

**Discussions in the CPT  
1981-1982**

**Documents**

**H. Erdal**

**IŞÇININ SESİ PUBLICATIONS  
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**Workers of all countries unite!**

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# Discussions in the CPT 1981-1982

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H. ERDAL

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## To begin with

A wide-ranging discussion is being held throughout the revolutionary movement and the communist movement of Turkey. This is also the case in the Communist Party of Turkey which is an inseparable part of this general movement. Intense discussion is taking place both within the party and in the circles close to it. Although there are, from time to time, demonstrations of unity and togetherness, they fail to be very convincing. We saw the most comic example of such showy demonstrations at the end of the year 1981. A statement was published in the name of three leading members of the CPT, including my own. It was said in this statement that "there are differences of opinion among us but we are still united". Even to this day I have not understood what the function of this statement was supposed to be, other than to expose this situation or an aspect of it to public opinion.

For some time now, my name has also been occupying a place in these discussions. There is a saying: "Where there is smoke there is fire". This is well said. Yes, I too am taking part in the discussions being held in and around our party and this is only natural. For a person in the party leadership, who took up his duties at the time of the party's re-establishment, to adopt a

particular stand on various ideological, political and organisational matters is a consequence of the duty and responsibility which he has accepted. To do otherwise, that is, for a leading party member not to have a particular stand, would be proof of his lack of integrity, his fickleness, proof that, for him, as we have seen with others, the party is only a vehicle for his personal advancement. And the struggle in which I am engaged did not emerge today or with the 12th September coup, as is the case with many others. The debate which is taking place today has its origins in the peculiarities of the 1973-75 period when the party was being re-established. In the time since then, however, these discussions were held only within the Political Bureau. At least I made particular efforts to prevent these discussions from going beyond the boundaries of this organ. If these discussions went beyond these boundaries to a certain extent in that period, the fault should be sought among those who even at that time viewed the party as a federation and whose ties with the federation were accordingly very loose and based on an "appropriate" recompense.

You will ask what these discussions were. However much the appearance of these discussions may have varied with changing periods and changing conditions, their essence has always remained the same. What kind of communist party is the CPT to be? This was the essence of the discussions. There were then and are today two alternatives. Either the CPT will remain an organisation conducting only general and abstract anti-imperialist propaganda abroad, as it has been for many years, or it will become an organisation waging a struggle *to make the revolution in Turkey, to seize political power*, an organisation that exists among the masses of Turkey.

The silence that had been created by the long absence of a communist party from the social life of our country on the one hand, and political inexperience on the other, prevented this question from being stated openly and then answered fully in the period 1973-74, when the CPT was being re-established.

We all had different intentions when we became involved in this work. For instance, the majority of the leadership abroad in



particular took up this work with the expectation of a legal communist party fostered in that period by the faith placed in Ecevit. It was only when, leave aside a legal communist party, the boundaries of the existing bourgeois democracy started to contract, that the question "what kind of party?" came to the fore. But with the emergence of this question, inner-party problems also started to grow and come out into the open.

The concern not to allow these discussions to spread beyond the organ of which I was a member and not to split the party again, naturally led me to make the mistake of accepting many things, some with which I agreed, some with which I disagreed, in the Central Committee of which I was also a member. When I look back today I see more clearly that this attitude was wrong. Of course this statement cannot change the fact that I share in the responsibility for all the actions of the CPT leadership, whether right or wrong, between 1973-1980.

I will try to give an open account of all the responsibility I share, including both right and wrong.

The inner-party discussion, which became unavoidable with the rebellion of *İşçinin Sesi* against the wrong path the party had entered, reached a new stage with the fascist coup of 12th September 1980 and became a flood that knew no obstacles. Problems were beginning to be discussed thoroughly whether we liked it or not. Between 12th September 1980 and November 1982 I made a final effort, particularly after many comrades had been arrested by the police; after the escape of a *particular group* abroad and, following that, the Byzantine coup effected within the party; despite a whole series of intrigues organised against my person and my views. Despite everything, despite the fact that I had no hope, I presented written warnings advocating that the problems should be solved within the relevant party organs.

None of these views, which I addressed, in writing to the Politburo during this period, not a single one, was ever put on its agenda. My written views were even kept secret from some of the other members of this organ. There was *never* any open acceptance or criticism, be it in verbal or written form, of myself or my views. All my written views were kept among dusty old

files and locked away in steel cupboards.

In another pamphlet, I will write about and document the decision I took in November 1982 in full awareness of my responsibilities; about the development of events that led me to take this decision, together with the solutions I saw. But with the present pamphlet, I first wanted to establish some other things. They are the following points:

1. There exist serious, very serious, differences of opinion within the CPT and, despite all that happened, I exerted efforts for these problems to be solved within the leading body until the very end.
2. Leave aside the opposition to these efforts, the suggestions and views which I put forward, they were not even made a subject for discussion. Those who had been pursuing unsound policies, continued in the same old vein.

I wish to inform the reader that, due to the fact that I shared the responsibility of leadership in the same organisation and was acting within the framework of rules which it prescribed, these documents were written in a fairly conciliatory language. Let there be no misunderstanding, the language only reflects the concern to find a common solution.

Now I will briefly touch upon the significance that the documents I have included in this pamphlet had within the context of the discussions which took place during those years.

In the first section, I attempt to make the following points in regard to the question of the programme:

— Today, the CPT has no programme. The programme which was written in 1973 has become an historical document which nobody even remembers exists.

— A new programme cannot be prepared with the pragmatic and eclectic methods of 1973. Above all, it must be produced and discussed with a comprehensive, scientific understanding of Turkey.

— Preparatory work for the programme cannot be carried out by pasting together views hidden behind the clamour for a "list of demands", views which concern details and are of secondary importance. This is just what is being attempted now, without, supposedly, making it obvious as such.

The second part has been included in order to make clear that, since the middle of 1982, I have not been in agreement with the policies in regard to some particular matters which have become a subject of debate both within and outside the party.

In summary:

1. There can be no question today of any unity in regard to such problems as "contemporary fascism", or "neo-fascism" in that very broad and *multi-coloured* framework which we call the world communist and workers' movement. In most instances these terms have been reduced to "curses" with a purely tactical political aim, even further to concepts having a watered-down content.

There, the Chilean, the South-African, the Israeli leaderships, there the Reagan leadership. I am convinced that if these terms are tried out first of all in these countries, it will bring to light the hidden aspects of this matter.

2. As for our country, if our terminology includes the concept of neo-fascism (contemporary fascist), then this concept exactly fits the regime in Turkey.

3. In Turkey, bourgeois democracy as a lasting and stable regime is not possible.

The third part is concerned with the storm let loose on a national and particularly international level, in regard to "freedom for the 52"\*. No one can remain silent in regard to the arrest, trial and execution of progressives in Turkey. Organisation of the broadest solidarity is natural and necessary. Of course, we too had to do whatever we could for the quickest possible release of these 52 progressives. But, on the other hand, it was also unthinkable that the workers' movement of Turkey, the DISK movement which is an inseparable part of it, and the defence of Marxism, should be reduced to the defence of these 52 friends solely in accordance with the rise and fall of the level of international tension. The relevant document was written precisely against this tendency.

What I want to emphasize in the fourth section in relation to the question of peace is the following:

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\*This refers to the 52 leaders of the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK) who are on trial for their lives in Istanbul.

— Beyond our empty phrases, the question of peace is genuinely important.

— If we are communists of *Turkey*, we must first of all work to create a powerful peace movement *in our country*, and overthrow the obstacles that stand in its way.

In the fifth part, I have taken up some organisational problems.

— The first problem in this connection is the question of the congress. The most important point here is what kind of meeting is to be held under the name of "congress". Many things may be done and said behind the screen of clandestinity. This has been suggested by some. Virtually all the important meetings of the communist movement of Turkey (including those which assumed the name of "congress") have had the character of founding congresses. The party was re-established at all of them. Again it is such a meeting that is on the agenda.

The second problem related to organisational problems is that of the evaluation of the past. Until today such evaluations have been aimed at finding a victim to be made responsible for the recent past. There has never been the concern to learn a lesson, to bring one's own responsibility out into the open. It is sufficient to remember the things I. Bilen said in the period 1973-77, the accusations he brought against other comrades. My aim is to show the necessity of learning one's lesson, without disregard for one's own responsibility and without committing such a mistake.

— Finally, on the organisational problem; in January 1981, I put forward a proposal that included a complete reorganisation of the party from top to bottom. My aim here is not so much to discuss whether the concrete proposals I put forward at that time were right or wrong, but to show the condition that the organisation was in four months after the 12th September, and three months before the May 1981 arrests.

The final word I want to say in relation to these documents is the following: These documents explain the efforts I made for the recovery of the party within the context of my understanding at that time. No more. However, the open struggle against *those*

*who deserve it* has its own magical logic. Ten years of compromise will not give to a person what uncompromising development gives within only a short period of time.

Comrades, it is precisely for this reason that I will henceforth wage my struggle for communism in the "other" wing of the CPT, a wing which, in a historical sense, is a mortal enemy of the wing I have left. The fact that our paths had diverged was in fact an "anomaly" which resulted from various historical accidents and mistakes. Now this strange situation has also ended.

In future articles I want to show more clearly the aims for which the accusation of "anti-Sovietism" against *Işçinin Sesi* was concocted in the Politburo. For the moment, let this be enough: The accusation of anti-Sovietism brought against *Işçinin Sesi* is a lie concocted with the aim of preventing the party member who is opposed to its unsound politics and organisational line from finding a *real* alternative in the class struggle. I am convinced that the same mentality will now also include me in the accusation of anti-Sovietism!

Yes, we have chosen a difficult path, the *most difficult* path. To create, despite various negative internal and external factors, a CPT that is the vanguard of the proletariat, the commander of the revolution, and to raise the fighting banner of Marxism-Leninism before both friend and foe. Lenin says, "he who is afraid of the wolf should not enter the forest". We are ready for whatever comes.

Finally, I would like to thank all the party organisations and comrades who gave their assistance in the preparation and printing of this pamphlet.

November 1982

H. Erdal

# I. The question of the programme

## On the question of the programme

(To the Political Bureau, 16th July 1982)

### Introduction

Our present party programme is the third programme of our party and was prepared in 1973. The programme reflects the characteristics of the period in which it was prepared. It exhibits the influence of both the international situation and the conditions that prevailed in Turkey at that time, including the conditions that prevailed in our party at the time. In regard to the international situation, the characteristics of the period may be enumerated as follows:

— it was a period in which the atmosphere of detente was developing and the hopes, particularly for a military detente, had not yet vanished;

— the common programme of the French left had been published, and the ideological impact of this programme, as well as the expectations occasioned by it were spreading;

— as a result of the internal contradictions of imperialism and the internal conflicts of the Greek bourgeoisie, the possibility of the fascist Greek junta changing places with bourgeois democracy was emerging;

— within the world communist and workers' movement, expectations of a legal communist movement in Greece as well as in Turkey had emerged.

The most important characteristics in regard to the internal conditions were:

- the 12th March regime had been unable to secure the political and economic transformations it had aimed at, and it became obvious that it would not last for long;

- the Ecevit movement developed as the extension of international social-democracy in Turkey;

- the “our hope is Ecevit” movement was adopted by all those sections which comprised the social opposition, including the working class and progressive intellectuals.

And in the workers' movement the following may be emphasized as the most important characteristics of the period which also influenced the programme:

- on the left, including the radical left, parliamentarist methods had proved unsuccessful;

- there was an awakening of interest and responsiveness towards the international communist movement;

- despite the fact that the CP had almost no organisational political influence in the country, the need for a more effective CP in the country made itself felt, among wider circles;

- efforts were being made within the party to identify those responsible for the periods in which the CP did not exist inside the country.

There is one very significant and strong aspect of the programme. It is rooted in the rich experiences of the world communist and workers' movement. The essence of the programme is inspired by the rich experiences of the world communist movement. It is founded on the basic strategy for revolutionary transformations developed by the world communist and workers' movement. This strategy may be summarized as follows:

The carrying out of a democratic people's revolution with the aim of it growing into a socialist revolution, under conditions of an international situation in which the objective preconditions for socialist revolution have largely taken shape, and particularly under conditions when the subjective conditions for a socialist revolution are lagging behind. On the other hand,

- an inadequate understanding of this strategy,
- the extreme optimism that arose from the international situation,

- the ideological influence of the common programme of the French left and of the definition of "advanced democracy" which it developed, and the immature illusions created by "our hope is Ecevit", led to this strategy being watered down to some degree, to the democratic people's revolution yielding place to a series of democratic reforms, or for something that was at least widely interpreted as such. In spite of all this, the strategy of a democratic people's revolution that will grow into socialism is still valid today.

This is the irreversible, lasting aspect of the party programme.

However, the preparation of the programme must be based on theses resting on an all-round analysis of Turkey. During that period, such theses, necessary if the general strategy of the world communist and workers' movement is to be applied creatively to conditions in Turkey, could not be produced, so that one proceeded *directly* to writing the programme in the light of the experiences of the world communist and workers' movement. The programme was written but there were no theses on Turkey inspiring it. There were none because:

- the level of organisation of the party was not sufficient for the production of such theses;

- all the leading cadres who set out to re-establish the party and to write a new party programme were, without exception, cadres from outside (Turkey — trans.);

- the ideological level of the cadres preparing the programme did not allow for an understanding of the importance of such an in-depth study.

The lack of theses on Turkey, the lack of analysis, was reflected in the programme. As a consequence, some broad and general definitions, explanations of processes and their causes, etc, which do not belong in a communist party programme, were included in the party programme. At the same time, it is not clear on what analysis many a determination was based. Further, in



the course of preparations for the programme, a scrutiny of the second programme of our party was not possible. The second programme of the CPT, which is to be found in the party archives and was published by *Inkilap Yolu* Publications, is a document that has at least historical value and some sections, for instance, the section on the national question, contain good formulations. It would be helpful if it were read and scrutinized by those comrades who will express views on the programme. Copies of the second programme should be distributed, particularly among the members of the Politburo, the Central Committee and all comrades who will participate in the preparations for the programme, including on a technical level. An end should be put to the unnecessary secrecy in which the second programme has been kept.

