annexa-

(13) David Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*, (Philosophical Library, New York, 1954), p. 4.

(14) Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

tion in view of the fact that invaders had frequently penetrated from there "into the Esdraelon lowlands, thus cutting the ancient Jewish state in two, separating Galilee from Judea."¹⁶ In addition, the Hedjaz Railway between Dera'a and Ma'an would be under their control in order to enable Jewish Palestine to supply the whole of this "eastern front." When they began thinking of the millions of Jews who would immigrate into Palestine and compared their needs with the resources of the country, they drew up plans which would secure a frontier line including the headwaters of the Jordan, the Litani river, the snows of Hermon, the Yarmuk and its tributaries and the Jabbok. They also thought of developing hydroelectric power from the Litani and the Yarmuk,¹⁷ while they considered the importance of the land of Gilead, the desert of the Negev, as well as other areas in Trans-Jordan.

Thus, it is not easy for the researcher to determine what great differences there were between the orthodox and the secular's claims which could justify their dissociation from each other. In the minds of the Zionists, the religious considerations came, in fact, to complement and complete the secular intentions of the movement. Also it would be correct to consider the boundaries dictated by the religious motives, explanations, and interpretations as the frontier of the Promised Land, while keeping in mind that the kingdom of Israel never stabilized these borders under David's and Solomon's reigns and that it did not extend its domination over them except for a very short period of time. In the American Rabbi Stephen Wise's distinction between "maximum Zionism" and "minimum Zionism," we find another piece of evidence which connects both religious and secular claims for Greater Israel. Rabbi Isaac's analysis and discoveries also add to our knowledge of the "true boundaries" in terms of this Zionist dialectic of the "minimum reality" and the "maximum ideal." There is no doubt that a complete mutual rapprochement has manifested itself between both sections since the June 1967 aggression and the proclamation of the idea of Greater Israel. This will be discussed later in this study.

Thus, we will limit ourselves to Frischwasser-Ra'an'an's discussion, considering it as the summing up of the opinions and claims advocated by the Zionist leaders during the period which preceded the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. We will then proceed to examine Rabbi Isaacs' view of Greater Israel, in its maximum and minimum limits. In his book, *Frontiers of a Nation*, Frischwasser-Ra'an'an stated that the above-mentioned considerations determined the territorial and expansionist claims of the Zionist organisation in relation to the frontier lines between Dan and Beersheba. Speaking of the Zionist leaders, he said:

"They required that the country should be bounded by the Mediterranean in the west, by the slopes of the Lebanon, the headwaters of the Jordan and the crest of Mount Hermon in the north and the Syrian desert in the east. In the south the Zionist leaders wanted access to the Gulf of Aqaba and in the southwest they hoped, by an

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 87.

(16) *Ibid.*

(17) *Ibid.*

amicable arrangement with Great Britain, to incorporate the El Arish region of Sinai in the national home. It was thought that since Britain now controlled southern Palestine, imperial interest would no longer need the Sinai peninsula to defend the Suez Canal and might, therefore, be ready to permit the transfer of El Arish from Egyptian to Palestine rule."¹⁸

The Reduced Grants and the Legacy of the Future

Rabbi Isaacs' daughter states in the preface to the first edition of her father's book that before Isaacs died, he expressed his desire to publish the results of his research related to the "true boundaries" of Greater Israel before the convening of the American Jewish Congress, so that the ones concerned with the Palestine question would be able to examine his findings. The first edition of the book appeared before this Congress was convened in Washington on November 18, 1917, a little more than two weeks after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. It is very probable that one of the reasons for delaying the convening of the Congress, which had been under preparation since the end of 1915, was to wait for the appropriate moment after the issuance of the Declaration. The United States had by then declared war on Germany (April, 1917) and the Bolshevik revolution having broken out in Tsarist Russia, the Soviets had disclosed the secret agreements and treaties the Allies had concluded among themselves in order to divide the Ottoman territories—and more particularly the Arab provinces—into spheres of influence. Isaacs' daughter mentions in the preface that "Jewish Congresses are being convened in various countries to express the views of their constituents in order that unified action may be taken at the Peace Conference to be held at the close of the war."

We have already mentioned that the boundaries adopted by Isaacs as a result of his research are the ones based on Numbers, chapter 34: verses 1-12. What are these boundaries mentioned in the Old Testament of the Holy Bible and which Isaac's daughter described in her preface to the second edition of the book as "the smaller area which Israel is to inherit"? She wrote:

"The text of Numbers XXXIV: 1-12 is the smaller area which Israel is to inherit—a *reduced* grant—to which he hopes to be restored. But this does not mean that his request for a Homeland must be confined to these boundaries; on the contrary, our author states 'God's conditional promises are never abrogated, but are reserved for fulfilment . . . at some future time.'"¹⁹

It is from there that the Rabbi defined the maximum boundaries which go beyond what he described as the "reduced grants" to Greater Israel. He named them "Provisional Grants" basing himself on a *proviso* included in Deuteronomy 11:22: "For if ye will but keep this commandment which I command you to do . . . then will the Eternal drive out all those nations from before you . . . Every place whereon the soles of your foot may tread shall be yours: from the wilderness

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 89.

(19) Isaacs, *op. cit.*, p. 8a.

of Sinai and the Lebanon, from the river Euphrates, even unto the western Sea shall be your boundary" (Deuteronomy 11:22-24).

Isaacs' map referred to the provisional boundaries:

- "And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying,
2. Command the children of Israel, and say unto them, When ye come into the land of Canaan; (this *is* the land that shall fall unto you for an inheritance, *even* the land of Canaan with the coasts thereof:
 3. Then your south quarter shall be from the wilderness of Zin along by the coast of Edom, and your south border shall be the outmost coast of the salt sea eastward:
 4. And your border shall turn from the south to the ascent of Akrabbim, and pass on to Zin: and the going forth thereof shall be from the south to Kadesh-barnea, and shall go on to Hazar-addar, and pass on to Azmon:
 5. And the border shall fetch a compass from Azmon unto the river of Egypt, and the goings out of it shall be at the sea:
 6. And *as for* the western border, ye shall even have the great sea for a border: this shall be your west border:
 7. And this shall be your north border: from the great sea ye shall point out for you mount Hor:
 8. From mount Hor ye shall point out *your border* unto the entrance of Hamath; and the goings forth of the border shall be to Zedad:
 9. And the border shall go on to Ziphron, and the goings out of it shall be at Hazar-enan: this shall be your north border:
 10. And ye shall point out your east border from Hazar-enen to Shepham:
 11. And the coast shall go down from Shepham to Riblah, on the east side of Ain; and the border shall descend, and shall reach unto the side of the sea of Chinnereth eastward:
 12. And the border shall go down to Jordan, and the goings out of it shall be at the salt sea: this shall be your land with the coasts thereof round about" (Numbers 34:1-12).

If we referred back to the map which appears at the end of Isaacs' book (see Map No. 4 at the end of this study), we would realise how the boundaries of the promised land were determined (1916) in conformity with the mentioned text of the Book of Numbers (the study area). Rabbi Isaacs gave to this huge area to the north the name of "reduced grants" because it did not include all the allotments of Greater Israel; it was drawn up in conformity with what he considered to be the frontiers of Solomon's empire. To the reduced grants, he added huge areas extending from the Euphrates to the Egyptian river (Wadi El Arish) and including the Gulf of Aqaba. It is worthwhile mentioning that the entrance of Hamath has within the concept of the reduced boundaries of the smaller area, extended from the suburbs of the city of Hamath to the Taurus mountains and the frontiers of Cilicia.

The Rabbi's daughter took it upon herself to remind the reader that the larger area included extremely fertile lands. She wrote:

"In this larger territory are included those valuable pasture and farming lands east of the Jordan which were allotted to the tribes of Reuben and Gad and the half-tribe of Manassah; also such as were acquired by peaceful settlement or justifiable conquest up to the time of King Solomon who reigned over the Jewish kingdom which had reached its largest extent before the death of King David."²⁰

Furthermore, she pointed out that the restoration of a Jewish national homeland under the British Crown "seems to be no longer a mooted question since the

(20) *Ibid.*, pp. 8a-8b.

issuance of the British Declaration and its endorsement by France, Italy and other governments and by our great President, Woodrow Wilson; to which has been added the approbation of His Holiness, Pope Benedict XV. She also found it appropriate to call our attention to what we would encounter in the book, namely that the Biblical, traditional and historic boundaries "include a much larger area than is generally conceded to the Jewish nation."²¹

What is worth mentioning with respect to the "discoveries" claimed by Rabbi Isaacs is that most of them are based on the research work carried out by the Palestine Exploration Fund. He quoted a great deal of what had been done and written by Charles Wilson, Captain Warren, and Colonel Conder in relation to the geography and topography of Palestine and pointed out that the identification of all the places mentioned in the text of the Book of Numbers would have been impossible without these explorers who had "responded to the necessity of stating the ancient as well as the modern names of the places they were describing."

In his opinion, the Great Sea on the west and the Salt Sea with the Jordan on the east were known boundaries, whereas the northern part of the western and eastern borders and the entire northern boundary "were forgotten and left to speculation."²² Consequently, he used the findings of the Palestine Exploration Fund to compare the names given by them to the places they described with those found in ancient Hebrew expositors or Targums for the purpose of making correct identification. Thus, he said, he was able to "identify many of the scriptural landmarks for the border lines so as to complete the boundaries on all the four sides in a rectangular figure."

To conclude his introduction, the author solicited "full attention to the reasons given for departing from the sites chosen by the existing expositors, as well as for the elected substitutes" and confessed—while offering no justification for that—that this constitutes a new departure, especially in the northern part and a "bold move." Finally, he told the reader that "good reasons" are given for each deviating step which, he hoped, would be conceded and the new arrangements welcomed.

We shall examine the conditions surrounding Rabbi Isaacs' discoveries in his description of the two extremes, the minimum and the maximum, between which the characteristics of the area which he ascribes to Greater Israel fluctuate.

The Southern Border: In the previously mentioned text it is said that the south of Kadesh Barnea is the extremity of the southern boundary. We learn from Ezekiel (47:19) that the southern border passed by the *waters of Meribah*. We also learn from the Book of Numbers (13:3, 32:8) that Kadesh Barnea "whence the twelve spies were sent out by Moses and whither they returned," is situated in the desert of Paran. How are we to relate these two contradictory texts? There, Rabbi Isaacs adopts a different view than the majority of commentators. He did not agree with the commonly accepted explanation that the

(21) *Ibid.*

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 18.

borders of the wilderness of Zin and that of Paran and Kadesh were not sharp lines as our modern political boundaries are. Rather, he assumed the existence of two different places named Kadesh and identified Kadesh Barnea with Ain Quadís while the second Kadesh is identified with Ain El-Weibeh which, in his opinion, makes them both on the border of the land of Israel.

The Western Border: There is no need to argue about considering the Mediterranean as the western border for it constitutes an unmistakable landmark. Yet, Rabbi Isaacs was worried about the fact that "the text does not appear to define how far north on the sea coast this border extends, or the point at which it terminates." Therefore, he supposed that the northern boundary turned to "Mount Hor" and from there to the "entrance of Hamath." Various theories were advanced as to where these landmarks were located and therefore the northern line of the Promised Land is drawn in different ways by the various explorers and scholars whose theories Isaacs summed up as follows:

"(1) The Old Opinion:

Mount Hor is one of the peaks of *Mount Hermon*; 'The entrance of Hamath' is the pass to Hamath through the Bukeia, beginning southwest of Mount Hermon; the turning point on the sea coast is accordingly directly west of Mount Hermon, so that a line drawn from that point extending eastward to Mount Hermon constitutes the northern boundary. The latitude of Mount Hermon, which is thirty-three degrees twenty-four minutes North, would thus be the northern extremity of the land.

"(2) R. Esthori Ha-Parchi, a celebrated traveler, 1322:

'Mount Hor' is identified with *Jebel el-Akra* (the ancient Mons Casius) on the sea coast near the thirty-sixth parallel north, between Ladikéyeh and Alexandretta, the border thence running southeast to Hamath, crossing the Bukeia, which is 'The entrance of Hamath.' This extends the territory about one hundred and ten miles farther north than the preceding theory.

"(3) R. Joseph Schwarz, 1850, often quoted by modern explorers:

'Mount Hor' is identified with *Jebel Nuriyah* on the coast, at thirty-four degrees nineteen minutes North, thence the line extends across the Bukeia ('The entrance of Hamath') to his Zedah. This extends the border about sixty-three miles farther north than the first theory.

"(4) Robinson and Porter . . . and many other scholars:

'Mount Hor' is *Jebel Akkár*, the northern and loftiest part of Libanus, 'The entrance of Hamath' is the valley which intersects the Lebanon and the Anseiriyeh mountains, carrying the River El-Kebir into the sea. This river is thirty-four degrees thirty-eight minutes North, thus extending their border eighty-four miles farther north than the first mentioned opinion."²³

Rabbi Isaacs devoted a special supplement to the second part of his book (Chapter IV) to deal with each of these theories separately. He declared that in spite of the fact that they were mostly based on religious texts, none of them could be accepted. In answer to the prevailing opinion identifying Mount Hor with Mount Hermon, Rabbi Isaacs quoted several passages in the religious texts which contradicted it and further argued that the said opinion was inconsistent with its own text. Referring to the *Tosefta*, he declared that this text—which was a supplement to the *Misbneh*, redacted in the third century—mentions Turey Amanon or Mount Amanon, and situated Mount Umanis or Manis along the bay of Alexandretta! Yet, he confessed that "the mountains in question have no com-

(23) *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

mon name and that the name of Amanus was lost probably at the time of the Arab conquest of Syria in the seventh century or soon after.

One should note, though, that Rabbi Isaacs found no contradiction in the different scriptural passages relating to the extent of the Promised Land. He attributed the divergence in the description of the boundaries to a misinterpretation of the texts whose vagueness, he said, might be judged by the widely different opinions of its expositors and indicated that "the origin of this divergence of opinion lies mainly in the change of the *geographical names* and also in other causes, chief among which was Ptolemy's *Geography*," the latter's map having *misplaced* the two mighty ridges, Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon so far east that they fell beyond the limits of Palestine.²⁴

The second cause in Isaac's opinion which led to the misconception of the text of Numbers was the general belief that "The Holy Land as conquered and divided among the Tribes was also the Promised Land allotted in Numbers 34: 1-12."²⁵ In order to avoid contradicting his previous statement, namely that the different scriptural passages relating to the extent of the Promised Land do not contradict one another, he chose to remind us that the Promised Land, in its extent and borders, did not correspond to the conquered land. We have previously encountered the distinction between the ideal and the reality, or between the promise and the fulfilment. This distinction is, in fact, found in most studies and works on the Bible and the history of the Israelites, and goes back in the modern era, to the second half of the nineteenth century. It might very well be that the desire to extend the borders of the land of the Israelites in the ancient times can be considered as a concealed reason behind the divergence in the pictures of "the promise" and "the fulfilment." The opinion of Yehezkel Kaufman is much the same:

"...the ideal boundaries of the promised land correspond neither to historical reality nor to later messianic hopes. The far-flung limits of the northern boundary and the exclusion of Transjordan in the east prove that these limits of the promised land were already fixed before the entry into Canaan. This implies a national ideal that preceded the individual wars of the tribes each for its own territory."²⁶

Thus he presents an opinion similar to that of Rabbi Isaacs that the divergence of opinions may be attributed to a plan agreed upon by the leaders of the invading tribes into the land of Canaan, while the ideal boundaries of the land which they promised themselves were fixed according to the plan. There is no need to consider them as the "higher national ideal." The Hebrew's conquests became merely historical expeditions aimed at the realisation of the "plan-promise" through the seizure of a wider area because the latter corresponded to the ideal frontiers which were drawn before the invasion took place. It thus forms the

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 60.

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 61.

(26) Yehezkel Kaufmann, *The Religion of Israel*, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1961), p. 246.

bases of Jewish irredentism, a matter deeply rooted in the ancient history of the Near East.

Furthermore, it is worthwhile mentioning in this connection, Anderson's book, *The History and Religion of Israel*,²⁷ at the beginning of which he indicated that "[Israel] was able to maintain fully independent national existence for only a fraction of the Old Testament period, and effective natural unity for an even shorter time." Describing the situation of the Israelites in the land of Canaan, he wrote:

"Such was the land in which the Israelites settled. For most of the Old Testament period their occupation of it was only partial; for long periods they occupied it only as the vassals of foreign powers; and always their life was in varying degrees interpenetrated by other peoples."²⁸

As to Isaacs' definition of the western border, which he considers to be a correct interpretation of the text he chose, it reads as follows:

"The western border begins at the south-east corner of the Great Sea where the brook of Egypt [Wadi El Arish] falls into it; thence it runs northward, passing Mount Carmel, Tyer, Zidon, the Lebanons, etc., unto the north-eastern corner of the Bay of Alexandretta."²⁹

Having thus stated his argument, he went on to declare that as his interpretation "is none else than a strict literal translation of our text and is clear of all ambiguity it merits acceptance without further proof."

The Northern Border: To define the northern border, Isaacs starts by trying to interpret the appellation "Mount Hor." It is composed of "the mount" and a proper name "Hor" knowing that the word "Hor" means "the mountain" in the Hebraic language? What is implied, then, in the appellation "mountain of a mountain" or "the double mountain" or the mountain standing on a mountain and does such a thing called "Mount Hor" exist? Here, the Rabbi refers to texts of the *Midrash Rabba* and the *Midrash Tanhuma*. And the answer to our question, "what is Mount Hor?" becomes: "A mountain on top of a mountain like a small apple on top of a big one."³⁰ Thus, Isaacs' interpretation amounts to the description of any mountain on top of another mountain situated on the border line! In the Book of Numbers 20: 22-25 and 27, we read that the Israelites "Journeyed from Kadesh and came unto Mount Hor. And the Lord spoke unto Moses and Aaron in Mount Hor, by the coast of the land of Edom." No such mountain exists on the sea coast at all. Besides, although the scripture designates both Kadesh and Mount Hor as being located at the border of the land of Edom (Numbers 20: 16 and 23), Isaacs rejects the identification of the traditional Jebel Harun with Mount Hor and further states, "That Jebel Harûn is not Mount Hor is a certainty—that Jebel Maderah may be Mount Hor is a slight possibility,"³¹ yet he chooses to

(27) G.W. Anderson, *The History and Religion of Israel*, (Oxford University Press, London, 1966).

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 13.

(29) Isaacs, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

(30) *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

(31) *Ibid.*, p. 32.

give this appellation to two mountains; Mount Hor in the south on the border of the land of Edom, and Mount Hor on the north which is the one mentioned by the Book of Numbers in relation to the border. This constitutes the first phase of Isaacs' interpretations. Thus he examines the *Targum* (The ancient Aramaic translations of the Five Books) and the *Mishnah* and discovers that Mount Amanus is Mount Hor. Mount Harum (or more correctly, Amanus) becomes the borderline between Northwestern Syria and Cilicia while the entrance of Hamath is transferred to the proximity of this mountain and Hazar Enam is identified with the Turkish Aintab. This marks the northeastern corner of the Promised Land, thus making it possible for Rabbi Isaacs to consider Mount Hor as part of the Taurus Mountains!

The eastern border runs from Hazar Enan (Turkish Aintab) to Shepham, which Isaacs considers to be the location of Kulat-el-Mudik on the northern borders of Lebanon (which may be Qalat-el-Hosn itself?). It then goes to Riblah which he identifies with the actual Hermel as it is situated east of Ain-el-Asy, runs down to the lake of Tiberias to meet the southern border at the Dead Sea.

With this, Rabbi Isaacs completes the delineation of the borders of the Promised Land according to the texts he had chosen for this purpose, pointing out that the shape of the Promised Land is rectangular. We will remember now the distinction Isaacs made between the reduced grants in the light of which he explained the extension of the frontiers from the Euphrates in the East to the Red Sea and the Nile in the South, knowing that he limited his interpretations to the smaller or reduced area of Greater Israel. Thus, he left out the larger one for a future empire which would restore Solomon's glories after the Israelites acceptance of the covenant of the old scriptures.

To conclude this analysis, we will point out Rabbi Isaacs' insistence on including both chains of the Lebanese mountains inside the borders of the Promised Land. He accuses Ptolemy of committing a geographical error since his "Map of Palestine" is responsible for the wrong opinion which has prevailed for the last two thousand years: it drew the northern border of the Promised Land "south of the real Lebanons, which is the north of Joshua's conquest." He further believed that Ptolemy's map contributed to the opinion that this smaller area is the one described in the Book of Numbers (Chapter 34), while according to his own interpretations, the eastern and western mountains of Lebanon do not fall outside the said area. Thus he draws the northern boundary of the Promised Land north of the Lebanon: "This is, in our opinion, a settled point," he wrote, "but the question yet remains: How far north is that border located?" It was this question which worried Isaacs' and made him search in the religious texts for answers they did not contain. Finally, he leaped over large areas and high chains of mountains, which led him to the Taurus mountains.

We do not know if the American Zionists submitted Isaacs' reduced demands to the peace conference with a view to make it recognize what they named "the historic rights and religious links" between the Jews of the world and Palestine.

But the Rabbi did not rule out the possibility of recognizing the Zionists as a body representing the Jews of the world. For this reason, he believed that they should present the Jewish question and claims before the peace conference. In his preface he declared that "whether it be sooner or later, in either case it is important to know the boundaries of the territory which Israel would claim"—when the subject of the Jewish national home will be considered by the peace conference in the near future.

When today, fifty years after the publication of his book, *The True Boundaries of the Holy Land*, we look into Isaacs' plan, we find that it is being echoed in the demands of the rabbis of Israel whenever they deem it desirable to do so. The June 1967 aggression has given them the opportunity to insist loudly and in the hearing of the worshippers in the synagogue for the creation of "Greater Israel." Religious Zionism, with its deep roots in the past, does not greatly differ from its secular associate or its Gentile ally with respect to the expansionist demands and the call for "Greater Israel," in spite of the diverse reasons invoked by each of them to justify their claims and consecrate their demands.

Let us listen to the secular Zionist Weizmann, for instance, addressing an assembly of Zionist devotees upon the arrival of the Peel Commission to Palestine (May 1936). He said:

"I know that God promised Palestine to the children of Israel, but I do not know what boundaries He set. I believe that they were wider than the ones now proposed, and may have included Transjordan. Still, we have foregone the eastern part and are now asked to forego some of the western part. If God will keep His promise to His people in His own time, our business as poor humans, who live in a difficult age, is to save as much as we can of the remnants of Israel. By adopting this project we can save more of them than by continuing the Mandatory policy."³²

And Weizmann went on to state that "God had always chosen small countries through which to convey his messages to humanity." He found it more convenient, then, for the Zionist Movement to accept a small Jewish state living in peace with its neighbors. In order to obtain a Jewish state with definite boundaries internationally guaranteed, he chose to proceed gradually by phases.

(32) Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1949), p. 386.

THE EVE OF THE DECLARATION

The Zionist Manchester School contributed to the British Zionist tradition. In fact, it succeeded in making Arthur James Balfour the major link in the chain of this deeply rooted tradition. His name (Balfour) has been associated since then, with the Declaration by which His Majesty's Government pledged to:

"View with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object."¹

On November 2, 1917, the British Government published, after approval by the cabinet, a statement of policy later known as the "Balfour Declaration." It took the form of a letter from the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Balfour, to Lord Walter Rothschild (II) in which its author expressed his great pleasure in conveying "on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations."²

However, the second part of the Declaration clearly stated that His Majesty's Government's declaration of sympathy with Zionist aspirations was conditioned by the following:

"Nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."³

After the issuance of the Declaration, Lloyd George proceeded to clarify the circumstances which prompted the government of his country to publish such a statement:

"The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word."⁴

Was the Declaration which Britain pledged through its Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Balfour, meant merely to reward the Zionist leaders for keeping their promise to try their best to rally "Jewish support throughout the world to the Allied cause"? Were not the Balfour Declaration and the circumstances described by Lloyd George in contradiction with the correspondence which Husain and McMahon exchanged two years before? Finally, was not the

(1) See the complete text of the Declaration in the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (The White Paper) Cmd. 5479, London 1937, pp. 16-17.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 16.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 17.

(4) *Ibid.*, Lloyd George used the term "Jewish national home" as a synonym for "Jewish state" and "Jewish commonwealth," see Weizmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-212.

Arab Revolution also meant to help the Allied cause against the Ottoman rule and was the Arab contribution to the Allied victory less important than that imputed to the Zionists?

We do not intend to go into these questions which we consider to be outside the scope of this study. But, the fact that we are abstaining from tackling them does not imply that we underestimate their value and importance. What is relevant to this study, though, is the expansionist intentions and irredentist demands which the Zionist leaders claimed they had obtained through the Balfour Declaration, knowing that the vague terminology of the text of the Declaration avoided indicating the boundaries of Palestine. Its authors preferred to not mention terms which could reveal that the Zionist intention was to establish a Jewish state in Palestine under the pretext of seeking British protection for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people. The Zionists decided—or at least pretended—to content themselves with the area described in the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement as the “brown area,” provided they would take the first opportunity, after the issuance of the Declaration, to claim more and insist on the expansion of the boundaries to include other areas they had ambitions for, because of their water supplies and economic potentialities. We also notice that the official text of the Balfour Declaration does not mention at all the “Jewish right” to Palestine or the historical links between the Jews and Palestine. The Zionists had to wait approximately five years (from November 1917 until July 1922) before the British Mandate over Palestine was decided by the Council of the League of Nations. The text of the Preamble of the Mandate indicated that the Balfour Declaration recognized “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.”⁵

If we wished to examine the circumstances which surrounded the issuance of the Balfour Declaration or its two various drafts, we would have to refer to chapter five of Herbert Sidebotham’s book, *Great Britain and Palestine*. It is worth mentioning that Sidebotham chose the term “The Balfour Promise” as the title to that chapter instead of “The Balfour Declaration.” The first formula drafted by the Conjoint Committee of the Jewish Board of Deputies in March 1916, expressed, according to him, the view of the official Jewish opponents of Zionism.⁶

As to the second formula, it was submitted to the Asquith government in October 1916, and Sidebotham observed that the word “home” appeared for the first time in this context while there was no mention of a “Jewish state.” He also explained that “the plan of a chartered company seems to have been borrowed from Laurence Oliphant’s and Theodor Herzl’s schemes; and the governing idea is that Palestine is a neglected estate which needs mass immigration of Jews for its development.”⁷ The lack of any reference to the boundaries of the homeland,

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 25.

(6) Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 58.

which the Jewish chartered company intended to colonize on the basis of its being "a neglected estate which needs mass immigration of Jews for its development," did not mean that the Zionists disregarded the subject of their expansion. We have only to recall the official Zionist position then as expressed in "A Note on the Boundaries," i.e. "Zionist and the Jewish Future" (1916)—which we have previously discussed—to know the nature of the boundaries which the Zionists drew up on Weizmann's advice and according to the Manchester Zionist School's teachings. It is obviously these same boundaries which the Zionists chose and thought of when they discussed the "homeland," and later the "Jewish national home." In a previous chapter, we examined the formation of the British Palestine Committee and the publication, *Palestine*, since the beginning of 1917. In the first issue the boundaries of the national home were discussed. Jeffries has expressed the reluctance of the advocates of the idea of the national home to define the boundaries of the land in which it was to be established. In accordance with Sidebotham's ideas, he wrote:

"When the question of boundaries first arose, *Palestine* was quite clear about Palestine. It said that 'Palestine has never, except for very brief periods, been a political unity, and hardly any definition of its geographical boundaries would agree in detail.'"⁸

On the other hand, Sidebotham discussed in his second book, *Great Britain and Palestine*, (1937) the report of the Zionist Executive to the Twelfth Zionist Congress (1921) explaining that this report ascribed to Manchester "the credit of being the first to realise fully the coincidence of British and Jewish interests." He added that the British Palestine Committee, through its organ *Palestine*, had no doubts about what the settlement should be: "It wanted a Jewish state in Palestine ... further it wanted Palestine to have boundaries wide enough to permit political and economic development on a national scale and strategically strong enough ... to make self-defence easier than it was in the classic days of the Jewish state,"⁹ once the period of tutelage had ceased and the protector had retired. Unlike Sidebotham, Sacher could not imagine that such a mandate could come to an end. When he was asked by the representatives of one of the Commissions which often visited Palestine how long the Mandate period should last, he spontaneously answered "forever" and thus became known since then as "Forever Sacher."¹⁰

Towards the end of 1916, a change in the Cabinet brought Lloyd George to the head of the government while Herbert Samuel, Asquith and Grey resigned. The Zionists were to find in Lloyd George and Balfour most enthusiastic support of their Movement.

The Zionist leaders had, by the end of the summer of 1916, decided to draft a memorandum on the Zionist program in Palestine. Stein has related that "a first draft was ready by the end of October; but this was not considered satis-

(8) J. M. N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality*, (Longmans-Green, London, 1939), p. 2.

(9) Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53.

(10) Jeffries, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

factory and was superseded by a second and drastically altered draft, which, in turn, was thought to need amendment. A revised version was ready by the end of November but does not appear to have been used until it was sent to Sykes by Gaster on 1 February 1917.¹¹

As to the German version of the memorandum which was published in the Report of the Executive Committee to the Twelfth Congress (*Berichte der Exekutive der Zionistischen Organisation an den XII Zionisten Kongress*), it did not mention clearly the boundaries of Palestine, but referred instead to the provisional program (*Das provisorische Programm 1916*) to be applied in case Palestine fell under British or French protection (in either sphere of influence) or under their joint protection. This program was viewed from two angles: (a) that of the Palestinian Jews, and (b) that of the Jewish masses of immigrants actually living outside Palestine. Stein points out that the version which was submitted to Sykes ended by summing up the scheme as follows:

"Palestine to be recognised as the Jewish National Home, with liberty of immigration to Jews of all countries, who are to enjoy full national political and civic rights; a Charter to be granted to a Jewish Company; local government to be accorded to the Jewish population; and the Hebrew language to be officially recognised."¹²

This version does not differ from that which Herbert Sidebotham described as the first formula of the Balfour Declaration (see above) and which he attributed to the conjoint Foreign Committee, except for the introduction of the expression "the Jewish national home" and the recognition by the Allies that such a "home" was Palestine.

In the letter he addressed to Herbert Samuel on the eve of his departure for Petrograd (26 February 1916), Sykes mentioned that he had read the memorandum and destroyed it after having "committed it to memory." He suggested that "Belgium should assume the administration as the trustee of the Entente Powers" because, in his opinion, "it might be more acceptable to France as an alternative to an international administration." Then, speaking of the boundaries, he said, "I think on the whole that the boundaries as marked* are more favourable than if they were wider. By excluding Hebron and the East of the Jordan there is less to discuss with the Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomes the only matter of vital importance to discuss with them and further does away with any contact with the Bedouin, who never cross the river except on business." In conclusion, he wrote:

"I imagine that the principal object of Zionism is the realisation of the ideal of an existing centre of nationality rather than boundaries or extent of territory."¹³

By the beginning of 1917, the Zionists had succeeded in securing, *vis à vis* the British Government, a position which a number of them were very eager to

(11) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 369.

(*) Does he mean by that the map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement then in draft?

(13) Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-234.

keep. In February of the same year, five Zionist leaders gathered with Sykes in Rabbi Gaster's house to discuss how to obtain official agreement that the national home should be established under British protection. According to Sykes, this meeting "has come to be considered as the event which inaugurated the new era."¹⁴ It was clear from certain of their remarks that they had heard rumors concerning an Anglo-French agreement over Palestine (Sykes-Picot Agreement) and that they had guessed correctly. As to the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, Mr. Scott, he soon warned Dr. Weizmann that Sir Mark Sykes, who was a Catholic, would give in to French claims in the east and went as far as telling him all he knew about the question, namely that, when he visited Paris in April, 1917, someone had told him of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. That is how the Zionists came to know about the secrets of the Agreement and to act accordingly. Sykes pointed out Herbert Samuel's outstanding role in this respect although he was no longer a member of the cabinet. He mentioned Mark Sykes' desperate efforts to make Samuel tell what he could divulge of the Agreement and wrote: "Mr. Samuel gave a guarded reply which could be interpreted as expressing ignorance or discretion."¹⁵ However, the Zionist leaders expressed then, with Samuel's agreement, their acceptance of Sir Mark Sykes' guidance.

It is evident that the Sykes-Picot Agreement realized the Zionists' hope in an extremely important respect, "for it gave a geographical identity to Palestine for the first time in hundreds of years."¹⁶

It is known that the division into blue and red spheres of influence stopped at the brown area which later became the geographical entity of Palestine. If we referred back to the memorandum which Herbert Samuel submitted two years before (March 1915), we would be able to say that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was of Zionist origin. We would also accept Christopher Sykes' statement that the special provision for Palestine (the brown area) was to a large extent the result of the following: the Samuel memorandum, Dr. Gaster's efforts to influence Sykes and convert him to the Zionist doctrine, and Sykes' influence on Picot.¹⁷ Although the Agreement countered the Zionists' wishes by insisting on an international zone, it served the purposes of the Zionists by breaking the British promises to the Sherif of Mecca for Arab independence.

Before proceeding to the discussion of the three remaining formulas, it is worth mentioning the part played by Nahum Sokolow in making George Picot accept the British Mandate over Palestine and adopt the Zionist views, knowing that the first concern of the majority of the French politicians then was to insure the continuation of the historical French mission in the Middle East. Sokolow left for Paris with Sir Mark Sykes who arranged his meeting with a number of French officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while advising him to go alone to these meetings so as to avoid the appearance of a British Zionist conni-

(14) Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 195.

(16) *Ibid.*

(17) *Ibid.*

vance. Then the two men left separately for Rome and the Vatican where Sokolow succeeded in obtaining an audience with His Holiness, the Pope Benedict XV on May 10, 1917, after he had gathered with Monsignor Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII), Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. On the Pope's demand, Sokolow explained the Zionist project in detail. He said, "Our programme is twofold. It aims first to create in Palestine a spiritual and cultural centre for Jewry, and secondly to establish a national home for oppressed Jews."¹⁸ It seems that the Pope was deeply impressed and that he expressed his enthusiasm for this "wonderful idea," but whenever he asked Sokolow a delicate question about the aims of the project, the latter "returned a skilfully evasive reply."¹⁹ When the Pope asked him whether there was enough space in Palestine to carry out his plan, Sokolow answered, "There is the possibility of reaching our goal but first we must prepare the ground."²⁰ To the question: "Are many Jews likely to settle in Palestine?", he again answered evasively saying, "The best—and those who have suffered most." Then, he led the conversation away from that subject to discuss the great agricultural work of the pioneers and the issue of the Jews of Eastern Europe. The audience was over after the Pope answered Sokolow's request for moral support by saying, "Yes, I believe that we shall be good neighbours."²¹

Sokolow then returned to Paris where he realised the importance of his meeting with Benedict XV. According to Christopher Sykes, "by his friendly reception of a Zionist leader, and his openly expressed approval of a Palestinian regime run by Great Britain, the Pope loosened one of the foundation stones of Monsieur Flandin's party."²² He succeeded in obtaining a formal document signed by Jules Cambon, Secretary-General to the Foreign Ministry. The French did not wish to make this document public, however, for fear of discontending their Syrian supporters and friends while the Zionists, for their part, did not wish to let it appear that "France, and not Great Britain, had been the first in the field with a formal declaration in their favour."²³ It seems that Sokolow refused to divulge the contents of the document to the Zionist Political Committee which had been formed in January 1916. He explained, however, to Sacher that "This is the first time that a Government committed itself to a statement that there exists a Jewish nationality in Palestine."²⁴

It might very well be that the Zionists decided to use this letter to invite their British friends to make a higher bid. On the other hand, the Allies' aim behind such a document was to make the Zionists use their influence with the Russian Jews—after the Bolshevik revolution and the wide Jewish participation in it—in the interest of their cause. Besides, French claims in Palestine made them hope "to detach the Zionist Movement from its exclusive reliance on Great

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 201.

(19) *Ibid.*

(20) *Ibid.*

(21) *Ibid.*, p. 202.

(22) *Ibid.*

(23) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 417.

(24) *Ibid.*

Britain." The Zionists thus found themselves tied to a number of links, but not for long. In fact, after French public opinion had become "cooler" towards the idea of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, the Zionists decided to return to their British alliance, and the Balfour Declaration was issued without prior consultation with the French government.

In the third formula which the Zionist Committee submitted to Balfour in July 1917 after it was shown to Sir Mark Sykes, to Baron de Rothschild, and to President Wilson, Sokolow succeeded in introducing for the first time the expression "the Jewish national home."²⁵ It was devised during Weizmann's absence. The leader of the Manchester Zionist School had, in fact, left London towards the end of June to meet each of Morgenthau and Felix Frankfurter in Gibraltar and defeat the attempts made by the Americans to approach the Turkish Liberals in Switzerland with a view to a separate peace. He was not back in London until July 22. Sidebotham and Sacher took the lead of the British-Zionist wing which had planned to include in the text a clear statement of the British sympathy for the Zionist plan to establish a "Jewish state" in the whole of Palestine instead of resorting to a diplomatic device by using the expression "national home of the Jews in Palestine." However, the amended version avoided referring to the whole of Palestine as a Jewish homeland. Sidebotham and Sacher ignored Sokolow's plea for moderation and diplomacy. Each one devised a draft of his own with the aim of making Palestine "just as Jewish as America is American and England is English." Under the title, Fifth Formula, Sidebotham discussed these two versions pointing out that there was no inconsistency between the "Palestinian state with a Jewish character" and the proviso of the Balfour Declaration "that the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine must not be prejudiced."²⁶ He tried to explain that "Jewish in character" did not necessarily mean the confinement of Palestine to the Jewish race alone; also, he did not deem it important to reproduce the complete text of the draft he had devised with Sacher, even after twenty years had elapsed since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. However, Stein filled in this gap by summing up the contents of both drafts. He explained that Sacher had invited the British government to declare "that one of its essential war aims is the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish state and as the national home of the Jewish people . . . The definite form of such reconstitution must be an integral Palestine which is a self-governing State."²⁷ Sacher sent to Sokolow his own draft and another by Sidebotham explaining what was meant by a "Jewish State," namely: "not a State of which membership is restricted to Jews but a State whose dominant national character . . . will be Jewish in the same sense as the dominant national character of England is English, of Canada Canadian and of Australia Australian."²⁸ We

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 369.

