

**FIRST INTERNATIONAL
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PARTICIPATION AND
SELF-MANAGEMENT**

**PREMIERE CONFERENCE
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L'AUTOGESTION ET LA
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**REPORTS
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**Reports
Volume I**

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**Dubrovnik — Jugoslaviya
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FOREWORD

*»In a society organized with the positive end to improve its welfare through science, the arts, crafts, and skills, the most important decision, the decision that determines the direction in which society should move, is no longer taken by people entrusted with functions of government. This decision is taken by society itself.«
And, »the governing of men is replaced by the administering of things.«*

Thus Henry de Saint-Simon in 1819 and 1823. One hundred and fifty years after these words were written the world is still as far away from the future foreseen in them as ever. Maybe farther than in Saint-Simon's time. And yet somehow the problem seems to be more practically relevant than it used to be, power of man over man less acceptable, alternatives more urgently sought. Both our increasingly negative experiences with power-as-enforcement and the fact that alternatives were and are attempted — however inconclusive the results — have contributed in moving the problem from the realm of ideological wishful thinking into the area of scientific discourse.

The discussion is becoming more and more animated as scholars from many countries and from various disciplines converge upon the problem of human autonomy in social decision-making, a problem for which the terms »participation« and »self-management« are no more than perhaps a convenient common denominator.

The conference in Dubrovnik is the result of this convergence and the Yugoslav experience should provide one of the focussing points for the debate.

Workers' self-management was introduced in Yugoslav industry as a general institutional arrangement, by law in 1950 and expanded successively to public services, to local government, promoted to a basic norm of the country's constitutional structure.

Social research — itself of comparatively recent vintage in Yugoslavia — has caught up with these developments only in the late fifties and sixties. The concerns of Yugoslav scholars were oriented, often concurrently, in three main directions:

— Towards the theoretical implications of Yugoslav institutional reforms. Emerging from dogmatic and philosophical speculation social science in Yugoslavia has preserved a keen interest in general theory. For it workers' self-management was seldom only a method for managing factories. Can it be a

general social relationship? Is it a basic principle upon which to construct a novel type of social system? What are its probable repercussions on other aspects of the human condition, from education to religion?

— Towards the practical political meaning of generalized self-management. Emerging from a relatively closed political system Yugoslav could not remain impervious to the democratic and pluralist commitment of self-management as a basic right guaranteed in the Constitution. From pragmatic and short-range political considerations to tendencies toward an ideology of self-management, these movements have left their visible trace in the writings of Yugoslav social scientists. Both in the form where commitment dominates reflection and in its obverse where the disappointment of unrealistic expectations introduces harshness into criticism.

— Towards empirical investigation of the actual processes of self-management. As in other European countries empirical social research started often from the research experiences in psychology, and psychology in Yugoslavia was anyway primarily oriented to the problems of men at work. Soon, however, other disciplines turned to the same problem. The teaching of sociology started simultaneously at the main Yugoslav universities, research institutes were organized in the main centers of Yugoslavia. As an indicator of the quantitative expansion of the field, the Yugoslav Sociological Association has to-day over a thousand members, not counting the political scientists, economists, lawyers and scholars of other disciplines engaged in the empirical investigation of problems of self-management.

The first analyses in the early sixties indicated an expansion both in the scope of tasks undertaken by workers' councils and in the activities of their members, an initial spurt in activity followed by a slack period after the organization got stabilized, greater interest of the workers for problems of their own position in the work process, leaving the problems of general management to the technical managers.

The actual experience of the distribution of influence in self-managed organizations was compared with the aspirations of the workers. It was found that the actual experience of distribution is still mainly hierarchical, with the general managers and the other managers at the top, and the management board, the workers' council, the first-line supervisors, and the workers following in that descending order. The aspirations of the workers, on the other hand, put the workers' council on top followed by the management board, the workers, the managers, and the first-line supervisors.

The influence of the members of workers' councils seems to be exercised in questions of income distribution (wages and salaries), social expenditure, investment, allocation of housing, replacement of equipment, personnel decisions, production planning, merger and association of organizations, in that order of frequency.

It was also found that participation was better in craft-type activities than in industrial-type processes, better in smaller organizations, better in the initial stages of an organizations' life cycle, better for male workers, positively correlated with education, age, skill, length of work-career, income, political participation in the League of Communists or other organizations, the general democratic climate in the organization, the interest in the work task, the techni-

cal possibility of influencing the nature of the work, the possibility of advancement. Disregarding or rejecting workers' suggestions reduces significantly their initiative.

It was found that the elements of hierarchy were still strong in local government administrative agencies, while self-management was more easily introduced and accepted in public services organized on the institutional-functional principle, that citizens saw in local government primarily an organization for the provision of public services rather than a device for participation, that the structure of relationships in local government was roughly correlated to the level of development of the territory in which a local government unit operated.

The empirical work done in Yugoslavia is always under the pressure of the very fast rate of actual developments. The main problems of methodology are related to the difficulty of catching trends, separating the ephemeral from the more permanent, distinguishing what are only new terms for old things from what is genuinely new in the structure of human relationships.

What is presented in this first volume of papers is far from being representative of the full scope of work done in Yugoslavia. Therefore this summary sketch, in the hope that it will wet appetites for more circumstantial information.

All the papers that are prepared for the First International Conference on Participation and Self-Management (Dubrovnik, December 13—17, 1972), taken as a whole, transcend Yugoslavia and its institutional reforms. They bear witness to the scope and generality of interest in the problem as such. Yugoslav self-management is possibly the occasion but not the cause of this interest.

A final note on language. Claude Lévi-Strauss, in the Foreword to his *»Tristes tropiques«*, reflects on the many occasions when he wrote in English. On these occasions, he says, he wrote not what he wanted to but what he could with the linguistic means at his disposal. In disciplines where the word is still not displaced from its place of honor, this can be important. Many of us are in a comparable situation, and hope that our English and French speaking friends will extend to us the benefit of doubt to the full power of their imagination.

Let us conclude by extending our most cordial welcome to those of our friends who will participate in Dubrovnik in December. We hope that this meeting is not the final act of our exchange but a beginning.

Zagreb, October 15, 1972.

Eugen Pusić
Rudi Supek



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DEFINITION THEORIQUE DE LA NOTION ET DE L'ESSENCE DE L'AUTOGESTION EN YOUGOSLAVIE

I

ACTUALITE DU PROBLEME

Je voudrais tout d'abord souligner l'actualité et la nécessité de définir théoriquement la notion et l'essence de l'autogestion. Il existe pour cela plusieurs raisons.

1. Je pense qu'il est en premier lieu nécessaire d'indiquer les différences fondamentales entre, d'une part, la situation réelle de l'économie en 1950 lorsque nous instaurions l'autogestion ouvrière et, d'autre part, la situation réelle actuelle de l'économie et les intentions de son développement ultérieur.¹

A l'époque de l'instauration de l'autogestion ouvrière, notre économie était en plein développement extensif. Dans cette économie dominait la production artisanale avec une organisation primitive du travail. Ensuite, il s'agissait d'une économie très morcelée et, enfin, l'Etat y exerçait par l'intermédiaire de son plan une forte dominance. Le champ d'action des conseils ouvriers sur le plan de l'autogestion était donc, dans les premières années de leur existence, très limité. Le nombre des questions sur lesquelles ils statuaient en fait était très petit et, de par leur caractère, ces questions étaient très simples. C'étaient là les conditions réelles dans lesquelles les premiers conseils ouvriers agissaient.

Aujourd'hui cependant, la situation réelle dans notre économie (et dans les autres secteurs) est tout à fait différente. L'économie extensive avec une production artisanale cède la place à une économie intensive (au sens économique et technologique du mot) et à des transformations toujours plus importantes dans la technologie de la production. L'économie morcelée disparaît avec le développement de l'intégration économique et technologique. La gestion de l'économie fondée sur une planification centralisée cède la place à une économie du marché. La domination de l'Etat sur l'économie diminue sans cesse (à vrai dire avec assez d'oscillations et avec de fortes résistances) dans la mesure où se développe l'autogestion dans cette dernière. De cette façon s'élargit sans cesse le champ d'action de l'autogestion. Le nombre et la diversité des questions sur lesquelles statuent les organisations de travail sont également en évolution constante.

¹ En réalité, il ne s'agit pas ici uniquement des différences fondamentales de la situation réelle de l'économie dans ces deux périodes, mais des différences fondamentales dans l'ensemble des conditions sociales générales dans lesquelles se situait et se développait l'autogestion dans ces deux intervalles de temps en réalité différents.

Or, la conception de l'autogestion n'a pas subi des changements adéquats aux transformations intervenues dans l'être réel de l'économie. On pourrait même dire que l'économie actuelle et les intentions de son développement se heurtent de plus en plus à la conception d'autogestion d'une réalité dépassée. En effet, l'économie intensive du marché, dont l'intégration est en pleine expansion, n'admet pas la conception d'autogestion d'une économie extensive et morcelée, ayant une production artisanale et une organisation du travail rudimentaire et où l'Etat exerce sa domination. L'être réel de l'économie actuelle et les intentions de son évolution, demandent une conception adéquate de l'autogestion.

2. Au niveau de la théorie, il n'existe pas une conception unique et suffisamment détaillée pouvant s'appliquer à l'autogestion en tant que système social intégral. Le dilemme pour nous n'est pas de savoir si nous sommes pour ou contre l'autogestion, mais bien pour quelle autogestion sommes-nous et qui doit l'exercer. Le fait est qu'aujourd'hui, sous le terme d'autogestion, on entend des choses fondamentalement différentes. C'est ce qui confère à la question de la définition théorique de la notion et de l'essence de l'autogestion toute son actualité.

3. Au niveau constitutionnel et juridique, nous n'avons pas non plus une conception constitutionnelle de l'autogestion qui soit définie dans tous ses détails. Les solutions contenues dans les amendements à la Constitution ne peuvent être considérées comme étant une conception complète de l'autogestion en tant que système social intégral.

C'est pourquoi nous devons »revenir aux débuts« et déterminer à nouveau la notion et l'essence de l'autogestion.

II

LA NOTION ET L'ESSENCE DE L'AUTOGESTION

L'autogestion est une catégorie universelle, aux sens multiples. Elle peut et doit donc être examinée sous plusieurs aspects: philosophique, sociologique, social, économique, idéologique, politique, juridique, moral, psychologique, etc. Mais il est impossible, dans un texte aussi court, de parler de l'autogestion en se plaçant sous l'angle particulier de chacune de ces disciplines scientifiques. Aussi nous bornerons-nous ici à une étude théorique notre propos étant de contribuer à définir la notion et l'essence de l'autogestion. Nous examinerons en particulier le rapport entre l'autogestion et d'autres phénomènes sociaux d'une importance certaine pour qui veut l'expliquer. Nous indiquerons enfin pourquoi nous optons pour l'autogestion et en quoi consiste son sens historique. Une dernière remarque: nous dirons, dans le présent texte, ce que l'autogestion **est** sur le plan de la théorie, et ce qu'elle **devrait être** sur celui de la pratique; en d'autres termes, il ne sera pas question du degré de réalisation pratique de l'autogestion.

1. L'autogestion est avant tout un système intégral de rapports sociaux foné sur la propriété sociale de moyens de production. En tant que système intégral de rapports sociaux, elle existe à tous les échelons de l'organisation fonctionnelle et territoriale de la société. La propriété des moyens de production est le rapport de production fondamental qui détermine tout le système

de rapports sociaux. Autrement dit, le caractère de la propriété des moyens de production conditionne celui du système politique, de l'idéologie régnante, de la politique, des sciences, de la culture, du système social dans son ensemble.

2. L'autogestion est un processus social qui se traduit foncièrement par la transformation du pouvoir au nom de la classe ouvrière, créé au cours et immédiatement après la révolution, en pouvoir de la classe ouvrière elle-même, de tous les travailleurs, pour aboutir à la disparition de toutes les classes par la transformation du pouvoir au nom de la classe ouvrière, créé au cours du pouvoir social des représentants de la classe ouvrière (dont l'Etat est l'incarnation) en pouvoir social de la classe ouvrière elle-même, de l'ensemble des travailleurs. Le pouvoir social de la classe ouvrière se constitue et s'extériorise alors en pouvoir social des gestionnaires et de l'autogestion. Toutefois, le pouvoir social de la classe ouvrière ne peut être authentiquement révolutionnaire, libérateur et historiquement légitime que s'il se constitue et se manifeste en pouvoir social des gestionnaires et de l'autogestion comme système social. Son sort est indéfectiblement lié au pouvoir social de l'autogestion. Enfin, sans le pouvoir social des gestionnaires et de l'autogestion constituée en système, il ne saurait y avoir de pouvoir social effectif de la classe ouvrière.

Dans ce sens, l'autogestion est le mouvement révolutionnaire de la classe ouvrière qui élimine les fondements de toute nouvelle polarisation, de toute nouvelle division de la société en propriétaires des moyens de production et en détenteurs du pouvoir, d'une part, en salariés et en administrés, d'autre part. Par son action, la classe ouvrière abolit ainsi la structure de classe de la société qu'elle empêche de se reconstituer sur une base de classe. En dernière analyse, elle se supprime en tant que classe.

Par conséquent, en tant que processus, l'autogestion n'est pas seulement abolition du pouvoir de la bourgeoisie sur la classe ouvrière, mais aussi dépassement de toute forme de domination de l'homme sur l'homme. C'est, par sa nature profonde, un processus qui affranchit l'homme de la domination de qui que ce soit, qui lui permet de se rendre maître des lois naturelles et sociales, des conditions et des résultats de son travail. Dans ce sens, l'autogestion est un processus de libération de la personne humaine, de cohésion sociale, d'intégration des hommes dans le système de rapports sociaux fondé sur la propriété sociale des moyens de production. L'autogestion n'est pas un état pétrifié. C'est un processus incessant d'intégration sociale. Ainsi conçue, n'est un phénomène inévitable qu'en »fin de compte«, pour nous exprimer ainsi. C'est avant tout le résultat de l'action des forces sociales d'avant-garde dans des conditions historiques données ou mieux encore — créées.

3. L'autogestion est, par ailleurs, un système de rapports sociaux dans lequel on voit s'individualiser l'intérêt matériel des producteurs à accélérer l'expansion des forces productives, mais aussi à réaliser et à développer l'autogestion en tant que système social, car les résultats de l'activité économique dépendent également de la question de savoir qui décide et de quoi l'on décide. Ce faisant, l'autogestion qui était initialement une catégorie politico-idéologique, devient essentiellement un rapport de production. L'homme est dès lors amené à consacrer tout son potentiel, toutes ses énergies au développement ininterrompu des forces productives, mais aussi à sa propre »reproduction élargie«. De la sorte, système de rapports sociaux, l'autogestion est efficace et »payante« sur le plan à la fois humain et économique. Elle prouve ainsi ses

avantages non seulement humains, mais aussi économiques sur les autres systèmes sociaux. Et ce n'est qu'en tant que telle qu'elle peut être historiquement légitime.

4. L'autogestion est aussi un système intégral d'institutions liées les unes aux autres, dans lequel les producteurs (les ouvriers au sens le plus large du terme) décident directement et indirectement des conditions et des résultats de leur travail. Par »producteur«, nous entendons tout homme qui travaille avec les moyens sociaux de production, et qui crée au cours de son activité, une valeur supérieure à celle qu'il a dépensée dans le processus de travail. Les institutions de l'autogestion sont suffisamment démocratiques (larges) pour que les intérêts, différents et opposés, puissent s'y manifester. Mais elles sont également capables de les orienter et de les dénouer avec efficacité et par la voie démocratique.

5. L'autogestion implique la responsabilité de tous ceux qui ont participé à l'élaboration et à l'adoption des décisions — pour les conséquences qu'elles entraînent. L'autogestion n'est pas une simple participation aux décisions. C'est avant tout l'exercice qualifié et responsable du pouvoir de décision. Sans la responsabilité de ceux qui prennent part au processus de décision pour les conséquences de leurs options, il ne peut y avoir d'autogestion véritable, authentique. L'irresponsabilité, l'anarchie, l'indiscipline, etc., sont étrangères à l'autogestion. La société autogérée l'est dans la mesure où elle a réglé aussi la question de la responsabilité.

6. L'autogestion est une forme spécifique d'orientation planifiée de l'économie de marché.

7. Le principe: »De chacun selon ses possibilités, à chacun selon son travail« dont les résultats sont vérifiés sur le marché, est immanent à l'autogestion. La »répartition selon les besoins« atténue la rigueur de ce principe. C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'indépendamment des résultats du travail, chacun a droit à la protection médicale, à l'éducation, etc. En ce qui concerne les revenus personnels, leur montant dépend non seulement des résultats du travail, mais aussi des qualifications professionnelles, de l'ancienneté et des conditions de travail. Le principe de solidarité est imbriqué dans le système d'acquisition et de répartition du revenu.

8. Au stade actuel de son développement, l'autogestion ne signifie pas que tous les travailleurs se prononcent sur toutes les questions qui requièrent une décision. A notre sens, un ouvrier qui est »cloué 7 à 8 heures par jour à sa machine« et qui se bat pour son existence, n'a guère la possibilité, à cette étape du développement de l'autogestion, de s'extérioriser pleinement comme gestionnaire universel.

La libération de l'homme dans sa totalité est le but ultime de la société d'autogestion. Mais cet objectif ne peut être atteint que si, aux diverses étapes de ce processus, on libère les différentes »parties« de la personne humaine. Exiger au stade présent de l'autogestion que tous décident de tout serait absolument manquer de réalisme et verser dans l'utopie. Une certaine »répartition« des droits, des devoirs et des responsabilités au sein des structures de l'autogestion, est en ce moment une nécessité, voire même un des préalables essentiels à la réalisation de l'autogestion.

Résumons. Nous tendons à l'autogestion, à un système intégral de rapports sociaux, qui sera à la fois 1) humain, 2) économiquement efficace, 3) rationnel sur le plan de l'organisation, et 4) responsable.

LE RAPPORT ENTRE L'AUTOGESTION ET LES AUTRES FAITS SOCIAUX IMPORTANTS POUR L'INTELLIGENCE DE L'AUTOGESTION

Nous voudrions faire maintenant quelques remarques à propos du rapport entre l'autogestion et les faits sociaux qui en facilitent l'intelligence.

L'autogestion ne peut être ni expliquée ni appréciée en fonction d'elle-même. Pour ce faire, il est indispensable d'étudier la nature du rapport existant entre l'autogestion et les autres faits sociaux directement liés à elle. Nous pensons au rapport de l'autogestion avec les quatre faits sociaux suivants:

1. L'Etat, ou plus exactement sa nature
2. La nature de la propriété des moyens de production
3. La nature de la structure de classe de la société, ou de sa structure socio-économique
4. Le parti politique de la classe au pouvoir. Dans notre cas, il s'agit du rapport entre l'autogestion et le Parti communiste ou Ligue des communistes.

Nous n'exposerons que sous forme de thèses le rapport entre l'autogestion et les quatre faits sociaux mentionnés ci-dessus.

1. L'Etat et l'autogestion

Le processus de dépérissement de l'Etat et celui de la réalisation de l'autogestion sont au fond un seul et même processus social, désigné par deux termes différents. L'ampleur et l'intensité du dépérissement de l'Etat conditionnent l'ampleur et l'intensité de la réalisation de l'autogestion. En d'autres termes, l'autogestion ne peut être réalisée que dans la mesure où l'Etat dépérit: ni plus ni moins. Le processus de mise en oeuvre de l'autogestion est en fait celui de la socialisation des fonctions de l'Etat, celui de son dépérissement. Les structures classiques de l'Etat se transforment en structures socialisées de l'autogestion. Il va sans dire que le dépérissement de l'Etat ne doit, par lui-même, signifier forcément réalisation de l'autogestion. Le processus de dépérissement de l'Etat, de dépossession de l'Etat de ses fonctions et de son pouvoir n'en est que le préalable. En revanche, la réalisation de l'autogestion implique forcément, de par elle-même, le dépérissement de l'Etat, la dépossession de l'Etat de son pouvoir, la socialisation de ses fonctions. Notre conception du dépérissement de l'Etat et de la réalisation de l'autogestion se fonde sur la thèse de Marx affirmant que «la classe ouvrière n'a besoin que d'un Etat qui dépérit».

2. La nature de la propriété des moyens de production et l'autogestion

L'ampleur et l'intensité de la transformation de la propriété d'Etat socialiste des moyens de production (forme inférieure de la propriété socialiste) en propriété sociale des moyens de production (forme supérieure de la propriété socialiste) conditionnent celles de la réalisation de l'autogestion. Lorsque la propriété d'Etat socialiste des moyens de production est la forme dominante des rapports de propriété, l'autogestion ne peut exister. Par contre,

la propriété sociale des moyens de production, en tant que forme supérieure de la propriété socialiste, suppose l'existence de l'autogestion. Comme la propriété des moyens de production est le rapport de production fondamental qui détermine tout le système de rapports dans une société donnée, le degré de réalisation de l'autogestion correspond à celui de la réalisation de la propriété sociale des moyens de production. Le processus de réalisation de l'autogestion est non seulement la négation de la propriété capitaliste des moyens de production et du rapport profit capitaliste-salaire ouvrier, mais aussi la négation de la propriété d'Etat socialiste et du rapport accumulation d'Etat-salaire ouvrier. C'est, par conséquent, l'abolition du monopole sur la propriété quel qu'il soit et de qui que ce soit, d'une part, et de la condition salariale de l'ouvrier, d'autre part. En tant que système de rapports sociaux fondé sur la propriété sociale des moyens de production, l'autogestion est avant tout le pouvoir de disposer des valeurs nouvellement créées et de statuer sur les conditions de leur acquisition, ce pouvoir étant exercé par ceux qui créent les valeurs nouvelles. L'autogestion est en dernière analyse, la négation de toute différence dans l'exercice du pouvoir de décider de la répartition des valeurs nouvellement créées et des conditions de leur acquisition.

C'est du reste pourquoi la propriété sociale des moyens de production est la forme supérieure de la propriété socialiste, la condition primordiale de l'existence et de la réalisation de l'autogestion, ainsi que de la libération de la personne humaine. Arrêtons-nous un peu plus longuement au problème de la propriété.

La place dont nous disposons ne nous permet pas (à notre sens, cela n'est d'ailleurs pas indispensable) d'analyser en détail la propriété sociale. Nous indiquerons cependant, grosso modo, les différences essentielles entre la propriété sociale et la propriété capitaliste des moyens de production, pour passer ensuite à celles que l'on observe entre elle et la propriété d'Etat socialiste, en tant que forme inférieure de la propriété socialiste.

La propriété capitaliste des moyens de production, c'est le monopole de leur propriétaire sur les conditions et les résultats du travail de l'ouvrier. Mais ce n'est pas tout. La classe capitaliste qui a le monopole des moyens de production, détient également le pouvoir politique, l'idéologie régnante, les sciences, la culture, les moyens d'information, etc. Dans ce rapport de production, l'ouvrier n'est pas seulement le salarié du capitaliste; il est aussi l'objet de sa domination politique. Il est soumis à la contrainte économique, idéologique, politique, voire physique. Le monopole du capitaliste sur les moyens de production engendre aussi son monopole sur le pouvoir de disposer des valeurs nouvellement créées qu'il partage en salaires ouvriers, comme prix de la force de travail, et en profit, comme contre-valeur pour la propriété des moyens de production.

Travaillant avec les moyens de production, la classe ouvrière crée des valeurs nouvelles, mais elle n'influe ni sur les conditions de leur création, ni sur celles de leur distribution. C'est pourquoi la répartition des nouvelles valeurs — salaires ouvriers et profit capitaliste — (capitaliste privé ou capitaliste d'Etat) — s'effectue à travers la lutte de classe et selon le rapport des forces dans le conflit de classes.

Ce qui caractérise la propriété d'Etat socialiste, c'est le droit monopoliste de l'Etat d'administrer les moyens de production, de déterminer les conditions d'acquisition des valeurs nouvellement créées et, enfin, de distribuer ces nouvelles valeurs.

Ce monopole de l'État socialiste, son droit monopoliste de gérer les moyens de production, d'en disposer à son gré, et de décider des conditions et des résultats du travail de l'ouvrier, donne naissance à son monopole sur le pouvoir politique, l'idéologie, la science, la culture, les moyens d'information, etc. Dans le rapport de propriété d'État, la classe ouvrière est réduite à une condition salariale sui generis vis-à-vis de son propre État, de ses propres représentants. Elle continue à travailler avec les moyens de production, mais elle est frustrée de son droit de les gérer et de statuer sur les conditions et les résultats de son travail. C'est l'État socialiste qui en décide au nom de la classe ouvrière. Là où la propriété d'État socialiste est la forme dominante des rapports de propriété, il n'y a ni libération authentique de la classe ouvrière, ni autogestion, car la condition de l'ouvrier dans la production, la répartition et le pouvoir de décision n'a changé que dans la mesure où le capitaliste a été remplacé par l'État socialiste. Le seul changement est en effet que l'ouvrier, les conditions et les résultats de son travail ne sont désormais plus manipulés par le capitaliste, mais par son État, une force autonome et aliénée par rapport aux travailleurs.

C'est précisément ce à quoi pensaient Marx, Engels et Lénine lorsqu'ils disaient qu'après la victoire de la révolution socialiste, la classe ouvrière était exposée à un double danger: celui de la «bourgeoisie dépossédée du pouvoir» et celui de «sa propre bureaucratie».

La propriété sociale des moyens de production est un système de rapports de production caractérisé par le fait que nul ne possède un droit monopoliste de gérer les moyens de production et de décider des conditions et des résultats du travail. C'est l'abolition de tout monopole de qui que ce soit et quel qu'il soit. La propriété sociale doit être la négation de toute division de la société en administrateurs et en administrés, en propriétaires et en salariés. Dans le système de propriété sociale, nul ne possède un droit d'appropriation en vertu de la propriété, car la propriété sociale en est la négation. La propriété sociale signifie que les moyens de production sont gérés par ceux qui, travaillant avec ces moyens, agissent — directement ou indirectement — sur la création de valeurs nouvelles; elle signifie aussi que ce sont eux qui décident des conditions et des résultats du travail. C'est au reste de cette base qu'émanent l'autogestion et la libération de l'homme, du producteur, de l'exploitation, de la domination et de la manipulation par qui que ce soit et par une force autonome et aliénée par rapport aux ouvriers. Aussi le travail et les résultats du travail — et non le droit de propriété — sont-ils l'unique titre d'appropriation.

3. La structure socio-économique de la société et l'autogestion

L'ampleur et l'intensité de la transformation de la structure de classe traditionnelle en une structure socio-économique répondant à la propriété sociale des moyens de production et au processus de dépérissement de l'État, déterminent l'ampleur et l'intensité de la réalisation de l'autogestion. Autrement dit, l'autogestion n'est pas seulement un processus (et un rapport) social où l'on dépasse la structure de classe traditionnelle de la société, mais aussi un processus (et un rapport) social au cours duquel disparaissent tous les fondements de la polarisation de la société en propriétaires des moyens de production et en administrateurs, d'une part, en objets de domination et en salariés, d'autre part. En tant que processus, l'autogestion ne signifie pas seulement dépassement de la division de la société en bourgeoisie et en classe

ouvrière, dépassement de leur conflit de classe, mais aussi élimination de la division virtuelle ou effective de la société en classe ouvrière et en bureaucratie de cette même classe ouvrière, ainsi que de leur antagonisme, de leur conflit possible ou réel. Dans ce sens, l'autogestion est un processus de cohésion sociale, un cheminement vers la société communiste sans classes, délivrée des éléments de la structure de classe et des conflits de classe.

4. La Ligue des communistes et l'autogestion

L'ampleur et l'intensité de la transformation du parti politique de la classe ouvrière (Parti communiste) de parti au pouvoir en facteur politico-idéologique et en rouage du système d'autogestion, conditionnent, dans une grande mesure, celles de la réalisation de l'autogestion. Là où le parti politique exerce directement et effectivement les fonctions du pouvoir, il n'y a pas d'autogestion. Dans notre cas, la réalisation de l'autogestion dépend aussi très largement de la question de savoir dans quelle mesure la Ligue des communistes se transforme de parti politique classique au pouvoir en avant-garde du mouvement ouvrier et en force politico-idéologique d'avant-garde dans la lutte pour la réalisation de l'autogestion dont elle doit être un élément constitutif. Parti politique de la classe ouvrière la Ligue des communistes renonce délibérément à l'avantage de la classe ouvrière. Il s'agit en fait d'un processus au cours duquel le pouvoir du parti politique de la classe ouvrière se transforme en pouvoir de la classe ouvrière elle-même. Dans ce processus, l'organisation politique de la classe ouvrière est la force subjective déterminante de la réalisation du pouvoir de la classe ouvrière, de l'autogestion. Pour être effectivement la force subjective d'avant-garde, la force subjective déterminante dans la lutte pour la réalisation de l'autogestion, la Ligue des communistes doit (c'est du reste ce qu'elle fait) démocratiser sa propre vie intérieure. Elle ne peut lutter efficacement pour la réalisation de l'autogestion (pour la démocratisation permanente des rapports sociaux) que par la force et l'autorité de l'esprit démocratique dans sa propre vie intérieure.

5. Résumé

Le dépérissement de l'Etat, la transformation de la propriété d'Etat socialiste en propriété sociale des moyens de production, le dépassement de la structure de classe traditionnelle de la société et son remplacement par une structure socio-économique répondant à la propriété sociale des moyens de production, la transformation du parti politique de la classe ouvrière de parti au pouvoir en facteur politico-idéologique de la lutte pour la réalisation de l'autogestion dont il doit être une partie intégrante, et enfin la réalisation de l'autogestion constituent au fond les volets d'un seul et même processus social global. Ceci dit, nous n'affirmons pas, évidemment, que chacun de ces cinq processus sociaux n'a pas une existence à part. En effet, ils sont relativement autonomes et possèdent une logique intrinsèque qui est elle aussi relativement autonome. Mais, aucun de ces cinq processus n'est possible sans les quatre autres, et aucun ne peut être ni expliqué ni apprécié sans étudier l'ensemble des rapports d'interdépendance qui existent entre tous les cinq.

IV

POURQUOI NOUS OPTONS POUR L'AUTOGESTION ET EN QUOI RESIDE SON SENS HISTORIQUE?

A l'échelle mondiale, nous observons aujourd'hui un paradoxe que l'on peut formuler comme suit:

1) L'homme maîtrise toujours plus la nature et ses lois. En conséquence, il en dépend de moins en moins. La nature est de moins en moins une force élémentaire et incontrôlée qui entoure d'incertitude l'existence et l'avenir de l'homme.

2) La concentration grandissante du pouvoir politique et économique entre les mains d'un nombre d'hommes et d'institutions de plus en plus réduit, accroît l'insécurité de l'homme devant l'arbitraire bureaucratique et l'anarchie sociale. Son existence et son avenir deviennent toujours plus incertains devant ces deux éléments. Il ne peut prévoir les décisions de ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir, la puissance, non plus que l'usage qu'ils en feront.

Le sens historique de l'autogestion c'est qu'elle élimine toutes les assises sur lesquelles s'accomplit la polarisation des hommes en propriétaires et en gouvernants, d'une part, en salariés et en gouvernés, d'autre part. L'autogestion, c'est, dans son sens historique, l'élimination du risque de voir se constituer des centres de pouvoir social autonomes et coupés des travailleurs. Ecartant ce danger, elle organise aussi la société à la mesure de l'homme. En accomplissant la révolution socialiste, la classe ouvrière ne se fixe pas uniquement comme objectif ultime l'abolition du pouvoir de la bourgeoisie, mais aussi la suppression de la base matérielle et de toute autre assise permettant aux uns de dominer les autres.

Le sens de l'autogestion n'est pas seulement d'offrir aux hommes la possibilité de savoir ce qu'ils seront dans la société, comment cette société se constituera et quelle sera leur condition en son sein. L'autogestion c'est avant tout la possibilité pour chacun de décider lui-même, de constituer la société, d'y définir sa condition, de se déterminer souverainement dans le temps et l'espace.

Une telle société socialiste autogérée n'est pas donnée une fois pour toutes; on ne peut la recevoir de quelqu'un; personne ne la donnera de son plein gré. L'homme doit lutter pour elle; il doit la créer de ses propres mains. C'est pour lui la seule façon de l'avoir et d'en jouir. Cette lutte sera d'autant plus efficace, et ses résultats seront d'autant plus substantiels, que ses animateurs seront des hommes qui n'auront rien à perdre dans la réalisation de l'autogestion.

WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT: IDEAL TYPE — SOCIAL REALITY

The historical significance of workers' self-management lies in its abolition of those intermediate strata which, in the class societies as well as in the post-revolutionary socialist societies, separate the producers from the conditions and the results of their work. This separation expresses itself in the fact that the right of decision-making, regarding the conditions and the results of work (of the surplus value), is claimed by the members of the mentioned intermediate stratum. In this regard, it is of no consequence whether this stratum appears as the private owners of the means of production, as technocracy (technostructure) of the capitalist corporations, or as state and political bureaucracy. Workers' self-management, in this sense, does away with that division of labour, which is essentially identical to the division of society into two basic classes, i. e., the minority of leaders, and the majority of those who execute orders. The hitherto course of socialist revolutions has shown that the mere nationalization of the means of production, and their being brought under state ownership, does not abolish the mentioned division of labour.

From this it follows, that it is impossible to limit selfmanagement only to the economic sphere, thereby maintaining the political organization of the global society. The state namely, the monopoly of power in all spheres, the political, economic, and cultural, and bureaucracy, in the name of the state, carry out this monopoly. Such normative decrees or political declarations, which attempt to show that in certain cases we are dealing with »the state of working people«, or »the state of the proletariat«, by no means change the above mentioned monopoly. All that might happen is a transfer of this monopoly from the classical state agencies to the leading bodies of the sole political party. In such cases, the division of labour between the governing minority and the majority which obeys and executes orders is carried out to its extremes.

Self-management has as its goal the very abolition of all such monopolies and ultimately, the abolition of the differentiation of a society into classes. We believe it follows quite clearly from this, that it is impossible to have a developed self-management in industrial enterprises without having, at the same time the self-management type of organization in the entire global society. Such an assertion is proved by the known fact that nowadays demands are being voiced for self-management, as well as joint management — in some places these are defined also as demands for broader democratization in all social fields, from economics to the university. Such demands are sup-

ported, as a rule, by those who have as their lot in the organization of work in all spheres, and not only in the economic the so-called negative authority roles. These, people are the stratum which is the lowest in the power structure, i. e., those who are rigidly subjected and excluded from the processes of planning, decision-making and management (1).

From the anthropological aspect, this stratum consists of economically and politically alienated people. If the essence of economic alienation lies in the fact that those who produce surplus value have no influence either upon the content and the nature of their work nor upon the use of the produced surplus value, than the essence of political alienation lies in the fact that the majority of citizens has no influence, except the more or less formal one in the voting process, upon decision-making regarding all those matters, which directly or indirectly concern their existence as human beings.

In this regard, self-management represents such a global society, wherein the division of labour between those who govern, on one side, and those who execute orders, on the other, no longer exists. Such a society would rightfully be labeled as a class-less one. In such a society each member would be judged as competent to participate in deciding all matters, not only matters which concern individual enterprises and local communities, but also matters of national importance. Such participation naturally implies adequate information and education of the members of such a society, as well as the understanding of the causes and consequences of all the decisions made in such a way.

Is the vision of such a society an utopian one? It is, and it is not! It would be utopian if we were to understand it as some sort of a »finished« social state, as an «ideal society«, the perfection of which would need no further correction. Such a utopia would be identical with the vision of »the end of history«. The above-mentioned vision, however, is not utopian if we understand by it social, i. e., historical, development in the direction of such a state of society. All history up to the present has been the result of mankind's conscious activity; however, this activity has so far always served only one stratum in the society, i. e., the minority which was holding the »reins« of social development in their own hands. Facing this stratum, the majority strata have been only executors of the former's orders and will.

Contrary to such a character of the hitherto historical development, the movements demanding self-management request creative spontaneity or spontaneous creativity of the masses, which have so far been only executors; this is particularly so concerning the creativity of the working class. Precisely because we are here dealing with spontaneity and creativity (2), it is impossible for the movement, of which we are speaking here, to end up in some sort of »ideal«, »perfect« organization of society, which would mean, in its final consequences, the hardening and paralysis of the self-management structures at a given level of development. Considering the essence of self-management, every paralysis of these structures would mean its very negation.

Taking such understanding as our starting point, we consider all historical experience of (workers') self-management which has occurred so far — from the Paris Commune, the workers', peasant, and military councils in Russia in 1917, the councils which existed in Austria and Germany following

¹ Jochen Anthes et al.: »Mitbestimmung, Ausweg oder Illusion?«, Rowohlt, 1972, pp. 11, 14.

² Karl Marx: »The emancipation of the proletariat must be an action of the proletariat itself«. Preamble to the Statute of the 1st Internationale.

the First World War, up to the hitherto experience of self-management in Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary in 1956, and those of Czechoslovakia in 1968 — as a process. Self-management, according to our view, can be only the expression of spontaneous and creative movement of the masses and not the result of any kind of decree coming from those who hold power. All that those in power can do is stifle the creative and spontaneous movement of the masses by decrees, and even by military force, of which recent historical experience speaks quite eloquently.

We have already mentioned that self-management, as a movement, cannot be the result of any kind of decree on the part of the authorities. And yet, the »Yugoslav experiment« came about on the basis of such a decree (3). The sociological content of this decree, i. e., its motivation, however, deserves to be mentioned especially. This decree, namely, represents the first example in which a Communist Party is explicitly renouncing, in accordance with the existing conditions, the position of power in economics as well as in the entire society, and thereby opens the legalized, institutionalized path toward the development of self-management in Yugoslavia. This was done by the Yugoslav Communist Party in face of a particular situation, namely its difficult conflict with the Informbureau and Stalinism, and the complete political and economic blockade of Yugoslavia on the part of other socialist countries. Given these conditions, the »workers' self-management by decree«, such as was introduced in Yugoslavia, has a specific political and social significance.

The critical observations regarding the Yugoslav type of self-management, which shall appear further on in this text, are mentioned with the sole intention of pointing out the conditions which, in our opinion, obstruct self-management as a spontaneous and creative process. In other words, this should not be understood as ill-intended criticism, as some readers might be tempted to think.

The essence of workers' self-management is the economic and political uniting of producers with the means of production and the products of their labour. The uniting, in this case, is such as to allow the producers, i. e., the workers engaged in material production, to decide on their own, without any interference from the outside, regarding the conditions as well as the results of their labour; ultimately, this means that they decide also about national income. Consistent deciding of the producers regarding national income would lead to such an economic structure which would in many ways be different from the presently existing one; such deciding would lead to a change in the quality of the production relations (4). This, of course, should be taken as an »ideal type« of workers' self-management in the sense Max Weber gives this category. He takes it as a »construction... like a utopia which has been reached by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality... It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous

³ »The basic law regarding the administration of state economic enterprises and larger economic associations in working collectives«, June 27, 1950.

⁴ »The structure of the Soviet enterprise has maintained, as has been correctly observed by Charles Bettelheim, two fundamental features of the capitalist enterprise: 'the separation of the workers from the means of production' (i. e., the absence of self-management), and the 'separation of one enterprise from another'. In order to overcome such a separation, absolute planning had to be realized. This proved to be impractical. Not because of a lack of will on the part of the Soviet leaders... but rather because of objective impossibility to decide on all matters in one center... The very existence of production units, which are separated one from the other, explains the remaining of commodity (market) exchange.« Gilles Martinet, *Les Cinq Communismes*, Seuil, Paris, 1968, pp. 94—95.

means of expression to such a description... An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct« (5).

The decrees of the 1963 Constitution of the SFR of Yugoslavia, which refer to the basic characteristics of the self-managing system, also have the nature of such an ideal type. Hence we find, for instance, in the Second Paragraph of the Constitution's Preamble, among other things also the following: »The inviolable foundation of the position and role of man lies in: Social ownership of the means of production, which precludes the restoration of any system of exploitation of one man by another, and which, by eliminating the separation of man from the means of production and their working conditions, provides the conditions necessary for the management by the working people in production and in the distribution of the products, of labour, and for social guidance of economic development; Emancipation of work, which supersedes the historically conditioned inequality and dependence of people in work, which is assured by the abolition of wage-labour relations, by self-management of the working people, by comprehensive development of the productive forces, by the diminishing of the socially necessary labour time, by the development of science, culture, and technology, and by the continual expansion of education; self-management by the working people in the working organization; free association of the working people, of working and other organizations and of socio-political communities in order to satisfy common needs and interests; self-government in the commune and in the other socio-political communities so as to assure the direct participation of the citizens in the determination of the course of social development, in the exercise of power and in the decisions on other social affairs.«

The 21st Amendment to this Constitution, introduced in 1971, defines, among other, the following: »The basis of socialist self-managing relations is the socio-political position of the working man in social reproduction, which assures that he may realize, with his use of the socially-owned means of production and by making it possible for him to decide directly and equally with all other working people in associated work on all matters regarding social production, on conditions and relations of mutual interdependence, responsibility and solidarity, his personal material and moral interest and right; that he may enjoy the fruits of his work and the acquisitions of general material and social progress; that he may, on the basis of this, satisfy, to the utmost, his personal and social needs and develop his working and other creative abilities.«

In accordance with these Constitutional principles, which concern the self-managing organization of the Yugoslav global society, relevant legal norms define in detail the organization of self-management in economic enterprises. Thus direct management of working collectives has been foreseen for smaller enterprises, and special forms of direct management for larger enterprises. Such forms are particularly the referendum and the assemblies of working people. With the newest Constitutional changes, the emphasis in deci-

⁵ Max Weber: *On the Methodology of Social Sciences*, translated by E. Shills and H. A. Finch, 1949, p. 90.

ding about basic economic matters: the organization of work, and particularly the distribution of income and personal income, is being transferred to individual technological and economic units of larger enterprises, to the so-called basic organizations of united work, which have their own bodies of management alongside the entire enterprise's management bodies. These bodies decide only on issues, which are significant for the work of the enterprise as a whole. Thus decision-making regarding the production process and the distribution of income, on the basis of work, is being transferred, with the development of workers' self-management, to the level of basic organizations of united work. Their management bodies decide on all matters of greater importance, while management bodies in the enterprise, as a whole, are becoming increasingly only coordinators. The producers thereby normatively become the carriers of the productive and developmental process, while at the same time the national production is being safeguarded within the particular enterprises.

According to the 1963 Constitution, the bodies of the working organizations are made up of the Workers' Council, the Management Board, and the Director. The 15th Constitutional Amendment, introduced in 1968, defines that both the working organization as a whole (the enterprise) and its individual parts (now known as the basic organizations of united work) have the right to decide alone upon the organs of self-management and bodies which are responsible to these, and upon the sphere of their activity. In such a way, the self-managing independence of working collectives became even more emphasized in the normative sense; at the same time, this enabled the transfer of decision-making regarding work, creation and distribution of income, and all other matters concerning their economic position, to the workers themselves (6).

III

Described broadly, such is the normative position of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia. In experience self-management, however, is different. Its veracity coincides only partly with the described »ideal type«, somewhere more and in other cases less. The following statement, made by one of the leading Yugoslav politicians, is characteristic of the existing situation in this domain: »The present position of the worker in the distribution of income and in forming his personal income is still defined by many elements which are essentially typical of wage labour relations. This means that the worker today still does not decide about the entire income which he produces and, therefore, cannot decide fully about the extended reproduction. His influence is very limited. He lacks knowledge regarding the present capital investment policy and the system of extended reproduction, and he does not trust these, insofar as his future position is concerned. He, therefore, decides primarily about those matters which he feels to be directly in his hands: personal income and personal consumption, funds for personal income and for general use. Such are the present circumstances. However, even such circumstances demonstrate that the workers act very rationally once they grasp that solving the problems of extended reproduction and the

⁶ Cf. Alojz Finžgar: **Self-management and Social Property**, Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke, Belgrade, 1-1971, pp. 60-61.

means for this is, essentially, solving the existence and the developmental interests of the economic organization. Once this is understood, they are willing to sacrifice a great deal, seeing in this the prerequisites for their future existence.« The same politician expressed also the following: »We have so far progressed slowly in our economic integration. Small-scale economic organization, which is linked through the market, and not huge enterprises and their integration, such as concerns, trusts, etc., which developed with capitalism, are still typical of our situation. So far in our system we have not had built-in economic relations which would be established with sufficient consistency, and which would promote integration. Quite the contrary. Group ownership, aspirations of groups, which make claims on monopoly in management and which are the foremost obstacle to integration and the main carriers of disintegrating tendencies, have been active and are still active« (7).

The quote above illustrates very well the main circumstances which obstruct the further development of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia. These are:

remains of the wage labour relations in the economy;

insufficient instruction of the workers, which is partly due to the relatively low level of education of the majority of workers, and partly to the inadequate operation of the information mechanisms within the enterprises;

— the simple organization of the economy, which is linked through the (uncontrolled) market or, in other words: the absence of a democratic regulation of the national economy as a whole, and the group ownership aspirations in many enterprises.

From this one may conclude also, that the production relations in the Yugoslav economy have not changed essentially (8). We are evidently experiencing, in the specific circumstances of our selfmanaging economic system, like the other socialist countries, taking into consideration their specific conditions, the profound truth expressed by K. Marx in his Foreword to **A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy**, namely, »that no social formation falls apart before all the productive forces, for which the formation is sufficiently broad, have developed; and that new, more developed production relations can never come into existence until the material conditions of their existence have developed within the framework of the old society« (9).

The development of science as a direct production force and, along with that, the increasing automatization of industrial production in the most developed countries, are already witnessing that the new productive forces are appearing »in the framework of the old society«; these new productive forces are surpassing the present society, and are demanding a different, new organization of production, different, new production relation. It seems that these new relations will be self-management in the economy. Empirically, this hypothesis is being confirmed by the fact that everywhere, in socialist countries as well as in capitalist, demands for self-management or, at

⁷ Sergej Kraigher: an interview in the newspaper *Delo*, Ljubljana, April 22, 1972, p. 16.

⁸ This conclusion might be taken by some as an argument for the assertion, claiming that Yugoslavia is »returning to capitalism«. Considering the possibility for such an interpretation to arise, I wish to add, that the production relations do not change in accordance with the will of the people, but are a function of the development stage of the productive forces.

⁹ Karl Marx, F. Engels: *Selected Works*, I Part, Cankarjeva Založba, Ljubljana, 1950, p. 456.

least, co-determination in the economy, are being voiced. This fact, in turn, confirms the truth of another thought expressed by Marx, which follows immediately the already quoted one: Namely, that mankind sets before itself »only such tasks as it is capable of solving, if observed closely, we shall always notice that a task appears only then, when the material conditions for its solving are already existing, or are in the process of being developed.«

When stating, that the production relations in the Yugoslav economy have not changed in quality, we must warn, however, that the interpersonal relations existing among industrial workers in many Yugoslav enterprises have changed significantly, if compared to those which existed and still exist among workers in capitalist enterprises. This is confirmed by the fact, which can be illustrated with data from some of the industrial enterprises, »that workers act very rationally once they grasp that solving the problems of extended reproduction and the means for this is, essentially, solving the existence and the developmental interests of the economic organization« (10). In quite a number of enterprises, the workers have given up and are still willingly sacrificing a part of their personal incomes on behalf of new investments. Such action shows undeniably that the workers, at least in these enterprises, are conscious of the fact that their long-range personal material standard of living depends, foremost, on their rational management of the economy. In such a way, conditions for a new quality of self-managing production relations are developing in the consciousness of at least one part of industrial workers. The change of consciousness is, doubtlessly, one of the most important factors which have a bearing in this situation.

All that has been said so far, of course, is true only for one part of the labour force, in the first place for the skilled and the highly-skilled workers. Empirical research shows that these, above all, identify themselves with self-management and, thereby, participate actively in the self-managing bodies. In this respect, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that skilled and highly-skilled workers make up the minority in Yugoslav industry; in 1969 they made up 35.1% of all employed. The majority of semi-skilled and unskilled workers think and behave generally as wage-labourers; their main motivation is the desire to earn immediately and as much as possible. Such motivation is partly the result of a low level of education and, partly, the remainder of the times when »the manufacturer asked nothing of the worker but his labor; the worker expected nothing from him but his wages« (A. de Tocqueville).

There are, however, also objective reasons, existing in the very structure of the Yugoslav economy, which engender that »the present position of the worker... is still defined by many elements which are essentially those of wage-labour relations«. Foremost among these are the effects of a market economy, about which more later on, inevitably implies also »a labour force market«. The very recruitment of the labour force by way of the market, necessarily brings into existence some of the elements of the wage-labour mentality. These elements are maintained, at least among one part of the workers, also by the position of the managers in economic enterprises (the technobureaucracy) and their influence: Particularly in the minds of the workers who are the lowest in status, these managers take on the roles of bosses, i. e., of employers. The large number of strikes also testifies that these

¹⁰ See fn. no. 7.

workers act foremost as wage-labourers: research has confirmed that the largest number of strikes occurred because of dissatisfaction with the amount of personal income (11). And finally: »Up to now, we have linked wage-labour explicitly only with the strictly economic conditions, with the selling of labour force for wages in return. It is time that we attach to the pillar of shame also the other side of wage-labour, which is no less shameful although it is of a psychological and social nature: The famous power to command, which goes, **per definitionem**, to those who are truly in charge of the means production« (12.) This has brought us to one of the key problems, the resolving of which will greatly influence the further development of self-management, which is directed, as we have already mentioned, at abolishing the division of labour between those who command and those who execute commands. The problem we have in mind is that of leadership in the economy, the problem of technobureaucracy.

The President of the Association of Slovene Trade Unions, has stated in one of his recent addresses: »We are witnessing a much too serious discrepancy between the position of the working class, as it is guaranteed by our Constitution, and the relations we actually have in everyday reality. This reality is characterized by an inadequate distribution of economic and political power. The 'mediators of the working class' are still dominating in the decision-making process regarding the society's reproduction« (13). Seen from the industrial enterprises' point of view, these 'mediators of the working class' represent a social stratum which resembles strongly the managers of the industrial corporations in the West. Without entering into a special analysis of the sociological characteristics of this social stratum we shall henceforth refer to it as technobureaucracy, here we are only interested in its real (and not the normative relations to the workers in economic enterprises. We wish to add only that the position of technobureaucracy in Yugoslav global society is a very complex one, some of its members being more or less linked (in some cases even by some sort of a »personal union«) with the state and political bureaucracy, while others stand against it in a more or less emphasized opposition.

The actual relation of technobureaucracy toward the workers is demonstrated by research on the distribution of influence, i. e., power, in Yugoslav industrial organizations. All these studies conclude unanimously that the greatest influence, the greatest power, lies in the hands of the (general) directors and the heads (directors) of individual sectors. This group is referred to as »the leading line«. The real relations between this »leading line« and the workers are revealed by sociological research, which shows that social power in enterprises is distributed hierarchically, in favour of the »leading line«, and that the workers have the least power. Corresponding indexes of the distribution of influence are 3.91 : 2.64. Inside of this, the structure of influence is strictly oligarchic (14).

The managing personnel in Yugoslav enterprises have a decisive influence when deciding either about the strategic or the operational tasks of the

¹¹ N. Jovanov: »On strikes in SFR of Yugoslavia«, VI posvetovanje Jugoslavenskega združenja za sociologijo, Portorož, 1972, III. Part, p. 131.

¹² Daniel Chauvey, *Autogestion*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1970 p. 71.

¹³ Daily newspaper *Delo*, Ljubljana, May 3. 1972, p. 8.

¹⁴ Bogdan Kovačič: »Contemporary Sociological Problems of Self-management in Enterprises«, unpublished doctoral thesis, Ljubljana, 1970, pp. 63-64.

enterprise; in this regard, the situation in our country is not essentially different from the one existing in the industrial organizations in the West. The fact that the number of the managing personnel and their functions in the bodies of workers' self-management is increasing from year to year, leads us to conclude that their influence is strengthening. The number of managing personnel experts, and administrative personnel in the Workers' Councils has increased by 9.6% in the last decade (from 1960 to 1970), and by 23.0% in the Management Boards. The number of Presidents of the Workers' Councils coming from the above-mentioned categories has increased in this decade by 22,9% while the number of Presidents of Management Boards has increased by 28.1% (15). This shows that the leading stratum in the Yugoslav economy reveals some important characteristics of the classical social class which stands against the labour class. »Hence we can speak, in a new sense, of a class society. There exists a small number of leaders, of those who think, foresee, discover, plan, give orders, and the multitude of those who execute these orders, those who are nothing but a large number of hands for the brains of the former« (16).

We regard such a relation between the leaders and the executives in the Yugoslav economic enterprises, as an antagonism between »leadership and management.« By leadership we understand the activity which is carried out by the leading workers in the enterprises, the organizers of production and administration in general, headed by the director; by management we understand the activity which is carried out by the self-management bodies. Hence, the difference does not rest in the content of the activity, but rather in the subjects which carry out this activity. The difference should also not be regarded as an antagonism between two institutions within the framework of self-management structures, as some of the critics of the Yugoslav system of workers' self-management seem to think (17). The essence of the above-mentioned antagonism is this: while it is held that in a developed system of self-management all employees would execute equally and evenly all the functions which are necessary for the administration of the enterprise, at the present stage of self-management the most important part of these functions is being carried out only by the leading workers of the enterprise. Hence, it is inevitable that these act toward the working collective — which is, normatively, the carrier of power — as the »rulers« of the enterprise. Such a situation, of course, is a contradictory one and represents a continuous source of tensions and conflicting situations; meanwhile it, above all, blocks the normative power of the self-management bodies.

In the Yugoslav literature one can find also views which oppose our way of thinking; such views, namely, hold that management and leadership are not antagonistic and that they represent a uniform process. Hence it is possible to find also such thinking: »Management is leadership, giving of orders, determining the direction of work, taking steps, i. e., being in charge of the orientation. In each of these words, we must always presume that there is one side which directs, which is active, and the other side which is being directed; one side, which issues orders, and the other, which obeys

¹⁵ Round-table discussion on conflicts and the socialist development of Yugoslavia, *Teorija in praksa*, Ljubljana, 10-1971, p. 1378.

¹⁶ Yvon Bourdet, »La Délivrance du Prométhée«, *Anthropos*, Paris, 1970, p. 144.

¹⁷ Daniel Chauvey, op. cit. p. 31.

these orders... If we confront self-management with management, than this can be done foremost with regard to the relation between the two sides. The very sense of the word »self« has such a meaning. Namely instead of two sides it places only one defined with the word »self«. This presupposes that this one side directs its own self, orients its own activity, gives orders to itself and executes its own commands« (18). Such a way of thinking which, from the linguistic point of view is faultless, is nevertheless erroneous when one considers the real position of the workers in the system of self-management, such as it is in Yugoslav enterprises. Such thinking is the expression of the so-called normative idealism, i. e., of such a mental or, better, ideological orientation, which projects the normative structure of self-management into reality and lives convinced that such reality is already existing.

Finally, it should be said that the »class society in the new sense« is being maintained, at least indirectly, by the still significant influence of the state and its agencies upon Yugoslav economy. It has been long since Yugoslavia abandoned the rigid type of central planning and introduced the so-called resolutions (or even plans) on the economic development of the country for longer periods of time (usually a five-year period). These Resolutions (plans), which are issued by the Parliaments (the Federal as well as the Republican, i. e., regional), determine only the main goals of the economic development in the given period, and the main means for coordinating production, distribution, and consumption. Although the Resolutions (plans) on economic development, as a rule, do not contain any sanctions for those who would ignore its instructions, that is, sanctions have so far never been carried out seriously, their very existence as acts of state represents the presence of a factor, which has in spite of everything i. e., in spite of the diminishing role of the state, decentralization, the ideology regarding the withering away of the state, and the like, a powerful influence on economic decision-making.

Besides, the economic enterprises are obliged to deliver a rather large part of their income to the Federation, the Republics and the Communities. In 1971 this part amounted to 28.2% of the value of their production, on the average. This by itself is a necessity since without these means it would be impossible to maintain the so-called non-economic domains as education, culture, medicare, social security, etc. These domains are of vital importance for the life of a society. However, the use of these means and their direct purpose is not determined by those who produce them, i. e., by the workers, but rather by the bureaucracy of the state, resp. of the state's agencies. From this it follows that, if decision-making regarding important matters of the global society and the means which are necessary to carry these out, is not in the hands of those who produce these means, workers' self-management remains, at its best, limited only to economic enterprises. Such self-management is developed only half-way since, as it has already been mentioned at the beginning, workers' self-management cannot develop fully until the entire society is organized on the self-managing principle.