Prepared in 1973 and adopted at the 1977 party conference, our third programme, for a period of nearly 5 years between 1973 and '78, performed the function of a document which guided and united the party at the time our party was being reassembled, and reestablished, and its advance was being effected. From 1978 onwards, discussions on the programme intensified. We talked about the need to review it, to establish its linguistic and conceptual coherence, and even started to work in this direction. But we were not able to continue the work; with the *İşçinin Sesi* event, the discussions reached a dead end. And this led either to all-out attacks on the programme, or to claims, under the pretext of defending the party, that it should not be discussed. After that stage, however, the programme greatly suffered in its character as a document that provided guidance and secured unity within the party leadership and party organisations. Concrete instances of this were seen in the ideological and political confusion that followed the 12th September coup. Many attitudes which were thought to be contrary to current political evaluations, or which repudiated existing political evaluations, and similarly those which concerned the programme itself were frowned upon. The questions of the main political enemy and militarism in particular, provide the most striking examples of this.

When we review the party programme, there is one thing we

will not change, one thing we will preserve. That is, we will preserve its essence as inspired by the rich experiences of the world communist and workers' movement. This will remain unchanged, but we are faced with the problem of how to apply this essence to conditions in Turkey more creatively than has been the case so far. To be able to do this, there needs to emerge, above all, analyses and theses which will provide the foundation for the programme, but which will not themselves be included in it.

### Analyses (Theses)

The analyses involved in the preparations for the programme will be gathered under these main headings:

1. An historical thesis on Turkey; this type of work has to this day never been conducted in the party. There is the need for an historical thesis with an historical-materialist approach and internal cohesion. Although such an analysis does not exist, the common characteristic of a number of unrelated propositions is that they rest on an understanding, identical to that of the Kemalists, whereby Turkey's social, economic and political life is seen to begin with the Republican period, disregarding everything that preceded it. This, however, not only leaves our analysis cut off and without a foundation; it also allows the worst reactionaries a free hand in this sphere.

2. Analysis of the base, investigation of Turkey's socio-economic structure. Putting it briefly, an explication of the specifics of capitalism in Turkey, analysis of its class structure and of the position of classes within this structure. The vulgar conception of the base-superstructure relation in the programme, and the almost complete exclusion of all super-structural analysis, has led to strategy being almost exclusively based on socio-economic analyses. And this has led to evaluations of the socio-economic situation that are sometimes scholastic, sometimes wholly subjective and devoid of reality. The most striking example of this is the discussion held openly in

the pages of *Yeni Çag (New Epoch)* in 1967. A scientist claims that demonstrating a high level of socio-economic development in Turkey would have the effect of raising revolutionary action and would therefore harm Turkish-Soviet relations. The reply made to this by the then general-secretary of the party should be a lesson to everyone.

In regard to the socio-economic structure, there must first of all be research into the specifics of capitalism in Turkey. Apart from the dominant mode of production, other modes of production should also be studied in general. In particular, the question of the feudal structure which is said to exist must be investigated. The lack of any analysis of the Ottoman land and social system has rendered the question of the character of certain pre-capitalist relations which are said to exist within capitalism today an inexhaustible topic for discussion. The question of the characteristics and size of social classes must be studied, not only in general, but with particular attention to the position of the different contingents that make up every class.

When, on the other hand, the spectrum of social classes is described, one social stratum which occupies a very important place in the concrete social and political life of Turkey has been completely ignored. This is the marginal sector which represents over 25% of the population of Turkey. (Marginal sector: a stratum which has only recently been torn away from the land, or is no longer needed economically in the rural areas, and has not yet merged with other social classes or strata; an undecided section, standing in the middle).

### 3. Analysis of the super-structure:

a) Really the analysis of the state in Turkey. What is the state in Turkey? Not a repetition of the general theoretical approach to be found in all the classics of Marxism-Leninism. In the light of this correct approach, the analysis of the role that has been played for hundreds of years in the life of society, in economic life, in social life, in political life, by specific characteristics of the class structure of the state in Turkey. Explanation of the connection between the class struggle and the question of the state. Study of the dominant bourgeois state

relation.

b) The most important question here to which an answer must be sought is to what extent civil society in Turkey is independent of the state. Has it become something more than the ideological apparatus of the state as it has been for hundreds of years; has there emerged a civil society that is to some degree independent of the state? If not, that is, if in Turkey the existing civil society and all its institutions are today, just as yesterday, no more than the ideological apparatus of the state, is it possible to speak of bourgeois democracy in Turkey as a regime, as a state form, and is the democratic transformation of civil society possible without seizing the coercive apparatus of the state? Besides this question, there is the important question as to the economic function which the state in Turkey has performed for hundreds of years. Is the function of the state in Turkey today, just as traditionally, only a relation of control or does it consist in the realisation of an important part of social production by the state as the direct owner of means of production? Did the ruling classes of Turkey in the past themselves produce a state apparatus? What is the relationship between the concept of the "beneficent state" which existed under the Ottomans and the concept of the "strong state" that is spread by the oligarchy today?

c) The state apparatus must be studied. Above all, its coercive apparatus: the military, police and law courts. What has traditionally been the position of the members of the military, which constitutes the state's coercive apparatus, and of the administrative bureaucracy in relation to the means of production? What have traditionally been the roles of the military and the administrative bureaucracy towards civil society? What are they today? What is the role of the political police within civil society today?

d) The ideological apparatus of the state must be studied. When we say ideological apparatus, we mean political structure, family, religion, education, mass media, professional organisations. Is there a civil society in Turkey that has emerged through the struggle of the masses from below, or are all the

institutions of civil society an apparatus organised from above, by the state, for ideological purposes? What is the role played by religion in Turkey? What are, in general, the differences between Islam and Ötoman Islam? Which sects and denominations are being oppressed and degraded in Turkey? For what reason is it necessary to have a differentiated approach towards the question of Islam in Turkey?

4. Analyses concerning the international situation. By this we do not mean "lifting" definitions concerning the international situation straight out of documents of the world communist movement. The relation between the revolutionary process in Turkey and the international situation must be studied. Their mutual interaction must be studied. What is the effect that the revolutionary process in Turkey has on the international situation and what effect does the international situation have on the revolutionary process in Turkey?

It is only through the presentation of such analyses that the theoretical approaches developed by the world communist and workers' movement in regard to the problem of revolution can be applied creatively to the concrete situation in Turkey.

### Some principles concerning the programme

1. Analyses, definitions and theses should not be included in the programme. The development of processes should not be explained. There should be no attempt to explain the causes of processes. Because these will have previously been discussed in theses.

2. Tactical tasks should not be included in the programme because they will be determined, in the light of the programme, for the short term at the party congress, and in party organs,

3. Reforms and demands, the realisation of which is not connected up with revolution, should not be included in the programme.

4. The following practical problems should be considered in the programme:

a. In the programme, language and style are important. The style should be simple and linguistic extremes should be avoided. Spoken Turkish should provide the basis, it should be written in a language that can be understood by everyone.

b. Care should be taken for the unity of concepts and terms, conceptual consistency, in the programme. The same concept should not be expressed by different terms; the same terms should not be used to express different concepts.

c. Repetition in the programme should be avoided.

d. Statistical information that will change with time should be excluded from the programme.

## The programme

It should consist of three main sections:

1. Fundamental propositions. This section should deal with fundamental propositions derived from the theses.

2. The urgent political tasks of the party should be explained.

3. The demands section. Those demands the realisation of which is possible only through revolution should be listed here. (Minimum programme)

## Fundamental propositions

This section will deal with the results of the analysis of Turkey.

1. The results of the analysis of the base.

— Characterisation of the stage reached today by Turkey's economic development, definition of the dominant mode of production,

— Definition of the fundamental contradiction.

2. The results of the analysis of the super-structure. The nature of the state in Turkey and the role it plays.

3. The position and task of the working class in the revolutionary movement.

4. The ultimate aim of the CP.

- The necessity of socialist revolution,
- The relation between revolution in Turkey and the world revolutionary process.

### Urgent political tasks of the Communist Party

- The main enemy
  - The necessity and nature of the democratic people's revolution,
  - The question of leadership and hegemony in the democratic people's revolution,
  - Alliances in the democratic people's revolution.

### Demands

In this section those demands will be included the realisation of which is linked to the democratic people's revolution.

- General revolutionary and democratic transformations,
- Demands for the benefit of the working class,
- Demands for the benefit of the peasantry,
- Demands for the benefit of other working people.

### Concerning some discussions about the programme

1. As I have also mentioned above, the fact that the programme did not rest on concrete theses about Turkey led to a rigid and eclectic formulation of the general theoretical scheme of the world communist and workers' movement. Almost all of the discussions that have arisen about the programme have their origin in this fact.

2. The fact that there is no analysis of the state led to an

indeterminate attitude on the revolutionary path in regard to the state, its repressive and ideological mechanisms, as well as leaving obscure the relationship between revolution and the state.

3. Despite the fact that they seem to be cut and dried, analyses of the base do not reflect the concrete class structure. In particular, the circumstance that there is no definition of the sense in which the terms are used has further complicated matters. The discussion as to what the "national bourgeoisie" is and what is it not, does it exist or does it not, belongs to this category.

4. Constant furthering of its democratic rights by the working class *before the revolution* has been confused with "bourgeois democracy" as a regime. Of course the working class will constantly struggle for the continuous development of its democratic rights. The contrary would mean a failure to understand the dialectic of revolution and reform. However, it is one question whether bourgeois democracy, as a regime, as a state form, will survive or not, and quite another whether such a regime is to be considered a precondition for the people's revolution. The answer to this question will be linked to an analysis of the present socio-economic structure and aspects of its development as well as an analysis of the state in particular.

5. The absence of theses on which the programme could have been based, as well as the international and national conditions under which the programme was prepared, led to the domination of an understanding which implied that the path to the people's revolution will be a peaceful path. This is also one of the questions on which light must be shed.

If we are unable to speak of the existence of a civil society in Turkey which is relatively independent of the state, and if we regard this civil society rather as the ideological apparatus of the state, and if we further add to this certain characteristics of capitalism in Turkey, we arrive at the conclusion that bourgeois democracy in Turkey, as a regime, as a state form, cannot survive. Moreover, if we add to this the role and traditions of the coercive apparatus, we realise that a peaceful



people's revolution is objectively virtually impossible.

6. While emphasis is placed on the anti-imperialist direction which the democratic people's revolution will certainly exhibit, the relationship between imperialism and the Turkish bourgeoisie has been treated subjectively. Imperialism has been depicted as a simple external phenomenon and, in a roundabout way, the Turkish bourgeoisie has been white-washed. This, however, inevitably opens up for debate the character and direction of the democratic people's revolution. Its anti-oligarchic, democratic aspect, is automatically pushed back into second place, and the illusion is created that the bourgeoisie (including the oligarchy) could have a place in an anti-imperialist transformation. This must be corrected and, first and foremost, the objective and subjective positions of various sections of the Turkish bourgeoisie vis-a-vis imperialism must be clarified.

7. There is confusion also in regard to the question of the demands which make up the third section of the programme. Demands that are to be included in the programme are those the realisation of which is linked to the question of revolution. It is the minimum programme which the CP will put into force in the case of the people's revolution effecting a political revolution.

8. The Kurdish question. If there are to be different sections in the programme, this question should be taken up in a separate section. The relevant section in the second programme must be examined. A text must be prepared that will put an end to discussions concerning the *right to secede*.

16. 7. 1983

### Concerning the "question of demands" (To the Political Bureau, 16th July 1982)

At the time questions of how to revise the programme and preparations related to it were being discussed and debated, the "question of demands" appeared. As I openly stated at the previous meeting, I have not understood what is meant by these "demands". What is more, it has become evident, both during

and after the meeting, that almost every comrade has understood something different by this concept. For some of us (it means — trans.) that the demands of the party programme concerning our minimum programme should be reformulated. According to others, it means that the aims of current tactical matters should be stated. For this reason, I would like to take up the “question of demands” as broadly as possible.

The dialectic of the revolutionary struggle, of revolutionary strategy, also includes the relation between reform and revolution. If, before everything else, we look at the matter in this way, the need to discern whether our demands are reform or entail revolutionary transformations, becomes clear. Those demands the realisation of which is not linked to the question of political revolution are reforms, and the party must reformulate these demands, which will facilitate and speed up the revolutionary struggle, at every tactical stage. And today we face the task of formulating the reforms-demands of the present tactical stage. In essence, these are bourgeois-democratic demands, improvement of the working and living conditions of the workers and working people, extending the limits of democratic freedoms (first and foremost, freedom of organisation and thought), adoption of a peaceful foreign policy, etc.

And then there are the demands the realisation of which depends on political revolution, the question of political power; these are not reforms but revolutionary transformations. They are demands which cannot be met under the conditions of the bourgeoisie’s political rule. They may be broken down into two main groups.

a. Demands whose realisation depends on the democratic people’s revolution. The main ones are the following:

- the destruction of the repressive (coercive) apparatus of the state,
- the democratisation of the state ideological apparatus,
- the curtailment of the oligarchy’s political, economic and social power,
- the adoption of a consistent anti-imperialist foreign policy,

- the achievement by the working class of leadership and hegemony in every sphere in social life,
- changes benefitting the working class,
- changes benefitting the peasantry and the agricultural programme,
- rights for the other working people.

All these constitute the minimum programme of the party and the section concerning demands in the party programme.

b. And then there are those demands whose realisation depends on the socialist revolution.

- Abolition of private property in the means of production and the dismantling of capitalism,
- The establishment of socialism.

These demands are demands which lead to the ultimate goal of the party. This is how I understand the concept "demands" and its categories.