(26) Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

(27) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 466.

(28) *Ibid.*

are not sure whether Sacher and Sidebotham were alone in insisting that the formula should raise the question of a Jewish state. Their drafts, though, were never adopted. The Zionists' demands which had been submitted to Sir Mark Sykes remained as they were, but the tactics of moderation adopted by Sokolow and Weizmann aimed at getting "a *general* approval of Zionist aims—very short and as pregnant as possible." By giving the preference to the "general approval" of Zionist aims, Sokolow was hoping to "gradually get more and more."

On June 9, Balfour returned from the United States where he had learned that the Americans were trying to approach certain Turkish politicians in Switzerland. On the other hand, the Zionist leaders were informed that a French delegation had been sent there to prepare the ground with the members of the Ottoman League of Peace and Liberation. Weizmann and Malcolm immediately called on the British Foreign Office and Balfour "personally arranged" for Dr. Weizmann to travel to Gibraltar in order to meet Morgenthau and endeavor to obstruct his mission.

In the meantime, the Zionists had resorted to a new manoeuvre in relation to their British allies. News that the German Empire would extend its protection to the Zionists in Palestine in the event the latter declared their support to Germany and to the Central Powers, reached London (with the knowledge that the German policy of keeping the Turkish Imperial integrity meant the end of the future of Zionism in Palestine).²⁹

In this context certain researchers have considered "two exceptions to the general rule of non-involvement governing American policy toward Turkey."³⁰ The first one was Morgenthau's mission, while the second one was President Wilson's policy on the Balfour Declaration. Also, we should not underestimate the role played by the American Zionists since the outbreak of the war.

The Fourth Formula came into existence at that time. It was to become the official text of the famous Balfour Declaration and Sidebotham pointed out that the second proviso was added "to meet the objections of Sir Philip Magnus and Mr. Claude Montefiore. He further explained that the English word "home" is untranslatable into the other European languages. In fact, the French version of the Balfour Declaration used the word "*foyer*" while the Italian one used that of "*centro*." As to the German translation of the word, it was "*Heimstätte*." Sidebotham also pointed out that the expression "Commonwealth" or "Autonomous Commonwealth" is not synonymous with national home,³¹ and that the expression "The Jewish National Home" in the Balfour Declaration was interpreted until 1919, as "the Jewish state." He explained that the Jewish state was "one that gave equal rights to all Palestinian citizens, irrespective of race" and that there was little doubt that "that was the meaning in Balfour's mind when he made his

(29) Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

(30) Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

(31) Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine, op. cit.*, p. 64.

promise." He, however, expressed his belief that the three years to come (1919-1922) were to see "a great limitation of this original ideal."³²

While the Gentile Zionists outran the Jews by insisting on a Jewish state with wide boundaries to insure economic development and security, Weizmann, on the other hand, adopted the principle of "gradualism." In May 1917, he declared while negotiations were going on:

"One hears from our friends, both Jewish and non-Jewish that it is the endeavour of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state in Palestine . . . we cannot consider (such opinions) as safe statesmanship. Strong as the Zionist Movement may be . . . it must yet be admitted that conditions are not yet ripe for the setting up of a State ad hoc. States must be built up slowly, gradually, systematically and patiently. We therefore say that, while the creation of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine is our final ideal . . . the way to achieve it lies through a series of intermediary stages."³³

As to the desired boundaries of Palestine, Weizmann kept asking for their delineation all through the period which followed the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. He openly expressed his views in this respect during the interview he gave to Walter Duranty on February 28, 1919: "Fixation of the boundaries of Palestine: The whole of Palestine from the Lebanon Province to the Egyptian frontier and from the sea to the Hedjaz will be open to Jewish settlement, which will ultimately develop into an autonomous Jewish Commonwealth."³⁴

Among the books published in 1917 under the auspices of the British Palestine Committee, two deserve our attention. They were written by the British Zionist historian, Albert Hyamson; the first one was published under the title, *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*.³⁵ It reproduced the map included in the book *Zionism and the Jewish Future* and tried to distinguish the religious Zionist from the secular stressing that the first was living of hopes, not of actions. "To him," Hyamson explained, "the Messiah will come and Israel will be restored to his heritage 'in God's good time.' To attempt to hasten that time would be ineffective; it would be an endeavour to force the hand of Providence—almost a blasphemy."³⁶ The second book, *British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews*,³⁷ was published by the British Palestine Committee itself. Its author surveyed the British efforts to settle the Jews in Palestine and restore the old kingdom of Israel. He enumerated the projects carried out by the British in terms of religious, political and colonialist missions aimed at resettling the Jews in Palestine and establishing for them a new state in the country of others.

It is evident that these two books represent another manifestation of the alliance through the Balfour Declaration of deep-rooted British colonialism with that newly introduced colonialism of Zionism which enjoyed the official sympathy of Britain and the protection of its coming Mandate.

(32) *Ibid.*, p. 66.

(33) Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

(34) *Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, Esco Foundation, Vol. I, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947), p. 162.

(35) Albert Hyamson, *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*, (Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1917).

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 161.

(37) Albert Hyamson, *British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews* (London, 1917).

PART THREE

FROM BALFOUR TO BEN GURION

AFTER THE DECLARATION

1918 - 1924

Immediately after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist Organisation published a manifesto signed by Sokolow, Tschlenow and Weizmann stating that the period of Expectation had ended while "the period which now begins is Fulfilment." With the British Declaration, the aspirations of 1897 had found "solid ground," which in itself, is "a gigantic step forward."¹ The commentators endeavoured to discover whether the Balfour Declaration envisaged the foundation of a Jewish state in Palestine under the protection of the Allies or the creation of a Jewish republic there. The editor of the *Manchester Guardian* wrote on November 10, 1917, when the text of Lord Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild was released:

"What it means is that, assuming our military successes to be continued and the whole of Palestine brought securely under our control, then at the conclusion of peace our deliberate policy will be to encourage in every way in our power Jewish immigration, to give full security, and no doubt a large measure of local autonomy to the Jewish immigrants, with a view to the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State."²

The Zionists' alliance with Britain was about to produce tangible results with the assurances given by the Balfour Declaration. They had already registered their first success with the "secret" Sykes-Picot Agreement which had put Palestine (the brown area) under the joint control of the Allies. What they were contemplating now was to avoid the internationalization of this area and secure the British protectorate for it while hoping to make its frontiers coincide with their immediate aspirations and demands.

While discussing the Sykes-Picot Agreement, we ought to mention the disclosure by the Russian Foreign office of the terms of the secret treaties among which was the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky, issued orders for publishing the texts of the secret treaties found in the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The *Manchester Guardian* was the first paper in Britain to publish the treaties after they had been communicated to it by telegraph from its correspondent in Petrograd, Mr. Philips Price. They

(1) Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 124-127.

(2) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 111-112.

appeared in its issue of November 26 and 28, 1917.³ They led to a number of embarrassing questions in the House of Commons to which Mr. Balfour, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied: "The documents in question ought not to have been published, and I do not propose to republish them"; and he added: "Of course, a lot of the documents have nothing whatever to do with this country; they have got to do with the Governments of our Allies, and the notion that we should republish documents relating to our Allies is, I should have thought, too absurd to deserve attention."⁴

But the Turks did not share Balfour's views in this respect. They thought the matter deserved their attention. By the end of November, Jemal Pasha dispatched a secret emissary to carry letters to Amir Faisal and to Ja'far Pasha. Both letters "stressed the significance of the Sykes-Picot Agreement as proving that the Arabs had suffered themselves to be duped by the Allies,"⁵ while the letter to Faisal was an invitation for a Turco-Arab peace entente. The moment Husain was informed about the contents of the letters, he instructed Faisal to reject the Turkish peace overtures and forwarded the whole correspondence to the British High Commissioner in Egypt asking him to explain the secret Agreement mentioned by Jemal Pasha. Wingate referred the matter to the Foreign Office and Balfour telegraphed the text of a message to King Husain, of which, states Antonius, "the least that can be said is that it was a piece of deliberate equivocation."⁶ In fact, the Foreign Office "did not admit or deny the authenticity of the Petrograd disclosures, but gave a misleading presentation of the character and scope of the Agreement in terms implying that Husain should regard Jemal's version as another instance of Turkish intrigue."⁷ The message was conveyed to Husain from Wingate and concluded "with an emphatic assurance that Great Britain, in accordance with her former pledge, would stand by the Arabs in their struggle for liberation and assist them in obtaining their freedom."⁸ With his faith "in British standards of fair dealing" still unshaken, Husain "took the disingenuous message at its face value and set his mind at rest."⁹ The Balfour Declaration had been issued three weeks earlier. When King Husain heard about it, he asked for the "definition of the meaning and scope of the Declaration." His Majesty's Government entrusted Commander Hogarth, one of the heads of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, with the task of delivering a message to the Arab King. He assured him, on behalf of the British Government, that "Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with *the political and economic freedom of the Arab population.*"¹⁰ The phrase italicized by Antonius,

(3) Zeine N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria* (Khayat's, Beirut, 1960), pp. 20-21.

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) Antonius, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 257.

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 258.

(9) *Ibid.*

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 268.

and which Husain himself had taken down since the message had been delivered orally, represents, according to the Arab historian, "a fundamental departure from the text of the Balfour Declaration which purports to guarantee only *the civil and religious rights* of the Arab population."¹¹ Husain, reassured, replied that "in so far as the aims of the Balfour Declaration was to provide a refuge to Jews from persecution, he would use all his influence to further that aim."¹² Yet, he made it clear that "there could be no question of surrendering the Arab claim to sovereignty." His faith in Britain's loyalty made him order the publication of an article "calling upon the Arab population in Palestine to bear in mind that their sacred books and their traditions enjoined upon them the duties of hospitality and tolerance, and exhorting them to welcome the Jews as brethren and co-operate with them for the common welfare."¹³ As pointed out by Antonius, the article is historically valuable "not only as an instance of [Husain's] freedom from religious prejudice or fanaticism, but also as reflecting the general Arab attitude towards Jewry."¹⁴ Zionism did not hesitate to take advantage of this position and use it to its own ends. Was the Zionist "utilization" of King Husain's magnanimity and his sons' compliance to his instructions to respect the "duties of hospitality and tolerance" a tacit acceptance of the Zionist ambitions in Palestine. Or was the picture drawn for Husain of the aim of the Balfour Declaration to provide "a refuge to Jews from persecution" not correspondent with the Zionists' own views of the contents of the Declaration? Answering the second question is by far easier than stopping at the first one. It is not unlikely that, in Husain's mind, Palestine did not extend beyond the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem which was separated from the Damascus vilayet in 1887 and fell under the direct control of the Sublime Porte. The historic "Palestine" the Zionists claimed to reconstitute with the help of the British, did not exist except in history books. The war with Turkey was to offer Herbert Samuel the opportunity of writing a memorandum centering around the future of Palestine. Then came the brown area of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the "Palestine" of the Balfour Declaration. What makes us endorse this view is Sherif Husain's refusal, in his correspondence with McMahon, to exclude the two vilayets of Beirut and Aleppo and their maritime coasts from the Arab kingdom for, he wrote "these are purely Arab provinces." From 1888 on, the new Beirut vilayet included the following sanjaks: Latakia, Tripoli, Acre and Nablus while, since then, natural Syria consisted of the vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut in addition to the two independent Mutasarrifiyyahs of Jerusalem and Mount Lebanon.

Thus, we see King Husain speaking, in his reply to commander Hogarth, of the "safeguard and control of the Holy Places by the adherents of each of the creeds who had sanctuaries in Palestine."¹⁵

(11) *Ibid.*

(12) *Ibid.*

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 269.

(14) *Ibid.*

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 268.

Had the king realized the implications of the Zionist alliance with Britain with respect to the brown area of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, we could say that such a tacit acceptance of the Zionist regional and expansionist ambitions in Palestine did exist. It is no wonder he was ready to help in the implementation of the Balfour Declaration after he had understood or been made to understand that the aim behind it was to provide a refuge to Jews from persecution. It is sufficient to note that he stressed the Arab claim to sovereignty making it plain that "there could be no question of surrendering it."

But the British-Zionist scheme became effective after the British forces conquered Jerusalem on December 9, 1917. It is worthwhile mentioning here that Faisal's forces had occupied Aqaba on July 6, 1917, and the war operations had thus come to extend over the south and the southeast of the Dead Sea. Three weeks after the occupation of Aqaba, the British War Office ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson to form a Jewish Regiment (38th Battalion). By the end of January 1918, this regiment, which counted five thousand men at the end of the war, was ordered to proceed on Active Service to Palestine. Meanwhile, a Zionist Commission was to leave England on March 8, for Palestine also. It was headed by Weizmann and carried letters of introduction from Lloyd George and Balfour to General Allenby. In *Trial and Error*, Weizmann simply remarked that "His Majesty's Government decided to send a Zionist commission to Palestine to survey the situation and to prepare plans in the spirit of the Balfour Declaration."¹⁶ But other sources have argued that the aim was "to assist in the rehabilitation of the *Yishuv*, to act as liaison officers between the government and the Jewish community, and to lay the foundation for the establishment of the Jewish National Home."¹⁷

It was not easy for a commission of this sort to fulfill these duties since the war had not ended yet. In June 1918, the Jordan valley was still in Turkish hands. Weizmann and Ormsby-Gore could not reach Faisal's headquarters in Trans-Jordan except by passing through Suez and going along the coast to Aqaba, then to the Araba valley and from there to Trans-Jordan. Secondly, that the commission acted as a liaison officer between the government and the Jewish community in Palestine makes us wonder what this government was. It might very well be that the aim behind it was to make the commission appear as a liaison commission between the military forces of occupation (General Allenby) and the Jews of Palestine, except that one wonders why the Jews, with their private courts of justice and their numerous organizations, should need such a mediator or liaison officer with the occupying authorities. We are thus left with the third purpose, to lay the foundation of the Jewish National Home; it is the nearest to Weizmann's statement on the preparation of plans in the spirit of the Balfour Declaration. This leads us to conclude that the purpose of the Zionist Commission was to implement the terms of the Balfour Declaration.

(16) Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

(17) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 128-129.

On December 18, 1918, the commission submitted an "outline for the Provisional Government of Palestine" to the Zionist authorities for their consideration in presenting the Jewish case before the Peace Conference. It can be summarized as follows:

"Palestine should be recognised as the National Homeland, in the affairs of which the Jewish people, as a whole, shall have a determining voice. England should be the trustee. A Jewish colonization society should be created with the sanction of the League of Nations.

"The colonization society should have broad powers: to organize Jewish immigration; to take over state lands and develop them; to obtain government concessions to construct railroads, harbors and irrigation works; to administer the agrarian bank of the former Ottoman government; to have the exclusive right to develop all subsurface natural resources; to establish new agrarian institutions; and to grant concessions for these purposes.

"The proposals aimed to bring about a large Jewish majority but, at the same time, to guarantee the rights of the various national and religious groups in all religious, cultural and philanthropic matters. Arabic as well as Hebrew were to be recognized as official languages. However, the purpose of creating a Jewish Homeland should receive recognition by adopting the name of *Eretz Israel* for the land and by recognizing the Jewish flag as the flag of the country.

"The principal administrative agency of the land was to be an executive committee over whose action the Governor General should have veto power. The executive committee should have jurisdiction over all matters except military and foreign affairs, the protection of places holy to non-Jews and their religious, educational and communal affairs."¹⁸

At about the same time, the American Jewish Congress was meeting in Philadelphia. It adopted a resolution, instructing its delegates to the Peace Conference to cooperate with the World Zionist Organization to the end that "the Peace Conference may recognize the aspirations and historic claims of the Jewish people in regard to Palestine . . . and there should be established such political, administrative and economic conditions in Palestine as will assure, under the trusteeship of Great Britain acting on behalf of such a League of Nations as may be formed, *the development of Palestine into a Jewish Commonwealth . . .*"¹⁹ The resolution also mentioned the traditional expression of the second part of the Balfour Declaration stating that "nothing shall be done which shall prejudice the existing rights of non-Jewish Communities in Palestine."²⁰

The issue of the historical claims of Jews to Palestine was considered by the following American Jewish Congress of March 2, 1919. A comprehensive memorandum on "The Jewish Title to Palestine" was submitted to Wilson. Palestine was claimed as "the historic home of the Jews" while the duty of the government was "to help the Jews to continue the development which they had already begun."²¹ The memorandum also stated:

"Until such a period when the people of Palestine were prepared to establish a representative and responsible government, the following terms were essential:

1. In any instrument establishing the constitution of Palestine, the declaration of the Peace Conference shall be recited as forming an integral part of such constitution.

(18) *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 153.

(20) *Ibid.*

(21) *Ibid.*, p. 154.

2. The Jewish people shall be entitled to fair representation in the executive and legislative bodies and in the selection of public and civil servants.

3. In encouraging the self-government of localities, the mandatory or trustee shall secure the maintenance by local communities of proper standards of administration in matters of education and communal or regional activities. In granting or enlarging autonomy, regard shall be had to the readiness and ability of the community to attain such standards. Local autonomous communities shall be empowered and encouraged to combine and cooperate for common purposes.

4. Assistance shall be rendered from the public funds for the education of the inhabitants without distinction of race or creed. Hebrew shall be one of the official languages and shall be employed in all documents, decrees and announcements issued by the Government.

5. The Jewish Sabbath and Holy Days shall be recognized as legal days of rest.

6. The established rights of the present population shall be equitably safeguarded.

7. All inhabitants of Palestine who, on a date to be specified, shall have their domicile therein, except those who, within a period to be stated, shall in writing elect to retain their citizenship in any other country, shall be citizens of Palestine, and they and all persons born in Palestine or naturalized under its laws after the day named shall be citizens thereof and entitled to the protection of the mandatory or trustee."²²

Also, the American commission of experts submitted to President Wilson the results of its work together with the following recommendations in connection with Palestine:

"PALESTINE

It is recommended:

- 1) That there be established a separate state of Palestine.
- 2) That this state be placed under Great Britain as a mandatory of the League of Nations.
- 3) That the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle there, being assured by the conference of all proper assistance in so doing that may be consistent with the protection of the personal (especially the religious) and the property rights of the non-Jewish population, and being further assured that it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact.
- 4) That the holy places and religious rights of all creeds in Palestine be placed under the protection of the League of Nations and its mandatory.

DISCUSSION

Ad 1) The separation of the Palestinian area from Syria finds justification in the religious experience of mankind. The Jewish and Christian churches were born in Palestine, and Jerusalem was for long years, at

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 154.

different periods, the capital of each. And while the relation of the Mohammedans to Palestine is not so intimate, from the beginning they have regarded Jerusalem as a holy place. Only by establishing Palestine as a separate state can justice be done to these great facts.

As drawn upon the map, the new state would control its own source of water power and irrigation, on Mount Hermon in the east to the Jordan; a feature of great importance since the success of the new state would depend upon the possibilities of agricultural development.

- Ad 2) Palestine would obviously need wise and firm guidance. Its population is without political experience, is racially composite, and could easily become distracted by fanaticism and bitter religious differences.

The success of Great Britain in dealing with similar situations, her relation to Egypt, and her administrative achievements since General Allenby freed Palestine from the Turk, all indicate her as the logical mandatory.

- Ad 3) It is right that Palestine should become a Jewish state, if the Jews, being given full opportunity, make it such. It was the cradle and home of their vital race, which has made large spiritual contributions to mankind, and is the only land in which they can hope to find a home of their own, they being in this last respect unique among significant peoples.

At present, however, the Jews form barely a sixth of the total population of 700,000 in Palestine, and whether they are to form a majority, or even a plurality, of the population in the future state remains uncertain. Palestine in short, is far from being a Jewish country now. England as mandatory, can be relied on to give the Jews the privileged position they should have without sacrificing the rights of non-Jews.

- Ad 4) The basis of this recommendation is self-evident."²³

(23) Dr. Nathan Feinberg, *Some Problems of the Palestine Mandate*, (Shoshan's, Tel-Aviv, 1936), pp. 28-30.

THE ZIONIST MEMORANDUM TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Before proceeding to the survey of the official Zionist demands—as submitted by the World Organization to the Peace Conference for examination—we will examine the chain of events which occurred during the first phases of the developments in the war which ended with the signature of the Armistice (October 30, 1918) and the ceasefire declaration of Thursday, October 31, 1918.

On 3 October 1918, Prince Faisal entered Damascus. Lawrence preceded him, while Allenby arrived on the same day to execute the orders of the British Foreign Office and the War Office, namely, "Choke off Faisal and Lawrence. Dam the Arab torrent. Remember the Sykes-Picot Agreement." The General pointed out to Faisal that the war was not over and that the territory occupied by his forces which would be under the administration of Britain for the time being, was "enemy territory." Reminding him of the "secret" Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain, he explained that he had been asked "to allow the French to take over control of the 'Blue' zone which represented Syria west of Damascus and Aleppo and which included the chief town of Beirut and the Lebanon."¹ In addition, he informed both Faisal and Lawrence that he had received a cable from the British War Office recognizing the Arabs as "belligerents" while, on the other hand, he expressed his readiness to recognize an Arab administration under Faisal from Akaba to Ma'an, including Damascus. He then asked Prince Faisal to agree on the appointment of two liaison officers, one British and the other French, between the Arab administration and two Allied governments, and to "accept the situation till the peace settlement."²

Prince Faisal had to accede. With the knowledge and approval of General Allenby, he established an Arab administration over Syria on October 5, 1918. On October 25, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo fell into the hands of the Arabs and British forces compelled the Turkish troops to surrender. Four hundred years had passed since the victory of the armies of the Ottoman Sultan Salim in the battle of Marj Dabiq, north of Aleppo. The armistice was signed with Turkey and the Arab's first concern, then, was when Britain would carry out its wartime commitment. Allenby gave official assurances that the measures taken by the military command were provisional and that they would not be allowed to influence the final settlement at the Peace Conference or prejudice Arab aspirations. What were these measures which the Allied military command had taken a few weeks before the signature of the armistice? In reality, they were nothing but the implementation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The areas which the Allied

(1) Zeine, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 30.

forces had occupied, after having denied their access to the Arab troops, were those which were under the effective control of the Ottoman Empire and which formed the Arab provinces under Ottoman administrative rule. The Allies immediately designated them as "Occupied Enemy Territories" and insisted on this designation, giving the "temporary" character of their decision as an excuse.

On 23 October 1918—before the signature of the armistice and after Weizmann's return to London—General Allenby reported to the British War Office that he had divided the "enemy territory," in each of Syria and Palestine, into the three following administrative areas:

1. Occupied Enemy Territory South (O.E.T.S.)
2. Occupied Enemy Territory North (O.E.T.N.)
3. Occupied Enemy Territory East (O.E.T.E.)

The O.E.T.S. was the "brown area" on the map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It included Palestine from the Egyptian frontiers to Acre on the north and to the Jordan River on the east. The O.E.T.N. was the "blue" zone which extended from north of Acre to Alexandretta, while the O.E.T.E. included portions of "Zone A" in which Faisal had already established his Arab government in Damascus and of "Zone B." Later on, the O.E.T.N. was put under the French Military Governor while Britain considered the O.E.T.E. as its share. The British focused their attention on convincing their French allies to leave the southern area (the brown area which the Sykes-Picot Agreement intended to internationalize) under Britain's military control. Iraq (both the Mosul and the Baghdad provinces) remained out of the scope of these measures and fell under the direct control of the British.

Turkey thus collapsed and the Arab Near East fell under the control of Great Britain and France. "This crucial fact alone," the Arab historian, Zeine N. Zeine, rightly remarked, "was perhaps more important than all the commitments and pledges given during the War." He then explained:

"For the first time since the Crusades, Jerusalem and the whole coast of what was then known as 'Syria' were once more occupied by foreign Christian forces, while Christian Powers had in their hands the destiny of the twin historic capitals of the once vast and mighty Muslim Empire: Damascus of Umayyad fame, and Bagdad of Abbasid grandeur."³

Early in November 1918, the Allies having realized Arab fears and suspicions about what had happened up to that time, issued a joint declaration which reflected in certain passages Wilson's ideas. It was published simultaneously in London, Paris, New York, and Cairo, and its object was to reveal the "policy which the two Allied Governments uphold in the liberated territories." It was considered by the Arabs as an amendment to the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement while Prince Faisal described it, on November 11, the Day of the Armistice, as "one of the great documents of history" which reflected "noble humanitarian sentiments."⁴

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 46.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 49.

The following is the English text of the said Anglo-French Declaration:

"The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

In order to carry out these intentions, France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing, and recognizing these as soon as they are actually established.

Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions, they are only concerned to ensure by their support and adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves. To secure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative, to favour the diffusion of education, to put an end to dissensions that have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish policy . . ."⁵

But, the "Agreement" which the joint declaration expressed, in spite of its compliance with Wilson's ideas, was not meant to depart from the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. On November 6, 1918, Mr. Georges Picot landed in Beirut as "Haut-Commissaire de la République Française en Syrie et en Arménie." The French suspicions of the British intentions greatly increased, and they felt that the continued presence of the British army in Syria would encourage the elements which were hostile to them. Efforts were made to reach a preliminary agreement prior to the convening of the Peace Conference. The amendment of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was first considered, and Clemenceau went with Marshall Foch to London on December 1 to prepare, in consultation with Allied statesmen, for the Inter-Allied Preliminaries Peace Conference. While Faisal who had arrived in Marseilles on board a British cruiser, the "Gloucester" on November 26, was visiting the battlefields of the western front, Clemenceau and Lloyd George were meeting between December 1 and 4 to modify the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. France convinced Britain to confirm its rights over Syria and Cilicia while, in return, Britain asked that Palestine (the brown area on the map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement) and the province of Mosul fall under its protectorate. In his book, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, Lloyd George related what had happened during that meeting. He wrote:

"When Clemenceau came to London after the War I drove him to the French Embassy . . . After we reached the Embassy he asked me what it was that I specially wanted from the French. I instantly replied that I wanted Mosul attached to Irak, and Palestine from Dan to Beersheba under British Control. Without any hesitation he agreed . . ."⁶

Lloyd George succeeded in replacing the international control over Palestine by a British one. He also claimed wider frontiers for Palestine than had been agreed by Sykes in the past. He called, in fact, for the old Palestine "from Dan

(5) *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

(6) Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, Vol. II, p. 1038; see also Zeine, *ibid.*, p. 59.

to Beersheba," while the brown area which Sykes had discussed with the Zionist leaders reached the city of Acre in the north, leaving the area of Galilee outside the scope of the brown territory.

On December 4, after the conclusion of Lloyd George's secret negotiations with Clemenceau, Weizmann hurried to the British Foreign Office where he reopened his discussions with Balfour and informed him of the proposals the Zionist leaders wished to submit to the Peace Conference through the British government. They consisted of the following:

"1. Recognition of the historical and national rights of Jews to Palestine, always with the proviso that the legitimate interests of the non-Jewish population would be fully safeguarded;

"2. Appointment of a Trustee for Palestine, it being understood that the Zionists would name Great Britain;

"3. Designation of an organization representing the Jewish people which would be empowered to make arrangements with the Trustee power necessary for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home."⁷

Balfour expressed his readiness to accept these recommendations and explained that the Zionists would probably be able to present their proposals directly to the Peace Conference. He reiterated Britain's positive policy *vis à vis* the Jewish national home and future support at the Peace Conference. Weizmann expressed his satisfaction in this respect and declared that if these conditions were granted, the Zionists would indeed have "more than the Basle Program."

The Zionists' attention was then diverted to Prince Faisal who had arrived in London on 10 December 1918. A few days before the Arab Prince left the British capital early in 1919, the British government succeeded, with Lawrence's help, in convincing him to conclude an agreement and cooperate with the Zionists in Palestine. On 3 January 1919, the so-called Faisal-Weizmann agreement was apparently signed. We could not know exactly what transpired between Faisal and the British Foreign Office then or what pressures the British had exerted on the Arab Prince. Did he agree to the British advice to accept French control in Syria or was he simply forced to admit that "Great Britain had no intention of falling out with France on Syrian questions"?

Dr. Zeine argued that Faisal's stay in London gave him the opportunity "to become fully acquainted, for the first time, with the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its far-reaching implications." The Prince was also able to see the map of that Agreement "which pushed the Arabs back into the desert," and he had to face the "bitter truth."⁸

What is important for our purposes is Faisal's stipulation which was inscribed in the space immediately following the last Article. He wrote:

"Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated the 4th of January, 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made [*sc.* in relation to the demands in the Memorandum] I shall

(7) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 155.

(8) Zeine, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever."⁹

Was this stipulation added to the text after the said Memorandum was submitted on 4 January 1919? What was that Memorandum? Was it actually submitted, or was Prince Faisal referring to the Memorandum which he had presented to the Peace Conference and which was dated 1 January 1919?

George Antonius explained that "from the internal evidence in the text of Faisal's stipulation, it seems probable that it was signed on a later date, and in any case not earlier than January 4."¹⁰ On this basis, we might be able to put the Memorandum dated January 4 in its proper perspective. The Memorandum which was submitted to the Peace Conference and which Dr. Zeine reproduced in the appendix to his above-mentioned book, appeared in David Hunter Miller's fourth volume of *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* under the title "Memorandum No. 250": 1 January 1919. The Peace Conference was inaugurated in Paris on 18 January. Had the Memorandum been submitted before the convening of the congress, or later on 29 January? In any case, Prince Faisal declared in his Memorandum of 1 January that "the country from a line Alexandretta-Persia southward to the Indian Ocean is inhabited by 'Arabs'—by which we mean people of closely related Semitic stocks, all speaking the one language, Arabic. The non-Arabic-speaking elements in this area do not, I believe, exceed one per cent of the whole."¹¹ He further explained that "the aim of the Arab nationalist movements is to unite Arabs eventually into one nation" and pointed to the general principles of such union which were "accepted by the Allies when the United States joined them, to our splendid past, to the tenacity with which our race has for 600 years resisted Turkish attempts to absorb us, and, in a lesser degree, to what we tried our best to do in this war as one of the Allies."¹² In relation to Palestine, he wrote:

"In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country."¹³

Regarding the pressures exerted on Faisal by the British during his visit to London, we will refer the reader to George Antonius' book, *The Arab Awakening*, which discusses this question at length (pp. 283-286). We will mention here through the author's remark, that Faisal "took the only course that in the circumstances he

(9) Antonius, *op. cit.*, Appendix F, p. 439.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 437.

(11) Zeine, *op. cit.*, Appendix C, p. 248.

(12) *Ibid.*

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 250.

felt was open to him." Commenting on the importance and significance of the Agreement, Antonius wrote: "...and, since the condition which he attached was not fulfilled, the Agreement never acquired validity. Its main interest is in the evidence it affords of the lengths to which Faisal was prepared to go in the sense of Arab-Jewish co-operation so long as that did not conflict with Arab independence."¹⁴

We will now proceed with our discussion of the Zionist moves early in 1919. In January a group of leading members of the Zionist Organization met in London to formulate the official policy of the Movement before the convening of the Peace Conference. Herbert Samuel was asked to draft a program "in a form suitable for presentation to the Foreign Office."¹⁵ Towards the end of the month, the Foreign Office advised them to submit their proposals directly to the secretariat of the Peace Conference. It also informed them that it would accept the Mandate only if "certain of the proposals considered excessive were eliminated," namely the demand that the head of the government in Palestine as well as the majority of the government officials should belong to the Jewish community.¹⁶ Certain changes were made, and on February 3, 1919, the draft was submitted in its final form to the Peace Conference under the title "Statement of the Zionist Organization regarding Palestine." It constituted the official Jewish proposals to the Peace Conference and requested that the "High Contracting Parties recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home." As to the aspect which falls under the scope of this study, it consists of the second proposal, namely that "the boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared in the Schedule annexed hereto":

"THE BOUNDARIES OF PALESTINE

SCHEDULE

The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out below:

Starting on the North at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon as far as JISR EL KARAON, thence to EL BIRE, following the dividing line between the two basins of the WADI EL KORN and the WADI EL TEIM thence in a southerly direction following the dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes of the HERMON, to the vicinity West of BEIT JENN, thence Eastward following the northern watersheds of the Nahr Mughaniye close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway.

In the East a line close to and West of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the Gulf of Akaba.

In the South a frontier to be agreed upon with the Egyptian Government.

In the West the Mediterranean Sea.

The details of the delimitations, or any necessary adjustments of detail, shall be settled by a Special Commission on which there shall be Jewish representation."¹⁷

(14) Antonius, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-286.

(15) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 156.

(16) *Ibid.*

(17) Hurewitz, *op. cit.*; Vol. II, p. 46.

The document went on to present what it designated as "The Historic Title" of the Jews to Palestine. Then, based on the decision of both the Jewish American Congress and the Congress of the Palestinian Jews in Jaffa, it requested that Great Britain be the Mandatory of the League of Nations, and advanced the following argument to justify the boundaries of Palestine outlined above:

"The boundaries above outlined are what we consider essential for the necessary economic foundation of the country. Palestine must have its natural outlets to the seas and the control of its rivers and their headwaters. The boundaries are sketched with the general economic needs and historic traditions of the country in mind, factors which necessarily must also be considered by the Special Commission in fixing the definite boundary lines. This Commission will bear in mind that it is highly desirable, in the interests of economical administration that the geographical area of Palestine should be as large as possible so that it may eventually contain a large and thriving population which could more easily bear the burdens of modern civilised government than a small country with a necessary limitation of inhabitants.

The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other semi-arid country depends on the available water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only to secure all water resources already feeding the country, but also to be able to conserve and control them at their sources.

The Hermon is Palestine's real 'Father of Waters' and cannot be severed from it without striking at the very root of its economic life. The Hermon not only needs reafforestation but also other works before it can again adequately serve as the water reservoir of the country. It must therefore be wholly under the control of those who will most willingly as well as most adequately restore it to its maximum utility. Some international arrangement must be made whereby the riparian rights of the people dwelling south of the Litani River may be fully protected. Properly cared for these headwaters can be made to serve in the development of the Lebanon as well as of Palestine.

The fertile plains east of the Jordan, since the earliest Biblical times, have been linked economically and politically with the land west of the Jordan. The country which is now very sparsely populated, in Roman times supported a great population. It could now serve admirably for colonisation on a large scale. A just regard for the economic needs of Palestine and Arabia demands that free access to the Hedjaz Railway throughout its length be accorded both Governments.

An intensive development of the agriculture and other opportunities of Trans-jordania make it imperative that Palestine shall have access to the Red Sea and an opportunity of developing good harbours on the Gulf of Akaba. Akaba, it will be recalled, was the terminus of an important trade route of Palestine from the days of Solomon onwards. The ports developed in the Gulf of Akaba should be free ports through which the commerce of the Hinterland may pass on the same principle which guides us in suggesting that free access be given to the Hedjaz Railway."¹⁸

That is how the Zionist Organization presented its expansionist territorial demands to the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, in the form of an official document including proposals previously approved by the British Foreign Office. A few days before the Zionist delegates appeared before the Council of Ten at Paris, a meeting of the Actions Committee was called. The document was severely criticized by the Committee because certain demands, such as "giving voice to the whole Jewish people in the affairs of Palestine and recognition of the Zionist flag as the flag of Palestine," were ignored.

The Zionist Territorialist, Israel Zangwill, launched a violent campaign against the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. In an article which he published in the February 1919, issue of the review *Asia* under the title, "Before

(18) *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

the Peace Conference," he indicated what the Zionists expected from the Peace Conference. He criticized the Zionist interpretation which appeared to him as making of Palestine "a British Crown Colony with predominantly Arab population . . . [The Jewish people,]" he argued, "is to crawl into a corner of its own land like a leper colony . . ." To him, such a Palestine was "neither Jewish, nor National, nor a Home."¹⁹ He proposed the gradual resettlement of the Arabs of Palestine in the "new and vast Arabian Kingdom," reminding the reader that "Jews no less than Arabs had laid down their lives" to liberate the Jewish territories and pointing out the close friendship which the Jewish Commonwealth would cultivate with "this new Arab state."

Thus, Zangwill devised a plan which, in his opinion, would make Palestine become a Jewish national home. Quoting Lord Morley's statement that "the power of every country always resides in the land-owning classes," he proposed to get rid of the thirty thousand Arab landlords and the six hundred thousand *fellahin* and to replace them by a Jewish majority. "Only thus," he explained, "can Israel—with his diaspora of thirteen millions—be told that Palestine is his country."²⁰ But Judaism looks forward to gain also "a minor traditional hope" from the Peace Conference, namely the repossession of Palestine:

"And if this secondary consummation could be united with the setting up of Jerusalem as the seat of the League of Nations, instead of the bankrupt Hague, the two Hebraic dreams, the major and the minor, would be fused in one, and the Hebrew metropolis—that meeting-point of three world religions—would become at once the centre and symbol of the new era."²¹

Zangwill had previously made a speech on the "Balfour Declaration" on 2 December 1917, in which he discussed the deep-rooted tradition of British support for the Jewish cause. He said:

"Seven crusades to the Holy Land have all meant massacre for the Jews; if the Eighth Crusade is to mean Palestine for the Jews, if it is to be truly a Christian Crusade, then that very fact is a proof of a new world-order of love and justice."²²

Obviously, Zangwill had been constantly thinking of this eighth crusade since the formation of the Jewish regiments on which, according to Colonel Patterson, "the whole military movement was pivoted." For Zangwill, this Jewish unit was to play an important role in the establishment of the Jewish state and the repossession of Palestine. Furthermore, one can detect the expansionist tendency of his thinking when he called for the liberation and unification of all the parts of the Jewish homeland: *Judeae Irredenta*.

When Nahum Sokolow's first volume of the *History of Zionism* was published in 1919, Zangwill reviewed it in an article entitled "Palestine Regained." He crit-

(19) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, Vol. I., pp. 158-159.

(20) Maurice Simon (ed.), *Speeches, Articles and Letters of Israel Zangwill* (London, 1937), p. 341.

(21) *Ibid.*, pp. 339-340.

