

*Attitudes of United States Congressmen  
toward Aid to the Palestinians  
and Arms to Israel*



ATTITUDES OF UNITED STATES CONGRESSMEN  
TOWARD AID TO THE PALESTINIANS  
AND ARMS TO ISRAEL

*by*

*Janice J. Terry*

PALESTINE RESEARCH CENTER  
BEIRUT

*PALESTINE ESSAYS No. 37*

---

Second Printing Published by the  
PALESTINE RESEARCH CENTER  
(with the permission of NEEBII)  
P.O.Box 1691  
Beirut - Lebanon  
July 1973

## INTRODUCTION

From the publication of the Balfour declaration to the present, United States Congressional attitudes concerning Israel have scarcely changed. The same arguments used after World War I to support Israel's establishment are still heard on the floor of Congress. It scarcely matters that these arguments have been based upon false premises or faulty logic — Congressmen tenaciously cling to them.

In 1922, Congress passed a joint resolution calling for the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews. This was the first major political victory in the U.S. Congress for the Zionist movement. For this reason it is instructive to glance at the debates over the resolution. The resolution was presented on the floor of the Senate by Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican Senator from Massachusetts, member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and probably the most powerful man in the Senate at that time. Originally, the wording of the resolution was almost identical to that of the Balfour Declaration, which, in fact, was cited in the draft resolution. The main difference between the Balfour Declaration and the U.S. Congressional draft resolution was that the latter specifically mentioned that the holy places in Palestine were to be protected. Both Presidents Wilson and Harding had previously made public statements endorsing the Balfour Declaration.<sup>1</sup> As the Senate was

---

(1) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, April 12, 1922; April 22, 1922.

overwhelmingly in favour of the resolution little debate took place on the issue, and it was promptly referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. In committee the reference to the Balfour Declaration was deleted.

In the House the resolution was altered to make specific mention of the rights of the Christians in Palestine. Although Christians were specifically mentioned, the majority Muslim population was referred to as the « non-Jewish communities. » New York Congressman Hamilton Fish, from an influential and wealthy family and member of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, introduced the resolution. He noted that Palestine was « the ancient homeland of the Jew » and was a « comparatively sterile country. »<sup>2</sup> While numerous Representatives defended this position, none spoke either in defense of the Palestinians or against the resolution. Most Congressmen mentioned the close religious and cultural ties between Christians and Jews; they used Biblical passages to support this position. Frank Appleby, representative from New Jersey, held the mistaken ideas about Palestine which are still prevalent among Israelis and U.S. Zionist sympathizers. Appleby remarked that Palestine was a Jewish country and that:

Every name, every landmark, and every trace of whatever civilization remaining there is still Jewish.... No other people has ever claimed Palestine as their national home. No other people has ever shown an aptitude or indicated a genuine desire to make it their homeland. The land has been ruled by foreigners. Only since the beginning of the modern Zionist effort may it be said that a creative, cultural, and economic force has entered Palestine.<sup>3</sup>

But by far the most eloquent spokesman for the Zionists was Walter M. Chandler, Republican from New

---

(2) *Ibid.*, House, June 30, 1922, 5759.

(3) *Ibid.*, 9801.

York. By profession Chandler was a lawyer and author of a two volume work, *The Trial of Jesus from a Lawyer's Standpoint*; he later wrote a study entitled *The Jew — a Tribute by a Gentile*. Chandler's ideas are fairly typical of those held by fundamentalist Christians who wholeheartedly support the Zionist cause in Palestine. Such Gentile Zionists usually take the trouble to learn something about Palestine; for example Chandler's information concerning Palestine was more accurate than Appleby's although, his conclusions were no less startling. Chandler pointed out that Palestine had a population of 700,000 of which 500,000 were « Mahmetan Arabs, » (sic), 110,000 Christians, and 90,000 Jews.<sup>4</sup> The Zionists, according to Chandler, projected an immigration of seven million Jews, mainly from Eastern Europe into Palestine. For Chandler, there was no doubt that Palestine should become a totally Jewish state, in spite of the demographic situation in Palestine at the time. He supported this idea in the following astounding terms.

The fundamental notion of race superiority and race achievement is one of the great reasons for national legislative approval of this resolution.<sup>5</sup>

Chandler recognised that not only did the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine oppose Zionism but also many Jews in Europe and the United States were against the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. He was, however, convinced that American Jews need not be concerned over the ramifications of Zionism because the movement for immigration was to be directed primarily at Eastern European Jews, not Western Jews. With regard to Palestinian Arab opposition, he outlined three solutions: First, he proposed that the Palestinians' civil

---

(4) *Ibid.*, 9804.

(5) *Ibid.*

and religious rights should be maintained and that they should be permitted to remain in Palestine; second, that if they did not consent to Jewish government and domination that they « should be required to sell their lands and retire to Arab territory; »<sup>6</sup> and third, that

... if they will not consent to Jewish government and domination, under conditions of right and justice, or to sell their lands at a just valuation and to retire into their own countries, *they shall be driven from Palestine by force.*<sup>7</sup>

Chandler concluded that if opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state was based upon Muslim interests in the holy places in Jerusalem that the Muslims should be excluded altogether.<sup>8</sup> Because his support for Zionism was based upon doctrines of racial superiority, Chandler had no difficulty whatsoever in disregarding the rights or existence of the entire Palestinian population.

Other Congressmen concurred with Chandler and added that a Jewish state would serve as a beneficial link between East and West.<sup>9</sup> This was a forerunner of the idea of using Israel as a base for Western interests in the Middle East. Congressmen also mentioned Jewish contributions to the (World War I) war effort, while failing to take any note of Arab contributions, including T.E. Lawrence and the famous « Arab-Revolt. » In retrospect, perhaps the most incisive comment on the true nature of Zionism was made by Albert Rossdale from New York. In support of the resolution, he remarked:

The colonist Jew is bringing Western culture and civilization into the country and it is natural that the Moslem Arabs, steeped in ignorance and extreme poverty,

---

(6) *Ibid.*, 9810.

(7) *Ibid.* (My italics).

(8) *Ibid.*, 9811.

(9) *Ibid.*, 9817.



would occasionally clash with the newcomers. This is especially true of the Bedouin Arabs, who have no civilization worth the mention. These Bedouins live in the open and have the same objection to the land being fenced by the Jewish farmers as the American Indians had in the early days of the white settlers.<sup>10</sup>

On the basis of such frankly religious, racialist and ill informed arguments, the resolution easily passed the House and, subsequently, the Senate. In its final form the resolution read:

... That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christians and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected.<sup>11</sup>

On September 20, 1922, President Harding signed the resolution which has, in fact, set the tone for all Congressional involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

During and after World War II the issue of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was again brought before Congress. On January 27, 1944, Senators Wagner from New York and Taft from Ohio and several Representatives in the House introduced resolutions which cited the 1922 resolution, called for the free entry of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, and demanded the « restoration » of Palestine as a homeland for the Jewish people. The word « restoration » implied that the Jews were returning to Palestine as its rightful owners, and purposefully obscured the true nature of the Zionist programme.<sup>12</sup> Congressional debates on the issue over-

---

(10) *Ibid.*, 9818.

(11) *Ibid.*, Senate, July 13, 1922, 10210.

(12) U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings Before the...*, Washington Government Printing Office, 1944, p. 1.

whelmingly favoured the Zionists. Arguments supporting Zionism were largely based on understandable sympathy for the Jews remaining in Europe following Nazi atrocities and on the fundamentalist Christian doctrine that the Jews were the chosen people of God and that Palestine was the land given them by God.<sup>13</sup> Illinois Representative Everett Dirksen, later the Republican Senate majority leader, cited the Old Testament and Moses while arguing the case for the creation of a twentieth-century Jewish state in Palestine.<sup>14</sup> No one mentioned the existence of the Palestinians; consequently, their claim to Palestine was obscured. Indeed the existence of the Palestinian people was forgotten altogether by Congress until the rise of the Palestinian commando movement after June 1967 thrust the Palestinians once again onto the world stage.<sup>15</sup>

The Zionists, however, did not allow their demands to be forgotten. In 1944 they particularly pressed a reluctant President Franklin Roosevelt to declare his support for their aims. Roosevelt's endorsement of the

---

(13) U.S., *Congression Record*, House, October 16, 1945.

(14) *Ibid.*

(15) In 1936, a Treasury administration ruling granted a tax exempt and tax-deductible status to the United Palestine Appeal (now The United Israel Appeal) which has raised several billion U.S. dollars for development, welfare, and immigration programs in Israel. Moreover, Bonds for Israel sold in the U.S. were accorded an exemption from the provisions of the interest Equalization tax in 1963. These arrangements enabled large sums of tax free money to go to Israel and provided a substantial monetary basis for the consolidation and upbuilding of the state. They have also been one of the major ties of the U.S. and Israel. See: W.T. Mallison. *The Legal Problem Concerning the Juridical Status and Political Activities of the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency; A Study in International and U.S. Law* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968); Samuel Halperin. *The Political World of American Zionism* (Detroit : Wayne State University Press, 1961); Richard P. Stevens. *American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1942-1947* (New York: Pageant Press, 1962); Moshe Menuhin. *The Decadence of Judaism in our Time* (New York: Exposition Press, 1965).

Zionist programme had important implications for Congressmen as both political parties incorporated pro-Zionist « planks » in their 1944 election platforms, setting the precedent for every Presidential election campaign since then.

The events of 1948 which actually led to the establishment of Israel, and the tremendous support in the U.S. for Israel are well documented and will not be dealt with here.<sup>16</sup> Congressional decisions and attitudes on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948 are, however, of importance for they both reflect and help to form the policies of the U.S. government. Congress supported various extraordinary arrangements to aid and assist Israel, including executive and administrative acts, the Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce of 1951 which provided Israel with most favoured nation status.<sup>17</sup>

The extent to which Israel enjoys « most favoured nation status » is reflected in Congressional attitudes towards, and voting records on, legislation concerning U.S. military aid and sales of armaments to Israel as compared with Congressional attitudes and voting records on appeals for financial and food assistance for the Palestinian «refugees,» a purely humanitarian matter.

---

(16) J.C. Hurewitz. *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: Norton, 1950); Harry Sacher. *Israel and the Establishment of the State* (London: Wiedenfield and Nicolson, 1952); Edgar O'Ballance. *The Arab-Israeli War, 1948* (New York: Praeger, 1957); Walid Khalidi (ed.) *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948* (Beirut : Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970).

(17) Although the world has for 23 years referred to the displaced and dispossessed Palestinian people as «refugees» this term does not in any way describe the Palestinians. The words « displaced » and « dispossessed » fit the case of the Palestinians because these words incorporate the dynamics of the situation: of Israel *displacing* and *dispossessing* the Palestinians. *Editor's note.*



## I. AID TO THE PALESTINIANS

In the summer of 1948 the members of the United Nations voted to grant immediate financial assistance to the Palestinians who had lost their homes as a result of the establishment of the state of Israel and who were living in miserable conditions in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip. As a founding member of the United Nations, the United States contributed aid to the Palestinian displaced persons although such aid was envisaged only as a temporary measure to provide prompt relief. The West generally viewed United Nations' aid for the Palestinians as a stop-gap measure. In December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 194 (III) calling for the payment of compensation to or the repatriation of the Palestinians to their homes. But Israel's opposition to this resolution prevented its implementation and the need for aid has continued although the United Nations General Assembly has annually reaffirmed Resolution 194 (III).

Upon the suggestion of Mrs. F.D. Roosevelt, then United States representative to the United Nations, a special organisation called United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR) was created to « alleviate conditions of starvation and distress » among the Palestinians; an overall budget of \$ 32 million was proposed for the next nine months.

President Truman asked the 81st Congress to autho-

rise an American contribution to UNRPR. In March 1949, in spite of some misgivings, Congress appropriated \$ 16 million for aid. Congressional sentiments were reflected in the words with which Congressmen chose to designate the Palestinians: Senator Tom Connally, a Texas Democrat, referred to the Palestinians as the « so-called Palestine refugees;» most Congressmen simply adopted the formula « Arab refugees, » obscuring both the nationality of these people and the reasons for their need for international assistance. This formula predominates today in the deliberations of Congress.

By August 1949, when the UNRPR's mandate came to an end, U.N. members realised that the «refugee» problem in the Middle East was not « temporary » because there had been no solution along the lines of Resolution 194 (III) calling for the repatriation of the Palestinians to Israeli-held territory, their resettlement and the payment of compensation for their losses. These Congressmen did not, however, blame Israel for its refusal to implement the resolution.

In December 1949, after consulting an economic survey mission, the General Assembly created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to provide material assistance to needy Palestinians and to attempt to resettle them *de facto* in Arab countries. This new formula for resettlement and rehabilitation of the Palestinians outside Israel had been promoted by the United States. As this formula was in the interests of both the Zionists, who wanted the Pa-

---

(1) For a detailed account of United Nations activities in aid of the Palestinians see: Michael E. Jansen. *The United States and the Palestinian People* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970); John H. Davis. *The Evasive Peace* (London: John Murray, 1969); and Fred J. Khouri. *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968).

lestinians settled, and the U.S. government, which sought to bring Palestinian relief requirements to an end, President Truman was able to secure Congressional approval of appropriations for UNRWA. In the « United Nations Refugee Act of 1950, » Congress earmarked \$ 27,450,000 for annual assistance to the Palestinians, with the proviso that the President, at his own discretion, might redirect a part of that sum to any U.S. government agency which might be able to better assist the Palestinians.