It is necessary to take up and consider in detail two groups of demands in particular. First the question of reformulating the minimum programme within the framework of the understanding set out in the appended note I wrote on the programme, and this work is not possible without the acceptance of certain theses. For this reason, the precondition for this work is the speedy development of the theses on Turkey. Secondly, our democratic demands will assist us in raising the class struggle during the present tactical stage, under the conditions of the existing political regime. These have, in my view, already been stated in many of our documents. The question is one of organising political action for these demands. In regard to both democratic freedoms and peace, it is a question, not of smothering these demands in detail, but of being able to raise the political struggle.

## II. The political situation

### The Political Situation

(To the Political Bureau, May 1982)

Some proposals concerning the style of the political documents we will prepare

The following are some proposals, which I believe it is correct in principle to apply when writing documents in order to enhance the clarity of the political documents we will prepare allow them to be readily understood and, most importantly, enable them to perform a guiding role.

1. Political evaluations and interpretations should include only a brief outline of past events. The presentation of events in itself is not enlightening. It is our *foresight* in regard to future tendencies of development and perspectives which will show the way. Political guidance works through political foresight.

2. In those cases where the perspectives concerning future tendencies are being stated, one should not be satisfied with the mere listing of all possible alternatives, but state which of these alternatives is most probable. Political foresight is not only the statement of the possible tendencies, but the statement of the most probable tendencies.

3. It is obvious that, given the complexity of social events, all determinations, definitions and laws are — without exception — in essence abstractions, which show the stage reached by some tendencies. Determinations and definitions are necessary to be able to understand the quantitative and/or qualitative stages of

tendencies. It is not right to counterpose the developmental processes of tendencies with the determination of the stage reached by these tendencies at a particular historical moment. To put it more clearly, to speak exclusively of economic, social and political processes without making an abstraction which defines the quantitative and qualitative stage reached by these tendencies at a particular historical moment, will yield no other result than that of making the analysis more unintelligible.

### On the political situation

Below are the evaluations of the political situation which I have arrived at through a retrospective look back over a long period.

### The factors which led to the 12th September coup

The internal and external causes of the 12th September coup should be sought, not in the period immediately preceding the 12th September, but further in the past, starting with 1968. The 12th March (1971-trans.) coup attempted, but failed, to halt the intensifying class struggle which had resulted from the rapid growth and the characteristics of capitalism in Turkey between 1963—68. Since 1974, Turkey has been faced with a great economic crisis and a new socio-political crisis.

Inside the country: the direct economic burden imposed by the Cyprus war and the island's post-war financial problems; the necessity to spend over 40% of Turkey's foreign currency earnings on oil imports due to the rapid rise in the price of oil world-wide; the rising of the class-struggle and the increasing number of strikes, the increasing weight of the state economic enterprises which were supposed to create employment but which were really an irrational burden on the economy; and, added to all these, most importantly, the inability of imperialism to carry out the external economic injections into the Turkish

economy which had become a structural necessity, left Turkish capitalism facing a profound economic crisis. The finance oligarchy, already impatient to take on the task of resolving this situation, declared its open candidacy in January 1980, with the support of international financial institutions. The aim was to reorganise Turkish capitalism in the interests of the finance oligarchy. This proposed plan for an economic reorganisation had three basic characteristics:

a. To bring the Turkish economy to the point where it could survive without economic assistance and for this reason to expand abroad.

b. To limit investment and to divert the resources thus saved to the finance oligarchy to enable it to achieve greater capital concentration,

c. To restrict internal consumption, that is, to lower the standard of living of the working people. And, again, to divert these funds to the finance oligarchy. Such radical measures directed against the entire people were not possible within the limits of the bourgeois democracy game. The fact that this plan, the general framework of which was drawn up on 24th January 1980, could not be applied until the 12th September, as well as the other examples in the world, confirm this impossibility.

In the relatively democratic situation which developed in Turkey after the 12th March, the class struggle became more fierce and political differentiation sharpened in all sections of society and social organisation. This applied to both civil society as well as to the state apparatus.

Since the Ottomans, totalitarianism has been the general characteristic of social life. Since the Ottomans, periods in which wide use could be made of democratic freedoms in the social life of Turkey have been extraordinary periods. Such democratic periods have been the armistice period of 1918-1922 and the 1960-71 and 1973-80 periods in recent times.

International developments between 1963-68, rapid development of capitalism within the country, the rapid development of the working class, and of its modern detachments in particular, accelerated the class struggle. The working class

assumed in practice the task of leadership which already existed objectively. It was during the period 1974-1980 that, for the first time, the CP became a force in the social and political life of Turkey which had, to some extent, to be taken into account on a national scale. Democratic mass activity developed. Society in general rapidly became politicised and differentiated. The bourgeoisie was faced with the problem of its ability to rule.

The political groupings that formed in civil society also led to the appearance of political groupings in the state apparatus. These developments in both civil society and the state apparatus made it more difficult for the bourgeoisie to govern through the accustomed methods (bourgeois democratic methods), that is, it became more difficult for it to maintain its rule. As a result of the sharpening class struggle and revolutionary developments, the point was reached at which only a *counter-revolutionary coup* was able to secure the future of the interests of imperialism and the Turkish finance-oligarchy. With such a counter-revolutionary coup, problems of re-organisation come onto the bourgeoisie's agenda in three areas:

1. Reorganisation of the economy,
2. Reorganisation of civil society,
3. Reorganisation of the state.

I believe that the necessity for such a multi-faceted and radical reorganisation constituted, from the point of view of the bourgeoisie, the objective causes of the 12th September coup.

Abroad: Developments in the international situation were also among the determining causes of the 12th September; these include, firstly, the accelerating trends towards greater reaction in the world imperialist system of which Turkey is part. A turning-point in this acceleration occurred with the coming to power of a clique representing imperialism's most reactionary, most militarist sections, in the USA, which occupies the leading position in the imperialist system, and its adoption of a foreign policy different from that of previous administrations. In order for the Reagan administration to conduct its policy of accelerating tension and the arms race on a world scale, it started to export, if this term is appropriate, reactionary, neo-fascist,

totalitarian regimes which are more closely tied to America, in a manner very different from that of the Carter administration. American imperialism's loss of Iran and Afghanistan increased Turkey's importance in the region from the point of view of the USA. The importance of the Gulf and the Arab countries encircling it increased with the oil crisis. In contradistinction, pacts like NATO and CENTO no longer sufficed to meet the needs of the Reagan administration's Middle East policy. Instead of concluding new global pacts, the Reagan administration began to follow the tactic of bilateral agreements, bilateral organisations for military-political coordination. The need arose to link Turkey more closely to the USA via a bilateral agreement and organisations of bilateral military-political coordination (just as were applied in Egypt, Israel, Sudan, Pakistan) in addition to the NATO agreement, and to use Turkey as the only Islamic country that is also a NATO member directly in the pursuit of its Gulf policy. This intention of the Reagan administration to a certain extent came into conflict with the Turkish finance oligarchy's desire to expand abroad.

It was under such internal and external conditions that a change of regime took place in Turkey and a new regime was established. The coup and the establishment of the new regime were effected by the clique of generals at the head of the army. What we are talking about here is not the soldiers and reserve officers doing their compulsory military service in the army. We are not talking about the 130-thousand strong mass of officers and non-commissioned officers. What we are talking about here are the generals of the Turkish army whose number does not exceed 300. I would like to stop at this point to mention briefly the position these 300 persons occupy in the life of Turkey. It is not a matter of the great care with which they were selected and trained from among a mass of 130 thousand. One must ask whether there is any one among these 300 who has not been trained in the USA? Is there a single person among these 300 who has not worked in MIT (Turkish Intelligence Service — trans.)? But, apart from all these characteristics I have mentioned, each of these 300 displays two other important characteristics.



The first determining characteristic of the Turkish army generals is universal. As in all capitalist countries, these 300 persons who are at the very top of the bureaucracy constitute an inseparable part of the ruling bourgeoisie. The second characteristic of Turkish army generals, however, is peculiar to Turkey. This characteristic is present neither in the armies of the imperialist metropolises, nor in those of developing countries. Perhaps only in Latin American banana republics. This characteristic consists of the fact that these 300 persons are not only part of the ruling bourgeoisie, but also part of the finance oligarchy. Via the mechanism of OYAK (Army Mutual Assistance Fund — trans.), the support trusts of the army, navy and airforce, they are in a position of direct ownership and directorship of a very important section of industry and finance in Turkey.

I believe that there is need for detailed research in this area. 300 generals constitute an inseparable (integral) part of the finance-oligarchy in such spheres as the automobile, petrochemical, rubber, electronics and food industries, the distribution services, banking and insurance, i.e., the sphere of finance. The coup was carried out by this clique.

I would like to present here a view with which I disagree. It concerns the relation between the state (including the armed forces) and civil society, and two tendencies both of which exaggerate and, in the end, lead to mistakes. They are the exaggeration of the state's relative independence from civil society, on the one hand, and of the integration of state and civil society on the other. An understanding which turns this process of integration into some mechanical identity surely represents a denial of the dialectic of social development. The other tendency, represented within the communist movement today particularly by the Euro-communists, is the thesis of the state's relative independence from civil society. Exaggerated a little, this thesis would take us to the same mistake they make: namely the idea that it is possible to take over the state without taking political power. What strikes us here, is the idea that generally "right-wing army members in counter-revolutionary coups appear both

as the tools of the exploiting classes and, at the same time, as their foremost active elements. Thus, these right-wing army members are capable of rapidly and without any regret leaving the political organisations and institutions of the exploiting class whose tool they are." Even if the counter-revolutionary actions of the army were to crush the political organisations of the propertied classes, this would still indicate that these military circles are performing plainly loyal and honest service for the protection of the economic and social basis of these classes. (See *Yeni Çag*, April 1974, "Whom does the army serve?", p. 295) It is not a matter of the relative independence of the state or the armed forces, but a characteristic of military dictatorships.

### Concerning the new regime that was established on 12th September

Those who seized power on the 12th September succeeded for a time to secure a certain mass support. Using the excuse of the terror that was consciously escalated from 1978 until 1980, and taking advantage of the slogan "security of life" which was advanced *for the first time* in Turkey by the CPT in 1978, they secured themselves a certain mass support. Here I would immediately like to say this: the composition and nature of mass support for regimes are factors which directly affect our tactics. However, again let us not forget that the narrowness or breadth of a regime's mass support cannot be counted among the factors which determine that regime's character. There are many examples from history which show this.

The junta came to power with the slogan of "security of life". The seemingly individual terror which until that day, they themselves had provoked or organised to an important extent, was replaced with open and systematic state terror. The military junta and the finance-oligarchy immediately started to institute both the internal and external changes I have mentioned above. Abroad they began to meet the demands of Reaganite policies. On their third day in power, they signed a new bilateral

agreement with the USA. They founded the Turkish-American military-political coordination organisation which is a specific form of the USA's new pact strategy. They entered into secret military relations with similar regimes in the region (particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Gulf states). Secret political party and military preparations against the Iranian regime were conducted in Turkey. Opportunities for the Rapid Deployment Force were prepared. When a political party came to power in Greece that had strong anti-American tendencies, they started to apply direct pressure against it with the aim of forcing it closer to the USA.

To put it briefly, they are continuing, with an increasing tempo, the Reaganite foreign policies which started on the third day of their accession to power. During the period in which they consolidated their power, they tried to make people believe that they were behaving more "realistically" towards the socialist countries. But it is clear that, since the 12th September, not only have political and cultural relations not developed, but there has been no development even in economic relations; on the contrary, the share of socialist countries in Turkey's foreign trade has progressively diminished.

What has the junta regime done inside the country? It has realised the three things mentioned above to an important extent. It has restructured these three areas to such an extent as to enable one to make a new qualitative definition. Thus:

1. It has succeeded to an important extent in securing the development of Turkish capitalism to the advantage of the finance oligarchy. It has succeeded in forcing back the real standard of living of the working people to the level of 1963-65. Investment has almost stopped completely. As a result, the increase of domestic prices has slowed down, a certain development has been secured in exports and, most important of all, there has been an accelerated accumulation of capital of unprecedented proportions in the hands of a finance group which numbers no more than 100 people. Research I carried out solely on the basis of the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper is enough to show the dimensions of the profits and increase of capital of these groups.

While the integration of different capital forms, financial, industrial and commercial, accelerated, those holdings and groups which had not merged with some financial institution were pushed aside and finance-capital began to play the determining role.

2. In addition to the economy, the junta has completely reorganised the state apparatus. According to official statements, the state apparatus was purged of more than 20 thousand high-and middle-ranking civil servants during the first 12 months of the junta. The entire executive apparatus has been changed, all elected organs were dissolved, right down to the level of city districts, an executive mechanism was formed within a military hierarchy functioning from the top downwards. In brief, the finance oligarchy has to a determining extent brought the state apparatus under its own control.

3. The junta has also re-organised civil society. It has changed the entire political structure. It has actually instated a "fuhrer system". All the elements of national rule, the legislative, judicial and executive, are gathered in the hands of the national fuhrer. All the democratic organisations of social life have been eliminated. A totalitarian and terrorist ruling mechanism has been formed. Education and science have, via such institutions as the National Education Trust and *YOK* (Higher Educational Council), been reorganised by the national fuhrer in the interests of the oligarchy. It is impossible to speak of human rights even within the general framework accepted by the United Nations code. The cinema, theatre, press, radio, television, in short, the entire propaganda mechanism, has again been reorganised in the interests of the oligarchy.

We may draw the following conclusions from all these:

The coup of 12th September 1980 was not a government coup. The state form in Turkey has changed. In Turkey today there is a totalitarian, terrorist, open dictatorship of the finance oligarchy exercised through the military junta with the appearance of a fuhrer system. By virtue of both its foreign and internal class base, the form of the state and the policies it pursues, this is a regime that, in our world of 1982, may be

defined as neo-fascist. For me this regime is a neo-fascist regime. However, the definition of "neo-fascist" is a concept about which lively debates are being held in the world communist and workers' movement today. Many communist parties which are firmly loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism are in disagreement with each other as to the stage at which this definition should be used and the processes to which it should be applied. Furthermore, Turkey is not at all a country which, from the point of view of its location, its political attitude, its social and economic potential, is unimportant for the politics of the world and the region. When both these points are taken into account, the definition of this regime is not so much abstract and theoretical, but very concrete, practical and political. In my view, there is not a single reason why this regime should not be called a neo-fascist regime today. On the other hand, the Politburo should decide separately what kind of language to use in its external agitation and propaganda.