(22) *Ibid.*, pp. 336-337.

icized France's attitude towards modern Zionism and pointed out that "the Turkish Empire knows not Palestine: it has been wilfully submerged under two vilayets and a sanjak. And in the same spirit France would submerge it in Syria."²³ He also mentioned Britain's positive attitude towards the Zionist Movement, and speaking of the Holy Places he declared:

"The question of the Holy Places can be easily solved: The Holy Sepulchre can be guarded by Jews converted to Christianity, and the Mosque of Omar by Jews converted to Mohammedanism."²⁴

A number of books on the frontiers of Palestine were published in 1919, and thereafter. Among them we will mention:

1. *Norman Bentwitch's—Palestine of the Jews*²⁵ which includes a map of Palestine from Beirut to the Gulf. To him, the future Palestine did not need to confine itself to its historic frontiers. Colonization and settlement might be extended to include the whole of the Promised Land (from the Euphrates to the Nile?): from the Mediterranean Sea to the Euphrates, and from the mountains of the Lebanon to the River of Egypt. This was, in his opinion, the land which was given to the chosen people, and which he did not hesitate to confess was nothing but "Greater Palestine."

2. *Arthur Ruppin*²⁶ endeavoured to define the frontiers of Palestine "with a high degree of accuracy and objectivity," arguing that the Balfour Declaration called for a clear definition of the characteristics of the land of the national home. He pointed out that until then, Palestine had not formed an independent administrative unit. It was instead distributed among the Ottoman Provinces: the two Provinces of Damascus and Beirut, and the Mutasarrifiyyah of Jerusalem. The first task was to undertake the unification of Palestine within its historic, natural, and economic frontiers so as to enable it to become an administrative unit.²⁷ He confessed that the historians and the geographers could not agree on all the points of the frontiers of Palestine. The eastern frontier of the Mediterranean Sea alone was uncontested. Introducing economic justifications for the expansion of the boundaries of Palestine, he defined them as follows:

"Concerning the historic northern frontiers, they certainly included one of the two main sources of the River Jordan, namely the one situated at Banias (near the old city of Dan). However, for economic considerations, we feel compelled to extend Palestine eastwards to include the other source of the Jordan which is in Hasbayya (Al Hasbani). The Jordan is the main river of Palestine. Its waters are most important for irrigation and for the generation of electrical power. Yet, its exploitation cannot

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 345.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 347.

(25) Norman Bentwich, *Palestine of the Jews—Past, Present and Future* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 1919).

(26) Dr. Arthur Ruppin, *Der Aufbau des Landes Israel — Ziele und wege Jüdischer Siedlungsarbeit in Palästina* (Jüdischer Verlag, Berlin, 1919).

(27) *Ibid.*, p. 60.

be carried out properly unless its sources become the property of Palestine. Since the Hasbayya is situated on the 33°27' north parallel, the northern frontiers of Palestine extend from this source of the Jordan to follow the line of the said parallel until they reach the Mediterranean Sea. East of Hasbayya, the northern frontiers run along the same parallel to Mount Hermon, then "Hauran" and finally Dara'a. On the east, historic considerations force us to include each of old Moab and Ammon, which belonged to the Jewish state, inside the eastern frontiers and expand, in turn, these frontiers till the desert.

As to the southern frontiers, they follow a line running from Rafah to the Egyptian frontiers at Akaba. From there, it crosses Ma'an on the Hedjaz railway line, and reaches the desert. Provided an agreement is reached with the Egyptian-British governments it would be most important, in this context, to extend the southern frontiers to El Arish because this arid area is suitable for afforestation and would therefore be adequate for Jewish colonization. Until now, the British government did not seem to favour settlement in this area in view of its forming a natural barrier to an eventual Turkish surprise-attack. With the disappearance of this danger, the British government would agree to a Jewish settlement in El Arish and its annexation to Palestine to which it belonged in the past."²⁸

That is Ruppin's conception of "Greater Palestine," a length of 260 kms., a width of 145 kms., and a total surface of approximately 30 thousand sq. kms. The desired frontiers of Palestine thus included, in addition to the Palestine of the Mandate, the caza of Tyr which was under the Mutasarrifiyyah of Beirut; the two cazas of El-Kirk and Es-Salt (the Mutasarrifiyyah of El-Kirk); the caza of Ajlun (the Mutasarrifiyyah of Hauran); and the caza of El-Kunaitra (the Mutasarrifiyyah of Damascus). The population counted approximately 880 thousand inhabitants whom he distributed, according to religion, as follows:

710,000 Muslims
90,000 Jews
80,000 Christians

3. *Louis Brandeis* offers the third example of this search for the historic frontiers of the Jewish national home. We have previously referred to him in relation to the Pittsburgh program which he had prepared and which was adopted by American Zionism until it became "the basis of every version of the mandate which the Americans offered to their fellow-Zionists for presentation to the Peace Council."²⁹ Early in July 1919, Brandeis had visited Palestine (the "Small California" as he said) to become familiar with its characteristics and gather the necessary information about it. Upon returning to the United States, he started calling for the necessity of afforestation and obtainment of more land to include the Gulf of Akaba.

We will simply reproduce in this respect the text of the cable which Brandeis addressed to Weizmann on February 16, 1920. It read as follows:

"Please convey Prime Minister Lloyd George following message from myself and all those associated with me in the Zionist Organization of America. . . . My associates of the Zionist Organization of America cable me from Paris that in Conference on Turkish Treaty, France now insists upon terms of Sykes-Picot agreement. If this con-

(28) *Ibid.*, pp. 60-62.

(29) Alpheus Thomas Mason, *BRANDEIS—A Free Man's Life* (Viking, New York, 1956, 1st ed. 1946), p. 455.

tion of French should prevail it would defeat full realization of promise of Jewish home for Sykes-Picot Agreement divides country in complete disregard historic boundaries and necessity. National northern and eastern boundaries indispensable to self-sustaining community and economic development of country on North. Palestine must include Litany river watersheds of Hermon on East must include Plain of Jaulan Hauran. If Balfour Declaration subscribed to by France as well as other Allied and Associated Powers is to be made effective these boundaries must be conceded to Palestine. Less than this would produce mutilation promised Home. Balfour Declaration was public promise proclaimed by your Government and subscribed to by Allied Powers, I venture to suggest that in your assuming just settlement boundaries in Palestine statesmen Christian Nations keep this solemn promise to Israel."³⁰

It is not unlikely that the new pretexts and justifications which the Zionists invoked to support their expansionist demands were inspired to a certain extent from the ideas advocated by Sir Halford John Mackinder in his book *Democratic Ideals and Reality*.³¹ Mackinder was a leading member of the school of geopolitics. He wrote this book at the end of the war period with the aim of presenting his views on the world geopolitics and enlightening the minds of the peace makers of the Congress of Versailles.

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 458.

(31) Sir Halford John Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (Britain, 1919, U.S., 1919).

THE FRONTIERS OF THE MANDATE

On January 29, 1919, Prince Faisal submitted to the Peace Conference his second memorandum which read as follows:

"As representing my father who, by request of Britain and France, led the Arab rebellion against the Turks, I have come to ask that the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarbekr southward to the Indian Ocean, be recognized as independent sovereign peoples, under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The Hedjaz, which is already a sovereign State, and Aden, which is a British dependency are excluded from the Arab demand. The confirmation of the States already existing in the area, the adjustment of their boundaries with one another, with the Hedjaz, and with the British at Aden, and the formation of such new states as are required, and their boundaries, are matters of arrangement between us, after the wishes of their respective inhabitants have been ascertained . . . I base my request on the principles enunciated by President Wilson and am confident that the Powers will attach more importance to the bodies and souls of the Arabic-speaking peoples than to their own material interests."¹

Early in February of the same year, in an address to the same Conference, Faisal defined the claims of the Arab peoples to self-determination in conformity with the principles of the mandatory system. He summed up these demands in the following manner:

1. Recognition of the geographical unity and independence of the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, under the rule of his father, King Husain,
2. Fulfilment of the promises for complete independence previously made to the Arabs, and
3. Recognition of the independence of Syria, provided the latter will seek the help of foreign counselors whenever necessary and will work in close cooperation with the Government of the Hedjaz for matters of foreign policy."²

Britain and France succeeded in making Wilson incorporate a new article related to the mandatory system into the Treaty of Versailles. It was Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which the American President had brought with him from Washington. Thus, the implementation of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was made possible under the banner of the League of Nations. Membership in the League was conditional to the ratification of the covenant. King Husain rejected the covenant and refused to sign the agreement related to the mandate system considering it as a new imperialist device. He was consequently denied membership in the League.³

As soon as Wilson returned to pursue the work of the Peace Conference—after an absence of one month in the U.S. (February 14 to March 14, 1919)—the Allies renewed efforts to gain American approval of the secret agreements related

(1) Antonius, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-287

(2) Amin Said, *Secrets of the Great Arab Revolt*, pp. 280-281.

(3) *Ibid.*, pp. 278 and 280.

to the partition of Turkey and to solve the "Syrian question." Britain had, on February 15, 1919, already secured the formal consent of France to transfer the vilayet of Mosul to the British sphere of influence and to British control of Palestine instead of internationalization.⁴

Negotiations for the appointment of an Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry to visit Syria and Palestine and ascertain the wishes of the population regarding the Mandate, began taking place. Wilson insisted on finding out whether the French and the British Mandates would be welcomed in Syria and Iraq respectively. The matter was submitted to formal discussion at a meeting held by the Big Four on March 20, 1919, and on March 25, agreement was reached, in spite of British and French reluctance to send a Commission representing the U.S., Britain, France, and Italy. The Zionist Organization opposed the idea and sided with the two Allies, which made President Wilson insist more and more on an exhaustive investigation "on the spot." An American delegation, known as the King-Crane Commission, was thus sent alone and arrived at Jaffa on June 10 of the same year. Zionist fears grew stronger and they made every effort to complicate the work of the commission. Felix Frankfurter was asked to write President Wilson on their behalf "expressing his fears lest the appointment of the Inter-Allied Commission would postpone the Near Eastern settlement beyond Wilson's stay in Paris and lead ultimately to a disposition of the problem contrary to the Balfour Declaration, on which Zionist hopes had centered."⁵ In answer to Frankfurter's request for renewed assurance of Wilson's adherence to the Declaration, the American President remarked that he did not deem it necessary.

Meanwhile, Faisal had left for Syria. He landed at Beirut on April 30, and upon returning to Damascus, issued a statement on May 1 to the "Sons of dear Syria" in which he announced to them that "it had been agreed, in principle in Paris, to grant Syria its independence and to send an International Commission of Inquiry."

On July 2 of the same year, the General Syrian Congress, composed of delegates from the three zones and "furnished with credentials" duly authorizing them to represent the inhabitants of the country, submitted a list of the people's aspirations to the American section of the Inter-Allied Commission. It began as follows:

"1. We desire full and absolute political independence for Syria within the following boundaries: on the north, the Taurus Range; on the south, a line running from Rafah to al-Jauf and following the Syria-Hedjaz border below Akaba; on the east, the boundary formed by the Euphrates and Khabur rivers and a line stretching from some distance of Abu-Kamal to some distance east of al-Jauf; on the west, the Mediterranean Sea"⁶—(with no protectorate and no mandate).

The resolutions of the General Syrian Congress went on to express the people's desire for a "constitutional monarchy based on principles of democratic

(4) Harry K. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission—An American Inquiry in the Middle East* (Khayats, Beirut, 1963), p. 9.

(5) Zeine, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

(6) Antonius, *op. cit.*, Appendix G, p. 440.

and broadly decentralised rule” and its decision to “seek assistance in the technical and economic fields from the United States of America on the understanding that the duration of such assistance shall not exceed twenty years.” The sixth clause expressed the denial of the French government’s right to any part of Syria. As to the seventh and eighth clauses of the resolutions, they read as follows:

“We reject the claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine, and we are opposed to Jewish immigration into any part of the country. We do not acknowledge that they have a title, and we regard their claims as a grave menace to our national, political and economic life. Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in common. We desire that there should be no dismemberment of Syria, and no separation of Palestine or the coastal regions in the west or the Lebanon from the mother country; and we ask that the unity of the country be maintained under any circumstances.”⁷

The King-Crane recommendations with regard to Syria, Palestine, and Iraq came on August 28, 1919, confirming the statements of the General Syrian Congress on Zionism and on Palestine. This Commission recommended “serious modification of the extreme Zionist programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews,” based on “the actual facts in Palestine” in addition to “the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians.” The Commission further recognized “that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour’s often-quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies,”⁸ and suggested a number of modifications to the Zionist programme after the following had been made clear to its members:

“The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission’s conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.”⁹

The American Commission pointed out that the non-Jewish population of Palestine—nearly nine tenths of the whole—“are emphatically against the entire Zionist programme.” The Commission further explained that “there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this.”¹⁰ It also found out that the hostility to this programme was not confined to Palestine, “but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria.” In fact, “more than seventy-two per cent—1,350 in all—of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist programme.” Based on the opinion expressed by British officers in Palestine, the Commissioners pointed out that the Zionist programme could not be implemented except “by force of arms.” The officers believed that a force of not less than 50,000 soldiers would be required “to initiate the programme.” “That of itself,” the Commissioners argued, “is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist programme, on the part of the non-

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 441.

(8) *Ibid.*, Appendix H, p. 448.

(9) *Ibid.*

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 449.

Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria." As to the Zionist claim to a 2000 years historic "right" to Palestine, it could "hardly be seriously considered."¹¹

The original copy of the King-Crane Commission Report was delivered to the White House on September 27, 1919, while Wilson was engaged in a campaign on behalf of the principles of the League Covenant. When he returned to his work in the autumn of the same year, he was stricken with paralysis. Neither Wilson nor the American Commission in Paris acknowledged the receipt of the Report. Furthermore, in view of the serious illness of the American President, it is unlikely that he ever read or studied the report."¹² Thus, the King-Crane Report was never divulged to the public although extracts may have been read by certain British and French officials. When Harry Howard undertook to carry out a study of the reasons for failing to publish the King-Crane Report, he found out that among these was the fact that it represented the findings of the American section alone while it was meant to represent those of the Allies as a whole. Howard advanced another reason, namely that "there was a feeling that the frankness of the document, and conclusions concerning the French position in Syria, if published, might have an adverse influence on Franco-American relations."²³ In addition, he argued that the disclosure of the hostile attitude of the Palestinian Arabs to Zionism might have created ill-feeling on the part of the British government. Estrangement among the Allies might have occurred and resulted in a serious setback to the League of Nations, especially since the United States had refused to ratify the Covenant.¹⁴

It was not until three years later that the King-Crane Report was published in its complete version. Meanwhile, rumours spread in the months which followed the filing of the document at the White House, that both the French government and the Zionist Organization, and probably the British government as well had exerted pressure on the American Commission in Paris and the State Department in Washington to keep the document secret. Harry Howard pointed out that "no statement concerning the Report was ever made by the Department of State."¹⁵

On September 15, 1919, a Franco-British military agreement was reached with respect to the spheres of influence defined in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The northern occupied territory was put under French control (after it was named O.E.T. West). In addition, France was to remain in Cilicia which had been occupied by its troops in January 1919, while the southern area remained garrisoned by the British who had withdrawn to "Palestine" behind a line near the Sykes-Picot division. The eastern area alone (Areas A and B) remained under Arab administration. The British troops were to withdraw on November 1. Prince Faisal arrived in London on September 18, upon Lloyd George's invitation. The

(11) *Ibid.*

(12) Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 259.

(14) *Ibid.*

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 260.

British Minister had invited Faisal to attend a special meeting at 10 Downing Street "with the object of inducing him to accept the proposal about occupation as assented to in Paris." Apparently, Lloyd George exerted strong pressure on Faisal and tried to convince him that the Arabs owed their freedom, to a large extent, "to the sacrifices of the French people in the late war."¹⁶ Nevertheless, Faisal raised strong objections to the Franco-British agreement and opposed vehemently any partition of the Arab territory into spheres of influence. He tried in turn to convince Lloyd George to cancel the agreement or postpone its implementation. But the British government chose to make the Arab independence in Syria under Faisal the prey of French ambitions.

Faisal then went to Paris where he spent two and a half months doing his best to reach an understanding with the French government. Meanwhile, the British troops began evacuating Syria in November 1919. By the first week of December, the British withdrawal from Syria was complete and the French influence started to establish itself. Towards the middle of January 1920, Faisal returned to Damascus to find the country in a state of extreme agitation. News of his negotiations with Clemenceau had preceded him, and before his return, the Syrian Congress had unanimously passed a decree instituting compulsory military service to defend Syria against French occupation. Meanwhile, the Peace Conference had closed on 21 January 1920 without the United States' participating in the post-war settlements of the Near Eastern problems.

The General Syrian Congress thus took the matter in hand. At a meeting held on March 6, the members expressed the aspirations of the Syrian nation for self-determination and full independence. The following day the Congress, "representing the Syrian Arab nation," drew up a "historic resolution" in answer to Faisal's address. Having reviewed the aim of the Arab Revolt, the Arab sacrifices during the war, and the promises made by the Allies on the principle of self-determination, the resolution went on to express the wish of the people of Syria "to put an end to their doubts and uncertainties and obtain their independence." Consequently, the General Syrian Congress proclaimed unanimously "the full independence of Syria within its natural boundaries, including Palestine in which they rejected the claim of the Zionists for a National Home for the Jews."¹⁷

The General Syrian Congress was not alone in realizing the expansionist danger of the Zionist endeavours to make Palestine a Jewish national home. The Arabs of Palestine, the inhabitants of southern Syria, had previously participated in the First Syrian Congress. Fully aware of the grave menace that these claims represented to the national, political, and economic life of the Arab peoples, they had collaborated in the drafting of the reports related to the establishment of a Jewish national home and immigration.

On February 27, 1920, the second General Palestinian Congress met in Damascus—the first Syrian Congress was considered as the first of the Palestinian Con-

(16) Antonius, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

(17) Zeine, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

gresses—with the participation of the delegates of the High Commission of National Defence and of the various political parties and associations, in addition to a number of leaders and notables. The four resolutions which were then adopted can be summed up as follows:

1. The inhabitants of the littoral and of northern Syria consider southern Syria "Palestine" to be a complementary part of Syria.
2. Rejection of the Zionist immigration because it constitutes a threat to the political entity of the country and the refusal to make Palestine a Jewish national home.
3. Non-recognition of any national government in Palestine before the recognition by the local authorities of the two Palestinian demands submitted to the American Commission of Inquiry, namely the non-separation of Palestine from Syria and the prohibition of Zionist immigration.
4. The national movement for the independence of Syria with its natural boundaries seeks:
 - a. the evacuation of the occupiers from the littoral, and
 - b. the evacuation of the occupiers from Palestine.¹⁸

One month after the proclamation of the independence of Syria as a sovereign Arab state and a Constitutional Monarchy with Prince Faisal as King, the Allied Supreme Council met at San Remo (April 9, 1920) and reached a final agreement on April 24. "Syria and Lebanon were to be placed under a single mandate to be entrusted to France" while "Great Britain was to hold a mandate for Iraq and another for Palestine."¹⁹ In his telegram to Faisal, Lord Allenby explained that Syria and Iraq were "to receive help and assistance from the Mandatory power, until such time when they would be able to stand alone." Britain was ready to recognize in principle Faisal as the head of an independent Syrian state, but the question of his "Kingship" would very likely be submitted to the Peace Conference for consideration.

* * *

Meanwhile, the Zionist Committee of Palestine was doing its best to impose on the British military occupying forces attitudes in harmony with the ambitions and aims of the Movement. Earlier in this study, we mentioned the Jewish legion which had over 5,000 soldiers towards the end of the war. A number of them participated in military operations in the Jordan valley during the seven weeks which preceded the signature of the Armistice. Moreover, Jabotinsky maintained a permanent contact with the Russian Jews urging them to mobilize a Jewish legion in the Caucasus while taking upon himself to secure the approval of the British authorities. When the military authorities started demobilizing the Jewish

(18) Issa Al-Safari, *Arab Palestine* (Jaffa, 1937), p. 34

(19) Antonius, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

legion, a group of Jewish American soldiers expressed their desire to settle permanently in Palestine. On January 15, 1919, Jabotinsky addressed a cable to Nahum Sokolow insisting that "such discharge should not take place until the Zionist Commission will be able to give them land and work."²⁰ As to the demobilization of Palestinian Jews, it would entirely disband the Palestinian battalion "at a time when students cannot proceed to European Universities and farm workers cannot find work."²¹ Consequently, he suggested the extension of service in Jewish battalions for two more years, asking Sokolow to obtain the required facilities.

There is no doubt that Jabotinsky's military concern after the war had ended reflected the kind of plans he was formulating for the Jewish legion. When the American and Palestinian legionnaires began to demand demobilization, he insisted that these were advised that "it is in their own interest to remain in the Army until the status of Palestine is definitely decided upon and the Zionist Organization is able to begin the work of systematic colonization."²² Finally, pointing out the part which they would play during the next phase, he said:

"Every Jewish volunteer must realize that the mission of the Jewish battalions in Palestine is much more important now than it ever was before."²³

Jabotinsky undertook to work on this basis. After the convening of the General Syrian Congress on the eve of the declaration of independence and the establishment of the Arab-Syrian kingdom, "plans for the expanding of the Jewish regiment by recruiting in Palestine or by enrolling young men from abroad" were presented once more at a meeting of the Zionist Commission on March 25. The Zionist leaders—from Weizmann to Dr. Eder and Ussishkin—unanimously decided that "the only capable man for this task is Jabotinsky" and that he ought to go to London and launch a press campaign to this effect. Jabotinsky was discharged from the Zionist Commission in February 1919, while General Allenby decided to discharge him from the British Army in August of the same year. Also, most of the members of the Zionist Commission who had arrived in Palestine in the spring of 1918, had left the country in the autumn of the same year. Dr. Eder, as well as Commander Bianchini and Victor Jabotinsky, were the only members of this Commission who remained in Palestine. Since the end of the war, Jabotinsky had worked in close cooperation with the members of the Zionist Commission. For several months, he was on excellent terms with Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Eder. When he came to present his program for Palestine, he emphasized the role of world Jewry and stressed that the promise for a national home contained in the Balfour Declaration was not confined to the Jews of Palestine, but rather included world Jewry as a whole. The "Outline for the Provisional Government of Palestine," incorporating essential features of Jabotinsky's scheme, demanded that

(20) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

(21) *Ibid.*

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 274.

(23) *Ibid.*

Palestine should be recognized as the Jewish national homeland "in the affairs of which the Jewish people as a whole shall have a determining voice."²⁴ This demand was not included in the official "Statement of the Zionist Organization Regarding Palestine," however. Politically, Jabotinsky and the official Zionist leaders began drifting apart. Schechtman relates that "Jabotinsky grew increasingly apprehensive of the political situation in Palestine and critical of Dr. Weizmann's conciliatory and appeasing policies, while the latter apparently disapproved of Jabotinsky's methods of dealing with the British authorities."²⁵ We will return to Jabotinsky's attitude and stands later in this study; now we will discuss the previously mentioned Franco-British Military Agreement which was concluded in the middle of September 1919. According to the provisions of this agreement, the enemy territory was divided into the three following zones:

1. The southern zone including Palestine north to Acre and east to the Jordan (under the British administration),
2. The northern zone—along the Syrian littoral and Alexandretta (under the commander of the French detachment), and
3. The eastern zone—Trans-Jordan and the Syrian hinterland (under Faisal).

Upper Galilee remained under the French Military Command until the boundaries of the Mandate zones were defined towards the end of 1920. In late 1919, unrest grew in the area situated on the frontier between the occupied zones. The four Jewish settlements in Upper Galilee were exposed to armed bedouin raids. The defence of the endangered Jewish positions was thus discussed at length in Zionist circles in Palestine, and put before the session of the *Vaad Zemani* on February 22, 1920. Ussishkin had been appointed Chairman of the Zionist Committee since the preceding September. Jabotinsky had suggested recalling the Jewish settlers from the endangered area, since defending the Galilee settlements without the British could not be considered. His stand was rejected by the other members of the *Vaad Zemani* who decided that "defence of Upper Galilee was a matter of national honour, and that men and money must be mobilized."²⁶ When Trumpeldor and his six comrades fell at Tel Hai on March 1, Jabotinsky went back to the object of his long-cherished wish and violently criticized the Zionist leaders. He accused them of inefficiency in military matters and expressed his eagerness to defend the Galilee settlements and "if necessary die there." To him, Trumpeldor and his comrades had been victims of the leader's thoughtless and irresponsible attitude, and in his article in *Ha'arets* on February 22, he minimized the "political value and political influence of martyrdom in our days."

We will mention here the provocative attitude of Jabotinsky's units which led to the outbreak of bloody riots during the Nebi Moussa Festival which coincided with the Jewish Passover and Christian Easter: April 4, 1920. With

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 291.

(25) *Ibid.*

(26) *Ibid.*, p. 315.

the help of Pinhas Rutenberg and Moshe Smiliansky, Jabotinsky put his idea of a "Self-Defence Corps" into practice. These corps later became *Haganah* units. In this respect, Jabotinsky's biographer pointed out that the "entire concept of Jabotinsky's Zionist political strategy is clearly recognizable from his early credo" which he expressed in an article in *Ha'arets* of March 28. To justify his request for organized Zionist military groups, he wrote:

For the past two years, there had been a tendency to bring about events in Palestine which would prove to London that Mr. Balfour's declaration must be abandoned. This tendency had brought the country to its present state. Jewish public opinion, however, should not exaggerate the danger. The aim of the anti-Zionist forces is a sinister one, but they may be able to achieve it only if we, Jews, continue to be silent. We have made an unparalleled mistake in having kept quiet. This will teach us a lesson. England possesses a sound and deep public opinion, and it is on our side. But public opinion is a tribunal which does not interfere in the dispute unless one comes and states his case. If we do it, we shall win. If we fail, we are bound to lose."²⁷

Since Jabotinsky's army was an "open affair," there is no reason to wonder that the Arabs of Palestine felt suspicious of it. The authorities as well as the public knew of the organized existence of the *Haganah* members and of their being armed. Speaking of them, Elias Ginsburg said: "It was an open affair, well known to the authorities. A few days before the Moslem festival of Nebi Moussa (Prophet Moses), regular military manoeuvres were staged by the Self-Defence Corps at the foot and on the slope of the Mount of Olives, the seat of the Government, and British officers 'reviewed' our movements through field glasses . . . The official attitude toward the self-defence organization not only did not appear to be negative but seemed paternal to a degree."²⁸ In addition, Colonel Patterson testified that Jabotinsky "had organized the Self-Defence Corps with the full knowledge of the authorities, many weeks before the outbreak his first act on taking command was to inform the authorities of the existence of the Corps, its arming and its purpose."²⁹

Obviously, Jabotinsky's army constituted the basis of his Zionist schemes. He had previously gone in 1908, from Constantinople on a short trip to Palestine in his capacity as a journalist, with the aim of reviewing what was described as the Jewish defence measures. There, he decided that the two greatest requisites for a Jewish settler were:

1. to learn to speak Hebrew, and
2. to "punch hard."³⁰

We also know that, during his stay in Constantinople, he developed a feeling of hatred towards the Orient in general and the Ottomans in particular which he described as "a sort of permanent row of a yelling rabble dressed up in savage-painted rags."³¹

(27) *Ibid.*, pp. 321-322.

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 325.

(29) *Ibid.*

(30) Robert St. John, *They Came From Everywhere*, (Coward-McCann, New York, 1962),

p. 98.

(31) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

In reality, the riots of the Nebi Moussa Festival were expected by "Jabotinsky's youth and army." They had been provoked by Jabotinsky's people to show the failure of the military authorities to protect the Jewish settlers or hinder their activities. In point of fact, Arab hostility was not directed against the Jews of Palestine as much as against the new immigrants who kept provoking them during this period.

Jabotinsky was arrested with nineteen members of the *Haganah* who had taken part in the terrorist operations of 7 April 1920. On April 19, he was sentenced to fifteen years of penal servitude and transferred to the prison of Acre, while "an exactly similar penalty was meted out to two Arabs convicted of raping Jewish girls during the riots."³² With the arrival of the newly appointed High Commissioner, the Zionist Jew, Herbert Samuel, on June 8, 1920, amnesty was granted to all the prisoners who had participated in the Jerusalem riots. Jabotinsky tried to convince his comrades to refuse the amnesty because it included the Arabs "on the same level" as them. But as a result of the interference of the Zionist Commission, they decided to accept the amnesty, thus rejecting Jabotinsky's advice. The latter's arrogance grew even stronger and reached its peak when he told the Twelfth Zionist Congress (Carlsbad, 1921) that he had cabled the High Commissioner warning him not to make the mistake of putting him "on the same level with a blackie."³³ Interruptions came from the floor, and he explained that he had in mind "moral blackness," not the color of the skin. By so doing, he was trying to attribute the "black color" to the appellation with which he wished to designate the instigators of the riots and massacres by analogy with the "Black Hundred" of Czarist Russia. Then, rephrasing the famous saying of Mazzini, he said, "In working for Palestine I would even ally myself with the devil."

Jabotinsky's alliances will be dealt with in the next chapter of this study. We will now confine ourselves to the policy of provocation which was devised by the Zionist Commission and put into practice by Jabotinsky. To do this, it is necessary to reproduce the integral text of General Bols' (then Chief Administrator of Palestine) letter to Allenby. Louis Bols had in December 1919, charged Weizmann to transmit a first letter to General Allenby referring to a ten-year development plan in Palestine, with a view to open the doors to Jewish immigration there. Bols had written the second letter on the day of the events in the Nebi Moussa Feast: April 4, 1920. It reads as follows:

I cannot allocate the blame to any section of the community or to individuals while their case is still *sub judice*, but I can definitely state that when the strain came the Zionist Commission did not loyally accept the orders of the Administration, but from the commencement adopted a hostile, critical, and abusive attitude. It is a regrettable fact that, with one or two exceptions, it appears impossible to convince a Zionist of British good faith and ordinary honesty. They seek, not justice from the military occupant, but that in every question in which a Jew is interested discrimination in his favour shall be shown. They are exceedingly difficult to deal with. In

(32) *Ibid.*, p. 338.

(33) *Ibid.*, p. 362.

Jerusalem, being in the majority, they are not satisfied with military protection, but demand to take the law into their own hands; in other places where they are in a minority they clamour for military protection

It is unnecessary to press my difficulty . . . in controlling any situation that may arise in the future if I have to deal with a representative of the Jewish community (Mr. Ussishkin was Vice-President) who threatens me with mob law and refuses to accept the constituted forces of law and order . . .

It will be recognized from the foregoing that my own authority and that of every department of my Administration is claimed or impinged upon by the Zionist Commission, and I am definitely of opinion that this state of affairs cannot continue without grave danger to the public peace and to the prejudice of any Administration.

It is no use saying to the Moslem and Christian elements of the population that our declaration as to the maintenance of the *status quo* made on our entry into Jerusalem has been observed. Facts witness otherwise: the introduction of the Hebrew tongue as an official language; the setting up of a Jewish judicature; the whole fabric of government of the Zionist Commission of which they are well aware; the special travelling privileges to members of the Zionist Commission; this has firmly and absolutely convinced the non-Jewish elements of our partiality. On the other hand, the Zionist Commission accuse my officers and me of anti-Zionism. The situation is intolerable, and in justice to my officers and myself must be firmly faced.

This Administration has loyally carried out the wishes of His Majesty's Government, and has succeeded in so doing by strict adherence to the laws governing the conduct of the Military Occupant of Enemy Territory, but this has not satisfied the Zionists, who appear bent on committing the temporary military administration to a partialist policy before the issue of the Mandate. It is manifestly impossible to please partisans who officially claim nothing more than a "National Home," but in reality will be satisfied with nothing less than a "Jewish state" and all that it politically implies.

I recommend, therefore, in the interests of peace, of development, of the Zionists themselves, that the Zionist Commission in Palestine be abolished."³⁴

Bols' recommendations resulted in the abolition of the military administration and its replacement by a civil one presided over by an "ardent Zionist," Herbert Samuel, despite the fact that the Hague Conventions did not allow the occupying power to set up a nonmilitary rule before the signature of the peace treaty. Pro-Zionist officers were appointed in place of the ones whom the Zionists were suspicious of. They were thus able to influence to a large extent, matters of high policy at the San Remo Congress after they had carried out a vast campaign to win over the delegates to their expansionist demands. Then came Article 95 of the Treaty of Sevres which Turkey signed on 10 August 1920 to "entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine to a Mandatory, who would be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers."³⁵

While the fixing of the boundaries remained a matter to be decided by the three Allied powers, the Zionists went on to complete the success they had registered by pressing the Allies to expand the frontiers of Palestine to the detriment of Lebanon, Syria and Trans-Jordan. They claimed the valley of the Litani and the slopes of Mount Hermon, as well as the Hauran and the Jordan valley. It was only natural that Britain should welcome such a claim which would result in the extension of its own sphere of influence. But the French opposed the Zionist

(34) Nevill Barbour, *Nisi Dominus* (Harrap, London, 1946), pp. 96-97.

(35) *Palestine Royal Commission Report, op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

demands and stuck to the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement which made Palestine a narrow area. The Zionists tried in vain to convince the French of the necessity to relinquish part of the Syrian-Lebanese territory. They had meetings with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the High Commissioner in Beirut as well as with other influential personalities. But their efforts were fruitless.

They resorted to an organized press campaign to make the United States interfere in the issue and succeeded in convincing President Wilson to address an official letter to the British government. The terms of that letter concurred with the cable Brandeis had sent to Weizmann asking him to inform the British government, in the person of Lloyd George, of the Zionist demands. Wilson explained in it that the fulfilment of the French's demands based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement would be a fatal blow to the national home by denying its natural geographic entity and neglecting its economic needs. The success of the Zionist case, he pursued, rests on the expansion of the northern and eastern frontiers to include the Litani River and the headwaters of Mount Hermon, namely the Golan and the Hauran plains. If the Balfour Declaration—which was approved by France and the other Allies—is to be more than words, the necessary measures should be taken to implement it.³⁶

On the other hand, the Zionists undertook to stimulate public opinion in the Jewish world to declare its enthusiasm and support for the decisions of the San Remo Conference. In June 1920, Sokolow pointed out that Zionist policy was entering a new phase, that of realizing their aspirations. He said:

"The chapter of politics is practically over and now begins the second chapter—the chapter of the realization of our aspirations. The first was written in the main not by us but by those in whose hands it lies to open the gates of the country; the second will be written only by us."³⁷

In July of the same year, the Zionist delegates arrived in London to attend their annual conference. At the head of a large American delegation, Brandeis expressed his feelings about the San Remo Agreement and said, "The work of the Great Herzl was completed at San Remo. The effort to acquire public recognition of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine for which he lived and died has been crowned with success . . ."³⁸ And Lloyd George answered him saying, "We gave you a start, now is it up to you."³⁹ As to Balfour, he expressed "the conviction that the Jewish renaissance in Palestine would be crowned with triumph ultimately, but he emphasized the great difficulties that had to be overcome." Among these was the smallness of Palestine and its undeveloped condition which he believed would be overcome with skill, knowledge and perseverance combined with Jewish capital. But the greatest difficulty, in his opinion, concerned the Arab question:

(36) Negib Sadaka, *The Palestine Question* (Dar Al-Kitab, Beirut, 1946), pp. 83-84.

(37) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

(38) *Ibid.*

(39) *Ibid.*, p. 149.

"Among these difficulties I am not sure that I do not rate the highest, or at all events the first, the inevitable difficulty of dealing with the Arab question as it presents itself within the limits of Palestine. It will require tact; it will require judgment; above all, it will require sympathetic good-will on the part of both Jew and of Arab. So far as the Arabs are concerned—a great, and interesting, and an attractive race—so far as they are concerned, I hope they will remember that while we desire—this assembly and all the Jews whom it represents—under the aegis of Great Britain to establish this home for the Jewish people, the Great Powers, and among all the Great Powers most especially Great Britain, have forced them, the Arab race, from the tyranny of their brutal conqueror, who has kept them under his heel for many centuries. I hope they will remember it is we who have established the independent Arab sovereignty of the Hedjaz. I hope they will remember it, we who desire in Mesopotamia to prepare the way for the future of a self-governing, autonomous Arab State. And I hope that, remembering all that, they will not grudge that small niche, for it is not more geographically in the former Arab territories than a niche—being given to the people who for all these hundreds of years have been separated from it, but who surely have a title to develop on their own lines in the land of their forefathers."⁴⁰

However, that "small niche" did not look the same to the Zionists even though they had decided to minimize the importance of the issue. Answering the American delegation's request for an exposé of his program, Max Nordau spoke for about one hour and a half on what was called since then the "Nordau Plan." His biographers mentioned this exposé as well as the discussion which took place then between Nordau and the forty-five American delegates:

"It is imperative to send to Palestine at least half a million young men and women determined to make it their fatherland, to settle there at any cost, to toil there, to suffer there if need be, but to affirm with all their might the will of the Jewish people toward a peaceful reconquest of the land of their fathers, which the Allies have promised them. Such is the minimum necessity and such the only way of immediately establishing a majority in Palestine. There is no other effective way of proving our intention to fulfil our part of the contract with England and to parry the Arab danger.

The Americans were frightened by the scope of his plan. They made objections: 'How are these people to be housed?' Nordau answered 'In that climate they can sleep in tents.' And to the question: 'And who is going to supply the funds for this mass immigration?' he retorted: 'You are!' 'And if they perish?' 'Perhaps some will. But far fewer will than if later on we expose small groups to even graver perils.'⁴¹

On 16 September 1920, Nordau returned to Paris to start on the publication of a series of ten articles in the weekly Zionist paper, *Le Peuple Juif*. The last article appeared on November 20 of the same year. This series of articles in which Nordau put forward his plan was considered by many as his political testimony. Having realized that "developments had fully endorsed its soundness," they affirmed that "history has turned it from a plan of 'irresponsible' and 'facile Zionism' into the accepted blueprint for the upbuilding of Israel."⁴² Part of Nordau's tenth article was devoted to answering his critics. He assailed the Zionist leaders with reproaches for their neglect in acquiring the greater amount of land necessary for a wide scale realization of his plan. He said:

"When last year I sounded the alarm and showed that we must at any price become a majority in Palestine and should consequently send thither without delay,

(40) *Ibid.*

(41) Anna and Max Nordau, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

(42) Oskar K. Rabinowicz, *Fifty Years of Zionism—A Historical Analysis of Dr. Weizmann's 'Trial and Error'* (Robert Anscombe, London, 1950), p. 85.

and only in the space of months, 600,000 souls, that otherwise our 'National Home' would remain a delusion and a will-o'-the-wisp, the official press of the Organization covered me with jeers and insults and gave me the character of a bolshevik and unscrupulous demagogue.