The most recent Constitutional reform of the Yugoslav assembly system wishes to surpass such a state, by introducing the delegation system instead of the classical Parliament. The core of this system should be the

¹⁸ »Sloboda«: »Wherein is the strength and the weakness of self-management«, Gledišta, Belgrade 1968, p. 1499.

so-called delegations on the community level. The citizens will send into these delegations, on the basis of direct and secret voting, the delegates of producers from all branches (not only workers from industry, but equally so deputies of the peasants, craftsmen, various service activities, etc.) as well as delegates from the »noneconomic« institutions (education and culture, medicare, social security, etc.). The community delegations, which shall be made up of the representatives of both the producers and the consumers, and all these will be permanently responsible to their voters, will send their members to the community and the republican (regional) assemblies, as well as to the Federal Assembly. They shall send there those delegates who have the greatest direct knowledge concerning the matters which the respective assembly will discuss and decide upon. The assemblies — from the Federal to the community assemblies — will thereby consist no longer of permanent members, which could be replaced every four years during election time, but would be made up of constantly changing representatives and knowledgeable men, corresponding to the matters put on the agenda of each assembly meeting. Such a system, which represents a novelty in the history of the parliamentary system, may indeed open realistic possibilities for the so-called vertical organization of self-management in the Yugoslav global society. By vertical organization of self-management we mean the realization of all those possibilities which are essential for enabling the workers to decide ever more directly, along with all other strata of our citizens, also in matters regarding the strategic questions of their nation and the means which are necessary to carry out these matters.

The above-mentioned is so far, of course, only a Constitutional and legal concept, in other words, another »ideal type«. What will be the actual effect of this concept in social reality, and how much will it really contribute to the vertical self-management organization of the Yugoslav global society, remains to be seen.

An important institution which, such as it exists presently in Yugoslavia, hinders rather than promotes the fuller affirmation of workers' self-management, is the market. The market, together with commodity production, is an essential part of our economic system. However, such as it is in reality, it is not quite in harmony with the essence of self-management. It is, namely, too »free«; its activity reflects insufficiently the regulating function of society, and this very fact makes it possible that various monopolistic tendencies and other negative phenomena are turning up in the Yugoslav economy. The results of an insufficiently regulated market are, among others, also the following: sharp movements of business cycles, inflation, with parallel nonliquidity of many economic organizations, a profound socioeconomic differentiation of the population, a relatively high level of unemployment, insufficient care for those infrastructure objects which do not show immediate profit, etc. Such a situation »creates among people the impression that the market is a phenomenon which is out of man's power to control (in such a case it becomes a typical example of economic alienation — J. G.); it also gives rise to the simplification by which the market is a domain in which success and the behaviour of all are determined by the all-powerful law of supply and demand« (19). The negative effects of an insufficiently regulated

¹⁹ Kiro Gligorov: »The laws of market-planned economy«, *Ekonomska politika*, Belgrade, May 1, 1972, p. 24.

market, which obstruct the self-management economy, appear even more clearly in the Yugoslav social sphere than they would elsewhere. In one part of this sphere there can still be felt a rather strong presence of certain elements of the Levantine commercial culture which is, as it is known, directed primarily at obtaining income through bargaining rather than through mass industrial productivity.

The described effects of the unregulated, resp. insufficiently regulated market, are in a certain sense historically inevitable. The market appeared in history in the period of transition from natural economy to trade-market economy. The principal economic and legal institution of the market is the private ownership of the production means and of commodities. Its basic characteristic is that it is the meeting place of the private owners of commodities and the private owners of labour force, and that, furthermore, both commodities and the labour force are measured on the basis of the same laws, which have been analyzed by Karl Marx (on the basis of David Ricardo's conclusions), that is on the basis of the law of value. Hence it is not surprising that the self-managing industrial enterprises in Yugoslavia behave in the market as group owners of commodities which they have produced. In the market they face each other as competitors and are forced to behave in such a way as the market demands; should they not act thus, they would be economically destroyed. Such is the immanent logic of the (unregulated) market.

By this logic, the commerce and banks in Yugoslavia behave equally as private owners of the financial means which they have gathered. Socialist commerce and banks were meant to be only mediators in the distribution of commodities and the circulation of money. Accumulation was supposed to be such as was needed for the reproduction (including the extended reproduction) of this social function of theirs. In reality they are accumulating a great deal more and are investing the accumulated surplus there where they expect the fastest and highest profit. Is this not a specific example of exploitation of the workers: taking the surplus value away from those who have created it, and disposing with it regardless of the workers' interests, and sometimes even against their interests? Moreover: some of the banks and larger commercial enterprises (particularly those engaged in import and export) are becoming powerful independent centers of economic power, upon which the labourers have no influence at all; the state and political bureaucracy also have but a weak influence upon them. Hence we come to the conclusion that the workers are separated from the products of their work, not only by the technobureaucracy and the state and political bureaucracy, but also by the bureaucracy of the banks and commercial enterprises (19a).

However, in spite of such and similar negative influences of the market upon the self-management economy, we still consider market economy as the only form of rational economy, for socialist countries also. We see its necessity primarily because of the present development stage of the productive forces and the given level of labour productivity, which do not allow a »distribution according to needs«. The historical circumstances in which market

19a. Recently one of the largest banks in Yugoslavia, Ljubljanska banka (The Bank of Ljubljana) changed its management structure in accordance with the Constitutional Amendments. As its founders it accepts industrial and other economic enterprises, the delegates of which will be in the Council of the bank. This Council will be charged to vote on the basis of direct participation of the mentioned delegates on resolutions which deal with the policy of the bank, particularly those regarding capital investment in the economy.

economy was introduced in Yugoslavia, have doubtlessly contributed to such a widely open, practically unregulated market, such as we have now, and which is the cause of the above-mentioned negative consequences (20). These were the circumstances in which Yugoslavia definitely did away with the concepts of state socialism and strictly prescribed planning. In such historical circumstances the market and its laws meant the only consistent alternative to such planning and state socialism. Besides, commodity production, the market cannot be simply »cut off« in socialism. »Even the systems in which the market is not recognized, or is bashfully recognized only in certain domains of economic life, experience it quite strongly as a part of the international, as well as their own economic relations. By denying it, the market and its laws will not cease to exist, but will rather act in a deformed manner and thereby draw attention to its existence« (21).

By introducing the (commodity-money) market into the Yugoslav economic system, an antithesis appeared within the framework of socialism. The antithesis is this: the strictly centralized, state-regulated planning, the automatic regulation of the economy through the market and its laws. So far this antithesis has existed only on the level of two different economic and political systems, the socialist and the capitalist one. Recently, however, this antithesis is appearing also within socialist countries, which is illustrated by the efforts in economic reforms of the 1960s in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere. The following three characteristics indicate more or less intensely these efforts: a differentiated stimulation of workers to higher productivity, the introduction of profit as an index of economy (thriftiness) instead of the former predominantly natural indices, and, foremost, the demand for greater autonomy of the enterprises as economic subjects.

Both extremes of the above-mentioned antithesis, are thereby »softened«: In the industrial countries of the West, such a free market, which has been the ideal of the competitive liberal market, has long ceased to exist. The rationalization of the economy has come in its place, first through trusts and concerns, and later with the increasing intervention of the state. In the socialist countries, the rigidity of centralized planning is being »softened« by more or less far-reaching economic reforms. Yugoslavia went the furthest with these. Evidently the problem is no longer in the alternative: either bureaucratic centralized planning of the economy, or the »free« market. Such an alternative is rendered invalid, as much by the difficulties which are encountered by state bureaucratic planners, as well as by the troubles, which are caused in the Yugoslav economy by the too poorly regulated (commodity-money) market.

The essence of the problem is, in our view, in the continuum which is limited by the two stated kinds of economy, the rigid forms of which have already been superseded by the very economic and political practice in both capitalist and socialist countries. Somewhere along this continuum there is a place which we may call the democratic, nonstate-regulated, non-bureau-

²⁰ Such an economy does not give rise to negative consequences only but equally so to positive ones. Thus the Yugoslav economy reached, in this economic system, a much higher productivity than that reached by other socialist countries where the economy is directed by the state. Such comparison is valid, of course only when one considers those socialist countries in which the productive forces are comparatively equally developed as in Yugoslavia.

²¹Kiro Gligorov, op. cit., p. 25.

cratic directed (if we wish to avoid at all costs the term planned) socialist economy, whose *conditio sine qua non* is, regarding the existing economic condition, the market. To find this exact place on the continuum and to shape it is the task facing the economic policy of the socialist countries, including Yugoslavia. The Constitutional changes which are now being introduced, are likely to become a stimulating normative framework for such an economic policy. Therein we are thinking primarily of the system of delegations, of which we have spoken earlier in this paper. Delegations of producers and consumers could, given adequate help from the corresponding bodies of experts, guide effectively the economic policy towards a democratic regulation of the commodity-money economy.

We have treated here a number of conditions, which we believe to hinder the development of self-management in Yugoslavia. Should we wish to form in this regard some sort of a »priority list«, we would mention in the first place the division of labour between those who direct, plan, issue orders, and those who execute these orders. This division of labour is, according to Marx, linked very closely to the division of a society into two major social classes (22). Among other things, the above-mentioned division of labour is also a more or less direct source of all other difficulties, which self-management is encountering in Yugoslavia, and which hinder its development. Such difficulties are: the wage-labour mentality of a large part of our workers, the relatively limited possibilities for workers to take part in the decision-making process within the enterprises, their lack of information and a relatively low level of education, and, at least indirectly, the existence and activity of the uncontrolled market and its negative influences upon the economy.

To overcome these and other difficulties would mean to abolish the division of labour of which we speak here. Such a demand, which can be found already in Marx's early works, may today appear utopistic at first glance. This, however, is misleading, since real conditions for its materialization are already developing. As the first among these we wish to mention automatization, which abolishes the high disjointedness of the working processes. Instead of the mass of workers with low level of education, who are placed at the conveyor, it requires a smaller number of highly-skilled supervisors of the automatized systems. The increase of leisure time and the decrease of work time will also enhance the indicated development, above all, because it will give the workers more time to engage in public affairs and in education. Finally, self-management is among the principal factors which jointly affect the effort to overcome the division of labour that we mentioned earlier. No matter how limited is the participation of workers in the managing process within the Yugoslav enterprises, no matter how the tiring work in production is hindering the workers in their efforts to engage more fundamentally in solving the global problems of their enterprises, no matter how much lacking self-management is in other respects, it is nevertheless a great educative experience for the working class. As is true of every other educative experience, its positive effects will become manifest only after a longer period of time.

Such meaning is ascribed to self-management, resp. to joint management also in the West. This is illustrated by the following quote: »If there was

²² See *German Ideology* by Marx and Engels Gesamtausgabe, I, 5, p. 22.

introduced in publicly owned industries this kind of self-management which I discussed earlier, and if this type of public ownership were established in all large enterprises, the range of the working activities of manual and clerical workers would be considerably extended. The individual worker would no longer be confined to his specialized task, but would also take part in the planning and management of production« (23).

It goes without saying that the trends which should lead to the abolishment of the division of labour between those who issue orders and those who execute them, which is, in a certain degree, identical to the abolishment of the division of work into intellectual and physical (manual) work, are still at the very beginning of exerting their influence, particularly so in the majority of socialist countries. This means, in turn, that it is impossible to »do away« with the mentioned division of labour simply by issuing decrees, or by wishful thinking, or by propaganda phrases. Therefore, we wish to emphasize once again at the end of this paper, that we do not consider the conditions, which make it impossible for self-management in Yugoslavia to develop without disturbance (Besides: is it at all justified to speak of »undisturbed« development of whatever movement in history, which radically changes the existing conditions?), as an error, a deviation, or a delusion of Yugoslav policy of the past twenty years. We consider these as historically inevitable phenomena, which have taken on a special appearance and a special way of operating because of the particularity of the period in which Yugoslavia broke away from the previous mode of »building socialism«, considered until then as the only viable way. Of these particularities we have spoken briefly at the beginning of this paper.

²³ T. B. Bottomore: *Elites and Society*, 1964, p. 136.

EMPLOYEES' PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL POWER IN INDUSTRY

PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE

The point of departure in this paper is the idea that there is or there should be no qualitative difference between the employees' participation in industry and citizens' participation in politics. Both notions refer to the »acts to influence the behavior of those empowered to make decisions«. Or looking from the opposite angle, no »participative technique« intended to secure a »ceremonial« or »support« participation by manipulating employees' or citizens' feelings and behavior can be considered participation. According to Sidney Verba, »the definition (of participation) stresses **intention** to influence decision-makers.«¹

How to influence decision-makers (or anybody else)? There are many ways to induce others to produce an intended result. However, two of them are especially important: persuasion and coercion. »**Persuasion** involves an effort to influence by argument, reasoning, or a presentation of ideas. The person who is the object of persuasive efforts may refuse to produce without fear of reprisal. Coercion, on the other hand, involves an effort to influence through the use or presentation of force, and the person who refuses to obey a command may expect reprisal. People who can produce an intended result through the use or presentation of force have power. **Power** may be defined, then, as an ability to influence through coercion.«² In organized forms of human life the power of a person (or a group of people) is his ability to induce others to produce an intended result through the application (or possible application) of sanctions.

To these two types of influence correspond two types of participatory acts: those which carry sanctions or the threat of sanctions and those which do not carry any sanctions, though »the borderline between these two types of participation is not clear.«³ It follows from this that participation as the process of social influence involves, at least in some situations, a power relationship between those who attempt to influence the others' behavior and those who are the objects of such attempts. This raises a significant and probably crucial issue: how to influence those who are very powerful if the attempts at persuasion fail? If any attempt at influence has failed, i. e. if participation is unsuccessful, this will discourage further attempts or further

¹ Sidney Verba, »Democratic Participation«, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences — Social Goals and Indicators for America*, Vol. II, September 1967, pp. 53, 55.

² Rocco Carzo, Jr. and John N. Yanouzas, *Formal Organization — A Systems Approach*, Homewood, Ill., Irwin-Dorsey, 1967, p. 186.

³ Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 61–62.

participation. In other words, social power of decisionmakers may constitute a barrier to an effective participation. This is not merely a theoretical possibility: this is what actually happens and can be observed or inferred from the observable behavior of actors in the process of social interaction.

THE POWER BARRIER

It is a common place that occurrence the participation of employees is more often preached than practised. It is seldom wholeheartedly welcomed by management. Why many management people do not accept the idea of employees' participation? A very simple and not entirely incorrect answer is that they fear that participation might reduce or even challenge the managerial power within the business organization. But even if the increase in the amount of power of the employees would involve the decrease in the amount of managerial power, and this is not necessarily true⁴ the question still remains: why are management people so deeply concerned about their power within the organization?

A social psychologist might offer at least two interpretative hypotheses:

First, the hypothesis of the »authoritarian personality»: that on the average, managers score higher on the scale of authoritarianism (F-scale) than the general population, and that they value very highly the power as a social reward (Dubin's »power pay«). Put in more popular terms: managers are »power-seekers«.

Another hypothesis relates to the perception of the managerial role by managers themselves. According to this hypothesis, managers are inclined to see their own role in terms of the master-servant relationship or in the perspective of the »boss« and »his workers«. If participation is to be successful it requires a redefinition of the »traditional« managerial role;⁵ however, such a concept of the managerial role is so deeply ingrained, especially in the developing countries, that it stubbornly resists any change. For that reason managers do not fully accept the idea of participation though sometimes they pay lip service to it.

If these hypotheses were true, and this is a factual question to be answered by empirical studies, then the remedies could be easily prescribed: a better selection of managers on the basis of personality testing and the clarification of the managerial role through an intensive and systematic management training. However, even in this case the sociologist would still be justified in pointing to a structural source of pressure on managers to try hard to preserve their dominant power within the organization. This source of pressure is, of course, the institutionally approved vertical pattern of the organization structure, which is essentially bureaucratic in the Weberian sense (though real organizations usually deviate, in significant respects, from the Weberian ideal type of bureaucratic organization). As is well known, the

⁴ A. S. Tannenbaum argues vigorously that the total amount of control (power) in the organization is rather a variable than a fixed quantity (Tannenbaum, ed., *Control in Organizations*, New York, McGraw, 1968, pp. 12–15). His general argument sounds convincing although he fails to recognize that in some situations the distribution of power may be some sort of »zero-sum-game«.

⁵ »Managers may not have fully accepted the redefinition of their functions which the new industrial system requires. Many managers are still playing, to some extent, the traditional role of 'master', holding on to prerogatives of interpersonal control — hiring, disciplining, and assigning employees to jobs — that really should not be part of their job description.« (J. Zupanov and A. S. Tannenbaum, »The Distribution of Control in Some Yugoslav Industrial Organizations«, Tannenbaum, ed., op. cit., p. 107.)

positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy are defined in terms of authority, i. e. in terms of power (according to R. Bierstedt authority is »institutionalized power«) which originates on the top and is distributed in smaller and smaller amounts down the line. The duties and privileges of the position represent a compelling force on the actual behavior of managers regardless of their personality traits and ideal role concepts. Moreover, since the organizational structure is a self-selecting mechanism it may account for a disproportionate number of authoritarian personalities in managerial positions, who are naturally inclined to see their role in terms of master and servant relationship and, by the same token, such a structure might frustrate the efforts at selection and training of managerial personnel.

The bureaucratic structure deprives the ordinary employees of sanctions in their attempts to influence managerial behavior, but it is not clear why it should prevent their efforts at persuasion. To put it differently, why a powerful manager could not sit down with his subordinates and decide jointly upon the matters of common concern? I would venture to say that the bureaucratic structure discourages even those participatory acts carrying no sanctions or threat of sanctions. We should not forget that the process of social interaction is patterned by social power. The most powerful participants initiate the interaction, they talk and the less powerful are expected to listen to them respectfully and approvingly; the former ask the questions and the latter are expected to submit the answers. Needless to say effective participation requires quite a different pattern of interaction: any member of the group (irrespective of his formal position) must be free to initiate interaction, to ask questions, to agree and disagree with any other member, in other words, effective participation implies that all participants talk on an equal footing. Such an equalitarian interaction pattern introduced into an authoritarian structure may be seen by managers as a disturbing and subversive influence.

The status differentials between the managers and the ordinary workers, work in the same direction reinforcing the patterning effects of social power.⁶ A lower status person should know his »place« (his position on the status ladder) when talking to a higher status person. If he »forgets« this, his behavior will be considered »indecent« and possibly subject to retaliation.

Though this explanation sounds convincing, it fails to account for the fact that in some organizations which are in terms of structure bureaucratic, management does adopt a participative philosophy and style of leadership. This suggests that quite different philosophies and policies can be adopted and followed under basically the same structural arrangements. If so, the previous argument of the patterning influence of social power and status seems to lose much of its explanatory power. However, it should never be forgotten that managers are ultimately responsible for any decision made in the organization, and hence the ultimate power lies with them. Participation may be allowed as far as the group is able and willing to reach such a decision which the manager considers appropriate. But »if the group is so divided in opinion that there is no time to reach decisions by consensus which adequately meet these (situational) requirements, the superior has the res-

⁶ »The pyramid of hierarchical organization represents a fusion of status, prestige, rewards, and power.« (D. Katz and R. L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations*, New York, Wiley, 1966, p. 211.)

possibility of making a decision which does meet them«. Or if the members of the group disagree with their superior and he thinks that the course of action suggested by the group will result in a costly mistake, »the superior may feel that he has no choice but to do what his own experience indicates is best... If he overrules the group, the superior usually reduces the amount of work-group loyalty which he has 'in the bank'... But whatever course of action taken, **he is responsible and must accept full responsibility for what occurs.**»⁷ The awareness of employees that they are free to suggest or even to pass any decision which is likely to please their boss will hardly encourage their effective participation.

Here is the crux of the matter: an effective system of democratic participation in industry requires that the ultimate responsibility and authority be shifted from the executives to the employees as a group. And this is exactly what has been done under the Workers' Self-management system in Yugoslavia. Of course, this involves major changes in the very definition of the business enterprise and in the structure of the working organization. Let us briefly describe these changes.

THE »LABOR CONTROLLED« FIRM

Underlying the bureaucratic working organization in industry is the »capital controlled« firm where the prerogatives to make major decisions, such as those referring to the allocation of profits and appointment of management, lie with the owners of capital (be they individual entrepreneurs and shareholders or the »Socialist State«). In contrast, in the »labor controlled« (or »labor managed«) firm this decision-making power lies with the owners of labor (as a productive resource), i. e. with the workers' collectivities.

»The institutional system gives the working collective prerogatives for making decisions on employing the productive factors and on deciding on the distribution of the net revenue, if there is any, this being not guaranteed in a market economy. Losses rather than profits may result: these would have to be covered by those who decided on the allocation of productive resources, i. e. by the working collectives. It follows that the position of the working collective is similar to that of the capitalist entrepreneur. Both invest and combine resources and shoulder the risks. The collective can in fact be defined as a **collective entrepreneur.**«⁸

It follows from such a definition of the firm that each employee is not merely a hired worker, i. e. a paid contributor of some specialized services, but is in addition to this a partner in the joint endeavour. Therefore, his participation in managerial decision-making is not merely desirable but is required by his institutionally prescribed role. And the fulfilment of the role is crucially important for any type of organization.

Here at least two basic questions may be asked: (1) Is the »labor controlled« firm viable in purely economic terms, more precisely, can this type of firm match the »capital controlled« firm in terms of business efficiency? (2) Do employees really accept their new, entrepreneurial role, as required under such a system?

⁷ R. Likert, *New Patterns of Management*, New York, McGraw, 1961, p. 112.

⁸ J. Županov, *Samoupravljanje i društvena moć*, (Self-management and the Social Power), Zagreb, Naše teme, 1969, The Summary in English, p. 306.

The first issue drew the attention of a number of economists both in Yugoslavia and abroad. However, even the economists who approached the problem within the same conceptual framework of the neo-classical analysis came out with two different answers: on the one hand, most Western economists came to the conclusion that the »labor controlled« firm (regardless of labels they use to describe it) is definitely inferior in efficiency terms as compared with the capitalist firm in the West; while, on the other hand, an outstanding American scholar and a number of Yugoslav economists maintain that such a type of firm is by no means inferior and might well be superior to the capitalist firm in terms of business efficiency.⁹ There is no room here to debate the relative merits of these two contrary views, nor am I professionally competent to enter the debate. However, the second issue (the willingness of employees to take the entrepreneurial role) is clearly relevant for the present discussion.

Here I have to refer to my own research. My studies in attitudes of employees towards some crucial aspects of the »collective entrepreneurship« suggest that employees, by and large, are not willing to take any responsibility beyond the limits of their own job.¹⁰ This seems to be due, among other reasons, to the cultural background and previous social experience of workers and to the inconsistencies of this institutional pattern of the firm itself. This pattern gives the employees the entrepreneurial prerogatives but no property claims on the fruits of their entrepreneurial activity beyond their personal earnings.¹¹

Whether and how this model of enterprise could be made more consistent internally — is still an open question.

FROM THE VERTICAL TO THE HORIZONTAL TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

The change in the definition of the business enterprise involved a major structural change in the organization — the shift from the vertical or hierarc-

⁹ Among studies falling into the first camp the following ones should be mentioned: E. D. Dornar, »The Soviet Collective Farm as a Producer Cooperative«, *American Economic Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 4, September 1966; B. Ward, »The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism«, *American Economic Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 4, September 1958; B. Ward, *The Socialist Economy*, New York, Random House, 1967, chs. 8—10. The contrary views are expressed by the following writers: Jaroslav Vanek, *The General Theory of Labor-Managed Labor Economies*, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1970 (a brief summary by Vanek himself appeared in the *American Economic Review*, Vol. LIX, No. 5, December 1969, under the title »Decentralization Under Workers' Management: A Theoretical Appraisal«); J. Vanek, *The Participatory Economy: An Evolutionary Hypothesis and a Development Strategy*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1971; D. Dubravčić, »Labour as Entrepreneurial Input: An Essay in the Theory of the Producer Co-operative Economy«, *Economica*, August 1970; B. Horvat, »Prilog zasnovanju teorije jugoslavenskog poduzeća« (A Contribution to the Founding of Theory of the Yugoslav Enterprise), *Ekonomika analiza*, 1, 1967; A. Čičin-Sain, P. Miović, A. Vahčić, »Ponašanje samoupravnog poduzeća — Centralno pitanje teorije samoupravne tržišne privrede« (The behavior of the Self-managed Enterprise — The Central Issue of the Theory of the Self-managed Market Economy), Zagreb, Ekonomski institut, 1971 (mimeo.)

¹⁰ See J. Županov, »The Producer and the Risk«, *Eastern European Economies*, Spring 1969, pp. 12—28. (The translation is not checked for accuracy.)

¹¹ S. J. Rawin emphasizes the structural inconsistency of the model of »collective entrepreneurship«: »The worker has no intrinsic rights with regard to the earnings of the enterprise except those arising from his actual contribution 'as producer'. Nor has he any claim on the permanency of employment. In the event of relinquishing his job, voluntarily or through dismissal, his relationship with the enterprise ceases entirely. In effect, notwithstanding the formal trappings of producer-associateship status, the relation here is that of wage employment. While the worker may enjoy a measure of social and economic protection, through legal statutes or through the mechanism of selfmanagement, essentially his position is not too different from that of a factory wage earner under other systems. . . . How can the worker collective function as an entrepreneurial unit while the individual members are placed under wage-earning conditions.« (»Management and Autonomy in Socialist Industry — The Yugoslav Experience«, Paper submitted at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Denver, Colorado, March 1971, mimeo.) The Constitutional Amendment 21 that has been passed recently contains an important stipulation which, if put into effect, could to some extent invalidate Rawin's argument. However, his argument is still valid at the present.

hical type of organization to the horizontal or democratic type of organization.¹² Actually, the changes in the formal-institutional blueprint of the working organization made in Yugoslavia during the last two decades are in important respects in line with the ideas of the »democratic« of »participative« organization advocated by a number of contemporary management theoreticians.

»A move toward a more horizontal 'participative' structure in organizations is being advocated by most contemporary theoreticians [W. Bennis, C. Argyris and R. Likert are explicitly mentioned in the footnote — J. Ž.]. The Yugoslav self-management system possesses several of the characteristics of organizational systems advocated by these theoreticians. In addition to being horizontally structured (Katz and Kahn's democratic structure), the Yugoslav system has instituted groups ('task forces') in their organizations which have common goals and in which social structures are fostered (as suggested by Likert). Management has to be worker-oriented if it wants to be reelected, and an atmosphere with a high level of openness prevails when the leadership encourages it, since the self-management ideology encourages workers to take a stand. These conditions fulfil some of Argyris' and Bennis' recommendations.«¹³

THE BLUEPRINT AND REALITY

Under such a system one would expect participation to flourish both on the policy-making and work-place levels. However, the available empirical studies, especially the study made by J. Obradović (under the general direction of R. Supek), in methodological terms the best one in the field, demonstrates that the actual participation falls short of the expectation. On the basis of a three-year systematic observation and objective coding the interactions in the workers' councils meetings in 20 Yugoslav firms located in four out of six Yugoslav republics, Obradović found that participation of rank-and-file employees in the most important policy-making areas was almost nil, the discussions on the meetings being preempted by the executives and staff experts. Somewhat greater employee participation was registered in the »labor relations« areas (esp. in the area of human relations); however, even in those areas the amount of participation was not impressive.¹⁴

No less surprising are the results of empirical studies in the power structure of Yugoslav industrial organizations carried out during 1960s by the present writer and a number of other Yugoslav sociologists.¹⁵ They showed no difference in the distribution of »executive power« in the surveyed Yugoslav organizations as compared with the American organizations: an oligarchic pattern was found in both of them. This finding in itself should not be di-

¹² Katz and Kahn use terms »hierarchical« vs. »democratic«, while I. Adizes uses terms »vertical« vs. »horizontal« in order to avoid unfavorable connotations« (*Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Style*, New York, The Free Press, 1971, p. 5, n. 2). I use here both pairs interchangeably.

¹³ Adizes, *ibidem*

¹⁴ Josip Obradović, »Struktura participacije u procesu donošenja odluka na sjednicama radničkog savjeta o ekonomskoj politici poduzeća« (The Structure of Participation in the Process of Deciding the Business Policies of the Firm on the Workers' Council Meetings), Zagreb, *Revija za sociologiju* (Sociology Review), No. 1, 1972.

¹⁵ Out of a number of studies by Yugoslav sociologists only two of them available in English are mentioned here: J. Zupanov and A. S. Tannenbaum, »The Distribution of Control in Some Yugoslav Industrial Organizations«, *op. cit.*; and B. Kavčič, V. Rus, and A. S. Tannenbaum, »Control, Participation, and Effectiveness in Four Yugoslav Industrial Organizations«, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1971.

sturbing since »executive power in democratic organizations usually is distributed in accord with the pyramid structure of authority«. ¹⁶ However, basically the same pattern was found in the area of »legislative power« where, according to Katz and Kahn, a completely different distribution should be expected: even here the top executives as a group are more powerful than the workers' council. True enough, the workers' council is perceived to have a »medium« amount of power, but further analysis revealed that two most influential groups within the council itself were top executives and staff experts, while blue-collar workers are the least influential group. (This finding is consistent with the results of Obradović's study.) Summarizing the results of the studies in social power one may conclude that the hierarchical organization has survived within the new institutional shell of democratic organization. In the light of such a conclusion Obradović's findings will appear less surprising: employees' participation faces again »la bête noire« of social power.

Why the radical change in the formal-institutional blueprint of the organization yielded no results in terms of the power structure of the firm? Is this failure due primarily, if not exclusively, to specific factors (historical, cultural, social) underlying the Yugoslav industrial scene? Or some more general factors arising from the very nature of the business organizations involved? Probably both kinds of factors are at work here, but the latter are certainly more relevant for the present discussion than the former. I am unable to deal at any length here with the more general factors which are responsible for preventing any significant change in the power structure of the Yugoslav business organizations along the expected lines: this would require a separate paper. Let me just point to two structural *loci* of managerial power which remained unchanged within the new system:

(1) The key position of management in the communication proces and coordination activity has not been affected by the change in the formal structure. Note that coordination of necessity restricts participation (»the free flow of information«). ¹⁷

(2) Management has retained, or, more precisely, has acquired in the course of economic decentralization, the strategic position in the organization's dealings with the external demands and environmental pressures stemming from technological and market forces. Though the Yugoslav executives are not granted the entrepreneurial function by the institutional order, this being the prerogative of workers' collectives and their representative bodies, they took it since they were better equipped to carry out this function. The increasing technological development and rising market economy have already exerted strong pressure in the direction of curtailing the formal participation of employees. ¹⁸ Although the self-management ideology resists this trend, it is likely to grow stronger.

¹⁶ Katz and Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

¹⁷ This is a fundamental organizational dilemma between coordination and communication (P. M. Blau and W. R. Scott, *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach*, San Francisco, Chandler, 1962, pp. 242-244).

¹⁸ In 1969 the Federal Parliament passed the 15 Constitutional Amendment allowing the business organizations more freedom in setting up the bodies of management as they see fit. In many firms managers were reported of having seized this opportunity to enhance their formal prerogatives, especially by abolishing the »Board of Management« (which was stipulated by previous laws as an executive committee of the Workers' Council) and instituting the »Business Committee« as an organ of professional executives. This move was met by a bitter opposition — on ideological grounds — by the Trade Unions and a number of political functionaries. However, since any empirical evidence is lacking, it is impossible to assess the magnitude of the change that undoubtedly took place.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The preceding discussion should not be understood as a case against the institutional redefinition of the business firm in terms of »collective entrepreneurship« coupled with the formal structural changes along the lines of the »democratic organization«. My argument does not intend to suggest that we go back to the beaten tracks of hired labor and bureaucratic organization — that would be a counsel of despair! I wanted to point to the limitations of organizational changes as briefly described: that even the most radical changes in the formal-institutional blueprint do not assure an effective participation of employees, for they do not necessarily redress the power imbalance between management and employees which is inherent in industrial organizations everywhere. In other words, they do not overcome the power barrier to successful participation.

There are at least two important lessons to be learned from the Yugoslav experience in the employee participation: (1) that participation by itself can not alter the existing, asymmetrical distribution of power between managers and employees, successful participation is likely to be the result rather than the cause of the change of the power-structure within the organization; (2) that the present structural arrangements stressing the horizontal organization of workers and employees in general («Workers' Collectivities») cannot be expected to produce the desirable results in terms of successful participation in the absence of a strong and autonomous vertical organization of employees capable of sanctioning their »participatory acts«. Strong and autonomous labor unions vigorously representing the interests and viewpoints of various sections of employees seem to be an indispensable part of structural arrangements for effective participation.

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THE PARTICIPATION OF THE STATE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DECISIONS OF THE WORKING ORGANIZATION

**(Selfmanagement: a feud between the technostructure and the
bureastructure)**

I.

TWO LEVELS OF SELFMANAGEMENT

The purpose of this paper is to forward a hypothesis that selfmanagement in Yugoslavia, in its present form, though in the foreground of political, and even more so of the social discussions, is not yet an operational concept since it does not take into full account the changed structure of the modern society.

The modern organization, especially the economic and the socio-political one, is directly endangering man's personal integrity, since it is turning him into the mere artibute of the organization, which, mostly in an impersonal way, is thinking on his behalf and instead of him. The endeavor for the rehabilitation of man is then understandable. But this rehabilitation can only be achieved under new conditions created by the modern world and not by the wishful thinking or the artificial extension of conditions of the past world into the modern one. An expressed unity and interdependence are characteristics of the modern world. This interdependence is due to the modern division of work, which in turn is caused by an ever increasing volume of knowledge, which can no longer be mastered by an individual. For the past world, on the other hand, a considerable independence of the individual and his associations from the broader society was characteristic; this enabled him to decie on his own fate mostly by himself.

The problem of selfmanagement splits into two levels: on one side the independence (autonomy) of the firm from the environment, on the other side, the autonomy of the people working in it to adopt decisions for the firm. Two completely different problems are at stake, though linked together and interrelated. So we start with three propositions in this respect.

First: we are presenting a proposition that the concept of self-management which requires full autonomy of a firm from its envitionment is unacceptable, since in the decisions on the highest level in the organization the people working in it are not the only ones to take part. We accept the pro-

position that an organization is a coalition and that in this coalition different members take part.¹ The proces of democratisation should mean that in the management of an organization on the institutional level the monopoly of only one participant must be abolished and that all, who can show a legitimate interest, should take part in this proces. Autonomy in management used to be reduced in the past to the monopoly of only one participant to make decisions; it was the right of the capitalist based on his ownership over the means of production. Democratisation of economy means its socialization. Socialization should mean that all members of the coalition take part in the decision making and that the monopoly of only one of them should be abolished.

In the management of a firm, people working in it are not the single participant. If the people working in a firm were granted the exclusive right to make decisions in the firm, it would lead to a reemergence of the capitalistic ownership in the collective sense.

Second: An assumption that the working community of a firm, a homogeneous entity leads to certain falseties which do not correspond to the reality. The technostructure of the firm has an essentially different position in the firm from that of the direct producers. If we do not recognize the division within the working community of a firm into at least these two parts, we enable one part — the technostructure² — to usurp, under the disguise of the unity of the working community, a monopoly on decision making in the firm and to pass the responsibility for these decisions to its working community as a whole.

And third: The problems of identifying the members of the coalition of the firm on the institutional level, of ascertaining the degree of their respective involment, of finding a common denominator for different interests etc., remain some of the most important yet unresolved problems of the scientific endeavor in his field.

On the institutional level each member of the coalition can struggle for the goals and values which he considers most important. These goals are ultimate values from the standpoint of an individual participant. Each can fight for what he considers as fitting his interests. But, whose interests should prevail? On what basis? We cre not yet in the position to answer these question.

II.

DIFERENT STATUS OF FIRMS IN SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Selfmanagement in the sense of autonomy of the firm means that the organization can state its goals independently and that it can separate itself from the value system of its environment and the society as a whole.

A high rate of the autonomy of this kind has been possible in the clasical capitalism. We can speak of monoism of goals. The only goal of the

¹ In this respect this paper draws on the line of thought advanced by H. A. Simon (Administrative behavioe — McMillan, N. Y. 1947), H. A. Simon/J. G. March (Organizations — Wiley, N. Y. 1959) etc.

² The term »technostructure« is used in the sence introduced by J. K. Galbraith (The new industrial state, N. Y. 1967). In the same way this paper uses the term »bureastructure« for the »political technostructure« in the larger social environment.

firm was to create the highest possible profit for its owner. That kind of the monoism of goals is ascribed to the special structure of the society of that time. A considerably low level of technological development enabled the society as a system to be more loosely linked together: the state had to guarantee some basic requirements of legal security and contract loyalty; all of the rest of the goods were provided by a multitude of independent, relatively small organizations. Those were mutually interconnected by the free market which as an instrument provided for the maximization of the profit, this one being the means of their integration into the social value system. The objective of the society, as an organized community, to have at its disposal goods, produced at the minimum expense, goods indispensable to satisfy the needs of its members, was achieved through the laws of the free market. The only way to get a greater share of the profit (under the perfect market conditions which were never fully achieved!) was to produce goods, which were demanded, at maximum quality and minimal expenses. Thus the society achieved the integration of the economy into its value system in an indirect way.

Maximal autonomy of the firm had not only been possible but indispensable. The market mediated for the necessary division of work and for the consistency of an organization with the value system of the society. The profit, which was the final and the only goal of the firm, was in its essence only an instrument to achieve a whole series of social goals.

Further development of science and technology led to a situation where such an indirect way of meeting social needs is no longer possible. The society has to assert its value system through the decisions of a firm in a more direct way. It is for this reason that the modern firm has not only one single goal but a series of goals, the maximum profit being only one of the many, not always the most important one.

The spectrum of the goods which have to be provided for by the state in a direct way had widened from the past role of the state as a tutor of the public order to a whole series of other goods: general education, social security, medical insurance, protection of the cultural heritage and natural environment etc. We cannot get this kind of goods by market exchange. A certain standard of general education had been strived for already by the capitalist society and since then we have compulsory elementary school education. Modern technology puts forward the requirements for a higher general standard of education and for a multitude of highly skilled workers. The principle of the work division makes it impossible for every single firm to educate the experts by itself for its own purposes. It is the task of the state to take over this burden of general education. Social security is a condition for social production and general social stability. The market economy led to an increasing social inequality and the state had to interfere. The same was true for medical welfare etc.

Even such fields which have traditionally been the exclusive domain of the free enterprise as the material production, had to undergo a change. It is for the sake of national security, economic stability, general social welfare etc., that the modern state everywhere had to interfere at least in such crucial industries as steel, oil, chemicals and others. These are the fields which are covered today by oligopolies. A lot of economic investments, es-

pecially those termed as infrastructure, that were once the field of private interest, are covered today by the state.

From the standpoint of the participation of the society in the decisions of an organization these could be placed on a continuum ranging from the free market firm to the state regulatory agency, acting as a direct state instrument. When talking about self-managed enterprises, however, we are dealing with them as if they were all a homogeneous body.

Different positions of the enterprises on this continuum prevent the society from granting them all the same degree of autonomy. There are firms which can be placed among market organizations and whose autonomy in decision making is very high. The sector of economy which is under the conditions of oligopoly can't afford such a degree of autonomy. The society has to interfere with their decisions, directly or indirectly. The number of public organizations where the state has an almost exclusive right to make decisions becomes greater and greater.

It becomes clear that the criterion of efficiency too will pass more and more into the hands of the state. The society will state the standards of efficiency, impose its standards of assessment and make many of its goals the goals of a firm. The autonomy of the firm on the other side requires its right to state the goals, to define the standards of assessment etc. Under present conditions we can not think of an independence of a firm of this kind.

III.

DIFFERENT STRUCTURE OF A FIRM AND ITS CONTROL

The increasing dependence of a firm on its environment prevents it to formulate independently the premises necessary for its decisions. It is a special characteristic of a free market firm to be able to do so independently. The longer we move away from the free market model of economy the more meager the possibility thus for a firm. This possibility varies for different kinds of organizations and in respect to different levels within the organization.

For a low structured small market firm it is characteristic that the manager or the owner will make all the necessary decisions on the institutional level by himself. From this top position he can control the entire organization. Due to the monoism of the goals and the certainty of the technological processes a computational strategy can be applied.³ There is certainty regarding possible outcomes and the cause effect relationships.

When the technology and the cause effect relationship become more complex and when, on the other hand, we have no monoism of goals, no single individual or collective body is able to manage and control the organization by himself. We face the phenomenon called the separation of the management and the expertness. Even on the institutional level we have to rely more and more on the experts to state the goals.⁴

³ The idea of different strategies used in decision making is borrowed from James D. Thompson (Organizations in action — Wiley, N. Y. 1967)

⁴ See Victor A. Thompson (Modern organization — Knopf, N. Y. 1961)

It was on the basis of a relatively low structured small enterprise that the idea of selfmanagement sprang up.⁵ If the manager or the owner can control and manage the firm, its working community as a whole can do it as well. And even better. In such circumstances we have to do nothing else but nationalize the firm and hand it over to the workers.

A similar idea has developed in the field of politics. If a ruler (sometimes intellectually even below the average) is able to manage and control a state the people at large can do it as well. But in this case too, it appeared that the modern state is something quite different from the classical liberal one.

The result in both cases was that the object of the struggle changed its nature before it was conquered.

Thus we can place the organizations also on a continuum with respect to our possibility to control them. On the one hand we have to deal with a small, relatively simple, market firm which can be effectively managed by its working community. The size and the nature of the necessary information is within the grasp of every member of the firm. On the other extreme we have to deal with a complex, oligopolistic organization with a most advanced technology, in the forefront of the scientific achievements and with tremendous information burden necessary for its transactions with the environment. The mass production firm could be placed in between these two extremes.⁶

The position of the working community on these two extremes will be a completely different one. Small differentiation in a small, low structured organization, with a skilled or semiskilled worker as its hallmark. A high stage of differentiation will prevail in most developed big organizations. There will be a mass of semiskilled workers on one side of such an organization, performing programmed and routine activities, and a growing proportion of highly skilled experts and managers on the other side, performing nonprogrammed work. Since uncertainty presents the main problem for an oligopolistic organization, people who can handle it, grow in their importance for the organization and acquire power in it. These are the so called technostructure, characteristic for the modern big-size complex organization. The objective position and the status of these two main groups within the firm will be decidedly different and often in conflict with each other.

The majority of workers who allegedly should manage the firm, directly or through their elected representatives, have at their disposal no meaningful social power (great interchangeability, scarce visibility, early occupational ceiling etc.). The opposite of their situation is the situation of the technostructure. It is unconceivable for a big, complex organization to be able to thrive without the expert management of the technostructure. And the prosperity of the firm is in the immediate interest of the technostructure, not so much for the rank and file.

Modernization, technological as well as economic one, adds to the power and to the importance of the technostructure. By this its status and the position within the firm as within the society as well are strengthened. The pro-

⁵ In the first place from Marx-Engels' analysis of the Paris commune in 1871.

⁶ See Joan Woodward: *Industrial organization — Theory and practice* (London, Oxford univ. press 1965)

cess is selfreinforcing. The more complexity increases, the more significant and indispensable the technostructure becomes, the achievement of greater goals becomes dependent on it.

The same process leads to almost the opposite results for the workers. Their social power decreases, they are becoming less important and endangered in their social position. Modernization and the technical processes may cause their jobs to become superfluous. It is only when they are specially organized and united that their power gets more social weight.⁷ When united, however, they become a significant political force also outside the firm. Such a political force, if not under a direct control of the political bureaustructure, is however at least undesirable if not considered a direct challenge to the bureaustructure. The workers' class thus becomes squeezed between two competing powers: The technostructure within the firm and the bureaustructure outside the firm. In this way it is practically eliminated from the scene.

Since most of the material production, and therefore the general material wellbeing of the country as a whole, is becoming dependent on the technostructure, this one becomes more and more a dominant factor on the social scene. The technostructure is increasingly more aggressive. This phenomenon is in accordance with the function of the oligopoly.⁸ The oligopoly has to solve the problem of uncertainty and dependance, since this one represents the critical point of its existence. General conditions of the economy, created by state measures or at least influenced by the state and its relations with other social subsystems etc. represent crucial socio-economic environment outside the control of oligopoly. The oligopoly depends more and more on such social subsystems as basic science, general education, public health, international relations etc. To overcome this crucial dependance the oligopoly tries to impose its dominance over the most relevant environment for its existence, be it economic or political.

This same endeavor lies in the nature of the bureaustructure which tries to impose its dominance over the society. The final outcome, in terms of economic policy, is that the state formulates many of the premises for the decisions adopted by a big complex organization. The state participates in the management of every firm. It is a division of management between both species of leading structures.

It may sound cynical that the weakest in the management of the firm is the role of the workers, though they are entitled to exclude all others from the management, and in whose name all acts in managerial process are being taken.

Thus new antagonisms, which have no basis in the formal ownership over the means of production arise in the society. The assumption that by nationalization all basic conflicts within the society will be resolved and that by this the path into socialism would be opened proved to be only an utopia. This fact however, is not recognized by the technostructure and even less so by the bureaustructure. They both act as if nothing were wrong. On the contrary, if something does not correspond to the expectations, and more and more it does not, they found the culprit in the impersonal character of the class enemy.

⁷ J. D. Thompson, *ibid.*

⁸ J. K. Galbraith, *ibid.*

It is by no means necessary that the worker be completely excluded from all management. He disposes of some information within the working process which is of basic importance for this process. This refers, before all, to his knowledge of actual conditions of the process, and to his motivation too. This qualifies him for a comembership in the decision making on the technical level, beside his participation in the coalition on the institutional level.

The struggle on the institutional level between both leading structures, because of their natural inclination to get rid of dependence, leads to their undemocratic and totalitarian behavior. Democracy is namely endangering their power positions. So they are both totalitarian in their very nature. But they cannot behave in a totalitarian way, especially if they rule in the name and on behalf of the working class, as they do. So they have to use the classical democratic institutions, which however are not suited for modern needs, neither in public nor in business administration.

The Yugoslav selfmanagement as a social institution is therefore an attempt to restructure the society on new grounds, basically different from those of the socialist society. The task is seemingly an unsolvable one: to create a social organization which would be democratic in all appearance and basically totalitarian in its essence.

This is why this attempt has been unsuccessful so far. It turned out to be only a different form of the feud between the bureaustructure and the technostructure, characteristic for all modern societies — in Yugoslavia under the specific form of selfmanagement.

The Yugoslav society is not specific in this respect. It may be less developed from the US, in economic respects even from USSR. But it is still so much developed that it does create the same basic problems, prevailing in modern world. Maybe only the dimensions of the problems are different. But it proves nevertheless, how harmful it is to try to solve the problems of a modern society on the grounds of some fictitious unity of interests within the working community of a firm or within a society. Due to the fact that in Yugoslavia the number of small-scale firms is greater in comparison with some more advanced countries, the statements about the validity of selfmanagement theory may seem more practical than they really are. But even so this is not the world of today.

IV.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE BUREAUSTRUCTURE FOR ITS POSITIONS

Self-management of a firm which would not take into account the system of values supported by the bureaustructure in the wider society would represent a challenge to the status of the bureaustructure and to the ideology on which the bureaustructure bases this status. This would mean that the working community within the firm would make decisions on the basis of its own perception of reality and its interests. Nothing of the kind is conceivable. This would mean a new revolution — we will not go into the terminology — but it is absolutely sure that it would be labeled by the bureaustructure as a counterrevolution. From its point of view this would really be

the case since the bureaustructure identifies itself with the proletarian revolution and its representatives. That is why the bureaustructure is so sensitive to all that is happening in the working organizations. It is very quick in its reactions to everything that might have a negative influence on its social status.

Any activity within the firm which would not be but a further elaboration of the attitudes and statements of the bureaustructure would mean a menace to its position, at least in its eyes. The paramount importance of the leading role of the Communist Party would be put in question. It is from this role of the party as the vanguard that the bureaustructure derives its special status and privileges.⁹

In defending its positions the bureaustructure has to resort to two different strategies on two different fronts: on the one hand against the working community, on the other against the technostructure. The first one it can handle rather easily, since it has small social power. With the other one the things are much more difficult due to its exceptionally strong social power.

a) against the working community

The working community can be handled so that all agenda which should be decided upon, or voted by the working community, have to be discussed and approved, beforehand, by the Communist party or by political organizations, primarily by the trade unions, which serve as an intermediary for the party directives. It is here that the leading role of the party should express itself. Its members have in one way or another to carry out its directives through selfmanagement bodies. So the workers' counsel in the matters of a firm, as well as the assembly in the matters of the general public, should serve just as an instrument to make the will of the party into the will of the entire working community or of the public in general. A very refined and subtle strategy for this purpose is necessary from time to time: regarding what should be passed on the agenda of one body, what of another one, etc.

Before all, however, a majority of votes in the deciding bodies is to be assured. Therefore all elections for, and especially the selecting of the candidates for the self-management bodies have to be firmly in the hands of the party. And as long as the party has a monopoly over the possibility of political organizing, as long as it disposes of the state as its monopoly, as long as through the state it has a firm hand over all social subsystems, before all over the political one, this can be relatively easily achieved. The mere circumstance to be already in the power gives a decisive advantage.

Since through its mastering of all influential positions in the society the party can dispose also of all social wealth, it has a decisive capacity to achieve a general obedience to its directives. Everyone in the country depends on the bureaustructure, in one way or another, or should depend. Selfmanagement, when and if actually carried out, makes a considerable hole into the unbreakable positions of the bureaustructure. And herein lies the basic contradiction in its role and position.

⁹ See J. V. Stalin: The foundations of Leninism.

In the Soviet administrative model and in its copies, the state is the full master of the situation. It combines in its hands all political as well as economic power, acquired through nationalization. Every single individual fully depends on the state, both politically and economically. The political monopoly is sustained by the economic one and vice versa. Therefore, any economic independence, whatever its title or origin, undermines the political monopoly. It is an outrage to »the political and social system«, as it comes to be labeled. This may be the main reason why all these political systems are being so extremely disfavorably disposed and disinclined against any form of private business, be it only a small peasant or a small artisan. This is not for the sake of a mere dogmatism. It is a menace to the political monopoly. Since, who does not depend will not act in accordance! He may even develop his own ideas! An absolute obedience is however a *conditio sine qua non*.

According to the logics of such a situation even the self-management should represent but a form, best suited, to carry out the ideology and the directives of the party and its representatives. Any socio-political system has, from this point of view, stand to a test of how much it is able to assure the supremacy of the political party in the decision making in social matters. As much as, e. g. in the East the politicians make accusations against Yugoslav selfmanagement system, the accusations aim at an alleged fact that the Yugoslav party lost political control. And on the other hand, the Yugoslav party itself assesses the successfulness of selfmanagement by the fact how easily and how far the party has been able to carry out its attitudes through self-management, and how much it helped to reaffirm the party, its social status and its role of vanguard. This is why the antagonism between the party on one side and the small peasant and artisan and a truly selfmanaged firm on the other is equally acute as in other socialist systems. Only the worker, who for his whole existence depends on the positions, held by the party, is acceptable.

b) against the technostructure

By means of control over self-management bodies, the party tries to get a decisive control also over the technostructure in the firm. The technostructure is elected by the self-management bodies. Since those are elected through the party will or approval, their lot is to serve as a party instrument within the firm. The possibility to carry out its will in the firm over a crosscut of the executive technostructure is in itself an attractive lure for the bureaustructure. There is no need for sometimes painful political »persuading«. It is only necessary to call the director (president) or some other leading personality in the firm, to give him the directives, and all is over. Beside that advantage, an eventual unsuccessfulness of the action later on can never hurt the real boss. The technostructure can always be blamed.

Since the technostructure, as long as all is going smoothly along the lines of undisputed party control, is completely dependent on the party for its own existence, it will eagerly carry out all the directives. Nobody can remain on his job if he is at odds with the bureaustructure.

But things do not run smoothly for a very long. First of all, such a crosscut has very negative effects on the bureaustructure itself. All crosscuts of

this kind require a concealed treatment. Because of this, sometimes even local and personal attitudes and interests, having no connection with the top echelon directives, win their lead to the detriment of the bureaustructure as a whole. And what is even worse, the bureaustructure is not forced to make realistic analyses of the situation. Its directives are often far askance with the reality, not adapted to the reality and onesided. In the final analysis we can come to a situation where only political considerations in the management of a firm will prevail. A director (president) of a firm will be assessed not on the basis of his economic achievements in the firm, but on how eagerly and thoroughly he carries out political directives. The so called »political factories« are but one of the typical consequences of such a management of the economy.

Since all the most important decisions are being adopted in the political committees outside the firm, even the party members at large become less interesting for the bureaustructure. The common party member has lost his political power and can be turned to a mere tool. The directives of the bureaustructure are being carried out directly by the technostructure in the firm. The consequences of this result in the party turning almost exclusively around the leading positions in the firm. There is a mass of complaints in all socialist countries against the fact that the employees and officials constitute the preponderant majority within the party or at least a dominant and most influential part.¹⁰ The party loses its proletarian character and becomes petit bourgeois.

V.

THE LACKING HAND OF THE STATE

Self-management started in Yugoslavia as an antithesis to the Soviet administrative model in economy, where a firm is but a »longa manus« of the state administration. The status of a firm is almost identical with that of a public utility or government agency. All working people in the country become just an attribute to the central state plan. A bureaucratic discipline serves as a substitute for the economic incentive and motivation. As a bureaucratic organization, a firm acts on the lowest level of performance acceptable by the standards laid down by the state plan. Each economic subject, placed in such conditions, develops maximum of its efforts to get minimal standards to be laid down as the measure of its performance instead of doing its utmost to perform as much as possible. A low standard for one period serves as precedent for the future tasks. Ultimately even the economic results are rather poor, the production resources underemployed etc.

These are some of fundamental deficiencies of the administrative system of all socialist countries, reducing their economic efficiency to a rather low level. Though low in efficiency, this system is consistent in itself. Meanwhile, selfmanagement as a negation of the administrative system is not. It never elaborated a macro model of economy of its own. As a negation of the administrative system its function was to deny it, but it never succeeded in developing a positive alternative. In stressing the freedom of the firm it simply

¹⁰ See e. g. the proceedings of the last congresses of SKJ (The Communist League of Yugoslavia).

adopted the classical model of free market economy. This model suffices for a simply structured economy of the past century; it met the needs of an underdeveloped semiagrarian Yugoslav economy; and it even meets the present needs of simply structured small firms. But small firms are not the whole economy. A free market model does not suit the needs of mass production, of complex technology, and the conditions of an oligopolistic economy. If not prevalent, this type of economy creates a very sizable proportion of GNP, but finds itself a foreign body within an economy, based on the assumption of a perfect market, which does not exist.

A macro model which could meet the exigencies of a modern economy is beyond the capacities of the existing doctrine which sprang up as an answer to a past world of simply structured economy. The slogan »Back to the pure Leninism« is just an extrinsic sign of the ideological impasse in which this doctrine found itself. In the first rate, the state did not and does not perform the role of a regulator of the general conditions of the economy. A planned economy is nothing but an attribute of the ideological arsenal — the reality being completely different. In Yugoslav economy there is always an absence of those elements of integration which have to be created by the state. This leads to a kind of dissolution of the whole economy, which then spreads into the political sphere. The bureaustructures of individual republics began to look for an independent way out of this impasse, partly as a smaller projection of the general Yugoslav pattern on a more limited area of one republic, partly as an attempt to renew the old administrative system and partly as an attempt to gain complete autonomy for the local economy.

Under these conditions the state becomes reduced, more and more, to the functions of classical liberal state: internal and external security; the rest of the functions of a modern state being very much neglected. As contradiction between the realities of the life and the ideological and political instruments to solve them become greater, so the necessity for security comes more and more to the attention of the bureaustructure.

The bureaustructure tries to manage the state in one direction only: its doctrine should become the source of all state measures. For this reason it pays very little or no attention to the information flowing in the opposite direction: to the reaction of those who receive its directives. The management of public affairs thus becomes a one-way process instead of a circular one.