### On political perspectives

Following the coup and during the process of consolidating its political power, the junta and the oligarchy followed a cautious path. Within the country, it behaved ruthlessly towards all bourgeois political parties and groups in order to prevent the appearance of a bourgeois alternative that would be able to oppose itself. On the other hand, it made efforts to secure the direct support of some bourgeois sections (while pushing aside their political organisations) by propagating the image that the bourgeois system in general was in danger.

This calculated and hypocritical policy and, of course, the political-economic pressures of said circles both within and without, resulted in the junta promising that the military junta would *voluntarily* give way to a bourgeois parliamentary system. Again in this period of the regime's consolidation of its political power, the junta behaved realistically (that is, realistically in the interests of the Turkish finance oligarchy),

promising that it would maintain good relations with our neighbours, including the socialist countries, that it would even improve these relations. Of course, if one thinks about the dangerous and adventurist alternatives that can be expected from such a junta, this attitude, even if it were to remain only in words, would still have to be taken into account. And our party has taken it into account in its evaluations.

What is the situation today when the junta believes it has consolidated its political power to a significant extent?

Abroad: while placing itself more openly on the side of Reaganite policies, the junta has adopted a defiant attitude towards Europe. This has intensified the open opposition to the junta by bourgeois liberal and bourgeois reformist circles both at home and abroad. In comparison with the 12th September, the junta today seems to have lost the support of those circles. Imperialism's reformist circles abroad are already working for the preparation of a bourgeois reformist alternative to the junta in Turkey. Herein lies the secret of their turning Ecevit and the 52 (imprisoned DISK leaders — trans.) into heroes.

The junta, however, does not hide the possibility that the civilian regime which it promised after the 12th September will not be democratic but totalitarian, not a pluralist but a monolithic regime. At the TISK (Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions) congress, a working system was proposed which even Mussolini would have greeted with respect. At this point I would like to point out that, with these policies, the junta applies the tactic of distraction (with the illusion of civilian rule) on the one hand, and that of intimidation (i.e., a future civilian appearance will not change the essence of the junta regime) on the other.

Now, let us return to the question of political perspective.

Has there been an instance anywhere in the world where the finance oligarchy's open military dictatorship has voluntarily given up political power? Is this possible? Of course not. What, on a very general level of abstraction, are the possible political alternatives to the junta regime? I will answer this question, first by disregarding international, foreign factors, and then by

taking external factors into account.

There are two alternatives on the abstract level:

1. The bourgeois alternative: the alternative of the liberal bourgeois reformist circles standing outside the finance oligarchy. This alternative is, in my view, not possible in the short term. Not only is the level of their political organisation and influence insufficient, but, more importantly, there is no economic basis for a pluralist bourgeois democratic civil society. Despite the fact that all of the former political parties except the Republican Reliance Party, the Nationalist Action Party and the fascist wing of the Justice Party are opposed to the junta, they have not, with the exception of Ecevit, turned this opposition into an open opposition. In the short term, they do not come forward as a political alternative to the junta regime. In my opinion, there are economic as well as political reasons for this situation (i.e., these groups act with class consciousness, they have not abandoned the belief that today only the junta regime can protect the capitalist system). And these economic reasons lie in the specific character of Turkish capitalism. It is a question of economic and political *dependence* on the finance oligarchy of those bourgeois sections which formally stand outside the finance oligarchy. Some extremely optimistic interpretations have their origin in the mistaken notion of an "anti-monopoly democracy", the foremost contribution to which in Marxist literature has been made by the French. This shallow economist and formalist approach, which does not adequately recognize the economic and political dependence of the non-monopoly bourgeois sections on the monopolies, emerges from an eclectic combination of the "non-monopoly" phenomenon, a socio-economic concept, with the "democracy" phenomenon, a socio-political concept.

The same mistake must not be made now in Turkey. The question of what the objective contradictions between the bourgeois sections outside the finance oligarchy and the finance oligarchy really are and what they are not, in what direction they are developing, and whether and at what stage of these contradictions they will lead those bourgeois sections to insist on

an alternative to the present regime, is a matter requiring a very detailed and concrete analysis. As already mentioned above, I do not see, on the basis of my own inadequate knowledge and perceptions, such an alternative in the short term.

2. *The revolutionary alternative:* distancing ourselves from our extremely subjective intentions as much as possible, I would first like to state the following. In one and a half years the junta has achieved:

- the reorganisation of capitalism,
- the reorganisation of civil society,
- the reorganisation of the state,

Today it has reached such a *qualitative* stage that a rectification of this situation by means of reforms, even the institution of a bourgeois pluralist social system, is not possible. In my opinion, this evaluation immediately confronts us with the question, by what means and with which methods of struggle is a radical, revolutionary transformation possible? I believe that the answer to this question is clear and obvious to all of us. On the other hand, it is also very evident that not all the conditions for a revolutionary transformation have yet matured. Above all, our party has suffered serious injuries. They must be cured quickly. As I have already stated, in writing, in January 1981, in one sense, there is a need for a top-to-bottom reorganisation. (See: *The Situation in January 1981*)

The second important question is that of cooperation for a common political strategy of the left-wing forces.

The third question is that of being able to develop means and methods of raising the level of activity of the masses and drawing them into the struggle for the common political aims of the left-wing forces. I would like here to touch upon another important point. And that is the question of the present relationship between the anti-junta bourgeois reformists and the revolutionary forces. There are, on the basis of an obviously crude abstraction, two alternatives. Either the bourgeois reformist circles' opposition to the junta will transcend also their contradictions with the left forces so that the entirety of the bourgeois reformist forces or an important part of it will support



the unity of the left, or the opposite will be the case. The left-wing forces will believe a bourgeois reformist alternative to be more probable, more realistic, and, will support bourgeois reformism for the reestablishment of a bourgeois pluralist regime. This, of course, if the left-wing forces arrive at the conclusion that a bourgeois reformist alternative in the country is more probable and realistic than a revolutionary alternative. The clear answer that will be given to this question is of vital importance. Unless such a clear answer is given, the political tactics followed will lead only to confusion. However, the clear answer that we will give to this question, will influence all areas of our party work. It will influence the essence and tactics of our alliance policies. In this case, the tactic of the unity of the democratic forces (all the forces that aim to restore bourgeois democracy), within which the left-wing forces will dissolve, will be followed. In the other case, the tactic of the unity of the revolutionary forces, of the left-wing forces, will come to the fore (and their political aims include the establishment of a revolutionary democracy). In regard to each of the two alternatives today, the unity of the left-wing forces in the context of our alliance policy will be of determining significance.

The effect of external factors on political perspectives will also be direct and determining. For this reason, correct political foresight will be possible only if one takes into account both the internal and external dynamics and their mutual interrelation. The question of whether or not the Reaganite policies of the USA, which in a broad sense is the actual political leader of the world imperialist system, can be restrained, is of vital importance. The continuing impact of Reaganite policies in the imperialist system also means that it will continue to have a direct negative impact on Turkey.

On the other hand, the future of the regime will also be influenced by whether or not the other imperialist centres, particularly the European community, go along with Reagan's policies, as well as the concrete political and economic relations of interest between Turkey and the European Community. These developments will also have important repercussions inside the

country. For today there are "pro-European" tendencies in Turkey even within finance-capital. Not to mention the fact that the ideological, political and economic support of bourgeois reformism again lies in Europe.

The latest fall in the price of petrol has had both positive and negative consequences for the regime. A positive consequence has been a reduction of half a billion dollars in Turkey's foreign payments. In contrast, the decrease in the income of oil-producing countries — primarily Libya and Iraq — may result in a restriction of export markets for Turkey.

Among possible international developments, the way in which the Iran-Iraq war will be concluded, and the future of the Saddam Hussein regime will have direct and significant consequences. Today, almost 40% of Turkey's exports are to that country. It will have not only economic but also political consequences. The consolidation of the present Greek regime which displays indisputably progressive and anti-American aspects will be among those factors influencing the regime in Turkey.

In the light of all these, the urgent task of working among the masses for the following common political aims confronts all the left-wing forces, our party first and foremost:

1. To work for the creation of a strong anti-American and particularly a strong anti-Reaganite movement, one which exists not only in words but is truly of a mass character, and which is closely linked to the day-to-day economic and democratic demands of the working people.

2. To raise concrete solidarity with Iraqi progressives fighting for the overthrow of the reactionary regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

3. To oppose the Turkish regime's pressures against the regime in Greece, to prevent chauvinist activities.

4. To expose the junta regime's use of the Turkish part of Cyprus for military intervention in the Middle East.

## On the question of the junta's internal contradictions

In regard to this matter I would first like to touch upon a methodological question.

Throughout human history, now and in the future, it is impossible to conceive of a human community without contradictions. It contradicts our understanding of the world and our methodology. All social classes and strata have their internal contradictions, the bourgeoisie, the working class, etc. All professional and political associations have their internal contradictions. There can be no such thing as a social entity devoid of contradictions. Since all human groups — including our junta — always have their own internal contradictions, is it possible not to take these into account when analysing these groups and determining one's policy towards them? In my opinion, it is not. It remains to say that we have never had any such problem. In that case, whence does the question arise? There are two basic reasons.

Firstly: instead of determining our policy against the junta by taking its internal contradictions into account, for quite a long period we have raised the mere statement that such contradictions exist to the level of a political tactic. Our comrades at every level called our political tactic one of a "differentiated approach", not seeing that there can be no such thing as an undifferentiated approach or that a differentiated approach does not constitute a political tactic. Even a bourgeois policy that fails to take into account its enemies' internal contradictions is an impossibility. In short, a "differentiated approach" is not a political tactic, but an undeniable methodological matter.

Secondly: views which exaggerate the nature of the junta's internal contradictions, and their perspectives of development have appeared. In the first place, it is obvious that the contradictions in question are not of an antagonistic nature and that they belong to the category of contradictions which can be resolved. Moreover, we have not devoted sufficient attention to

defining these contradictions as such; there have been exaggerated interpretations concerning which matters lead to the formation of which groups in the junta. Aside from gossip, I have still not seen any external confirmations of the formation of such groups. Nevertheless, the question is still one which is of significance today. A concrete investigation and evaluation of the individuals who make up the junta and the circle around it must be carried out. At the head of the factors which will intensify and raise the junta's internal contradictions to a level at which they will help us overthrow it, is the process of open conflict between the junta and the rising wave of social opposition to it.

### On the question of unity

In order to enable the working class and its vanguard organisation, the communist party, to seize power and establish socialism, it is objectively necessary to follow a policy of alliances. And our party is doing just that. It is seeking to develop its alliances. There may be many particular forms of the manifestation of its policy of alliances: the policy of a single front, a policy of left unity, or other bloc policies, etc. All these are particular forms of the tactic of alliances.

In Turkey today "left unity" in the broadest sense of the term and with great urgency must be the heart of our alliance policy. With a few exceptions, the left in Turkey is anti-imperialist and pro-socialism; in general it is inspired by Marxism. We face the urgent task of uniting this community around a single political tactic.

The question of unity involves also a second aspect: that is the question of gathering all the Marxist-Leninists of Turkey in a single organisation. There is no categorical relation between this question and the question of alliances. It would, moreover, be incorrect to postpone the matter, to put it off, due to the difficult conditions in which we find ourselves.

For my own part, in the recent past I approached this

question quite incorrectly. As was openly pointed out at the 1977 Conference, there were and are Marxist-Leninist individuals and groups remaining outside our Party for what are really only subjective reasons. In reorganising our Party at a higher level the achievement of this unity must be our main organisational tactic. The idea that we have our own difficulties already and that, if they come too, we will really be strangled by difficulties, will not advance us. As was the case in some periods in the past, the party may be turned into a narrow circle turned in upon itself.

We must pursue an organisational policy aimed at drawing in all the existing accumulation.

An additional point: the reader must remember that, in March 1982, high-level discussions were carried out between the CPT, TİP (Workers' Party) and TSİP (Socialist Workers' Party), that this drawing together was advanced as an alternative to the unity that was developing among the other left forces, and that, when it failed to materialise, the process of isolating TSİP accelerated.

## On Kemalism

The Mustafa Kemal period is a concrete historical phenomenon. Evaluating this phenomenon is a question in itself. After 1960 the term "Kemalism" began to be widely used and discussed in the political atmosphere of Turkey. There is very little ideological, political or organisational connection between the term "Kemalism" as it was used widely after 1960 and the Mustafa Kemal period itself.

"Kemalism" did not appear after 1960 as a trend which then divided. Rather, *separate bourgeois trends* applied the term "Kemalism" to themselves. For this reason, what must be investigated is not the split within Kemalism but separate trends calling themselves "Kemalist".

These trends are:

1. The nationalistic, leftist, anti-imperialist trend which began with the *Yon* (Direction) journal and continued with the

“National Democratic Front” movement. The *Revolutionary Democratic Movement* characterised itself as Kemalist. Today this revolutionary democratic movement has split into two. The old cadres (former members of the 1960 junta) are still bearing the standard of this type of interpretation of Kemalism. The new cadres, the young and mass rank-and-file of revolutionary democracy, long since abandoned the claim to be Kemalist and approached closer to socialism (for example, the *Dev Yol* — Revolutionary Way — movement).

2. After 1970 in particular the bourgeois reformist trend which had sprung up and was developing within the Republican People’s Party (the Ecevit movement) laid claim, and is laying claim to Kemalism.

3. After 1960 the non-racist wing of neo-fascism, the Republic Reliance Party movement, and a section of the leading ranks of the state and the army represented in the finance oligarchy connected with it, claimed and are claiming a fascist interpretation of “Kemalism”. The present-day leadership of the army and the junta in general can be considered within this category.