..Nevertheless after some reflection Dr. Weizmann admitted that we should try to send to Palestine not the 2,000 Jews per annum allowed by the calculations of our clever 'experts,' but twenty, thirty, sixty, even a hundred thousand. Only—so it was said—that was physically impossible.

Why?

Because we had neither the needed land nor the money.

But why had we not land? Because our eminent statesmen did not trouble to ask for it and continued to do nothing toward obtaining it."⁴³

But the control of the undertaking was in the hands of the two Allies by the summer of 1920. The mandate system which Lloyd George had described as the substitute for the old imperialism, was to assume the responsibility of the implementation of the Zionist demands. There was no great difference, though, between Nordau's idea of the "civilizing mission" by which the Zionists would extend the frontiers of Europe to the Euphrates, and the "politico-economic protection" the underdeveloped countries were to enjoy within the framework of the League of Nations. It was thus natural that the Zionists should enthusiastically welcome the decisions of the San Remo Conference.

In July 1920, the French armies, unconcerned with the decisions of the Peace Conference and the principles of the League of Nations, entered Damascus. King Faisal left Syria for Palestine after his departure to London had been organized. On December 23 of the same year, the British reached an agreement with the French over the boundaries between Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. It allowed for the implementation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and came to supplement the decisions of the San Remo Conference. The boundaries of the two Mandates were defined along the following lines:

"On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan Koeui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French Mandate the entire basin of the western Kabur and passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imtar to the south of Jebal Druse, then a line to the south of Nassib on the Hedjaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French Mandate; the frontier will in principle leave the valley of the Yarmuk in the territory under the French Mandate, but will be drawn as close as possible to the railway in such a manner as to allow the construction in the valley of the Yarmuk of a railway entirely situated in the territory under the British Mandate. At Semakh the frontier will be fixed in such a manner as to allow each of the two High Contracting Parties to construct and establish a harbour and railway station giving free access to the Lake of Tiberias.

On the west, the frontier will pass from Semakh across the Lake of Tiberias to the mouth of the Wadi Massadyie. It will then follow the course of this river upstream, and then the Wadi Jeraba to its source. From that point it will reach the track from El-Kuneitra to Banias at the point marked Skek, thence it will follow the said track, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate as far as Banias. Thence the frontier will be drawn westwards as far as Metullah, which will remain in Palestine territory. This portion of the frontier will be traced in detail

(43) Anna and Maxa Nordau, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

in such a manner as to ensure for the territory under the French Mandate easy communication entirely within such territory with the regions of Tyre and Sidon, as well as continuity of road communication to the west and to the east of Banias.

From Metullah the frontier will reach the watershed of the valley of the Jordan and the basin of the Litani. Thence it will follow this watershed southwards. Thereafter it will follow in principle the watershed between the Wadis Farah-Houroun and Kerker, which will remain in the territory under the British Mandate, and the Wadis El Doubleh, El Aioun and Es Zerka, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate. The frontier will reach the Mediterranean Sea at the port of Ras-el-Nakura, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate."⁴⁴

Thus, Britain managed to extend its mandate over Palestine "from Dan to Beersheba" and succeeded in adding Upper Galilee to the brown area of the Sykes-Picot map which previously reached north of Acre only. One also notices that Trans-Jordan remained within the frontiers of the British Mandate area over Palestine.

In June 1922, the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, issued his statement on the "British Policy in Palestine." Nearly two years had elapsed after the signature of the Treaty of Sevres before Britain was able to make the government of the United States waive its claim of "applying the principle of equal economic opportunity for all State Members of the League," with regard to Palestine.⁴⁵ This was considered by the Zionists as recognition of the special situation of Palestine and a manifestation of sympathy for their aspirations. On June 30, *the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States* adopted a joint resolution "favouring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" and ratified the whole text of the Balfour Declaration.⁴⁶

The opportunity was thus wide open for the Council of the League of Nations to reach a decision on the terms of the Mandate over Palestine. On July 24, 1922,—nearly five years after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration—the draft Mandate for Palestine was confirmed by the Council of the League. Article 25 read as follows:

"In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions . . ."⁴⁷

The British High Commissioner in Palestine and Trans-Jordan defined the administrative boundaries between eastern and western Palestine—according to Zionist terminology—on 1 September of the same year. They were traced in the following manner: The boundaries begin at the intersection of the Yarmuk with the Jordan to run southward from the middle of the water course of the Jordan River, the Lota Lake and the Araba Valley where it ends on the coast of the

(44) *The Keren Ha-Yesod Book—Colonization Problems of the Eretz Israel (Palestine) Foundation Fund* (Leonard Parsons, London, 1921), pp. 170-171.

(45) *Palestine Royal Commission Report, op. cit.*, p. 31.

(46) *Ibid.*

(47) *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Gulf of Aqaba, approximately two miles west of the town of Aqaba.⁴⁸

On September 16, the British government submitted a memorandum in this sense for the approval of the Council of the League. It defined the limits of "that part of Palestine which was known as Trans-Jordan." Britain's Mandate over Trans-Jordan was recognized while the boundaries between Egypt and Palestine remained the same, i.e. as they were defined in the agreement which was concluded in October 1906, between Khedival Egypt and the Ottoman government: "from Tal Kharaeb at Rafah on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea until Ras Taba on the Gulf of Aqaba" (see Map No. 5 at the appendix of this book).

Thus, the Zionist Movement was faced, a quarter of a century after its creation, with a "Palestine" whose boundaries were drawn up by the Mandate and corresponded to the religious traditions concerning the area between Dan and Beersheba. However, this Palestine of the Mandate did not correspond with the Zionist aspirations, the various expressions of which we have already encountered from the "Kingdom of David and Solomon" to "Greater Palestine" and "Greater Israel" and to "Palestine with its historic frontiers" to the "Jewish National Home" with the boundaries defined in the Zionist proposals to the Peace Conference. Max Nordau assailed the Zionist leaders, as already mentioned, accusing them of neglecting the issue of the wider boundaries for the national home. He was not the only one, however, to manifest his opposition and hostility. The movement calling for the claiming of Palestine with its historic boundaries started since then and crystallized with Vladimir Jabotinsky and his followers. It soon took the form of an organized Zionist party known as the Revisionist Party. It was to split later on from the Zionist World Organization to create a new Zionist Organization of its own with a special program and army based on violence and terror.

In the following chapter of this study, we will examine an important aspect of the Zionist expansionist thinking through the call advocated by Jabotinsky who tried to combine action with thought. This combination materialized during the events which led to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The period between 1922 and 1948 corresponds to that of the British Mandate over Palestine. We have chosen to look into it from the point of view of "Greater Zionism" which was advocated by Jabotinsky and which we have encountered with Max Nordau, Davis Trietsch and the religious Zionists, in addition to the members of the Manchester Zionist School and many others.

If we referred to "Herzl's Era" and to the period "From Herzl to Balfour," as well as to the "Jewish National Home," we might as well describe the period from the establishment of the Mandate to the creation of the State of Israel as the "Jabotinsky Era," while "Ben Gurion's Era" will refer to the first twenty years of the State of Israel up to the June 1967 war, and the appearance of the Movement calling for Greater Israel among the Zionist circles in occupied Palestine and in the world at large.

(48) Mustafa Al-Dabbagh, p. 19.

GREATER ZIONISM: JABOTINSKY

When the Twelfth Zionist Congress was convened between September 1-14, 1921, in Carlsbad, eight years had elapsed since the Eleventh Congress had met in 1913 in Vienna. It was attended by 540 delegates representing some 770,000 shekel-payers. The British Ambassador in Prague attended the inaugural session and delivered a speech which was received with great applause, while Sokolow submitted with Weizmann a detailed report to the Congress members. This report reviewed the activities and development which led to the Balfour Declaration, its ratification by the Allies and its inclusion in the Peace Treaty with Turkey, as well as to the approval of the British Mandate over Palestine. In his opening speech, Weizmann said, among other things:

"Neither the force of arms nor that of money or influence were at our disposal. Even the Jewish religion was merely a symbol of our readiness to sacrifice and was far from containing hostile intentions. We only had the moral force of our idea, our historic right and our loyalty to Zion, in addition to the activities we have carried out for the revival of Palestine."¹

Opposing trends to Weizmann's policy, led by such Zionists as De Lieme and Julius Simon, started manifesting themselves at this Congress. As for Vladimir Jabotinsky, he took up the defence of the Executive Committee which was accused of neglecting the Zionist expansionist demands with respect to the Anglo-French agreement over the boundaries concluded nine months earlier. Weizmann was reelected to the chairmanship of the Organization after the Vienna Congress had made him chairman of the Permanent Committee. As for Sokolow, he was appointed chairman of the Executive Committee which counted among its members Ussishkin, Cowen, Dr. Eder, Jabotinsky, Motzkin, and Ruppin.

Most of the speakers devoted special attention to the frontier question. From the Protocol of the Twelfth Zionist Congress which was published in Berlin in 1922, one notices the keen interest which the leaders and the delegates showed in the issue of the northern and eastern frontiers of the national home. De Lieme stood up to inquire into the results of the diplomatic activities carried out during the last two years in Paris regarding the frontier issue. While insisting on the great economic importance of the northern frontier, he expressed his growing fears about the eastern one in view of the political developments which were then taking place in the Arab area. In addition, he admitted that the Zionists had protested to the Allies about the prejudice shown against them by the division of the spheres of influence; he also pointed out that his fears were justified since the

(1) *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XII, Zionisten-Kongresses in Karlsbad*—Vom 1-14 September 1921 (Judischer Verlag, Berlin, 1922), p. 14.

outcome was not quite satisfactory.² On the other hand, violent criticism was directed by other delegates against the activities of the Zionist office in Paris, accusing it of negligence. It was also pointed out that Herbert Samuel had made known from the beginning his intentions of separating Trans-Jordan from Palestine, while Kaplansky, member of the Zionist Actions Committee, argued that the issue of the northern frontier had not been settled in a way which favored Jewish colonization. In his opinion, the fact that a new kingdom had been set up in Trans-Jordan was a sign of injustice towards the Zionist cause.

Weizmann took the floor to answer them. He pointed out that the text of the Mandate had already been published and that no amendments could be brought to it except with respect to Trans-Jordan. Whereas in the first draft of the Mandate it was removed from the Mandate area, it was now included in it. Then, turning to De Lieme, he said: "We could answer the question in a better way, Mr. De Lieme, if only the west bank of the Jordan were filled to the point of pushing us in the direction of Trans-Jordan."³

The Congress took the following decision in relation to the frontier question: "The Congress notes with satisfaction that the area of Trans-Jordan, which the Jewish people considers as a complementary part to the Land of Israel, will be included in the Palestine Mandate area. The Congress regrets that the issue of the northern frontier of the land of Israel could not be solved to its satisfaction in spite of the efforts made by the Executive Committee. The Congress requests the Executive Committee not to refrain from taking any step, in the future, to prevent the abandonment of the administrative and economic unity of Palestine which could result from the policy of the spheres of influence, so that this will not lead to the limitation of the settlement and colonization activities of the Jewish masses seeking employment. The Congress expresses its hope of seeing the French Government act according to the interests of the Jewish people."

We will end here our discussion of the Twelfth Zionist Congress to pursue, in the next section, the survey of Jabotinsky's activities from the time of his membership of the Executive Committee to the appearance of the Revisionist movement on 25 April 1925. We will then proceed to examine the new split in the ranks of the World Zionist Organization and of the Revisionist movement itself. This split led to the foundation, in 1923, of the party of the Jewish State (*Judenstatspartei*) under the leadership of Meir Grossman and to the withdrawal of Jabotinsky's people from the Zionist Organization to form their own independent organization in 1935. It was known from that time as the "New Zionist Organization."

A. *The Taxation Fund*

After his release from Acre, Jabotinsky left Palestine for London where he arrived on September 1, 1920, to resume his Zionist activities. He had decided to

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 103.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 768.

integrate himself "fully and unreservedly" with the collective Zionist effort and was "willing and eager" to cooperate wholeheartedly in every major aspect of this effort. He soon cooperated actively with the *Keren ha'Yesod* (Palestine Foundation Fund) by joining the Board of Directors and assuming the responsibility of the Press and Propaganda Department. His biographer gave him the credit for preparing "the standard work on the *Keren ha'Yesod*—'The Keren ha'Yesod Book.'"⁴ Quoting Naiditch, he stated that Jabotinsky "went over every single article in this collective work with the utmost care and invested much of his ability in this book, which has become the very basis of the *Keren ha'Yesod* activities,"⁵ although his name as editor does not appear on the cover; this was "typical of Jabotinsky" according to Schechtman. Furthermore, the anonymous editor had been "most lavish in mentioning dozens of names connected with the preparation of the book and with the various fields of Zionist work." The book commences with an appeal to the Jews of the world, "Manifesto of the Keren ha'Yesod" signed by Rothschild, Alfred Mond, Joseph Cowen, Redcliffe N. Salaman, Chaim Weizmann, Nahum Sokolow, Berthold Feiwel, Vladimir Jabotinsky, Isaac Naiditch, and Hillel Zlatopolsky. It mentioned that:

"The Mandate for Palestine, which is at once a pledge and a challenge to the Jewish people, is about to become part of the Law of Nations. The moment has arrived for the concentration of Jewish effort on the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home . . . The purpose of the Keren ha'Yesod is to bring about the settlement of Palestine by Jews on a well-ordered plan and steadily increasing numbers, to enable immigration to begin without delay . . . The gates of Palestine are no longer barred from within. The key is in the hands of the Jewish people . . ."⁶

The manifesto also indicated that "no casual charity will suffice." It argued that "the exceptional effort which is called for today must take the form of self-taxation—steady, persistent, systematic, inspired by the noble Jewish tradition of the Tithes."⁷

Then came the introductory note which stressed that the Keren ha'Yesod is an amalgamation of two essential ideas: the "Ma'aser" principle, which is a return to one of the oldest Jewish traditions, and the "unity of effort":

"One-tenth at least of all you possess must go to the Treasury of the Nation for the rebirth of our land. This must be done in spite of the world's financial crisis, of the low rates of exchange, of the terrible disasters in Eastern Europe. In spite of all, one-tenth at least of all you own and earn belongs to Palestine. This is demanded of every Jew, Zionist or non-Zionist. No Jew has done his duty until he has paid the Ma'aser. This is the old Jewish law . . ."⁸

It is worthwhile mentioning that the introduction to the book begins with an expression which reminds us of the economic penetration that we have found in Otto Warburg's appeal to the conquest of Palestine by way of economic domination. The Keren ha'Yesod people now said in turn that "the peaceful method of con-

(4) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

(5) *Ibid.*

(6) *The Keren Ha-Yesod Book, op. cit.*, pp. 5-8.

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 8.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 11.

quest called colonisation has, in our days, undergone the same transformation as the methods of conquest by force of arms called war.”⁹

It is not unlikely that the article entitled “The Political Position” was written by Jabotinsky himself while it is certain that he is the author of the chapter on “The Jewish Troops.” What is most relevant to our study, however, is the chapter which examined the political position in the light of: the Balfour Declaration, the San Remo Resolution, the Franco-British Convention concerning the boundaries of Palestine, and the draft of the Mandate, in addition to the ordinances of the High Commissioner for Palestine. The author of the article envisaged at first the actual political position resulting from the above-mentioned acts from two points of view:

First: Is this position satisfactory in itself, does it provide any stable guarantees for the smooth working of the National Home scheme for a period of at least one generation, does it preclude all attempts at obstructing the development of the Jewish Commonwealth?

Second: Is it favourable enough to justify an immediate effort, to allow the Keren ha'Yesod a sufficient space for setting into motion the machinery of constructive work in Palestine?”¹⁰

The author did not conceal that the answer to the first question had to be “frankly sceptical.” “The Mandate,” he stated, “is still not sanctioned at the moment of writing, but the official draft is undoubtedly couched in terms which encourage restrictive interpretation. The word ‘National Home’ is a vague expression belonging by right to rhetoric rather than to politics.” When he proceeded to discuss the boundaries in relation to the first question, he expressed his opinion with frankness and clarity:

“The waters of the Litani river, the richest reservoir of Palestine, are cut off altogether. The Yarmuk is left outside of the Jewish ‘National Home,’ and its water can only be used if a foreign Government finds it desirable to grant a concession. The upper sources of the Jordan are in the same position. It is, by the way, ironically curious that such an essential part of the Holy River should be refused the honour of being included in the Holy Land.”¹¹

However, he did consider that the boundaries of the Mandate, unsatisfactory as they were, would afford sufficient space and protection for immediately starting the work of colonisation. One should note that the area he was discussing included Trans-Jordan on both sides of the Hedjaz railway line. He considered the land of Gilead one of the richest parts of Palestine in water supplies, quality of soil, and vegetation, but “one of the poorest population.” He was seeking to fill this “truncated Palestine” as he called it, with Jewish immigrants to the maximum of its capacity. He expressed his regrets that “we must abandon, for the present, all plans concerning the Litani” while he called for immediate interest in the waters of the Jordan between the Lake of Houleh and the Dead Sea since “both sides of the river are within the boundary” and Trans-Jordan was part of the mandatory

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 9.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 23.

(11) *Ibid.*, p. 24.

area under the same High Commissioner as Judea, Samaria and Galilee. In Jabotinsky's opinion, there were no legal obstacles to the liquidation of the special regime which had been set up in Trans-Jordan, as he considered it, legally-speaking, a one-sided act of the British government.

He reassured the Zionists instead, declaring that the French zone of Palestine should not be considered closed to Jewish colonisation. In fact, France had signed the Balfour Declaration and undertaken to "further the National Home scheme within her sphere of influence" in accordance with the decision of San Remo. He thus declared that, "The area open to Jewish colonisation, and, eventually, reserved for the establishment of the Jewish National Home is not limited to the British mandatory zone."¹²

Finally, he pointed out that the political conditions in Palestine as far as Zionism was concerned "depends entirely on the personality of the High Commissioner," and since the office of High Commissioner was held by a man "whose devotion to the spirit of the Balfour Declaration is above all question," the possibilities within the actual boundaries of Palestine were practically unlimited.

To conclude, he assured his fellow Zionists:

"Effort and energy are also the best and only remedies for whatever defects the Mandate or the boundaries agreement may contain. Live force, the force of masses, and the weight of their collective wealth, are stronger than any words written or omitted."¹³

Since the "live-force" reminds us of Jabotinsky's past and future ideas equally, we must look into the call to "Greater Zionism" which he advocated during the last part of his life in view of his demand for a new Jewish region and his appeal to create a "Great Zionist Cabinet" including the leading personalities in the Movement with the aim of organizing and uniting efforts for the common goal. His biographer attempted to demonstrate that Jabotinsky had dedicated himself, during the period of his membership in the Zionist Executive, to the success of his experiment of "broader Zionist cooperation."

B. *The Zionist Garibaldi*

Born at Odessa in 1880, Jabotinsky left Russia for the first time in the spring of 1898, for Switzerland. He soon enrolled in the Law School of the University of Berne, but his sojourn in this city was to be quite brief. The autumn of the same year saw him in Italy which, according to his biographer, played a decisive role in his spiritual formation: "If I ever had a spiritual fatherland," he later said, "it was Italy more than Russia." As a university student in Rome he took a number of courses in Roman law, political economy, and statistics, while he attended

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 26.

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Professor Antonio Labriola's conferences on history and philosophy. Though a Marxist, Labriola never confined himself to any one system of ideas. To him, "there was no predetermination in human life; progress is not fated." He rather believed that "men themselves must produce the future." It might very well be that Jabotinsky owed his Zionist outlook to this professor. Even more important was Ferri's influence on his thinking. A professor of penal law, Enrico Ferri, was an "outstanding exponent of the positive school in criminology and the founder of the science of criminal sociology." On the other hand, Jabotinsky admitted having acquired a lot from Benedetto Croce's philosophy. He said, "Benedetto Croce was perhaps the first who taught me to discern the vibrations of the aesthetic nervous system which underlies the clockwork that drives the wheels of history."

It is evident that Jabotinsky was keenly interested in Italy's struggle for national unification. Of the famous triad, Mazzini-Cavour-Garibaldi, his preference went to the latter whom he considered "the decisive force in Italy's resurrection." Although his concept of proper national existence was due mainly to the inspiring effort of Italy's struggle for unification, he manifested no interest in Jewish Italian affairs. The Jews of Italy had been assimilated to a large extent into Italian society, and Barzilai, the parliamentary leader of the irredentist movement—which aimed at annexing Trieste and Trento to the Italian mother country—was a Jew.

It was his admiration for Garibaldi which led him to adopt "fanatic nationalism" which he attributed to the Italian leader. To him, Garibaldi's personality was "the synthesis of ardent, fanatic nationalism with the broadmindedness of a citizen of the world."

It is not easy to penetrate the underlying factors of this admiration which was based on both the military character and the pacifist tendency of the man. When Jabotinsky left with the first Karen ha'Yesod delegation for the United States and toured the Middle East with Colonel Patterson, the two men were described by the Zionist press as representing "the aggressive and militant aspect of the Jewish National restoration." At the solemn reception for the delegation, he was introduced by the chairman as a "militant Zionist" known the world over as the "Jewish Garibaldi." It is interesting to note that later on, Ben Gurion referred to him as the "Zionist Trotsky" and "Vladimir Hitler."

Late in July 1901, Jabotinsky returned to Russia to appear before the conscription board. The following year, he wrote a poem, *Poor Charlotte*, which was an attempt at giving an original interpretation of the terrorist act of Charlotte Corday. He compared her to a bee "who dies stinging," explaining that she had revolted out of pride and had longed for a heroic deed.¹⁴ When the menace of a pogrom appeared in 1903, he urged the organization of a Jewish Self-Defence Corps in Odessa, justifying his appeal with the rumors that pogroms were expected to occur in Odessa. He was soon joined in his appeal by Disengoff, the Zionist leader who later became the first mayor of Tel Aviv.

(14) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

If, as pointed out by a number of Zionist historians, the Dreyfus case was the immediate cause of Herzl's Zionism, the Kishinev massacres were to play the same role in Jabotinsky's life. At the age of twenty-three, he attended the Zionist Congress in Basle as the representative of the city of Odessa. His biographer, Schechtman, points out that the experience of his first Congress "was anything but a happy one." Dr. Weizmann, then leader of the opposition, disappointed him. When, in a café, Jabotinsky saw him surrounded by friends and engaged in a spirited discussion, he asked him, "Would I disturb you?" Weizmann answered him saying, "You *are* disturbing me."¹⁵

It is interesting, however, to note that Jabotinsky had voted against the Uganda plan although he declared later that he did not know the innermost motivation of his vote since at that time he "had no romantic love for Palestine." Many years later he told his son Eri that "the only time when he temporarily doubted the soundness of his vote" was during the early years of his struggle for the Jewish legion. He thought then that "if by that time there were in existence a Jewish Commonwealth in Uganda, it would automatically provide a ready-made nucleus for a full-fledged Jewish Army."¹⁶ In 1906 though, he sent a letter to "*Neo-Bilu*" in which he devised a program and an ideology for "prospective pioneers." He distinguished between two kinds of immigrants: the "natural immigrant" who goes to Palestine in order to make a living, and the "pioneer" who is always useful. To him, the latter must possess two qualifications: "He must be physically and spiritually fit, and he must be organized and disciplined, [for] . . . we must have in Palestine a population which 'in the future will be capable of fighting for our political independence.'"¹⁷

In the winter of 1908, he went to Constantinople after the Young Turks Revolution and wrote a series of articles which he published upon his return to Russia declaring that "the development of national relations in Turkey will very soon reconcile the Young Turks with the inevitable strengthening of the national characteristics among the country's ethnic groups and with the latter's striving for self-government and concentration."¹⁸ He further argued that "our Palestine vanguard is inclined to overestimate Arab strength." Speaking of what he described as *terror arabicus*, he said, "if this *terror arabicus* would lead merely to stressing our wish to live in friendship with the Arabs, this attitude would be useful; but it should not foster attempts to make us conform to Arab political aspirations or to support their anti-Turkish or particularist trends."¹⁹

Schechtman pointed out that Jabotinsky had rejected the slogan "silence and work" which was then popular for Zionist work in Palestine, accusing its advocates of "avoiding politics" and concentrating only on practical colonizing activities. His argument went as follows:

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 85.

(16) *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

(17) *Ibid.*, p. 139.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 151.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 152.

"It was too late, after twenty-five years of Zionist propaganda, to pretend that we are going to Palestine just to till the land . . . The political method in our movement is absolutely inseparable from the practical work."²⁰

In the early twenties, he addressed a call to the Jewish youth saying: ". . .the only way to liberate our country is by the sword."²¹ He went to the Twelfth Zionist Congress in 1921, with this slogan in mind hoping to see the Zionist Organization execute it. He tried to convince Weizmann to agree to create a "Great Zionist Cabinet" which would be composed of the party leaders and would represent the various tendencies in the Organization.

C. *The Great Zionist Cabinet*

In his speech at the Carlsbad Congress in August 1921, Jabotinsky explained that he had reached an agreement with Dr. Weizmann but denied categorically that this agreement was based on "mutual concessions." He then exposed the four essential terms of the agreement which were related by Schechtman in the following form:

1. Should the time come for 'a big change on the Mount of Olives' (meaning the appointment of a new High Commissioner), the Zionist Organization was to demand the right to have its say.
2. Concerning the Legion, 'here was no need of an agreement, because in this question Dr. Weizmann and myself have cooperated for several years.'
3. In any reorganization of the Zionist Commission, the Palestine *Yishuv* must be represented.
4. Reconstruction of the Executive along the lines indicated above."²²

He further declared in this speech that the terms "revolution" and "militarism" belonged to the Latin expressions which he did not understand. He had previously joined the Zionist Executive. To justify this action, he explained that he had accepted the majority's opinion and that his presence in the Committee was based on his belief in the possibility of what he described as "conquering from within." He stated that two possible paths could be followed in politics: "One was to tear down a fortress by an assault from without; the other was to conquer it by working from within."²³ He chose the second which he believed was "the only practical and expedient one." He probably adopted this attitude because of his weak position during this critical period. At the end of his speech, he reiterated his appeal to all Zionists to "build bridges to each other" insisting that there was work for all of them and that "besides viewpoints on which we disagree, there are still those on which we do agree." He hoped the Great Cabinet he was calling for would include "all who accept the foundations of historic Zionism, who possess sufficient tolerance to compile a program which would be satisfactory to everybody and for which we all would be able to work."²⁴

(20) *Ibid.*

(21) Robert St. John, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

(22) Schechtmann, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 373.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 375.

Jabotinsky devoted most of his time in the Executive to the problems connected with what he called "the security of Palestine Jewry." When Herbert Samuel submitted his scheme of a Jewish-Arab force in March 1921, Jabotinsky warned the Zionists against the dangers of such a scheme. His argument was that "very few Jews and very many Arabs would volunteer for service in such a body" and that the Jews "could not and would not remain in a mixed militia, just as little as in a mixed police force."²⁵ In his opinion, this would result in a militia composed mainly of Arabs, "which," he argued, "of necessity would be anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist," while his fanaticism made him declare that it would mean "the creation of a pogrom army." There is little doubt that the aim behind his opposition to a mixed militia was to leave the way open for his own scheme which was to form a "Jewish" legion. He, thus, succeeded in obtaining the support of the Zionist Executive for the following proposal dealing with "Militia Force," which was submitted to the British government:

"1. The 38th-40th Royal Fusiliers as formed in 1917 should continue to form part of the British Forces in Palestine.

2. Recruiting of Jewish volunteers should be reopened until their number reached at least one-half of the proposed total strength (7,700) of the British garrison.

3. It was assumed that, by appealing to the patriotism of the *Halutzim*, a sufficient number could be induced to enlist at a pay of one Egyptian pound per month for privates, two pounds per month for sergeants, etc. Apart from the difference of pay there should be no disparity between the recruits in the proposed forces and in any other British troops in Palestine. Only single men would be enlisted, so that family allowances would be out of the question."²⁶

We know a controversy took place between Jabotinsky and the advocates of the *Haganah* as the only Zionist defence corps. We also know that his proposals were unanimously accepted by the Executive except for the proviso in his original resolution which stated that the Zionist Organization should contribute toward the upkeep of the "Judeans" a sum sufficient to cover enlisted men's pay. After the Jaffa troubles of May 1921, the *Haganah* leaders (Moshe Shertok, David Hacohen, and Eliahu Golomb) undertook to organize the *Haganah* so that "hundreds of workers could be converted into a secret army" arguing that "the question of arms is now not less important than the question of Legion." The dispute between them and Jabotinsky grew in scope and intensity. To him, "Jewish self-defence in Palestine must not be a clandestine body; it could serve its purpose usefully only if legally recognized by the Palestine government."²⁷ He visited Palestine in October 1922, and tried to obtain *Haganah's* legalization by asking from Sir Wyndham Deeds governmental sanction for the organization and training of the *Haganah* units in the towns and colonies. This scheme implied that "in return for legalization, the *Haganah* would surrender illegally held arms," which the leaders refused to do declaring: "We do not agree to sacrifice our real strength, if ever so small, on the altar of Jabotinsky's illusions."²⁸

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 377.

(26) *Ibid.*, pp. 377-378.

(27) *Ibid.*, pp. 382-388.

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 384.

But Jabotinsky was not inclined to retreat so easily. He remembered Mazzini's statement which he quoted at the Twelfth Zionist Congress to answer the accusation that his pro-Allies appeals during the war had practically put him in the ranks of the Czarist regime known for its hostility to Semitism, and undertook with Slavinsky "to put into effect a plan whereby a Jewish gendarmery, properly armed, manned, officered, and maintained by Jews, would be attached to the Ukrainian Army."²⁹ He had to resign from the Committee two years later, however, and withdraw from the Zionist Organization as a whole because of the ever-increasing disparity between his reaction to events, such as Churchill's White Paper, and those of his colleagues. The situation had begun to deteriorate, in fact, since his alliance with Slavinsky against the Bolsheviks and his dispute with Herbert Samuel, the British High Commissioner in Palestine whom he accused of "undermining the very foundations of the Zionist political position." The acceptance of Churchill's White Paper by the Zionist Committee, which he violently criticized was the last of a chain of events which could only end in Jabotinsky's withdrawal from the Organization. He turned to journalism and joined the editorial board of *Rasswyet*, the organ of the Federation of Russian-Ukrainian Zionists which was published in Berlin. Soon, *Rasswyet* was to become Jabotinsky's organ through which he pursued his own Zionist scheme. A series of articles entitled "Our Platform" appeared in the March 1924, issues of *Rasswyet*. In his article "Political Offensive," Jabotinsky enumerated the basic points of his program:

1. The goal of Zionism—a Jewish State;
2. The territory of the State—both sides of the Jordan;
3. The method—mass colonization;
4. The financial system—national loan."³⁰

He added that "the immediate task of Zionism was, therefore, a sustained political offensive, coupled with the militarization of the Jewish youth in Palestine and in the Diaspora."³¹

Simultaneously, Jabotinsky's supporters opened offices in the European capitals and sent to a number of Zionist leaders a memorandum signed by the *Ligue Pour la Révision de la Politique Sioniste, Bureau Provisoire d'Organisation* which contained "a concise program of action along the lines of *Our Platform*."

By May 1924, *Rasswyet* closed down for financial reasons while Jabotinsky established his headquarters in Paris instead of Berlin. There, he founded a movement which he named "The Revisionists" and whose mission, he explained, was "to revise the program and tactics of the Zionist Organization in accordance with the new situation," while *Rasswyet* resumed publication in that same city. A Central Committee of twelve members was formed and Jabotinsky was elected President. The point at issue then was whether "the Union of Zionist Revisionists" was to become an integral part of the World Organization. In spite of Jabotinsky's option

(29) *Ibid.*, p. 402.

(30) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 33.

(31) *Ibid.*

for independence, the Committee convinced him that the former attitude would serve their purposes better while the movement reserves to itself the right of independent propaganda in Jewish and non-Jewish circles."³²

The new program of the movement was based on the following:

"The aim of Zionism is the gradual transformation of Palestine (Trans Jordan included) into a Jewish Commonwealth, that is into a self-governing Commonwealth under the auspices of an established Jewish majority. Any other interpretation of Zionism, especially the White Paper of 1922, must be considered invalid."³³

The Central Committee further decided that the Revisionist Union should participate in the Fourteenth Zionist Organization. Thus, Jabotinsky was again in the Zionist official political arena. He agreed to head the Revisionist list in the Congress elections in Palestine partly because of his friends' pressure. Another major factor in his yielding to the decision of the Committee was "his concern lest the World Zionist Organization lose its control over its most valuable political instrument—the Jewish Agency."³⁴ Weizmann was, in fact, negotiating with a group of "non-Zionist financial potentates" with the purpose of "securing their participation in the Jewish Agency on a fifty-fifty basis." The only possible way to combat this scheme, thought Jabotinsky, was to attend the Congress and defend his views on the question there.

It is worthwhile mentioning though, that while the Zionist Revisionists assigned themselves the mission of "revising" the Basle Program, they were, in fact, disclosing and stating openly what official Zionism was reluctant to declare for fear of revealing its true intentions. It was not Weizmann's trend, but his method, which was different from Jabotinsky's. One should note in this respect that certain Arabic sources of the thirties referred to the members of the new movement as the "Reformists," not the "Revisionists."

Expansionism is not the attribute of one Zionist section alone. It is found throughout the World Zionist Organization; while one section proclaims it, unconcerned with the consequences of this attitude, another works in the same direction silently and calmly, declaring publicly that the advocates of extremism form a minority which has no place in the ranks of official Zionism.

In the next chapter, we will examine the "new" element brought in by Jabotinsky's Union and dwell on its "revisionist" character. From there, we will proceed to the part Jabotinsky's Zionism played in the creation of Israel and the conditions surrounding it after the death of its founder in 1940. We will simply remind the reader that the idea of the "Great Zionist Cabinet" was realized to a certain extent on the eve of the fifth of June 1967, when the terrorist Zionist *Herut* Party, the successor of Jabotinsky's, joined Eshkol's war cabinet, in the person of its leader, Menachem Begin, who became Minister of State without portfolio. We will also examine the effects of Jabotinsky's appeal in Israel today, with the

(32) *Ibid.*, p. 38.

(33) *Ibid.*

(34) *Ibid.*, p. 39.

call for a Greater Israel and the proclamation of its well-known expansionist intentions under the cover of "security," "defence," and "stability" demands.

D. *Zionism's Traveling Salesman*

"I may be a tactless writer,
or altogether a bad man;
what does it matter?
what if the teacher has an
unpleasant voice? The question is
whether his teachings are right."

(Jabotinsky, 1926)

From the foundation of the Union of Zionist Revisionists until his death in 1940, Vladimir Jabotinsky advocated expansionist thinking and the ideas associated with it. He pursued his crusading expedition seeking to realize Greater Zionism; he went on propaganda tours to win supporters while trying to polarize the "discontented elements in Zionism." Having toured eastern and central Europe, he turned to the United States for a visit early in 1926. His American followers had by then published a pamphlet containing the basic principles of the Revisionist program.

During his stay in the United States, he began cultivating relationships with the various Zionist associations and succeeded in "capturing" the "Order of the Sons of Zion." This order had previously founded the Judea Industrial Corporation which, in turn, established the Judea Insurance Company which had three branches in Palestine itself. A Palestine Exhibition and Fair Corporation was also founded by the Order in 1924, and two exhibitions were arranged in 1925 and 1926, to cover the entry of Jewish immigrants as participants in the pseudo-exhibition. There is no doubt that Jabotinsky's ideas, as well as the sporting and military organization which he carried out with great care, played an important role in these two fields of activity. The Revisionists encouraged the sporting games as a pretext for training the youth in the art of combat. The *Maccabi* games offered them the opportunity to introduce a large number of young people into the country, ready to join the Zionist army.

Jabotinsky was not content with his American success; he rather extended his activities to Palestine Jewry and European Jewish students as well. During his visit to Palestine in October 1926, he convinced the members of the *Vaad Leumi* to demand from the Mandate government "the establishment of a purely Jewish military unit within the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force."³⁵ Besides, he did not abandon his old dream and continued to declare that his appeal for using violence and force was not a "revision" but a "reform" of the Zionist program: "This is so because we are actually fighting for the old Herzlian concept, against the *galut* tendencies which now dominate the Zionist movement."³⁶

(35) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 64.

(36) *Ibid.*

In the manner of Max Nordau, he emphasized the importance of duelling. At a meeting of all the student corporations in Vienna in 1927, he declared:

“You can abolish everything—the caps, the ribbons, the colors, heavy drinking, the songs, everything. But not the sword. You are going to keep the sword. Sword-fighting is not a German invention, it belonged to our forefathers. The Torah and the sword were both handed down to us from Heaven.”³⁷

The appeal to maintain swordfighting was, in fact, simply meant to complement that which he frequently addressed to the Jewish youth in order to encourage them to join the Zionist army and liberate Palestine from the Arabs! And how often did Jabotinsky declare that “Jewish troops in Palestine are indispensable not only to prevent the recurrence of anti-Jewish riots,” arguing that “the justification of their maintenance lies far deeper.”³⁸

In 1929, Jabotinsky attended the Sixteenth Zionist Congress at Zurich and started his address with the definition of the basic ideas of Zionist terminology. He said:

“What is the Jewish National Home?

It is ‘a national State, a State with a predominant Jewish majority, where the will of the Jewish people will determine the forms and ways of collective life.’

What is Palestine?

‘It is an area, whose essential geographical characteristic is that the Jordan River flows not along its frontier, but through the middle of it.’

What is the meaning of Zionism?

Zionism aims at the ‘actual solution to the political, economic and cultural tragedy of many millions of Jews. Its purpose is, therefore, not only to create a [Jewish] majority in Palestine, but to create living space for millions on both sides of the Jordan.’³⁹

After reading these statements, one cannot hesitate to place Jabotinsky among the advocates of the type of expansionism in which the Nazi and Fascist movements abounded. In one of his articles on Zionist ideology, the historian, Hans Kohn, explained that Jabotinsky’s ideas had developed and flourished in the intellectual atmosphere that was then prevailing in Italy and France. To him, Jabotinsky was not so much a revisionist when compared to the Herzlian concept. He indeed began with the same idea as Herzl and Nordau, that of Jewish distress. His purpose was delivering the Jews from their distress through Jewish colonization, using the authority of the Jewish state with its military strength as a tool to achieve this end. Regarding the Arab attitude, he believed that Jewish majority could be attained only if one counters the will of the indigeneous population. His appeal, thus, became extremely clear: achievement of Zionist colonization by force—if not, Zionist aims cannot be fulfilled.