Combined with the doctrine that the state has to wither away, all this results practically in the withering away of an expert, competent public administration. In contrast to this the institutional level of state administration grows at an increasing rate. The assemblies on all levels widen the sphere of their authority, serving as channels to convey party directives. Party directives are however conveyed not only through the state assemblies. All different political organizations serve as an equal instrument. The institutional level of the assemblies, of the party, is being multiplied in the headquarters of all political organizations. The physiognomy of the Yugoslav state administration resembles a body with a giant head and a miniature trunk.

The process of management going mostly in one direction, with little or no feed-back, the directives from the institutional level of the Yugoslav society are mostly unadapted or poorly adapted to the needs of reality. Poorly adapted, they are hardly or sometimes not at all carried out. While, if not

being carried out, they cause an instability which contributes to the general mistrust. This entire situation, however, adds to the power of the main rival of the bureaustructure, the technostructure in the firms.

VI.

THE SOURCES OF THE TECHNOSTRUCTURE' STRENGTH

Self-managed firms cannot expect from the state to provide them with the income they have not been able to create, because of their eventual unsuccess. It is up to them to procure the necessary income. Starting from this logic everything that contributes to their income is good, and bad what does not. If the directives of the bureaustructure will go against a management which might lead to an increase in income, they will not be given the necessary consideration. These directives, because of their one-way flow of information, very often do not meet the exigencies of the income, and since the workers live on income, this creates a gap between political and economic necessities. The economic necessities usually prevail. And this leads to the first serious and open challenge to the bureaustructure.

The technostructure in the firms, being the most competent to contribute to the income of the firm, due to its expertness, the information at its disposal, its capacity to handle uncertainties etc., will acquire a strong hold over the workers. This hold is at the same time a source of its dependence. The technostructure will survive only as long as it is able to contribute decisively to the income. Thus the dependence of the technostructure is twofold. By its origin it depends on the bureaustructure, by its function in the economic process it depends on the success of a firm and hence on the workers. To which side does it lean under such conditions? The technostructure needs a lot of political ability to survive between the opposing forces. The economic necessities will usually prevail, however.

If the technostructure is not able to contribute decisively to the income of the firm, its position will become very critical and precarious. In the case of a strike (a majority of the strikes in Yugoslavia have the income as their basis)¹¹ this strike will immediately become a political problem, and the bureaustructure will feel menaced too. The bureaustructure will try to settle the dispute. First of all it will try to present the technostructure as the main culprit and expose it to the outrage of the workers. Even if the director (president) of a firm comes safely through the ordeal, he nevertheless loses. He loses his prestige in the eyes of the bureaustructure as being unable to handle the political situation within the firm. This should be his main responsibility, greater than anything else.

If successful, the technostructure will have a more stable position. In such a case it can hardly be ousted by the bureaustructure. Although this isn't impossible the price for the bureaustructure is usually too high.

If the technostructure wants to be successful in the creation of the income the way to this success would often lead, if not through a direct vio-

¹¹ See Neca Jovanov: »O štrajkovima u SFRJ (On the strikes in Yugoslavia) — Družbeni konflikti i socialistički razvoj Jugoslavije III/1972.

lation, then at least through little attention to the political directives. Each such success would mean at the same time an undermining of the status of the bureaustructure. There is a constant, though mostly hidden, but never subsiding feud between the two leading structures, which only rarely flares out into an open conflict. The bureaustructure is still undisputably at the better end. But it comes more and more into the dependence on the technostructure. The technostructure provides for the GNP, and by this for the political stability too. By the same token however, the working class becomes more and more dependent on the technostructure, if it is economically successful.

Sure, the income is not the only vested interest in a firm. There are different goals at stake in a firm, depending on different interests among the members of the coalition (higher economic development, higher rate of employment, higher social equality and greater opportunities, satisfaction with the political situation etc.). Nevertheless they all revolve around the financial success. A director (president) who is able to attain this goal, will acquire great power over the environment in which the organization exists. Again the bureaustructure feels menaced. This undermines its power, which, however is the quintessence of its existence.

And again from time to time a conflict bursts out. The pros are on the side of the bureaustructure in the short run, but it seems on the side of the technostructure in the long run. They both evoke the interests of the working class, which is however in both cases only a junior partner.

VII.

THE OPPONENTS IN ACTION — THEIR ADVANTAGES AND SETBACKS

The bureaustructure in Yugoslavia as compared with its counterparts in other countries has a very odd and strange position. This is due to selfmanagement, at least to a very large extent.

We mentioned already that the bureaustructure in the Soviet model unites all power, political as well as the economic one, in one hand. The same would be the case in neocapitalistic countries, though formally different. Marx already made the statement that the capitalist government is just an executive body in the hands of the capitalists. This statement needs some qualification, however. Such a direct link between the state and the capitalist class does not exist today. Nevertheless it is still valid in its essence. The state will have to be an instrument in the hands of those who have power. This power today is no more in the hands of the capitalists (or at least not only in their hands); it passes over into the hands of the technostructures of oligopolies, and to a lesser degree into the hands of the representatives of other social subsystems. In both cases the connection between these aspects of power is undisputable. An important difference exists only in the fact that the technostructure in the capitalist system has to be economically efficient if it wants to dominate the political scene; in the Soviet system, however, the bureaustructure has to be politically efficient if it wants to dominate the economic scene. The result, however, is the same.

In the selfmanagement system the situation should be, but is not the same. The workers as managers of the economy should also manage the state as their instrument: they first have to be economically efficient if they want to be politically efficient. Neither of these two conditions is fulfilled. In the firm, decisions over the most important matters are being made not by the workers but by the technostructure; in the state the decisions are not being made by the so called producers but by the bureastructure, which fights for its positions with the technostructure.

The bureastructure still dominates the state. Also a great number of elements of organizational environment relevant to the firm are still in the hands of the bureastructure; in the first place the legislature, and by this the entire normative system, and also the regulation of relations within and towards other social systems, on which the economy increasingly depends.

It has however no direct influence on what is happening within the firms. A firm should be autonomous and selfmanaged, though in reality it is being managed mostly by the technostructure.¹² On behalf and in the name of the working class, in fact however for enhancing its own positions, the technostructure also comes to the scene as a rival for political power — even if this requirement is never officially presented nor perhaps is the technostructure aware of it. By the mere logics of an oligopoly and by the necessity to handle the uncertainty, the technostructure tends to get rid of dependance. The way to do it is to get a strong hand over the relevant environment. From the viewpoint of the technostructure the political environment is much to unpredictable for it to be indifferent towards it. Through political directives, turned into respective state norms, a firm can overnight become a bankrupt organization out of a very prosperous one. This often happens, e. g., through different regulations concerning foreign exchange, the rate of currency etc. By interfering within the inner organization of a firm, a state law can, and has already, disrupted into small pieces a big merged firm etc.

Thus the technostructure turns out to be the most outspoken representative and supporter of the interests of the firm as an organization. In this role however the technostructure may and often does come into an open conflict with the third partner in the inner coalition, the working class, direct producers.

For the sake of the long run interests the short run ones often have to be sacrificed. Direct producers however usually lean more to the side of the short run interests. Their primary interests will be a »matching« personal income (wage), satisfaction on the job and good working conditions. The direct producer will usually not look at the firm as at a means for achieving the aims of his personality since the programmed and routine work does not offer him such an opportunity. His attitude towards the firm will be a much more practical one: the firm will be only one of the means for achieving his goals which lie mostly outside the firm.¹³ And when the long run policy of the firm, carried out by the technostructure, will menace his short run goal of a »decent« level of personal income, his contributions-inducements balance will be disrupted. Then he has to quit or try to restore the

¹² There is an increasing volume of research on this problem in Yugoslavia last time. The focus was on power and its distribution within the firm and the position of the technostructure. See e. g. Janez Jerovšek et al.: *Industrijska sociologija* (Naše teme, Zagreb 1971).

¹³ An excellent empirical study to this effect made by V. Arzenšek (*Motivacijska struktura zaposlenih — Teorija in praksa* 2/1972) gives ample evidence on these facts.

balance. This can be done only against the policy of the technostructure. Thus the technostructure will many times be forced to do its utmost to pass through selfmanagement bodies certain projects which are not viewed favorably by the rank and file workers.

Here lies another weak spot of the technostructure. Its objective position and the function it is performing within the economic process is not consistent with its legal status. It lacks a formal legitimacy for its important role of the initiator and the executor of all most important decisions in the firm.¹⁴ All important decisions in the firm are adopted by the workers' counsel; many important decisions, especially all those which refer to the status of the firm, are to be submitted to a general approval (referendum) of the entire working community. All the assistants to the director of the firm (the so called leading personnel) are nominated by the workers' counsel, not by the director himself. All internal regulations, in first place the wage regulations, are issued by the selfmanagement bodies. The workers' counsel has a series of executive bodies of its own which may interfere with the work of the technostructure and abrogate the rights of the director. The wages and salaries (personal income) for individual workers are fixed by special committees, not by the technostructure. The technostructure has no hire and fire right. It has no right to fine.

If the technostructure wants to be active in these fields, it can do so only through selfmanagement bodies.

The technostructure has two significant weapons in dealing with such a situation: the weapon of rationality and the weapon of pressure against the worker as an individual in the working process.

If the workers are against a submitted project in the session of the workers' counsel, they have to oppose it with reasonable arguments. In this dispute almost all the pros are on the side of the technostructure. Only the technostructure possesses the relevant information and expertese. If the workers are against a project they can usually adopt it or reject it, but they can hardly forward an acceptable alternative. It is difficult to fight against something you don't know, and when you fail to understand the arguments. The rationality usually needs expert knowledge which only the technostructure has. The workers have no special expert staff of their own. (Though there have been some attempts to create it!).

The workers can decide on the fate of the technostructure in the workers' counsel, but they themselves even more depend on the technostructure as individuals in the technical process of carrying out the decisions of the workers' counsel. They are subordinated to the technostructure as their leader and hierarchical boss. Each worker will think twice before objecting to a project submitted by the technostructure to the workers' counsel. His role is, many times, only that of nodding and approving.

The workers' counsel then serves as a shield of legitimacy for the technostructure. This has however a very negative influence on its responsibility. Since it has no legal rights to make decisions it cannot have the necessary responsibility for what it is not entitled to do. The technostructure is always in a position to wash its hands clean: »it was not our decision, we only car-

¹⁴ See Josip Županov: *Samoupravljanje i društvena moć (Selfmanagement and social power)* — *Naše teme*, Zagreb 1969.

ried out the decision of the workers' counsel.« This will especially be the case when the measures of the firm will hurt general social interests of the community.

This kind of irresponsibility lures the technostructure to very risky undertakings, sometimes unreasonable ones. While aware that it cannot be held responsible, it can risk much more than is reasonable. Too many inefficient firms are an additional consequence of the phenomenon no country with nationalized economy has been able to solve: taking the risk and the accountability for it.

Though the willingness to taking risks may have beneficial influences in a dynamic surrounding, the negative consequences when not matched by an adequate accountability may be more harmful. The present state of Yugoslav economy is an eloquent proof of this. Things are even worse when both leading structures compete in irresponsible decisions: the bureaustructure can always step into the background of anonymity when a certain of its »political monuments« crumbles down, while the technostructure can hide itself behind the workers' counsel.

Nevertheless, the illegal status of the technostructure is its weakest spot. It can always be accused of illegal handling and aspirations for power whenever deemed necessary by the bureaustructure. It will do so, when the bureaustructure considers the status of the technostructure too strong, so that it may become annoying or even dangerous, or when the advantages of letting loose the technostructure will be outweighed by the dangers to its own position.

Both of the leading structures address themselves, in this feud, to the working class with the slogan of fighting for their rights and interests. The bureaustructure is more sincere, but more demagogic too.

Because of the fact that the working class and especially its lowest strata are still forced to give a preponderant majority of the GNP for new investments and for the maintenance of other social subsystems, it still feels on very unequal grounds with the rest of the society, though its material conditions are much better compared with the past. The burden carried by the working class is a very heavy one. The lowest worker feels humiliated by the social differences he sees no justifications for. In capitalism the social differences are manifest. Though unjust, they are at least visible in the foundations of the capitalist society. He cannot, however, find a justification for great differences in a society which started out as a workers', having nationalized the capitalistic wealth etc. Egalitarianism is deeply rooted. It is considered the only alternative to social injustices he still has to endure.

Herein again lie some basic contradictions in the position of the technostructure. If it wants to be economically efficient it has to introduce a differentiation in the inducements. The salaries and wages should be in accordance with the work contributions. A member of the technostructure who, because of his connections and references, is able to handle some critical dependence for the firm (the purchase of important raw materials, selling of products, procurement of financial means etc.) is a very valuable asset on the sheet of balance of the firm. This member of the firm may raise very high claims against the firm. Because the technostructure as a whole will be assessed by the final results, in the first place by the increased income, it

will always be willing to comply with such claims. If not possible in a legal way, it will find out some other informal outlets. The differences between the technostructure and the rank and file will become very great. And, what is even worse, they become very visible and provocative. Since people with higher incomes cannot reinvest them, because of the social ownership of the means of production, they use them for the most frivolous consumption: expensive cars, luxurious weekend houses etc. This in a country with such a terrible lack of capital!

A relatively low stage of development of technology and economy induces the technostructure to use more authoritative behavior and to lean much more to an authoritarian discipline. This adds to the differences of its status. Meanwhile the common worker is exposed to a stiff discipline, his work results being technologically measurable etc., the technostructure is much more liberal in its own area.

The dissatisfaction, which arises out of such conditions is very skillfully exploited by the bureaustructure. The campaigns for egalitarianism launched from time to time always get a lot of adherents among the rank and file. The so called campaign against »the social differentiation« launched here in the beginning of 1972 is a typical case. It may become even more welcome as a culprit for economic difficulties and setbacks, as a means to divert the attention of the workers somewhere else. And in doing so, the bureaustructure always reaffirms its role as the vanguard, as an extension of the interests of the working class and recaptures the lost positions, endangered by the technostructure. The bureaustructure is still able to lead the masses. The technostructure is not.

VIII.

THE TECHNOSTRUCTURE AND THE SYSTEM NEEDS

The attempts of the bureaustructure to impose selfmanagement from above and to turn the technostructure into a mere tool, lead to a selfmanagement which has an administrative character and suffers from bureaucratic anaemia. Its special shortcoming is a disregard for objective social laws. One such attempt is the last constitutional amendment concerning the so called »basic organizations of united work« (BOUW).¹⁵

BOUW should represent, in system building, the starting building block. BOUW are formal work groups encompassing an identifiable technological economic process whose results are measurable on the market or in the inner exchange with other BOUWs. All other systems in economy are but a combination of BOUWs which through a free negotiating come to different agreements on their mutual relations. Since a BOUW is small enough the management in it may be a direct one, without the mediation of the market and the technostructure. The workers, independently from any interference, dispose of the income of the BOUW. This is their constitutional right and unalienable even in agreements with broader economic associations. The income created in broader economic associations is redirected back into the BOUWs.

... ¹⁵ Amendments to Yugoslav Constitution, no. XXI—XXII.

BOUW should thus become an instrument to remove the technostructure from its leading positions.

An empirical analysis of how much the concept of BOUW has been carried out is not possible, since till now no considerable progress with their introduction, inspite of all the pressures of the bureaustucture to do so, has been made. Only a speculative appraisal is possible. By doing so we come across all the difficulties connected with the system theory, the relations between the whole and its parts.

Broader systems, even if created by mutual agreements (a complete fiction however) have thus come to existence. For any systems an interdependence of the parts is characteristic. Where there is interdependence, there is power too. The power will be distributed in such a way that the system will survive. This does not mean that the power will be equally distributed among the members. Since the system performs different functions, the power will be distributed in accordance with these functions. This leads to a new inequality between different parts of the system and to the needs of the system. The needs of the system immediately get their representatives who will try to satisfy them even against the will of the parts of the system. The system appears as a new independent reality. And where there is a very complex and prolonged flow of expert information within the system, the need for an expert staff to analyse these needs of the system will arise, to gather information in accordance with these needs, and before all, to divide work among different parts of the system. This means the appearance of a new technostructure, illegal and irresponsible in the same way. And with still more power.

IX.

WHAT DO WE WANT TO DECIDE UPON?

There is a lot of dispute over the theoretical discussion of the needs of the system. We sustain a statement that a system has its needs too. But to avoid semantics, those are the needs of a different kind. They are instrumental only, since all artificial social systems are but a means for people to achieve their ends, to cover their needs. The needs of the system are of an intermediate nature, functioning as a bridge to the final goods, through which we can satisfy our ultimate needs. The needs of a system have nothing directly to do with the needs of an individual. Thus, when speaking of the needs of a system and the needs of an individual we are moving on two completely different levels.

When the problem is to make decisions concerning the needs of the system and on the methods of how to satisfy these needs (what should be the goal of the system and how to reach this goal) then only those who are able to get, to perceive and to absorb the necessary information, who are able to solve the problems and to create programs, should be able to make decisions. The role of an individual within the system is an instrumental one. He has to act in a way to satisfy the needs of the system.

All activity in an organization with a goal will be subordinated to the principle of rationality, though this will not be the only principle; some other elements will interfere with the activity of the organization (originating in

the personality of the individual, in the environment in which the organization acts etc.). Nevertheless, the principle of rationality will be the dominant one. And due to this, only those who have the necessary rationality will be able to manage the organization, those who have at their disposal the relevant information: the technostructure.

The members of the system do not put much weight on their right to decide on instrumental processes. They put much importance, however, on the final goods and values which are directly connected with their needs. They specifically do not attach much importance to participating in decisions on professional problems. On the contrary, the procedure to let the members of a system decide on the problems which are only instrumental, is to divert the responsibility from those who should bear the responsibility to those who cannot be held responsible. So, if the workers in a firm are doing badly, they can always be told: It is your fault. You have a full right to self-management. It is up to you to establish order in your own house.

When deciding on final goods and values, the workers or the members of any other organization do not exercise their expertness in a specific field. They just express their subjective opinion on what their interest in a specific case may be.

Usually we are not interested in economic and technical processes necessary to lead to the final results. In most cases we would not understand them. But to decide whether a certain product is covering our needs or it is not, nobody but ourselves can decide. Our opinions may seem completely wrong from an expert point of view. We may wish things which are harmful to our health, to our wellbeing, to our future — there are so many goods, produced by the modern industry, which are harmful. But still, if somebody else should pass directives on what we should and what we should not do, because of some professional or even ethical reasons, we create a paternalistic society: only some individuals, endowed with special wisdom and enlightenment will decide on our fate.

Modern man is sick of all those who try to bring him happiness on a platter. What has science to say about what happiness is? Modern man wants to decide by himself on matters that concern him. His business is, however, not the instrumental processes to produce goods. His business is to decide on what his needs are, on how to satisfy these needs, on the priority of his needs and on the assessment of how a certain good is or was able to satisfy his needs. Especially in this respect modern man is subject to different kinds of violence: the instrumental needs of different systems are being presented as his primary and final needs. Since he is unable to decide on how the instrumental needs are able to meet his final needs, the method of self-management may become a way to present the needs of others as his own.

There are different organizations having as their goal the recommendation of a specific way of life, specific way of production, of consumption, a specific priority of the needs etc. But it is the right of an individual to decide on what he himself considers as reasonable. Plato's state led by scientists would be doing a great disservice to the mankind. A scientist may become a most severe dictator if convinced that he has in possession the entire truth.

This may not be a real scientist. The quasi scientists are the plague of the modern world. In the name of the science, of possession of the most progressive ideology, of their missionary vision to alter the world of calcifying

different views into progressive and reactionary one etc., they are committing a terrible violence to the mankind. So much more, if they succeed to proclaim their own philosophy as the official ideology, where any other independent and different idea becomes a crime endangering the security of the state.

In the classical liberal state of the economy the individual had, at least formally, enough possibilities to decide on his own needs. By the purchase of the goods he decided on how he was satisfied with the activities of the respective firms. As a consumer he was supreme. As a citizen he was limited, but to a very small extent. As a formal right, this freedom was reduced to a mere formality when stricken by poverty and shortage. But, with the progressive wealth and the vanishing poverty, this freedom is also vanishing. The individual as a consumer is more and more dependent. The oligopolies interfere with his personal wants, the state and different public organizations with his personal domain. In an authoritarian way they decide what his needs are, what the priorities in these needs are, what are the ways to meet them.

X.

COMANAGEMENT

An individual participates in the instrumental systems not only by taking part in the goals of the system. Different participants see in the organization a means to achieve different goals. For a worker or an employee, since he spends much of his time at work in a specific organization, the satisfaction with his job, good working conditions and the possibility to enhance his personality, become a goal in itself, and a final value. This final value competes with other goals he has in the organization, which may be inconsistent with one another. But it is up to him to strike the balance.

So, a final value for him may be only an instrumental one for the others, in the first place for the organization, and vice versa. On the institutional level he will advance some other interests than on the technical one etc. It is for this reason that a worker can never be treated only as a means to achieve the goals of the organization: he strives for some different values on all levels. The satisfaction with the job may be one of the final values for the worker; for the organization it may be only an indirect one etc.¹⁶

It comes out of all this, that the management of an organization should express its coalition character. The members of this coalition are very different ones, their roles are being changed at different stages of the process, the character of the goods and goals is being changed etc. The selfmanagement, then, as an exclusive right cannot be the symbol of modern social production. The symbol of the modern production, of modern life, is comanagement, comanagement of all participants on all levels.

Since modern organization is being integrated into the social value system in an increasingly direct way, not any more through the market, the interference of the society on the institutional level of an organization

¹⁶ The fusion process (E. W. Bakke/C. Argyris — Organization structure and dynamics, Yale 1954) has to be achieved by the worker himself.

becomes ever more important. By this, the problem of democracy and the participation of an individual in making final decisions concerning the goals of the public administration becomes more and more relevant to the conditions of the economy as well. A worker enhances a part of his direct interests as a producer within his own firm — but as a consumer, a great part of his interests can be enhanced only by the means of a broader social system, even against the interests of his own firm.

From a scientific point of view the main problem of comanagement will then be to solve those problems which are common to different participants, where it is very difficult sometimes to ascertain the degree of involvement, the intensity of the interests, the methods of solving the conflicts etc. This fundamental problem of comanagement is one of the fundamental problems of the modern society: how to delimit different interests. All organizations and all producers are in the first place participants in the most general social interests. Starting from this point the problem is repeated in the same way on all different levels, including the smallest economic organization. The ever growing connectedness and interdependence cause the problem of comanagement to be increasingly more difficult to solve. It is more and more difficult to identify the participants in common matters and to measure the degree of their involvement.

To proclaim selfmanagement as the last and final answer to this high degree of interdependence in the social life is an unthinkable oversimplification and a negation of selfmanagement. We cannot give to any one of the coparticipants in common matters the right to act and to decide in his own name and in his own interests on behalf of all others without their consent. The working community of the firm is also only one of the different participants, though maybe most deeply involved.

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LE RAPPORT ENTRE LA GREVE COMME CONFLIT SOCIAL ET L'AUTOGESTION COMME SYSTEME SOCIAL

INTRODUCTION

Lénine disait que la société qui n'a ni la capacité ni le courage d'apprendre la vérité sur elle-même — n'est pas une société saine. Il devait le prouver par son propre exemple en parlant publiquement de «... l'application de la lutte gréviste dans l'Etat où le pouvoir est aux mains du prolétariat». Ce texte de Lénine — qui est en même temps une décision du Comité central du Parti communiste — fut publié par la «Pravda» dans son numéro 12 du 16 janvier 1922.

Le débat public mené en Yougoslavie à propos des grèves doit être interprété avant tout comme une nécessité d'analyser et d'expliquer ce phénomène afin d'en dégager l'origine et la signification véritable dans la situation historique spécifique de la Yougoslavie. Aussi le débat public sur les grèves ne peut-il être considéré comme une manière de «laver son linge sale en public», ainsi qu'on le prétend parfois. Le propos de l'auteur du présent texte est de fournir sa contribution à l'étude de la grève et du rapport entre la grève — comme conflit social, et l'autogestion — comme système social.

Avec un nombre relativement réduit d'os on peut reconstituer le squelette d'un mamouth. Evidemment, nous n'avons pas l'ambition, avec ce texte sur les grèves, de reconstituer le système social global. Néanmoins, nous ne cachons pas que, dans nos efforts, nous avons tendu à analyser la grève comme un segment du système social, dans sa liaison avec la situation dans le système social global. Il va sans dire que l'idéologie «comme conscience déformée» est présente dans ce texte. Nous ne dissimulons pas que notre conscience est «déformée» au profit de ceux qui se mettent en grève. Nous savons que notre tentative d'expliquer les grèves se situe, pour une très bonne part, dans l'optique de la position réelle des grévistes. C'est dans cette mesure que nous ne sommes pas objectif. Nous prions les lecteurs de ce texte d'avoir ce fait en vue.

Nous avons analysé dans notre texte les grèves qui se sont produites jusqu'à la fin de 1969. Nous n'avons pas étudié ce qui s'est passé depuis. C'est pourquoi il est possible que certaines choses ne soient plus maintenant ce qu'elles étaient à la fin de 1969. Nous saurions gré aux lecteurs de prendre ce fait en considération.

Le présent texte comporte trois parties. Dans la première, nous avons essayé d'analyser le faisceau des circonstances contradictoires qui contribuent de façon essentielle à l'apparition des grèves. Ces conditions générales

étant contradictoires, la grève est elle-même, à maints égards, un phénomène contradictoire. Dans la deuxième partie, nous avons exposé quelques-unes des caractéristiques fondamentales de la grève. Dans la troisième partie enfin, nous avons étudié le rapport entre la grève et les structures institutionnalisées de la société.

I

LE FAISCEAU DES CIRCONSTANCES CONTRADICTOIRES QUI INFLUENT DE MANIÈRE DÉTERMINANTE SUR L'APPARITION DE LA GREVE

Les circonstances dont il sera question ici n'ont pas toutes existé dans une mesure égale; elles n'ont pas eu non plus les mêmes incidences sur l'apparition des grèves. Le texte qui suit permet néanmoins de discerner des différences quant à l'ampleur et à l'intensité de l'action de certains processus généraux dans la société globale et de l'état réel de l'autogestion en tant que système social, sur l'ampleur et l'intensité des grèves. Selon l'influence déterminante de telles ou telles circonstances sur l'éclatement de la grève, on peut qualifier la grève elle-même.

1. Un processus relativement rapide de constitution de la classe ouvrière en «classe en soi»

Il est indubitable que le processus de modification de la structure sociale de la population et de constitution de la classe ouvrière en «classe en soi», est relativement rapide. En 1939, on comptait 59 personnes employées pour 1.000 habitants, 119 en 1950 et 187 en 1970. Leur nombre total atteignait 920.000 en 1939, 1.944.000 en 1950, 3.850.000 en 1970 et près de 4.000.000 en 1972. Par rapport à 1950, il avait augmenté en 1970 de 198%.

La part relative de la population agricole dans la population globale était de 60,7% en 1953, de 49,6% en 1961 et de 36% en 1971. Elle n'est pas la même dans toutes les régions de la Yougoslavie. En Slovénie, elle est en effet de 18,0% contre 50,1% dans la Province autonome de Kossovo. Entre 1953 et 1971, la population agricole totale a baissé 28,5% pour toute la Yougoslavie et de 48,4% pour la Slovénie. Dans la Province autonome de Kossovo, cette catégorie de population a progressé de 6,7% pendant la même période. Ces quelques données permettent déjà d'entrevoir les grandes différences de degré de développement entre les Républiques et les Provinces autonomes qui constituent la Yougoslavie.

Dans l'économie, le nombre des personnes employées est passé de 1.684.000 en 1952 à 3.105.000 en 1970, soit une progression de 184,3%. Dans les secteurs non économiques, l'emploi était en 1970 de 219% (650.000 personnes) supérieur à celui de 1952 (297.000).

L'accroissement relativement rapide de l'emploi se double d'une augmentation du nombre des personnes en quête d'emploi. En 1953, 82.000 personnes cherchaient du travail; en 1970, ce nombre atteignait les 320.000. Ajoutons que celui des travailleurs yougoslaves se trouvant temporairement à l'étranger a progressé comme suit: 1964 — 100.000, 1967 — 320.000 et 1972 — plus de 800.000.

Le taux de croissance moyen de l'emploi a varié selon les années: 7,1% de 1953 à 1960 et 2,6% seulement entre 1960 et 1970.

En 1950, les employeurs privés (hôteliers et artisans pour l'essentiel) occupaient 2,6% (52.000) du nombre total des personnes employées en Yougoslavie. En 1970, cette catégorie avait diminué en valeur relative — 2,2%, mais augmenté en valeur absolue — 85.000 personnes.¹

Le processus relativement rapide de transformation de la structure sociale de la population et de constitution de la classe ouvrière en «classe en soi», est un phénomène nécessaire et positif qui est en rapport avec l'apparition des grèves dans les régions économiquement développées du pays et les lieux à forte concentration ouvrière. Les grandes différences entre les diverses Républiques et Provinces autonomes quant au degré de développement économique et au volume de l'emploi, sont en relation avec les grandes différences que l'on observe entre elles en ce qui concerne le temps, l'intensité et le nombre des grèves.

Ceci dit, nous n'affirmons évidemment pas qu'il faille lutter contre les grèves en ralentissant le développement économique et en empêchant la classe ouvrière de se constituer en «classe en soi». Nous relevons tout simplement la coïncidence entre l'ampleur et l'intensité des grèves dans les différentes régions de la Yougoslavie, et l'ampleur et l'intensité de l'apparition de la classe ouvrière dans ces régions.

2. Le processus de constitution de la classe ouvrière en «classe pour soi»

«Force fondamentale de la société socialiste, c'est la classe ouvrière qui anime et garantit le développement socialiste» (Programme de la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie). La conscience relativement élevée de ce rôle dans la classe ouvrière yougoslave est une des conditions positives essentielles de l'existence de la grève. Jusqu'ici les grèves ont été le fait principalement des ouvriers de la production, employés dans l'industrie et les mines, de gens qui, objectivement, de par leur condition sociale, appartiennent à la classe ouvrière, et qui se constituent relativement vite en «classe pour soi».

Etant donné qu'ils tiennent le socialisme d'autogestion pour leur propre modèle de système social et qu'ils possèdent une haute conscience de ce qui est socialiste et de ce qui ne l'est pas, les ouvriers ne font pas la grève «contre eux-mêmes et contre leurs intérêts», comme on le pense parfois, mais bien contre ceux qui les empêchent de réaliser l'autogestion ouvrière et de répartir le revenu selon le travail fourni et les résultats du travail, contre ceux qui empêchent la classe ouvrière de réaliser ses intérêts de classe et de jouer son rôle historique. Par la grève, les ouvriers ne luttent pas contre l'autogestion comme système de normes, mais à cause de leur condition sociale et matérielle qui est en contradiction avec ces normes.

La peur de voir les ouvriers — si on leur «donne» le droit de statuer sur le revenu total — «manger l'accumulation», la distribuer sous forme de

¹ Cf. «Samoupravljanje i društveno-ekonomski razvitak Jugoslavije 1950—1970» (L'autogestion et le développement socio-économique de la Yougoslavie 1950—1970), Belgrade 1971, Institut fédéral de statistiques, pp. 94, 99 et 100. «Neki pokazatelji razvoja Jugoslavije, socijalističkih republika i autonomnih pokrajina 1950—1970» (Quelques données concernant le développement de la Yougoslavie, des Républiques socialistes et des Provinces autonomes 1950—1970), Belgrade 1971, Institut fédéral de statistiques, pp. 18—21.

revenus personnels, n'est pas fondée sur le comportement réel des travailleurs et de l'autogestion.

En se constituant en «classe pour soi», la classe ouvrière laisse entrevoir l'accomplissement de sa mission de «fossoyeur du capitalisme», mais aussi de fossoyeur de «sa propre bureaucratie». Il va sans dire que nous ne prétendons pas pour autant que tous les membres de la «classe en soi» soient devenus aussi membres de la «classe pour soi», ou que tous les ouvriers qui font la grève aient véritablement conscience du rôle historique et des responsabilités de la classe dont ils font objectivement partie.

3. La démocratisation des rapports sociaux

Dans notre pays, les grèves n'ont pu se produire qu'après que les rapports sociaux ont atteint un degré de démocratisation suffisant pour permettre réellement aux intérêts différents et contradictoires de se manifester et au conflit entre leurs titulaires de culminer sous forme de grève. Si paradoxal que cela puisse paraître, dans notre pays, la grève telle qu'elle est n'est possible que moyennant la démocratisation des rapports sociaux et le démantèlement du monopole du pouvoir social du Parti et de l'Etat. Dans un système capitaliste totalitaire ou dans un système «socialiste» bureaucratique, les grèves fréquentes ne sont pas possibles. Et lorsqu'elles éclatent, elles sont beaucoup plus grandes par le nombre des participants, et bien plus drastiques par la violence des conflits, entraînant des conséquences catastrophiques pour les grévistes. Si pour l'essentiel il n'y a pas de grèves dans les pays possédant de tels systèmes totalitaires, ce n'est pas parce que la classe ouvrière est plus que satisfaite de sa condition, mais parce qu'elle n'a pas la possibilité de manifester son mécontentement par la grève. Dans notre pays, les grèves se font plus nombreuses chaque fois qu'il est nécessaire d'insister plus fortement sur la démocratisation des rapports sociaux et de briser les résistances à l'autogestion. En faisant cette constatation, nous ne prétendons nullement que l'existence des grèves et le fait qu'elles soient autorisées constituent le principal critère de la démocratie.

Le processus de démocratisation des rapports sociaux a écarté pour l'essentiel le risque de polarisation de la société globale entre la classe ouvrière, d'une part, et son Etat — mais un Etat aliéné par rapport à elle et bureaucratise — d'autre part. Il a éliminé, toujours pour l'essentiel, la possibilité de voir éclater au niveau de la société globale (entre la classe ouvrière en tant que tout, d'une part, et l'Etat comme entité, d'autre part) un conflit qui revêtirait le caractère d'un mouvement politique de la classe ouvrière dans son ensemble, contre son propre Etat en tant que système politique global, aliéné par rapport à elle. Ce processus de démocratisation des rapports sociaux signifie: premièrement, une démythification de l'Etat de la classe ouvrière, celle-ci cessant de croire que cet Etat-abstraction peut tout faire s'il le veut; deuxièmement, une transformation du pouvoir social de l'Etat — puissance abstraite, invisible et insaisissable en puissance visible des hommes eux-mêmes, des titulaires concrets du pouvoir social; troisièmement, une concentration et une intensification dans le cadre de l'espace social et physique concret (de l'organisation de travail et de la commune en premier lieu) des contradictions dont les tenants — promoteurs d'intérêts concrets différents — se heurtent directement; proches les uns des autres, ils sont

visibles et saisissables; aucun n'est érigé en fétiche et aucun n'est tout-puissant au point que ceux dont les intérêts ont été lésés brutalement et de manière injustifiée (soit effectivement soit uniquement dans leur esprit) seraient obligés de se taire et d'endurer ces abus dans l'espoir que «ça ira mieux», et attendant d'un Parti et d'un Etat mythifiés et tout-puissants un «avenir meilleur» ou «pis encore». L'époque de la carte-blanche, du «soutien sans réserve au Parti et au Gouvernement» pour mettre en oeuvre non seulement les décisions prises, mais aussi celles qui le seront, est tout de même révolue.

La démocratisation relative des rapports sociaux est la condition positive de l'apparition de la grève, car elle permet à la classe ouvrière de s'en servir comme méthode pour faire valoir ses intérêts. Dans ce sens, la démocratisation des rapports sociaux est «responsable» de l'apparition des grèves.

4. L'autogestion arrêtée au micro-niveau et non constituée en système intégral. L'hétérogénéité sociale de la classe ouvrière et son degré d'organisation politique.

L'autogestion s'est arrêtée au micro-niveau; fragmentaire, elle ne s'est pas constituée en système social intégral. Ce fait facilite notablement la domination de l'Etat (et du capital financier et commercial autonome) sur elle, et contrarie les efforts de la classe ouvrière, en tant que force autogestionnaire pour s'affirmer souverainement sur la scène politique de la société globale.

Comme l'autogestion, la classe ouvrière est elle aussi parcellaire. En tant que classe, elle est, politiquement parlant, insuffisamment organisée au niveau de la société globale. A l'intérieur, dans les questions majeures de sa position sociale et matérielle, elle est contradictoire et socialement hétérogène. Ceci offre de plus grandes possibilités de manipulation aux centres de pouvoir social aliénés et coupés par rapport aux travailleurs, qui prennent la désunion sociale de la classe ouvrière (et de la société tout entière) comme prétexte pour perpétuer leur pouvoir social et se poser en arbitres — la plupart du temps, à leur propre avantage.

Toutes ces circonstances ont des effets négatifs pour la classe ouvrière, et elles influencent très nettement les grèves ouvrières. Mais ce sont des grèves «au détail», si l'on peut dire (un grand nombre de grèves avec un nombre réduit de participants; grèves de courte durée; efficacité des grèves limitée essentiellement au micro-niveau, etc.).

5. Le fléchissement de la représentation et de l'influence des ouvriers dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social

On observe un processus tendant à confiner le pouvoir de la classe ouvrière, ou plus exactement du mouvement ouvrier, dans des institutions aliénées, autonomes, coupées des ouvriers, qui visent à se constituer en force située au-dessus de sa propre source sociale, au-dessus de la classe ouvrière. Le rôle des centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social est en train de grandir. Mais le problème, c'est que, par leur composition sociale et la structure des influences, ces centres de décision sont de moins en moins ouvriers.

Dans l'analyse du problème que nous relevons ici, nous partons de l'hypothèse que la représentation relative des ouvriers dans les centres de décision institutionnalisés est la condition primordiale de leur influence sur les décisions et la réalisation de leurs intérêts de classe et, en conséquence, sur l'élimination du risque de voir les conflits entre les travailleurs et les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social revêtir un caractère de classe.

Nous exposerons les tendances observables dans la composition sociale des conseils ouvriers et des comités de gestion des organisations économiques qui, occupant un grand nombre de personnes, élisent des conseils ouvriers. Notre analyse n'embrasse pas les petites entreprises dans lesquelles tout le personnel exerce directement les fonctions du conseil ouvrier. Enfin, notre analyse des tendances dans la composition sociale des organes d'autogestion couvre une période de dix ans: 1960—1970.

Composition sociale des conseils ouvriers en %²

	1960	1965	1970
Nombre total des membres des conseils ouvriers	156.300	149.404	135.204
dont:			
1. Ouvriers — total	76,2%	73,8%	67,6%
— Hautement qualifiés	15,1	16,7	17,2
— Qualifiés	40,5	37,8	33,7
— Semi-qualifiés	13,4	10,8	9,0
— Non-qualifiés	7,2	8,0	7,4
— Apprentis	—	0,5	0,3
2. Autres personnes employées — total	23,8%	26,2%	32,4%
— Formation professionnelle supérieure (1er et 2e cycle)	4,2	5,9	10,1
— Formation professionnelle secondaire	12,0	13,0	15,9
— Formation professionnelle primaire	7,6	7,3	6,4

Sur le nombre total des personnes employées dans l'économie, 80,1% sont des ouvriers de toutes qualifications, et 19,9% des représentants d'autres catégories professionnelles; 4,0% sont de formation supérieure (1er et 2e cycle). En ce qui concerne la représentation dans les conseils ouvriers, on remarque une grande disparité entre les différents groupes sociaux. Déjà mal représentés aux conseils ouvriers, les travailleurs proprement dits sont de moins en moins nombreux dans ces organes d'autogestion. Si l'on ne prend en considération que les ouvriers de la production, les producteurs directs, on constatera qu'en 1970 leur part dans le nombre total des membres des conseils ouvriers, était de 54,9% seulement, et non de 67,6% comme l'indique le tableau ci-dessus. Le nombre des producteurs directs siégeant dans les conseils ouvriers, est moins élevé que celui des membres des conseils ouvriers qui sont des ouvriers de par leur formation. En effet, si certains le sont par

² Le tableau ne concerne que les conseils ouvriers centraux des entreprises. L'analyse n'englobe pas les conseils ouvriers des ateliers, départements, unités de travail, etc.

leur formation professionnelle, ils ne le sont pas par leurs postes de travail, parce que, entretemps, ils sont devenus soit des agents de direction, soit des employés.

Composition sociale des comités de gestion en %³

	1960	1965	1970
Nombre des membres des comités de gestion — total	51.261	49.794	46.994
dont:			
1. Ouvriers — total	67,2%	61,9%	44,2%
— Hautement qualifiés	19,3	19,7	18,2
— Qualifiés	34,8	31,0	20,4
— Semi-qualifiés	8,9	6,9	3,4
— Non-qualifiés	4,2	4,3	2,2
2. Autres personnes employées — total	32,8	38,1	55,8
— Formation professionnelle supérieure (1er et 2e cycle)	11,0	13,8	27,3
— Formation profes. secondaire	15,0	17,4	22,9
— Formation profes. primaire	6,8	6,9	5,6

Le tableau ci-dessus indique qu'en 1970 la part des ouvriers dans le nombre total des membres des comités de gestion était de 44,2%, mais si l'on ne prend en considération que les producteurs immédiats, on arrive à la conclusion que la part de ces derniers n'était que de 32%. Un membre des comités de gestion sur trois était alors un ouvrier.

Composition sociale des présidents des conseils ouvriers

	1960	1965	1970
Nombre total des présidents des conseils ouvriers	7.796	6.746	6.356 ⁴
dont:			
1. Ouvriers — total	74,1%	65,8%	51,2%
— Hautement qualifiés	27,1	29,2	26,1
— Qualifiés	38,3	31,3	22,3
— Semi-qualifiés	5,9	3,6	2,0
— Non-qualifiés	2,8	1,7	0,8
2. Autres personnes employées — total	25,9	34,2	48,8
— Formation professionnelle supérieure (1er et 2e cycle)	4,4	9,7	18,9
— Formation professionnelle secondaire	13,5	17,6	23,3
— Formation professionnelle primaire	8,0	6,9	6,6

³ L'analyse n'englobe que les comités de gestion (organes collégiaux, organes collectifs d'exécution des conseils ouvriers) se trouvant au «faite» des entreprises. Elle ne concerne pas les comités de gestion qui fonctionnent à l'échelon des différentes parties des entreprises, dans les unités organisationnelles inférieures.

⁴ Le nombre total des entreprises ne cesse de diminuer, car le processus d'intégration, de fusion des petites entreprises est très intense. C'est ainsi qu'entre 1965 et 1969, quelque 2.590 entreprises se sont intégrées. En conséquence, le nombre des conseils ouvriers centraux, des comités de gestion et de leurs présidents est lui aussi en régression constante.

Si sur le pourcentage (51,2%) concernant les ouvriers présidents des conseils ouvriers, on ne retient que les ouvriers de la production, les producteurs directs, on constate qu'en 1970 leur part était de 31,4%. Un président de conseil ouvrier sur trois était un ouvrier.

Composition sociale des présidents des comités de gestion

	1960	1965	1970
Nombre total des présidents des comités de gestion	7.796	6.746	6.247
dont:			
1. Ouvriers — total	69,5%	61,0%	41,4%
— Hautement qualifiés	24,1	26,5	21,1
— Qualifiés	36,9	29,0	17,9
— Semi-qualifiés et non-qualifiés	8,5	5,5	2,4
2. Autres personnes employées — total	30,5	39,0	58,6
— Formation professionnelle supérieure (1er et 2e cycle)	6,7	11,3	28,5
— Formation professionnelle secondaire	15,3	20,1	24,7
— Formation professionnelle primaire	8,5	7,6	5,4

Sur les 41,4% d'ouvriers présidents des comités de gestion, il n'y avait en 1970 que 27,0% de producteurs directs, d'ouvriers de la production.

Représentation des ouvriers aux assemblées des communes et des Républiques et à l'Assemblée fédérale

	1960	1965	1970
1. Ouvriers conseillers dans toutes les assemblées communales	13,0%	15,0%	13,0%
2. Ouvriers députés à toutes les Assemblées des Républiques	9,0	7,0	1,0
3. Ouvriers députés à l'Assemblée fédérale	8,0	6,0	1,0

Le fléchissement de la représentation relative des ouvriers aux assemblées des communautés socio-politiques coïncide avec une augmentation de celle des catégories de formation professionnelle supérieure (1er et 2e cycle).

A l'Assemblée fédérale, la part des députés à formation universitaire dans le nombre total des députés, a évolué comme suit: 1958 — 21%, 1963 — 49% et 1970 — 68%. Dans les Assemblées des six Républiques de la Fédération, les députés de formation universitaire étaient 15% en 1958, 37% en 1963 et 58% en 1970. En 1968, sur le nombre total des personnes employées dans le secteur socialisé 4,9% étaient de formation supérieure, dans l'économie 2,4% et dans les secteurs non économiques 16,0%.

On observe une nette augmentation du nombre des députés issus des rangs des dirigeants économiques. A côté des fonctionnaires officiels et des responsables politiques (en 1963, ils représentaient 30,9% sur un total de 670 députés, et en 1969 — 31% sur un total de 619 députés), ils sont en effet les

plus nombreux dans les Assemblées. En 1963, les dirigeants économiques qui siégeaient à l'Assemblée fédérale, étaient au nombre de 77, soit 11% du nombre total des parlementaires. En 1969, ces chiffres étaient respectivement: 129 et 20,9%. Ce n'est pas sans raison que le Conseil économique de l'Assemblée fédérale est appelé couramment: »Conseil des directeurs«. Toujours en 1963, la part des dirigeants économiques dans le nombre total des députés des six Républiques était de 9,0% (259), pour passer dès 1969 à 19% (425)⁵.

La représentation relative des ouvriers dans les centres de décision institutionnalisés décroît à mesure que le niveau de ces centres s'élève. C'est ainsi qu'en 1970 elle se présentait comme suit: conseils ouvriers 54,9%, comités de gestion 32,0%, assemblées des communes 13%, Assemblées des Provinces autonomes 4%, Assemblées des Républiques 1% et Assemblée fédérale 1% également.

La tendance à la baisse de la représentation relative des ouvriers dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social à tous les échelons est donc évidente. On retrouve le même phénomène dans les autres structures institutionnalisées que nous n'avons pas analysées dans la présente étude.

L'influence effective des ouvriers sur les décisions prises dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social se situe bien en deça du degré de leur représentation dans ces centres.

Ces faits expliquent dans une large mesure pourquoi ce sont surtout les ouvriers de la production qui font la grève et pourquoi ils entrent en conflit, par la grève, avec les structures institutionnalisées.

Le processus qui refoule les ouvriers des centres de décision institutionnalisés n'a pas épargné non plus le Deuxième Congrès de l'autogestion dont les assises ont eu lieu en 1971. Sur le nombre total des délégués élus au Congrès (2,301), un sur quatre seulement (24%) était un ouvrier. Et encore ces 24% comprenaient les délégués qui n'étaient des ouvriers que par leur profession initiale et non par le poste de travail qu'ils occupaient effectivement, parce qu'entretemps ils étaient devenus soit dirigeants soit employés ou fonctionnaires. Les délégués ouvriers de par leur poste de travail effectif étaient donc moins nombreux et leur part était inférieure à 24%.⁶

En revanche, au Congrès des conseils ouvriers tenu en 1957, sur le nombre total des délégués (1.761), 61,1% étaient effectivement des ouvriers à la fois par leur formation et leur poste de travail⁷. Alors qu'au Congrès des conseils ouvriers les délégués ayant une formation professionnelle supérieure et moyenne constituaient 22,2% du nombre total des délégués, au Deuxième

⁵ Sources:

- Samoupravlanje i društveno-ekonomski razvitak Jugoslavije 1950—1970, Institut fédéral de statistiques, Belgrade 1971, pp. 21-23, 63-69, 72, 94, 999-1.002.
- Neki pokazatelji razvoja Jugoslavije, socijalističkih republika i autonomnih pokrajina 1950—1970, Institut fédéral de statistiques, Belgrade 1971, p. 18.
- Radni dokument Saveznog zavoda za statistiku (Document de travail de l'Institut fédéral de statistiques, Année VIII, No 15, 2, 6, 1971, pp. 9—13.
- Samoupravlanje u privredi 1970 (L'autogestion dans l'économie), Bulletin statistique 658, Institut fédéral de statistiques, Belgrade mars 1971, pp. 9—15.

Voir également:

- Skupštinski izbori 1969 (Les élections parlementaires de 1969), Institut de sciences sociales, Belgrade 1970, pp. 148, 150—1951.

⁶ Cf. »Drugi kongres samoupravljača Jugoslavije« (Le Deuxième Congrès de l'autogestion), Ed. »Radnička štampa«, Belgrade 1971, pp. 809—810, 821—843.

⁷ Kongres radničkih saveta« (Le Congrès des conseils ouvriers) Ed. »Rad«, Belgrade 1957, pp. 732—735.

Congrès de l'autogestion rien que les ingénieurs et les techniciens en représentaient 23,6%, les économistes 11%, les juristes 7,9%, les enseignants 7,1%, les responsables et permanents socio-politique 5,1%, etc.

Le processus de baisse de la représentation et de l'influence des ouvriers dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social coïncide avec:

- 1) une option verbale plus intense des structures politiques institutionnalisées pour une représentation plus grande des ouvriers dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social, et pour leur influence déterminante dans ces centres de décision,
- 2) un accroissement de l'importance et du rôle des centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social,
- 3) une augmentation constante du nombre des questions sur lesquelles ils statuent — accroissement quantitatif de leurs droits, devoirs et responsabilités,
- 4) une multiplication permanente des questions sur lesquelles les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social sont appelés à se prononcer — l'exercice de leurs droits, devoirs et responsabilités ne cesse de gagner en complexité,
- 5) un accroissement de la représentation relative et de l'influence des experts et des dirigeants (politiques, économiques, organisateurs de la production et du travail) dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social à tous les échelons,
- 6) un processus de différenciation sociale et d'aggravation des inégalités sociales manifestement au détriment des ouvriers de la production, ce qui est en fait l'autre volet de la différenciation du pouvoir social aux dépens des ouvriers,
- 7) un accroissement de l'insécurité sociale des ouvriers,
- 8) une augmentation du nombre des grèves relativement grandes, et de la violence de ce genre de conflits,
- 9) un déplacement de la ligne des conflits (grèves) qui cessent d'opposer les ouvriers aux »organes de direction« (ou aux titulaires des postes de direction dans les entreprises) pour mettre de plus en plus aux prises les ouvriers et les institutions de l'autogestion. Ces derniers temps, les ouvriers font de plus en plus la grève pour protester contre les décisions des conseils ouvriers et des comités de gestion; ils entrent donc toujours plus en conflit avec les centres de décision institutionnalisés qui sont nominalement des centres ouvriers, mais où la représentation et l'influence des ouvriers sont de moins en moins grandes.

L'existence de tendances au fléchissement de la représentation relative et de l'influence des ouvriers dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social est par conséquent indubitable. Mais ces tendances font l'objet de différentes appréciations et interprétations depuis celles qui affirment que la domination des technostructures est un phénomène inévitable et que la classe ouvrière doit donc en faire sa propre idéologie et la voie de sa propre libération, jusqu'à celles qui font observer que la domination des technostructures n'est en fait pour la classe ouvrière qu'une manière de changer de gouvernants tout aussi aliénés et autonomes par rapport à elle, alors que

les travailleurs demeurent de simples salariés. Du point de vue de la conception de Marx soulignant que «la libération de la classe ouvrière ne peut être que l'oeuvre de la classe ouvrière elle-même», en continuant à réduire la représentation et l'influence des ouvriers dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social on risque d'aboutir, non à l'unification, mais à la cassure définitive entre la classe ouvrière et les structures institutionnalisées du pouvoir social. En dernière analyse, on déboucherait sur une structuration de classe de la société où, partant de sa position salariale, la classe ouvrière se constituerait définitivement en «classe pour soi» et aurait recours aux moyens de la lutte des classes pour assurer sa propre libération. C'est là que réside, selon nous, la conséquence véritable du concept de domination des technostructures, c'est-à-dire en fait d'une nouvelle variante de «l'absolutisme éclairé».

Le renforcement du rôle et des responsabilités des experts et des spécialistes, des dirigeants et des organisateurs, est indispensable au progrès scientifique et technologique; mais il l'est sous l'angle de leur position professionnelle, des fonctions (tâches) pour lesquelles ils sont rétribués. Dans ce sens, leur «pouvoir» sur la technologie et l'organisation du travail, est un phénomène positif.

En revanche, la suprématie des dirigeants et des experts dans les conseils ouvriers et les autres centres de décision institutionnalisés est un phénomène négatif, car leur «pouvoir» sur la technologie et l'organisation du travail — en tant que fonction et tâche professionnelle — se transforme en pouvoir économique et politique sur les ouvriers, sur les conditions et les fruits du travail de ces derniers.

La tendance à refouler la représentation et l'influence des ouvriers des centres de décision institutionnalisés est un processus négatif qui contribue foncièrement à l'apparition des grèves ouvrières. Mettre fin à cette tendance à l'avantage de l'autogestion ouvrière — à la fois comme mouvement et comme système social intégral — est un préalable essentiel à la réduction des grèves ouvrières.

6. L'existence de centres de pouvoir social autonomes et aliénés par rapport aux ouvriers

En dépossédant l'Etat et le Parti de leurs prérogatives de centre unique du pouvoir social, pour transférer celui-ci à plusieurs centres plus petits, on n'a pas définitivement réglé la question de l'exercice du pouvoir de la classe ouvrière elle-même. Nous nous trouvons en présence d'un processus relativement rapide de décentralisation du pouvoir du Parti et de l'Etat, et d'un processus relativement lent de démocratisation des rapports sociaux. Le démantèlement graduel de l'Etat fédéral ne s'est pas fait uniquement au profit du renforcement de l'autogestion ouvrière. Au contraire, il a contribué beaucoup plus à renforcer les centres bureaucratiques du pouvoir politique et économique qui existaient déjà, et à en créer de nouveaux. Ces centres bureaucratiques du pouvoir social («les caïds») sont éparpillés au micro-

Etudes supérieures (1er cycle) fonctionnelle et territoriale de la société. Hétérogènes et parfois concurrents, ils sont unis et privilégiés par rapport aux ouvriers. Cela contribue grandement à l'éclatement des grèves ouvrières.

La décentralisation du pouvoir est un fait positif. Mais sans un processus correspondant de démocratisation des rapports sociaux, elle n'écarte pas par elle-même les risques de grève.

Lorsque l'ouvrier est réduit à l'état salarial et lorsqu'il est en butte à la contrainte, peu lui importe, en dernière analyse, de savoir à quel niveau — Fédération, République, commune ou usine — se situe le centre de pouvoir social, bureaucratisé, aliéné et autonome, qui le soumet à cette contrainte. C'est contre elle que l'ouvrier proteste, même par la grève, sans se préoccuper d'où elle vient et au nom de qui elle est exercée.

7. Le marché

Il est difficile de dire jusqu'à quel point les lois économiques jouent librement sur le marché. De même, il est malaisé de préciser le sens empirique de l'expression «économie de marché planifiée et autogestionnaire» adoptée par les structures politiques institutionnalisées. Sur ce point, les opinions divergent considérablement, même chez les économistes.

En regard de la direction planifiée centralisée, l'économie de marché est un fait positif. Mais celle qui a été retenue par les structures politiques institutionnalisées engendre aussi des «différences sociales injustifiées», combattues du reste par ces mêmes structures politiques. Le marché n'est pas le seul à engendrer les inégalités sociales. La répartition du pouvoir social y est également pour beaucoup. Le marché contribue à l'apparition des grèves ouvrières dans la mesure où l'économie marchande fait surgir des différences sociales abusives au détriment des ouvriers de la production. C'est là une des raisons principales qui les amènent à se mettre en grève.

8. Le sous-développement politique et le retard culturel de certaines parties de la classe ouvrière

La formation scolaire et le degré d'éducation professionnelle ne sont pas des indicateurs tout à fait suffisants pour apprécier le niveau de développement ou de sous-développement politique et culturel, ou le degré de constitution ou de non-constitution de la classe ouvrière en «classe pour soi». A défaut d'autres indicateurs, nous présenterons ci-après la structure des personnes employées selon la formation scolaire et l'éducation professionnelle.