### On the religious trend

After 1960 the religious opposition, which is included among the traditional opposition trends in Turkish society, appeared as an openly political trend. In quite a short time it turned into a mass movement. Like many political trends, it had its own internal contradictions and these were clearly reflected externally. The religious trend included both theocratic, canonical, reactionary tendencies, and ties with international imperialist centres on the one hand; anti-American, anti-imperialist, anti-big capital, democratic and justice-seeking trends on the other.

Anti-American tendencies had become very widespread prior to the 12th September coup. In some provinces, anti-communist prejudices had begun to be overcome, and in trade unions and youth organisations, members of the religious trend

had even begun to enter into joint action units against the fascists with the communists. Until the 12th of September, the CPT, our party, continually evaluated the two-sided nature of this trend.

Among the political causes of the 12th September coup were also the facts that the National Salvation Party movement had begun to display open anti-Americanism and that the pro-American minister of foreign affairs had been removed from office with NSP votes. The CPT's 12th September 1980 statement was written with these in mind.

In the period that followed the coup, we thought that emphasizing the anti-imperialist aspect of the religious trend, its lay, Kemalist circles, would particularly discomfit the junta's "realistic" wing and we thus pushed the concrete, objective situation into the background. (One of the conditions that the platform of conciliation with the junta imposed on the party by a group of leaders who opposed the 12th September 1980 statement was to refrain from any mention of some progressive elements in the religious trend. — Author) After one and a half years had passed, we saw again that the *National Newspaper* was one of the few legal publications in the country that voice anti-American views.

After brutally suppressing the anti-American and democratic movement within the religious trend, the junta then began to make liberal use of religious motifs in its own reactionary propaganda. For the first time in the history of the republic, the junta has undertaken to train "Islam missionaries" for imperialist purposes.

### III. The trade union movement

#### **Criticism of the "freedom to the 52" campaign launched after 12th September 1980 (To the Political Bureau, March 1982)**

The working class of Turkey is heir to approximately 100 years of development. Throughout its entire history it achieved many and various forms of organisation having many different aims. This development rests upon a rich past which stretches from the solidarity organisations and first trade unions at the turn of the century, through various legal workers' parties, to the illegal party and trade unions.

From the time of its first appearance, the working class of Turkey fought against Ottoman totalitarianism and the direct repression and terror of imperialism. This period comprises a relatively short period in the history of Turkey's working class. Starting from the 1908 bourgeois revolution, our working class has really been struggling against the repression and terror of the Turkish bourgeoisie for 74 years. Aside from some very short-lived examples which appeared, the bourgeoisie has never accorded the working class any possibilities for legal organisation at any level (either political or trade union).

The organisational characteristics of the national Turkish bourgeois state and society played an important role in the emergence of this situation. In my opinion it would not be incorrect to advance the following thesis: the socio-political



superstructural organisation of the Turkish bourgeois state and society exhibits non-pluralist, totalitarian and monolithic traditions and characteristics.

The pluralist, representative, parliamentary bourgeois democracy which is seen in, and which developed and became institutionalised in the countries of Europe, the continent where capitalism first developed, either never existed in Turkey or were imitated in a purely formal manner. Trade union organisation, which is really our topic here, is thus not only political, but is also a product, a form, of pluralist organisation on the social level as well. Through constant struggle the working class created its tradition of trade union organisation in the first centres of capitalism and also succeeded in forcing the bourgeoisie to accept this. Nevertheless, the weak and limited development of capitalism in Turkey and its consequence, the qualitative and quantitative weakness of the working class, objectively made it impossible to smash the totalitarian, monolithic superstructure for a long time. For this reason, the history and traditions of trade unionism in the true sense of the term do not go back a long way.

### A brief look at the recent past of Turkey's trade union movement

In the pre-Republican period (pre-1923) we see that workers' solidarity organisations and trade unions were established in regions where the working class had developed relatively and numerically in the Ottoman Empire, first and foremost in Selanik and Istanbul. These organisations reached their most widespread level in the years of truce during which the state authority weakened (1918—1922). (For information see Selanik trade unions — Sülker, Tuncay, etc.)

After proclaiming the Republic, the Turkish bourgeoisie which reconsolidated its political power within the present borders of Turkey, banned all forms of organisation by the working class and working people. From 1925 to 1946 there were

no legal trade unions in Turkey which was ruled by a totalitarian regime. The right to establish legal organisations on a class basis was accorded to the working class for the first time in June 1946 under the influence of the "wind of democratisation" that was blowing in the capitalist world after the Second World War. In a very short time, two legal workers' parties and several trade unions were founded. The first discussions of the principles of the trade union movement began. Horizontal and vertical models of trade union organisation were proposed. Tens of thousands of workers were organised in trade unions. Regional trade union bodies uniting trade unions on a regional scale were established. Communists were at the forefront of this struggle. Communist workers who had gained the confidence of the working class were elected to the leadership of trade unions.

The lifespan of this democratisation movement was not long. In December 1946 the martial law commanders once again banned all forms of working class organisation (Istanbul Martial Law Command closure decision) and imprisoned the leaders and many members of workers' parties and trade unions.

Via a new law passed the following year, on 20th February 1947, the working class once again secured the right to organise trade unions.

The new trade unions to be established were not allowed to conduct collective bargaining in the name of their members or to organise strikes. That is, a type of solidarity organisation was established under the name of "trade union". Nevertheless, once established, the organisational activity of these "trade unions" developed rapidly. The "regional trade union units" organised within these trade unions waged an active struggle for the rights to strike and collective bargaining. The two trade union parties existing at that period tried every type of method in order to attract the working class to themselves.

This time the working class struggle for the right to strike lasted 16 years. A law passed on 15th July 1963 gave the working class the limited right to strike and the trade unions the right to conduct collective bargaining for the first time in Turkey's history.

An influential role in the political and social life of Turkey was played by the American Aid to International Development (AID) organisation which had begun to work in Turkey under the terms of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. In 1952 (the year that Turkey entered NATO) a central trade union authority was established in Turkey as the result of the joint efforts of the ICFTU, the AFL-CIO, AAFLCO and AID. *Turk-İş* (the Turkish Workers' Confederation — trans.) was founded on 31st July 1952 with the direct aid — of a financial, information and personnel nature — of the organisations listed above. (Registered CIA agents such as Irwing and Brown came to Turkey and took up active duties in the establishment of *Turk-İş*.)

Although it was founded in 1952, *Turk-İş* proved unable to establish a central trade union authority on a real national level during the ten year period until 1962. Trade union authority rested in the regional trade union units where, in general, progressives were influential.

In the year 1962, American imperialism, and the Turkish government which was cooperating with it, carried out a series of covert operations before giving the trade union movement the right to strike and to conduct collective bargaining. The main operations were:

- The closure of regional trade union units.

- In their place the appointment from the top of "trusted" individuals as *Turk-İş* regional representatives in an anti-democratic manner.

- In 1962 AID, which had been providing financial aid to *Turk-İş* via the government since 1952, now began to finance it directly. AID began to provide close to 70% of its expenditures and, in return, to intervene in *Turk-İş* openly.

- While, until 1962 cadres were sent to the USA for so-called education on an individual basis, in that year they began to be sent *en masse*.

- An ideological campaign was accelerated to keep the working class and the trade unions out of politics. (Above-party politics)

Aside from all these, the limited right to strike was given to the working class only after a whole series of *precautions* (!) had been taken.

Meanwhile, on 13th February 1961 a group of progressive trade unionists in leading positions in the regional trade union units founded the Workers' Party of Turkey. Contradictions appeared and gradually increased between these trade union leaders who were defending the interests of the working class within the restricted trade union organisations existing since 1947, and the *Turk-İş* leadership. The following are the points on which these contradictions were focused:

- That it was incorrect for *Turk-İş* to accept money from AID, an American government body,
- That the organisational structure of *Turk-İş* was anti-democratic and must be democratised,
- That *Turk-İş* must stop taking the side of the government and the bosses during strikes,
- That it must abandon the attitude of "above — party trade unionism" which was designed to keep the working class out of politics.

The contradictions between the *Turk-İş* leadership which had gained the confidence of the government and of AID, and the representatives of the democratic and progressive trends in the trade union movement became ever more intense. Parallel to these developments on the trade union level, after 1965 internal contradictions, upsets and differentiation had begun to appear in the Workers' Party founded by these progressive trade unionists in 1961. The influence within the party leadership of those who had established the party had greatly declined. Deprived of any opportunity to work within *Turk-İş* and seeing their influence within the Workers' Party restricted, these trade unionists, who had led the progressive tendencies within the trade union movement since 1947, sought a new organisational model for themselves. On 15th July 1966 a group of trade unionists issued a statement. They were Kemal Turkler (Metal Workers), Ibrahim Guzelce (Press), Kemal Ayav (Plastics), Kemal Nebioglu (Clothing). The statement they issued was called the "Solidarity

among Trade Unions" (SADA) statement. On 15th January 1967 another statement was issued above the signatures of : Nusret Onsuher (Bank Workers), Ibrahim Guzelce (Press), Ayhan Yetkiner (Press, Ankara), Kemal Nebioglu (Clothing), Kemal Turkler (Metal Workers), Mehmet Alpdündar (Zonguldak Metal Workers), Rıza Kuas (Plastics), Nejat Akbay (Chemical Workers), Mehmet Kılıç (Petroleum Workers), Cevat Gümrükçü (Sugar-beet Workers), Rıza Güven (Textile), Cemal Akın (General Workers' Union), Tuncer Kocamanoğlu (Land and Water workers), Suat Kundakçı (Construction), Tahir Öztürk (Construction).

Some of the trade unionists who signed this statement (members of the Republican People's Party) decided *at the last minute* not to participate in the founding of DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions) and it was only 8 years later, in the 1973-75 period, when the DISK leadership was approaching the RPP, that they joined DISK. On 13th February 1967 a group of trade unionists founded DISK (i.e., on the 6th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party in 1961).

They explained their reasons for leaving the Workers' Party in one document, and stated the founding principles of DISK in another.

Trade unions in 5 branches of industry took part in the founding of DISK: metalurgy (Metal Workers' Union), clothing (Clothing Workers), the press (Press Workers), mining (Mining Workers' Union) and chemicals (Chemical Workers). There were approximately 30,000 members. Established in 1967 with 4 trade unions and 30,000 members, by its 10th year, 1977, DISK had approximately 500,000 members.

The growth of DISK was not only numerical, its qualitative influence also increased. It gained the confidence and sympathy of a significant section of the working class of Turkey, including first and foremost the members of *Türk-İş*. Governments and the reactionary forces began to seek means of dissuading the workers from becoming members of DISK. The influence of DISK was not restricted to the working class alone. The working

people of other social strata also felt the need to organise within DISK; if nothing else, to struggle alongside it. Rural working people, cooperative organisations, various professional organisations (teachers, technicians, etc.) saw DISK as a centre defending and developing the interests of workers and working people. The main reasons that DISK developed with such strength and influence and became a powerful centre in Turkey's working class movement were:

— The fact that it organised young workers, particularly in the relatively modern branches of industry (metal, chemicals, etc.) gained it dynamism.

The fact that the leaderships of both the confederation and its member trade unions were relatively homogeneous ideologically and politically and the fact that Kemal Turkler, who had truly great leadership ability, was undisputed leader within the organisation, allowed the organisation to function effectively and in unity for a long period.

— The objective dissatisfaction which the working class and members of *Türk-İş* in particular felt towards *Türk-İş* increased interest in DISK.

The fact that, in their founding years (1967-1970), the member trade unions of DISK employed various working class methods of struggle in organising and in winning rights in the trade union struggle gained it a justified confidence and fame.

— The fact that both DISK's founding statements and the theses in other fundamental documents it published included, not only a search for a solution to the workers' day-to-day problems, but also at the same time theses for the democratic transformation of society as a whole, and the fact that these theses defended the interests of the other sections of the working class as well, gained DISK the support of all the dynamic sections of society, first and foremost of other working people and progressive intellectuals.

— The rapprochement between the DISK leadership and the RPP in the years 1972-1975 opened the way for those trade unions under RPP leadership which had retracted their decision to participate in the founding of DISK at the last minute in 1976

(Textile, Petroleum, General Workers, Land Workers, etc.), to join DISK as a body.

Gaining strength in this way, DISK at the same time became a powerful centre which definitely had to be taken into account in the political life of Turkey.

On the other hand, the fact that the Communist Party was illegal and that until 1975 it was unable to play an effective role in the political life of society, the ideological and organisational weaknesses of the legal workers' parties, and the existing ideological and organisational confusion in the working class movement, objectively created a vacuum in political life. It was under the conditions of the appearance of such an ideological, political and organisational vacuum that DISK, a powerful working class organisation which opposed the system, and supported socialism in general, was given, from both within and without, a political mission — one which was, moreover, exaggerated most of the time.

The strong aspect of the progressive trade unionists who founded the Workers' Party in 1961 and DISK in 1967 was their faith in the class movement, in their class. Their weak aspect, on the other hand, was their ideological formation. As a result of this, their confidence in their own intellectual abilities increased to the extreme. In some periods these weaknesses led them to act together with groups outside themselves whom they believed to have greater intellectual capabilities. But they could not integrate fully with any of those groups. They preserved their relative internal independence. From time to time, this tendency resulted in a certain "group" psychology and led them into ideological zig-zags.

The turning points of this development were:

- their compromise with the Aybar-Boran-Aren group of the WPT leadership in 1962,

- Their collaboration with the M. Ali Aybar group in 1967, whose openly revisionist line had become apparent,

- their relations with left-wing revolutionary democrats in the years 1969-71 (the Dev-Güç, 9th March attempts, etc.)

- unity of action with the RPP in the 1972-75 period which,

during 1978, turned into unity of action with the RPP left-wing represented in the Unity-Solidarity movement,

— their participation in the "Unity-Solidarity" movement in the period 1975-78.

### The reasons for the attacks on DISK

Before we analyze the emergence of the attacks on DISK which became ever more violent, it is necessary to take a brief look first at the reasons underlying those attacks.