Initially, many Congressmen believed that aid for the Palestinians was necessary for humanitarian reasons and to ensure that the Palestinians would not support the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> Following the latter line of Congressional thinking, the appropriation for the financial year 1951-52 came under the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

The debate over this appropriation was a particularly lively one.<sup>3</sup> By this time, the United States had contributed over \$ 40 million for the maintenance of needy Palestinians; much of this sum, and subsequent aid, has been in the form of surplus foodstuffs, not in cash. The foreign aid bill for 1951 appropriated \$ 175 million for aid to African and Middle Eastern nations. This money was to aid development programmes not included under the Cooperation Act of 1948. Of this sum, \$ 50 million was earmarked for UNRWA programmes. A section was added whereby the identical sum — \$ 50 million — would be appropriated for Israel. A lengthy debate over these appropriations took place in both the Senate and the House.

In the House of Representatives, John Kennedy, later

---

(2) U.S., *Congressional Record*, House, Frances Bolton (Ohio, Republican), May 19, 1953; August 17, 1951.

(3) *Ibid.*, House, August 17, 1951.

to become President, proposed that the money be appropriated for the resettlement of the Palestinians within Israel. This approach to the « refugee » issue had its impact on American policy when John Kennedy became President in 1961. Both Jacob Javits, a New York Republican and Abraham Ribicoff, a Connecticut Democrat, rejected Kennedy's idea. Both, who later became Senators, have been staunch supporters of the Zionist cause. They argued that it was impossible for Israel to incorporate so many potential enemies inside her boundaries.

A group of Southern Democrats, led by Harold Cooley, a North Carolina representative who sat in the House from 1934 until 1966, argued differently. They emphasised the inequalities of United States aid policies in the Middle East. Cooley pointed out that the cost of resettling displaced Palestinians had been estimated at \$ 200 per person, while the cost of resettling Jewish refugees was \$ 2,800 per person. These were compared to the cost of settling United States tenant farm families at approximately \$ 6000 per persons.<sup>4</sup>

Congressman Vorys from Ohio added that United States per capita aid to the Arabs averaged \$ 1.90, but aid to the Israelis averaged \$ 52.50 per capita.

Walter Judd, a Minnesota Republican, and an outspoken advocate for the Israeli cause, responded that the United States had to balance its aid to the Arabs with equal aid to Israel because it had a good army and had demonstrated its friendship for the West, particularly the United States. Judd was well known for his tenacious support of nationalist China and his fear of the advance of Communism. He tended to support those nations he

---

(4) *Ibid.*



believed would take a firm and clear-cut stand against the Soviet Bloc. In his speeches he made frequent Biblical references and was known for his flamboyant rhetorical style. He supported Israel because he viewed it as a bastion of pro-Western influence in the Middle East and because he saw it as a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy.

Joseph McCormack, a Democrat from Massachusetts who later became Speaker of the House, stated that Congress had « to realize that the Nation of Israel, without saying that we could not rely upon others, is one nation in the Near East in case of a crisis we could rely upon. »<sup>5</sup>

The Southern Representatives countered that if the « refugee » problem remained unsolved, Communism would make its greatest inroads in the Arab states, particularly among the Palestinians. This argument, however, was not given much weight; indeed, most Congressmen viewed Israel as the only stable, reliable American ally in the Middle East.

Congressional support for Israel, whether motivated by emotional commitment to Zionism or through a desire to maintain Israel as a dependable military ally for the West in the Middle East, cut across party lines. Israel's strongest, most loyal spokesmen came from the Eastern seaboard, particularly from New York with its heavy concentration of Jewish constituents. Many of these Congressmen were both Jewish and members of various Zionist organisations. They continually presented and supported Zionist policies. They viewed the best interests of the U.S. as being concomitant with Israeli interests. New York Democrats Ribicoff, Collers, Halpern, and Farbstein, and New York Republican Javits were outstanding in their support of Zionism.

---

(5) *Ibid.*, 10269.

In addition, Israel also found allies among Gentile Republicans such as Walter Judd and Wayne Morse, who viewed the state as an outpost of the U.S. against the encroachment of Communism. In the Presidential campaign of 1952, Republican Senator Robert Taft from Ohio adopted a strongly pro-Israel position. Taft's friendship with Cleveland Rabbi Hillel Silver, a staunch Zionist, was well known as were his Protestant Gentile Zionist sentiments. Taft's son was later to carry on the family political tradition by becoming a pro-Zionist Senator from Ohio. In 1952, as in 1944 and in every subsequent Presidential election, both the political parties and their candidates declared their support for Israel.

In 1953, when the question of continued United States aid to the Palestinians was again closely scrutinised, the House voted to create a subcommittee, led by Lawrence Smith from Wisconsin and Winston Prouty from Vermont, to investigate the conditions under which the Palestinians lived; they were also to look into the possibilities of a permanent solution to the problem.<sup>6</sup> The Smith-Prouty report recommended that the United States *not* urge the return of the « refugees » to Israel under the existing conditions. The report emphasised that the «refugee» problem was closely connected to the problem of obtaining a permanent peace in the Middle East which entailed the recognition of Israel by the Arab nations. A Senate subcommittee, headed by Senator Taft, which studied the Palestinian issue, reached similar conclusions. (Five years later another House subcommittee, Hays-O'Hara-Church, reiterated these findings, and urged that the displaced persons be integrated within the Arab nations). But, uncertain as how to bring about a resolution of the « refugee » problem according to these recom-

---

(6) *New York Times*, February 14, 1954.

mendations, Congress, as usual, appropriated funds within the Mutual Security Act of 1953.

In general, Congressmen supported the resettlement of Palestinians in Arab nations and did not envision any alteration of the state of Israel. A few Congressmen spoke occasionally in favour of resettlement within Israel, but only as a part of an overall solution which entailed Arab recognition of Israel. In 1955 and 1956, as the polarisation of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East increased, United States Congressmen became more vocal in support of Israel which was depicted as the only reliable United States ally in the area. Congressmen read into the *Congressional Record* many *New York Times* and *Washington Post* editorials and articles supporting the Israeli side.<sup>7</sup> Abraham Multer and Emanuel Celler, both of whom were from New York and were members of several Zionist organisations, led the way in advocating continued U.S. support for Israel. In the House they criticised the State Department for formulating what they considered to be pro-Arab policies; they also urged Congress to exert pressure for the resettlement of the Palestinians in Arab nations.

As a means to implement the resettlement of the Palestinians outside of Israel, Congress promoted programmes which were designed to expand the amount of fertile, agricultural land in the Arab states bordering on Israel. It was hoped that the Palestinians could be persuaded to settle upon such land and thereby eradicate the embarrassing problem of the continued existence of « refugee » camps around the perimeter of Israel.

---

(7) For a detailed quantitative analysis of the bias in these newspapers see Janice Terry. « The Arab-Israeli conflict : a Content Analysis of Three United States Newspapers, Quadrennially, 1948-1968. » *The Arab World: From Nationalism to Revolution* (Evanston: Medina University Press International, 1971).

Armed with a plan prepared by the Tennessee Valley Authority, Eric Johnston, appointed by President Eisenhower as his personal representative, toured the Arab world to discuss with governments the sharing of the waters of the Jordan River. The plan did not suit either the Arab governments concerned or Israel.<sup>8</sup>

In October 1955, Johnston's negotiations were suspended. The Plan was dead. But U.S. Congressmen did not notice Israel's reluctance to accept the terms of the plan, rather they blamed the Arab governments. They sought the resettlement of the Palestinians outside Israel, but when the Arab governments resisted such resettlement, Congressmen accused the Arab governments of being reluctant or totally opposed to accepting the displaced persons as permanent settlers within their boundaries. Congressmen did not take into account the fact that the Palestinians themselves had refused to be resettled and were demanding their right of repatriation,<sup>9</sup> a right which the Arab governments — and the U.S. — had supported by repeatedly voting for the terms of Resolution 194 (III) in the General Assembly.

As Egypt's President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, emerged as the pivotal leader in the Arab World and as Soviet influence in the Middle East became more pronounced, United States Congressmen increasingly saw Israel as its

---

(8) Fred J. Khouri. « The Jordan River Controversy, » *The Review of Politics* (January 1965); Georgiana Stevens. *Jordan River Partition* (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1965).

(9) Fred C. Bruhns. « A Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes, » *Middle East Journal* (Spring, 1955). As Bruhns noted, the «refugees, as a group, feel uprooted to a much greater extent socially than they do economically. Also when the refugees' perception of the term « social uprootedness » was investigated, and when they were asked what items of their pre-expatriate life, other than economic, they now missed the most, it was found that to the refugees it means mainly the severance of personal and traditional ties connected with concepts of home, family, clan, and community. » p. 133.

best ally in the area. They believed that the Palestinians had become pawns for Nasser's territorial and political ambitions. This was particularly true of Southern Congressmen who, prior to Nasser's coming to power, tended to support the conservative Arab governments as the best means of maintaining U.S. interests in the Middle East. But with the coup d'état against King Farouk in Egypt in 1952, these Congressmen reconsidered and altered their positions. They, too, came to see Israel as the best friend of the U.S. in the area.

In order to prevent the Palestinians from becoming a pro-Nasser political force, Congressmen continued to press for Palestinian resettlement in the Arab countries. Javits argued that the United States had to push for the resettlement of the refugees; for this reasons he had strongly supported the TVA-Johnston plan in spite of the widespread opposition to it from Middle Eastern governments, including Israel.<sup>10</sup> Hubert Humphrey, 1970 Democratic Presidential candidate and Vice-President under Lyndon Johnson, aligned himself with Javits; he was joined by a number of other Senators. Others pressed the State Department to take a tough line with the Arab governments, insisting that they take the Palestinian displaced persons as permanent settlers.<sup>11</sup>

In 1959, Javits proposed that the United States take the initiative in securing a resolution of the conflict by forcing the Arabs to take the responsibility for the Palestinians. Javits felt that Israel could be encouraged to take back a « fair » portion, but that the vast majority should be resettled in Arab territory. Javits' plan entailed increasing the amount of aid to the Arab states for

---

(10) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, June 24, 1957.

(11) *Ibid.*, House, May 23, 1956; January 30, 1957; these are speeches by Abraham Multer.

development purposes, but also proposed increased U.S. military aid to Israel because it was a dependable ally. Javits remarked, in this regard, that, « ... ever since the Lebanese episode we have begun to understand the critical importance to us of Israel as a dependable anchor for the free world in military and strategic terms in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. »<sup>12</sup> Multer, from New York, reiterated his earlier remarks that resettlement of the refugees within Israel would be unthinkable.<sup>13</sup> Largely because of Congressional doubts over continued aid to UNRWA, a rider was attached to the appropriation of \$ 23 million for 1960-1961 to the effect that U.S. aid was not to exceed 70 per cent of all the other nations' contributions.<sup>14</sup> (See Table One on the next page for a summary of U.S. contributions during this period).

After John Kennedy's election in 1960, the Administration began to re-examine United States policies in the Middle East. Kennedy, following his earlier stand, wanted to improve the position of the U.S. vis à vis the nationalist regimes in the Arab world, particularly with that of President Nasser. On May 11, 1961, Kennedy initiated a correspondence with Nasser referring to the payment of compensation and the reintegration of the Palestinians, but did not mention their resettlement in Arab lands. This omission brought forth substantial criticism from Congress, particularly from Zionists who feared the Kennedy Administration might take steps to press for the return of the Palestinians to Israel. It is highly unlikely in view of Kennedy's dealings in military equipment with Israel at this same time, that the Administration was indeed promoting any such solution; it did, however, hope to improve U.S.-Egyptian relations and considered that this could be accomplished simply

---

(12) *Ibid.*, Senate, July 20, 1961, 13011.

(13) *Ibid.*, House, May 10, 1959.

(14) *United Nations Yearbook*, 1960.

by making a few friendly gestures towards Nasser's regime.<sup>15</sup> Congressmen tended to exaggerate the importance of these moves. Javits contended that Israel could take back from 50,000 to 100,000 refugees, but that more would endanger her security and would therefore be against the best interests of the U.S.<sup>16</sup> He urged that the refugees be resettled in the Arab countries, and that they be compensated for their losses. He insisted that the Arabs should end their economic boycott of Israel. Javits concluded that it would be a «colossal mistake»<sup>17</sup> to let the Arabs think that the U.S. supported the return of the Palestinians to Israel. New York Republican Senator Kenneth Keating voiced his support for Javits and added that the agreement should also provide for the opening of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping.