Structure des personnes employées dans le secteur socialisé
selon la formation scolaire — en 1968

	Total	Economie	Sect. non économ.
	1968	1968	1968
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0
Sans formation scol. et de l à			
3 classes d'école primaire	7,8	8,7	3,9
De 4 à 7 classes d'école primaire	29,8	33,3	14,4
Ecole primaire de 8 ans	18,5	18,7	17,3

Ecole secondaire et école pour ouvriers qualifiés et hautement qualifiés	36,0	35,7	37,8
Etudes supérieures (1er cycle)	3,0	1,2	10,6
Etudes supérieures (2e cycle)			
— Facultés et Académies	4,9	2,4	16,0

La situation se présente approximativement de la même manière pour ce qui concerne la formation professionnelle des personnes employées⁸.

**Structure des personnes employées dans le secteur socialisé
selon les qualifications professionnelles — en 1968**

	Total	Economie	Sect. non économ.
	1968	1968	1968
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0
Formation profes. supérieure (2e cycle)	4,9	2,5	15,8
Formation profes. supérieure (1er cycle)	3,3	1,5	11,5
Formation profes. moyenne	13,6	9,7	33,6
Formation profes. primaire	8,8	6,9	17,4
Ouvriers hautement qualifiés	6,7	7,8	1,9
Ouvriers qualifiés	25,5	30,4	3,9
Ouvriers semi-qualifiés	13,4	15,7	2,8
Ouvriers non qualifiés	23,8	26,2	13,1

Sur le nombre total des personnes employées dans l'économie, 41,9% sont des travailleurs non qualifiés ou semi-qualifiés. Lorsqu'on y ajoute les ouvriers de formation professionnelle primaire, on aboutit à près de 50% des effectifs de l'économie. Nous ne prétendons pas pour autant qu'un ouvrier sur deux travaillant dans l'économie ne possède pas une conscience élevée du rôle historique et des intérêts authentiques de la classe ouvrière. Il est certain cependant que la conscience de certaines parties de la classe ouvrière ne se situe pas au niveau de la «classe pour soi». En conséquence, le faible degré de la conscience de classe chez une partie de la classe ouvrière est une des conditions négatives de l'existence des grèves.

La structure défavorable de l'éducation générale et de la formation professionnelle des ouvriers, s'ajoutant aux effets du marché, à l'hétérogénéité de la classe ouvrière et à l'insuffisance de son organisation politique à l'échelle de la société globale, favorise l'apparition d'intérêts partiels et momentanés chez certaines parties de cette classe, ainsi que l'éclatement de grèves dont le but est précisément de satisfaire ces intérêts partiels et momentanés

⁸ »Samoupravljanje i društveno-ekonomski razvitak Jugoslavije 1950—1970. Institut fédéral de statistiques, Belgrade 1971, pp. 101 et 102.

qui sont le plus souvent d'ordre matériel. Cette conduite de certains groupes d'ouvriers est en contradiction avec les intérêts de classe et la mission historique de la classe ouvrière tout entière.

9) L'activité (inactivité) pratique de la Ligue des communistes et des Syndicats n'est pas suffisamment adaptée aux intérêts de classe des ouvriers

Qu'en est-il de la Ligue des communistes et des Syndicats et quelle est leur attitude envers la classe ouvrière? La réponse à cette question requiert une analyse approfondie qui déborde le cadre et le propos de ce texte. Il est certain cependant que la liaison sociale et idéologique de la Ligue des communistes avec la classe ouvrière a eu tendance à se relâcher.

De 1946 à 1966, le nombre des ouvriers membres de la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie avait quadruplé, tandis que celui des autres catégories professionnelles avait augmenté de 15 fois⁹. La baisse de la représentation relative des ouvriers à la Ligue des communistes devait se poursuivre après 1966, passant de 35% en 1965 à 31,2% en 1969. La part des ouvriers dans le nombre total des exclus de la Ligue des communistes a évolué comme suit: 24,8% en 1953, 48,3% en 1963 et 53,1% en 1968. En ce qui concerne leur part dans le nombre total des nouveaux adhérents, elle se présente de la manière suivante: 36% en 1953, 34% en 1963 et 38% en 1968. Enfin, sur le nombre total des ouvriers, 14% sont membres de la Ligue des communistes. Par contre, selon une analyse du dr Stipe Šuvar, sur 100 fonctionnaires et employés publics, 85 sont membres de la Ligue des communistes¹⁰.

Ajoutons que, suivant l'analyse de Vinko Hafner, deux tiers environ des membres de la Ligue des communistes ont une position sociale supérieure à la moyenne. Autrement dit, ils appartiennent aux couches sociales moyennes et supérieures¹¹. La Ligue des communistes devait dès lors (par sa composition sociale et dans ses actions pratiques) subir l'influence dominante des forces sociales et politiques entrant toujours plus ouvertement et violemment en conflit avec la classe ouvrière. Ce fait peut expliquer qu'à l'occasion de la «réorganisation de la Ligue des communistes», de la «restructuration en cours de marche», «de la puissante politisation des masses» et autres mots d'ordre officiels, ce sont précisément les ouvriers qui ont quitté la Ligue des communistes.

On peut dire que par ses actions politiques pratiques (ou par son inactivité) et par sa composition sociale (celle des instances dirigeantes, en particulier), la Ligue des communistes a été toujours moins une organisation ouvrière, un instrument dans les mains de la classe ouvrière. Elle ne mobilisait pas suffisamment les ouvriers pour l'action; elle n'était pas, dans la mesure voulue, l'avant-garde du mouvement ouvrier de masse. C'est ce qui explique la présence de membres de la Ligue des communistes parmi les ouvriers en grève, et aussi parmi les dirigeants contre lesquels les grèves ont été déclenchées.

Quoique peut-être pas dans une mesure aussi grande et dans le même sens, ces constatations valent aussi pour les Syndicats. Certes, ceux-ci n'ont

⁹ Cf. «Savez komunista Jugoslavije i samoupravljanje» (La Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie et l'autogestion), Ed. «Kultura», Belgrade 1967, pp. 754-755.

¹⁰ «Borba», No 182 du 4. VII. 1972, p. 5.

¹¹ Cf. «Komunist», No 760 du 7 octobre 1971, p. 14.

cessé d'intervenir au nom de la classe ouvrière et au profit de ses intérêts. Mais ils l'ont fait sans la présence de la classe ouvrière et sans actions pratiques destinées à mobiliser les masses ouvrières et à les rendre capables — organisées dans les syndicats — de lutter elles-mêmes pour leur propre libération, pour faire valoir leurs intérêts de classe. Les Syndicats (ou plus exactement leurs instances dirigeantes) ont souvent désapprouvé les mesures officielles portant atteinte aux intérêts des ouvriers. Par contre, ils n'ont pas entrepris des actions en vue d'organiser la classe ouvrière et de l'amener à dire «non» ou «oui» en tant que force sociale (en tant que mouvement ouvrier de masse).

La Ligue des communistes et les Syndicats n'ont donc pas été, dans toute la mesure voulue, générateurs d'autogestion à la fois comme mouvement ouvrier et comme système social. Le décalage entre l'action de la Ligue des communistes et des Syndicats et les intérêts de classe des ouvriers constitue un fait négatif qui exerce une influence déterminante dans le sens de l'apparition des grèves ouvrières.

10. Les agissements de l'ennemi

Il est assez difficile de définir la notion d'ennemi et celle d'agissements de l'ennemi. Les ennemis des ouvriers ne sont pas seulement les anciens capitalistes et les espions étrangers. Les ennemis des ouvriers peuvent être aussi les bureaucrates, les technocrates, les nationalistes, les séparatistes, les anarchistes, les unitaristes, les couches privilégiées qui vivent du travail d'autrui, etc. Tout ce faisceau d'ennemis réels ou virtuels des ouvriers devrait être analysé sous l'angle de l'influence directe ou indirecte qu'ils exercent sur l'éclatement des grèves.

Nous réduisons ici la notion d'ennemi aux anciens membres (au sens physique) de la bourgeoisie et aux adversaires politiques actuels de l'étranger.

Les menées de ces ennemis, en tant que condition négative de l'apparition des grèves, sont assez contestées.

Les recherches effectuées jusqu'ici pour dégager les causes des grèves montrent que, dans certains cas, l'ennemi s'était livré effectivement à diverses menées, mais que ces agissements n'étaient pas la cause véritable des grèves en question. Dans ce sens, les agissements de l'ennemi ne sont pas une condition négative réelle de la grève. Par contre, il est possible (c'est du reste ce qui s'est passé effectivement) que l'ennemi exerce son influence dans un milieu en proie à un conflit qui tend à atteindre son point culminant, à se transformer en grève. Dans les cas de ce genre, les survivances du passé capitaliste et l'influence organisée de l'extérieur peuvent exacerber le conflit existant et en hâter la culmination. Elles s'imbriquent alors dans les causes directes de la grève. Dans ce sens, les menées de l'ennemi se présentent effectivement comme une des causes négatives de l'éclatement des grèves. On se doit de faire observer cependant que les survivances du passé capitaliste et l'influence de l'ennemi extérieur ne sont pas les causes premières des conflits qui tendent à dégénérer en grèves et qui se terminent avec elles.

11. La tradition en matière de grève

L'influence de la tradition gréviste d'avant la révolution sur l'éclatement des grèves après elle, n'a pas été suffisamment étudiée. Il est certain néanmoins que les ouvriers plus âgés conçoivent la grève comme le moyen le plus efficace dans la lutte pour faire valoir les intérêts des travailleurs. De ce point de vue, il est possible de parler de l'influence de la tradition (d'avant la guerre) sur le nombre relativement plus élevé des grèves dans les centres industriels et les branches économiques où il y avait également des grèves avant la révolution. Cette constatation vaut surtout pour la métallurgie, l'industrie textile et les mines.

12. Quelques causes générales de conflits qui agissent dans le sens de l'apparition des grèves

Certains conflits dont les causes sont diverses, ont également leur importance pour l'explication générale de l'éclatement des grèves dans notre pays. Nous n'en mentionnerons que trois qui nous paraissent essentiels. D'abord, le fait que l'avenir promis et tel qu'on l'imaginait n'a pas été réalisé. Ensuite, l'identification, dans une large mesure, du programme et de la politique courante, de ce qui est conçu comme le but ultime de la société socialiste et ce que l'on peut en réaliser aux différentes étapes de l'édification. Enfin, les changements dans l'infrastructure.

Dans le premier cas, il s'agit de la non-réalisation («ajournement temporaire») de certains idéaux fondamentaux de la révolution. A la place de la justice et de l'égalité sociale, nous avons des «différences sociales injustifiées» au détriment du groupe social qui attendait le plus l'équité et l'égalité sociales. Indiquons, à titre d'exemple, qu'en 1971 l'écart entre les revenus personnels les plus bas et les plus élevés était en Slovaquie de 1:12¹². Lorsqu'on prend en considération ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler les «autres revenus», c'est-à-dire la «fortune globale» des différents groupes sociaux, cet écart peut être encore plus grand et varier de 1 à 25¹³.

Dans le deuxième cas, les conflits surgissent et s'aggravent du fait que l'on identifie les objectifs ultimes et la situation telle qu'elle est effectivement. La comparaison entre l'état de choses réel et les buts ultimes ne cesse d'accentuer le décalage entre la condition sociale espérée et la situation véritable.

Dans le troisième cas, il s'agit des grands changements qui surviennent, les économistes, dans le développement des sociétés lorsqu'il leur faut franchir le cap des 600 dollars USA de revenu national par habitant pour atteindre le palier des 1.500 dollars. Dans cet intervalle, les changements qui affectent l'infrastructure engendrent inévitablement des conflits dont la grève est le point culminant. La Yougoslavie où le revenu national par habitant est actuellement de l'ordre de 700 dollars, traverse précisément cette période de restructuration.

¹² Cf. «Komunist» du 25 novembre 1971, p. 11.

¹³ Cf. «Komunist», No 760 du 7 octobre 1971, p. 13.

II

QUELQUES CARACTERISTIQUES IMPORTANTES DES GREVES

1. La première grève

La première grève en RSF de Yougoslavie eut lieu les 13, 14 et 15 janvier 1958. Près de 4.000 mineurs de Trbovlje et de Hrastovik cessèrent alors le travail. Tous les grévistes étaient employés dans les mines: 3.726 mineurs, 157 techniciens et porions, 17 ingénieurs et 141 employés y compris les cadres de direction. Tous les membres du conseil ouvrier et du comité de gestion, tous les membres de la Ligue des communistes, ainsi que les dirigeants et les membres des Syndicats participèrent eux aussi au mouvement.

Des revenus personnels faibles, conditionnés par la position des mines dans le cadre général du système de répartition, les prix relativement élevés des fournitures et des produits intermédiaires, le prix relativement bas du charbon furent à l'origine de la grève. Les revenus personnels distribués dans les mines étaient beaucoup moins élevés que ceux des autres branches de l'économie, en particulier des secteurs non économiques.

La position des mines dans le système général de répartition et le montant des prix des fournitures et du charbon étaient déterminés exclusivement par les autorités fédérales. En faisant la grève, les mineurs se trouvaient donc en conflit direct avec ces autorités.

La grève était l'ultime recours des mineurs. En effet, leurs représentants s'étaient obstinément, mais en vain, adressés à tous les organes politiques (Ligue des communistes et Syndicats) et à toutes les autorités officielles de leur commune et de leur arrondissement, de la République de Slovénie et de la Fédération.

En ce qui concerne la satisfaction des revendications formulées par les mineurs, la grève se révéla plus efficace que tous les efforts que leurs représentants avaient accomplis avant le déclenchement du mouvement. Mais les causes profondes de la grève n'en furent pas pour autant entièrement éliminées. La faible valorisation du travail productif dans les charbonnages devait demeurer longtemps encore une cause de grève dans d'autres mines.

Les moyens d'information gardèrent le silence sur la grève des mineurs. En effet, la grève était alors un sujet tabou. Mais les nouvelles concernant la grève circulèrent d'une manière assez organisée par les canaux officiels.

En signe de solidarité avec ceux de Trbovlje, près de 1.200 ouvriers des charbonnages de Zagorje ob Savi firent une grève de 24 heures le 16 janvier 1958.

Nous tenons à faire observer que la première grève éclata dans la région la plus développée de Yougoslavie, en Slovénie, dans une mine de charbon possédant une longue tradition et une vieille classe ouvrière au degré de qualifications relativement élevé.

2. La dynamique des grèves selon les années

Après la Slovénie, les grèves firent leur apparition en Croatie et en Serbie, puis en Bosnie-Herzégovine et enfin en Macédoine et au Monténégro. C'est dans la partie la moins développée de la Yougoslavie — dans la Pro-

vince socialiste autonome de Kossovo, que les grèves éclatèrent le plus tard (1968). Une décennie entière s'était écoulée entre la première grève de Slovénie et la première grève de la Province de Kossovo.

Comme nous le verrons par la suite, c'est dans les Républiques les plus développées et dans la Province de Voïvodine que l'on a enregistré, relativement parlant, le plus grand nombre de grèves et de grévistes. Leur nombre a été bien moins élevé dans les Républiques sous-développées et dans la Province de Kossovo.

Ce fait donne encore plus de relief à la question des préalables (conditions générales) à l'apparition des grèves.

On ne possède pas de données absolument exactes sur le nombre des grèves selon les années. Mais les données dont on dispose à ce sujet peuvent utilement parce qu'elles correspondent approximativement à la situation réelle.

	Année	Nombre de grèves	%	Nombre de grévistes	%
1.	1958	28	1,6	pas de données	—
2.	1959	35	2,0	—	—
3.	1960	61	3,5	—	—
4.	1961	130	7,4	—	—
5.	1962	225	12,8	—	—
6.	1963	213	12,2	—	—
7.	1964	271	15,5	11.000	14,2
8.	1965	231	13,2	9.000	11,6
9.	1966	152	8,7	pas de données	—
10.	1967	118	6,7	16.762 (8)	21,6
11.	1968	148	8,5	19.206 (20)	24,8
12.	1969	138	7,9	21.629 (9)	27,8
	(8 mois)				
Total:		1.750	100,0	77.597 (37) ¹⁴	100,0

En quatre ans et huit mois, ces 77.597 grévistes ont participé à 869 arrêts de travail, soit environ 90 ouvriers par grève. Les données concernant le nombre des grèves pour la période allant de janvier 1958 à décembre 1961 ne sont pas complètes, et les grèves ont été en fait plus nombreuses. On ne possède pas de données sur le nombre des grèves en Slovénie, en Serbie et en Bosnie-Herzégovine pour 1958 et 1959, en Serbie et en Bosnie-Herzégovine pour 1960, et en Bosnie-Herzégovine pour 1961. Les données faisant défaut pour cet intervalle, il est impossible de dire exactement quelle a été la dynamique des grèves de janvier 1958 à décembre 1961. En ce qui concerne la dynamique des grèves selon les années — du 1er janvier 1962 au 30 août 1969, on peut dire qu'elle correspond grosso modo à la réalité.

C'est en 1965 que nous fîmes nos premières recherches sur les grèves. Une autre enquête fut organisée en 1966, et une troisième en 1969. Au cours de ces trois enquêtes, c'est l'auteur du présent texte qui élaborait les que-

¹⁴ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous n'avons pas de données sur celui des participants.

tionnaires, organisa les recherches et en étudia les résultats. Les deux premières enquêtes furent effectuées exclusivement sur le territoire de la République socialiste de Serbie; la troisième (1969) couvrit tout le territoire de la Yougoslavie. Les résultats des deux premières enquêtes firent l'objet, au début de 1967, de la première discussion scientifique sur les grèves¹⁵. Un autre débat sur les grèves eut lieu le 24 octobre 1968 au Conseil central de la Confédération des syndicats de Yougoslavie avec le concours de scientifiques et d'hommes politiques de toute la Yougoslavie¹⁶. La documentation pour ces deux débats avait été préparée et rédigée par l'auteur de la présente étude.

Nous n'exposerons ici que les principaux résultats de l'enquête que nous avons effectuée en 1969. Le questionnaire contenait 25 points (des questions ouvertes pour la plupart), de sorte qu'il est impossible de présenter ici toutes les réponses par ailleurs quantifiées. Il avait été envoyé à tous les conseils syndicaux des communes et à toutes les assemblées municipales de Yougoslavie, qui y avaient répondu pour l'essentiel en commun.

Sur les 478 conseils syndicaux des communes qui existaient alors, 405 répondirent au questionnaire, tandis que 73 ne fournirent aucune réponse. Sur ces 405 communes, 258 affirmèrent qu'il n'y avait pas eu de grèves sur leur territoire; 147 communes répondirent en remplissant les formulaires concernant les grèves qui avaient eu lieu sur leur territoire.

Sur ces 512 grèves, 458 se produisirent du 1^{er} janvier 1966 au 30 août 1969, soit 90% environ. Sur les 66.845 participants aux 512 grèves en question, 62.504, soit 93,5% du nombre total des grévistes, prirent part à 458 grèves du 1^{er} janvier 1966 au 30 août 1969. L'analyse qui suit porte sur 512 grèves auxquelles participèrent 66.845 travailleurs. Pour 40 grèves, nous ne possédons pas de données concernant le nombre des participants. Si l'on fait abstraction de ces 40 grèves, on aboutit à la conclusion que pendant cette période la moyenne a été de 141 ouvriers par grève.

3. La répartition territoriale des effectifs, des grèves et des grévistes

République socialiste	% des effectifs	Nombre de grèves	%	Nombre de grévistes	%
1. Serbie (28)	38,6	215	42,0	22.066 (21)	33,0
2. Croatie (16)	25,1	119	23,3	25.230 (8)	37,7
3. Slovénie (8)	14,1	81	15,7	8.674 (2)	12,9
4. Bosnie-Herzégovine (14)	13,5	59	11,6	7.671 (1)	11,5
5. Macédoine (3)	6,7	38	7,4	3.204 (8)	4,9
6. Monténégro (—)	2,0				
Total RSF de Yougoslavie (69) ¹⁷	100,0	512	100,0	66.845 (40) ¹⁸	100,0

¹⁵ Le procès-verbal sténographique de cette discussion et notre étude sur les grèves ont été publiés dans l'ouvrage: «Obustave rada» (Les arrêts de travail), Ed. Centre d'études et de formation politiques, Belgrade mai 1967, 216 p.

¹⁶ Le procès-verbal de ce débat a été photocopié sous le titre: «Les arrêts de travail et les questions directement liés à eux», Conseil central de la Confédération des syndicats de Yougoslavie, Belgrade 1968, 230 p.

¹⁷ Nombre des communes pour lesquelles nous n'avons pas d'informations concernant les grèves sur leur territoire.

¹⁸ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous n'avons pas de données sur celui des participants.

On possède aussi des données sur deux grèves au Monténégro avec 243 participants. Sur le nombre total des grèves (512), cela représente moins de 0,5%, et sur celui des grévistes 0,4% seulement. Dans la suite de notre analyse, nous avons fait abstraction de ces deux grèves du Monténégro, puisqu'elles n'ont guère d'importance pour l'étude du problème.

4. Répartition territoriale des grèves dans la République socialiste de Serbie

Territoire	% des effectifs	Nombre de grèves	%	Nombre de grévistes	%
1. Serbie proprement dite	65,6	126	58,9	15.002 (12)	67,9
2. Voïvodine	27,7	83	38,4	6.629 (6)	30,1
3. Kosovo	6,7	6	2,7	435 (3)	2,0
Total RS de Serbie	100,0	215	100,0	22.066 (21) ¹⁹	100,0

5. Répartition des grèves selon les communes et les organisations de travail

République	Nombre de communes	%	Nombre de org. de tra.	%	Nombre de grèves	%	Nombre de grévistes	%
1. Serbie (28)	51	34,7	147	41,9	215	42,0	22.066	33,0
2. Croatie (16)	36	24,5	83	23,6	119	23,3	25.230	37,7
3. Slovénie (8)	22	14,9	62	17,7	81	15,7	6.674	12,9
4. Bosnie-Herzégovine (14)	27	18,4	39	11,1	59	11,6	7.671	11,5
5. Macédoine (3)	11	7,5	20	5,7	38	7,4	3.204	4,9
Total RSF de Yougoslavie (69) ²⁰	147	100,0	351	100,0	512	100,0	66.845	100,0

La répartition territoriale des grèves montre que le faisceau de circonstances contradictoires qui engendre les grèves ne couvre pas dans une mesure égale tout le pays, et que les différentes causes des grèves n'existent pas ou n'agissent pas avec la même ampleur et la même intensité dans toutes les régions de la Yougoslavie. Une analyse à part révélerait quelles sont, parmi les conditions que nous avons exposées au début du présent texte, celles qui ont des incidences plus ou moins fortes sur l'ampleur et l'intensité des grèves dans les différentes Républiques et Provinces autonomes.

Nous nous proposons de produire quelques données sur les grandes différences de degré de développement économique et culturel entre les diverses régions de la Yougoslavie, qui peuvent laisser entrevoir les conditions primordiales de l'apparition des grèves dans ces régions.

¹⁹ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous n'avons pas de données sur celui des participants.

²⁰ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des communes qui n'ont pas répondu à l'enquête.

En 1970, la part des Républiques et des Provinces autonomes dans le produit social total de la Yougoslavie se présentait comme suit: Bosnie-Herzégovine 11,7% (18,3%), Monténégro 11,9% (2,6%), Croatie 26,6% (21,6%), Macédoine 5,6% (8,0%), Slovénie 15,7% (8,4%), République socialiste de Serbie dans son ensemble 38,5% (41,6%), Serbie proprement dite 25,4% (25,6%), Voïvodine 11,0% (9,5%), Kossovo 2,1% (6,0%). Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent la part respective des Républiques et des Provinces autonomes dans la population globale de la Yougoslavie. La même année, en 1970, la production industrielle de la Slovénie était presque dix fois plus élevée que celle de la Province de Kossovo. Par rapport à la moyenne Yougoslave (100%), la part de l'emploi dans le secteur socialisé en regard de la population totale était de 168% pour la Slovénie et de 43% pour la Province de Kossovo. Le produit social par habitant était, par rapport à la moyenne yougoslave (100%), de 186% pour la Slovénie et de 35% pour la Province de Kossovo. Les dépenses publiques par habitant étaient quatre fois plus importantes en Slovénie que dans la Province de Kossovo. En 1971, la part de la population agricole dans la population globale était de 36% pour la Yougoslavie, de 50,1% pour la Province de Kossovo et de 18,0% seulement pour la Slovénie. En 1970, le nombre des personnes employées pour 1.000 habitants était de 189 pour la Yougoslavie, de 318 pour la Slovénie et de 82 pour la Province de Kossovo. La même année, le nombre des demandes d'emploi sur 1.000 personnes employées, était de 83 pour la Yougoslavie, de 31 pour la Slovénie et de 310 pour la Province de Kossovo. Le produit social par habitant actif était en Slovénie quatre fois supérieur à celui de la Province de Kossovo. En 1971, le nombre des personnes à charge par travailleur était de 2,7 pour la Yougoslavie, de 1,3 pour la Slovénie et de 9,0 pour la Province de Kossovo. La même année, la formation scolaire était la suivante: études primaires de huit ans — Yougoslavie 14,6% de la population globale, Slovénie 30,8% et Province de Kossovo 15,2%; études secondaires — Yougoslavie 15,3%, Slovénie 23,4% et Province de Kossovo 7,4% seulement. En 1970, il y avait en Slovénie (88) près de dix fois plus d'automobiles que dans la Province de Kossovo (9). Enfin, en ce qui concerne les médecins: Yougoslavie — un médecin pour 1.010 habitants, Slovénie un pour 819 habitants et Kossovo — trois fois moins, ou en chiffres absolus, un médecin pour 2.580 habitants.²¹

Devant des différences aussi tranchées quant au degré de développement économique et culturel, on peut se demander si nous pouvons avoir dans toute la Yougoslavie le même concept de l'autogestion et si, compte tenu d'une disparité aussi grande de ses conditions préalables, nous pouvons prétendre atteindre partout au même niveau de réalisation du modèle d'autogestion. On peut se demander, par ailleurs, si les tendances analysées dans la première partie du présent texte, iront se renforçant pour engendrer des grèves d'une ampleur et d'une intensité encore plus grandes, ou si, s'adaptant aux différents degrés de développement économique et culturel, le système d'autogestion offrira un cadre suffisamment large (et démocratique) à la manifestation des intérêts divergents et opposés, étant entendu que le système social tout entier sera capable de les concilier et de les harmoniser par des méthodes démocratiques et sans grèves. La question a son importan-

²¹ Source: Neki pokazatelji razvoja Jugoslavije, socijalističkih republika i autonomnih pokrajina 1950—1970, Institut fédéral de statistiques, Belgrade 1971 pp. 13—29.

ce car l'ampleur et l'intensité des grèves dans les Républiques développées ne diminuent pas dans la proportion où elles augmentent dans les régions sous-développées.

6. La fréquence des grèves dans les mêmes organisations de travail

Nombre des org. de trav.	%	Nombre des grèves dans la même org. de travail	Nombre total des grèves dans celui des organ. de travail	%
265	75,5	1	265	51,8
48	13,6	2	96	18,7
21	6,0	3	63	12,3
10	2,8	4	40	7,8
3	0,9	5	15	2,9
1	0,3	6	6	1,2
1	0,3	8	8	1,6
1	0,3	9	9	1,8
1	0,3	10	10	1,9
351	100	—	512	100

7. Nombre des grèves par branches d'activité

Activité	% des effec. glob.	Place sur la liste des revenus pers. 1969	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Métallurgie	7,5	33	123	24,5	14.623 (16)	22,0
2. Ind. textile	6,0	53	55	10,8	13.823	20,7
3. Ind. forestière	3,4	52	62	12,2	6.871 (7)	10,3
4. Ind. matér. constr.	1,8	44	24	4,7	1.706 (1)	2,6
5. Ind. électrique	2,4	32	28	5,5	2.099 (3)	3,1
6. Ind. non-métaux	1,2	46	12	2,4	2.308	3,5
7. Ind. cuir et chaus.	1,2	48	8	1,6	679	1,0
8. Ind. caoutchouc	0,5	39	9	1,8	779	1,2
9. Ind. papier et cel.	0,8	37	8	1,6	910 (1)	1,4
10. Ind. graphique	1,3	16	3	0,6	247	0,4
11. Ind. chimique	2,2	23	3	0,6	235 (1)	0,3
12. Constr. navales	0,6	9	—	—	—	—
13. Transp. mar. et fl.	0,3	17	8	1,6	3.993 (4)	6,0
14. Ind. alimentaire	3,1	43	10	1,9	1.484	2,2
15. Agriculture	6,4	50	9	1,8	514	0,7
16. Combinats agro-ind.	—	—	8	1,6	2.983	4,5
117. Bâtiment	9,2	47	37	7,3	2.892	4,3
18. Mines	1,6	41	28	5,5	4.255	6,4
19. Sidérurgie	1,4	27	10	1,9	1.501	2,2
20. Combinats métal-min.	—	—	7	1,4	1.421	2,1
21. Transp. (rut. aé. PTT)	3,2	24	16	3,1	1.415 (1)	2,1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. Commerce et hôtel.	11,5	31	3	0,6	17 (2)	0,0
23. Hâbit. et serv. com.	2,3	38	3	0,6	80 (1)	0,1
24. Artisanat	5,7	42	20	3,9	688	1,0
25. Education	4,9	26	10	1,9	1.214	1,8
26. Etablis. sanitaires	4,2	28	4	0,8	75 (1)	0,1
27. Tribunal d'arrondis.	—	—	1	0,1	21	0,0
Total	—	—	509	100	66.833 (38)	100
Sans réponse	—	—	3	—	12 (2)	—
Total	—	—	512	—	66.845 (40) ²²	—

Quelques éclaircissements s'imposent.

1) Le tableau indique qu'il n'y a pas eu de grèves dans la construction navale, ce qui n'est pas exact. En effet, dans cette branche industrielle les grèves ont été assez nombreuses, massives et violentes. Mais les informations recueillies n'ont pas pu être chiffrées.

2) Les grèves indiquées dans la colonne «Bâtiment» n'ont affecté que les entreprises ou les départements qui exécutent des travaux de construction. C'est à eux que se rapporte le chiffre (47) concernant la place sur la liste des revenus personnels.

3) Les grèves mentionnées dans la colonne «Transports» se rapportent uniquement aux transports routiers comme du reste le chiffre (24) relatif à la place sur la liste des revenus personnels.

4) Les grèves de la colonne «Commerce et hôtellerie» se sont produites dans les entreprises de commerce intérieur ou, plus exactement encore, dans les départements productifs ou auxiliaires («chargement et déchargement») de ces entreprises. Les vendeurs et les employés n'ont pas fait grève.

5) Enfin, les grèves indiquées dans la colonne «Education» ont eu lieu dans les écoles primaires et secondaires, et c'est à ces établissements que se rapporte le chiffre (26) concernant la place sur la liste des revenus personnels.

Comme le montre le tableau, c'est dans l'industrie que les grèves ont été les plus nombreuses — 71,2%. Viennent ensuite le bâtiment avec 7,3% et les mines avec 5,5%. Les grèves de ces trois secteurs économiques représentent 84% du total. En 1970, leur part dans l'effectif total du secteur socialisé de toute la Yougoslavie atteignait 47,9% dont 38,7% pour l'industrie et les mines, et 9,2% pour le bâtiment.

Dans le cadre de l'industrie, les grèves les plus nombreuses ont été enregistrées dans la métallurgie (24,2%), l'industrie forestière (12,2% et l'industrie textile (10,8%). C'est également dans ces trois branches que les grévistes ont été relativement les plus nombreux — 50%.

Le très mauvais classement de ces trois branches économiques sur la liste des revenus personnels est en relation directe avec les causes des grèves qui y éclatent. Comme nous le verrons par la suite, la faible valorisation (à la fois matérielle et morale) du travail humain dans la production directe

²² Les chiffres entre parenthèses, indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous n'avons pas de données sur celui des participants.

est, dans la majorité des cas, non seulement le prétexte immédiat, mais aussi la cause profonde des grèves. C'est au demeurant ce qui ressort du processus d'appauvrissement relatif de l'économie, mais aussi de renforcement du capital financier qui devient de plus en plus autonome et qui accroît son emprise sur les entreprises de production. Pour donner une idée de ce processus, il suffit de prendre les données concernant les changements survenus en quatorze ans dans les structure des titulaires des investissements en capital fixe dans les entreprises.

Structure des titulaires des investissements en capital fixe dans les organisations économiques de 1955 à 1969

Année	Total	Entreprises	Banques	Toutes les communautés socio-politiques ensemble
1955	100%	44,0%	0,8%	55,2%
1960	100	37,4	1,0	61,6
1965	100	36,8	31,7	31,5
1969	100	34,8	49,4	15,8

Comme on peut le constater, la part relative des entreprises économiques dans la structure des investissements, est passée de 44% en 1955 à 34,8% en 1969. Celle de toutes les communautés socio-politiques ensemble a régressé elle aussi de 55,2% en 1955 à 15,8% en 1969. Par contre, celle des banques a progressé de 0,8% en 1955 à 49,4% en 1969.

Le fléchissement de la puissance financière de l'Etat ne s'est pas traduit par un renforcement de la base matérielle de l'autogestion. Les statistiques montrent que le dépérissement des fonctions économiques de l'Etat ne doit pas déboucher nécessairement sur un renforcement de l'autogestion ou de ses assises matérielles.

Au cours de la période considérée, les banques sont devenues de nouveaux centres de pouvoir financier qui accumulent une bonne partie des revenus créés dans la production. Ces centres financiers commencent par accroître leur autonomie et s'aliéner par rapport aux producteurs, pour se transformer ensuite en pouvoir financier au dessus d'eux. Bien plus, ils deviennent autonomes vis-à-vis des structures de l'Etat et »font concurrence« aux centres de pouvoir social des communautés socio-politiques.

Du point de vue de la force (ou de l'impuissance) économique de certaines branches (économiques et non économiques) d'activité, et de la condition sociale générale de ceux qui y travaillent, il importe de faire observer qu'il n'y a pas eu de grèves dans les banques, les entreprises de commerce extérieur, l'administration publique et autres institutions du même ordre (caisses de sécurité sociale, offices d'assurances, etc.), les services des organisations socio-politiques et ainsi de suite (la seule exception est la grève du Tribunal municipal de Lazarevac). S'il n'y a pas eu de grève dans ces différents secteurs, ce n'est pas parce que l'autogestion y est plus développée que dans les entreprises de production, mais parce que la condition sociale générale de leur personnel est de loin meilleure que celle des ouvriers travaillant dans les entreprises de production. On peut même dire que les employés des banques, des entreprises de commerce extérieur ou de l'admini-

stration publique sont satisfaits de leur sort: peu d'autogestion certes, mais un niveau de vie élevé qu'ils risqueraient de perdre en se mettant en grève, et d'être ravalés au rang de ceux qui n'ont pas grand'chose à perdre en faisant la grève.

Par contre, les ouvriers des entreprises de production ont beaucoup plus de sens démocratique et aussi de courage, pour pouvoir se mettre en grève sans que celle-ci vienne aggraver leur position sociale et politique. Leur condition sociale générale est en effet telle qu'ils n'ont presque rien à perdre. Indiquons, à titre d'exemple, que le revenu total par personne employée dans l'industrie textile est quatre fois moins élevé que celui dans le commerce extérieur (produits non agricoles), et six fois plus faible que dans les centrales hydroélectriques etc.

Ceci dit, nous n'avons évidemment pas donné une réponse complète à la question de savoir pourquoi les grèves sont les plus nombreuses dans les entreprises de production, alors qu'elles sont inexistantes dans les banques, le commerce extérieur, l'administration publique ou d'autres institutions du même genre.

Les grèves des écoles primaires et secondaires, ainsi que des établissements sanitaires peuvent s'expliquer par le prix modique de la force de travail et la mauvaise condition sociale générale des enseignants réduits à un état salarial par rapport à ceux qui les financent. Ces deux éléments menacent gravement les hautes qualités morales et professionnelles des enseignants et du personnel médical. Les incidences des grèves sur la morale professionnelles de ces catégories mériteraient d'être étudiées à part.

8. Durée des grèves

Durée des grèves	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Moins de 3 heures	171	34,6	18.149 (11)	27,0
2. De 3 à 7 heures (moins d'une journée de travail)	100	20,2	14.105 (9)	21,2
3. Une journée de travail	117	23,7	13.717 (4)	20,6
4. Plus d'une journée et moins de deux journées de travail	22	4,4	2.868	4,3
5. Deux journées de travail	39	8,0	5.812	8,7
6. Plus de deux journées de travail	3	0,6	530	0,8
7. Trois journées de travail	19	3,8	7.902 (1)	11,9
8. Quatre journées de travail	6	1,2	703	1,0
9. Plus de quatre journées de travail	17	3,5	2.782	4,2
Total	494	100	66.569 (28)	100
Sans réponse	18	—	277 (12)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40)²⁴	—

²⁴ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous l'avons pas de données sur celui de leurs participants.

Sur le nombre total des grèves, 78,5% ont duré une journée de travail ou moins, 21,5% plus d'une journée, alors que les 19 grèves (3,8%) de trois jours ont réuni 11,9% du nombre total des grévistes.

9. Nombre des participants selon les grèves

Nombre des grévistes par grève	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des participants	%
1. Moins de 50	191	40,5	5.228	7,9
2. De 51 à 100	127	26,9	9.826	14,7
3. De 101 à 300	108	22,9	20.205	30,2
4. De 301 à 500	25	5,3	11.161	16,7
5. De 501 à 800	15	3,2	9.652	14,4
6. De 801 à 1.000	2	0,4	1.701	2,5
7. De 1.001 à 1.500	—	—	—	—
8. De 1.501 à 2.000	2	0,4	3.772	5,6
9. Plus de 2.000	2	0,4	5.300	8,0
Total	472	100	66.845	100
Sans réponse	40	—	—	—
Total	512	—	66.845	—

On relève d'assez grandes différences dans le nombre des participants selon les grèves. C'est ainsi que 5.300 ouvriers (8,0%) ont participé à deux grèves (0,4% du nombre total), soit autant qu'à 191 autres grèves (40% du nombre total des grèves).

10. La structure sociale des grévistes

Caractéristiques sociales des grévistes	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des participants	%
1. Tout le personnel de l'entre.	10	2,2	2.038 (1)	3,1
2. Tout le personnel d'une partie de l'entreprise	30	6,5	3.842 (3)	5,9
3. Ouvriers de la production seuls	367	79,6	47.925 (13)	74,0
4. Employés seuls	—	—	—	—
5. Cadres seuls	1	0,2	15	0,0
6. Dirigeants seuls	—	—	—	—
7. Ouvriers de la production et employés seuls	34	7,4	9.919 (1)	15,3
8. Ouvriers de la production, cadres et employés seuls	19	4,1	1.088	1,7
Total	461	100	64.827 (18)	100
Organisations de travail des activités sociales	13	—	1.305	—
Sans réponse	38	—	713 (22)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40)²⁵	—

²⁵ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous ne possédons pas de données sur celui des participants.

Le tableau montre que dans presque 80% des cas, les ouvriers de la production ont été les seuls à se mettre en grève. Dans les autres cas, les employés et les cadres techniques ont suivi le mouvement. Ils ne l'ont fait cependant que lorsque le personnel de toute l'entreprise ou celui d'une partie de l'entreprise avait cessé le travail. Autrement dit, les employés et les cadres techniques se sont mis en grève lorsqu'il leur était impossible d'adopter une autre ligne de conduite, soit qu'ils ne pouvaient travailler du fait de la grève des ouvriers de la production, soit parce qu'ils n'avaient d'autre issue que de se solidariser avec les producteurs directs. Il importe de faire remarquer que ni les dirigeants, ni les employés n'ont jamais été les seuls à faire grève. Nous tenons à faire observer une fois encore que les grévistes sont essentiellement ceux qui, par leur être social et leur condition sociale, appartiennent objectivement à la classe ouvrière que toutes les structures politiques officielles ne cessent d'invoquer en s'employant verbalement depuis des années non seulement en faveur de l'amélioration de la position sociale des ouvriers de la production, mais aussi de leur influence déterminante sur les décisions concernant tant la condition sociale de la classe ouvrière que les développements sociaux en général. Ce qu'il faut c'est précisément répondre à la question de savoir quel est le rapport existant entre le fait que les grévistes sont surtout les ouvriers de la production, et l'option verbale des structures politiques officielles affirmant que ce sont eux (les ouvriers de la production) qui doivent être les animateurs et les garants de l'édification de la société socialiste d'autogestion. D'où la nécessité d'étudier la position sociale et politique réelle de la classe ouvrière dans notre société, ainsi que son influence effective sur les décisions prises dans les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir social.

11. La participation des membres des organes d'autogestion ouvrière aux grèves

Fonctions des grévistes dans les organes d'autogestion	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des participants	%
1. Avec la participation de membres des organes d'autogestion	351	85,0	54.095 (13)	92,9
2. Sans la participation de membres des organes d'autogestion	62	15,0	4.132	7,1
Total	413	100	58.227 (13)	100
Sans réponse	86	—	7.313 (14)	—
Organisations de travail des activités sociales	13	—	1.305	—
Total	512	100	66.845 (40)²⁶	—

Il est important de constater que dans 85% des grèves, les membres des conseils ouvriers, des comités de gestion et d'autres organes d'autogestion ont pris part au mouvement. Ce fait est en liaison directe avec le fléchissement de l'influence des ouvriers sur les décisions prises dans les organes

²⁶ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous ne possédons pas de données sur celui de leurs participants.

d'autogestion ouvrière, et avec la baisse de la représentation relative des travailleurs de la production dans les conseils ouvriers et les comités de gestion. Etant dans l'impossibilité de faire valoir, devant les centres institutionnalisés du pouvoir d'autogestion, des solutions à leur avantage, les travailleurs membres des conseils ouvriers et des comités de gestion font grève tout comme les ouvriers de la production qui n'appartiennent pas formellement aux organes de l'autogestion ouvrière.

12. Les causes effectives de la grève — extérieures à l'organisation de travail

La question posée était: Quelles ont été les causes réelles de la grève, les causes extérieures à l'organisation de travail?

L'analyse des réponses nous a fourni les résultats suivants:

Les causes de la grève extérieures à l'organisation de travail	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Mauvaises conditions d'activité et position défavorable sur le marché	202	90,6	32.120 (22)	87,2
2. Position défavorable de l'entreprise dans le système général de répartition	4	1,8	3.384	9,2
3. Impossibilité de l'entreprise de satisfaire les revendications du personnel — hausse des revenus personnels, équipement social, etc.	7	3,1	487	1,3
4. Différences sociales abusives entre les ouvriers de la production et les employés des services publics, du commerce, etc.	4	1,8	132 (1)	0,4
5. Comportement bureaucratique des autorités extérieures à l'entreprise	6	2,7	708 (1)	1,9
Total	223	100	36.901	100
Sans réponse	289	—	29.944 (16)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40)²⁷	—

13. Causes immédiates des grèves

La question posée était: Quelle a été la cause immédiate de l'arrêt du travail?

L'analyse des réponses à l'enquête nous a donné les réponses suivantes:

Cause immédiate de la grève	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Bas revenus personnels	134	26,6	19.049 (17)	28,6
2. Revenu personnel minimum	14	2,8	1.245	1,8
3. Bilan et distribution des revenus personnels	133	26,4	16.228 (3)	24,3

²⁷ Entre parenthèses le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous ne possédons pas de données sur celui de leurs participants.

4. Retard dans le versement des revenus personnels	75	14,9	8.223 (4)	12,3
5. Réduction de l'assiette des revenus personnels	39	7,8	6.571 (3)	9,9
6. Augmentation des normes	24	4,8	1.975 (1)	3,0
7. Conduite bureaucratique des dirigeants envers les ouvriers	37	7,4	6.831 (5)	10,2
8. Décisions des organes d'autogestion	7	1,4	1.466	2,2
9. Manière d'informations ou fausses informations	24	4,8	3.661 (1)	5,5
10. Licenciements ou mutations à des emplois moins bons	13	2,6	1.303	2,0
11. Agissements de l'ennemi	—	—	—	—
12. Promesses ou engagements non tenus par des autorités extérieures à l'en.	3	0,5	107	0,2
Total	503	100	66.659 (34)	100
Sans réponse	9	—	186 (6)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40)²⁸	—

14. Causes réelles des grèves dans les organisations de travail

La question posée était: Quelles ont été les causes réelles de la grève, les causes profondes... dans l'organisation de travail elle-même?

L'analyse des réponses nous a fourni les résultats suivants:

Causes de la grève résidant dans l'organisation de travail	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Sous-développement de l'autogestion, faible influence des ouvriers sur les décisions dans l'organisation de trav.	67	14,9	10.423 (8)	17,0
2. Système de répartition des revenus personnels, répartition non conforme aux résultats du travail fourni, non-application de ce principe à tout le person. Ecart injustifiés et abusifs entre les revenus personnels	164	36,4	20.472 (10)	33,2
3. Revenu personnel absolument faible, revenu personnel minimum, normes trop élevées, assiette trop faible du revenu personnel, et.	121	26,8	15.657 (5)	25,4
4. Conflit durable entre une partie de l'organ. de travail et l'organisation de travail dans son ensemble aux dépens de la première. Concentration du pouvoir de décision au niveau de l'entreprise et autogestion sous-dévelop. dans ses dif. parties	37	8,2	7.045 (3)	11,4
5. Conduite bureauc. constante envers les ouvriers. Rejet de leurs revend. légit.	15	3,3	1.285	2,1

²⁸ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous n'avons pas de données sur celui de leurs participants.

6. Agissements ennemis constants	—	—	—	—
7. Manque d'inform. ou fausses inform.	47	10,4	6.694 (6)	10,9
Total	451	100	61.576 (32)	100
Sans réponse	61	—	5.269 (8)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40) ²⁹	—

Dans plus de 90% des cas, la position de l'organisation de travail dans le système économique est indiquée comme réponse à la première question: »Les causes des grèves extérieures à l'entreprise« (sur les 223 questionnaires remplis par les enquêtés). De toute évidence, le macro-système — économique et politique — a de fortes incidences sur l'éclatement des grèves. Bien que les grèves se soient situées pour l'essentiel sur un micro-plan, elles ne résultaient objectivement pas uniquement des rapports au sein des organisations de travail, mais aussi de ceux dans la société en général.

En ce qui concerne les causes immédiates résidant dans l'organisation de travail elle-même, on observe une assez grande concordance entre les prétextes directs et les causes profondes. Dans la structure des prétextes immédiats, on constate que dans 83,3% des cas il s'agit des revenus personnels. Ceux-ci interviennent pour 63,2% dans le nombre global des causes effectives. On peut en conclure que les conflits ont un caractère social.

Le sous-développement de l'autogestion dans les organisations de travail est indiqué dans 14,9% des cas comme la cause effective de la grève. Cette donnée ne manque certainement pas d'être intéressante. Elle mériterait une analyse plus approfondie, ne serait-ce que pour établir le degré d'option consciente pour l'autogestion comme unique possibilité d'assurer la libération authentique des ouvriers et de dépasser la polarisation où nous avons, d'un côté, ceux qui produisent et réclament des revenus personnels plus élevés, des logements, etc., et, de l'autre, ceux qui dirigent et auxquels on demande une augmentation des revenus personnels et une amélioration de la condition sociale générale.

Nous tenons à signaler que les agissements de l'ennemi ne sont pas mentionnés une seule fois comme prétexte immédiat ou comme cause effective des grèves.

En tout état de cause, la structure des prétextes, des causes immédiates et des causes effectives des grèves, est en rapport direct avec le peu de cas que l'on fait du travail productif, ce qui est dû à l'existence de centres de décision autonomes et aliénés vis-à-vis des ouvriers, dont on sait qu'ils ont tendance à se constituer en force sociale au dessus des travailleurs.

15. A quel moment se situe le recours à la grève?

Le question posée était: »Avant de se mettre en grève, les ouvriers avaient-ils mis à profit toutes les possibilités normales de résoudre le problème sans grève?«.

²⁹ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous ne possédons pas de données sur celui de leurs participants.

En analysant les réponses nous avons obtenu les résultats suivants:

	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Les ouvriers avaient mis à profit les possibilités régulières, et la grève a été le recours ultime	130	27,7	20.992 (1)	33,4
2. Les ouvriers n'avaient pas mis à profit les possibilités régulières, et la grève a été un des premiers recours	313	72,3	41.909 (3)	66,6
Total	433	100	62.901	100
Sans réponse	79	—	3.944 (36)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40) ³⁰	—

16. Autorités avec lesquelles les ouvriers étaient en conflit au cours de la grève

La question posée était: »Contre qui les grévistes exprimaient-ils leur mécontentement? Avec qui étaient-ils en conflit?«. L'analyse des réponses nous a fourni les résultats suivants:

	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Uniquement contre les autorités extérieures à l'entreprise	44	10,2	9.194 (2)	14,5
2. Uniquement contre les autorités de l'entreprise	369	85,4	48.911 (7)	77,3
3. Contre les deux à la fois	19	4,4	5.166	8,2
Total	432	100	63.271	100
Sans réponse	80	—	3.574 (31)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40) ³¹	—

17. A la question: »Avec qui les grévistes étaient-ils en conflit au sein de l'organisation de travail?«, nous avons obtenu les réponses suivantes:

	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Uniquement avec la direction de l'entreprise	179	70,1	24.160 (1)	68,4
2. Uniquement avec les organes d'autogest.	43	17,1	4.548 (1)	12,9

³⁰ et ³¹ Entre parenthèses, le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous ne possédons pas de données sur celui de leurs participants.

3. A la fois avec la direction et les organes d'autogestion	27	10,8	5.741	16,3
4. Avec un autre département de l'entrep.	5	2,0	871	2,4
Total	251	100	35.320	100
Sans réponse	261	—	31.525 (36)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40)³²	—

18. L'efficacité des grèves

La question posée était: »Les revendications des ouvriers ont-elles été satisfaites après la grève?«. L'analyse des réponses nous a donné les résultats suivants:

	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Les revendications des ouvriers ont été entièrement satisfaites	256	58,7	34.763 (3)	55,1
2. Les revendications des ouvriers ont été satisfaites en partie	78	19,9	17.969 (4)	28,5
3. Les revendications des ouvriers n'ont pas été satisfaites	102	23,4	10.338 (1)	16,4
Total	436	100	63.070	100
Sans réponse	76	—	3.775 (32)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40)³³	—

19. Les Syndicats et les grèves

Le question posée était: »Les Syndicats ont-ils pris position sur la grève? Si oui, comment?«.

Réponses	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Les Syndicats ont soutenu les revendications des ouvriers et la grève comme moyen de les réaliser	32	11,3	3.013	7,7
2. Les Syndicats ont soutenu les revendications des ouvriers, mais ils ont désapprouvé la grève comme méthode	126	44,5	22.996 (1)	59,0
3. Les Syndicats n'ont soutenu ni les revendications des ouvriers ni la grève	61	21,6	7.589	19,5

³² et ³³ Entre parenthèses le nombre de grèves pour lesquelles nous ne possédons pas de données sur celui de leurs participants.

4. Les Syndicats n'avaient pas de position propre	64	22,6	5.392 (10)	13,8
Total	283	100	38.990	100
Sans réponse	229	—	27.855 (29)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40) ³⁴	—

20. Les Syndicats et les grèves futures

La question posée était: »Quelle devrait être, à votre avis, la position des Syndicats sur la grève? Quel rôle devraient-ils jouer dans ce domaine«?

	Nombre des grèves	%	Nombre des grévistes	%
1. Prendre des mesures préventives — éliminer les causes de la grève	255	63,1	32.948 (3)	56,9
2. Soutenir toutes les grèves	2	0,5	1.150	2,0
3. Etre contre toutes les grèves	40	9,9	6.511	11,2
4. Soutenir les grèves légitimes — lorsque les ouvriers y voient le recours ultime	98	24,3	16.152 (9)	27,9
5. Etre neutres	—	—	—	—
6. Demander des comptes à ceux dont l'incurie est à l'origine de la grève	9	2,2	1.151	2,0
Total	404	100	57.912	100
Sans réponse	108	—	8.933 (28)	—
Total	512	—	66.845 (40) ³⁵	—

III

LA GREVE ET LES STRUCTURES POLITIQUES ET AUTOGESTIONNAIRES INSTITUTIONALISEES

La grève prend naissance et se déroule à l'extérieur des structures politiques et autogestionnaires institutionnalisées aussi bien dans l'organisation de travail qu'en dehors d'elle. C'est dire que les centres de décision institutionnalisés ne sont pas suffisamment larges (démocratiques) pour que les intérêts divergents et opposés puissent se manifester dans leur cadre et être conciliés ensuite de la manière la meilleure et la plus efficace possible, mais par des méthodes démocratiques. Les centres de décision institutionnalisés

³⁴ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous ne possédons pas de données sur celui des participants à ces mouvements.

³⁵ Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des grèves pour lesquelles nous ne possédons pas de données sur celui de leurs participants.

subissent une influence déterminante de la part des structures contre lesquelles les ouvriers se mettent en grève.

La grève est organisée et se déroule en dehors et à l'insu des organes d'autogestion, de la Ligue des communistes, des Syndicats et de l'organisation de jeunesse. De ce point de vue, elle est »sauvage« puisqu'aussi bien elle n'est organisée par aucune des structures institutionnalisées. Or, nous avons aux deux pôles de ce conflit des hommes qui appartiennent aux mêmes structures politiques et autogestionnaires institutionnalisées. Parmi les grévistes, de même que parmi ceux contre lesquels la grève est dirigée, il y a des hommes qui appartiennent à la même organisation de la Ligue des communistes, au même syndicat, au même organe d'autogestion et à la même organisation de jeunesse. L'appartenance aux mêmes structures politiques et autogestionnaires institutionnalisées n'a pas d'incidence sur la participation des travailleurs à la grève, non plus que sur leur attitude envers la grève en tant que conflit. Les éléments qui déterminent la position des parties au conflit (les grévistes et ceux contre lesquels ils se sont mis en grève) face à la grève, sont les suivants:

1) des possibilités différentes d'agir sur les décisions concernant les questions essentielles pour la condition générale de tels groupes sociaux. En effet, nous avons, d'une part, ceux qui exercent une influence déterminante sur l'adoption des décisions (ce sont avant tout ceux qui détiennent les postes de direction) et, d'autre part, les ouvriers de la production, dont les possibilités d'agir sur les décisions sont beaucoup plus faibles;

2) le critère de la participation à la répartition des revenus: ceux qui font la grève réalisent leurs revenus personnels en fonction des résultats de leur travail — mais ces résultats sont mesurés et évalués par d'autres, tandis que ceux contre lesquels la grève est organisée réalisent leurs revenus personnels et leur condition sociale générale sur la base de leur fonction dans le processus de travail et, plus particulièrement, selon l'importance du poste de direction qu'ils occupent;

3) le montant de la fraction de revenu attribuée à chacun lors la répartition (volume de l'appropriation), qui ne dépend pas des résultats du travail, mais du pouvoir social d'influer non seulement sur la répartition des revenus individuels mais encore sur les décisions relatives aux questions touchant l'ensemble de la condition sociale; la répartition du revenu étant faite non selon les résultats du travail, mais selon le pouvoir social d'agir sur elle, les grandes différences (non socialistes) dans la détention du pouvoir social et la condition sociale générale entre les groupes sociaux, engendrent de violents conflits (grèves) entre eux, sans égard à leur appartenance formelle aux mêmes structures institutionnalisées; ces inégalités sociales peuvent confronter beaucoup plus qu'unir, dans les rapports réels, des hommes qui appartiennent formellement aux mêmes structures institutionnalisées, aux mêmes organisations (Ligue des communistes, syndicats, organes d'autogestion, etc.).