First among these reasons is the fact that by 1977, DISK had become a force, a centre which definitely had to be taken into account in the political life of the country.

Before the 1973 elections, the RPP leaders established contact with the DISK leaders, asking for their assistance in persuading DISK members to support the RPP in the elections. During those years, there was also quite a broad section within the working class which placed its hopes in the RPP. The propaganda of a "people's sector" which was to become the material basis for the class collaborationism the RPP leadership tried to impose on the working class, began to be conducted by the RPP intellectuals within DISK as well. Workers with a high level of class consciousness, however, soon understood the situation. They prevented people like Beşir Hamitogulları, who is now a member of the junta parliament and in those times was the champion of the "people's sector", from appearing at trade-union educational meetings.

The top RPP leadership again asked DISK for support before the 1977 elections. (Mustafa Üstündağ, Besim Üstünel, and Aytekin Kotil from the RPP leadership came to DISK and met with I. Güzelce. B. Ecevit came in person to meet K. Türkler.) The stand of the working class was clear. DISK did not make concessions from its class positions. It opposed the "social contract" proposed by the RPP for the rescue of capitalism. DISK was the only consistent, legal force which obstructed the implementation of legislation on the State Security Courts. Its



consistent stand also influenced all the other organisations, including the RPP. On May Days and in other massive demonstrations DISK displayed its material strength.

It was this DISK which in 1977 committed yet another inexcusable mistake (!) It participated in the "Unity-Solidarity Movement" which, on the legal level, represented one section of the political forces in the country which sided with democracy and progress. The same "Unity-Solidarity Movement" housed supporters of the Communist Party of Turkey, one section of the RPP's left wing, and the dynamic youth, women's and teachers', professional, and co-operative movements. Naturally, it was inevitable that all the organisations and forces taking part in this unity of action should influence each other ideologically and politically. Among the political forces represented in this movement, the CPT supporters possessed the strongest internal organisation and inevitably, to a significant extent, the ideological and political motor of the "Unity — Solidarity Movement".

In 1977 the following picture emerged: By organising the most dynamic sections of the working class of Turkey, DISK had both become a quantitatively great force and its politics were developing in the direction of a radical, all-round democratisation of society. This new situation became an important reason for the open attacks against DISK which had cooperated with the top leadership of the RPP from 1972 until 1975.

Another important reason for the attacks against DISK was the great economic impasse Turkey faced in 1977. It is a marked feature of Turkish capitalism that it cannot remain on its feet without large-scale economic aid from abroad. In the period 1974-77, imperialism did not and could not continue to provide economic assistance to the same extent as before. The invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974 and the consequences of the occupation placed an unbearable burden on the Turkish economy. Again in those years, rapidly rising oil prices made it necessary for Turkey, which for the most part uses imported oil, to set aside 35% of its foreign currency expenditures for the purchase of oil. The economic difficulties which all these circumstances created,

led one section of the bourgeoisie to seek more radical solutions. This, however, made it necessary for the economic and democratic demands of the working class and other working people to be suppressed. The democratic political alternative to bourgeois reaction had to some extent shifted from the RPP to the "Unity-Solidarity Movement" and DISK was the strongest and most massive part of this movement. It was not easy to start taking action against the working class and other working people without first silencing this movement and DISK. The freezing of wages and of social rights was possible only if DISK were silenced. We believe that it was these two fundamental factors which constituted the reasons for the start and the intensification of the attacks against DISK.

### Development of the attacks against DISK

The attacks against DISK started by the bourgeoisie from 1977 onwards not only intensified step by step, for the most part in a coordinated manner, but moreover the various sections of the bourgeoisie each played a role in this assault suited to its own nature. *The first stage* in the attacks on DISK was the stage of wearing it down and of conducting propaganda which prepared excuses justifying the assault against DISK. The first signal in this stage was given by the reactionary elements within the RPP. Agents of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) within the RPP's youth section prepared a so-called secret report which they leaked to the public. (The report by Zeki Alçın and his friends.) The essence of the report spoke of the organisational ties, which in fact do not exist, between DISK and the CPT. The reactionary bourgeois press, led by the *Tercüman* columnist, and MIT agents worked to spread the campaign. Refik Sönmezsoy, one of MIT's ideologues on labour questions, took it upon himself to become the flag-bearer of this campaign. He even wrote a base novel about DISK-CPT relations. While, on the one hand, this campaign prepared the justification for a more advanced assault, it also aimed at driving a wedge between DISK

and the "Unity-Solidarity Movement" on the one hand, and the RPP, particularly its left wing, on the other. To a certain extent they succeeded in creating within the RPP the paranoia about "communist infiltration"

In the second stage of the attack, the bourgeoisie began to use its agents to intervene directly into the internal affairs of DISK and to isolate the revolutionary elements within DISK.

Here we must mention a particular weakness. The "Unity—Solidarity Movement" could not succeed in achieving the unity of all the revolutionary forces. There existed significant left-wing forces outside this movement. There were the workers' parties, the revolutionary democrats (the term 'revolutionary democrats' is used to describe all those groups proposing anti-imperialist, pro-socialist, radical transformations, other than the Maoist organisations and those directly set up by the police), and the advanced sections of the Kurdish national movement. This weakness provided the bourgeoisie with extra room for manipulation. An anti-"Unity-Solidarity Movement" was launched, headed by various RPP factions within DISK and which objectively provided an opportunity for the division of the left-wing forces. The first consequence of this reactionary movement appeared in December 1977. It succeeded in bringing about a split at the 6th Congress of DISK. The president of DISK and its true leader, K. Türkler, was stripped of his post. In this way, reaction achieved its first concrete success. However, due to the conscious attitude of the DISK rank-and-file, the irreversible democratic procedures of DISK, and due to the fact that the necessity for unity became better understood among the majority of the left-wing forces, the organisational unity of DISK was to some extent re-established at its 7th Congress.

This time the bourgeoisie moved its assault onto yet a higher level and murdered Kemal Türkler, the founder of DISK, its president and one of the leaders of the working class movement of Turkey, on 22 July 1980. Kemal Türkler occupies a special place in the working class movement of Turkey. Raised in the practical school of industrial labour and the class movement, Kemal Türkler had many of the characteristics that a leader

should have. Within the Workers' Party, of which he was a founder member and leader, as well as within DISK, of which he was a founder-member and its president for 13 years, he was a determined leader who had been accepted among the workers whose pulse he held in his hand. He saw from the beginning that the liberation of the working class and of society lies in socialism and, particularly after 1975, had begun to adopt Marxism. With his past, with his stand and his determination, Kemal Türkler constituted an obstacle to the 12 September 1980 coup and the bourgeoisie treacherously rid itself of this obstacle.

The 12 September 1980 coup ushered in a further stage in the attacks on DISK. DISK was banned. Leaders of DISK and of affiliated trade unions, together with thousands of progressive DISK members were forced to flee the terror of the bourgeoisie. *Türk-İş*, on the other hand, was left untouched.

During this stage of the assault on DISK, workers who were members of DISK were made to resign from their trade union and compelled to become members of *Türk-İş*. In the meantime, conscious, experienced workers' representatives were picked out, given the sack, and their membership of *Türk-İş* prevented.

The present stage of the attack on DISK is the trial of DISK, the DISK leadership and leading cadres, in military courts. The military regime has announced that it will try thousands of DISK members.

## The DISK trials and an indictment

Some of the court cases which the reactionary military regime announced against DISK have already been opened and are still continuing. We will mention only one of these trials, the trial which is known in the public as the "DISK trial" or the "Trial of the 52". For there are some features of this trial which differentiate it from the others.

First among those features is that the most senior officials of DISK are being prosecuted in this trial. On the 12th September 1980, these persons constituted the top leadership of DISK.

Independent of their personalities, this is an important fact in itself.

Further, a significant number of those DISK leaders being tried are people who were elected to the DISK leadership as an outcome of the "anti-Unity-Solidarity" campaign and hold very different ideological and political views.

Thirdly, as is clear from the indictment, it is not these 52 persons who are being tried. What is being tried is the entire DISK movement between 13 February 1967 and 12 September 1980. As is again clear from the indictment, what is being tried is socialist thought. In that case, one has to answer the following questions in order to understand the significance of this trial. Firstly, if what is being tried is the entire DISK phenomenon between 13 February 1967 and 12 September 1980, can the whole responsibility for and the defence of those 14 years of struggle which occupy an honourable and very important place in the working class movement of Turkey, be placed upon these 52 friends, or not? Secondly, if what is really being tried under the indictment is Marxism-Leninism and the class struggle, can the defence of Marxism-Leninism be left to those friends who hold very different world-views, many of whom have on many occasions stated that they are not Marxist-Leninists, and even that they are opposed to it? Thirdly, can the development of the attacks and arrests aimed directly at the Communist Party, be conceived of separately from the whole series of CPT trials, the Peace Association trial, etc., where hundreds of people are being tried for the *sole reason* that they are members of the Communist Party, solely because they hold Marxist-Leninist world views?

If we attempt to answer these questions, we arrive at the following results:

The DISK trials and the CPT trials are different aspects of the same attack.

The issues which are being tried cannot be left to the 52 persons who are being tried directly.

This struggle cannot be reduced to a struggle to save the 52 from the hangman. Whoever lays claim to DISK's 14 year history of struggle, whoever sides with Marxism-Leninism, must

take his place in the struggle against this concerted attack. No reply to this attack is possible if the CPT and DISK trials are isolated from each other.

There are two ways. Either it is a matter of saving the 52, the hanging of whom is in any case not very likely. In that case, the 14-year old DISK, as well as Marxism-Leninism, will be convicted in court, possibly together with a section of the 52. Or it is a matter of defending Marxism-Leninism and DISK. The 52 will be saved as an outcome of this. In this second case, the DISK solidarity campaign and the CPT solidarity campaign will be conducted together.

Now I shall briefly state some of the characteristics of the indictment. As already mentioned, it is above all Marxism which is being tried in the DISK trial. The military prosecutor has acted in the light of the experience of the 12 March 1971, using the charge which led to the conviction of the Workers' Party in the 12 March period, the indictment suggested by the Sabancı Holding. The *Akbank*, which is a subsidiary of the Sabancı Holding, guided the 12 March prosecutor by publishing the Federal German Constitutional Court's decision to ban the DKP. The prosecutor in the DISK trial is using the same arguments. 50 per cent of the 900-page indictment against DISK consists of excerpts from DISK documents and publications.

The second characteristic of the prosecutor's indictment is that it suggests to the working class, in a style reminiscent of that of the "national leaders" period in Turkey, that it abandon its class interests, that it abandon the class struggle and collaborate with the bourgeoisie.

Another characteristic of the indictment is that the slander against DISK conducted both in the reactionary press as well as by the junta leaders, fails to be seriously represented in the indictment. The prime instance of this is that the prosecutor has belied their attempts to portray DISK as a terrorist organisation.

Another example of how this slander has proved futile even in the indictment is the question of an organisational link between DISK and the CPT. This can be seen even in the way this question is handled in prosecutor Takkeci's indictment. A

general characteristic of the indictment, more correctly, the reflection in the indictment of a general characteristic of the 12th September regime, is its theoretical contribution to the concept of "illegality".

Now the bourgeoisie is advancing a "rationale" according to which even those organisations which were founded with its own consent will be regarded as illegal when it sees fit. The two concocted excuses for this are the following.

If a discrepancy exists in any organisation (party, trade union, etc.) between the size of its membership and its political influence, that organisation will be illegal. Secondly, if it is alleged that the leaders of a legal organisation adopt, after its foundation, ideas and views which are not in the interests of the bourgeoisie, and/or if a section of its membership is alleged to be involved in illegal activities, the organisation itself will become illegal.

Twenty years of bourgeois democracy are being tried in the concrete form of DISK.

For example:

- the previous martial law is being denounced — although the very same martial law commanders now constitute the junta,
- the deed by which the statutes and documents of DISK were approved is being denounced,
- the judiciary stands accused.

Issues to be researched:

- examples of the connection between the indictment and articles by Refik Sönmezsoy and Nazlı Ilicak published in *Tercüman* during 1976-78,
- examples of the connection between the indictment against DISK and the book "Communism Denied",
- the relationship between the indictment against DISK and the murder of Kemal Türkler,
- the NAP (Nationalist Action Party) trial,
- response to the murder of Kemal Türkler in the progressive press,
- the connection between the indictment against DISK and the 24th January decisions (economic austerity measures imposed in January 1980 — trans).

## IV. The peace question

### On the peace movement

(To the Political Bureau, 16 July 1982)

- Difficulties
- Possible slogans
- Some mistakes
- Correct points of emphasis

#### Difficulties

There exists in Turkey no peace movement which could have a mass character and play a role in political life to this or that extent; such a peace movement could not be created. Today as well there are some difficulties which hinder its creation.

— The fact that Turkey has seen no significant war for a very long time and, in particular, that it did not directly suffer the destruction of the Second World War, objectively constitutes a source of difficulty. To the masses and to the intelligentsia, war and possible destruction through war are either historical tales read in books or fantasies about the future.

— The role played by religion within the peace movement is an important one. In this respect, the Catholic Church has the greatest influence. The emergence and the essence of



Catholicism are connected with pacifism. In addition, Catholics experienced the second world war. For these reasons, Catholics constitute an important detachment of the peace movement. On the other hand, belligerence and conquest characterise the emergence and essence of Islam. This aspect, this influence of Islam, constitutes an obstacle to the organisation of a peace movement in Turkey.

— The character and influence of bourgeois nationalism in Turkey constitutes yet another obstacle. Nationalism, which yesterday also included Turanist and Panturkist designs, has still preserved its expansionist character, on the condition that it also accords with the general interests of imperialism.

— The traditional character and development of the state in Turkey, and the political role which the army plays within it, are also an obstacle facing any peace movement. For centuries the army in Turkey has been the most powerful "political party".

— Anti-Russian sentiments in their historical development, the continuous and systematic propagation of this motif and, connected with this, the fairy tale of the Russian-Soviet threat, and the fact that insufficient struggle has been waged against this fairy tale, constitute another obstacle.