As a result of increased Zionist activity and apparent changes in the Administration's attitude toward the Arab governments, the aid bill for 1961 was rigorously debated in Congress. Philip Hart, a Democrat from Michigan and Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, spoke concerning the plight of the Palestinian displaced persons and the terrible conditions in which they lived. He praised the work of UNRWA and asked for the continued support of UNRWA's programmes. Hart attempted in this discussion to offset criticism of UNRWA by Zionist Congressmen who claimed that the Agency was biased in favour of the Palestinians and the Arabs.<sup>18</sup> In the hope of finally ending the problem of

---

(15) This was a simplistic approach to the knotty problem of improving U.S.-Egyptian relations. Kennedy's arms and «refugee» policies did not fool the Egyptians although they welcomed the lessening of tension between Cairo and Washington.

(16) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, July 20, 1961, 13017.

(17) *Ibid.*

(18) *Ibid.*, August 17, 1961, 16185. See speeches by Abraham Multer September 19, 1961 and March 28, 1963 for examples of Congressional criticism of UNRWA.

TABLE I

Detailed Statement of income to UNRWA, May 1, 1950 - December 31, 1970  
In U. S. Dollars\*

Contributor	1950-65	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Total
Canada	17,468,725	1,111,111	2,463,768	1,709,445	1,574,074	1,577,000	25,904,123
France	12,221,920	229,778	1,258,137	1,128,457	683,959	582,000	16,104,251
Israel	256,547	—	683,911	591,629	943,103	601,000	3,076,190
Sweden	2,118,650	2,354,641	2,200,773	2,222,369	2,194,018	2,193,018	13,283,532
U. A. R.	5,097,319	255,960	120,452	1,845	400	—	5,475,976
United Kingdom	90,524,004	5,000,000	5,000,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	114,024,004
United States	364,468,069	22,550,000	24,200,000	22,200,000	22,200,000	22,325,000	477,943,069

\* From the Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1969, - 30 June 1970, General Assembly, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013), pp. 89 - 91.



Palestinian homelessness, the Kennedy Administration appointed Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to investigate possible solutions with Arab and Israeli officials.<sup>19</sup> As it finally emerged the « Johnson Plan » contained the following five proposals:

(1) The displaced Palestinians should have the choice of repatriation or resettlement;

(2) Israel should be permitted to refuse individual Palestinians;

(3) Repatriation and resettlement should be gradual;

(4) The Palestinians should be compensated for properties in Israel and they should be assisted in order to become self-supporting (Israel contributing to this fund); and,

(5) The U.N. should supervise the programme.<sup>20</sup>

Both the Arab governments and Israel rejected the « Johnson Plan » as granting too much consideration to their opponents.

Congressmen in the U.S., who wanted to see the end of the Palestinian problem, were generally dubious over the practicability of repatriating the Palestinians.

As late as 1963 when Senator Hart merely referred in a congressional debate to the « Johnson Plan » as a possible solution to the Palestinian problem, he was severely criticised. In the face of such criticism, Hart publicly apologised for his remarks and stated that he

---

(19) *New York Times*, November 26, 1961.

(20) Fred Khouri. *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, p. 14; *New York Times*, 21, 1963.

did not consider the « Johnson Plan » to be the sole solution.<sup>21</sup> In the House, Representative Halpern from New York voiced the opinion that Israel should not have to take back the displaced Palestinians because many were « not authentic 'refugees' and some never lived in Israel at all. »<sup>22</sup> He also remarked that the Palestinians would form a dangerous fifth column and that some were « adherents of the Arab Communist Party. »<sup>23</sup> By inferring that the Palestinians might be Communist sympathisers, various Congressmen hoped to discredit the validity of the Palestinian claim to their homeland. Thus, Congress faced the dilemma of, on the one hand, wishing to terminate assistance to dispossessed Palestinians, but, on the other, being unable to find a solution which would eradicate the problem of Palestinian homelessness and the need for international aid.

Some Congressmen also feared that the Palestinians might be used by Arab leaders, particularly President Nasser, for their own personal ends. These Congressmen believed that such manipulation would be detrimental to U.S. policies in the Middle East. For most Congressmen the only possible alternative was to press for the resettlement of the displaced persons in Arab territory. Congress considered that Arab governments, which proved reluctant to agree to the resettlement of the Palestinians, should be coerced by the U.S. into acceptance. Congressmen continued to argue that the « refugee » problem would best be solved within the context of a general peace agreement in which the Arab governments would recognise the integrity of Israel.<sup>24</sup>

---

(21) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, July 22, 1963.

(22) *Ibid.*, July 9, 1963, 12313.

(23) *Ibid.*

(24) *Ibid.*, House, August 17 and August 22, 1961; March 28, 1963.

Throughout this period, Senator Fulbright, a Democrat from Arkansas and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was the only continual voice of dissent. In the spring of 1960 he toured the Middle East. While in Israel, he proposed that Israel permit some of the « refugees » to return. He also wanted an impartial body of experts to study the Palestinian situation in order to formulate solutions to the continuing problem.<sup>25</sup> Fulbright's position was criticised by pro-Zionists in the Senate. Their criticism became even more strident in 1964 where Senator Fulbright initiated Hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the activities of foreign agents in the U.S., notably the Zionist Agency. These hearings, of course, directly effected the multitude of Zionist agents in the U.S. who were in charge of a vast fund-raising apparatus. The Committee was charged with investigating the activities of registered foreign agents and, tangentially, the use of tax exemptions. Certain members of the Committee, particularly Hubert Humphrey, not only tried to avoid direct criticism of Israel but also direct confrontation with witnesses called.<sup>26</sup> Zionists in Congress voiced concern lest the findings or recommendations of the Committee be detrimental to the work of the Zionist organisation in the U.S. Javits and others expressed their concern over, and hostility towards, the actions of Committee members. On the Senate floor, Javits led the questioning of Fulbright over this issue; while he avoided direct mention of the Zionist Organisation he made several allusions to it and told Fulbright that everyone knew who would be primarily affected were certain changes to be made concerning the registration or tax exemptions of foreign agents.<sup>27</sup>

---

(25) *New York Times*, May 18, 1960.

(26) *Newsweek*, August 12, 1963.

(27) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, July 6, 1964, 16033.

During this period Congressmen were concerned over the activities of President Nasser. He was viewed as a Communist-controlled dictator who posed a deadly threat to the interests of the U.S. and to the security of Israel. The general consensus was that Egypt should receive minimal aid, if any at all, from the U.S. and, in fact, aid was discontinued completely in 1968.<sup>28</sup> By 1965, it was felt that Nasser was supporting and inciting Palestinian guerrillas against Israel. Many Congressmen believed that were Nasser removed, the attacks against Israel would promptly cease. Congressmen considered that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, then headed by Ahmad Shukairy, was totally under Egypt's control. They did not consider the possibility of independent action by Palestinians within or outside the P.L.O. or action outside the realm of Egyptian influence. James Roosevelt, a California Democrat and outspoken Zionist supporter, stressed that only the resettlement of the refugees could defuse the steadily escalating tensions along the borders. He understood that the Arab states would resist attempts at resettlement, but maintained that they had to be informed in no uncertain terms that they had to comply and, in this regard, he mentioned that U.S. aid to UNRWA accounted for approximately 70 per cent of the organisation's budget.<sup>29</sup> He did not, however, take note of the fact that the Arab governments had provided \$ 38 million in direct aid through 1962<sup>30</sup> or that the U.S. contribution was not as substantial as contributions of other, smaller, states if assessed on a per capita base. Other Congressmen supported Roosevelt's contentions, arguing that UNRWA should concen-

---

(28) *National Diplomacy 1965-1970* (Congressional Quarterly: May 1970), Table III, p. 23, source from A.I.D.

(29) U.S., *Congressional Record*, House, August 24, 1965, 21620.

(30) *New York Times*, August 19, 1962.

trate its efforts on rehabilitation, vocational training, and finding work for the Palestinians. It should not, in the opinion of these Congressmen, have concentrated primarily on direct aid, although they neglected to note that people must eat in order to work and live. These Congressmen argued that « Arabs » lived comfortably in Israel and could do so outside. Thus there was no reason for Nasser and his allies to « play politics »<sup>31</sup> with the « refugees, » but they should instead have already integrated the Palestinians within their own territories. Thus the « refugees » were pictured as just one more weapon the Arabs used against Israel; no account was taken of the fact that the «refugees» themselves demanded repatriation.

Leonard Farbstein, a New York Democrat, proposed that a solution could be forced by the steady, planned decrease of U.S. aid to UNRWA. Having toured Israel, but not the Arab states, he believed such a solution was perfectly feasible. He introduced a plan to be incorporated into the aid bill for 1966 whereby the amount of U.S. aid to UNRWA would be reduced by five per cent per year for twenty years. Farbstein's argument rested upon the premise that the U.S. could move closer to a settlement of the « refugee » issue by cutting off financial aid.<sup>32</sup> Farbstein's plan for phasing out U.S. aid to UNRWA was not accepted, but Congress cut aid for 1966 by \$ 100,000, from the original \$ 22,300,000, a petulant and insignificant amount for the U.S. but important to UNRWA which must meet ever expanding human needs.

Questions were again raised in 1967 after it was revealed that some of the Palestinians on UNRWA's relief rolls were members of commando groups. After touring

---

(31) U.S., *Congressional Record*, House, August 24, 1965, 21622.

(32) *Ibid.*, August 25, 1965, 21858.

the Middle East, Senator Edward Kennedy who had previously demonstrated his pro-Zionist sympathies, expressed concern over this issue and demanded that immediate action be taken to put a stop to any aid going directly or indirectly to the Palestinian liberation movement. Other Congressmen brought up once again the question of possible abuses in UNRWA relief card procedures; they feared that a number of the names on the relief rolls included individuals who were dead or were no longer dependent on UNRWA, failing to consider the fact that UNRWA had « ceilings » on its ration rolls, that there were waiting lists of new registrants and that Palestinians did not only die but also were born in the camps. Congressmen argued that they did not want to appropriate money for a system which was full of abuses, nor did they wish to, in any way, fund or support the commando movement. Because of concern over what they considered « corruption » in UNRWA procedures, Congress rejected UNRWA's request for assistance for additional food and housing. Laurence Michelmores, UNRWA Commissioner-General, had proposed these increases owing to the steady rise in the numbers of refugees and the inflation which UNRWA was forced to meet.<sup>33</sup> Farbstien, at this time, introduced a resolution calling for the U.N. to update its rolls and to issue new ration cards to the « refugees. » Undoubtedly allegations of corruption and abuses in the UNRWA system were vastly exaggerated, but they served to provide a basis for Congressmen to voice their opposition to continued aid for the Palestinians and to urge, once again, a final solution to this nagging and expensive problem.

---

(33) *United Nations Yearbook*, 1966, 1967; U.S. *Congressional Record*, February 9 and February 20, 1967.

Later in 1967, as hostilities in the area escalated, the issue of support for the Palestinians and the activities of Palestinians in the Palestine Liberation Army again became items for debate. Prior to the 1967 war, Javits and others urged the U.S. to avoid a second Viet-Nam in the Middle East by checking into the use of U.N. funds which they claimed were being used by commandos. In joining traditional Zionist advocates, Senators Charles Percy from Illinois, Wayne Morse from Oregon, and Representative Hickenlooper from Iowa supported this stand.<sup>34</sup>

Congressional debates on the eve of the 1967 war were overwhelmingly pro-Israeli. The Arabs were branded as the aggressors and the Soviet Union was accused of encouraging hostilities to suit their own ends. Farbstein remarked, « it should be remembered that Israel represents the American presence in the Middle East. »<sup>35</sup> UNRWA was accused of having failed because the Palestinians had not been resettled and because many had joined or supported the commando movement. Congressmen felt that the Arab governments had displayed unreasonable hostility to the resettlement of the « refugees » and gave the « refugees » as the main reason that the Arabs refused to recognise Israel.<sup>36</sup>

On June 15, 1967, just after the 1967 fighting, the conclusions of a House of Representatives study committee, which had toured the Middle East in November 1966, were made public. The report called for (1) a cease-fire between the Arabs and Israel, (2) recognition by the Arabs of Israel with guarantees by the Great Powers, (3) « refugee » resettlement in the Arab countries, (4) an imposed arms limitation, and (5) the initiation of econo-

---

(34) *Ibid.*, Senate, April 27, 1967.

(35) *Ibid.*, House, June 5, 1967, 14580.

(36) *Ibid.*

mic development projects in the region — with the aim, of course, of reintegrating the Palestinians. This was, in effect, a complete endorsement of all of Israel's major demands. The intention of this, and other reports before it, was to eliminate the problem of the dependence of Palestinian displaced persons on international assistance by resettling them outside Palestine; there was never any question of recognition of the Palestinian right to return to the land which had been their home for centuries. By dissolving the Palestinian people into the Arab countries where they were living in exile, Congressmen hoped to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. By thus ignoring the crux of the issue between the Arabs and Israel, the right of the Palestinians to live at home and to self-determination, Congressmen have never really come to grips with the central issue in the Middle East struggle.