Jabotinsky’s logic in no way relates to either peace or justice. His crusading spirit is essentially founded on minimization of the national awakening of the Arab population and on inculcating eternal antagonism between Arabs and Jews, while his Fascist attitude towards Arab aspirations led him to declare openly that

(37) *Ibid.*, p. 79.

(38) *The Keren Ha-Yesod Book*, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

(39) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 112-113.

“his heart would be filled with joy for any failure of this movement, not only in Trans-Jordan or Syria, but also in Morocco.”⁴⁰

Hans Kohn commented on Jabotinsky’s thinking and fanatical hostility to all that was Arab or oriental—and his statement proved to be true forty years later with the June 1967 aggression. He said:

“Among the extraordinary ironies of destiny is that the people which lived in the west as outcast orientals should have been intoxicated with the assimilationist policy of the last century to the point of wishing to return to the East as the superior and master people of the West.”⁴¹

We will add to this comment that the expansionist Zionist movement, with its various parties, sections, and successive leaders, was reflected in Jabotinsky’s approach. And Jabotinsky was not the only one to belong to the Zionist trend that was both extremist and expansionist in intent. Furthermore, his successors are not the only members of the terrorist military organization which became, after the creation of the State of Israel, the *Herut* Party. To think otherwise would be falling into the snare of Zionist propaganda. During the twenty years which followed the creation of the State of Israel, Zionist leaders continue to re-iterate their disavowal of the ideas propounded by the *Herut* and their remoteness from Jabotinsky’s thinking, while trying to convince world public opinion that the *Herut* represents nothing more than a small group opposed to the government. In fact, they endeavoured to evict the members of this party from government for personal reasons as a result of old disputes, not on ideological grounds. This helped them appear to be peace-loving and progressive while Jabotinsky’s partisans alone were put in the ranks of an opposing minority and were attributed all forms of extremism. This attitude was not modified until the eve of the June 5 aggression when, under the cover of a coalition Cabinet gathering the various sections and attitudes in the country, Jabotinsky’s student, the terrorist Menachem Begin came to government as Minister of State. And Begin himself is the author of the following statement:

“Even if we signed a peace treaty, there will be no peace for the people of Israel or for the land of Israel and even for the Arabs, as long as we have not liberated the whole of our country” (April 7, 1950).

On the other hand, the young Zionist members of the military organization, *Betar*, kept raising the slogans which Jabotinsky had written in 1932, as the official hymn of this organization:

A Living Space for Millions,
Both sides of Jordan,
The one which is ours —
And the other which is ours too.

When Weizmann declared at the meeting of the Zionist Actions Committee

(40) Hans Kohn and Robert Weltsch, *Zionistische Politik* (Verlag Dr. R. Färber, Mährisch-Ostrau, Tschechoslowakei, 1927), S.122.

(41) *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

in Berlin on August 27, 1930, that "the Jewish State was never an aim in itself, it was only a means to an end" and that "nothing is said about the Jewish State in the Basle program, nor in the Balfour Declaration. The essence of Zionism is to create a number of important material foundations, upon which an autonomous, compact, and productive community can be built."⁴² Jabotinsky began considering seriously the withdrawal of the Revisionists from the World Zionist Organization. At the Seventeenth Congress in 1931, Sokolow succeeded Weizmann as chairman of the Organization while Jabotinsky read the following resolution before the Congress:

"The aim of Zionism, expressed in the terms 'Jewish State,' 'National Home,' or 'a Homestead guaranteed by public law,' is the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan."⁴³

But the majority of the Organization's members raised the problem of dual leadership. The Executive Committee issued a statement prohibiting simultaneous membership in the World Organization and in other organizations external to it, whenever the latter was in opposition to the mother organization. Members in the Union of the Zionist Revisionists demanded a return to Herzl, while Jabotinsky's partisans demanded a return to Jabotinsky himself as well as continuation of the extremist program. The majority went as far as to demand the establishment of a dictatorial system inside the Revisionist movement. The leaders began contacting governments and politicians, whereas Jabotinsky was busily engaged in maintaining internal order and discipline. He took this opportunity to support Hitler and Germany and proclaim his own dictatorship following the plebiscite of April 16, 1933. He took over all powers in his movement claiming that he was working for settlement while emphasizing his belief in the necessity of personal leadership. To his supporters, the love of Zion became the love of Jabotinsky. Rituals of hero worshipping started to appear while the Zionist opposition undertook to fight Jewish Hitlerism.

With the Eighteenth Zionist Congress in Prague in 1933, the breach in the Revisionists movement was definitely sealed. A section of the Democratic Revisionists withdrew from Jabotinsky's movement to form a party of their own, the "Jewish State Party," under the leadership of Meir Grossman. The newly-formed party recognized the sovereignty of the World Zionist Organization. As for the Revisionist movement itself, it was violently criticized by the Zionist socialists especially after two members of Jabotinsky's movement were accused of assassinating the head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, Chaim Arlosoroff, who was a moderate leader of the Labor movement, while Jabotinsky tried to impute the murder to Arab extremists. A broad anti-Revisionist coalition was formed. It called for the wholesale outlawing of the entire Jabotinsky movement with the motto, "Expel the Revisionist gangs from Jewish life," while Jabotinsky kept proclaiming that the aim of Zionism was the establishment of a Jewish state

(42) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

(43) *Ibid.*, p. 149.

with a Jewish majority on both sides of the Jordan. Asking for the liquidation of the "extended Jewish Agency," he condemned class warfare in Palestine and demanded the legalization of the Jewish self-defence organization. However, the Labour wing which largely controlled the Eighteenth Congress succeeded in precluding Revisionist representation in the Praesidium. On the other hand, Jabotinsky was again antagonized by the left parties when, taking the defence of the middle-class, he declared: "If there is a class in whose hands the future lies . . . it is we, the bourgeoisie . . ."44 To him, the middle-class was "the militant vanguard of the *Yishuv*." By middle-class he meant "the average type of Jew nearing or above the age of thirty" while Jewish Fascism means to him the way to realize Zionist colonization: "Of course, our social attitude is different: it is neither 'left' nor 'right,' but inexorably colonizing."45

Thus, he criticized the notion of class struggle which he attributed to the Zionist socialists pointing out that "classes can exist only in an already formed and established society, and the class-war theory cannot and should not be applied to a country undergoing a period of colonization."46

In spite of his provocative attitude towards the Zionists socialists, Jabotinsky was ready to negotiate with Ben Gurion. It seems he was becoming increasingly influential and the socialists feared for their future in Palestine should the Revisionist leader and his right wing gain the upper hand. The two parties signed an agreement forbidding "all acts of terror or violence in any shape or any form." It was opposed by the majority of the Palestine delegation, especially by the terrorist leader, Menachem Begin, at the Sixth Revisionist World Conference while the majority of the *Histadrut* Conference refused to grant certificates for *Betarim*. Hopes for a better relationship between the Revisionists and the official Zionist bodies thus dissolved rapidly. In April 1935, Jabotinsky, rejecting the strategy of "fighting from within," withdrew from the World Zionist Organization and formed an organization of his own which he called "New Zionist Organization." Interpreting Jabotinsky's strategy, Meir Grossman said:

"He attempted to effect unity in Zionism by force, unity through a split . . . He despaired of Zionist Parliamentarianism, and hoped that a fierce struggle might open the eyes of the people, goad them to revolt and thus force unity and accord."47

E. *The New Zionist Organization (1935-1946)*

The Foundation Congress of the New Zionist Organization was convened in September 1935. Jabotinsky introduced then a revolutionary new definition of the ultimate aim of Zionism, emphasizing "the humanitarian aspect of the movement rather than its purely nationalistic aspirations." The Jewish state was no

(44) *Ibid.*, p. 234.

(45) *Ibid.*, p. 235.

(46) *Ibid.*, p. 236.

(47) *Ibid.*, p. 280.

more the ultimate aim, but became merely "the first step in the process of implementing Greater Zionism" with its expansionist intentions, while the second step was "the return of the Jewish People to its Homeland" which meant the exodus into Palestine. To him, the real meaning of "Zionism" became "exodus" or "the liquidation of the enforced Dispersion, the gradual repatriation of 'all those Jews who want it.'"⁴⁸ He came out of the Congress with a new scheme inspired from Max Nordau, consisting of preparing a "Ten-Year Plan" for the transfer to and settlement in Palestine of 1,500,000 new Jewish immigrants within a period of ten years.

Moreover, Jabotinsky's new Zionist concept included a religious aspect which was meant to obtain the support of the Orthodox circle. It is no wonder Jabotinsky realized the important role played by religion in the Zionist Organization and decided not to ignore it despite his claims of rationalism. He resorted to a new manoeuvre of introducing religion and tradition into the framework of the basic principles of the new Revisionist movement, knowing that such a step constituted a departure from the fundamental principle of Zionistic monism.

When the headquarters of the New Zionist Organization were transferred to London in 1936, Jabotinsky began issuing statements against the establishment of the Legislative Council in Palestine. Once more, he considered seriously offering the Mandate to Italy instead of Britain and centered his efforts on freeing Palestine from the British, claiming that the Mandate would then fall into Jewish hands once the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* organization had imposed itself on the Palestinian territory. At the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of Jewish battalions in the British Army, he gathered with Sidebotham who expressed his hope of seeing the two camps of the Zionist Movement unite. Jabotinsky then led an anti-partition crusade. He went to South Africa where he conducted a lecture campaign insisting on "the urgency of immediate evacuation of Jews inhabiting the belt of *Judennot* in the Eastern part of Europe." Furthermore, he denounced Weizmann's willingness "to sacrifice nine-tenths of the Jewish national territory," while in a letter to Nahum Levin he ironically charged that for "Weizmann and Co.," the Zionist program now reads as follows:

"The aim of Zionism is to partition Palestine and give the Arabs 95% of the country including the historical and Biblical land of Israel."⁴⁹

Jabotinsky did not favour the idea of an Arab-Jewish state. He maintained instead his original plan of establishing a Jewish majority in Palestine while being fully aware that it would have to be achieved "against the wish" of the country's Arab majority. Unconcerned with these considerations, he insisted on the creation of an "iron wall," a Jewish armed force "to protect the process of achieving a majority"⁵⁰ by way of violence and terrorism.

Seduced by Nordau's suggestion of transferring the Arabs of Palestine to

(48) *Ibid.*, p. 284.

(49) *Ibid.*, p. 323.

(50) *Ibid.*, p. 324.

Iraq, he adopted and supported it in his book *The War and the Jew*, which was published in New York, in 1942.⁵¹

Upon reading the various statements uttered by the Zionist leaders from the creation of the State of Israel until now, one has to admit that their common and unique position *vis à vis* the Palestinian Arabs who were chased out of their country to become "refugees," is in no way different from that of Jabotinsky or his followers. For now the Revisionists' attitude has been officially adopted by Zionist leaders of all trends and tendencies. All of them are demanding the solution of the refugee problem through their settlement in the vast stretches of Arab territories which, still suffering from underpopulation, can absorb more inhabitants. It is also evident that the factors which Jabotinsky took into account have not undergone any substantial change since his death and after the creation of the State of Israel. He stressed the importance of the time factor for Zionism and was perfectly aware of the demographic considerations and the proportional annual increase of the Arab population of Palestine. He insisted on the urgency of Jewish settlement; Israel was to do the same after 1948, and also after the June 5 aggression. We read regularly every day statements to this effect on behalf of the Israeli leaders and officials. All of them call for the urgent settlement of new Jewish colonizers in the occupied territories. Expansionism through aggression and occupation of conquered territories is achieved under the cover of peace and security requirements. Obviously, demographic considerations play an important role in the expansionist calculations of Zionist colonization.

Also, it is not unlikely that demographic conjectures were at the origin of the Zionist appeal before June 5, 1967, namely that the number of Arabs living in Palestine would be able to constitute, in the course of the next fifty years, the majority in the country or at least a significant force capable of being compared with the Jewish one, and thus threatened to possess exclusive power over the area.

Nothing can induce us to believe that Zionists have abandoned, or intend to abandon, the implementation of the plan which Jabotinsky took from Nordau. More and more appeals are addressed to the Jews of the world urging them to immigrate into occupied Palestine. If Jabotinsky chose to use the word "evacuation" to mean Jewish mass emigration as a solution to the Jewish question, Zionism has not neglected for one moment the evacuation of Arabs, claiming that it was voluntary. Furthermore, the Revisionist leader included evacuation among the aims of Zionism, pointing out that his scheme was nothing but the implementation of both Herzl's fundamental Zionist concept of 1896, and Nordau's plan of 1920. Sharing Herzl's static and narrow views on anti-Semitism, he viewed it as an indispensable factor for the realisation of the Zionist plan as a whole; thus, his reference to "exodus" and "evacuation." Interestingly enough, Jabotinsky adopted the approach of the founder of political Zionism when he declared to the Second Revisionist World Congress "*Morenu ve' Rabenu, ha'goy*"

(51) *The War and the Jew* (Dial Press, New York, 1942), p. 215.

(our teacher and our mentor, the gentile).⁵² To him, the non-Jewish world was a "great and creative force, from which the Jewish national movement had a lot to learn in the field of political thought and action."⁵³ He thus favored the existence of close cooperation between the Jewish national movement and the gentile world. A fervent advocate of Jewish self-reliance, he kept referring to Nordau's plan which became "one of the cornerstones of his evacuation crusade." His main motivation was that "we must at any price become a majority in Palestine . . . otherwise our National Home would remain a delusion and a will-o-the-wisp."⁵⁴ Further, to the policy of "alliances" which he had followed since the foundation of the New Zionist Organization, he initiated negotiations with the Polish government. In 1939, he endeavored to attract the attention of the American government to his scheme, confident that "with the phenomenon of a Jewish majority becoming a fact 'almost overnight,' Palestine Arabs would accept the *fait accompli* and come to terms."⁵⁵ In fact, since 1936, and throughout 1939, Jabotinsky endeavored to cooperate with "the Governments of the countries directly interested in emigration outlets for their Jewish population, and [utilize] their influence for securing possibilities for Jewish mass transfer to Palestine." He successively met Polish leaders, the King of Rumania, the President of Czechoslovakia, the Irish President, thus deserving his name as Zionism's traveling salesman.

Furthermore, the organ of the new Revisionist movement, *The Jewish Standard*, published notices from 1939, until the creation of the State of Israel such as the following which appeared in its issue of August 24, 1945:

**JOIN THE
NEW ZIONIST ORGANISATION**

and support the programme of

1. The solution of the Jewish Problem by the establishment of Palestine on both sides of the Jordan as a Jewish State.
2. The early voluntary transfer of all European and other distressed Jewries and resettlement in Palestine.
3. The constitution of a Jewish Provisional Government with representation on the United Nations Organisation.
4. The Creation of a Jewish Army to assume the defence of Palestine.
5. The Unification of Jewry for the attainment of the above aims.

JOIN THE NEW ZIONIST ORGANISATION IN GT. BRITAIN

For further particulars of membership fill in the following form and post:
**THE GENERAL SECRETARY, N.Z.O. in G.B.,
 25, Manchester Square, London, W.1.**

(52) Schechtman, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 349.

(53) *Ibid.*, pp. 349-350.

(54) *Ibid.*, p. 351.

(55) *Ibid.*, p. 353.

As for the map which the reader will find on the front page of this paper which appears on the following page, it is the best evidence of the expansionist slogan which the New Zionist Organization adopted during Jabotinsky's life and after his death in 1948. We have chosen to reproduce the front page of the May 21, 1948, issue published on the eve of the creation of the State of Israel on Palestinian land.

Although, from his recurring disputes with the World Zionist Organization Jabotinsky may appear as the champion of extremism and violence, the basic principle of the New Zionist Organization does not reject Herzl's teachings at all, but openly proclaims that the aim of Zionism is:

"To reconstitute in Palestine, including Trans-Jordan, as the Jewish State; to gather in it all those Jews who, for any reason whatever, regard themselves as homeless, thus putting an end to all involuntary dispersion; to build a Jewish civilization whose language shall be Hebrew, its soul the Bible, its order freedom and social justice."⁵⁶

We cannot say either that this Zionism calls for new principles. In fact, it receives its inspiration from both Herzl's and Nordau's Zionist schools which even gave it its expansionist framework. Unconcerned with diplomatic or official considerations, the New Zionist Organization put itself before the public; it seized the minds of the Jewish youth. Practicing violence and terrorism, it proclaimed Jabotinsky's leadership and began implementing this Zionist school of thought, putting into practice the teachings of its Revisionist leader. It resulted in the expulsion of the people of Palestine from their land while terrorism and usurpation as well as other violent means were thought of merely as tools to liberate the Jewish national home.

This picture does not differ from the one drawn by Herzl at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Expansionism is not only a facet of extremist Zionism which the other Zionists considered as a mere revisionist trend moved by personal aspirations and dominated by Jabotinsky's dictatorial prestige. It rather forms the basis of Zionist thinking. No wonder Zionism, by its very nature and by virtue of its origin and goals, cannot be easily dissociated from expansionist intentions and imperialist ambitions, no matter how successful it is in camouflaging its real intentions and appearing as a progressive "poor little state" wishing nothing but calm and peace, and extending a friendly hand to its neighbors.

We would thus be correct in stating that Zionism, with its expansionist tendencies, and both its revisionist and official wings, does not constitute a departure from Jabotinsky's concept. Rather it has followed in his footsteps, looking into the direction of Herzl, Nordau, and Jabotinsky through its actual leaders: from Ben Gurion to Eshkol and from Weizmann to Shertok, Eban and others. Zionism cannot contradict its own nature, no matter how often it claims its intention to leave out the expansionist shadow which accompanies it.

(56) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1135.



NATIONAL JEWISH WEEKLY

CALL TO ARMS

By
A. ABRAHAMS

(See page 3)

Ninth Year/No. 4

Friday, May 21st, 1948—Iyyar 12, 5708.

Price 3d.

STATE OF ISRAEL IS PROCLAIMED

ISRAEL MOVING TO OFFENSIVE

Striking Successes Reported

(From Our Correspondent in Israel)

JEWISH Army Headquarters have just reported the linking up with the Jews in the Old City and the capture of Mount Zion, which commands the road from Hebron and the entry into Jerusalem from the South. Seventy Arab soldiers were captured in the attack on the Old City. The Arab Legion outside Jerusalem has been shaken by the steady advance of the Jewish forces, which are acting according to a plan, while the Arab troops seem to be operating without co-ordination and frequently without agreement among the different units.

"Our Call to Jewry to Rally to Our Side"

THE Jewish State, to be known as Israel, was proclaimed at 4 p.m. on Friday, May 14th, at a solemn session of the National Council at Tel Aviv. Mr. David Ben-Gurion, who became Israel's first Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, read the declaration of independence. It begins:

"The land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and national identity was formed; here they achieved independence and created a culture of national and universal significance. Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world. Exiled from Palestine, the Jewish people remained faithful to it in all the countries of their dispersion, never ceasing to pray and hope for their return and the restoration of their national freedom impelled by this historic association. Jews strove throughout the centuries to go back to the land of their fathers and regain their Statehood."

After recalling the events which led up to the establishment of the State, from the first Zionist Congress to the Jewish holocaust during the Second World War, the proclamation goes on:

"On November 29th, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution for the establishment of an independent Jewish State in Palestine and

TWO KINDS OF RECOGNITION

Britain Avoiding the Issue

(From Our Diplomatic Correspondent)

THE recognition of the State of Israel by the United States, Guatemala and Soviet Russia, was followed during the week by recognition on the part of Poland, Uruguay and Czechoslovakia. The French Government was expected to give recognition before the end of the week as it was known that the French Cabinet was almost unanimously in favour of it. It was anticipated that most of the European States would follow suit very soon.

Important Differences

While the United States has granted

IN JABOTINSKY'S FOOTSTEPS

Jabotinsky died during the summer of 1940, while endeavouring to realize the creation of the Jewish Army on a large scale and compromising for the sake of unifying the Zionist ranks.

One month later, Abraham Stern and his people seceded from the *Irgun* to form the "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel," known as the "Stern Gang." Less than a year after Jabotinsky's death, appeals were made again for unification of the Zionist ranks and settlement of disputes between the New Zionist Organization and the World Zionist Organization. A Round Table Conference was suggested for this purpose while the policy of the N.Z.O. was summarized as follows by A. Abrahams, leader of the N.Z.O. directory board in a letter to *The Jewish*

Chronicle:

The creation of an independent Zionist Army.

The constitution of a Jewish National Committee as a Provisional government for the war period.

The adoption of a plan for voluntary emigration from the European countries and resettlement in Palestine.

The Proclamation that the aim of Zionism is the establishment of a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan.

The constitution of a unified Jewish representation at the Peace Conference.¹

The author of the letter went on to express the N.Z.O.'s readiness to participate in the Round Table Conference with the other Zionist Organizations in order to reach a unified and firm membership in the general Zionist ranks.

But the leaders of the mother organization refused to answer the Revisionists' invitation. They accused them of expecting the N.Z.O. to accept the Revisionist program and of misleading public opinion by "trying to create the impression that the Zionist Organization and the Revisionists are two equal forces."² Also, they pointed to the "fallacy" that "the Zionist Organization has, after some opposition, adopted points of policy proclaimed by the N.Z.O." and stressed the following: "It so happened however that the *Judenstaat* was written by Theodor Herzl, and not by Jabotinsky."³ To conclude, they argued that the philosophy and propaganda methods of the Revisionists are strange "to the Jewish tradition and the ideals of democratic society."⁴

(1) *The Jewish Chronicle*, July 18, 1941.

(2) *Zionist Review*, August 28, 1942.

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) *Ibid.*

The leaders of the old Zionist Organization thus set out to block their competitor's path: they fought them with their own weapons and chose to reveal their hidden plan at the appropriate time, namely on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. An extraordinary Zionist Conference was held at the Hotel Biltmore in New York on May 8, 1942. It was attended by delegates from all parts of the United States in addition to Dr. Weizmann, Ben Gurion, Nahum Goldmann and Rabbi Stephen Wise, as well as other leading Zionist personalities. The resolutions then adopted formed the Biltmore Program. They were an expression of the views of the American Zionists and constituted the basis of the official Zionist policy for the following years. The sixth, seventh and eighth resolutions read as follows:

"6. The Conference calls for the fulfilment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which "*recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine*" was to afford them the opportunity, as stated by President Wilson, to found there a Jewish Commonwealth.

The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939 and denies its moral or legal validity. The White Paper seeks to limit, and in fact to nullify Jewish rights to immigration and settlement in Palestine, and, as stated by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons in May 1939, constitutes a breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration.' The policy of the White Paper is cruel and indefensible in its denial of sanctuary to Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution; and at a time when Palestine has become a focal point in the war front of the United Nations, and Palestine Jewry must provide all available manpower for farm and factory and camp, it is in direct conflict with the interests of the allied war effort.

7. In the struggle against the forces of aggression and tyranny, of which Jews were the earliest victims, and which now menace the Jewish National Home, recognition must be given to the right of the Jews of Palestine to play their full part in the war effort and in the defense of their country, through a Jewish military force fighting under its own flag and under the high command of the United Nations.

8. The Conference declares that the new world order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice and equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.

The conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened, that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world."⁵

Thus, the principles adopted by the Biltmore Program meant the triumph of the proposals previously submitted by Ben Gurion and Weizmann. The leader of the Jewish State Party condemned the appeasement tactics of the Zionist leadership and derided its unwillingness to "embarrass the noble British government that brought about the *Struma* disaster." He called for a "change from the present leadership with its unrelieved record of failures and defeats."⁶ Weizmann, answering his critics, said, "as long as British policy in Palestine permits us to acquire land and bring in Jews, I am ready to put up with everything."⁷ With regard to the Jewish Army, he believed that "200,000 was a somewhat unreasonable figure." He said, "I will be satisfied if not an army but a Jewish contingent of a few Jewish regiments will be organized. There is a nucleus of 12,000 already

(5) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1084-1085.

(6) *The Jewish Chronicle*, May 15, 1942.

(7) *Ibid.*

in the armed services in the Near East. If these receive the badge of the Magen David, such a contingent will increase by thousands, until Palestine is organized."⁸

When Dr. Judah L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University, initiated the establishment of a new organization called *Ibud*, the aims of which were "the propagating of the unification of all Zionistic countries, including a bi-national Palestine, and the incorporation of this Semitic federation in a democratic world system."⁹ The Zionists, "old" and "new," demanded his resignation, accusing him of "utilizing the prestige of his position for harmful political manoeuvres."¹⁰ In his report to the Inner Committee of the Zionist General Council in Jerusalem, Moshe Shertok described the *Ibud's* program as "being in opposition to the activities carried out in the U.S. as well as to the desires of the broad Jewish masses." He argued that "any political programme which does not include the demand for *Aliyah* as its main feature opposes the basic aims of Zionism,"¹¹ and went on to describe the *Ibud* as "a small sect without any influence on the *Yishuv* and on Zionist affairs." Nevertheless, he said it is a danger in itself because the members of *Ibud* appear as outspoken anti-Zionists.¹²

If the reaction of official Zionism reached such a degree, it is easy to understand the Revisionists' attitude in this respect. The organ of the Revisionists, *The Jewish Standard*, launched a violent campaign against the activities of Dr. Magnes, accusing him of being the echo of the British Colonial Secretary and of the High Commissioner.

Returning to the policy of Jabotinsky's successors between 1945 and 1948, we find that their demands had not changed since the establishment of the N.Z.O. by Jabotinsky. In 1945, for instance, the Revisionists issued an official statement which included among other things a demand for a change in the British policy in connection with Zionism, a warning to the three big powers about the danger of leaving the Jewish question unsolved, a call to Great Britain to create a Jewish state in Palestine while disregarding the "fallacy of Arab opposition."¹³ Two months earlier, the Jewish Agency had submitted a statement of policy to the San Francisco Conference. A five-point program, prepared by Weizmann, asked for "the constitution of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth, abolition of restrictions on Jewish immigration, development of the country and aid in immigration and settlement."¹⁴

The Revisionists tried to outbid the Jewish Agency, asking it to impose itself on the government of the Mandate and inform all other governments that its loyalty is to the Jewish people and not to the Palestine administration except insofar as the latter cooperates with the Jews in the creation of a Jewish state in historic Palestine. It was clear from the various articles and comments of the

(8) *Ibid.*

(9) *The Jewish Chronicle*, September 4, 1942.

(10) *Ibid.*

(11) *Ibid.*, September 11, 1942.

(12) *Ibid.*

(13) *The Jewish Standard*, July 20, 1945.

(14) *Palestine*, Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1196.

Revisionist press then that the ending of the war with the Allied victory would inevitably be followed by another war in Palestine. The Revisionist leaders accused Weizmann of accepting Churchill's White Paper and renouncing Trans-Jordan for fear of complicating the situation and contenting himself with the West Bank alone.

But news of the railway line sabotage during the night of October 31, 1945, confirmed the existence of close cooperation between the *Haganah* and *Irgun* in spite of the declarations by the leaders of the Jewish Agency, in London and in Washington, imputing the plan to the Sternists and to the *Irgun Zvai Leumi*. Jabotinsky's successors were again asked to return to the bosom of the old Zionist Organization after an absence of ten years, since all Zionists, including the responsible body of the old Zionist Organization, had proclaimed their acceptance of the principle of the Jewish state.

When Ernest Bevin issued his statement on the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on November 13, 1945, both the Revisionists and the leaders of the Jewish Agency expressed disapproval and went further in their criticism of British policy in Palestine, arguing that the statement was nothing but a surrender to the Arabs demands. Terrorist activities increased in violence while the Jewish Agency was renewing its demand for the immigration licences of 100,000 Jews.

Early in 1946, General Sir Frederick Morgan, President of the U.N.R.R.A., revealed that the "Secret Jewish Gang" was responsible for the terrorist activities carried out in order to coerce the Polish Jews to flee *en masse* from Germany to the American zone of occupation and then settle in Palestine. At the same time, the leader of the Stern Gang declared that the members of this movement were at war with the British Empire since they wished to create a Jewish state in defiance of the British. Besides, the Zionists did not overlook, at any time, their Zionist ambitions. The *Torah Va' Arodah*, which consisted of religious elements among the Jews, called for the creation of a Jewish state within the historic boundaries. It also expressed disapproval of Mr. Bevin's statement of policy and rejection of Churchill's White Paper, as well as any scheme aiming at partitioning historic Palestine, since, they argued, it would contradict the religious principles. The N.Z.O. decided not to cooperate with the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry accusing its members of neglecting even the collection of true facts.

When on January 17, 1946, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, gave his second declaration on Trans-Jordan before the General Assembly of the United Nations, he was violently criticized by the Zionists for separating the East Bank of the Jordan from Palestine and recognizing it as an independent state. They unified their ranks under the leadership of the Jewish Agency and decided to fight together for the "rights" of the "Jewish nation." The *Mizrabi* group and the General Zionists joined the N.Z.O. in the following decision: that the Jewish nation does not approve of the separation of the East Bank of the Jordan from Palestine to which it is linked historically, geographically and economically.

Thousands of copies of Jabotinsky's poem "Left Bank of the Jordan" (*Semol Hayarden*) were circulated. The Zionists forgot their dissensions to express the rejection by all Jews of the separation of "Eastern Palestine" from the land of their ambitions. The Zionist press began referring openly to the Jewish Resistance Movement which was formed of the *Haganah*, the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* and the Stern Gang. It warned Britain that every Jew in Palestine must be considered an active member of the Resistance Movement.

On March 9, 1949, the Revisionist Party merged with the Jewish State Party, and the leadership was transferred to the Union of the Zionist Revisionists in the United Kingdom. They proclaimed that the Jabotinsky movement was at the head of the Jewish struggle for liberation after the *Yishuv*, they argued, had been convinced that it was the only way. Zionist terrorist activities grew more intense and reached a climax with the destruction of King David's Hotel, other terrorist actions, and murders of Arab civilians.

Differences between the Zionist groups disappeared, and at the same time a number of crimes were perpetrated in the name of the Jewish Resistance Movement. Various available sources confirm the existence of close cooperation then between the *Irgun* and the *Haganah* on the one hand, and the *Haganah* and the Jewish Agency on the other. Terrorism spread its shadow over Palestinian land. The British finally understood the nature of the secret contacts between the Zionist Organization and the terrorist gangs inside and outside Palestine. The plan which aimed at opening the gates of Palestine to the immigration of Jewish terrorists who had been trained in East European armies and others was also uncovered.

The Revisionists and the members of the Jewish State Party were invited to attend the Twenty-Second Zionist Congress in Basle (1946), and the return of the separatists from the general Zionist ranks was thus completed. The following year was to witness the unified Zionist stand for the realization of both Herzl's and Nordau's dreams and the implementation of Jabotinsky's teachings. The alleged struggle between Weizmann's and Jabotinsky's methods was transferred to the arena of the Zionist Congress without the Revisionists' abandoning their demands for the restitution of Trans-Jordan and their accusations of defeatism and weakness of the leaders of the Jewish Agency.

The unified struggle brought them together for the sake of a Zionist victory and they returned to the Congress with the aim of transforming it into a Parliament of the Jewish people with democratic elections extended to all Jews who wished to participate. But the expansionist complex remained deep-rooted in their hearts.

When the Partition Plan was submitted to the United Nations in September 1947, the *Irgun* presented a memorandum containing objections inspired by Jabotinsky. The Zionist ambitions in Trans-Jordan were again emphasized and it was pointed out that any agreement on the partition question was not binding on

the Jewish people.¹⁵

Also, when, with the approval of the *Vaad Leumi*, David Ben Gurion brought up the question of the constitution of a Jewish Provisional Government, the *Irgun* immediately declared its support for the plan provided such a government would extend its authority over the whole land of Israel and not over a "Jewish ghetto" in the same land. The *Irgun* leaders made it clear that any partitioning of the land of Israel should be ruled out.¹⁶

How very similar yesterday is to today and vice-versa. What Begin had said on behalf of the *Irgun* twenty years earlier has now entered the phase of execution. It does not differ in essence from the declarations which are made by the Israeli leaders, among whom are Begin and his group, in the Eshkol Cabinet about their intention of making Israeli expansionism after the June 5 aggression an irrevocable *fait accompli* and an effective step in the creation of "Greater Israel."

The twenty years which have elapsed since the creation of the State of Israel in occupied Palestine constitute the best testimony of the Zionist expansionist character and an "experimental field" for the actual implementation of the Zionist idea. Since the shadow of the "armed prophet," David Ben Gurion, has reigned over it, it is no wonder that the era succeeding Jabotinsky should be completely dependent on Ben Gurion and the expansionist aggressive policy which he has unceasingly advocated and proclaimed in public.

(15) *The Jewish Standard*, October 31, 1947.

(16) *Ibid.*

PART FOUR

BEN GURION'S ERA

FROM "ISRAEL" TO "GREAT ISRAEL"
1948 - 1968

"It is not absurd to imagine Arab leaders ardently urging a return to the frontier of 1966 or 1967, just as they now urge a return to the frontier of 1947 which they once set aside by force."

Abba Eban — Summer 1965
Foreign Affairs

Less than a week after the proclamation of the State of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban was delegated by the Jewish Agency to answer the questions raised by the Security Council. The questions referred to the fact that the government of the State of Israel was extending its domination over territories which do not fall within the boundaries fixed by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947. It also pointed out that these territories, with the exception of Jerusalem, had previously included an Arab majority.¹

In his reply, Mr. Abba Eban explained that "no area outside of Palestine is under Jewish occupation but 'sallies' beyond the frontiers of the State of Israel have occasionally been carried out by Jewish forces."² He then proceeded to justify these 'sallies' or military operations which, he argued, were carried out "for military reasons, and as a part of an essentially defensive plan." Besides, Mr. Eban informed the Security Council that those measures had been taken in order to insure the entry of Jewish immigrants into Palestine in conformity with the first duty of the State of Israel which was to open its doors to immigration on a very large scale.

There is no need to discuss here all the terms of this memorandum. The same story has been repeated again and again during the twenty years which followed the establishment of the State of Israel. The usual answer for the special consumption of the Security Council avoided open declaration of aggressive and expansionist intentions. Five months after the submission of Mr. Eban's memorandum, when the Israeli Defence Forces started moving to occupy the Negev,

(1) *Zionist Review*, May 28, 1948.
(2) *Ibid.*

the Revisionists were calling for the occupation of the whole of historic Palestine. Their terrorist military organizations resumed negotiations for the unification of the movement founded by Jabotinsky, in the hope that the Revisionists might reach agreement with the *Hachberut* people. The *Betar* organization held its first congress after the war in Paris between 25 and 30 September 1948. The congress passed decisions welcoming the proclamation of the State of Israel as a first step in the restitution of the country as a whole within its historic boundaries. Jerusalem was the object of a special resolution calling for its official inclusion with the state and its proclamation as the capital of the Zionist state. The participants in the congress sent a cable to Jabotinsky's wife expressing the *Betar's* firm intention of pursuing aggression until Jabotinsky's directives of restituting the land of Israel—wholly free and indivisible—were fulfilled.³ The Revisionist leaders had previously wired Ben Gurion in New York objecting to their eviction from participation in the government. Meir Grossman reminded Ben Gurion that his appeals for the unification of the ranks would lose their significance should the second strongest party in Israel be denied participation in the Executive. He also reminded him of the dangers which threatened Israel and which urgently required the formation of a coalition cabinet allowing for the Revisionists participation in the defence of the country.⁴ Yet, the Revisionists' denial of participation in the cabinet was to persist, for personal as well as tactical reasons, for the next twenty years.

The Revisionists' demands were rendered possible on the eve of the June aggression. The two "mortal enemies," Ben Gurion and Begin, met and made peace together for the sake of the unification of the Zionist ranks. The *Herut* party leader became Minister of State in the Coalition Cabinet on behalf of the *Gahal*. In Ben Gurion's days, the *Mapai* had been behind the government's refusal to transfer Jabotinsky's remains to Israel according to the founder of the Revisionist Movement's will. Levi Eshkol's government, however, acquiesced later to the *Herut's* demand and the transfer was carried out. Under the headline "Ceremonial at Jabotinsky's Grave," the *Jerusalem Post* reported that: "At the 27th anniversary of the death of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, founder of the Revisionist Movement and spiritual mentor of the *Herut* Party, was marked at a memorial ceremony at his grave and that of his wife Johanna on Mount Herzl . . . Revisionist veterans brought handfuls of earth to the grave from various parts of the West Bank—the Mount of Olives, the Jordan fords where Jabotinsky led the Jewish Legion fifty years ago, Rachel's tomb and Hebron."⁵ On the other hand, the *Gahal*, which is formed of both the *Herut* and the Liberal Party, began to seek revision in the refugee policy. The same paper published on August 13 of the same year the following information: "The Liberal Party has followed the *Herut's* lead, and the Liberal Executive adopted a resolution urging that 'Arab refugees not be allowed to return to the West Bank because they will become

(3) *The Jewish Standard*, October 22, 1948.

(4) *Ibid.*, May 21, 1948.

(5) *The Jerusalem Post*, August 7, 1967.

a fifth column ...' The Liberal Party Executive also urged the Government not to welcome the UN Secretary General's representative in Jerusalem. The party found that this was interference with Israel's internal affairs, an affront to Israel sovereignty because the Knesset had already adopted laws unifying Jerusalem ...

"These resolutions were moved by Dr. Elimelech Rimalt and won an overwhelming majority, overruling the objections of the party's Minister, Yosef Saphir. He was criticized for over-cautiousness."

Although we have limited our discussion until now to Jabotinsky's successors, this does not mean that we accept the Zionists' delusive propaganda: that the *Herut* Party alone is calling for the adoption of an expansionist policy and raising the slogan, "Israel with its historic boundaries," while the peace loving Israel government (or more precisely the *Mapai* which is in power) is working for a peaceful existence with its neighbour. The events of the last twenty years have proved the falseness of this statement and have shown the dangerous consequences resulting from following it and falling into the trap. Behind all the various aggressive moves and manoeuvres, we find the Israeli expansionist complex: the repeated aggressions over the borders set by the United Nations Partition Commission, the annexation of Arab areas on the pretext of security requirements, the occupation of the Negev, the capture of the Aqaba area, which became the port of Eilath, the tripartite aggression of 1956, and now the June 1967 aggression.