Etant donné que les ouvriers qui font grève se distinguent de ceux contre lesquels ils se mettent en grève par 1) la possession du pouvoir social, 2) le critère de la participation à la répartition du revenu, et 3) le volume de l'appropriation, c'est-à-dire en fait par leur condition générale et leur influence dans les centres de pouvoir social, ainsi que par la position sociale

générale qui en découle, on peut parler, selon nous, de la grève comme d'un conflit revêtant un caractère de classe. Si cette qualification de la grève est foncièrement exacte, la grève est incompatible avec la projection de l'autogestion. La future autogestion, telle que nous l'avons exposée dans le texte: »Teorijsko određivanje pojma i suštine samoupravljanja« (Définition théorique de la notion et de l'essence de l'autogestion), ne sera certes pas sans conflits, mais elle sera sans grèves en tant que conflits ayant un caractère de classe. Cet objectif ne sera pas atteint de sitôt. Néanmoins, nous croyons qu'il le sera.

SILVANO BOLČIĆ, M. A. Sociology, Researcher,
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THE VALUE SYSTEM OF A PARTICIPATORY ECONOMY

I.

It is difficult to speak of the value system of a »participatory economy« in a situation where for many the existence of such a type of economy is still disputable.

The majority of economists who deal with comparative economic systems still classify economic systems according to the traditional division between market and centrally planned economies.¹ If they are forced to broaden that classification, then they do so by introducing so called »mixed economies«. Sociologists rarely concern themselves with investigating the sociological aspects of various economic systems² and are therefore spared the problems confronting economists specializing in comparative economics. Among sociologists of a radical orientation there would probably be found those who would consider the linking of the concepts »participation« and »economy« as an impermissible, practically desecratory act, for the demand for participation often arises as a reaction to the economism of industrial society and the profiteering »cultural orientation« in the organization and management of economic processes.³

A radical critique of contemporary industrial society, in (justifiably) rejecting economism, is in danger of entirely forgetting economics. Only if man's social life could be built without an economy would such neglect be desirable. But since we are still not in a position to imagine human society without an economy, instead of a »flight from economics« we must try to reflect on the possibilities of cultural change in relation to the organization and management of economic processes. Precisely for this reason a discussion about the participatory economy has its sense and justification. It should be immediately emphasized that it is a matter of investigating an economic system for which pure economic knowledge probably will not be sufficient either for determining the conditions for constructing such an economy, or even for studying its efficiency. That economists will have to broaden their knowledge of sociology and other »inexact social sciences«, and that sociologists and social psychologists will have to read something of

¹ Such a conclusion is reached from reading, among others, the work of Jean Lhome, »Sociologija ekonomskih sistema, režima i strukture«, in *Sociologija*, edited by G. Gurvich, Vol. I (Sarajevo: Naprijed, 1966), pp. 404-441.

² The cited work of Jean Lhome is one of the rare studies with such an orientation.

³ Such an attitude should probably also be expected from the circles representing an anarchist view of society. See, e. g., M. Bookchin, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (Berkeley: Ramparts Press, 1971).

»boring economics« appears to have already been somewhat affirmed in practice.⁴

It may appear odd that the author of this work, a member of a society in which the principle of participation in management of the economy has been a reality for twenty years, speaks of a »participatory economy« and not of an »economy of workers' selfmanagement«. It would seem necessary to accept the latter term if the Yugoslav model of economic organization were to remain the sole distinct »case« of such organization of economic processes. But in the situation when an orientation toward the widest application of the principle of participation is becoming a world tendency, it seems possible to speak of an »economy of workers' self-management« as one concrete form of a »participatory economy«. This is precisely the viewpoint of Jaroslav Vanek, whose work on the »participatory economy« was one of the stimuli for writing this paper. Since we are using his term, it would be best if we also borrowed from him the definitions of the elements of this concept. Professor Vanek emphasizes the following characteristics of the participatory economy as the essential determinants of that type of economic organization:

1. a »participatory economy is one based on, or composed of, firms controlled and managed by those working in them. This **participation in management is by all** and on the basis of equality, that is, on the principle of one man one vote«.⁵
2. The second characteristic is **income sharing**: »the participants of the labor-managed firm, after they have paid for all material and other costs of operation, share in the income of the enterprise.«⁶
3. The working community, which has the exclusive right to control and manage the affairs of the enterprise, does not have, however, full ownership in the traditional sense of the word »ownership« over the means of production that it uses. It has the **right to enjoy the fruits of the use of these means**.⁷
4. A participatory economy is a **market economy**. This implies and is the condition of it being completely **decentralized**.⁸
5. Since the »human factor« is no longer only a »factor of production«, but above all a decision-making factor carrying out the entrepreneurial function, a participatory economy implies **freedom of employment**, i. e. mobility of the labor force.⁹

In this description of the participatory economy, its goals should by no means be forgotten, i. e. the motivational basis on which the efficiency of the economy founded on the above cited principles depends. Professor Vanek distinguishes a »narrower and broader motivational principle«. Maximization of the income of each member of the participatory firm is the narrower motivational principle, while the broader one relates to maxi-

⁴ We have in mind the work of Jaroslav Vanek, **The Participatory Economy: An Evolutionary Hypothesis and a Strategy for Development** (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971). We adopted the expression »participatory economy« from this author.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

zing also other »incomes«, including those of free time and frequently non-material goods.¹⁰ Although he did not state so explicitly, Prof. Vanek assumes that it is precisely participation of the workers in management of the firm that guarantees adjustment of the »objective function« to the real needs of the people included in such an economy.

Without entering into a more detailed description of the characteristics of a »participatory economy«, it is sufficient in this introduction to emphasize that its differentiation from other economic systems is possible. What is more, application of such a model in Yugoslav practice provides the possibility of also appraising empirically some positions on its efficiency. It is well known that scholarly comparison of the efficiency of individual economic systems is a particularly complicated, practically almost insoluble task. We emphasize this because we consider that the existing estimates of the efficiency of a participatory economy should be accepted only as more or less well founded observations and assumptions on the performance of that type of economy, and not as firm evidence of it.

Although it is not the basic objective of this paper to describe a participatory economy and its performance, it is nevertheless useful to present some of the judgments of the economic efficiency of such an economic system, since precisely these and similar judgments require additional sociological explanations, in relation both to the significance of participation in reaching those results and the value system that would maintain the efficiency of a economic system based on participation as the fundamental organizational principle.

In his study, **Privredni sistem i ekonomska politika Jugoslavije** (Economic System and Economic Policy of Yugoslavia), Branko Horvat discusses the comparative efficiency of a participatory economy in relation to previous economic systems in Yugoslavia.¹¹ Comparing the growth rates of some basic economic aggregates from period to period, the dates of which are determined by changes in the economic system, he arrived at the results shown in the table below:

TABLE 1
Comparative Analysis of the Efficiency of Economic
Systems in Yugoslavia, 1911—1967
(Rates of Growth)

	Gross Domestic Product	Employment	Fixed Capital	Technical Progress
Capitalism				
1911—1932	3.28	1.87	3.52	0.71
1932—1940	4.67	0.72	2.59	3.16
Etatism				
1940—1954	5.91	4.76	9.99	—1.04
Self-Management				
1956—1967	10.31	4.44	7.84	4.44

Source: B. Horvat, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 12—13.

¹¹ B. Horvat, **Privredni sistem i ekonomska politika Jugoslavije** Beograd: Institut ekonomskih nauka, 1970), p. 32.

If we accept Horvat's indicators of efficiency, we arrive at the conclusion that at least in the case of Yugoslavia the participatory economy has shown its superiority in relation to earlier economic systems. Of course, it should be shown that the cited differences in efficiency are truly caused by the character of social organization in the given period.

J. Vanek also arrived at similar results on the comparative efficiency of the Yugoslav participatory economy on the basis of an analysis of cross-section data. He compares the rate of growth, saving and the increase of income for every 10 percent of income saved for Yugoslavia and other countries in the same time period, which leads him to the conclusion that there are few countries in the world with such results in economic development.¹²

It is certain that many economists would object to the way the economic efficiency of the participatory economy is measured. It would be difficult, however, to deny entirely the basis of these estimates, for the very fact that there exist positive arguments that can be empirically founded must be considered significant, since it is a question of an economic system that is still more a possibility than a reality. There is reason to assume that sociological analysis of the social organization of the economy that achieves the cited results also could serve as a contribution toward verifying the hypothesis of the substantial economic efficiency of a participatory economy. That is, every argument that explained the causal mechanism by which the effect of social organization based on participation is carried over to the economic behavior of people in the given society would increase the credibility of the above presented estimates of the economic efficiency of a participatory economy. In that context the importance of the value system in the construction and performance of a participatory economy should also be discussed.

II.

The question whether one can in general speak of a value system of a participatory economy should probably be discussed somewhat more broadly than will be done here. An objection to posing such a problem could arise from the fact that it is a matter more of a model than of an actual economic system. In that case any discussion of the value system would have to remain within the limits of normative analysis, which then excludes the possibility of investigating deterministic relationships between the value system and the economic efficiency of a given economic system. The twenty year experience of the Yugoslav participatory economy nevertheless appears to be a good basis for a discussion of the value system as a real attribute of a participatory economy, and precisely this opportunity of directly examining the value system of that economy will be used in this paper.

A second problem about which something should also be said relates to the nature of the deterministic relationship between the value system and other characteristics of the participatory economy. It could be said that for sociologists of Marxist orientation this problem really does not exist, for the value system as a part of the superstructure can be only the consequence of basic relationships in the economic base of society, with a certain feed-

¹² Op. cit., pp. 46-49.

back effect on those relationships. Sociology resting on the thought of Max Weber suggests a somewhat different answer, the most frequent one being that the value system and other elements of the economic base mutually condition each other, allowing even the possibility of the value system being the determinant of these relationships. Weber's work, **The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism**, although seriously criticized and disputed by many, remains an important stimulus to the examination of the role of the value system in economic and social development, not only of developing societies, but also of those that have long since moved in the direction of industrial or »postindustrial« society.

This »infectious effect« of Weber's work is also present in this paper, although the viewpoint on the deterministic relationships of the value system and economic development are closer to Marx's than to Weber's position. That is, there are many reasons to assume that the independent effect of the value system in relation to economic behavior lies in its **supporting** behavior that suits the given system, although behavior is basically determined by the institutional and not the value structure of society. It could be said that Weber also shared this point of view, although he left a different impression by certain criticisms of historical materialism. Pointing out that the ethic of calling, which is the key element of the Protestant ethic, did not originate on the soil of capitalism, he warns at the same time that he does not think that »for modern capitalism the subjective adoption of this ethical maxim by its individual carriers, say the capitalist or worker of modern capitalist enterprises, is the essential condition of its continued existence. The present day capitalist economic order is a strange cosmos in which the individual arrives by birth and which is for him, at least as an individual, given as a factually unchangeable shell in which he has to live.«¹³

This paper, therefore, representing the viewpoint that the value system can support (or hinder) the behavior of man as an economic decision-maker, will attempt on the one hand to define by theoretical analysis a value system corresponding to a participatory economy, and then with the aid of some empirically based observations to analyze the value system of workers in the Yugoslav participatory economy.

The careful analysis made by Vanek in his work of the characteristics of a participatory economy allows us to speculate about the value system that would be suitable for that economic system. Above all, the most important place in a real value system should belong to that value which defines the basic organizational principle of this economy, and that is **participation**. The question can be posed immediately whether participation can have the character of a value in view of the fact that it serves as a means for realizing one of man's basic needs, the need for self-determination. A similar objection can be made to all values, since besides being ends they always have an instrumental character as well. After all, people can experience participation as a value for it is not a mere means for attaining self-determination, but also a direct **expression** of self-determination.

The second value for which an important place in the value system of a participatory economy should be anticipated is **work**. Vanek expressly emphasizes that participation in the management of a firm is conditioned

¹³ Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, cited according to M. Đurić, *Sociologija Maxa Webera* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1964), p. 280.

by work in that firm, so that work and work alone is the sole legitimate basis for participation. Work is simultaneously the basis for determining the rights of individuals in the distribution of income. Although it is obvious that work also appears as a means for satisfying many needs, it can be assumed that the cited relationships in a participatory firm can be established on a more lasting foundation insofar as work has the character of a value, and not only of a necessary means for obtaining income in order to satisfy other needs.

Vanek and others attempt to explain many elements of the efficiency of a participatory economy by the creative behavior of workers, which leads to the conclusion that a certain place for creativity should also be anticipated in the value system of a participatory economy.¹⁴ In fact, it is possible to conceive **creativity** as the result of the attitude toward work as a value, which transforms work from a routine into a creative activity of the individual.

Although participation and creative work appear as expressions of man's **individual** self striving for self-determination, nonetheless their realization is in essence a social act, because of which it is necessary to assume that **collectivism** also ought to be one of the basic values of workers in a participatory economy. In conjunction with the whole value orientation toward collectivism, one should expect on the one hand great emphasis on **equity** and on the other hand on **solidarity**, since these are the values that can protect the mutual personal relationships in a collective in which work and participation are the basic values. Emphasis on equity is understandable, in view of the fact that actual, and not formal participation is possible insofar as there is no pronounced inequality in the distribution of social power, which is at the same time also the condition for avoiding sharper within-group conflicts, and because of this Vanek also considers that the participatory economy can be more efficient than other economic systems.¹⁵ Solidarity plays an important role in maintaining group cohesion, which is also significant for participatory and collective decision-making about the affairs of the participatory firm.¹⁶

This presentation of the value system of a participatory economy, besides its incompleteness, probably also suffers from a certain artificiality of the arguments for determining the elements of that system. After all, the goal of this paper is to stimulate reflection on this theme and hence these observations must not be taken too seriously. Nevertheless, it is worth reflecting on whether participation, work and collectivism are the essential elements of the value system of a participatory economy,¹⁷ and on what the importance of these values is based for explaining the efficiency of economies constructed according to the model of a participatory economy. Although the latter task is both theoretically and practically more important, in the remainder of this paper we shall on the whole neglect it in order to devote the limited space available to analysis of some data that seem to

¹⁴ This is in accord with the conceptions of the majority of social psychologists on the effects of participative organization on the behavior of people in the organization. See, e. g., D. Katz, R. L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 338-339.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁶ Solidarity is also significant for interorganizational relations in the participatory economy, but we are not in a position to discuss that in this paper.

¹⁷ We wish to emphasize here that the outlined value system of a participatory economy has much in common with a socialist value system, as presented by V. Rus in »Vrednote slovenskih študentov in slovenske javnosti«, *Teorija in Praksa*, 1 (1971), 10.

point to the real value system of workers in the Yugoslav participatory economy.

III.

Apart from the problem of the validity of data from direct questioning of people as to whether participation in itself is a value for them and how important it is, we can state that such a direct question has not been posed to the Yugoslav population. This is the reason that in this analysis of the relationships of workers in the Yugoslav economy toward participation we must rely on indirect data. While not wishing to summarize the results of research on this topic, we shall mention some observations of Yugoslav researches.¹⁸ It could be said that the actual participation of workers in Yugoslav enterprises significantly deviates from the behavior that would be expected from application of the institutional model of a selfmanaged enterprise.

Research on the structure of influence leads to the conclusion that participation is unequal, i. e. that all socio-functional groups in the organization do not participate equally in the processes of managing the enterprise, since it is the general judgment that the director and experts have the greatest power, while the power of the workers' council, work units and workers in general is less than should be expected according to the institutional model of the enterprise. The second conclusion is that the majority of workers do not show equal interest in participation in decision-making on all essential questions of managing the enterprise. Decision-making is sought after to a greater extent in income distribution, hiring and firing of workers and disciplinary actions, while interest in deciding about sales, prices and business policy is less.¹⁹ Finally, there is a belief that participation of workers is quite limited, particularly when problems that concern the enterprise as a whole are in question. Such a conclusion was reached by V. Arzenšek on the basis of research in 15 industrial enterprises in Yugoslavia.²⁰ His index of total participation²¹ for individual groups was as follows:

TABLE 2
Participation of Workers in Yugoslav Industry, 1968

	Unskilled and Semi-Skilled Workers	Skilled and Highly Skilled Workers	Managers		Managerial Staff	Members of Workers' Council	
			Lower	Middle			
Index of Total Participation	222.2	244.8	310.5	350.7	282.9	367.4	326.7

Source: V. Arzenšek, op. cit., p. 141.

¹⁸ We rest these observations primarily on the works of J. Zupanov, *Samoupravljanje i društvena moć* (Zagreb: Naše teme, 1969) and V. Rus, *Odgovornost in moć v delovnih organizacijah* (Kranj: Moderna organizacija, 1972).

¹⁹ See the cited work of V. Rus, pp. 146–147.

²⁰ V. Arzenšek, »Participacija zaposlenih u jugoslovenskoj industriji,« *Moderna organizacija*, 2 (1971).

²¹ The index of total participation was calculated by summing the results of the frequency of participation on three levels: job, work unit, enterprise. For those who said that they participate »often« the author gave 1 point, »rarely« 2 points, »very rarely« 3 points. The total sum was 9 points. The respondents were divided into categories 3–4, 5–6, 7–8, 9 points and the percent share in each category was calculated. Then these percentages were multiplied by the scale 4–1 and the results summed, obtaining the total index of participation; see the cited study, p. 141.

Since the maximum possible value of this index was 400.0, it could be said that participation is not so small when it is a matter of managers, members of the managerial staff and members of the workers' council; but it is obviously limited for the majority of workers in the organization.

The cited results of surveys on participation in Yugoslav industry raise the question whether the inadequate participation of workers in Yugoslav industry is the consequence of insufficient acceptance of participation as a value in itself.

Research carried out in the Institute of Economic Studies in Belgrade is a new source of information on the value system of the workers in Yugoslav industry, and we shall also seek there information on the attitude toward participation as a value. First of all, it should be emphasized that earlier research pointed to the conclusion that the need for participation is greater than indicated by data on actual participation. That is, the desired influence was always greater than the actual influence. This could show that participation has the character of a value and therefore that the need for participation is greater than the conditions for actual participation permit. If we compare the actual and desired influence of individuals²³ we then obtain information on the unsatisfied need for participation. Some relevant results from the cited survey of the Institute of Economic Studies are presented in the following table.

TABLE 3
Need for Participation Among Workers in Yugoslav
Industry, 1971

	Total	Laborers Manual	Workers Other	Educated	Educated Less
Actual influence	2.45	2.41	2.51	2.72	2.37
Desired influence	3.47	3.41	3.50	3.61	3.44
Ratio of Desired to Actual	141.6	141.5	139.4	132.7	145.1

Source: Institut ekonomskih Nauka, Beograd, unpublished tables.

Literal interpretation of these data on the need for participation would mean that participation would have to be about 40% greater than at present. The data also illustrate the conclusion that education is a more important determinant of the structure of influence, and hence of participation, than the functional position in the organization. Finally, we can conclude that the need for participation is more pronounced among manual laborers than

²² The research was headed by the author of this paper and carried out between September 1971 and May 1972. The data relate to 916 respondents from 16 industrial enterprises in all regions of Yugoslavia. The choice of enterprises was deliberate, so that there were two enterprises from each republic and province, from the same place, of which one was judged economically more efficient in respect to income per worker and average wages than the other selected enterprise. The respondents were selected according to the principle of simple random sample, about 50 from each enterprise, regardless of its size. In that number was included the randomly selected one-third of the members of the central workers' council.

Filling out of the questionnaires, with questions predominantly of the semiclosed type, was carried out in smaller groups in the work organization in the presence of the surveyor hired by the Institute.

²³ Influence is measured by a five degree scale, where the statement »very great« was given the value of 5, and the statement »none whatever« the value of 1.

among other groups in the enterprise, or that it is greater among the less educated than among the educated, which is understandable since these are the groups that in present relationships achieve less influence and probably satisfy their need for participation to a lesser degree.

The Institute of Economic Studies' survey included the following question: »Do you consider it **your obligation** to reflect how some problem in your environment should be solved?« It was assumed that a positive answer to this question would show readiness for participation and also a certain internalization of the role of self-manager in Yugoslav conditions. Although these data should be interpreted with the same reservation we have toward all information based on verbal statements, it can be seen, as shown by the data in the following table, that the readiness for participation is very great.

TABLE 4
Readiness for Participation Among Workers in
Yugoslav Industry, 1971

	Total ²⁴	Manual Laborers	Other Workers	Educated [%]	Less Educated
Readiness for Participation	79.0	76.1	91.7	95.7	78.3

Source: Ibid.

We have reason to believe that the self-management role is not equally internalized among all members of Yugoslav enterprises, which could possibly be explained by different needs for participation, but the latter, as shown by the data in Table 3, has the opposite tendency from that shown on Table 4. It could be said that the lesser readiness of manual laborers to participate in solving their organization's problems can be explained primarily by the characteristics of the existing structure of influence, and also by the negative experience of some workers in participation up to now. This is indicated by data from the survey on the question which stated: »It happens that people do not wish to participate in making a decision although they are invited to do so. In your opinion, what are the reasons for such behavior?« Almost a half (42.7%) of those surveyed chose the alternative: »people know that their participation in making decisions does not influence actual decision-making.«²⁵ In this case the differences in answers were not significant when the division was made according to functional position in the organization and education, but the division into »influential« (3—5 on the scale of influence) and »less influential« (1—2 on the scale of influence) showed marked differences in negative experience from past participation. While among the »influential« there were 35.1% with such experience, among the »less influential« there were 62.3%.

Summarizing these observations on participation among workers in Yugoslav industry, we can conclude that it can be assumed that among the res-

²⁴ The remainder up to 100% is accounted for by answers of »no« and »I don't know«.

²⁵ The other alternatives were: »People consider that they are not sufficiently educated and capable of making good decisions« (22.6%), »People most often do not have time to attend meetings at which decisions are made« (14.7%) and other answers and no answer (15.5%).

pondents there is an orientation toward participation as a value, although its expression is sometimes blocked by the structure of influence (which, it appears, is the result of relations in the society as a whole) and by negative experience in past participation.

IV.

The second value complex of importance for a participatory economy relates to work and the relationship toward work. In this case there are also certain studies of significance for this discussion, but it is not possible to present these results as a whole. First of all, serious attempts were made to study the relationship toward work in the context of Marx's theory of alienation, as well as in respect to contemporary viewpoints on the influence of technological change on that relation.²⁶ For this discussion it is important to mention a research study of the relation of the young toward work, for in that study an attempt was made to determine the acceptability of work as a value in itself among Yugoslav youth.²⁷ Results of this research show, among other things, that the relation toward work was different among different socio-professional groups of youth. Here are these results:²⁸

TABLE 5
Relation of Yugoslav Youth Towards Work

Type of Orientation	Village Youth	Laboring Youth	Young White Collar Workers	Young Technical Experts	% of total Youth in School
1. Work is a means	51.3	46.4	22.4	33.3	11.1
2. Work is a value in itself	37.0	48.2	68.9	66.7	84.2

Source: *op. cit.*, p. 195.

If we ignore the answers of youth in schools, since their attitude toward work is formed outside of the true relation towards work, then we can state that, with the exception of village youth among whom a utilitarian attitude towards work prevails, all other groupings of youth have a stronger attitude toward work as a value than as a means for realizing other values.²⁹

Data from the survey of the Institute of Economic Studies show, however, that among workers in Yugoslav industry the utilitarian relation toward work has numerous adherents, which is a warning that the actual value orientation in Yugoslav conditions, at least when work as a value is in question, is not sufficiently harmonized with the indicated normative value system of

²⁶ Here we have in mind primarily the research on the influence of technology on the relation toward work and self-management carried out in the Institute for Social Research under the leadership of Prof. Rudi Supek and Dr. Josip Obradović.

²⁷ Slobodan Bjelajac, »Životno opredeljenje omladine i njen odnos prema radu«, *Sociologija*, 2 (1971).

²⁸ The results are given in a somewhat different form than the source data in order to condense them somewhat. This does not, however, change the essence of these data.

²⁹ Data from the Institute of Economic Studies' survey also indicate substantial differences between the value orientations of young and old, which demands additional reflection on possible changes in the value system of the Yugoslav population.

a participatory economy. The relation to work was examined in this survey by means of value statements about work for which the surveyed persons had to express the degree of agreement with such an opinion.³⁰ The utilitarian relation to work was especially expressed in the statement: »people do not work much on the job, for they consider that they are not sufficiently paid for the work they perform«. The average value approaches the place on the scale which was expressed verbally by the statement, »I agree«.

TABLE 6
Relation of Workers in Yugoslav Industry
Towards Work as a Means

	Total	Manual Laborers	Other Workers	Educated	Less Educated
Average Value on the Scale	2.81	2.90	2.61	2.63	2.81

Source: Ibid.

These results are not surprising, since the very character of work is one of the determinants of the attitude towards it. The fact that workers employed in positions where the possibilities for self-expression are greater than for manual laborers also express to a substantial extent a utilitarian relation to work once more confirms the previous observation on the inadequacy of Yugoslav workers' attitudes towards work as an element of the value system of a participatory economy. A somewhat lower value³¹ (2.59) was obtained for the statement: »People on the whole do not like to work, but they work because that is the condition for obtaining the means for life«. In this case it is also a matter of a utilitarian relation toward work with which those surveyed again show a significant degree of agreement.

Since the attitude towards work will again be discussed in the final part of this paper, we can conclude here with the comment that because of the cited relation towards work it is not possible to predict the lasting behavior of workers in relation to the requirements of a participatory economy.

V.

Since the value orientation defined as collectivism also plays a primary role in the value system of a participatory economy, it will be necessary to devote somewhat more space to it. It was already emphasized that it is a matter of an orientation with several distinct value elements, and that is also a reason for discussing it further.

Past studies of the attitudes of workers in Yugoslav industry were oriented primarily to one element of that value orientation of importance for the materialization of the institutional model of collective entrepreneurship, the readiness for collective risk bearing. The research of J. Županov³² and of

³⁰ Agreement was expressed by a four degree scale, where the statement »I agree completely« was given the value of 4, and the statement »I don't agree at all« the value of 1.

³¹ Measurement was carried out in the same way as in the previous question.

³² See the cited work of J. Županov, *Samoupravljanje i društvena moć*, pp. 13—38.

V. Arzenšek³³ led to the conclusion that there is little such willingness, especially among the lower socio-functional groups in the organization. The results of the Institute of Economic Studies' survey, although they do not contradict the cited conclusions, permit a somewhat more optimistic judgment of that willingness. In truth, in this case also, only 15.1% of the total number of those surveyed consider that when the work organization operates at a loss the incomes of all employees should be reduced. The data in the following table enable a somewhat broader analysis of the attitude of workers in Yugoslav industry towards risk.

TABLE 7
Attitude of Workers in Yugoslav Industry Towards Risk

Answers	n	%
1. Incomes of all workers should be reduced	138	15.1
2. Incomes only of those who have not fulfilled their work obligations should be reduced	242	26.4
3. Incomes of managers should be reduced, for it is their concern that losses should not occur	218	23.8
4. Incomes should not be reduced, but losses should be covered at the expense of capital accumulation	157	17.1
5. Incomes should not be reduced and the community should cover losses	72	7.9
6. No answer	89	9.7

If we conceive the cited answers as statements of a general attitude toward risk and attempt to calculate scale values of that attitude, so that we give the value 5 to the first answer and the value 1 to the fifth, then we arrive at the conclusion that the readiness to bear risk among workers in Yugoslav industry is moderate (the scale values amount to 3.26), although still in disaccord with the model of collective entrepreneurship. The expressed point of view, according to which 8% of the total number of those surveyed consider that the community should cover losses, or 65.3% show willingness to cover losses at the expense of incomes of those employed in the given organization, should be considered significant.

The impression should not be left that different groups in work organizations do not show different willingness to accept collective risk. The data in the following table illustrate this point:

TABLE 8
Readiness for Collective Risk-Bearing Among
Workers in Yugoslav Industry

	Total	Manual Laborers	Other Workers	Educated	Less Educated
Average Value	3.26	3.17	3.46	3.67	3.21

Source: Ibid.

³³ V. Arzenšek, »Stavovi zaposlenih u jugoslovenskoj industriji o riziku preduzeća«, Moderna organizacija, 3-4 (1971).

In our judgment, we also find collectivism as a value orientation in attitudes on the use of enterprise profits. In answer to the question how the greatest part of these funds should be spent, 64.0% of the total number of those surveyed chose investment in acquisition of new machines, modernization and improvement of methods of production, or investment in the enterprise's reserve fund to ensure regular business activity and payment of wages for »rainy days«.³⁴ In this case also there is a somewhat greater orientation toward collective entrepreneurship among the educated and non-laborers, but these differences are not so pronounced. That is, 61.2% of workers exhibit the cited orientation, although among them there are substantially more of those (33.3%) who would allocate the greatest part of profits to increasing wages.

In view of the utilitarian relation toward work as well as the inadequate willingness for collective risk bearing, a question can be raised about the sincerity of those answers pervaded by much less individualism than we would have expected. Although it is possible to interpret these answers as the result of ideological pressures toward such an orientation, the possibility should not be excluded that it is a matter of a real orientation among workers in Yugoslav industry. That is, we must take into account that such a collective entrepreneurial point of view is possible when it is a matter of a predominantly immobile labor force³⁵ and workers who are to a substantial degree tied (psychologically and socially) to a given work environment. We also have some data about this from the cited survey. In answer to the question: »In your opinion, to what extent is it 'normal' for a person to remain at work in one work organization,« 31.8% chose the alternative that it is normal to stay at work in one work organization until one finds a better position, while the others considered that a person should spend his entire working life in one organization, or at least 10 years. Hence it is a matter of insufficient readiness for mobility, which makes possible, among other things, more lasting ties to a particular work organization and accordingly also to its collective goals.

The results of measuring binding to a given work organization (with the aid of a five degree scale of attitudes)³⁶ were as follows:

TABLE 9
Binding to a Given Work Organization Among Workers
in Yugoslav Industry

	Total	Laborers Laborers	Workers Workers	Educated	Educated Educated
Average Value	3.48	2.90	3.40	3.10	3.53

³⁴ Other answers relate to the alternatives: »most of the money should be spent on increasing workers' wages« (13.3%), and »most of the money should be deposited in the common consumption fund (for building flats and satisfying other needs of workers)« (11.0%) and other answers and no answer (11.7%).

³⁵ This is also confirmed by data from the 1961 Census of the Population which show that practically 2/3 of the population live in the place of birth.

³⁶ The statement »I have no intention at all of leaving this work organization« was given the value of 5, and the statement »I intend to leave as soon as I find a better job« the value of 1.

In addition to the previous conclusion about the substantial ties to the work organization, the data in this table at the same time indicate that the more educated workers are less bound to a given work organization, while on the other hand those among the more educated who have higher functions in the organization show more binding to the work organization. Thus at the same time the fact that »manual laborers« and »less educated« and »educated« and »other workers« do not show the same tendencies in replying as in previous examples can be explained.

In conclusion on these observations on collectivism, we must again emphasize that in this case also, although a collectivist orientation is present both in relation to risk bearing and in the use of profits, this orientation is not equally present in all parts of the employed population, nor is it widespread to that degree necessary from the standpoint of the normative value system of a participatory economy.

VI.

The above observations on the value system of the workers in Yugoslav industry are fragmentary, and therefore, in that presentation there is more said about value **orientations** than about the value **system**. It should be stated immediately that the determination of the **system** of values is an exceptionally difficult, not to say insoluble task, and hence research on the system of values, as a rule is to determining the places that individual values have in a certain limited, more or less ordered list of values. Such an approach was also applied in the cited survey, in which the question had the following form: »There are many principles that should be observed in a society in order for people to be happy. We cite some principles and your task is to indicate their order of importance«. The list contained the following values: equality, constant rise of the standard of living, security, personal freedom, solidarity, equity, self-management, payment according to work, and honesty. The initial analysis of these data, although still very rough, gives us the possibility of at least attempting to speak about the value system of the workers in Yugoslav industry on the basis of systematic information. The results of this research speak in favor of J. Županov's thesis about egalitarianism as the dominant value orientation in Yugoslav society.³⁷ That is, although the average values³⁸ by which the order of importance for those surveyed of individual values is expressed are not sufficiently diverse, they indicate an order that can be accepted as realistic. The results of this analysis are given in the following table:

³⁷ J. Županov presented this view in several places, especially in the article »Egalitarizam i industrijalizam«, *Naše teme* 2 (1970).

³⁸ The average values were obtained as follows: for each value a separate grouping of the data was made, so that the ranks 1—3 were interpreted as if the interviewee said that this value was »very important«, ranks 4—6 »important«, and ranks 7—9 »of little importance«. The percentage distribution of answers was calculated, and then the percentages corresponding to the modality »very important« were multiplied by 3, »important« multiplied by 2, and »of little importance« multiplied by 1. The cited average value according to importance was obtained by summing these products.

TABLE 10
Value System of Workers in Yugoslav Industry

	Average Significance
1. equality	233.1
2. equity	228.2
3. personal freedom	226.5
4. security	210.3
5. standard of living	208.6
6. honesty	199.5
7. solidarity	181.5
8. self-management	180.5
9. payment according to work	161.9

It can be assumed that there are certain differences in the value systems of individual categories of workers. Indeed, if we compare the »value systems« of, for example, unskilled and semiskilled workers and managers, we arrive at the following results:

TABLE 11
Value Systems of Unskilled and Semiskilled Workers and Managers in Yugoslav Industry

Unskilled & Semi-skilled Workers	Average Value	Managers	Average Value
1. equality	242.3	1. personal freedom	244.4
2. equity	220.3	2. equity	229.2
3. personal freedom	217.2	3. honesty	218.7
4. security	216.2	4. payment according to work	217.2
5. standard of living	208.2	5. standard of living	206.6
6. honesty	203.8	6. security	193.2
7. solidarity	188.8	7. equality	186.5
8. self-management	181.6	8. self-management	182.3
9. payment according to work	146.5	9. solidarity	164.5

At this moment it is not possible to enter into detailed analysis of these and other recorded differences in »value systems«, although such an analysis would be necessary for a complete discussion of the value system of a participatory economy. It should be emphasized that although there are certain differences among the »value systems« of individual categories of workers, depending on what they do in the organization, their influence in the organization, their educational status, the nature of their inclusion in the formal system of self-management, as well as in regard to national and regional identification, one gets the impression that there is great similarity with the »average model«, which gives us the possibility of basing some final observations on the value system of a participatory economy on just the data from Table 10.

These results, for example, show that the value orientations that we designated as essential elements of the value system of a participatory econo-

my are at the bottom of the list. Their average significance is noticeably less than the significance of other values. It is obvious that in reality in Yugoslavia reality the value orientation that would suit a participatory economy is in conflict, not only with certain universal values, (such as personal freedom and equity) or even value orientations typical of bourgeois society (the standard of living), but above all with egalitarianism, whose origin probably is not exclusively in the dominant socialist ideology but also in elements of the traditional society which, it appears, still significantly influence relations in Yugoslav society.

Although at this moment we are far from the belief that we have presented in this paper »solid evidence« on the value system of workers in the Yugoslav economy of workers' self-management, we are prone to conclude that the actual value system, although it gives reason to expect that in the future it will take on the characteristics of the outlined normative value system of a participatory economy, is still far from that normative system.

Since it is our view that the function of the value system is to support the behavior of economic decision-makers that contributes to the efficiency of the given economic system, we can form the hypothesis for future research, that is: the more recent unfavorable trends in the Yugoslav economy are to a certain extent conditioned by the incompleteness of the value system that would correspond to an economy based on a system of self-management and that would be accepted by the majority of workers in the Yugoslav economy.

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SELFMANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN YUGOSLAV ENTERPRISES

At the outset, it must be explained that the economic system in Yugoslavia is substantially different from those operating in other socialist countries. Our industrial organizations do not operate in the framework of a centralized system, which might be efficient in a simple and undeveloped economy (where different subsystems are not highly interrelated and interdependent) but is inefficient and rigid in a more complex economy, where the operation of each subsystem determines the efficiency of other subsystems. Our industrial organizations operate in a market system and their efficiency is measured in economic terms of profit and growth.

All organizations are autonomous and make decisions regarding planning, production targets, investment, prices, wages, and all less critical issues. The question is, who makes these decisions within the plant?

We have introduced a most radical participative model. It is not possible to identify this model with the human relations approach which intends to make the executive human-oriented rather than task-oriented. Participation, in our model, is not manipulative and workers are not considered children. Our participative model has mainly to do with a completely different structure of organization in which the legitimacy of all decisions stems from all employees. Since workers constitute the majority, workers are the major source of legitimacy. From this point of view, our model is typically democratic.

In practice, this means that the workers make all important decisions on the policy of the enterprise and set the fundamental aims that the enterprise pursues. Top managers i.e. the general manager and the heads of departments, are not appointed, but elected. Formally, they are responsible to the workers and to all lower participants, i.e. to those who formally elected them.

As all workers cannot directly make decisions on all important issues, they elect a Workers Council composed of about thirty or more members. The number of members depends on the size of the enterprise.

The Workers Council meets once or twice a month and passes all important decisions on expansion of the enterprise, new investments, prices of products, wages, the incentive system, safety provisions etc. About 70 to 80 per cent of the Workers Council membership are workers: the others are top managers, middle managers, supervisors and professionals.

Self-management was introduced in our country as an »ideological projection« and not as a pragmatic managerial idea. It was defined and treated a priori as if self-management were identical with the greatest efficiency and with the

highest degree of democracy. Some suppositions, on which selfmanagement was based, were illusions, and all of them were insufficiently empirically tested. Scientists in the field of organizational sciences became aware that a most radical participative organization was thus introduced, i.e. an organization with a completely new formal structure which was nowhere in the world formally introduced or tested. With this a need arose to find out how this system works how democratic and efficient it really is and which structural solutions are unsuitable and wrong. It was necessary to find out, how influence is distributed in the work organization, how the system of collective responsibility works, how leadership relates to self-management, how the system of financial stimulation operates, who bears the risk, how the system of sanctions operates, who exercises sanctions, what are the conflicting roles of the general manager, his sources of power etc. It was necessary to investigate these problems empirically and to form a new theoretical model of the work organization, Work organizations were bureaucratic, or even prebureaucratic when self-management was introduced and formally institutionalized from the top downwards (i.e. by the government).

This led to incoherence and structural inconsistency. The formal system of organizations appeared to be rather complicated, with tasks and relations among numerous committees and organs being loosely defined. Since the organizations operate as rational systems, managers simplified in veryday functioning the formal system. This led to strong informal organization, that created an inconsistent social system falling short of legitimacy. Therefore the problem arose of now to lessen the gap between formal and informal organization. The main disadvantages and insufficiencies of the self-management model are the following:

1. The essence of autonomous action is that it is not controlled, that it goes beyond the framework of the formally permissible and expected. Since autonomous action in the work organization functions disruptively — or, at least, so seems — there exists a continuing effort to channel the action into the formal structure. When the formal organization completely frustrates autonomy of action and allows only activities that can be anticipated, and are strictly and rigidly regulated, it reduces or destroys the motivational basis for participation. We institutionalized our self-management model from the top downwards with an enormous and excessive system of laws, excessive to the extent that we greatly narrowed the motivational basis for participation deriving from autonomous action.

2. The model of self-management is based on the assumption of common interests. A work organization, however, contains a social and status system with various organizational and socio-economic groups which hold different positions in the hierarchy and have different incomes, education, responsibilities, and aspirations. Interaction among these groupes having different interests leads to conflict.

3. As the model is based on the assumption of uniformity of interests, tensions and conflicts are interpreted to be residual and are not recognized as integral parts of the system. The strike, as one form of conflict, threatens the social system of the working organization and is therefore seen as dysfunctional. Since sharp conflicts are not defined as elements of the system, they are not legitimate.

4. The existing model of the self-management organization comprises two different structures: a hierarchical one functioning within the frame of the daily work process, and a non-hierarchical one functioning only sometimes. In this latter framework, the most important decisions are formally taken and aims and policy of the working organization are defined.

Josip Županov says that »each of these structures is based upon different definitions of the function of the producer and upon different organizational principles. Not one of the structures — if we take it by itself — is internally coherent, and neither of them is compatible with the other; therefore, the rights are defined unclearly and contradictorily — or they are not defined at all«.¹

The main advantages of the self-management model are the following:

1. Through self-management it is possible to increase the degree of co-operation and involvement in working toward organizational goals, particularly on higher levels in the organization.

2. The self-management model gives greater opportunity for awareness by all members of all important events and potential happenings in the organization: this is the source of greater identification with the enterprise and of greater opportunity for participation.

3. The self-management model provides opportunities for mutual influence and control which in turn reduce the negative effects of hierarchy, improve communication, stimulate motivation and generally make the organization more flexible. This means that the organization is able to adapt to those environmental elements (market, economy, technology and system of production) most threatening to its progress and development.

4. The main point here is that all employees participate directly, or through the Workers Council, to achieve a most rational and socially desirable allocation of financial resources. This gives employees the feeling that the success or failure of the organization can be attributed mainly to members of the enterprise and not to outside groups. (Of course, merits for success are not evenly distributed, but depend on the distribution of influence and knowledge).

5. The value system in the wider society is dominated by participative ideals which enhance the feeling in all employees that they are the legitimate source of power.

6. The discrepancy between personal and organizational needs is not overcome: it is however, not as great as is characteristic of a typical hierarchical organization. Personal needs — especially those of employees occupying lower levels in the hierarchy, are satisfied to a much greater extent. In such a participative organization, there is more opportunity for differential reward than in the classical organization.

Prior to the introduction of self-management, our economy was strictly centralized by a system of planning which limited the autonomy of work organizations. With the introduction of self-management, not only was the social system within working organizations changed, but also the entire political system was changed, and, as well, the economic policy of the government. As a result of these changes, the effectiveness of work organizations, and of the

¹ Josip Županov, Samoupravljanje i reforma, Naše teme, No. 5, 1968, p. 688

whole society, increased. The gross national product increased by 12 per cent per annum, thus including Yugoslavia among those countries with the most intensive and rapid economic development in the world. Today, it is difficult to establish the extent to which the abolition of the centralized system and strict planning contributed to this rapid development, or the extent to which this extraordinary development can be attributed to self-management. The centralized system imposed substantial limitations upon individual initiative: the self-management system loosened those limitations to a great extent. There is little doubt that self-management created a more flexible organization, capable of rapid adaptation to changes in the environment.

Yugoslavia was for the last two decades among those societies (states) with the most rapid economic development and in a few years had recorded the most rapid economic development in the world. In this period Yugoslavia has changed the composition of its population.² That is evidence that the participation system in Yugoslavia is a viable one, and it is therefore a worthwhile subject for comparative studies.

We shall limit ourselves to the presentation of some empirical data and some indicators demonstrating indirectly that self-management has created a vital social dynamic in work organizations.

Data from a recently completed study indicate the extent to which the self-management model has been realized in our work organizations, and the extent to which the model is effective.³

We based this study partly on the organizational theory which we find in the works of Rensis Likert and Arnold Tannenbaum. Rensis Likert distinguishes four systems of organization:

1. exploitive authoritative
2. benevolent authoritative
3. consultative
4. participative.

Because of the lack of space, we will describe here only systems 1 and 4, as we have adapted them to Yugoslav conditions.

System 1

Within this system, the managers of the enterprise conceive of workers as market goods which can be bought. Managers perceive their own role as that of decision-making and giving orders. They lean primarily upon coercion as a means of motivation. Human feelings and higher needs are not taken into consideration. It follows that the flow of communications is in one direction — from the top downwards.

Decisions regarding aims and policy of the enterprise are made by top managers only, and often on the basis of inaccurate and inadequate information. The lower organizational levels do not participate and they do not feel responsible for carrying out these aims and policies. Responsibility is hence found only at the top. Since the managers depend primarily upon coercion, there is

² After the war more than 70% of the total population was agricultural, now less than 50% is agricultural

³ Stane Možina, Janez Jerovšek, *Determinante, ki vplivajo na učinkovitost vodstva v delovnih organizacijah*, Inštitut za sociologijo in filozofijo pri univerzi v Ljubljani, Ljubljana 1969.

no real co-operation or interpersonal influence. Changes are carried out with difficulty because resistance is relatively strong. There are many conflicts and they are difficult to solve. In such a social system the dissatisfaction of lower participants is substantial.

System 4

Within this system all employees are treated as important parts of the organization. Managers are responsible for decisions, but in making those decisions they take into account the opinions and suggestions of lower participants. Workers participate primarily in determining the work processes, the area in which their fund of knowledge and experience is greatest and most useful. Communications flow vertically, in both directions, and horizontally. They are, for the most part, rapid and accurate. Employees are relatively highly motivated by the differentiated reward system, such that everyone who produces more and better work is rewarded correspondingly and those performing poorly in quantitative and qualitative terms are punished correspondingly. This system does not represent a loose organization. With mutual control and influence, a highly co-ordinated, cohesive and closely knit system is introduced. This is not a permissive system — it is a system having more formal organization in that everyone is simultaneously an object of control, and exercising control over others. Responsibility is not located only at the top, but among all organizational groups. The degree of responsibility is linked to the power which the individuals and groups possess. There are fewer destructive conflicts in system 4 than in system 1, and those that exist are more likely than in System 1 to be solved integratively. Changes are more easily introduced because those concerned with the changes are not just their passive executors, but active participants in their planning. Although this system is not loose or permissive, the employees are relatively satisfied.

We have described only systems 1 and 4 because these represent extremes. Systems 2 and 3 are in between and differ only in degree. While we have labelled system 4 participative, we have defined it not only in terms of degree of participation, but also in terms of other variables — motivation, communication, interaction, responsibility, change, conflict, efficiency, and the like.

We have assumed that work organizations are managed on the basis of different social systems, and that the efficiency of those social systems is of differing degrees. We hypothesized that those working organizations approaching system 4 would be more efficient than those operating on the basis of systems 1 or 2.

For these reasons, we selected 20 work organizations, 10 highly efficient and 10 less efficient. We selected industrial organizations so that in each branch there would be one highly efficient and one less efficient organization.

The following criteria were used to determine the level of efficiency of each organization:

1. average personal income per employes
2. profit per employee
3. funds per employee
4. investments per employee
5. increase in number employed over last three years
6. increase in number of professionals employed in last three years.

All of these criteria overlapped: average income was in the more efficient organizations high and in the less efficient ones low. In the last three years profit increased in the more efficient organizations but not in the less efficient ones. Funds increased in the more efficient organizations over the last three years, and in less efficient ones they decreased. Investments grew in the more efficient organizations and decreased in the less efficient ones. Over the last three years, the number of employees and professionals increased in the more efficient organizations and decreased in their less efficient counterparts.

When selecting highly efficient and less efficient organizations we were also concerned with the social system in which they operated. We found that all the highly efficient organizations belonged to system 3. In Figure 1 we can see this difference. Calculations reveal that differences between efficient and less efficient organizations are statistically significant.

In the highly efficient organizations, superiors express trust in their subordinates, while in the less efficient enterprises, trust is absent. In the highly efficient organizations, subordinates feel relatively free to discuss their problems with their direct superiors; in the less efficient organizations, they feel less free. In the efficient organizations, superiors often seek the ideas of their subordinates in solving problems, and try to incorporate these ideas in their solutions; in the less efficient enterprises, this is done far less often. This type of influence is of primary importance since other studies⁴ have shown that employees want to participate in determining their own working process — where their fund of knowledge and experience is greatest — but do not so much want to participate in decisions concerning the entire enterprise where their fund of knowledge is lowest.


In the highly efficient organizations, the total amount of influence is greater than in the less efficient organizations, meaning that in the former all levels in the hierarchy exert greater influence upon relevant events than in less efficient organizations.⁵ Using Wilcoxon's test, the difference was found to be statistically significant.

In highly efficient organizations employees are motivated to participate more than in the less efficient organizations. Nevertheless, we established that on this variable, highly efficient organizations approach system 2. This means that human potentialities are not being fully utilized even in the highly efficient organizations. Concerning the interaction variable, we established that in the highly efficient organizations extensive use is made of team-work, while in the less efficient organizations little use is made of team work.

We found as well, that in the highly efficient organizations, the communications flow both upwards and downwards; in the less efficient enterprises, vertical communications flow primarily downwards. In the more efficient organizations, employees receive downward-flowing information with confidence and trust; in the less efficient organizations, such information is received mainly with distrust. In the highly efficient enterprises, the information flowing upwards is, for the most part, accurate, while in the less efficient organizations, it is carefully arranged and screened. In the highly efficient organizations, supervisors are well acquainted with the working problems of their subordi-

⁴ Veljko Rus, Status strokovnega in vodstvenega kadra glede na komuniciranje, moč in odgovornost, Moderna organizacija, 1968, No. 5

⁵ The association between the amount of influence and efficiency in working organizations was confirmed in several other researches. See: Arnold S. Tannenbaum, Control in Organizations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.



nates; in the less efficient enterprises, they are correspondingly less well acquainted with such problems.

Concerning decision-making we found that in the highly efficient organizations decisions are made at the top, but with considerable delegation of authority in formulating those decisions. In the less efficient organizations, decisions are made at the top with little delegation of authority in the process. In the highly efficient organizations those making decisions on important issues possess quite enough relevant knowledge, while in the less efficient organizations they have relatively little knowledge that is relevant to the issues.

In the highly efficient organizations work tasks are defined and distributed on the basis of discussion — in the less efficient organizations, this is accomplished without benefit of discussion.

In the highly efficient organizations data on operations, expenses, income, and productivity are used to a much greater extent than they are in less efficient enterprises.

Systems 3 and 4 are not characteristically loose organizations: in these two systems there is intensive supervision. Our data demonstrate that in highly efficient organizations, all organizational groups are considerably more supervised than in less efficient organizations.

In more efficient enterprises, not only are all groups more supervised but they are also more differentially supervised. From other studies⁶ we know that those groups and organizations with more differentiated reward systems and structures of influence, are more efficient than those groups and organizations with more egalitarian reward systems and less differentiated structures of influence. Our data also lead to the conclusion that a more differentiated system of supervision is related to higher efficiency.

Further, we found that in the highly efficient organizations, a more open system of supervision is applied and in the less efficient organizations, a more closed system. In the highly efficient organizations, the employees are considerably more motivated by rewards than in the less efficient enterprises.

We found that the utilization of work time is greater in the more efficient enterprises probably because of the greater supervision.

Although organization members are considerably more supervised in the highly efficient organizations than in the less efficient ones, they are considerably more satisfied.

The difference in degree of satisfaction is substantial. In the less efficient organizations, 84,1% of respondents answered that they were not particularly or not at all satisfied with the current results of the enterprise: in highly efficient organizations, only 12,5% of respondents were of the same opinion.

In our study, we found that all of the highly efficient organizations fell into system 3 and all of the less efficient organizations into system 2. At the same time, we asked respondents (top managers and members of the Workers Council) in which system they would prefer to operate. In Figure 1, it can be seen that for several variables, all respondents in more and less efficient organizations preferred system 4.

⁶ Harold J. Leavitt, «Unhuman Organization», Readings in Managerial Psychology, Illinois: U of Chicago Press, 1968.

CONCLUSIONS

A participative system, as we have defined and operationalized it cannot be introduced from the top. Institutionalization does facilitate the introduction of a social system which appears to produce optimal results in terms of efficiency. A social system characterized by optimal utilization of human resources cannot, however, be realized through laws or institutionalization alone. This means that within a formal bureaucratic and autocratic structure, a participative social system can be introduced, but it is possible that the formal self-management organization will remain, in reality, bureaucratic and autocratic.

Within a bureaucratic organization the style of leadership can be democratic, motivating workers, raising their morale and their productivity. On the other hand, the style of leadership can be, explicitly autocratic within a formal self-management organization having a negative influence on satisfaction, working morale, attitudes toward work and productivity.

We found, in our study, that work organizations operating on the basis of a participative social system are highly efficient: those working on the basis of an autocratic social system are less efficient and operate at the lower limit of profitability.

It appears that philosophy of management differs in more and less efficient organizations. We found, for example, in interviews, that the general managers of highly efficient organizations define effectiveness as the expansion of their organizations. General managers of less efficient organizations defined effectiveness as simply staying in business. For the latter, then, effectiveness is the mere existence of the enterprise; not its expansion.

The fact that highly efficient organizations have different social systems may give us the right to conclude, or at least to suppose, that this is a matter of differing philosophy and differing practice.

Managers, primarily those in less efficient organizations often assert that their low levels of efficiency are the result of their exposure to changes introduced continuously by the government. These changes they say are often neither justified, not consistent, and are sometimes discriminatory. While these claims are not entirely without foundation, they are, in some respects, quite exaggerated. If they were accurate, then we would not find both highly efficient and less efficient organizations in the same branch. Economic policy can have discriminatory effects among branches, but not within one branch.

We found, in our study that the social systems differ in highly efficient organizations compared to less efficient organizations. We can ask now, who determines the nature of a social system within an enterprise or who contributes most to that system resulting in optimal efficiency. It seems to us that the nature of the social system is determined by those who exert the greatest influence within the organization — the general manager and the top managers immediately below him. If this supposition is accurate then it follows that the degree of democracy in work organizations depends to a large extent on the qualifications of top managers. It follows, that the education of managers and the recruitment policy of the enterprise are of primary importance.

Our research was not undertaken and the enterprises were not selected so that we could test the above hypothesis. We mention our interpretation only because

our observations suggest such conclusions and because of our interest in seeing the above hypothesis tested in the future.

Although we are aware that the structure of the work organization is affected by its environment⁷ which is different in different societies, and by the system of values and customs which also differ among societies. The experiences of Yugoslavia in introducing the democratic structure of organization can be useful for all those, who will experiment with self management. If nothing else, the Yugoslav experience will show what should not be done and where there may be little chances to be successful.

⁷ Lawrence, Lorsch, *Organization and Environment*, Harvard University Press, Boston 1967.

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RELIGION AND SELF-MANAGEMENT

It has been said that utopia is a symptom of the fundamental relation of human life. Man is an utopian being because there is no state he can denote as final; nowhere will he ever find the satisfaction of all his human needs.

Religion is a natural and social phenomenon. While morality is on the human level religion shifts the matter to a being separated from man. Religion, in fact, becomes the personification of the relations morality considers human. In this personification the inverse comes to expression that it has always been man, humanity in itself and about itself that is in question. This, of course, is man's humanness separated from man's actions; God independent of all relations . . .

We have it appears, forever left behind the time when religion was interpreted only **rationalistically**, from either a theological or an atheistic point of view. Even now it can be said that to the category of the so-called naive historical consciousness belongs the thesis that religion stems from those dark regions of consciousness which are still uninhabited by facts of philosophy, science and art. Someone's belief can be true, though the intellectual defence of this belief may be pure rationalization. This means that the truth has been reached in some way other than by thinking in a scientific framework. A purely rational conviction in God's existence means very little if it is not united with experience and sentiment. A. Marius has expressed vividly and impressively the fact that the »knowledge« of God — that God as a reality for man is not primarily a matter of reason but of intuitive experience, sentiment (which, of course, does not exclude thinking as well). He severely and openly attacks all those who over-ambitiously and naively want to completely determine and explain this theoretically undefinable and inexpressible secret only rationally; who wish to »dissect (Him) by the sharpness of their reasoning, dress Him in their opinion und undress according to their own will«.

Only scholarly approach to religion is displaced and untenable if its protagonist is not aware of its ontological and historically conditioned limits. The spirit of the time is certainly expressed in its contemporary forms (art, philosophy); so it is in religion and in its cognitive dimension. But since man is a self-conscious subject, there are some lasting and ever-present sources of all man's cognitive adventures — *thaumasein*, admiration of the wonder of being, curiosity about what is in and around us. Thus the questions of meaning, origin and eschaton, as the basic existential questions — the ques-

tions of Faust and Hamlet — can be called the eternal questions of man to which no final answer exists; instead, they are more socio-historically conditioned. The question which loses nothing in its need to be asked remains: to what extent is man able to surmount his nature, his anthropological facticity? If the world changes consciousness, the change itself must be conscious and led by thought. Not only death, but also the overall »human situation«, (illness, forlorn love . . .), can constitute an impulse for religion as well as for other spiritual forms. And there are problems which no social change can completely remove, which, therefore, man will always solve either in transformed religion and other spiritual forms or in nihilism. The request for radical historical change is a practical question as well. This relates namely, to the possibility of bringing about the essential revolutionization of the reality anticipated by Marx, which today is **questionable**, since the concrete nature of the historical subject is not entirely defined. If, after all, by abolishing social dependence, the social roots of religion are abolished the question remains whether one also abolishes anthropological dependence, which, it should be added, is not excluded from the sphere of change. It is perhaps better to say that the abolishment of the social conditions producing conventional religion will contribute to its transformation, »protestantization«, »de-sacrilization«, to its becoming more philosophical, more humane: in short, it will lead to the strengthening of man's subjectivity. Marx's vision, which contains an optimistic programme — just as do all historically alive visions — possibly contains a certain amount of the utopian (not utopianistic). And such a utopia becomes a real force since it is a dynamic factor in the process of abolishing **alienated** mediators.