— The fact that Turkey is a multi-nation country and that the bourgeoisie has always felt the need to use open force in the implementation of national oppression, and finally,

— The fact that, due to the nature of the organisation of a peace movement, it must be a broadly-based and legal movement, that this in turn requires the existence of a minimum of bourgeois democracy, but that periods when minimum democratic freedoms have been granted have only been very short-lived and extraordinary periods in the life of the country, constitute some of the most important obstacles to the peace movement.

## Possible slogans

While taking into account the difficulties listed above, which for all practical purposes may be regarded as objective difficulties, nevertheless, the slogans around which a peace movement in Turkey can become a mass movement must be formulated, and both propaganda and agitation, as well as organisation, must be conducted in the particular forms under which a peace movement may thrive. The organisation of such a movement with a peace-loving and anti-American essence, in such a clear and exposed manner, faces the difficulties I have mentioned above. A movement with such an essence may assume many different forms. For example:

- a straight-forward peace movement
- an anti-war movement
- an overt anti-American movement
- a movement opposed to the American military presence in the country
  - pacifism
  - a generally anti-nuclear movement (including its use for both military and peaceful purposes)
    - a movement against nuclear weapons
    - a general environmentalist movement
    - an anti-NATO movement for an independent policy within NATO
      - a movement for independence and non-alignment
      - a movement against unemployment and for economic development
        - a movement directly opposed to military expenditure
        - a movement for good relations with our neighbours, etc.

We must be able to clarify these and similar forms and to determine (independently of our own subjective preferences) which of these options objectively has a chance to thrive in our country.

I would here like to touch upon a difficulty and something necessitated by this difficulty. It is impossible to create a peace movement which is to play a role in questions of peace on an

international level, if it is not at the same time a peace movement which is directly linked to the national questions inside the country.

### Correct points of emphasis

In order for a peace movement to thrive in Turkey, there must be a broadly-based agitation-propaganda effort which takes into account the concrete, day-to-day interests of the masses (not only their objective interests but also taking into account their subjective attitudes).

The main points of emphasis in this work should be the following:

1. A continuous struggle against the idea of a Russian-Soviet threat and the concrete forms which it takes. Today, the fairy-tale of a Russian-Soviet threat revolves around three main points:

- a) The Soviets want territory from Turkey.
- b) The Soviets want to divide Turkey into single-nation entities.
- c) The Soviets are organising terrorist trends within Turkey.

Separate agitation and propaganda work against this policy must be directed towards both the intelligentsia as well as the broad mass of working people.

2. To show the threat of a nuclear war and to explain its results, in particular to make clear that there is no possibility for Turkey to remain outside this threat. And to this end:

- a) Explain that the Soviets have promised not to use nuclear weapons against countries which do not store nuclear weapons and propose that Turkey may, at least on this issue, reach a separate agreement with the Soviet Union, an agreement not to use nuclear weapons.
- b) Explain the meaning of the Soviet Union's guarantee not to be the first country to use nuclear weapons.
- c) Concretely expose the existence of overt and covert

nuclear weapons in Turkey.

3. To explain to the masses NATO's strategy of "flexible response", a strategy still applied to Turkey today.

4. Today Cyprus has become a burden for the Turkish bourgeoisie, at least for a significant section of it. Both a political as well as an economic burden. Using this concrete example, militarism and expansionism must be attacked.

5. To be able to give concrete examples of the relation between day-to-day economic problems, unemployment, rising prices and the inability to develop economically on the one hand, and military expenditure on the other.

6. To step up agitation around the question of the Rapid Deployment Force by using such examples as the Sinai Peninsula and Lebanon.

## V. Organisational questions

### On the question of the congress

(To the Political Bureau, 20th April 1982)

We all agree that the convening of our party congress within the shortest possible time has become a question which is difficult to postpone. There are two main material reasons for this. Firstly, our party has not convened a congress for a very long time. There is a widespread expectation, both among party members and maybe also among many fraternal parties, that this vital activity of party life be undertaken by the CPT as soon as possible. The campaign which the *Işçinin Sesi* group has been conducting both inside and outside the party since 1979 is also one of the reasons why this issue has become a matter of polemics.

Secondly, the resolutions of the 1980 plenary meeting resolved that changes should be carried out above all in the party programme, as well as in its other basic documents in accordance with prevailing conditions. And although certain preparatory work has already been done, this work was halted by the 12 September coup. For these reasons it has become a burning task to speed up preparations for the congress, as resolved at all the Plenums since the 1977 Konya Conference and in many resolutions of the Politburo. In connection with the preparations for the congress my main views and suggestions are the

following:

1. The congresses of communist parties are their highest forums. They are meetings where party life and party work are determined on a fairly long-term basis, meetings where the party's organisational and ideological unity is consolidated on a higher level. It is for this reason that, since the days of the Communist International, a communist party's ability to convene its congress is judged above all by its having a certain minimum representativeness. However, in parties which, compared with us, are more experienced in convening congresses, the scrutiny of the representativeness of their congresses has become a well-established principle. It is a well-known, established and necessary practice of communist parties that a "mandate" commission submits a report confirming the representativeness of the congress at the beginning of the congresses of all the communist parties.

For this reason, we too should put the question of raising the representativeness of our congress at the forefront of our preparatory work for the congress. After a minimum representativeness of our congress has been established, the CC and PB of our party must make efforts for the convening of the congress.

2. In order for the documents that will be considered at our congress to be altered in accordance with present conditions, preparations in this respect must be stepped up, at least certain sections of the party must participate in these preparations and in the discussions to be conducted. It is therefore necessary that we start to put forward and develop a number of preliminary drafts in this area.

3. There is, in my opinion, a practical issue which we must clarify, that is to give an answer, *together with reasons for it*, to the question of which congress it is that will be convened.

If we make a brief break-down of the congresses of the CPT up to the present, we arrive at the following picture:

The congress which united the communist organisations of Turkey both inside the country and abroad was the Baku Congress of 10 September 1920. This congress was a founding

congress. When the great majority of the party leaders elected at this congress were murdered, the communist organisations abroad joined the Bolshevik Party, while in Turkey two separate communist organisations emerged, both linked to the Comintern but having no organisational link with each other. One was centred in Istanbul, the other in Ankara. This fact is stated openly and clearly both in all the theses on Turkey published by the Soviet Academy of Science's Institute of the East, as well as in the sources translated and published in Turkey (cf., *Turkey*, Kızılırmak Publications, Vol. 2, p.189). This division was based as much on the ideological, political differences between the two organisations, as on the uncertainty as to whether Istanbul and Anatolia would remain in one state. One of these two organisations convened its own congress in 1922 (the Ankara Congress of the People's Socialist Party). This congress has no relation whatsoever with the CTP which was based in Istanbul. In 1925 these two organisations united under the leadership of Ş.H. Değmer, at a founding congress, arriving at a compromise.

The question of whether or not the PSP Congress was the second congress of the CPT must be discussed. Today as in the past, this question is interpreted differently by circles sympathising with either the Istanbul or the Ankara organisation. According to those supporting the Istanbul organisation, the CPT's second congress was the 1925 Congress. According to those supporting the Ankara organisation, it was its third congress. As I have already mentioned above, Soviet sources still regard the 1925 Congress as the second congress. It will be appropriate to analyse this question apart from any subjectivism while keeping in mind the political benefit for the CPT; it will also be appropriate that this issue definitely be discussed with fraternal parties and that the question of which congress is to be convened now, is clarified *together with the reasons for it*.

4. The party congress our Party will convene must also be a congress which unites under the roof of the CPT also those Marxist—Leninist individuals and groups which have remained

outside the party. The documents of the 9th Congress (1974) of the Communist Party of Greece, convened under conditions of fascism and with such an understanding of unity, will assist us in drawing certain conclusions. In my view, this issue must also be taken up and steps taken in regard to it within the framework of the preparations for the congress.

5. While the preparations for the congress must be accelerated, we must also keep in mind that some time will be necessary for these preparations to reach a certain level. It will take time for the process of party organisation to reach a certain minimum level, for the basic draft documents to be discussed and finalised. Given this, there is another alternative under present conditions. The convening of a party conference with limited aims. For example, to discuss the question of changing the party programme in accordance with present conditions. And there are very concrete examples of this in our practical experiences. The 1977 Konya Conference. At this conference,

a— New party rules and a new programme were adopted,

b— A mainly new CC was elected; a mainly new Political Bureau was elected; and a new General Secretary was elected. The conference constituted the basis for the legitimacy of the new, top-to-bottom re-establishment of the party. With these features, the 1977 Conference was also a founding congress. Maybe it would have been more correct at that time to characterize this meeting as a congress.

For the reasons I have tried to explain above, any meeting convened under conditions where representativeness and internal party procedures have not reached an acceptable level — and in my view such a meeting is necessary — should still be characterized as a conference rather than a congress. However, if we succeed in raising these features to an acceptable level, it will be more correct to characterize this meeting as a congress.



## On the evaluation of the past

(To the Political Bureau, 20th April 1982)

We are faced with the task of evaluating the work of our party in the recent period. There are three important factors which necessitate such an evaluation. Firstly, in order to be able to explain the reasons for the ruin that our party faces today. Secondly, to enable us to draw lessons which will throw light on our work in the coming period. The third originates from the particular place this period occupies in our party history: in this period, for the first time in 60 years, our fighting party became a force which had to be taken into account in the political and social life of our country.

But there are two difficulties involved in making such an evaluation. Firstly, the difficulties arising from the fact that this evaluation must be done quickly. To what degree will we be able to abstain from subjective judgements? To what degree will we be able to limit this evaluation to the aims mentioned above? To what degree are some facts which will emerge going to assist the revival of our party?

On the other hand, however, there are drawbacks in postponing the evaluation. Above all, the three reasons mentioned above make it difficult. In addition the material evidence in regard to many phenomena in our party's recent past is limited. There is the possibility that we may all, with time, forget certain things. In contrast with some examples in our party's past, we are able to make such an all-round evaluation which will serve as an example. It may be considered that there are priorities other than the three factors cited above which necessitate an evaluation of our party's recent past. In particular, it may be considered that an explanation of the difficult conditions which we face is a more pressing task. The fact that the questions directed to the party leadership by party members centre around this point may strengthen the view in favour of assigning such a priority. I do not in fact, share this view. It is very clear that all the developments are linked to each other in a chain of connections. We must be able to identify correctly the

relation between the general and the particular, the objective and the subjective, the collective and the individual, when making such an evaluation. To this end, it is above all necessary to set out a record of events and documents and then to evaluate them. I will try to clarify this point by giving some examples.

1. With the assault by the junta, the party organisations have suffered very widespread arrests, and it has further come to light, if the articles and documents that have emerged up to this point are correct, that a significant section of the comrades who were imprisoned during these arrests, could not show the necessary resistance to the police. Now let us ask ourselves the following question: to what extent are the arrests connected with this lack of resistance? The following may be said in a superficial evaluation: If the lack of resistance was widespread, it is only natural that arrests should also be widespread. It is probably true that the lack of resistance further increased the arrests; but for us it is clear that the lack of resistance was not the determining factor in the arrests. For, already at the end of January 1981, we knew that the police held photographs and lists of the regional leaderships of 30-odd regions.

2. There were definitely shortcomings and mistakes in the work of comrades at various levels of party activity. Again, in a simple evaluation, we may consider some problems as the result solely of individual mistakes or shortcomings. But one must stop and immediately ask the following questions: Did the party have a clear, definite political line in that particular area? Had the task given to that comrade or that organisation been defined? Was there a certain mechanism for supervision? And so on.

3. While seeking out the reasons for the difficulties which we face organisationally, in my opinion, a more realistic picture will be gained if, before making a break-down of our shortcomings and mistakes as an organisation, we make a break-down of the things we accomplished, of what we achieved. I would like to expand a bit more on this example. If we show a shortcoming or mistake to a comrade who is not himself very much involved in the problems, naturally he will show a reaction.

But perhaps it is the case that there are far greater shortcomings which are also the objective basis for those mistakes and shortcomings. If we show this young comrade only the results, we will have deceived him.

With these examples, I have briefly touched upon some of the problems of superficial evaluations. In that case, how are we to make an evaluation that is more sound? Above all, it is necessary to do as complete a break-down as possible of all the events and documents. Such a break-down should encompass the following phases:

1. An evaluation of the 1951—1973 period preceding the 1973 revival:

- a) the period between 1951—1962
- b) the period between 1962—1965
- c) the period between 1965—1968
- d) the period between 1968—1973

This period should be analysed in conjunction with the relevant documents and greater emphasis must be given to the period 1960—73. This evaluation of the period which preceded the revival is important for many reasons. Above all, because such an evaluation was not carried out in 1973. The relations between the CPT and the Workers' Party during that period are still a matter of debate today. It was in this period that the factors which led to the revival and the pre-conditions for its character took shape.

2. The period of revival: 1973—80

- a) the factors which led to the revival, international factors, developments inside the country, the RPP factor, etc.
- b) the 1973—75 period. How did the CPT leadership emerge? What were our organisational policies?
- c) the 1975 DISK Congress and its consequences.
- d) the 1975—78 period: What was our membership policy? What was our educational programme? The letter written to the CPSU (in relation to the question of becoming legal).
- e) organisational policies between 1978—79
- f) the Yürükoğlu event, its emergence and consequences
- g) the 1979—80 period.

Research carried out on the basis of Political Bureau resolutions, Politburo minutes and other documents should include the break-down of all the resolutions adopted, a break-down of all those carried out, a break-down of the resolutions which were naturally not adopted. It is necessary to establish what was done on the basis of which resolutions; what was done without being based on adopted resolutions; which district and regional committees were set up and supervised by the Political Bureau, particularly after 1973; which fundamental areas of work it took up and debated; and to determine the mistakes and shortcomings of the organisations implementing the resolutions adopted. Only such an objective analysis can lead us to a sound evaluation free of subjectivism.