In the various statements uttered by the Zionist leaders, we can find the expansionist complex hidden behind such terms as "the liberation of the Jewish national home as a whole" and behind the search for the state of the future which would include the whole of the "land of Israel" with its historic frontiers.

Ben Gurion undertook to formulate the irredentist ideological basis of world Zionism through a gradual approach to the geographical, historical and religious elements which he attributed to the State of Israel, the materialization of the Zionist concept. He wrote:

"Its [Israel's] geography, where three continents touch, lent much importance to the Land and made it, in a sense, the lodestone of empires. But, from the viewpoint of security, it added nothing to Israel's ability to defend itself. On the contrary, it diminished it, in fact and measure. The boundaries of Israel were not fixed and set, but were shifted time and again, from the days of the Judges to the days of Bar Kochba. Even in the heyday of its expansion and growth, those boundaries were in themselves no safeguard of existence. The situation of Israel reborn is no better than in that distant past. Its geographico-physical definition is practically unaltered, although vast and vital changes have taken place in its geopolitical surroundings."⁶

Having thus stated the geographic location of Palestine through history and its influence over the boundary question and the expansionist issue, he proceeded to present the characteristics of the land:

"Our land is distinguished in three respects: in topography, in geography and in history. Its appearance has no parallel on the face of the globe. Down the whole length of it, from North to South, from the heights of Lebanon and Hermon to the Red

(6) David Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1954), p. 444.

Sea, there stretches the abyss we call the Jordan Valley and the 'Arabah, at its middle point the Dead Sea, sunken 400 meters below sea-level, the lowest spot on the earth's surface."⁷

In the third and last part of his discussion, Ben Gurion attempted to create a relationship between the bygone past and the present which is robbing its sleep and refusing to reconcile itself with it. While dealing with the question of the Arab character of Palestine, he tried to use detours and evasions, looking into its history from the angle of Bar Kochba's revolt against the Roman rule, and situating the appearance of Islam, "near the land of Israel," after Bar Kochba. He stated: "The State of Israel has been restored in the western part [of historic Palestine]. In area it is no smaller than was the Jewish state during most of the period of the First or Second Temple, and the gravity of the current problem of security is not a matter of differing boundaries. It stems from far-reaching changes that took place near the Land about 500 years after Bar Kochba; from the spiritual convulsion which altered the face of the Middle East, of Central Asia and all the countries of North Africa."⁸

He meant by that the appearance and spread of Islam and of this Arab outburst which was to change the face of history and impart its character on this part of the world, centuries after the Romans crushed the revolt led by Bar Kochba! Avoiding a discussion of the historical conditions which surrounded the establishment of the first and second commonwealths, he contented himself with stating that the present area of the State of Israel (1952) "is no smaller" than was that of the Jewish state during the two commonwealths. He resorted to using negative wording in order to avoid stating that the "Israel" of today has a far larger area than it had during most of its historical periods and especially during the period of the Second Temple.⁹

Obviously, the Zionist opinions expressed by Ben Gurion in the above passages uncover Israel's intention to look forward to the extension of the area it is occupying on the basis of geographical and historical factors and of artificial comparisons and relationships.

It is also evident that expansionist Zionism is seeking to pull history backward after having rewritten it in its own way and in harmony with its own ambitions and leanings. We must, then, consider the following question: How is it that Israel, showing its aggressive nature in the light of the decisions of the United Nations and the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, refuses to go further than twenty years back? Particularly since it insists on going hundreds of years back to link its usurping existence with a Jewish Commonwealth which existed for a period of time and died out in the course of history. Is not this Zionist attitude another piece of evidence that Israel, or the Third Commonwealth (1948), is merely a phase in the process of the establishment of a "far-stretching Israeli Empire" as the realization of "Greater Israel"?

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 452.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 463.

(9) See Salo Baron's "Second and Third Commonwealth: Parallels and Differences" in Moshe Davis, *Israel: Its Role in Civilization* (Harper, New York, 1956), pp. 58 ff.

BOUNDARIES OF THE STATE—BOUNDARIES OF THE NATION

When David Ben Gurion declared in the introduction to the *Israel Government Year Book* (1952) that the State of Israel "has been established in only a portion of the Land of Israel,"¹ his statement came as new confirmation that Zionist expansionism was among the first aims of the "smaller Israel." This same idea was expressed by Ben Gurion on August 13, 1948, after the proclamation of independence and the establishment of the State of Israel when he explained that the state was not an end in itself—it was the means to the end which was Zionism.

In his speech to the Knesset (1951), he reminded his colleagues that "nineteenths of Jewry" were without a homeland, warning them not to fool themselves by "using sweet, sounding misnomers." He thus summed up for them once more the concept of the new Zionist irredentism and the meaning of the great introduction to Zionist expansionist thinking which begins on the basis of "smaller Israel," by declaring that "the Jewish nation in Israel . . . is still a promise and not a fulfilment."²

That is how the Zionist expansionist character, which is inherent in the Movement has manifested itself from the beginning of the Organization with Theodor Herzl until after the foundation of the Jewish state in Palestine. Since the very birth of "Israel," we have encountered new aspects of the Israeli logic which have brought out the difference between "promise" and "fulfilment."

The portion allocated to the Jews by the partition plan formed almost fifty per cent of Palestine despite the fact that at that time Jews owned only one-seventh of the land. The Israeli official position considered this portion as an "irreducible minimum." The Zionists' military strategy was not limited in scope to the frontiers mentioned in Abba Eban's memorandum to the Security Council. It rather included other considerations which would make it possible to impose a "new status quo" and face the Arabs and the world with a *fait accompli*. It is known that the second part of the strategy, known as the Plan Dalet, was adopted with a view to occupying all of Palestine. The Hebrew book, *Qurvot 1948*, explained that the purpose of the plan was "control of the area given to us by the UN in addition to areas occupied by us which were outside these borders and the setting up of forces to counter the possible invasion of Arab armies after May 15."³

But the frontiers of the status quo after the signature of the armistice were, in Ben Gurion's opinion, transitory and temporary since the boundaries of the state did not correspond to those of the nation. The map of the promised land

(1) *Israel Government Year Book* (1952), (Government Printer, Jerusalem, 1952), p. 15.

(2) Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*, *op. cit.*, p. 386.

(3) Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet," *Palestine Collected Papers*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

as drawn by the Zionists was still larger by far than the areas which were occupied by the force of arms. Besides, the religious wing in the Zionist Movement would not abandon the idea of an Israeli empire which would bring back the glories of David and Solomon in an area extending "from the Nile to the Euphrates." On the other hand, the Revisionists kept insisting on the historic frontiers of Palestine including Trans-Jordan as "the other bank" of the Jordan. Ben Gurion himself gave a clear expression to Zionist irredentism when he pointed out that "the State," "the Land," (the land of Israel), and "the Jewish People" did not coincide. He wrote:

"Every State consists of a land and a people. Israel is no exception, but it is a state identical neither with its land nor with its people . . . I add now that it has been established in only a portion of the Land of Israel. Some are hesitant as to the restoration of our historical frontiers, fixed and set from the beginning of time, but even they will hardly deny the anomaly of the new lines."⁴

A large number of Zionist studies and writings have been dedicated to examining the "mission of Israel," "the nation which is in Zion," "the return of Jews to their ancestral land" or to comparing the characteristics of the first, second, and third Jewish Commonwealths. In 1955, for instance, Frischwasser-Ra'anana published his book, *The Frontiers of a Nation*, which examined the frontiers from a historic-geographic point of view. And, while the author tried in his introduction to convince the reader that his book was far from Zionist irredentism or geopolitics, he explained that: "Frontiers questions tend to play their most important part during the birth pangs of new nation states." In that same part, he undertook to draw the history of the frontiers of Israel in order to show the difference between "the promise and the fulfilment," "the reality and ideal," and "Israel" on the one hand and the other countries on the other: "The historical geographies of other states must of necessity be like plays which change their *dramatis personae*; the heroes and villains of the Israel drama only alter in so far as they age somewhat."⁵

We will proceed to examine this drama since the appearance of its heroes on the stage of the "State" which was established on only a portion of the promised land. We will also find out whether the advance in years, during the two decades which followed the creation of Israel, did lead to a change and whether the *dramatis personae* are the same, if they are not still the prey of the expansionist plot and the tools used to realize the Zionist idea and make the frontiers of the nation and those of the state coincide to form "Greater Israel."⁶ We do not have the slightest doubt that the era which bears the name of Ben Gurion has witnessed a repetition of this drama, with its characters, its events and its plot. We must not forget either the major part played by the "armed prophet"—Ben Gurion—throughout the period when he was in power, working behind the scenes

(4) Ben Gurion, *op. cit.*, p. 466.

(5) Frischwasser-Ra'anana, *op. cit.*, p. xv.

(6) See: Eliahu Elath, *Israel and Elath: The Political Struggle for the Inclusion of Elath in the Jewish State* (Jewish Historical Society of England, London, 1966).

for the realization of the next phase of the expansionist Zionist plan and the completion of what the Zionists had failed to accomplish on the day their "smaller" state was established on Palestinian land: the occupation of the remaining part of Palestine of the Mandate and the appropriation of important areas in the neighbouring Arab lands.

The Zionists' insistence on distinguishing between the "boundaries of the state" qualified as the armistice or cease-fire lines, and those of the status quo and the "frontiers of the nation" which form "Greater Israel," again revealed the expansionist intentions which the Zionists sought to put into practice whenever circumstances permitted. That is why we deem it necessary to examine certain "preparations" and projects which "Israel of 1948" became the focal point of, and which were carried out on the pretext of "the liberation of the remaining part of the land of the Jewish National Home" and "the unification of the land of Israel"; once they had evicted its Palestinian inhabitants just as if they were chasing out foreigners to liberate their own country.

In the next chapter, we will examine the Israeli moves since the early fifties regarding the consolidation of the Zionist occupation of Palestine until the June 5 aggression and the open claim to "Greater Israel," as well as the refusal to allow Arab refugees to return to their homes.

Let us remember how Ben Gurion tried to justify the establishment of the Jewish state and the emigration of tens of thousands of Jews—or their immigration by way of the Zionist organizations networks—with the return to what he called "the vision of the Messianic redemption." In this way he tried to conceal the Zionist colonialist nature and disguise its expansionist characteristics. He explained:

"It is impossible to understand everything that has happened in our days—the renewal of the Jewish State and the immigration of tens of thousands of Jews who never read Hess, Pinsker and Herzl, and perhaps had never even heard the name of Zionism—without considering the vision of Messianic redemption which is implanted deep in the heart of the Jewish people, not only since the destruction of the Second Temple, but ever since the days of the first literary prophets, if not before the departure from Egypt."⁷

But, how did the immigration of this large number of Jews to occupied Palestine take place? If Zionism did not urge them to come to Palestine, how can we then reconcile the teachings of scientific Zionism with this deep-rooted religious tendency—according to Ben Gurion. Since when does the vision of the Messianic redemption find its perfect fulfilment by way of force of arms and attachment to worldly possessions to the point of creating a state in another people's country? Is not Solomon himself the author of the following statement (Psalm 127): "Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it: except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh *but* in vain."

It is by no means unlikely that practical Zionism should have resorted to

(7) *Israel Government Year Book*, 5718 (1957), (Government Printer, Jerusalem, 1957), p. 16.

arousing religious feelings in the hearts of the Jews and using them for its own interests, urging them to join the waves of emigration in the name of "the ascension to the land of Israel" so that a total merger would take place between the fanatical religious feelings and the military spirit of the groups of pioneers. It was expressed in "the Proclamation of the Establishment of the State of Israel" which the Zionists considered as "the proclamation of independence." It reads as follows:

"Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, *ma'pilim** and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community, controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country's inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood."⁸

It is not surprising that the Zionist ambition for the foundation of an independent Jewish nation achieved the first goal of its persistent search in the establishment of the Jewish state over a portion of the land of Israel (1948). Its love for peace compelled it to use aggression and expansionism as devices for self-defence while the "blessings to all the country's inhabitants" became violent blows against the non-Jewish majority of these inhabitants. Not satisfied with what it had perpetrated for the sake of peace, the thriving community derided its growth and development, and expanded into the usurped area and extended its domination over more regions which it considered within the scope of the "historic boundaries of the nation." It was blinded by fanaticism and dominated by ambitions which were motivated by racial theories until it imagined it was repeating an old drama on a stage called "Land of Israel."

(*) *Ma'pilim* (Hebrew)—immigrants coming to Palestine in defiance of restrictive legislation.

(8) Joseph Badi (ed.), *Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel* (Twayne, New York, 1961), p. 8.

THE STATE AND THE INGATHERING OF THE EXILES

Nearly ten years after the establishment of the State of Israel, Ben Gurion affirmed that the Zionist state had not yet fulfilled its vision of the Messianic redemption. This vision was a major cause, if not the primary one according to him, for the establishment of the State of Israel. He revealed to us the nature of the greater goals of Zionism. He was, in fact, repeating what he had declared on the day of the proclamation of the State of Israel, namely that the state was a means to an end which is Zionism. We will examine, then, the nature of the aims which Zionism was seeking to fulfil, after the creation of the State of Israel on "a portion of the historic land of Israel," to discover how the Zionist Movement imagines this phase of self-realization and fulfilment of the vision based on the coincidence of "State" and "Nation" at various levels: geographical, historical, economic and moral. We will start with Ben Gurion's statement:

"The State of Israel has been created by the vision of Messianic redemption of a people dispersed throughout the world. But the State has not yet realized the vision, and its future depends on the attainment of two goals laid down in the Proclamation of Independence and confirmed in two laws, which, though they have not been given the name of basic laws, should be considered as the supreme laws of the State of Israel. So long as they have not been fully implemented we cannot consider that the work of the State has been completed."¹

The two laws to which he referred were:

1. The Law of Return which contains the objective of the ingathering of the exiles.*
2. The State Education Law.

But, what is meant by the first article of this Law of Return which grants every Jew the right to come "to this country" as an *oleh*, and how does this "return," for which the Zionists prescribed a special law, relate to Israeli ideas of survival and growth as well as to the concept of "fulfilment of its mission of national redemption"? Further, does this call for return reveal an important element of the Zionist expansionist attitude from the viewpoint of Israeli attachment to the Jews of the world and insistence on a connection between "Israel" and the "Diaspora."

In his previously mentioned article, Ben Gurion answers all of these questions. He states:

"The Law of the Return is not like those immigration laws in force in other countries which lay down the conditions under which the State accepts certain classes of immigrants from abroad. The Law of the Return is the law of the historic permanence and continuity of the bond between our people and the Land of Israel; it lays down

(1) Ben Gurion, "Israel and the Diaspora," *Israel Government Year Book*, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.
(*) The full text of the Law of Return (1950) is at the end of this chapter.

the principle of state by virtue of which the State of Israel has been revived, and by virtue of which it will survive and grow and fulfil its mission of national redemption."²

And he leaves it for the future to show "what proportion of our people will be both willing and able to return to the Homeland."

Yet, this future behind which Ben Gurion protects himself started before the establishment of the state and extends, with the issuance of the Law of Return up to the present day. Moreover, nothing can persuade us to believe that their position will not extend beyond the limits of the present until it reaches its proper basis. Ben Gurion appears reluctant—in this article at least—to explain his concept of survival and growth, as well as that of national redemption. Another Zionist had previously carried out this task and clarified certain results which would be derived from accelerating the pace of Jewish emigration to Palestine, during the British Mandate and after its occupation by the Zionists.

The Zionist Revisionist, Joseph Schechtman, member of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency, published in the spring of 1948, a series of articles concerning what he called the issue of "Arab emigrants." After admitting that the Arabs had always formed an important majority in Palestine, he explained that the major objective of the Zionist Movement was the establishment of a Jewish state with a Jewish majority in spite of Arab opposition to Jewish immigration.³

He proceeded to enumerate the events and changes which occurred in Palestine up to May 1948, and which led to Arab emigration from their country, denying that terrorism had been responsible for such emigration. He adopted the slogan which the Zionists wished to spread, namely that the Arabs had willingly left the country and that the responsibility fell entirely on the Arab leaders themselves. He even stated that the emigrants did not listen to the Jewish leaders' appeals to remain or return. Then came the Arab armies offensive which was to end the Zionist policy of leniency and force the Israeli government to declare its official position: we do not want them and we will not accept them, we would have an army of liberation fighting in our midst. To end this part of his study, Schechtman summed up the official Zionist solution to the problem of the transferred Arab population, namely evacuation of Jewish residents in Arab countries and immigration into Palestine in exchange for the settlement of Arab emigrants in their place.

In reality, neither Schechtman nor official Zionism wished to solve the problem. They wished only to modify and restrict it to the Palestinian Arabs and to the Jews living in the Arab countries; they were thus ignoring the waves of European immigrants who brought Zionism with them into the country and played an active part in planting the seeds of dissension and struggle. As far as we know, Zionism was never born among the Eastern Jews; and the Arab Jew never dreamed of a Jewish state or of the restitution of the old kingdom of

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 31.

(3) *The Jewish Standard*, April 29, 1949.

Israel. He rather lived in the Arab society like any other minority. The oriental Jews, as a matter of fact, were regarded with more contempt by the Roman-European Jabotinsky than by the Arabs. The best evidence for it is the statement of the Zionist poet Bialik, Jabotinsky's closest friend: "I do not like the Arabs because they resemble too much the Oriental Jews."

We notice that Schechtman attributed the suggestion for solving the Arab problem in Palestine to Israel Zangwill who had proposed it at the end of World War I. It did not occur to him that the founder of Zionism himself divulged the secret in his diaries when he spoke about his intention to get rid of the indigenous population. He then declared that Jabotinsky and his people adopted the population transfer plan only after 1948, and when the New Zionist Organization Congress decided to support the plan in February 1942, the Revisionist leaders requested them to delay their decision for fear of arousing fanaticism against Zionism and giving the Arabs the pretext for good propaganda abroad.

However, he admitted that Weizmann had clearly referred to the plan in January 1942, while Ben Gurion had "decided" in 1943, when he was the chairman of the Executive Committee in the Jewish Agency that the Arabs would have an economic and political interest in strengthening their position *vis à vis* their Turkish and Persian neighbors by transferring new Arab settlers into their country. He had also pointed to Palestine as the only source of settlers of this sort.

What is most interesting about Schechtman's articles from the angle of this study was his tendency to insist on declaring that the plan was not considered to be a "Zionist solution" until after 1948, when it acquired the official Zionist stamp. He attributed similar plans to Sir Norman Engel (1942), Elie Colbertson, John Gunter, and Herbert Hoover.⁴

But, the fact that official Zionism refused to take the responsibility of the plan before the year 1948, does not imply that they did not welcome it or try to insure its success through various devices and means. When they found it suitable to do so, the Zionist leaders did not hesitate to adopt it officially. They brandished the idea whenever they felt that American and European public opinion had become tired of the Arab-Israeli struggle and adopted the view that the Arabs alone were responsible for the dispute and thus held the key to the solution in their own lands. One notices, for instance, that since the June aggression, the Israeli leaders have multiplied their references to the transfer question. They use the plan in their scheme to remain in the occupied territories. We hear almost every day about the creation of "defensive" kibbutzim in these territories be it in the Golan Heights, the East Bank, or the Gaza Strip. Also, the appeals for the "return" of the Jews of the Diaspora are part of this expansionist scheme which is still among the major aims of Zionism and one of the basic principles for realizing the Zionist idea. It is worthwhile remembering that the State of Israel considers itself incomplete. That is why it keeps raising the slogan, "return of the exiles," into the "homeland" with a view to gathering all the Jews of the

(4) *The Jewish Standard*, May 28, 1949.

world and reaching its ideal goal, which is to create complete identity between the State and the Nation.

It is not strange, then, that the state's existence is not stable in a given situation, but is rather in constant movement to go beyond the existing situation and create for itself a better one. Also, the arrival of new immigrants cannot be confined to the defensive scheme alone; aggression and attack have become the best defensive means of the State of Israel and a pretext to fulfil its expansionist ambitions at the expense of its neighboring countries.

If the call for ingathering the exiles constitutes one of the foundations of Greater Zionism in the existence of the State of Israel, in its search for the whole Jewish nation, the principle which gives it importance and makes it dangerous is reflected in the "State Education Law." Ben Gurion himself declared that these two ideals were linked by an inner bond "and each of them reinforces the prospects of the realization of the other." He pointed out that Israel was "the only country in the world which has no 'relatives' from the point of view of religion, language, origin or culture . . .," concluding with the remark: "We are a people that lives alone."⁵

What is this lonely existence and why are Israel and the Jewish people alone? An American Jew who refutes fanatical Zionism wrote the following:

"It is one of the ironies of history that, at the very moment when the 'Ingathering' takes place, the existence of Jewish culture itself turns out to be so questionable."⁶

It is, in fact, an irony of history that the state which is gathering the exiles should be still looking for a common culture for these "returning emigrants." Judaization thus becomes a search for a common Jewish culture or as Petuchowski describes it:

"It is the realization of this dilemma which is undoubtedly responsible for the feverish search for common cultural roots in which Israel is engaged. It accounts for the role which archaeology plays in the life of the young state, a role which almost amounts to a religious one. In the ruins of the remote past, in the foundations of the ancestors' buildings, and in the remnants of their artifacts, one finds a common cultural bond for their latter-day descendants. And, of course, "the Land" in and by itself, is milked for its very last drop of historical associations—if only it can be shown (or believed) that 'the nation that dwells in Zion' (a favorite phrase in official Israeli pronouncements) today is composed of the very people which inhabited this region in Biblical antiquity, spanning the intervening centuries and millenia with a blithe silence and a blissful ignorance."⁷

It is not coincidental that one of the favorite hobbies of the Israeli military leaders should be archaeology. Yet, this is not the only way to search for a common civilization, to gather the exiles. The slogan which Zionism has adopted since its foundation by way of Pinsker, Herzl, Nordau, Jabotinsky, and Ben Gurion, warned against the "danger of assimilation" although the Jewish religion survived for thousands of years without the service of the Israeli state. To end this part of

(5) Ben Gurion, *Israel and the Diaspora*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

(6) Jakob Petuchowski, *Zion Reconsidered* (Twayne, New York, 1966), p. 34.

(7) *Ibid.*

our study, we will quote Petuchowski's statement pointing out the differences in the background of the "returning exiles":

"In Hungary, a man will be pointed out as a Jew; in Poland, a man will be pointed out as a Jew; and in Rumania, a man will be pointed out as a Jew. But, when these three Jews come to Israel, the first will be pointed out as a Hungarian, the second as a Pole, and the third as a Rumanian!"⁸

It is in fact one of the ironies of history that we should find the outstanding dissimilarity between the aim of the Israeli state which is the successful realization of the gathering of world Jewry—in the historic land of Israel under the banner of the Return of the Exiles—and the absence of a unique Jewish culture.

LAW OF RETURN

1950

Right of *aliyah*. 1. Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an *oleb*.

Oleb's visa. 2. (a) *Aliyah* shall be by *oleb's* visa.
(b) An *oleb's* visa shall be granted to every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel, unless the Minister of Immigration is satisfied that the applicant:—

(1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or

(2) is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State.

Oleb's certificate. 3. (a) A Jew who has come to Israel and subsequent to his arrival has expressed his desire to settle in Israel may, while still in Israel, receive an *oleb's* certificate.

(b) The restrictions specified in section 2(b) shall apply also to the grant of an *oleb's* certificate, but a person shall not be regarded as endangering public health on account of an illness contracted after his arrival in Israel.

Residents and persons born in this country. 4. Every Jew who has immigrated into this country before the coming into force of this Law, and every Jew who was born in this country, whether before or after the coming into force of this Law, shall be deemed to be a person who has come to this country as an *oleb* under this Law.

Implementation and regulations. 5. The Minister of Immigration is charged with the implementation of this Law and may make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation and also as to the grant of *oleb's* and *oleb's* certificates to minors up to the age of 18 years.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 27.

THE ORGANIZATION, THE AGENCY AND THE STATE

When Ben Gurion declared in a voice borrowed from the prophets of the Old Testament, that the State of Israel was only "the beginning of redemption," he was, in fact, trying to make an association between the survival of the Jewish state and the fulfilment of its mission, and the continuation of the ingathering of the exiles. Picturing the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora, he wrote:

"The fate of the State is involved in the fate of World Jewry, and *vice versa* . . . without mutual bonds between Israel and the Diaspora communities it is doubtful whether Israel will survive, and whether Jewry in the Diaspora will not perish by euthanasia or suffocation."¹

What is the Zionist doctrine on which the Movement is based with its various associations and agencies, now that seventy years have elapsed since the First Zionist Congress and that the Jewish state has been established in occupied Palestine? Or, what is the nature of the relationship between the World Zionist Organization—the Jewish Agency for Palestine—and the State of Israel?

The basic laws of the Zionist Organization, as adopted by the Twelfth Congress, stipulated the following:

1. The aim of Zionism is to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, guaranteed by international law.
2. The Zionist Organization comprises all Jews who accept the Zionist program and pay the shekel.

The constitution of the enlarged Jewish Agency for Palestine included a detailed definition of the aims of the Agency, in accordance with the Zurich Agreement (August 14, 1929); these aims can be summarized as follows:

1. Encouraging Jewish immigration.
2. Meeting religious needs.
3. Fostering the Hebrew language and Jewish culture.
4. Acquiring land as Jewish property.
5. Promoting agricultural colonisation based on Jewish labor.

In fact, the Jewish Agency was created for a political task—to serve as a tool of the Mandate Government. Based on the terms of the Mandate, it never really existed independently, but continued as a "skeleton facade" until Louis Marshall's death and the American financial support was stopped.² In spite of the Zionists' abstention in America, for instance, from recognizing it as a branch of the World Zionist Organization or as the World Zionist Organization itself, the W.Z.O. never lost control over it, and altered its structure according to the needs of the moment.

(1) Ben Gurion's article, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

(2) Moses Lasky, *Between Truth and Repose* (San Francisco, California, 1956), p. 14.

The activities of the Agency and the Organization did not end with the creation of the State of Israel. The Twenty-Third Zionist Congress (1951) adopted a resolution authorizing the Zionist General Council "to examine the question of the continued existence of the Jewish Agency and the adaptation of its structure to present conditions, and to decide on the basis of the Executive's proposals upon the necessary changes."³ Besides, Article 3 of the States Law adopted by the Israeli Knesset on November 24, 1952, stipulated that the World Zionist Organization is also the Jewish Agency for Palestine, while the Covenant between the government of Israel and the Zionist Executive (called also the Executive of the Jewish Agency) was made in accordance with the declaration of the Twenty-Third Congress which read as follows:

"The Congress declares that the practical programme undertaken by the World Zionist Organization and its agencies for the fulfilment of its historic tasks in Eretz Yisrael calls for the fullest degree of cooperation and coordination on its part with the State and Government of Israel, in consonance with the law of the land. The Congress considers it essential that the State of Israel ... grant status to the World Zionist Organization as the representative of the Jewish people in all matters that relate to the organised participation of Jews the world over in the development and upbuilding of the land and the rapid absorption of its newcomers."⁴

This basic notion was also expressed by Ben Gurion on behalf of the Israeli state: The boundaries of the nation go beyond and are wider than that of the state. Also, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency, declared at a meeting in 1954, of the World Jewish Congress in Vienna that:

"There is no other state in the World where 90 per cent of the people live outside it."⁵

What is the basic notion shared by the Zionist Organization and the State of Israel? According to Moses Lasky, it may be summed up as follows:

"All Jews of the world form one Nation, the State of Israel is the lawful representative of that portion of the Nation dwelling in Zion, and the Zionist Organization is the authorized representative of the Nation dwelling elsewhere throughout the world. The two are coordinated representatives of one nation and thus make covenants and treaties and cooperate with each other to a common end."⁶

It is evident that the cooperation between world Zionism and the State of Israel rests on the latter's insistence of participation by world Jewry as a whole in the consolidation of the Jewish state and its supply of money, men and assistance. The first article of the state's law stipulates that "the State of Israel considers itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people," while it is, in fact, the result of Zionist efforts and alliance with colonialism, and not "the creation of the entire Jewish people" in the minds of the large number of Jews who do not see the necessity of a Zionist Movement.

(3) *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 47.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 49.

(6) *Ibid.*

It will be sufficient, in the context of our discussion on the coordination of efforts between the Israeli state and the World Zionist Organization, to enumerate the fields of activity of the World Zionist Organization on the basis of the status granted to it:

- "(a) The organisation of immigration, and the transfer of immigrants and their property to Eretz Yisrael.
- (b) Participation in the absorption of immigrants.
- (c) Youth 'Aliya.'
- (d) Development of agricultural settlements.
- (e) Acquisition and improvement of land by the Keren Kayemeth Leyisrael (J.N.F.).
- (f) Participation in development projects."⁷

And we further know that the Coordination Board of the Israel government and the Executive of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency coordinate the operation of the above-mentioned activities.

Obviously, the aim of all these activities is enabling the Israeli state to realise the ultimate Zionist goal and make its frontiers coincide with the "historical frontiers of the nation." It is the best evidence of the deep-rooted Zionist tendency to look for the *lebensraum* of the Jewish state and give it the expansionist character. The forces consolidated by the Zionist Movement united to make of the state of Israel a "dynamic center" and on "evolutionary yishuv" endeavouring to gain territorial acquisitions on the pretext of a "preventive war" and "self-defence." Thus, after the June 5 aggression, the Movement for a Greater Israel resulted from efforts spent and plans in execution since the establishment of "the Israeli state over a portion of the land of Israel." The Zionists could not avoid open declaration of their expansionist intentions in the name of peace and security. They kept expressing their wish to introduce stabilization in the Middle Eastern area while, in reality, they did not seek stabilization when they felt they were capable of taking decisive action.

At the Annual Conference of his party, the "Armed Prophet," Ben Gurion, "warned that the Six-Day War was not the last battle, because the Arabs still planned Israel's destruction." He then proceeded to state that "a great wave of Jewish immigration must come to settle the empty spaces" urging that "a target be set of two per cent a year for every Jewish community abroad." This, he said, would mean an annual immigration from the free countries of 160,000 people, which can only be achieved "if the government took immigration into its own hands, away from the Zionist Organization." Playing once more on the feelings of the Zionists outside Israel, he indicated that "only Israel can provide the attraction for other Jews, and only Israelis can absorb them, and not the Zionists, most of whose leaders never settled here." He accused the latter of having become

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 48.

"a society of friends of Israel" and he added, "their responsibilities should be in accordance with this." To conclude, he pointed out that "the only way the Arabs could be persuaded to make peace was by the sight of a strong Israel, and for this immigration was of supreme importance."⁸

Meanwhile, the chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, Louis A. Pincus, pointed out that Israel needed at least 40,000 immigrants a year "if she is to cope successfully with her demographic problems." Speaking to the visiting mission of seventeen officers and officials of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in North America, he said that "while the Zionist Movement had a decisive role to play in the matter of *aliya* this was no longer a purely Zionist affair but one that should concern all of Diaspora Jewry." Reassuring the members of the delegation, the Zionist leader declared that "the Jewish Agency absorption workers were receiving systematic and scientific orientation to the new conditions involved in encouraging and absorbing immigration from the West."⁹

We need not examine the question of the facilities the Israeli government decided to grant to the new immigrants with the help of the Agency—the World Zionist Organization. Two months after the June aggression, the Knesset decided to exempt the new immigrants from additional taxation on big apartments and houses for the first three years. This was done to encourage immigration at all cost, in spite of the unemployment crisis which Israel faced during 1967. It is evident that any reduction in the proportion of the unemployed since then corresponded to military mobilization and permanent call to arms. On the other hand, the new strategic kibbutzim and settlements absorbed the excess of the unemployed.

The Director of the Jewish Agency Immigration Department declared on May 19, 1968, that the number of Jewish immigrants for the year ending on March 31, 1968, reached 21,000. The Israeli broadcasting service added that forty per cent of these immigrants were under seventeen years of age and that thirty per cent had come from East European countries.¹⁰

Thus, the Organization and Agency joined hands with the State to realize the Zionist goal and receive the largest possible number of immigrants—especially the youth among world Jewry—under such slogans as "the Ingathering of the Exiles," "the Return to the Homeland," and "the immigration move into the land of Israel." How does the Israeli state wish to convince the world that immigration of Jews into occupied Palestine does not conceal aggressive intentions aiming at more expansion and at waging "June-like wars" for the acquisition of the necessary vital space? Since the June war, it has been very clear that expansionism constitutes one of the essential bases of the racial Zionist state through its various attitudes, actions and aggression.

(8) *The Jerusalem Post*, August 10, 1967.

(9) *Ibid.*, August 9, 1967.

(10) See the Lebanese paper, *An-Nabab*, May 21, 1968.

THE STATUS LAW

(Adopted by Israeli Knesset, November 24, 1952)

1. The State of Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people, and its gates are open, in accordance with its laws, to every Jew wishing to immigrate into it.
2. The World Zionist Organization, from its foundation five decades ago, headed the movement and efforts of the Jewish people to realize the age-old vision of the return to its homeland, and with the assistance of other Jewish circles and bodies, carried the main responsibility for establishing the State of Israel.
3. The World Zionist Organization, which is also the Jewish Agency for Palestine, takes care as before of immigration and directs absorption and settlement projects in the State.
4. The State of Israel recognizes the World Zionist Organization as the authorized agency which will continue to operate in the State of Israel for the development and settlement of the country, the absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora and the coordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations active in those fields.
5. The mission of gathering in the exiles, which is the central task of the State of Israel and the Zionist Movement in our days, requires constant efforts by the Jewish people in the Diaspora; the State of Israel, therefore, expects the cooperation of all Jews, as individuals and groups, in building up the State and assisting the immigration into it of the masses of the people, and regards the unity of all sections of Jewry as necessary for this purpose.
6. The State of Israel expects efforts on the part of the World Zionist Organization for achieving this unity if, to this end, the Zionist Organization, with the consent of the Government and the approval of the Knesset, should decide to broaden its basis, the enlarged body will enjoy the status conferred upon the World Zionist Organization in the State of Israel.
7. Details of the status of the World Zionist Organization whose representation is the Zionist Executive, also known as the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine—and the form of its cooperation with the Government shall be

determined by a Covenant to be made in Israel between the Government and the Zionist Executive.

8. The Covenant shall be based on the declaration of the 23rd Zionist Congress in Jerusalem that the practical work of the World Zionist Organization and its various bodies for the fulfilment of their historic tasks in Eretz Israel requires full cooperation and coordination on its part with the State of Israel and its Government, in accordance with the laws of the State.
9. There shall be set up a committee for the coordination of the activities of the Government and Executive in the spheres in which the Executive will operate according to the Covenant; the tasks of the Committee will be determined by the Covenant.
10. The Covenant and any variation or amendment thereof made with the consent of the two parties shall be published in *Reshumot* and shall come into force on the day of publication, unless they provide for an earlier or later day for this purpose.
11. The Executive is a juristic person and may enter into contracts, acquire, hold and relinquish property and be a party to any legal or other proceeding.
12. The Executive and its other institutions shall be exempt from taxes and other compulsory Government charges, subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be laid down by the Covenant; the exemption shall come into force on the coming into force of the Covenant.

THE MOVEMENT FOR A GREATER ISRAEL

"The national task of the Israeli State—to gather in the Diaspora—calls for uninterrupted immigration at least for the lifetime of one generation. The State must ensure normal conditions for this population . . . Thus, our task is to seize Arab territory, establish our control over it . . ."

(Taken from the "Strategic Plan of the Israeli Army" for 1956-57, *The Dagger of Israel*)

Since its creation twenty years ago, the Zionist state has never tried, in intent or action, to implement the policy of *status quo* except through statements uttered from time to time by Zionist leaders and statesmen for the sake of propaganda. Their policy of the immigration of world Jewry, projects aimed at exploiting Arab territorial waters, transforming the relationship between the state and the Zionist Organization into a sort of "World Gentile Zionism," and the economy of the war period, in addition to exploiting the "encirclement mentality" which has infused a military spirit and thus prepared the ground for an evergrowing importance of the military influence—this is proof which indicates the Zionist state's preparedness to realize expansionism and change of the *status quo*. Moreover, the Zionists' distinction between the "demarcation lines" and the "boundaries" whose qualifications fluctuate between "secure," "natural," and "historical" is nothing but a device used by the Israeli military leaders to conceal their expansionist intentions. On the other hand, one cannot separate the contrived frontier incidents at the demarcation lines and the reiterated aggressions over the demilitarized zones from the Zionist expansionist scheme. This provocation and escalation is carried out in the exchange of fire with the intention of extending its scope and waiting for an opportunity to find justification for waging a "preventive war" which Ben Gurion spoke about and threatened with. It is evident that the skirmishes on the demarcation line contribute a great deal toward making the "mentality of the encircled state" more and more rooted in the minds of the Jews. In no time, the "mentality of the Israeli encirclement" becomes a "heavily armed stronghold in the heart of the Arab world," making of itself the instrument of the imperialist interests in the area.

In the middle of November 1955, David Ben Gurion issued a statement before the Knesset expressing his rejection of the settlement proposal submitted by Sir Anthony Eden as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He proposed to the Arabs unconditional, direct negotiations as means to solve the issue. However,

what the Israeli Prime Minister said about Israel not wishing to gain one inch of foreign territory while not allowing an inch of its own territory to be taken away from it,¹ does not mean that Israel had decided to abandon the idea of occupying more land from the territories which Zionism considered to be "the Israeli land under foreign domination"—this land which was to be liberated in the future and added to the liberated territories to form the whole of the land of the national home.

Among other things, Ben Gurion declared to the Knesset members that the Arab countries' attack had rendered the United Nations' decisions about Palestine of no effect. He accused the British Premier of having granted to the Arab countries "gains" which were not included in the UN decisions, and described the proposal aimed at increasing the territories of the neighboring states at Israel's expense as utopian. Speaking of reparations, he pointed out that Israel was the only country in the area entitled to demand them for the Arab armies' attacks of 1948. With regard to the cease-fire agreements, he said to the address of Anthony Eden that they were not binding on both parties and that it would be wrong to ignore the UN decisions and reached the following conclusion: Egypt must leave the Gaza Strip at once while Jordan should abandon the whole of western Palestine.²

It is worth noting that Ben Gurion failed to speak of the violations of the UN decisions by Israel which occupied thirty-six per cent more of the Arab territories than was agreed upon in the Partition Plan.