As a social and personal force, religion in the Yugoslav socialist society cannot be reduced to a **dependent** variable only. It is a merit of the degree of spiritual articulation of our society and the nature of its structure. In a domestic historical and cultural context religion not only reacts but also stimulates; it does not simply adjust but also (often rightfully) accuses; it does not exhaust itself in imitation but sometimes »suggests new patterns of behaviour and sensibility«. Under conditions when other socio-political forces abstain from the bitter taste of life, religion becomes all the more engaged in giving renewed life to the spirit amidst the endless tension in the world . . . The fact that religion in certain environments emerges more in a political, emotional, cultural or national form — should not exclusively be explained by the clergy's influence or the believers' religious behaviour. The essence is contained in re-examining the believers' social position since it determines or at least motivates their attitudes.

A number of authors attach enough importance to social **deprivation** or **de-intimization** to make it the basic factor of the Church's ability to survive without a basic change in form¹. It is more probable that a religious solution will be sought when the nature of deprivation is wrongly conceived, or when those suffering from its consequences are not able to work directly towards removing them. When, however, the nature of deprivation is determined, and when those suffering from it possess the power to remove it, then the solution is **secular**. This certainly does not prevent us from finding that the religious solution of ethical deprivation is as certain and effective as the

¹ »Religion and Social Conflict«, Edited by Robert Lee and Martin E. Marty, Oxford University Press, 1964, New York.

secular solution in overcoming deprivation. While economic and social deprivation are characterized by the individual's assessing that he is not on par with the standards of the society, ethical and psychological deprivation are characterized by the individual's feeling that he does not live according to his own standards.

It has already been determined that religious movements acquire the form of **sects** where they have been caused by economic deprivation, the form of **church** where deprivation has been social, and the form of **cult** where deprivation has been **psychic**. All three forms are evident in the Yugoslav society. Sects most often are composed of people who, having experienced disappointment in one orthodoxy (Catholicism), have accepted another orthodoxy (Marxism), and — after being disappointed in it join a faction of a church (sect) when there is no faction within the Party. In the largest number of cases they have been pushed into the first orthodoxy by social deprivation and into the second by psychic deprivation, while ideological disappointment, often accompanied by the loss of economic position, has pushed them into a sect.

ATHEISM AND RELIGION

Atheistic practice depends on the type of society to which it belongs, and, accordingly, in atheism there are various views about religion and the possibilities for its being overcome. In addition to Marxist atheism, which leads to active and optimistic activity of social transformation, there are other kinds of atheism: cynical atheism, individualistic »enjoyment of life« atheism, atheism resulting in discouragement and resignation (which can often lead to »religious repentance«) and the like. One is characteristic of a finely developed personality, maintaining harmony with his environment, the other is characteristic of a withdrawn and deviant individual.

In historical retrospection atheism emerges as an idea accompanying almost all liberation movements. Thus, for instance, during the French Revolution there was a strong atheistic mood in France. It was, it seems, rather an expression of an almost instinctive resistance against the Church and all that it signified and brought about at that time: darkness, disbelief in man, exploitation — in a word, the spiritual protection of the class against which the revolution was directed. It is here that one should seek the roots of the often brutal forms of protest by a mass of people against the clergy, the Church and rituals. This is the time when even atheists sometimes unhumanly demonstrated their opposition to religion through programmes of almost physical annihilation of religion and its institutions. This was the expression of the vigorous liberation movement of the French bourgeois class which wanted to carry out a thorough change of the world of that time. The then massive atheism simply resulted from the abandoning of old medieval frameworks which prevented an independent development of the new society, new relations and the new man. »The absurdity of the existing state of affairs challenged the entire power of their logic to go to the end in the theoretical determination of that which had to be«².

² Kleiberg Alfred, *Evropska kultura novog veka* (European Culture of the Modern Age), Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo, 1959, p. 65.

An illustration can also be found in more contemporary historical events — in the atheism accompanying the October Revolution and the Yugoslav Revolution. Bearing in mind understandable historical differences the state of affairs was basically very similar. Besides atheists who rationally revealed the ideological and moral weaknesses of the religious system and convictions, there existed an enormous mass of »emotional atheists« (more precisely unmediated atheists), who — exalted with revolutionary fervour and the possibilities of the new man through his changed position in society — were opposed to church concept, often expressing this opposition in an uncompromising way. To them, too, Kleinberg's thought is applicable: While on the one side helpless desperation sought shelter in the supernatural and magnanimous mystique, on the other there arose will, action and a sense for essence in the first encounters preparing the struggle for the future.³

In recent history the ideological antagonisms and conflicts between atheism and religion or the Church very often manifested real relationships of strength between the protagonists of two distant, often diametrically opposed concepts.

And what, in fact, is the unceasing struggle about?

The focus of the conflict between atheism and the religious system is — **man**. All that surrounds man, that constitutes the essential content and meaning of life — new or old social relations, new rational occupations or petrified conceptions, new moral judgements or antiquated norms, new psychological states or old psychic restraints — these are problems arising from the human and inhuman social situation in which man finds himself, his freedom or confinement. The most valuable, the one and only meaning of atheism in the Marxist sense of the word is, of course, reduced to the struggle for the liberty of man. And this is precisely what attracts the many newly convinced adherents — not only those who »feel« the righteouness of such a state and the stand stemming from it, but also those who are aware that the acceptance of atheism is not an **assumption** but the **result** of the establishment of a socialist self-managing community.

The power of atheism has always been dependent on the extent to which man's social freedom is fulfilled. In the society which is not free or in which man's freedom is reduced to the minimum, despite the fact that it contends to be atheistic atheism, conceived and carried out in this way, does not have a chance. In any phase in the development of a socialist revolution when the basis of man's freedom became narrowed, for one reason or another, it was accompanied by an exceptional intensification of religious consciousness. Here one should not be confused by the fact that the subject of religion has been changed; that God is no longer in heaven but, say, has become man on earth. This, changes nothing in the matter itself: religion remains religion regardless of the change in subject, and of man's duplication, of man's transferring his own powers to his strengthened double. In this connection it is essential that man has alienated himself, transferring part of his unfulfilled self to some other power — earthly or heavenly. Thus he becomes impoverished to the extent to which he endows some external entity with his own spiritual wealth. Upon transferring the highest powers of his being to his institutions, the alienated man enters them with fear as if under some new histori-

³ Kleinberg Alfred, *Ibid*, p. 211.

cal, heavenly dome. This is fortunately temporary: »I would warn you« Esarpit writes to God in his letter- »that in this domain trust obtained in advance, blind devotion and the cult of personality can last for only a few years while men are small in numbers, exhausted by wars, without developed capabilities and burdened with necessity; but believe me, such a state is of short duration«⁴.

Atheism of Marxist type is important precisely because it is the most delicate indicator of man's spiritual freedom; and not only of the freedom of consciousness but also of freedom as a **social** act, as social practice. In the very beginning of atheism conceived in this way, it is very clearly evident to what extent man has succeeded in overcoming a whole range of restrictions, both his own, and those on the broadest social plane. Whether man succeeds in affirming himself in the social life, in building up himself and his own criteria, in making his consciousness as sensitive as possible, in sharpening his responsibility, not only before **other** but also before **himself**, all depends upon the formation of an **integral** personality of which atheism is only one of the dimensions, not one which is assumed but one that results.

It is well known that the basic programme and meaning of self-management socialism is to develop a complete personality. If atheism constitutes an effort to achieve man's spiritual freedom; to resist all that confuses man or distracts his attention from himself and the problems of his own mind and life, then atheism is in fact a constitutive element of the socialist programme for a complete, integral personality. For material freedom or the social conditions for man's free development and his real affirmation cannot in the least be separated from his spiritual emancipation nor from the free development of personality on that most personal lyric plane.

By exploring more precisely the degree of development of the Yugoslav self-managing community we have learned that the building up of an integral personality is a very complex process, which, in an undulating manner, is gradually being fulfilled. Fulfillment, of course, is not a linear path. An integral personality is achieved, thanks to men and institutions, in a turmoil of old relations and new possibilities. With us even religion itself is an expression of our own historical sense and our own possibilities. Thus, for instance, the Catholic religion, which no doubt constitutes the most developed one in our territory, contains in itself a whole range of our specific forms of belief, ranging from pagan prejudices to ritual conventions. Religion therefore bears the imprint of our territory and our people. In accordance with this, atheistic action cannot possess that classical simplicity it has in more developed countries, but is characterized by special circumstances: ranging from that still manifest dependence on nature and its whims to the deification of some of the forms of secular life as the substitute for traditional religion.

Atheists in the Yugoslav society **feel** atheism rather than penetrate its essence. They most often do not attempt or do not succeed in explaining their own spiritual position. A sociological study of religion in the present-day Yugoslav society has shown that most of our people belong to the emotional (unmediated, type — of either atheistic or religious orientation⁵. Fore-

⁴ Esarpit, Robert: *Otvoreno pismo bogu* (The Open Letter to God), The Zodiac Library, Belgrade, 1948, p. 80.

⁵ I have published the basic results of this research in the book: *Socijalističko društvo i religija* (Socialist Society and Religion), Second Edition, Svijetlost, Sarajevo, 1970.

most, a Yugoslav reveals his sentiments. He is temperamental, often hasty and hot-tempered. And the fact that he emotionally accepts definite values, convincingly indicates to us the extensive possibilities that are hidden within himself- but only possibilities! — for an intensive spiritual life. To cover the distance from mute and undefined moods and states to acquiring an awareness of them require considerable intellectual effort which, on the rational plane, means a dialogue with the past, present and future. Only then does the authentic man's existence become not a self-surrender to the spontaneity of living but a lasting search for the purposfulness of life. Excitement should not be underestimated, but it is sufficient if it does not bear in itself proofs and the strength of spiritual self-consciousness, because otherwise it is usually short-lived.

The emotional moment in the Yugoslav Revolution that represented a collective renaissance performed a significant role. The Yugoslav was thrown into a turmoil of intensive changes he often did not understand, and does not even comprehend today. Psychological motives have vigorously contributed to the fact that a great number of people have become socially involved. They very quickly transferred the revolt in which they participated to all that bothered them in the development, either consciously or unconsciously. That is why they rose in revolt not only against secular injustices, but also against the heavens. The opposition against the secular life in which the church played a significant role, could not exempt religion, sometimes even in its original meaning.

The research into religion, we have already mentioned, revealed that the constellation of current social relations, the phenomenon of atheism as the purest form of **vacuum**, as the external, not internal, dialectical interference, is possible. Marx insisted on this latter. Simply by the abstract abolishment of the classical form of religion, concrete socialism does not forever win the battle for the human contents and spiritual dimensions by which religion is to be replaced. Religion is namely a bearer of totality, and not only of the negative; it denotes the presence of the whole lying beyond the boundary, against the partial on this side of boundary.

Atheism can appear as the theology of no god, as a negative theology. It can be an orientation, a position of consciousness, an atmosphere of culture: but all this depends on the corresponding religion. In the Yugoslav society, too, there exists a certain form of secular religion, («atheistic religion» or »religious atheism«), in which the negation of religion has acquired the form of religion. The fact that the object of belief is changed, changes nothing as long as man remains dependently and irrationally related to this changed object while seeking and expecting supernatural support from this object. There exists a possibility of **release** from the obsession of religious substance because there are deeper realms of atheism as a religion.

The aforementioned research has offered us a category of atheists who bear within themselves a primitive rush on culture, a primitive relationship to cultural tradition, a tradition which is, of course, confessionally coloured.

Theoretical elaboration of the empirical evidence we obtained in the study of religion in the Yugoslav society has provided us with the basis for the following typology of religious or atheistic motivation:

1. There is a type of man who finds himself in the shelter of religion for **aesthetical** reasons. This is a man in love with nature, who is taken by its rythm, which he finds ravishing, who only sees its metaphysical, unperishable side. He seems to stick to the principle: from all that I know of society, nature is that which is dear to me.

When, however, the substratum present in religion does not contain sufficiently broad and adequate possibilities for self-development, man finds his proper medium in philosophy and art, but in this case philosophy and art can be said to be sublimized religion.

2. There is a type of man who is inspired by, or brought back into the fold of religion by **scientific** results, because it has become evident to him that material things are dematerializing. This is a rational type of thinker, who at the boundary of rationality discovers something that is irrational, that cannot be included in the rational; something which atheistic consciousness, logically, calls religious. This refers to the man who **exceeds** a single sphere by using imagination.

Analogous to this intellectual formation of theists there are people who cannot resolve religiosity on an intellectual plane. In the best case they replace one type of religiosity by another, for instance, by a belief in science because by their structure of reasoning they are not on the level to **critically** relate to science. Such an atheist who cannot maintain a critical relationship towards science, (as a surrogate of conventional religion), is close to religion; he is a pseudoatheist.

There are basically two opposing concepts involving the relationship between science and religion. According to the first the source of belief is ignorance: lack of knowledge about the world. According to the other, science strengthens faith because it reveals and penetrates the perfection of the creative mind; scientific discoveries, in accordance with this opinion, constitute human participation on that divine plane. We contest the first concept by stating that religion cannot be reduced to cognitive roots nor can a strict line be drawn between its various roots. Cognitive roots cannot be reduced only to ignorance. »It is well known that human passions and feelings bear partial logic so that man carefully collects all the arguments favouring his opinion but he also carefully avoids all arguments against his convictions«⁶. The second standpoint neglects that science is a purely rational sphere of the mind, while a religious relationship directed towards his transcendental object is essentially irrational, emotional. A religious relationship endeavours to link the irrational and rational spheres and surmount the dichotomy in the concept of the all encompassing — **totality**. One cannot, however, have the last word on the final matters of human history, because history itself has not expressed itself with finality.

At this moment it should be asked whether the accomplishments of science and philosophy are available to a wider circle of people? Is there a chance for science and philosophy to become a mass movement?

Darwinism has for instance, operated with several categories which gained popularity with the masses. However, knowledge of modern science, for instance, genetics, cannot lie within the field of insight of even an expert; it is so detailed that it necessarily appears as a partial **self-consciousness**.

⁶ Rudi Supek: *Socijalna psihologija* (Social Psychology), Rad, Belgrade, 1968, p. 249.

Nor can philosophy, with its internal structure and esoteric terminology, become of interest to the masses. Because they are special, symbolic, mathematical, modern science and philosophy cannot be a **world** (mass) movement. Being a movement of the elite, emerging as a competitor to religion, science seems to give more and more ground to religion. Why? It is because religion continues to remain, and perhaps is even increasingly becoming the **only** alive, existential, approachable, non-exact (empirical) philosophy to every man (layman).

3. There is a type of man who is not in ecstasy while watching nature, nor is he interested in the scientific image of the world, but he possesses a keen moral imagination. Simply: he is worried about the moral crisis of the contemporary world; in God he sees the only origin of morality which is not endangered and, moreover cannot be endangered in the least by anything! The **moral vulnerability** of the contemporary world and man, constantly binds him to a religion as an oasis of morality.

The atheist, as an antipode to this type of theist sees in God an **alienated mediator**, and that is why he »removes« Him as an obstacle to humanization.

4. Finally, in our society there is quite numerous the type of man who is **indifferent** towards border situations and especially towards their rational solution. We here refer to people who do not react to any rational or moral crisis in the present-day world no matter how deep; people who have fallen so far into the ruthless embracement of social violence that any felt need to search for a way out has been extinguished, no matter whether they offer themselves to God or reject Him without restraint. We refer to a phase in the modern culture which makes man devoid even of the need to think: thinking is monopolized by science and philosophy, a cult of rational indifference is being created. We may even speak about a **dullness** that has stemmed from the wider atrophy of thinking.

SELF-MANAGEMENT SOCIALISM AND RELIGION

The types of religion and atheism which have constituted the subject of our previous analysis, owe their existence not only to tradition but also to the current practice of self-management. This analysis of certain segments of the Yugoslav society, though fragmentary, has shown at least a tendency towards an ever more copious scale of nuances in religious and atheistic consciousness, ever more directly proportional to the context of the self-managing socialist society.

We would now draft for our **project**, a theoretical model of self-management socialism which, in many ways, is very removed from Yugoslav society; precisely because it is a model it must be sufficiently generalized and simplified.

Both society and man result from history. But men, by their origin and by the duration of their structures, considerably transcend concrete situations. People can more or less be affected by the current society, but they are not made of wax and the society cannot make copies and schemes of them in accordance with momentary »necessities« without this having a negative reflection on the individual and the society.

It must be determined to what extent concrete social circumstances **enable** a greater or lesser development of essential **human** potentials, and to what extent the degeneration of certain primary human characteristic should be ascribed to social circumstances. In short: the problem of man in society is almost entirely encompassed by the question of why the possibility of man as man, that obviously exists, is given narrower or broader room for expression.

In the present-day society it is not just the material product that is alienated nor is it just the power over the product or the processes of work. The entire superstructure and the entire sphere of social relations and phenomena are alienated as well. Due to the alienation of the entire system one cannot see anything that remains »on that side« — not even the very foundations and assumptions upon which the system of relations lies. Thus a distortion of consciousness appears due to the impossibility of comprehending the whole of the matter. Here is found the **place of origin** of religion as an alienated consciousness whose form and content are determined by the fundamental social alienation. For the more-or-less or even totally alienated man's position in life seeks compensation. And alienation, above, all, is a loss of humanness. The man that is alienated loses all autonomy, and his activity loses any trace of self-activity.

In what way does self-management constitute a stimulant to the humanization of mutual human relations? Does it serve the general interest which is gradually but never completely fulfilled? Can it be said that it constitutes an open dimension for the continuous self-affirmation of man's original creative powers: for the individualization of personality that is of less and less service to the partial ends of history?

Class society has brought about the difference between man as a man and as a member of a class, between the public and the private, between the individual and the society. With a class society **ethos** does not remain that by which all people are what they are; instead, the real structure of society is interpolated between man and ethos. There are the social relations that ask man to do something that is demanded of him; that he himself build something as a home. Now this relation is being transformed into a social battle-ground for his activity; ethos is becoming morality. Morality as a phenomenon and ethics as a philosophy of this phenomenon are not only a sign of alienation but also an attempt in given conditions to overcome this phenomenon. Criticism of morality does not mean criticism of its positive content, but of the **class** form of society, so that the mechanical individual-society relation can be transformed into full human determination as the community of the personality.

The idea of Western humanism culminates in the request that men be the authors of their historical deeds; that they should not be dissolved in the process of institutionalization. A hidden premise involved is the **anthropocentric subject** who behaves as if he were in possession of everything, of his entire heritage. The saying: since God is dead, man is god; rings with an existential tone.

In a humanely structured and oriented society, man's need for man should be the highest one. On the other hand, in the final instance, man should be in the highest need for himself. This is of course mutually conditioned and instilled. For in history, with the exception of the ancient societies,

man has gradually become able, precisely through other man, to experience himself more humanely, convinced that the »root of man is — man himself« (Marx).

The basic rational and humane premise of the concept of self-management is: all that is must be reconciled with all that should be: should be situated in reality. The ideal that criticizes reality without being able to change it is weak!

Self-management means the process of **uniting** the economic, moral, political and psychic spheres, so that man's social relationships can be strengthened. It is the overcoming of illusory freedom as the freedom of consciousness. Active, free consciousness is the component of the **critical** practice. Thus self-management involves the socio-economic, moral-psychic and cognitive aspects.

The socio-economic aspect of self-management is its reuniting associated human work with its own power. Associated direct producers are in possession of their own product. In the Yugoslav society, for instance, the management of the conditions of work on a technical plane, the degree of development of the means of production, is insufficient, and owing to this, the management of social conditions is also incomplete.

The moral-psychic aspect of self-management is having man relate less and less to other man as an object and more and more as a subject. The more man is able to rely on his own powers, the more he becomes more responsible before himself and society. Any longer lasting and more-intensive human engagement preceding a more important action stimulates the use of one's own moral criteria. Man's responsibility is the responsibility to himself and the community. Therefore, in self-management, thought is an indicator of morality as well as knowledge, because self-management presupposes the change of relations towards other people, and this necessarily changes the structure of man's reasoning as well. Therefore, it becomes less and less man's activity according to what he must do and increasingly to what he will do...

The cognitive moment in the conditions of self-management is also modified, and more active. In self-management man is stimulated to think; he does not want ready conclusions. As soon as social practice enables him to observe the final meaning of his own work, man enters the sphere of reasoned activity that has hitherto been inaccessible to him.

In summary:

a. Man rises to the level of subject, creator of his own destiny, through self-management. The extent to which he decides on the distribution of that which he has produced is the degree to which he measures his and others' work; that which is produced **ceases** to be taken away from him, and he gets an insight into that which is precisely his own deed. Practically, man gains confidence in the power of his own actions combined with the actions of others. That is why self-management means presence and participation in the present, as opposed to the feeling of helplessness, the need to escape to seclusion.

b. Practical humanism is present inasmuch as **alienated mediators** between man and man (State, God...) are abolished. The practice of self-management enables a rational insight into mutual human relations. Under

The respondents of the **Moslem** confession revealed a different quality of participation in socialist self-management as well as an essentially different structure of religiosity. We have found that in this confession religion is a **fatalistic** mood of people rather than a clearly defined **spiritualistic** relationship of man towards God. Besides this, the respondents in this group are of a consciousness in which the religious and the national are often interwoven and supplemented, to greater extent than in others. Owing to this it is often not religion that motivates members of this confession to belong, but the aspiration to form their **own** specific national qualities and assert their individuality.

For the majority of the members of both the Orthodox and the Moslem confessions, ignorance is the main source of poor religious indoctrination i.e. they lack a theologically meaningful attachment to religion.

As for the Catholics not engaged in socialist self-management, only an insignificant number are of atheistic conviction. We have found that even these socially and politically uninvolved atheists live in an environment widely affected by the practice of self-management. It is therefore realistic to suppose that the positive implications of this practice are also reflected in them. There is a certain number of these respondents who are not now socio-politically involved, but who remain atheists as they were previously when they were involved. They, for instance, were not shaken in their atheistic conviction even in foregoing their political convictions in Yugoslav socialism (in 1948), the direct cause for some of these respondents to abandon active participation in socialist self-management.

It is not at all accidental that in the Moslem confessional group almost all those who are socially uninvolved in socialist self-management are at the same time religious. There are respondents who do not possess the elementary prerequisites for social involvement (poor education, a low cultural level, unfavourable age structure and the like). To this we should also add that these respondents most often live in relatively apathetic social environments.

On the basis of all empirical evidence that we have systematically collected, we have found that self-management practice has developed in different degrees, has exerted varied impacts on the intensity of renunciation of traditional religion, and has constituted the original integrative factor of this process. The social scope of such practice, bearing in mind that a definite character of dependence is overcome, is best seen in the fact that the atheist respondents are to the most part **emotional** types. Those of the respondents who believe in the supernatural have a more direct relationship, all the more so if traditional believers are in question. They relate themselves to religion as well as to atheism in an almost fetishistic, magic way. This is a component part of the relationship these respondents have towards society as a whole. For them, religion and atheism are not, or at least not primarily, intellectual convictions. On this basis it can be supposed that, depending on whether these current atheists continue their active participation in socialist self-management or not, and depending on the quality of that participation, their evolution or firmness in atheistic view will continue, or that they will return to religious positions.

In the areas explored, current practice self-management has led to either the weakening or the disappearing of the **traditional** forms of religion. Its restrictive influence is understandable if we bear in mind that it develops in the economic, political and, to a degree, social spheres of man's involvement. The establishment of the basic premises of socialist self-management: education, broad culture, economic assumptions, higher socialist consciousness, moral involvement, and above all its proper functioning; have brought about the basic process of liberation in the Yugoslav society.

The basic change of the **social** situation depends on the participation of historically **concrete** individuals, and on the **real** content of self-management, which contributes to the formation of an active personality. A psyche shaped by one's own social activity and not just by the external influence of upbringing, eliminates the use of supports **outside** oneself as the only or decisive ones. The basic meaning in the development of the personality, according to Marx, is the »absolute working out of one's own creative dispositions without any assumption other than previous historical development — a totality of development, i.e. the development of all human abilities as such, not measured against a previously given criterium, which is its own end where it is not performed in its determination (limitation) but produces its totality«.

Even the fact that religion exists shows that people aspire to live in ever better conditions, closer to man and worthy of man's nature. Therefore religion is not just a sign of alienation but is also an attempt to overcome it, under given conditions, in a special way. Socialist self-management means the overcoming of given conditions, not in order that man might free himself from religion but that he might live a life adequate to his human nature, which as known historically in itself leads to the negation of religion. For condition and the existential practical needs of men are very closely interconnected. If practical circumstances and needs affect cognition giving it direction and content, then it is necessary to practically humanize human life in order to humanize human consciousness.

Concrete humane social action is at the same time the practice of atheism and a precondition for overcoming the theoretical atheism and its antipode — religion.

The process we have described in brief has been not so infrequently experienced by the average Yugoslav as the deep crisis in the system of cultural-ethical values, and the desintegration of value patterns which corresponded to the traditionally structured, socially closed environment. Man's consciousness, if he creates the self-management process by himself, is less and less unclear; it can reach its own roots and the nature of its function, and it less and less seeks any consecration or any authority of petrified, unchangeable norms and values.

A Yugoslav experiences socialist self-management as a continuous expansion of spiritual room or as a continuous dialogue with himself and the world. In practicing socialist self-management, people become convinced that it is the negation of social coercion and social powers which as an almost undisputable, almost natural force, rule over human beings. Precisely by this very essence it represents the abolishment of social assumption which are closed within themselves, and signifies the elimination of routine cons-

sciousness and religion, too, if it is such. For religious consciousness as well, at least the consciousness which we know historically, appears in situations of fear and uncertainty before all superior and »beyond this side« powers. And the light of consciousness in a demystified society created by man disperses the darkness of coercion and uncertainty.

FREEDOM AS THE OVERCOMING OF THE DILEMMA: RELIGION OR ATHEISM

Self-management as an idea comes to expression in an institutionalized area, in the sphere of objectiveness: politics, economy... The boundary of self-constitution is congruous with the boundary of objectiveness. Fortunately, one cannot rule and master human existence. The identification of objectiveness with that which makes objectiveness possible (man) is, in fact, an impersonal anonymous dictator. Self-management without the individual, the man, is **contradictio in adjecto**.

If freedom is on the margin with the wielding of all that is institutionalized, objectified and given, and besides this, if it means the wielding of the possibilities of history and nature, then it is not above techno-bureaucratic manipulation. Namely, it is supposed that man can reach the **unwieldable** that is, the ground of his own existence, if he beforehand succeeds in being in control of all that is available which has acquired the form of institutionalized progress, institutional culture, institutional history. Since man, however, cannot foresee everything, the non-institutionalized sphere is that which cannot be managed, ruled; that is the **internal** boundary of self-management as well.

To sum up: there exists on the one side, a burgeoismanagerial conception which is reflected in the pretensions of the government to extend itself to the non-institutional, and on the other, an original socialist conception which means the return of man and his deed to himself: self-management, self-wielding, self-government. In focus, therefore, is the **question of freedom conceived as the possibility of common control in the sphere of objectiveness and individual self-government in the non institutional sphere:**

In the Yugoslav society three areas of self-management can be distinguished:

Political — in which almost the final limit has been reached, and where further insistence on the exclusively political dimension of self-management would be transformed precisely into its contradiction: democracy for all or general democracy, in the conditions of the unestablished premises of self-management, concerns everyone and does not concern anyone.

Economic — in this area self-management is developing under the conditions of a relatively rich material basis, whose multi-dimensional formation is also affected by self-management. If this basis is poor, self-management necessarily appears as a factor in realizing one's own impotence.

Anthropological — in this area man is not only responsible for what he has done, but also for all that he has not done. This is in fact still a realm of imagination.

Perhaps the greatest merit of socialist self-management lies precisely in that it inspires the thought and practice by which the division of men into atheists and theists is pushed to the margin of society or is even completely displaced. The position between theism and atheism, which on the sociological plane, particularly in recent times and among the young, is manifested as the non-acceptance of both traditional religion and atheism or dogmatic Marxism, is a standpoint which is founded on its critical relationship towards the one and the other exclusivity, and which as an effort based on humanistic fixation on both poles, on common human values, has, like these opposite poles, its theoretical-philosophical ontological-gnoseological assumption. This assumption need not be completely aware of itself but can be more of an experience.

It is therefore encouraging, viewed humanistically, that the differences in theoretical answers to man's eternal questions are pushed to the background (what would it be like if all man thought uniformly?) and the strengths are united in a practical humane involvement in common human values.

In theory too, but above all in practice, God as an absolute is replaced by man as an absolute among atheists. And we can not conceive of a society without any mediators. Would not such a society, particularly in the sphere of morality, be a form of empirical mystical unity? Is not the image of the future society in which the **alienated mediators** between man and man are abolished, not the mediators as such, precisely in accord with Marx's vision of the world? In accordance with this, I only mention that if religion or any other phenomenon (science, philosophy, art) succeeds in constituting itself in a way so that it ceases to be a factor of alienation, it has a bright and secure future.

If we should remain within the concept and along the line of Marx's thought, we should not stick to the standpoint that religion is an exclusively practical relationship towards the world because it is at once a conscious and an emotional state, though its basic and deepest source still lies in man's practical relations or, more precisely, in the corrupt material relations of the bourgeois, essentially, class society. Marxist criticism of the religion which stems from the structure of this society assumes the establishment of social suppositions which enable man to succeed as a personality in the change of consciousness by affirming his free personality:

»Only an atheist can be a good Christian, only a Christian can be a good atheist«. Though paradoxical, these words which, after one of his stays in Rome, were spoken by Ernst Bloch in his talks with journalists, contain a fruitful anticipation which, in the highest reaches of present-day society, is being fulfilled as the wealth of human nature. In this sense active believers who simply can not wait for eschatological prospects, and, equally, active atheists who do not approach socialism as something unavoidable, express a restlessness and virulence of spirit, not the intimate desolation of passive beings.

Criticism of religion as **religion** is nothing other than a form of theoretical battle which often can acquire all essential attributes of sophistic competition. The reasons **pro et contra**, on a theoretical level, are not essential

here; in other words, an apology of religion on the theoretical plane is »at home «because religion, too, is nothing other than a consequence of the fundamental division of man's world into the theoretical and the practical sphere. Criticism of religion must therefore be based on the clarification (theoretical) and negation (practical) of this division. Only the criticism of the practical, assumptions of religion, that is, the criticism of the social, cultural and historical phenomena that bear religious epiphenomenon, constitute for us a justifiable criticism. On this occasion we have not searched the thoughtful horizon for revelation, in principle, of possibly more-profound suppositions. (Translated by R. Požar)

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DIMENSIONS AND FACTORS OF THE APPERCEPTION OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

DEFINITION OF THE BASIC POSITION

The possibility of introducing workers' democracy is most often dependent on the level of the education of workers. This thesis has often been emphasized in the scientific and political literature. It is very clear and decided: if the workers' democracy is an inevitable phenomenon, then its introduction to the economic and political system of society becomes possible only when the workers reach that level of education which is necessary to decide successfully and competently. Along with such a position there comes the argument that contemporary economics of the market, high technology and organization of work, require an expert knowledge of the matter so that decision-making is connected with very complex intellectual operations. The »Educational imperative« of the workers' democracy has its adherents in the nonworking strata and ideologies as well as in the labour movement. It is not without its root in the socialist countries and it is so the incase in Yugoslavia also.

Insisting upon the education of the workers first, and then upon the economic democracy is, first of all, a political sophistry, because an exchange of political premises with educational and intellectual ones is made. The workers' democracy is, above all, a political phenomenon; it represents a radical change of the political structure of society, change of its basic economic, political, social and other institutions, values, norms of behavior and organizing.

Accentuation of education as a prerequisite for workers' participation in the field of economic decision-making is not a factor which is a priori to be ignored or attached little importance to. We have already mentioned the first reasons: the economic decision-making requires complex intellectual operations in order to formulate most rationally the aims and means for its accomplishment and foresee most exactly its consequences. The second reason is of sociological nature: the working class, besides being self-renewed, is permanently recruited from the peasant strata whose education is very low. Joining the industry and tertiary activities, these strata bring with them the remainders of their traditional culture, keep their initial education and inadequate structure of the perception of social movements and occurrences. Such a situation in renewing the stratum emphasizes the importance of education as a factor in its successful participation.

This paper does not discuss workers' self-management as a form of global organization ob the economic and socio-productional relations. This view is accepted here as a basic theoretical and ideological premise, and without cri-

tical appraisal of its realization. In this paper we shall try to discuss some very concrete questions having theoretical and practical implications. The basic motive of our research is the following: twenty years' of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia, no matter how we qualify its successfulness, represents quite a concrete social experience, normatively formed and regulated, which the individual consciousness perceives, understands and interprets reasonably. The individual, rational consciousness behaves toward the surrounding objective world in an active way because it comprehends. This comprehension develops on the basis of gnoseologic rules: the rational comprehension of the essential attributes of self-management, as a constituted situation given in its structural dimension, is accomplished on the basis of the past and present social experiences of the subject. In other words, in creating the rational concepts of objectivity, both past (perceptions of previous experience) and present ideas interfere. On the extent and on the quality of present human practice individually reflected and experienced, will depend the exactness of its reflection in the rational human consciousness. Making conclusions about the present objectivity on the basis of past experiences and notional symbols (stereotypes) points to an insufficiently active presence of man in current practice. For this hypothesis there are plenty of empirical arguments. Some of our previous research in Bosnia and Hercegovina pointed to a wide presence of stereotypes in the peasant population at the time when it should comprehensively reflect the fundamental qualifications of the communal and workers' self-management because parts of this population were very distant from direct perception and comprehension of the structured situation. Having that in mind our attention was directed to the industrial population for which the self-management practice should be the subject of everyday observation and its active experience.

EXPLANATION OF THE RESEARCH

The thesis is that the education of workers as a *conditio sine qua non* for the introduction of workers' democracy is can not be accepted in the form in which it is formulated and offered. The Yugoslav practice essentially corrects such a thesis: though the working class is of low education and culture, self-management, as a system and institution, has been carried out with relative success which is obvious in most enterprises.

In order to enable the mentioned thesis to be submitted to discussion, we give here some data obtained on a sufficiently important sample. We made a list of 37 concepts and tested the clarity and the exactness of their understanding on a population of 1241 persons employed in 16 industrial enterprises spread over the whole country. This list includes those essential notions which define all the basic fields of workers' self-management and represent the framework in all areas of decision-making within the competence of the organs of workers' self-management. We checked the clarity and knowledge of the basic economic categories, economics of the enterprise, the characteristics of social property in self-management, structure of self-management authorities, competences in decision-making, obligations of the self-management bodies towards the producers (or self-management rights of the producers), rights of the workers and work security. In selecting the notions, we were guided by the principle of their frequency and functionality in deciding. On the other side, we checked those concepts acquired by experience which could be said,

at least arbitrarily, to represent the inevitable basis for understanding the subjects of decision-making, individual position in self-management and social evaluation of the decisions made. The subjects questioned were chosen according to the principles of sampling from all categories of producers who differ in their professional and educational characteristics as well as in their functions in management and the frequency of their election into the self-management bodies. In this way, the essential socio-professional, organizing-functional and self-management-participation groups were formed, so that in the analysis it is possible to check the connection between the level of knowledge and those characteristics of producers which are supposed to influence the quality and the extent of knowledge about self-management.

The main purpose of this test is given in three questions: first, what is the level of knowledge of the producers of self-management; second, to what extent is such knowledge dependent on the level of their school education, and how much on the other personal characteristics and peculiarities of the social and organizational situation in which they are; third, to what extent is the present situation perceived by means of stereotypes, that is, how much are the stereotypes present in defining the objective characteristics of the situation. We note that knowledge referring to the legislative and theoretical definitions (descriptively expressed) of the notions, represents conditionally the comprehensive and rational reflection of the normative state of the social organization of production, and the possibility of interference of value judgements, projections and ideological notions was purposefully guarded against.

RESULTS OF THE KNOWLEDGE TEST

a) Quality of knowledge or what is known best and what least

It is quite understandable that one cannot expect all areas of self-management to be known equally. It is not only a question of complexity and abstractness of some notions by which the characteristics of social organization, self-management or economics are defined, but also of the direct interest of the people in better knowing some things because of practical reasons shown in solving their own problems.

The following table illustrates how much is known about self-management and what is known best.

TABLE 1.
Level of knowledge according to fields % of persons

rank of knowledge	knowledge	Level of knowledge				
		know	partially	well	very well	excellent.
1.	Self-management obligations to the producers	2	2	6	16	74
2.	Work security	4	5	8	21	62
3.	Basic knowledge of property	16	10	28	29	17
4.	Purposes of the funds of the enterprises	14	16	22	23	25
5.	Self-management structure in the enterprise	20	19	13	18	30
6.	Working rights of the workers	30	8	33	3	26

7.	Basic economic knowledge	20	23	24	21	13
	ment organs in the enterprise	20	24	21	21	14
8.	Competences of the self-manage-					
9.	The purpose of the tax on					
	personal income	64	9	24	1	2
<hr/>						
II.	Wider fields of knowledge					
1.	Self-management and working					
	rights of the workers	4	8	28	27	28
2.	Self-management structure					
	and competence of the organs	23	22	21	11	23
3.	Basic economic knowledge and					
	economics of the enterprise	18	29	23	12	18
4.	Property, general and					
	special knowledge of economics	17	25	31	11	16
<hr/>						
III.	General assessment of knowledge	9	18	28	32	13

Note: The level of knowledge was determined quantitatively: doesn't know — 0—20% answers; partially knows — 20—50% of correct answers; knows well — 50—60% of correct answers; knows very well — 60—80% of correct answers; knows excellently — 80—100% of correct answers. This way of grading was uniformly applied in all of the three categories of knowledge.

The presented data show that people know their legislative rights best. Here belong, before all, those rights of producers referring to the self-management bodies, as well as to the statutory obligations of the self-management bodies to the workers. (Information, reports, recall, evaluation of work, and others). There is a very small number of those who do not know these rights and obligations, and, on the contrary, there is a very high percentage of people who know all these rights. It is similar with the degree of knowledge referring to the rights in the field of work security: when employment can be terminated a notice received, how a worker can be protected from receiving an illegal notice — all these are well known to people. Knowledge of their protective rights is much greater than, for instance, knowledge of their legally regulated obligations or of the rights to some higher needs (e.g. rights in the field of education, recreation, rights to reclassify). Not only the data of this test, but also the data obtained in testing the peasant population, point to this conclusion. This is, in our opinion, one of the characteristics of the population which from traditional culture, where the obligations are more emphasized, enter the industrial consumers' culture in which not only the necessities are more emphasized but the individual autonomy is connected with individual risk for existence and individual prosperity.

Knowledge of their political and working rights of the great majority of people (about 90%—) means that the interest of producers in the profit of self-management is very high. Most people know very well what should be done, within the limits of the statutory regulations, in order to realize their socio-political functions in managing the enterprises. It is another question, and this one we shall not discuss here, to what extent could these functions

indeed be realized. Now it is important to state that producers know well what chances they are given by self-management. And it gives them rather wide possibilities for self-management activity on the normative plane.

The definition of social property is certainly a very abstract category. For empirical thinking it is rather difficult to separate social property from the property of the socialist State and collective property. But our subjects in their majority were able to do it. That data has its special value because in the test, by alternative answers, both etatistic and collectivistic definitions of property were offered. Partial analysis shows that etatistic stereotypes of defining social property have nearly disappeared, whereas the collectivistic understanding of property is relatively more present (39%). As soon as they passed from the attributive definition of property to its manifest functions in self-management, that is to the rights of the collectivity to manage the social means of production and to dispose of the results of work, the general score of knowledge increased (these functions of property in self-management relations were not known to 15% of those tested). It is important to emphasize that the idea of the collectivistic character of property has mostly been retained by workers without skills and by those who recently came from agriculture.

The empirical rationalization of the meaning of the essential notions is evident when each region of knowledge is tested separately. Those notions that are related to direct practice, interest and utility which people expect from the collective work are much better known. An illustrative example is the knowledge of the essential economic categories (productivity, economical uses, the whole revenue, income, costs of production etc.) and those about the purposes of the funds of the enterprises, that is, about the functions of surplus work which goes to the enterprise. Knowledge about funds is much greater than about the economic categories. The accumulated and functionally directed surplus of work is known better because the disposal and distribution of it encroach on the economic interests of the producers. That category is experientially and intellectually more familiar to people than those that do not have a direct bearing on the individual and the collective economic interests. It can't be claimed that people know little about distribution of income and resources in the funds, because it is very often discussed in the enterprises. But they know almost nothing about what will happen with that part of surplus work which doesn't remain at the disposal of self-management. This refers, before all, to numerous items of taxing personal income, and these amounts are, at least theoretically, claimed to be indirectly paid back to the producers in the way of satisfying their general needs. Where these funds go to and what they are intended to achieve, remains an enigma for almost three quarters of producers. This is quite understandable because they decide neither about allocating nor about the aim of spending these funds. They are absolutely outside of their observation and of their right to control the use of these funds.

A large number of workers are not able to nominate all the subjects of self-management decision-making in the enterprise: one fifth of them doesn't perceive at all the selfmanagement structures of the enterprise, and the same number of them are able to perceive only parts of this structure. Special confusions arise when they should determine the carriers of direct decision-making: according to many of them, workers' councils still remain the carriers of all the self-management prerogatives, as a personified collective will. Because this perception is defective, a still greater confusion arises when determining

the essential competences of each individual self-management body, almost 44% of persons know nothing or very little about these competence. On one side, the workers know rather well their political rights in relation to the self-management bodies, and on the other side, they know much less what these bodies should decide about. The self-management structure has been rather extended and institutionalized in the last years, so that the individual consciousness is not able yet to distinguish clearly the member of that structure and to perceive their statutory roles, the perception of the previous competence interferes very much (specially those of the workers' council and the management board).

When determining the subjects of legitimate decision-making, the (negative) perceptions and stereotypes disappear. The earlier holders of these authorities are not mentioned now. So for instance, there is an insignificant number of those who exaggerate the authorities of the manager and the management board, or confuse the subjects of decision-making and transfer their authority to some bodies outside of the enterprise (community or state administration). It is of special interest and importance that the producers know that the manager, the section heads or other executive organs have no right to take decisions from the sphere of the self-management organs. This fact is important because when estimating, on the level of attitudes, the quantity of influence and power in deciding, the same executives are credited with more influence than should legally belong to them. The right perception of the normative state is the basis for forming critical attitudes toward deviations in practice. That is one more proof that the producers know who the legitimate holder of decision-making is and who, in practice, usurps these competences.

It can also be said that the selfmanagement autonomy of the enterprise is correctly understood, because it is known that the self-management organs are responsible for their decisions not to the bodies outside of the enterprise but to the self-management institutions inside the enterprise. Concretely is also perceived the role of the meeting of the workers' community as an authorized holder of social control over the work of representative bodies in the enterprise. Since the self-management legislation represents the juridical realization of an ideological and political concept, very great differences were found between the knowledge of the members of the Yugoslav League of Communists and others, as well as differences inside each professional category and each group of self-management roles. When the data of this test are compared with the data about the opinions, attitudes and estimations of the work of the self-management bodies, or to the state of self-management in the enterprises, there becomes apparent a gap between the normative and the real, which is reflected in the individual experience in social practice.

The experienced acknowledgement of autonomy is most often onesided. Autonomous rights or juridical determination of the autonomy of the enterprise are much better understood than the essential obligations of the productive collective to the global society. A significant number of persons do not perceive that enlarged reproduction is one of the basic obligations of the enterprise to the society, but consider the security of existence of the employed as consumers more important. But on the other side, there is also a large number of producers who perceive as equal the obligation of the enterprise to society and to the vital interests of the producers.

Something similar could be said of the perception of the idea of productivity of work, economy and costs of production. The understanding of the meaning of these ideas has two practical sides. First, all three economic categories are built into the concept of the socio-economic function of work (production), namely, they give a collective expression of the social productivity of work, its rationalization. Second, these categories are most frequent in the field of economic decision-making so that the producers meet them most often when examining the economic components of income, the establishment of the income realized in each economic unit and its distribution according to the invested labour. These are the reasons why it is important to conceive all of the three directions. It could be said that their essence and operationalism were well understood. This is to be specially emphasized for the idea of productivity of work because the inverse definition »a larger production with a larger number of workers« (a wrong alternative offered as answer in the test) is seldom selected. With the idea of productivity, the ideas of »economy« and »profitability« are sometimes linked. As a rather large number of workers have no clear perception of these categories (the test offered only theoretical and textbook definitions), we cannot be satisfied with the shown knowledge, specially because there were no great differences among them considering the differences in education.

In the field of economies of the enterprise, the clarity of only those ideas closely connected with the actions of the enterprise as an economic community were tested. These concepts are »the whole revenue«, »income« and »costs of managing the enterprise«. It should be mentioned that in determining these values rather complex economic and bookkeeping instruments were applied, which inhibit experience. Therefore, one fifth of the producers had these three ideas confused while only one half showed precise knowledge of them.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF KNOWLEDGE OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

It was mentioned before that we checked the knowledge and clarity of 37 notions which we considered, first, to be most frequent in the self-management decision-making, second, to represent the basic socio-economic and legislative framework wherein the workers' administration could develop and, third, to determine the place of a producer as a self-management actor and socio-economic subject. If we use the quantitative system of estimating the knowledge (such as exposed in the note on page 7) we can reach an almost general knowledge about self-management (see last line of table 1). This result, although indicating one conclusion, is not negative because only 27% of producers could be claimed not to know, or to know partially the correct answers to the questions, while, on the other side, there are 45% of producers whose knowledges could be accessed as very good or excellent. These data have a rather significant meaning specially because this knowledge is not acquired by regular schooling, but in an indirect way in which the most important factors were the life- and work experience, their presence in the field of decision-making and the ways of information. As it will be seen later, among those whose knowledge about self-management was poor, most are manual workers who were recently included in industry and were not elected into the self-management bodies. Of course there are many reasons for such knowledge of theirs which is caused by the degree of education and specialist's training, as well as by their position in the system of self-management decision-making which they haven't parti-

cipated in sufficiently or not at all, since they have just entered work. On the other side, there are producers, the majority of them, who could be claimed to know the extent of selfmanagement well, since their development made possible for them a better socio-professional position, as well as a versatile participation in managing the enterprise.

b) Identification of Producers Considering the Level of Knowledge

If the general score of knowledge of self-management or the clarity of all the thirty seven notions, were taken as a criterion, it could be possible to designate those groups of producers that are showing different degrees of knowledge out of the offered test. In the following table we show the connection between the degree of the self-management and political participation and the range of knowledge shown by producers. In the table the range of knowledge is trichotomous: a poor knowledge marks those who gave wrong or only a few correct answers in the test; an average knowledge is attributed to persons who gave 50—70% of correct answers and a high knowledge possess those persons who had more than 70% of correct answers (previously classified as very well and excellent).

TABLE 2.
General score of knowledge of workers' self-management

Participant groups	% of persons with knowledge ranged as			General range of knowledge of groups
	poor	average	high	
I. Without political and self-management participation	54	22	24	4
II. Selfmanagement participation without political	24	33	43	3
III. Political participation without selfmanagement	19	29	52	2
IV. Selfmanagement and political participation	11	23	66	1
General average for all the tested	27	28	45	

Statistically observed these data show an evident correlation between the grade of participation and the range of knowledge: those who do not participate are at the bottom of the scale and the mansided are on its top. On the other side, political participation (membership in the Yugoslav League of Communists) includes a higher range of knowledge than self-management participation (membership in the representative organs of self-management: workers' council, management board and council of the meeting of the workers' community). This conclusion though stastically corroborated, is necessarily corrected when a sociological interpretation is added. In other words, these participant groups correspond to the real socio-professional and functional categories of producers, so it is worth to identify persons and mark those who belong to each of the four groups. Here we present that classification (criteria of classification are mostly characteristics of the groups).

I. The worst knowledge
— nonparticipants:

young people included to work after the age of twenty five, most of them manual workers (75%—), many among them without skills (28%), never been elected into organs of self-management nor members of the Yugoslav League of Communists. These are people either living in the country or who spent most of their life in the country (46%), unurbanized population.

II. Lower average knowledge — members of the organs of Workers' Self-management and not members of the Yug. League of Communists:

they are mostly skilled and highly skilled workers (53%), of mature age, who found a job early in their life, that is, with a rather long working experience, mostly urbanized (born or long living in towns); that is the first generation of our working class, its early-industrial part. The same level of knowledge is shown by a number of experts and clerks who lagged behind the others in their further development.

III. Good knowledge — members of the Yug. League of Communists, but not elected into the organs of Workers' Selfmanagement:

of younger age (49% are below thirty years) with small working experience (42% with a working period up to five years), most of them experts (55%) and less skilled and highly skilled workers (37%). That is in fact a group of younger, politically educated experts joined by a number of more educated workers of younger age.

IV. Very good and excellent knowledge — members of the Yug. League of Comm. elected into the organs of Workers' Selfmanagement:

— a middle generation with rather long working experience; most of them experts (54%) and less skilled and highly skilled workers (37%), a large number of section heads, among them (section managers, formen); they are mostly part of an urbanized population who stabilized their professional and social status.

Classification of the population according to its degree of knowledge shows a high functional connection with the real socio-professional strata of the persons employed in industry. That correspondence is not absolute. It is not a form of conception expressed by a mathematical function but it still points to a high dependency. First, the self-management position depends on the professional, organizational, educational and work-experience status as well as on the political commitment of people. Second, the level of self-management knowledge or the extent of the rational perception of the socio-legislative framework of self-management depends on the activity of people in the work of the bodies of self-management. And third, the socio-professional, organizational or some other position is not achieved only on the basis of professional, working ability and activity but also on the basis of continuous political and self-management action in the socio-economic system of the enterprise. Determination of the socio-professional strata on the basis of the level of knowledge (and this means on the basis of the level of social consciousness as well) shows that these strata are confirmed, since now the objective social differences are reflected as differences in the correctness and extent of perceiving the institutionalized self-management situation, and this may indicate indirectly (and approximately) the differences in the evolution and the development of the social consciousness of the real producers' groups. The fact that parts of some socio-professional groups (roughly speaking: workers and experts) move to lower or higher degrees of knowledge could be explained, at least in our analysis, as a progress or regress in their position, though personality factors should not be neglected.

COMMENTARY ON THE DATA

The general analysis of the knowledge test pointed to a link between the degree of participation and the degree of knowledge. This showed specially between the groups of total nonparticipants on one side, and the other groups of partial or many-sided participants on the other side. A partial analysis of these data shows more clearly this relation. We shall mention here only some results: first, in manual workers whose education is very low (as well as the degree of urbanization) participation in the work of the organs of self-managements influences the increase of knowledge much more than in producers who finished secondary schools and two year college. Second, there is not a small number of skilled and highly skilled workers (about 30%) whose knowledge of self-management in all the fields that were checked is not only very high, but often higher than for some persons having higher education. This could be noted specially for the middle aged highly skilled workers. Third, the younger generation with higher skills (workers and experts) perceive very clearly the whole complex of factors determining the framework of self-management decision-making. Fourth, participation on the organs of self-management reduces among the manual workers the number of those with poor knowledge and increases the percentage of those with average knowledge, i.e. neutralizes ignorance by increasing the average knowledge. Fifth, political participation much more increases the number of those with higher knowledge than it reduces the number of persons of complete ignorance (they make-up one fifth). And sixth, one methodological observation: it could not be asserted that any variable taken individually is highly correlated with the score of knowledge. Such a correlation appears only in combination with all the three variables (education —

skill, membership in the bodies of self-management and membership in the Yugoslav League of Communists). By cumulating these three variables the highest degree of knowledge is obtained. The effect of »compensative« or »corrective« factors is also observed since the influence of the negative factor is neutralized by the presence of the positive one: for example, membership in the Workers' Council or in the Yugoslav League of Communists neutralizes the influence of low education.

CONCLUSION

The attitude that higher education of workers is an essential prerequisite for introducing workers' self-management and for its successfulness is only theoretically correct but, at the same time, it is relative: insufficient education could be compensated by active participation of people in self-management and by their political engagement. In other words, it is not necessary first to wait for the working class to acquire a higher culture and education, and only then let it manage the production or, in our case, to broaden only then its management functions and its responsibilities in society, since the knowledge of self-management can be obtained by taking part in it. But since it is true that the education is a positive factor in self-management decision-making, it is necessary to pay special attention to further education of workers even then when the management of the economy has already been transmitted to them. Waiting for the working class to acquire a higher administrative and cultural education by using the existing schools and supplementary systems of education will not yield the necessary effects, because the working class is permanently being taken ant of the peasant population, which has a low economic position and little free time. We could not, however, claim that our society paid all the necessary and possible attention to the education of its working class.

Since the data from this test are, more or less, identical with the data from similar tests which we have carried out many times during the last ten years, we can claim that the level of socio-economic knowledge of a large number of workers, although acquired through experience and out-of-school activities, is so high that there are no reasons for skepticism in regard to our working class not being able to take all the responsibility (and power too) in organizing the socio-economic relations in production, and taking care of carrying out the basic changes in the society. The claims that our working class is not yet politically mature and able to manage directly the development of the society are groundless. Making rational and socially appropriate decisions in the field of production is not merely the function of education. There are not few workers' councils, constituted mainly of educated persons, which are not able to manage and make socially acceptable decisions. And even greater is the number of opposite cases. Our legislative and ideological scope of workers' self-management is much wider than the real state of that self-management, but this is caused least of all because of incapability of the workers to carry out social functions in production.

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TWO TYPES OF SELF-MANAGING ORGANIZATIONS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

I.

WORKERS SELF-MANAGEMENT AND THE WORLD AROUND US*

In spite of the fact that it has originated in Yugoslavia under conditions of an intense political and ideological isolation, workers self-management has proved to be the most successful weapon for the affirmation of the policy of ideological alignment on the basis of the development of the socialist society itself, as opposed to the policy of alignment based on the division into blocks.

The concept of a »special way into socialism«, seemingly accepted by all communist parties, has not thus restricted itself to a neutral pluralism of ways into socialism and socialist models of society, but has acquired a markedly aggressive characteristic as a means to overcome a socialism which does not deserve this name, as the rejection of a certain socialist practice and an alternative to statist and bureaucratic socialism.

In the criticism of statist socialism and Stalinism, its best known deformation, we can distinguish a minimalistic and a maximalistic approach in the contemporary workers movement.

1. The minimalistic approach stresses the principle of the »special way into socialism«. That means in other words to remonstrate against the negative developments in some other socialist countries, a promise that we will try to solve the same problems in our own country in a more satisfactory way, but it also implies different models of socialism or a certain pluralism in the Marxist interpretation of political and social reality. The majority of communist parties have adopted this principle, but refuse to take the corresponding theoretical consequences because of the workers movement«.

2. The maximalistic approach consists of a theoretical endeavor to overcome the statist socialism on the basis of Marx's theory of the withering away of the state and his theory of alienation (political and state institutions become alienated forms of social life, etc.). This actually happened in Yugoslavia. In this framework the workers' self-management concept becomes inevitable.

* The first part of this article was already published in the review »Praxis« (3-4, 1971).

While the minimalistic approach remains on the level of political tactics and tries to justify its opportunism with political and tactical reasons, the maximalistic approach represents a consequent theoretical criticism that questions the nature of socialism itself, the true content of socialist revolution and the modes of its realisation, and thus has a general theoretical, political and strategic character. Therefore, it is no wonder that leading Marxist theoreticians from G. Lukács to R. Garaudy have discarded the dogmatic and apologetic philosophy that under the name of »Marxism-Leninism« serves as the basis of statist socialism, and thus necessarily represents a revision of Marx' thought. The frequent attacks, especially after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, by the official Soviet ideologists against the so called »revisionism« in Marxism, represented by the leading Marxist philosophers such as E. Bloch, E. Fromm, G. Lukács, E. Fisher, H. Lefebvre, J. Habermas, K. Kosik, L. Goldmann, H. Marcuse, and recently R. Garaudy, and many others (among whom also the Marxists gathered around the periodical »Praxis«) clearly show that statist socialism has lost the battle on the grounds of Marxist theory, at least on this old continent where it was born.