There were few voices raised in protest to the House committee's report. One was the voice of Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, later defeated in the 1970 elections, who had also made a fact-finding visit to the Middle East in 1967. Gore had sat on the Foreign Relations Committee with Fulbright and had undoubtedly been influenced by him. He emphasised that U.N. aid amounted to only \$ 17 a year per « refugee » or about four cents a day. His perceptive analysis — in direct contrast to the House report — stressed that the problem went far deeper than just economics. Gore felt that Israel should not make Palestinian repatriation dependent upon the signing of a peace treaty with the Arab states. He noted further that the problem had been made more complex by the displaced persons who had fled the West Bank during the 1967 war. Gore urged Israel to approve the return of the « new refugees; » he believed that by so doing Israel could

---

(37) *Ibid.*, House, June 15, 1967, 16097.



demonstrate its willingness to compromise and could thereby bring about a permanent settlement of the conflict. Gore concluded with a plea for increased U.S. assistance to UNRWA which, owing to the increase in the number of refugees following June 1967, needed money more desperately than ever before.<sup>38</sup> Fulbright concurred with Gore's analysis, but these men were largely ignored in Senate debates on the « refugee » issue.

Congressional reluctance to appropriate money for UNRWA resulted in the fact that the amount of U.S. aid remained relatively constant during the twenty year period of the conflict. Throughout its mandate, UNRWA has had to struggle to keep pace with inflation and the growing « refugee » population. Although UNRWA did its best to provide for all of the displaced Palestinians' needs, including health and educational facilities, the lack of money meant that these services were curtailed in favour of simply feeding more than a million people. UNRWA was unable to initiate many of the vocational training and other services that it believed were necessary. In 1969, for example, Congress appropriated \$ 22,200,000, or \$ 350,000 less than in 1966;<sup>39</sup> this cut occurred in spite of the fact that there were thousands of newly displaced Palestinians since the 1967 fighting. Thus the « refugees » actually were provided with fewer necessities and services than previously.

By August 1967, Congressmen were again complaining about the manipulation of the Palestinians by Arab leaders. While the 1967 war had, in fact, exacerbated the « refugee » issue, it appears that many Congressmen had hoped that Israel's victory would force the Palestinians to realise the fruitlessness of continued hostility. Israel's

---

(38) *Ibid.*, Senate, July 12, 1967, 18501.

(39) See *United Nations Yearbooks* for these years.

victory, however, had exactly the opposite effect on the Palestinian community and was directly responsible for the tremendous growth of the commando movement following the war. As we pointed out earlier, Congress did not credit the Palestinians for initiating and leading the commando movement; instead they considered that the Arab leaders, especially President Nasser, had been responsible for the movement.

Mike Mansfield, Democratic majority leader in the Senate, spoke in favour of the old solution of resettlement in the Arab world; as an alternative, he suggested resettling the Palestinians in the United States or elsewhere.<sup>40</sup> Farbstein, in the House, had earlier proposed that the U.S. take 25,000 Palestinians and that this would, hopefully, set off a chain reaction in which other nations would volunteer to take more displaced persons.<sup>41</sup>

Such a suggestion from a firm Zionist, like Farbstein, was, ironic as it may seem, single-minded and purposeful: in 1943 President Franklin Roosevelt had attempted to obtain a similar agreement of the great powers to accept as immigrants large numbers of Jewish refugees from Europe. Although Britain's Prime Minister Churchill took the lead in accepting 100,000 refugees, Roosevelt could not bring the U.S. Congress to do the same. The Zionists demanded that the Jews must go to Palestine and exerted their considerable influence in Congress in favour of the restrictive immigration policies established by Congress in 1923-24, policies which closed U.S. doors to Jewish immigrants.

Since the 1967 war the criticism of U.S. aid to UNRWA has continued. In the Senate, it has been led by

---

(40) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, October 10, 1967.

(41) *Ibid.*, House, August 10, 1967.

Jacob Javits of New York, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, Walter Mondale of Minnesota, and Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut and by several Representatives from New York in the House. Not surprisingly, these same individuals have all supported the sale of arms to Israel. They have been questioned and occasionally opposed by Senators Mark Hatfield, an Oregon Republican, and George Aiken, a Republican from Vermont who is also a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Hatfield has publicly urged a more balanced U.S. approach to the Middle East; he has also expressed concern over the living conditions of the Palestinian displaced persons.<sup>42</sup> Both Hatfield and Aiken have supported UNRWA activities while Javits and Gaylord Nelson have questioned U.S. allocations. Senator Aiken remarked that « the treatment of the Arab 'refugees' is one of the black spots in the history of the United Nations.»<sup>43</sup>

Fulbright is the best known U.S. Senator who has questioned the wisdom of many U.S. policies in the Middle East. On August 24, 1970, in a lengthy speech in the Senate he spoke on the « Old Myths and New Realities — the Middle East. » Regarding the « refugee » issue he said:

A commitment by the Arab States to accept them and assist in their resettlement — as in part they have already done — should be accompanied by generous Israeli financial support, both to compensate these 'refugees' for their losses and to facilitate their resettlement. With contributions from friends abroad and with the relief from military costs which peace would make possible, Israel should have no great difficulty in meeting these costs,

---

(42) *Ibid.*, Senate, June 13, 1970; November 24, 1970; February 9, 1971.

(43) *Ibid.*, November 30, 1970, 19026.

which in any case ought to be accepted as an elementary moral obligation.<sup>44</sup>

Although Fulbright's position was far removed from what most Palestinians demanded (he did not call for the return of the Palestinians to their homeland), he was, nonetheless, roundly criticised in Congress and the U.S. press for adopting what they considered a pro-Arab stand. His reference to the responsibility of Israel for Palestinian homelessness was a particularly sensitive point and one upon which pro-Zionist forces in Congress focused. Fulbright also advocated concluding a U.S.-Israel treaty of friendship which would formalise U.S. support for the continued existence of Israel. Through such a treaty Fulbright hoped to halt the continuous Israeli pressure for more and more U.S. armaments; Fulbright was alarmed by the escalation of the arms race in the Middle East and was eager to stop it, if at all possible.

From May 1950 to December 31, 1970, U.S. aid to UNRWA totalled \$ 477,943,069 — the highest contribution made by any nation. Great Britain was second with donations totalling \$ 114,024,004; however, on a per capita basis, U.S. aid is less substantial than that of nations with small populations such as Canada and Sweden, which have provided \$ 25 million and \$ 13 million respectively<sup>45</sup> (see Table One). The total income for

---

(44) *Ibid.*, August 24, 1970, 14035. Ribicoff led the questioning of Fulbright during this speech. The American Committee for Justice in the Middle East, Boulder, Colorado, periodically publishes information concerning Congressional attitudes with regard to the Middle East; their publications are particularly useful in gathering current material on Congressmen and their statements on the Middle East.

(45) *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*, July 1, 1969, June 31, 1970, Supplement No 13 (A/8013), pp. 89-92.

UNRWA during this period was \$ 738,100,720; U.S. donations accounting for more than half of the total. The Soviet Union and its European Allies have not been donors. Strong Congressional opposition to continued aid for UNRWA coupled with the desire of many Zionists to exclude the Palestinians from an overall Arab-Israeli settlement has restricted U.S. assistance and influenced the form such assistance was to take. Over the last 23 years, a group of vocal, well organised Senators and Representatives have consistently criticised UNRWA programmes and have urged the resettlement of the « refugees » in Arab territory. Other Congressmen have supported Israel's refusal to repatriate the Palestinians because they claim to fear Russian influence among the « refugees. » Paradoxically they agreed to maintain appropriations for UNRWA, although reluctantly. But, the failure to recognise the rights of the Palestinians has led to increased Soviet influence in the Middle East and to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union on the Arab side against Israel.



## II. ARMS TO ISRAEL

While the U.S. grudgingly provided aid to the Palestinian « refugees » from 1948-1970, it willingly gave much more substantial and valuable assistance to Israel. Much of this assistance was in the form of sales or gifts of military equipment to Israel; in turn, these arms were directed against the Palestinians and/or the Arab states. Not surprisingly, there has been a high correlation between those Congressmen who have persistently advocated decreasing the amounts of aid for the Palestinians or resettling them *outside* Israel, and those who have advocated increased U.S. military assistance for Israel. Similarly, those Congressmen who have favoured a more balanced U.S. policy in the Middle East, while expressing sympathy for the refugees, tended to be dubious or, at least, cautious concerning continued and increased U.S. military aid to Israel.

In 1947, under the United States Neutrality Act of 1939 and the Export Act of 1940, the U.S. instituted an arms embargo on the Middle East.<sup>1</sup> However, considerable smuggling of arms from the U.S. to Israel occurred

---

(1) Ahmad Refaat El Kashef. « United States Assistance to Israel: The Military Dimension, » *The United States, Israel and the Arab States*, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Information Papers No. 3, December, 1970. For more on military aid to the Middle East in general see: J.C. Hurewitz. *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

prior to and during the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli fighting.<sup>2</sup> Both public and governmental sympathy was openly on Israel's side. Following its establishment in 1948, Israel began to search for a reliable supplier of military armaments. The Israeli leadership approached the U.S. concerning a possible arms deal in 1950. Simultaneously, the Israelis asked Great Britain and France for arms.

The Truman Administration vacillated on the request because the U.S. wanted to maintain the amity of the Arab governments while keeping Israel's friendship. Most Congressmen favoured cutting off military aid to the Arab states, and supported providing arms to Israel. Congressional pressure was an important factor leading to the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 by the United States, Great Britain and France. The three powers publicly stated their recognition of Israel's right to exist and their support for Israel's continued existence. They also pledged that they would not allow armed aggression across the existing Arab — Israeli armistice lines — in effect establishing these armistice lines as Israel's *de facto* borders. If any aggression were to take place the powers were to take action against the aggressor either within or outside of the United Nations.<sup>3</sup> This meant that the Palestinians — and the Arabs — could not resort to the use of force to regain the territory captured by Israel in 1947-49 without drawing in the three powers. The Declaration enunciated the policy of arms « parity » in

---

(2) *New York Times*, January 4, 7, 9, 12, 14, 1949; February 18, 1948; March 23, 1948. During the winter of 1948 there were many cases of arrests by the FBI in which armaments being shipped to Palestine were confiscated. Reports were also made concerning the purchase of armaments by the Jewish Agency with the knowledge of the FBI, January 12, 1948. On January 20, it was announced in the *Times* that shotgun shells for sports-use had been legally cleared by U.S. custom officials.

(3) J.C. Hurewitz. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965), Vol. II, p. 308.



the Middle East, i.e. the establishment of a so-called « military balance » between Israel, on the one hand, and all her prime Arab antagonists, on the other. Such an arms « balance » has, naturally, meant Israeli military predominance in the area. And, whenever it appeared that the so-called « balance » was threatened, one or more of the powers took steps to redress the « imbalance. » Taking advantage of the situation, Israel has perpetually claimed that the « balance » had been upset by various arms deals concluded by the Arab states and has demanded additional arms. The Israeli pressure for more and more arms increased after the rise of President Nasser in Egypt as Nasser appeared to take seriously the Arab struggle against Israel. This constantly escalating arms race in the Middle East has been largely maintained by the West, which has been Israel's supplier, and by the Soviet Union, which has supplied arms to Egypt.

Many Congressmen, especially those in pro-Zionist groups, hailed the Tripartite Declaration, but, still unsatisfied, called for further evidence of U.S. support for Israel. They depicted Israel as an outpost against Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Javits praised the effectiveness of the Israeli military which, in his words, could be « part of the hard core of (Western) defense in the Eastern Mediterranean. »<sup>4</sup> This demand was repeated in successive years by Javits, Celler,<sup>5</sup> and other pro-Zionist Congressmen. Calls for additional arms to Israel were based on the premises that Israel was the defender of the « free world » in the Middle East, that it had a good army, and that it was reliable. Arms were to be

---

(4) *New York Times*, November 26, 1951.

(5) Celler, now over eighty, is House Judiciary Chairman. His law firm has been publicized as operating a double-door legal practice whereby the firm has two doors, one with Celler's name on it and another without it for clients with federal business. *Parade* magazine, March 7, 1971.

provided under the Mutual Security Act;<sup>6</sup> thus, in the minds of many Congressmen, the military and strategic interests of the U.S. have become integrally linked to the continued existence of Israel.

This link was formalised in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded between the U.S. and Israel in August, 1951. It constituted the most sophisticated economic treaty ever concluded between the U.S. and a « most favoured nation. » Its twenty-five paragraphs were designed to promote and protect large-scale private U.S. capital investments in Israel and can be seen as a further effort to consolidate the newly created state.

In 1951, a group of Democratic Congressmen issued a joint declaration calling for the agreement of the U.S. government to the purchase by Israel of \$ 50 million in « defensive » armaments. Although this time the government hesitated to become directly involved in a military build up in the Middle East, the U.S. was not against urging its allies in Europe to provide such military equipment. During the 1952 election campaign, Javits depicted Israel as the economic focal point of the Middle East from which development would radiate to help the Arab countries if only they would recognise and cooperate with Israel.<sup>7</sup> He then called upon the U.S. to continue to assist Israel in every way possible; clearly Javits envisioned Israel as the dominant economic and military force in the Middle East.