The Zionist Congress of May 1956, elected Nahum Goldmann as the sixth chairman of the World Zionist Organization and decided to ask the Soviet Union to allow the emigration of a large number of Jews to Israel.³ This took place before the tripartite aggression over the Sinai and Suez which indicates the existence of an outstanding connection between the reduction in the proportion of immigrants into Israel and the stagnation of the economic situation on the one hand, and the decision to carry out military action against the Arab countries on the pretext of "preventive war."

And here is Ben Gurion, who has no ambition for one inch of another's land, declaring before the Knesset after the tripartite aggression of November 8, 1956:

Our expedition had these objectives:

1. Annihilation of the enemy's armies threatening our country.
2. Liberation of those portions of "our land" which are still under enemy occupation.
3. Guarantee of freedom of passage in the Aqaba and in Suez.

In spite of the Israeli forces' occupation of all the Sinai Peninsula, Ben Gurion estimated that "we have only fulfilled our first objective." He went on to

(1) *The Jewish Chronicle*, November 18, 1955.

(2) *Ibid.*

(3) *Ibid.*, May 11, 1956.

say, "however we do not have the slightest doubt that we will fulfil the two other objectives in the near future." This future came nearly twenty years after the establishment of the State of Israel and eleven years after the tripartite aggression. We deem it necessary to look into Ben Gurion's statement in the light of the expansionist plan known as the "Strategic Plan of the Israeli Army," 1956-1957.

A. *The Strategic Expansion*

The authenticity of the document included in the book, *The Dagger of Israel*,⁴ can no longer be contested. It is the strategic plan which the Israeli Army made for the year 1956-1957. The events which have taken place recently furnish the best evidence of the authenticity of the contents of this book, at least from the viewpoint of expansionist ambitions, while confirming at the same time that the Israeli military defence plan is based on surprise-attack and on the expectation of an Arab-Israeli war which would give the Zionist state an excuse for achieving further gains at the expense of the Arab countries which surround it.

It has often been said that the operations plans devised by the General Staff in the various states of the world reflect the opinion and planning of the governing classes of such states. Israel is no exception to this rule, especially if we look at the actions of the Israeli state before and after the June 5, 1967 aggression. Thus, we find "twin objectives to be borne in mind" in all the Israeli planning:

- (1) The minimum objective of acquiring territory essential for us in war-time;
- (2) The maximum objective of winning territory that would meet all our requirements."⁵

Trying to synthesize the strategic, economic, and political considerations in making the expansionist aggressive plans, the authors of the document stated that the national task of the Israeli state compels it to occupy the Arab areas which are claimed to be complementary to the land of Israel and to the Jewish national home within its historic frontiers:

"The need to seize the territory claimed by Israel is dictated by Zionism's primary objective—the creation, within a lifetime of one generation, of a State with a population of 3 to 4 million."⁶

Through the justification for expansion on both strategic and economic levels, we can find the reasons behind expansionist aggression:

"The present frontiers of Israel have no natural protection and are very difficult to defend."

"The purpose of the war between Israel and the Arabs is to change the existing frontier line. The occupation of the territory claimed by Israel will improve our country's economic and political situation."⁷

(4) R.K. Karanjia, *The Dagger of Israel*, (R.K. Karanjia BLITZ Publications (private) Ltd., Bombay, 1957).

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 14.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 34.

(7) *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

In addition, the political aim behind the seizure of Arab territory is "to strengthen Israel's political position by seizing control of the strategically important routes in the Middle East, by driving a corridor through the Arab countries, by preventing Arab unity and by spreading propaganda favourable to Israel among Middle Eastern minorities."⁸

If we looked closely into what is described in this plan as the defence requirements making possession of Arab territories essential for the survival of the Israeli state, we would find that these territories do not fall outside the scope of the Zionists' understanding of 'Greater Palestine' or the 'Land of Israel with its historic frontiers' which was expressed in the proposals submitted to the 1919 Peace Conference by the World Zionist Organization. Zionism has not relinquished its claim to these areas since its appearance as a Movement at the end of the nineteenth century. And the State of Israel is the stepdaughter of World Zionism and the heir of the expansionist complex without which it would cease to exist.

As to the areas established by the strategic plan as candidates for Zionist occupation by virtue of the defence requirements, they are the following:

"Southern Zone, Gaza area: this area would guarantee the security of our vital centres and also enable us to seize the southern section of the Sinai Peninsula and ensure a free outlet from Eilat.

The Sinai Peninsula: Its occupation would render an Egyptian offensive impossible. Indeed, Egypt herself would be in perpetual danger of attack.

The Eastern Zone, West Jordan (the Triangle), the Hebron Hills and East Jordan, including the desert areas. The capture of these territories would enable Israel to build up her frontiers with Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The Northern Zone, Aleppo, Hermon, Litani: An offensive in this sector would make it possible to seize Golan, Bogan, Hermon, Yarmuk and North Galilee up to the Litani River."⁹

We need to go no further into the importance which Israel's strategy attaches to the areas it seeks to occupy for strategic, economic, and political reasons. It seems to us that the idea advocated earlier by Davis Trietsch was taken up by the Zionist expansionist planning for execution.

It was the Revisionists who expressed the expansionist intentions and ambitions during the years following the creation of the State of Israel, but the people actually in power carried this expansion out. It did not take long before they found themselves on an equal level with the extremist religious parties and elements. On June 12, 1951, for instance, the Revisionists made a statement to the *Jerusalem Post* confirming their position at the head of the movement demanding a state stretching to "our historic boundaries." August of the same year saw Judah Menon, the Minister of Religious Affairs, declaring at a meeting of the Karen Ha'emet Fund that "the frontiers of the Jewish state extend from the Euphrates to the Nile."

However, Abba Eban could not speak about the historic frontiers without certain reservations about the existence of expansionist intentions. In his declaration to the *Jerusalem Post* on May 2, 1951, he said:

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 34.

(9) *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

"We are not interested in the Nile or the Euphrates; all our interest goes to the Jordan and its sources."

Speaking of Israel's interest in the Jordan and its sources in Lebanese and Syrian territories leads us to examine another aspect of Zionist expansionism: the irrigation projects and exploitation of the water supply of the Arab countries adjacent to Israel.

B. *The Expansionist Irrigation Projects*

The Zionists' interest in the water supply in Palestine and the areas adjacent to it goes back to the days of Theodor Herzl. In his play, *Altneuland*, Herzl described the future of the Jewish society in colonized Palestine in the following manner: "The true founders of Altneuland are the irrigation engineers . . ."¹⁰

Since its birth, the Zionist Movement has devoted itself to the fulfilment of Herzl's dreams and it has claimed the areas rich in water supply in the piece of land which it wished to seize in order to establish Jewish settlers and secure a vital space for colonizing activities. To do this, the Zionist leaders began devising plans based on what they called the "historic principles" of the promised land. In *Frontiers of a Nation*, Frischwasser-Ra'anana summarized the Zionist expansionist plans related to the water resources as follows:

"The Zionist Organization naturally wanted to provide for the largest possible population within the very limited confines of the country. For this reason large-scale irrigation plans were of vital importance. Since Palestine's water resources are far from rich, such plans were completely dependent on the area to the north and northeast, which included the headwaters of the Jordan, the Litani River, the snows of Hermon, the Yarmuk and its tributaries and the Jabbok. In addition, the country was almost completely lacking in coal ... and petrol ... any plans for industrialization were therefore thought to be dependent on the development of hydro-electric power, which could best be supplied by the falls of the Litani and the Yarmuk."¹¹

The first step in this respect was taken by the Russian Zionist engineer, Pinhas Rutenberg (1879-1942). In his plan for exploiting the waters of the Jordan and generating electric power for the whole of Palestine, we know that the Zionists insisted on considering the Anglo-French Agreements over the northern borders of Palestine as giving them the right to exploit the waters of the Jordan and the Yarmuk by virtue of a cooperation treaty to be put down between the French and the Zionist technicians. Their insistence was inspired by their desire to include the Yarmuk valley and the sources in the British Mandate. The following was written by the American Zionist Horace Meyer Kallen in his book, *Zionism and World Politics*:

"For the economy of Palestine, the number of people it can support, its cultural status and social organization must depend very largely upon the degree of industrialization it can attain. Industrialization depends on power, and in Palestine at the present stage of technical control of power, power on any scale can be nothing except

(10) Arthur Ruppin, *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine* (London, 1926), p. 3.

(11) Frischwasser-Ra'anana, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

water-power, and water-power is a matter of boundaries, particularly of the northern boundaries. The whole future of Palestine is in the hands of the state which controls the Litani, the Yarmuk, and the headwaters of the Jordan."¹²

World Zionism did not limit itself to submitting expansionist proposals to the Peace Conference; it resorted to a number of means and pressures. In November 1920, the Zionists passed a resolution in the Advisory Council of Jerusalem, stating that:

"Representatives of all Palestine's inhabitants unanimously urge that the northern frontier should comprise the lower portion of the Litany, all the territory in the Jordan Valley, and all its streams, and request the High Commissioner to take the necessary steps."¹³

But the French persisted in their position, insisting that the Litani originates in and runs entirely in the Lebanese territory under their Mandate. Philip Graves pointed out that:

"Zionist influences appear to have inspired a proposal for the inclusion of the Lower Yarmuk Valley in the interests of the Rutenberg Scheme, but this was not accepted by the French, who ... determined ... to reserve their rights over its waters. At one time during the negotiations the surrender of the area north of the Waters of Merom in return for a frontier abutting on the river Litani was mooted, but the French required the Leontes waters for the irrigation of their fertile plain of the Bukaa."¹⁴

Yet, the drawing up of frontiers of the Palestine of the Mandate and its final fixing in 1923, did not obstruct the execution of the Zionist expansionist plans. Among the major attempts to fulfil the irrigation projects we find that which the Turkish expert in irrigation, Lowdermilk, demanded for the Jewish Agency. It aimed at forming a body responsible for exploiting the Jordan valley and the water supply for the irrigation of the area situated west of the Jordan which would absorb two million Jewish settlers! The Zionists sent him again in 1942, when Dr. Weizmann succeeded in obtaining Winston Churchill's approval for the inclusion of the Negev in the Jewish territory.¹⁵

Another plan was formed by the "American Tennessee Valley Group" in the summer of 1953. The Johnston Plan, as it was called, aimed at the unified development of the sources of the Jordan valley, and called for the formation of a joint body for the exploitation of the waters of the Jordan made up of members representing Israel and the three Arab countries: Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The plan reserved for Israel more water than was needed for irrigation with a view to preparing the ground for the settlement of over 1,350,000 Jewish immigrants in addition to providing a tremendous capacity for electrical power.

Then came John Cotton's plan which he prepared with the help of Israeli technicians. It was a counter-proposal to the Johnston Plan which was put down

(12) Horace Meyer Kallen, *Zionism and World Politics* (Heinemann, London, 1921), pp. 288-289.

(13) W.D. McCrackan, *The New Palestine* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1922), p. 382.

(14) Philip Graves, *Palestine, the Land of Three Faiths* (Jonathan Cape, London, 1923), pp. 219-220.

(15) Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 536.

by "Charles T. Hain, Inc." in Boston, Massachusetts. It was described in one of the pamphlets circulated by the Israeli Embassy in London (1953) as "The Cotton Plan for the development and exploitation of the water resources of the Litani and the Jordan Rivers."

In 1956, Israel began executing what was called the Ten-Year Plan. The object of this plan was the appropriation of more Arab water resources by way of the following:

- a. Drainage of the Huleh and the flowing of one hundred million square meters of its waters inside Israel in special canals.
- b. Diversion of the Jordan at the Banat Ya'coub bridge so as to obtain fifty million square meters.
- c. Diversion of the waters of the Lake of Tiberias and pumping them into canals passing through the Bissan area so as to obtain seventy million square meters.
- d. Diversion of the salted spring waters of the Lake of Tiberias so as to obtain thirty additional million square meters.

With this plan, Israel would possess what corresponds to fifty per cent of the Jordan River. It would not leave the same amount for the three Arab countries, knowing that the proportion of water originating inside the territories Israel occupies does not exceed twenty-three per cent of the total amount of water contained in the Jordan and its tributaries.

From there, we can depict the Zionists' concern about the Jordan and its headwaters—according to Abba Eban—and Israel's ambitions for the appropriation of the Litani waters are revealed. The Israeli Plan for cultivating the Negev with a view to settling more Jewish immigrants there constitutes an important part of the Israeli scheme whose object is to make of the Negev the starting point of expansionism. In an article published in *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Dana Adams Schmidt made the following statement: It was clear to the Israelis that their dreams of developing the Negev could not be realised without the Litani waters.¹⁶

Levi Eshkol's statement to the French paper, *Le Monde*, on July 8, 1967, is the best evidence of the Israeli expansionist dreams:

"If we could discover water in these areas, which we can if the waters of the Litani instead of useless, pouring into the sea were better utilized in the framework of the Johnston Plan, by utilizing the already existing canals, if we dealt seriously with the problem of desalination of sea water, it would not be impossible to envisage this ..."¹⁷

Eshkol was thus expressing the Zionist ambitions over the Litani waters on the pretext of looking for a means to restore the independent Palestinian existence in the West Bank of the Jordan. His reference to the Johnston Plan which Israel opposed by presenting the Cotton Plan is simply a manoeuvre on his part. On the other hand, he did not hesitate to reiterate that Israel had persistently called

(16) *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. VI, No. 1, January, 1955.

(17) *Le Monde*, July 8, 1967.

for the necessity of realising the great hydraulic projects which would benefit the whole area, and he expressed Israel's readiness to extend its technical assistance in this respect. Eshkol mentioned all of these points in answer to a question related to the refugees' condition in the occupied territories and the possibility of finding a solution to this problem on both economic and political levels. He could only put forward the well-known Israeli point of view: the demand that the Litani waters "which pour uselessly into the sea" be channelled through the canals which were especially built for this purpose! The canals mentioned by Eshkol are evidently those prepared by Israel in the framework of its expansionist hydraulic plans. Besides, by mentioning the realization of the desalination of the sea water he implied securing vast territories for more Jewish immigrants and thus implementing the Israeli expansionist policy.

Levi Eshkol did not confine himself to this first statement which he made approximately one month after the June aggression; he reiterated it two months later. In *Le Monde* of September 8, 1967, we find another statement in which he stated that the Suez Canal was the best natural frontier after having deplored that "half a billion square meters (one half milliard) of the Litani waters were lost per year in the sea instead of being utilized for the benefit of the population of the area." The special correspondent of *Le Monde*, Andre Scemamae, indicated that the last part of the statement aroused the interest of the official milieu in Jerusalem and more particularly, the diplomatic circles. It is, therefore, not strange that the Israeli expansionist ambitions should be directed towards the Litani waters and to the area in southern Lebanon which is adjacent to occupied Palestine. Furthermore, it is not a matter of mere coincidence that the "spy who came from Israel," Elie Cohen, established contacts with a Lebanese engineer in order to study the terms of other hydraulic projects inside Lebanese territory and to examine the nature of the canal to be placed in the framework of the Arab projects for diverting the tributaries of the Jordan which has its source in Lebanese and Syrian territories.¹⁸

We haven't the slightest doubt that the Zionist expansionist ambitions are not foreign to the aggressive character of the State of Israel. The attempt at seizing rapidly the headwaters of the rivers is simply one aspect of the Zionist expansionist scheme concealed under the call for "the ingathering of the Jews in the land of Israel" and the cultivation of more land for their settlement in the northern and southern regions pursuant to the requirements of strategic settlement.

Here are the governing circles in Israel deciding, after the June aggression, to implement the original Zionist share of pumping the waters of the Jordan. The *Jerusalem Post*, published in its issue of August 7, 1967, the following information under the title "Plan to Pump Water from Bnot to Ya'acov":

"A top-level decision is expected to be taken in the near future on the plans to revive the original project for tapping the Jordan River at the Bnot Ya'acov Bridge—

(18) Ben Dan, *L'Espion qui Venait d'Israël*, L'Affaire Elie Cohen (Fayard, Zürich, 1967), p. 229.

envisaged for the National Water Carrier in 1951. Since it will no longer be necessary to go around the former demilitarized zones, the Treasury will be able to save an estimated IL 12m. for the Mishmar Hayarden-Tabgha channel ... This part of the project was stopped in 1953 when the Syrians gained a ruling by the UNTSO to discontinue the project."¹⁹

The paper went on to enumerate the advantages of this plan to Israel stating that "the implementation of the project in its original conception would provide the rest of the country with low-mineral content water and also eliminate the need for pumping water from Lake Kinneret" (i.e. the Lake of Tiberias). Thus, "a hydro-electric power station could utilize the 260-meter drop from the channel to Lake Kinneret," which would in turn lead to an increase in the storage capacity of the lake "by raising its peak spring levels as much as one meter, and the redistribution of the Yarmuk River waters."

The appropriation of the Jordan waters and the threat to occupy the territories containing its headwaters and tributaries cannot be dissociated from Zionist ambitions over the Litani waters. The French thinker, A.M. Goichon, pointed out in her publication, *L'Eau, Problème Vital de la Région du Jourdain*, that a Zionist society known as the "Palestine Water Committee" prepared in 1943, a study on the Litani waters and concluded that "the waters of the Litani River cannot be all utilized in Lebanon."

This theme was reiterated many times by Eshkol, thus revealing Zionist expansionist plans northward in the Lebanese territory. If the Israeli leaders have continued to remind us since the creation of their state of the importance of the Jordan and its sources to Israel, the recent statements of Eshkol as well as earlier Zionist declarations have convinced us that the Litani waters are no less important than the Jordan and its headwaters. And who knows? The next Zionist step might very well be directed towards an equal concern for the Nile or the Euphrates!

C. *The Geography of Israel*

If the strategic plan attributed to the General Staff of the Israeli Army revealed expansionist ambitions of the State of Israel, the Zionist picture of the geography of Israel constitutes irrefutable evidence whose source cannot be contested. The book, *Geography of Israel*, which was published in Jerusalem by the Israel Program for Scientific Translations,²⁰ states in the first page of its introduction:

"These accidental frontiers have roots neither in the physical geography nor in realities of demography, economy, etc., then extant." (meaning in 1948).²¹

The introduction to this book went on to speak of the "national area" or

(19) *The Jerusalem Post*, Monday, August 7, 1967.

(20) Efraim Orni and Elisha Efrat, *Geography of Israel* (Israel Program for Scientific Translation, Jerusalem, 1964).

(21) *Ibid.*, p. 1.

"that of the promised land to Abraham" and to call to mind the kingdom ruled by David and Solomon "extending from the great river, the Euphrates, unto the River of Egypt" (Genesis, 15:18-21). However, it does not find it essential to adhere to the historical truth and neglects to mention that the United Israeli Kingdom only lasted for three quarters of a century at the most. It rather points out the "minimal area" which was delimited by Jewish sages under Roman and Byzantine rule. It then tries to get out of the historical dilemma by dividing the chapters into "the present political frontiers" and "the historical aspects" while the chapters dedicated to physical geography go beyond the actual frontiers to include the whole country as an organic unit.

Thus, the area which falls under the scope of the geography of Israel includes the following:

"The area bounded in the west by the Mediterranean Sea, in the east—by the Great Syrian Desert, in the southwest and south—by the Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of Eilat, and in the north—by that section of the Litani River between its sharp bend and its mouth."²²

The book is full of maps, tables, and figures which are meant to show the wideness of the area of Israel in the days of the first kings (i.e. the kingdoms of David and Solomon) and the frontiers in Saul's times and the two kingdoms of Israel and Judah. In Figure 84 of the book, we find a map of the "Suggested borders and actual frontiers of Palestine, 1905-1923" in which we encounter the following details:

- Demarcation line between Turkey and Egypt before 1892.
- Demarcation line of Sinai border in 1906.
- Borders demanded by Zionist Organization.
- Palestine under British-French-Russian supervision as suggested by Sykes-Picot negotiations.
- British compromise proposals for border between French and British Mandates, in 1919.
- Borders of Transjordan, 1923.
- Borders of Western Palestine, 1923.
- Areas added to Palestine, 1923.
- Areas taken from Palestine, 1923."²³

It is very likely that this book figures among the official teaching books in Israeli schools where such a picture of the geography of Greater Israel is anchored in the minds and souls and where Israeli youth are taught the principles of Zionist irredentism. He grows up looking to the frontiers imposed by the contingent conditions and determined by the cease-fire line not corresponding to the natural geographic reality or to the historical truths at all.

The author of *Frontiers of a Nation* reminds us that "map-making in the Middle East had never been completely divorced from politics,"²⁴ while, on the

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 2.

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 162 (see Map No. 6).

(24) Frischwasser-Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

other hand, voices are raised, inside Israel and since the establishment of the state, to demand a change in the map of the land of Israel and its delineation according to the desired Zionist ideal. We also find an extraordinary Zionist fascination in drawing maps and delineating demanded frontiers. As evidence, we only need to refer to the quite recent statements of the Israeli Minister Yigal Allon (February 21, 1968), namely that "all the survey maps published by Israeli Area Department and which bear signs designating the armistice lines of 1948 must be considered "traditional and historical." "The Department drew up new maps of Israel in accordance with the cease-fire frontier lines of June 1967."²⁵

In reply to a written question in the Knesset, he frankly answered: "The previous armistice lines, like the armistice agreements themselves, have lost their effect since the June war. And all the maps published by the Area Department since then bear a sign explaining that they indicate the cease-fire lines only, under the heading "Israel—cease-fire lines map." He, then, pursued his argument with the following clarification: "These cease-fire lines do not correspond to the political frontiers which were agreed upon. But from the viewpoint of international law and protocol, they constitute the only frontiers actually existing between Israel and its neighbours."²⁶

It is evident that Israel intends to carry out the manoeuvre of 1948, to end up this time with more territorial gains and draw up a new picture of its geographic and political map after twenty years of "expectation" and reservations from changing the characteristics of the map of the land of Israel. And the map published by the official Zionist departments is, according to the Israeli paper, *Hayom*, an attempt to make the frontiers of the "New Israeli State" appear to include the Syrian Golan Heights and all of the West Bank in addition to the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert. The commentary which accompanied the publication of this map included the following:

"The area of Israel before June 5, 1967, reached 20,700 square kilometers. The area of Greater Israel has come to amount now to more than four times as large as the area of Israel at the establishment of the State—that is, 87,000 square kilometers."²⁷

D. *The Expansionist Religious Driver*

"If you have the Book of the Bible, and the People of the Book, then you also have the Land of the Bible—of the Judges and of the Patriarches in Jerusalem, Hebron, Jerico, and thereabouts." (Moshe Dayan, August 10, 1967)

When the Defence Minister, General Moshe Dayan, stood to speak before the members of his party, with the strange Zionist logic he told them to look to

(25) *An-Nahar*, February 22, 1968. Taken from Reuters and AFP.

(26) *Ibid.*

(27) The Jordanian Paper, *Al-Dastur*, March 14, 1968.

"the reality of 1967 and the map of 1967," the researcher of Zionist expansionist, religious meaning feels compelled to study the statements and acts of this responsible leader. In spite of his explanation that "he was not speaking as Defence Minister nor as a member of Government," he was in fact expressing best the feeling which has prevailed in Israel since the June 1967 aggression and has revealed the important aspects which have accompanied the Zionist expansionist phenomenon since its birth. Otherwise, what could be the reason behind his following statement:

"People abroad must realize that with all the strategic importance to Israel of Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the Tiran straits—the mountain range west of the Jordan lies at the heart of Jewish history."²⁸

Moshe Dayan answers our question saying, "This may not be a political program, but it is more important." And the extreme importance which he attaches to the Zionist expansionist program is made clear by his definition of the program: "It is," he said, "the fulfillment of a people's ancestral dreams."

When the Sephardi Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim heard about Dayan's declaration, he sent him a congratulatory telegram for his remarks "about Israel's presence in the new territories as being the fulfillment of a people's dreams." The telegram read as follows:

"You have lent correct expression to Israel's belief about Eretz Yisrael, and you penetrated the profundity of the Jewish concept. May you be privileged to see all these places settled and flourishing in the hands of Israel. Be strong and of good coverage in your stand."²⁹

On the other hand, we find Labour Minister Yigal Allon calling for Jewish settlement in the West Bank and the Golan Heights at a meeting of the Kibbutz Hameuhad Federation. He then delimited Israel's eastern border at the River Jordan and the halfway line through the Dead Sea stressing once more that "a permanent Israeli presence by settlement of this region will ensure the nation's security."³⁰ He described the "occupied territories" as "liberated areas" and expressed his surprise that a member of the Cabinet could have "publicly negated the Biblical Offinity of the Golan Heights and the Bashan Range." "The Golan," he pursued, "is no less part of ancient Israel than Hebron and Nablus, for did not Jephtha judge there?"³¹

It is very likely that Allon was pointing to Israel Barzilay, one of the Mapam Party leaders and member in the Coalition Cabinet. Soon after, the French paper *Le Monde* reproduced a news item to the effect that this minister had for the first time disapproved of the expansionist tendencies of General Dayan and Levi Eshkol.

(28) *The Jerusalem Post*, August 10, 1967.

(29) *Ibid.*, August 11, 1967.

(30) *Ibid.*, August 16, 1967.

(31) *Ibid.*

He also declared that this party would form a wide front which would fight against chauvinism and expansionism and would call for peace negotiations.³²

After reading statements by Israeli leaders since the June aggression, one becomes convinced that the waves of fanatic religious feelings had, by then, reached their peak. The great rabbi of the Israeli Army, Schlomo Goren, came in turn to ask for the erection of a Jewish synagogue (the Third Temple?) in the square of the Al Aqsa Mosque and on the debris of the Old Temple of Solomon.³³ The Great Sephardic Rabbi opposed the plan, stating that the question of rebuilding Solomon's Temple would take place only with God's will and help. These waves of religious fanaticism were not merely products of the moment of victory. They were, in fact, deeply rooted in the hearts of the Zionists. We will pause a moment to note some opinions and remarks expressed by three French journalists: Eric Rouleau, Jean Lacouture and Jean-Francis Held in their book *Israel and the Arabs: The Third Combat*.³⁴

In the last part of their book, the three writers tackled the question of the future of the "occupied territories" and endeavoured to classify the Zionist ambitions as follows:

- a. Maintenance of the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Kuneitra and the Golan Heights for security reasons and possibly a bartering instrument in case of negotiation.
- b. The West Bank of the Jordan is a completely different matter since it is part of Palestine. It will thus play a basic role in the eventual general settlement with the Arabs. In addition, the West Bank is not a foreign land to the Israeli collective psychology; it is confused with a part of the land of Israel, of the Promised Land, of Biblical Palestine.³⁵
- c. In dealing with Jerusalem, the Israelis slough off political reasoning to enter a more passionate field. It is an obsession and a religious hysteria. The rapid annexation of old Jerusalem is a fundamental aspect of what is being called the "rejudaisation of Israel."

To the question: "Does this feeling of carnal appropriation of the old Jerusalem reflect a revival of a real Jewish integration?", Jean-Francis Held answered by saying that this formulation might be a bit too intellectual. The reactions of the Israelis are more intimate although it is true the three writers had witnessed a true "recoil" *vis-à-vis* what many Israelis and friends of Israel would wish, meaning "the secularization of the State, its reaching the adult age, its liberation from old neuroses inherited from the Diaspora and from the persecution."³⁶ They considered that "in the religious or 'pseudo-religious' revival one must

(32) *Le Monde*, December 2, 1967.

(33) *L'Orient*, August 17, 1967 — News taken from the AFP.

(34) Eric Rouleau, Jean-Francis Held, Jean et Simonne Lacouture, *Israël et les Arabes : Le 3e Combat* (Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1967).

(35) *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164.

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 165.

see a symmetrical reaction to Arab extremism *vis-à-vis* Israel." They observed the same phenomenon of Jewish reaffirmation which existed in the concentration camps. Thus, the Jews found themselves to be more Jewish after June 5. Jean Lacouture then argued that "if we admitted the existence of a link between the feeling of anguish and re-Judaisation... it does not seem that this religious revival is closely related to the chain of events," while Jean-Francis Held expressed his amazement at the occurrence of the opposite. "This victory opened the way for an attitude of religious or pseudo-religious reaction. The Jewish consciousness which made Zionism, might very well express and exalt itself outside any proclaimed religion." But what is the attitude of the Israelis in this respect? Jean-Francis Held answered by saying:

"When we point this out to Israelis, they reply that this attitude is not related to religion but to the reconfirmation of their identity, of their authenticity."³⁷

If we scrutinize this remark, we will find that it is closely connected with Jewish revival and desire for integrity. Zionism inherited from this its aversion for proselytism and even for assimilation of external elements.

"Assimilation is considered to be the loss of the 'Jewish identity,' it constitutes the prelude to the 'dissolution' and the 'elimination' of the 'Jewish nation.' It follows that auto-segregation is the Zionist answer to Jewish assimilation for Zionism considers that auto-segregation is the only way to 'redemption,' 'salvation' and 'fulfilment of the nation.'"³⁸

The principle of auto-segregation, in Zionism as well as in Judaism, is not far from the call for the necessity of keeping the "purity of the race." Also, the reference to "Jewish superiority" was clearly reflected in Dayan's statements about "Israeli superiority." The Zionist appeal for purification of Jewish land of all that is non-Jewish and liberation from its Arab inhabitants is merely one aspect of the doctrine of the "chosen people," on both political and expansionist levels.

This brings us to the religious drive behind Israeli expansionism, free from the mirages of propaganda and misguidance we find this odd racism, nourished by religious fanaticism, in its most obvious form. The characteristics of the "special Jewish destiny," which Zionism seeks to realize after the ingathering of the Jews of the world and their uniting in the "Promised Land of Israel" with its historic frontiers, are also made clear to us.

Those who waged the June war were transformed suddenly into "descending from Maccabean offspring." On June 11, Moshe Dayan declared that the absorption of the Arabs of the occupied territories is incompatible with "our aims for the future" since it would make Israel a state with dual nationalism or a state of joint Arab and Jewish character. He continued, "what we want is a Jewish state ..."³⁹

To the *New York Times*' correspondent's question: "Is it essential in your

(37) *Ibid.*, p. 166.

(38) André Denis, "Israël Etat Colonial Etat Raciste," *Un Jour ou L'autre Israël Disparaîtra* (Editions "Le communiste," Paris), p. 26.

(39) *The Jerusalem Post*, November 3, 1967.

opinion to preserve the Jewish character of this state and maintain it this way?," Dayan replied: "Certainly, certainly. We want a Jewish state just as the French people have a French state"!

When, in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a student asked Moshe Dayan's opinion about the frontiers of the country, the Defence Minister answered the following: "The links between the Jewish people and its historic country cannot be measured in kilometers... It would be difficult to separate Samaria, Judah (Mount Hebron), and Gaza from the Jewish Land"!⁴⁰

There is no doubt that the chauvinistic feelings make use of the Jewish religion to bring enthusiasm in the hearts and exploit religious beliefs to fulfil the expansionist dreams. It would be enough to point out, in this respect, the skill of Zionist propaganda in choosing the title of the books and articles published after the June war. In West Germany, for instance, titles such as these were chosen: ... *And They Vanquished on the Seventh Day* or *The Holy War of Israel*, or *David and Goliath*, while the title of the book *Strike Zion* which was published in the United States became ... *And Throw Them into the Sea (Werft Sie ins Meer)*.

Furthermore, the leaflet⁴¹ which was recently circulated in America under the title, *The Future of Israel and the World*, is nothing but the reflection of Rabbi Samuel Hillel Isaacs' opinion which was expressed in his previously mentioned book, *The True Boundaries of the Holy Land* (1917). As to the pamphlet which was distributed free of charge entitled *The Holy Plans for History* it was a copy of various other attempts at misguidance aimed at demonstrating that Israeli expansionism emanates from the will of God since it fulfils the promise made to the chosen people and undertakes to come ahead of events to make them coincide with the religious texts and prophecies of the Old Testament of the Holy Bible. The publication of this leaflet and the pamphlet attached to it could very well be the result of Gentile Zionists. In fact, Gentile Zionists do not hesitate to picture the events as being the fulfilment of what is written in the holy texts and prophecies. Besides, the maps drawn to the side of the leaflet on: Israel of Yesterday (before June 1967), Israel of Today (from the Suez to Kuneitra), and Israel of Tomorrow (the way it was presented by Rabbi Isaacs, from El-Arish to the Taurus Mountains)—are the best evidence of the attempts to justify expansionism by considering it the confirmation of the texts of the Old Testament and the actual fulfilment of the written religious texts. What also attracts attention is that the leaflet refers to Israeli expansionism, past and future, while exhibiting it as the necessary result of the meeting of the "genius of the Israeli military" and the will of God.

The British Zionist, Herbert Sidebotham, had written thirty years ago under the title *The New Boundaries*: "If we may liken the land of Palestine to the floor of a church, Jordan is the nave and Esdraelon the transept."⁴²

(40) *An-Nabar*, May 28, 1967.

(41) The pamphlet was reproduced in the Lebanon paper *Al-Anwar*, April 10, 1968.

(42) Herbert Sidebotham, *Great Britain and Palestine*, op. cit., p. 276.

Yet, Gentile Zionism is not alone in presenting the religious interpretations aimed at justifying Zionist expansionism. It is very likely that its importance is confined to the value of the propaganda from which Israel takes advantage through the existing institutions in the western world in particular. In Israel itself, we find this effervescence of religious feelings after it was materialised in its most obvious form since June 5 and it has reflected itself in successive statements and in measures taken by the Israeli occupying authorities.

The Great Rabbi of Israel, Izhak Nissim declared in the morning of June 5, 1967: "The Land of Israel (Eretz-Israel) is a holy legacy to every Jew; and no temporal or religious authority possesses the power to reduce this claim or depreciate it."⁴³

The religious zeal for expansion was aroused to an extent never reached before. The official Israeli authorities decided to pursue the activities begun a hundred years earlier by the "Palestine Exploration Fund" and started to dig the land of the occupied territories on the pretext of "excavations" and the delimitation of the old historical locations or of archeological surveys in the West Bank of the Jordan (the mountains of Samaria and Judah) and in the Golan Heights. Recently, the chairman of the Israeli Archeological Council issued the following statement:

"The map of the kingdom of Israel, which was mentioned in the Torah, is being drawn up again on the basis of the results of the archaeological surveys in the areas of the mountains of Samaria and Judah ... and in the Golan Heights ..."⁴⁴

The survey operations of the Israelis took about four months and were nearly completed in the middle of April 1968. The occupation authorities issued the following declaration:

"A group of archaeologists carried out the examination, the recording and the confirmation of 2,500 locations pre-historical and of the following periods, more than one thousand of which were still unknown and unrecorded."⁴⁵

The recording or authentication implies the inclusion of the desired locations in the map of the kingdom of Israel and the justification of such an inclusion on the basis of certain texts of the Old Testament. Furthermore, the discovery of the unknown locations of the "land of Israel" is merely another step in the implementation of the expansionist policy on the basis of the claim that the mentioned locations and places were, in the past, on the map of the kingdom of Israel—which did not last more than seventy years in the old history of the Near East! And the excavations carried out by the Israeli authorities near the wailing wall are aimed at discovering the lower layers of Solomon's Temple—according to Benjamin Mazar. And this is the excavation which the Palestine Exploration Fund tried to carry out in the second half of the nineteenth century for religious ambitions

(43) *Der Spiegel*, December 25, 1967.

(44) *Al-Hayat*, a Lebanese daily, April 13, 1968.

(45) *Al-Hayat* and *Al-Anwar*, April 13, 1968.

and goals which, essentially, do not differ very much from the Jewish religious drive to the Israeli expansionist policy.

If the Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, declared in his speech to the Zionist Women's Organization in America (*Hadassah*) that "the Jordan River is the natural frontier of the State of Israel,"⁴⁶ Menachem Begin does not allow the "callers for moderation" in Israel to overbid his own bloc in so far as extremism and the implementation of the expansionist policy are concerned. He recently started reiterating the official Zionist allegations: "That the restitution of the occupied territories constitutes a threat to our national security," and went on to speak, in the manner of Ben Gurion, Dayan, Allon and the Great Rabbi, of what he described as:

"The Jewish people's right to the land of Israel from which he was exiled by force for 1898 years."⁴⁷

He stressed that the Jews did not forget their homeland during the 2000 years of exile and persecution—since the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 A.D. and the beginning of the Diaspora. He forgot, however or pretended to forget, the extraordinary events which history witnessed during the two thousand years which he wished to disregard as if they did not belong to the history of mankind.

Early in 1968, more than 1,600 rabbis and laymen gathered at Solomon's Palace (*Hechal Schlomo*) in occupied Jerusalem for the first World Conference of Orthodox Jewry. We know that about a quarter of the 5,600,000 Jews in the United States are orthodox and that of Israel's 6,000 synagogues, only nine are non-orthodox. Besides, this important branch of Judaism—the other branches being Reform and Conservative Judaism—insists on ritual observance: "It accepts every word of the Hebrew Bible as divinely inspired and insists that the God-fearing Jew must keep every one of the 613 rules of the Halaka."⁴⁸

The conference dealt with the questions of "how to preserve religious tradition," the Jewish spiritual revival, and "how to reach out to the religiously-alienated Jew." At this conference, differences between the modern orthodox Jews and the conservative ones emerged from the discussions and led to internal struggles and divisions.

At the end of the session, the delegates created a "permanent committee to coordinate further orthodox efforts to make tradition compatible with contemporary life." The appeal made at the opening of the session—by the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban—was a call for all the Jews in the world to come and settle in the land of Israel. He said:

"Israel is in need of more affection and support; it is in need for Jews to consolidate its ranks; it is also in need of more inhabitants."⁴⁹

(46) *Lissan-Al-Hal*, February 16, 1968.

(47) *An-Nabar*, May 27, 1967.

(48) *Time*, January 19, 1968.

(49) *An-Nabar*, January 9, 1968.

We do not need to examine more statements and deeds to absolutely confirm the role of the religious factor in justifying the Israeli expansionist ambitions and giving them the landmark of "holiness" and "historic right." Besides, the call for "Greater Israel" is not only due to the religious, the revisionist, and the extremist elements. It is a "collective feeling" in Israel which has been inculcated with pseudo-religious content, to condition it and make it a link between the religious incentives and the expansionist ambitions of the Israeli state.