The philosophical criticism of the theoretical basis of statist socialism appeared simultaneously with the strengthening of the idea of workers self-management, which was a logical consequence of already existing forms of workers participation, and it has imposed itself as a request for qualitative changes in the labor union movements in West European countries. The idea was accepted by the student movement, a lot of the New Leftists and some other categories of intellectuals, especially representatives of the so called »intellectual proletariat«. Thus, the workers movement converged with that of the leftist intellectuals on the idea of workers self-management.

If we want to give a short explanation as to why workers self-management has become the topic of the day in the workers movement, among left-wing intellectuals, and even in the progressive part of the liberal middle class, we can list the following reasons:

1. With the discovery of the »human factor« in industrial production, modern sociology and social psychology have dedicated innumerable theses to the problem of workers' and employees motivation in production, and, quite independently from Marxism, have stressed the need for participation in decision-making in industrial enterprises. From participation to self-management there is only one (revolutionary) step.

2. After the workers unions through collective agreements have achieved the right to participate in some decision-making in industrial enterprises, (Mitbestimmungsrecht, joint consultation, comité d'entreprise), chiefly as regards working conditions and employment, the next step was naturally the demand for a transition from quantitative rewards (increase of salaries) to qualitative rewards (broadening of participation to self-management). Since 1968 these tendencies have been especially strong in France.

3. The development of tertiary activities, the formation of the intellectual proletariat, the syndicalism in technologically highly developed industries with new forms of integration of manual and intellectual workers, the increasing anonymity of the corporative capital (the so called »managerial revolution«), all this brought about the imposition of the idea of self-management as a logical consequence of the democratization and normalization in the management of industries.

4. As the dictatorial and despotic character of statist socialism became more and more obvious, as evidenced by penalties for opposing views, absence of civil rights, confinement in lunatic asylums of critically disposed scientist, antisemitism, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, etc., a need arose for an alternative to this kind of socialism, which would not lead into bourgeois democracy, i. e., social-democracy, but into a truly new form of socialist democracy.

5. There is a growing conviction that the highly developed countries that have found themselves under the impact of stateism and centralism, i. e., a increasing centralization of social decision, will try to find a way out in forms of participative or direct democracy. The scientific and technological revolution along with the development of cybernetics, automatization, and modern means of communication makes possible far more decentralization than was the case in undeveloped systems. At the same time, technology is becoming the »infrastructure of society« freeing it from its economic and technical determinism and providing greater possibilities for the organization of society in accordance with man's real needs.

6. The idea of workers self-management has given a new offensive strategy to the workers movement in highly developed countries, which although not fully developed at the moment, means a decisive break with a certain passivity that meant waiting for the forces of the Third World or for the Soviet army to free Europe. This offensive strategy shows itself in the convergence of aspirations towards self-management among workers as well as among the intellectual proletariat. It is regrettable that those two factors have not yet found a corresponding synchronization in their ideas and actions, and thus the workers movement is still under the influence of dogmatism, while the intellectual movement is influenced by »gauchism«, radical »leftism« without a clearly defined goal or strategy (which would link it more closely to the workers movement) in spite of the ideological backwardness of the leadership of some Communist parties.

7. There is a growing awareness among the Marxist intellectual avanguard that the idea of self-management is the keystone in the forming of an offensive strategy; and it does not care very much about the never-ending attacks against it by the bureaucratic leaderships some of which in the socialist block more and more openly even try to rehabilitate Stalinism. The continuous attacks have not been able to diminish any of their convictions and morale. As before, the Marxist avanguard knows that the historical truth is on its side, and that it is their responsibility to bring about a harmony between contemporary socialism and the most progressive aspirations of contemporary mankind.

Without any exaggeration, we can maintain that many political, scientific and humanistic-philosophical reasons in Europe are favorable to self-managing socialism. These reasons are so strong that they could not be shaken eventually by a complete failure of the Yugoslav self-managing socialism. In this regard, we can paraphrase a well-known situation: as the »truth about Stalin« could not shatter the belief in socialism, but only posed the question about its content and goals in a more definite way, so the »truth about Yugoslav workers self-management« cannot shatter the belief in workers self-management, but can only raise questions about the modes of its realization. But, are we today in a position to give the »truth about Yugoslav workers self-management«, i. e., do we command a broad enough historical perspective to visualize

clearly its »good and bad points«, that which should be rejected and that which should be kept, both in our country and in other countries that will work on its realization? It seems that some problems have by now become clear and oblige us to define them clearly for the benefit of others and as ours well.

DEMOCRATIC-LIBERAL CONCEPT OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

Evidently the principles on which it is based are not wrong; that man as the producer has the right to make decisions about the results of his work, that the state cannot appropriate and dispose of the work surplus, that the right to manage an enterprise is shared by all workers and employees who work in it. Its shortcomings might only be the modes of its realization and that it had not been worked out in detail.

It seems that the implementation and the realization of our workers self-management was chiefly governed by a democratically liberal or »proudhonistic« concept.¹ What are the basic outlines of this concept?

First of all, the basis of society is represented by voluntary associations of producers (mutualistic organizations) which do not need political mediators in the form of state or political parties (the state is withering away). These organizations must have at their disposal a certain amount of »property« which is a synthesis of private and group ownership. Proudhon has difficulties as do our lawyers in the definition of the legal status of such organizations. This »legal status« is best explained by today's concepts of group ownership i. e. a mixture of private and collective ownership (private especially as regards *usui et frui*, and collective as regards *abuti*).

Secondly, production relationships between associations of producers are based on a free exchange of products which presupposes relations based on agreements or contracts between interested parties without the intervention of a third party. The society based on mutualistic associations is directed by the principle »service for service, product for product, loan for loan, insurance for insurance, credit for credit and guaranty for guaranty . . . In this system the laborer is no longer a serf of the State, swamped by the ocean of community. He is a free man, truly, his own master, who acts on his initiative and is personally responsible«. (P. G. Proudhon).²

Thirdly, by putting the emphasis on free exchange as a principle of personal freedom and autonomy of association, the market appears as a basic medium of exchange, with the laws of supply and demand as regulators of production. »The advocates of mutualism are as familiar as anyone with the laws of **supply** and **demand** and they will be careful no to infringe upon them. Detailed and frequently reviewed statistics, precise information about needs and living standards, an honest breakdown of cost prices, the foreseeing of all eventualities, the fixing, after amicable discussion, of a **maximum** and **minimum** profit margin, taking into account the risks involved, the organizing of regulatory commissions, these things, roughly speaking, constitute all the measures by means of which they hope to regulate the market. There will be as much liberty

¹ A more detailed description of this concept can be found in my book »Power and Socialism«, that will be in print soon. There I am discussing other types of productive organizations, also the democratically-humanist or the functionalistic concept of workers self-management on which I am basing the criticism of our System.

² P. J. Proudhon, Selected Writings, Doubleday, 1969, page 59—60.

as you like, but more important than liberty are sincerity, reciprocity and enlightenment for all.« (ibid. p. 70). It is not necessary to explain how the Yugoslav practice of »self-management discussions«, establishing profit margins, sincerity and reciprocity works in reality. Proudhon's outlook on the market system was that of a bourgeois liberal in spite of the fact that he realized that the market should be controlled by a constant analysis of economic processes, and appropriate interventions. Our practice in this respect is even more liberal than Proudhon's concept and about the consequences we will say something later.

Fourth point, contractual relations govern not only in the economic sphere but in the political sphere of social life as well. »Instead of laws we would have agreements. No laws could be passed, either by majority vote or unanimously. Each citizen, each community or corporation, would make its own laws.« (p. 99) A literal enactment of the principle of political de-centralization eliminates general laws.

Additionally, society's integration will start from below on the basis of economical relations and not on the basis of joint political decisions: »Instead of political power we would have economic forces.« (p. 99)

Then the division of society into classes will be replaced by socio-professional and corporate divisions. »Instead of the old class divisions of citizens into nobility and commoners, bourgeoisie and proletariat, we would have categories and classes relating to various functions: agriculture, industry, trade, etc.« (p. 99)

Lastly, Proudhon was enough of a dialectician and sufficiently devoid of any political pragmatism for »zig-zag politics« to realize that his society based on self-managing voluntary associations would not be able to avoid inner conflicts. Upon having equalized the democratic liberal trade exchange with free and independent activity, he realized that the market exchange necessarily destroys the equality among producers and their solidarity. That is why it seemed to him impossible to realize equality without the use of laws, that is to say certain general regulations which regulate exchange. »The community seeks **equality and law**. Property, which is born of autonomy of reason and respect for individual merits wants above all things **independence and proportionality**.

But the community, mistaking uniformity for law, and leveling down for equality, becomes tyrannical and unjust. Property, through its despotism and its infringement on rights, soon becomes oppressive and works against the interests of society.

What the community and property intend is good, but what they both in fact produce is bad. Why should this be so? It is because each is exclusive and each overlooks two elements in society. The community rejects independence and proportionality, while property does not fulfill the conditions of equality and law.« (ibid. p. 92—93).

Proudhon suggests that the following four mutually exclusive elements, equality, law, ownership, and proportion, should be distributed proportionally. In our workers self-management system we find the same paradox and the same dilemma: on the one side granting of full operational autonomy, which in the market economy necessarily leads to inequality in profit and salaries, resistance against levelling, i. e., respecting »proportion«, rewarding the overall effectiveness of the enterprise and not the individual work, on

the other side, there are the working people pressing for equality of rewards and social position in the name of society. Our system has given full freedom to market money goods relationships: we are not taking into account those limitations which arise from the giving of a part of the surplus work to the state because it is a question of principle. There has even been formed a special ideology of »socialist money/goods relationships« and »the theory of a socialist market«, in spite of the fact that the market laws work in the same way in capitalism and socialism and in any other society that is based on a money/goods exchange. There is no doubt that this democratic and liberal type self-management organization resembles our workers, self-management and points out some problems and contradictions that can also be found in our system.

Let's try now to look in a more concrete way at the types of problems and results that had to arise from the application of democratic and liberal concepts of workers' self-management in our society. Above all, in the spirit of middle-class liberalism, the concept of social organization is individualistic or atomistic, so that all economic associations are equalized in their legal status and are on an ideal social plane (as was the case of the middle class as owners of the means of production in classical democracy). Production organization is defined primarily politically, and not functionally, in an economic sense with regard to the complexity of the social divisions of labor and the differing roles in the economic system. So it happened that a certain type of political democracy defined the nature of »economic democracy«; furthermore, the legal/political equality quickly led to economic inequality among the same as in classical middle-class liberalism with a low level of development of social organization in general and especially by division of labor (and with this the corresponding concepts of »societal work«) the same as with legal formalism legally equalizing all production or economic organization is not capable of grasping their basically different functions in society. In our country this legal formalism is a consequence of the still dominant role of the »shyster« as opposed to the professional intelligentsia, especially the part linked to social organization: economists, sociologists, engineers.³

The freedom of social activities is first of all regarded as a free agent's liberty, the main role of which is the exchange of production in a competitive market with the assumption that supply and demand best regulate industrial development. It is not assumed that the determining factor for economic growth is the development of modern technology, possession of a developmental strategy or principles in regard to the distribution of personal and collective incomes. Furthermore, even though it is nowadays recognised that the market no longer plays the same role it did in the last century, and that it has experienced various limitations and is no longer the regulator of economic development, we can derive a sort of »socialist ideology« where the money/goods relationships are transformed into »socialist money/goods relationships«, and the market is changed into a »socialist market«, so that the capital, with its profit logic, is transformed into »socialist capital«. Such nonsense is stressed so as to make everybody forget that the capital market, with

³ The author of these lines has been living for quite a while in the illusion that the markedly economic orientation of our political leadership has drawn into the state the most prominent economic experts but the economists themselves have dissuaded him from this belief. The economists have already for ten years been advising the establishment of a separate economic body working in conjunction with the government but the politicians have been actively rejecting this. It seems that this appears to them to be a form of »technocracy«.

its laws of supply and demand, has already undergone important limitations not only because of socialization (societal control of the means of production) of production and distribution, but rather and because of the role of worker's syndicates (control of so called »indirect wages« and social contributions). Social intervention which fundamentally differs when we speak about the production of consumers goods or of production of the means of production and especially when we speak of the development of the labor force in the form of a scientific-technological factor (education of cadres, organization of production, etc.) has already brought about a polymorphic economic structure, so that the market (even if we disregard the role of contemporary arms production in the development of the labor force and research) has acquired a secondary importance.

Political decentralization had not only been recognized as identical with the abandonment of centrally administrated, planned economics, but also with every planned developmental concept (regardless of whether it will be realized from the above or below), that is to say whether on the level of »self-management conferences« or on the level of »representatives of self management enterprises«, planned with regard to a long term social development, which under the conditions of modern technological development is a condition sine qua non of a harmonious and speedy social development. Naturally, the submission of economic development to the inherent logic of the market cannot prevent the occurrence of a whole series of internal contradictions and irregularities in the development of various enterprises and branches of production, and of various forms of disloyal competition and conflicts, especially under our »Balkan conditions«, which will constantly search for compromises and a single arbiter in the settlement of resulting disagreements. Who will assume the role of this arbiter? Will a certain »coordinating organization« composed of producers, as Proudhon already suggests, or a political representative of society's long-term interest, that is the communist party, as has been suggested in our country, or will it be a »mediator bureaucracy« whose precondition for existence is political, economic and cultural atomization of society? It should be openly said that behind Yugoslav self-management there is hidden a vertical organization of societal power, which is represented by the communist party, which is trying to play all three of the above mentioned roles.

If we would like to give a short characterization of the contemporary workers' self-management system in our midst, we would say that it has these characteristics:

- a) legal formalism
- b) anti-functional as regards the social function of productive organizations
- c) middle class liberalism regarding the market and self-regulation of economic development
- d) combination of self-managing organizations on a horizontal plane with a statist power structure on a vertical plane.

Generally we are speaking here of a concept that remains in the framework of democratic and liberal theory, which has not as yet reached the level of a democratically humanistic and functional organization of producers.

WHEN WORKERS SELF MANAGEMENT TURNS AGAINST THE WORKING CLASS

One of the most obvious (negative) consequences of legal formalism for the workers, self-management was the legal and business-like equalization of productive and mediating organizations, that is to say, those who produce the surplus wealth and those who have this surplus at their disposal in the form of working capital (banks, trade, foreign trade enterprises). This legal equalization has quickly brought about a state of affairs where mediator organizations under the conditions of the market economy assumed the control of the producing organizations and started to mercilessly exploit them. Economic reform brought many producing organizations into difficult positions and made it easy for financial organizations to assume monopoly positions. While banks and trading served in an earlier period in the development of industrial production, now industrial production serves the strengthening of the power of financial centers, naturally against the interests of the working class and a healthy economic-development policy. The results of dysfunctional and legal and formalistic equalization of producing and mediating organizations are as follows:

a) the mediating organizations acquired a monopolistic relationship towards producing organizations;

b) that monopolistic mediating organizations started to illegally draw off profits from the producing organizations (a legislature report from Federal Assembly commission states that the financial trade capital »brutally exploits the existing shortage of money for regeneration and acquires an usurious, crude, early capitalistic profit logic. In some places it assumes such dimensions and forms that it astounds businessmen from contemporary capitalist economies«);

c) they stifled the normal expanding reproduction of producing organizations, by investing financial resources using a speculative logic in places where a profit could be quickly realized, and especially the modernization of producing in harmony with the development of modern technology (which works with shortened amortization cycles and cannot successfully progress without the help of state subsidies, in other words a developmental strategy of the whole economy);

d) with their investment orientation successfully blocking economic development (however, the so-called economic reform from 1965 is also to blame), brought about a mass emigration of our workers, inflation and negative trade balance due largely to the importation of largely unnecessary consumer goods (this import serves and enriches a small sector of the population);

e) they brought about in recent years a financial boom for the so-called middle class and a certain elite linked to financial and trade capital, but at the same time brought about the impoverishment and emigration of large portions of the working class;

f) with regard to the fact that the new centers financial power located mainly in the place where the de-nationalized state capital was located, its liberation and »style of business activity« immediately sharpened the internal national relationship in Yugoslavia (some representative from Dalmatia were speaking of signs of »colonialistic exploitation«).

All of these indicators show, in the last several years, that the working class has been economically exposed to great difficulties which is also demonstrated by the more than 1000 strikes during the past two years while at the same time our streets choked by automobiles expensive imported goods (a pair of shoes for 30,000 dinars which represents one half of some workers salaries), a deluge of weekend houses, etc. show that one part of our society is very rich. People who visit our country are often of the impression that it is not a country of workers and workers, self-management, but of nouveau riche. A great segment of our press, perhaps the part that is most read, has greatly contributed to not only the creation of an »enterprising spirit« but also to the creation of a »consumer's culture« with all of its' petite-bourgeois stupidity and snobbism. We have already mentioned that the democratic and liberal concept of worker's self-management is based on a certain atomization of society. This also applies to the working class. The working class was put into self-managing organizations which seemingly had the same rights and liberties but which in the market situation proved to be unequal and dependent. Besides, they were taught an enterprising spirit for competitive market relations which meant approval of the differences in salaries and uneven compensation for the same work (for the same work in one enterprise a worker was receiving two to three times as much salary as a worker performing the same work in another factory). Workers' unions were forbidden to fight for a uniform standard by which laborers were to be compensated. As this would oppose the logic of the realization of profit through competition, which was euphemistically called »according to the results of one's work« on the competitive market (not taking into account the monopolistic positions of certain enterprises, non-equivalent exchanges and so forth), so the working class remained fragmented, bound to the interest of its groups' capital taught the profit logic of money/goods relations, and furthermore the working class was made to believe according to the same logic that its exploiters are »workers« and »self-managers«. The atomization had two consequences. The first less important is that the working classes do not appear as an economic factor in the equalization of average market levels that is to say as a stimulus of economic development. This was also attempted by means of economic reform. The second consequence was that the workers became disorganized because the roles of the unions became irrelevant. In the same way as the vertical organization of political power has retained the features of etatist socialism so the union has in our country kept the typically etatistic socialist role, namely that of a working class' teacher of discipline. There was no longer anything that the union could teach the workers because this role had been taken over by the experts of enterprise. Under the new conditions the unions did not retain their traditional role as defenders of the working classes' immediate interests, that is why the numerous strikes appear as wildcat strikes, without the participation and against the will of the syndicate leadership. The absence of the union class role brought about not only a diminishing of its influence but the formation of cliques in enterprises so that the workers selfmanagement existed more on paper than in reality.⁴

⁴ Sociological research that I conducted in 20 factories in 1966, while the situation was better than it is today, showed that the workers repeatedly listed the power and influence of the union as the least important or next to the least important. The standing as far as influence is reflected in the following listing: 1. director, 2. management committees, 3. technical council, 4. workers council, 5. communist party, 6. workers, 7. foremen, 8. syndicate, 9. administration.

II.

THE PRINCIPLES OF A DEMOCRATIC AND HUMANISTIC CONCEPT OF SELF — MANAGEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY

Authors who look with criticism at stateist (etatistic) socialism, in its productive and non — productive sectors, because it gives strength to one of the key evils of a bourgeois society — the bureaucratic and authoritarian organization of the state — are very often equally critical of the liberal and democratic concept of self — management in socialism, because it takes the market and market economy as the regulator of social interaction. This is an evil taken over from the capitalist society. It seems that the contemporary socialist thinking moves between Scylla and Charybdis of centralism and market economy liberalism and does not know how best to escape from these dangers which threaten the socialist concept of organization. For the sake of truth we must say that there are those authors who have lived in the commercialized Capitalist society with its mania for consumption, and to whom the dangers of stateism are less of an evil than to those authors who have for years lived under the yolk of stateist socialism and are dreaming to get from under it. And then, there are those who are inclined to believe Proudhon's »dialectic« that »every good has its inevitable bad sides«, and therefore suggest that workers' self — management be put into the framework of stateism. Such an outlook is politically »realistic«; it was under such conditions that self — management in Yugoslavia moved towards a more liberal and independent position. After all, the theory of »the dictatorship of the proletariat«, that is, the initial political taking over of the state and the nationalization of the means of production, to some degree presupposes such an outcome. We think that what is of essence here are the structural changes in the organization of self — management, which will be determined, equally, by the degree of socio-economic progress achieved, by the political climate of the particular country, and by its powers and aspirations. It is easy to suppose that in the underdeveloped countries the dangers of a stateist solution are greater, but self — management would, all the more, be fashioned after a more liberal and democratic model of organization, since the market would be one of the important stimulations of economic consumption. The underlying conflict will revolve around state planning and market economy; in choosing those economic structures and means which will allow the greatest growth in the conditions where the human factor, as stimulator of competition and economic growth, will play a more important part than the technology of production or the developments in applied sciences.

We will therefore, limit ourselves here to the discussion of the development of a self-managing organization in an economically developed society. Since, so far, we have no practical experience in this field, we will only note certain postulates for some possible solutions which can be drawn out of the tendencies in social development thus far. Of course, it is not a question of some sort of an utopia, but of something possible to achieve within the framework of a modern and developed society.

If somebody were to ask whether there exists some sort of **strategy in establishing the sequence or the order of importance of the postulates**, then we could formulate it, according to the Marxist theory, in the following way:

1. Human relations in production, and in work in general, have represented, up to now, the essence of man's social life; it is here primarily, that the question of his freedom and equality, in the framework of political, economic and social democracy described before, must be resolved.

It is in production and work relationships that human sociability and the position of a man as an individual in a society can best be measured, because these are, par excellence, the relationships of cooperation and of individual and collective creativity.

2. »Civil rights«, that is the democratic right to management of a working organization can not be formally subject to the economic, professional, educational or social inequalities. The individual's basic right to participate in the management of his working organization can not be denied, as it is often the case, on the grounds of human capabilities or incapacities, or in the name of individual immaturity or indifference. The relationships of ordering and obeying, which are an inevitable outcome of all productive social activities, cannot put this right into question.

3. The extension of »civil rights« to the working organization prevents authoritarian and despotic exercise of power in production, making it a working community, and through it establishing a relationship with the social community. Thus, man as a citizen establishes himself in a working community and, by the same token, he as an active member of a working organization confirms his position in the social community. In this way the traditional gap between the »economic« and »political« sphere of life is bridged.

4. Man's entering a working organization as a productive member, means, on one hand, that the individual will decide on joining or leaving the organization, and will make sure that the relationships between the individual and the organization are free and contractual, and on the other hand that the relationship between the single organization and the society as a whole, and also other organizations, are just and as much as possible independent. Limitations can be imposed only by the socialization of work itself and by the rational planning of production.

5. Just as the **forms** of relationships in production have changed in order to close the gap between man as a producer and man as a social being, so must the **content** of production, if the gap between man as producer and man as a consumer is to be overcome. The purely economic factors (profit, productivity etc.) involved in production must give away to **human needs** and the demands of a healthy relationship between man's nature and nature in general. Social organization must more and more serve the realization of man's true personality.

Those who advocate stateist socialism look, invariably, to Marx's theory that in socialism people will introduce a »conscious rational and planned control« over productive processes. They, however, fail to define more precisely what exactly this »conscious and planned control« means in terms of Marx's critique of capitalism, and what are its uses. It is obvious that production is not an end in itself, and that man must be placed in it as a productive and creative being. Consequently, the nature of production itself must be subordinated to man's needs and wants as a producer. With Marx this is primarily a demand to avoid the negative consequences of the technological division of labor and establish man as the central subject of the productive processes. In

Das Kapital Marx energetically demands »that the manifold abilities of the worker be accepted as a law in production«, and that the relationships in production conform to this law. Thus, he states: »But as now the situation which demands changing of work can only come about through some overpowering law and with blind and destructive action of this law, which itself is faced by obstacles on all sides, the big industry with its catastrophies, makes **changing work and recognizing the manifold ability of the worker as a law**, and making relationships in production conform to it, a question of life and death. Big industry makes imperative the exchange of the wretched working people, kept in the reserve, at the disposal of varying demands of exploitative capital, for the absolute availability of man to the changing demands of work. The partial individual, who is the carrier of only a partial function, would have a chance to develop completely and different social functions would thus become interchangeable ways of activity for him.« (Underlined by R. S.)⁵

Marx's melodramatic formulation of this demand — a matter of life and death! — shows that the extension of work and functions, the importance of which has been pointed out by the contemporary industrial sociology, has been made a paradigm of a humane and democratic organization. It is obvious that the development of a manifold individual is realized through a sequence of different functions; that is on the level of the »collective worker« or the »collective work«. This means that all essential functions of production through which, by the nature of division of labor, he again puts all the productive processes under his control, must be available to every worker. This brings into question every form of bureaucratic and technocratic power which wants to take division of labor as the basis for an authoritarian and hierarchic power structure in an organization. This, indeed, must remain the point of departure in any discussion of the foundations on which a productive organization is to be built.

Consequently, the objection that this is a question of ideals, and that the worker is, unfortunately, disinterested in such an extension of functions must be rejected. The same arguments were used by the opponents of the bourgeois democracy two hundred years ago, and of mass education somewhat later.⁶

Even less acceptable is the position that the authoritative power structure in an organization is the expressed wish of the working class.⁷ The arguments

⁵ Kapital, Ed. Kultura, Beograd, v. I., ch. 13, p. 352.

⁶ R. Blauner who very aptly analyses all forms of alienation of the worker in the productive process, provides a very sceptical conclusion when it comes to answering the question of how to do away with it:

»Orthodox Marxism saw the separation from the means of production as the central fact of capitalism, the inevitable consequence of which would be the worker's general alienation from society. This has not happened; manual workers have required only steady jobs, reasonable wages, and employee benefits to put down at least moderate stakes in society and industry. Yet, despite the lack of any conscious desire for control in this area, we cannot know for certain whether or not the worker's alienation from ownership unconsciously colors whole quality of his experience of the factory, as Erich Fromm, for one, argues.« (Alienation and Freedom, p. 17. The University of Chicago, Press, Chicago, 1964.)

⁷ The eminent Soviet economist, A. Rumjancev, in answering E. Kardelj in the »Komunist« (no. 18, 1956), writes:

»Managing production in accordance with the objective needs of a developing Society, can be carried on only in the name of and with the help of the working class, and through the workers' state. . . Members of the executive branches of economy are elected, can be recalled, and are responsible to give accounts to the masses. Government institutions are under the control of the avantgarde workers, that's, Communist party, workers' unions and other social organizations. The material process of work, in its essence, demands the subordination of all wills to the will of one authorized by the socialist society and responsible before it. This conforms to the interest of all workers. Conscientious workers can not refuse to subordinate their will to those represented by the general interest.« This position is in agreement with Soviet Union's idea of »one man's rule« management in production, and it radically differs from Marx concept of the organization of production.

in this case are analogous to those of the bourgeois democracy, which states that the individual must subordinate his interests to the general interest of the »workers' state«.

An organization with self-management presupposes the extension of functions for every of its members not only to overcome the onesidedness of the division of labor, but also to terminate wage — work. For this to happen the workers must have the products of their work at their disposal. This condition is denied if the state manages production and decides on the forms of distribution. If the state has a monopoly over the realized surplus of value and takes the greater part of this surplus for itself, then wage-work relationship is not eliminated, even if the state gives back to the producer the greater part of this surplus in the form of indirect wages or free services to all citizens.

Engels already warned that the nationalization of the means of production by the state, even workers' state, means converting the state into the »general capitalist«.⁸

The management of a factory by the workers does not mean that every trace of wage — work will disappear; since one part of the produced value will be alienated from the producer, either in the form of contributions to socio — political organizations (community, state) or in the form of an inequitable exchange on the market, which depends on the nature of the capital, its position on the market and other factors. We can agree with P. Naville when he says that the true basis for the disappearance of wage — work is in »social productivity, which remains the determining criterium, for not only the disappearance of wage — work, but also of private property. This disappearance can only be made possible with increased production.« (p. 346) The disappearance of these relationships is a somewhat longer social process, the length of which we can not now guess. However this process is not of essence in the termination of the most important aspect of wage — work relationship found when there is a monopoly over the means of production and the productive processes. In the discussion with the socialists who considered distribution of work and surplus goods the central issue, Marx warned that problems in production and production relationships, (collective ownership, management, leadership) come in the first place and not the problems of distribution.⁹ Indeed, all the opportunists look today for their arguments in distribution, poin-

⁸ P. Naville justifiably warns that »nationalization of wage«, that is the establishment of state wage, does not change the nature of wage — work relationship. In answer to Soviet economist Strumilin, who sees in the free distribution of means, (in the form of scholarships, pensions, etc.), an indication that Socialism is changing into Communism, P. Naville describes a common tendency in the distribution process of a modern society: »Relationships in Capitalism are also changing because of the increases in the budget, intended for public services which are more or less free, as it is the case in Soviet Union. The fact that the state, just like private enterprise, can make the personal wage into a social wage, contributes nothing to the disappearance of the relationships characteristic of wage — work. But it is true that this development gains in importance by making the workers conscious of how relative the relationship of their dependence on the product of their labor, to which they are subordinated is. In this sense the problem of »free« goods and services is a manifestation of the crisis of wage — work.« (Socialist Wage, Anthropolos, Paris, 1970, p. 339—340).

⁹ In »The Critique of Gothic Program«, Marx explains: »Not considering all that has been said so far, it was a mistake to raise so much noise and give so much importance to this so called distribution (underlined by R. S.). Every distribution of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production. While distribution of the conditions of production is in itself determined by the nature of production. In the capitalist society the means of production are in the hands of non — producers, in the form of ownership of the capital and land, while the masses are in control of only the personal condition of production, that is their labor. Consequently, when the factors are thus distributed, we get the existing distribution of the means of consumption. When the conditions of production are the collective possession of all workers, we get also a different distribution of the means of consumption. Vulgar Socialism, (and from it one part of social democracy), inherited, from the bourgeois economists, a way of looking at the distribution of means of consumption as separate and independent from the process of production, and thus presenting Socialism as if centering on the question of distribution.« (Kritika Gotskog Programa, Kultura, Beograd 1959, p. 18.)

ting their finger at the better standard of living, the equalization of wages, free services and indirect wages, and in this way in the name of a »better and more carefree life«, they direct the democratic conscience of the worker teaching him to accept someone else's control over his work.

Putting relationships in production and the »extension of functions« into the center of the development of a democratic and humane model of self — management in production, to the extent that man will in truth have control over the productive processes, and not they, in their social, personal and technological sense, over him, we must necessarily overstep the boundaries of productive organization, and take a look at the basic productive functions on the level of the society as a whole.

What does it mean, from the standpoint of man as a producer, to be the owner of the productive process or of his own work? The answer is: to have full control over these processes. But let us look more closely at the basic components of the productive process. Schematically presented, we deal with two basic situations in the social division of work:

1. **Production** includes: — **planning** — **manufacture** — **overseeing** — **disposal of the product**
2. **production** includes: **manufacture** — **mediation** — **consumption**

In the first case the division of work is determined, primarily, by the technological factors, and it corresponds to the needs of **cooperation** among the different functions of the same productive process. This division is found within a company. It corresponds to the need of man, as the producer, to manage different aspects of the same productive process, that is to establish him again, in the form of a »collective worker« (Marx), as a craftsman. In the other case we have a division of labor which corresponds to the processes of **exchange** in the society, in which man is presented in different roles, that is, as a producer, a mediator, and a consumer. These different roles are determined by the interactions in the market, and are characterized more by **competition** than by cooperation or integration. Different roles correspond to the different types of self-managing organizations. Thus we have productive, intermediary, and service organizations. While the first scheme corresponds to the functional diversity within a company, and its principle is the integration of these functions by the producer, in the other, functional diversity appears within the society as a whole, once emphasizing integration as is the case in a company (planned economy), the other time exchange, as the basis of free social agreement. The technocratic ideal takes society as a highly technological integrated company, while the liberal ideal regards it as a free market of agreements and understandings. However, we have to put a question here from a democratic and humane position: can integration of functionally diverse social organizations be allowed, if it encroaches upon the independence of man's different roles as a producer, a consumer or a citizen?

We have seen that uniforming socialism, which puts emphasis on the question of distribution, almost entirely eliminates man's independence as a producer, because it puts it under the control of state or socially established plans. In this case the role of the process of exchange and agreement is reduced to the minimum, not only among the productive organizations, but also between man as the producer and man as the consumer. Man does not appear as the regulator of relationships within the market, because he receives the products

planned by someone else, and in the same way the greater part of his wages goes for indirect and »free« grants, which the state will distribute. He is better and better provided by the society, and is relieved of the responsibility of providing for himself. His life approaches that of a well organized humanized army or a monastery. However, it is, in this case clear, that the reduction of consumer functions goes hand in hand with the reductions in productive functions; limiting diversity in demand means limiting diversity in production. As Marx said, »distribution is determined only by relationships in production« in which the workers do not have too much of a chance of developing their own initiative, originality or imagination! The case becomes completely different if we take as a rule the enrichment and artistic improvement of production (in the spirit of the modern industrial design), and even the rehabilitation of individual artisan production. Under these circumstances the consumer also appears as a man with developed demands, a differentiated taste, and a need to organize his consumption according to his individual needs and desires. The processes of exchanges (not simply the exchange of money and goods!) become in this case more complex and subtle. Are we not, then, in a situation which is postulated by Marx to be the goal of human development and the expression of »true wealth«?¹⁰

However, experience with the liberal and democratic type of self — management, and the position that the producer or creator must possess control over his product, have been shown to create a need for control over the intermediary organizations. This is also made imperative by the very nature of the socialization of work. In a society with massive production and consumption, and with developed financial capital, often happens that the intermediary organizations (banks, stores, advertising etc.) gain control over the productive organizations and over the consumers themselves. Massive production demands massive consumption, and massive consumption demands the creation, by skillful manipulation (advertising, promotion), of the need and desire for consumption. The fate of the producer, in this case, depends on the fate of the consumer, while both are determined by the stimulation created by the intermediary, whose role becomes decisive for the existence of the entire system.¹¹

Here we are faced with two problems, of which one is the result of the need to control **accumulated values**, created by the producers, and which find their way into variable »intermediary organizations« (banks, stores, insurances

¹⁰ »But actually if we separate it from its limited bourgeois meaning, what else is wealth than universality of needs, abilities, enjoyments, and productive forces of the individual developed in a universal exchange? The full development of human control over nature in general and his own nature in particular?« (Grundrisse, p. 387)

¹¹ Many authors (J. Galbraith, V. Packard, E. Dale, W. Lipmann, B. Ward, W. Mills etc) have pointed at the manipulation of human needs in an »affluent society«, whose affluence is, after all, only relative, because coerced consumption on the »private level« can coexist with poverty on the »public level«. Vance Packard explains that »the economy of the U. S. depends on the good will of the consumer and the government to spend each year more than the previous one. Some economists warn that if consumption were not increased by about 4% every year, the economic growth would be brought into crisis«. (28) »We need things, which can as rapidly as possible, be burned, worn out, used, changed and thrown out.«, states Victor Lebow. For this reason the advertising experts have created the strategy, says Packard, »to make all Americans as voracious and wasteful consumers as possible.« One expert says that the goal is to manipulate the consumer so that he will react according to Pavlov's conditioned reflex. »Millions of consumers are manipulated, blinded, indoctrinated and their wills crushed. They are conditioned to be dissatisfied with the last years model, and easily accept the new one«, says Packard, and suggests the need for a new balance between production and consumption. However, he does not tell us whether the capitalist system is capable of providing one. He warns of the constantly increasing role of television, and the way it has been commercialized. He proposes public control over it, through compulsory subscription, in this way making it free of advertising and marketing.

(See, Vance Packard, *The Waste Makers*, Penguin Book, England, 1963)

etc.), and the other is to synchronize the goods of production with real human needs, in this way putting the production itself under the control of the consumer.

From the schematically presented relationship: producer — mediator — consumer it is quite clear that the producer and the consumer must gain certain control over the mediator. The problem of mediating material and spiritual goods in a society must be solved through an agreement between the consumer, («man with human needs») and the producer, that is the organization with self — management. Through an independent agreement, control over the productive process itself must be established. Is this possible? Naturally, on the condition of digressing from the universally accepted rule of self — management to social management. In other words, to put the intermediary organization, by a law or a constitutional amendment, under social control. This is not a step backwards in self — management, if we understand that the goal is not the independence of an organization as such, without regard to its social function, but rather the independence or maximum freedom of man, both as the producer and the consumer. The limits in this case are imposed by the people who make up the organization, by workers who are consumers as much as producers, and all the more so with time. In view of systematic solutions we here have the need to combine workers' self — management with social management.¹²

Needless to say, the control over »intermediary organizations« is of even greater importance when we are dealing with culture. Here we especially have in mind the means for massive communications, in whose representation, the people in the field and the consumers themselves would have to act as some sort of control. This actually means that we have respected »the full right of creators as producers to manage their own products«, and consequently to determine a way of presenting these goods to the public, just as the public has the right to its say on the products offered to it. We will not here deal with all the complex problems involving intermediary organizations, but rather we want to point out the importance these problems have for socialism with self — management and any humane society.

We will briefly consider another dilemma which faces authors who deal with the problems of self — management. There is something of a contradiction between the **independence** of self — managing organizations and the **social planning** of production. There still exists and is very wide — spread, a belief that centralized and administrative state planning is identical with socialist economy, and that all other problems related to free organization of workers, individual or social responsibility in production, and elimination of alienation in the division of work are of secondary importance. This position is deeply rooted with those authors who believe that socialism must, more than anything else, solve the question of economic growth, that is of greater efficiency and productivity (although, in this sense, they come all the more into question, and also with those who equate the question of equality with the leveling out by the administrative planning, which corresponds to the mentality of certain »collective uniforming socialism«. However, the problem of actual indepen-

¹² Paragraph nine of the Yugoslav Constitution of 1962 deals with the rights of organizations with self-management, and at the end states a limitation: »Citizens and representatives of certain organizations, and also representatives of the social community may take part in management of a productive organization, when matters of social interest are involved.« However, this law has up to now been applied only to cultural institutions, such as universities, museums and galleries.

dence of productive organizations in their relation to a conscientious and rational planning of social development remains, not only at this stage of industrialization where the productivity is still in the center of scientific criteria, but even in the post — industrialized society, where »human needs« will be the most important consideration, a central problem. Marx had no concrete answer in dealing with this problem with which he too was faced.¹³

In agreement with Marx's vision of Socialism, »collective and rational planning«, must rest on the »associations of free and equal producers«, and not on the government or the state »who stand in contradiction with the society.«

To eliminate this contradiction and make planning a question of the competence of the »associated producers«, it is most probably necessary to satisfy the following demands in the organization of relationships in society and production:

a) The means of production, which are used collectively, must be made social property, so that society can give them to the »associated producers« to use them, under condition that they will use them as »good producers« (against **jus abutendi**), according to social goals.

b) Social property can not become »group property«, that is, it can not be used to the disadvantage of the society or for the exploitation of other productive organizations. (It is understood that this does not include the elimination of exploitation which is a result of a different nature of capital, or of better organization such as lower productive costs. This form of exploitation ends only with the elimination in the socialist society of the »law of values«. Equally, the individual, as the producer can not become »group« or state property«; he as a master of his work freely enters and leaves a productive organization. And naturally freedom of association presupposes the freedom of disassociation.

c) Social planning can not be the function of only the state or a political group, planning from the above, but the expression of the society itself.

d) Produced »surplus value« or surplus work can not be alienated from the producer and put at the disposal of some privileged social group; thus becoming a form of economic power. The producers themselves must have control over socialized accumulation through a democratic body (a council of producers, and also on the community state, and federal level), and for the »general good« of all citizens and in their name, a certain part of this accumulated value is alienated from the producer. »General good« includes all social services which are provided for the existence and personal growth of the citizens. While control is established through the system of direct or self — managing organization of society; about this we will say more later.

e) Since in a system of direct democracy social control is directed »from below«, and not the other way around; the system of social planning itself, that is the establishment of the goals of social development and the ways of

¹³ In one of his later writings Marx sees society after the elimination of exploitation in this way: »Only then will class differences and privileges disappear, together with the economic structure from which they arose, and society will become an association of free »producers.« To live at the expense of others will be a thing of the past! There will no longer exist a government or a state which will be in conflict with society! Agriculture, mining, industry, in one word, all the branches of production, will gradually get organized for the greatest good. National centralization of the means of production will become the natural basis for any society made up of associations of free and equal producers who act conscientiously according to a common rational plan. »The great economic movement of the 19th century moves towards the realization of this goal.« (Marx-Engels Werke, Band 18. Berlin, 1969. p. 62)

managing social means, also moves in this direction. It goes from the productive organizations on one side, and from the community of citizens and consumers (that is, communes) on the other, to the higher social structures, which include qualified bodies capable of giving concrete and rational meaning to these goals. Planning can not be under the jurisdiction of only the state or a group of experts, so called »technocrats« (K. Galbraith). Planning does not presuppose a centralized economy; it can be even more successful in a decentralized economy. The contemporary cybernetic models allow for the optimal solutions for both situations. From the social point of view the optimal conditions are those under which individual freedom and responsibility have developed to the fullest.

f) Just as »monolitism« in the administrative and centralized planning was more a form of political and ideological control over citizens than an efficient form of production, so will **pluralism** — more centralized forms in energetics and automated basic industries, and more decentralized and individualized forms in production of consumer goods and services for the primary and especially secondary needs — be in planing of social growth in a society of self-management. This will especially be of importance in those fields where production will be influenced by the »law of beauty« and where the »social individual« will be the one on whom production will rest. Industry, technology and science, which have up to now been creating in the name of rationalism and productivity uniformity and impersonality, will all the more serve individuality and diversity. In this way we will end even that syllogism which presents production as a function of consumption, and not vice versa.¹⁴

III.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES AND WORKERS SELF-MANAGEMENT

The subject which we wish to discuss briefly here concerns the widespread opinion that technological development of society moves in the direction of always greater concentration of social functions and social power itself at the highest level of society, and that decision making and social power remain the privilege of a political oligarchy or a single group of experts. Obviously such tendencies go contrary to the principles and practices of representative democracy, and particularly against the possibility of direct or participatory democracy.

The thesis of the concentration of social power as a consequence of technological development has two variations:

a) Technological development facilitates the concentration of political power in the hands of a monopolistic group, political oligarchy, which controls

¹⁴ »Production, distribution, exchange, and consumption make up a syllogism; production — universality, distribution and exchange — particularly, consumption — individuality, which makes it complete. This is in every case a relationship, but a very shallow one. Production is determined by general laws of nature, distribution by social circumstances and hence stimulate production either more or less, exchange lies between the two as formal social interaction, and the final act, consumption, which has to be taken not only as the end but as the goal, lies far outside of the economy, so much outside that it can again begin and the whole process anew.« (K. Marx Grundrisse p. 11).

p. 11)

The entire dialectics of the relationships between the man and the means of production, between means of production and relationships in production, between the social structure and can be deduced from Marx's clever formulation.

the most important means of production and communication, and makes the most important social decisions; and

b) Though technological development goes in the direction of the concentration of social decision — making, it does not aid a political power but rather a depoliticized power, pure technical power which could be in a certain sense even a depersonalized power.¹⁵

We shall here introduce a contrary thesis, that is, that the development of technology facilitates the strengthening of democracy, and particularly its more radical form — direct or participatory democracy, which assumes not only direct participation of the citizenry in the making of political decisions but also a far greater decentralization of social power, more precisely, the socialization of political power.

If technology leads to the progressive exclusion of human subjectivity, to the replacement of human volition by the logic of »objective necessity«, if technology really forms a »circular process of production which is conditioned by itself«, than one can best test this directly in the enterprises, where a certain »socio-technical system« is prevailing, where the activity of man is subordinate to the demands of technology (efficiency, rationality, and economy) to the »logic of technics« over human logic is correct, then man would be in the »logic of technics« over human logic is correct, then man would be in the real conditions of actual production, on different levels of technological organization (from handicraft industry to mechanized industry, and from mechanized to automated industry), more and more ruled by technology. Such an assumption can be tested experimentally.

We have examined the relationship between social hierarchy and technical hierarchy in respect to different levels of technological development and of different aspects of decision making in the factories. This observation was carried out under the conditions of workers' self-management, which is a maximally democratic organization of an enterprise.¹⁶

In connection with the problem which interests us, we shall formulate four hypotheses and attempt to test them on the basis of the results of our research:

1. Social hierarchy in an enterprise (directors, supervisors) withdraws in the face of technical hierarchy (engineers, technicians) on the higher level of technological organization, because the role of discipline is more and more taken over by the technical staff or technology itself.

2. The higher the technological level of production, the lesser are the roles of workers and other employees in decision-making. Decision-making becomes the business of a narrow group of experts (managing board or technical staff).

¹⁵ In illustration of this thesis we can cite the theory of H. Schelsky on the »technical state«, inspired by A. Gehlen's anthropology according to which the government of political subject, essentially personal and irrational, is more and more replaced by scientific and technical processes, essentially objective and impersonal. A »scientific civilisation« is appearing which is managed by its own »inner laws«, generating a »circular process of production which is conditioned by itself«, that is, in which man as a subject no longer has a role. In this civilisation, the state is ruled by the »technicians of the state«, but they do not in fact »govern«, but only implement that which is determined by the »nature of the things itself« and not by certain rulers. »The technical State takes the substance out of democracy, says Schelsky, without becoming in itself anti-democratic. Technically scientific decisions cannot be subordinate to any kind of democratic moulding of the will, because the wolut thus become inefficient.« (H. Schelsky, *Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation*, Köln-Opladen, 1961, p. 12)

¹⁶ The research was realized in 20 factories in metal and chemical industry, including a sample of 523 workers (302 simple workers and 221 workers — members of workers' councils). This research was carried out in 1966. by the author in the Institute for Social Research of University of Zagreb.

3. Because social hierarchy as well as the objective possibilities of decision-making disappear, the peoples' desire to manage progressively declines. Technology starts to »rule itself«.

4. As a consequence of the above, the social integrity of man in his enterprise also disappears. Man as producer becomes more and more anonymous, lonely, and mere »technical man«.

ad Hypothesis No. 1)

Research in Yugoslav enterprises on the power structure confirmed that the managing authority is shifting from the social hierarchy to the technical hierarchy. However, this phenomenon is not completely regular, because on the level of mechanization, where work is most alienated and where the worker is most powerless, one finds a departure from the above tendency, due to certain »group factors«.

Table 1. — Power structure in Yugoslav enterprises in respect of technological level

	Manual Rank	Mechanized Rank	Automated Rank
1) Director	1	3	2
2) Technical staff	2	5	1 (!)
3) League of Communists	3	1	5
4) Management Board	4	4	3
5) Workers' Council	5	2	4
6) Supervisors	6	8	7
7) Workers'	7	7	6
8) Administration	8	9	8
9) Trade Unions	9	6	9

(All groups: simple workers and workers'-members of workers' council)

Technical staff which falls in the second rank on the manual-work level and in the fifth rank on the mechanized level, rises to the first place on the automated level, above the rank of director. It is also significant that on the automated level members of workers' councils, who best know from personal experience how decisions are made, gave the highest grade of all to the technical management (2.90 of possible 3.00 points, which means »great influence«), while average grades for directors in all three groups of workers (members and no-members on 3 levels) were lower.

The simple workers give usually higher rank to the director (because his power — as »executive power« — is the »most visible«) than do the members of workers' councils who have greater knowledge of the real process of decision-making. On the mechanized and automated level the members of the workers' council give only fourth rank to the director — a degradation of his role, caused probably more by the self-management system than by the techno-

logy! His power is most expressed on the manual-work level, where both workers and members of W. C. agree that he is the most influential. And this entirely corresponds to the predominance of social hierarchy on this level.

ad Hypothesis No. 2)

The technological division of labor which lead to »fragmented work« (G. Friedmann), to impoverishment and stereotypization of work operations, brought out various attempts in the sense of »job-enrichment«, such as »job-rotation« or »job enlargement« (Ch. Walker *et al.*), at correcting this situation. But all these measures cannot eliminate the real alienation and powerlessness of the workers in the work situation, as much research has shown. There are two theoretical currents involved in analyzing and overcoming this work situation:

- theory of motivation and participation (the school of Michigan),
- theory of alienation (Marx, Fromm, R. Blauner, *et al.*).

Both of these currents recognize the need of workers to achieve personal dignity and to be able to carry out full responsibility in the work tasks. Therefore they plead for the extension of workers' responsibilities in decision-making. They consider that a significant widening of work tasks or functions of workers in their job is necessary to overcome the degradation of modern labor. The most radical form of such enlargement of functions is given in the expansion from soley executive manual functions to managing ones; that is in full democratization of the enterprise, in the form of workers' self-management.

Combining executive work functions (work operations) with managing functions, we are able to avoid, as the following table shows, the radical decline in worker's participation, going from lower to higher levels of technological organization of the enterprise.

Table 2. — »Have you ever given any suggestion or expressed opinion on the following questions at the meetings in your enterprise?« (in percentiles)

(Positive answers only for the simple workers, not members of W. C.)

Suggestions	Manual	Mechanized	Automated
a) organization of work	52,5	57,0	53,6
b) distribution of personal income	29,7	64,0	60,4
c) allocation of housing	13,9	37,0	51,5
d) planning of production	28,7	39,0	29,7
e) planning of investments	20,8	14,0	10,9
f) solution of conflicts	33,7	43,0	33,7
g) functioning of workers Council	26,7	28,0	30,7
h) behavior of director	39,6	59,0	27,7
i) want you have more meetings	16,8	37,0 (1)	66,3

(The number of obtained suggestions of the members of workers' council is obviously much higher as a result of their active participation in decision making.)

In any case it is interesting to note that, although the manual level of production gives by its nature more possibilities for individual initiative and

useful suggestions in various aspects. The mechanized level from that point of view is even more intensive than automated level, and the increase on both levels is not possible to explain by technological factor alone, but rather by a better motivation to take part in the collective life. (Emphasis on the collective forms of living — League of Communists, Workers' Councils, Trade Unions — for the workers on the mechanized level is a very important indicator!).

On both mechanized and automated level, suggestions which relate to personal problems of the worker (distribution of income, allocation of housing, resolution of personal conflicts, etc.) prevail over those on the organization of business (organization of work, planning of production or investment). On the manual-work level, suggestions for the better organization of work are more intensive, which is understandable. However, it is important to emphasize that such suggestions are not perceptibly fewer on the higher levels.

As shown, the role of individual initiative is not lessened as a consequence of technology, and the nature of social organization itself (workers' self-management) provides the possibility to stimulate and not to paralyze it. The worker is able in the different aspects of his social functions to compensate for that which technology takes away as a result of its development. Let us be aware of this phenomenon as sign of a more general trend in the behavior of the workers in the democratized enterprises!

One significant manifestation more: a large majority of the workers on the mechanized level (87%!) want even more meetings (this is not the case on the manual work level, where only 16% so desire). Is this not a symptom of workers' striving to overcome the process of alienation at the work place which is created by the mechanisation of production? Is it not here a question of profound human need for social integration which should be borne in mind in the organization of production?¹⁷

ad Hypothesis No. 3)

Does the development of technology give rise to apathy among workers and employees toward management? We tried to answer this question by seeking the degree of resistance of the workers if self-management should be abolished:

Table 3. — »Would the repeal of the Workers' Council and a return to the previous way of managing provoke dissatisfaction among workers and employees?« (in percentiles)

	Simple workers				Members of W. C.			
	Great	Some	Nothing	Don't	Great	Some	Nothing	Don't
Handicraft	27,7	21,8	6,9	39,6	53,8	19,8	5,4	19,4
Mechanized	43,0	18,0	5,0	30,0	78,2	8,0	3,5	9,2
Automated	51,5	18,8	8,9	19,8	80,5	2,4	2,4	12,2

¹⁷ R. Blauner (Alienation and Freedom, Univ. Press of Chicago, 1964) enumerates four types of alienation in the work: powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation and self-estrangement. »A person is powerless when he is an object controlled and manipulated by other persons or by an impersonal system (such as technology), and when he cannot assert himself as a subject to change or modify the system (such as technology), and when he cannot assert himself as a subject to change or modify this domination.« (p. 16). — When it is impossible to assert himself in the work itself, and this is the case in mechanized work, than it is absolutely necessary to have the opportunity in the organizing, controlling and managing functions of the enterprise. Therefore an increased need to social integration and more meetings!

According to the technocratic theory the desire to manage should decline with technological level of production. But, as we can see from our data, identification with the Workers' Council and the desire to manage the production is very clearly increasing with the technological level! It is higher on the mechanized level and yet more higher on the automated level!

For those who are more familiar with the psychology of workers and employees there is nothing surprising but a completely natural behavior. The more frustrating the nature of work, the more the worker tries to compensate for it through social activity. Those who hold the technocratic point of view forget a very important phenomenon, namely, that better integration of workers into workin collutives when the work is automated, results in, on the one hand, a greater feeling of solidarity among all the employees, on the other hand, a desire for equal participation in the sharing of organization responsibilities.

ad Hypothesis No. 4)

Our results show that a worker or an employee under the influence of the technological level of production, with an increasing predominance of the technological process, as in the case of automated production, does not start behaving as a »technical man« (as the appendix of the machine), but begins instead more and more intensively to behave as a »social man«. We have an other proof of increased desire to manage the organization in a personal and collective way to present. The attachment to the collective forms of management witnesses the intensity of this desire, and the following table on the **desirable structure of power** in the enterprise confirms this.

Table No. 4. — Desirable power structure versus real power structure (in ranks, for all six groups)

Desirable rank order			
1. Workers' Council	1,0	1. Director	2,1
2. Technical staff	2,8	2. Managing Board	3,1
3. League of Communists	3,0	3. Technical staff	3,3
4. Workers	3,5	4. Workers' Council	3,5
5. Trade Unions	5,3	5. League of Communists	3,7
6. Director	5,8	6. Workers	6,5
7. Managing Board	7,1	7. Supervisors	6,9
8. Supervisors	7,3	8. Trade Unions	7,9
9. Administration	9,0	9. Administration	8,1

The unanimous answer for the desirable rank order is that the Workers' Council should be in the first rank. The importance of technical staff is not at all underestimated but there is no hesitation that it must be subordinated to the authority of workers' council. It is interesting to state that in the desirable picture of power relationship even other collective organisations are higher ranked than in reality such as League of Communists, Trade Unions and

workers as a collective body itself. A more detailed analysis shows an interesting fact, namely that the members of W.C. on the automated level emphasize far more than other the need for management functions. The tendency to have social responsibilities and to participate in decision-making in the higher levels of technological development is so consistent and obvious, that it is quite impossible to hold further a technocratic argumentation to the contrary.

In conclusion, we can say that all points, where we assumed that the technological factor acts negatively on the motivation of workers and employees to participate in decision-making, we obtained a negative result. The truth is that the development of technology shifts the center of gravit of organizational authority from the social to the technical hierarchy (engineers come above directors), but **at the same time** the need for participation and enlargement of managing functions, thus allowing all members of a collective to participate equally. By opposition to the technological division of labor, which is frustrating, there arises a desire for social affirmation. On the level where a man is most alienated or subordinated to technological requirements of work, such as mechanized labor, group or collective identifications are most expressed. On this level the workers feel most strongly the need to compensate the work situation by an intensified group involvement at management level.

These results lead as to conclusions to which other researchers have already drawn attention. We can fully agree with postulated statements of Nancy C. Morse and Robert S. Weiss:

». . . 4. The average human beings learn, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibilities. Avoidance of responsibility, lack of ambition, and emphasis on security are generally consequences of experience, not inherent to human characteristics.

5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population.

6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of the average human being are only partially utilized.« (»The Function and Meaning of Work«, in American Soc. Rev., vol. 20, pp. 191—198, 1955).

PARTICIPATION AND THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEXITY

Participation in the sense of »taking part«, »sharing« has, obviously, a multiplicity of meanings that are relevant to social living and social development. As any other form of social action, it can be an end in itself or a means toward ulterior ends. Again both motives will often motivate one and the same behavior, as one might join an organization for the pleasure of associating with like-minded people as well as in order the better to pursue common interests. Participation can be dictated by the technical requirements of a collective undertaking no less than it can express the wish of the participants to improve their bargaining position in an association. It may need a constant effort to sustain it, so that if left to itself participation will tend to weaken, to dwindle, and finally cease as a result of a negative feed-back mechanism. Or it may involve the participants increasingly, lead them to commit growing portions of their interests to the association, creating a positive feed-back toward more and more participation.