After the 1952 elections, John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, stated that the United States should provide Middle Eastern states with limited military aid « which will contribute to their internal security and will assist in promoting plans for peace between Israel and

---

(6) *New York Times*, September 13, 1952.

the Arab nations, and in establishing a regional defense organization. »<sup>8</sup> The assumption underlying this policy, which was later embodied in the Baghdad Pact, was that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat to the continued existence of the Arab states. Dulles believed that if all the states in the Middle East, including Israel, were militarily strong they would cease to be suspicious of one another and would be able to reach a satisfactory peace agreement. Secretary Dulles' evaluation of the Middle East situation was based on the wrong premise: that the Arabs felt their major antagonist to be the Soviet Union — as did the United States. The Arab states considered Israel as their primary opponent and, because of what had happened in Palestine, a formidable threat to their very existence. The Baghdad Pact, like NATO in Europe and SEATO in Southeast Asia, was designed to surround the Soviet Union with pro-Western states. But many Arab governments - particularly those with nationalist reformist leadership, such as that in Egypt - saw the Baghdad Pact as another attempt by the West to recolonise the Middle East. Thus the Pact polarised the Arab world between such conservative governments as that of Nuri es-Said in Iraq, which were willing to accept the Pact, and the nationalist-reformist governments such as that of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, which were not. In the long-run, the Pact directly contributed to political instability in Jordan and Iraq and led to the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy. In Jordan, the King was caught between his desire to join the Pact and popular opposition to it, opposition which was led by the Palestinians, who comprised more than half of Jordan's population and who blamed the West, particularly the U.S., for Israel's establishment and continued existence.

---

(8) *Ibid.*, May 6, 1953.

While Dulles wanted to arm states so that they would provide a barrier of defense against the Soviet Union, Congressmen opposed such a policy as potentially dangerous to Israel. These Congressmen sent letters to Dulles and Eisenhower stressing Israel's loyalty to the West and expressed doubts about the practicality or wisdom of providing arms to any Arab government.<sup>9</sup> With the overthrow of the Iraqi regime in 1958 and Abdel Kader Kassem's immediate withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, these Congressmen demanded recognition of their correct evaluation of the Middle East situation, asserting that the Arabs could never be dependable allies for the West.

As early as 1955, Javits was asking for a mutual defense agreement between Israel and the U.S. This demand was reiterated at regular intervals for the next fifteen years.<sup>10</sup> Hubert Humphrey supported this suggestion and, in addition, called for the suspension of all military aid to the Arab states until they progressed toward a peace settlement with Israel.<sup>11</sup> In June 1955 it was revealed that Israel had asked for such a defense arrangement as early as October 1954, thus the pro-Zionist Congressmen were certainly taking their cues from Tel-Aviv. The Eisenhower Administration delayed its decision. Events in Israel, such as Ben-Gurion's return as Prime Minister and the consequent Israeli raid on the Gaza Strip in February 1955, caused the Eisenhower Administration to reopen its deliberations on the matter. The Gaza raid, demonstrating the military vulnerability of Egypt, precipitated the first Egyptian-Soviet arms deal. Israel, in turn, asked the U.S. for jets to « redress » the military « imbalance. » The Egyptian-Soviet arms deal

---

(9) *Ibid.*, March 7, 1954.

(10) *Ibid.*, May 17, 1955.

(11) *Ibid.*, June 19, 1955.

greatly alarmed Congress and gave additional weight to the Israeli argument that arms were needed to maintain the balance of power against the Arab states.

Senator Estes Kefauver, an aspiring Presidential candidate, and others, staunchly supported Israel and called publicly for additional arms to be sold to Israel.<sup>12</sup> These demands were supported by Mrs. F.D. Roosevelt, Walter Reuther, head of the United Autoworkers, and ex-President Truman.<sup>13</sup> Abba Eban visited the U.S. in November with the Israeli shopping-list of arms which he wished to purchase on lenient credit terms.

If supplies of arms were made to Israel, whom pro-Zionist Congressmen claimed was the most dependable ally the U.S. had in the Middle East, then the Administration may risk losing Arab support against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East and the forfeiting of continued supply of Arab oil to Europe.

The pro-Zionists launched a powerful campaign during the winter of 1956 to force the Eisenhower Administration to decide in favour of selling arms to Israel. Although the Administration continued to defer the desired decision, it is now known that certain secret deals were concluded to sell small amounts of military equipment to Israel during this period.<sup>14</sup> Both Democratic candidates for President, Senator Kefauver and Adlai Stevenson, supported the sale of arms to Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban called on Dulles in February in an attempt to hasten a decision. Eighty-six Democratic Congressmen sent a letter to the Administra-

---

(12) *U.S., Congressional Record*, Senate, February 1, 1956.

(13) *New York Times*, January 29, 1956.

(14) *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, V. 13, p. 19017, A. col. 1; *U.S. News and World Report*, September 19, 1958.

tion urging the arms sale. The signatories included: Keating of New York, Scott of Pennsylvania, Roosevelt of California, Martha Griffiths and Charles Diggs of Michigan.<sup>15</sup> Keating, Scott, and Roosevelt at various times expressed concern over aid to the Palestinians, but were constantly calling for more armaments to Israel.

Meanwhile, the Administration announced that it had concluded a sale of tanks to Saudi Arabia, a deal which backfired on both the Administration and the oil companies, which had pressed for its conclusion. Congressmen greeted the news with cries of alarm. They demanded an investigation of the Saudi Arabian arms deal, accused the State Department of being pro-Arab, and demanded that arms immediately be sold to Israel.<sup>16</sup> Largely owing to pro-Zionist pressures, the tank shipments were halted at the docks in February 1956.

Unknown to most Congressmen, and incidently to most Arab governments, the U.S. at this time was providing Israel with arms through West Germany. West Germany was virtually used as a conduit to provide Israel with arms; such arms sales had, of course, prior U.S. approval, although the U.S. publicly maintained that it was absolutely neutral with regard to arms sales to the two sides in the Middle East conflict.<sup>17</sup> By adopting such tactics the Eisenhower Administration hoped to avoid possible recriminations from Arab governments and to protect privately owned U.S. business operating in the Middle East. News of the West German arms arrangement with Israel became public after December 1957<sup>18</sup>

---

(15) *New York Times*, February 7, 20, 1956.

(16) *Ibid.*, May 20, 1956.

(17) *Ibid.*, December 25, 1957; *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1969.

(18) *Ibid.*

and resulted in many Arab governments breaking off diplomatic relations with West Germany.

Tensions in the Middle East decreased following the Tripartite Aggression in 1956 and the withdrawal of troops from Egyptian territory. Although the events of 1956 do not directly pertain to this study, it should be noted in passing that Congress was generally in favour of Israeli actions, but criticized both Great Britain and France. The period following 1956 was characterised by the avoidance of overt military confrontation by all parties involved in the Middle East conflict. After Israel's military capabilities had been amply demonstrated by its victories in 1956, Congressional demands for additional arms to Israel abated.

Following the 1956 fighting, Senator Ellender of Louisiana visited the Middle East and returned with some severe warnings for Congress.

I left this area convinced of one thing, and that is, that it will be impossible to establish a self-sustaining state of Israel.<sup>19</sup>

Although the Senator's remarks appear forcefully anti-Israel, at least some of his concern stemmed from his determination to stop the flow of U.S. dollars abroad as he was known to be a consistent opponent of foreign aid. Ellender proposed that Israel return to the boundaries delineated by the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947, and that further Jewish immigration into the area be channeled into Arab states. Ellender felt that it was impossible for the U.S. to continue to extend aid to both the Arabs and the Israelis. Having just returned from the Middle East, Ellender realised that the U.S. could not indefinitely continue to play both sides against the

---

(19) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, February 7, 1957, 1716.

middle. To Ellender it was counter-productive in the long run for the U.S. to try and support two diametrically opposed sides. Arms to Israel would alienate the Arabs and an arms embargo would be opposed by both Arabs and Israelis.

Ellender brought up the issue of aid and loans to Israel again in 1963. He was opposed to granting more loans to Israel on the grounds that they were not being repaid at a rate to justify the expansion of the loan programme. He noted that the U.S. had authorised \$ 504,380,425 in loans, had disbursed \$ 423,839,286, and had been repaid \$ 102,466,901. This meant that there was an outstanding debt of \$ 310,004,163.<sup>20</sup> In total, including food for peace, AID (Association for International Development), and Title I and II programs the U.S. had provided Israel from 1948 to 1962 some \$ 879 million in government aid. Ellender considered this sum to be excessive; his point of view was supported by Frank Lausche, Democratic Senator from Ohio.

AID statistics on U.S. assistance to Israel are a bit more precise (see Table Two on the next page). According to these statistics Israel received slightly over one billion dollars of aid from 1946 to 1968; of that sum, Israel had repaid \$ 370.3 million which left a net total of \$ 784.<sup>21</sup> This figure does not include military assistance which is classified. Israel, therefore, ranked twenty-third in the list of recipients of U.S. aid; this figure is, of course, deceptive since the classified military aid Israel received was substantial and if the overall figure is taken into account Israel's ranking among U.S. aid recipients would be much higher. For example, in 1969, classified military aid totalled \$ 432.4 million of which the largest single

---

(20) *Ibid.*, November 5, 1963, 21089.

(21) *National Diplomacy*, p. 26.



TABLE II

U.S. Aid Recipients - Economic and Military  
(in millions \$) 1945 - 1968\*

	Net Total		Net Total
1. U. K.	7,590.7	14. Yugoslavia	2,577.9
2. France	7,014.3	15. Netherlands	2,050.5
3. India	6,971.9	16. Iran	1,923.1
4. Korea	7,438.2	17. Spain	1,902.7
5. Italy	5,324.9	18. Philippines	1,782.4
6. Vietnam	5,483.0	19. Belg. - Lux.	1,747.5
7. Turkey	5,194.9	20. Chile	1,282.3
8. Nat'l China	4,941.4	21. Austria	1,106.0*
9. W. Germany	3,543.7	22. Thailand	1,104.0
10. Japan	3,498.5	23. Israel	784.7*
11. Greece	3,624.2	24. Mexico	550.6
12. Brazil	2,664.5	25. Colombia	822.5
13. Pakistan	3,404.0	26. UAR	900.9a

\* Does not include classified military aid  
the UAR received only economic aid.

(1) *National Diplomacy 1965-1970* (Congressional Quarterly: May 1970), Table III, Source: A.I.D., p. 23.

amount was for equipment which went to Israel. In December 1968, Israel was slated to receive 50 Phantom jet fighters at an estimated cost of \$ 200 million; this then accounts for one half of total U.S. classified military aid for one year.<sup>22</sup>

In the spring of 1960 it was revealed that Israel had been receiving what was termed « modest amounts » of U.S. military equipment. This announcement was necessitated after the Israelis displayed U.S. military equip-

(22) *Ibid.*,

ment during their independence day parade. Following this public demonstration, the State Department and the Department of Defense were forced to admit that an arms deal had been concluded secretly.<sup>23</sup> This, of course, placed further strain on the credibility of U.S. neutrality in the Middle East.

In what was a major policy shift in 1962, the U.S., under Kennedy's leadership, publicly agreed to supply Israel with Hawk ground-to-air missiles. This deal was concluded after Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, met with Golda Meir who was then Israeli Foreign Minister. Senator Javits lauded the decision during a trip to Israel where he indicated that the Hawk sale was only the beginning of a «U.S. reappraisal of Israel's defense needs.»<sup>24</sup> Following this trip, Javits renewed his requests for a United States-Israeli mutual defense pact. He recommended dropping all aid to Egypt and replacing it with increased arms sales to Israel. Javits contended that Israel was «a dependable and effective ally of the free world in the Middle East — one of the very few there. No one can say as much for the United Arab Republic.»<sup>25</sup>

Keating reiterated Javit's points by comparing Israel to Berlin as a major U.S. overseas interest.

It is the task of all of us to do what we can to stimulate our government to view the plight of Israel with the same alarm that they apparently regard the situation in Laos or the problem of Berlin.<sup>26</sup>

Both Keating and Javits urged President Kennedy to reaffirm U.S. declarations supporting Israel. Pastore, from Rhode Island, Case of New Jersey, and Gruening of

---

(23) *New York Times*, May 4, 1960.

(24) *Ibid.*, December 29, 1962.

(25) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, April 30, 1963, 7339.

(26) *Ibid.*, 7340.

Alaska, the latter having visited the Middle East in 1962 and being a well known critic of President Nasser, all reaffirmed this stand. Senators Scott, Morse, and Humphrey joined in the debate. They were concerned about the arms build-up in the Middle East, but tried to defend the Administration's policy of maintaining an appearance of neutrality. Speaking for the Administration, Humphrey opposed further arms sales to Middle Eastern countries. He urged the Soviet Union and the U.S. to cooperate in trying to obtain a peaceful settlement to the conflict; he also asked that the United Nations attempt to develop some acceptable means of compromise. To substantiate the Administration's claims of neutrality, Humphrey even praised President Nasser as a « dedicated, able, intelligent»<sup>27</sup> leader. This was clearly the Administration's point of view at that time and not one that Humphrey personally expressed in his political campaigning. Early in Kennedy's presidency, the Administration made a serious attempt to improve relations with President Nasser as the leading Arab statesman who, if the Arabs were ever to unify, was the only leader capable of providing stable government. In the meantime, however, the Kennedy Administration continued to sell arms to Israel. Indeed the Administration never wavered from full support of Israel. But, in spite of its obvious commitment to Israel, some of the more vociferous pro-Zionist Congressmen, like Jacob Javits, interpreted the attempts to improve relations with Egypt as a direct threat to Israel.