E. *The Canaanite Myth*

"We are Canaanites, living in the land of our ancestors. The Bible is our history book. We are Canaanites, or Israelites or Hebrews—one and the same thing—but not Jews." (A Canaanite)

In our research of underlying factors of the Zionist expansionist complex, we feel compelled to examine certain important doctrinal aspects to which Zionism has resorted since the end of the twenties to justify expansion as well as demonstrate its historic and ethnic bases. By that, we mean Canaanism which was advocated by a group of enthusiastic Zionist youth who soon described themselves as "Canaanites."

Zionist Canaanism grew and developed in the fanatic nationalist atmosphere of Revisionism. Among its spiritual leaders of the thirties, we find a Polish-born poet who had taken the name Jonathan Ratosh. At nineteen, he went to Paris (1928) to pursue his studies. In his book *The Deed*,⁵⁰ Gerold Frank related that the young Ratosh had met in Paris a number of French Orientalists, "among them one Adolf Gourevitch, who preached that the Biblical story of the Exodus was a vast exaggeration."⁵¹ He argued that the exodus referred to "a thin trickle of Hebrews who had gone into bondage in Egypt and had found their way back to Palestine," but he maintained that these few refugees never formed "the nucleus of the Hebrew nation," and when they returned to Canaan, they found "their own kinfolk there—Hebrew-speaking, resembling them in physical characteristics—their own people."⁵²

Thus, Gourevitch put forward his Canaanite theory: "The Hebrews and Canaanites were one; the majority of the Canaanites had never left the land of Canaan; the Hebrew religion evolved among them; the Hebrew language was, in fact, actually a Canaanite dialect."⁵³

Ratosh, "deeply influenced by Gourevitch," returned to Palestine where he developed the Canaanite thesis, emphasizing the identification of the people with

(50) Gerold Frank, *The Deed*, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1963).

(51) *Ibid.*, p. 98.

(52) *Ibid.*

(53) *Ibid.*

the land and the role of the land in the struggle for Jewish independence. Inspired by his teachings, his followers repeated what Eliahu Bet Zouri had written to a friend: "We are not Zionists. We are the natural sons of the soil of Israel. Our war against the British is the natural war every patriot wages against one who will not let him be free. We suffer with the Jews of Europe as brothers in humanity—but we are a free nation, formed and created on this soil through generations of time."⁵⁴

While studying the opinions of the Canaanite group, we find a new and dangerous trend of Zionist thinking which contains an expansionist aspect to the Israeli nation in the land of Canaan and to the links which bring the Israelis together and which originate in the Canaanite soil. Zionist Canaanism seeks to repress the religious feelings and maintains that biological origin has nothing to do with the Canaanite descent, and that nationalism is Israeli nationalism and not Jewish nationalism. It also believes in the "unity of those in the same territory, not the unity of those of the same blood": "On this Canaanite soil we are Canaanites—not Jews." A Canaanite leader once said:

"Here in Palestine, we are a nation, emerging with every sign of a nation: a common language, a common culture, a common ancestry stemming from a common soil. Our cultural patterns, our heritage, are those of ancient Israel. We have nothing to do with the Jews in Poland, England, America. Their language, their cultural patterns, their citizenship, are those of the country in which they live. They are Poles, Englishmen, Americans. We are Canaanites ..."⁵⁵

The Polish-born poet, Ratosh, was a sort of spiritual leader of the Canaanites. The Russian-born Vladimir Jabotinsky was deeply influenced by two Russian writers, Berdychewski (1865-1921) and Tchernichowsky (1875-1943). He adopted some of their opinions and attitudes after having "divested of their philosophical aura"⁵⁶ and brought into them the soldiering spirit and the love of combat and arms. For this reason, we will try to acquaint ourselves with the most important characteristics of these two writers as well as the "Canaanite movement in Zionism" from the angle of their teachings and opinions.

Berdychewski

He called himself: Micha Joseph Ben Gurion. Deeply influenced by the Jewish awakening movement in Russia, he abandoned Jewish tradition in an attempt to reevaluate all values. He acquired a lot from Nietzsche's thinking whom he considered as the "prophet of will-to-power and of the master-man, who proclaimed the need of a new vitality, of overflowing joy of life, of an ecstatic affirmation of primitive nature." In a brief summary of Berdychewski's ideas, Hans Kohn wrote:

(54) *Ibid.*

(55) *Ibid.*, p. 96.

(56) Hans Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea," *Palestine Collected Papers*, (May, 1963), *op. cit.*, p. 34.

"The Hebrew prophets and the long line of rabbis and scholars of the last two thousand years appeared as the grave-diggers, the corruptors and defamers of the true Jewish life which was represented by the 'sinful' kings, and the men of the soil, and the nationalist zealots of ancient Israel and Judah whose statesmanlike wisdom and heroic deeds equaled those of other peoples."⁵⁷

Thus, Nietzsche's Jewish theory began from this new angle to look for the "remnants there of the natural polytheism, of colorful myth and barbaric strength, which the ancient Hebrew tribes had possessed and which prophets and priests later expurgated."⁵⁸ Berdychewski's ideal thus materialized in this pagan life of the ancient Cannanites while the Jews had lost "all their natural vitality under the yoke of God's law." It is clear that he was trying to introduce into Judaism the Greek standards praised in Nietzsche's writings. To him, redemption from exile will only come through the rejection of Judaism.

Tchernichowsky

He was a poet and a doctor. He came to Palestine after he studied in Germany between 1922 and 1931. Glorifying the ancient "rebels" of Israel, he attacked what he called the "sick spirituality" that had sapped the strength of the Jews and exhorted his generation to "noble deeds worthy of their ancestors."⁵⁹ In his poetry, he celebrated the "primitive Hebraism" of "those tribes which, emerging from the desert under Joshua's leadership, overran and conquered Canaan." To him, they looked "virile and beautiful like the ancient Greeks," and it was their Hebrew God which he celebrated in his poem "Before the Statue of Apollo," in which he turned his back upon Judaism.

I have left the ancient paths,
And far behind me in the dark wander the sons of death.
See me here, the first who turns to thee.
My living earthly soul,
Which hates the eternal rigidity of dying,
Will now break the fetters of the spirit.
Living sentiment, degenerated in the course of time,
Breaks out of the prison built by one hundred generations.

Thine image is a symbol of light in life.
I bow before thee, life's strength and beauty,
Bow before youth which like a whirlwind
Frights and chases away those withered dried-up people
Who have tried to take my God's life,
And who fetter with their prayer-straps
El shaddai, the lord of the deserts,
Who led Canaan's daring conquerors.

We do not need to repeat the changes and additions which Jabotinsky brought to these concepts, but rather limit ourselves to mentioning Hans Kohn's judgement which attempts to throw light upon the expansionist aims which emanated from both the Revisionists and the Canaanites. To them,

(57) *Ibid.*, p. 33.

(58) *Ibid.*

(59) Frank, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

"The frontiers of Jewish Palestine were to be extended as far as they had ever reached in any period of history."⁶⁰

If the Canaanites in the Zionist movement had, from the start, issued a monthly newspaper called *Aleph*—the Hebrew letter A signifying starting from the beginning—one should not feel amazed that military organizations should hide behind this paper. Some people say—but we could not determine to what extent this statement is true—that Moshe Dayan belongs to the supporters of this group and is one of its military organizers.

In an article in *New Outlook*, written by an Israeli writer, under the title "Meaning of a Homeland,"⁶¹ it was pointed out that the "Committee for the Integrity of the Land of Israel" included members of the Canaanite Movement. The author, Amos Oz, then indicated the common view of both the Canaanites and the advocates of Jewish nationalism towards the Arabs which they consider the new and direct materialization of the Amorites, the Ammonites and the Arameans ... Pursuing his analysis of the Canaanites' ideas and claims, he said:

"But the people who returned to modern Zion did not find in it the ancient Canaanite tribes ..."⁶²

It found the Palestinian Arab people, in spite of the Zionist slogan, "the people without a land to the land without a people" (Israel Zangwill). And "Palestine is the homeland and the country of the Palestinians"—according to the critic who concluded his article with these words:

"Should the Zionist tendencies, the first of which is the question of the "redemption of the land," and which center on the Canaanite and nationalist ambitions to make of Israel a Greater Jewish state or a Great Nation—should these tendencies prevail, then the Arabs would be justified in waging a struggle of life and death against the Zionist danger."⁶³

It is evident the Canaanite myth used by the Zionists contains many long-range expansionist aims. We have chosen not to deal with the question of the validity or the invalidity of the Canaanite claims, although we found a similar nationalist movement in the Arab countries (the Syrian Nationalist Call) which tried to link its concepts of what it described as the "Canaanite Sin" and spoke in not so very different terms about the Canaanite call, except that it considered the "Jewish psychic" to be in direct opposition with the Canaanite civilization.

(60) Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

(61) Amos Oz, "Meaning of a Homeland," *New Outlook*, Vol. 10, No. 9, p. 14.

(62) *Ibid.*

(63) *Ibid.*

THE FRONTIERS OF 1967

When we learn that on the eve of June 5, 1967, Levi Eshkol hastened to put General Moshe Dayan at the head of the Israeli Defence Ministry, Ben Gurion's previously mentioned speech instantly comes to mind. In 1964, you will recall, Ben Gurion had wished that Dayan had been the Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Zionist forces in 1948; the frontiers of the State of Israel, he thought, would undoubtedly have been wider than they were. Three years later, his wishes were fulfilled. Moshe Dayan distinguished himself as the leader of the Israeli military expedition which waged aggression on the pretext of a "preventive war," and came out victorious in the June 1967 war.

In the summer of 1965, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, was to utter prophetic statements in his article "Reality and Vision in the Middle East: An Israeli View."¹ Many people failed to realize the significance of the opinion he then expressed:

"It is not absurd to imagine Arab leaders ardently urging 'a return to the frontier of 1966 or 1967,' just as they now urge a return to the frontier of 1947 which they once set aside by force."²

He considered that the future still depended on the Israeli expansionist will and that it was not unlikely that the story whose events succeeded themselves since 1948, should repeat itself. What particularly draws our attention in this article, is Abba Eban's mentioning what he calls "a constant appeal to the Middle Eastern map" (*Ibid.*, p. 627). In his opinion, wars are "highly ineffective" in bringing about desired changes in the political map of an area, and "the idea that any conceivable war in the Middle East would substantially change the political or territorial structure deserves a more critical scrutiny by Arab minds." He then proceeded to enumerate the factors which he felt represented obstacles to the realisation of territorial gains by waging a new war:

1. Local military deterrence.
2. International respect for the existing frontier structure.
3. World opinion which makes the cry for Israel's liquidation discordant."³

Yet, it is primarily the Israeli will for expansion which transformed the Foreign Minister's vision into reality, when Israel carried out its aggression on the morning of June 5, 1967. Nearly two years after Abba Eban declared his decision to stick to the status quo in the Middle East and to seek to preserve it, this

(1) Abba Eban, "Reality and Vision in the Middle East: An Israeli View," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1965, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 626-638).

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 630.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 631.

Foreign Minister issued the following statement to the information agencies and the press on June 16, 1967:

"Should the United Nations vote it with 121 votes against one, we will not withdraw from the territories we occupy."

Soon after, General Moshe Dayan expressed frankly and clearly the Israeli expansionist intentions and gave free rein to the official position of the government with respect to what could be designated as "the open strategy of expansion." Early in August, the Knesset members met to vote on a motion regarding Israel's policy *vis à vis* the occupied territories. The motion was passed by an overwhelming majority of the House—the coalition and Agudat Yisrael. Only the two communist factions voted against, whereas the Free Center, Uri Avneri, abstained from voting. The operative part of the motion reads as follows:

"The Knesset approves the stand of the Government in favour of steps leading to direct talks between Israel and the Arab countries on the signing of peace agreements, and reaffirms that so long as peace is not attained Israel will continue to maintain unaltered the situation created by the cease-fire arrangements following the Israel Defence Forces' successful repulsion of enemy aggression."⁴

The next part of the resolution said that "the Knesset expected the Jewish people ... to carry out the supreme national injunction of *aliya* to Israel."⁵

Since then, Israeli military leaders and politicians began issuing one statement after another to express their intentions with respect to the territories occupied by the "Defence" Army. At a symposium of the Habonim youth movement on the problems of attracting immigration of Jewish youth, Mr. Levi Eshkol declared that the occupied territories must "help us to ensure that in the future we shall not again have the kind of borders that invite attack by our neighbours."⁶

Voices were raised in Israeli circles from the military to officials and the majority of the population, and from organizations to parties and religious associations—to reiterate in chorus: "No return to the frontiers of 1948." In the beginning, this chorus was led by Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon in the midst of the enthusiasm of the revisionist and the religious groups and to the embarrassment of the "Israeli left" which was on the verge of turning to the right. And Moshe Dayan began issuing arrogant statements such as the following with the enthusiastic approval of the overwhelming majority of the population:

"We need to consider the reality of 1967 and the map of 1967. We need not only permanent borders but borders that will ensure peace."

.....

"Peace does not depend on Arab wishes alone, but on the kind of borders Israel has."

.....

"The solution to the Arab refugee problem does not lie in Israel's hands alone, but must be tackled on a regional basis."

(4) *The Jerusalem Post*, August 3, 1967.

(5) *Ibid.*

(6) *Ibid.*, August 6, 1967.

He, then opposed:

"Facile theories that supposed the entire solution lay within our means. There is not room for a million Arab refugees within Israel. The solution does not lie in our restricted area and with us alone, but in the region as a whole."

Then he said:

"We are in Jerusalem and the West Bank because our security demands it ... we are not colonialists and this is not Aden: we have our own bus drivers, our own shopkeepers and our own inhabitants to run things. They (the Arabs) should know their opposition will decide nothing. If they want to cooperate, well and good, but if they do not, we will manage without them."⁷

What, in Dayan's statements—which soon became threats—and demands our attention is the persistent emphasis on the question of frontiers needed by the Israeli state, twenty years after the Partition Plan and the creation of the state in the land of Palestine. What are these frontiers which the Zionists seek to obtain through their aggression aimed at consecrating the reality of 1967, and how does Zionism wish to draw up its expansionist map twenty years after the establishment of the state?

Moshe Dayan resorted to making a distinction between "permanent borders" and "borders that will ensure peace." He also confirmed that peace in the area also depends on "the kind of borders Israel has." He was not the only one in Israel to stress the difference between the "armistice lines and the cease-fire lines" on one hand, and the "natural," "secure," and "historic" frontiers on the other. It would suffice for us to remember, in this connection, Israel's concept of the territories it intended to occupy by force as "the occupied portions of the Jewish National Home," or the "complementary parts of the historic land of Israel," then their counting them among the territories whose liberation had not yet been completed. As soon as the aggression was completed and the occupation was consolidated, reference was made to the "liberated territories" while voices were raised to demand natural frontiers which would secure peace and meet economic needs which coincided with Zionism's picture derived from the distortion of historic facts under the cover of "God's promise" and the "Holy Boundaries."

The student of the nature of Israeli strategy and its peculiar logic with respect to the question of desired frontiers, will find an outstanding similarity between the Zionist Movement's demands and the ambitions of the Israeli state since their early stages. Official Zionism proceeded along the lines of the slogan "the legal frontiers" or the frontiers of the Homeland "guaranteed by international law"— as it occurred in the Basle Program nearly seventy years ago. According to Zionist allegations, the Balfour Declaration was to guarantee in 1917, the "legal borders," although controversial views were held later on by both kinds of "political Zionists," the "Practicalists" and the "Revisionists," about the size of the area which these legal borders should include. When the Partition Plan was adopted, Zionism accepted it "reluctantly." Yet, it chose not to respect

(7) *Ibid.*, August 10, 1967.

the frontiers of the plan but occupied more of the Arab territories, giving as a pretext Arab rejection of the Partition Plan at times, while at others claiming that the Arabs had violated it by attacking the Israeli state in 1948. When the armistice agreements were signed, the Israeli officials began speaking of the "boundaries of the State" which were established on a portion of the Promised Land of Israel, or of the "Frontiers of the Nation" which should coincide with the sacred historic frontiers.

Thus, Israeli strategy fluctuated deliberately between the slogan of "legal frontiers" (which apparently differ from those of the cease-fire lines and the armistice), and "secure frontiers" which will ensure safety and stability while protecting Zionist schemes which are based on expansionist possibilities and the realization of the vital space necessary for increasing Jewish colonization. Then came the June aggression—after the failure of the tripartite aggression of 1956—which was to offer Israeli militarism the opportunity to fulfill its expansionist plans, the first phase having been "the transfer of the battlefield into the enemy's territory" (Eshkol 1965). As a result, the future of the occupied territories was dealt with. Voices were raised to demand "permanent and secure" frontiers while the Israeli authorities were setting up military colonies (kibbutz) in strategic areas of the West Bank (between Hebron and Bethlehem and on the coast of the Dead Sea), in the Golan Heights and the Syrian area of Banias, or in the Egyptian area of El-Arish and the Gaza Strip.⁸ These kibbutzim were all set up in accordance with the overt expansionist strategy which Israel has chosen to follow.

Yet, the new slogan which was raised high by Israel during the period succeeding the last aggression suddenly transformed into a slogan demanding "the Holy Boundaries." In reality, Zionist expansionist schemes keep using the three mentioned slogans one after the other on some occasions, while on others it amalgamates all three together. One should further note that the Israeli expansionist chorus includes the voices of the Revisionists, the religious group, the Poale Zion and the parties of the center. Besides, the statement made by the Great Rabbi which was considered as a religious "decree" cannot be separated from its political meaning on both external and internal levels. This decree causes a great deal of soul-searching for any Jew who is willing to relinquish an inch of the occupied territories. Why? Because the slogan "The Holy Boundaries" which coincides now with two other political slogans considers all the occupied territories as falling within the land of Gilead. Thus, the Great Rabbi's decree becomes: "no Jew has the right to turn over one iota of these territories unless he is an infidel (unbeliever) . . ." At the same time, Ben Gurion raised his voice to demand recognition by the world at large of the right of military conquest which in turn will give the authority to settle Jews in the occupied territories ("the liberated" territories, according to him).

(8) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, "Israel baut drei Wehrdörfer," Dienstag, 26 September 1967.

In the midst of expansionists attempts to outbid each other, Levi Eshkol finally raised his voice. The Israeli Prime Minister spoke for the first time on October 28, 1967, about what he called "Greater Israel" which would include the occupied territories of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria. He made this declaration in his opening speech to the B'nai B'rith Israel Commission in the context of a new call for Jewish settlers from abroad. As to this sudden turn in Eshkol's statements, it was mentioned in the *Herald Tribune* in the following manner:

"Although Mr. Eshkol and other Israeli leaders have suggested before that parts of the occupied areas be settled by Jews to influence eventual border discussions, his reference to a "greater Israel" seemed to be the most direct suggestion so far."⁹

Eshkol went on to speak about "new opportunities" which "faced the nation in the aftermath of its victory" and, asked himself the following question:

"If you were to ask me what is required to realize these opportunities I would answer in one simple word: we need Jews."

"In greater Israel today we have a population of 3.8 million souls. Of these, 2.4 million are Jews; 1.4 million are non-Jews. The percentage of Jews in the total population is 64 per cent; the non-Jews are 36 per cent."

"Whatever the political decisions that will eventually be made, they must not be determined by a situation in which there is no *aliya* (immigration into Israel) or prospect of *aliya*."¹⁰

The newspaper correspondent indicated that Israeli leaders had long "expressed concern over the falling birth rate among Jews in Israel and over the steep drop in immigration." Early in May 1968, the American *Time* Magazine indicated, in an article written on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel, that "many of the country's leaders are also troubled about a decline in immigration. Though several hundred people of the thousands who came to help during the war decided to live in Israel, the country is now losing many trained citizens who are emigrating to the west."¹¹

In this article, reference was made to the serious weaknesses the economy was suffering from, among which are:

1. Its dependence upon the generosity of the Jews abroad, and
2. Its large trade deficit."

This brought Eshkol's appeal and address to the American audience in Israel to the level of events and to that of the expansion of Israeli territory and the creation of what he named "Greater Israel." In Israeli planning, the call for more Jewish immigration means bringing more people in need of land and settling them in the occupied Arab territories. As to the pretext which Eshkol used to win over the support of his American audience, it consisted of an allegation that settling Jews in these areas would consolidate the position of Israel and

(9) *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, October 30, 1967.

(10) *Ibid.*

(11) *Time*, May 3, 1968.

better its opportunity to meet the Arabs with equal strength. It is obvious that Eshkol's open reference to "Greater Israel" and to the "Jewish" and "non-Jewish" inhabitants (without mentioning the Arabs!) as well as the expression of his worry about the decline of immigration was very close to the thinking of Israeli planners¹² (and quite in conformity with their aspirations).

On the day following the speech in which he had proclaimed the "Greater Israel" plan Eshkol uttered another statement, the essence of which was that Israel was seeking to consolidate its roots in the "new frontiers" and that it intended to keep most of the Arab territories it occupied. This declaration came as a major policy statement before the Knesset. He indicated, among other things, that he did not regard some of the areas Israel had won as rightfully belonging to Jordan or Egypt (namely the West Bank and Gaza) since these had been acquired by military provocation and aggression on the part of the Arab states. He further argued that although the armistice agreements had reorganized such an occupation, they were nullified by the previously mentioned provocation and aggression.¹³

He forgot, however, or pretended to forget to mention how Israel had occupied areas outside the scope of the frontiers of the partition of Palestine, if not the whole of Palestine. It is clear that the Zionist expansionist plans succeeded in their search for justifications and allegations to allow the realization of their schemes. Speaking of the frontiers, Eshkol said:

"It was agreed . . . in 1949 that the armistice lines were dictated by military considerations only and that they were not frontiers."¹⁴

Thus, he reached his aim by proclaiming Israel's refusal to withdraw to the prewar lines, justifying the Israeli position by invoking legality, policy, security and peace, and declaring that his government's policy was based on "the establishment of secure national frontiers agreed upon in the framework of a peace conference." It is to be noted that he changed the name of the "Gulf of Akaba" to the "Gulf of Eilath." The German paper *Sddeutsche Zeitung* indicated in its issue of March 1 that radio Israel had changed the name to "the Gulf of Solomon." The paper went on to state:

"Israel will maintain the cease-fire lines and consolidate its position in conformity with the requirements of its security and living developments as a result of the Arab's refusal to enter into peace negotiations. As long as the danger is present, we will keep on consolidating our strength."¹⁵

He finally exposed his Zionist scheme aiming at the establishment of peace according to the following points:

First — Israel's capabilities for deterrence and defence.

Second — Non-interference by the states in the area on the side of those who proclaimed their will to destroy Israel.

(12) *Herald Tribune*, *op. cit.*

(13) *Herald Tribune*, No. 26375, October 31, 1967.

(14) *Ibid.*

(15) *Ibid.*

Third — Avoidance by the United Nations of issuing vague statements which, in terms of a peace settlement, would be meaningless.¹⁶

In this way, the call to "Greater Israel" reached the official Zionist level after the strategy of expansion had put it at the level of action and execution. On the eve of the anniversary of Balfour's Declaration, Eshkol indicated that the number of Jews in Israel would double between 1967 and 2000, and exceed five million by the end of the century, while on the other hand, Lord Victor Rothschild (the nephew of the Rothschild who received the letter containing the Balfour Declaration) called for the Big Powers to issue a new Balfour Declaration.

As to the former Chief of Staff of Israel, Itzhak Rabin joined the expansionist chorus when he declared in New York:

"Israel would make a big mistake if it gives up the territorial acquisitions of the June war.

"In this war, we have reached ideal military lines which can be considered at present our most important achievement."¹⁷

He then gave as a condition "a change in the political relationships" between Israel and the Arab states, and the attainment of a "mutual agreement" in the "peace talks" stating:

"Then, we would withdraw to more restricted lines than the actual frontiers."

The basic condition for the abandonment by Israel of certain gains or its "withdrawal to lines more restricted than the actual frontiers" (it is clear that a complete withdrawal is not considered by the Israeli expansionist plans since perhaps this would have been, in Rabin's opinion, a big mistake) is nothing but the Arab state's recognition of Israel. Here we see an important aspect of the Israeli scheme which seeks to conceal the aggressive expansionist aims behind the idea of a "desire for peace." And the peace which Israel refers to does not differ a great deal from the acceptance of the actual situation and giving in to Israeli demands under the cover of "secure frontiers."

On the other hand, we see the Israeli Prime Minister standing before six thousand university students in New York, reiterating his appeal to the Jewish youth to come to Israel and help it fulfil its aspirations. At the same time, he pointed out the necessity of preserving the Israeli military force as a condition for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. The five principles which he enumerated in his "exposé" on the policy of Israel were the following:

First — Search for peace between Israel and the neighboring Arab states.

Second — Peace will be established through direct negotiations which would lead to official peace agreements between Israel and the neighboring states.

(16) *An-Nabar*, No. 9791, October 31, 1967.

(17) *An-Nabar*, No. 9828, December 10, 1967.

- Third* — Free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Tiran Straits form an integral part of any agreement.
- Fourth* — Peace agreements will be based on secure frontiers agreed upon by Israel and the neighboring Arab states.
- Fifth* — Establishment of peace in the Middle East and regional cooperation which will follow open possibilities for the solution of the refugee problem within the framework of a regional and international agreement.¹⁸

Commenting on Eshkol's proclamation of the plan aiming at establishing "Great Israel," a journalist wrote: "Perhaps in speaking about 'Greater Israel' from the Suez Canal to the Qunaitra and the Jordan River, Eshkol overlooked the fact that the Arabs would have the right to speak about 'Greater Palestine' also from the Suez Canal to the Qunaitra and the Jordan River."

The wider Israel becomes by including non-Palestinian land, the greater the Palestine question becomes until it becomes the problem of the Egyptian country, the Syrian country, the Jordanian country, and thus the Arab country."¹⁹

Certainly, the call to "Greater Israel" is a great challenge to all of the Arab states and the answer to a great challenge is great confrontation. Let us remember Lord Curzon's statement in his book, *Boundaries*, in which he expressed his conviction that "the frontiers are like Moses' sword; they form the basis of the outbreak of the war or the establishment of peace, that of the life of the peoples or their extinction."

(18) *An-Nahar*, January 11, 1968.

(19) *An-Nahar*, No. 9793, November 1, 1967.

THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE "LIBERATED" TERRITORIES

"In the first flush of victory,
Israel's press referred to these
conquests as the 'captured territories.'
That phase, however, soon gave way to
'occupied territories'—which in turn
was replaced by 'liberated territories.'
And, more recently, Israeli Premier
Levi Eshkol has begun to talk blandly
of 'Greater Israel.'"

(*Newsweek*, December 25, 1967)

The Israelis did not wait for Prime Minister Eshkol's call for "Greater Israel." Two days after the June war, the students gathered before the Knesset building repeating the slogan "Do not return the occupied territories," and when the government decided to return the building of the International Truce Committee in Jerusalem to the United Nations officials, hundreds of Israelis demonstrated to express their disapproval of this measure. It was reported that these demonstrators belonged to the "Action Committee for the preservation of the territories Israel occupies."¹ In its issue of December 25, 1967, the American magazine *Newsweek* indicated that Israel did not have any expansionist plan at the outbreak of the June aggression and that these came rather as a result of the Arabs' refusal to attend a peace conference. The Israeli greed started to grow day after day as the Arabs continued to adhere to their refusal. However, the history of Zionism and the past of Israel do not correspond with the opinion expressed in the magazine. The voices that were raised calling for the annexation of the occupied territories and their inclusion in "Greater Israel" did not need an Arab refusal to express their intentions. The expected refusal came as a pretext to justify their ambitions. One should not overlook the religious motives which grew sharper after Israel decided to annex East Jerusalem and ignore the United Nations decisions while the "Gahal" bloc was represented in the government by the terrorist leader, Menachem Begin, and Minister Pinhas Sapir.

Thus, Eshkol's speech at the end of October 1967, and his reference to the "Greater Israel" plan came to encourage expression of expansionist aims on the organized public popular level. On the first of November, a group of political

(1) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, "Aktionskomitee für das Festhalten an den von Israel besetzten Gebieten," Samstag-Sonntag, 15-16 Juli 1969.

writers and leaders as well as army officers convened a meeting for the foundation of the movement which was named "Movement for the Integrity of the Land of Israel." Among those who made speeches at that meeting, we can cite: the poet Nathan Alterman, General Abraham Janny, and Tassir Harcel, formerly Chief of the Secret Services. The French paper, *Le Monde*, confirmed then that the speakers presented religious arguments as well as arguments related to security.²

In reality, the "movement for Greater Israel" had appeared on the public scene before Eshkol's speech and statements. The manifesto which was signed by fifty-four leading writers, poets and scientists³ was published in the form of an advertisement in *Ha'aretz* on September 29, 1967.

This "movement for Greater Israel" soon developed into a formidable force and an organization on the Israeli political scene. It brought more enthusiasm into the hearts of those who wished the annexation of the occupied territories and met the leaders' expansionist biddings on the same level. Then came the Great Rabbi's decree about those who were thinking of renouncing one inch of "our promised land."

Between summer and autumn, Israel became an expansionist chorus while politicians and party leaders started wooing voters by "citing Biblical chapter and verse to prove Israel's historic claims to Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Heights and the West Bank of Jordan."⁴

The labour parties called for unification of their ranks and formation of a unique party, which led to Ben Gurion's dismissal for his opposition to the merger scheme, and to the joining between Eshkol (*Mapai*), Dayan (*Rafi*) and Allon (*Abadut Haavoda*) into a "new" labour party. On the other hand, the supporters of the "Greater Israel" plan were getting stronger every day and succeeded in getting adherents from "all classes." It grouped representatives from all the Israeli political parties, in addition to personalities belonging to non-religious bodies or economic associations. The influence of the "movement for Greater Israel" reached such a degree that its leaders requested the Israeli government, towards the end of February 1967, not to enter into negotiations with the Arab states and to settle a large number of Jews and Israelis in the occupied Arab territories.⁵ Nothing indicated the strength of this group as much as Eban's change of policy after he had criticized the supporters of the idea of "Greater Israel," knowing that before the demand made by the proponents of "Greater Israel," the Israeli authorities had settled Jews in the newly occupied territories and provoked the departure of the Palestinian inhabitants.

It should be noted that, while speaking about "our concern for our existence as a Jewish state," Eban had declared that "the policy aiming at including the

(2) *Le Monde*, November 2, 1967. See also the manifest published by the "Movement for the Land of Israel," Appendix I.

(3) See the entire text of the manifesto-advertisement in Appendix II.

(4) *Newsweek*, *op. cit.*

(5) *An-Nabaz*, February 27, 1968.

occupied Arab territories does not have much support." On the other hand, the Cabinet did not include one member wishing to return all of the occupied territories. Its members were divided, according to the American *Time* magazine, into two groups: the one group "wanting to return none at all" and the other "willing to give part."

Besides, the results of a poll by Israel's Dachaf Agency showed that "an overwhelming 87% approve the government's policy of refusing to give back any territory until the Arabs agree to direct talks with Israel . . . 78% are willing to give back one or more pieces once negotiations begin, while only 21% want to keep the sandy wastes of Sinai, 95% favor retaining Jerusalem, 88% the Golan Heights, 61% the port city of Sharm el-Sheikh and 47% the West Bank of the Jordan."⁶

In addition to the support enjoyed by the policy of the Israeli government in the popular circle, the decisions taken by the Israeli parties in the "secret" congress convened in February, 1968, came to canonize this position of the government. These decisions uncovered the expansionist intentions which Israel tries to fulfil through the negotiations. The *Al-Hurriyah* magazine (No. 402, March 4, 1967) reproduced the text of these decisions calling for the retention of part of the occupied territories and the extension of Israeli influence on the remaining part. It is worth noting that these decisions contained the "lines along which the negotiations were to be carried." (See Appendix III).

We cannot help but fear a second Israeli plan aimed at realizing the territorial gains and expansionist schemes through working on the consolidation of a new form of partition (the year 1968)—after a little more than twenty years have elapsed since the first partition decision of the United Nations (1948). Nothing persuades us to believe that Israel intends to abandon its expansionist plans which it conceals behind the demand for "permanent and secure frontiers." The reality confirms for us the Zionist intention to accomplish the "Greater Israel" plan through various means, whatever the solution.

The idea is inherent to Zionism; and the reference to the "liberated" territories reminds us of the war for "liberation and independence" which Israel invoked in 1948, to occupy Palestine. Twenty years have elapsed since the establishment of "Smaller Israel." "Greater Israel" is the great challenge. No doubt our destiny has come to depend on our capability and our determination to meet the Zionist challenge. Will we raise ourselves and our actions to the level of that greater responsibility?

(6) *Time*, May 3, 1968.

APPENDIX I

Priority for the Establishment of Jewish Colonies in the Liberated Territories

The Jewish masses received, with great satisfaction, the news of the creation of pioneer colonies in the new territories of our liberated country. We mean by this the colonies established by the Unified Kibbutz Movement (Kibbutz Homeland) in the Golan Heights and the northern part of Sinai, and the return of religious colonists to the old Kibbutz of "Ghosh Zion" (in Galilee). These measures constitute a mere beginning on the long road we are to follow. What is required from us now is to intensify our efforts, especially for the colonization of the area situated west of the Jordan (West Bank). This remains, as it always has been, the heart of our country and the key to a peaceful future for us and for our children. The hills of Judea and Samaria, which have been returned to us now, have never ceased to be the object of our hopes and dreams, even when they were under foreign rule [meaning Arab rule]. We are convinced that our efforts should be centered on the present development of these territories. Vast areas of land west of the Jordan are barren and uncultivated and waiting for Jewish initiative.

We demand from the Israeli Government and the establishments concerned the development of these territories and the immediate creation of a network of agricultural and industrial colonies throughout the recently conquered area, with the exception of the already existing villages and towns.

Upper Jericho is no less important than Upper Galilee with respect to the dynamic national interest! It is equally necessary to create inhabited suburbs in new Jerusalem, east of the city.

APPENDIX II

For the Sake of a Reconstituted Israel

As a result of the Israeli Army's victory in the six-day war, the nation and the State have entered a new era.

The whole of Palestine is now within the hands of the Jewish people.

In the same way that we have no right to abandon the state itself, we have no right to abandon what our state has given us: Palestine. We owe allegiance to our country in its entirety, to our national past and future.

No Israeli government has the right to give up any part of our newly-acquired land. Our present borders constitute a guarantee for peace and security. They present new horizons to our nation, strengthening its power both materially and spiritually.

Within these borders, all citizens will enjoy freedom and equality—which form the basis of Israel. Jewish immigration and settlement are the pillars on which our future rests. And mass immigration from the Diaspora is the essential prerequisite for the preservation of Palestine as a whole and its Jewish character. Let us use the duties and opportunities now presented to us as a means for awakening the Jewish people and revitalizing Palestine.

The signatories of this manifest are working for the realization of these goals by using all the available means to win over general support to their program.

APPENDIX III

"Secret" Decisions of the Israeli Parties


1. *Jordan* — A separate peace agreement should be signed by Israel and Jordan. This agreement should be based on economic and cultural cooperation and a non-aggression pact between the two states. It should further provide for the return of the West Bank of Jordan, with the necessary border ratifications which would ensure permanent peace and security to Israel.
2. *Refugees* — The agreement with Jordan and the border rectifications would facilitate the solution of the refugees problem, most of whom should settle in Jordan. Jordan would then join efforts with Israel in the development of irrigation and industrial projects and in a common exploitation of the Dead Sea. At the same time, Jordan would be granted a free port on the Mediterranean Sea. Such a change would reinforce Jordan's political and economic independence from foreign forces and strengthen its ties with the State of Israel.
3. *Jerusalem* — No portion of Jerusalem will, under any circumstances, be returned to Jordan. The united city of Jerusalem will become the capital of Israel, with a possibility of granting religious autonomy in the preservation of the Holy Places.
4. *The Sinai Desert* — The Egyptian threat on Israel's southern borders should be definitely removed by declaring the Sinai Desert a demilitarized zone.
5. *The Gaza Strip* — This strip with all its inhabitants, should fall under Israel sovereignty. A special territory should be assigned to the refugees living in Gaza.
6. *Suez and the Straits of Tiran* — Israel should secure guarantees from all parties concerned—including the United Nations—with respect to free navigation in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.
7. *The Golan Heights* — The Golan Heights have always constituted a threat to the security and safety of the Is-

raeli settlements of Galilee and the Jordan valley. The area should thus be demilitarized and Israeli defence forces should establish positions on the peaks of the Golan Heights.

8. *The Future Unions* — Israel feels that the peace agreement will be permanent and will lead Israel and its neighbors toward disarmament, neutrality, and the development of political and economic relations, with a view to uniting, in the future, all independent states in the area.
9. *The Transitory Stage* — Until a permanent peace agreement has been reached, Israel will act in such a way that will insure security, law, and order. We will pursue our economic, agricultural, industrial, and construction programs in the occupied territories. Israel will also endeavor to secure for these territories investments as well as social and cultural services. Israel will also endeavor to solve the question of the refugees and their housing problems. A final solution will not be possible without the establishment of peace and the help of foreign investments. There is now a possibility of absorbing a number of the refugees in the occupied territories.
10. *Cooperation with the Inhabitants of the Occupied Territories*— Israel must work out a constructive program to improve living conditions in the occupied territories. The adoption of such a program will help to create understanding and cooperation with these inhabitants.
11. *Military Government* — All the remnants of the Military Government should disappear completely. Total equality of civil rights should be established at the same time that Israel is working for a peace agreement.
12. *Reuniting Dispersed Families* — Reunification of dispersed "Israeli" Arab families should be continued and reinforced.
13. *Jewish Communities in the Arab Countries* — Immediate measures should be taken to ensure the safety of every Jewish community still living in the Arab countries. Rapid measures for such communities to join their families and people in Israel should be carried out at once.


MAP No. 1

THE TURKISH – EGYPTIAN FRONTIER 1892 - 1906




MAP No. 4

RABBI ISAACS' MAP 1916




MAP No. 5

FRONTIERS OF THE MANDATE 1920 - 1948



MAP No. 6

PALESTINE 1905 - 1923



--- Demarcation line between Turkey and Egypt before 1892

- · - · - Demarcation line of Sinai border in 1906

· · · · · Borders demanded by Zionist Organization

— Palestine under British-French-Russian supervision as suggested by Sykes-Picot negotiations

— British compromise proposals for border between French and British Mandates, in 1919

· · · · · Borders of Transjordan, 1923

· · · · · Borders of Western Palestine, 1923

▨ Areas added to Palestine, 1923

▨ Areas taken from Palestine, 1923

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