All these alternatives are relevant to participation in the sense in which the term is going to be used in this paper, a sense, though, more narrow than the usual connotations. Participation for the purpose of the present discussion shall mean: exercising conscious and active influence upon decisions in human cooperative systems.

The argument will be made that participation is related to development, specifically to the development of human cooperative systems. In order to avoid the valuational implications of development, often understood as progress toward a more desirable state, the attempt will be made to use »development« consistently in the neutral sense of »non-random change«.

Another basic statement, submitted to examination, will be that the non-randomness of change in human cooperative systems consists in their movement towards increasing complexity. Complexity shall mean: any kind of variety integrated into, and in this way constrained by, any kind of order. The measure of complexity shall be the amount of variety that can be integrated into a given order.

I

Definitions are conventional restrictions of reality. When little is known about the reality so restricted, the restrictions must necessarily be arbitrary. Definitions as well are a kind of order integrating a potential variety of meanings. So that the phenomenon of »restriction by integration« can be studied right here.

The order imposed by a definition upon a universe of meanings operates by exclusion. It is a declaration of intent to consider a great many aspects of a phenomenon as unimportant, not essential, secondary, not meriting our attention. If a definition is to be sufficiently precise to be useful, the number of aspects that are excluded by the definition will be considerably larger than those included. The smaller our previous knowledge about the phenomenon defined, the greater the probability, therefore, that the excluded group of aspects contains elements of considerable importance for the understanding of the situation under study, the greater the price which we have to pay for our definitional ordering.

This predicament is experienced fully in the field of organization theory, administrative science, political systems analysis, comparative bureaucracy, management science and other disciplines, traditional or emerging, that focus on human co-operative systems as their main reality referent. Already the multiplicity of disciplinary names foreshadows the difficulty. Is the fact of human co-operation to be understood as patterned behavior or as a pattern of mental contents in the minds of the participants? Is it more fruitful to interpret it as a stable system or as a moving process? Or, if both, when should the accent be on continuity and when on change? Is it the abstract pattern or structure of mental contents or of behavioral elements that makes the co-operative system? Or is it rather the visible and audible aggregate of people, resources, instruments, products, information? Is human co-operation the opposite of human conflict or is co-operation compatible with the simultaneous existence of conflict, is it even its necessary complement?

A possible way out of this difficulty is to try to operate with several definitions that are neither mutually exclusive nor, necessarily, together exhaustive. Rather they converge upon the phenomenon studied, throwing light from different directions. Let us apply this technique of conceptual multidimensionality to human cooperative systems. By using more than one definition of the concept we might be able to see more than one side. Of what? Of the same object? Let us leave this question open. The whole point might be there.

1

A human cooperative system is

- a pattern of meanings, cognitions, and norms orienting the interests of a number of people, and
- a pattern of behavior by a number of actors.

The assumption that organizations exist »really« only in the heads of people is an old theme in organizational and administrative theory. In no way less venerable than the belief that all which matters is actual behavior. There should be no quarrel with the inclusion of both. They are obviously present, in a sense, positively as well as negatively. The orientation network in the consciousness of people is a social product. It is developed and reinforced in actual behavior. On the other hand, this patterned behavior itself is only possible as a result of the orientation design existing in each individual mind. At the same time, existing mental contents are never implemented fully, never exteriorized without residue in behavior. Just as behavior is never described exhaustively by the contents of consciousness.

The model of the human cooperative system along this dimension includes two levels. One, consciousness, is understood as a pattern of meanings, norms, and cognitions orienting, at the brain level, responses to stimuli, external or internal, responses that were at earlier levels of biological evolution coded genetically. Stimuli filtered through the pattern of consciousness are called interests.

The other, behavioral, level of the model can be sketched as a counterpart to the orientation network. In human cooperation associations are the general expression of interests mirroring the belief of the individuals concerned that their interests will stand a better chance of satisfaction through association. Association can be directed towards the creation and maintenance of symbolic institutions, reflecting the semantic component of the orientation network, of regulative institutions corresponding to the norms and values in orientation and directed towards the aim of influencing the orientation and behavior of others, or of productive institutions paralleling cognitive orientation and presumed to create entities likely to satisfy interests.

The problem area defined by this dimension is related to the nature and the consequences of interaction between the two levels as well as among the various elements at each of them, the orientation network and the institutional system. In the study of human cooperative systems we are operating, at present, with rather gross simplifications. The orientation network itself is a simplified version of what is actually known and felt about reality. Meanings and cognitions in cooperative systems are often defined within the system in a way that simplifies actually existing meanings and cognitions, such as the cases of »official truth«. Norms are only partly made explicit in detail and a large part is left to interpretation of more or less generally formulated values and goals. The norms regulating the behavior of any one person in the system are summarily compressed into the concept of functional role and norms regulating the composite interaction of two or more persons are reified as relations. The norm itself can only be a more or less vague homomorphism in relation to the variety of situations to which it is meant to apply. A further element of simplification is standardization which is introduced into any cooperative system beyond a certain level of complexity.

A major simplifier in human cooperation is coercion and, consequently, power-as-coercion. For a very long time in the actual development of cooperation power-coercion was the main method of creating the emotional loads necessary to stabilize the normative structures of cooperative systems. This was achieved by the strong pressures of uncertainty generated through threats or the application of coercion and the subsequent relief when submission to the norm replaced uncertainty. The realization that behavior, however coerced, tends to change attitudes, and that emotional components of the orientation network tend to change dissonant cognitional components seems to flow from experience and experiment. The limits to coercion are not so much the negative emotions it generates, but the maximal emotional load with which a norm can be invested through coercion and still be amenable to change when adaptation to environment should so require.

However, there are signs of a gradual shift from normative to cognitive orientation in human cooperation, the process of rationalization. With this change the importance of emotional loads on norms and, therefore, the centrality of power-coercion in cooperative systems tends to decrease.

A human cooperative system is

- a variety of orientational and behavioral events, and
- a set of rules, principles, or common denominators restricting that variety to a pattern both at the level of consciousness and at the level of behavior.

»Environment« for present purposes can be understood as »everything that is not the cooperative system«. Though parts of this »environment« can be highly structured and themselves represent cooperative systems, the environment as a whole represents, in relation to the cooperative system under consideration, a system with infinite variety.

The cooperative system is in continuous interaction with the environment. In this interaction the variety of the environment, relevant for the cooperative system and impinging upon it, is greater than the variety of the system that is responding to environmental events by systemic events. The system is, therefore, under constant pressure, figuratively speaking, to increase its proper variety in order to be able more adequately to react to impulses from the environment. To recruit more members, for instance, obtain more resources, increase production, diversify activity, raise the level of knowledge and expertise of its personnel, transact more information, improve communication, differentiate structure. In order, however, to be useful to the system, this increasing variety has to be integrated into the system, i.e. made to conform to the system's basic rules, principles, or whatever common denominators serve as links. This process is reversible: the system can lose variety and so capacity of reacting to the variety of the environment.

By imposing a rule or common principle on systemic events the system sets limits to its own variety, and consequently to its capacity to absorb variety, to its ability to react to the environment. As the continuous process of interaction with the environment generates constant pressure toward further differentiation of the system, these limits are reached sooner or later. Further differentiation is then only possible by changing the rules, the integrative principles of the system, by replacing them with wider common denominators allowing more variety to be included.

Every cooperative system, therefore, is subject, besides the continuous process of differentiation, to a second discrete, discontinuous process of changing its integrative framework in the direction of greater potential inclusiveness. This process as well is reversible. The change of integrative rule can move in the direction of greater simplicity, of less inclusiveness.

The widest expression for the motivational impulse toward absorbing increasing variety into the cooperative system is uncertainty, the feeling of inadequate orientation or insufficient dependability of the behavior of others, from whatever source and however rationalized. In relation to the cooperative system it tends to be explained as its failure to cope with environmental contingencies. It points toward further differentiation as a way to increase the system's capacity to respond to contingent variety.

On the other hand, however, uncertainty is the main source of emotional loads reinforcing the normative structure of a cooperative system, giving it

structural stability and resistance to change. Uncertainty as a negative experience can be neutralized primarily by falling back upon a pattern of orientation and behavior.

Hence the paradoxical situation that the same class of elements, uncertainty, motivates in opposite directions, toward change by growing differentiation and increasing width of integrative principles, and toward stability and against change, against abandoning existing integrative principles. An increase in security often seems a prerequisite for the venturesomenes needed in order to face a sharp though temporary drop in certainty through the in-between period when the old rule no longer applies and the new has not yet been fully shaped and settled.

The pressure of uncertainty can generate, depending on the type and the setting of the cooperative system, a need for affiliation, a need for power, a need for achievement, or any combination of these need orientations, depending on the principle relied upon to secure the cohesion of the cooperative system: solidarity, coercion-power, or functional efficiency.

By extending its integrative norm to new categories of environmental variety, in order to widen its own responding homeomorphic variety, to increase the precision of the »mapping« of the environment in its own structure, the cooperative system broadens the class of relevant variety and so, again increases uncertainty, generating in turn new impulses toward more detailed differentiation as well as toward more inclusive integration.

An alternative to the reinforcing of structures by the pressures of uncertainty is integrative stabilization through redundancy. Cumulative explanations of the same phenomenon, identical norms related to the same potentialities of behavior, complementary institutional arrangements have a better chance of achieving their effect. When, however, the explanations are seen as alternative instead of cumulative, the norms are understood as requiring different behavior, the institutions appear in different contexts of social life, these differences will tend to broaden the scope of choice for system members. In this way redundancy can not only restrict but also increase freedom, cause both rigidity and adaptiveness, depending on slight and purely subjective modifications of the point of view.

When an integration rule in a cooperative system cannot accomodate increases in differentiation of the system, developing in response to the pressure of widening environmental variety becoming relevant for the system, it is replaced by another. The only thing that can be then said definitely about this new rule is that it is going to be less restrictive than the old one. It has to be less restrictive, less excluding, because its capacity to absorb variety, to respond to it with its own regulating variety has to be greater, in the nature of the described process of systemic change, than that of the former principle that was discarded precisely because of insufficient scope. A greater amount of variety integrated within the new order of the system is defined (p. 2) as greater complexity. The cooperative system under the new rule will be more complex.

Will it also be »better«, in any sense of this valuation, is a different matter. Has the survival of the system priority over all other considerations, or is its performance the main goal? What is the cost of changing from the old rule to the new in terms of survival chances or loss of production? What about the

residues of the old system in the new, the possible coexistence and compatibility of two classes of elements? How is the new principle going to adapt to environmental conditions unforeseen when the change was made?

Both the »pressure« toward increasing differentiation and the »resistance« to change is experienced subjectively as interest. On the one hand, each basic integrative rule in a cooperative system tends to generate interests that are increasingly difficult to satisfy within its boundaries. On the other hand, each structural type will create strong interests attached to things as they are, to the defense of the status quo.

3

A human cooperative system is

- cooperation of people toward a common goal, as well as
- conflict of interests among people in continuing interaction pursuing their several interests in relation to scarce resources.

Cooperation is the primary focus of attention in cooperative systems. Harmonious views of the cooperative relationship prevailed, therefore, longer and more persistently than similar views, nevertheless long-lived and stubborn enough, of general society. The fact of interest conflicts in organization is even today often forgotten or treated as marginal deviant behavior to be overcome by the system's homeostatic mechanisms. Or to the contrary, when conflict in organizations is made the main focus chances are that it will be magnified out of all proportion so as to overshadow the cooperative aspect. One is left to wonder, over such texts, how the organizations described ever find time and resources to turn out any product at all.

»Conflict« is used in the sense of »perception of a situation as excluding the satisfaction of an interest in any other way than at the expense of another interest«. How far certain objective interest-situations, i.e. situations perceived as relevant to somebody's interest by others in accordance with socially accepted valuations, can be used to predict successfully the emergence of subjective conflict orientations in a significant number of individuals — e.d. the class situation as predictor of class conflict — is an empirical question. In the same way as the related problem, what is the probability that subjective conflict orientations will lead to overt conflict behavior, and what will be the likely reactive influence of conflict action on conflict orientation.

In cooperative systems conflict will tend to increase uncertainty. The relationship between this uncertainty and the stability of the system is probably curvilinear. Up to a certain level conflict will create the need for better orientation, for conflict-handling mechanisms within the system and in this way contribute to its differentiation and development. Beyond this level, however, conflict becomes incompatible with cooperation.

Also, conflicts have outcomes perceived as possible whatever the actual objective possibility. These perceptions are likely to influence behavior. With the level of resources for interest satisfaction and existing interests seen both as unchanging, a conflict of interests can result either in domination, when one interest is actually satisfied at the expense of another, or in compromise, when all contending interests are satisfied in part none fully. Allowing for a change in interest-orientation, conflict can end by the reorientation of one or

the other party to the conflict toward other interest goals. With a perceived possibility of changing the amount of available resources, conflict can lead toward concerted action in order to expand, to increase the production of the critical scarce resource. All these outcomes, with the possible exception of re-orientation, are compatible with continuing cooperation and with the existence of the cooperative system.

4

A human cooperative system is

- a pattern of orientation and behavior, and
- an aggregate of »inputs« — such as people and their work capacity, natural resources including sources of energy, man-made products for production and for consumption, information in the widest sense as a non-random arrangement of signals including the partial or total input of structures.

The structure of cooperative systems tends to grow more complex in order to accommodate greater variety in response to the variety in the system's environment. In order to do so it has to incorporate from the environment elements that can be integrated into its structure and made to serve the purpose of homeomorphic mapping, of channels of action, of ways to respond to variety. With the same integrative rule this process means an increase in quantity of incorporated elements. A change of rule, however, requires also a change in kind of inputs, or rather a shift in the proportion of various inputs.

The fundamental problem in this area is the exact relationship between the necessary inputs on the one hand and the level of structural complexity, the one hand and the level of structural complexity, the ability to respond successfully to variety in the environment. It is assumed that insufficiency of inputs restricts potential complexity in the cooperative system, and that the absence of a given class of inputs prevents the adoption of a given type of structural arrangement. Is it possible, however, and to what extent to substitute one form of input for another and still maintain a given type of cooperation? For example, to make up for the lack of weapons technology by the number of soldiers in an army, or to replace educational preparation and expertise by charismatic leadership qualities in a government bureaucracy?

It is also assumed that abundance of resources will exercise »pressure« upon the cooperative system to differentiate along the structural dimension that will permit to utilize the available resources as inputs. The question here is what influence will be exerted by the presence of potential inputs incongruent in kind with the existing type of cooperative system? Will there be a tendency to adjust type to resource irrespective of the type's potential for absorbing variety? The availability of a large labor force, for instance, seems to lead to the expansion of simple, labor-intensive forms of cooperation. On the other hand, the increasing convertibility of one form of resource into another, e.g. through money, makes the adjustment of resource to desirable type more probable.

In order to test these assumptions, and others derived from them, a number of problems of measurement must be solved. The easier part is to measure the complexity of cooperative systems. There is some experience in identifying

the main structural input dimension for each type, such as number of people, levels of leadership, number of units, of tasks, of individual jobs, width of the span of control, value of assets, number of specialties, of network links, of contacts, of participants, amount of information, total interpersonal influence etc. There are also mathematical methods beginning to evolve to express and manipulate measures of structural diversity. For instance, W. Rushing's and L. Pondy's formulas for measuring the extent of the division of labor or, indeed, any form of diversity. H. Thiel's decomposition analysis applied to social and administrative variety. J. Galtung's calculation of the maximum possible number of contacts in a group. Gini's index of inequality applied to the measurement of any form of concentration. A. Tannenbaum's measurement of relative and of total influence in a cooperative system.

The main problem, however, is the quantitative relationship of the various kind of inputs or potential inputs into the cooperative system. There is no common denominator in sight for biological, material, normative, informational, emotional-aesthetic productivity and creativity as background for inputs into cooperative systems.

Shifts of balance between inputs and structural complexity in a cooperative system will tend to produce one of two types of situation:

— Available inputs exceed the complexity of the system. There are, on one hand, more inputs than are required to maintain existing structures. On the other, these structures are not differentiated enough to absorb available inputs and to integrate them into a more complex, and possibly more productive system. Or

— The complexity of the system exceeds available inputs. The inputs are insufficient to maintain the system's structure at its present level of differentiation, and the structure is more complex than can be utilized for the integration of elements at the system's disposal.

These two basic types characterize processes of change in cooperative systems irrespective of the source of imbalance between inputs and complexity of structure. Available inputs can increase through the influence of self-breeding properties in the system by spoiling the environment, through more efficient conversion of resources into productivity. They can diminish through loss to the environment, through increased internal requirements, or through reduced efficiency of conversion. Structural complexity can grow through internal differentiation or external influences (e.g. demonstration effects, rising aspirations). It can decline through structural degeneration or through conscious manipulation. Also, the change of integrative principle can leave an unused reserve of potential inputs.

The two types describe the dynamics of a cooperative system only in a very general way. What makes the concrete processes so intricate is the number of possible relationships between various kinds of inputs and the different elements of the system's structure. The identification of these relationships between various kinds of inputs and the different elements of the system's structure. The identification of these relationships and their invariances seems to be the fundamental task of an analytic organization theory.

II

To what extent is any individual able to exercise conscious and active influence in a human cooperative system, i.e. participate in it, depends first of all on the integrative principle patterning the system, permitting some possibilities of influence and excluding others. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish cooperative systems by the integrative rules defining their pattern, to classify them into types each characterized by its specific ordering arrangement. To a certain extent this procedure tends to emphasize stability over change, concentrating attention on the type irrespective of the continuous modifications that differentiation produces within each typological category, and deemphasizing the periods of transition from one integrative principle to another when elements of the old and the new exist parallelly and interact with each other. In fact, change is just as much a fact of experience in cooperative systems as stability, indeed one is, conceptually and observationally, defined by the other.

As the types are set in order of complexity, from the simpler to the more complex, they can give the impression of describing a sequence in historical time. Though there is reason to assume a correlation between general social development and the complexity of human cooperative systems — and this assumption in fact is central to the present analysis — the types can just as well be understood as existing simultaneously in present-day societies, their differences in complexity being related to the various purposes that they are made to serve.

1

In the **primary cooperating group**, as the simplest form of cooperation, behavior is patterned ad hoc through continuous audio-visual contact among the group's members and is oriented toward the task at hand. If »pattern« is understood as any non-random arrangement of elements and »structure« as a pattern that persist beyond and independently of the concrete task just undertaken by the cooperating group, then it can be asserted that the primary cooperating group has no structure. Its existence, in consciousness as well as in behavior, is limited to the present operation. The orientation of its members operates at two levels, on the level of actual work and on the level of motivation for undertaking the work in the first place, for joining the cooperative group. At both levels the emphasis in orientation ranges all the way from purely cognitive patterns and utilitarian interests to predominantly normative representations with strong emotional loads, as in groups engaged in activities with ritualistic or magical significance. In any case on the level of motivation the primary cooperating group, because of its simplicity and lack of permanence, depends almost wholly on the orientation network and the institutional system existing in society outside of the group itself.

The dimension of variety in primary cooperating groups, along which the group differentiates, is defined by the number of possible contacts among its members and by the number of potential elements in the task undertaken. Its integrative principle, on the other hand, is simply the task visualized as accomplished, the cognitive or normative rules defining the procedure of its accomplishment, and the minimum solidarity permitting the member of the group to cooperate toward its accomplishment. This excludes everything that is not seen relevant to the task in the light of the available technology, normative and cognitive, but it also precludes all tasks for which there is no available

technology. This is, at the same time, the technical limit of the primary cooperating group. Whatever task requires more differentiation, in space or in time, than can be accommodated by ad hoc patterning and audiovisual coordination, transcends the scope of its integrative principle.

The area where the interests of the primary cooperating group's member's overlap is, as well, defined by the task. This area, small and temporary by necessity, is surrounded by strong currents of individual interests irrelevant to the group's existence and operation or outright disintegrative. These are the sources of potential conflict that have to be neutralized or held in abeyance for the time of the group's functioning in the pursuit of the task. If the task-interests are not strong enough to achieve this effect, the group's cohesion depends on orientational inputs from the environment, most commonly strong norms of solidarity in the social grouping of which the group is a part.

The primary cooperating group having no structure there is no expenditure of social energy in structural maintenance. The orientational inputs from the environment are not directed specifically at the group. They are meanings that are current in the social grouping, knowledge that is diffusely present in it, norms valid for social behavior irrespective of any cooperation. What can be treated as inputs is almost wholly directed towards task performance, muscular as well as mental energy of the group's members, and a very small part of it is expended in maintaining the group's pattern while it is at work.

Whatever activity needs more scope and continuity than can be provided by ad hoc face-to-face contacts or a stronger control of conflicting interests than simply relying on existing solidarity, will have to develop more complex structures of cooperation. In the actual historical process of trying to stretch the capacity of primary cooperating groups to allow for more differentiation there arose a curious dilemma. The more stable patterning needed for more continuity was achieved mainly by norms with powerful emotional reinforcement. This method, however, meant such a loss of adaptability of the patterns so stabilized that the method was bound to reach very soon the point of diminishing returns. In present-day folk-customs there are often visible the fossilized remnants of over-strongly stabilized primary cooperating groups where the purpose has evaporated long ago and only the shell of the prescribed behavior patterns has remained.

2

The type of cooperative system that comes next in order of complexity is the **leadership group**. Here the behavior already has structure. The relationship between leader and followers exists and persists independently of the task undertaken by the group. At the level of orientation this structure includes meanings, such as the term »leader«, specific norms of obedience and loyalty, and, in more differentiated forms, elementary cognitive techniques about exercising and maintaining leadership. On the level of behavior the leader commands and is actually obeyed in a practically significant percentage of cases.

The leadership group permits a greater variety of contacts among people, of task elements, as well as of potentialities of power and authority to be integrated by its characteristic principle of leadership than the primary cooperating group by its widest reach. The members can be directed to any task. They can tackle work that needs dispersion in space and continuity in time

beyond the possibilities of face-to-face contact. The link of followership can bind an incomparably larger number of people than the ad hoc patterning of the primary cooperating group. This larger number alone makes it possible and at the same time necessary to integrate significant non-human inputs into the system, resources for group maintenance as well as for task performance.

At the other end, the possibility of the leadership group to bind people to a leader and to orient them mainly through the simple normative principle: obey the leader, represents the technical limit of this type. Where obedience cannot be habitually exacted and where more detailed orientation for cooperative functioning is required, the leadership group is too simple an instrument.

The cooperation-conflict dimension in the leadership group presents a clear picture. The actual cooperation between the leader and the followers is based on the assumption of a reciprocity of interests. The obverse of the followers' obligation to obey is their expectation of protection and orientation by the leader. The leader takes upon himself the stresses of uncertainty inherent in the various situations the group faces, and in this way unburdens the followers. The followers, on the other hand, accept certain more or less defined interest advantages of the leader as an institutional rule regulating the behavior of the group. The tensions between the two sides of this interest bargain, the actual institutionalized advantages of the leader and the advantages the followers expect from cooperating in the group, are almost inbuilt into this type of structure. They are the source of ambivalences and conflicts, and ultimately define the limits, from the point of view of interests, of the leadership group's capacity to integrate variety. The interest domination by the leader produces several tendencies, all eventually dysfunctional to the group as a form of cooperation. It spreads interest in the position of leader, develops ambitions whose intensity is roughly proportional to the size of the group while the chances of satisfaction are almost inversely proportional to it. Resistance to interest domination leads to increasing reliance on power-coercion as the institutional mechanism to guarantee the group's cohesion and the respect of its integrating principle. Power-coercion in the service of interest domination gives rise to a feed-back requiring more and more power while leadership as a self-sustaining structural relationship is devalued and tends to degenerate. Finally, the interest conflicts resulting from interest domination motivate the leader and the group to try to shift the front of the interest conflict to its relations with the environment, to accumulate sufficient resources to satisfy all conflicting interests within the group by spoiling the environment. Though this method has been used, in history, sometimes successfully for a surprising length of time, it puts the group in a parasitic relationship to its environment concentrating its energies on this front to the exclusion of other possible goals of cooperation.

Besides the inputs needed for the task activity, and these requirements grow simply with the possibility of larger size and more ambitious tasks, the leadership group needs additional inputs for the maintenance of its structure: the leader-follower relationship. At the very least it must free the leader, and in larger and more elaborate groups the whole leadership personnel: subleaders, people engaged exclusively in the maintenance of the leader's authority by coercion or by other means, from productive work towards the accomplishment of the group's tasks and maintain them physically. As a rule it must also provide the resources to satisfy the privileges and interest advantages awarded and institutionally guaranteed to the leader and the leadership personnel. The costs of maintaining the leadership structure tend to grow faster than the size of the

group, and to grow exponentially with the frequency and intensity of interest conflicts within the group. Because of the mechanism of shifting interest conflicts to a confrontation with the environment, the costs of external conflicts as well can be considered, at least in part, as structural maintenance costs.

When the resources needed to maintain the structure of the leadership group are not available it disintegrates. Its members can, under certain conditions, continue to cooperate as a simpler, structureless primary cooperating group (e.g. a leaderless military unit in combat). Before its disintegration, however, the leadership group manifests the strains from »structural starvation« in many ways. One is the overvaluation of human relationships in simpler cooperative forms, the nostalgia for an idealized equality of the primary groups.

When the limits of its integrative capacity are nearly attained the leadership group tries to stretch its reach by strengthening its main structural axis, the leader-follower relationship. From the point of view of interests this attempt is mostly self-defeating. The growing size of the group, which is the goal of expanding its capabilities to integrate, creates quickly increasing strains by internal interest conflicts around the interest domination exercised by the leadership sub-group. On the technical side, the strengthening of the undifferentiated leadership relation cannot solve the problems caused by the need for a more precise allocation of tasks and a technically more meaningful integration of the results of a more and more detailed division of labor.

3

The type satisfying these requirements of greater complexity is **process organization**.

On the level of orientation, process organization introduces new meanings, such as the notion of »organization«, new normative patterns, e.g. the chain of command, and tend toward a greater emphasis on cognitive orientation. In process organization functional rationality comes into its own and begins to predominate over the mainly normative inclination of consciousness in earlier types.

On the behavioral level process organization is characterized by a complex institutionalized equilibrium between the independence of the individual function in operation and its dependence within a hierarchical chain, between centralization and decentralization, standardization and flexibility, freedom and control. While participation, in the defined sense, is at a minimum in the leadership group, in process organization participation tends to increase in proportion to the individuals position on the hierarchical scale. Even at the lowest level, however, each member is expected to exercise some discretion and choice, not simply to obey. Without this area of responsibility, however circumscribed, a function loses its usefulness within process organization.

Process organization increases the capacity of the cooperative system to integrate a variety of contacts among people, task elements, potentialities of power, and elements of technology to a level that is a class above that of the leadership group. It does so by applying a more permissive and therefore more encompassing principle of integration, that of functional subordination and superordination. Each position on a vertically differentiated scale represents a

function and derives its authority to direct not from a general recognition of leadership but from its functionally defined links with other positions. The duty to follow the directive, by the subordinate function, is based on the assumption, as a rule not subject to falsification, of the functional usefulness of the command issued for the achievement of the organization's output. The operational links between functions at different hierarchical levels are not the establishment, and when needed enforcement, of obedience but the much more ambiguous and mutual link of supervision. Supervision has a central place in process organization. Supervision is the constant and standardized process of interaction between functions on different hierarchical levels, including command but also help, report as well as suggestion, implementation of decisions taken elsewhere and at the same time the development of the potentialities of the subordinate to assume wider responsibilities, to climb on the hierarchical scale

The integration of complex activities through a hierarchical chain tends to transform them into a series of processes, prescribed ways of doing things in the same way in cases defined as belonging to the same class. This tendency toward procedural standardization is characteristic of process organization. It introduces a new dimension of division of labor into this type of cooperation, the division of the work process into progressively smaller and simpler parts, down to elementary operations meaningless in themselves and tied into the total enterprise by the process of supervision.

The ambiguous character of the structural relationships in process organization is reflected in its interest relationships. The main source of cooperative attitudes is the interdependence of positions defined as functions, all necessary parts of an inclusive task. The main area of conflict is hierarchy, the subordination and superordination of functions to each other combined with definite institutionalized interest advantages for the higher strata. This situation produces the interest in hierarchical climbing, one of the most important motivational forces in process organization. For the organization, however, this interest is functional only as far as the climbers perceive a chance to satisfy their ambitions, to reach the top of the hierarchy. The larger the organization the more apparent it must become how small this chance really is, for statistical reasons alone, and then the incentive can turn into its opposite and produce attitudes of aggression, defeatism, and resignation. Or it might trigger efforts to develop, one-sidedly, the cooperative aspect of process organization, to emphasize the independence of the functions, to demand their participation in organizational decision making. In this direction then the limits are soon reached. The principle of hierarchy, the process of supervision, and the tendency towards procedural standardization, as the integrating rules of process organization, have no room for the development of independent initiative in the lower layers

Another characteristic aspect of the interest situation in process organization is the emergence of institutional interests. As an increasingly large part of the organization is engaged in coordination and maintenance of structure, as distinguished from directly task-oriented activity, interests toward the continuing existence of the organization, irrespective of the task or tasks undertaken, can develop and find its base in the hierarchical elite wherefrom it spreads downward by a process of diffusion and imitation. Institutional inte-

rests are independent of goal-interests in the organization and can, under certain conditions, become opposed to them.

Institutional interests are one of the items in the list of necessary inputs into process organization to maintain its structure at the required level of complexity. The list includes the maintenance and the interest advantages of the whole hierarchical pyramid above the strata engaged wholly or predominantly in task-activity. It includes, further, the cost of supervision, the cost of maintaining hierarchical discipline, the losses from procedural standardization, and the losses of information in the pyramidal communication network.

If resources are insufficient, process organizations try to economize on one or more of the items enumerated. Disregarding the losses of variety through standardization, the organization tries to standardize an increasing portion of its activities, permitting to economize both on supervision and on the quality of implementing personnel. Or it reduces communication within and between strata, economizing on communication time and, again, on supervision. Reducing supervision seems to be one of the most frequent reactions to scarcity of resource and to »structural starvation«. To the next obvious step, to economize on the size and the interest-advantages of the hierarchy, there is usually powerful and effective opposition motivated by the very interests that are under attack. In any case, all measures to reduce the costs of structural maintenance in process organization lead toward its replacement by the leadership group or, in extreme cases, by primary cooperating groups.

The increase in structural costs can result from particular stresses stemming from the environment, just as scarcity of resources in general can be brought about by growing demands and affect, indirectly, structural maintenance. An army in peace time, for instance, corresponds to the type of process organization. In battle, however, it will have to function as a leadership group, sometimes even as an aggregate of primary cooperating groups, the stepped up requirements, particularly of time, not permitting the structurally more complex operations of a process organization.

The continuing process of differentiation tends to bring process organization as a type to the limits of its capacity for integrating variety. Growing differentiation increases the burden of supervision, using the time of the supervisor as well as the supervisee. The longer periods of time needed for supervision have to be taken out of the fixed time budget of each members working day until a point of diminishing returns is reached when supervision becomes more important and more time consuming than task-activity. The rising importance of information, another aspect of differentiation, tends to make another aspect of process organization critical: the communication network following the pyramid of the hierarchy develops a bottle-neck at the top where all information has to be relayed in good time to influence decisions. The losses of information through this structural peculiarity can be less and less afforded. These technical limitations are compounded by growing tensions and conflicts of interests caused by the frustations of hierarchy and of procedural standardization, by the less and less acceptable and accepted differences in chances of interest satisfaction paralleling hierarchical position, by the clashes between goal-orientation and institutional interests. In this crisis of process organization the tendency is toward the development of a new structural type obeying a still more encompassing and tolerant integrating principle, with additional capacity to absorb variety, particularly variety-as-information, to accommodate differentiated interests.

This new structural type, still in the building stage in the most advanced areas of human cooperative activity, will be called the **team-system**.

Again, there are new concepts on the level of orientation — e.g. »planning« —, new normative attitudes, such as the values of humanism, man as an end in himself, growth and selfactualization of the individual. Goal activity is even more than before oriented by cognitive patterns, by the more and more intricate and increasingly specialized technologies derived from the cognitive system of science.

Behavior in cooperation is structured by the very complex network of informational and parametric interdependence, where one part of the system sets the conditions (parameters) for the functioning of the other parts by its activity, most often by its informational output, even without any conscious attempt to influence a defined alter. This applies at all levels of the system, from the relationship of members within a single team, to the widest association of large subsystems.

The capacity to integrate the variety of human contacts, task elements, power potentialities, technologies, and interests is again increasing by a whole order of magnitude. The principle of integration is mutual dependence based on a relative monopoly of information held by each part of the system, individual or group. The structure of the team system is meant to provide maximal permeability for information, the easiest access to and contributing of information. It is, therefore, non-hierarchical, but rather one or the other modification of the circle where each member or part has the greatest possible number of channels to each other member or part.

While participation in process organization is the expression of an interest in equality of chances of satisfaction, in the team-system it is a technological necessity and a precondition for effective functioning. Here the equality of chances of interest satisfaction is a consequence rather than a demand in opposition to the prevailing technology.

Through its general participativeness the team-system increases the chances of conflict-behavior. How far it is able to handle conflict more successfully, from the point of view of the stability of the system, by compromise and the pressures of a fixed time-budget within which each individual and group have to assert a proliferating spectrum of interests, only future experience can show. We know too little about the mutual feed-back processes between conflict-behavior and the orientation network to risk even a guess. One thing, however, seems documented already by developments up to the present: the team-system is favoring an unprecedented growth of institutionalized structures for the handling of conflicts, such as bargaining procedures, arbitration, courts, grievances, insurance etc.

The conflict handling structures are only one item in the rocketting structural costs of the team system. Others, related to interests are the need for a high level of material interest satisfaction for all members to make the system viable over time, and the high expenditure for boundary activities, from marketing to armed conflict. On the technical side the existence of team-systems hinges on the prevalence of information dependent technologies. When this condition is fulfilled, the maintenance of the team structure requires high inputs into the appropriate level of education of its members and in the specific

technology of information management (data-banks, monitoring, operations research etc.). How far it depends on the prevalence of cognitive attitudes, of rationality in its social environment is a question for the future to answer.

Team-systems, to-day still in the process of emergence, are obviously very vulnerable to a reduction in the level of their specific inputs. What we have in most cases at present are teams and team-like arrangements within the wider setting of a process organization. Even in the future the retro-development of team-systems through reintroduction of hierarchical relationships in interest allocation should be expected as frequent events.

On the other end of the development scale team-systems as well are bound to reach the limits of their capacity to integrate variety, though this capacity is greater than that of any other structural type known to-day. On the technological side this limit might be the disappearance of information monopolies with the concentration of increasing parts of the total information treasury in publicly accessible non-biological systems. Or the requirement of participation, playing a role analogous to that of supervision in process organization, swamping goal-directed activity and finally making it impossible. On the interest side, a possible limit of the team-system would be its failure to handle spreading conflict-behavior in a satisfactory way.

A human cooperative system that would be able to expand beyond the limits of the team-system, transcending its boundaries and avoiding its, possible, deficiencies is as yet not in view.

III

To the extent that participation overlaps with cooperation — all members of any cooperative system influence decisions made in it in some measure — it is present in all four structural types considered. The extent and the conditions of participation, however, vary considerably from one type to another. In primary cooperating groups technical decision making, not differently from other modalities of cooperation, is patterned ad hoc, and there is no a priori structural reason for excluding any member from exercising influence. In interest decisions as well, in so far as decisions affecting interests are taken at all in these transient clusters, general participation is a consequence of the solidarity principle underlying much of primary cooperation. In the next two types, in order of complexity: the leadership group and process organization, participation is limited by their basic structural principles. The leader and the hierarchy have dominant positions in determining both the technical aims and conditions and the interest pay-offs of the cooperative activity. With the difference that the ambiguous character of hierarchy, where each function is at the same time dependent and independent, stimulates the demand for participation in the sense of a demand for interest equality, even if not matched by comparable technical contributions. Finally, in the team-system participation, in the sense of maximal contributions of information by every member as well as in the sense of every member's equal chance of influencing decisions affecting his interests, is becoming the normal condition of cooperative activity.

Participation and self-management in Yugoslavia are based on a positive value judgement about participation. It is, therefore, introduced as a normative requirement in a number of cooperative institutions irrespective of their

structural type. In the material that follows the framework described above is applied in the analysis of some of the experiences in Yugoslavia in local government and in public service institutions, the assumption being that the participation and self-management system, regulated by central legislation in a uniform manner, will function differently depending on the structural type of the cooperative system it is applied to and on the general level of development of the local social environment defining the probably available inputs needed for maintaining the systems at their level of complexity.

The material presented is the result of research undertaken in the Institute of Social Research of Zagreb University from 1965 to the present. The results of the various research projects are described systematically and in detail, as well and the members of the research teams are listed: E. Pusić: *Samoupravljanje* (Narodne Novine, Zagreb, 1968) pp. 226—274; E. Pusić: *Territorial and Functional Administration in Yugoslavia* (Administrative Science Quarterly, No. 1/1969) pp. 62—72; E. Pusić: *Area and Administration in Yugoslav Development* (International Social Science Journal, No. 1/1969) pp. 68—82; E. Pusić: *Samoupravljanje u općinama i ustanovama društvenih službi u različitim fazama ekonomskog i društvenog razvitka* (Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 1972) pp. 1—95; as well as in hitherto unpublished manuscripts.

Local government in Yugoslavia is organized in cca 500 communes in the following pattern: The Commune Assembly is composed of two parts, the Commune Council elected by all citizens over 18 and the Council of Work Organizations elected by all citizens employed in any capacity or self-employed but associated in various forms of cooperation (rural cooperatives etc.). The executive stratum of local government is represented by the Committees, one for each area of local government activity, composed of members of the Commune Assembly, citizens appointed by the Commune Assembly on the basis of expertise in the field concerned, and citizens delegated by self-managed institutions and organizations with interests in this field, — and by the Commune President, elected by the Commune Assembly for the duration of its own term of four years. Finally, the administrative stratum is composed of the secretariats composed of and headed by professional local government employees and coordinated by the Secretary of the Commune (or a Director of Local Administration), all appointed by or under the authority of the Commune Assembly.

Public service institutions — in education, health, welfare, local transportation, public utilities etc. — are regulated and supervised in a general way by the commune through the executive Committee responsible for the respective area. In their day-to-day management, including basic decisions about prices and salaries, hiring and firing, investment and amalgamation, however, they are autonomous, operating under a system of self management prescribed essentially in the same form for all organizations whatever their activity. All those working in the organizations whatever their activity. All those working in the organization elect a council as the same form for all organizations whatever their activity. All those working in the organization elect a council as the supreme decision making body for all the decisions mentioned. The council appoints a general manager as its executive. The decisions affecting wider interests — e.g. the prices and tariffs for public services — are in principle negotiated directly among the representatives of various interested groups, with the commune playing the role of arbitrator and, sometimes, paying consumer of the services produced.

The first series of observations is related to the incompleteness, the discrepancies, and the contradictions within both the orientation network and the institutional system as well as between these two sides of any social pattern.

The orientation networks in the consciousness of individuals in the same society only partially overlap. What people know, what they believe and value, even what they mean by quite common words can be widely different. What is the minimal extent of overlapping to make social interaction possible varies from one field to another. This minimum will be quite high, for instance, when planning the construction of a factory or operating a power station, but low when several people decide to join the same political party, to migrate from one place to another, to support or oppose religious education. Behavior can be induced by quite different orientation networks and the same orientation pattern may result in different behavior.

The various semantic, cognitive, and normative elements of a person's orientation network need not be in harmony with each other. People might hold logically incompatible statements to be true, they are often beholden to beliefs and loyalties contradictory to each other.

On the side of actual behavior there are the symbolic, productive, regulative, or simply associational forms of an institutional system. The behavior of people in the same role and in analogous situations might differ. Behavior actually never corresponds to the manifest content of any existing orientation network. The question is, rather again, what is the maximum permissible discrepancy for any given social purpose.

In the Yugoslav system both local government and self-managed institutions are treated as forms of participation. By structural type, however, local governments approach process organizations with more pronounced hierarchical and relationships while most institutions by their technology and structure are nearer to team-systems.

Comparing the goals of activity in local governments and in institutions it was found that the proportion of tasks determined cognitively by explicit technological, not normative, rule increased from 35% in the first class to 45% in the second.

Institutions are more autonomous in their decisions, less subject to outside influences than local governments. Out of the total number of tasks that were set or changed within a period of two years 34% were initiated by agents outside the institution, but 64% were the consequence of outside initiative in local government.

The process of decision-making in technical matters depends less on authority than on rational argument in both institutions and local governments, but this trend is more pronounced in institutions — 92%, against 73% in local governments. On the other hand, the maintenance of discipline still depends on authority in both settings, but local governments are in this respect more authoritative — 76% of cases — than institutions (61%).

What people believe about behavior and how they actually behave might significantly differ. Four modes of activity in local government — authoritative, service, participative, internal administration — were compared accor-

ding to two sources: the responses to a questionnaire and the content analysis of the minutes of the commune assemblies. The two sources yield significantly different results:

Percent of total activity of commune assembly in each class of activity according to:

	Responses	Minutes
Service	57.8	18.7
Authoritative	9.0	45.5
Participative	16.2	23.2
Internal administration	16.9	12.7

The over-estimation of the part of the commune's activity related to the provision of services to the population on the part of the respondents, all members of the commune assemblies and other functionaries in the commune, might reflect the general tendency in the population to be interested primarily in the service aspect of communal activity. The interviewing of a sample of citizens as to what activity of the commune they are particularly interested in and classifying the responses into four categories gave the following results:

	%
Authoritative regulation	7.92
Service	80.95
Coordination	2.12
»Do not know«	9.01

Keeping in mind this orientation, how do citizens estimate the distribution of influence between various factors in local government? What would they consider as the ideal distribution? What value do they attach to their own participation?

Average percentage of responses favoring a category of potential influentials in the commune, including citizens, seen as

	Actual	Desirable
Elected bodies in commune	19.77	10.5
President	10.8	37.15
Local bureaucracy	9.77	8.15
»They« in the commune	11.53	7.2
Citizens and their organizations	10.73	2.45 (!)
»Do not know«	37.4	34.55

More than one third of the respondents gave no response to the question about the distribution of influence. Among those who did respond there is a marked tendency to enhance the influence of the president and to reduce their own influence, the participation of citizens. How to interpret this result? For people who view local government primarily as an organization to tender ser-

vices to the population — and this is the same sample as the one mentioned in the previous paragraph — influence is tantamount to responsibility for service delivery. From this point of view it is natural to seek to enhance the responsibility of the most visible agent of local government, the president of the most visible agent of local government, the president of the commune. On the other hand, participation in this context can mean release from responsibility of those individuals and agencies the citizens would just like to see assuming full responsibility for the functioning of local services, and the obliteration of this responsibility in a vague concept of participation-as-selfhelp where the malfunctioning of services can be considered almost the fault of the consumers.

2

Development is a process, but a process that can be understood only against a background of stability of the integrated patterns. It is a contradictory process, constant differentiation integrated within the same integrative rule, and also intermittent discontinuous change of the rules themselves, of the principles of integration.

For instance, modernization of agriculture can develop within the existing way of life and relationships of ownership, production, and distribution. At a certain point on the way to large scale industrial farming, however, a change of the traditional patterns may become unavoidable in order to accommodate the greater technological and sociostructural variety implied in advanced methods of agricultural production.

Existing patterns, both on the level of orientation and on the level of institutional behavior, »resist« change. This resistance is expressed through the interests of people that have become attached to things as they are. The relationships between the forces of change and the interests in the status quo are always potentially antagonistic. Traditional ways can, it is true, accommodate often more modernizing variety than eager developers would have sought possible. But when it comes to changing existing patterns, resistances will always have to be overcome.

Local governments as systems of administration will tend to be more complex, more differentiated when operating in a more differentiated, developed environment. All communes in Yugoslavia were ranked according to a composite factor obtained by the regression analysis of over 50 primary indicators. Three communes taken from samples at the bottom, in the middle, and at the top of the list showed a significant difference in measures of differentiation.

The index of functional complexity, applied by Rushing and Pondy,* give the following results for the three communes:

Top	0,9865
Middle	0,7137
Bottom	0,6953

* William A. Rushing: The effects of industry size and division of labor on administration (Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 768—776—1967),

Louis R. Pondy: Effects of size, complexity, and ownership on administrative intensity (ASQ pp. 47—60—1969).

The percentage of the work force classified as professional and the functional and the functional complexity index applied only to this class were in the three communes:

	% professional	index
Top	47.97	0.9160
Middle	37.78	0.8246
Bottom	34.04	0.7969

The same criteria were applied to service institutions — schools and health centers — in the three communes but the results were not correlated to the level of development of their local environments. It seems that these institutions, tending towards the type of team-system, have minimal requirements of complexity imposed by their technology independently of the level of development of the environment.

The Yugoslav system of self-management puts the accent on participation but only by the members of an organization's work force. Consumers are largely excluded from direct influence upon the service institution. They must exercise what influence they have through the instrumentality of local government. Therefore, the comparison of influence by inside groups and outside groups in communes and institutions gives the following picture:

	Percentage of influence by	
	inside groups	outside groups
communes	57	43
institutions	82	18

A number of case studies illustrate in detail that the monopoly of participation by the work force in organizations and institutions will tend to activate and facilitate the satisfaction of institutional interests or of interests vested in inside groups and mobilize resistance against outside interests and against effective participation by outside groups.

3

Human structures and interacting behavior can be cooperative or conflicting, depending on how the participants view the possibility of satisfying interests that motivate their action. Both orientations can and do exist simultaneously in the same relationship, because people identify usually with more than one interest. Some interests might motivate them to cooperate, others lead them into conflict.

Influential social groups in a community might have interests opposed to change and stand to lose substantially through it. For instance, a class of big landowners will usually be sufficiently near the political and military power centers of their country in order to be able to oppose effectively, under normal conditions, attempts at bringing about land reform by peaceful means.

When change has happened, by whatever means and from whatever motives, some interests have probably suffered. It is likely that the groups in this way negatively affected will be either actively opposed to the new order, bearing it ill will, or they will retire into passivity, a strategy potentially even more costly to the community as a whole.

There is, most important of all, the social cost of overt conflict. Resource in form and quantity can be used up in strife. This extra strain on inputs results in their level being reduced sometimes to a degree where it becomes impossible to maintain cooperative structures at the level of complexity required by their structural type. Conflict is the most usual source of unexpected changes in the energy economy of human systems.

Case studies illustrate the successful opposition to technical innovations motivated by vested interests or simply not clearly understood, mistrusted, or not proven.

Conflicts in communes as well as in institutions are less interest conflicts (67% of responses in institutions, 62% in communes) and more differences of opinions about how to best implement agreed upon goals. While this result might reflect the prevailing value of harmonious social relationships, it is possibly more significant that most conflicts involving institutions have inside groups opposing each other (65%) while almost the same percentage (62%) involves opposition to outside groups in communes.

As a source of conflict 65% of respondents in institutions indicate income, while the same response is given only in 35% of the commune questionnaires. On the other hand, 17% in communes attach importance to hierarchical rank as source of conflict, while in the less hierarchical institutions only 7% of respondents attach importance to this cause.

When it comes to resolving conflicts 36% of respondents in communes point to the method of domination — satisfying one interest at the expense of another — and 56% to the method of compromise — satisfying all interests but none fully. The same proportion in institutions runs 7% to 70% (significant at 0.001 level).

4

Every pattern in order to maintain itself against disintegrating influences needs inputs. With the increasing complexity of patterns these inputs change in quality and increase in quantity. It seems that with increasing complexity of structures the role of informational inputs in both orientation network and institutional system is becoming more important. The input can be »raw«, in the sense of displaying no other pattern than its own — information being a nono-random arrangement of signals — or it might be pre-patterned in view of the regulating and orienting purposes it will have to serve in the receiving system. In relation to Max Weber's thesis about the role of Protestantism in capitalism, for instance, it would be an interesting problem to consider Protestantism as a pre-patterned input into the capitalist orientation network.

The problem on that dimension of human cooperative systems is the possible discrepancy, between the system's attempted level of complexity and the kind and quantity of inputs required for the maintenance of its structure at that level.

There is a possibility that structures should be planned and attempted at a level that is too complex for the inputs available to sustain them. Chances are that this applies, to self-management in Yugoslavia in so far as it introduces participation as a normatively imposed structural mode of cooperation in all cooperative systems including those that are, by structural type, unsuited to it.

The complex structures, in order to maintain themselves will tend to consume a disproportionate amount of scarce inputs — e.g. time — and so have high opportunity costs in what might have been achieved with the same value of inputs into simpler structures.

Discrepancies can also develop in the opposite direction. Certain forms of inputs become too abundant for the existing opportunities to use them, e.g. in agriculture, mechanized too early human labor force is transformed from an asset into a liability.

Greater structural complexity is expressed, among others, in higher average education of an organization's members, demonstrating the growing importance of informational inputs. Among communes at different levels of the development scale there are the following relationships:

	Elementary education	Secondary education	Higher education
	%	%	%
Top	38.31	28.64	33.05
Middle	58.89	22.22	18.89
Bottom	59.57	27.66	12.77

The comparison along the same dimension between communes and institutions shows the greater information dependence of the institutions.

	Elementary edu- cation and less %	University education %
Communes	51.8	13.0
Institutions	30.3	20.0

It is particularly significant that cooperative systems of the structural type of process organizations, such as the communes, will tend to economize, under pressure of scarcity on coordination and supervision.

The span of contacts will, on the whole, tend to decrease with development i.e. availability of resources. The average span of contacts per position in the three communes is:

Top	7.16
Middle	12.65
Bottom	10.15

The percentage of total working time of personnel in supervisory positions used in actual supervision of their subordinates in the three communes is:

Top	18.45
Middle	8.33
Bottom	7.14

The generally surprisingly low percentage shows that the pressure for supervisors to work at other tasks than supervision is strong even in the most developed environments.

The correlation between level of development of a local community and the structure and differentiation of the system of local government in that community should, however, not be regarded as demonstrated. Not only is size of the local territory not related to indicators of local administration. Even such an obvious correlation as administration and revenue was shown at a certain moment to be almost non-existent.

of	Correlation coefficient with area in sq. km, budget revenue per inhabitant	
Number of workers per 1000 inhabitants	0.160	-0.076
Number of items trasacted per 1000 inhabitants	-0.048	0.080
Number of items per worker	-0.187	0.025
Education of workers in local administration		
university	-0.101	0.257
college	0.121	-0.037
secondary	-0.190	-0.063
elementary	-0.129	-0.077

IV

In summary, the communes in Yugoslavia have been found to approach the type of process organization, with more pronounced hierarchical relationships, more authority, and more domination in conflicts of interest, while service institutions are nearer to the team-system type, with more cognitive elements in their orientation, more rational approaches to differences of opinions in technical matters, more readiness for compromise in interest conflicts.

In institutions as team-systems, therefore, participation is the normal modality of cooperation both in technical matters and on questions of interest. Communes are regarded by citizens primarily as organizations to provide various needed services. From this perspective citizens tend to regard the principle of general participation in communal activities rather as a weakening of the responsibility of those agents that, in their opinion, should primarily

be responsible for the proper functioning of local service, and not as an improvement of their own chances of interest satisfaction.

Increased participation in service institutions, however, is limited to the personnel working in the institutions. It is the inside groups that enjoy greater autonomy from outside influences, that have a greater say than before in technical as well as interest matters. Not only are outside groups, foremost the consumers of the service, left outside the system of participation. The inside groups tend to oppose, and on the whole successfully, their »interference«.

There is some correlation, though not established beyond doubt, between the level of structural differentiation in local government and the level of general socio-economic development of the local community in which the local government operates. This points to the conclusion that the administrative organization of the communes as process organization differentiates — including higher average levels of education — in response to greater availability of inputs from the immediate environment.

No correlation has been found between the level of structural differentiation — including education — in institutions and the level of development of their local environments. This can be interpreted as a lack of correspondence between the institutions requiring, as team-systems, an altogether higher level of differentiation and their local environments unable in most cases to provide the necessary inputs from their own resources. Institutions have their technologically determined minimal of differentiation that must be met from any source if they are to function at all. It might be assumed, therefore, that institutions have to be provided with inputs by centrally managed resources (e.g. universities). Though they will represent a greater strain on poorer environments, they can never be totally dependent on local resources.

To a certain extent the same must be true of the communes. As process organizations they all tend to economize on the expensive but essential, for process organizations, method of hierarchical supervision. When they could reach the point of structural regression and become, essentially, leadership groups or even primary cooperating groups is a question for debate.

As was pointed out, participation has a place in any form of cooperation. In primary groups participation of all group members is natural but, in view of the ephemeral character of the group, not particularly significant. In the leadership group the demand for participation is tantamount to a demand for mitigating the interest domination by the leader, but not by reducing his responsibility for the results of the cooperative undertaking, to a certain extent contradictory aspirations. In process organization, to emphasize participation means to stress one side of the organizational dialectic, the independence and autonomy of the functions against the constraining integrating principle of the hierarchy. The limit of this tendency is the technical necessity of integration that, in this structural type, can be achieved by no other means than by hierarchy. Again, therefore, participation in process organization can mean only a demand for greater equality in chances of interest satisfaction, without upsetting the necessary conditions for working together in an orderly fashion. Finally, in team-systems, where participation is becoming the technological condition for integrated functioning, it is very well possible that, for a time at least, the interest groups refuse to draw the logical consequences from this technical situation in the area of interests and try to combine informational participation with interest domination. The history of the human relations movement in industry is an illustration.

The search for an alternative to the hierarchical process organization has two sources and proceeds along two dimensions. One is the technological orientation towards greater informational openness, toward a form of cooperation that would make possible the maximum contribution of information from every member of the system, the maximal capacity for securing, storing, retrieving, analyzing information from any source. The other is the interest dimension, the striving for equality in chances of interest satisfaction, for the abolition of interest privileges based on hierarchical rank.

The first tendency is non-political in appearance. It will manifest itself in various forms wherever and whenever the technical conditions are given, i.e. information is becoming the consideration ruling the cooperative process. The risk is that the interest aspect of this tendency, its necessary interest complement, participation in decisions affecting interests, will remain unrecognized for some time, will be resisted by interests attached to the status quo.

The second tendency, for participation in interest decisions, on the other hand, might press for interest equality before the technical conditions for team-systems are given. The result can be only a better protection of the interests of those members of the system who would otherwise be at a disadvantage through their structural position, but not a change of structural type for which the technological conditions are as yet extant. These interest adjustments, however, have a cost in efficiency that must not be lost from view.

In the light of this analysis, the Yugoslav system of self management appears as a normative system directed against interest domination in any form of cooperation. In the structural types of leadership group and process organization this normative demand implies certain costs in the efficiency of technical functioning; advantages must be compared with disadvantages. In team-systems, however, self management simply draws the normal interest consequences from the existing technological situation.

The question is, how to reconcile the various dimensions of participation, how to assure equal participation for all interested groups — that from the point of view of interests can be rightly considered members of the system? In the Yugoslav system this question is related particularly to the participation by consumers. The problem has not been given sufficient attention in the classical version of the self management system. Present efforts to build »interest communities« are directed toward filling this gap. Only the future can tell about the results.



CONTENT

Eugen Pusić	Foreword	5
Rudi Supek:		
Neca Jovanov:	Definition théorique de la notion et de l'essence de l'autogestion en Yougoslavie	9
Jože Goričar:	Workers' Self-Management: Ideal Type — Social Reality	18
Josip Županov:	Employees' Participation and Social Power in Industry	33
France Bučar:	The Participation of the State and Political Organizations in the Decisions of the Working Organization	41
Neca Jovanov:	Le rapport entre la grève comme conflit social et l'autogestion comme système social	62
Silvano Bolčič:	The Value System of a Participatory Economy	97
Janez Jerovšek:	Selfmanagement System in Yugoslav Enterprises	113
Esad Ćimić:	Religion and Self-Management	123
Živan Tanić:	Dimensions and Factors of the Apperception of Self-Management	139
Rudi Supek:	Two Types of Self-Managing Organizations and Tehnological Progress	150
Eugen Pusić:	Participation and the Multidimensional Development of Complexity	174



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