In 1963 Zionist Congressmen again marshalled their forces to push for a collective defense agreement with Israel. Representative Roosevelt and Senator Javits introduced a joint resolution in both Houses of Congress.

---

(27) *Ibid.*

Seymour Halpern, a Republican from New York who subsequently became a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, amended the foreign aid bill so that any government which received military equipment from the Sino-Soviet block could not receive U.S. foreign aid. This was an obvious attempt to put an end to aid to Egypt.

On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of Israel's birth, Zionist Congressmen made laudatory speeches on development in Israel and described in glowing terms the beneficial effects of U.S.-Israeli cooperation. Senators Keating, Thomas Dodd and Robert Kennedy joined in the pro-Zionist demonstration.<sup>28</sup> It was customary for Congressmen to read into the official Congressional Record speeches or statements which they had made at various Zionist fund raising dinners, or on the occasion of various Israeli holidays, providing still further opportunities for the airing of the Israeli point of view, on the floor of the House and the Senate and in verbatim records of Congressional debates.

As tensions increased in the Middle East during 1965 and 1966, Congress began calling for decreased aid to the Arab states and additional U.S. armaments for Israel. They insisted that the following conditions should be placed on Nasser before he receives any U.S. funds: (1) Egypt should not develop nuclear weapons and should submit to U.S. inspection of all nuclear projects to ensure that no violations would occur; (2) all Egyptian rocket production should cease and U.S. inspection should be permitted; (3) Egypt should freeze the size of its army.<sup>29</sup> Such conditions flagrantly infringed upon the sovereignty of Egypt and, not surprisingly, were flatly rejected

---

(28) *Ibid.*, April 25, 1963; April 30, 1963.

(29) *Ibid.*, House, August 10, 1956.

by President Nasser. No Congressman suggested that Israel should be bound by similar conditions although at the time these conditions were proposed, the Israelis were developing nuclear capabilities at Dimona and had refused to participate in the nuclear arms ban.

In the House, Roosevelt called for increased U.S. arms sales to Israel at discount prices and increased show of force in the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet.<sup>30</sup> Farbstain and others were in full accord with these demands. In 1965 Patton tanks were sold at lenient terms to Israel. Then in 1966 the U.S. concluded its first sale of aircraft to Israel. This deal included the sale of 48 A-4 Skyhawk fighter bombers which were to be delivered in 1968.<sup>31</sup> This deal placed further strains on the already precarious U.S. relationship with Egypt and other Arab states.

When the arms deal with Israel was concluded in February 1966, the Armed Services and Appropriation Committees were briefed but not the Foreign Relations Committee. The Department of Defense explained this omission on the basis that the deal was concluded for gold and therefore did not involve foreign aid.<sup>32</sup> This policy appears to have been adopted in order to avoid possible embarrassing questions from members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Undoubtedly, both Fulbright and Gore, both of whom had been critical of growing U.S. involvement in the Middle East, would have questioned the escalation of the arms race in the area. Then, too, the arms deal was likely to have brought up the issue of U.S. involvement in Viet Nam — a subject that the Department of Defense did not wish to discuss if it could be avoided. After the conclusion of the 1966

---

(30) *Ibid.*

(31) *New York Times*, May 21, 1966; *Christian Science Monitor*, January 31, 1970.

(32) *New York Times*, May 21, 1966.

U.S.-Israeli arms deal, Israel promptly requested more armaments. The Israeli leadership claimed that the «balance of power» in the Middle East had been upset by the continuous sale of Soviet arms to Egypt. The Israelis intensified this demand after the U.S. sold 36 F-104 Starfighter jets to Jordan in 1965.<sup>33</sup> These aircraft were to be delivered in 1968. This particular arms deal underlined the Administration's desire to maintain the support of pro-Western Arab governments which could be trusted not to turn the arms against Israel. Arming these governments was seen as a means to limit Soviet influence and the proliferation of nationalist-reformist governments in the Arab world.

During the months prior to the 1967 war, many Congressmen openly expressed their sympathy for Israel and demanded complete U.S. alliance with it. Senator Edward Brooke, a Black Senator from Massachusetts visited Israel in May; upon his return he expressed his support for Israel and its accomplishments. Javits congratulated him on his tour and called for increased U.S. diplomatic activity with the objective of resettling the Palestinian displaced persons in the Arab countries.<sup>34</sup>

As the situation in the Middle East deteriorated after the Israeli raid on the Jordanian village of Samu' in November 1966, Congress became increasingly concerned. The withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force caused dismay in Congress. Congressmen praised President Johnson's May 23 statement in which he reiterated U.S. support of Israel, non-recognition of boundary alterations secured through armed aggression, and support of the Strait of Tiran as an international waterway. The

---

(33) *National Diplomacy*, p. 47.

(34) U.S., *Congressional Record*, House, May 19, 1967.

U.S. government viewed any blockade of the Strait as a move against peace in the area.<sup>35</sup> The use of the Strait of Tiran for shipping was the main gain Israel had made in the 1956 fighting against Egypt; her leaders had publicly announced that any blockade of the waterway would be *causus belli*.<sup>36</sup> In a joint statement on May 25, forty-one Senators and Representatives endorsed Johnson's statement and his stand on the blockade of the Strait of Tiran. Signatories to the resolution included : Edward Brooke, Robert Kennedy, Edmond Muskie, William Hart, and Walter Mondale. All of these men had previously expressed their support for Israel.

The Johnson statement constituted public recognition of the U.S. commitment to Israel and served notice that the U.S. was not prepared to recognise or accept any changes in the status quo or alterations of existing boundaries as a result of armed conflict. Egypt and the other Arab states had, of course, never recognised the Strait of Tiran as an international waterway; they contended that Israel had only gained the use of the Strait as a result of the 1956 Tripartite Aggression of which Israel had been a participant. While the U.S. government was prepared to reject territorial changes resulting from possible Arab aggression, it was not adverse to accepting such changes which might result from possible Israeli aggression. Ironically, the May 23 statement was meant to forestall Arab aggression and to protect Israeli interests. After Israel had won the 1967 war and had occupied large segments of Arab territory, the statement was interpreted quite differently. Indeed, then the U.S. government was forced to minimise the statement's importance.

---

(35) *Ibid.*, May 24, 1967; *New York Times*, May 24, 1967.

(36) Moshe Dayan. *Diary of the Sinai Campaign*. (New York: Schocken, 1967).

When war finally broke out, Congressmen were outspoken in the criticism of Arab leaders, particularly Nasser, and laudatory of the Israelis. Farbstein stressed that «it should be remembered that Israel represents the American presence in the Middle East.»<sup>37</sup> Halpern remarked that « Israel seeks only to live in security and peace, and in cooperation with her neighbors. »<sup>38</sup> Israel was pictured as a small, democratic state surrounded by hostile enemies who were intent upon the destruction of the one Western, democratic state in the Middle East.<sup>39</sup> Once Israel's victory was assured, Congressmen congratulated the state and its leaders. Representative Gallagher praised Israel as the saviour of the free world in the Middle East.

When one considers the dangers of World War III posed by Nasser, the dilemma in which not only the U.S. was in, but the entire world on the waterway issue alone, I think it can be quickly understood that the free world owes a great debt to Israel.<sup>40</sup>

Gallagher had returned from representing the U.S. at the opening of the Israeli Knesset prior to making this speech. Representative Gerald Ford, a Republican from Michigan and House Minority leader who is well-known for his support of Zionism, suggested that the U.S. give Israel a destroyer to replace the *Eilat* sunk by Egyptian missiles because Israel had furthered U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Congressmen also supported Israeli policies regarding the terms of a settlement. For example, Halpern outlined the terms of a future settlement in the following manner.

---

(37) U.S., *Congressional Record*, House, June 5, 1967, 14580.

(38) *Ibid.*, June 15, 1967, 15951.

(39) *Ibid.*, See debates on Middle East throughout June 1967.

(40) *Ibid.*, House, June 8, 1967, 15169.



1. That the Suez be open to Israeli shipping.
2. That the Strait of Tiran and Aqaba be international waterways.
3. That the Gaza Strip be under U.N. administration.
4. That there be a satisfactory resolution of all boundary issues.
5. That Jerusalem be part of Israel.
6. That the hills of Syria and Jordan be within Israeli territory.<sup>41</sup>

Halpern also advocated that the U.S. provide broad economic aid to Israel; in passing he noted that if the Arabs wanted peace, the U.S. could then consider providing aid to them as well.

Senator Gruening branded the Arabs as the aggressors in the 1967 war and stressed the fact that nothing could be gained by forcing Israel to give up what she had won.<sup>42</sup> At a later time, Gruening criticised the U.S. because «when the time came for the U.S. to face up to its very real commitments to Israel, in an area of the world where, unlike Southeast Asia, its vital interests were very much involved, it vacillated.»<sup>43</sup> Since 1967 Gruening has continued to make extremely partisan remarks in favour of Israel.

Congressmen neither took into account the legitimacy of the Palestinian case, the Arab position as victims of naked Israeli aggression; nor did they criticise Israel for its refusal to give up the occupied territories. The conquest of Arab territories by Israel was seen as favourable to U.S. interests in the area and was not viewed by most Congressmen as the capture of territory through aggression.

Frank Church, a Democratic Senator from Idaho

---

(41) *Ibid.*, June 15, 1967.

(42) *Ibid.*, Senate, June 27, 1967, 17429.

(43) *Ibid.*, August 10, 1967, 22141.

who was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, provided a more impartial and realistic appraisal of the Middle East conflict. Church, noted for his « dovish » views on Viet Nam, called for a halt to the arms race in the Middle East; he wanted to implement a strict embargo on the sales of arms in the area. He noted that in the past seventeen years the U.S. had provided foreign governments with \$ 8 billion in military vehicles, \$ 7 billion in aircraft, \$ 5 billion in ammunition, \$ 2 billion in communications equipment, \$ 1.5 billion in missiles, and \$ 3 billion in miscellaneous material, amounting to some \$ 37 billion of U.S. military equipment provided to foreign governments.<sup>44</sup> Much of this equipment had, in fact, been purchased by or given to Middle Eastern governments. However, Church's plea for a limitation on arms to the Middle East went largely unheeded.

By the middle of July, scarcely one month after its tremendous military victory, Israel was again requesting more arms from the U.S. These arms were to renew the balance of power which had supposedly been upset by the 1967 war and the continuing Soviet arms shipments to Egypt. Owing to the war, the U.S. had imposed an arms embargo on all sales to the Middle East. Israel's problem of securing additional armaments was complicated by French President Charles de Gaulle's announcement prior to the 1967 fighting that France would not sell arms to any aggressor in the Middle East. After Israel struck the first blows in the 1967 war, de Gaulle labelled it as the aggressor and refused to sell any armaments to the Israeli government. Israel was then forced to find a replacement for its major arms supplier. The U.S. appeared to be the most logical and likely choice.

Many Congressmen favoured granting additional

---

(44) *Ibid.*, June 26, 1967.

armament sales to Israel. Celler spoke against the French arms embargo. Rather poetically he announced that «the flame of democracy burns brightly in Israel and wherever that flame of democracy burns, we must nurture it.»<sup>45</sup> Later, Representative Charles Wilson of California urged the U.S. to reverse its policy and sell arms to Israel. Having just returned from a tour of Israel, Wilson criticised what he considered was a two-faced policy pursued by the U.S. in the Middle East; he also accused the State Department and the CIA of engaging in pro-Arab activities.<sup>46</sup>

When the issue of further sales of arms to Israel became public, government policy makers faced a realignment of some Congressmen because of growing opposition to the Viet Nam war. The Viet Nam war caused more and more Congressmen to question the efficacy of continued and increased U.S. military sales or aid to «trouble spots» throughout the world. The so-called «doves» in Congress hesitated to support additional arms deals with nations involved in international conflicts; they feared that such deals provided possible openings for further U.S. military involvement, for new Viet Nam situations. A number of these «dovish» Congressmen were long-time Zionist supporters. These Congressmen faced the dilemma of advocating decreased U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and increased U.S. involvement in the Middle East in support of Israel. The Johnson Administration sought to manipulate these sentiments by accentuating the fact that budget cuts for defense spending would affect Israel as well as appropriations for U.S. involvement in Viet Nam. In this manner, the Administration attempted to sustain support

---

(45) *Ibid.*, House, August 24, 1967, 23970.