Such a concrete and extensive break-down and evaluation may face two problems, one artificial, one real. The artificial problem is the mistake of applying the term "secrecy", not to technically necessary information, but to some political realities. We must avoid this as much as possible. It will lead us nowhere and only further complicate our problems. The greatest difficulty, however, lies in the fact that the responsibility for all the developments since 1950, and particularly since 1973, rests primarily with the Political Bureau.

We must both make a complete break-down and evaluate it, as well as reveal its conclusions to the party organisation. I believe this to be necessary, but unrealistic today. I am convinced that any evaluations made today, when we must bind our wounds and revive the party, if they are incomplete, if they are not concrete or if they are of a subjective character, would have no other result than to further aggravate our already existing difficulties.

## The situation in January 1981

(To the Political Bureau, 26th January 1981)

To the Political Bureau of the CPT Central Committee,  
Under the new political conditions faced by our country and our

party, we are confronted with the burning task of reviewing the entire organisational mechanisms from top to bottom in order to develop the organisational structure of our party, its internal procedures and party life in general, and in order to fulfil the political tasks faced by our party in a more effective manner.

I propose that the following changes in relation to our organisational procedures be taken up, debated and decided upon at the coming meeting of the Political Bureau:

1. That from now on regular meetings of the Political Bureau be held at least once every two weeks at a date previously arranged, and without fail.

2. That the secretariat compile a complete list of all the resolutions adopted by the Political Bureau during 1980, and that any resolutions which were not carried out be specified; that the reasons why they were not carried out be presented; and that the secretariat submit all of this to the members of the Political Bureau before the Political Bureau meeting, in the form of a written report.

3. That henceforth the written agenda of Political Bureau meetings be handed out to Political Bureau members beforehand.

4. That the secretariat submit a report to every Political Bureau meeting stating whether or not the resolutions adopted at the previous meeting have been carried out and, if not, why not.

5. Despite the long period of time that has elapsed since resolutions in relation to organisational questions were adopted by the CC at a meeting of the Political Bureau with CC members, and again since resolutions on organisational questions were adopted by the CC at the CC Plenary in 1980, these resolutions have never been placed on the agenda of the Political Bureau and, to this day, no decisions have been taken or work carried out for the implementation of these resolutions. That therefore the resolutions of the 1979 meeting and 1980 Plenary be taken up at the coming Political Bureau meeting and that the Political Bureau take the decisions and conduct the work necessary for the implementation of these decisions.

6. That the organisational proposals made by myself and

stated in the appended list concerned with party procedures, and particularly with the improvement of the leadership functions of the leading cadres, be adopted.

7. That copies be made of these written proposals as a whole, handed out to the members of the Political Bureau before the Political Bureau meeting, and put on the agenda of the meeting in order for them to be debated, and decisions be taken in relation to these proposals at the coming Political Bureau meeting.

### Proposals concerning the party structure and procedures

The organisational structure of our party is set out in our party rules only in general outline and only in regard to the basics. It is a question of applying the party rules parallel to the existing political conditions and the organisational development of the party.

During the first years of the party's revival and preceding the Conference, an organisational strata emerged between the Central Committee and the provincial committees. At the 1977 Konya Conference the regional committees were made official on the condition that they would not be included in the printed copies of the party rules for reasons of security. The causes which led to the emergence of regional committees were the low level of party organisation which was a determining factor under the prevailing conditions, together, in contrast with that level, the wish to be able to embrace the whole of Turkey as soon as possible. Today, the party is at a very different level of organisation and faces new problems. There are some provincial committees which are far more developed than the regional committees to which they are supposedly subordinate. There are regions where, apart from one developed area, the regional committee is unable to concern itself with the other areas. And again there are some regions where there is not a single area which has an established provincial organisation. Therefore, it is still necessary today to

adopt a discriminating attitude towards the different party organisations. There are some provincial committees which must of necessity be subordinated directly to the CC (as is today the case with Istanbul). Again, there are some workplaces which, from the point of view of the demands of the class struggle, should be subordinated directly to the CC. It is for these reasons that I propose the organisational changes listed below.

Additionally, all the committees, workplace committees, the youth central committee, the executive committees of organisations abroad, the bureaus and sections, should be reconsidered and reviewed at the Political Bureau meeting and appropriate changes be made so that they become committees which have been formed through the collective decision of the Political Bureau.

A. Organisations subordinated directly to the Central Committee:

1) Workplace committees subordinated directly to the Central Committee:

Ereğli Iron and Steel

Karabük Iron and Steel

Iskenderun Iron and Steel

EKI

MKE

Seydişehir Aluminium Factory

2) Provincial Committees subordinated directly to the CC:

— Istanbul

— Ankara

— Izmir

— Adana

— Diyarbakir

3) Regional committees subordinate to the CC

4) Party organisations abroad subordinate to the CC:

— those who work in the central apparatus,

— the party organisations in the capitalist countries,

— party members in the socialist countries not working in the central apparatus,

5) The central committee of the youth organisation

6) The bureaus and sections of the CC

B. Party organisations subordinated to the CC via the regional committees. These organisations are gathered in 3 groups:

1. The provincial committees of provinces where provincial committees exist which have been formed in accordance with the party rules and the general practice of the communist and workers' movement.

2. Those provinces which have a certain degree of organisation without there having formed a leadership organisation directly on the level of a provincial committee.

3. Those provinces where party organisation does not exist or is very weak.

Proposals concerning the executive functions to be carried out by the Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat

1. In relation to the CC:

a) Unless there exist particular difficulties, statements made in the name of the CC should be made with the participation of CC members in as much as this is possible.

b) A solution must be found to the shortcomings arising from the fact that all of the CC members live isolated from daily social life and production.

2. In relation to the Political Bureau:

A section of the Political Bureau consisting of at least three members should, on condition that they remain within the general perspectives set out by the CC and Political Bureau meetings, at which all of its members are present, work together abroad with the aim of evaluating the developing political events and developing the party's political tactics. This section of the Political Bureau abroad should, at the same time and in addition to its functions listed above, also supervise the functions carried out abroad in the name of the CC which are listed below.



A section of the Political Bureau consisting of at least three people should be continuously resident within the country and form an executive bureau whose real function will be to guide organisational work, and which is linked politically to its other half abroad. This bureau must work in accordance with the resolutions of the CC and the Political Bureau, and under the political direction of the section abroad.

Those who work in either of the sections of the Political Bureau, inside the country or abroad, should exchange places once a year. This exchange should not be carried out all at one time, but with a period of 4 months in between each exchange. In other words, once every four months, one Political Bureau member should enter the country and one leave the country.

#### Organisational work:

In order for the register of party membership to be preserved in a systematic form, and for the necessary reports to be made to the CC and the Political Bureau, a comrade of the leadership who enjoys the complete confidence of the Political Bureau, should be assigned this task. Today this task is, in fact, neglected. Consequently, no one in the leadership has even the most basic knowledge which is necessary for a party. Therefore, the identification and solution of problems have become impossible. For example, exactly how many members does the party have at present? How many party members have been killed during the last two years? How many of our members are at this moment in prison? What is the social constitution of our party at present? What is the class constitution of the party leadership?

The register of party membership should be kept abroad. The three-man section of the Political Bureau working inside the country should at the same time function as an organisational bureau.

#### 3. Transmission of information within the party:

The preparation of drafts of the form in which reports by the party organisations are to be submitted; the development of the existing report system, supervision of the way in which decisions taken by the higher organs are passed on to the lower organs.

Organisation of the reports received from party organisations and the submission of these reports to the Political Bureau. Preparing and submitting to the Political Bureau drafts of the informative reports which are to be sent on the basis of those reports to the relevant sections, bureaus and party organisations.

There is at present no comrade whose specific task is this work. Therefore, incoming reports are either simply put away in files or are submitted to the Political Bureau after having been passed through a subjective sieve and, most important of all, it is not possible to turn some of the conclusions derived from these reports into collective experience or information to be passed on to the party organisations.

A comrade of the leadership (preferably a CC member or even a Political Bureau member) who enjoys the full confidence of the Political Bureau should be occupied abroad specifically with this task.

#### 4. International relations:

This area consists basically of the following sub-sections:

- a) Relations with the communist and workers' movement, and the national liberation movements (including "Problems of Peace and Socialism"),
- b) Observation of the international political situation,
- c) Relations with international professional organisations,
- d) Political developments in neighbouring capitalist countries,
- e) Turkey's international relations.

Collecting information on international relations in the areas mentioned above and doing the necessary archival work, is the work of the bulletin *Durum (Situation)*, the basic CPT information bulletin on an international level, and of the other informative brochures, pamphlets, etc. Just as today the tasks to be carried out by the party leadership have not been clearly defined, so too, within the party leadership, the Political Bureau and the CC, it is not clear to whom the organisation and responsibility of this area belongs. Therefore, a comrade of the leadership (preferably a Political Bureau member) abroad

should specifically carry out this task.

5. Party organisations and members abroad:

Today, there are three categories of CPT organisations and members abroad:

a) Those who work in the CC apparatus. Their number has increased in recent years. The supervision of these comrades is in itself an area of responsibility. Raising the standards of party life among these party workers, strengthening their ties with the country, and organising them into a truly functioning party organisation, are problems which are still to be solved.

b) The party organisations in capitalist countries. The Party CC and Political Bureau should, given that conditions have changed in the last seven years, review the reason for the CPT setting up party organisations in other capitalist countries and review what kind of party functions are satisfied by those organisations. There does exist a report on this question prepared and submitted 6 months ago by one of our experienced comrades which has still not been discussed.

c) CPT members resident in the socialist countries although they do not work in the CC apparatus.

Although I have been in the party leadership for quite some time, this is a problem of which none of the comrades in the Political Bureau has any knowledge, or one on which different attitudes have been adopted at different times. This issue should be taken up by the Political Bureau and the CC and the question as to who is and who is not a party member must be answered in this area as well.

6. Financial matters:

Financial matters should be dealt with by the accounting system of the party, which for security reasons, should rather be kept abroad. There does not exist a central accounting system in our party at present. And because there is no such function, there is also nobody responsible for this function. Both incomes and expenditures lack central supervision. Separate accounting systems should be kept for party incomes from dues, donations and other incomes and similarly it should be made clear which organs are authorised to spend which sums and/or spend which

percentage of their incomes. Today, many organisations speak of a lack of finance. The solution to this problem requires above all a central party accounting system and there is urgent need for a comrade, who enjoys the full confidence of the Political Bureau as a whole, to be assigned this specific task which should be carried out abroad.

Inside the country; an executive and supervisory committee for the commercial enterprises should be set up, subordinate to the Political Bureau.

#### 7. Ideological work;

It is necessary that the kernel of the Party CC ideological apparatus should be located abroad.

a) In the area of publications: the *Atılım* editorship, the *Komünist* editorship, the *TKP'nin Sesi (Voice of the CPT Radio)* editorship and the *Bizim Radyo (Our Radio)* editorship.

b) In the area of education: development of the materials for the application of educational standards and principles for the party; to deal with the problems faced by comrades studying at party schools and universities.

c) In the area of scientific research and propaganda: In order to complement these units of the ideological apparatus abroad, sub-editorial boards should be founded also in every regional and provincial committee in the country to assist the central editorial boards of the central organs. For instance, as part of the ideological apparatus of every regional and provincial committee, an *Atılım* editorial board, a *Komünist* editorial board, and radio editorial boards, should be established. The task of these sub-editorial boards would be, in close cooperation with the central editorial board, to organize the contribution of their own organisations to these publications on an organisational level of which they are part, as if the entire responsibility for these publications rested on their shoulders. Briefly, the task of these sub-editorial boards should be to organize articles for these publications, as well as to pass on criticism directed at the central publications.

Another task that must be fulfilled on the level of ideological work is to establish a central bureau, also inside the

country, to organise and supervise inner-party education.

Another task on the level of ideological work inside the country that should be carried out centrally, is the setting up of a central structure to secure the use and development of agitational tools.

8. Clandestine printing and distribution tasks:

This is a task which should be carried out under the supervision of a comrade from the leadership within the country.

9. Communication:

This is a task which should be carried out under the supervision of a comrade from the leadership both inside and outside the country. He would be responsible basically for 3 areas:

- a) Communications between Turkey and abroad
- b) Communications among party organisations inside the country
- c) Communications among party organisations abroad.

10. Intelligence work:

This task is one which is not being carried out in our party in an organised way. It encompasses the following areas:

- a) Political intelligence, the political structure, state structure and cadres, etc.
- b) Intelligence work to be carried out inside the police apparatus
- c) Intelligence work within the bourgeois army
- d) Economic intelligence work

One comrade of the party leadership should be responsible for this area; only the archives and evaluating units of the intelligence organisation should be abroad, the apparatus itself should work inside the country.

11. Security work:

One of the tasks not being carried out in the party in an organised way. Particularly after the 12 September coup, the lack of any organised work in this area has become very noticeable. A whole series of comrades, both from the party leadership and the rank-and-file, have fallen into the hands of the police, were tortured and, after coming out of prison, were put back to work

in their previous organisations. The trustworthiness of these comrades is based solely on the subjective prejudices of the organisations of which they are a member, and this is a great mistake. In this area the following tasks must be carried out:

a) Activity to foil the attempts of the bourgeois police to infiltrate our party and to collect intelligence.

b) Protection of the meetings of party leaders and leading party organs.

Again the archives and evaluation units of the security organisation should be abroad and the actual apparatus should work inside the country.

#### 12. Military work:

Again in this area archives and documentation units should be abroad, while all of the work related to it should be carried out inside the country.

#### 13. Bureaus of mass organisations:

These specialist organisations, which should assist the development of tactics to be applied in the mass organisations active within the framework of bourgeois legality, should really be resident entirely within the country. Under present political conditions, youth organisations should be considered outside of this framework.

14. Assistantship to the General Secretary: This is a task which has emerged in the present specific conditions. Differing from the practice being applied at the moment only in that one CC member should be assigned this duty as his exclusive task. Not to mention the fact that the comrade who presently carries out this duty does so successfully.



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
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

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