(46) *Ibid.*, October 4, 1967.

for its Vietnam policies by threatening to decrease military sales and aid to Israel. Congressmen countered these arguments — not by maintaining that the U.S. should not become involved militarily in the Middle East — but by stressing that alternative channels existed through which Israel could be kept supplied with U.S. arms. Stuart Symington reported that while he favoured the abolition of the Department of Defense's \$ 383 million revolving arms sales credit fund, the abolition of that fund need not endanger arms to Israel. There were a number of alternative programmes under which such arms could be supplied. These programmes included the Foreign Assistance Act, and, specifically, Section 507, whereby \$ 475 million could be provided from Department of Defense stocks. The President could also grant up to \$ 250 million outright, or up to \$ 300 million to any nation which under Section 510 of the Foreign Assistance Act was considered to involve the strategic interests of the U.S. Because Israel's credit was good, it could also go to the World Bank or a number of other organisations for long-term, low-interest loans.<sup>47</sup>

After a long debate, the Senate voted to abolish the Department of Defense revolving fund; this vote was interpreted as a victory for the «doves» on Viet Nam, many of whom were the «hawks» regarding the Middle East. They only supported decreased U.S. spending in Viet Nam after they were assured of continued U.S. arms supplies to Israel through other channels. In the course of these debates, many Congressmen demonstrated that they were beginning to question, in general, U.S. policy regarding arms sales. Such questioning was particularly pointed with respect to U.S. activities in Southeast Asia, but, to a lesser extent, was also directed toward similar

---

(47) *Ibid.*, Senate, July 31, 1967.

activities in the Middle East. Senator John Tower from Texas emphasised the true meaning of arms deals when he spoke about the various U.S. armament agreements around the world. On this occasion he remarked:

... that arms policy is in fact an instrument of foreign policy, and the military sales program is an accurate reflection of considered agreement at the highest levels of authority.

The Defense Department does not respond independently to arms purchase requests from countries of the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa and other underdeveloped areas. These requests are subject to intensive review and debate within the executive branch. Usually, serious efforts are made to reduce them in quantitative or qualitative terms. Non-U.S. alternative sources of supply are often sought for foreign policy reasons, and a sale is made only following a considered conclusion that, balance of payments considerations aside, U.S. interests could be safeguarded.<sup>48</sup>

Ironically, Tower was echoing what the Arab governments had been saying whenever an arms deal with Israel had been concluded: it is, in fact, impossible to dissassociate foreign policy from the sale of or giving of armaments to other nations; one merely reflects the other.

Acting on this principle, the U.S. steadily increased the amount of its sales of military equipment to Israel after 1967. (See Tables III and IV on nex page). The U.S. is now the primary arms supplier to Israel. In August 1967, Israel asked for more than \$ 150 million in aircraft, notably Phantom fighter-bombers valued at \$ 3-4 million each and Skyhawk fighter-bombers valued at \$ 1 million each.<sup>49</sup> These requests were greeted favourably by numerous Congressmen. These Congressmen also demanded the delivery of arms which had already been

---

(48) *Ibid.*, August 9, 1967, 22091.

(49) *New York Times*, February 7, 1970.

purchased but which had been detained because of the arms embargo. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir visited the U.S. in September, 1968, in order to hasten the decision to lift the embargo. Under an arms agreement of 1966, then enlarged, the U.S. agreed to deliver Skyhawks to Israel. In October, 48 Skyhawk jets, and some other military equipment, were provided to Israel.

Also in September, the House passed H.R. 17123, an Armed Services Procurement Authorisation which allocated \$ 19.929 billion for military expenditures in 1971. In Title V, Section 501 the bill reads:

... In order to restore and maintain the military balance in the Middle East, by furnishing to Israel the means of providing for its own security, the President is authorized to transfer to Israel, by sale, credit sale, or guaranty, such aircraft, and equipment appropriate to use, maintain, and protect such aircraft, as may be necessary to counteract any past, present, or future increased military assistance provided to other countries in the Middle East.<sup>50</sup>

**TABLE III**  
U.S. Foreign Military Sales (in millions \$)\*

	1962-68	1969
Europe and N. America	8,092.3	841.0
Latin America	269.0	51.4
Near East & S. Asia	668.6	219.7
Africa	113.7	17.0
E. Asia & Pacific	1,413.2	173.4
Other	1.7	99.7
Classified	974.2	432.4

(\*) *National Diplomacy*, Table VII, Source: Department of Defense, p. 26.

---

(50) U.S., *Congressional Record*, House, September 28, 1970, 9321.

TABLE IV  
Total U.S. Aid to Israel\*

	Total
Military Aid 1948-1967	\$2-3 billion
Military Aid 1970	\$250-\$300 million
Economic Aid 1948-1967	\$1.1 billion
Purchases of Israeli bonds	\$ 1 billion
Private Gifts	\$ 1 billion
	<hr/> 5,350,000,000-6,400,000,000

\* Figures from: *Christian Science Monitor*, January 31, 1970; February 7, 1970; George Lenczowski (ed.) *United States Interests in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1968).

---

This then, gives the President almost a *carte blanche* to provide armaments to Israel for an indefinite period of time in the future. This section of the bill, known as the Jackson amendment, gave the President an open-ended authority to transfer military equipment to Israel without any cost limitations. This was, of course, a provision quite similar to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which had provided for large-scale U.S. military involvement in Viet Nam. Senator Henry Jackson, in 1972 a candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, who introduced the section into the bill, is from Washington State which depends rather heavily upon defense industries, particularly aircraft manufacturing. Jackson is an outspoken supporter of Zionism. Regarding this bill, John McCormack, Speaker of the House and no critic of Zionism himself, expressed surprise that so open ended an arrangement should have been made:

... Not only does it (H.R. 17123) provide the authority

for our country through the President to take necessary steps in relation to Israel, but note this language.... I have never seen, in my 42 years as a Member of this body, language of this kind used in an authorization bill or in an appropriation bill...<sup>51</sup>

However, doubts over the wisdom of such actions were brushed aside. U.S. provision of armaments to Israel continued steadily. In October, President Johnson told Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to open negotiations for the sale of Phantoms to Israel. The Administration announced its decision to sell 50 Phantom F-4 jets, an advanced U.S. fighter-bomber, to Israel in December. Delivery of the first 16 planes was to be in September 1969, and four planes were to be delivered every month thereafter. Congress approved this decision with Fulbright only voicing doubts about it.

Under the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (PL90-629) Israel was one of seven countries exempt from restrictions on the extension of credit for purchase of « sophisticated weapons.»<sup>52</sup> Other nations which were exempted were Greece, Iran, Turkey, South Korea, Phillipines, and Nationalist China. In the second Session of the 91st Congress, the House extended the Act through 1972 (HR 15628-H). Through this action, armaments were to be made available to Israel for its national security needs.<sup>53</sup> Through such extraordinary measures — sometimes covert, sometimes overt, the U.S. was able to provide Israel with \$ 2 to \$ 3 billion of military equipment from 1948 to 1967.<sup>54</sup>

Following the inauguration of the Nixon Administra-

---

(51) *Ibid.*, September 29, 1970, 9345-46.

(52) *National Diplomacy*, p. 47.

(53) *Ibid.*

(54) *Christian Science Monitor*, January 31, 1970; February 7, 1970.



tion, which had originally seemed less open to Zionist pressures, Israel submitted requests for more armaments. In a press conference on January 31, 1970, Nixon stated:

We are neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel. We are pro-peace. We are for security for all nations in that area. So when we look at this situation, we will consider the Israeli arms requests based on the threats to them from states in the area and we will honor those requests...<sup>55</sup>

Nixon was clearly leaving the door open for further U.S. armament sales to Israel. Israeli requests for armaments were coupled with Congressional letters and statements urging Nixon to agree to sell arms. Stuart Symington spoke for the sale of arms. Lester Wolff, a Democratic Representative from New York, in February, soon after Nixon's inauguration, introduced a resolution for the sale of Skyhawks and Phantoms to Israel. This resolution was co-sponsored by 24 Representatives<sup>56</sup>. Several of these signatories were known for their «dovish» views on the Viet Nam issue. In June 1970, seventy-six Senators including George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic Presidential candidate, Hughes, Goodell, Cranston, Hart, Eagleton, and Young signed an open letter to Nixon urging the sale of arms to Israel. Both McGovern and Goodell were opposed to U.S. involvement in Viet Nam; in fact, the Republican party later campaigned in New York against Goodell because of his views on Viet Nam. He was defeated in his race for re-election. The June letter hinted that a confrontation similar to the Cuban missile crisis might occur in the Middle East. Such a crisis, it said, would, of course, be caused by increased Soviet presence in the area.<sup>57</sup>

---

(55) *New York Times*, January 31, 1970.

(56) *National Diplomacy*, February 18, 1970, (H Con Res 91-511), p. 47.

(57) *New York Times*, June 2, 1970.

Two diametrically opposed views on the sales of armaments to Israel were publicised on March 8. Appearing on «Face the Nation,» Senator Mike Mansfield spoke in favour of the sale of U.S. arms to Israel; and Senator William Fulbright appearing on «Meet the Press» the same day, spoke against such sales.<sup>58</sup>

At the same time, Congressmen tended to be highly critical of France's sale of armaments to Libya. In an open letter signed by Canon, Fong, Goodell, Ribicoff, Schweiker, Young of Ohio, and forty Representatives, they called on French President Pompidou to cancel the agreement with Libya.<sup>59</sup> This caused some official reaction as Pompidou was making a tour of the U.S. and met with several hostile public reactions owing to France's Middle East Policy since 1967.

There were, however, moves within the Senate to limit the amount of U.S. aid to Israel. In November 1970, Nixon sent the Senate his requests for economic assistance for foreign nations. Requests for allocations were included for South Korea, \$ 150 million; South Viet Nam \$ 65 million; Jordan, \$ 30 million; Lebanon, \$ 500 million. Other nations were included on the list, but the amount for Israel was by far the largest sum. Senator John Williams of Delaware and member of the Foreign Relations Committee proposed an amendment to present the President from sending U.S. troops to Israel without Congressional permission just as he was restricted from sending troops to Cambodia:

In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat

---

(58) *National Diplomacy*, pp. 47-48.

(59) *Ibid.*

troops into Cambodia or Israel or provide United States advisors to or for Cambodian or Israeli military forces in Cambodia or Israel.... Military and economic assistance provided by the United States to Cambodia or Israel and authorised or appropriated pursuant to this or any other act shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia or Israel for its defense.<sup>60</sup>

The Williams amendment was supported by Hatfield, Mansfield, Church, and Fulbright, but was tabled (defeated in procedure) in the Senate by a vote of 60 to 20. Among those voting in favour of considering the amendment were Senators Bennett, Burdick, Cotton, Curtis, Dole, Ervin, Fannin, Fulbright, Gravel, Gurney, Hansen, Hruska, Jordan, Mansfield, McClellan, Metcalf, Miller, Saxbe, Williams of Delaware, and Young of North Dakota. Twenty Senators also abstained from voting.<sup>61</sup>

Although U.S. opinion polls showed that American voters did not favour increased U.S. involvement in the Middle East, Congressmen continued to press for further arms sale to Israel. A poll in *Time Magazine* revealed that any U.S. military intervention in Jordan during the September, 1970, crisis would have caused reactions in the U.S. which «would have been overwhelmingly adverse.»<sup>62</sup> In two Congressional polls conducted in Illinois, only a minority favoured the sale of armaments to Israel. Questioned on whether the U.S. should intervene with military force if Israel were threatened, 10,655 responded negatively, 1,294 had no opinion, and 2,793 replied affirmatively.<sup>63</sup> In spite of such polls, Senator Percy of Illinois remained one of the most vehement supporters of Israel. A California poll revealed that 17

---

(60) U.S., *Congressional Record*, Senate, December 15, 1970, 20184-5.

(61) *Ibid.*

(62) *Time*, October 5, 1970, p. 14.

(63) U.S., *Congressional Record*, September 17, 21, 1970.

per cent favoured the sale of aircraft to Israel, 23.9 per cent wanted to stop all arms sales in the area; 29.5 per cent wanted a joint U.S. - Soviet peace settlement and 29.4 percent were for direct Israeli-Arab negotiations.<sup>64</sup> A later poll conducted in New Jersey indicated that 25.9 percent wanted the U.S. to negotiate a settlement, 25.5 per cent wanted to work through the United Nations, 22.8 per cent wished to remain outside the conflict, only 11.5 per cent wanted to continue military aid to Israel, 9.8 per cent wanted to continue non-military support to Israel, 9.8 per cent were neutral, and 1 per cent had no opinion.<sup>65</sup> These polls clearly show that most U.S. citizens favoured an imposed multilateral settlement.

The Rogers Plan was an obvious attempt to implement such an imposed settlement. The Plan was criticised in the Senate as «undermining Israeli interests.» The campaign to discredit the Rogers Plan was led by Javits and Jackson. It was supported by Ribicoff and Scott. Prior to the attack, all of these Senators had met with Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, who was visiting the U.S. at the time. Fulbright and Aiken defended the Rogers Plan against these attacks. Fulbright's exchange with Javits over this issue grew quite heated and Javits finally accused Fulbright of presenting a one-sided position. Fulbright retorted that he hoped the issue would be debated logically and without an excessive amount of emotion.<sup>66</sup> The pro-Zionist reaction to the Rogers Plan typified the approach of these Congressmen who consistently adopted precisely the same policies as the Israeli government. Since Israel had called for direct negotiations for a peace settlement, these Congressmen were

---

(64) *Ibid.*, November 23, 1970.

(65) *Ibid.*, December 12, 1970.

(66) *New York Times*, March 24, 1971.

against attempts to impose a settlement even when such attempts were initiated by the U.S. government.

In August 1971, four Republican and six Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged Secretary of State William Rogers to give more consideration to Israel's request for \$200 million in assistance to meet defense requirements. These Senators included, Republicans Clifford Case of New Jersey, Jacob Javits of New York, James Pearson of Kansas, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, and Democrats Gale McGee of Wyoming, Edmund Muskie of Maine, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, John Sparkman of Alabama, William Spong of Virginia, and Stuart Symington of Missouri.<sup>67</sup> Javits, Scott, and Symington had spoken frequently in support of Israel in the past, and Muskie was a Democratic hopeful for President. Members of the Foreign Relations Committee who did not support this statement included: Fulbright, the Committee Chairman, Mansfield, Church, Mundt a Republican from South Dakota, John Cooper, a Republican from Kentucky, and Aiken. Most of these Senators had previously been skeptical over U.S. policies in the Middle East and its support for Israel. Many of these Senators had also expressed opposition to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and undoubtedly feared a similar development in the Middle East. Thus the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is rather polarised on this issue.

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, likewise, has some well known pro-Zionist members. These include Lester Wolff, Seymour Halpern, Benjamin Rosenthal, and Gallagher from New Jersey. All of these Representatives and from districts with a substantial number of Jewish

---

(67) *The Jewish News* (Michigan), August 13, 1971.

constituents with pro-Zionist views. Members of the Near East Subcommittee include: L. Fountain, Democrat from North Carolina and Chairman of the subcommittee; William Murphy, Democrat from Illinois; John Monagan, Democrat from Connecticut; Lester Wolff, Democrat from New York; Peter Frelinghuysen, Republican from New Jersey; H. Gross, Republican from Iowa; John Buchanan, Republican from Alabama; and Sherman Lloyd, Republican from Utah. Monagan has visited both the Arab states and Israel; but has been reluctant to speak publicly on the conflict. Ronald Dellums, a Black liberal from California is new on the Foreign Affairs Committee and has come out against arms sales to Israel. While there are some Representatives and Senators who have spoken out against U.S. support for Israel, by far the more vociferous members are the pro-Zionists. These are the same Congressmen who have spoken against continuing or increasing U.S. assistance to the Palestinians.

In 20 years the U.S. has moved from a position of declared non-involvement in the arms race in the Middle East to being the major supplier of armaments to Israel. This alteration of traditional U.S. neutrality was inherent in the attitudes held by both Presidential administrations and Congress since 1922. Indeed, the change has been greeted favourably by the majority of Congressmen who view Israeli interests as being identical to U.S. interests. The Nixon Administration's attempt to impose an outside settlement, while continuing to supply armaments for Israel, was merely a tactic to obscure the extent of the U.S. commitment to the military predominance of Israel in the Middle East.

## CONCLUSIONS

An investigation of Congressional attitudes on the Middle East reveals a high correlation between Congressmen who were critical of UNRWA programs and U.S. aid, but who took strongly pro-Zionist stands by advocating increased U.S. military aid and arms sales to Israel, (see Table V). These Congressmen dearly understood that the continued homelessness of the Palestinians complicated — if not totally blocked — a solution to the Middle East conflict. While the «refugees» remained, the existence of Israel as a purely Zionist state was always open to question. Pro-Zionist Congressmen, therefore, desired to see the refugees disappear as a separate, recognisable group. So long as the refugee camps, and the misery and poverty of the camps, remained evident, the issue of the Palestinians would be brought up annually in the United Nations and before Congress. This, then, kept the issue of the displaced persons and their conditions before the public. Pro-Zionist Congressmen believed that if the Palestinians were integrated into another society, Israel would no longer have to fear the return of the people who would threaten Israeli institutions and the Jewish character of Israel. Also, Congressmen hoped that once the Palestinian issue was settled, the Arab governments would become more willing to accept Israel.

Simultaneously, these Congressmen wished Israel to remain as strong as possible through the continued, sustained military support of the U.S. These views led

TABLE V — Attitudes of Congressmen Who Have Spoken Frequently on Middle East Issues

SENATORS	For Arms Sales	Against or Doubtful on Arms Sales	Sympathy to refugees Aid to UNRWA	Against Aid Critical of UNRWA
George Aiken (R)		X	X	
Frank Church (D)		X	X	
J. William Fulbright (D)		X	X	
Mark Hatfield (R)		X	X	
Philip Hart (D)	X		X	X
Henry Jackson (D)	X			X
Jacob Javits (R)	X			X
Mike Mansfield (D)		wavers	X	
Edmund Muskie (D)	X			
Abraham Ribicoff (D)	X			
Hugh Scott (D)	X			
Stuart Symington (D)	X			
REPRESENTATIVES				
Emanuel Celler (D)	X			X
Ronald Dellums (D)		X		
Leonard Farbstein (D)	X			X
Gerald Ford (R)	X			X
Cornelius Gallagher (D)	X			X
Seymour Halpern (R)	X			X
Abraham Multer (D)	X			X
Lester Wolff (D)	x			x



pro-Zionist Congressmen like Javits, Ribicoff, Celler, Humphrey, and Judd to search continually for methods to diminish U.S. aid to UNRWA while increasing U.S. sales of military equipment to Israel. They wanted to remove the Palestinian displaced person as a basic component to the conflict, and to increase U.S. military involvement with Israel. They frequently stressed the value of a military treaty of alliance between the U.S. and Israel; such a treaty would ensure U.S. interests and the continued existence of Israel. The claim that Israel represents and protects U.S. interests in the Middle East was designed by supporters of Israel to make it appear that the Palestine problem is an East-West issue involving U.S. strategic interests and planning.

The Congressmen who held these views were highly vocal and well organised. They put forth these opinions with intelligence and fervour to their fellow Congressmen, many of whom had little if any direct knowledge or interest in the Middle East. Owing to the general lack of knowledge concerning the nature of the Palestine question, and the relative success of the pro-Zionist Congressional groups to publicise their views, the stance of Congress has historically tended to approximate closely Zionist policies.

In general, these policies consistently advocated forcing the Palestinians to resettle within the Arab world. By and large, Congressmen believed that the «refugees» could be coerced into resettling by providing them with jobs, land, or better living standards outside the camps. But when they were not resettled, Congressmen placed the blame upon Arab leaders who were depicted as using the Palestinians for their own personal gains; such Congressmen refused to recognise that the problem of the «refugees» was considerably more complex than most

of them believed. However, Congress was not fully informed as to the true nature of the conflict or the rights of the Palestinians. Even those Congressmen, such as Fulbright or Gore, who expressed sympathy for the displaced Palestinians on humanitarian grounds, did not stress the grievances or goals of the Palestinians themselves. Nor did Congress place much reliance on the information these Congressmen occasionally supplied.

On the other hand, the Israeli views on the «refugee issue,» and on many other issues, were publicised regularly. Because of this, the debates in Congress centered around the possibilities of the resettlement of the Palestinians. Occasionally, Israel was urged to take back a portion of the displaced persons or to offer compensation, but these demands were repudiated by pro-Zionist Congressmen, who were willing to consider such possibilities only within the context of an overall peace settlement.

Thus, numerous schemes, most notably the Johnston Plan, were devised and supported as means to settle the Palestinians outside of Israel. Congressmen felt that if the amount of cultivated land within the Arab states was increased, the Palestinians could easily be resettled on it. Ironically, Israel opposed most of these plans because they appeared to limit possible financial assistance or resources that Israel might otherwise receive. The latter was particularly relevant in the case of the distribution of water from the Jordan River. Secondly, Israel feared that the Arab states might benefit unduly from these plans and would eventually turn those benefits against Israel. Other Congressmen suggested education or other rehabilitation programs whereby the dispossessed Palestinians could improve their skills and find work in Arab states. When all of these schemes failed to produce

the desired results — namely the resettlement of the «refugees» — it was suggested that they be permitted, or even encouraged, to settle outside the Middle East. This suggestion, especially when the U.S. was mentioned as a nation which could easily allow the settlement of Palestinians, was coldly received in Congressional circles. Periodically, it was also proposed that the U.S. attempt to force resettlement by threatening to cut off its financial aid to UNRWA or to the various Arab governments which received U.S. foreign aid. These suggestions were not pragmatic if the U.S. wished to maintain its relationships with Arab governments, particularly the pro-Western Jordanian monarchy which ruled the territory upon which the majority of the Palestinians lived. Nor were such suggestions acceptable on humanitarian grounds.

For these reasons, Congress agreed to the undesirable, but seemingly necessary, allocation of annual aid to UNRWA. They tried to keep these allocations as low as possible, while seeking to ensure that the Palestinians remained apolitical. Any mention that the they were joining commando organisations or other political groups brought forth loud cries for the cessation of aid or investigations into the uses of UNRWA funds.

Many of these pro-Zionist Senators and Representatives were committed to Israel through religious or cultural ties. They opposed U.S. policies which might be detrimental to Israel, and whenever possible, sought to align the U.S. with Israel. Their allegiance to Israel was largely emotional, but while their sentiments were sometimes expressed in flowery prose, these Congressmen were careful to emphasise that aiding Israel was in the best interests of the U.S. The pro-Zionist Congressmen recognised that mere emotional support for the Jews, although strong following the holocaust in Nazi domina-

ted Europe, was not adequate to sustain long term Congressional or executive support for a Zionist state in the Middle East. Rather, U.S. support for Israel had to be based upon pragmatic political, military, and economic considerations. Care was taken to depict Israel as a reliable bastion of pro-Western and pro-U.S. interests. During the height of the Cold War under the Eisenhower Administration, Israel was constantly described as a deterrent to possible Soviet expansion in the Middle East. The strength and efficiency of its army was emphasised. Pro-Zionist attitudes among Congressmen were based not only on emotional commitments, but were sometimes caused by pressure groups within a given Congressmen's constituency or upon other political considerations such as large donations from dominant economic groups in a state or district. Thus, commitment to Israel cut across political party lines and across geographic areas.

Initially, there was a small group of mainly Southern Congressmen who had supported continued U.S. alliances with the Arab governments. They felt that the U.S. relationship with Israel would alienate the Arabs and cause them to turn to the Soviet bloc. As attempts, such as the Baghdad Pact, to bring the Arab governments into the pro-Western orbit failed, and as neutralism was increasingly viewed as a negative, anti-Western force, these Congressmen began to reconsider their positions. These Congressmen all began to support Israel after Nasser emerged as the politically dominant force in the Arab world. Fearful of Nasser's increasing cooperation with the Soviet bloc, the Southern Congressmen became advocates of a strong, militarily well equipped Israel. Israel was to defend U.S. interests in the Middle East when the various Arab governments could no longer be trusted to adopt a consistently pro-U.S. stand. At the same time, Congress was anxious to prevent the spread

of Arab nationalist-reformist governments, such as that of President Nasser, which threatened to nationalise U.S. companies and which adopted positions threatening to U.S. economic or political interests.

Congressional attitudes were almost entirely hostile to President Nasser who was seen as the primary motivator of anti-U.S. policies in the Middle East. In order to deter possible expansion of Egypt's power throughout the Arab world, Israel and strongly pro-Western Arab governments received more and more shipments. In other words, while Arab nationalism, particularly as personified by Nasser, was seen as a threat to U.S. interests, Israeli nationalism was seen as closely connected to Western interests. United States support for Israel was, at least partially, motivated by a desire to keep Western influences in the Middle East and to prevent the proliferation of truly independent Arab governments.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that a number of Senators and Representatives who had particularly strong opinions on the Middle East were reelected time after time. Their longevity of service meant that they obtained important committee posts, or went on to higher positions within the government. Among the most noted pro-Zionist Congressmen with long periods of service are Celler, Javits, Humphrey, Wolff, and Scott. On the other side, Fulbright has served long enough in the Senate to become Chairman of the important Foreign Affairs Committee; from this position he can influence a number of other important individuals. His influence is clearly reflected in the positions of both Church and Aiken against arms to Israel and in support of improved programmes for the Palestinians. However, Fulbright's influence on the Foreign Affairs Committee may now be tempered by Javits' membership on the same Committee.

Finally, in the recent past, both the Johnson and Nixon administrations have attempted to bargain U.S. involvement in Viet Nam for U.S. support of Israel. These were attempts to co-opt some Congressional opposition to further U.S. involvement, militarily or financially, in Viet Nam by emphasising that decisions to decrease military appropriations might well effect the amount of military aid or arms sales to Israel. To some extent this tactic was successful. To counter it, Congressmen, even «dovish» ones on the Viet Nam issue, attempted to find alternative channels whereby Israel could be ensured of continued U.S. military support. In effect this meant that while some Congressmen became convinced that it was against the best interests of the U.S. to remain in Viet Nam, they remained committed to the proposition that the continued existence of Israel was in the best interests of the U.S. For this reason, after 1967, the U.S. willingly — and with substantial Congressional support — became the major supplier of armaments to Israel. Congress has not enacted any bills designed to forestall possible future U.S. direct military involvement on behalf of Israel or to halt U.S. economic aid. Thus the door remains open, as it was in Southeast Asia, for direct U.S. military involvement in a Middle East conflict.